Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2792

 1                           Monday, 26 January 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good morning to everybody in and around the

 6     courtroom.  Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-81-T,

 9     the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Could we have appearances

11     for the day starting with the Prosecution.

12             MR. THOMAS:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

13     everyone in and around the courtroom.  Mark Harmon, Barney Thomas,

14     Rafael La Cruz and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  For the Defence.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning

17     everyone.  Milos Androvic, Tina Drolec, Chad Mair, Daniela Tasic,

18     Gregor Guy-Smith and Novak Lukic on behalf of the Defence.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

20             Could we move into private session just for a short while.

21                           [Private session]

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20                           [Open session]

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we are back in open session.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Mr. Thomas.

23             MR. THOMAS:  Prosecution calls Dr. Charles Kirudja, please.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

25                           [The witness entered court]

Page 2794

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good morning, Mr. Kirudja.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  May you please make the declaration.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 5     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 6                           WITNESS: CHARLES KIRUDJA

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You may take a seat.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  Are you okay, Mr. Kirudja?  Are you

10     well this morning.

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes, as well as I can be.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Yes, Mr. Thomas.

13             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

14                           Examination by Mr. Thomas:

15        Q.   Doctor, can you begin please by providing us with your full name

16     and date of birth?

17        A.   My name is Charles Kirudja.  I was born in Kenya on April 20th,

18     1946.

19        Q.   Your current occupation is?

20        A.   I'm a retiree from the UN.

21        Q.   Could you give us, please, very briefly an indication of your

22     background prior to your involvement in the former Yugoslavia?

23        A.   Prior to my posting to Belgrade in April of 1992, I had been

24     serving in various capacities at the United Nations beginning 1977.

25             Those capacities included about seven years where I was involved

Page 2795

 1     in a field involving what national corporations and their influenced

 2     activities around the world.  It was a special department of the UN at

 3     that time tasked with tracing all the affects, political, economic, and

 4     social at that time.

 5             Then I was transferred from that role to the department of

 6     finance and budget where I remained until about 1984, something like

 7     that.  Then I was re-assigned --

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I thought you were seven years in the other

 9     department starting from 1977.

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes, seven years, 1977 brings up to --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  To 1984.

12             THE WITNESS:  That's what I just said, just about 1984.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I thought 1984 you were starting the new --

14             THE WITNESS:  No, 1984 is what I was going to tell you.  And at

15     that time, I was then assigned in the office of the controller and posted

16     four years later to a department that had been created in 1988, following

17     the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union from Afghanistan; and the

18     United Nations had been tasked to pick up the pieces of the humanitarian

19     crisis that had been created in Afghanistan.  And responsible for that

20     effort was the Late-Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who I was tasked to assist

21     in organising that effort based in Geneva.  And in that capacity, I was

22     both the administrator of a fund where the international community had

23     put their contributions, humanitarian and cash, for the effort.

24             From Geneva I would be travelling around in Afghanistan, in the

25     Soviet Union, in Iran, and in Pakistan because the effort around those

Page 2796

 1     countries were inclusive of the tasks that we were assigned to do.

 2             About 1989 or thereabouts, I was then returned back to the

 3     United Nations and given the task of dealing in the office of finance

 4     that dealt with peacekeeping activities, rather than the general

 5     financial and budgetary affairs of the UN.

 6             1992, then I was posted to Belgrade.

 7        Q.   Before I talk about your postings in the former Yugoslavia, can

 8     you tell us what your academic qualifications are, please?

 9        A.   I graduated from the University of Nairobi in 1972, bachelor of

10     commerce, specialising in management of business activities, operations

11     research and management science.  I then was given a scholarship by the

12     Canadian foreign office and arrived in Canada 1972 at the University of

13     York where I did a masters in business administration.  Thereafter, I

14     went to the University of Western Ontario where I graduated the PhD in

15     business management operations research in 1977.  And then the

16     United Nations recruited me directly from London, Ontario, Canada, at the

17     University of Western Ontario.

18        Q.   Moving now to your time in the Balkans, what was your first

19     posting?

20        A.   We arrived in Belgrade where the mission headquarters was, and

21     from there, I was posted on a fact-finding tour by bus from Belgrade to

22     Osijek where Sector East.  Across Osijek to Erdut where Sector East was

23     based; and from Erdut, I was asked to proceed to Daruvar where

24     Sector West was based, and from Daruvar I received a fax notifying me

25     that I was to take over in Topusko in Sector North where I would be at

Page 2797

 1     that time acting as chief civil affairs officer.

 2             MR. THOMAS:  Before we go any further, Doctor, you have mentioned

 3     some areas which we should identify for the Trial Chamber, please.  And I

 4     wonder, Your Honours, if I could have a map from the court binder up on

 5     the screen; it is 65 ter number 09234.  At number 1 in the booklets, Your

 6     Honour.

 7        Q.   First of all, Doctor, do you recognise that map as one of the

 8     territories of the former Yugoslavia?

 9        A.   Yes, I do recognise it.

10             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, could we please tender the blank map

11     as a Prosecution exhibit.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The map is admitted into evidence.  May it please

13     be given an exhibit number.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P469.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

16             MR. THOMAS:

17        Q.   The first area I'd like you to -- perhaps before I can you to

18     mark these areas on the map, Doctor, you mentioned Sector North, Sector

19     East, Sector West, can you explain what these sectors are?  Not

20     geographically what they are, but what they were actually -- why they

21     were termed that way, what they were?

22        A.   The mission that the Security Council had authorised to these

23     areas of the former Yugoslavia was based on an agreement that became

24     known as the Vance Plan concluded between Belgrade and Zagreb and Dojt

25     [phoen] as the basis of this mission by the Security Council.

Page 2798

 1             That Vance Plan had delineated areas of conflict within the

 2     former Republic of Yugoslavia, now known as Croatia, where the conflict

 3     of the parties at that time had an impact.  Those areas designated by the

 4     Vance plan formed a number of designated "opstinas" or municipalities, if

 5     you like; and those areas spread all over parts of Croatia.  And for

 6     administrative purposes when the UN began to implement the terms of the

 7     Vance Plan, they were designated as Sector East, which was in east

 8     Slavonia; Sector West, which was in west Slavonia; Sector North, which

 9     comprised a some of opstinas; and Sector South, which also comprised the

10     remaining number of opstinas, which were all in what they used to call

11     the Krajina area.

12        Q.   Doctor, I'm going to ask Mr. Usher, please, to provide you with

13     an electronic pen, and ask you, please, as best you can with the passage

14     of time to mark roughly for us on the map before you on the screen those

15     various sectors.

16        A.   Counsel, this map with my old eyes has become very, very

17     concentrated and it's very -- the density of it would make it hard for

18     me, actually, to do that.

19        Q.   We can --

20        A.   If you have a larger map where I can see the outlines of the

21     opstinas that I have named, I could do that.  Right now, I see a patch of

22     green, white and all of the little lines in between.

23        Q.   Would it assist you, sir, if we enlarged the area of Croatia?

24        A.   That would be very helpful.  Could you do it again?  I still

25     can't read the names there.

Page 2799

 1             MR. THOMAS:  Perhaps if we go to 65 ter number 09246,

 2     Your Honours, and that is map 7 in the booklet.

 3        Q.   And, Doctor, if that's still --

 4        A.   No, I can begin to see the outlines of Sector North as --

 5     Your Honour, if you are looking at this screen that I'm looking at, and

 6     if you can see my pen, there is the extension of the opstina called

 7     Kostanica that is to the west.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I don't see your pen unfortunately.

 9             THE WITNESS:  You don't see my pen and I don't see what you are

10     looking at, the same map.  That map -- excuse me.  I apologise, Your

11     Honour.

12             The opstina of Kostanica was part of the Sector North, and it

13     comes down going westwards from Kostanica you pick up the opstina of

14     Petrinja which was also part of Sector North, and then you come down to

15     the opstina of a Dvor na Uni, which was in Sector North.  West of

16     Petrinja, you go to Glina, which was the opstina also inclusive of Sector

17     North.  And then from Glina you go westward, and you will see the opstina

18     of Vrgin Most.  I will name them when you can see them on the map, Vrgin

19     Most and then as you proceed west of Vrgin Most, then you go to -- going

20     down along the border south-west, you get to Slunj which was also a part

21     of Sector North and part of the opstinas that are inclusive of Sector

22     North.  Vojnic and then going southwards, the border of Sector North,

23     would have ended somewhere in Korenica and that was basically and roughly

24     what was our Sector North.

25             Northwards, there are some rivers that you can trace around,

Page 2800

 1     Mreznica, Kupa river, and westwards there should be another river.  Maybe

 2     it is Korana, I've forgotten -- maybe it's Korana.  I've forgotten the

 3     name.  Those were roughly the boundaries of Sector North, and it was that

 4     area where we were located.  My office being at Topusko.

 5             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Doctor.  Your Honours, could we tender

 6     the blank map, please, as a Prosecution exhibit.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The blank map number 7 is admitted into evidence.

 8     May it please be given an exhibit number.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P470.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

11             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Thank you,

12     Madam Registrar.  Thank you, Mr. Usher.

13        Q.   Doctor, what was the position that you held when you first --

14     when you were first posted to Sector North?

15        A.   At that time, the position had been described the chief civil

16     affairs officer; and shortly thereafter, it was revised to civil affairs

17     coordinator.

18        Q.   And how long did you hold that position?

19        A.   From 1992 to 1994, I believe.

20        Q.   During that period, were you or was your area of responsibility

21     Sector North?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And you were posted physically in Sector North throughout that

24     time?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 2801

 1        Q.   What were your duties?

 2        A.   My duties were to ensure that the terms of the Vance Plan as

 3     endorsed by the Security Council as the core functions of the mission

 4     were implemented and implemented in full.

 5             Therefore, I had the responsibility alongside the military sector

 6     commander to advise the initial aspect of that mandate which were all

 7     military.  And it was military in the sense that the terms of the

 8     Vance Plan required that there be a total demobilisation, decommissioning

 9     of military materiel and personnel.

10             And also to ensure that all military personnel are put out of

11     business, so to speak, except for the police which had been made in the

12     terms of the Vance Plan an exception to that.  The only authority that

13     were to remain in all the sector activities was the authority of

14     civilians who ran the opstina beginning with the mayors, as well as the

15     police.  The police were to be reintegrated and made reflective of the

16     communities that occupied the place before, and they were only to carry

17     light weapons with their, quote, side-arms at that time.

18             Then the mandate, if all went well, all weapons had to be locked

19     into common storage was known as a double-key system, where the UN would

20     take control of those weapons along with the local authorities.  The

21     mandate envisaged from there we would be tasked with ensuring a safe and

22     voluntary return of the people who had been displaced from those areas.

23     And for that, our part of the mission had police contingent, UN police

24     contingent, that we would work with to ascertain that the conditions for

25     voluntary return were taken hold on the ground.

Page 2802

 1             And finally, we had to render humanitarian assistance for all

 2     those who had been affected during that war and after.  Basically that

 3     was the responsibility that the civil affairs coordinator had, and the

 4     rest was the responsibility of the military commander for the

 5     implementation of the military aspects of the mission.

 6        Q.   Did your duties, therefore, require you to deal directly with the

 7     military leaderships of the forces concerned?

 8        A.   Yes.  Actually, the earlier part of the mission was almost

 9     exclusively a military endeavour because when we arrived in the area, the

10     combatant, the people who were fighting were still in their foxholes.

11     There were tanks facing each other.  There were people armed eye to eye

12     across the confrontation lines.  Most of the houses and residences had

13     been destroyed, and people had already run away from the area.  So the

14     only thing that was -- the only activity that was there was a military

15     activity.

16             Our duty was, therefore, to immediately engage all the warring

17     parties on both sides of the confrontation line from Sisak through

18     Karlovac to Ogulin to Rijeka; and we had to go immediately identify all

19     the military command on the Serb side and on the Croat side; and as time

20     went on in March or so on the Bosnian border that was bordering Sector

21     North.  So most of our time from April all through to June or July was

22     heavily a military involvement of the sector commander and myself to try

23     to achieve the earlier goal, I said, of getting the parties to

24     demobilise.

25        Q.   You spoke earlier of the two signatories of the Vance Plan having

Page 2803

 1     been Zagreb and Belgrade.  Who were the military forces, what were the

 2     military forces engaged in the conflict that you were concerned with?

 3        A.   I'm sure you were aware this was originally one country called

 4     Yugoslavia, and when these conflicts took the turn they did necessitating

 5     the Vance Plan, there was a military known as JNA.

 6             JNA was a national military.  The JNA deployed in the areas that

 7     became the United Nations protected area, Sector North and Sector South

 8     formed one military command, and that military command was based in

 9     Bihac.  And that military command, I believe, was the 10th Corps.  And

10     the 10th Corps was based in the -- and the command was in Bihac.  And at

11     that time, Lieutenant-General Spiro Nikovic was in command.  So most of

12     our earliest engagement began with him, to identify all the command

13     structure and the deployment of the military in Sector North.

14             Specifically, we learned he had divided or the 10th Corps had

15     divided Sector North into two regional command.  One command was known as

16     Banja, and the command was located at that time when we arrived in

17     Petrinja.  And there was the command called Kordun that was based at the

18     time we arrived somewhere near Topusko, somewhere in the wooded area,

19     near Topusko that was the command and a bit of it in Vojnic but mostly it

20     was called Kordun.

21             Part of Sector North also involved Lika command, which took the

22     whole opstina of Slunj and part of Korenica and Plaski.  Plaski was

23     another opstina that I didn't mention in my earlier.  So we had to

24     identify who was in command, and then because the Security Council also

25     had made the mandate of UNPROFOR at that time to be within the area that

Page 2804

 1     I'm referring in Sector North across the line of confrontation, there

 2     were the Croatian side of the military.  So we had to identify on the

 3     Croatian side who was in command.  And we did, ran the command from Sisak

 4     through Karlovac and then across to the side that are called on Ogulin

 5     side running all the way to Rijeka there was a military command based in

 6     Rijeka at that time.  So we did identify all of those command.

 7             On the Croatian side, they had formed, there were much more

 8     organised since there were the signatories with Belgrade and they had

 9     been recognised as an independent country so they were overtly, more

10     clearly organised when we arrived and committed to dealing with UNPROFOR

11     and they had a commander in Sisak, General Budnji [phoen].  And in

12     Karlovac, they had a commander, but at that time they had put the entire

13     organisation under one civilian leader whom we dealt with where he would

14     come into a room with his military command, and that civilian was the

15     Deputy Prime-Minister Ramljak.

16        Q.   Just going back to the JNA command for a moment, did you come

17     across a Colonel Cedomir Bulat?

18        A.   Yes, Cedo Bulat was the commander of the Kordun wing of the 10th

19     Corps in Sector North.

20        Q.   Was he there throughout your period in Sector North?

21        A.   Yes, he was the longest serving of all the commanders from when I

22     arrived to when the sector was taken over by the Croats by force.  He

23     remained in that capacity the longest.

24        Q.   Once you had identified the appropriate people to deal with

25     within the respective commands, within the respective command structures

Page 2805

 1     of the two armies, did you then engage each side in accordance with what

 2     you were required to do?

 3        A.   We did our best, under very trying circumstances.  I can't say we

 4     achieved most of what we started out, but I believe we did achieve a lot

 5     of what we had started out.

 6        Q.   How long were the JNA engaged in Sector North?

 7        A.   General Spiro Nikovic was tasked with the responsibility of

 8     demobilising his entire command.  He engaged us from the time we arrived,

 9     I arrived in April there, to a certain date in May, I believe, which I

10     don't recall the date, when we had reached an agreement, both on the

11     Croatian side and on the Serb side that the warring parties would

12     withdraw their forces to a designated distance from the confrontation

13     line.

14             And the Serbs insides the UNPA had been given a general order

15     that said something like anyone of the commanders that was not indigenous

16     in that area, meaning born there but serving with the JNA, were to be

17     recalled from their command, and leave only what they began to call

18     Territorial Defence forces commanded in more or less the same structure,

19     but under the control of those who were indigenous, meaning born in the

20     area.  That included Cedo Bulat, who was born somewhere near Vrgin Most,

21     originated from there.  I don't know for sure that he was born there, but

22     I know his house and family, where it was.  But on the Banja command, the

23     general who was there, at the time, had to leave because he had

24     originated from Montenegro.  And in his place, eventually, we had a

25     series of commanders taking over very quickly but the last and longest

Page 2806

 1     serving there was Colonel Tabak [phoen] in Banja.  That particular

 2     situation for Spiro ended when he himself, Spiro Nikovic was also a

 3     Montenegrin, but he didn't complete or see to completion the negotiation

 4     of the demobilisation that he had reached with us.  He called us one

 5     evening and we met in his office in Bihac, and we abruptly announced that

 6     he had been recalled, and he had to hand-over to somebody else.

 7        Q.   Besides your dealings with military authorities to carry out your

 8     own mandate, were you required as part of your duties to meet with any of

 9     the political authorities in Sector North?

10        A.   Yes.  We had also for the purposes of achieving that requirement

11     of the Vance Plan that the area returned to the control of civilian

12     authorities, meaning the mayors and police.  So I had to go to every

13     capital of each opstina and identify who was in civil control, as well as

14     in police and military control.

15        Q.   In your dealings either with the military or the political

16     authorities, did you encounter any articulated concept of a greater

17     Serbia?

18        A.   Remember, you come into a situation where people are still

19     engaged in communal hostility, and the first question is they want to

20     engage you is the righteousness of their course:  Why they are fighting.

21     When we ask, Why are you fighting, why are you fighting each other;

22     invariably you will hear, we no longer can live together and we have to

23     go our separate ways.  And if you ask who are we in a country that was

24     previously a homogenous country, you quickly understood whether the

25     speaker was, we the Serbs and on the other side the Croats.  And if you

Page 2807

 1     come down southwards towards the border with Bosnia, there were the

 2     Muslims.  So we, depending on the speaker, was we the Croats, we the

 3     Serbs, and the Muslims don't enter into that kind until much later, you

 4     don't hear about we can't live together from the Muslim side.  Mostly you

 5     heard that from the Serb side.

 6        Q.   And would you hear that from the military authorities or the

 7     political authorities?

 8        A.   Most of the military officers you meet are not given to giving

 9     speeches or explain why they are doing things.  You heard it mostly from

10     the civilians.

11        Q.   Were the political authorities with whom you dealt all based in

12     Sector North?

13        A.   No, as I mentioned to you, a good part of the controls of the

14     military was in Bihac, meaning the part of the opstinas, in Bosnia

15     running all the way from Bosanski Novi to Krupa, to Velika Kladusa to

16     Bihac; and these were people we had to deal with.

17        Q.   The Serb articulation or the articulation by the political

18     authorities with whom you dealt of this concept of a greater Serbia?

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm going to object because that

20     mis-characterizes the gentleman's testimony.

21             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, I can rephrase that question because

22     it does paraphrase what the doctor is saying, and I appreciate that that

23     can cause some difficulties.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed.  And I think so far the doctor said we,

25     the Croats; we, the Serbs and much later; we, the Muslims.

Page 2808

 1             MR. THOMAS:  Yes, sir.

 2        Q.   Doctor, you spoke of -- and I'm just talking about the Serbs at

 3     the moment, about how they would speak of the inability to live in

 4     cohabitation, if you like, with the other ethnic groups in Sector North.

 5     Was this a theme that carried on throughout your time in Sector North, at

 6     least as far as the Serbs were concerned?

 7        A.   Yes, and let me clarify.  When I say from the military side you

 8     don't hear that particularly said.  That didn't mean it didn't come out

 9     in a different way.  It did come in a different way.  The military, for

10     example, if I ask them why are you fighting, in one of my written

11     testimony, I do give an account of Spiro Nikovic explaining to us what he

12     was fighting for and why he stopped where he stopped.

13             I mentioned Sector North stops in the northern opstinas of

14     Vrgin Most and Petrinja going across, they were the confrontation lines

15     stopped around rivers, Mreznica, Kupa, and Korana on the west side going

16     down to Slunj.  He said, I could take - I remember - I could have taken

17     Zagreb, I could have taken Karlovac; but we didn't have to do that

18     because those cities were predominantly Croats, why do we need to take

19     them?  So we needed a natural area that was mostly Serb and that mostly

20     Serb was in those opstinas.

21             When he was explaining on the Bosnian side why are you fighting

22     there also, he would say, for example, most of those areas, 80 percent

23     are Serb, so we need to control areas which are mostly Serb.  Doesn't go

24     beyond that.  But you could see that it not too different a concept when

25     the civilians vouch we can't any longer live together.

Page 2809

 1        Q.   Engaged in this role in Sector North, were you ever required to

 2     engage the FRY authorities?

 3        A.   Not from Sector North.  I later on got to engage the FRY

 4     authorities when I was posted in Belgrade.

 5        Q.   Okay.  You spoke of the soldiers who were left behind from the

 6     JNA, if I can use that term, but the ones who remained as those born on

 7     the territory forming a Territorial Defence force, and defence of what?

 8        A.   As he knew well, that Vance Plan made no distinction when they

 9     said we want all the weapons decommissioned and put in control -- in

10     storage points controlled between the UN forces and the local

11     authorities.  They were not to be removed from the area, but were to be

12     put in storage.

13             However, he explained, General Spiro Nikovic when we were

14     negotiating that there are still dangers that our people faced if we

15     pulled out.  The Territorial Defence forces would be left with

16     sufficient -- sufficient weapons so they can defend themselves.  And

17     those weapons included heavy weapons like artillery, armoured vehicle,

18     tanks, all except air force kind of weapons that would project fighting

19     beyond those areas.  Those weapons would be pulled and taken by the JNA

20     as it was as they were pulling out.

21             I remember General Spiro was very honest in his attempt to deal

22     with us and he would provide at our request an explanation of why he was

23     doing what he was doing.  At one point, he did tell us, bear in mind, for

24     our own understanding we didn't know what was unfolding every week after

25     week and about May he says, There is a new reality in the former

Page 2810

 1     Yugoslavia, and that new reality, he said, was that you -- the former

 2     Yugoslavia is going to break up into six republics and he proceeded to

 3     name them.  Those republics he named were:  Serbia and Montenegro in one

 4     rump, remainder of the former YugoslaviaCroatia, Slovenia, Macedonia,

 5     and Republika Srpska and Republic Serbian Krajina, RSK.  So what he

 6     called the remaining is what is today the new republics except those two

 7     RS and RSK, which he expected to be separate republics.  And that made it

 8     understandable why he would insist certain weapons be left for the

 9     defence of our people, left behind.

10        Q.   When the JNA did withdraw, did they leave the weapons behind as

11     he said they would?

12        A.   Yes, they were left behind, and we did collect them and put them

13     in storage.

14        Q.   When did you move -- or when did you leave Sector North?

15        A.   Late 1994.

16        Q.   And that was -- and where did you go?

17        A.   I was named Chief of Staff for the civilian side of the mission

18     in Zagreb.

19        Q.   And how long did you remain in that position?

20        A.   Short.  Because from there I was asked to proceed as the delegate

21     of the special representative of the sector general to Belgrade.

22        Q.   And did you take up that post?

23        A.   Yeah, I did.

24        Q.   And would that have been -- do you know exactly when you began

25     that -- commenced that post?

Page 2811

 1        A.   Really I've forgotten a lot of things especially about when I did

 2     these things.

 3        Q.   If I suggested August 1994, does that sound right?

 4        A.   Yeah.

 5        Q.   And what were your -- first of all, Mr. Akashi was the special

 6     representative to the Secretary-General?

 7        A.   He was the second.  The first one was Stoltenberg.

 8        Q.   But you as delegate were reporting to?

 9        A.   Was reporting to him.

10        Q.   To Akashi?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And what were your duties or what did you expect your duties to

13     be as delegate of the special representative in Belgrade?

14        A.   A lot has -- had changed by that August 1994 in the UNPAs, but

15     the signatories and the drivers of the reality going on their remained

16     still the authorities in Belgrade and the authorities in Zagreb.

17             The course of events in the sectors still was being discussed,

18     driven, negotiated, if you like.  There was a contact group of countries

19     that were assisting the parties and the UN.  There was a bigger forum

20     based in Geneva known as the ICFY, International Conference on the Former

21     Yugoslavia, still also conducting the events going on in the sectors as

22     well as in the broader area known as Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The

23     Secretary-General and the UN was involved in all of that, and the special

24     representative of the Secretary-General needed to engage the authorities

25     in Belgrade as well as in Zagreb.  When he would engage the authorities

Page 2812

 1     in Belgrade, it was my responsibility to arrange and be his arm in

 2     engaging the authorities on that score.

 3             There was also a no-fly resolution against Yugoslavia, Security

 4     Council Resolution 761, that also required us to monitor and engage the

 5     former -- the authorities in Belgrade.

 6             Lastly, there was the question of the Prevlaka peninsula which

 7     fell within the country then known as -- republic then known as

 8     Montenegro but part of what was left as Yugoslavia.  My responsibility,

 9     therefore, was to engage both the leadership in Belgrade, at that time

10     President Milosevic, and the leadership in Montenegro, at that time

11     President Bulatovic.

12        Q.   Doctor, you've mentioned a couple of groups or organisations that

13     I should probably get you to explain just a little bit more for us.  The

14     first is the contact group and the contact group plan.  Can you just

15     describe what those were, please?

16        A.   A lot went on in the sectors but the sum effect of what was going

17     on by the time we are talking about in August 1994 was an idea that

18     Belgrade and Zagreb were pursuing, and that was to move in measured steps

19     in resolving the conflict in the former part of Croatia that there was

20     fighting, and grant those sectors, the authorities in those sectors sort

21     of semi-autonomy, autonomy within Croatia.  And to negotiate those --

22     that outcome of some autonomy for those -- for the Serbs who lived in

23     those areas.  The contact group formed around some of the most

24     influential countries like Germany.  I mentioned Germany because the

25     leader of the contact group at that time was the ambassador from Germany.

Page 2813

 1     There was United States and there was Russia, and I forget what the other

 2     countries were but there were six of them.  And that was what the contact

 3     group was trying to reach and the negotiated outcome and autonomy.

 4        Q.   And what was the -- geographically what was the compass of the

 5     contact group plan?

 6        A.   Basically was to have -- since it never happened, it was a much

 7     negotiated, argued, or debated concept.  If there were to be an autonomy,

 8     what would be the nature of that.  Since it never happened, it is hard to

 9     give you a concrete thing because whatever was being proposed was at one

10     point being opposed by the other side.  So whatever it was that didn't

11     happen is simply there was no autonomy, and when the autonomy and the

12     discussions around autonomy failed, then Croatia took action that

13     resulted to what you know as an overrun of all the sectors.

14        Q.   If the JNA had retreated from Croatia leaving behind the Serb

15     Territorial Defence force in respect of those disputed areas, why was it

16     necessary to engage the FRY authorities in relation to the contact group

17     plan?

18        A.   The Serbs who took over control of sectors north, south, west,

19     and east ended up basically not following the Vance Plan and begun

20     activities aimed at making reality of their goal of an RSK Republika

21     Serbian Krajina in what was a territory that Croatia had always

22     eventually projected that they had control over that area.

23             In order for us to deal with the events in that area, with

24     Croatia insisting that this is its territory and it had to proceed in a

25     manner that we can agree with whether it's semi-autonomy or full return

Page 2814

 1     to autonomy, that's -- we have to be engaged.  So the engagement of

 2     Zagreb is clear from that point.

 3             But for the engagement of the Serbs who began to control and

 4     project that control inside those areas, the question was are they doing

 5     it all by themselves without anybody's assistance because this begun as

 6     an integrated Yugoslavia; and, therefore, there were under the control of

 7     Belgrade in so many ways from the fact that starting with the soldiers.

 8     These soldiers whether they were first JNA or they had transformed

 9     themselves to TDF, they were drawing some pay, some support of all kind

10     including money from, the question was did that flow, did the payment

11     from did it stop from Belgrade.  Our position was it didn't stop.

12             The communications lines when they wanted to communicate, where

13     did these communications lines originate from?  The currency, the money,

14     where did this originate from?  Therefore there was an umbilical linkage

15     always to Belgrade.  Therefore, the outcome of all what would happen in

16     those areas, Belgrade was always a major player and they had to be

17     involved.

18        Q.   When you did engage Belgrade on these issues, were they prepared

19     to engage?  Did they accept that they needed to engage?

20        A.   Very clearly they always had like Zagreb, their own policy view

21     about what they wanted to see happen there.  That eventually begun to

22     digress from what their kin and kith who were in those territories were

23     doing.

24             Towards the end, I go towards the end of the process, Belgrade

25     with Milosevic in charge at that time had already reached a policy

Page 2815

 1     agreement that whatever would happen in those areas had to be settled

 2     through peaceful negotiation and no military.  They did not never changed

 3     that they wanted to see a negotiated outcome, no military.

 4             Events of course were not always totally controllable by either

 5     side.  When there was a reality of an RSK, there was other events

 6     happening in and around Pale about the Republika Srpska and the two

 7     realities had a lot of common confluence around and if not a common

 8     policy.  In the end, there did emerge a deviation because the negotiated

 9     process never bore fruit.  Even if the Belgrade people wanted it to bear

10     fruit.

11        Q.   Now, Doctor, just before I leave this point and I've strayed from

12     where we were at a little while ago, but the second organisation you

13     mentioned which might require some explanation is ICFY, the International

14     Conference on Former Yugoslavia.  Can you explain, first of all, if I've

15     got the name right; and secondary, who were the members of this group and

16     what was their function?

17        A.   Very briefly, this was an umbrella forum on one side co-chaired

18     or co-driven by the UN on one side and by the European Union on the

19     other.  And the co-chairs initially of that organisation were Lord Owen

20     representing the European Union side and Stoltenberg representing the

21     United Nations side.  There was also recognition that there were issues

22     that involved the entire former Yugoslavia that were not localised simply

23     in sectors or in Bosnia or just Croatia and the Serbia alone, there were

24     issues that were much broader.  And the forum was to kind of put a

25     lasting umbrella to the outcome of the solutions that were being sought

Page 2816

 1     in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Croatia.

 2             To that extent they were engaged on the ground with us.  I did

 3     meet on the ground with Lord Owen.  He had come there several times to be

 4     informed about what was going on on the ground.  Cyrus Vance himself did

 5     come, but he was basically representing the contact group as the original

 6     inspirer of this Vance Plan but in the context of the contact group.

 7             But and also in broader involvement of his own country in the

 8     process, and that would, of course, put him at every aspect of that

 9     including ICFY.  Therefore, the group that was in ICFY would endorse

10     negotiations that came from the ground as valid.  Specifically, the

11     result of the contact group which we spoke.  At one time, we were given

12     to understand, we were close to getting an agreement for autonomy that

13     Serbs led by Martic at that time and the Croatian government would agree.

14             Most of those negotiations were not even in the former

15     Yugoslavia.  We would take delegate, people representing both the Serbs

16     and the Croat into Geneva where we had many, many meetings with these

17     groups, under the ICFY because the headquarters -- that's where ICFY was

18     and at times also in Vienna.  That was the overall process of validation

19     of attempted solutions to the issues that were on the ground arising from

20     the various flash points in former Yugoslavia.

21        Q.   In general terms during your posting in Belgrade, which of the

22     FRY authorities did you most often deal with?

23        A.   Most of the times I did deal with the FRY authorities over issues

24     that involved the sectors and that was President Milosevic.  At that time

25     he was the president of Serbia, but he still was the main player.  As you

Page 2817

 1     know, there was another president for the former Yugoslavia jointly

 2     meaning Republic of Serbia and Montenegro.  He was still the president of

 3     Serbia when we were dealing with him.

 4        Q.   Just pause there for a moment, Doctor.  Could you just explain

 5     that dynamic a little bit for the Trial Chamber.  We have the president

 6     of the FRY, on the one hand; and the president of Serbia on the other

 7     hand.  Can you just explain why it was that Milosevic was the key player?

 8        A.   This was never understood in the media, but it was always

 9     understood in the international community where anybody who was involved

10     from the leadership of other countries that would come in Belgrade and

11     they would meet not Lilic; I never met him so, therefore, I don't even

12     remember very much because it was the president of Serbia whom we met

13     with.

14             There was a prime minister in both -- also of Yugoslavia, that I

15     remember because his Deputy Simic we did meet with.  However, the control

16     of the reality de facto, I'm not talking about de jure; de facto

17     authority, de facto influence was with the president of Serbia at that

18     time, Milosevic.

19        Q.   Was that the situation as well prior to your arrival in Belgrade

20     in August 1994?

21        A.   Yes, even before I arrived.

22        Q.   Was it the position when you left Belgrade?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   When was that, can you recall when you departed Belgrade?

25        A.   June 1995.

Page 2818

 1        Q.   Presumably -- let me ask you another question.

 2             On how many occasions would you say you've met Milosevic?

 3        A.   I actually never kept count, but I did meet him so many times,

 4     and each meeting was not a short meeting, it was always long meetings

 5     lasting anywhere between four and six hours.

 6        Q.   You've spoken of this theme of greater Serbia emerging during

 7     your time in Sector North --

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Once again that mis-characterizes the gentleman's

 9     testimony.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

11             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, I'd like to find the appropriate

12     passage in the transcript, so I can get that right.  I wonder if it would

13     be an appropriate time to take the break now, and I can pick up on that

14     question.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  That's an appropriate time

16     we'll take the break and come back at quarter to 11.00.  Court adjourned.

17                           --- Recess taken at 10.14 a.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 10.46 a.m.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Thomas.

20             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

21        Q.   Doctor, you mentioned that during your time in Belgrade, it

22     became apparent that Milosevic's preference was for a negotiated

23     settlement rather than an military option in response to the contract

24     group plan, for example.  At what point did that preference on the part

25     of Milosevic become apparent?

Page 2819

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I take it you mean his own personal knowledge of

 2     that, or are we talking about something else?

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  He is just asking the question.  And the witness

 4     will tell whether he has any personal knowledge of it or not.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I understand that, but the way the question is

 6     framed, it would seem that the point is a point in time that would either

 7     become a truth or a non-truth based upon -- and by that I'm talking about

 8     time, based upon what this witness say, so there may well be other

 9     information that his preference, meaning Milosevic's preference, existed

10     in a much earlier time or not at a much earlier time.  I think Mr. Thomas

11     understand the thrust of my question.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It says when it -- at what time did it become

13     apparent, so it may have existed long before it became apparent, all the

14     lawyer wants to know is when it became apparent to the witness, if at

15     all.

16             Mr. Thomas.

17             MR. THOMAS:

18        Q.   Dr. Kirudja, when did it first become apparent to you that

19     Mr. Milosevic's preference was for a negotiated settlement?

20        A.   Mr. Milosevic himself said so.  If you ask me whether he had said

21     it before I heard it, I wouldn't know that.  But he did say in several

22     instances where there was an issue, there was an issue, for example, when

23     the first action taken Croatian authorities to retake western Slavonia.

24     We had a meeting called by Mr. Akashi because of that event.

25             There was an incident where we met with him when, for example,

Page 2820

 1     the NATO shot down some planes flown by some RSK officials from the field

 2     in Udbina.  During this event, there was violence created over an issue

 3     like shooting down the plane or taken by force, by the Croatian

 4     authorities, western Slovenia.

 5             In instances, I'm not saying it's only limited to those instance,

 6     Milosevic would always in addressing the UN delegations repeat, This is a

 7     preference I have that there be a negotiated solution.  And he believed

 8     and he repeated many times passionately, that if he wasn't, I remember

 9     words to the effect:  If you left us in the same room, myself and

10     president Tudjman, we could agree to negotiate this solution.

11             But I understand you would say there are forces at all sides that

12     are opposed to this negotiated solution, and he termed those forces as

13     forces that want a war solution, specifically in both RSK and Bosnia, and

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are forces which are intent on having -- having

15     a war solution.  But he would also hasten to say, They will not succeed.

16     In the case, he will say, look, for example, the supporters of such a war

17     option like the member of parliament aligned with [indiscernible].  He

18     lost his position recently in advancing this war position.

19             He repeated this, so it's not a secret that he said that.  The

20     time sequence of when he said any of these things I have referred to,

21     Your Honour, these events took place a long, long time, and I can't give

22     you an exact time sequence about this.

23        Q.   Doctor, you referred to one of your topics of engagements with

24     the FRY authorities as being the no-fly zone, and I think you mentioned

25     Security Council Resolution 781.  Can you just explain what the no-fly

Page 2821

 1     zone is or was?

 2        A.   It was a much older resolution coming about the same time the

 3     resolution enabling the mission started.  The same time when the Security

 4     Council was authorising this nation to get ahold of the events that were

 5     unfolding in the whole of Yugoslavia at that particular time.  They

 6     wanted also to ensure that the seat of Yugoslavian power, which was then

 7     Belgrade, didn't project its advantage in fighting forces, especially

 8     their force, to project beyond where it was.  So they were forbidden to

 9     fly.

10             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, could we please have Exhibit 65 ter

11     02190 on the screen.

12        Q.   Dr. Kirudja, you can see from the title that we are looking at

13     Security Council Resolution 781 adopted on the 9th of October, 1992 by

14     the Security Council?

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas, I see on the B/C/S side it's

16     Resolution 780 of 6 of October, 1992.  Instead of 9th of October, 1992

17     and instead of being -- okay.  Now we've got it.

18             MR. THOMAS:  The relevant passage that I'd like to draw

19     everyone's attention to is on page 2 of both version, please.  Numbered

20     paragraphs 1 and 2.

21        Q.   Now, Doctor, do you see paragraphs 1 and 2 establishing the ban

22     on military flights and also enabling the United Nations protection force

23     to monitor compliance with that ban?

24        A.   Yeah, I can see 1 and 2.

25        Q.   Are those the relevant parts of the resolution -- are these what

Page 2822

 1     is relevant to your description of the no-fly zone?  Are we talking about

 2     the same thing?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Okay.  First of all, the ban is on all military flights in the

 5     air-space of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is apparent enough.  But I am

 6     interested also in paragraph 2 which enables:

 7             "The protection force to monitor compliance including the

 8     placement of observers when necessary at air-fields in the territory of

 9     the former Yugoslavia."

10             Was UNPROFOR able to place the necessary observers at those

11     relevant installations?

12        A.   Yeah, we had a contingent of United Nations military observers in

13     the control rooms at a Surcin airport.

14        Q.   And where is Surcin airport?

15        A.   In Belgrade.

16        Q.   What was the function of those UNMOs?

17        A.   Actually, I never went inside there, myself; but they would brief

18     me routinely.  They were to observe what was going on there for whatever

19     was in violation of the resolution as they interpreted it themselves.

20        Q.   Do you know specifically what they were looking at or looking

21     for?

22        A.   Unless there was an event like an event that I describe in one of

23     my reports, routinely I wouldn't know what they were looking for.  But if

24     there was a specific event like the one that is discussed in one of my

25     reports, I know what they were looking for.  They were looking for the

Page 2823

 1     tapes of -- or radar to confirm whether or not that event took place.

 2        Q.   Let me ask the question another way.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, Mr. Thomas.  I do hate to interrupt.

 4     If you could do us a kindness here.  Mr. Perisic is having difficulty

 5     reading on the screen the exact portion that you were discussing with

 6     Mr. Kirudja.  If you don't mind terribly just reading it out so that he

 7     gets the precise language, I'd appreciate it.  I do apologise for

 8     interrupting.  I really am sorry, I was just given a note.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I suggest you also talk via the Bench.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And I apologise to the Bench for that, too, yes.

11             MR. THOMAS:  That's no problem, Your Honours, I can read that

12     into the record.

13        Q.   The relevant passage is, I'm reading the numbered paragraphs 1

14     and 2 in the English version, page 2.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I suspect what Mr. Guy-Smith is saying is that the

16     B/C/S is not numbered.  Therefore, Mr. Perisic is finding it difficult to

17     pin-point the exact paragraph that you were reading.  So reading the

18     English version is not likely to be helpful to him, maybe.  If you can

19     point at the B/C/S one.

20             MR. THOMAS:  I think, sir, the relevant -- it would appear, sir,

21     that it is the starting at the fifth paragraph on the page that's on the

22     screen at the moment.  But I will defer of course to my native B/C/S

23     speakers.

24             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Here, the only problem is that the

25     B/C/S version is not numbered like the English version.  I believe the

Page 2824

 1     general will be able to follow now, but perhaps it would be a good

 2     idea -- it's exactly as was explained.  It's the fifth paragraph in the

 3     B/C/S.  I believe Mr. Thomas identified the paragraph correctly.

 4             MR. THOMAS:  All right.

 5        Q.   Doctor, were the UNMOs stationed at Surcin airport?

 6        A.   Yes, they were.

 7        Q.   And was their function to monitor this resolution as or monitor

 8     the ban as set out in this resolution?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And was their task to report to you or to others if there were

11     any breaches of the ban?

12        A.   Their task was to report what they observed through a

13     well-defined channel among which was their own superior which the UNMO

14     line went to the chief military observer, and then to the force

15     commander.  And then on the civilian side, they would brief from the

16     local to the headquarter civilian line.

17        Q.   Was there an appreciation on the part of the FRY authorities that

18     access needed to be given to the UNMOs to undertake that task?

19        A.   They did it rather willingly and effortlessly considering there

20     was also a sanction resolution, not this one, against the remaining

21     Yugoslavia.  They, relatively speaking, they were very forthcoming about

22     it.

23        Q.   Just on that a topic, was compliance or otherwise with Resolution

24     781, this resolution, something that would be relevant when it came to

25     deciding whether or not sanctions should be lifted or extended?

Page 2825

 1        A.   I don't recall the sequence of -- I think the sanctions of the

 2     resolution came after since this is in 1992.  I think the sanctions, I'm

 3     not sure, you can check that, and I don't know whether this resolution

 4     influenced it or not.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And if I may just get clarification, Doctor.  When

 6     you said there were sanctions against the remaining Yugoslavia, what do

 7     you mean by remaining Yugoslavia?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, when the old well-known Yugoslavia

 9     fell apart and Slovenia went its way, Croatia went -- began to go its

10     way, Bosnia-Herzegovina voted to secede, then the authorities

11     reconstituted Yugoslavia and retained the name Yugoslavia to mean the

12     joint what was known as Montenegro and what was known in Serbian, the old

13     resolution formed the new Yugoslavia although they didn't use the label

14     "new."

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Is that what was called the FRY?

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it was not actually recognised by the UN.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Thomas.

18             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Could we tender as Exhibit

19     please Security Council Resolution 781, which is the one on the screen

20     says 65 ter 02190.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It's admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

22     number.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P471.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

25             MR. THOMAS:  Just so I can clarify a comment you just made,

Page 2826

 1     Doctor, about the sanctions resolution, could we have P00202 on the

 2     screen, please.

 3        Q.   Now, Doctor, you will see that we are looking at Resolution 757

 4     adopted on the 10th of May, 1992.

 5             MR. THOMAS:  If we look, Your Honours, please, at page 3 of both

 6     versions.

 7        Q.   If you look under paragraph 4 there, Doctor, we see a number of

 8     sanctions referred to.  They spill over on to the next page, and please

 9     tell if you need to go on to the next page, but is this what you refer

10     today as the sanctions resolution?

11        A.   Yes, yes.

12        Q.   Once the sanctions resolution was imposed, was the lifting of the

13     sanctions or the reduction of the sanctions something that was upper most

14     in the mind of the FRY authorities?

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Objection.  Calls for speculation.

16             MR. THOMAS:

17        Q.   To your knowledge?

18        A.   Do you want me to answer that question?

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, you may proceed.

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it was.  And part of the reason why I

21     remembered it because in the execution of the no-fly resolution, they

22     would remind me as a representative of the UN, a point I always noted,

23     Look, we are trying to do the best under the sanctions resolution.  Like

24     these machines require spare parts, and we can't do it so easily with our

25     hands so tied by the sanctions resolution.  Yes, it was foremost in their

Page 2827

 1     mind.

 2             MR. THOMAS:

 3        Q.   You've referred to the authorities saying that they needed spare

 4     parts for certain machines.  What machines are you talking about?

 5        A.   Particularly on this incident that I referred to, the UNMOs would

 6     go into the radar room and find out some equipment, I don't know exactly

 7     what equipment they reported, not functioning; and they are asking why is

 8     this not functioning, and state spare parts problem.

 9        Q.   Are we going back now to the UNMOs monitoring the no-fly zone?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   In early February 1995, did you become aware of possible

12     violations of the no-fly zone by the FRY?

13        A.   Yeah.

14        Q.   Perhaps before I move on to that topic, in addition to the no-fly

15     resolution, were there other issues concerning the border between the FRY

16     and the Republika Srpska at that time?

17        A.   Counsel, Republika Srpska was not something we as the UN knew as

18     an existence.  If you mean with Bosnia-Herzegovina was the border

19     between -- a recognised border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

20     that border is actually defined by the river Drina.

21        Q.   At the time of these possible violations, early February 1995,

22     was the border between the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina open?

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   Who had closed it?

25        A.   The authorities in Belgrade.

Page 2828

 1        Q.   And when had they closed it?

 2        A.   Unfortunately, I don't remember the exact date.

 3        Q.   Why did they close it, to your knowledge?

 4        A.   I learned why they exposed -- and the reason you see a reluctance

 5     in answering why, is because this mandate and the whole issue involving

 6     that border, the FRY authorities made sure that it doesn't involve the

 7     UN.

 8             It involved the European Union and the FRY authorities, and

 9     whatever may have been official reasons involving it didn't come my way.

10     I can only, of course, tell you my understanding since I needed to

11     understand what was going on what was it about.  It was about Milosevic

12     being taken to task many times when he met in the international community

13     including ourselves that there were movements of materiel and personnel

14     involved in the conflict in Yugoslavia across that border, and this

15     wasn't helping.  Taking him to task many times this way, he said, if you

16     don't believe us, we will close the border to ensure this doesn't happen

17     except for humanitarian -- humanitarian supplies which obviously we

18     couldn't deny passage.

19             And then from there on, the monitors he agreed would be supplied

20     by the European Union, and he set up this organisation for monitoring,

21     and it was headed by our former chief military observer in his capacity

22     as a European, General Pellnas from Sweden.

23        Q.   Do you know until what date the border was closed?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   From your own observations and your own dealings in Belgrade at

Page 2829

 1     the time, did you have any observations as to whether this was effective,

 2     ineffective, whether anything materially changed with the closing of the

 3     border?

 4        A.   The simple answer to that is that it was really not my

 5     responsibility even to find out whether it was effective or not.

 6        Q.   The monitors that were supplied to monitor this border closure

 7     were supplied by whom?

 8        A.   To my knowledge, the European Union.

 9        Q.   I want to move now to these helicopter flights that were -- or

10     this issue which arose in early February 1995.

11             Before we go on to some documents dealing with that, can you just

12     generally explain to the Trial Chamber what occurred?

13        A.   Very generally, and I would -- if Your Honour agree, I would like

14     to see that report.  It's about three pages, to refresh my memory about

15     it.  It is a report I wrote to Mr. Akashi, and unlike other reports, it's

16     a coded cable.  Coded meaning it did carry lots of sensitivity in its

17     content, so I wouldn't have sent it in an ordinary way.  There are

18     routine reports that we made.  That was not a routine report.

19             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, could we please have 65 ter 03283 on

20     the screen, please.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry, 02?

22             MR. THOMAS:  Sorry, 03283.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

24             MR. THOMAS:

25        Q.   Doctor, do you recognise that as the report that you wrote to

Page 2830

 1     Mr. Akashi on the subject?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Before we go into some aspects of that report, what prompted this

 4     report?  What was the first information you received, do you recall?

 5        A.   This mission has -- it was a complex United Nations mission with

 6     reporting channels that involved the total sources from civilians, from

 7     police, from military observers.

 8             Military reports from people on the ground are daily sitreps

 9     wherein prior to this report, and they are circulated to all senior

10     management, we get our supply of reports on a daily --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just to clarify the record, can you explain what

12     sitreps are.

13             THE WITNESS:  Situation reports.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

15             THE WITNESS:  Daily situation reports.  And those come from all

16     channels.  So prior to this report, a flash report comes that a

17     contingent of UN forces.  The Dutch contingent specifically in Srebrenica

18     reported a contingent of helicopters that flew across the border towards

19     their direction, towards their base.  When military sitreps come that

20     way, they just report the facts and not the reasons, not anything.

21             And of course, it comes back later to what was this all about.

22     UN Belgrade, what this all about.

23             MR. THOMAS:

24        Q.   At the same time, what was happening to the UNMOs at Surcin

25     airport who were tasked to police the no-fly zone or the ban on military

Page 2831

 1     flights into Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 2        A.   Their sit report were report on this particular day we couldn't

 3     go in, we were not allowed to go in.  We normally can go routinely to

 4     observe.  Their sit report says we were not there, we could not go, we

 5     were not allowed.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  To go in where?

 7             THE WITNESS:  To the airport, to the control room.

 8             MR. THOMAS:  I'd like to turn, Your Honours, please, to page --

 9     in the same document, to page 9 of the English version and page 11 of the

10     B/C/S version, please.

11        Q.   Doctor, do you recognise that as an annex to your report dealing

12     with the restriction of movement to the radar room that the UNMOs

13     encountered?

14        A.   Separated from the report, I can only assume because again it's a

15     long time ago, it's an attachment I didn't write.  So in and of itself

16     couldn't be recognisable by me unless it is physically attached to the

17     report.

18        Q.   I understand, I understand.

19             Could you read the document quietly to yourself and tell us if

20     that accords with your recollection of what occurred at the time.

21        A.   I've read part of the front page, and it is now clear reminiscent

22     of what I was trying to say earlier, that the UNMOs at this time, it's

23     Colonel Goodmanson [phoen].  Colonel Goodmanson comes to my office, and

24     he is reporting this incident, and this is what happened.  It was unusual

25     in the sense in which there was unfriendliness on the part of the

Page 2832

 1     authorities over this issue which was unusual.  I said earlier there

 2     always was a friendly and cooperative relationship until this occasion.

 3     And because it didn't -- it stood out from the ordinary way unnecessarily

 4     aggressive and argumentative on a simple issue can we go in where we have

 5     always gone in to observe what we have always observed.  That is

 6     reflected in the report that you saw earlier in one of the paragraphs

 7     where I'm thinking this was also made purposely so that we can take note.

 8     My report itself characterises it as an incident staged so that we can

 9     take note.

10             MR. THOMAS:  I understand.  This page deals with events or

11     restriction of movement on the 2nd of February.  I want to also turn,

12     please, to page 8 -- sorry, Your Honours, the previous page before this

13     one in the English.  Thank you.  And two pages back in the B/C/S, please.

14        Q.   Doctor, this is also an annex to the same report?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   First of all, there will be some terms that might need further

17     clarification.  If you look at the title, "Summary of ROM ..."  The

18     previous report, if it's of any assistance, dealt with restriction of

19     movement.  Would ROM appear to be an abbreviation of the same thing?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And Surcin ATC?

22        A.   Where does it occur?

23        Q.   Is ATC, do you know what ATC would stand for?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   The report appears to deal with matters involving staff at

Page 2833

 1     air-traffic control, could that be the --

 2        A.   Yeah, sorry, yeah.

 3        Q.   If you look down at the entry on the 9th and 10th of February,

 4     1995, "Oral protest forwarded to SLO air FRY".

 5        A.   Yeah, senior liaison officer.  SLO, senior liaison officer.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  The next entry begins with "DSMO."

 7        A.   Deputy -- senior military observer.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  On the seconds line, at the end, we have "but LO off"

 9     and then a name?

10        A.   Liaison officer.

11        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Now, do you recognise that document as

12     what it purport to be, namely a summary of restriction of movement over

13     those days?

14        A.   Again part of ordinary sitrep, that's what you would recall a

15     situation report, they did that routinely every day.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. THOMAS:  If we move back to page 1 of the document, of the

18     exhibit, please, Your Honours.

19        Q.   Now, paragraph 1 introduces the steps that you took in response

20     to these possible violations, and the authorities with whom you spoke.

21     Again, just a couple of abbreviations and acronyms that we might need

22     your assistance on.  Firstly, the third line after Colonel Vuksic, we

23     have, "Responsible to JA General Kovacevic."  JA standing for?

24        A.   Yugoslav Army.

25        Q.   And was that an abbreviation that you yourself used consistently

Page 2834

 1     in your reports and in your dealings?

 2        A.   Yeah.

 3        Q.   All right.  And the second to last line in that paragraph, "The

 4     SRFC in Belgrade."

 5        A.   Is the senior representatives of the force commander, a military

 6     official located in my office at that time.

 7        Q.   Part of UNPROFOR?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in paragraph 2, you summarise the response of

10     the FRY authorities to the allegation regarding these cross border

11     helicopter flights.  What I'm interested in is paragraph 3, which is on

12     the next page of both documents, please, Your Honours.

13             You make two requests in subparagraph (a) and subparagraph (b) to

14     the FRY authorities.  The first appears self-explanatory that access be

15     restored to the UNMOs to the radar screens.

16        A.   Correct.

17        Q.   Can you just assist the Trial Chamber why you made the second

18     request the tapes of radar observations, and any relevant flight logs?

19        A.   Please repeat.

20        Q.   Paragraph (b) you also requested that the tapes of radar

21     observations and any relevant flight logs from the period 1-4 February be

22     provided to UNPROFOR.

23        A.   Because this matter had reached the Security Council as the

24     previous paragraph show.  The previous paragraphs show this matter was

25     now a Security Council matter.

Page 2835

 1        Q.   You are talking about paragraph 3 on the same page?

 2        A.   Right.

 3        Q.   Yes.

 4        A.   I had on instruction gone to see Mr. Cicanovic about this matter

 5     and registered the point made at (a) on this.

 6        Q.   Yes.

 7        A.   Not said here and there had been decision there would be a

 8     military investigation to ascertain these claims about the airport.  And

 9     part of that investigation involved if there are planes doing a no-fly

10     violation in a situation where there is a radar system, was it captured

11     by the radar?  If not, why not.  Central to that investigation would be

12     the tapes that were kept by the FRY authorities.

13        Q.   Thank you, Doctor.  And I should also highlight that in

14     paragraph 3, you also make the point that the present information made it

15     inconclusive, at that time at least, as to whether or not helicopter

16     flights had crossed the international border or could be identified as

17     belonging to or associated with any of the warring sides?

18        A.   Right.

19        Q.   At that point did you have any reason to dispute the reports from

20     those in Srebrenica who had reported the flights?

21        A.   I was never in the habit of disputing military observers or

22     police observers on the ground saying on this day and this day we saw

23     that.  That for me wouldn't have been a disputable matter.

24        Q.   Thank you, Doctor.

25             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, could I tender, we needn't tender the

Page 2836

 1     whole document.  The page that is we've referred to will be sufficient.

 2     Those are --

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I might.  I suggest we do tender the whole

 4     document because there might be some further questions about this

 5     particular document, so rather than going through some of the

 6     difficulties we have with incomplete documents being tendered, I would

 7     suggest we tender the entire document.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  How many pages is the document?

 9             MR. THOMAS:  In total, sir, I think it's 10 or 12.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What is your response to your learned friend?

11             MR. THOMAS:  The -- sir, the Prosecution has no need of the other

12     pages.  They flesh out matters already referred to in summary and the

13     report to which we have referred.  I have no difficulty putting the

14     entire document in, however, if that's ultimately going to be a lot

15     easier than going through the process of being under cross-examination.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  The document then is admitted into

17     evidence.  May it please be given an exhibit number.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P472.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

20             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Thank you,

21     Madam Registrar.  Can we please have 65 ter 03282 on the screen, please.

22     Sorry, Your Honours, I think I've got the wrong document.  Sorry, 65

23     ter 03281.  My apologies.  No again the wrong one.  Sorry, Your Honours.

24     It will take me a second.  03280.  My apologies again.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Is that it now?

Page 2837

 1             MR. THOMAS:  It is.  Thank you, Your Honour.  Thank you,

 2     Mr. Usher.

 3        Q.   Doctor, you will recognise this as a further code cable you sent

 4     to Mr. Akashi on the 16th of February on this issue?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   You begin by stating in the first paragraph that UNMO access to

 7     the radar screens has been restored.

 8        A.   Can you increase it, sir, please.  My aging eyes are struggling

 9     on this.  Yes.

10        Q.   And the tapes have been -- or the tapes are available for

11     analysis?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Why did you make the comment that you can't be too sure or that

14     it would be your bet that the tapes will contain nothing implicating the

15     FRY authorities?

16        A.   In the first place, this precedes several meetings I had

17     including one with the FRY authorities.  And you showed that in an

18     earlier thing.  You also showed that they said it didn't happen.  And if

19     you want the tapes, you can have them.

20        Q.   Yes.

21        A.   I knew the fact that they are going to give me the tape, the

22     tapes won't be incriminating.  They are coming from the government

23     sources.

24        Q.   Yes.

25        A.   I don't know any governments that hands over incriminating

Page 2838

 1     records.  I'm speaking in general now.  We were given the tapes willingly

 2     with the proviso that we didn't do this, and, therefore, I was sure that

 3     it would be a big surprise if they were proved wrong by the tapes.  That

 4     is why my bet.

 5        Q.   If that were the case, why do you make the next comment, the

 6     first comment in paragraph 2?

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which comment, Mr. Thomas?

 8             MR. THOMAS:

 9        Q.   Sorry Your Honours:

10             "Confidential local sources here leave little doubt that those

11     flights happened and were from the JA."

12        A.   That was me trying to corroborate what our own soldiers were

13     saying.  So the local people say yeah, they were, they happened.  But

14     they were not captured on tape.  Therefore, the rest of the thing is how

15     come they weren't captured on the tape -- in the tapes.

16             MR. THOMAS:  I'd like to turn over the page, please, in each

17     document.  Or on each version.

18        Q.   And, Doctor -- just the first two paragraphs, that will be fine.

19             Doctor, in the first two paragraphs on this page, and take a

20     moment to read them if you need to.

21        A.   Again, counsel, I'm having difficulty reading them.  They are too

22     small for my eyes.

23        Q.   We can fix that, sir.

24        A.   Yeah, I recall this.

25        Q.   In those paragraphs, you set out your interpretation of these

Page 2839

 1     events and why they occurred.  Please explain that if it requires further

 2     explanation?

 3        A.   Counsel, I don't think these paragraphs require more.  They speak

 4     for themselves.  More so because I was writing it to my boss, and I

 5     couldn't leave what I was saying to his guess.

 6        Q.   All right.  In the third paragraph on that page, which is the

 7     second paragraph on the top of page 3 of the B/C/S version, Your Honours.

 8     You provide some further corroboration for your interpretation; is that

 9     right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Was this the first time you had detected this tension between the

12     military and the political leadership in Belgrade over the peace process?

13        A.   I can't say it is the first time partly because the nature of

14     the -- of all these issues where civil authorities and military

15     authorities are involved.  It is in the nature of these thing that there

16     be tensions.  The events usually are troubling.  Most of the things are

17     troubling.  Honest people can have different points of view.  Interests

18     are always varied.  Yes, the nature of this is to have tension.

19        Q.   You spoke earlier of Milosevic being in favour of a settled or a

20     settlement option and other forces or other groups being interested in a

21     war option.  Just talking generally now, did that tension always appear

22     to exist as far as you could tell?

23        A.   Not chronologically.  Events change, players change, interest

24     changed.  Except one player from my time there, Milosevic.  He was never

25     changed, but I don't think his ideas and positions were static either.

Page 2840

 1        Q.   I understand.

 2             MR. THOMAS:  Can we tender, please, that document as a

 3     Prosecution exhibit, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That document is admitted into evidence.  May it

 5     please be given an exhibit number.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P473.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 8             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Thank you,

 9     Madam Registrar.  Now, before I call up the next document, I'll just

10     check that this time I have it right, Your Honours.  65 ter 03281 please.

11        Q.   Now, Doctor, up until now we were dealing with possible

12     violations that occurred early in February 1995, but you will see here

13     that we have another report related to cross-border flights, this time

14     from, you dated, 1st of March [Realtime transcript read in error,

15     "July"], 1995.

16             You see that, Doctor?

17        A.   Yes, I do.

18        Q.   First of all, in the second paragraph of your report, you link

19     that to emergency medical evacuations from fighting at Mount Vlasic.  Can

20     you tell us where Mount Vlasic is?

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Before that, I believe my colleague misspoke

22     himself on line 15, he said the document is dated July 1995.  I believe

23     he meant March 1995.

24             MR. THOMAS:  I certainly didn't intend July, Your Honours.  The

25     1st of March, 1995.

Page 2841

 1        Q.   But, you see, Doctor, that you refer to fighting at Mount Vlasic

 2     near Travnik.  Can you tell us where this is?

 3        A.   Counsel, this way outside my area of operations.  The reports

 4     coming to me indicated it.  I wouldn't be personally as conversant

 5     physically in that area as I would where I was located.

 6        Q.   I understand.

 7        A.   Right.

 8        Q.   Was it -- on whose territory was it?

 9        A.   This is was in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10             MR. THOMAS:  Okay.  Now, in the context -- if we just turn over

11     to the next page, please, in both versions.  Thank you.

12        Q.   There are three paragraphs I'm interested in.  Paragraphs 2, 3,

13     and 4 on both versions.  And can you confirm for us that what you've

14     included in those paragraphs is information that were made available to

15     you about the involvement of JA forces?

16        A.   Yes, I recall this paragraph as well as the other one you

17     referred to.

18             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you.  We tender that document as well, Your

19     Honours, as a Prosecution exhibit.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

21     number.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P474.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

24             MR. THOMAS:  If I could have 65 ter 03282 on the screen, please.

25     Thank you.

Page 2842

 1        Q.   Doctor, do you see that again as another -- if we can get it

 2     blown up again.  Another code cable from you to Mr. Akashi dated

 3     31 March 1995?

 4        A.   Yes, I do.

 5        Q.   You will see from the second paragraph that this deals again with

 6     further possible helicopter cross-border violation, this time at the end

 7     of March?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And then in the two paragraphs we see the first two paragraphs of

10     the report you link it to activities, military activities, and also refer

11     in paragraph 1 to:

12             "Involvement of the Yugoslav Army on the side of the BSA in the

13     most active and critical battle spots in BiH."

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   I want to turn first in the third paragraph, and there you are

16     more specifically referring to the involvement of the 63rd Para-Troop

17     Commando Brigade of the Yugoslav Army?

18        A.   Correct.

19        Q.   And thereafter in that paragraph, you describe the reason for

20     their involvement, the ABiH.  Sorry the army of Herzegovina Bosnia

21     specific targets and so on?

22        A.   Yes.

23             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours, can I tender that document

24     as an Prosecution Exhibit.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

Page 2843

 1     number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P475.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 4             MR. THOMAS:

 5        Q.   Now, to just confirm that these cross border -- possible

 6     cross-border flights were investigated to see if they could be

 7     substantiated by material taken by the radar tapes; is that right?

 8        A.   No, counsel, the only incident that was subjected to serious

 9     investigations rather by those who were reporting it --

10        Q.   Yes.

11        A.    -- was the incident involving the helicopter flights because it

12     became a Security Council issue.

13        Q.   I understand.

14        A.   This was one more of the hundreds of various events that we would

15     report but would not subject to investigation unless there was a reason

16     for doing so.

17        Q.   Can you confirm for us that in relation to the investigation that

18     was undertaken, those February flights that involve the Security Council,

19     that that investigation was inconclusive?

20        A.   To my understanding, it was.  But it was done by General Pellnas.

21     The monetary group of the border.  The one we discuss earlier.  That was

22     the one that was given the mandate for the official investigation.  I saw

23     it, I spoke to General Pellnas and it was.  I can't prove it, that this

24     happened other than the fact that those who saw the flights vouch that it

25     happened.

Page 2844

 1        Q.   Are the two compatible, those who saw the flights on the one hand

 2     and the inconclusive report on the other?

 3        A.   The report said just we saw the flight.  If they said they saw

 4     them, you don't have other than your eyes physical evidence of what

 5     happened.  If that physical evidence is missing from the flight

 6     observation point of view, and the motivation for doing it is also being

 7     disputed, then the only thing you can reach is it's not conclusively

 8     determined.

 9        Q.   Doctor, did you ever meet General Perisic?

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   Were you ever aware of General Perisic meeting General Mladic?

12        A.   There is an incident that I show in one of my written reports,

13     and it is an incident that occurred as I visited Glina sometime in

14     October, I believe, or something like that.

15        Q.   Just pause.  Where is Glina?

16        A.   Glina is in the former Sector North where I was based, where I

17     had served for longest and the people on the grown I knew them well.  As

18     well as the people I used to interact with.

19        Q.   And October of which year?

20        A.   I think it's -- unless I check on the report.  1994 or 1995 for

21     me seem to be so blurred, those two years.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, I believe that you are suggesting an

23     answer to the witness.  There is no October that's been discussed.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If you look at page 52, line 12.  There is the

25     answer of the witness.

Page 2845

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  My apologies.  My apologies.  Thank you.

 2             MR. THOMAS:

 3        Q.   Doctor, let me ask you this.  Where were you posted at the time

 4     that you heard --

 5        A.   I was posted in Belgrade.

 6        Q.   Okay.

 7        A.   And I was taking a trip back into the sector, I had some business

 8     I had to do there.

 9        Q.   Yes.

10        A.   Now, these authorities, the people I used to meet, knew me well

11     and they knew I was in Belgrade in the capacity I described.  So when we

12     met, they took the opportunity to say, Hey, this happened here; and the

13     context was all over the local media, the fallout between the two sides

14     those who were seeking the peace and those who were not seeking the peace

15     was all that they could talk about.  It was all about their life, it was

16     whether or not trouble will start back.  So they took the opportunity to

17     say even General Perisic was here with Mladic to try to sort out the

18     various oppositions that is were happening including in our part.  That

19     was the incident.

20        Q.   Apart from this meeting, are you aware of any other meetings

21     between Mladic and Perisic?

22        A.   No, no.

23        Q.   Are you aware of what sort of relationship existed between

24     Milosevic and Mladic?

25        A.   Never met Mladic.  But I did meet that many times as my testimony

Page 2846

 1     shows with Milosevic.  There were issues that involved that would bring

 2     him to occasionally say something involving the various parties, and

 3     from -- for him, I mean Milosevic to say something.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Doctor, if I may just take you a little back.

 5     These people who told you that Perisic had come to sort out things with

 6     Mladic, did they also tell that you they were present during their

 7     meeting, the meeting of the two people?

 8             THE WITNESS:  No, no.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Do you know whether they were present during that

10     meeting?

11             THE WITNESS:  No, I was sure they weren't present, but they said

12     they know about it.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Did they tell you how they know about the subject

14     of the meeting?

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  It is because, as I said earlier, this is

16     their life, this is their interest when involved in the peace process.

17     They were involved in negotiating including the contact group.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  They were, but they don't know what Perisic and

19     Mladic were talking about, do they?

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  They said it was all about this fallout that

21     some of us want to support Milosevic, some of us want not to support it.

22     They are politicians.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  They are politicians.  What I'm trying to find out

24     from you is whether they had personal knowledge of this or were they just

25     speculating that this is the purpose of the visit?

Page 2847

 1             THE WITNESS:  They didn't themselves say we were there.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Right.

 3             THE WITNESS:  That's clear, there's no doubt about that.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And they told you the subject of discussion

 5     because that subject was general discussion in the area.

 6             THE WITNESS:  It was their life.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So they were guessing?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Guessing about the subject, no.  The subject

 9     is something that they were involved in.  That is, do we support this

10     side or do we support this side?

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Who?

12             THE WITNESS:  The support Milosevic attempt.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Wait a minute, wait a minute.  When you say this

14     was something they were involved in, are you talking about Mladic and

15     Perisic or are you talking about the general people.

16             THE WITNESS:  General people.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The general people.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And these people who told you were not party to

20     the meeting between Perisic and Mladic.

21             THE WITNESS:  No.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  They cannot tell us exactly what they discussed?

23             THE WITNESS:  Correct.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

25             MR. THOMAS:

Page 2848

 1        Q.   Doctor, just getting back to Mr. Milosevic and General Mladic,

 2     you were talking about your encounters with Mr. Milosevic, and I'm

 3     wanting to know from you if from those you are able to tell us what if

 4     anything you can of the relationship between Mr. Milosevic and

 5     General Mladic?

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I think the question is vague as its presently

 7     put.  What if anything about the relationship, the political

 8     relationship, social relationship, psychological relationship.  I don't

 9     believe the question as put is specifically focused or the witness to be

10     able to really give an answer.

11             MR. THOMAS:  I can be more specific, Your Honour.

12        Q.   If we deal firstly with the political relationship, are you able

13     to describe that from what you knew from your encounters with Milosevic

14     and others and from your duties?

15        A.   The most I can say about this, and this is absolutely the most I

16     can say, is that he would comment only when --

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Who is he?

18             THE WITNESS:  Milosevic.  He would make a comment when there is

19     an issue.  There's fight, we are trying to stop it, for example.  There

20     was a shooting of planes by NATO and the sides that caused it.  There are

21     players involved.  During those negotiations, he would say what he wanted

22     to say of his view and to let us know his view about these players.  One

23     of the reasons we went to see Milosevic plainly speaking was that we

24     believed he had influence with the players associated with any particular

25     event that we are discussing.

Page 2849

 1             He would say so and so, this is what I think he is doing, so and

 2     so is, I will speak with so and so, and see if we can sort out this

 3     issue.  Then he will speak either provingly or disapprovingly.  I never

 4     heard him speak disapprovingly or any -- any way other than differential

 5     of Mladic.  Very little times it even came out.  Very little.  So it

 6     would be a differential one, if it came at all.  But it would be

 7     different, for example, in contrast with Karadzic because of his open and

 8     public differences or views of the outcome.  So that's the most I can

 9     say.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  On that differential note, would it be

11     appropriate?

12             MR. THOMAS:  It would, sir.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We'll take a break and come back at half past

14     12.00.  Court adjourned.

15                           --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 12.31 p.m.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Thomas.

18             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

19        Q.   Doctor, just before the break you were telling us about what

20     Mr. Milosevic told you about his professional relationship with

21     General Mladic.  Did he provide any clues as to his personal relationship

22     with General Mladic?

23        A.   Counsel, at no time would Mr. Milosevic speak personally.  He was

24     very, very tuned to the issue of the time, and I wouldn't characterise

25     anything I said about him as any disclosure of anything personal.

Page 2850

 1        Q.   Finally, Doctor, I want to ask you about your time in Belgrade,

 2     and specifically your dealings with the FRY political and military

 3     leadership there.  What I want to ask you is now well informed were they?

 4     How informed were they about both political and military events, both in

 5     the FRY and outside the FRY?

 6        A.   It was my sense of it that they were very informed mostly to the

 7     ground about any of the issues and events surrounding whatever it is we

 8     came to discuss with them.  My sense of it was that they were extremely

 9     well informed.

10        Q.   Does that apply to the -- both the political and the military

11     leadership?

12        A.   Yes.  Whatever it took or central to the issue.  If it was

13     political, that was central to any specific event, they were on top of

14     all details.  If there was a military angle to it, they were also very

15     informed.

16        Q.   Many of the issues that you would have discussed would have been

17     very specific, but necessarily would have needed to have been viewed

18     against a much broader context?

19        A.   Correct.

20        Q.   Can you comment on how well they were informed of the broader

21     issues affecting the whole territory?

22        A.   Yes.  Let me give you an example.  When we were there, my time as

23     representative of the -- special representative of the Secretary-General,

24     I mean delegate of the representative of the Secretary-General, there was

25     a stream of high-level visitors, delegations, both from individual

Page 2851

 1     countries, also representing forums, like ICFY.  The address was also

 2     Mr. Milosevic's office as then-president of Serbia, where that office is

 3     located in Belgrade.

 4             The issues ranged all the way from broad negotiations of what the

 5     outcome would envisage in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the final status and

 6     disposition of those areas in Croatia that became known as UNPAs.  His

 7     reach, his contact was always from the bottom to the top.  But the last

 8     time, for example, I ended my mandate in there UN staff had been taken

 9     hostages in Sarajevo, around Sarajevo.  He was involved in the process of

10     getting all these various nationalities released.  At the same time, he

11     was negotiating with the American representative, I believe it was

12     Robert Fraser, about the outcome.  He was always involved from top to

13     bottom.  From the smallest disposition of an issue, to the broader

14     international out come.

15             MR. THOMAS:  Doctor, thank you those are all the questions I have

16     for you at this stage.  My learned friends for the Defence will have some

17     questions for you, if you kindly answer them.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you Mr. Thomas.

19             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you, if I could have but a moment to set

21     up.

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

23        Q.   Good afternoon, Dr. Kirudja.

24        A.   Good afternoon, counsel.

25        Q.   How are you doing?

Page 2852

 1        A.   Fine, thank you.

 2        Q.   Good.  These events --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Please speak into the microphone,

 4     Mr. Guy-Smith.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 6        Q.   I have a problem, I often drop my voice and the people in the

 7     interpretive booth yell at me and rightfully so.

 8             I'm wondering can I be heard now just to be sure?  If anybody can

 9     give me an indication of whether or not my voice is doing all right, that

10     would be great.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  It's fine, thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you very much.

13        Q.   These events occurred quite a number of years ago, and I'm sure

14     that the situation for you was not only remarkable but also memorable;

15     but as you've said, with regard to some of the details of the matters,

16     that you couldn't remember all of the exact details; right?

17        A.   I believe specifically, I was addressing details like sequence of

18     timelines.

19        Q.   Right.

20        A.   Details like specific dates and specific event.

21        Q.   Absolutely.

22        A.   Yeah.

23        Q.   And you gave a statement, I think you probably gave many

24     statements, but you gave a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor in

25     September of 1999, about ten years ago, a little give or take a few

Page 2853

 1     months?

 2        A.   Yes.  Correct.

 3        Q.   And at that time just would it be fair to say that when you gave

 4     that statement, that your memory with regard to the details not only of

 5     time, but of certain events was fresher than it is as you sit here today?

 6        A.   Logical.

 7        Q.   You first arrived in the region in April; correct?

 8        A.   Right.

 9        Q.   And that was April of 1992?

10        A.   Right.

11        Q.   And before you came to the region, you educated yourself as best

12     you could concerning the situation on the ground; correct?

13        A.   Your Honour, that particular statement is difficult to place.

14     When you are assigned, Your Honour, a UN mission, you are not supposed to

15     do other than the orientation inside the UN of what the mission is.  I

16     had two or three years before been involved in Afghanistan a different

17     situation.  It is not a study I'm referred to do nor am I required to

18     know beyond the official terms of reference for the mission.  To that

19     extent, I did educate myself.

20        Q.   And when you say, as you just did, that you are not required to

21     know beyond the official terms of reference for the mission, could you

22     explain to the Chamber what you mean by that specific statement?  When

23     you say "official terms of reference"?

24        A.   It's easy to summarise by the enabling resolution putting the

25     mission to action.  As it is an international document, it's rather a

Page 2854

 1     complete document because the resolution will refer to all the background

 2     material that led to the situation, to the reason the Security Council

 3     was involved, to the terms of what they want done, and the result they

 4     expect.  It's rather comprehensive thing.

 5        Q.   And with regard to your specific research prior or education

 6     prior to arriving at Belgrade in April, I take it that you did that?

 7     That you educated yourself with regard to reference of the mission?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And in that regard, as you've testified here, you understood that

10     there was the Vance Plan?

11        A.   Right.

12        Q.   You understood the parameters of the Vance Plan?

13        A.   Correct.

14        Q.   And you understood your specific duties and obligations with

15     regard to attempting to effectuate the plan as best you could?

16        A.   Right.

17        Q.   And the Vance Plan envisioned both a civil and military

18     component, did it not?

19        A.   Yes, it had those components.

20        Q.   Now, part of your duties obviously because I take it you are not

21     a military man, were to liaise with the military component that were

22     involved in the Vance Plan?

23        A.   True.

24        Q.   Who found their expression under such organisations as UNPROFOR

25     and the UNMOs; right?

Page 2855

 1        A.   True.

 2        Q.   And to the extent that you -- before you arrived once again in

 3     Belgrade, to the extent that you knew that you were going to have to

 4     liaise with these groups, did you educate yourself with regard to any of

 5     the military difficulties that were occurring prior to your arrival?  Was

 6     that part of your reference?

 7        A.   If you are talking about educate myself in materials extraneous

 8     to what I described.

 9        Q.   No, absolutely not.  You've told me you didn't do that.

10        A.   Right.

11        Q.   Okay.  Upon your arrival to Belgrade, you were immediately

12     seconded to a particular area; correct?  Within a couple of days?

13        A.   Mm-hmm, yes.

14        Q.   And when you arrived in that area, did you learn at that point in

15     time upon your arrival as to whether or not your mandate to assist in the

16     effectuation of the Vance Plan was going to be -- I would say

17     hassle-free, but I would say something more subtle than that, which is

18     there were difficulties presented upon your arrival.  There were

19     immediate problems in terms of the way that the parties were dealing with

20     the plan as it stood?

21        A.   That's true.  And it was obvious from day one the crossing in the

22     Osijek that we had to do was a battle ground with smouldering tanks with

23     people on both sides; so it wasn't like you had a choice but quickly get

24     an understanding, this is a war zone.

25        Q.   I'm sure that's the case.  With regard to the issue of this being

Page 2856

 1     a war zone, there was obviously an immediate and direct concern that you

 2     had because part of the plan was the notion, and relatively important

 3     part of the plan, of demobilising the forces?

 4        A.   Correct.

 5        Q.   The demobilisation of the forces independent of being something

 6     that was important on its own, was necessarily connected to the parties'

 7     view of what I think you have identified as the opstinas or the

 8     municipalities; correct?

 9        A.   Partly correct.  It was also trying to understand what each of

10     the parties understood we were coming to do.  And it was graphically

11     demonstrated to us when we arrived at the confrontation lines in Sector

12     North where one side actually thought we were relief party to take their

13     positions in the foxholes.

14        Q.   When you say one party thought you were to --

15        A.   Relieve them in their positions at the confrontation line in

16     their foxholes.

17        Q.   Which party was that?

18        A.   The Serb side.

19        Q.   And the other party, the Croatian side, what was their position

20     with regard to what your mandate -- why you were there?

21        A.   They also figured we are out come there and throw them out of

22     their foxholes.

23        Q.   So at the moment that you arrived, there was clearly a severe

24     misunderstanding of what your purpose was that you had to clarify?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 2857

 1        Q.   Which I take it that you did in rapid haste?

 2        A.   We were forced to.  One, to say we didn't come to do that, and on

 3     the other side, you have to pull back to your positions.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Now, during those initial days, were there any discussions

 5     about precisely which areas, once again I'm talking about the opstinas,

 6     were to fall under whose, and I use the word authority in a loose sense

 7     for the moment, really what I'm driving at here is if you could explain

 8     to the Chamber, the pink zone problem?

 9        A.   Yes, I will.  And very quickly.  Your Honour, this was a

10     culmination of what the learned counsel has been trying to say, that

11     there had to be a clarification of not only our mandate, but also the

12     borders, the jurisdiction borders of that mandate.  It was not like most

13     things made by committees, assemblies, watertight.  What Vance Plan had

14     said was your mandate will cover these opstinas, and they proceeded to

15     name those opstinas in an annex to his agreement between Belgrade and

16     Zagreb.

17             Those opstinas in the maps that prevailed before the war had

18     boundaries, the civic boundaries of those opstinas.  From the Croatian

19     side, they would trace the civic boundaries of those opstinas in their

20     utmost side closest to their side of the war, and trace that as the

21     boundary of where the opstinas would be.  That where the UN mandate was

22     to terminate beyond those civic boundary, they didn't expect that we had

23     any mandate regardless of the situation on the ground.

24             From the point of the Serbs, not so.  Their interpretation was we

25     have waged this war and we have come to a clear line of confrontation

Page 2858

 1     where our forces are deployed.  They drew a map tracing that

 2     confrontation line and that map often ignored the opstinas boundaries and

 3     cut across them.

 4             When the two maps are put together, there was an area which

 5     became known as pink zones because our military coloured it pink zones

 6     because the military mapping itself turned it pink.  It became a major

 7     issue about those opstinas which were not in the Vance Plan named, and

 8     those which the Serbs included because they had waged the war to the

 9     border which, if you recall, Your Honour, I said it roughly traces the

10     natural rivers that they wanted to be their natural boundaries.

11             Then because of the dispute about what should be done in those

12     areas where they had a difference of opinion, the matter went all the way

13     to the Security Council and became Resolution 762, I believe.

14        Q.   Thank you for that answer.  I'd like to read to you from your

15     statement and see whether or not this is a fair, concise summary of that

16     which you just said.  And I refer counsel to page 10, which is:

17             "The Vance Plan based the boundaries of the UNPAs," the UNPAs

18     would be the United Nations Protected Areas --

19        A.   Right.

20        Q.   "Along the confrontation line as understood by Mr. Cyrus Vance

21     months before the arrival of UNPROFOR In April 1992.  The Vance Plan was

22     ambiguous on whether the borders of the UNPAs corresponded to the civic

23     boundaries of the previously demarcated 'opstinas'" -- which is what I

24     think what you were just referring to, "which is apparently what our

25     Croat interlocutors understood, or simply, if the 'borders' of the UNPA

Page 2859

 1     reflected the dividing frontline at the time of UNPROFOR's arrival --

 2     which is what the Serb side understood.  The areas disputed between the

 3     Serb and the Croats eventually became known as the 'pink zones,'" and

 4     you've told us why, "the disposition of which became the subject of a

 5     specific resolution of the Security Council that essentially amended the

 6     original Vance Plan."

 7        A.   Correct.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can I interrupt you, Mr. Guy-Smith, I'm not sure

 9     I'm the only one who is hearing noises in their earphones like somebody

10     is rummaging on something.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I hear noises every once in awhile but I've

12     decided -- I'm glad to know that you hear them too because I thought it

13     was just me.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  They are getting worse and worse.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  Let me see.  Let me try something and if

16     this is the noise that you are hearing.  Is that the noise you are

17     hearing?

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, that's it.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's better.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  We apologise.  I take that upon myself.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:

24        Q.   Now, the issue of the pink zones and the amendment to the

25     Vance Plan concerning the pink zones is actually one of the first things

Page 2860

 1     that you had to concern yourself with when you arrived in Sector North;

 2     right?

 3        A.   Correct.  Among the many other first things.

 4        Q.   I understand there were many first things.

 5             When you first got to the area, the political situation was as

 6     follows, and I'm talking about in April of 1992:  At that point in time

 7     FRY, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had yet to be recognised by anyone,

 8     either internally or internationally, as a state; correct.

 9        A.   Correct.

10        Q.   Croatia, when you arrived, was in the process of recognition, or

11     had they been recognised by then?

12        A.   They had been recognised.

13        Q.   And Bosnia-Herzegovina was up in the air at that time when you

14     arrived?

15        A.   There, counsel, I can't be exact.  But I do recognise by March of

16     1992, what was a very peaceful Bosnia had begun to mobilise for war, and

17     the result was their disagreement with the recognition of the declaration

18     of independence of Bosnia.

19        Q.   Okay.

20        A.   So I'm seeking from you the time-line you are thinking about

21     because it was around that time.  It too got into this recognition

22     business.

23        Q.   Okay.  The Republika Srpska was in April had not yet been

24     created?

25        A.   I hadn't even heard the word.

Page 2861

 1        Q.   And the Republika Srpska Krajina once again, was that something

 2     that had been created independent of whether or not it had international

 3     recognition?

 4        A.   First time I heard it has to be about May.

 5        Q.   Okay.  When you arrived, you were -- and by you I mean the UN

 6     mission, was relying on the JNA?

 7        A.   Totally.

 8        Q.   Totally.

 9        A.   First few weeks.

10        Q.   And that would have been consistent, would it not, in your

11     opinion, with the position that had been taken by Milosevic with regard

12     to entering into the Vance Plan, that there was a necessity for the

13     United Nations mission to be there, and they of course were going to need

14     to be supported?  Logistically needed support?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   Okay.

17        A.   The reason was our own failure to get our logistics in order.  It

18     was not an expectation that the JNA should provide us with the logistics,

19     but they did.  They did it voluntarily and it was appreciated because it

20     would be worse if they fought us, we wouldn't go in.

21        Q.   As a matter of fact, and I think you commented about this in your

22     statement, that it was somewhat ironic that the JNA provided the basics

23     because if they hadn't, the whole mission would have ground to a halt?

24        A.   Correct.

25        Q.   And that was in April of 1992?

Page 2862

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   It soon became evident, and now I'm moving to the end of April,

 3     that the nature of things were going to change dramatically, and by that

 4     I mean that among other things, FRY had come into existence, and as a

 5     legal matter, I'm not asking you to comment on the legal matter, Doctor;

 6     but as a legal matter, you were informed that the authorities in Belgrade

 7     understood that by virtue of the fact that now there was a new nation

 8     state that had been created, there were certain places that the army,

 9     specifically the JNA, could no longer be?  And I believe that

10     General Nikovic discussed this with you?

11        A.   Correct.

12        Q.   And that as a matter of fact, was part of the discussion that you

13     had with him when you were working out how the JNA would remove itself

14     from the area?

15        A.   Correct.

16        Q.   To your knowledge, before the break-up of the former Yugoslavia,

17     were there Territorial Defence units in each of the respective republics?

18        A.   Not to my understanding.  It was a uniform command called the

19     10th Corps in that area.

20        Q.   To your knowledge, prior to the break-up of the former

21     Yugoslavia, do you know if there was a distinction between the army, the

22     JNA, and groups of individuals who were involved in what we will call

23     Territorial Defence units?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   Okay.  When you were discussing with General Nikovic, and just so

Page 2863

 1     we are clear, he was the commander of the JNA and the commander of that

 2     entire region; right?  When you were discussing the new political reality

 3     with General Nikovic - and I'm using some of the language that I found in

 4     your statement again because I think it's quite accurate - he indicated

 5     that it did not belong in its previous area of responsibility dealing

 6     with Croatia as well as with Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were area that they

 7     were going to have to leave, and there were a series of practical

 8     problems that had to be sorted out?

 9        A.   Those are very exact words that he used.

10        Q.   And in that regard, did you assist him in your assessment of how

11     to sort out some of these practical problems, or did he come to you with

12     what I'll term as an evacuation plan so that you had an understanding of

13     what the thinking was of the JNA in terms of evacuating the area?

14        A.   Counsel, we didn't have to entertain that kind of thing.  We

15     wanted him to give us a demobilisation as requested by the Security

16     Council, how he is going to do it, and how soon is he going to do it.

17        Q.   Okay.  Now, at that point in time because there was this issue of

18     those that were born in the area remaining, and those that were not born

19     in the area having to go, the issue of what was going to happen to the

20     assets of the JNA obviously was something of great importance?

21        A.   Certainly.

22        Q.   Did you have discussions with him about what you believed to be

23     in your representative capacity, the most appropriate way of those assets

24     being dealt with?

25        A.   We didn't even to determine that, that was determined for us in

Page 2864

 1     the terms of reference for the mission.  The terms of reference for the

 2     mission required that weapons be demobilised and put into storage in

 3     designated areas with one key, symbolic key really, to be held by the

 4     mission and the symbolic key to be held by the local authorities.  And

 5     there, counsel, it is a concession that weapons, some of the weapons it

 6     was understood weren't going to leave.

 7        Q.   Okay.  What was clear and what you learned from

 8     Lieutenant-General Nikovic was it was the intention of the JNA to leave

 9     behind and I'm quoting from your statement again and see whether or not

10     this is an accurate quote, "A clear and clean situation militarily and

11     administratively."

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And he gave you a full account of how the JNA and TDF units were

14     previously deployed into different groups; he focused on the withdraw of

15     the JNA in handing over military control to UNPROFOR.  And your

16     estimation at that time, it would be fair to say, would it not, that he,

17     the general of the JNA appeared surprisingly forthcoming both in

18     substance and in attitude?

19        A.   Correct.

20        Q.   He was cooperative?

21        A.   Correct.

22        Q.   And he was as a representative of the JNA well disposed to seeing

23     that the United Nations mandate was implemented fairly and in full?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Did he say something to the effect of, and I quote, Therefore

Page 2865

 1     what UNPROFOR agrees with Belgrade will apply to Serbia Krajina.

 2        A.   I took that to mean he is going to make a proposal of how to

 3     leave what you just referred to as a clear and clean situation because he

 4     was requested by us, but his channels were different than ours.  Our

 5     channels go through the force commander of the UN.  His went to Belgrade.

 6     When that proposal that is developed from the ground is accepted, what

 7     disagreed would then apply.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Now, as you said some ten years ago, one of the other

 9     parties to this, however, had a slightly different view.  And you said as

10     it turned out, however, the local Serbs had a different agenda?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   I'd like to talk for a minute about that different agenda, if I

13     could.  You learned that they intended to consolidate their own whole on

14     the contested territory in Croatia?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Now, when you learned that, is that a reference to the UNPAs, or

17     is that a bit more far reaching than the UNPAs or the pink zones?

18        A.   I meant what they themselves considered the extent of something

19     they called Republika Srpska Krajina, and that extended in all of the

20     sectors:  north, south, Slavonia, west Slavonia, inclusive of the pink

21     zones.

22        Q.   Now, I may have got the wrong impression from your testimony

23     earlier today, and if I did, please correct me; and if I didn't then you

24     can help here, which is, I was led to believe that it was your view that

25     what happened was that the Territorial Defence forces just were set up by

Page 2866

 1     the JNA, and when the JNA left it was your position that the Territorial

 2     Defence forces was what the JNA left in situ as it were?  Is that what

 3     you said?  Is that a fair rendition of what you said?

 4        A.   I don't think so.

 5        Q.   Let me ask you if this is a fair rendition then of what actually

 6     occurred in your estimation, which is that the local Serbs found a

 7     loop-hole in the Vance Plan.  And the loop-hole in the Vance Plan was one

 8     that excluded police units from the armed group that were to be

 9     demobilised?

10        A.   That's what I said.

11        Q.   Okay.  So what happened then is that the local Serbs, the local

12     Serbs proceeded to set up their "Territorial Defence forces (TDF),"

13     right at the heels of the JNA withdrawal?

14        A.   Yes.  It's not the JNA that set them.

15        Q.   It was the local Serbs that set this up.  So the Vance Plan as

16     constituted unfortunately had not one ambiguity which was the one we

17     spoke to with regard to the pink zone, but there was another ambiguity

18     here which is how does one define a police force?

19        A.   I'm not sure, counsel, I ambiguity and loop-hole are synonymous.

20     Because that's where you --

21        Q.   Fair enough.

22        A.   The loop-hole they found is not an ambiguity, it's a whole.

23        Q.   Okay.  So it's worse?

24        A.   If you --

25        Q.   Fair enough.  I'll put it to you in another term, then.  There

Page 2867

 1     were, at least up until this point, in the discussion of the Vance Plan,

 2     there were two structural difficulties that allowed for interpretation

 3     and/or misinterpretation with regard to how to achieve its purpose?

 4        A.   Right.

 5        Q.   Now, even with the problems that were created in terms of the

 6     structural difficulties that existed, in your capacity, you never

 7     received any resistance from Belgrade with regard to trying to continue

 8     to implement the Vance Plan, did you?

 9             I mean, you never were in a situation where you received

10     information, for example, from Milosevic where he throws up his hands and

11     says, Listen, this plan is full of holes, we can't make this work, let's

12     go back to the drawing table?

13        A.   No, not in that sense.

14        Q.   When you first got there, once again I'm now referring to Sector

15     North, you had occasion to deal with a gentleman by the name of

16     Lazarevic; correct?

17        A.   Yeah.

18        Q.   I notice the smile on your face, and I take it that the dealings

19     with this particular individual were less than satisfactory?

20        A.   Yeah.

21        Q.   In all respects.  He was -- would it be fair to say he was a

22     scoundrel at best?

23        A.   He was a thorn in our flesh.

24        Q.   Not someone you can rely on too terribly much?

25        A.   It took us awhile to figure that out.

Page 2868

 1        Q.   Do you as you sit here today recall when the JNA finally withdrew

 2     from the area?

 3        A.   Let me say this:  We went with the difficulties up to a point

 4     where we were happy we had reached a demobilisation.  The weapons were

 5     handed over.  We had designated storage points.  The remnants of JNA who

 6     were born there were in civilian uniform, and the militia which is a

 7     local term for the police were in the blue uniform, and for awhile there

 8     was an air that we are getting somewhere with this Vance Plan.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And what is a civilian uniform?

10             THE WITNESS:  Blue, blue uniforms as opposed to the military

11     fatigue.  Fatigues that military, you know, all the military.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry, you said:

13             "We had designated storage points, the remnants of the JNA who

14     were born there were in civilian uniform, and the militia which is a

15     local form for the police were in the blue uniform."

16             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm quoting what you said.

18             THE WITNESS:  Correct.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Now, what is civilian uniform as distinct from the

20     blue uniform?

21             THE WITNESS:  I meant civilian clothes like you and me, not even

22     a uniform at all.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  That's what I wanted to correct.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, yes.  They were in their suits and they were

25     in their casuals.

Page 2869

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  They were in mufti, in civilian clothes.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 4        Q.   Now, I'd like to get some clarity on another brief issue, which

 5     is that when you were speaking with General Nikovic concerning the new

 6     political reality, he told you that there would be six countries created

 7     from the former Yugoslavia, and he proceeded to name them specifically as

 8     follows:  Slovenia, Croatia, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

 9     Serbia, and Montenegro being included in that - for that I was doing the

10     parenthetical remark - the Serbian Krajina, Macedonia and

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

12        A.   Right.

13        Q.   Now, I want to move forward now, if I could, to this whole issue

14     concerning what I'm going to call generally speaking the helicopters and

15     the tapes, which have a series of component parts obviously, and we'll

16     talk about the various component parts.

17             But as an initial matter - so that we are all very clear - the

18     idea was that at the Surcin airport, there would be observers from

19     United Nations military observers present in the room to make a

20     determination as to whether or not everything was okay or whether or not

21     there were, in fact, violations.  And if there were violations, the

22     importance of that was twofold or maybe even more than that, but

23     certainly the importance of violations were something that needed to be

24     immediately reported because of the concern that had been expressed in

25     the resolution about no-fly zones.

Page 2870

 1             And second of all, there was also at that time another issue

 2     which is whether or not sanctions which had been previously imposed would

 3     remain, would increase, or would lessen, because sanctions, as a matter

 4     of fact, were one of the true bargaining chips that you had, and when I

 5     say you, I mean United Nations had at its disposal in terms of trying to

 6     regulate, and I use the word advisedly, but I think it's a fair word, to

 7     regulate the madness at the time.

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Now --

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can I just interrupt.  Apart from the stenographer

11     is there anybody else who is typing or moving around with a mouse?

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I am.  I was making a joke.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry, I don't know whether I'm the only one but

14     there is just this noise in the earphones that --

15             MR. THOMAS:  Sorry, Your Honour, I must confess that I was, but

16     it shouldn't be picked up.  The microphones are off here, but if it's

17     being picked up, then we'll stay away from keyboards and mousses.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I would appreciate if that could happen because it

19     looks like my microphone is extra sharp today.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm with you.  I'm having the same issues.

21        Q.   Now, one of the natural consequences of the sanctions that were

22     imposed were that certain items that were necessary to make the radar

23     function were not available in the radar room?

24        A.   A claim was made to that effect, and I underscore the word, a

25     claim was made.

Page 2871

 1        Q.   With regard to the claim that was made to that effect, was a

 2     claim made to the effect that certain of the machines in the room had to

 3     be cannibalised in order to make other machines work?  And by

 4     cannibalised, I mean they were taken apart so that you could have a

 5     couple of operative machines?

 6        A.   I think I heard something to that effect, but it came in a

 7     context that made me -- made it hard for me because for that you don't

 8     have to make sure that are UNMOs are not there.

 9        Q.   Well, initially isn't what occurred that -- and I'm trying to see

10     whether or not because I think you reflect this in one of your reports,

11     but an animosity kind of built up; there was tension.

12        A.   Quickly.

13        Q.   There was a tension in the workplace, too many people in a small

14     room, and there were a lot of extraneous issues and somebody got mad and

15     acted badly.  It had great international effect, but I'm trying to stay

16     in the room for the moment?

17        A.   Yeah.

18        Q.   Because initially what happened was that the UNMO observing

19     station was taken over by one else, and the observer was no longer at a

20     station in particular but was able to peer over someone's shoulder;

21     right?

22        A.   Counsel, those two details for me since I wasn't presently there

23     to respond to.

24        Q.   I'd like to go back then to -- just for a moment to see if we can

25     clarify this, and it's the -- it's P472.

Page 2872

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could have P472 up on the screen, please,

 2     and I'm referring to page, I believe it's 8 of 10.  And I'd like to go to

 3     the very first line entry which is 1 February 1995.  And the very first

 4     entry.  If you could make that larger for Dr. Kirudja, please, so he

 5     doesn't have to squint.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I see it.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 8        Q.   It says:

 9             "The supervisor switched off the screen used by the UNMO from

10     this moment only 'over-shouldering, over-shoulder monitoring' was

11     permitted."

12        A.   I see that.

13        Q.   Well, that means what I'm talking about is a practical effect

14     apart from the inter-radar room politics that were going on, from a

15     practical effect, the UNMO had the ability to monitor although not in the

16     fashion that had been envisioned?

17        A.   Can you, counsel, be sure of that?

18        Q.   I'm saying just by basis of the sitrep that we received that he

19     had over-shoulder monitoring?

20        A.   That's what I'm asking.  If I'm required to be in front of it for

21     monitoring, I'm no longer in front of it.  Maybe I can cast a glance.

22     Can you conclude I'm monitoring?

23        Q.   Fair comment.  Fair comment.  Looking later, going back to the

24     page again looking further down, if we could, 7 until 10 it says:

25                 "UNMO have no access to any screen and is restricted to sit

Page 2873

 1     at the writing desk next to the supervisor."  Could you help us there?

 2     Is the supervisor the UNMO is sitting next to an UNMO supervisor or is it

 3     a radar -- someone in the radar?

 4        A.   No, I went out read easily there is a supervisor of this

 5     facility.  It's a government facility.

 6        Q.   Okay.  So while he is while the UNMO is at the writing desk for

 7     that period of time, it would seem that there may not be any

 8     over-the-shoulder monitoring ability?

 9        A.   I would say so.

10        Q.   There's obviously a distinction between at least in the author's

11     mind who put the sitrep together for your information to forward on, that

12     a there is a distinction between the two?

13        A.   Yeah.

14        Q.   Okay.  Thank goodness ultimately the whole issue is resolved.

15        A.   Right.

16        Q.   And the way that it's resolved is that there is an analysis of

17     the tapes.  Do you know if they ever got the spare parts?

18        A.   As I said to you earlier, after the whole thing was sorted out,

19     there was no talk of spare parts.  The machines were working.

20        Q.   Okay.  So this could all be attributed to bad mood in the work

21     environment which obtained international dimension, unfortunately?

22        A.   No, counsel.  No.

23        Q.   Okay.  With regard to the tape analysis that occurred, the tape

24     analysis ultimately revealed, if you recall, and if not there's some

25     documents we can pull up, but ultimately revealed a couple of thing that

Page 2874

 1     is had been maintained by the authorities at FRY for sometime, that in

 2     fact there were some flights.  And those flights were, in fact,

 3     countenanced flights, I believe there were four medical flights, four

 4     humanitarian flights, and two evacuation flights.

 5        A.   Certainly, counsel, it's better to check the document more

 6     accurately.  My memory of it was that there were something they called

 7     traces seen on the tapes.  There was a reference to some traces that they

 8     couldn't discern or what they were.  But it is also a record that -- an

 9     evaluation says there was some flights.  If this was the flight seen by

10     the Dutch soldiers or some of the things that you have referred to early

11     on, it is not certain.  That's my recollection but it's certainly a good

12     thing to be clear about what the report says, and I know you have it

13     somewhere.

14        Q.   We will get to that in a minute.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could have, I believe, it's page 6 of

16     that -- page 6 of the report for a quick second.  Thank you.

17        Q.   I'm referring to the observations that you made on the 13th of

18     February, 1995.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And if we could have paragraph 13 made a little

20     bit bigger so those of us who are older can see better.  I fortunately

21     have my glasses on.

22        Q.   "It is evident from the above that the FRY authority have

23     provided not new information, but new arguments in support of those

24     inclined to back their position at the SC."

25             Could you tell us what SC means?

Page 2875

 1        A.   Security Council.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             "From their viewpoint, they're innocent until proven to the

 4     contrary.  Further they are clearly putting out the signal that they too

 5     have not lost the right not to be compelled to be witness against

 6     themselves.  They have left, however, the door open to patching up the

 7     quarrel started by the hitherto unidentified supervisors ordering the

 8     UNMOs away from the radar screens.  This situation will probably be fixed

 9     in a couple of days."

10             Those were your observations at the time.  And with regard to in

11     support of those inclined to back their position to Security Council, I

12     take it what you are referring to is that there were certain members of

13     the Security Council at the time who were of the position, specifically

14     the Russian Federation that you mention on page 3 of this report, who

15     were in a line with and supported the position, the general position

16     taken here of not being compelled to be witness against themselves?

17        A.   Counsel, you are right generally in your surmise, but I want this

18     paragraph to be understood it's not really conjecture, and me musing

19     about what happened.  I did actually have a discussion of those views

20     expressed on paragraph 13 with Mr. Cicanovic, who was the head of the

21     foreign minister dealing with this matter in the Security Council.  And

22     he put it very clearly that we take the position there were no flights.

23     And if anyone else has proof we had is up to someone else to provide us

24     with the information or with the evidence.  So it's not as speculative as

25     it might seem.

Page 2876

 1        Q.   You just used the term -- I'm done with that particular exhibit

 2     thank you so much.

 3             You just used the term "surmise," and I appreciate that you did

 4     because if I understand the sequence of events with the recognition that

 5     the document that we just dealt with was issued by you on the 13th of

 6     February.  On the 16th of February, which is document you authored, we've

 7     discussed briefly before, that's P473, which we'll get to, the subject

 8     is, "The helicopter flights, a maybe epilogue."

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And you use as a basis for some of your musings, and I'm not

11     using the term in an insulting fashion, but I think rather one in which

12     you went through a deductive process based upon the information that you

13     had, that the helicopter flights, in fact, were an indication of a crack,

14     if I might, in the political stability of Milosevic's position?

15        A.   Strategy, not position.

16        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough.  And that you believe, and if we could have

17     the document up, that would be nice.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Page 2.  First paragraph.

19        Q.   You state that:

20             "Surprisingly all pieces of this story, rather incredulously, I

21     might admit, to the episode as being an internal affair by the JA

22     calculated to send a daring message to Milosevic.  That message has to do

23     with the efforts of the international mediators trying to get Milosevic

24     to agree to a package involving the recognition of

25     Croatia/Bosnia-Herzegovina and the lifting of sanctions."

Page 2877

 1             Now, I want to pause here for a moment, and at this time have

 2     some of the following discussion with you, which is:  Did you have

 3     confidential source information that you were relying upon to --

 4     independent of what we see here that is of assistance to you in this

 5     deductive process that you are going through?

 6        A.   I had a variety of sources, Your Honour, in writing this report.

 7     When I look at them, I have to remind myself especially the document

 8     itself, the one you are referring to, as contrasted with the document you

 9     referred earlier in your comment prepared in New York in the whole

10     testimony.  That was prepared for testimony to this court.  This document

11     was not prepared for testimony in a court.  It was not a document that

12     intended to be reviewed other than by it's recipient in a confidential

13     manner.

14             We had, therefore, many sources, and the intention of even what

15     is there, the content, is to improve our discussions and negotiations

16     with FRY authorities so that we -- if we knew or thought we knew what the

17     reasons behind things were, so much for our negotiations.  Therefore, the

18     sources which I discussed and used included the totality of what was

19     available to us, first in our normal flow, military, civil, as well as

20     civilian sources.  And some of them were private in that sense.

21        Q.   With regard to this specific matter, you say here, it's -- if you

22     go down to the bottom of this particular page, please:

23             "Three days ago my sources further inform me ..."

24             Could you tell us which sources those were.

25        A.   No, not now.

Page 2878

 1        Q.   When you say no, not now, I mean --

 2        A.   What date is this document?

 3        Q.   This document is the 16th of February, 1995, so a long time ago.

 4     I understand.

 5        A.   Thank you.

 6        Q.   So as you sit here today, you don't recall who those sources

 7     were.

 8        A.   No, and since I didn't want to identify them, it remains vague

 9     and I wouldn't want to speculate now because I would have then to tell

10     you which part of this report came from who, and I can't do that.

11        Q.   It's like a double-key system?

12        A.   Yeah, almost.

13        Q.   "Three days ago my sources further informed me, a letter signed

14     by some 80 JA generals and colonels began to circulate."

15             Did you ever see such a letter?

16        A.   I remember this would appear in the local language and usually

17     for all my sources, I reply on interpretation and translation.  So

18     originals of this kind of thing are not something that I would know

19     about.  So if somebody transcribed it and brought it to us, then that is

20     all we needed to know.

21        Q.   So then as you sit here today, you don't recall ever seeing such

22     a letter?

23        A.   No, no, no.

24        Q.   And the letter you further go on to say:

25             "It reportedly warns Milosevic that if he recognises Croatia and

Page 2879

 1     BiH and therefore, disowns the RSK and the RS, they will disobey the

 2     supreme council and commander and join the fighting forces of these two

 3     Serb states."

 4             Now, before we go any further, in 1995, do you know who was the

 5     Chief of Staff and head commander of the Yugoslav Army?  I may be able to

 6     help you out, that was this gentleman here, Mr. Perisic.

 7        A.   I was going to tell you because I was dealing with this liaison,

 8     a Colonel Vuksic.

 9        Q.   Vuksic, yes.

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And what you are referring to there when you refer to the

12     commander, that is the commander that you are referring to, isn't it?

13     And the reason I'm asking you that question is because in the statement

14     that you prepared some ten years ago concerning this matter, for purposes

15     of testifying, as you've told us, the language that you used is as

16     follows:

17             "... they would disobey the Supreme Defence Council and the JA

18     commander."

19             So you've defined it, and "... joined the military forces of the

20     RSK and RS."

21             That's on page 59 of your statement for purposes of counsel.

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Now, that piece of information there is a piece of information,

24     as I understand it, that was based upon somebody else's giving you an

25     idea of what was going on?  You never saw a document that established

Page 2880

 1     that there were 80 generals who said this?

 2        A.   Correct.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now, part of the importance of your surmise on this issue

 4     of what I'm discussing is the Milosevic -- I am going to call it the

 5     Milosevic dilemma, if I might, at the time was based directly upon the

 6     issue of the helicopters.  They were tied into each other as you thought

 7     of at the time; correct?

 8             That's what it seemed to be at the time for you.  You had the

 9     suspicious helicopter incidents, you reported about it on the 13th of

10     February, and on the 16th of February, you are dealing with a helicopter

11     incidents as well as this other piece of information that you believe

12     exists with regard to the general's letter, so you are seeing at that

13     point in time in your mind some schism that's occurring that is of

14     importance for purposes of internal understanding for further

15     negotiations?

16        A.   Correct.  But I would like to rephrase that, it is more or less

17     the last piece of a puzzle originating for a longer period, and there

18     were other pieces of that puzzle --

19        Q.   Sure.

20        A.   -- that are not mentioned or summarised, but those you have

21     summarised are part and parcel of the collage of these pieces.

22        Q.   Now, in your mind, in your mind, what was the -- the importance

23     of this particular information from the standpoint of the sensitivity of

24     the international negotiations that are going on at the time?  Because,

25     as I read it, it seems as if we are at a very delicate, in your

Page 2881

 1     estimation, we are at a very delicate point in terms of how to proceed

 2     forward.

 3        A.   We were.

 4        Q.   Right.

 5        A.   We were.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And was part of the concern then a concern about how best

 7     to assist Milosevic and obviously Perisic because you include him in

 8     achieving the peace based upon the information you believe to be true?

 9        A.   Actually, nowhere in my testimony would indicate, since I don't

10     believe I had reached any conclusion, which side of this divide that you

11     are describing he fell, your client fell, into.  There's nothing in that

12     testimony that would allude to that, nor do I think I ever, to this day,

13     made up an understanding of which side of that.

14        Q.   Let me go back then to the other issue that I was -- raised with

15     you before, because perhaps we need some clarification.  Which is on page

16     59 of your statement, you say, the one that you prepared for testimony,

17     you say:

18                 "Indeed, three days prior to the aforementioned flights into

19     Srebrenica, 80 JA generals and colonels publicly warned Milosevic that if

20     he recognised Croatia in BiH - thereby disowning the RSK and RS - they

21     would disobey the Supreme Defence Council and the," and I place the

22     emphasis here, "JA commander."

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   And that would have been General Perisic?

25        A.   Right.

Page 2882

 1        Q.   Okay.  That's assuming that it's true?

 2        A.   Correct.

 3        Q.   And that your information is accurate?

 4        A.   Correct.

 5        Q.   Okay.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm a minute before what I believe would be an

 7     appropriate time.  Your Honour, would this be an appropriate time?

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, you still have some more questions to ask.

 9     Are you moving on to a new topic?

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I would be moving on to a new topic, yes.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  We'll take a break and adjourn for the day

12     tomorrow morning at 9.00 in courtroom II.  Court adjourned.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.

14                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 27th of January

15                           2009, at 9.00 a.m.