International Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
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Affaire No. IT-96-21-T

1 Monday, 1st December 1997


3 (2.40 pm)

4 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

5 We are sorry to have been late. I think it is not due

6 to our own fault, because if the aircraft had arrived

7 punctually, perhaps we could have kept to the time.

8 Brother Jan was away and he was supposed to be here

9 early this morning, but the flight from Pakistan came in

10 late. That is why we have been delayed for so long.

11 Mr. Niemann, we start with you, with your

12 examination of your witness, is it not? That was where

13 we left off.

14 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour. Does your Honour wish me to

15 announce appearances first?

16 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, I expect that we will continue

17 with Professor Economides. That is the programme we had before we

18 left.

19 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour. Your Honours, Professor

20 Economides -- I should say we had intended to -- we

21 intend to call Dr. Gow; the reason for that is that

22 Dr. Gow is restricted this week, he only has today and

23 tomorrow to testify and that is the only time we have

24 available to do it. We have Professor Economides.

25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, you may carry on, please.

  • 1 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour. Your Honours, Dr. Gow is only

    2 available today and tomorrow, and so we were anxious to

    3 start him so that we could conclude his evidence in

    4 order for the Prosecution to be able to close its case

    5 this week. The difficulty we are now confronted with is

    6 I am not sure that we will have sufficient time to

    7 conclude with Dr. Gow, unless we have some indication of

    8 how long the Defence will be in cross-examination. We

    9 will only be about two hours, I would think, in

    10 evidence-in-chief of him, but if the Defence anticipate

    11 that they will not be concluding collectively their

    12 cross-examination tomorrow afternoon, that would mean

    13 that we could not close the case, and Professor Gow

    14 would have to come back in January, because that is the

    15 only available time he has in order to conclude his

    16 evidence.

    17 So we are left with a situation whereby if he

    18 testifies and commences his evidence-in-chief now, that

    19 we all impose upon ourselves the discipline, I am

    20 talking about the Defence and ourselves, to conclude his

    21 evidence by tomorrow evening, because if he does not

    22 conclude his evidence by tomorrow evening I will not be

    23 able to close, and I do not think that it is in the

    24 interests of anybody to leave the case running now over

    25 until January.

  • 1 So it is unfortunate that Dr. Gow just does not

    2 have an opportunity to come back or stay longer this

    3 week. He simply cannot stay until Wednesday. I have

    4 gone over his commitments and he must go back to London

    5 tomorrow night. He is then not going to be available

    6 until very late in December, and that would conflict

    7 with times when this courtroom is going to be used in

    8 the Blaskic case.

    9 So through your Honours, may I enquire of the

    10 Defence whether they estimate that they could conclude

    11 the evidence of Dr. Gow, i.e. the cross-examination of

    12 him, tomorrow, so that I can make a decision on whether

    13 or not we should even proceed; with great reluctance,

    14 the Prosecution would not call him. We believe the

    15 evidence is of great importance and would assist the

    16 Chamber considerably on some of the matters that have

    17 arisen in the case of this Prosecution. We believe it

    18 would be most unfortunate if we had to make the decision

    19 not to call him, but unless we are prepared to impose a

    20 discipline in terms of the amount of time, then I am

    21 afraid I am left with no other option than to do that.

    22 I should say that Professor Economides is due to

    23 fly in tomorrow morning, he would not be available until

    24 lunch-time.

    25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Can we have the appearances, please?

  • 1 Let us have the appearances. I think you can take the

    2 Prosecutor as having announced his appearance. He has

    3 announced his appearance.

    4 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you, your Honours. I am Edina

    5 Residovic, appearing on behalf of Mr. Zejnil Delalic,

    6 along with my colleague, Eugene O'Sullivan, from

    7 Canada. Thank you.

    8 MR. OLUJIC: Good afternoon, your Honours. I am Zeljko

    9 Olujic, appearing on behalf of Mr. Zdravko Mucic,

    10 together with my colleague, Mr. Michael Greaves.

    11 MR. KARABDIC: Good afternoon, your Honours, I am Salih

    12 Karabdic, attorney from Sarajevo, appearing on behalf of

    13 Mr. Hazim Delic, together with Mr. Thomas Moran, attorney

    14 from Houston, in the United States.

    15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: We are the other side of the

    16 50 per cent?

    17 MR. MORAN: Yes, your Honour, my partners in Houston decided

    18 I needed to come back to The Hague, which probably tells

    19 you something about my relationship with my partners in

    20 Houston.

    21 MR. ACKERMAN: Good afternoon, your Honours, I am John

    22 Ackerman and I appear with my co-counsel Cynthia

    23 McMurrey on behalf of Esad Landzo.

    24 May I request your indulgence for just a moment so

    25 that Defence counsel can have a short huddle to discuss

  • 1 the announcement that we got from Mr. Niemann, right now,

    2 and then we will be able to respond to that announcement

    3 with some knowledge and understanding. Can we do that

    4 for just a couple of minutes?

    5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You can have that.

    6 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, your Honour. (Pause).

    7 Your Honours, thank you for your indulgence. It is our

    8 very strong and considered opinion that the

    9 cross-examination of Dr. Gow would go well beyond

    10 tomorrow. Probably a good conservative estimate would

    11 be a couple of days of cross-examination. At least two

    12 Defence counsel have done significant preparation and

    13 have significant matters to cover with Dr. Gow.

    14 If I might suggest a solution, it would be that

    15 since he is here, that Mr. Niemann go ahead and do the

    16 direct examination today and that we then cross-examine

    17 him on January 12th and that should then complete the

    18 Prosecution's case and we can go from there. I do not

    19 think there is any chance in the world of completing it,

    20 unless the court is prepared to serve him with a

    21 subpoena and keep him from returning to England until he

    22 has finished his testimony. That may be a way to do

    23 it. I am certainly sympathetic to the need to get the

    24 Prosecution's case wound up. That is the only way I can

    25 think of to do it and perhaps in terms of keeping our

  • 1 witness reasonably happy, it may not be a good idea to

    2 put him under that kind of restraint, I do not know. We

    3 will see what the Prosecution responds to that

    4 announcement.

    5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I think the Prosecution will carry on

    6 with his evidence until it is able to dispose of it.

    7 Mr. Niemann, do we have your witness, if you have

    8 anything to say about him?

    9 MR. NIEMANN: Our position, your Honour, is that we are most

    10 anxious to close the case, as we have said before. We

    11 are keen for the matter to conclude this week, which has

    12 been our position for some time. We would have hoped to

    13 have finished in early November, but we unfortunately

    14 could not get to that point, so it was really with great

    15 reluctance that the Prosecution case is extended to this

    16 point.

    17 I am loath to ask your Honours for an adjournment,

    18 and I do not believe that letting the matter go over to

    19 January is the best course. It seems that the

    20 cross-examination cannot be restricted, even if I was to

    21 endeavour to restrict my evidence-in-chief. Perhaps

    22 I could do that so that there is more time this

    23 afternoon, or if your Honours are prepared to sit for

    24 longer hours tomorrow, we may be able to conclude it;

    25 but it is with considerable reluctance that I decide not

  • 1 to call Professor Gow, but at the moment I am tempted to

    2 take that course.

    3 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Actually, I think my colleagues also

    4 agree, you can carry on with your other evidence. You

    5 need evidence as much as you can and then the Defence

    6 will also cross-examine him to the extent to which they

    7 can.

    8 JUDGE JAN: How long will you take with Dr. Gow?

    9 MR. NIEMANN: I had planned on taking three hours, I can

    10 reduce it to two, but I could reduce it even more than

    11 that. I would have hoped to complete it today in time

    12 for the Defence to start cross-examination.

    13 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: That is not a matter for bagging. I

    14 think they want to do their case as much as you can.

    15 You carry on with your evidence, you can certainly go

    16 ahead and do that and they would also try to do their

    17 best.

    18 MR. NIEMANN: As your Honours please. I will call Dr. Gow.

    19 (Pause). It is a considerable distance now your Honour

    20 from here to the new witness room, so it probably takes

    21 a little longer to get the witnesses down.

    22 JUDGE JAN: Dr. Gow is an expert in military matters?

    23 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour.

    24 (Witness entered court)

    25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Will you kindly swear the witness.

  • 1 DR JAMES GOW (sworn)

    2 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You may take your seat.

    3 Examined by MR. NIEMANN

    4 Q. Dr. Gow, would you please state your full name?

    5 A. Andrew James William Gow.

    6 Q. Dr. Gow, are you a researcher in the Department of War

    7 Studies, King's College London and a research associate

    8 at the Centre for Defence Studies, University of London?

    9 A. I hold the title of Reader in War Studies at King's

    10 College London and I am a research associate at the

    11 Centre of Defence Studies, University of London.

    12 Q. Formerly, were you a research officer at the Centre for

    13 Defence Studies?

    14 A. I was.

    15 Q. Do you hold a PhD from the University of London?

    16 A. I do.

    17 Q. Was your doctoral thesis of Yugoslavia at the School of

    18 Slavonic and East European Studies?

    19 A. It was.

    20 Q. For the past several years, has your work concentrated,

    21 although not exclusively, on the former Yugoslavia,

    22 particularly its military and political affairs?

    23 A. That is true.

    24 Q. Have you written extensively on this area?

    25 A. I have.

  • 1 Q. For the purpose of your evidence today, have you drawn

    2 from your own writings and that of other recognised

    3 scholars in the field?

    4 A. I have.

    5 Q. And published reports, military and civilian writings,

    6 speeches, official documents and conversations with

    7 persons knowledgeable in this area and particularly

    8 having regard to documents made available to you by the

    9 Office of the Prosecutor?

    10 A. I have.

    11 Q. Have you published numerous books and articles on the

    12 former Yugoslavia?

    13 A. I have published a couple of books and many articles.

    14 Q. Without naming them, have you also published monographs?

    15 A. I have.

    16 Q. Have you participated in conferences in various

    17 locations throughout the world on a number of topics,

    18 including the former Yugoslavia?

    19 A. I have, and I have made presentations in a number of

    20 forums at the invitation of various bodies.

    21 Q. Have you given evidence before this Tribunal on a number

    22 of occasions previously?

    23 A. I have.

    24 Q. Are you a member of the Expert Panel of the

    25 United Kingdom Security of Defence?

  • 1 A. I am a member of the Expert Panel to the UK Secretary

    2 for Defence for Strategic Defence.

    3 Q. Sorry. Dr. Gow, what was the structure of the armed

    4 forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

    5 prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991?

    6 A. Yugoslavia had a two-tier system of armed forces. One

    7 element was the regular armed force; this was designed

    8 to carry out normal armed functions, was conscript based

    9 and was intended to hold the defensive line, while the

    10 second element was mobilised. That second element was a

    11 territorial defence system organised through regional

    12 structures within the republics which constituted the

    13 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

    14 The conscript structure of the armed forces was

    15 broadly in line with the ethnic distribution of the

    16 population. The officer corps tended to be dominated

    17 around 60 per cent by Serbs.

    18 Q. Doctor, what happened to the character of the JNA, the

    19 Yugoslav People's Army following the dissolution of the

    20 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

    21 A. In the period of dissolution, as Yugoslavia broke up and

    22 particularly as armed hostilities began, the JNA became

    23 aligned with the Serbian political leadership and

    24 alongside this, the composition of the JNA went from

    25 being something in the region of having around

  • 1 40 per cent, I think it was, Serbs to being 90 per cent

    2 Serbian within a space of one to two years.

    3 Q. Was there any relationship between the JNA and the

    4 Serbian political leadership?

    5 A. As the crisis in Yugoslavia developed and as Yugoslavia

    6 broke up, the JNA leadership and the Serbian political

    7 leadership began to work together. In March 1991 there

    8 was collaboration regarding the possibility of declaring

    9 a state of emergency. As Yugoslavia came to break up,

    10 they appear to have joined forces in a project to create

    11 a new set of territories from the territory of republics

    12 other than Serbia.

    13 Q. What was the main aim of the JNA and the Serbian

    14 political leadership at the time?

    15 A. The principal aim appears to have been to create a set

    16 of territories mainly formed, but not exclusively

    17 formed, around Serbian populations in Croatia and

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a view to breaking the

    19 territorial integrity of those two republics and

    20 creating territories which would then be joined in a

    21 federation with Serbia. A mini Yugoslavia, but for the

    22 Serbs.

    23 Q. Did the attempts to achieve these aims affect all Bosnia

    24 in the same way?

    25 A. Although territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina was subject to

  • 1 this type of armed attack, it has to be said that some

    2 areas were designated to be part of this set of

    3 territories and others were not. This means in some

    4 areas there was a take-over and there were armed

    5 hostilities, in others there were not armed hostilities;

    6 but the whole of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    7 nonetheless was affected by this project.

    8 Q. Doctor, what military preparations were made to

    9 implement these aims prior to the commencement of the

    10 armed hostilities?

    11 A. In the late summer and autumn of 1991 onwards, this is

    12 with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the JNA carried out a

    13 series of manoeuvres and exercises to mobilise Serbian

    14 reservists into units in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

    15 Serbian security service, the SDB, was involved in

    16 making arrangements with activists, agents in

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina for the preparation of a political

    18 programme and also for the distribution of weapons by

    19 the Serbian Democratic Party, the SDS.

    20 Q. To whom were these weapons distributed?

    21 A. The weapons were distributed to people within I think

    22 what would be regarded as loyal Serbian groups

    23 co-operating with the SDS under the influence of the SDS

    24 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    25 Q. This was the civilian population, was it?

  • 1A. This would be elements of the civilian population, those

    2 who had previously served perhaps in the armed forces.

    3 Q. Was there any parallel political activity?

    4 A. In April 1991, a process began of marking out territory

    5 which was later to be taken to form parts of the

    6 territory of the Republika Srpska, that is the

    7 territory claimed by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    8 In April there was a series of declarations of

    9 associations of municipalities, given the label

    10 "Serbian". These became the basis for the declaration

    11 of Serbian autonomous regions in September 1991 in four

    12 parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A fifth area was later to

    13 be declared, I think in November. These constitute

    14 political preparations for the infrastructure for the

    15 territory which was to be carved out of

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina to be joined with Serbia.

    17 Q. This was the objective of the JNA and the Serbian

    18 political leadership, was it?

    19 A. I believe the objective was to establish military

    20 political control over these territories, to separate

    21 them from Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to be able to

    22 join them in a federation of a mini Yugoslavia with

    23 Serbia and Montenegro.

    24 Q. Was this plan confined to the territory of

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

  • 1A. No, it was not. The territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    2 were part of a plan to build territory around, as

    3 I said, but not exclusively, Serbian populations, and a

    4 similar pattern of events took place in Croatia prior to

    5 the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina from July 1990 onwards,

    6 with the declaration of a Serbian autonomous region of

    7 Krajina, around Knin in the Dalmatian hinterland,

    8 later followed by the declaration of a Serbian

    9 autonomous region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and

    10 Srem. These two later formed the Republic of Serbia and

    11 Krajina, so the pattern was followed of declaring

    12 autonomous regions and then later declaring a republic,

    13 the intention which was to unite with this federated set

    14 of territories.

    15 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, I just ask you to look at this

    16 document, and I have four copies for the Defence and a

    17 copy for their Honours.

    18 This document has previously been made available

    19 to the Defence, your Honour. I might indicate,

    20 your Honours, we will only be seeking to tender two

    21 documents through Dr. Gow, this one and another

    22 document.

    23 Before you comment on that, Dr. Gow, I will wait

    24 until the Defence counsel have a copy, and their

    25 Honours.

  • 1THE REGISTRAR: Prosecutor's document 206.

    2 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, what is the document I have just shown

    3 you?

    4 A. The document is a set of instructions titled, "For the

    5 organisation and activity of organs of the Serbian

    6 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina in extraordinary

    7 circumstances". It is a document prepares by the

    8 leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party, that is the

    9 SDS to which I made reference before.

    10 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me, your Honour. I know Mr. Niemann

    11 indicated that this had already been provided to us.

    12 I have no memory of ever having seen this document

    13 before. It may very well have been provided long, long

    14 ago when Mr. Braskovic was still involved with the case.

    15 It certainly is not something that has been provided to

    16 us recently at all. The other thing I am concerned

    17 about with it is its authenticity. It has no signatures

    18 on it, it has no indication of its provenance other than

    19 what is stated on it. It is the kind of document that

    20 could have been prepared by anyone. I am not suggesting

    21 that it was prepared by the Prosecution by any means,

    22 I know that is not the case, but we have no idea where

    23 this came from. It could be a completely bogus document

    24 and unless the Prosecution can give us some idea of its

    25 provenance and its authenticity, then I would object to

  • 1its being used by this witness in this case. It is just

    2 a typewritten document, as near as I can tell. I do not

    3 have the Serbo-Croat version, maybe it is different.

    4 I am looking at it right now and I see no signatures --

    5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You have made your point. Let us hear

    6 Mr. Niemann.

    7 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honour, this is a document that was made

    8 available in January 16th 1997, and it is an exhibit

    9 that was tendered in the Tadic case. It was accepted in

    10 that case as a reliable document, the Tribunal accepted

    11 it there and relied upon it. I can ask Dr. Gow some

    12 questions about the document, your Honours, that he can

    13 express an opinion on, having regard to his knowledge

    14 and having regard to what he knows of this particular

    15 topic, but as I say, it is a document that was provided

    16 to the Defence a considerable time ago and as I say, it

    17 has been admitted and accepted as a document in the

    18 Tadic case.

    19 Dr. Gow, do you consider this to be a document that

    20 you would rely on for the purposes of your research and

    21 for the purposes of expressing an opinion?

    22 A. I do.

    23 Q. Why would you rely on it?

    24 A. As you mentioned, I did seek to use the document in

    25 evidence in the Tadic case and as I think I said when

  • 1I was giving evidence at that time, the document --

    2 I understand the document to have been assessed by well

    3 qualified persons from member governments of the

    4 United Nations, and on that basis, as well as appearing

    5 to me to be the way this document would be, would

    6 therefore be a reliable document to be used in this

    7 case.

    8 Q. You would, on the basis of that, express an opinion for

    9 it in your professional duties, you would express an

    10 opinion based on that document?

    11 A. I would.

    12 MR. NIEMANN: I seek to tender it on that basis, your

    13 Honour.

    14 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I think it is admissible. I see

    15 nothing obnoxious about it being admitted.

    16 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, what processes were implemented by the

    17 Serbian political leadership in order to facilitate its

    18 plan?

    19 A. From late 1991 onwards, in addition to the steps

    20 I already mentioned, the preparations were made for the

    21 creation of what were effectively shadow governments to

    22 be prepared for the time when the plan would be put into

    23 effect. This involved the creation of crisis

    24 headquarters which made preparations for primarily the

    25 political but also some of the military aspects of the

  • 1turnover, as I think can be seen from this document.

    2 This was done with two versions, one for areas of

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina in which there was an absolute

    4 Serbian majority, and the other in which there was not

    5 an absolute Serbian majority. In either case, with the

    6 same view to preparing the loyal Serbs in the particular

    7 area for the turnover, and to prepare for co-ordination,

    8 for example, with the JNA.

    9 Q. Dr. Gow, how did the municipality of Konjic fit into this

    10 scheme?

    11 A. As I understand it, although Konjic was not a majority

    12 Serbian area, it was designated to become part of a

    13 Serbian territory on the basis of the number of

    14 representatives from the Serbian community in local

    15 political bodies. I am afraid I do not know what that

    16 figure is, but I also believe that the actual number

    17 does not make any difference, given that that was the

    18 basis on which they sought to act.

    19 Q. Earlier in your evidence, you spoke of the Serbian

    20 political leadership playing a role, in particular in

    21 arming the population. From your reading, did the SDS

    22 committee in Konjic play a role in arming the Serbian

    23 population?

    24 A. It is my understanding that the SDS in Konjic provided,

    25 distributed around 400 weapons to Serbs in the area.

  • 1Q. Did anything significant happen to the JNA after the

    2 commencement of hostilities in the spring of 1992?

    3 A. In addition to the processes affecting the JNA, to which

    4 I already made reference, specifically in May 1992, the

    5 JNA formally ceased to exist. As of 19th May 1992,

    6 formally it became two armed forces, one designated the

    7 VRS, the army of the Bosnia Serbs, Vojska Republika

    8 Srpska and the other, the VJ, Vojska Yugoslavia, army

    9 of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, although

    10 in fact substantially this remained the same body.

    11 Q. Dr. Gow, what steps were taken to facilitate this end?

    12 A. The Serbian political leadership and the JNA command,

    13 some months prior to this action, undertook to

    14 redistribute personnel within the JNA in order that the

    15 JNA personnel serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be as

    16 far as possible Bosnian Serbs and that all Serbs who

    17 were not from Bosnia-Herzegovina would be transferred to

    18 units in Serbia and Montenegro.

    19 Q. Who made this decision, when was it made and where?

    20 A. The decision was made by Slobodan Milosevic, President

    21 of the Republic of Serbia, and Borislav Jovic, the

    22 representative of Serbia to the by then defunct or rump

    23 Federal Yugoslav State Council or Collective Presidency,

    24 and this instruction was then given to General Kidjovic,

    25 the head of the JNA, and the decision was taken by Jovic

  • 1and Milosevic on 5th December 1991.

    2 Q. In your opinion, what was their motivation for doing

    3 this?

    4 A. I believe -- judge quite clearly their motivation in

    5 doing this was to prepare for a situation in which the

    6 JNA units deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a view to

    7 carrying out the project of annexing parts of

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina for this new state project. After,

    9 any international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina's

    10 independent international personality would be seen as a

    11 foreign occupying force and that therefore this decision

    12 was taken as a means of providing a way to camouflage

    13 the activity, that is to confuse the issue and to say,

    14 by formally dividing the JNA and by having primarily

    15 Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that this was in

    16 fact no longer the same army, although it continued to

    17 have the same structure, and to be left with all the

    18 capabilities of the JNA as they had been in

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina before.

    20 Q. Are there any publications or documents or other

    21 material that you have relied on in order to form this

    22 view?

    23 A. I relied specifically on the entry for 5th December 1991

    24 in the selected diaries of Borislav Jovic, published as

    25 the volume, "Prozlje Medana Siflia", I think it was

  • 1published in 1996, maybe 1995.

    2 Q. In relation to the expression of your professional

    3 opinion, this is something that you would regard as a

    4 reliable source?

    5 A. I would indeed regard it as reliable. Jovic was there

    6 and knew what was happening.

    7 Q. If I could just ask you to look at what I will now show

    8 you, if I may? (Handed).

    9 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecutor's document 207.

    10 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, is the document you are now shown the

    11 document that you relied on in order to express your

    12 opinions you have just referred to?

    13 A. It is a photocopy extract from the volume I mentioned,

    14 plus a translation of it.

    15 Q. In particular, is there any particular part of the

    16 document which you say supports the opinion that you

    17 have expressed?

    18 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me a moment. Your Honour, again this

    19 is a document that appears new, that we have not seen

    20 before. I have no idea where it came from, what its

    21 provenance is, whether it is really excerpts from a

    22 diary of Borislav Jovic or whatever it is.

    23 MR. NIEMANN: Last Tuesday, I believe.

    24 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I do know we were served a

    25 document last week which Mr. Greaves thinks is the same

  • 1language, but it appears to be a completely different

    2 document and I have no idea why it looks different today

    3 than it did last week. I am now curious about that.

    4 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: What is your apprehension of its

    5 content? Is that your problem, that it might contain

    6 things which are against your interests?

    7 MR. ACKERMAN: Of course not. I have no concern whether it

    8 contains things against my interest -- I would prefer it

    9 not be used if it contains things against my interest.

    10 The issue is whether it is authentic and reliable and

    11 things of that nature. It does not look anything like

    12 what we were given last week. It may be the

    13 Prosecutor's office has retyped from what they gave us

    14 last week to make a nicer looking document, I do not

    15 know. If Mr. Niemann wants to represent that to me, that

    16 it is an accurate retyping of the document, I have no

    17 problem, other than the continuing issue of

    18 authenticity.

    19 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: The understanding of authenticity is

    20 the story he tells, is it not? In what respect are you

    21 considering authenticity?

    22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I could sit at my typewriter and

    23 prepare a document that looks like this and call it the

    24 diary of Borislav Jovic; how do we know that that is

    25 what it is? That is what I am talking about as regards

  • 1authenticity.

    2 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Except you have the counterpart of the

    3 diary itself.

    4 MR. ACKERMAN: I do not know that I do.

    5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: He is representing to you what the

    6 diary is, that is what he is representing to you. You

    7 might follow by cross-examination later to discover

    8 whether it is a correct representation of what is

    9 stated.

    10 MR. ACKERMAN: All I have said, your Honour, is if Mr. Niemann

    11 says to me that what they have done is retyped the

    12 document they gave to us last week and this is the

    13 identical language then I have no problem with the

    14 document.

    15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much. Mr. Niemann is on

    16 his feet, I am sure he will be able to confirm that.

    17 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honours. Perhaps I might answer the

    18 question. Firstly, in terms of whether we created, or

    19 somebody mysteriously created the document, the issue is

    20 not that, the issue is whether Dr. Gow relies on it to

    21 express an opinion. He is an expert and has testified

    22 on a number of occasions. If it is a document that he

    23 relies on to express an opinion, then in our submission

    24 that is something that is relevant. He can also express

    25 an opinion as to what he considers about its

  • 1authenticity and reliability. In terms of the

    2 translated version that was given to the Defence, I am

    3 instructed that it was a -- there has been an additional

    4 typing of it. It is the same thing, but it has been

    5 retyped again, so the format may appear differently.

    6 JUDGE JAN: Who is this Borislav Jovic?

    7 MR. NIEMANN: If I may ask Dr. Gow to explain who he is and

    8 where he fits into the scene, he is much more expert at

    9 it than me. He is a person who, as I understand it, was

    10 there at the relevant time during the course of the

    11 conversations and after the events sat down and

    12 proceeded to write his diaries, which he published.

    13 Those diaries that he published are the material that

    14 Dr. Gow is relying on.

    15 Perhaps you might confirm for his Honour who is

    16 Borislav Jovic and how he fits into the scene, just so

    17 his Honour may know.

    18 A. Gladly. Maybe I can clarify. I think I said already,

    19 Borislav Jovic was the Serbian representative to the

    20 State Council, also known as Collective Presidency of

    21 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and was the

    22 close political ally, collaborator, confederate of

    23 Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of

    24 Serbia. I think I already said, on 5th December, as

    25 this extract indicates, 5th December 1991, Jovic and

  • 1Milosevic had a discussion about the intentions

    2 regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina and took the decision that

    3 it would be advisable to transfer personnel depending

    4 on -- Serbian personnel, but depending on their origin

    5 either in Serbia and Montenegro or in

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that the Serbs in the JNA in

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina could then be said to be an army of

    8 Bosnia Serbs rather than the army of Belgrade, even

    9 though it was a matter of moving people around so that

    10 the same army could then carry out its operations.

    11 Maybe I could also add that although Jovic

    12 published this diary, there are relatively few copies of

    13 it available, because the Serbian political leadership,

    14 that is Milosevic, had it withdrawn from the shops at a

    15 fairly early stage, once it became clear some of the

    16 things which were in it.

    17 JUDGE JAN: But you have read the diary as a whole. You

    18 have an excerpt of the diary?

    19 A. I have one of the few copies of the book.

    20 MR. NIEMANN: Where did you get one of the few copies of the

    21 book, Dr. Gow?

    22 A. It was purchased for me by a friend in Montenegro who

    23 saved it for me until he could see me and then handed it

    24 over to me.

    25 Q. I think I have asked the question but I will in case

  • 1I have not, but this is a document that you would rely

    2 on in order to express your expert opinion on matters?

    3 A. Yes, I would.

    4 MR. NIEMANN: I tender it, your Honour.

    5 A. If I may, you did ask me a question earlier about which

    6 part of the text I might want to draw to you. I am

    7 happy to answer that question.

    8 Q. Please do.

    9 A. If you go to the third paragraph of the first page of

    10 the translation, I think you will see the third

    11 sentence, and I will read just to be clear:

    12 "Practically, all those who remain in the JNA are

    13 Serbs and Montenegrins, but from all Serb lands. When

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina is recognised internationally, the

    15 JNA will be declared a foreign" --

    16 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Slow down.

    17 A. I will begin again:

    18 "Practically" -- might it be useful for the

    19 interpreters to see the original, to read with it?

    20 MR. NIEMANN: No, you are just reading short sections.

    21 A. "Practically, all those who remain in the JNA are Serbs

    22 and Montenegrins, but from all Serb lands. When

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina is recognised internationally, the

    24 JNA will be declared a foreign army and its withdrawal

    25 will be demanded, which is impossible to avoid."

  • 1The translation is a little imprecise, it is not

    2 my own translation, it was carried out by translators in

    3 the Office of the Prosecutor, I understand.

    4 Q. The significance of this is the date 5th December 1991.

    5 A. The significance is that on 5th December 1991, Milosevic

    6 and Jovic foresaw what the situation would be following

    7 recognition of the independent international personality

    8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore carried out a

    9 decision to enable the overall project to be continued

    10 but in some way to attempt to be disguised.

    11 Q. And the actual decision, I think you testified earlier,

    12 took place in 1992?

    13 A. The actual decision formally to divide the JNA into the

    14 VRS and the VJ was announced on 4th May 1992, to take

    15 effect from 19th July 1992.

    16 Q. Dr. Gow, how would you characterise the role of Belgrade

    17 regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    18 A. The political and military leadership in Belgrade was

    19 engaged, in my judgement, in a campaign to expand the

    20 territory under Belgrade's control in the situation of

    21 the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation and the

    22 independence of some of the republics which had formed

    23 that federation; the intention was to have Serbia,

    24 Montenegro and allied federated territories from Croatia

    25 and from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

  • 1Q. Was the role of Belgrade one of support or was it

    2 something else, or something more?

    3 A. It seems to me that Belgrade's role was to conceive of

    4 and to plan the execution of this project, which would

    5 see these territories carved from Bosnia-Herzegovina to

    6 be attached to Serbia or Montenegro.

    7 Q. Did this include deploying military units from Serbia

    8 and Montenegro?

    9 A. In addition to the device I just described regarding the

    10 JNA, it also included at certain times arrangements

    11 involving paramilitary groups organised by the Serbian

    12 security service coming into Bosnia-Herzegovina and also

    13 through the period of the war, support being given by

    14 units designated VJ, that is from the elements of the

    15 old JNA in Serbia and Montenegro, going into

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    17 Q. What parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina were affected by this

    18 war?

    19 A. All parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina were affected by the

    20 war, although as I think I indicated earlier, the

    21 precise way in which it was affected would depend on

    22 whether an area was easily taken over, was engaged in

    23 armed hostilities or was on the other side of the line.

    24 I think it is clear to say that as in all wars, whenever

    25 there is a major armed conflict, then the whole of the

  • 1territory involved should be considered to be part of

    2 the war.

    3 Q. How would you characterise the relationship between the

    4 Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade?

    5 A. I think the Bosnian Serbs within the JNA and within

    6 certain political structures, and indeed associated with

    7 them, who were loyal to this project, were effectively

    8 acting in the interests of Belgrade and pursuing a

    9 course by Belgrade, although in doing that, I think they

    10 may well have been undermining what would otherwise have

    11 been a genuine political question for Serbs in

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they were taking the role of

    13 acting for Belgrade against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    14 Q. Did this apply to all of the Bosnian Serbs?

    15 A. No, it did not. As I think I was just trying to

    16 indicate, it was a question of those who were loyal to

    17 this project as opposed to some who perhaps took sides

    18 with the Bosnian government, others who fled

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina and others who simply, I think,

    20 perhaps became politically disenfranchised because of

    21 this course of action. It took away what might have

    22 been a genuine political question because it was put in

    23 the framework of this armed campaign.

    24 Q. How would you regard the approach taken by the

    25 authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

  • 1A. The authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina took a number of

    2 approaches, including the organisation as best they

    3 could of defence and political capabilities regarding

    4 the Bosnian Serbs in areas of conflict where there had

    5 been -- at least where there had been arming of some of

    6 the Bosnian Serbs in order to pursue this project, then

    7 I think they regarded them as potentially hostile and

    8 therefore would in some cases treat them either as

    9 prisoners of war or suspect them of being agents of

    10 Belgrade and therefore, until their status was

    11 determined, might regard them as hostile.

    12 Q. How did the Bosnian Serbs react politically and

    13 militarily to the international recognition of the

    14 independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    15 A. The Bosnian Serbs responded politically by formalising

    16 the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was

    17 later renamed Republika Srpska in August 1992 -- sorry,

    18 in April 1992 they formally consolidated the Serbian

    19 Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which then later in

    20 August they renamed Republika Srpska, effectively

    21 declaring its association with Serbia and Montenegro

    22 through the constitution which had been enacted in

    23 January 1992, and militarily in co-operation with the

    24 JNA they began the armed campaign to secure all major

    25 communications and access points into

  • 1Bosnia-Herzegovina, so as to create a frame for military

    2 and political developments.

    3 Q. What was the focus of the JNA operations in

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina in April and May 1992?

    5 A. The principal objective of the JNA and Serbian armed

    6 forces in the first weeks of the campaign appears to

    7 have been to take control of entry points or major

    8 communication points in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so in the

    9 first weeks all the major conflicts were at places such

    10 as Bijeljina or Visegrad, which, once control was taken

    11 of them, would then enable free access for Serbian

    12 movements into Bosnia-Herzegovina or, in some cases,

    13 such as Bosanski Brod, would prevent access from outside

    14 to give assistance against the Serbian campaign.

    15 Q. Did the JNA operate in the municipality of Konjic, so

    16 far as you know from your readings?

    17 A. I believe the JNA did operate in Konjic municipality.

    18 It was there for only a relatively short period of the

    19 armed conflict, perhaps until May, some time in May

    20 1992, although once specifically JNA units had been

    21 moved out of some of the areas in Konjic, I believe

    22 bombardments using JNA artillery continued.

    23 Q. After 19th May 1992, what was the continued role, if

    24 any, of the VJ in Bosnia?

    25 A. The VJ, that is the element of the JNA which was in

  • 1Serbia and Montenegro, continued to give -- to

    2 contribute actively in terms of its personnel and in

    3 terms of supplies to the prosecution of the Serbian new

    4 state project in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It did so in a

    5 number of cases in support of the VRS, that is the JNA

    6 units in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where it was necessary to

    7 provide additional support or forces of a particular

    8 kind, and it continued almost, effectively, to act as

    9 one body, albeit with a degree of operational authority

    10 given to the commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General

    11 Ratko Mladic. There are a number of instances over the

    12 years where VJ troops, specifically VJ troops, are

    13 identified, and a number of other cases where -- you can

    14 see even to this day a report by Ambassador Perdue; the

    15 American special representative for arms control

    16 agreements over the Dayton Peace Accords has noted one

    17 of the problems they have in the Republika Srpska that

    18 still it is effectively one army with Belgrade.

    19 Q. How would you describe then the relationship between the

    20 Bosnia Serb military command and the military political

    21 leadership in Belgrade?

    22 A. I believe that the Bosnian Serb military command,

    23 I think I just said this, was given broad operational

    24 authority, knowing what the objectives were, to

    25 prosecute the armed campaign, and as far as possible, to

  • 1do so bearing in mind not to bring Belgrade's role into

    2 question, going back to the decision by Jovic and

    3 Milosevic on 5th December 1991 to try to ensure that

    4 Belgrade would not be seen to be responsible for the

    5 events in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    6 Q. From publications and documents that you have examined

    7 and studied, did the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    8 consider itself to be engaged in an armed conflict with

    9 a foreign army?

    10 A. The authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina considered that

    11 they were engaged in armed hostilities with a foreign

    12 power. On 22nd June 1992, the President of

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, proclaimed a

    14 state of war to this effect.

    15 Q. What was the foreign power in which it was in a state of

    16 war with?

    17 A. The declaration of a state of war, I believe, regarded

    18 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so-called Serbia and

    19 Montenegro, as being the hostile power.

    20 Q. What steps were taken by the presidency of

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to prepare itself for the

    22 conflict in April 1992?

    23 A. The presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina began, immediately

    24 prior to the onset of major armed hostilities, began to

    25 mobilise the Territorial Defence system of the Republic

  • 1 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some time in early 1991 the

    2 leading party in the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    3 the SDA, had also begun to prepare a shadow framework

    4 for possible developments in the future, known as the

    5 Patriotic League.

    6 Q. When was the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina formally

    7 established?

    8 A. The army of Bosnia-Herzegovina appears formally to have

    9 been established on 15th April 1992, although there were

    10 also further developments taken in this regard in May

    11 1992. These in any case were formal declarations; the

    12 reality was that the armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    13 continued to be unformed or partially formed in this

    14 context and it was not until some time later in 1992

    15 before a formal structure, going back to any declaration

    16 in April, began to take shape.

    17 Q. What was the command structure of the newly founded

    18 army?

    19 A. The formal structure was that the presidency was supreme

    20 commander and appointed a general staff and a chief of

    21 staff. The chief of staff would then nominate

    22 commanders for regional military authorities and below

    23 that lower levels would be appointed by the chief of

    24 staff on the recommendation of reports from lower

    25 levels.

  • 1 Q. Who was the chief of staff?

    2 A. Initially the chief of staff was I think Hasan Efendic,

    3 but this was only for a relatively short period. On May

    4 25th, I think it was 1992, Sefer Halilovic became chief

    5 of staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    6 Q. What steps were taken to achieve full mobilisation?

    7 A. In April 1992, the Bosnia authorities ordered the full

    8 mobilisation of the Territorial Defence units in

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    10 Q. Was this universally obeyed?

    11 A. No, it was not, on the whole. Croats and Serbs did not

    12 respond to this call.

    13 Q. What role, if any, did paramilitary formations play in

    14 this?

    15 A. In ill-formed military circumstances, a number of

    16 paramilitary groups played a role on the side of the

    17 Bosnian government. Significantly the Patriotic League,

    18 which was organised by the SDA leadership, that is the

    19 Party of Democratic Action, the leading party among the

    20 Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also groups such as

    21 the Green Berets -- although it is very difficult to

    22 discern exactly which units were which, because a lot of

    23 the reporting seems confused and seems generally to

    24 label all such groups as Green Berets, a lot of the

    25 time. I notice this, the UN Expert Commission report

  • 1 itself tends to group all the different Muslim

    2 paramilitary groups as one kind.

    3 Q. Dr. Gow, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, was there

    4 a TO, Territorial Defence, in the municipality of

    5 Konjic?

    6 A. If I may just go back to add something to the previous

    7 answer, I got distracted in describing the problems in

    8 identifying particular paramilitary groups. The key

    9 thing was that the Patriotic League and the Green

    10 Berets, in organising the defence forces for

    11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, played a key role of being a

    12 loyalist strand, which would then create an umbrella or

    13 a framework for other elements of defence, including

    14 Territorial Defence, to be used.

    15 On this question, in Konjic, the Territorial

    16 Defence -- there was Territorial Defence in Konjic and

    17 it was mobilised.

    18 Q. Do you know what its size was, from what you have

    19 studied?

    20 A. I understand that the Territorial Defence in Konjic

    21 should have had a complement of around 2,000 personnel.

    22 Q. What sort of condition was the Territorial Defence in in

    23 the Konjic area at the outbreak of hostilities?

    24 A. It was severely depleted. As I indicated, some,

    25 certainly Serbs and Croats, as was broadly the case,

  • 1 were not responding to the call, and in addition, as was

    2 also broadly the case in other parts of

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the JNA had previously moved weapons

    4 from TO facilities and concentrated them under the

    5 control of the JNA.

    6 Q. Where were the weapons of the Konjic TO stored?

    7 A. It is my understanding that they had been concentrated

    8 in the Ljuta barracks of the JNA.

    9 Q. Were there weapons of other Territorial Defence units

    10 stored in these barracks, or was it just purely Konjic

    11 material?

    12 A. It is my understanding that the Territorial Defence

    13 weaponry also for the neighbouring municipalities of

    14 Prozor and Jablanica had also been concentrated in the

    15 same barracks.

    16 Q. Dr. Gow, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, did the

    17 TOs have regional headquarters?

    18 A. In theory, had there been an overall structure for the

    19 Territorial Defence, then there would have been regional

    20 headquarters, although the reality of the Territorial

    21 Defence system was to facilitate a large degree of

    22 autonomy at the lowest levels, because of the envisaged

    23 conflict for which the doctrine was designed.

    24 Q. What, then, was the regional headquarters for Konjic

    25 Territorial Defence?

  • 1 A. The headquarters should have been Mostar, but in fact,

    2 because of the particular circumstances, was Sarajevo,

    3 was going directly -- Konjic was reporting directly to

    4 Sarajevo, as far as it was reporting at all, I suspect.

    5 Q. What you are saying is that after the outbreak of

    6 hostilities the traditional TO headquarters, in relation

    7 to Konjic at Mostar, was not functioning, is that right?

    8 A. It is my belief that Mostar was not being used as the

    9 appropriate point in the hierarchy regarding Konjic, but

    10 instead Sarajevo was taking that role.

    11 Q. Did the Konjic Territorial Defence become the -- I am

    12 sorry, did the Territorial Defence become the army of

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    14 A. Yes, I think as I was -- again, I tried to suggest

    15 before, there was a degree of some confusion, some

    16 transition and transformation, but the various elements,

    17 the Patriotic League, the elements of the Interior

    18 Ministry and also the Territorial Defence all went

    19 together to form the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    20 Q. Was the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina the only unit

    21 operational in the area, or were there other units as

    22 well?

    23 A. In the spring/summer of 1992, there were -- the army of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina as such was not fully in existence,

    25 so the Territorial Defence units were operating, so were

  • 1units of the Croatian Defence Council, the HVO, and,

    2 also identified, some of the kinds of paramilitary

    3 groups I made reference to earlier.

    4 Q. With all these groups operational, they all had their

    5 focus on the one particular enemy, I take it, at the

    6 time, or opposition in the conflict, is that right?

    7 A. In the spring and early summer of 1992 certainly all

    8 these units were engaged in operations against the

    9 Serbs.

    10 Q. Was there, from your readings, any effort made to create

    11 a joint command of these units?

    12 A. A joint command was formally established between the

    13 Territorial Defence, or the Bosnian army, the army of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Croatian Defence Council,

    15 the HVO.

    16 Q. Did this succeed?

    17 A. It does not appear really to have succeeded as far as it

    18 was ever functional at all, and as far as I can see

    19 there is not significant evidence to suggest that it

    20 was. After the HVO capture of west Mostar in early July

    21 1992, relationships began to break down and certainly

    22 they did not function after that time.

    23 Q. What about the paramilitary units, Dr. Gow? Were they

    24 operational on the side of the Bosnia-Herzegovina forces

    25 in the Konjic area?

  • 1 A. I think I indicated already that there were paramilitary

    2 groups operational in this area, some small particular

    3 ones, not generally well known, and also some which

    4 would broadly have been put under the umbrella of Green

    5 Berets or Patriotic League.

    6 Q. How would you characterise these paramilitary units?

    7 A. I think the role of the paramilitary units was to be the

    8 guiding influence, the organisation of the most loyal

    9 strands to the SDA Muslim leadership. I say this in a

    10 context where some of the evidence is not clear, but it

    11 does appear to be that the point of organising the

    12 Patriotic League and other paramilitary groups is to

    13 provide a particular organisation of loyalists who are

    14 therefore able also to organise defence and other

    15 activities in particular areas.

    16 In a sense the framework for the army of

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina comes even not from the Territorial

    18 Defence but from the organisation of the Patriotic

    19 League, so therefore, in a way, it provides the elite or

    20 the political guidance that perhaps the JNA or the

    21 Communist Party would have been intended to provide

    22 under the old Yugoslav system, as I described the

    23 Territorial Defence system before.

    24 Q. Were these similar to private armies or something?

    25 A. I think in the situation it would be fair to

  • 1 characterise the activities of these paramilitary

    2 groups, and indeed possibly of Territorial Defence and

    3 HVO units, in some way as being private armies. It was

    4 a confused situation in which units were being formed,

    5 in which there was no overall well established

    6 hierarchy, but in which various groups were being

    7 established to co-operate to work for the same cause.

    8 Q. So having said that, how well established was the chain

    9 of command of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    10 particularly in the early part of the war, say May to

    11 July 1992?

    12 A. Just to be clear, I believe it was not well established

    13 and was not particularly clear in this early phase.

    14 Formal relationships did exist, but I think the degree

    15 to which all elements were integrated into one whole

    16 gives some reason to suppose that the situation was not

    17 at all clear.

    18 Q. In the Konjic area in this particular period, May to

    19 July 1992, were any steps taken in relation to the

    20 military establishment, the military structure there?

    21 A. In addition to the evolution and development of certain

    22 units, it was decided, or it appeared to have been

    23 decided to designate a co-ordinator to begin -- to

    24 designate a co-ordinator.

    25 Q. From the documents that you have examined, are you aware

  • 1 who was given that role?

    2 A. It is my understanding from the documents that that role

    3 was given to Zejnil Delalic.

    4 MR. NIEMANN: Is that a convenient time?

    5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Perhaps we will break for 30 minutes

    6 and continue at 4.30.

    7 (4.00 pm)

    8 (A short break)

    9 (4.35 pm)

    10 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Kindly invite the witness to come in.

    11 (Witness entered court)

    12 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Kindly inform the witness he is still

    13 on his oath.

    14 THE REGISTRAR: I remind you, sir, that you are still under

    15 oath.

    16 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, from your study of military matters and

    17 structures, are you able to explain how the term

    18 "co-ordinator" can be understood?

    19 A. I can attempt to offer some idea. It is not a normal

    20 term in military structures, it does not fit into a

    21 generally understood framework, although it is not a

    22 term which is without use. I think one way I would use

    23 to explain the role of co-ordinator, what a co-ordinator

    24 is, maybe would be with reference to the formation of

    25 special forces by the British during the Second World

  • 1 War, in which a number of small units, sometimes

    2 designated "private armies" -- indeed one of them went

    3 under the label "Potski's Private Army", began to

    4 develop for special missions. They are devised either

    5 for very special purposes or at the initiative of a

    6 particular commander, and in a situation where you have

    7 uncertain lines of command or where units do not fit

    8 into the traditional formal hierarchy of command and

    9 control, the private nature of these armies -- then

    10 I think you see the creation of the possible role for a

    11 co-ordinator there, and in the context of British

    12 special forces where these units were beginning to

    13 emerge, one man, John Hackett, was appointed with the

    14 job of co-ordinator, who incidentally went on later to

    15 be General Sir John Hackett, Commander in NATO and then

    16 after that principal of my own King's College in

    17 London.

    18 His role as co-ordinator was to know what was

    19 going on, to be able to deal with all the different

    20 units and to be sure they did not carry out private

    21 initiatives, essentially to undertake the same mission

    22 or to end up fighting each other, they call it "crossed

    23 lines", or to ensure that common resources could be

    24 created, or that logistics supplies would be made

    25 available; whatever that role particularly was.

  • 1 In some senses, this was carrying out some of the

    2 tasks which an officer commanding might perform, but in

    3 a situation where there was -- as not part of the formal

    4 hierarchy, there was no officer commanding at that

    5 stage, although later special forces were integrated and

    6 began to have formal officer commanding positions.

    7 Q. What sort of authority do these co-ordinators have? You

    8 mention they must have full knowledge of what is

    9 happening, but what sort of authority did they have or

    10 exercise?

    11 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, can I object to this question?

    12 I fail to see the relevancy of what the British army did

    13 in World War Two as being relevant to our case.

    14 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I think there is nothing seriously

    15 wrong with a comparative approach to any explanation.

    16 A. Probably there are two essential features for a

    17 co-ordinator successfully to play a role. Of course, a

    18 co-ordinator -- the term is not a usual one and

    19 therefore it is only relevant to specific circumstances,

    20 and on one level could be all or nothing, but I think it

    21 is clear if a co-ordinator's role, broadly, in any

    22 context, is to be successful, it depends on two

    23 qualities.

    24 The first would be full knowledge, that is that

    25 you would have to be able to know exactly what each of

  • 1 the relevant units was doing, and capable of doing,

    2 otherwise there could be serious problems in the

    3 exercise of operations; and the second is a degree of

    4 authority, perhaps personal authority, which would

    5 enable you to deal with sometimes highly charged egos of

    6 commanders of some of these particular units; that is

    7 they would have to respect you on whatever basis you had

    8 the authority, otherwise they would not give you the

    9 information, they would not trust you and you would not

    10 therefore be able to carry out your role successfully.

    11 So I think there are two elements: one is the

    12 degree of authority involved, on whatever basis the

    13 authority is founded, and the full knowledge, both of

    14 which, without being formal command roles, are

    15 consistent with some of the elements of a command

    16 position.

    17 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Let me see. I am not too sure you have

    18 got yourself within the context of the question the

    19 Prosecutor is asking. I think if I am right the

    20 Prosecutor wants you to define a co-ordinator within the

    21 context of the Konjic municipality, or within the area

    22 in which you are here.

    23 A. I understood I was asked to give some explanation of how

    24 this term --

    25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: It is a very broad area which you have

  • 1 gone into, but within the scope of your testimony, you

    2 are expected to give the military structure of the

    3 Yugoslav army, and the functions of the co-ordinator

    4 within that army and the structure he occupies. These

    5 are things which perhaps might be more helpful to us,

    6 not a general view of what a co-ordinator is, because

    7 each institution might have its own different concept of

    8 what a co-ordinator is.

    9 MR. NIEMANN: That is right, your Honour. If you could

    10 assist his Honour with that, particularly concentrating

    11 on the Konjic area.

    12 A. I am happy to assist in whichever way I am able. In

    13 answering the question, I was trying to give some sense

    14 of what this term might mean and I think I stressed that

    15 it is not a usual military term, but it is one which

    16 occurs sometimes, and I was trying to give sense to

    17 definition generically, from what I know about things in

    18 the field of military matters and war, how this term

    19 might be understood.

    20 It is not a term, if you wish to ask the question

    21 regarding the Yugoslav People's Army, which was used, as

    22 far as I am aware, in the Yugoslav context normally.

    23 I am not aware of any incident where it was or that

    24 anybody understood how this role might be played in the

    25 context either of the Yugoslav People's Army or of the

  • 1 doctrine of general People's Defence.

    2 However, and I believe you are interested in the

    3 Konjic municipality, we did, prior to the recess, raise

    4 the question of the appointment of a co-ordinator in the

    5 Konjic municipality and I am happy to give some

    6 suggestion as to how I think that could be understood,

    7 if that is what your Honour wishes.

    8 Q. Yes.

    9 A. I think I was trying to express generally how this term

    10 might be understood in order then that you could look to

    11 the Konjic context in which you see a number of

    12 independently organised armed forces, i.e. the absence

    13 of a formal, organised, hierarchical command structure

    14 as you would normally expect with an armed force, and in

    15 that context, a degree of fluidity and uncertainty, and

    16 with the fluidity and uncertainty in a number of units,

    17 but the overall intention to carry out operations

    18 against the hostile Serbs, it seems to me, in

    19 designating a role of co-ordinator in the Konjic

    20 municipality, the role was based on an ability to have

    21 full knowledge and a degree of authority to be able to

    22 go to each of the various units involved and, without

    23 being able to give formal order, to be able to give

    24 guidance, to make requests, to give indications of what

    25 or what might not be appropriate and helpful in a

  • 1 particular situation, to see what requirements a

    2 particular unit might want and to find ways in which to

    3 satisfy those requirements.

    4 This would involve some of the capacities, some of

    5 the qualities, rather, that an officer commanding might

    6 perform in a more organised military structure, without,

    7 in fluid and changing circumstances, being a formal

    8 command position. In the Konjic municipality, and

    9 I have -- as an expert, I have only very limited

    10 knowledge of the details of the Konjic municipality

    11 itself, but I have looked at the interface between my

    12 general understanding and Konjic to address this

    13 question, it does seem to me that it is possible that

    14 the co-ordinator in question was given that role in part

    15 because of personal wealth and an ability to carry out

    16 certain tasks, including the purchase of provisions.

    17 Perhaps on the basis of personality he was able to have

    18 the trust of all sides, and I believe I saw an interview

    19 documentary in which the co-ordinator himself made this

    20 clear, that he seemed to be able to go to all sides and

    21 they seemed to trust him and be able to tell him

    22 everything accurately, again going to the importance of

    23 full knowledge for a co-ordinator; and possibly also on

    24 the basis that I understand the co-ordinator in question

    25 was also a member of the Green Berets organisation,

  • 1 which I think earlier, if I did not make it clear

    2 earlier, I will say, I understand to be one of the

    3 loyalist strands and therefore possibly to have a

    4 particular role in connection, vis-à-vis the central

    5 authorities or structures leading to the central

    6 authorities in Sarajevo. So it is in that context that

    7 I would explain generally the functions of a

    8 co-ordinator and in the context of Konjic how I would

    9 understand it, although I stress I do this on the basis

    10 of my general expertise and a limited degree of

    11 knowledge of looking at the situation in Konjic. I hope

    12 that has been helpful.

    13 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much.

    14 JUDGE JAN: At the relevant time in Konjic, there were three

    15 entities, there was the War Presidency, then there was

    16 the HVO and there was the territorial army, so the

    17 co-ordinator was appointed at that time, so maybe the

    18 co-ordinator was to co-ordinate activities of the HVO

    19 and the territorial army and also to make sure the War

    20 Presidency's orders are carried out by the other two

    21 entities.

    22 A. If I understand you correctly, you are identifying

    23 certain armed units within the Konjic municipality.

    24 JUDGE JAN: At the relevant time.

    25 A. And trying to establish the relationship between the

  • 1 co-ordinator and the relevant units --

    2 JUDGE JAN: Not between the co-ordinator, between the War

    3 Presidency and the two warring factions, the HVO and the

    4 TO, so the co-ordinator was probably --

    5 A. I am sorry, I may not be clear, but if you are

    6 suggesting that the HVO and the Territorial Defence were

    7 engaged against each other in armed hostilities at this

    8 stage, I think that is not the case.

    9 JUDGE JAN: That is not the case, but they were treating

    10 themselves as separate entities.

    11 A. Clearly there were separate units, and also some small

    12 paramilitary groups, which were not formally designated,

    13 as I understand it, in the documentation for the

    14 co-ordinator, but I would also assume it was possible,

    15 for the co-ordinator to be able to play a role in all

    16 senses, that the role in a situation where there is no

    17 formal position of command authority, either through the

    18 structures of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or

    19 in an uncertain situation and devolution of a political

    20 and military authority to the municipality in Konjic to

    21 the HVO, they were not fully participating and

    22 recognising the authority in command; therefore it does

    23 seem to me that it is relevant to look at the work of

    24 co-ordinator in the context of being able to have the

    25 trust of both sides and to deal with both sides on the

  • 1 basis of a degree of personal and/or other authority, to

    2 be able to say, "these are the things" -- here I am

    3 speculating, I have not looked at specific discussions,

    4 "these are the things which would be useful, or these

    5 are the things which such and such a unit might need;

    6 let us put it all together and make it more coherent".

    7 JUDGE JAN: Yes.

    8 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, you have spoken at length about

    9 co-ordinator. Were there then subsequent steps taken

    10 later in 1992 regarding military formations?

    11 A. If you are speaking with regard to the armed forces of

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the evolution of the construction of

    13 the armed forces continued, with the designation, first

    14 of all, of seven administrative districts, which are

    15 sometimes you see referred to as corps, although I think

    16 this is not the accurate terminology.

    17 Q. Before the corps were established, was there an

    18 intermediary period between the appointment of

    19 co-ordinator and the establishment of the corps?

    20 A. When I say the seven administrative districts, I was

    21 suggesting that these were not the corps per se. Corps

    22 came to be formed at a later stage. Another development

    23 was also the creation in some areas of tactical groups.

    24 Q. What is a tactical group?

    25 A. A tactical group, as I understand it, may as a unit -- a

  • 1 set of units brought together for specific tactical

    2 purposes for a temporary period. It is created in a

    3 context where the regular structures and the regular

    4 organisation of units is not judged to be appropriate to

    5 the circumstances, and it may be of what I think -- one

    6 of two types; either designed specifically for one

    7 objective in which designated units are brought together

    8 to achieve that objective, or in other circumstances to

    9 be brought together as a group in order to be able to

    10 act to some extent independently within the broad scope

    11 of objectives to be achieved, to achieve whatever is

    12 possible.

    13 I suspect that in the case of the area we are

    14 talking about, where a tactical group became relevant,

    15 Tactical Group 1, it falls somewhere between the two.

    16 The broad objective was established of actions which

    17 would facilitate lifting the siege of Sarajevo, but

    18 I have the impression that this was in an evolving

    19 context of working out what operations it would be

    20 possible to carry out.

    21 Q. Was it a step in the evolution from the co-ordinator to

    22 the establishment of tactical groups?

    23 A. As I understand, Mr. Delalic, who had been appointed as

    24 co-ordinator, to some extent made a transition from the

    25 role of co-ordinator to being tactical group commander,

  • 1 after a short period in which I think it was a Colonel

    2 Polutak had been tactical group commander for a short

    3 period, but he was replaced by Mr. Delalic, who I think,

    4 as tactical group commander, again looking at the

    5 fluidity of the situation, the special circumstances,

    6 I might presume was appointed because of again the role

    7 he had already played and the authority that he seems to

    8 have had, but I say this with caution from the position

    9 of an expert, not as somebody who has looked very

    10 closely into the detail of Konjic.

    11 Q. Does the authority that a tactical group commander has,

    12 is that different from that of a co-ordinator? Can you

    13 explain the authority that a tactical group commander

    14 would have?

    15 A. I judge that there is a clear difference in the formal

    16 authority between co-ordinator and tactical group

    17 commander. Whereas co-ordinator, as I indicated, might

    18 carry out many of the functions of an officer

    19 commanding, a co-ordinator would not have any formal

    20 authority within the military hierarchy. A tactical

    21 group commander would have formal authority within the

    22 military hierarchy, would be able to issue orders rather

    23 than, for example, make requests or give advice, and

    24 would be backed in doing so by the regular structures of

    25 any military and the possibilities of discipline.

  • 1 Q. Were there any further developments regarding command

    2 structures in the Konjic municipality that you looked at

    3 in the documents that you saw?

    4 A. After the appointment of Mr. Delalic as tactical group

    5 commander on, I believe it was, 11th July 1992, he was

    6 subsequently re-appointed on 27th July, but with a

    7 clarification or possibly an extension of the scope of

    8 his authority. A tactical group would normally be

    9 understood to have perhaps five particular units

    10 attached to it for particular operations. On 27th July,

    11 all the units in a geographical area, including Konjic,

    12 were put under the command of the Tactical Group 1

    13 commander, so there was an evolution not only in the

    14 role played and the formal position but also in the area

    15 over which formal command authority could be said to be

    16 relevant.

    17 Q. Do you have an opinion as to why this occurred?

    18 A. My impression from some of the documentation presented

    19 in evidence and that I have seen in the Office of the

    20 Prosecutor is that there may have been a degree of

    21 personal rivalry between Mr. Delalic and Captain Esad

    22 Ramic. There are a number of cases while Delalic

    23 appears to have been co-ordinator where Ramic does not

    24 respect his role fully, and there do seem to be some

    25 kinds of difference and this also seems to be the case

  • 1 after he has been appointed tactical group commander.

    2 I think my reading of the clarification, the superseding

    3 appointment of Delalic on 27th July, and this is only an

    4 interpretation again, a feeling from what I have seen,

    5 would be to clarify and to attempt to reinforce

    6 Delalic's formal position as officer commanding.

    7 I believe that there were some instances where Ramic

    8 disputed Delalic's authority over his particular

    9 command; "tactical group commander is not commander over

    10 me and my units because we are not assigned specifically

    11 to the tactical group". The 27th July document changes

    12 that.

    13 Q. What was the next evolutionary step in the organisation

    14 of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    15 A. Following the evolution into the creation of military

    16 districts and the establishment of some tactical groups,

    17 in November 1992, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina began

    18 finally to take shape with the creation of a corps

    19 structure, with five corps being organised through the

    20 territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina, answering to the

    21 general staff and command in Sarajevo.

    22 Q. How did this affect Konjic?

    23 A. The Konjic municipality became -- was covered by the

    24 area of four corps in this structure.

    25 Q. Against whom was this army of Bosnia-Herzegovina engaged

  • 1 in armed hostilities?

    2 A. At this stage in 1992, it continued to be engaged in

    3 armed hostilities against the armed forces we were

    4 describing earlier, the divided JNA, the two elements of

    5 the JNA, and also in this period, clashes were beginning

    6 to emerge, in fact from a little earlier, between the

    7 HVO and army of Bosnia-Herzegovina units, and into the

    8 spring of 1993, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was

    9 engaged in armed hostilities with Croatian forces to the

    10 west, as well as with the forces, the Serbian forces to

    11 the north, east and south. The conflict with the

    12 Croatian forces lasted for about nine months, to the end

    13 of 1993; the armed conflict with the Serbian forces

    14 continued until 1995.

    15 Q. Did the military political relationship between the

    16 Republika Srpska and Belgrade continue after 1992?

    17 A. Yes, the military political project, to which I made

    18 allusion earlier on, to create this set of territories

    19 through the use of armed force and complementary

    20 political action continued both in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    21 and in Croatia, so that by May 1995 you still see some

    22 of the ways -- not only do you see ways in which Serbia

    23 and Montenegro designated forces sometimes contributing

    24 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, but also for

    25 example in May 1995, the deputy chief of staff of the

  • 1 Belgrade army, that is the VJ, is appointed as commander

    2 of the Republic of Serbia and Krajina as part of the

    3 Serbs in Croatia, as a change within the one structure.

    4 In 1993 there is some speculation when the new

    5 chief of staff is being appointed in Belgrade that it

    6 will be General Mladic, commander of the element of the

    7 JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the VRS, the army of

    8 Republika Srpska. But that does not happen, I suspect

    9 partly because of the appearance it would give at that

    10 stage of the links between Belgrade and the Republika

    11 Srpska, going back to what I said earlier about the

    12 intention to disguise as far as possible Belgrade's role

    13 in all of this.

    14 You can also see the way in which, going back to

    15 the origins and the way the Serbian security service

    16 worked with the SDS and groups -- and its operatives in

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina -- to prepare politically and to arm

    18 the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you see the final

    19 confirmation, in my own mind, of the way in which

    20 Belgrade could exercise control in the fact that in June

    21 1995 the head of the Serbian security service, Jovica

    22 Stanisic is sent from Belgrade to deal with a problem

    23 which is causing a big international difficulty, the

    24 taking of UN military personnel as hostages and their

    25 being chained to ammunition dumps and other facilities,

  • 1 and Stanisic is the man who is able to intervene, simply

    2 to turn up with the Bosnian Serbs and everything is

    3 sorted out. Again, he plays a similar role in the later

    4 stages of the year, leading up to the process of going

    5 to Dayton for the peace talks.

    6 In all of this, I think it is clear, if I may just

    7 expand a little, I think to understand, and I believe --

    8 my understanding is this is also something of a question

    9 of relevance, looking at the basic factual differences

    10 between this situation and another one which is of

    11 interest, I think it has to be understood that by

    12 comparison, for example, with Nicaragua, which has been

    13 raised as a case I know on a factual basis, there is a

    14 clear difference. Stanisic, the Serbian security

    15 service, the Serbian political leadership in Belgrade

    16 and the JNA leadership were exercising a role to carve

    17 territory from a neighbouring state, to change the

    18 borders through a use of force and using both their own

    19 people but particularly people in a neighbouring state,

    20 acting effectively on behalf of this project to

    21 incorporate them in a set of territories to be annexed,

    22 which it seems to me on a factual basis is wholly

    23 different from a case in which you have a group within a

    24 country seeking to change the government of the country

    25 as a whole and gaining some support from a major power,

  • 1 both in terms of equipment and finance and training, but

    2 in a neighbouring country, to support this overall

    3 objective of changing political power within the country

    4 as a whole -- this is in comparison with Nicaragua,

    5 where the United States, for whatever support it gave to

    6 the Contras, had no intention of either taking control

    7 of the whole of Nicaragua or indeed of annexing parts of

    8 Nicaragua, but rather for its own ideological reasons

    9 was opposed to the particular government and backed

    10 those who wanted to change the government.

    11 I think there are clear differences in the

    12 material involved in those two cases. One is the

    13 intention to annex territory and to include people as

    14 agents, if you like, in that process, and the other is

    15 the intention simply to help those who are trying change

    16 the government of a country as a whole to do so.

    17 However, whatever problems there might be with that from

    18 an ethical or other perspectives, but on a substantive

    19 basis, it seems to me there are two completely separate

    20 cases.

    21 In Nicaragua, perhaps more of a parallel would

    22 have been if the United States had been seeking to annex

    23 part of the country and had used the Anglophone, largely

    24 West African origin population on the Mosquito Coast to

    25 try to carve out a part of the country which would then

  • 1 be annexed as the 51st State of the Union, rather than

    2 giving support to one of the groups which is trying to

    3 change government of the country as a whole. Forgive me

    4 for adding that, it may be out of place. I hope not.

    5 MR. NIEMANN: I have no further questions, your Honour.

    6 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Any cross-examination?

    7 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes, your Honours, we will proceed in this

    8 way. First counsel for Mr. Landzo. Second counsel for

    9 Mr. Mucic. Third counsel for Mr. Delic and fourth counsel

    10 for Mr. Delalic.

    11 MR. ACKERMAN: May it please the court.

    12 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, you may continue.

    13 Cross-examined by MR. ACKERMAN

    14 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Gow.

    15 A. Good afternoon.

    16 Q. How are you doing?

    17 A. I am hoping I am going to be able to get home, but

    18 I doubt it at this stage.

    19 Q. We have all being hoping that for months. You have only

    20 got a couple of days to worry about. My name is John

    21 Ackerman, it is obvious to you I am one of the counsel

    22 over here on this side of the room. I have quite a few

    23 things that I would like to discuss with you, and if we

    24 do not finish by tomorrow about this time then I suspect

    25 you will get to come back in January so we can finish

  • 1 then. We will see how we do. I will try my best to

    2 help you get out of here by 5.00 tomorrow if I possibly

    3 can.

    4 A. I appreciate that.

    5 Q. To a great extent, whether or not we will be able to do

    6 that is going to be largely dependent on you. I think

    7 you understand what I am saying to you. I am going to

    8 try the best I can, and in the context of trying to

    9 accomplish the things I need to accomplish to make my

    10 questions to you as concise as possible; perhaps many of

    11 them can be answered with a yes or no by you, but by the

    12 same token, I do not want you to think that I am trying

    13 to restrict you in some way. If you feel that an

    14 explanation is necessary with regard to a matter we are

    15 talking about, please give us that explanation, because

    16 what we are really interested in is what light you can

    17 shed on the issues we are trying to deal with here and

    18 not in trying to establish some kind of control over you

    19 that would keep you from telling us what you think is

    20 important. Do you understand what I am saying to you?

    21 A. Understood perfectly. I will do whatever is relevant to

    22 assist the court.

    23 Q. Thank you, and maybe to assist me and you in getting

    24 through this.

    25 A. Indeed.

  • 1 Q. You know that -- I want to ask you something, just

    2 because I am fascinated by this. When I was fooling

    3 around on the Internet trying to find out things about

    4 you, one of the things I learned, and the first time we

    5 have heard it in this court that I know of, is that you

    6 are classified by King's College as a Reader and I have

    7 not seen that term before. What is that? What is a

    8 Reader?

    9 A. This is not a yes or no answer, I take it?

    10 Q. No, it cannot possibly be. There will be many of them

    11 that will not be that way.

    12 A. In the British academic system, there are a number of

    13 different kinds of appointments, some which may be

    14 termed as research appointments, some which involve

    15 teaching and research, various kinds and degrees of

    16 responsibility. Leaving aside the research posts, the

    17 first level is lecturer. This is a teaching post, this

    18 is the way the majority of people enter, and they become

    19 lecturers. I was previously a lecturer in war studies,

    20 before they gave me the title of Reader. Lecturers can

    21 be promoted to senior lecturer, which usually comes as

    22 a matter of having done a number of things such as long

    23 service, having performed a number of roles in terms of

    24 college administration, teaching and research, but more

    25 or less one way. These are appointments which can be

  • 1 made by any of the colleges within the University of

    2 London, which is a federal body of 45 separate

    3 institutions of which King's College is one, and one of

    4 the biggest and indeed in itself it is bigger than many

    5 other universities.

    6 The position of Reader is one which denotes a

    7 degree of national recognition with the potential,

    8 possibly, for international recognition or even a degree

    9 of international recognition, particularly in the area

    10 of research and writing, and which is a title conferred

    11 not by the college but on the nomination of the college

    12 by a council of the University of London as a whole, and

    13 that council, where there is a promotion, where somebody

    14 is promoted to a senior lecturer, would nominate two

    15 referees and the process would go through and be

    16 decided.

    17 In the cases of being conferred with the title of

    18 Reader, that entails not only going through that first

    19 stage, which is the same, to get the nomination, but

    20 then further references being sought, including from

    21 people in other universities in the UK and around the

    22 world; some of which you might get a chance to nominate,

    23 some of which you just do not know, which people are

    24 then asked to confirm whether or not they think you

    25 would merit being conferred with this title.

  • 1 The further stage would then to be conferred with

    2 the title of Professor, that is a full Chair, which is

    3 when, as I said before, international potential or some

    4 degrees of international recognition, the sense would be

    5 overall that the work that you have carried out is of an

    6 international standing and probably you have already

    7 been a Reader or something else first. I hope that is

    8 enough of a clarification.

    9 Q. I think you have told us more about that than any of us

    10 needed to know.

    11 A. I agree, but you asked the question.

    12 Q. So one does not interpret it the way one would

    13 ordinarily interpret the term, as a description of one

    14 who sits around and reads, but it has a technical

    15 connotation that goes way beyond that.

    16 A. It has a technical connotation which goes way beyond

    17 that and means it is difficult to find time to read,

    18 because you end up doing other things.

    19 Q. The fact people are likely to misunderstand that term

    20 would probably account for why we do not see it in your

    21 writings and your books as a description of who or what

    22 you are. We see "Lecturer", we see "Researcher", but I

    23 do not recall seeing "Reader" on any of the

    24 publications.

    25 A. I think that is because you are looking at publications

  • 1 for which the information was supplied before I was

    2 conferred with the title of Reader last year.

    3 Q. That was only last year?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. There is a course called, "the rise and fall of the

    6 Yugoslav state". Do you currently teach that course at

    7 King's College?

    8 A. I do.

    9 Q. Is it a regular lecture course where students attend the

    10 course on a regular basis and you give lectures and that

    11 sort of thing?

    12 A. It is a course which is taught regularly, that is one of

    13 the things that I have to do on Wednesday, to be there

    14 to teach it at 9.00 in the morning.

    15 Q. In the course of giving those students reading

    16 assignments for the kinds of things you would like them

    17 to read so that they can understand issues about the

    18 rise and fall of the Yugoslav state, I think you

    19 recommend about five works, as I can see from here. It

    20 would be a book by Ivo Banic, called, "Yugoslavia and

    21 the National Question in Yugoslavia, Origins, History,

    22 Politics"; Aleksa Djilas, "The Contested Country"; James

    23 Gow, "Legitimacy and the Military"; Susan Woodward, "The

    24 Balkan Tragedy"; and James Gow, "Triumph of the Lack of

    25 Will, International Diplomacy in the International War

  • 1 of Dissolution". Is that correct?

    2 A. Sorry, is what correct?

    3 Q. That that is the essential reading that you demand of

    4 the students in that course?

    5 A. I do not think it is reading that I demand of the

    6 students in the course. I am not sure what the document

    7 in front of you is. I suspect it may be a page taken

    8 either from a prospectus or from a departmental

    9 handbook. I do not recognise that, I have never seen

    10 that before.

    11 Q. Pull up your own -- not there. Some day when you get a

    12 chance, look at your college's website and you will find

    13 a description of your course and under "essential

    14 reading" it lists those five books.

    15 A. What I was going on to say, anyway, is -- I do not know

    16 where you got it from, but I assume it is taken from a

    17 departmental handbook or prospectus, something of that

    18 kind, I guess a website, and I have to say I do not have

    19 time to visit our own college website, especially to

    20 look at my own entries on it -- that is indicative

    21 reading. I was asked, for the purpose of prospectuses

    22 and handbooks, to supply a number of books that would be

    23 relevant as introductory reading, things which people

    24 might choose to read before they came to take up the

    25 course. Probably as a normal practice, that is not the

  • 1 extent of the things that it is suggested people read,

    2 these are things it might be particularly useful to read

    3 before coming; it is not the only things that

    4 I recommend strongly.

    5 Q. Please understand that where I am going with this

    6 question is just to establish that those books that you

    7 have listed as essential reading are books that you

    8 believe are useful and authoritative in terms of

    9 understanding what happened in the Yugoslav crisis?

    10 A. I would say that, but more precisely I would say they

    11 are useful in preparation for the course which will be

    12 taught.

    13 Q. I do not think you would put a book on that essential

    14 reading list that you believed was filled with

    15 inaccuracy and misjudgements and false factual matters

    16 and things of that nature. You would not want to

    17 deliberately mislead your students with bunkum, would

    18 you?

    19 A. Without prejudicing one of the classes in my course, one

    20 of the things I actually do is get them to read four

    21 texts separately to form an opinion on them, at least

    22 one of which is questionable and all of which have --

    23 because one of the important things in understanding the

    24 way I teach this course especially, but also the

    25 Yugoslav conflict as a whole, is to understand the

  • 1 importance of interpretations. So it is conceivable

    2 that I would put things on which I might otherwise have

    3 reservations about, precisely to bring people to points

    4 of understanding about the importance of interpretation.

    5 Q. Could you perhaps tell me a book that you might give

    6 them that you have reservations about?

    7 A. The text about which I have reservations and which some

    8 poor soul who is always the fall guy has to take, is,

    9 "The Yugoslav Crisis" by John Zametica. I would stress

    10 that however authoritative and however good any text on

    11 Yugoslavia, including my own, I would never ever regard

    12 any of them as being perfect and many which have faults

    13 also have agreed strengths. For example, one of the

    14 books you mentioned there, Aleksa Djilas, "The Contested

    15 Country", is an excellent book in many respects in

    16 describing the Yugoslav Communist Party and the question

    17 of its evolution of thinking on the national question,

    18 but it is a book which in some ways I would have

    19 reservations about, particularly at the time it was

    20 appearing, the emphasis on some other questions or the

    21 way in which some questions are dealt with.

    22 Q. You are familiar with a fellow named J.F. Brown, who wrote

    23 a book you are not particularly fond of also, correct?

    24 A. I am familiar with Jim Brown and I am familiar with the

    25 book that he wrote. It is not as much that -- it is not

  • 1 a question of fondness, but I think you are probably

    2 going to identify that I did make a comment about his

    3 comment on my work.

    4 Q. You called him an "asinine doubting Thomas", correct?

    5 A. I did that, but that is not all that I did. I did that

    6 in the context of his having described my analysis of

    7 something -- the particular thing was that I had laid

    8 out in an article the framework for the campaign by the

    9 JNA, Serbian political military forces in

    10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which I established the framework

    11 of operations and also noted the preparations which had

    12 gone before and Jim Brown, in a footnote on the book had

    13 said, if I remember correctly, and it struck a blow,

    14 I will tell you, as you understand, "but to construe

    15 planning as intention is" -- do you have the quote

    16 there? It is something like "one dimensional", I forget

    17 what, and so, piqued at this and also supplemented by

    18 the later availability of evidence from the memoirs of

    19 General Kadijevic concerning the plan I was describing,

    20 I made reference to this article and said, "this should

    21 satisfy asinine doubting Thomases like J.F. Brown",

    22 something to that effect.

    23 Q. You and Brown basically have gone into a footnote war?

    24 A. I do not think we got into anything more than a minor,

    25 and, until now, largely unnoticed, footnote skirmish.

  • 1 Q. I ask you this because I am trying to evaluate the

    2 position I will be in if I tend to disagree with things

    3 you have written. I wonder if I will become an asinine

    4 doubting Thomas by disagreeing with things you have

    5 written.

    6 A. How can we predict at this stage.

    7 Q. Okay. We have talked about a few books, you know that

    8 there have been a very, very large number of books

    9 written about the Yugoslav crisis and various aspects of

    10 it.

    11 A. Indeed.

    12 Q. If you look, for instance, at a list of published works

    13 about the war in Yugoslavia, the list just goes on and

    14 on, there are many, correct?

    15 A. There are many, correct.

    16 Q. I doubt that even you, with your focus on this, have had

    17 an opportunity to read all of them?

    18 A. That is correct. It would be amazing if I had, if

    19 anybody has.

    20 Q. I do not know -- I may not be correct about this, it

    21 seems to me that if you look at those books, especially

    22 the ones that focus on the politics and the military

    23 aspects of the war and the factual matters that occurred

    24 during the war, that we might be able to divide those

    25 books into three different types. There are a group of

  • 1 books that were written by journalists who were active

    2 in covering various aspects of the war. I am thinking,

    3 for instance, of David Roddy's book about Srebrenica,

    4 Misha Glenny's book. There also are a group of books

    5 that were written by people who might be more

    6 appropriately classified as academics, that will include

    7 the book written by you, the new book you have just

    8 written.

    9 A. I hope it also includes the other one as well.

    10 Q. That is kind of old.

    11 A. But it is still academic.

    12 Q. I will be happy to include it. There is the book

    13 written by Susan Woodward, which tends to be written

    14 from a more academic perspective, and my understanding

    15 is that there are a whole train of academic books

    16 sitting in a line at publishers about to come out and

    17 I cannot recall as I stand here the names of those

    18 authors, but there are some people from Harvard and some

    19 other places who have some books in line.

    20 Then I think the third category would probably be

    21 people reporting their personal experiences in a role

    22 that they played in some part of it. I am thinking, for

    23 instance, of David Owen's book about his role, and

    24 I know there are several others that would fall into

    25 that category. There may be other categories, but for

  • 1 purposes of what I want to talk to you about, I think

    2 that is sufficient to get into what I want to talk

    3 about.

    4 There is a difference, is there not, in the

    5 discipline between, for instance, a journalist who is

    6 writing an account of incidents that occurred that they

    7 were reporting and an historian who is trying to write

    8 an academic work of history; there is a difference in

    9 the approach and a difference in -- I think difference

    10 in approach is a sufficient question. That is true, is

    11 it not?

    12 A. There might well be a difference in approach between a

    13 journalist and an historian in the way they approached

    14 it, but I see no reason whatsoever to suppose that an

    15 historian would not be capable of writing a book as a

    16 journalist would, or a journalist an essentially

    17 historical book, or an academic book of any other

    18 description, not necessarily historical.

    19 Q. I agree with you that a journalist can in many ways

    20 become an historian and an historian can in many ways

    21 become a journalist, but what I am suggesting to you is

    22 the discipline is a bit different in terms of the need,

    23 if you are writing a book as an historian, from an

    24 historical perspective, to be much more certain, with

    25 regard to the facts that you report and the conclusions

  • 1 that you draw, that you are dealing with valid,

    2 verifiable information. A journalist might very well

    3 report, both in newspapers and in books, matters that

    4 they have heard third or fourth hand and sort of, "let

    5 the reader sort it out", sort of say, "this came from

    6 here, you decide for yourself whether this makes sense

    7 or not", whereas an historian is more likely to demand

    8 confirmations of sources and things of that nature

    9 because an historian understands they are writing not

    10 for the moment but for history.

    11 A. That may well be the case, it might be true of any kind

    12 of academic enterprise. I assume it is the case for

    13 history, but as I am not trained as an historian,

    14 I would be careful of expressing too firm an opinion on

    15 it. In general, an academic exercise is intended.

    16 Q. Although you are not trained as an historian, you tend

    17 to deal with history a great deal. It is a large part

    18 of what you do in terms of your writing and your

    19 lecturing and everything else. You are talking with us

    20 here today about the history of the Yugoslav crisis.

    21 You come at it from a military and political

    22 perspective, maybe like a military scientist, political

    23 scientist, but you still are coming at it from a

    24 historical perspective, are you not?

    25 A. I do not think that I am. I am not sure what "coming at

  • 1 it from a historical perspective" means. I hate to be

    2 really difficult about this, especially seeing as I want

    3 to get away, but I really do not understand what that

    4 means. If you say that I deal with things that happened

    5 in the past as a way of understanding military and

    6 political dimensions of the present, that is the case,

    7 but dealing with things in the past is not the same

    8 thing as history.

    9 MR. ACKERMAN: It is virtually time for us to break. Let me

    10 leave you with something that you have written. The

    11 degree of detail when you are talking about your book,

    12 "Triumph", and how it is written:

    13 "This degree of detail is necessary for an

    14 accurate interpretation rather than the more usual

    15 approach to analysis of the difficulties of the Yugoslav

    16 conflict which relies less on analysis of particulars

    17 and more on opinion, based on incomplete information and

    18 understanding."

    19 Did you get it or would you like me to read it

    20 again?

    21 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You might as well repeat it. I think

    22 that is the intention.

    23 MR. ACKERMAN: That is what I will do. You are talking about

    24 the degree of detail that you go into in your book.

    25 What you have written is:

  • 1 "This degree of detail is necessary for an

    2 accurate interpretation rather than the more usual

    3 approach to analysis of the difficulties of the Yugoslav

    4 conflict, which relies less on analysis of particulars

    5 and more on opinion based on incomplete information and

    6 understanding."

    7 Let me ask you not to comment about that now,

    8 because I think it is time for us to break. I will give

    9 you the whole evening to figure out what you would like

    10 to say, if you have anything to say about that.

    11 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You might start the comment at 10.00

    12 tomorrow morning.

    13 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, your Honour.

    14 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: The Trial Chamber will now rise.

    15 (5.30 pm)

    16 (Hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

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