Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3164

 1                           Wednesday, 4 February 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.13 p.m.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good afternoon to everybody in and around the

 6     courtroom.  Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon Your Honours.  Good afternoon

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-81-T,

 9     the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Particularly today because

11     there are people hiding behind poles, I would like to have appearances,

12     please, for the both parties starting with Prosecution.

13             MR. THOMAS:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon to

14     everyone in and around the courtroom.  Mark Harmon, Barney Thomas,

15     Lorna Bolton, Salvatore Cannata, and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution,

16     sir.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Thomas.

18             And for the Defence.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good afternoon, Your Honours, and to all in the

20     courtroom.  Daniela Tasic, Nikki Sethi, Tina Drolec, Milos Androvic,

21     Eric Tully, Chad Mair, Novak Lukic, and I'm Gregor Guy-Smith for the

22     Defence.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And I think I may have mispronounced one of the

25     intern's names, but I'll take care of it at a later point in time and I

Page 3165

 1     do apologise to Nikki.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Not a problem.  Thank you very much.

 3             Mr. Thomas.

 4             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  The Prosecution calls

 5     Martin Bell, please.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 7                           [The witness entered court]

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good afternoon to you, Mr. Bell.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Will you please make the declaration.

11             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

12     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, you may be seated.

14             Yes, Mr. Thomas.

15                           WITNESS:  MARTIN BELL

16             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, sir.

17                           Examination by Mr. Thomas:

18        Q.   Mr. Bell, can you begin, please, by giving us your full name and

19     your date of birth.

20        A.   My full name is Martin Bell and I was born on the 31st of August,

21     1938.

22        Q.   What is your current occupation?

23        A.   I'm a goodwill ambassador for UNICEF and a writer and a

24     journalist.

25        Q.   Did you spend the large part of your career as a war

Page 3166

 1     correspondent employed by the BBC?

 2        A.   Yes, sir, from about 1966 to 1997.

 3        Q.   Could you just very briefly describe for Their Honours, the

 4     conflicts which you covered during that time?

 5        A.   It started with the Nigerian civil war, the Middle East wars in

 6     1967 and 1973, the Vietnam war, wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, the

 7     first Gulf war, and the wars of ex-Yugoslavia, chiefly in Croatia and in

 8     Bosnia.

 9        Q.   In 1997, what did you do after leaving the BBC?

10        A.   In 1997, I accidently fell into politics and I became for four

11     years a member of the House of Commons.

12        Q.   That was as an independent MP?

13        A.   Yes, I was the -- I was the first independent elected since 1951.

14        Q.   During the course of your career did you receive any formal

15     awards for journalism or otherwise?

16        A.   Oh, bits and pieces, yes.  But they don't really mean very much

17     to me, and one even from the queen.  But you know, I think my chief

18     benefit was experience.

19        Q.   The award you received from the queen was an OBE, Order of the

20     British Empire?

21        A.   Yes, that is true.  I think I got it for being the reporter most

22     shot at in 1993 or something like that.

23        Q.   What does your current work with UNICEF involve?

24        A.   UNICEF have a variety of real celebrities which they can't send

25     to war zones and so they send me because I'm -- I should be able to look

Page 3167

 1     after myself in these places.

 2        Q.   And what is your function?

 3        A.   As a witness, as a fundraiser, as someone who gives encouragement

 4     to their staff, locally and nationally, and someone who raises the

 5     profile of these issues at home.

 6        Q.   And to again just briefly for the Trial Chamber's information,

 7     could you just tell us, please, what sort of areas, what sort of

 8     situations you've been sent to in that capacity?

 9        A.   Some have been non-war zones, like Malawi, but they're are mostly

10     scenes of conflict or recent scenes of conflict, Afghanistan, Darfur, the

11     Democratic Republic of the Congo, places -- places like that.

12        Q.   Now, Mr. Bell, plainly you have acquired a lot of knowledge over

13     the years about many different conflicts, but this afternoon I want to

14     focus on your time in Sarajevo.  Can you tell us when you first went to

15     Sarajevo in the context of the conflict in the Balkans?

16        A.   I first went to Sarajevo in March of 1992 at the -- on the

17     occasion of the referendum on independence, and then when the war started

18     in the first week in April, I went back and I stayed there on and off for

19     much of the next three and a half years.  Not just in Sarajevo, but in

20     central Bosnia, in Mostar, in Tuzla, all over.

21        Q.   And what were you doing in Sarajevo during that time?

22        A.   I was the main reporter for BBC television there throughout the

23     early months of the war, from April 1992 until I was wounded at the end

24     of August 1992.  I went back in rather reluctantly at the end of 1992 and

25     worked a great deal in 1993 on the side war between Muslims and Croats in

Page 3168

 1     central Bosnia, but by March 1994, after the cease-fire between them, I

 2     returned to Sarajevo and spent much of the rest of the war there.

 3        Q.   During the period between the end of 1992 when you were wounded,

 4     and when you say you returned to Sarajevo in March of 1994, did you spend

 5     time in Sarajevo?

 6        A.   Yes, I did, even when I was based in Vitez and Gornji Vakuf.  I

 7     used to make day trips or longer trips to Pale.  I spent a lot of time

 8     with the Serbs.  I had a reputation among the Sarajevo press corps, I

 9     suppose, of being pro-Serb.  I wasn't, I was neutral and I had a very

10     good friend who was one of the defenders of the Serb-held suburb of

11     Grbavica and I used to go and see him.  And one of the points that I

12     would make is that there was no monopoly of suffering in this particular

13     war.

14        Q.   From March 1994 onwards until the end of the war in Bosnia with

15     the signing of the Dayton Accords, where were you largely based?

16        A.   I was based, I suppose, at the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo for much

17     of that time.  Towards the end, I was based in Gornji Vakuf because the

18     implementation of the Dayton Accords was done largely in the south of the

19     country by British troops and they were -- in December 1995 they

20     became -- they took off the blue helmets and they became NATO troops, and

21     they broke through the former frontlines and implemented the agreement.

22     So I was with them on that occasion.

23        Q.   During the -- during the period of between March 1994 until the

24     end of the war, were you covering also other parts of Bosnia, were you

25     travelling out of Sarajevo to cover any other parts of the conflict?

Page 3169

 1        A.   Yes, I did.  There were -- it was increasingly hard by then to

 2     get the attention of my editors to what they perceived as a long-running

 3     war so they were losing interest in it.  But I did quite a lot in

 4     northern Bosnia, in central Bosnia, but in Sarajevo itself, the fighting

 5     was especially intense in the summer of 1995.  There were attempts, if

 6     you remember, there was the -- there was the kidnapping of UN troops in

 7     Pale, this was in May of that year.  There was an attempt, there was a

 8     very strong attempt by the BiH, the Bosnian army, to break out of the

 9     encirclement in June.  So I was in Sarajevo and reported those things.

10        Q.   I want to go back now to the situation in Sarajevo in 1992.  In

11     terms of your first arrival there and the outbreak of war in April 1992,

12     what did that do to the city?  What did that do to the civilians and the

13     city of Sarajevo?

14        A.   It was a little bit as if the Great War were being refought in a

15     modern urban environment.  And so many people were trapped in these

16     high-rise buildings.  I mean trapped in the sense there was no

17     electricity so the lifts didn't work, the winter of 1992 to 1993 was a

18     very bitter winter.  A lot of the -- there was no water-supply so the

19     only water they could get either out of the river or from standpipes

20     which were themselves under fire.  I mean, I think looking back it was a

21     truly desperate time for all of the people on Sarajevo, I would say, on

22     both side of the lines.

23        Q.   By that time, the winter of 1992/1993, were the confrontation

24     lines in Sarajevo reasonably firmly established?

25        A.   Yes, they were.  I would say they probably -- there was a

Page 3170

 1     tremendous battle in Sarajevo, I think, on the 22nd of May, 1992, and

 2     after that the confrontation lines changed very, very little until

 3     November/December 1995.  Occasionally a trench line would be lost, a

 4     group of houses would change hands, but you know, I think if you looked

 5     at the map in the end of 1995, it's roughly where the frontlines were

 6     established in the early summer of 1992.

 7        Q.   If I were to show you a map, would you feel comfortable providing

 8     us with some general indication as to where the confrontation lines were?

 9        A.   Yeah, sure.

10        Q.   All right.

11             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, if we could please have Exhibit P 439

12     on the screen, which is map number 8 in the court binder.

13        Q.   Mr. Bell, just while that's appearing on the screen, you've

14     testified previously in this Tribunal?

15        A.   Yes, that's true.

16        Q.   Firstly as a witness for the Defence in the Blaskic case?

17        A.   Yes, that is true.

18        Q.   And more recently as a Prosecution witness in the

19     Dragomir Milosevic case; is that right?

20        A.   That is right, yes.

21        Q.   I think they were using this technology in the Dragomir Milosevic

22     case.  You can see that we have an image on the screen.  The image can be

23     blown up and manipulated without altering the image in various different

24     ways.  You will recognise the image as a map of Sarajevo?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 3171

 1        Q.   For the purposes of marking the confrontation lines, do you need

 2     a closer view?

 3        A.   Yes, I would like that.

 4        Q.   Is that sufficient or too close?

 5        A.   No, that's sufficient.

 6             MR. THOMAS:  All right.  What I'm going to do is ask Mr. Usher if

 7     he can provide you with a means to electronically mark the screen in

 8     front of you.

 9        Q.   And what we are looking for, Mr. Bell, is as best you can to

10     simply mark the confrontation line.

11        A.   I hope I'm looking in the right direction, but you will notice

12     that right in the middle on what we call the Bridge of Brotherhood and

13     Unity, the Serbian lines came right down to there, so it was not a case

14     of Serbs on the hills around and the Bosnian government forces trapped

15     inside.  They came right down there and the suburbs of Ilidza and

16     Grbavica were both in the Serbian hands right through to the Dayton

17     Agreement.

18        Q.   If we can just pause for a moment there.  First of all, can you

19     using the marker circle the Bridge of Brotherhood and Unity which you

20     have just --

21        A.   I don't have a clear enough view.  I need it -- need to be closer

22     than I see it here.

23        Q.   Okay.  We'll leave that for a moment.  Can you circle the areas

24     of Ilidza and Grbavica that you've referred to?

25        A.   Yeah.  Ilidza was at one end of the airport runway.

Page 3172

 1        Q.   If you could just mark that with an I.

 2        A.   Okay.

 3        Q.   Grbavica?

 4        A.   Grbavica I'm having difficulty with because I'm going too far

 5     back but I would guess it would be around here.

 6        Q.   Now, would it help if we got in closer?

 7        A.   It might do.  It's a rather -- it's a very detailed map.

 8        Q.   All right.

 9             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, I don't intend to tender this version

10     of the map.  If we could go into just a little closer, please.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Why don't you want to tender it?

12             MR. THOMAS:  Because I'll get the markings done on a clearer

13     version of the map by Mr. Bell.

14        Q.   Again, if we start with the Bridge of Brotherhood and Unity, can

15     you see it on the map there this time?

16        A.   The bridges are not very clearly marked, but I would guess it's

17     probably around here.

18        Q.   Okay.  If you could just mark that with a B.

19        A.   [Marks]

20        Q.   Can you just mark that with the letter B, Mr. Bell?  Yes, thank

21     you.

22        A.   [Marks]

23        Q.   Okay.  Can you mark with a circle the area of Ilidza.

24        A.   Yes, it was around about -- it's this end of the runway.

25        Q.   Mark that with the letter I, please.

Page 3173

 1        A.   Yeah.

 2        Q.   It's the left-hand marking that we see on the map?

 3        A.   I think the key thing is that the Serbs were at both ends of the

 4     runway.  Ilidza there and Lukavica barracks at the other end, I'll just

 5     mark that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7        A.   And the government forces were on either side including this,

 8     I'll mark it here, this is Dobrinja.  I'll mark it with a D.  That was

 9     the old press village in the winter Olympics and the other side of it is

10     the village of Butmir, which I'll mark with a B.  So you have the

11     government forces at both sides of the runway and the Serb forces at both

12     ends.

13        Q.   Now, when you are talking about the government forces you are

14     talking about the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; is that --

15        A.   Yes.  We have great difficulty with the terminology because they

16     had some Serbs fighting for them as well, what they called the loyal

17     Serbs, but I would normally call them Bosnian government forces.

18        Q.   All right.

19             MR. THOMAS:  If we could tender that, please, as a Prosecution

20     exhibit, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Its admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

22     number.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P514.

24             MR. THOMAS:  I'd like to go again, please, to the blank map,

25     P 439.

Page 3174

 1        Q.   Now, Mr. Bell, if you could draw on this map what you were about

 2     to draw for me a few minutes ago, which was the confrontation line,

 3     please.  And if you need to go in closer, please say so.

 4        A.   This will be actually quite difficult to do.  It was something

 5     like, like down here and out and a much bigger range around.  I mean,

 6     this is a highly inaccurate but it would be something of that order.

 7        Q.   All right.  Just a couple of questions about that.  The area that

 8     you've marked as being held by the Serbs, Ilidza?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   Do we see that on the map there?

11        A.   Yes, it's roughly this end of the -- this end of the -- of the

12     runway.  I've probably drawn the -- I probably put the line too not

13     sufficiently.  That I will amend because actually it came quite close to

14     the end of the runway.

15        Q.   Okay.  There is a means of erasing the line if you need to use

16     that, please say so and Mr. Usher will help you.

17        A.   Well, I think I've corrected it, that should suffice.

18        Q.   What I'd like to do is erase the redundant part of that line so

19     that when we look at this map in several months' time, it's clear.

20        A.   Yeah.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Usher, can you help by erasing, please.

22             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If you will please connect the correct line now,

24     Mr. Bell.  Thank you so much.

25             MR. THOMAS:

Page 3175

 1        Q.   Do we see on that map the area of Hrasnica?

 2        A.   Yes, it was the -- it was beyond -- I mean, it's such small print

 3     but it was really beyond Butmir on the -- on the sort of southern edge of

 4     that map.

 5        Q.   Was that within the confrontation lines or --

 6        A.   It was -- it was -- it was -- I wouldn't say it was a frontline

 7     village but it came under -- under bombardment especially in 1995 with --

 8     with rockets.

 9        Q.   The area within the line that you have drawn was occupied by the

10     forces of which army?

11        A.   There were -- within they were the forces of the Bosnian

12     government, BiH.

13        Q.   Okay.  If we could just, if you don't mind just righting ABiH in

14     there, please.

15        A.   [Marks]

16        Q.   And presumably on the other side of the line?

17        A.   On the other side of the line were the forces of the Bosnian

18     Serbs.

19        Q.   Known as the VRS?

20        A.   Known as the VRS.  I'll fill that in.

21        Q.   And can you circle for us the area of Hrasnica?

22        A.   I'm doing this from memory because I can't see it.  But I -- it's

23     roughly towards the bottom of Mount Igman there.

24        Q.   Would you mark that with an H, please?

25        A.   [Marks]

Page 3176

 1        Q.   And Hrasnica was held by the forces of which army?

 2        A.   It was held actually by the forces of the BiH, in which case I

 3     obviously again have to reconnect this line.  I'm going to have to -- it

 4     was more like that because both Butmir and Hrasnica were held by the --

 5     by the Bosnian government forces.

 6        Q.   All right.  Again with Mr. Usher's assistance, if you would just

 7     remove the redundant line, please.

 8        A.   I have to apologise for this, it's a long time ago.

 9        Q.   We all understand, Mr. Bell.

10             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  If I could please tender

11     that map as a Prosecution exhibit.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It's admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

13     number.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P515.

15             MR. THOMAS:

16        Q.   Now, you've explained that these lines change little from the

17     time when you first arrived in Sarajevo until the end of the war.  What

18     did the position or the shape of these lines mean for the population

19     which occupied that part within the lines of encirclement, the civilians

20     in the area marked ABiH?

21        A.   Mostly they were overlooked by high ground, especially, I would

22     say, on the south side of the city, and they would then be within line of

23     sight of snipers in some areas; but at the same time, the -- Grbavica,

24     for instance, was in line of sight of snipers from the other side

25     operating out of the old parliament office building and vantage points

Page 3177

 1     like that.  So there was no -- I mean, I don't think anyone lived safely

 2     in that city at that time.

 3        Q.   All right.  Was there an easy means of entry into and exit from

 4     the city for the civilians in ABiH-held territory?

 5        A.   There was no easy means at all.  There was in the latter half of

 6     the war a tunnel constructed underneath the airport runway which provided

 7     a means of reinforcement and supplies to come into the city.  But for

 8     any -- anyone who wanted to leave, unless they had the right permissions

 9     and the right influence, I mean, they were more or less, they had to

10     endure the whole siege.  We were in a different state because we had

11     United Nations passes and we were able with difficulty to come through

12     Bosnian Serb roadblocks in Ilidza and elsewhere.

13        Q.   You mentioned the high ground being occupied by the VRS.

14             MR. THOMAS:  What I want to refer you to now is map or photograph

15     number 10 in the booklets, Your Honour, which is 65 ter number 09242.

16        Q.   Mr. Bell, do you recognise that as an aerial photograph of

17     Sarajevo and its surrounds?

18        A.   Yes, I do.

19        Q.   You've spoken of the airport and is that what we see in the

20     bottom right-hand corner?

21        A.   That is so.

22             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, could I firstly tender the unmarked

23     photograph as an exhibit.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Is it not already been tendered?

25             MR. THOMAS:  Not to my knowledge, Your Honour.  No.

Page 3178

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  So admitted.  May it please be given an

 2     exhibit number.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P516.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

 5             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Thank you,

 6     Madam Registrar.

 7        Q.   Bearing in mind the confrontation lines that you drew for us on

 8     the other map and your comment about the VRS holding the high ground, can

 9     you point out again with the pointer, mark the areas of high ground that

10     were held by the VRS?

11        A.   I think there is one area in particular which I shall ...

12             If I can, this area here is high ground that they held with a

13     commanding view of some of the streets below.

14        Q.   Were there any areas of high ground held to the north of the

15     city?

16        A.   This -- the high ground I shall mark now, again it's approximate,

17     had on it the television transmitter and was actually used as a

18     training-ground by the BiH Army for awhile.  The lines of conflict are

19     further north, were further out than that, so you are talking about the

20     high ground commanding the city centre, it's the area that I've outlined

21     on the right-hand side.

22        Q.   All right.  If you could just mark that right-hand circle,

23     please, with VRS.

24        A.   [Marks]

25             MR. THOMAS:  And, Your Honours, if --

Page 3179

 1        Q.   One question, actually, Mr. Bell, before we leave that

 2     photograph, do we see on the area of the photograph where this tunnel was

 3     that you spoke of?

 4        A.   It would be roughly, I can sort of put it in here.  I never took

 5     it myself because I went around it because the entrances were often under

 6     mortar fire, but it was roughly on the line that I've given there.

 7        Q.   All right.

 8             MR. THOMAS:  Now, Your Honours, if I could please tender the

 9     marked photograph as an exhibit.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Before we do that, could we have a marking of

11     some sort, either a BiH indicating the training grounds or T for the

12     television transmitter so that --

13             THE WITNESS:  Shall I put T or BiH because it's --

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Whatever.  Whatever works because otherwise

15     months from now we won't have an indication of what that is either.

16             MR. THOMAS:  No problem with that, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I have thought if we've got VRS written on the

18     right-hand side, we probably might write ABiH on the left.

19             THE WITNESS:  Of course in both cases it's not the only place

20     they were --

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Understood.

22             THE WITNESS:  --  I'm just marking high ground on either side of

23     the city centre.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Quite understood.  Maybe put a T on the tunnel,

25     next to the tunnel.  Then the map as marked is admitted into evidence.

Page 3180

 1     May it please be given an exhibit number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P517.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

 4             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours, Madam Registrar.

 5             Your Honours, I wonder if we could have, I'm not sure if it's

 6     possible to do this on the same screen, but photograph number 12 from the

 7     booklet which is 65 ter number 09241.

 8        Q.   Maybe we can start with that image, Mr. Bell --

 9             MR. THOMAS:  Which, Your Honours, is the page marked "left" in

10     photograph 12 of the booklets that Your Honours have, and is the

11     left-hand half of Exhibit 65 ter 09241.

12        Q.   You spoke of a tower -- a hill with a television tower on it.  Is

13     that what we see in the photograph?

14        A.   Yes, sir, that's what you see.

15        Q.   And has the photograph been taken from the high ground that you

16     marked as occupied by the VRS in the previous photograph?

17        A.   It could have been taken from there, but it might possibly have

18     been taken from the Olympic village which was on ground held by the ABiH.

19        Q.   I see.

20             MR. THOMAS:  If we -- can we scroll to the right, Mr. Usher?

21        Q.   By scrolling to the right, does that assist you?

22        A.   Yes, it does.  And by scrolling to the right, I would say it was

23     more likely taken from the old Olympic village because the high ground

24     overlooking the city centre was to the right.  You see the yellow

25     Holiday Inn.

Page 3181

 1        Q.   Yes.

 2        A.   What we call the Sniper's Corner would be about, oh, 400 yards to

 3     the right of that.  And that was overlooked by high ground controlled by

 4     the Bosnian Serbs.

 5        Q.   And that was, as we look at the photograph, off to the right-hand

 6     side of the photograph?

 7        A.   That is right.

 8        Q.   Would the vantage or the view from the VRS positions bear any

 9     resemblance to the sort of view that we see in this photograph?

10        A.   A marginal resemblance, but in fact they were -- they were

11     closer.  They were looking down the -- latterly down the side-streets.

12     You'll see there was a hill beyond the Holiday Inn.  I used to camp out

13     there with my camera in July 1995.  It was a dangerous place but an

14     excellent vantage point; we called it Gypsy Hill.  So in fact, I would

15     have said that the VRS soldiers, if they were so minded, would have

16     actually had a clearer view than the one taken from this position.

17             MR. THOMAS:  All right.  Your Honours, could we tender this

18     photograph, please, as a Prosecution exhibit.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It's admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

20     number.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P518.

22             MR. THOMAS:

23        Q.   Now, you've spoken of the Holiday Inn which we see is the yellow

24     building in the middle of the photograph as it appears on the screen at

25     the moment.  And is that where you were stationed for a time in Sarajevo?

Page 3182

 1        A.   Yes.  Not at the very start of the war because it was damaged in

 2     the early days, but from about June 1992 I stayed there on and off

 3     because I was away in central Bosnia a lot.  I stayed there, really,

 4     until the end of the war.  It was the main press headquarters even though

 5     one side of it was uninhabitable because it was damaged by shell fire and

 6     other fire.

 7        Q.   Which side was uninhabitable?

 8        A.   What you see -- it would be the right side.  The side roughly

 9     facing the tall building beside it which is the parliament office

10     building.

11        Q.   All right.  And that was as a result of fire from which forces?

12        A.   That would be as a result of fire from the Bosnian Serb-held

13     side.

14             MR. THOMAS:  All right.  So that we can now begin to orientate

15     ourselves relative to the map that we have already viewed, I'd like to go

16     back, please, to Exhibit P439.  And if we could close-up, please, on the

17     main part of the city.  Thank you, Mr. Usher.

18        Q.   Mr. Bell, are you able to mark on the map, as it presently

19     appears on the screen, the location of the Holiday Inn?

20        A.   I would imagine, though it's a very indistinct map to me, it's

21     about there.

22        Q.   If you could just mark that with an H, please?

23        A.   [Marks]

24             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, if we could please tender that as a

25     Prosecution exhibit.

Page 3183

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It's admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

 2     number.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P519.

 4             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Thank you,

 5     Madam Registrar.

 6        Q.   Now, you mentioned, Mr. Bell, the --

 7             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Mr. Usher.  We don't need your help

 8     anymore.  Thank you.

 9        Q.   You mentioned, Mr. Bell, the plight of civilians in the ABiH-held

10     territory, and the sniping and shelling.  Can you please tell us, first

11     of all, what the situation in that respect was like at the end of 1992,

12     beginning of 1993?

13        A.   Well, this was a war fought, looking at it from my perspective,

14     against all the Geneva Conventions.  There was no distinction between

15     military and civilian targets, except of course that the civilians were

16     not able to defend themselves.  They had to come out for food and water

17     and fuel if they could gather it and many of them spent, especially the

18     children spent much of those three and a half years in cellars.

19        Q.   What would happen to civilian who were outside?

20        A.   I had an experience in -- I was doing a report in early 1993 and

21     we discovered there was a water point, a stand pipe, a tap which people

22     had to come out to within range of the Bosnian Serb positions and people

23     were regularly shot as they fetched their water.  Sometimes the trams

24     were targeted in a similar way.  There was -- to me one of the iconic

25     images of the war - and this was towards the end - is a French armoured

Page 3184

 1     personnel carrier shuttling roughly between the parliament office

 2     building and what we knew as Sniper's Corner, and for once UNPROFOR, the

 3     UN Protection Force was doing some protecting and they -- the civilians

 4     would walk with the -- the armoured personnel carrier went at walking

 5     pace and it would protect the civilians who were obviously sheltered on

 6     the safer side of it.  I mean, I've never seen -- I've never been in a

 7     war quite so merciless as this.

 8        Q.   You've spoken of the effect in terms of trams, in terms of

 9     needing to fetch water.  What were the -- besides the effects of sniping

10     and shelling directly, what did this do to day-to-day life in Sarajevo?

11        A.   Well, it -- it really closed down.  The business -- people's only

12     business - and this applies to both sides of the lines - was survival,

13     just getting through -- getting through the day.  Especially difficult in

14     the winter because it's a very cold winter there.  There was -- there

15     were no -- the gas was turned off for most of the time.  There was no

16     electricity.  There was no source of food apart from what the

17     United Nations could bring in.  So the people really, really suffered

18     on -- to an extent that I hadn't seen in all my other wars, to be quite

19     honest.

20        Q.   How frequent were the -- and again, focusing on the period the

21     end of 1992, beginning of 1993 for a moment, how frequently were

22     civilians getting shot and civilians getting shelled by the VRS forces?

23        A.   This was not something that happened at a steady rate over three

24     and a half years.  Apart from the first winter of the war, 1992 to 1993,

25     which was particularly grim, there would be in the early months of the

Page 3185

 1     year, I think January, February, middle of March, something of a

 2     cease-fire and this is when there were actually cease-fire negotiations.

 3     But when the snow and the ice melted about the middle of March, you would

 4     find that the pace of the shelling and the fighting quickened and there

 5     was a lot of, I mean, there were some -- there were main force

 6     engagements like the attempt by the BiH Army to break the siege of

 7     Sarajevo in June/July 1995.  So it was almost a seasonal thing and I

 8     would say that some times were much worse than others.

 9        Q.   Were you in any position to assess whether or not civilians were

10     specifically targeted?

11        A.   Common sense says yes.  I remember a cameraman in the Holiday Inn

12     just sort of zeroing his camera one morning, poking it out of the window

13     to make sure that it worked and there was an old lady getting out of a

14     van and going into a house, so he just -- he was just making sure and as

15     he did so she was shot.  I think it's highly unlikely that she was shot

16     by accident.  It would seem -- common sense would say she was targeted.

17        Q.   Were there areas of the city which were more prone to attacks on

18     civilians than others?

19        A.   Yes, roughly speaking those areas where the snipers and the

20     gunners on the VRS side of the lines would have a clear line of sight

21     down one of the side-streets.  You understand that the main street goes

22     from one end to the other, but the side-streets were especially

23     vulnerable and this is where the notorious Sniper's Corner was, and they

24     actually had a road sign saying, "Beware snipers," which was up for three

25     and a half years.  But of course, having said that you were vulnerable to

Page 3186

 1     mortar fire wherever you were.

 2        Q.   All right.  Was that vulnerability to mortar fire consistent

 3     throughout the three and a half year?

 4        A.   No, I don't think the level of fighting was consistent throughout

 5     the three and a half years.  I would say it was at its worst in the

 6     summer of 1992 and again in that resurgence of the fighting in summer of

 7     1995.

 8        Q.   What were the respective strengths and weaknesses in terms of

 9     weaponry and manpower of the two forces?

10        A.   The Serbs obviously had the advantage in heavy weapons, in

11     armoured personnel carriers, in tanks, they even had a tank in the suburb

12     of Grbavica.  In bombs and rockets.  The BiH Army, although it was much

13     more lightly equipped, had the advantage in numbers.  Numerical

14     superiority.  The Serbs by about the fourth -- third year of the war were

15     seriously defeated -- depleted.  They had, I mean every -- this was a

16     citizens army.  Everyone who could bear arms did bear arms, but the main

17     units of the Romanija Corps, the corps that surrounded Sarajevo, were

18     seriously under strength, lacking officers, lacking sufficient NCOs.

19             And even though when we were -- we could -- I had very good

20     relations with the Serbs right up to August 1994 and I would -- and

21     Karadzic and others would sometimes take us around their frontlines and

22     show us the spirit of these soldiers.  I mean, it was all part of what we

23     call the information campaign, but I noticed up there there were a lot of

24     very old men, and I raised this with Jovan Zametica who was a Cambridge

25     don who was his foreign policy advisor whom I knew very well.  I said,

Page 3187

 1     Jovan, you know, you are going to lose, why don't you deal, and he said -

 2     I'll never forget this - he said, We don't care.

 3             So there was an imbalance between the two forces.  The heavy

 4     weapons on one side, but the manpower on the other.  And of course,

 5     towards the end of the war, the Bosnian government forces found ways of

 6     getting more weaponry, especially anti-tank weapons.

 7        Q.   So how did this imbalance manifest itself in the military

 8     exchanges?

 9        A.   It manifested itself in a growing ability of the Bosnian army

10     seriously to threaten the Serbs' stranglehold on the city.  About

11     June 1995, we had some amazing images where they actually broke out for

12     awhile and over the old Pale road.  They had -- they tried to break the

13     siege from the outside, but suffered very severe casualties.

14             So what you got towards the end of the war which you hadn't

15     really had so much before was exchanges of fire between main force units

16     on either side, which didn't make the civilians any safer, but there were

17     times when it was a war of one army against another.

18        Q.   So what would the response of the VRS be?

19        A.   Well, I noted that what would happen, and the government forces

20     were, I mean, I remember reflecting at one time that Harry Silajdzic who

21     was a senior member of the presidency, I felt he had the effect of a

22     whole brigade of marines or something, because he could -- what would

23     happen was that the government forces might snipe or make some aggressive

24     move to try and break the siege and then they would really get hit very,

25     very hard with artillery, with tank fire, you could see this in the early

Page 3188

 1     months of the war.  So then the -- Silajdzic would turn around and say,

 2     Look what are they doing to us, we are the victims, why will the world

 3     not move to save us?  And you had this especially in 1995 with the use of

 4     aircraft bombs powered by rockets and indeed by the use of phosphorus

 5     which was also used then.

 6        Q.   I want to ask you a little bit about these bombs that you've just

 7     described.  Which forces used these aircraft bombs propelled by rockets?

 8        A.   Any force would use whatever it had.  And the Bosnian army

 9     actually had very little in terms of heavy weapons.  When the Croats were

10     besieging Gornji Vakuf in the side war in 1993 to 1994, they were

11     actually rolling sea mines down hills into the village.  You used

12     whatever you had.

13             Now, by then there was a no-fly zone in force and the government,

14     the Serb side had these aircraft bombs that it couldn't use because it

15     couldn't use its aircraft so it devised a means of getting them propelled

16     by rockets.  There was, while was there I think there was three of these

17     cases, one was in Vlasenica, one was in the bus depot which was a

18     UN vehicle compound opposite the television station, and one of course

19     was actually in the well of the television station itself, which did

20     great damage.

21        Q.   Can you describe what you know of the effect of these bombs?

22        A.   I only came in after they had been fired and these were, I

23     believe, 500-pound aircraft bombs and they were completely devastating.

24     They were the heaviest weapons used, I mean, relative to the tank and

25     artillery shells used from the early days of the war, these were the

Page 3189

 1     heaviest weapons that were employed throughout the whole course of it.

 2        Q.   The ones which you saw or the sites that you went to, were they

 3     at military installations or were they in civilian areas?

 4        A.   Hrasnica I didn't see because I couldn't get there.  The

 5     UN compound was a UN compound.  It was a former bus depot so by

 6     definition it had no military -- no competent military inside it, and the

 7     television station was also a civilian installation by definition.

 8        Q.   Besides the buildings themselves, were the immediate surrounding

 9     areas civilian or military?

10        A.   I know of no military installations anywhere near the television

11     station and the bus compound opposite it.  The principal army

12     headquarters were down-town; and the other military areas, if you like,

13     were on the -- on the frontlines.  But not around those target zones, no.

14        Q.   Generally speaking, where were the -- geographically, where were

15     the ABiH troops deployed?

16        A.   They were deployed obviously round the, round the edges.  They

17     were -- they would -- you would sometimes find them billeted in schools,

18     but you were not aware of a -- living in a city with a great mass with a

19     standing army in it.  This was a war fought very piecemeal, house by

20     house and sector by sector.  And apart from when I -- we did a story

21     about the Bosnian government forces training on that hill near the

22     television tower, that is the one time I've seen them en masse, apart

23     from the attempt to break the encirclement in June 1992 where they were

24     moving very rapidly up hill and under covering fire, but it looked like a

25     ruined city, but I would say not a militarised [Realtime transcript read

Page 3190

 1     in error "mill tear terrorised"] one in any obvious way.

 2        Q.   When you talk about the troops being deployed around the edges,

 3     what do you mean?

 4        A.   Could you mind if I just correct something.  There's -- that word

 5     should be militarised, not "mill tear terrorised," three lines up.  I'm

 6     not accusing anyone of being a terrorist here.  Sorry.  That's right.

 7     Thank you.  Sorry.

 8        Q.   Yes, Mr. Bell, when you mentioned the troops, the ABiH troops

 9     being deployed around the edges, what are you talking about?

10        A.   I'm talking about the frontlines, sir.  This was a war in which,

11     you know, the frontlines could be as little as 30 metres from each other.

12     It was house to house, and very often there would be a kind of a local

13     cease-fire either explicit or just agreed between commanders, but there

14     were -- but every inch of ground was fought for from, oh, I'd say May

15     1992 onwards.

16        Q.   You spoke earlier, Mr. Bell, of the gas being turned off, the

17     electricity being turned off, and you've described people having to go to

18     certain collection points for water.  Why would that be?

19        A.   The gas came into Sarajevo from outside.  The water was on a

20     main.  The one consistent source of water throughout, of course, was the

21     Miljacka River, and you would find people in the middle of winter drawing

22     their water from it, carrying it in handcarts, in any way, because you

23     can -- you know, these people had to come out to get their water.  It was

24     one of the effects of fighting a war, I would say an early 20th century

25     war in a late 20th century urban environment.  This is why the war,

Page 3191

 1     terrible as it was, out in the -- out in the country-side was not -- did

 2     not have as severe an effect as the war in the cities.  Not just

 3     Sarajevo, but Mostar and Tuzla as well.

 4        Q.   When you were in Sarajevo the first time, late 1992, early 1993,

 5     what were you reporting?

 6        A.   I was reporting initially the result of the referendum campaign,

 7     and then I was reporting the start of the war, the street fighting in

 8     Sarajevo, the massive flight of refugees especially from Eastern Bosnia.

 9     We went up to Zvornik.  We still had a degree of movement.  I was

10     reporting the politics of it.  I spent a lot of time in Pale with Jovan

11     Zametica, with Karadzic, with Nikola Koljevic, his vice-president.  You

12     know, we tried to be as comprehensive as we could in rather difficult

13     circumstances.

14        Q.   Did that reporting include what was happening to the civilians?

15        A.   Yes, it did.  It was -- it very much did.  The report I did from

16     outside Zvornik, we were watching, I think, 20.000 civilians on the move

17     in that one day.  And since civilians were the principal casualties of

18     this war, a lot of the reporting was about their plight.

19        Q.   Including the reporting from Sarajevo?

20        A.   Including the reporting from Sarajevo.  On both sides of the --

21     on both sides of the lines, yes.

22        Q.   The -- at the time you were there, in late 1992, early 1993, how

23     large was the international press contingent in Sarajevo?

24        A.   There were about -- I wouldn't have thought that even at the

25     height it was more than about 50.  It was a very difficult place to get

Page 3192

 1     to.  The costs of protection were high, the logistics were difficult, so

 2     those of us present throughout were actually relatively few, which, from

 3     my point of view, had the advantage that you could get to the main

 4     people.  You could get to the UN generals, you could get to the Bosnian

 5     Serb leadership.  It wasn't done through spin doctors and press officers.

 6             No, there were not that many of us and we bonded together pretty

 7     well.

 8        Q.   Was everybody interested in the same sort of stories that you

 9     have described?

10        A.   There was more of an agreed agenda than I think there is now.

11     Yes, on the whole.  There were no tabloid press there very much.  I don't

12     think there were any great differences between us in the way that we

13     covered the story, except that I probably spent more time with the Serbs

14     than most of the rest.

15        Q.   What sort of networks, press agencies, and other organisations

16     were represented at that time?

17        A.   There were the -- obviously Reuters was there, Associated Press

18     was there, AFP was there, the BBC was there, CNN, and French television.

19     But we put together a -- because it was so dangerous, I took the

20     initiative and knocked some heads together and we actually formed what we

21     called the Sarajevo Agency Pool so that the cameramen and women were not

22     competing with each other to go into the most dangerous places, and I

23     think we saved some lives with that.  So it was an unusually close-knit

24     and non-competitive group of people.

25        Q.   And what was that group of people doing with its footage?

Page 3193

 1        A.   They went -- those footage went out on satellite exchanges all

 2     over the world.  I know that because the story that I sent from -- about

 3     the refugees being driven out of the villages around Zvornik, and Zvornik

 4     itself by a paramilitary leader called Zeljko Raznjatovic.  Hisnom de

 5     guerre was Arkan, I knew him very well.  He -- that -- we started off

 6     with some footage taken by a cameraman of mine in Zvornik of the dead

 7     Muslims being carried out and the Serbian flag hoisted, and whatever I

 8     said clearly offended this warlord and because it was seen in -- it was

 9     seen in Belgrade, and I had to backtrack in some way on my comments the

10     next day to try and reduce the risk to him.  His name was Dragan and he

11     was seriously threatened.

12             So yeah, these images went around Europe and we went around the

13     world, especially in the early phases of the war.

14        Q.   When you returned in early 1994 and through to the end of the

15     war, were the same sorts of stories being reported in the international

16     press from Sarajevo?

17        A.   No, I rather feel that a degree of war fatigue set in.  At the

18     same time, the -- what they call in the military field security tightened

19     up a lot, so you couldn't just roll around everywhere with your armoured

20     vehicle, you were stopped and blocked, and there was much more of an

21     attempt to manipulate the press.  But the images of -- from May 1995

22     through to the, really, through to Dayton, they were so graphic that they

23     were going around the world as much as in that first summer of the war,

24     yes.

25        Q.   During the period of March 1994 through to the end of the war,

Page 3194

 1     was there a constant international press presence in Sarajevo?

 2        A.   It was constant but I would have thought it waned, interest

 3     diminished to the news editors of Europe and the United States; it was a

 4     long war which had been going on a long time.  You know, I was already

 5     competing with a change in the news agenda in which a royal divorce, for

 6     instance, is thought to be much more important than a European war.  But

 7     that -- towards the end May, June, July 1995, that lack of interest had

 8     gone away and people really did want to know.

 9        Q.   Does that mean there was no coverage of what was happening to

10     civilians during this time?

11        A.   No, there was always coverage.  The Sarajevo agency pool had two

12     especially able Bosnian cameramen who got everywhere.  We kept working,

13     we kept working hard, and I found that by early summer of 1995 my own

14     editors in London were waking up to the fact that this was the --

15     probably the climactic phase of the war.  I think this really came home

16     after the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, it then became a war, shall

17     we say, on the conscience of the world.

18        Q.   Were you involved in reporting of the Srebrenica massacre?

19        A.   Only from the outside.  It was denied.  It took really quite a

20     few weeks and even months for the true reality to dawn.  The first -- I

21     mean, we knew these people had disappeared but we couldn't prove they had

22     been killed, but there were some aerial photographs taken by the

23     Americans which suggested so.  I would think it was not really until

24     about September 1995 that the -- you know, it was possible for people to

25     deny this had happened.  Well, after I suppose September 1995 it was no

Page 3195

 1     longer possible, and I think this contributed to the political initiative

 2     that ended the war.

 3        Q.   Can you tell me what Eurovision is?

 4        A.   Eurovision is a syndicate of all the European broadcasters.

 5     Besides its, you know, the song contest and all the other things, it's

 6     core is an exchange of news footage between its broadcasters and they all

 7     take in each others news feeds, or they did then, at a regular time every

 8     day.

 9        Q.   Was it operating during 1992 to 1995?

10        A.   Yes, it was.  In fact, our initial satellite dish when we were

11     based -- when we first got in in April 1995, we were based in the

12     Hotel Srbija in Ilidza actually, in Serb-held territory, and our dish was

13     a Eurovision dish.  It was actually provided by the European broadcasting

14     union, so the Eurovision was at the heart of this enterprise.

15        Q.   Just in practical terms, what would happen to footage, what would

16     Eurovision do with it, what would other subscribers do with the

17     Eurovision footage?

18        A.   Before we formed the Sarajevo agency pool, the main television

19     news agencies, Reuters which was then called Viz News, and what was then

20     WTN, World Television News, and APTN, which was -- they would -- they

21     would offer up their images of the day and an adjudicator in Geneva would

22     decide to take this agency's or that agency's.  After we formed the

23     Sarajevo agency pool in May 1992, there was this Eurovision rep, somebody

24     on the ground who would scoop up everything that was available and send

25     it at a given time to the European networks.

Page 3196

 1        Q.   Do you know whether the Eurovision pool of material was regularly

 2     accessed by subscribers, did they download or retrieve footage on a

 3     regular basis?

 4        A.   Well, I used to get letters from all corners of Europe, so they

 5     obviously did.  You have to understand, there was no -- apart from CNN,

 6     there was no rolling news at that time.  But there were all the large and

 7     even the small European broadcasters, they showed intense interest.  We

 8     had -- I mean, I could see that by the people coming through.  We had

 9     Irish television, German television, French television, Austrians, I

10     mean, everybody was there, and they were there because they had seen this

11     on their screens and they wanted to send their own people and own

12     correspondents.  So it was -- I spent -- after Croatia, I think you have

13     to understand this was the first war in Europe since 1945 so it would

14     have been surprising if there had not been this interest.

15        Q.   Were there any Serb networks who or which subscribed to

16     Eurovision, Republic of Serbia networks?

17        A.   Well, I wasn't in Belgrade at the time for obvious reason, but

18     Yugoslav television was a member of the European broadcasting union in

19     good standing and so obviously -- well, it certainly received what we

20     sent or my cameramen wouldn't have been threatened whenever it was, it

21     was in April 1992.  And of course, there were, I mean, if you could

22     consider the Serb's own interest in Bosnia, it would have been

23     extraordinary if they turned their backs on it which they didn't.

24             And of course we had quite a lot of Serbian journalists came in

25     as well.  The Associated Press correspondent was a Serb.  A lot of the

Page 3197

 1     networks initially sent their reports -- of the agency sent their reports

 2     through Belgrade because they were still in the old Yugoslav system, so

 3     Serbian journalists were quite heavily involved, yes.

 4        Q.   Just give me a moment, please, Mr. Bell.

 5             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, that's all I have for Mr. Bell at the

 6     moment.  I've just been handed a note which might suggest that there are

 7     one or two errors in the transcript which I'd want to have a look at in

 8     case they need any further clarification from Mr. Bell.  I wonder if we

 9     could take the adjournment now and I can use that time to find those

10     mistakes and see whether Mr. Bell is required to comment on those at all.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Very well, then.  We'll take a break and come back

12     at 4.00.  Court adjourned.

13                           --- Recess taken at 3.25 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 3.59 p.m.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Thomas.

16             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Yes, there are a couple of

17     passages in the transcript which I'd like to refer back to Mr. Bell,

18     please, Your Honours.  The first is at page 27, line 12.  And I wonder if

19     we could have that passage appear on the screen before Mr. Bell, please.

20             THE WITNESS:  You want me to fill in the gap?

21             MR. THOMAS:

22        Q.   Sorry, Mr. Bell --

23        A.   You wish me to fill in the gap?

24        Q.   Let me just find where we are for a moment.  Yes, you see the

25     reference to 27:1 on the left-hand side?  Do you --

Page 3198

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   If you scroll -- if you go down to the number 12?

 3        A.   Yes, that name is Jovan, J-o-v-a-n, Zametica, Z-a-m-e-t-i-c-a.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And then you --

 5        A.   Nikola Koljevic, K-o-l-j-e-v-i-c.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.

 7             MR. THOMAS:  And Your Honours, there's one more passage, please,

 8     page 31, line 10.

 9        Q.   And you were talking -- first of all, do you see the reference to

10     31:1?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And if you go down to line number 10 under there?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   We were talking about Eurovision?

15        A.   Yes, I've made -- I've maken [sic] a mistake there.  It's April

16     1992, of course, when we first got in.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Bell, thank you.  Those were the only matters I

18     wanted to raise with you.  My learned friends for the Defence will have

19     some questions for you if you would kindly wait there for us, please.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.  Keep forward.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Could you please use the other microphone.

23     Thank you.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Is this better?

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Perfect.  Thank you.

Page 3199

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good.

 2                           Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

 3        Q.   If you'll excuse me, Mr. Bell, I have a tendency to drop my voice

 4     and I get into trouble because they can't hear me and can't interpret

 5     then they yell at me, and I'd rather not have that happen too terribly

 6     much while we are talking to each other.

 7             I've had occasion to read all of your testimony in all of the

 8     cases previously and I've had occasion to read the book or one of the

 9     books that you've written, "In Harm's Way."  And I think I'd like to

10     start my examination based upon what I've seen previously as well as what

11     I've seen today, echoing the remarks that were made by Judge Jorda in

12     which he said:

13             "I also thank you for the quality of your testimony to which you

14     always try to take the high ground vis-a-vis this dreadful conflict."

15             And in my discussions with you today, I'm really searching for

16     that kind of a balance, because you are uniquely situated to comment on

17     and give us some understanding of a number of, I think, very important

18     issues that surround this particular litigation and this particular

19     conflict.

20              You said on your direct testimony that this war, unlike other

21     wars that you had reported, was different.  You mention at one point that

22     it was a re-enactment or perhaps a Great War again, and you also

23     mentioned that it was an early 20th-century war being fought late in the

24     20th century.  And I'd like to start there for a moment, if I could.  And

25     could you explain to us what the distinctions that you believe existed in

Page 3200

 1     this war were based upon your experience for many years as a war

 2     correspondent in many theatres of operation?

 3        A.   I think I would start by saying I sometimes felt, especially in

 4     central Bosnia, that I had blundered into some scenes from 1914 to 1918.

 5     That is, the weapons used in Bosnian war were almost entirely, apart from

 6     the aircraft bombs, I suppose, the same weapons used in the Great War.

 7     They were assault weapon, they were mines, they were machine-guns, and so

 8     on.  But the difference, I think, was that the extent to which in a late

 9     20th century war in an urban environment civilians were so much caught up

10     in it and it wasn't just that there was no distinction between the

11     soldiers and the civilians.  I sometimes felt the civilians were being

12     targeted, and political leaders would use the sufferings of their people

13     to advance their political cause.  And the same thing happened in the war

14     in Croatia.  I think -- I think that's why I found this -- of the 18 wars

15     that I have reported, I found this the most shocking.

16        Q.   And when you say that political leaders used the suffering of the

17     people sometimes to advance their cause, earlier in your direct

18     testimony, you had mentioned one of the things that occurred as a result

19     of what would happen when the BiH would attempt to break out of an area

20     and then they would be hit with this heavy response and there would be,

21     then, a response from a gentleman whose name has just escaped me.  I

22     can't remember what his name was --

23        A.   Oh, Silajdzic maybe?

24        Q.   Silajdzic, yes.  In that regard, he, then, would go forth and

25     say, See what they are doing to us.  And I'm wondering, is that what you

Page 3201

 1     are talking about or is that an example of what you are referring to when

 2     you are talking about in one sense the political leadership using the

 3     suffering of their people to advance their cause?

 4        A.   Yes, at the same time the political leadership would have been,

 5     from their own point of view, quite sincere.  I remember Haris Silajdzic

 6     taking to task General Sir Michael Rose, who was UNPROFOR commander, in a

 7     very public way and attempting to humiliate him.

 8             I think I would like to make a distinction between main force

 9     unit clashes like the one I described when the BiH forces attempt to

10     break the siege in the summer of 1995, and the day-to-day shelling and,

11     as I see it, sniping of and targeting of civilians.  I mean, this was a

12     war with where both these things happened.

13        Q.   In this war, do you find that the - I'm trying to figure out how

14     to say this properly - that the status of the media was distinct from

15     that of the other wars that you've reported?  I'm trying -- and to be

16     perfectly honest with you, I'm trying to edge up to, I think, where you

17     know this discussion is going.

18        A.   Yeah.  I'll be as helpful as I can.  When the war began in April

19     1992, the international community as such was hardly on the ground.  The

20     UNPROFOR had its headquarters in Sarajevo when the war began, but they

21     left hurriedly in May 1992.  So as far as the international community was

22     concerned, there were one or two European monitors, but as far as the

23     peoples of Bosnia were concerned, the only representatives they saw of

24     the international community were the international press.  And therefore,

25     there would be obviously an attempt to influence us, to get us to put

Page 3202

 1     their point of view and we understood this.

 2             So it was an unusual war in that respect as well.

 3        Q.   That, I think, falls or flows into a comment that's often made,

 4     it's an old saw, and I certainly, from what I've seen, am not accusing

 5     you in this in any respect whatsoever, but the first casualty of a war is

 6     truth.  And to the extent that that is something that is of concern, I

 7     think as a reporter it's clearly something that must have been to concern

 8     not only to you but of to your colleagues?  That you made sure that you

 9     were both objective and telling the truth?

10        A.   Yes, sir.  And anything you do is fragmentary because you are

11     concentrating on what you find at a particular time and a particular

12     place.  But especially in the early months of the war, we did have most

13     remarkable access to both sides.  And I'll be honest, that one of the --

14     one of the problems I had dealing with my editors, and they were not

15     unique in this, was that they got themselves very early into a mindset of

16     good Muslims and bad Serbs, if you see what I mean.

17        Q.   Yes, I do.

18        A.   And when an ambulance with Serbian soldiers was intercepted and

19     hijacked and eight or nine Serbs were killed in cold blood, I had great

20     difficulty impressing on my editors that this had actually happened.  But

21     I think, you know, obviously you ask yourself, What did I get wrong?  I

22     think I'd stand by just about everything I wrote and said at the time.

23     Always accepting that it was necessarily fragmentary and I could only be

24     where I was and not somewhere else.

25        Q.   I believe, as you've commented, one of the things that is true

Page 3203

 1     about war is that war is in fact local?

 2        A.   All wars are local, yes.

 3        Q.   All wars are local.  As a matter of fact, that's a point that you

 4     raise in your book which is that what is going on on the ground at the

 5     time is in fact what is most pressing to all those that are involved in

 6     that issue?

 7        A.   It's the field where you fight, it's the ditch where you die.

 8        Q.   You said that you initially, if I'm not mistaken, you initially

 9     came to the area with regard to the referendum process?

10        A.   Referendum, mm-hmm.

11        Q.   And I'd like to, for a moment, see if what you said in your book

12     still holds true, and that's with regard to the issue of what I would

13     call the Genscher push, which I think you understand what I mean, to

14     recognise the independence.  And in your book you say, and this is on

15     page 35, which I believe is pages 2 and 3 in e-court, you say:

16             "The then Secretary-General of the United Nations Javier Perez de

17     Cuellar, in the final days of a distinguished term of office" --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Thank you for slowing down when reading.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:

20        Q.   -- "wrote to the president of the council of ministers, Hans van

21     den Broek of Holland, to convey the sense of foreboding expressed by

22     Cyrus Vance after meeting many of the main players including the Bosnian

23     leadership.  More than one of his high-level interlocutors described the

24     explosive consequences of such a development as being a potential time

25     bomb ... and I'm deeply worried that an early selective recognition could

Page 3204

 1     widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation especially in

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina and also Macedonia.  I believe, therefore, that

 3     uncoordinated actions should be avoided."

 4             Lord Carrington wrote to a similar effect, I'm going to skip a

 5     couple of lines:  "... an early recognition of Croatia would undoubtedly

 6     mean the break-up of the conference.  There is also a real danger,

 7     perhaps even a probability that Bosnia-Herzegovina will also ask for

 8     independence and recognition which would be wholly unacceptable to the

 9     Serbs in the Republic.  This might well be the spark that sets

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina alight."

11             Some years later after reflection, and I know it's in your book,

12     do you still hold that same position?

13        A.   Yes, I do.  I was passed all the documents relating to the debate

14     on the recognition of Croatia and I think now looking back on it, it was

15     an absolutely pivotal event, and all the predictions made by Carrington

16     and others, they all sadly were proved true.

17        Q.   Did you, during the time that you were in the region, discuss

18     with Serbian leadership or Serbs at all the fact of the European decision

19     to recognise these particular quests for self-determination and

20     independence?

21        A.   I almost certainly discussed it during -- in the margins of my

22     reporting on the referendum campaign in March 1992, because by then the

23     decisions on Croatia had been -- had been taken.  And you will notice

24     that, like all civil wars, the civil war in Bosnia -- well, it was more

25     than a civil war, but it was partly a civil war.  It was slow to start

Page 3205

 1     because the people of Bosnia had a very acute sense of what was going to

 2     happen once it started.  So I almost certainly did discuss this with the

 3     Serb leadership, Karadzic and Koljevic especially.  This is when I got to

 4     know them first.

 5        Q.   We may have a moment to speak about Mladic.  I take it this is

 6     something that you did not speak with General Mladic about?

 7        A.   Well, General Mladic was not in the frame at that time.  He was a

 8     general in the JNA based elsewhere.  I never knew him as well as the

 9     others because I was dealing with the political leadership, but I did at

10     one time in August 1992, I prevented him -- I intervened to prevent him

11     throttling the Reuters correspondent Kurt Schork, whom he'd taken against

12     in a big way.

13        Q.   As a matter of fact, you suggested that if the other side would

14     control theirs then you would control yours, because Mladic was somewhat

15     upset what with the Reuters correspondent was accusing him of; right?

16        A.   That is true, yes, sir.

17        Q.   What I'm trying to come to is an understanding because part of

18     what we are dealing here -- with here is the issue of, in a very real

19     way, perception of that which is being said.  And I want to frame it in

20     the following way, and if it's a fair characterization, tell me; and if

21     it's not a fair characterization, tell me that too.  You say at page 103

22     of your book, that's page 9 of the e-court, you say:

23             "At the same time, and rather to my surprise, I found the Serbs

24     quite easy to like on a personal and social level.  Once they even sought

25     to use me to pass a message to the British government, though I protested

Page 3206

 1     to them it was none of my business.  They could be warm hearted and

 2     hospitable and even almost innocent in a," and this is what I'm driving

 3     at here," 14th-century kind of way, which is not to excuse them, but

 4     rather to suggest that they belong to a different age.  Yet they were

 5     doing damage in this one and the problem was to get through to them."

 6             When I think of the 14th century, I think of the plague, the

 7     Hundred Years' War, it was a time when society was relatively shut down,

 8     and the people were unnecessarily isolated and concerned about

 9     information that came from the outside.  And I'm wondering if that is a

10     fair characterization of your experience with the Serbs, and if that's

11     what you meant with regard to that particular language?

12        A.   I refer to the 14th century because I had in mind the battle of

13     Kosovo Polje, which I think was 14 -- 1389 and which is the defining

14     event in their history, so I wrote somewhere in this book or elsewhere --

15     and this is not to criticize them at all, but the Serbs are a people who

16     live their history like no other people on earth.  That's not to

17     criticize them, it's just one of the interesting things about them.

18        Q.   And as a matter of fact -- and do I apologise to both the Court

19     and counsel.  Mr. Mair has just suggested to me that it might be helpful

20     to mention that I'm referring to 1D 005556 when I'm referring to those

21     pages in Mr. Bell's book, and to that extent I do apologise.  If we could

22     have that brought up generally.  My apologies both to the Court as well

23     as to you, Mr. Thomas.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  How many 5s?

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Three 5s and a 6.

Page 3207

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 3        Q.   Now, with regard to the -- with regard to the self-same kind of

 4     idea, you also mention, and this is when you are referring to the Bosnian

 5     Serbs as opposed to any other group, I think, and this is page 113 of

 6     your book, sir, and that's page 12.  You say:

 7             "... mostly their fierce isolation was self-imposed.  They [were

 8     prisoners of their politics and their history, but I've sometimes

 9     wondered whether the mechanisms and dynamics of television may have

10     also -- may also have had something to do with it.

11             "Throughout the war we did not flit around evenly between one

12     side and the other.  Mostly, though I tried to break the habit, we did

13     not flit at all.  We stayed on the government side of the lines and

14     reported from that perspective.  For the kind of TV news operation that

15     we were mounting is not a free running enterprise, it has a certain

16     centre of gravity, and that is hard to move."

17             First of all when you are dealing with the issue of their fierce

18     isolation, I take it by that you are referring to characters, and I use

19     the term in a loose sense for the moment, such as Karadzic?  Or are you

20     referring to just the people in general?

21        A.   I think I think both, sir.  I mean obviously I got to know many

22     of soldiers, civilians, at all levels, including what was at one time a

23     sort of peace movement within the Bosnian/Serb army led by Major Mauzer

24     from Bijeljina.  So it wasn't just the leadership.  I mean, I knew and I

25     liked a lot of these people but I felt there was -- that they're so

Page 3208

 1     easily set in a sense of paranoia that the world was against them.  And

 2     the reason I wrote that was machinery was much more primitive than it is

 3     now so we would be camped around a satellite dish, and the satellite dish

 4     started in Serb territory but then it migrated.  And it was -- you know,

 5     to reach the Serbs once the war had started, you had to cross an active

 6     frontline.  You might get shot at across the -- crossing the airport, so

 7     there was every reason to confine yourselves to government-held

 8     territory.  Well, I got badly shot up once crossing the runway, but I

 9     still tried after that, and it was only in August 1994 that the Bosnian

10     Serb territory was closed off to us.

11        Q.   I see.  So up until August of 1994, and I not only do I

12     understand why you may not wish to travel but it makes eminently good

13     sense to me, and as a matter of fact, I take it that's one of the reasons

14     that you created the Sarajevo corps was, as you said earlier, to protect

15     lives as opposed to be recklessly out there trying to grab bits of

16     sensational news.  But considering that you have this understanding of

17     them that they were prisoners of their politics and their history, with

18     regard to the issue of the television reporting that was going on from a

19     standpoint of what I'm going to call for a moment, if it makes sense,

20     their isolation, did you ever get any sense that they believed that the

21     information that was coming across the television was propaganda and was

22     not to be believed?

23        A.   Some of them certainly believed this.  One of the first things

24     they did was to set up their own television service which they did with

25     the help of some editing machines that they hijacked from the BBC,

Page 3209

 1     actually.  So they could put out their own version of events.  But even

 2     as late as August 1994, they had us over, there was a referendum on the,

 3     what was called the contact group plan, and we were led around the

 4     trenches and we were invited to interview anybody we liked.  And the

 5     purpose of this was to show that the Bosnian Serbs were unanimously

 6     against the contact group plan.  So they continued to deal with us up

 7     until that time.

 8             And I found if you had a reputation for being, the word the

 9     soldiers liked to use was "correct," they thought you were correct you

10     could still do business with them.

11        Q.   And they thought you were correct?

12        A.   Mostly they thought I was correct.

13        Q.   That's my understanding.  And when you use this term "correct,"

14     actually, this is something that you've discussed in some previous

15     testimony at some point.  Could you explain to us what that term means?

16     And from the standpoint of the Serbian interpretation of what it means to

17     be correct?

18        A.   The Serbian interpretation of being correct is this is a man who

19     is reporting facts as he finds them and as he knows them and he is not

20     coming to see us with a preconceived notion.

21        Q.   Okay.  Now, early on you met with a gentleman who said that the

22     BBC was a Ustasha organisation, I believe.

23        A.   Ustasha.

24        Q.   Ustasha, yeah.  Thank you very much.  Did that view find voice in

25     those Serb that you spoke with?

Page 3210

 1        A.   If I remember, and you have the book in front of you and I don't,

 2     I think it was the commander of a Serbian artillery battery laying down

 3     fire on the frontlines.  And I had to convince him that I was not Ustasha

 4     which is to say a Croatian Fascist, and he was, in the end, most

 5     forthcoming and gave me a wonderful insight into the Serbian mindset of

 6     the time.

 7        Q.   I'm -- another point you mention, and this is at page 109, and

 8     it's -- incidentally your memory is spot on.  This is page 109, and it's

 9     page 11 of the document.  You are talking about after a point that

10     Milosevic had travelled to Pale to urge the Bosnian Serb parliament to

11     ratify the plan.  And further on that page you say:

12             "Those who could dispersed to Belgrade and the rest returned to

13     the trenches.  The Serbs closed their ranks against the outside world of

14     which we, in the press, were the most visible and intrusive symbol, so

15     they set about curbing the intrusions."

16             And then you explain that access became more difficult and a

17     series of other things became increasingly hard from the standpoint of

18     being able to deal with them.

19             And I think one of the things that happens in both in a

20     courtroom, as well as other places is the things are drawn in black and

21     white, which obviously is not only inaccurate but also a bit naive.  But

22     with regard to the issue of, once again, the perception that the Serbs,

23     and for the moment it's the Bosnian Serbs, had with regard to the

24     reporting that was going on, did you ever get a sense from them that they

25     didn't trust it?  And by that I meant, the images that were being put

Page 3211

 1     forth?

 2        A.   They certainly believed that the Bosnian government side were

 3     waging a propaganda war.  As they closed off their frontlines so we

 4     couldn't get to them anymore, the only journalists in Pale with one or

 5     two exceptions were -- would be Serbs or Greeks or Russians, people of

 6     the Orthodox religion.  And it was just impossible for us to report

 7     accurately what was going on except what we could see from their

 8     television service.

 9             For instance, the first we knew of the kidnapping of a

10     military -- UN military observers in May 1995 was when we saw it on our

11     screens.  So that's what we were -- that's what we were reduced to.  We

12     didn't have the personal experience of talking to Karadzic, talking to

13     Mladic.  And I think our reporting obviously suffered from that.  I

14     wouldn't say it was biased, but it wasn't as -- we didn't have the same

15     freedom at the end of the war that we had at the beginning of the war.

16        Q.   You mentioned at one point in your book, and you state -- and

17     this is page 139, which is 20 in the e-court:

18             "The satellite is as much a weapon of war as is the snipers

19     rifle, and the sound bite is extension of warfare by other means.  A

20     modern-day Machiavelli or Klausewitz instead of conceding those to his

21     adversary will co-opt them for himself."

22        A.   Yes, sir, the modern military thinkers, people like General Sir

23     Rupert Smith, have written intensively -- extensively on the importance

24     of the information campaign.  I mean you can -- you can win militarily,

25     but lose politically and that's been the fact ever since Vietnam, I would

Page 3212

 1     think.

 2        Q.   I think we could agree that Vietnam was the first time that the

 3     military understood in a very particular sense the power of the media?

 4        A.   Yes, I would accept that, yes.

 5        Q.   Yeah.  It stopped the war and brought down a president

 6     ultimately.

 7        A.   Yes, well, I mean having said that, the first of our great war

 8     correspondents William Howard Russell from the Crimea, brought down a

 9     government in 1855 --

10        Q.   That is true.

11        A.   -- so there is a history.

12        Q.   And part of the importance of that history is to be able to

13     accurately and dispassionately present to whatever the population is

14     whether it be viewing or reading population, the circumstances that are

15     surrounding the political and military will of the state that is waging

16     the war?

17        A.   That is true.

18        Q.   Yeah.  I want to turn for a minute to the issue of UNPROFOR.  And

19     in your book you talk about "mission creep," but before we get to the

20     issue of mission creep, which I understand to be defined as being given

21     essentially a loose mandate and ultimately the activities on the ground

22     evolve the purpose of what the people are there for.  Is that fair?

23        A.   I'd put it slightly differently.  That a peacekeeping force

24     becomes deployed and by the time it gets on the ground, the situation

25     facing it has changed in such a way that it has either not to fulfill the

Page 3213

 1     mission or to redefine the mission as it goes along.

 2        Q.   With regard to the presence of UNPROFOR, would you agree with me

 3     that its mandate was that, in the first instance, of peacekeeping, as

 4     opposed to peacemaking?

 5        A.   Yes.  Except that there was always the ambiguity of its name.

 6     The UN Protection Force which suggested that parts of its mission was do

 7     some protecting and by the time it arrived, it was a force of

 8     peacekeepers in a country where there was no peace to keep.

 9        Q.   So it was in an anomalous position because it had a mandate that

10     it could not perform?

11        A.   Yes, sir.  I quote one of its spokesman in the book, Alexander

12     Ivanko, something to the effect was that we would love to do our mission

13     if only someone in New York could explain to us what it is.

14        Q.   And during the period of time that you were in the region, did

15     you ever see that New York did explain to New York what its mission and

16     by "its" I mean UNPROFOR's mission was?

17        A.   Did they explain to UNPROFOR?  Not in any coherent way.  Both the

18     British generals who commanded UNPROFOR in Sarajevo found this deeply

19     contradictory.  And in the end, General Smith got permission essentially

20     to change the rules because the old rules were unworkable.

21        Q.   With regard to UNPROFOR, we heard yesterday some testimony with

22     regard to the black-market transfer of fuel and foods, which is something

23     that I believe you also were aware of.  I'm not saying privy to, but you

24     were aware of that, and you, as a matter of fact, discuss specifically

25     the, I believe it was the Ukrainian unit that was involved in

Page 3214

 1     black-marketing fuel and other goods.  Is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes.  The UNPROFOR was a force of very -- of national contingents

 3     of very different abilities, but I mean, there was never any suggestion

 4     of wrong-doing in that respect made against, shall we say, the British,

 5     the French or the Dutch.

 6        Q.   Understood.  Do you know if the information, this is obviously

 7     something in your capacity as a reporter, the information that UNPROFOR

 8     units, certainly not the British, the French or the Dutch, but that

 9     UNPROFOR units were engaged in black-market smuggling with individuals in

10     the area was a topic of discussion with the Bosnian Serbs?

11        A.   I was aware of this -- these allegations only at secondhand

12     because for most of this phase of the war, I was out of Sarajevo and

13     based in central Bosnia.

14        Q.   Did you ever become aware of a particular protest by Mladic with

15     regard to an UNPROFOR vehicle being used for moving weapons from one area

16     of the region to another?

17        A.   No, sir.  He may well have made the protest, but I was not aware

18     of it.

19        Q.   Since I've mentioned General Mladic, I want to know whether or

20     not -- well, I don't want to know whether or not.  You state that Mladic

21     was a maverick who accepted the political instructions that suited him

22     and disregarded the rest.

23        A.   I would add also, with respect, sir, that he was, which is not

24     always the case with generals, he was widely admired by the soldiers

25     under his command.

Page 3215

 1        Q.   Understood.

 2        A.   I mean, he was a soldier's soldier.

 3        Q.   He was on the line, he was on the ground?

 4        A.   Sure.  He was out, he was out with them a lot.  He was not an

 5     armchair general.

 6        Q.   More like Patton and some of the others?

 7        A.   I've declared -- I've compared him once to General Schwarzkopf, I

 8     think.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Gotcha.  Now, with regard to this issue, which is that he

10     accepted the political instructions that suited him and disregard the

11     rest, during your time in the region did you perceive that there were

12     equal powers between the military and the political arm, or that Mladic

13     was under the command of Mr. Karadzic?

14        A.   I was aware of tensions between them.  One of my friends was a

15     British army major who was the liaison officer at Pale, the Bosnian Serbs

16     headquarters, and I became aware in the later phases of the war that

17     these tensions increased, especially after Dr. Karadzic started wearing a

18     military uniform.  And I quote somewhere in the book Karadzic regretting

19     that they perhaps had made too much of a hero out of Mladic, so there

20     were some serious, serious differences of opinion towards the end.

21        Q.   Did you in your capacity as a reporter determine whether or not

22     when Karadzic rendered any orders, Mladic followed them or not?

23        A.   I don't think it was that kind of relationship, with respect,

24     sir.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 3216

 1        A.   Mladic would sit in on a lot of the important meetings with the

 2     mediators, but I would doubt very much if he regarded himself, Mladic, as

 3     an implementer of political decisions.

 4        Q.   His position, I believe, is best voiced by his statement that

 5     history will judge him, which I'm sure it will, but --

 6        A.   Yes, this was his reason for not dealing with the press.  He said

 7     something like, I don't care about the press because I will be judged by

 8     history.

 9        Q.   With regard to the structure of the dissemination of the

10     information that was compiled, I'd like to see if I can get a clear

11     understanding of that for myself, and perhaps for the Chamber and perhaps

12     I'm the only one that is a bit confused here.  The information when it

13     first, and I'm talking about --  let's say, shall we split this up in

14     terms of the way that the information was obtained, between the first

15     period of time up to 1993 and then thereafter; is that fair?

16        A.   That's fair.

17        Q.   During the first period of time when information was obtained,

18     where did that information go?  Physically, what happened to the clips,

19     the footage?

20        A.   The footage would be taken all around the city and to some extent

21     all around the country.  It would be assembled either initially in the

22     hotel in Ilidza where we were and later in our offices in the television

23     station.  Because there was a pool, a lot of it would be traded, so you

24     could have a report from Sarajevo at any time there and it might be the

25     agency cameraman, your own cameraman, it might come from the French, it

Page 3217

 1     might come from the Germans, but obviously I would put a premium on what

 2     I had been present at myself and could witness personally.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now, once you had the clip -- I'm sorry.  Once you had the

 4     information in terms of the visual image, was that then sent out of the

 5     region?

 6        A.   Yes.  These images -- I mean, there are two sorts of information;

 7     there's the image and there's the facts.  And it's the job of the

 8     reporter to assemble them and put them together in a coherent way and

 9     we -- ever since the arrival of the light hand-held camera in the early

10     1980s, we did our editing on site.  One of our satellite dishes actually

11     had a sniper's bullet through it, it was that close, and this gave us a

12     wonderful freedom.  Therefore you didn't have somebody calling you on

13     your mobile phone and telling what you the feeling of the editorial

14     meeting was in London.  It was very direct and personal, and I did a lot

15     of patrolling.  I just went around the city seeing what I could find,

16     which is -- you can't do that these days.

17        Q.   No.  When you had a completed, what I'll call product or

18     completed story, that would be sent where?

19        A.   It would be sent to my -- to the BBC in London.  They had main

20     television bulletins at 1 p.m., 6 p.m., and 9 p.m.  So at ten to 1,

21     ten to 6, and ten to 9, they would see this piece for the first time.

22        Q.   Now, with regard to the other members of the reporting staff, I

23     take it that what they were doing was something different than from what

24     you were doing, by that I mean that you were not being sent to all of the

25     television stations around the world, they had their own reporters?

Page 3218

 1        A.   They had their own reporters.  The French guy was particularly

 2     impressive.  Some of the others tended to, to my mind, they spent too

 3     much time in bunkers, and also, to my mind, not enough of them tried to

 4     seek out the Serbs.  Because I always felt that the Serbs held the key to

 5     this war.

 6        Q.   And with regard to some of your colleagues, I believe that you

 7     mentioned that one of your colleagues -- or is it true that one of your

 8     colleagues did a fair amount of his reporting or her reporting, but I

 9     think it's a he, from the presidency?

10        A.   That is true, yes.

11        Q.   Who was that?

12        A.   That was in the early weeks of the war, that was John Burns of

13     the New York Times whom I regard as a -- actually as a very good

14     reporter, but he had some excellent sources inside the presidency.

15        Q.   Now, as you sit here -- as you sat there then, could you tell us

16     what the, if you could, the psychological effect would be on people

17     viewing, specifically the Serbs viewing such reporting coming from the

18     presidency with regard to the issue of bias?

19        A.   Well, for a start, they wouldn't have the sort of access to

20     newspaper reports that they had to television reports, which came back to

21     them.  And I would go on to say in defence of Mr. Burns, that he also

22     sought out the Serbs.

23        Q.   I'm not being critical of Mr. Burns whatsoever, it's really --

24     it's really because we understand that the true power of the image that

25     is translated in television, and which is what I'm really driving at

Page 3219

 1     here.  I mean, to see a reporter at the presidency building reporting

 2     would -- in a war where there are clearly two sides would lead one to

 3     believe that there was a concern about at least this international

 4     reporter if not many international reporters having a bias against the

 5     Serbs.  That's what I'm asking you.  If it's accurate, that's fine; and

 6     if it's not accurate, that's also fine, because I think you're in a

 7     better position to tell us than not.

 8        A.   With respect, sir, I don't think it is accurate because the image

 9     of a newspaper reporter is not beamed around the world.  His words are.

10     It is the image of the television reporter who is beamed around the

11     world.  And if I had done my three and a half years inside and outside

12     the presidency then I might well have been perceived to be biased, but

13     this was not the case.

14        Q.   When you discuss the issue of -- well, you state that the

15     corruption of language, you talk about corruption of language and

16     corruption of thought, which is obviously something comes out of a book.

17     With regard to the issue here of the corruption of language and

18     corruption of thought, in terms of the choice of words that were used,

19     and I'm not talking about you in specific, but as a general proposition,

20     considering some of the subjects we've talked about in terms of the use

21     of the media by the respective parties, do you think it would be fair to

22     say that by virtue of what -- we could call it David and Goliath kind of

23     presentation by the media that there was in fact at a presentation level

24     a corruption of language and thought?

25        A.   Speaking for myself, my words were always very low-key, and one

Page 3220

 1     of the arts of television is it shows things.  You drop the adjectives,

 2     you drop the adverbs, the pictures are so powerful.  So I think newspaper

 3     reporting and television reporting are completely different in that

 4     respect.  I was at one time accused of, I think by the British foreign

 5     secretary, of being a founder member of the something-must-be-done club

 6     on Bosnia.  I never campaigned for -- for this or that action because I

 7     didn't need to because the pictures made the case for me.  That's not

 8     biased, that's as best you can showing things as they are, sir.

 9        Q.   With regard to the power of image and the choice of image,

10     obviously that would influence the viewer, independent of -- independent

11     of the accuracy or inaccuracy, you would agree, would you not?

12        A.   Sure.

13        Q.   And the repetition of image would also have that same effect?

14        A.   That is true.

15        Q.   And is it fair to say there came a point in time in your thinking

16     with regard to the entire issue of reporting that you made a

17     determination to accept that the old BBC habits of distance and

18     detachment were casualties and that, in fact, although you never, shall

19     we say, verbally argued for, you made a determination that something was

20     to be done and you proceeded, as did some of your colleagues, to go about

21     doing that?

22        A.   This is very interesting ground.  I came to the conclusion that a

23     reporter can be impartial or fair, but not between the armed and the

24     unarmed, between the aggressor and the victim.  For instance, some of the

25     most powerful images in those years I got on the Bosnian Serb side of the

Page 3221

 1     lines in Grbavica where people hung carpets and sheets on wires across

 2     the road to blind the snipers on the other side.  So it wasn't to that

 3     extent sort of one-sided.  I was able to show that Serbs also were being

 4     sniped at and I think that was very important part of the story.  But I

 5     was also very critical of the media towards the end of the war, I felt

 6     the whole thing was being reported from a corridor, perhaps 2 miles long,

 7     of the main road down the centre of Sarajevo.

 8             The worst casualties in the whole thing were in Tuzla in May

 9     1995, where nearly 90 people were killed in a single bombing and that got

10     hardly any coverage at all.  Hardly any.  And I was and remain very

11     critical of some of our practices.

12        Q.   I take it that you do from what I've read and what I've heard you

13     say in some speeches.

14             I'd like to, if I could, for a moment shift gears because I've

15     been alerted to something with regard to P 515.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we, first of all, have P 515 pulled up.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before we go to P 515, what do you want us to do

18     with 05556?

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Nothing at this time, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:

22        Q.   I just wanted you to take a look at this image just for a moment,

23     okay?  And now what I'm going to do, just so you've seen it, you've

24     indicated a couple of things among others, parts of it may be inexact.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Now what I would like to do is if I could,

Page 3222

 1     please, have the map that we used -- is there the ability to increase

 2     this now or is it still in the same position that we can't increase it?

 3     If we could just enlarge the area right around where it says "VRS."  Can

 4     we make that any bigger?

 5        Q.   I don't know if that is of any help to you.  Looking at this

 6     particular area and specifically going to where there are those black

 7     boxes below the V, what I'm wondering is --

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And now if we could make it smaller again just

 9     for the moment.

10        Q.   Do you recognise that area as also being part of the ABiH

11     territory?

12        A.   No, this is -- we are at now the Lukavica end of the runway and

13     that was held by the Bosnian Serbs.

14        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  You mentioned during your direct testimony,

15     Mr. Bell, that some units of the BiH were billeted in schools.  Do you

16     have a recollection of how many units were billeted in schools?

17        A.   My only experience of this was when I, as I explained, I went to

18     do a report about the Bosnian BiH Army training to break out of the siege

19     and the unit, we went and found them in a school, that's it.  But for the

20     rest of it, I think there must have been sort of billeted among the

21     people.  I mean, it was not -- for much the war this was not a formed

22     army and professional force like the -- as the Serbs had, though they

23     formed themselves and trained themselves and became professional in the

24     course of the war.  It was very loose-knit.  I mean, the Serbs never

25     respected a lot of them because they wore trainers, if you would believe

Page 3223

 1     that.  I mean, they didn't have boots.

 2        Q.   That meant they weren't correct soldiers or they weren't soldiers

 3     at all?

 4        A.   Yeah, we are going back to the definition of correct, you see.

 5        Q.   Right.  I see, yes.  So --

 6        A.   But of course they were underestimated at the Serb's peril,

 7     because they were very good snipers as well.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could go back to 1D 005556 for but a

 9     moment.

10        Q.   In your book you make the following statement which is that one

11     of the lessons that's learned in peacekeeping is that all threats will be

12     tested.

13        A.   Yes, sir.

14        Q.   And with regard to your experience in the war here, would it be

15     fair to say that a number of the threats that were made by the

16     United Nations were not only tested, but upon them being tested, the

17     United Nations was found wanting in delivering that which they had

18     threatened?

19        A.   Yes, I think this was especially the case in 1994 of the -- what

20     we now see as the pin-prick -- pin-prick attacks in response to breaches

21     of the cease-fire or movements of the -- of heavy weapons.  It was

22     only -- it was only in the late summer of 1995 that General Smith

23     correctly assessed the forces, the balance of forces, what he had and

24     what the Bosnian Serbs had, and he was able to take advantage of the --

25     his -- the UNPROFOR commander in Zagreb was on holiday, it was one of his

Page 3224

 1     children's weddings, and General Smith could then turn the key and use

 2     effective force which essentially changed everything.

 3        Q.   And in so doing, what he effectively did is he changed the policy

 4     because he had command for a day in the sense that the other gentleman

 5     was no longer in the seat of control, so he was able to take control?

 6        A.   With the permission of New York.  It was not a maverick decision.

 7        Q.   That I understand.  You mention also in your book that television

 8     by its very nature has an aptitude for illusion anyway and that reality

 9     is somehow diminished by being framed in the modest rectangle in the

10     corner of living-room.  And to the extent that we are dealing with an

11     image that is being shot across the world, to what extent, if you have

12     any thoughts about this being in the business of reporting for some many

13     years now, to what extent does what your reality is on the ground

14     understood by those that are watching it through the box?

15        A.   I have written extensively about this.  I've sometimes come out

16     of scenes I was in, whether from Vukovar or Tuzla or Sarajevo or -- and

17     you bring them back and you edit them and you think, Is that all there

18     was, because you don't have the smell, you don't have the scene going on

19     all around you.  And there was another element that I also get into that

20     we were forced by timid editorial decisions to take out nearly all the

21     bloodshed because we didn't want to upset people, and this had the effect

22     of sanitizing and actually, I would say, falsifying some of the coverage,

23     but I fought this battle with my editors for many years and I lost it.

24        Q.   Pity.

25        A.   It is a pity.

Page 3225

 1        Q.   Yes.  I want to get an understanding of something you said

 2     earlier on which is when you said trainers, I --

 3        A.   I mean shoes, I mean soft shoes.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Yeah.  Because sometimes trainers are the --

 5        A.   No, I mean the --

 6        Q.   Soft shoes.

 7        A.   I mean you are going to war in basketball shoes.  That's what I

 8     mean.

 9        Q.   We see that happening increasingly throughout the world these

10     days, do we not?  Basketball shoes or bare foot, for that matter.

11        A.   Absolutely, yeah.

12        Q.   Do you think that in a certain sense, and I'm asking this based

13     upon the experience you've had for all these years, that this war, and I

14     hate to use the term, but this war was the first of the new wars that we

15     are going to see and that as a result of it being a new war, all

16     responses to it were at best confused?

17        A.   Yes, this is what General Smith now describes as war among the

18     people.  And the Iraq war was war among the people, what happened in Gaza

19     was war among the people.  The last time there was a set-piece tank

20     battle was 1973, so we are out of the phase of industrial war into a

21     different sort of war and the Bosnian conflict, what, 97.000 dead, was

22     definitely one of those sorts of war.

23        Q.   And in that situation, once again based upon your experience, I

24     take it that there's a fair amount of, I used the word before, confusion,

25     but I'll use a different word which is there is a lack of clarity in

Page 3226

 1     terms of how these wars are going to be waged.  I'm not referring to the

 2     rightness or the wrongness of it, but rather because we are dealing with

 3     a series of factors that we heretofore have not dealt with before, that

 4     internally there now are issues that have not been raised before, that we

 5     are for the first time having to address?

 6        A.   I think that's a fair comment.  The old cliche about the -- the

 7     old phrase the fog of war comes to mind here, with another new element

 8     that we haven't really had time to get into here which is the

 9     dissemination of atrocity stories, whether true or false, and the

10     responsibility on the journalist not to go with secondhand information.

11     That is, I was again and again told about this or that atrocity and I

12     said, Show me, and they would say, No, sorry, the road is mined, we can't

13     take you.  And I just -- I would never report it because that can do so

14     much damage and it did.  People --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could you please slow down.

16             THE WITNESS:  People believing the worst of another ethnic group

17     and sometimes these prophecies become self-fulfilling, so I think that in

18     this new kind of war there is an added obligation on the journalists to

19     get their facts right and to be very, very careful.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:

21        Q.   And with regard to this war, if you were to give a grade to, I am

22     not asking for to you give a grade to yourself, but a grade to the

23     journalists that were involved in this new experience which had many

24     factors that had heretofore not been addressed, understanding that's the

25     case, do you think that they came up to the grade?

Page 3227

 1        A.   I think I'd give the best an Alpha minus because, you know, we

 2     all make mistakes and some I wouldn't rate at all, honestly, sir.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I could have but a moment.

 4                           [Defence counsel confer]

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 6        Q.   I have to confer with those that know better than I do.

 7        A.   I know the feeling, sir.

 8        Q.   Thank you very much for your time, Mr. Bell.  I really do

 9     appreciate it and I'm once again thankful for your candour and your

10     thoughtfulness, and I mean that in a very sincere fashion.

11        A.   I appreciate that.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you Mr. Guy-Smith.  Mr. Thomas.

13             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, sir, just briefly.

14                           Re-examination by Mr. Thomas:

15        Q.   Mr. Bell, you were asked a series of questions, in fact there was

16     a lot of discussion about the part that the media had to play in

17     depicting the war and also guiding the various decisions that were made

18     by the parties concerned.  And you also spoke in your evidence about

19     meetings and access you had to political and military authorities

20     involved in the conflict.  What I want to ask you is whether you got a

21     sense of whether those authorities were aware of the role that the media

22     might potentially play in this conflict?

23        A.   Yes, I believe they were.  They were very keen on getting their

24     point of view across in the world media.  And there was another unusual

25     dimension to this, that if they were involved in sensitive negotiations

Page 3228

 1     over a prisoner exchange or a body exchange, they would actually ask for

 2     the international media to be present because they felt that in the

 3     presence of television cameras from the outside world, it would make the

 4     other party more likely to honour the obligations it had entered into.

 5     So quite -- I think actually without intending to we may even have done a

 6     little bit of good in that respect.

 7        Q.   Did you get a sense whether the political and military

 8     authorities were themselves paying attention to what was being reported?

 9        A.   I think they were.  The -- some of the military commanders would

10     actually have their own -- their own cameramen with them, it was part of

11     the old Yugoslav way and some of the most vivid pictures we received in

12     the whole war came from a young man who was the cameraman of

13     Colonel Ruskic [phoen] who was -- appeared before this court, so there

14     were many different sources.

15        Q.   Was this a feature of what was happening at the end of the war or

16     was there -- this awareness of the power of the media, if you like,

17     from 1992?

18        A.   I think by the time, by 1995 all parties to the conflict had

19     become acutely aware of the power of the media, and that is why we found

20     ourselves increasingly hemmed in and restricted as time went by.

21        Q.   Are you able to give us your indication as somebody who was there

22     throughout the period as to a particular point in time where people

23     started realising the potential power of the media in this conflict?

24        A.   I think it was probably after the ending of the side war between

25     Muslims and Croats which ended in February 1994, and then we faced a

Page 3229

 1     war -- apparently a war without end between the Muslim Croat Federation

 2     on one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other.  And as I became

 3     increasingly aware of the weakness of the Bosnian Serbs in manpower, but

 4     of course I couldn't -- by then I couldn't get -- have the personal touch

 5     I had earlier, and I found that on the BiH side, the roadblocks were

 6     going up all over the place.

 7        Q.   Mr. Bell, thank you.  That's all I have for you.  Their Honours

 8     may have some questions for you.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I might, with the Chamber's indulgence and my

10     colleagues, I forgot to ask Mr. Bell one question.  If I could be

11     permitted to do so.  It does not cover anything that Mr. Thomas has just

12     discussed.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

14             MR. THOMAS:  I have no objection, Your Honour, provided if

15     there's any issue arising, I be afforded the same opportunity.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed.  Mr. Guy-Smith.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you very much for the courtesy.

18                           Further Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

19        Q.   And I do apologise to you, I've been through your book so many

20     times and noted different things that I just forgot this.  You said in

21     your book, and I'm going back to this one issue, this is on -- it's

22     page 114, which would be 13 of 1D 005556.  I'm reading from the middle of

23     the paragraph:

24             "In this self-critical mode, I would ask myself when had we ever

25     shown a civilian victim of sniper fire on the Serb side of the lines,

Page 3230

 1     when had we reported from their hospitals, when had we heard from the

 2     Sarajevo Serbian news in Grbavica rather than Oslobodjenje" -- did I

 3     pronounce it properly?

 4        A.   Oslobodjenje.

 5        Q.   "Oslobodjenje, the celebrated newspaper on the government side

 6     which was an icon of journalism and a symbol of the city's ordeal."

 7             And my question to you is with regard to the newspaper and the

 8     government side, when did Oslobodjenje start becoming a newspaper on the

 9     government side?

10        A.   Well, it was Sarajevo's daily newspaper, but after the war

11     started the Serbs then published their own version of Oslobodjenje which

12     was actually edited by a friend of mine.  So there were two rival

13     versions of Oslobodjenje.

14        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to the Oslobodjenje that you are refer to

15     here that is the Oslobodjenje of the ABiH side, to put it in those terms?

16        A.   Yeah, it's headquarters were ruined, it was one of the iconic

17     images ever the war, the state of its headquarters.  But I'm being

18     critical of my own profession there, but that's one of my failings, I

19     question a lot.

20        Q.   I certainly find no fault in the work that you've done.  I think

21     many that have seen what you've done find absolutely no fault in it

22     either, sir, and I thank you.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

24             MR. THOMAS:  Nothing, sir, thank you.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  We'll take a break and come

Page 3231

 1     back at quarter to 6.00.  Court adjourned

 2                           --- Recess taken at 5.14 p.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before we proceed, may the record show that we are

 5     sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis during this session as Judge David had to

 6     be absent for reasons beyond his control, and Judge Picard is sitting on

 7     my left simply because her desk is -- she is locked in that side and her

 8     papers are on that side.

 9             You had finished.  Do you have any questions for the witness?

10                           Questioned by the Court:

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Bell, I've got just two questions for you.

12     The first one is:  On which side of the war was Haris Silajdzic and what

13     was his position?

14        A.   He was at that time the prime minister of the Republic of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina, so he was on the government side of the lines.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  And at page 61 of the

17     transcript, starting from line 1, you were asked a question that -- well,

18     it was put to you that "... amongst others we are dealing with a series

19     of factors that we heretofore have not dealt with," and you quickly

20     answered to say, "I think that's a fair comment."  What factors are these

21     that you are dealing with at that time?

22        A.   There are two that come to my mind immediately, Your Honour.  One

23     is the power of the medium of the media and especially of television to

24     shape the response of governments, especially when they do not have a

25     settled policy.  It's been described once as the CNN factor, I believe.

Page 3232

 1     So this imposes an extra responsibility on the journalists involved.

 2             And the other is the nature of the war, the -- that this was not

 3     an old-fashioned war, although the weapons were old-fashioned, it was a

 4     war among the people in which the suffering of civilians was so evident

 5     that the suffering of civilians also to some extent shaped the world's

 6     reactions and I think required governments to respond finally, although

 7     they were very slow to do it in a way that they wouldn't have been

 8     obliged to in a less media-driven age.  I think that those are the new

 9     elements, sir.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Any questions arising from

11     the questions by the Bench, Mr. Thomas.

12             MR. THOMAS:  No sir, thank you.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  None, Your Honour.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

16             Thank you very much, Mr. Bell.  This concludes your testimony and

17     let me take the time to say thank you for taking the time off your busy

18     schedule to come and testify at the Tribunal.  You are now excused.  You

19     may stand down and please travel well back home.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

22                           [The witness withdrew]

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

24             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Ms. Bolton will lead the

25     next witness.  That concludes my business before you, and that of

Page 3233

 1     Mr. Cannata this afternoon, if we could please be excused.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You are excused.  Madam Bolton.

 3             MS. BOLTON:  Good evening, Your Honours.  The next witness for

 4     the Prosecution will be Mesud Jusufovic.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mesud Jusufovic.

 6             MS. BOLTON:  He is a 92 ter witness, Your Honour.

 7                           [The witness entered court]

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good afternoon, sir.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  May you please make the declaration.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

12     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13                           WITNESS:  MESUD JUSUFOVIC

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  You may be seated.

16             Yes, Madam Bolton.

17             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you.

18                           Examination by Ms. Bolton:

19        Q.   Sir, could you begin by stating your name for the record?

20        A.   I am Mesud Jusufovic.  17th of February, 1960.

21        Q.   Sir, I understand that on the 3rd of April, 2002, you had

22     occasion to testify in the matter of Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And yesterday you had occasion or the opportunity to listen to

25     the recording of your testimony, an audio recording of your testimony in

Page 3234

 1     those proceedings; is that correct?

 2        A.   That's correct.

 3             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry.  I think I had my headphones on the wrong

 4     channel and I didn't hear the response to that.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What channel are you on?

 6             MS. BOLTON:  Now I'm on channel 4, is that the correct channel?

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's the correct channel.

 8             MS. BOLTON:

 9        Q.   Sorry, sir.  And was the recording that you listened to yesterday

10     in a language that you understood?

11        A.   Yes, it was in my language.

12        Q.   And were the answers that you provided in that previous testimony

13     true and correct?

14        A.   Yes.  All of the answers were correct and true and I stand -- I

15     remain by that.

16        Q.   If I asked you those same questions today, would you answer them

17     in the same manner?

18        A.   Yes, I would give the same answers.

19        Q.   I should point out one thing, and that is that when you were

20     questioned the last time, back in 2002, about your occupation, at that

21     time you were the commander of the professional fire brigade in Sarajevo;

22     is that correct?

23        A.   Yes, that's exactly so.

24        Q.   And you've since been promoted?

25        A.   Yes, within the last six months I became the civil defence

Page 3235

 1     secretary within the canton of Sarajevo.

 2        Q.   And with the exception, then, of that area of your testimony

 3     being different, was the remainder of your testimony from 2002 still

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Yes, correct.

 6             MS. BOLTON:  I wonder if, Madam Registrar, if you could please

 7     bring up 65 ter 09412.  Your Honours, that is an official transcript of

 8     the audio recording that the witness listened to yesterday, and it has

 9     been redacted to indicated the portions of the transcript that the

10     Prosecution is seeking to have filed pursuant to 92 ter and I would ask

11     that it be marked as an exhibit.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It is admitted into evidence.  And it may be so

13     marked, please.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P520.

15             MS. BOLTON:  And with the Court's permission, Your Honours, I

16     have a few clarifying questions I'd like to ask and then a brief summary

17     of the witness's evidence I'd like to read.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Very few indeed, yes.

19             MS. BOLTON:  Very few, yes.

20        Q.   Sir, during your previous testimony in the Galic matter, you had

21     indicated that there were many buildings and monuments that were set

22     ablaze by Bosnian Serb army shells during the conflicts; is that correct,

23     sir?

24        A.   Yes, that's correct.

25             MS. BOLTON:  And, Madam Registrar, if you could bring up

Page 3236

 1     65 ter 03061, please.  There should also be an English translation of

 2     that document.

 3        Q.   I'll ask the witness if you recognise the document that's in

 4     front of you, sir?

 5        A.   Yes, I recognise it.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The only thing being that there is no English

 7     version on the screen.

 8             MS. BOLTON:  Okay.  I have the ERN number, pardon me for a

 9     moment.

10                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

11             MS. BOLTON:  I am informed that there's a problem in that the

12     English version doesn't seem to be appearing.  If I could proceed with

13     the questioning of the witness, I think it will become quite clear what

14     the document is and perhaps we could find the English version at a later

15     point in time.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You may proceed, ma'am.

17             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you.

18        Q.   Sir, do you know who authored this document?

19        A.   This is the record that we have in our fire brigade on the

20     computer and when I needed this for the purposes of this court then we

21     just printed this list showing all facilities that had been shelled.  I

22     think that I signed it, that my signature is on this document.

23             MS. BOLTON:  If we could actually go to the third page of this

24     document.

25        Q.   Is that your signature, sir?

Page 3237

 1        A.   Yes, this is my signature.

 2        Q.   And in terms of the kind of facilities, there's 120 names listed

 3     of facilities, did you include every single place in Sarajevo that there

 4     was a fire at?

 5        A.   No, not all of the locations.  Only the more important facilities

 6     and locations that were shelled and set on fire.

 7        Q.   And what time-period does this document cover, sir?

 8        A.   This document pertains to the period from the 5th of April, 1992,

 9     until the 10th of August, 1994.

10        Q.   And were there any fires as a result of shells at public

11     buildings that post-dated August 10th, 1994?

12        A.   Naturally there were.  Throughout the war civilian facilities

13     were shelled, especially cultural and historical monuments, as well as

14     buildings where people resided in large numbers.

15             MS. BOLTON:  I wonder if this item could be marked as the next

16     Prosecution exhibit, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It is admitted into evidence.  May it please be so

18     marked.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P521.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

21             MS. BOLTON:

22        Q.   A few more questions, sir.  One of the things you indicated in

23     the Galic proceeding was that there were approximately 67 Serbian members

24     of the fire brigade that left just prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

25     I'm wondering if you could tell me if they left of their own volition or

Page 3238

 1     if they were terminated?

 2        A.   Based on my conversations with these people, because not all of

 3     them had left, 67 firefighters of Serb ethnicity left whereas 10 of them

 4     remained, they to me confirmed that they had a meeting with

 5     Radovan Karadzic and that he had instructed them to leave Sarajevo, and

 6     they simply didn't show up for work one day.

 7        Q.   Another issue that you discussed in your testimony, sir, was the

 8     fact that there was a number of members of your brigade who were killed

 9     or injured during the war, and I just wondered if you had a total count

10     of the number of firefighters who were killed during the conflict?

11        A.   During the conflict 12 firefighters were killed and 58 of them

12     were wounded.

13        Q.   And of the 12 that were killed, how many were killed while on

14     duty?

15        A.   Three were killed on duty.  Two while putting out fires, and one

16     was killed while he was repairing the fire engine within our

17     headquarters.

18        Q.   And for those three people, what was the cause of death?

19        A.   The cause of death was a shell.  If you wish, I can give more

20     details.

21        Q.   We'll just deal with the total numbers for now, sir.

22             Turning to the people who were wounded, how many of those

23     firefighters were wounded in the course of duty?

24        A.   Thirty-eight were killed while on duty.

25        Q.   Sorry, you just said killed, I thought we were talking about

Page 3239

 1     wounded?

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  At least that is what the interpretation said.

 3             MS. BOLTON:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, I didn't hear your comment.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  At least that is what the interpretation came

 5     across as.  I don't know whether the witness had said killed, but the

 6     interpretation said killed.

 7             MS. BOLTON:

 8        Q.   My friend is shaking his head and I think it was an

 9     interpretation error, that you actually said wounded, and I just want to

10     clarify.  We are talking about people who were wounded, not killed;

11     correct?

12        A.   I said wounded.

13        Q.   So 38 of the 58 were wounded on duty; is that correct?

14        A.   That's right.  Out of those 38, there are those who had been

15     wounded on a number of occasions.  I, for example, was wounded twice.

16        Q.   And with respect to those 38 including yourself, what were the

17     causes of the wounds?

18        A.   The cause of the wounds were always the shells.  When we went out

19     to put out fires, they would increase the shelling of the area where we

20     were putting out fires.  In Sarajevo, the most dangerous situations were

21     when there was a location on fire.  All the citizens fled from there

22     because they knew that the people from the hills would fire at the

23     firefighters, and that this is why it was so dangerous.

24        Q.   What do you mean by people from the hills?

25        A.   I'm referring to the Serbian army.

Page 3240

 1        Q.   And to the best of your knowledge, were any of those

 2     38 firefighters who were injured while on duty acting in a military

 3     capacity at the time?

 4        A.   No.  Within the fire brigade there were no members of the army.

 5     There couldn't have been any because we worked almost continuously.  Most

 6     of the firefighters remained within the fire brigade because it was a

 7     major problem to come to work and to go home from work without falling

 8     casualty to shelling.  That is to say, that none of the firefighters were

 9     members of the army.

10        Q.   The last thing I want to ask you about, sir, is in your previous

11     testimony you spoke about attending fires in hundreds of buildings and

12     you told the Court in those proceedings that with the exception of

13     responding to fires at the Tito barracks, where UNPROFOR soldiers were

14     stationed, that you saw no evidence of any of these buildings being used

15     for military purposes.  And I want to clarify whether you personally

16     attended all of the fires you are talking about?

17        A.   I couldn't have been at all fires.  It was physically impossible.

18     There were situations where there were 15 fires simultaneously at

19     different places.  Mostly fires were set up by incendiary rounds, mostly

20     in areas where there were monuments or where people resided.  If people

21     had nowhere to reside, they had to leave Sarajevo.  That is to say, that

22     all of those were civilian facilities.

23        Q.   So in cases where you couldn't personally attend the fires,

24     what's the source of your information that these weren't military

25     installations?

Page 3241

 1        A.   Out of the firefighters -- or, rather, from the firefighters who

 2     went out to work, we would get reports.  It is possible that sometimes

 3     there were some military facilities because we firefighters do not pay

 4     attention to what is on fire.  We go out to put out fires.  I, myself,

 5     always went only to fires where there were civilian facilities burning.

 6        Q.   Just with respect to the list that you have already identified

 7     for us, Prosecution Exhibit 520, were you aware of any of those

 8     facilities being used -- sorry, 521.  Were you aware of any of those

 9     facilities being used for military purposes at the time of the shellings?

10        A.   Based on what I know, no.  I came to the fire brigade about the

11     20th of June, 1992.  From that time on, I don't know of any cases.

12             MS. BOLTON:  At this juncture, with the Court's permission, I'd

13     just like to read a brief summary of this witness's testimony.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, you may, ma'am.

15             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16             In 1992, Mr. Jusufovic was the third highest ranking member of

17     the Sarajevo fire brigade.  His superiors included a man named

18     Radomir Spaic who was a Serbian gentleman.  Commencing in early 1992,

19     Mr. Spaic ordered the transfer of much of the forces equipment to Pale,

20     which was an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs.  That included the

21     transfer of fire trucks, radio equipment, fuel, as well as other

22     equipment.

23             By the time the shelling of Sarajevo commenced in April 1992, the

24     Sarajevo fire department had only 14 vehicles, little fuel, and no spare

25     parts.

Page 3242

 1             In addition, there were 67 Serbian members of the fire brigade

 2     who left the force just prior to the outbreak of the hostilities, taking

 3     additional equipment with them.

 4             The VRS forces used both ordinary shells and incendiary shells

 5     containing phosphorus.  Even non-incendiary shells often sparked fires.

 6     Fires were a daily occurrence and the firefighters were constantly busy.

 7     The VRS targeted all kinds of buildings in Sarajevo including apartment

 8     buildings, schools and hospitals, as well as food and waterlines.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Slow down, please.  The stenographer can't keep

10     pace with you.

11             MS. BOLTON:  Certainly.

12             Immediately prior to shelling a monument or building, the VRS

13     would typically shell the fire stations.  And the witness presumes that

14     the VRS was endeavouring to prevent the fire brigade from responding to

15     the fire.  Firefighters were routinely fired at by snipers and targeted

16     by shells, both while they were en route to fires and while they were

17     fighting fires.

18             To avoid being hit by shells or snipers, members of the fire

19     brigade learned to park their vehicles in locations where they would be

20     sheltered from incoming explosives.  They learned not to enter buildings

21     through the doors, but instead to make holes in the walls and enter the

22     buildings through those holes.

23             They learned to crawl by windows inside the building to avoid

24     sniper fire.  And despite these tactics, many fire fighters were wounded

25     and some were killed by shells, grenades, and sniper fire.

Page 3243

 1             The brigade's ability to fight fire was compromised by the fact

 2     that the VRS controlled the electrical and water supplies.  Frequently

 3     the only source of water was the well at the brewery, and fire trucks

 4     came under fire whenever they attended the brewery to refill their tanks.

 5     The professional brigade was assisted by volunteers, both the

 6     professional brigade and the volunteer societies were civilian

 7     organisations, neither had ties to the army or police.

 8             The brigade responded to fires in hundreds of buildings during

 9     the conflict, and the witness did not personally see nor did he hear of

10     evidence that any of the buildings, with the exception of the Tito

11     barracks, were being used for military purposes at the time.

12             Those are all of my questions, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before you sit down, ma'am, in your reading of

14     that statement, at the beginning you said at page 76, line 6:

15             "Commencing in early 1992, Mr. Spaic ordered the transfer of much

16     of the force's equipment to Pale."

17             Which force is this?

18             MS. BOLTON:  This is the Sarajevo fire brigade's equipment being

19     transferred to Pale area.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  Is that you, Mr. Lukic?

21             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:

23        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Jusufovic.

24        A.   Good afternoon.

25        Q.   My name is Novak Lukic, I will be putting questions to you on

Page 3244

 1     behalf of the Defence team of Mr. Perisic.  You have experience in

 2     testifying before this Tribunal and you know that you need to wait -- I'm

 3     actually here to remind you that you need to wait after my question.  You

 4     see, I'm being reprimanded by the Presiding Judge already, so please try

 5     to answer my questions slowly so that the transcript can be accurate, and

 6     interpretation as well.

 7             When the war started, and you said that that was sometime in

 8     April of 1992, you lived in Vratnik, and this is where you were based

 9     throughout the war.  That's where you lived; correct?

10        A.   Yes, correct.

11        Q.   At that time you and a group of citizens residing there organised

12     yourselves within one month and you set up barricades and checkpoints in

13     that neighbourhood in the area where you lived; correct?

14        A.   No, we did not set up barricades, we dug out trenches near the

15     barracks in Vratnik.

16        Q.   You were the commander in that location?

17        A.   If one may call the leader of 30 to 40 people a commander, in

18     that case, yes.

19        Q.   And how was it that you became the commander?  Who appointed you

20     to that post?

21        A.   On the 5th of April, the shelling started and people started

22     fleeing to their homes.  Most of them came to the culture hall and those

23     who were present concluded that we had to defend our families, our

24     children, our wives because we had the previous experience in Croatia,

25     and it was then that we decided that we had to organise ourselves to

Page 3245

 1     defend Vratnik, and there were 20 to 30 of us there and the people said

 2     that I should be the one leading the effort.

 3        Q.   And what were you doing at that time?  What was your occupation?

 4     Were you already working as a firefighter then or not?

 5        A.   I've been a firefighter since 1983.

 6        Q.   As far as I remember, for awhile you were a taxi-driver?

 7        A.   From 1980 until 1986 I was a taxi-driver.

 8        Q.   In Sarajevo the whole time?

 9        A.   Yes, in Sarajevo the whole time.  I was born there and live there

10     to this day.

11        Q.   Would you agree with me that already in March of 1992 barricades

12     were set up and checkpoints throughout Sarajevo both by the members of

13     the SDS party and by the members of the SDA party?

14        A.   In March there were barricades, I know of them because my wife

15     used to work in Grbavica and she couldn't go to her office.  But I don't

16     know that the SDA set up any barricades.  I know only of the Serbian

17     barricades.

18        Q.   So you don't know that the SDA members set up any barricades?

19        A.   I don't know about that.

20        Q.   Would you agree with me that the army of BH was set up in

21     April of 1992 on the basis of the decision of the presidency of BH?

22        A.   It is possible that there was a decision of the presidency, but

23     there was no army at the time.  There were only the units in existence,

24     such as the unit that I was a member of.

25        Q.   And when did you become aware or, rather, when do you consider

Page 3246

 1     that the BH Army was set up and that it existed in Sarajevo?

 2        A.   I think that the Territorial Defence, not yet the army at the

 3     time, but the Territorial Defence was set up sometime in late May or

 4     early June, as far as I can remember, because this is when I joined the

 5     fire brigade.

 6        Q.   Do you know what happened when you joined the fire brigade, when

 7     you rejoined the fire brigade, if I may refer to it so, what happened

 8     with your neighbours who also organised themselves, those 30 to 40 men,

 9     did they join the army?

10        A.   When the mobilisation order was issued, everyone had to be

11     assigned to some unit.  Most of these men were in the Territorial Defence

12     which later became the BH Army.

13        Q.   Do you know if the presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina had

14     declared a state of war?

15        A.   I really don't know that.

16        Q.   Are you aware that all men of military age had to be mobilised

17     into some kind of unit or a work detail?

18        A.   Yes.  Everyone had to be in some kind of unit, either in civilian

19     protection or the army or the Territorial Defence, or the police.

20        Q.   Do you agree with me that the forces which were loyal to the

21     BH presidency in spring of 1992 took over the strategic vital facilities

22     in Sarajevo, whereas the Serbs withdrew to the hills around Sarajevo?

23        A.   I don't know that BH Army members took up some positions.  I know

24     that before April the Yugoslav People's Army was busy digging in the

25     tanks and building up positions around Sarajevo.  This we could see on

Page 3247

 1     TV.  And when people ask what this was, Kukanjac explained -- or, rather,

 2     I'm not sure if it was Kukanjac or someone else, but somebody said that

 3     they were protecting these positions from an external enemy.  And then

 4     later on, they used this as positions from which they shelled Sarajevo.

 5        Q.   In your evidence in the Galic case, on page 6522, line 9, you

 6     said, and this was redacted later or, rather, it was changed, altered, it

 7     did not enter into this portion of the transcript, so I'd like to refresh

 8     your memory.  Line 9, I will read this in English, you said:

 9             "[In English] [Previous translation continues] ... who had left

10     they have also shelled us and they have also shelled our fire station."

11             [Interpretation] And then after this, in answer to Judge Orie's

12     question, on page 6524, line 25, you said that you meant that they

13     actually joined and fought as members of the Serbian army but not that

14     they specifically shelled you.

15        A.   Yes, I think what I meant was that they had joined the Serbian

16     side, but the reason why I thought they were shelling us was because they

17     would advise us in advance.  They would tell us -- they would call the

18     station and say, Now your -- a shell is coming your way, and then they

19     would announce, Five more shells are going to land on your station.

20        Q.   Well, but in any case from what you've said here and the portion

21     that you've corrected, there is no reason for to you believe that they

22     were personally trying to shell you?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Could you tell us, were all the hills -- were all the positions

25     on the hills around Sarajevo held by the members of the VRS?

Page 3248

 1        A.   Well, I don't know many of these positions, but I know that

 2     members of the BH Army were on Trebevic, on Brijeg, then I think on

 3     Spicasta Stijena.

 4        Q.   Well, let me be more specific, do you know who held the Zuc hill?

 5        A.   I think the Zuc hill was held by the BH Army.

 6        Q.   What about Mount Igman?

 7        A.   Mount Igman, if I remember this correctly, I think there was some

 8     movements there of the army.  There was the BH Army and then the Serbian

 9     army.

10        Q.   Do you know whether the BH Army had mortars?

11        A.   While I was there, we didn't have anything.  We would observe

12     from Lapusnica them shelling us, this was from about 800 metres, and we

13     would just lie there because there was nothing we could shell them with

14     or there was nothing we could shoot and reach them.

15        Q.   Just a moment, so when you say "when I was there," you mean when

16     you organised yourself, but what I'm referring to is the period while you

17     were a fireman, a firefighter.  Up until the Dayton Accords, since you

18     were in contact with many people and were -- attended many events, do you

19     know or did you hear that the BH Army had mortars on the Sarajevo

20     theatre?

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry, Madam Bolton.

22             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you.  Sorry.  My friend began that question by

23     assuming that in fact the witness was talking about the period of time

24     when he was in the, I guess, neighbourhood defence and I think he should

25     actually put that question to him.  I don't know if that is what he's

Page 3249

 1     talking about or isn't, but I think the witness needs to clarify that,

 2     and my friend not to just assume that is the period of time he is talking

 3     about.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Isn't that for you to clarify that in

 5     re-examination?

 6             MS. BOLTON:  It's simply that I understood from the guide-lines

 7     that we were supposed to be asking succinct, sort of one question at a

 8     time and then moving on, so that was the basis for my objection.  I can

 9     clarify it otherwise, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I suggest you do so.

11             MS. BOLTON:  Okay.  Thank you.

12             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I think the witness understood me and

13     the portion where he was describing this particular time he was even

14     nodding, so I didn't feel it was necessary to explain what period this

15     was referring to.  But let me go back to my question.

16        Q.   Can you remember throughout the war period, did you have any

17     information that the BH Army had some mortars in the Sarajevo theatre of

18     war?

19        A.   Well, I cannot claim this with any certainty because I had no

20     ties with the army because we were continuously busy putting out fires,

21     so I really don't know.  We were -- it's possible during the war that

22     they acquired them, but I'm not sure.

23        Q.   Did you hear stories or see evidence that the BH Army had

24     long-barrel weapons as well?

25        A.   I did not see this myself.  I don't know.

Page 3250

 1        Q.   Did you ever hear of stories of this?

 2        A.   I did not.

 3        Q.   Would you agree with me that during the war in Sarajevo there

 4     were some 35.000 members of the BH Army in Sarajevo and about as many

 5     around Sarajevo on positions that were held by the BH Army?

 6        A.   I really don't know what the figures were, but it's possible that

 7     there were as many.

 8        Q.   You say that you did not have any contact with the army.  As

 9     firefighters, you belong to the civilian protection, if I understand you

10     correctly, is this correct, the professional fire brigade?

11        A.   The professional fire brigade and all the volunteer firefighters,

12     and there were five such societies in the town, they were under civilian

13     protection and they were units of the civilian protection.

14        Q.   Did you have meetings with your superiors from the civilian

15     protection?

16        A.   On several occasions I did.

17        Q.   Did you have some official meetings with police members?

18        A.   I think no.

19        Q.   To be more precise, was there at any point in time during the war

20     did you have any kind of meetings with the BH Army representatives?

21        A.   No, I did not have any meetings with BH Army members.  We only

22     had meetings in the town hall where we were invited to come to meetings

23     by the mayor.

24        Q.   Can you recall if there were any army representatives there, any

25     army members there?

Page 3251

 1        A.   If my memory serves me, no, because the army was not really into

 2     the civilian administration.  They didn't really care for this.

 3        Q.   On page 6533, in line 7, among the sites that were shelled, you

 4     also mention the Holiday Inn.  You say that it was a very attractive

 5     target, and you also say on the same page, in line 23, that you had to

 6     attend or respond to fire calls from that position over 500 times, that's

 7     at least what you said, up until the summer of 1994.  Can you please

 8     answer the question?

 9        A.   That's correct.

10        Q.   The Holiday Inn was open as a hotel throughout the war; correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   The 500 fires until the summer of 1995 were so bad that -- and

13     you were so successful in putting out those fires that the hotel remained

14     open throughout the period?

15        A.   That's correct, because we would be there on time.  We were on

16     the spot to put out the fires.

17             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]  All right.  I would now like to show

18     you Exhibit 521.  Could we please pull it up on the screen.

19        Q.   First I'd like to ask you something about this document.  You

20     just mentioned that you printed this out from your database of the

21     records that were kept for that period.  My question is this:  First of

22     all to say what the title of this document is, Fires on High Profile

23     Facilities.  Could you please tell us what do you understand to mean --

24     or what do you understand is meant by high profile facilities?  What was

25     the criterion?

Page 3252

 1        A.   Well, it was a facility where a lot of people lived or important

 2     cultural and historic monuments, significant for our people's history and

 3     tradition.

 4        Q.   Would you please leaf through all these three pages and tell us

 5     whether these facilities are -- whether most of them are public

 6     buildings, not residential buildings.

 7        A.   From what I can see here there are no apartment buildings, no

 8     residential buildings.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see the last page,

11     please.

12        Q.   I will now put some questions about some of these individual

13     facilities.

14             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 1 again.

15        Q.   Under 3, it says the MUP motel.  MUP stands for the Ministry of

16     the Interior; correct?  That's a police facility; correct?

17        A.   Yes, MUP means the Ministry of the Interior.

18        Q.   And that was a police facility?

19        A.   No, that was a hotel owned by the MUP.

20        Q.   All right.  Under 4, it says, MUP, the Vraca facility.  Could you

21     tell us what this is?

22        A.   This is the police academy where -- police academy with cadets,

23     so there was an attack on this school and a fire there.  These cadets

24     were young people between the ages of 14 and 19.

25        Q.   And this was in early 1992, in the beginning of the conflict,

Page 3253

 1     right, on the 10th of April?

 2        A.   That's correct.

 3        Q.   Under 18, we see it says, Magros Wholesaler Point.  Is this a

 4     commercial facility?

 5        A.   Magros is a company.  It is a commercial company.

 6        Q.   Under 38, we see a Magros store.  That is another commercial

 7     facility; correct?

 8        A.   Yes, they sold food there.

 9        Q.   Under 27, I see that you mention the Holiday Inn on the 24th of

10     May, 1992, and there is no further mention of the Holiday Inn 500 fires

11     on this list.  What is the reason?

12        A.   The mention that was made here on the 24th of May, 1992, was

13     because we actually went to the hotel from the fire brigade premises

14     because we did not have a unit on the premises of the hotel itself.  But

15     because it was impossible to get to this hotel across Marin Dvor because

16     it was being shelled all the time, we set up a unit in the basement of

17     the Holiday Inn and we had fire hoses all around the hotel so that the

18     fires were put out by the men who were stationed on the premises of the

19     Holiday Inn.  And that is why there is no further mention of it on this

20     list.

21        Q.   Were these other fires also recorded in your database?

22        A.   No, they weren't.  They were only logged in a log-book by the

23     duty officers because we would respond -- we would record an intervention

24     when a vehicle left our premises.

25        Q.   So what is listed here are the fire events or fire incidents

Page 3254

 1     where you actually had to send fire trucks from the station?

 2        A.   That's correct.

 3        Q.   And for those about 500 Holiday Inn fires, you have no records at

 4     your police -- at your fire station whatsoever?

 5        A.   No, we don't.

 6        Q.   Under 62, on the next page, the word "barracks" appears.  Is this

 7     is civilian facility?

 8        A.   It doesn't mention here which barracks it is.  It saysVojvoda

 9     Putnika Street, and I'm not sure whether this could have been the Tito

10     barracks where the UNPROFOR soldiers were stationed.

11        Q.   On the 21st of August, 1992, do you remember that?  Based on the

12     date, do you remember when that fire was?

13        A.   No, I don't remember.

14        Q.   Under number 73, we see the word "cold storage depot" and the

15     "slaughter-house."  Can you explain what that was, the cold storage

16     depot, please?

17        A.   In a part of the town called Stup there is a cold storage depot

18     and a slaughter-house.  They slaughter cattle there.

19        Q.   Do you remember how tall that building is, how many storeys?

20        A.   No, I don't remember.  People from the fire station in Stup went

21     out to put that fire, I didn't go myself.

22        Q.   Another question related to that facility:  Was the separation

23     line close to that facility, close to the cold storage depot?

24        A.   Yes, the combat line was close.  And I just realised on the

25     28th -- this happened on the 28th, I was wounded then and I wasn't able

Page 3255

 1     to walk, I had to use crutches so I couldn't go out to respond to that

 2     fire.

 3        Q.   Can you tell me please what is written under 76, it says OS

 4     Skenderija.  What was located in those premises?  OS, what does OS stand

 5     for, please?

 6        A.   I don't know.  I have no idea what it could mean.

 7        Q.   Could it be that the TO staff was located in Skenderija?  Do you

 8     remember?

 9        A.   Well, Skenderija is quite a large area.  I live now in

10     Skenderija.  I don't know where the staff was located.  The staffs had to

11     be located somewhere, the headquarters and where they were located in

12     Skenderija area I couldn't say.

13        Q.   At any rate, Skenderija was not a residential building, was it?

14        A.   No.  As we have already said, there is no residential buildings

15     in this list.

16        Q.   I'm now interested in the location under 85, it is also mentioned

17     under 97.  What is this location called Zica?

18        A.   That's a factory manufacturing wire.

19        Q.   Do you know where the premises of Zica are located?  It says here

20     Dzemala Bijedica Street.  What area of Sarajevo is that?

21        A.   I think that that is in the area of Ali Pasin Most because we

22     have a firefighters association there called Ali Pasin Most.

23        Q.   Very well.

24             MR. LUKIC:  [Interpretation] Now could we have, please, a copy of

25     the map 9244 under Rule 65 ter, please.

Page 3256

 1        Q.   Mr. Jusufovic, given what your profession was and that you were a

 2     taxi-driver, I will expect you will orient yourself on the map of

 3     Sarajevo and I would kindly ask you to point out to some locations on the

 4     map in just a minute, please.

 5             Can you recognise Sarajevo on this map?

 6        A.   Yes, I'm familiar with this area in Milicka where the tram rails

 7     are.

 8        Q.   Could I ask the usher please, when I asked you about the Zica

 9     factory, could you now please draw a cross and a number 1 on the spot

10     where this Zica factory was located?

11        A.   I really can't find it, I know where Bascarsija is.

12             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in.  If not,

13     then I will try with a different map.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this doesn't have to be

15     accurate, but I think it was somewhere here around this bridge because I

16     see that it says here Ali Pasin Most, or Ali Pasin Bridge.

17             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Could you please put a cross there and number 1.

19        A.   [Marks]

20        Q.   Can you say approximately where the cold storage depot was?  Can

21     you draw the location on the map.  It doesn't have to be very accurate,

22     but just the general area.

23        A.   Near Stup, in this area where Stup is.

24        Q.   Could you please put number 2 next to it?

25        A.   [Marks]

Page 3257

 1        Q.   Now, I asked you about the Magros facility, do you know where

 2     that is located?

 3        A.   No.

 4        Q.   What about kindergarten Osmi Mart nearCengic Vila, do you know

 5     approximately where that kindergarten is located?

 6        A.   I don't know where the kindergarten building is but I can see the

 7     area called Cengic Vila on the map.

 8        Q.   Could you put number 3 next to it, please.

 9        A.   [Marks]

10        Q.   Have you heard of the elementary school Petar Jokic?  And if you

11     know it's approximate location, it would be useful.

12        A.   I have heard of it.  I believe that such a school exists but I

13     have no idea where it's located.

14        Q.   What about the school called Pavle Goranin, you were asked this

15     in the previous trial where you testified?

16        A.   I really don't know.

17        Q.   What about elementary school Slobodan Vukovic?

18        A.   Have you any idea how many elementary schools there are in

19     Sarajevo?

20        Q.   Well, I'm asking you about specific ones.

21        A.   I don't know.

22        Q.   All right.

23             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I now tender this map into evidence,

24     Your Honours.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The map is admitted.  May it please be given an

Page 3258

 1     exhibit number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D40.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 4             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Jusufovic, would you agree with me that throughout the war

 6     the schools were not open in Sarajevo, there was no teaching, it was

 7     discontinued?

 8        A.   Yes, that's correct.  I don't know when that started, but after a

 9     certain period of time, the people simply didn't send their children to

10     school any more because it was dangerous for them.

11        Q.   Would you agree with me that during the war there were huge

12     problems with electricity supply in Sarajevo?

13        A.   Yes, I agree with you.  More often we did not have electricity

14     than the opposite.

15        Q.   There were certain rules about the priorities, who had priority

16     in electrical supply, and who set up those rules, was it a ministry or

17     some other relevant state bodies?

18        A.   Most likely that was so.  We were never considered a priority.

19     We, the fire brigade, had a generator for power supply.

20        Q.   Would you agree with me that the hospitals were a priority as

21     well as the army?

22        A.   Most likely it was so.

23             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]  Could we now have on our screens

24     1D 005592, please.

25        Q.   Mr. Jusufovic, I suppose that you are not familiar with this

Page 3259

 1     document and I will put a couple of questions to you regarding this

 2     document.  It says here to the command of the 102nd Motorised Brigade or,

 3     rather, the command of the 102nd Motorised Brigade and it is from the

 4     first six months of 1993, because the date is illegible.  And then it

 5     says that the subject is priority and it was sent to the command of the

 6     1st Corps.

 7             My question to you is this:  Do you know that in the compound of

 8     the Zica factory where you went out to put out fires, that the command of

 9     the 102nd Motorised Brigade of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was located

10     there?

11        A.   I'm not familiar with that because sometimes you had a facility

12     that during one period of time was used for one purpose, and then later

13     on for a different purpose.  At any rate, when we went out there to put

14     out fires, there was no army there.

15        Q.   Would you agree with me, I'm now asking you as a professional,

16     you are now a commander within the civilian protection, so I'm asking you

17     that capacity, if the army wants to use a civilian facility, then it is

18     not a good idea to announce to everybody that the army wants to use that

19     facility?

20        A.   To tell you the truth, I never studied any military matters.  I

21     have nothing to do with the army and I don't know how they decide what is

22     secret and what is not.

23        Q.   Very well.  I'm asking you as an official of civilian protection,

24     I'm asking you in that capacity.

25        A.   We in civilian protection have no secrets.  We keep no secrets.

Page 3260

 1        Q.   Now, tell me please, given that you went to certain locations

 2     where there were fires, including the fires listed here, do you know that

 3     within residential buildings there were also military units and military

 4     facilities located in those areas?

 5        A.   I didn't see that.

 6        Q.   But you heard that in the building where the Loris company was

 7     located, and that was a building of mixed use, residential and

 8     commercial, that there were members of the BH Army on the ground floor?

 9        A.   Well, the Loris building is some 150 to 200 metres long and it

10     has several entryways and that building is located on the frontline, and

11     people lived there.  So we would come to the residential portion of that

12     building and it was the upper floors that were mostly at risk.  And you

13     were quite correct, and I stated this last time, I think, that I knew

14     that somewhere within that building there was also a portion used by the

15     army.

16        Q.   When you say somewhere, you mean somewhere within that Loris

17     building?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct, because the Loris facility comprises some

19     20 buildings.

20             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can we please tender

21     this document into evidence.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The document is admitted into evidence.  May it

23     please be given an exhibit number.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D41.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Lukic please come closer to the

Page 3261

 1     microphone.

 2             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I'm trying to conclude as soon as

 3     possible so I'm imposing an unreasonable pace on myself.  Now could we

 4     see 1D 005591, please.

 5        Q.   We only managed to find the draft translation of this document,

 6     we found it on EDS, we will cover this document quickly.  It's the same

 7     heading, it says that this is the document of the command of the

 8     102nd Motorised Brigade.  I think the date is the 14th of September,

 9     1993.  I will read out only the first portion, this is an order.  I'm

10     hereby ordering the Hladnjaca cold storage facility shall be exclusively

11     used for sniper nests as an observation post and VP of certain resources.

12     This was signed by the commander.  And let me ask you this now:  Do you

13     know that the BH Army had snipers?

14        A.   I don't know about that, but I think that every army has them.

15        Q.   When it comes to this facility, the cold storage facility

16     Hladnjaca it is located relatively close to the frontline; correct?

17        A.   Yes.

18             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document into

19     evidence as well, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Admitted into evidence.  May it please be given an

21     exhibit number.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D42.

23             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I have concluded with my

24     cross-examination.  Thank you, Mr. Jusufovic.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You are welcome.

Page 3262

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you, Madam Bolton, do you have any

 2     re-examination?

 3             MS. BOLTON:  I do, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  How long will it take?

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 6             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry.  I would hope 5 to 10 minutes.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I would hate to impose on the interpreters and the

 8     rest of the staff so maybe we might as well take an adjournment until

 9     tomorrow.

10             MS. BOLTON:  I'm in the Court's hands, yes.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We'll be -- we are back in courtroom II at quarter

12     past 2.00 in the afternoon.  Court adjourned.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 5th day of

15                           February, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.