1 Wednesday, 23 January 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.26 p.m.
5 JUDGE LIU: Call the case please, Madam Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
7 IT-98-34-T, the Prosecutor versus Naletilic and Martinovic.
8 JUDGE LIU: I'm sorry for the delay. That's because of the
9 overtime of the previous case which was using this courtroom, which also
10 shows that how punctuality is important to all those trials.
11 Mr. Usher, will you please bring in the witness.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Witness.
14 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE LIU: Please understand that you are under solemn
17 THE WITNESS: I understand.
18 WITNESS: MARTIN GARROD [Resumed]
19 Examined by Mr. Scott: [Continued]
20 Q. Good afternoon, Sir Martin.
21 A. Good afternoon.
22 Q. Before we finish with a few additional documents, I'd like to go
23 back and follow up on a few things from yesterday. I'd like to direct
24 your attention, please, to around the 19th of September, 1993. Did you
25 meet on that day or about that time an ABiH officer by the name of Esad
2 A. Yes, I did. I'd previously had a meeting with Arif Pasalic and
3 then I had a separate meeting in his headquarters with Esad Humo, who is
4 the deputy commander of one brigade of the ABiH.
5 Q. Can you recall whether Humo told you that day about a particular
6 incident that had happened sometime previous to that?
7 A. Yes. He was -- he had two main things which were concerning him
8 considerably. First of all, he said that he wanted to draw my attention
9 to the fact that the HVO were using prisoners to dig trenches on the front
10 lines. And secondly, he then said that, two days previously, four
11 prisoners had been dressed up in HVO uniform and placed in front of the
12 front lines. The object, of course, would be to draw fire, to see where
13 the fire was coming from. One was seriously injured, but the other three
14 managed to get back across the lines.
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
16 MR. MEEK: Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours. It has
17 come to my attention, and I apologise for not standing and making this
18 objection sooner, but apparently Mr. Humo is deceased, is no longer within
19 the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to bring him here to cross-examine him
20 concerning the statements that Sir Martin Garrod is now making and they
21 are introduced -- offered for the proof.
22 JUDGE LIU: It seems to me that we have come across this problem
23 yesterday, and this Trial Chamber has made a ruling already.
24 You may proceed, Mr. Scott.
25 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, may I perhaps add that Pasalic is
2 certainly dead, he drowned, but to the best of my knowledge, Esad Humo is
3 still alive.
4 JUDGE LIU: You may proceed.
5 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. Now, you discussed a bit the detention camps and specifically some
7 visit that you had to the Dretelj camp. Let me ask you generally, during
8 your various conversations with senior HVO officials, was any
9 justification ever made to you or given to you as for the existence of
10 these camps?
11 A. No. The camps tended to be a non-subject, and they were never
12 really -- they never provided any justification for them, no.
13 Q. All right. If I could ask you to look next at -- I think the
14 binder's still there. If you can turn your attention to Exhibit 611.1.
15 Again, we've worked our way toward the back of the binder. If you should
16 come across it in a different -- if it might assist you or anyone else, it
17 is a daily summary for the 24th of September, 1993, from CC Mostar to RC
19 A. Yes. I've got it.
20 Q. All right. If you would just -- I'm not going to ask you detailed
21 questions about the first topic at all, but if you just cast your eyes
22 down the first two pages, actually continuing over to the third page, but
23 there's a substantial part of this report simply records a fairly
24 extensive meeting or conversation you had with Slobodan Praljak on the --
25 about this date, the 24th of September, 1993.
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 Q. And as you indicate in the first paragraph under number 2,
3 "Political activity," was that -- was he in fact at that time, as of that
4 time, the overall chief, I guess number one position, in other words, of
5 the HVO army?
6 A. Yes, he was.
7 Q. If I can direct you to the top of page 3. Primarily just for the
8 Chamber's benefit, to tie into other evidence.
9 As part of this conversation and meeting with General Praljak that
10 day, were you seeking the HVO's permission for a BBC news team to come
11 into Mostar?
12 A. Yes. I left it to the end of the discussion because I guessed it
13 would be a contentious point.
14 Q. And --
15 A. I'm sorry.
16 Q. No, please.
17 A. And when I raised the subject -- he had been very cheerful and
18 smiling up to then. He then became extremely angry.
19 Q. And is this -- I'm sorry?
20 A. Sorry.
21 Q. Is this the same news team that Jeremy Bowen, to your knowledge,
22 was part of?
23 A. That is correct, yes.
24 Q. Go ahead, please. I --
25 A. He then gave a long tirade against the lack of impartiality of the
1 BBC and said that he was not going to let the BBC into East Mostar under
2 any circumstances. I then went back to the BBC and advised them to
3 contact Slobodan Bozic and Bruno Stojic direct, which they did, and then
4 they obtained agreement. So Praljak, to an extent, shall we say, was
6 Q. Very well. Further down that page in another section toward the
7 bottom, the paragraph above item 3, "Military activity," so it's the
8 preceding paragraph, there are several references to a Colonel Akrap,
9 A-K-R-A-P. Do you recall having any dealings with this man, either by
10 telephone or in person or of any sort?
11 A. Yes. We met for the one and only time when I attended a meeting
12 chaired by Mr. Tadic, who was leading on humanitarian affairs for the
13 Croats, trying to arrange a joint Croat-Bosnian convoy, food convoy, up
14 into Central Bosnia. And he was extremely disruptive and in fact
15 virtually brought the whole meeting to a close by trying to swing the
16 whole meeting on to the subject of casualty evacuation helicopters which,
17 of course, was not the subject of the meeting at all. When I asked him
18 what his job was, what his appointment was, he replied, "That is a
20 Q. Did you ever learn or were you ever made aware that this
21 Colonel Akrap was an HV officer?
22 A. No, I did not know that.
23 Q. Let me ask you to look at the top of the next page, and I will not
24 ask you to cover the topic again, but is this simply a record of one of
25 your conversations about moving approximately 500 detainees from Dretelj
1 to the Croatian island of Korcula?
2 A. Yes, I remember that. That was Claudio Baranzani, the head of the
3 ICRC, informed me of that.
4 Q. A name that may not have come up in your testimony as much as it
5 might have, and I may have skipped over a few points yesterday, but just
6 in case, in this report you also mention a man named Bogo -- I'm sorry,
7 Bozo Raguz. Just for the record and in case he should come up in the
8 future, can you tell us who he was and what his role was vis-a-vis you?
9 A. Yes. I met him when we got into Mostar because he was the liaison
10 officer with the international communities for the HVO in Mostar.
11 Q. And was he, therefore, someone that you had some number of
12 dealings with?
13 A. Yes. I met him on several occasions, yes, a number of occasions.
14 Q. I ask you now to go to the next exhibit which hopefully should --
15 if you again just leaf down through the B/C/S translation, you should come
16 to Exhibit 642.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And can you just confirm, please, this is a report, a daily
19 summary from CC Mostar for the 13th of October, 1993, and directing your
20 attention to the fourth page of the report. Are you familiar with the
21 preparer of this report?
22 A. Yes. That's Jesus Amatriain of the Spanish who I handed over to
23 HCC Mostar when I moved to Zenica. He stayed in that position for a few
24 weeks until I sent Philip Watkins down to take over the post.
25 Q. Now, up on that last page above that under 6, there's a reference
1 to an invitation by General Andabak and then some -- also a reference to
2 Tuta and it says, "He and Tuta are the war lords of this area. Sir Martin
3 Garrod knows Tuta and his story."
4 Now, can you provide some light in terms of had you discussed with
5 Mr. Amatriain or how is it that -- if you can give us some additional
6 assistance when he says you know Tuta and his story, what was that based
8 A. Well, for a start, I'm pretty certain that Jesus Amatriain was
9 also present at the lunch that I had in the mayor of Siroki Brijeg's
10 house. I'm sure he was. And so I knew that he had contacts with Ivan
11 Andabak, because particularly with the Spanish link, and so no doubt we
12 would have discussed these matters.
13 Q. On the prior page, there are -- he makes a report -- when I say
14 he, Mr. Amatriain, makes the report that apparently concerning two Muslim
15 villages that, according to this document, perhaps Mr. Tuta and Mr.
16 Andabak had given some protection to, is one of the words that was used.
17 Can you add anything to what's in this document about that, sir?
18 A. No, I can't. Of course, I was pleased to see that. The villages
19 are fairly close to Mostar, south-west of Mostar, but I'm afraid I cannot
20 really add anything to that. I did not know those two villages myself.
21 Q. If I can ask you then please to go to Exhibit 643. Really,
22 primarily, sir, I want -- if you can confirm again that this is a CC daily
23 summary for Mostar for the 13th of October, 1993, also prepared by Jesus
25 A. That is correct, yes.
1 Q. Concerning I guess two quick items: On the second page under the
2 heading B, "Minorities," toward the end of the paragraph titled "Comment,"
3 if you see that.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. There's a reference to -- it says, "We did have not any problem
6 yesterday due to the fact that General Andabak, Ivan, one of the HVO SF
7 commander passed at that moment and ordered the MP to let us pass."
8 A couple of questions. In common parlance, what would the MP be
9 reference to?
10 A. I think he's referring to military police.
11 Q. And did you ever hear any discussion or did Mr. Amatriain ever
12 tell you anything about the authority of Mr. Andabak in connection with
13 giving orders to the military police?
14 A. No, but that wouldn't surprise me, bearing in mind his seniority
15 in the hierarchy of the military.
16 Q. And next I'm going to direct your attention to a short paragraph a
17 little below the middle of the page, where again it says, "HCC tried this
18 afternoon to deal with the affair of providing school and water for people
19 from Kozice, but Mr. Naletilic, M, nickname Tuta, was not available."
20 I simply ask you again did Mr. Amatriain share any more
21 information with you about his involvement if any with Tuta in that
23 A. No. I don't recall any further information.
24 Q. And I think the final question on this document, under item 6,
25 does that, as far as you know, record a meeting that Mr. Amatriain did in
1 fact have as indicated earlier, a meeting with Andabak that previous
3 A. Yes. He said he was going to meet him and here he clearly did
4 meet him the previous night. So it is clearly a record of his -- the
5 discussions that they had.
6 Q. And if I can ask you to go then to -- back to your end of tour
7 report, which was a couple of documents, one or two documents down. We'll
8 skip over a couple of documents, but it's --
9 A. Yes, I've found it.
10 Q. All right. Sir Martin, on this document I had promised to counsel
11 yesterday that we would get back --
12 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Yes, Mr. Meek.
13 MR. MEEK: May we have an exhibit number on that, please?
14 MR. SCOTT: Of course. 770.1. It's the end of tour report.
15 Q. Sir Martin, I indicated to the counsel and Chamber yesterday that
16 I would take you back to the one question -- clarification, and it's on
17 page 3, top of page 3, about the HV presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And
18 about two-thirds of the way through that first paragraph, what would be
19 the carry-over of paragraph 15, are the words "We were also aware of a
20 build-up of HVO/HV in the Buna area south of Mostar."
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. I think that I put the question to you yesterday, I used the word,
23 if you had observed or your teams this observed. Can you clarify please,
24 if you can, the nature or basis of the awareness that you or your
25 organisation had of that presence of HV troops in that location?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. That would almost certainly have come from the team M3, mike 3
2 based in Medjugorje, based on his sightings, but I cannot be categoric
3 about that.
4 Q. All right. In closing, Sir Martin, a couple of questions.
5 After -- sometime soon after the ICTY had returned indictments against the
6 men Dario Kordic and Tihomir Blaskic in approximately November 1995, did
7 you have any conversations with any senior HVO officials about that
9 A. Yes. I remember one --
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
11 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, Your Honours, the objection is that this
12 is well outside the scope of the indictment, and I believe this Honourable
13 Trial Chamber yesterday indicated that we would not be dealing with the
14 years of 1995 and 1996, and those years, and this is exactly where we're
15 coming back full circle to 1996 now -- or 1995. It's inappropriate, it's
16 outside the scope, and we object.
17 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Scott, you have to show to us the relevance of
18 this question --
19 MR. SCOTT: I will.
20 JUDGE LIU: -- to this case.
21 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I will, and the reason is, it is
22 not -- I think for this purpose the time is not critical. What I'm trying
23 to have this witness assist you with is the attitudes or views of many of
24 the Bosnian Croats - certainly not all - but toward people like Dario
25 Kordic, and then a follow-up question concerning the man Tuta. And I
1 think it is -- I think it is something the Chamber should know in terms of
2 the way things were down there during this time, and perhaps still are.
3 JUDGE LIU: Well, if you're eventually going to lead us to the
4 accused of this case, we'll allow you to go.
5 MR. SCOTT: I will, Your Honour, and I believe, I mean if I can
6 predict -- I can't obviously completely predict how the witness will
7 answer, but I believe I have four questions.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Yes, Mr. Meek.
9 MR. MEEK: Your Honour, we believe that it is highly improper to
10 talk about what some people in Bosnia-Herzegovina felt three, four years,
11 three years, two years after the facts which we've been hearing about
12 since September 10th of last year in this Trial Chamber. It's
13 unbelievable, and we object strongly to being able to allow this type of
14 evidence so far after the scope of this indictment. We -- clear -- it's
15 been pointed out that not only after the indictment, the war had been over
16 with, peace had settled in, it was peacetime. It -- where does this end
17 if we start this? I object strongly, Your Honour.
18 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, the statement about Mr. Kordic, that
19 would be one of my next questions, was allowed in the Kordic case. I
20 realise that's not governing on this Chamber. I fully appreciate that,
21 but I simply point that out to Chamber. It was relevant to who the man
22 Kordic was, and I -- all I suppose I can do is make an offer of proof
23 that -- of what the evidence would be, and if you think it's relevant or
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Scott, you have to explain to us how
2 relevant it is for that case with this very case.
3 MR. SCOTT: Very well, Your Honour. Your Honour, this -- I
4 believe that if -- I would put it -- I would make the offer of proof this
5 way: That if allowed, I believe, from prior statements of this witness,
6 the witness would indicate that this HVO senior official said to
7 Mr. Garrod, he said, "You must remember -- you must remember that Kordic
8 was our Churchill. He was a war hero to these people." And then I was
9 going to ask Sir Martin if he had any similar information about how Tuta
10 was regarded in the Mostar region, and I submit the witness, I expect,
11 would say that he was regarded by a large number of the Bosnian Croats as
12 a war hero. And I think the Chamber should know that --
13 JUDGE LIU: But why don't you ask a direct question concerning the
14 accused rather than refer to another case?
15 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, because I thought that it was appropriate
16 because we've asked questions before about the HVO leadership and that
17 this was not -- a position not unique to Mr. Naletilic but this was the
18 attitude that many of these leaders were held in. I thought it was quite
19 relevant. Of course, I wasn't allowed to ask the question.
20 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Krsnik.
21 MR. KRSNIK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for your
22 indulgence, but I want to object briefly but strongly, in the strongest
23 possible terms. I cannot allow it, and I really strongly protest against
24 introducing by the back door into the courtroom certain things which are
25 happening outside the time frame. The war ended with the Washington
1 Accords, which is in 1994, and then peace set in, and thank God it is
2 still there. And there is the Federation which is still such as it is.
3 This Court is not competent to try anything that happened during
4 the time of peace. Our indictment ends with February, and what is more
5 important with regard to this witness, and we've read his previous
6 statement, all his knowledge about the events date from the -- from 1994,
7 that is, following April 18th, that is, after the peace was established.
8 And then in 1995, 1996, and so forth, when this witness, of course, was
9 there and he was principally concerned to establish a united government
10 in Mostar.
11 Of course he heard a lot of hearsay. Of course there was a lot of
12 grapevine; of course there were a lot of things, but that, Your Honours,
13 has nothing to do with the indictment. What he heard in 1995, 1996, 1997
14 about the political interests, about the political struggles among
15 political parties, that has nothing to do. What the witness knows about
16 1993, he has already told us. Thank you very much, Your Honours, but once
17 again I protest in the strongest possible terms and I hope you will not
18 allow it. Thank you.
19 JUDGE LIU: You may ask a question about how the accused in this
20 case was regarded in 1993 and 1994 but not mention the other case.
21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. Sir Martin, if you recall, based on your experience and
23 involvement in Herzegovina and the Mostar region in 1993 and certainly at
24 least the first part of 1994, can you tell the Chamber your understanding
25 and assessment of how many of the Bosnian Croat people regarded
1 Mr. Naletilic?
2 A. I would say to about 50 per cent of the Croats that Mladen
3 Naletilic was a mythical -- well, not mythical but a hero of the war, and
4 they regarded him with respect and awe. I can give an example of that but
5 the example is a little bit outside the time scale.
6 Q. In light of the limitations, Sir Martin, I won't ask you about
8 Sir Martin, I thank you very much for your testimony.
9 No further questions, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE LIU: Any cross-examination? Yes, Mr. Meek.
11 Cross-examined by Mr. Meek:
12 Q. Good afternoon, Witness.
13 A. Good afternoon.
14 Q. My name is Chris Meek, and I am one of the Defence counsel for the
15 accused Mladen Naletilic.
16 A. Yes. Thank you.
17 Q. The first question I have is how would you like me to address
19 A. It doesn't worry me at all. Anything.
20 Q. Sir Martin, did you take a survey in 1995? You've just testified
21 that 50 per cent of the Croats believed that my client was some hero of
22 the war. Did you take a survey?
23 A. No. No.
24 Q. How many people did you even talk to?
25 A. Oh, I talked to, over the years, to a lot of people.
1 Q. You also indicated that out of these number of people that many of
2 the people felt that he was a mythical person. Didn't you say that?
3 A. Yes. I think I took the word "mythical" back. I think they held
4 him in "awe" is the word.
5 Q. Would it surprise you, Sir Martin, if we've had one other witness
6 in this case who has described Mr. Naletilic as a myth?
7 A. As a myth. Well, to my mind, a myth is something which does not
8 exist, whereas I think Mr. Naletilic does exist.
9 Q. While a person might be actually existing, his actions or his
10 position could be mythical, couldn't they?
11 A. Yes. Certainly actions and -- ascribed to him could be --
12 Q. Thank you.
13 A. -- could be mythical, yes.
14 Q. And you're aware, are you not, that Mr. Naletilic was involved in
15 the war alongside his Muslim brothers against the Serb aggressors?
16 A. Yes, indeed.
17 Q. And isn't it a fair statement, Sir Martin, that these people who
18 you have claimed believed him to be some sort of a mythical hero could
19 very well have been describing their feelings toward this gentleman from
20 the war against the Serb aggressors?
21 A. Oh, indeed. And that applied to a number of other leaders.
22 Q. Thank you. If you'd like to look at the document, Sir Martin, you
23 certainly can. It's 642, P642. It's a daily summary from 13 -- excuse
24 me. Yeah, 13 of October, 1993. I don't think you really need to but --
25 you indicated in that report that there were two Muslim villages that were
1 somehow being taken care or protected by my client Tuta, and you also
2 indicated that you were very pleased to see or hear that; correct?
3 A. Of course. One was always delighted to hear of people of the
4 opposite divide taking care of the minorities.
5 Q. And do you have any knowledge of how many other villages in the
6 area that my client may have had some protection or have taken care of
7 other than these two?
8 A. No.
9 Q. You do not rule out that possibility, though, do you, Sir Martin?
10 A. No, of course not.
11 Q. You indicated in your direct examination, Sir Martin, that your
12 goals with the ECMM were three, and I believe you even put them in the
13 proper order -- correct me if I'm wrong -- political first, military --
14 military second, and third humanitarian.
15 A. Yes. Reporting on those three issues, yes.
16 Q. If I'm pausing, Sir Martin, I'm trying to look at the transcript
17 to make sure we don't overlap since we both speak the same language.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So -- do you mean by that statement that you were primarily
20 interested in political matters in Bosnia?
21 A. Yes. We were attempting to get -- I'm sorry. I must be a bit
22 slower. Yes. We were attempting to gain for our masters, our political
23 masters in the capitals, as an accurate picture as we possibly could of
24 the political strands running throughout the whole of the country, because
25 as you will be aware, at this time the Vance-Owen Plan was collapsing, but
1 then we were moving on into other discussions, the Invincible plan, the
2 EU action, and so on. So it was essential that all the political masters
3 in our countries had as accurate information as possible on the political
4 situation and, of course, the military situation which was so closely
5 linked in with it.
6 Q. So the lowest priority on your list was humanitarian aid, is that
7 correct, or helping humanitarian convoys?
8 A. It was third in the priorities but I would not say it was of a low
9 priority, certainly not. It was of great importance to us, and we spent a
10 great deal -- a great deal of our time on humanitarian matters. But as I
11 said, it was the political and military reporting which were the first two
13 Q. And when you indicated earlier that you were gaining this
14 information on political matters and military matters for your masters,
15 are you indicating the British government?
16 A. No, I'm not indicating the British government. I'm indicating
17 the -- well, for me, initially, the regional centre, then the headquarters
18 of the ECMM, and from there to the EU Presidency and the capitals of the
19 12 countries and five OSCE countries that formed the EC monitor mission.
20 I was not -- I must stress I was not reporting to the British
21 government at all.
22 Q. And, Sir Martin, tell me if you can, at that time in 1993, did
23 Britain have any interests in Bosnia?
24 A. Yes. I think we all -- I think Britain certainly, along with
25 other countries, had a great deal of interest in Bosnia.
1 Q. What kind of interest would that have been, sir?
2 A. Concern after the war in Slovenia and then the war in Croatia and
3 to see a third war erupting in Bosnia. In other words, great concern and
4 a determination to try and resolve the whole problem.
5 Q. I'll be quite honest with you, Sir Martin. Since you started your
6 testimony on Monday afternoon, you've spoken about so many things and so
7 many topics and so many areas that I really didn't even know where to
8 start this cross-examination. So bear with me, please.
9 A. Of course.
10 Q. If you know, can you tell us, me and the Trial Chamber, why it
11 took so long for the western world to step into the situation in the
12 Balkans back then, if you know?
13 MR. SCOTT: I wonder how relevant that is, Your Honour. Objection.
14 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Meek, we don't believe this question is
15 relevant. You must skip this question. It's too political.
16 MR. MEEK: Pardon me?
17 JUDGE LIU: It's too political oriented.
18 MR. MEEK: The reason I asked it, Your Honour, Sir Martin has
19 testified that his primary goal was political in his ECMM mission. I
20 understand it's a political question, but he did testify to that.
21 JUDGE LIU: Well, you know, this is a Tribunal. We are just
22 addressing the individual responsibilities rather than to solve any
23 political issues, and this witness is certainly not a politician. He may
24 be an expert in military matters, but certainly he's not a politician. So
25 you must skip this question.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President. I will skip this question.
2 Q. Sir Martin, as the President, Judge Liu, just mentioned, you may
3 be an expert in military matters, and my question to you is: Did you come
4 to this Tribunal, in your own mind, to testify as a military expert?
5 A. Throughout my whole time in Bosnia, I was not in a military role.
6 First of all, with the EC monitor mission, we were civilians, and then for
7 the rest of my time in Bosnia I was there in a civilian capacity, albeit
8 having had a military background.
9 Q. And a fairly lengthy and extensive military background at that, I
10 take it. Thirty-seven years, is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Are you then familiar with any rules concerning warfare or armed
13 aggression between countries?
14 A. I would not be able to read off the various conventions, but I
15 am -- I am aware, yes.
16 Q. I'd like to pose a question then to you. If, for example, two
17 countries are side by side, like Sweden and Norway, and Sweden acts as an
18 aggressor and attacks Norway, are you aware of any rules, military rules
19 of conduct which would allow Norway to move into the actual -- inside the
20 borders of Sweden, the aggressors, in order to protect their country and
21 neutralise the aggressors?
22 A. I don't know the exact rules, but I would have thought that if one
23 is being attacked from another country, then you are entitled to take
24 retaliatory action, yes.
25 Q. And in fact specifically, if you know, is it allowed to go into
1 that other country, the aggressive country, in order to neutralise and
2 take your troops into that country to neutralise, and in defence, the
4 A. I don't know what the rules say, but common sense says yes.
5 Q. Sir Martin, I want to clarify the fact that your first posting in
6 Bosnia was in Mostar on 1st of July, 1993; correct?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. And it's my understanding that you arrived in Siroki Brijeg
10 A. Yes. We were based -- CC headquarters was based in a little house
11 in Siroki Brijeg.
12 Q. It took -- was it two weeks before you finally got into Mostar
13 or --
14 A. No.
15 Q. -- four weeks?
16 A. I think it must have been the best part of six weeks.
17 Q. Six weeks?
18 A. Hmm. I was trying every single day to get in.
19 Q. During this six-week period, you came to know the chief of police
20 of Siroki Brijeg, did you not?
21 A. I -- I didn't come to know him. I think I had one meeting with
23 Q. The mayor of Siroki Brijeg, did you meet him?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. How many other approximate persons in government in Siroki Brijeg,
1 in the municipal -- city level, did you meet?
2 A. Very few, because I hardly spent any time in Siroki Brijeg. I did
3 not realise at that time how many interesting people were living in Siroki
4 Brijeg, otherwise I would have spent more time in Siroki Brijeg.
5 Q. Once you finally did arrive in Mostar and set up your
6 headquarters, which under your testimony would be approximately six weeks;
8 A. No. We got into Mostar, but we didn't move the base from Siroki
9 Brijeg because at that stage -- sorry. I'm just looking at the -- at that
10 stage, it wasn't possible to find any accommodation for the headquarters
11 in Mostar. So we were still based in Siroki Brijeg, travelling daily to
13 Q. After you were -- after you did get some headquarters in Mostar,
14 you remained in Siroki Brijeg, though? You slept every night in Siroki
16 A. We left in Siroki Brijeg, yes.
17 Q. During the whole 91 days that you were there, or 90 some-odd days
18 that you were there; correct?
19 A. Yes. Apart from my visits to Zenica, Zagreb, or wherever.
20 Q. After the first ordeal that you've described, the difficulties
21 of getting into Mostar proper, how many days on the average per week would
22 you go into Mostar personally, Sir Martin?
23 A. This is quite difficult to remember, but I would say two or three
24 times a week into West Mostar and two or three times a week into East
25 Mostar. That was the focus of our interest. Of course, I did have other
1 responsibilities, but Mostar was the focus.
2 Q. Sir Martin, I notice you looking at the screen and the
3 transcription has stopped, but I'm listening to the French translation.
4 So that's why I'm waiting longer to ask my next question.
5 A. I am -- that's all right. I'm trying to notice whether there are
6 any --
7 Q. I'm sorry, you're trying to notice if there's any --
8 A. Yes. No, that's fine.
9 Q. I forgot to mention this earlier so I'll ask it now before I
10 forget. Which one of the three primary responsibilities of your ECMM
11 mission, political, military, and humanitarian, which one of those fell
12 into being a front man for BBC to get into East Mostar to make a
14 A. I don't suppose that they were really concerned -- you mean from
15 my point of view?
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. None of those. It didn't fall into any particular category. It
18 was just a request that we had from the BBC to help them to get into
19 Mostar, and we tried to assist international organisations, where we
20 could, as we knew the ground and we had the contacts. So this was purely
21 a response to a request.
22 Q. But not -- you'll agree with me that request came not from an
23 international organisation or humanitarian organisation, though, did it,
25 A. No. But we did -- we used to have many requests from many
1 different people. Some we accepted; some we didn't. But this seemed to
2 us to be a perfectly reasonable request, so we said we would do what we
3 could to help them.
4 Q. Did you spend more time, in your opinion, in East Mostar or did
5 you spend more time in West Mostar during that period of time that you
6 would go two to three times a week?
7 A. I would say roughly 50/50.
8 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber, please, what personal knowledge
9 you have, not what someone told you or you read in any report, but what
10 personal knowledge you have of the presence of HV troops in Mostar during
11 your three months there?
12 A. I relied on reports of my teams who I had utmost faith in, but the
13 only HV that I have told you that I actually saw were on the mountain road
14 between Tomislavgrad and Prozor.
15 Q. For the benefit of the Trial Chamber, that's approximately how
16 many hours away by car from Mostar?
17 A. I can tell you Tomislavgrad is about two hours, two hours by
19 Q. And Tomislavgrad is very close to the border of Croatia and
20 Bosnia; is that correct?
21 A. It's -- it's heading down towards Split.
22 Q. How far from the border between Croatia and Bosnia is Tomislavgrad
23 located, to the best of your knowledge?
24 A. I think driving time from the border to Tomislavgrad probably
25 would have about three-quarters of an hour to an hour.
1 Q. I believe most all of the attorneys in this courtroom, including
2 you, Sir Martin, have been to this area. The Trial Chamber has not. So
3 when you describe a 30 or 45-minute drive, these are on small, windy roads
4 and not super highways or autobahns; correct?
5 A. No, it's a reasonable tarmac road up from Split to Tomislavgrad
6 but then from Tomislavgrad to Prozor, it was a totally -- a mountain
8 Q. Thank you.
9 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott.
10 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I see you've already pulled out the
11 map. I'm simply going to suggest that it might assist the witness and the
12 Chamber to have one of the maps, in particular I've pulled out P3, but I
13 think it makes it much clearer than just talking about it abstractly, I
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
16 MR. MEEK: I would like to thank my learned colleague for that
17 suggestion, and if I could borrow the map P --
18 MR. SCOTT: Sure. You can use me or the Registry's. It doesn't
20 MR. MEEK: -- P3 for the ELMO, please. For the record, we have a
21 map previously identified and admitted as P3 in front of Sir Martin.
22 Q. If you'd like to, Sir Martin, certainly feel free to take the map
23 in your hand and look at it first, if you'd like to.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And once you have found the location of Tomislavgrad, you might
1 circle that.
2 A. It's marked -- it's marked on the map as Duvno.
3 Q. Thank you. While you still have the map, Sir Martin, could you do
4 me another favour? Does that map reflect the boundary of the country of
5 Croatia on Bosnia?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Can you take that red pen that you have in your hand and draw the
8 line where the border is, please?
9 MR. SCOTT: We have no objection, Your Honour.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Scott, please. Mr. Scott, your
11 microphone. You could not be interpreted.
12 THE WITNESS: [Marks] Sorry. Can I just mark on one more
13 thing? [Marks]
14 MR. MEEK:
15 Q. Thank you, Sir Martin. You have a pointer there --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- somewhere.
18 A. Sorry.
19 Q. The usher will have a --
20 A. Wait a minute. There is Mostar.
21 Q. Yes. Thank you.
22 A. Tomislavgrad, marked "Duvno" on the map.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. And the mountain road was between Tomislavgrad and Prozor, up
25 through the mountains here.
1 Q. Okay.
2 A. And this, I think you might just be able to see it, I have marked
3 it --
4 Q. I see it very clearly. Thank you, Sir Martin. So that would be,
5 as the crow flies, from Tomislavgrad to the border of Croatia, can you
6 roughly give us an estimate of the kilometres since you spent so much time
8 A. I used to think in terms of time, not distance, because distance
9 didn't make -- wasn't relevant. It was time. I would say about
10 three-quarters of an hour. I'd say about --
11 Q. As the crow --
12 A. -- 45 kilometres.
13 Q. As the crow flies.
14 A. Something like that, yes.
15 Q. Okay. Thank you very much. I don't need the ELMO any longer.
16 A. Maybe a little bit more. Maybe a little bit more.
17 Q. Sir Martin, you were -- you didn't discuss this in your direct
18 testimony, but most of the ECMM personnel and other monitors who have
19 testified in this Trial Chamber have described being briefed before they
20 went to the area on their mission. Were you also briefed?
21 A. Yes. I had a briefing in London because I was recruited by our
22 foreign office initially and then flew out to Zagreb, where we were given
23 briefings on the whole of the former Yugoslavia at the headquarters of the
24 ECMM, because at that stage we did not know where we were going to go. We
25 were asked where we wanted to go. I said Bosnia, and I fortunately got
1 it, so then went to Zenica where I had further briefings. But I did not
2 know for -- I was a week in Zenica, at the regional centre, and then I was
3 told that the head wanted me to go down to Mostar.
4 Q. Would it be a fair statement, Sir Martin, that when you were
5 briefed in London, in Zagreb, in Zenica, that you were briefed on all of
6 the political climate as you might find it in this area around Mostar? Is
7 that correct?
8 A. Not specifically around Mostar. London was a very broad briefing
9 on the whole of the Yugoslavia. In Zagreb, the ECMM operations areas were
10 described, but again covering it in big detail but not focusing -- Mostar
11 was not -- I suppose it must have been discussed, but it wasn't in
12 detail. And it wasn't until I got to Zenica that we started talking about
13 specific areas.
14 Q. Thank you for that answer. I presume that would be the way it
15 would work. So in Zenica is when you learned and were briefed the
16 clearest and in the most detail about what to expect militarily,
17 politically, and otherwise on the ground in Mostar and in that south-west
18 Herzegovina area; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And in those briefings, you were told, were you not, the political
21 figures and the military figures of the ABiH army and their -- and the
22 HVO; correct?
23 A. I suppose I was, but I can't really remember what those briefings
24 consisted of, because what really matters is not what you're told but when
25 you get on the ground and see what the situation is yourself. So I have
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 to say that a lot of those briefings I had in London, Zagreb, even in
2 Zenica, may have faded away.
3 Q. So even in Zenica when you had a week long -- you were there for
4 one week approximately in your briefing before going to Mostar, you don't
5 have an independent recollection of asking questions of, "Which
6 individuals should I speak with in the HVO," or "Which individuals should
7 I speak with in the ABiH army"?
8 A. No.
9 Q. You don't remember it?
10 A. I don't remember it. What really mattered was when I got on the
11 ground talking to my predecessor, talking to him directly.
12 Q. And your predecessor was?
13 A. Claus Nissen.
14 Q. So that Claus gave you the best briefing once you reached the
15 ground in Siroki Brijeg?
16 A. Yes, the most immediate.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. MEEK: Your Honours, I just noticed that it is break.
19 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Usher, will you please show the witness out of the
20 room first.
21 We will resume at 4.00.
22 --- Recess taken at 3.30 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 4.00 p.m.
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek. Please proceed.
25 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. Sir Martin, a quick question about your predecessor there in
2 Siroki Brijeg or Mostar, Claus. How long had he been there before you
3 relieved him?
4 A. Oh, that I couldn't answer accurately. I think about three or
5 four months.
6 Q. In the broad -- in the broad briefing you received in London
7 you've just described earlier this afternoon, you learned, did you not,
8 that the country of Croatia was attacked by the aggressors, the JNA, the
9 Serbian army, in 1991 and 1992 through the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 into southern Croatia?
11 A. Yes, I was aware that there was a war going on indeed in Croatia.
12 Q. And you were aware indeed that it was the Serbian aggressors
13 coming through Bosnia-Herzegovina to attack Croatia in the southern part?
14 A. I can't remember the precise routes they used to get to Vukovar,
15 but I wasn't aware that that -- it could have been through Bosnia,
16 but I wasn't aware of the precise routes, but Vukovar, of course, is
17 adjoining Serbia.
18 Q. Do you mean Dubrovnik?
19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott.
20 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I think at this -- if these questions
21 and answers are to have any meaning or relevance at all, we need to have
22 both time and location as to particular events.
23 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Meek, what is your follow-up questions? Are
24 you going to lead us to the international armed conflict?
25 MR. MEEK: Yes, I am.
1 JUDGE LIU: You may continue, but bear in mind the objections from
2 the other side.
3 MR. MEEK: Yes. Yes, Mr. President.
4 Q. Sir Martin, are you aware of the agreement called the Split
5 agreement which was reached, I think, in 1992?
6 A. I am aware of it but I can't remember precisely what that agreed.
7 Q. Okay. You indicated in your direct testimony, Sir Martin, that
8 you, during your time in Bosnia and in the Mostar area, that you did not
9 visit the Heliodrom; is that correct?
10 A. I think I visited it but wasn't able to get inside it. I tried to
11 but did not succeed.
12 Q. Were you aware or are you aware that one of your -- one of your
13 people from M2 actually visited the Heliodrom?
14 A. If he did, I can't remember when.
15 Q. You've indicated in your direct testimony, Sir Martin, that you
16 used different sources, correct, for your information?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Can you give me some examples of these sources, please?
19 A. Talking to Croats, talking to Bosniaks, talking to Serbs, and of
20 course talking to members of the international organisations and NGOs.
21 Q. Were there any specific sources that you used on a regular basis
22 that -- that you can tell us about?
23 A. No. My main sources, my main sources were direct information from
24 Croat political and military leaders and Bosniak political and military
1 Q. Did you have personally an interpreter while you were in Bosnia?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And can you tell me the nationality or ethnicity of that
5 A. We used Croat interpreters in West Mostar, but when we went over
6 to East Mostar, we would use a Bosniak interpreter because the --
7 otherwise, the interpreters would not be acceptable if they were the wrong
8 side of the River Neretva.
9 Q. Did you use -- excuse me. Did you use your interpreters as
11 A. No, not really, because apart from factual information of
12 localities and how to contact individuals and so on, we did not draw them
13 into any form of political discussions. It would have been unfair on
15 Q. Did you just say that it would be unfair to use your interpreters
16 as sources?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me the approximate number of meetings you
19 had with Croats versus the number of meetings you had with Muslims during
20 this period of time?
21 A. During that three months?
22 Q. Yes, sir.
23 A. I probably had more meetings with Croats because we were living on
24 the Croat side, as I say, in Siroki Brijeg. All our early dealings were
25 with Croat leaders, trying to get into Mostar, which didn't leave all that
1 much time by the time we got into East Mostar for the Bosniaks. So it
2 would have been inevitably more meetings with the Croats.
3 Q. In regards to this BBC documentary which you helped to organise,
4 can you tell me whether or not there was any filming done on the west side
5 of Mostar or was it solely on the east side?
6 A. Could I correct you? I did not help to organise it. All I did
7 was discuss it with Praljak and then I personally led them over into East
8 Mostar and left them there. But what they were going to do, that was
9 their business.
10 Q. Would "facilitate" have been a better word, Sir Martin?
11 A. Facilitate, yes.
12 Q. Thank you. To your knowledge, did Jeremy Bowen pass through the
13 west side of Mostar to reach the east side to film this documentary?
14 A. Yes. He would have to do so.
15 Q. Thank you. And again, if you know, and if you don't please tell
16 me, do you know if Jeremy Bowen and his crew did any filming on the west
17 side of Mostar while they were there?
18 A. Not to my knowledge. Certainly the focus of the film is the
19 situation in East Mostar.
20 Q. Yesterday, in your direct testimony, or perhaps the day before,
21 you had indicated that there were many Croats in Herzegovina who called
22 Tudjman as their president; correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did this confirm to you in any fashion that the Croats living in
25 Herzegovina did not accept - excuse me - Mr. Izetbegovic as their lawful
2 A. That is certainly the impression that I gained. As far as they
3 were concerned, their president was Tudjman.
4 Q. And do you know of any specific reasons why they felt that way?
5 A. Well, there was a very close link between the Croats of Bosnia and
6 Croatia. As I've said, there were a number of members of Tudjman's
7 government who came from Herzegovina.
8 Q. Do you know, Sir Martin, how many Croatian citizens were born in
10 A. How many Croatia citizens, no.
11 Q. Were born in Bosnia.
12 A. No.
13 Q. If I told you 400.000 approximately, would that ring any bells?
14 A. It wouldn't ring a bell, but it wouldn't surprise me.
15 Q. And the total population of Croatia, to your knowledge, is
16 approximately 4 million; correct?
17 A. I believe so, yes.
18 Q. Sir Martin, if you can tell me, and you may not be able to, do you
19 know how many citizens -- excuse me, how many Muslims have citizenship in
20 the country of Croatia?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Sir Martin, are you aware that all Croatians who live anywhere in
23 the world, such as the United States where I come from, such as Great
24 Britain where you come from, can hold a dual citizenship?
25 A. That would not surprise me, no. No.
1 Q. And with this dual citizenship, under the parliamentary law of
2 Croatia and the constitution of Croatia, these citizens are allowed to
3 vote in Croatian elections through the Croatian embassies. Are you aware
4 of that, Sir Martin?
5 A. On the assumption, presumably, that they were Croatian, yes.
6 Q. You are aware of that then?
7 A. Yes, dual citizenship Croatia and the United States, dual
8 passport, yes.
9 Q. Yes. And it's not -- nothing uncommon about having a dual
10 citizenship, is it?
11 A. No, but I was referring to Croats from Bosnia having Croatian
12 passports and voting in the Croatian elections. Not Croatian, Croats
13 from Bosnia.
14 Q. Were you aware that a Croatian who has a dual citizenship can even
15 run for an elected office even though they're not physically living in the
16 country of Croatia at the time they're running for election?
17 A. That wouldn't surprise me, no.
18 Q. You spoke yesterday and the day before about certain meetings that
19 were had where you describe Croatian politicians being present at those
20 meetings, did you not?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And Sir Martin, were you somewhat surprised because of this?
23 A. No, I wasn't surprised, because we realised the very strong
24 effects that Croatia had on the Croats of Bosnia, and indeed we used to
25 consult with the Croatian government, Tudjman, Granic, and so on, to
1 assist us in our task in Mostar.
2 Q. Which leads me and probably answers my next question, and that
3 is: Is it your understanding and is it not true that during this period
4 of time the European Community was requesting the help of certain Croatian
5 politicians in helping to solve this conflict, this civil war?
6 A. We in Mostar certainly consulted Tudjman, Granic, and others to
7 assist us in our task, yes.
8 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Meek, you have to slow down a little bit.
9 The French interpretation is far behind you.
10 MR. MEEK: I apologise to Judge Diarra. I'm sorry. The only way
11 I can tell if the French is finished... [French interpretation on the
12 English Channel]
13 Q. Sir Martin, you had spoke -- excuse me, you testified yesterday or
14 the day before about a meeting held in Medjugorje where President Tudjman
15 was present. Do you recall that?
16 A. I can't -- I don't know. I don't recall that one, but certainly
17 it wouldn't surprise me. But I don't recall that specific meeting, unless
18 it's in this folder.
19 Q. Perhaps it was the Grude meeting that you were attending.
20 A. Grude meeting, certainly Tudjman was not present in Grude. That
21 was Mate Granic, the Foreign Minister.
22 Q. Yesterday or the day before, Sir Martin, you testified about the
23 presence of Mujahedin, did you not?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Can you tell me and tell this Trial Chamber, please, what
1 countries these Mujahedin were coming from?
2 A. From a whole variety of Islamic countries. I personally thought
3 it was a great mistake that they were ever allowed into the country, and I
4 think others did too. I used to raise this subject on many occasions with
5 the Bosniak Generals in Central Bosnia, most of whom did not want the
6 Mujahedin either, and -- but they assured me that they had them under
7 control, but I was not all that convinced.
8 Q. Such as yesterday or the day before, you testified that the HVO
9 was giving you what you've called excuses of certain factions that were
10 out of control and that you believe that it was a weak or lame excuse.
11 Wasn't that testimony?
12 A. Yes, but I did say that all sides occasionally claimed they had
13 out of control elements.
14 Q. And, Sir Martin, would this be one example of an ABiH general
15 perhaps or some military person telling you that the Mujahedin are out of
16 control and it's their fault?
17 A. I don't recall any specific instant, although of course the
18 hijacking of our team up near Jablanica by the Mujahedin, I don't think
19 that was ordered by the ABiH generals.
20 Q. So it would be a fair statement, Sir Martin, that on both sides,
21 the ABiH and the HVO, had at times factions that they couldn't control?
22 A. That is true, but I never accepted it as an excuse.
23 Q. Now, these same variety of mid-east countries that were sending
24 Mujahedin into Bosnia to fight were also sending weapons into Bosnia,
25 isn't that a fact?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. I have no doubt, because, of course, there was the arms embargo
3 Q. Sir Martin, these same countries that were sending Mujahedin and
4 sending weapons to Bosnia were also sending financial aid to the ABiH,
5 were they not?
6 A. I have no proof of that, but I think it's very possible, yes.
7 Q. Can you give me and this Trial Chamber your opinion of what these
8 people, these Mujahedin fighters, what were they fighting for?
9 A. With hindsight, some sort of Islamic cause, but I never
10 established while I was there precisely what they were there for. Maybe
11 just to help their Muslim brothers. I don't know.
12 Q. Do you believe they were there to fight for a multi-ethnic Bosnia,
14 A. I believe that they were probably there to come and support the
15 Muslim cause in Bosnia.
16 Q. You haven't testified specifically to your military experience
17 other than it was 37 years, but you have been in other theatres of combat
18 in that 37 years. Would that be a fair statement?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And would you agree that in Bosnia in 1993 when you were there,
21 and in -- as in previous countries where there were war conflicts where
22 you were present, that rumours and stories travel fast?
23 A. Yes. And in particular, the comparison I make -- I used to make
24 was between Mostar and Belfast.
25 Q. And would you agree with me that during this time in Bosnia and
1 the civil war that these stories would often, as is human nature, become
2 distorted and become more grandiose in the telling of the same?
3 A. Yes. And of course there was a considerable amount of media
5 Q. Okay. Thank you. Sir Martin, with all that in mind, is it so far
6 out of your realm of possibility to believe that the story of the
7 kidnapping of the ECMM people, the armed robbery of their Mercedes at
8 gunpoint by these Mujahedin, might very well in the telling of this story
9 become something to the effect that the Mujahedin were killing children
10 and raping women throughout Bosnia?
11 A. I'm sorry, I haven't quite got your point there.
12 Q. I think we've agreed on several things. One is that stories and
13 rumours tend to fly in war and that's what happened in Bosnia; correct?
14 A. Yes, rumours did proliferate. That is true.
15 Q. The second is it is a fact that the ECMM team, I think it was M1,
16 was or were the victims of kidnapping, armed robbery at gunpoint; correct?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. Isn't it reasonable, Sir Martin, that a story, a factual story
19 such as that, including Mujahedin, could in the telling evolve itself into
20 a story that the Mujahedin were raping women and killing children?
21 A. Well, I don't quite see how that -- that case could have happened,
22 because the report was to us, and this was an internal matter, not to the
23 Croats. I don't think the Croats were even aware that this had happened.
24 I don't think they were aware. It is a matter of considerable
25 embarrassment to us.
1 Q. Of course. But the fact is, and you'll have to agree, I think,
2 that that story could have got out in many ways?
3 A. It could have got out, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Do you have an estimate, Sir Martin, of the number of
5 Mujahedin fighters in Bosnia, Central Bosnia you talked about yesterday
6 and south-west Bosnia-Herzegovina, during that time period?
7 A. No, but my estimate -- I guessed it was in the region of
9 Q. And you will agree with me, Sir Martin, that it takes far less
10 than a hundred fundamentalist Islamic radicals to cause a lot of damage,
11 as we saw on September 11th in New York?
12 A. Oh, certainly. I agree. That's why I said I think it was a
13 terrible mistake to ever have allowed them in in the first place.
14 Q. So my question -- are we going too fast?
15 JUDGE DIARRA: [Interpretation] Are we now in the field covered by
16 the indictment, Mr. Meek, or are we now trying to have a historical
17 background about how Muslims show solidarity vis-a-vis their Muslim
18 brothers throughout the world?
19 MR. MEEK: I couldn't hear the translation. I had to read it.
20 Your Honour, we are in the area covered by the direct examination
21 yesterday and the day before by the Prosecutor's Office where the
22 Mujahedin was brought up, number one. Number two, we're into the area of
23 dealing with the direct examination and documents that were put to this
24 witness about exaggerated concerns by the Croats of Mujahedin warriors in
25 the area.
1 JUDGE LIU: Well, we have spent a lot of time on the Mujahedin
2 issues, but we still don't know where you are leading us to.
3 JUDGE DIARRA: [Interpretation] And more than anything else, I
4 don't believe that it is relevant to speak about 11th of September and
5 what happened in the US. This only happened very recently and is of no
6 relevance to us.
7 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Judge. Thank you, Your Honours. The
8 relevance of this question I want to ask Sir Martin --
9 Q. In some of the reports we have seen in this binder, there is talk
10 about the fact that the Croats in Herzegovina were constantly talking
11 about their fear of the Mujahedin and that the belief by the ECMM was that
12 these beliefs were unfounded. Isn't that a fact?
13 A. I did not hear many concerns expressed about the Mujahedin as
14 such. It was more, many times more, the prospect of an Islamic
15 fundamentalist state.
16 Q. Thank you. Sir Martin, in this Trial Chamber since this trial
17 started, we have had some testimony from another witness concerning a
18 location called Bocina. Have you heard of Bocina?
19 A. The name rings a bell, but I'm afraid I can't picture it on the
20 map or what happened there.
21 Q. Well, it was a training camp for Mujahedin in Bosnia.
22 A. Ah, yes. Yes.
23 Q. Does that ring a bell?
24 A. Yes, that does now.
25 Q. Were you ever made aware that President Izetbegovic was in that
1 camp giving these Mujahedin support and even he got some honours from
3 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott.
4 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Mr. President. I've been quiet over here,
5 but I think this has now gone on for some time. What is the relevance of
6 this? If they can connect this to a defence, to a defence to the charges
7 in the indictment, perhaps it should go on, but it is not clear to me it
8 has any relevance at all.
9 JUDGE LIU: We quite agree with you, Mr. Scott. I don't think
10 this issue has some relevance to the -- to this witness.
11 MR. MEEK: May I, if Your Honour permits me, I believe the
12 relevance is simply that this witness has testified from his knowledge of
13 being on his mission in Bosnia that the Croats did not accept President
14 Izetbegovic as being the legal president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'm
15 trying to get at and question this witness as to the reasons why the
16 Croats may not have accepted Izetbegovic as the lawful president.
17 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President.
18 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
19 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, counsel. Assuming for the moment that that's
20 true, assuming there were Croats in Herzegovina who did not accept
21 President Izetbegovic as their legitimate leader, I would ask the Chamber
22 to ask the Defence, how is that a defence to the charges in that case?
23 Does that allow prisoners to be used as human shields? Does that allow
24 mosques to be destroyed? How is it relevant to a defence to the charges
25 in the case?
1 MR. MEEK: Your Honours, I have heard my learned colleague from
2 the other side just now indicate to Your Honours that, to make it short, I
3 think, to cut to the chase, that every question in cross-examination has
4 to be related to the defence, and I don't believe that's correct. I
5 believe that in cross-examination I'm allowed to ask anything that was
6 dealt with in direct examination. And they dealt with this in direct
7 examination, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE LIU: But the baseline is the relevance to this very case.
9 We have spent a lot of time on the Mujahedin issues, and we have been
10 sitting here for more than four months. We believe that that issue, the
11 Mujahedin issue, is only a very small portion in this case. You must skip
12 these questions and continue your cross-examination.
13 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President. I will.
14 Q. Sir Martin --
15 JUDGE CLARK: You see, Mr. Meek -- sorry -- there is no dispute on
16 this issue. I think everybody in the Court accepts that there were
17 Mujahedin in the area of conflict in Bosnia and that obviously their
18 presence fuelled flames, but that's not in dispute. There's no point
19 cross-examining on something that we all agree with.
20 MR. MEEK: Thank you very much. I'm glad that we all agree on
21 that now. I'm off that subject.
22 Q. Sir Martin, during your direct testimony, you spent some time
23 testifying about your knowledge, albeit secondhand or thirdhand, of
24 expulsions of Muslims from the west bank of Mostar to the east bank. Do
25 you recall that testimony, sir?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Can you give us an estimate of the -- or give us an estimate or
3 any information on the number of Croats who were expelled to the east bank
4 from the west bank?
5 A. Well, this is a very interesting matter. There were very, very
6 few Croats in east Mostar. I never established precisely when they moved
7 across, but it is possible. One of the theories I always had was perhaps
8 they were directed by the HVO to move across before the shelling of East
9 Mostar started. I never had any evidence given to me about Croats being
10 expelled from East Mostar.
11 Q. So then would it be a fair statement that you were not aware of
12 the fact that there were only 12 Croats who stayed in East Mostar?
13 A. I would have put it more like 50, because there was still a number
14 of mixed marriages, but the numbers were certainly very small.
15 Q. Okay. And would you agree with me that there were approximately
16 9.000 Muslims living on the west bank of Mostar during this time period?
17 A. Well, that again is an interesting figure. You see, the Croats
18 used to say there were 9.000. The Bosniaks used to say there were 3.000.
19 I used to split the difference in all the briefings I gave and talked
20 about some 6.000. But there were a substantial number.
21 Q. And -- and if you know, Sir Martin, prior to 9 May of 1993, who
22 was taking care of these refugees and displaced persons in West Mostar?
23 A. Well, it was still -- the Croats were inevitably the largest
24 percentage in West Mostar, but the Croats were certainly dealing with a
25 lot of refugees and DPs.
1 Q. Do you, Sir Martin, know anything at all about the ownership of
2 apartments in Mostar?
3 A. I had a lot of dealings with this because of the expellings which
4 continued until 1996 and of which Vinko Martinovic, in my view, was
5 largely responsible.
6 Q. Thank you for that non-responsive answer. The question I'll ask
7 you again, Sir Martin, do you have any knowledge of the ownership of the
8 apartments in Mostar during your time there in the three months you spent
9 in 1993?
10 A. I'm not quite sure what you mean by "ownership."
11 Q. Common term of ownership. Do you know who owned the apartments?
12 Were people just taking apartments? Were --
13 A. No. Well, there had, up until the war, been clear tenancy
14 agreements run by the municipal council, and of course there were some
15 private houses. But after the war and during the war, that all broke down
16 and it became completely bedlam.
17 Q. I want to ask you a question about the Heliodrom. Can you please
18 tell us, if you can, the percentage of detainees in the Heliodrom that
19 were actually from Mostar as opposed to the detainees from other
21 A. I'm very sorry. I was just checking that. I wonder if you --
22 could you possibly repeat that?
23 Q. The question was, Sir Martin, if you can tell us, do you know the
24 percentage of detainees in the Heliodrom, during your term there, that
25 were actually from Mostar as opposed to detainees from other locations?
1 A. No. I do not have a breakdown, no.
2 Q. I believe that it's in one of your reports -- it's a fair
3 statement, isn't it, Sir Martin, that there were approximately 200.000
4 displaced Muslim refugees living in Croatia during 1992 and 1993?
5 A. I don't know whether they were living in Croatia. There were
6 certainly some 200.000 displaced Muslim refugees, some of them down in
7 the south. Yes, I don't know exactly how many in Croatia.
8 Q. You mentioned that, in your opinion, that this predicament or
9 conflict or civil war which you found yourself as a monitor in in 1993 all
10 revolved around territory. Was that your testimony?
11 A. That is my belief. Territory and population.
12 Q. And would you agree with me, Sir Martin, that there were large
13 amounts of displaced persons coming into the Mostar area in the south-west
14 Herzegovina area during this period of time and prior to your coming?
15 A. Yes, particularly from Central Bosnia.
16 Q. And I believe -- and I believe that you -- in one of your
17 reports, you've indicated that there may have been 20.000 to 30.000
18 Bosnian Croats who were displaced from Central Bosnia that had moved down
19 to this area.
20 A. Yes. Yes.
21 Q. Further, that the Muslim refugees who were displaced because of
22 the Serb aggression could have amounted to 10.000 to 20.000 also?
23 A. Yes. I don't have the precise figures, but that sounds about
25 Q. That in and of itself created most, if not all, of the problems
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 that you experienced or you saw while you were in Bosnia; correct?
2 A. Yes. The problem of DPs was one of our biggest problems of all.
3 Q. You mentioned yesterday some names of some HVO military figures
4 who you called hard-liners. Do you remember that testimony?
5 A. Yes. Yes.
6 Q. I don't believe you mentioned in your testimony about any
7 hard-line ABiH military personnel, but there were some, were there not?
8 A. Yes, but they were more up in Sarajevo, not quite so much in
10 Q. What about Zenica?
11 A. Zenica, the generals I had dealings with up there were mainly
12 concerned with fighting the war, and we used to discuss endlessly their
13 war aims, but they insisted that they were fighting for a unified Bosnia.
14 But many -- I can go on if you like.
15 Q. I'm just waiting, Sir Martin, for the transcript to catch up with
17 A. Sorry.
18 Q. Please go ahead. I would like to hear your response.
19 A. Well, the -- the Bosniak generals were very determined, during the
20 time I was there, to regain the territory that they'd lost, in particular,
21 to the Serbs. I'm talking about Zvornik, the upper reaches of the River
22 Drina, Sanski Most, Prijedor, access to the Sava in the north, access to
23 the Adriatic via Neum in the south, and indeed all those areas which
24 before the fighting they had held the majority. So the Bosniak generals
25 were extremely determined.
1 Q. Would you agree, Sir Martin, that if the ABiH wanted to reach the
2 Adriatic Sea, they would have to have taken Mostar?
3 A. First of all, they would have to have taken Gornji Vakuf and then
4 Prozor. That is why I mentioned, I think this morning, Prozor was just a
5 key town for the Croats. They would have to have taken Gornji Vakuf,
6 which was divided between the Bosniaks and the Croats -- I'm sorry, I'm
7 going too fast -- then Prozor, then down to Mostar, and from Mostar south
8 to the sea.
9 Q. So the -- the precise answer to that last question was yes, they
10 would have had to have taken Mostar, in addition to these other two
11 locations that you've mentioned?
12 A. Yes. Although the main road, the main road coming down, the M17
13 road, actually just continues down the east side of the Neretva and so in
14 fact passes through the Bosniak side of Mostar.
15 Q. You mentioned this -- you mentioned General Arif Pasalic, I think
16 yesterday and the day before.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You indicated, I believe, that you believed him to be an
19 honourable man.
20 A. I never had any reason to doubt it. He was concerned with
21 fighting the war, and I didn't hear him say any -- make any remarks which
22 I considered not acceptable.
23 Q. Wasn't he one of the generals that you had indicated said that he
24 would fight to the end, if need be?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Was he not one of the generals who would be a hard-liner?
2 A. I draw a distinction between military people who say they're going
3 to fight and fight and fight until they achieve their objectives. When I
4 say hard-liners, I'm more talking about the political side, the political
5 side, political aims, bearing in mind, as I said, that the political side
6 and the military side frequently overlapped.
7 Q. And that overlapping that you've spoken about and testified to
8 occurred in both armies, the HVO and the ABiH; correct?
9 A. Oh, yes. I would talk to politicians and we would discuss
10 military matters and vice versa.
11 Q. When did you first meet Arif, General Pasalic?
12 A. I met him, I suppose, on the first day when I got across into East
13 Mostar, which must have been the latter part of August.
14 Q. And was he one of the first ABiH generals that you met and spoke
16 A. Yes. He was the only one in the south. That was the four corps
17 area. So he was the only one I could meet.
18 Q. Yes. Okay.
19 A. Until I went up to Central Bosnia.
20 Q. Right. So prior to your -- I'll start this question this way:
21 You were in Zagreb, then in Mostar?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Or Siroki Brijeg.
24 A. Yes. Yes.
25 Q. Prior to your reaching Siroki Brijeg, you had not spoken with any
1 ABiH generals; correct?
2 A. No. No.
3 Q. And you didn't speak with any ABiH generals until you met Pasalic
4 in East Mostar sometime in August 1993?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Okay. Sir Martin, yesterday you indicated that you first met my
7 client, Tuta, on August 15th of 1993; correct?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. And you believed him to be upset because you had to ask him his
10 name twice and it meant nothing to you; correct?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. And you indicated in your testimony that when he expressed his
13 views on the state of affairs as concerned Muslims in that region, that
14 you tried to tell him the generals that you had drank brandy with scoffed
15 at that idea of a fundamental Islamic state, didn't you?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 A. I have to say you're absolutely right.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 A. But can I just say one thing?
21 Q. Thank you, Sir Martin.
22 A. Can I just add one thing? I think, if you look at my actual
23 report, you will see I use the word "Muslims" and not "generals." And I
24 certainly had spoken to Muslims in Zenica, but I hadn't met any generals.
25 Q. Thank you, Sir Martin. I believe the record and transcript from
1 yesterday's testimony will speak for itself.
2 You talked about in your direct testimony ethnic cleansing, this
3 word "ethnic cleansing"; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do you have any knowledge of any ethnic cleansing where Croats
6 were cleansed?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Are they in any of the reports that you have been submitted and
9 been reviewed in the last two or three days in this courtroom?
10 A. I don't think so, because some of those -- some of the cases in
11 Central Bosnia, in particular, took place before I arrived in Central
12 Bosnia, towns like Bugojno, Fojnice and so on, Kakanj.
13 MR. MEEK: For the record, I believe line 17, Your Honours, on
14 page 49, line 18 is missing, but I think the question was properly
15 understood by the witness and it was: Do you have any knowledge of
16 incidents where Muslims were ethnically cleansing Croats.
17 Q. Do you see that, Sir Martin?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Is that how you understood the question?
20 A. And I said yes. Yes. Cleansing because some of those -- yes.
21 Q. Okay. Thank you. We are going to look at a few documents, if you
22 don't mind. Document 553.1.
23 A. Yes. Got it.
24 Q. It's a daily summary from August 1, 1993; correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Under your signature; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And in that report under "Military activity," you speak about a
4 meeting with Colonel Andabak, commander of the HVO special forces;
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. This was --
8 A. Clearly a mis -- I got the terminology wrong.
9 Q. The terminology wrong?
10 A. His name is spelt incorrectly and his appointment incorrect.
11 Q. Pardon me?
12 A. And his appointment incorrect.
13 Q. Well, it was to the best of your knowledge at the time on August
14 1st of 1993 that on Colonel Andabak was the commander of the HVO special
15 forces, or you would not have put that in your report, would you?
16 A. I might have been advised incorrectly. I'd clearly been given the
17 wrong information.
18 Q. Or you could have been given the correct information. Isn't that
19 a fair statement?
20 A. It's possible, but I don't think so.
21 Q. Thank you. And if you were given incorrect information, Sir
22 Martin, how many times did that happen, that incorrect information was
23 given to you and put in these reports and sent on up the chain?
24 A. Undoubtedly, it would have happened occasionally, but I hope very
1 Q. Hopefully not daily; correct?
2 A. I don't think so.
3 Q. Thank you. I take it, Sir Martin, that during your time in Bosnia
4 and specifically the three months you were there in Siroki Brijeg, in
5 Mostar area, that you were trying to create an atmosphere of trust among
6 all the parties so you could deal with them?
7 A. Absolutely, yes.
8 Q. And in that attempt to create that trust, you tried to be as
9 honest as you could with everybody, didn't you?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. If you'll look at Exhibit P565.2 for a moment, Sir Martin?
12 A. 5 --
13 Q. 565.2.
14 A. I've found it, yes.
15 Q. And this again, this is the document that refers to your first
16 meeting, first knowledge of my client, Tuta, correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And you indicate, did you not -- and I'll take you to the second
19 page of that document -- you indicated that you didn't trust him, didn't
21 A. That's right.
22 Q. And from reading your comment, it appeared that part of the reason
23 that you didn't trust him or he was suspect was because he had a
24 nickname. Would that be a fair statement?
25 A. That was a -- a jokey remark, but I tend to judge people on first
1 meeting them. Sometimes I'm right, occasionally I'm wrong, but I like to
2 think that usually my first impressions are right.
3 Q. And that's just human nature, isn't it?
4 A. Absolutely.
5 Q. We all want to be right, don't we?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. So we know now that in at least one of these documents you're now
8 saying you had misinformation; correct?
9 A. Yes, because in here I've called Mladen Naletilic commander of the
10 HVO special forces. So there can't be two.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. So one of them is incorrect.
13 Q. Okay. And in another document you're putting jokes in it, is that
14 your testimony?
15 A. Well, I'm sure you will agree or you can see that that first
16 sentence is meant to be, meant to be humorous. It may not have been.
17 Q. Are you aware, Sir Martin, that there are many, many people in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina who have nicknames?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Do you tend to not trust these people because they have nicknames?
21 A. It depends on who they are.
22 Q. Going up a little -- a little down from there, you indicated that
23 Tuta was definitely charismatic; correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You also indicated that further discussions with Tuta could prove
1 interesting or indeed valuable; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You intended to use my client without letting him know that,
4 didn't you?
5 A. It depends what you mean by "use." I was talking to anyone who
6 could further our information and knowledge of the political, military,
7 and other situation in Bosnia. I spent a great deal of my years in Bosnia
8 talking to people whom I did not like, but that did not stop me talking to
10 Q. You never spoke with Tuta after the 15th of August, 1993, did
12 A. No. We had a brief -- a brief -- we ran into each other briefly
13 in the Hotel Ero when Tuta was having supper with someone else, but
14 otherwise, no.
15 Q. And that's in no report that you ever gave to the OTP, is it?
16 A. What?
17 Q. The fact that you ran into Tuta after the 15th of August, 1993, is
18 not contained in any report that you gave to the Office of the Prosecutor,
19 is it?
20 A. Well, none of these ECMM reports, no, because I'm talking about
21 1996, 1997.
22 Q. I'm referring to the statements that you gave to the Office of the
23 Prosecutor, your formal statements. Do you recall, Sir Martin, that you
24 first spoke with Mr. Carry Spork and Mr. Ramlal Goonewardene for three
25 days in February 1998?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. The 17th, 18th, and the 19th, three days?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You reviewed this report, this official statement to the OTP,
5 before you came to The Hague to testify, didn't you?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. The first report is 16 pages long, is it not?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You didn't mention my client one time in 16 pages in three days of
10 debriefing by the OTP, did you?
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott.
12 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, if there's going to be questioning
13 about the document, I ask that it be put before the witness, please.
14 MR. MEEK: I can do that but he said he reviewed the document.
15 Q. Would you like to look through it again or do you agree with me?
16 A. I don't think he was mentioned in the document because this is a
17 different matter.
18 Q. Thank you. How many times did you meet with Slobodan Praljak, the
19 chief general of the HVO or military?
20 A. I think that was the only real proper meeting I had with him. As
21 far as I can remember, he had only taken over his post not long before and
22 then he was dismissed from his post a week after the destruction of the
23 Stari Most, the old bridge.
24 Q. And wasn't it Mr. Roso who took his place after that?
25 A. Ante Roso, yes.
1 Q. Ante. Do you recall about what month that was?
2 A. When he left his post?
3 Q. Yes, sir.
4 A. Yes, I can tell you exactly. The Stari Most was destroyed on the
5 9th of November, so a week later must make it about the 16th of November
6 that he left that post.
7 Q. At that time you were not posted in Mostar; correct?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Sir Martin, in your direct testimony, you described in a little
10 bit of detail about your conversation with my client, Tuta, on August 15th
11 of 1993. Do you remember that testimony?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Would you agree with me that the views that he expressed to you
14 concerning his fears of a fundamentalist Islamic state being created
15 was -- was not -- wasn't something you'd never heard before?
16 A. No, indeed, and of course I heard it from the Roman Catholic
18 Q. Exactly. It wasn't such an eccentric point of view, was it?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Now, if we could look at document P359 for a moment. You found
21 it, Sir Martin?
22 A. I've found it, yes.
23 Q. You found it quicker than I did. You mention in that report,
24 bottom of page 1, last paragraph, about multiplication of Croatian flag
25 raising in sensitive areas. What do you mean by that?
1 A. Perhaps I could just point out that this is actually a report
2 written by the head of the regional centre Zenica, Jean-Pierre Thebault,
3 and it was the 1st of May, which is two months before I arrived in
4 Bosnia. Now, yesterday I was testifying whether certain things in here
5 still applied, and I said yes, but now you're looking at that particular
6 paragraph, I don't know precisely the circumstances surrounding the flag
7 raising in -- in Travnik, but I am aware that all people in Bosnia are
8 very prone to raise their flags at every opportunity. So I don't know the
9 significance of that, unless it had been put on a mosque, but it doesn't
10 say that.
11 Q. Right. And you'd agree with me that there's nothing inherently
12 significant about flying a flag, is there?
13 A. Oh, yes. We had awful problems over the years with flags.
14 Q. What about the -- let me ask this question --
15 A. And in fact, we had to cancel the opening of two bridges built by
16 the EU because we insisted no national flags.
17 Q. On either side, I presume?
18 A. On either side. And because they were put up, no opening,
20 Q. What year -- what year was that?
21 A. We're now talking about 1995, 1996.
22 Q. Thank you. Were you aware during your three months in Bosnia of
23 any problems with the Croat flag flying?
24 A. Well, as I did say, we had an awful lot of problems with Croat
25 flag flying, but you're saying when I was in Mostar at that time.
1 Q. Yes, sir, Sir Martin.
2 A. Well, of course I was in -- no, I was not aware of any problems at
3 that time.
4 Q. You mention in your direct testimony about school textbooks, I
5 think. Do you recall that testimony?
6 A. I think that might have been a report by my predecessor, but I'm
7 delighted to comment on it.
8 Q. Okay. Are you aware, Sir Martin, that before the war all
9 textbooks came from Serbia?
10 A. I think I was aware of that, yes.
11 Q. Were you also aware that the Bosniak language was not established
12 until 1993?
13 A. Well, I know --
14 Q. Excuse me. 1998. I'm sorry.
15 A. I know there are people in this courtroom who will not agree with
16 me, but as far as I'm concerned as an amateur linguist, they're all the
17 same language.
18 Q. Thank you very much, Sir Martin. Let me ask you a quick question
19 about the HVO and the ABiH armies in 1993. Did they have the same
20 uniform, basically?
21 A. They started off with the same uniform but then rapidly, I think
22 it was sometime in 1993, they changed, and the HVO adopted the Croatian
23 style army uniform.
24 Q. Was it after -- in 1993, after you had left Mostar for Zenica that
25 this occurred?
1 A. I cannot be precise. I cannot be precise.
2 Q. We've had some testimony from some other military figures in this
3 courtroom, and I'm not sure if any of them have had as much military
4 background as you have, but would you agree with me, Sir Martin, that in
5 this crazy mixed-up civil war in Bosnia in 1993, that it was difficult to
6 tell the three armies apart at times because of the uniforms?
7 A. I would like to add that I don't consider it a civil war in
8 Bosnia, but that's besides the point. No. At times, at times it was
9 difficult to differentiate from a distance, but as soon as one got
10 reasonably close, then it became apparent either through shoulder flashes
11 or whatever.
12 MR. MEEK: I think, Mr. President, Your Honours, it's time for a
13 break. I apologise for running us over a little bit.
14 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Mr. Usher, would you show the witness out of
15 the room, first.
16 And in the meantime, may I ask Mr. Meek how long are you going to
17 take after the break?
18 MR. MEEK: Your Honour, I've got a few more --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.
20 JUDGE LIU: Microphone.
21 MR. MEEK: It shouldn't take very long. It shouldn't take an
22 hour -- microphone. I'm sorry.
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
24 MR. MEEK: I don't want to tell the Trial Chamber something that
25 I'm going to prove to be wrong, but I don't believe it will take me more
1 than 20, 30 minutes at the most.
2 JUDGE LIU: I see. You know, we have to make the logistic
3 arrangements if we are not sitting tomorrow. If we have to sit, we have
4 to inform the security, the Registry, to make the proper arrangements for
5 tomorrow's sitting. So, Mr. Par, do you have any cross-examination and
6 how long will it take?
7 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the answer is yes, and it
8 might take about one hour, I think.
9 JUDGE LIU: We'll resume at quarter to six.
10 --- Recess taken at 5.17 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 5.47 p.m.
12 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
13 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. Sir Martin, if we could look at Exhibit P559 for a moment,
16 A. Yes, I've got it.
17 Q. That is a document dated 4 August 1993, a special report under the
18 name of Jean Pierre Thebault; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Would you please look at page 2, paragraph 2 under subsection A/?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And just read the first sentence, if you would, please. Not out
23 loud but look at it, please. Now, Sir Martin, that document indicates
24 that at least on 4 August 1993, that the situation of about 30.000 to
25 40.000 civilians seized in Mostar since about three months (meaning far
1 before any BiH army attacks anywhere). Do you see that, sir?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Do you agree with that?
4 A. We're talking about from mid-May to mid-August. I can't recall,
5 I'm afraid -- June, July -- May, June, July -- when the BiH military
6 military offensive operations started.
7 Q. Let me try to refresh your recollection, sir. Sir Martin, are you
8 aware of the March 1993 BiH attack on Konjic?
9 A. Not in detail.
10 Q. Okay. But you're aware of it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Are you aware, Sir Martin, of the April 1993 BiH
13 attack on Trusina?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. I can't remember where Trusina is.
17 Q. Thank you. Are you aware of the, I believe March 1993, attack by
18 the BH army on Orliste?
19 A. No. I'm afraid this is before my time. I don't know.
20 Q. Okay. Could it be possible that this is one of those instances
21 where Jean-Pierre Thebault had been given bad information, perhaps?
22 A. I cannot really answer that.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, if you'll look at the same document, sir, on page
24 2 under subsection B.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. The second sentence talks about these operations followed -- have
2 followed the mutiny of Muslim soldiers of the HVO and have given the
3 opportunity to the BH army to create a horseback quarter between
4 Jablanica and Mostar. Do you see that?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. My question, if you know, did the ABiH army have sleepers in the
7 HVO, soldiers that were -- had alliances with the BH army but in fact
8 turned their weapons on the HVO at an appropriate time, if you know?
9 A. Well, of course, until the fighting started, the Muslims were
10 fully involved in the HVO, and of course they fought together in the HVO
11 with the HVO against the Serbs.
12 Q. And at some --
13 A. And so there were Muslims in the HVO forces, yes.
14 Q. Can you confirm or do you have any knowledge that in fact some of
15 these Muslim soldiers in the HVO were in fact sleepers, so to speak, who
16 were just waiting for the appropriate time to mutiny?
17 A. No, I wouldn't put it like that. I would say that when the
18 fighting started, then they had -- they knew where their loyalties lay,
19 and these were the -- these particular ones were the Muslims in the HVO,
20 the barracks in East Mostar which then was taken over by the ABiH army.
21 Q. Thank you. Yesterday, you spoke briefly about the bad conditions
22 in East Mostar and lack of water and food; correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Are you aware, Sir Martin, that during the time period of at least
25 perhaps June of 1993 in West Mostar that the HVO was rationing water
1 in West Mostar?
2 A. They may have been rationing water, but at least they had water to
4 Q. Thank you. And you indicated that you didn't really have a good
5 answer or understanding as to why the HVO were taking detainees to the
6 island; correct?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Couldn't it very well have been and were you ever made aware of
9 the possibility that there was a shortage of food because of this massive
10 influx of displaced persons?
11 A. It was certainly -- it was certainly part of the release procedure
12 and certainly the ICRC noted that with the 500 gone out at Dretelj the
13 conditions for the remainder were better.
14 Q. Bear with me, Sir Martin, and we'll get finished pretty quickly, I
15 think. Yesterday you spoke about the shelling of East Mostar when you
16 were there. Do you recall that testimony?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You also testified that the Serbs were still shelling Mostar, the
19 east side mainly, during this period.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. You can't tell us today, can you, what mosques might have been
22 destroyed by the Serb shelling as opposed to the HVO shelling, can you?
23 A. Oh, indeed. And of course, the Serb shelling was not nearly so
24 regular at this stage, but certainly all the bridges, all the bridges in
25 Mostar had been destroyed during the fighting with the Serbs. That is
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 Q. What evidence do you have that the Serb shelling was not -- did
3 not result in the destruction or damage to some or all mosques in East
5 A. It is conceivable that some of the Serb shelling may have
6 damaged -- certainly damaged buildings and may have damaged mosques. That
7 is true.
8 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much, sir. You mentioned yesterday in
9 your testimony concerning the Vance-Owen Peace Plan that the Croatian or
10 the Croats had a misunderstanding of this Vance-Owen Peace Plan?
11 A. That is my interpretation, yes.
12 Q. You also testified that most all of -- or all the Croats you spoke
13 to sang the same tune. Do you recall that testimony?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Will you agree with me that during your tenure in Bosnia that the
16 many times you spoke with members of the BiH army, that they also sang the
17 same tune, so to speak, that they were the victims, they were the poor
19 A. Yes indeed.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 A. But, but I should add that they did consistently say they did want
22 a unified Bosnia.
23 Q. Speaking of that, you've testified in this Tribunal before, at
24 least one time; correct?
25 A. Uh-huh.
1 Q. Just once?
2 A. Just once.
3 Q. Have you been requested by the OTP to testify in any other cases
4 besides this case?
5 A. No, but I've got some indications that some lawyers want to speak
6 to me about possible other cases. I don't know.
7 Q. OTP lawyers?
8 A. OTP. What does OTP --
9 Q. Office of the Prosecutor.
10 A. Yes, I think so. I think so, yes. But I have no idea what they
11 wish to speak to me about.
12 Q. Yesterday, you were speaking about Dario Kordic and your regular
13 dealings with Mr. Kordic and his views. Do you remember that testimony?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You testified that there was almost an identical or general
16 theme. Do you recall that testimony?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And you also testified that you believe that Dario Kordic had
19 close links to Boban; correct?
20 A. Yes. I believe he was related, but I may be wrong there.
21 Q. Correct. So you also testified that no doubt Kordic's views
22 reflected Boban's views because they had close links. Wasn't that your
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Isn't that, in a fashion, guilt by association? Because someone
1 has close links, they must have the same opinion?
2 A. No, because I was aware that Boban was an extremely strong
3 nationalist. He was the creator of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna
4 and therefore it was only natural that the people he placed in positions
5 of authority would reflect his views.
6 Q. You testified yesterday that there was a joke while you were in
7 Bosnia, and you said it in Croatian, but it meant "Thank you, Vance-Owen,"
8 I think; correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did the Muslims tell you that joke?
11 A. No. I can't remember where I heard it. No, it was certainly not
12 the Muslims.
13 Q. Okay.
14 A. And I don't think it was the Croats either.
15 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, briefly yesterday you talked about the
16 detainees when you were discussing the International Red Cross in Mostar
17 and their monitoring situation; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And you said that this subject of the detainees at that time was a
20 hot potato; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is this the same -- can you -- if you can, is this the same kind
23 of hot potato that is going on right now with the detainees that the
24 United States has in Cuba that they brought from Afghanistan?
25 MR. SCOTT: Objection, Your Honour, to relevance and just
2 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Meek, we come back to all those issues about
3 other matters.
4 MR. MEEK: I'll skip that question, Your Honour. Thank you.
5 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
6 MR. MEEK:
7 Q. Yesterday, Sir Martin, you testified that you felt that Siroki
8 Brijeg had a strong Croat area.
9 A. Yes. Siroki Brijeg was a very strong Croat area, yes.
10 Q. And you said you felt that way.
11 A. Yes. It was a fact. I don't think there were -- I cannot recall
12 any Muslims or Serbs living in Siroki Brijeg. I think it was a totally
13 Croat town.
14 Q. In another part of your testimony yesterday, you were talking
15 about Mr. Granic, and this was right after you were talking about the hot
16 potato issue with the detainees.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And that you had heard that no one would be released unless they
19 did not return to Bosnia, none of the detainees. Do you recall that
21 A. I -- I think I said that I was not aware of precisely -- I think
22 I'd heard something about that but I had no firm knowledge about not being
23 allowed to return to Bosnia, no.
24 Q. So in fact, you could not confirm that?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Thank you. You testified yesterday, Sir Martin, that you had
2 mixed feelings about a situation where the Muslims and the Croats had
3 agreed on the ECMM going to Jablanica. Do you remember that testimony?
4 A. Yes. I said -- I think I said it was of interest that both
5 Muslims and Croats expressed enthusiasm for us to return to Jablanica for
6 different reasons.
7 Q. And I think you used the term that you had mixed feelings about
9 A. Perhaps mixed feelings was the wrong phrase. Perhaps I should
10 have said there were mixed motives for Croats and Muslims being -- wishing
11 us to return to Jablanica. No. We were very anxious. We were very
12 anxious to return.
13 Q. Dobro. But my question would be: Why was it that you had these
14 mixed feelings?
15 A. Mixed feelings may have been the wrong phrase. We were
16 desperately anxious to get back to Jablanica as quickly as possible. What
17 I think I meant - maybe I didn't phrase it well - was that the reasons for
18 the Croats and Muslims wanting us to go back to Jablanica were different,
19 were mixed.
20 Q. In your testimony in the Kordic case, you testified that in the
21 last six months, the Croats wanted peace. Is that a fact?
22 A. I certainly, when I was up at Zenica towards the end of my time, I
23 got the feeling that the Croats wanted to finish the fighting. They were
24 on the defensive. The Bosniaks were making gains. There had been a
25 number of incidents, well, apart from the destruction of the Stari Most.
1 There had also been the massacre at Stupni Do, there had been the serious
2 loss of Vares, which was a very significant strategic loss for the Croats
3 because it meant that the Bosniak army, the ABiH army, could move from
4 Tuzla to Gornji Vakuf without passing through any Croat pockets. So that
5 was very significant. So I got the feeling that they realised that the
6 longer it continued, the more they were going to lose.
7 Q. Would it be a fair statement, Sir Martin, the fact remains that in
8 the last six months before the final peace agreements, the Croats desired
9 peace, strongly desired peace, but it didn't happen for six months because
10 the BH army wouldn't allow it?
11 A. I started forming these opinions early in the -- at the end of the
12 year, at the end of the year. No Croat general or even political leader
13 said that they wanted peace. It was just my reading of the situation.
14 Q. Okay. Very briefly, I believe that you've indicated that you do
15 not recall any reports of looting whatsoever when you were in Mostar. In
16 your statement, you said --
17 A. Looting, looting from?
18 Q. Looting, stealing, taking things from people's apartments, taking
19 their cars, taking their valuables, looting.
20 A. Can you just draw my attention to precisely what I said?
21 Q. Sure. Absolutely.
22 MR. MEEK: If I could have the usher's assistance. Page 5 on the
23 English. Just show that to Sir Martin.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. Yes. At that time - this is
25 in the summer of 1993 - I do not recall any reports of looting, although
1 I'm quite certain it would have occurred during the expulsions.
2 MR. MEEK:
3 Q. Thank you.
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. Usher.
6 JUDGE CLARK: Mr. Meek, that's radically different from what
7 you've put to the witness. So saying "thank you" as if he agreed with you
8 is really a misrepresentation of what the bench hears. Read back what you
9 said and then look at Sir Martin's answer, and I don't need any further
11 MR. MEEK: Judge Clark, is this the question that starts on line 2
12 of page 69? Okay. I apologise.
13 Q. Sir Martin, I should have said during your time in Bosnia, the
14 three months you were there, but --
15 A. In those three months.
16 Q. Yes. I --
17 A. We know for a fact that many of those who were expelled just
18 walked out with the clothes that they were wearing. So what happened to
19 all their other possessions?
20 Q. But it's a fact that you said in your report that "I do not recall
21 any reports of looting, although I am sure -- certain that would have
22 occurred during" --
23 A. Indeed. Indeed.
24 Q. That's all I wanted to ask you, sir. One final question,
25 Sir Martin, and it deals with the Washington Agreement in 1992. Are you
1 aware of the Washington Agreement?
2 A. In March, 1994.
3 Q. 1994. Pardon me. In that agreement, was the HVO recognised as
4 the lawful military authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to your knowledge?
5 A. As far as I can remember, it was agreed that the HVO and the ABiH
6 would continue in their -- under their present constitution but with a
7 view to combining under a joint command.
8 Q. Sir Martin, I thank you very much for your patience and your
9 time. Thank you.
10 A. Thank you.
11 JUDGE LIU: Any cross-examination, Mr. Par?
12 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Cross-examined by Mr. Par:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Sir Martin. I'm Zelimir Par, and
15 I'm one of the counsel for the accused Vinko Martinovic. I will ask you
16 some questions relevant to your testimony.
17 Yesterday, you could see that we ran into a number of problems
18 when we tried to establish what was your exact position, whether you were
19 here as an expert witness, representative of the International Community,
20 general eyewitness, and so on and so forth. The Chamber ruled that we
21 should treat you as an independent observer.
22 Now, my question is whether you can personally define the position
23 that you are testifying from. That is, can you help us resolve this
24 dilemma? How do you see yourself here? Are you an observer, a general,
25 an eyewitness?
1 A. I'm not here -- I'm not here as a general, because I said that
2 throughout my time in Bosnia I was acting in a civilian capacity, but I
3 would say that I am here because of the knowledge and experience I gained
4 during those five and a half years, almost entirely in Mostar, in those
5 four different appointments that I had in Mostar.
6 Q. I see. But what I am trying to establish is you were there in the
7 capacity of an observer, that is, a witness qualified to observe certain
8 events. Now, what I'm trying to establish here is whether you are
9 testifying in that capacity or is your testimony the result not only of
10 that particular duty that you held there but of your knowledge in
11 general. I'm not quite sure that I've made myself clear.
12 A. I hope I understand you, but if I could just clarify one point.
13 When I was serving with the EC monitor mission, I would say I was a
14 monitor and an observer, assisting with meetings and doing what we could
15 do. But from then on, it was -- we were actually hands-on engaged in
16 practical work, not just observing but actually doing things.
17 Q. And so let us perhaps go back. Perhaps you could have a somewhat
18 closer definition of an ECMM. What were the qualifications? What were
19 the criteria that were used in order to designate, to appoint somebody to
20 that post, to become a monitor?
21 A. They were normally chosen from former majors, lieutenant colonels,
22 as far as the UK is concerned, in the British armed forces. I was
23 actually, in theory, far too old for the task but somehow they accepted
24 me. But if we go on to the qualifications, it was a careful interviewing
25 and vetting to check whether they considered you were a suitable person
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 for this particular task, but initially it was mainly ex-military people
2 because the task -- a military background certainly helped. But then
3 later on, others, former diplomats, lawyers, and others came in. But
4 certainly the military background, because of the nature of the work and
5 the potential -- the potentially dangerous work, a military background was
6 very useful.
7 Q. Thank you. Now, the task of that military observer, was it only
8 to register facts, that is, on the basis of his knowledge to merely record
9 what he had observed and then send on these facts to somebody else who
10 would then judge them or was this monitor's task also to interpret those
11 facts, to make some conclusions, to make some forecasts? What did the
12 task of a monitor mean?
13 A. We would normally -- we would normally -- as I think I said
14 yesterday, our fundamental task was reporting on political, military, and
15 humanitarian matters, in that order, but we did cover -- carry out a
16 number of other tasks such as chairing meetings, negotiating, helping with
17 humanitarian work and so on. But our reports were not just what we saw or
18 reporting of meetings that we'd had and views that had been expressed to
19 us but nearly always at the end of the report, and particularly end of
20 weekly reports, we would produce an assessment, an assessment of what all
21 this actually meant in the view of the person who was writing the report,
22 and the way things were developing or the possible dangers ahead and so
23 on. So it was interpreting as well as reporting.
24 Q. So we are still talking about the monitors and their mission. Do
25 they monitor only the conduct of the parties to the conflict or do they
1 also cover the work of other international organisations involved in the
2 conflict, or is it restricted only to the parties to the conflict?
3 A. No. We'd certainly have meetings with other international
4 organisations. That is where a lot of our information came from. And so
5 there would be discussions not only, for example, in Mostar with the
6 Croats and Bosniaks but also with the military, international military,
7 UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ICRC, and so on, to get as wide as possible pool of
8 knowledge and of views as possible.
9 Q. Yes. I understand that these international organisations were a
10 source of certain information, that they were part of international
11 activity there, but my question is whether your role of monitors also
12 extended to them. Did you report on the activities of UNPROFOR? Did you
13 report perhaps on what the UNHCR was doing, or the Red Cross, and so on
14 and so forth? That is, would you, your role of observer, allow you to
15 also cover their work, to monitor their work and report on their work as
17 A. Oh, yes. We -- we -- yes, we would certainly report on, you know,
18 what problems UNHCR were having, what convoys they were running, and
19 UNPROFOR, what difficulties they were facing, what problems they face, and
20 they would seek our advice and we would seek their advice.
21 Q. I meant something specific in this regard, namely, throughout the
22 war, both sides objected from time to time to UNPROFOR and other
23 organisations involved there. At some point in your testimony, you
24 mentioned that convoys with the humanitarian aid, be it from UNHCR and so
25 forth, were blocked. Are you aware that there were also objections that
1 UNPROFOR vehicles were used to smuggle in weapons or people and so on and
2 so forth, and that many people took that as a pretext for the blockades?
3 Have you had an opportunity to hear anything about it or did you hear
4 anything about it? Did you report about that? Did you hear anything
5 about UNPROFOR or any other international organisation misuse its position
6 in order to cooperate with one of the parties to the conflict?
7 A. One did hear, one did hear allegations, but I never was given a
8 concrete example to follow up. That never happened. The allegations were
9 always vague and were never substantive enough to enable me or my people
10 to actually pursue a particular line, because you cannot act on just
11 vague allegations.
12 Q. Monitors -- a monitor's job - I'm still there - does it also mean
13 that one makes a political assessment of one of the belligerents? Did
14 you, as a monitor, assess the positions of the Croat side? You heard
15 those positions. And would it be your job to then assess those views and
16 to say, for instance, well, the Croats have no right or the Bosniaks are
17 not right? Would that be part of your task to make political assessments
18 of their ideas?
19 A. Certainly. One of our tasks must, had to be assessing the
20 information, assessing what we felt was going on, assessing the views of
21 different people and different leaders. This was all part of important
22 information. And if we got our job right, if we did our job well, then
23 back in the capitals they would have solid, concrete facts to work on.
24 Q. So if I understand you well, you followed a specific method.
25 There was a standard model of collecting information, of selecting
1 information, processing it, and then forwarding it. I suppose there is a
2 standard method which you used. It was not left at the discretion of some
3 new head of mission how things would be done. There were certain
4 established rules, certain procedures that you all invariably followed, is
5 that it?
6 A. Yes. I mean, we had -- we -- all the reporting procedures were
7 standardised, but what of course went into the reports varied from monitor
8 to monitor depending on how capable he was, how well he was doing his job,
9 and so on. So different monitors would produce different standards of
10 reporting and different standards of assessments. And so one learnt after
11 awhile that certain individuals' views were significant and important and
12 others, one didn't really bother about them quite so much.
13 So the reporting procedures and so on were all standardised, but
14 how the monitor actually did his job on the ground varied from person to
16 Q. Now, these reports, you observed, you sent your reports, your
17 mission was in full swing, and how was the work of your mission assessed?
18 Were your reports accepted? How was that assessed? Do you get any
19 feedback how they were accepted at some higher level? Did you get any
20 feedback as to how your reports were viewed?
21 A. Yes. We did not get feedback on a daily basis because people were
22 so busy. But, for example, if one sent in a special report on a
23 particular subject which was significant and which was considered to be a
24 good report, then back would come the message, "Much appreciated, your
25 very good report on so-and-so," and maybe asking a few additional
1 questions which we perhaps might be invited to pursue. So there was
2 feedback, yes.
3 Q. Now we've covered a certain road, from the manner in which
4 information was gathered, who and how gathered it and who then forwarded
5 it. What I'm interested now is in this feedback. You have just told us
6 that this information reaches a centre or some centre, some hubs, and on
7 the basis of this information, the international commission draws certain
8 moves. Could you please explain it now to me? Where -- what is the final
9 destination for this information, and what is the feedback or, rather, the
10 reverse effect? How does this information or, rather, the feedback, the
11 response, how does it then become a part of a plan or a programme of work
12 or something? Could you perhaps describe more specifically the route that
13 this feedback or reverse information takes?
14 A. Well, as I say, the majority -- the majority of the messages were
15 going one way. They were going upwards from the coordinating centres to
16 the regional centres, to the headquarters in Zagreb and then off to the EU
17 Presidency and the capitals.
18 Now, I have to say that we did not -- I don't recall getting
19 feedback from capitals. It was -- but we sometimes got feedback from the
20 headquarters of the ECMM in Zagreb. We tended to take the view that no
21 news is good news. And if they had any queries on what we'd said, then
22 they'd come back to us, and as I said, occasionally, thanks and
23 appreciation for a particular report.
24 Q. I don't mean specifically your work or your reports. I'm, in
25 principal, interested in that information. So that information from the
1 ground must have had some purpose. Somebody, I suppose, would then be
2 invited to act upon -- upon it or, rather, act on the basis of this
3 information, and that again would find its reflection in the events, in
4 the developments on the ground, and that is, I suppose, why it matters
5 whether information is accurate or not, because it would then have again
6 its effect on whatever happens on the ground.
7 Now, my -- what I want to know is the information comes from
8 different places to one centre, and I suppose they are either put -- this
9 information is either put together and then somebody will use it, will
10 determine its purpose, and then at the level of the International
11 Community, somebody's going to use it for something, pursuing some
12 objective or other. Now, what I'm interested in is to know how one uses
13 it, in what way is this information then used?
14 A. Well, then, if I could perhaps give concrete examples. Now, in
15 Bosnia, when I was the head of the coordinating centre in Mostar, I would
16 receive reports from all four of my teams every day. Now, some of that
17 information would be for me to act on. It would require my action.
18 Other, I would be passing on as information up to the regional centre.
19 Some of the information that I passed up to the regional centre would be
20 for them to take action on. Other would be information which they would
21 be forwarding on to the headquarters in Zagreb. And as I say, the final
22 product at the end of the day was the coordinated reports sent from the
23 headquarters in Zagreb to the capitals, giving them a daily snapshot of
24 the whole situation throughout the former Yugoslavia, political, military,
25 and humanitarian in particular.
1 Q. Why am I insisting upon all this? Perhaps you are aware of that.
2 In Bosnia, a general attitude toward ECMMs was that as of the moment they
3 turned up in Bosnia, all those who could see themselves as victims or did
4 not -- wanted this to disappear, they were all very happy to see those
5 representatives of the international organisation because there would be
6 somebody coming there, seeing what was going on, report it, and then the
7 problem would be resolved. However, very many people were very
8 disenchanted with this mission because the results were either too late or
9 never happened. So my question is: Why is it -- are you aware of this
10 feeling, which is, I should say, a popular feeling there, that more was
11 expected from international organisations, and international organisations
12 and especially the ECMMs somehow fell short of these expectations?
13 A. Well, all I can say is that I'm sorry to hear that. I did have
14 views such as like you have expressed to me from time to time,
15 but I must stress again that the ECMM was, as its name implies, was a
16 monitoring organisation. It was not delivering food like UNHCR. It
17 wasn't providing military like UNPROFOR. It wasn't providing the ICRC.
18 It was fundamentally a monitoring organisation to provide, eventually, the
19 foreign offices of the various capitals with information that they
20 needed. As I said, this was a very delicate period. We'd moved on from
21 the Vance-Owen Plan. We were moving into the Invincible talks, the EU
22 action plan, the contract group plan, and so on. These were fast moving
23 days, and it was essential that capitals had a very clear idea of what was
24 happening on the ground.
25 So I know that people may have expected more from the ECMM than
1 the ECMM could deliver, but at least capitals were getting the information
2 which politicians needed.
3 Q. All this was one aspect of the whole matter, that is, you provide
4 some, so to say, inside information, that is, Bosnian information, and
5 send this information on to outside centres. Was it a part of your task
6 to also transmit and implement certain views, certain positions of the
7 International Community in Bosnia? Was a part of your task in Bosnia to
8 try and exercise some influence on the people that you communicated with
9 them by transmitting to them certain views, certain positions of the
10 International Community?
11 A. Yes, certainly, certainly. And also, as I think I maybe mentioned
12 yesterday, we did also -- the monitors did also take a -- played a part in
13 arranging meetings, negotiating and so on between the different factions,
14 and this was a very important part, to bring -- try and bring the sides
15 together and, where possible, arrange meetings. This was part of the job.
16 Q. And perhaps we could now start with those meetings. If I
17 understand you properly, you leave off on a mission. First you have some
18 very general information, then less general about the political, military,
19 humanitarian situation on the ground in the area that you're being sent
20 to. That is part of those briefings. Then you also hear what the
21 International Community thinks about all these issues and the directions
22 in which you should act and what it is that you should focus on. If I am
23 wrong, you will correct me.
24 Now, my question is: During the -- after you had been briefing,
25 after you were about to set off on your mission, do you already have, if I
1 may put it that way, do you already have the special glasses on through
2 which you look at the situation at the mission, glasses provided to you by
3 the International Community? Is it that you already know what you have to
4 concentrate on and what it is you are to do once on the ground?
5 A. I think -- I think members of the ECMM monitor mission were given
6 a wide degree of latitude, and I think it depended on the calibre and
7 the quality of the various monitors to decide, he might be invited by his
8 superior headquarters to find out, and I often was, "Please could you find
9 out and produce a special report on a particular subject?" But otherwise,
10 we had very much a free hand, and it was up to us to decide what we
11 considered to be important and what we wanted to pursue.
12 Q. All these questions, Sir Martin, have to do with what I am -- with
13 the position of the defence, namely, we think that the conclusions and
14 these considerations, these analyses, what you gave us during your
15 testimony about the causes for the conflict in Mostar, different
16 relationship, who intended to do what, who picked up which idea, and so on
17 and so forth, so the position of the Defence is that what you testified
18 about is a simplified story about Mostar, seen and experienced to that
19 particular pair of glasses made by the International Community in pursuit
20 of its own political objectives, and where this complex picture was
21 simplified making one party guilty and the other one with its hands
22 completely clean. So that is our position. That is not a question, that
23 is the reason behind all these questions that I asked you.
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott.
25 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I realise and I appreciate counsel just
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 saying that was not a question, however, I think it is unfair to this
2 witness. This witness had something like five and-a-half years of
3 experience on the ground in Mostar and Zenica. He is probably -- well,
4 it's not for me to say, but an extremely knowledgeable witness about
5 this. To suggest that he has presented a simplified story, I would
6 suggest -- at the same time, the Defence has objected to him talking about
7 anything else that he has learned and confirmed anytime after the first
8 few months of 1994 is unfair to the witness, and his base of information
9 and the basis on which he has said the things that he says.
10 THE WITNESS: I'm also very happy to respond.
11 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Par, it just seems to me that you are not
12 asking a question but make quite a long statement, which is not allowed.
13 You have to bear in mind that. We understand that you have the different
14 views, you know, compared with the views expressed by this witness, but
15 that's not the right place to state your views.
16 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I'm very happy to give a response
18 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] With your permission. Mr. President, in
19 this way, I presented the position of the Defence precisely in order to be
20 fair and correct to the witness here, Sir Martin. In other words, there
21 is nothing behind this question, but I am stating our position as it is,
22 and I am trying to test some of the evidence that the witness has given
23 against this.
24 I was in no way trying to diminish the authority of this witness.
25 On the contrary, I believe this is a witness with whom one can carry on
1 this discussion in which two different positions are confronted.
2 Q. So my real question was going to be: Is this way in which you,
3 Sir Martin, presented your views based on what you -- you were prepared to
4 do and was it that he was staying within the framework of what was -- what
5 he was asked to do, and that was then the relevant framework within which
6 he operated?
7 A. I think if I can respond to that by saying that I think the thrust
8 of your question is by the use of your word "glasses," looking through
9 things from a particular viewpoint and being -- operating to someone's
10 instructions. I think it's in this file somewhere. I seem to remember
11 saying - I think it may have been to Prlic at one stage - that if I was
12 receiving instructions from my own government back in England, I would
13 pack my bags and go back the next day. We were not under political
14 control, absolutely not. It is entirely up to the monitors to report and
15 to present their views. If someone was consistently getting it wrong,
16 then he'd be chucked out. But there was absolutely no pressure brought to
17 bear on monitors as to what they should say and what they shouldn't say.
18 I hope -- I hope that answers the question.
19 JUDGE CLARK: Can I just say something? Sir Martin, I think that
20 Mr. Par has asked you a very valid question, and he's expressed it as a
21 sort of statement in that the position that he is in, if I understand it
22 correctly, as Defence counsel for Mr. Martinovic, is that you as a senior
23 ECMM monitor had your view of the goings-on, if I can call it that, in the
24 Mostar region predetermined by the politics of the EU, and because of
25 that, you found one side in the wrong and the other side in the right. I
1 think that's what Mr. Par is saying.
2 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, if I can perhaps answer that by
3 saying that I don't think it was the EU that would be providing the policy
4 because, as you probably know, the different members of the EU had very
5 different views on the whole problem in Bosnia. So I don't think there
6 was a really united view coming down. And so, as I say, we were, I
7 believe, totally impartial and certainly not under any form of political
8 direction either nationally or from the ECMM. We were treated as adults,
9 and we were judged by our work.
10 MR. PAR: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I absolutely understand you. My intention was not to allude to
12 any kind of political pressures. I was referring to you as a person, as
13 an individual. You may have had a bias. You come in biased simply
14 because you come equipped with a certain amount of information. So the
15 pair of glasses that I was referring to was a pair of glasses that filters
16 your individual vision. In other words, when you arrived in Bosnia, did
17 you arrive with a particular -- with any particular bias? But what you
18 have told me in your response was you did your best to, a reasonable
19 and a responsible person, to observe things as best you could.
20 A. I have to say that I confess that when I arrived in Bosnia, I was
21 very ignorant of the situation. Bosnia, at that time, for the people who
22 are thousands of miles away, was a very complex business. I used to read
23 the newspapers, but of course that only gave one hundredth of the story.
24 So I came to Bosnia with a totally, I can assure you, a totally open mind.
25 My views were formed as the weeks and months and years went by.
1 Q. Right. One of the questions I was going to put to you was whether
2 your views today or the ones presented in your evidence, the same ones
3 that you held then or have they been supplemented by an amount of
4 additional information which you have somehow gathered since.
5 So if we go back to Mostar, are your views about everything that
6 went on there the same as they were in 1993 or have your views undergone a
7 certain kind of evolution since that time?
8 A. Well, Mostar is certainly a very different place from when I first
9 knew it in 1993 when I left it in 1998, but some of the underlying
10 problems which we've been talking about in the last 48 hours still exist.
11 There's still the wish by many for a third entity, Croatian Republic of
12 Herceg-Bosna. There's still the wish for Mostar to be the capital. There
13 is still the fear of Islamic fundamentalism and so on. A lot of these
14 things, the situation is much, much better, but some of these underlying
15 problems still exist.
16 Q. The specific background of this question were the documents. When
17 you -- when you were given a document, say, by Mr. Scott and it is a
18 report from 1993, and he said -- the question to you is: "Sir Martin, do
19 you still stand by everything that is contained in these reports?" you
20 say, "Yes."
21 My question to you was when you refer to these reports of 1993 and
22 you say that that is so, is that with the hindsight of what you know now
23 or was that -- is that something that you also held as your view back in
24 1993? I guess that is -- because in 1993, perhaps, it's easier to say
25 that this is fine, but back in 1993, did you have sufficient information
1 to be able to corroborate or confirm this?
2 A. Well, I think when I was being asked by Mr. Scott to confirm
3 things, I say -- I think I've been saying yes, that is my report and those
4 were my views expressed in that, and I have no reason to change the views
5 of what happened in 1993.
6 Q. I think I understood you now. So I think that we have laid out
7 the foundation sufficiently. We know now where your positions come from.
8 Now we may -- we can go into various specific areas where our views may
9 differ. You will understand that.
10 One of the theories that seemed to be underlying some of your
11 evidence was to portray the opposing sides, the Croatian and the Bosnian
12 Muslim side, according to this theory, the Bosniak Muslims advocated a
13 multi-ethnic community and the Croats opposed it. Is that one of the
14 theories or one of the statements that you or positions that you laid out
15 for us and that you consider one of the causes of the conflict?
16 A. Certainly this is the problem or one of the key problems that we
17 faced in Mostar. Was it going to be a multi-ethnic city or was it going
18 to be a divided city or was it going to be a Croat city? This was a
19 fundamental problem that we faced year after year after year.
20 Q. So this problem of the division of Mostar is actually the story
21 that extends to all of Bosnia, and so if blown up, it concerns all of
22 Bosnia, is it -- is Bosnia going to be divided or not, partitioned or not?
23 So the Mostar problem is really the same problem in a kernel, because in
24 Bosnia some wanted a division of Bosnia and some wanted something else.
25 The same story really can be taken down and be also seen as the story in
2 A. I agree. And people used to say, and I would agree with it, that
3 Mostar in many ways was a microcosm of Bosnia, particularly in view of its
4 multi-ethnic nature which I described yesterday before the fighting, but
5 we now already have Republika Srpska, and so I wouldn't like to -- to
6 guess what the future holds, but certainly I would have very much liked to
7 have seen a unified Bosnia as it was before the fighting.
8 Q. If we agree that this is a problem that was sort of -- that
9 trickled down from the larger to smaller, although the microcosm to
10 microcosm, maybe we should focus on this issue, the main issue, that is,
11 the division of Bosnia itself rather than Mostar. And this is perhaps in
12 Mostar a slightly simplified story because Serbs are missing from the
13 picture as is the International Community.
14 So let me ask you this: Sir Martin, in -- if in the evidence you
15 provided on Mostar you presented the two sides, the Croat and the Bosniak,
16 do you find it necessary, if we were to look for the real causes of war in
17 Mostar, that we should have included the Serbs, and the Serb aggression in
18 Mostar, the Vance-Owen Plan as all the elements that led up to the
19 conflict of the 9th of May?
20 A. Well, I mentioned yesterday that I did not consider -- I
21 personally do not consider the war in Bosnia to be a civil war, because it
22 was started off by Serbian aggression. Milosevic and then the
23 paramilitaries, Zeljko Raznjatovic and so on, Bijeljina, and then the JNA,
24 and then within a months 70 per cent of the country was in Serb hands. So
25 I agree there were problems, but if you look, that's why -- if we separate
1 how the fighting started in Bosna with why the Croats and the Muslims
2 started fighting each other. That's what I was trying to do yesterday,
3 and I said that I believed it was a problem of territory, and it may well
4 have been a misreading by the Croats of the Vance-Owen Plan provinces,
5 which I believe maybe the Croats assumed were Croat provinces, whereas
6 that was certainly not the intention. I think then it became a problem of
7 territory and then the shooting started.
8 Q. I agree with you. That is precisely why I am trying to agree with
9 you on that. There were additional factors involved such as the Serbs and
10 the Vance-Owen Plan which, intentionally or not, did increase the
11 tensions, and that was the consequence of information sent by various
12 international organisations to their capitals, and this came back as the
13 Vance-Owen Plan.
14 My question to you is whether you can agree with me on this: that
15 it is not so simple who was to blame for the 9th of May and the start of
16 conflict, that there are many factors involved, some of which are
17 actually -- do not actually come from the two banks of the Neretva River,
18 and you cannot say in a simplified way that Croats, let's say, for
19 instance, are the bad guys here.
20 A. I agree with you to an extent. And of course the shooting -- the
21 fighting didn't actually start initially in Mostar. It spread to Mostar.
22 But once it started in Mostar, then I am clearly of the opinion that the
23 HVO had made careful plans. I cited the case yesterday of the -- all the
24 detainees, which required careful planning. So I think that -- I don't
25 think it just erupted. I think there must have been careful planning,
1 because you can't do something that -- I'm sorry. I'm going too fast.
2 This requires a lot of planning, a lot of logistics, and so I am
3 certainly of the view that the fighting was pre-planned.
4 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] I'm afraid, Sir Martin, that we're --
5 our time is up. It is 7.00.
6 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your permission, I
7 would continue tomorrow.
8 JUDGE LIU: Well, Witness, I am sorry that we have to keep you for
9 another day. We appreciate your cooperation.
10 THE WITNESS: That's fine. That's fine, Mr. President,
12 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Usher, will you please bring the witness out of
13 the room first.
14 JUDGE CLARK: Before you leave, could I just say that in the four
15 months that we've been hearing this case, the exchange between Mr. Par and
16 you, Sir Martin, was the most interesting evidence I've heard, and I hope
17 it continues tomorrow.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, because of the logistic arrangements, we will
20 resume our sitting tomorrow afternoon at 4.00, at 4.00. So we will rise.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 24th day
23 of January, 2002, at 4.00 p.m.