Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6670

 1                           Thursday, 28 May 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good morning to everybody in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, will you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you.  And good morning, Your Honours.  This

 9     is case number IT-04-81-T, The Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

11             And could we please have the appearances for today, starting with

12     the Prosecution.

13             MR. HARMON:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning, counsel.

14     Mark Harmon and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

16             And for the Defence.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good morning to everyone in the courtroom.

18     Daniela Tasic, Tina Drolec, Eric Tully, Chad Mair, Novak Lukic,

19     Gregor Guy-Smith on behalf of Mr. Perisic.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

21             Do we have a witness today?

22             MR. HARMON:  Hopefully we have a witness today, Your Honour.  I'm

23     not in charge of bringing him over here from the -- his accommodations.

24     I assume he is in the witness waiting-room.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Could we call him in, please.

Page 6671

 1                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 2                           [The witness takes the stand]

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good morning, Mr. Butler.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We hope you're well rested.  Just to remind you

 6     that you are still bound by the declaration that you took at the

 7     beginning of your testimony to tell the truth, the whole truth, and

 8     nothing else but the truth.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

11             Mr. Guy-Smith.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13                           WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

14                           Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith: [Continued]

15        Q.   We left each other last night having a brief conversation with

16     regard to the Mujahedin.  And I'd like to spend a few more moments

17     talking about some of the contextual issues that involving around the

18     time of July 1995.

19             You had mentioned in your testimony that, I believe, that there

20     was also apart from the presence of Mujahedin within the Muslim Bosnian

21     army, there was also smuggling occurring that went through Tuzla.

22     Correct?

23        A.   Well, sir, the smuggling was the continuing effort to move man

24     power and supplies into particularly the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica

25     and Zepa in order to keep the 28th Infantry Division supplied.  I don't

Page 6672

 1     know how that has to deal with the Mujahedin, in so much as I'm not aware

 2     of any of them in those eastern enclaves.

 3        Q.   Very well.  With regard to the issue of smuggling, were you aware

 4     of a meeting that occurred in 1994 in Tuzla with various members of the

 5     United States air force and Bosnian Muslim army members concerning

 6     supplying ammunition and other necessary equipment to the army?

 7        A.   No, sir.

 8        Q.   Okay.  In the research that you did, did you come across any

 9     discussions about a secret airport or air strip was being built in a

10     place called Visiko?

11        A.   No, sir.

12        Q.   Then we won't talk about it.

13             In terms of -- I'm moving to your report now in a general sense.

14     Would it be fair to say that in your view --

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Harmon.

16             MR. HARMON:  Could we have which report we're talking about.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Reports.

18             MR. HARMON:  Oh, reports, I'm sorry.  I thought I heard the

19     singular.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If you did, I dropped the S.

21        Q.   Would it be fair to say that when you were engaged in your

22     analysis as you were writing your various reports that you attempted to

23     be as objective as you possibly could be?

24        A.   Yes, sir.

25        Q.   And as technically accurate as you could be?

Page 6673

 1        A.   Yes, sir.

 2        Q.   And I think, as a matter of fact, an expression of your concern

 3     about accuracy was evidenced at the beginning of your testimony here

 4     where you corrected I believe on two occasions some errors that you saw

 5     in your report.

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  That's been a component of most of the trials there

 7     have been minor errors that have been identified that we've corrected

 8     over time.

 9        Q.   Sure.  And obviously whenever you come across -- whenever you

10     come across an error whether it be by review of your report or through

11     the process of examination or cross-examination, that's something that

12     you have remedied at a later point in time, if a later point in time came

13     about; correct?  It's an evolutionary process.

14        A.   Remedied in the sense of my discussion and testimony.  I have not

15     updated the reports.

16        Q.   But as you did here, actually it was in Courtroom II, but as you

17     did here when you came across an error, you at least alerted the

18     Prosecution with regard to that error?

19        A.   Yes, sir.

20        Q.   Okay.  Now, before the formation of the VRS, there was -- and I'm

21     going to -- I believe for you familiar territory, the JNA, as a military

22     organisation that embodied the entirety of the SFRY, the former Republic

23     of Yugoslavia.  Correct?

24        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

25        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to the JNA, you had occasion to review a

Page 6674

 1     number of documents in that regard in your analysis of the structure of

 2     the VRS; correct?

 3        A.   Specifically we had access to documents from the former JNA

 4     4th Corps and 17th Corps, which I did use as a model to determine whether

 5     or not the VRS had organised along the same lines.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to the issue of whether or not the VRS had

 7     organised along the same lines, you studied, I take it, the former

 8     situation that existed in the SFRY prior to its breakup; correct?

 9        A.   Not the historical context of the SFRY for the most part.  My

10     interest was in the military doctrine and an organisation and processes

11     of the former Yugoslav national army.

12        Q.   And when you use the term "military doctrine," I take it you're

13     talking about a principle that dictates military behaviour in the most

14     general of senses.

15        A.   In -- in the term of doctrine, yes, it is the most general of

16     senses.

17        Q.   Okay.  Could you explain for the Chamber, if you could, what the

18     term "military doctrine" embodies.

19        A.   The term embodies the general principles by which a military

20     force exists within a nation state.  The doctrine of a particular

21     military force within a country, in turn, drives many of the other

22     factors that are necessary for a military to survive, such as a doctrine

23     will drive what type of equipment that that military will purchase over

24     time.  It will drive the types of units that they want, how they want to

25     organise them, and how they want to man them.  It will drive their entire

Page 6675

 1     professional training and educational process.  It drives their budget.

 2             So within the former SFRY, for example, their doctrine was one

 3     known as All People's Defence.  And within that doctrine, that is how

 4     they organised their armed forces.

 5        Q.   When you say within their doctrine, that is how they organised

 6     their armed forces, you've mentioned All People's Defence.  And I take it

 7     at that point what you're talking about is what occurred in the former

 8     Yugoslavia; correct?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   And what was the All People's Defence?

11        A.   Simply put, All People's Defence was a doctrine, a defence

12     doctrine that was driven by many of the lessens of World War II, where

13     the Yugoslav national leadership recognised that, particularly between

14     the former Warsaw Pact block and the NATO block in Europe that they would

15     be able to conventionally defend Yugoslavia from a threat.  So going back

16     to the lessens of World War II and their occupation by the Nazis, their

17     defence doctrine took the view that they would have a nucleus of a

18     professional army and some conventional forces, but that in large part

19     all military-aged men would be capable of engaging in military activities

20     in a partisan or guerilla warfare type of campaign, the goal being to

21     make anyone's thought of occupying Yugoslavia so expensive in terms of

22     time, manpower, and other resources that they would not do so.

23        Q.   Now, with regard to the doctrine as it applied to the All

24     People's Defence, you've mentioned partisan or guerilla warfare.  Would

25     it be fair to say that what you're talking about there is that the entire

Page 6676

 1     nation would be involved in mass resistance to an invader, either from

 2     the west or the east?

 3        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

 4        Q.   And with regard to the notion of the All People's Defence, the

 5     All People's Defence necessarily included within it a decentralised form

 6     of operation; correct?  One that would be able to be easily used in a

 7     guerilla warfare setting.

 8        A.   It was envisioned over time that the more centralised

 9     conventional forces would fight the best that they could, and that in

10     order to buy the time for Territorial Defence units and those guerilla

11     forces to organise themselves while the actual military operations were

12     viewed as being along a decentralised manner, by municipality in many

13     respects they were still envisaged to be centrally organised by the top

14     leadership of the country.

15        Q.   With regard to, once again, the Territorial Defence units would

16     it be fair to say that they were -- I'm going to put this in these terms:

17     That they were formed locally; they were under the direction of the

18     opstina.  Correct?

19        A.   They were not necessarily under the direction of the opstina, but

20     the opstina or municipality would be responsible for raising the forces.

21     They would be responsible for provisioning them to the best of their

22     ability.  It was envisioned that that civilian organisation, then

23     structure, of the municipality would play a very large role in supporting

24     the continued existence of those particular Territorial Defence.

25        Q.   Those defence units were trained for combat operations close to

Page 6677

 1     home; correct?

 2        A.   Since those defence units were in effect made up of people who

 3     had served their conscripted time in the JNA, they had the same ability

 4     to do that.  However, you know, it's not a question of training.  They

 5     were organised for local operations, is probably the more accurate way of

 6     saying it.

 7        Q.   Fine.  I'll accept that as a -- as a modification.

 8             And with regard to where they were organised, by that mean if

 9     they were organised in the lowlands or the mountains, the organisation

10     was based upon the particular geographic area in which they were located,

11     among other things; correct?  Mountain fighting being different than

12     lowland fighting.

13        A.   I'm not sure, because I didn't study the entire former SFRY in

14     that respect, whether that's accurate.  What I can say is that most of

15     those Territorial Defence units were organised as light infantry units

16     which would make them capable of fighting in a variety of environments.

17        Q.   Those individuals who were not fighting age, which I think was

18     between of, let's say, 16 to 64.  The rest of the population, what was

19     their function, if you know, with regard to the All People's Defence?

20        A.   I don't know what their specific functions would be, I mean,

21     other than generally to support the war effort.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now apart from the Territorial Defence aspect of the

23     military doctrine that you have been explaining to us in the former

24     Yugoslavia, there was also a standing professional army; correct?  The

25     JNA, independent of the Territorial Defence.

Page 6678

 1        A.   Yes, sir.  The JNA stood as a separate arm of the armed forces.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And they -- by that I mean the JNA, they standing as a

 3     separate part of the armed forces were professional army.  True?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.

 5        Q.   With rules and regulations that existed internally with regard to

 6     such issues as command and control; correct?

 7        A.   That is correct, sir.

 8        Q.   And other organisational issues that were perhaps not necessarily

 9     germane to the Territorial Defence in the former Yugoslavia, right?

10        A.   It would depend on what issues you would be referring to.  For

11     example, the same military officers who had a command in the JNA could

12     subsequently go over and, you know, have command issues or be part of the

13     Territorial Defence, so issues of command and control and many of those

14     particular regulations would be the same for both.

15             So it would depend on which particular area that you wanted to

16     discuss, whether or not the operating procedures of the JNA and the

17     operating procedures of the Territorial Defence would differ.

18        Q.   Well, with regard to the former Yugoslavia, did you come to an

19     understanding of how those two forces would operate together?  Would one

20     be subordinate to the other; would they work in tandem with each other?

21        A.   In their particular doctrine, and in this case, what I refer to

22     is the provisional corps regulations.  I mean, it envisions that in a

23     number of cases that the professional army and the Territorial Defence

24     would work in tandem on the modern battlefield.

25        Q.   And with regard to them working in tandem in the modern

Page 6679

 1     battlefield as you've described it, this was, once again, a military

 2     doctrine that was essentially defensive in nature; correct?

 3        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

 4        Q.   With regard to one of the things you mentioned earlier in your

 5     testimony, which I believe was that the military doctrine embodies the

 6     national objectives of the state, with regard to the Federal Republic of

 7     Yugoslavia, first of all, can you tell us when the Federal Republic of

 8     Yugoslavia was formed as a nation state?

 9        A.   I couldn't tell you offhand which date after World War II that

10     would have occurred.

11        Q.   I'm not talking about the Socialist Federal Republic of

12     Yugoslavia; I'm talking about the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

13        A.   I assume at this juncture we're talking sometime after April of

14     1992, after Bosnia had gained their -- or had basically voted for

15     independence.  I couldn't tell you when the exact date would be on that.

16        Q.   And with regard to the Republika Srpska, can you give us a date

17     for that?

18        A.   The -- what would become the Republika Srpska, first, was known

19     as the -- was it autonomous Serb republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I

20     believe, started to surface in documents as at least a governmental body

21     as early as January of 1992.  It later officially was redesignated the

22     Republika Srpska approximately November of 1992.

23        Q.   With regard to the issue of the formation of the Republika Srpska

24     Krajina, did you in your analysis do any study of the Republic of Srpska

25     Krajina?

Page 6680

 1        A.   No, sir.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Neither factual nor historical, in terms of an

 3     understanding of the conflict?

 4        A.   Just broadly within in the terms that it existed, there was a

 5     conflict related to that.  But given that my focus was primarily on

 6     Eastern Bosnia, it was just outside the scope of study for me.

 7        Q.   Now, with regard to the formation of the army, the VRS in the

 8     Republika Srpska, could you tell us when the army was formed?

 9        A.   The army was -- I guess their official birthday is June of 1992

10     is when they called themselves when they were formed.  The reality was

11     that it was a much more fluid process.  For example, General Mladic was

12     appointed the commander of the army in early April 1992, and at that

13     point, from April, May, through June, most of his efforts were in fact

14     working to try and create the army.  From an amalgamation of locally

15     raised units and former JNA units that in some form or another were left

16     behind.

17        Q.   All right.  With regard to what you've just said, that his

18     efforts were in fact working to try and create the army, in your research

19     an analysis, did you make a determination of how many actual JNA soldiers

20     remained at the Republika Srpska?  I'm sorry, that assumes something that

21     that we haven't discussed yet, which is there come a time when the JNA

22     left the region; correct?

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   And when was that?

25        A.   I believe the JNA withdrew through the month of late April and

Page 6681

 1     early May 1992.  I they were out by either the 16th or the 17th

 2     officially.

 3        Q.   And where did they go, if you know?

 4        A.   Most of the JNA formations that withdrew went to either Serbia or

 5     Montenegro.

 6        Q.   And the JNA formations that withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 7     some of the JNA formations had previously been on a journey, having

 8     previously withdrawn from the area of Croatia; correct?

 9        A.   Correct, sir.

10        Q.   Now with regard to those that remained in the Republika Srpska?

11     Did you have an idea of how many actual individuals or soldiers remained?

12        A.   I don't have that figure off the top of my head.  I know that in

13     the VRS's an annual report for 1992 that they actually do provide those

14     figures of the professional soldiers an officers of the JNA who were

15     serving with the VRS.  So I know that the answer is there; I just don't

16     know the figure off the top of my head.

17        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to General Mladic's effort to create an

18     army, you mentioned that this was an amalgamation of various forces, to

19     use the -- I think a relatively liberal term for the moment.  And those

20     force would have been those remaining soldiers, correct, and the

21     Territorial Defence?  Would be the two main components of that

22     amalgamated army?

23        A.   Yes, sir.  In some areas, for example, in the Krajina, where you

24     had large bodies of the former JNA that did remain, they organised as the

25     1st Krajina Corps and had you some professional units or the nucleus of

Page 6682

 1     some professional units as well as a lot of the Territorial Defence units

 2     that had been stood up by the municipalities that were ultimately

 3     absorbed in the 1st Krajina Corps.  In Eastern Bosnia, for example, where

 4     none of the former JNA formations that were there remained, that corps

 5     was formed by a variety of locally raised Territorial Defence units

 6     exclusively.  And I guess the last element that was integrated in the

 7     army over time was some of these rogue paramilitary organisations that

 8     were running around the Krajina and eastern Bosnia that were either

 9     disbanded or absorbed into the regular army by the fall.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have 65 ter 6073 on the screen, please.

11        Q.   Now, with regard to some of the efforts that were occurring in

12     terms of the amalgamation issue that you have discussed, I'd like to you

13     take a look at this particular document and see whether this comports

14     with what you were saying.  And I'm looking at the language at

15     paragraph 1, the decision.

16        A.   Yes, sir.  It reflects the initial routes as out of those local

17     or regionally based TO units and defence staffs.

18        Q.   And is this one of the documents that you were analysing when you

19     were involved in your research with regard to the general issue

20     concerning the structure of the army and the evolution of the VRS?

21        A.   Yes, sir, it was.

22        Q.   Okay.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And if we could go down to the bottom.  Just

24     scroll down to the bottom.  If we could have this admitted as defendant'

25     next in order.

Page 6683

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Harmon.

 2             MR. HARMON:  Yes, could we go to the next page.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sorry.

 4             MR. HARMON:  It appears to not be complete on the English

 5     translation.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we go to the next page.  Sorry, I

 7     apologise, yes.

 8             All right.  As a matter of fact, thank you so much, Mr. Harmon.

 9     You reminded me of something that I had forgotten for the moment.

10        Q.   With regard to the explanation, it indicates in paragraph 1 that

11     the TO staffs shall remain in their existing formation and composition

12     and they shall be established TO staffs in newly established Serbian

13     municipalities along the same lines.

14             And I take what that means there, and you clearly understand this

15     from all of the research you've done, is that the TOs are going to remain

16     under the control of the opstinas.  Correct?

17        A.   Initially at this point in time it was a very decentralised

18     command and control model, and the local TOs engaged in military

19     operations or other activities strictly at the direction of their local

20     Crisis Staff or other municipal leaders.  There wasn't the overall

21     national level, to use that word, command and control apparatus in place.

22     So most of that was at the local level.

23        Q.   Okay.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have this marked -- admitted as

25     defendant's next in order.

Page 6684

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's admitted.  May it please be given an

 2     exhibit number.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D102.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we now have P190 on the screen.

 6        Q.   And if you would take a look at Article number 2, understanding

 7     that this -- this document deals with decisions made on the 12th of May,

 8     does this reflect, in your opinion, the beginning of the evolution of the

 9     Territorial Defence from being only under the control of the opstinas to

10     being integrated into the army?

11        A.   Yes, sir, the appointment - I again, think I said April, so I'm

12     corrected if it's 12 May - the appointment of General Mladic as the

13     commander of the Main Staff of the army and the organisation of that

14     Main Staff subsequently is the efforts to take these Territorial Defence

15     organisations and start to meld them into a national type of army and one

16     that could start dealing with conflict-related issues on a national level

17     rather than at each individual municipal level.

18        Q.   Okay.  Now, at that point in time, and if you could be of some

19     help to me here, it seems to me that you have a bit of a dilemma, and the

20     dilemma being as follows, which is that you have a professional army that

21     has a military doctrine that envisions some of the aspects of the

22     Territorial Defence notion, and you have a Territorial Defence component

23     that is strictly defensive in nature in a civil war.

24             So it would seem to be somewhat of a dilemma in term of how best

25     to proceed forward.  Would you agree?

Page 6685

 1        A.   I don't think that's an accurate characterization of the issue.

 2     I think the problem that they were facing was that the -- there was no

 3     national military hierarchy to look at the strategic big picture of the

 4     military.  And the problem that they were facing is that the municipal

 5     Crisis Staffs were very often focussed on the immediate threat in their

 6     particular municipality.

 7             So you this had odd situation where military forces in one

 8     municipality wouldn't be performing any duties, because they had already

 9     accomplished the missions that they wanted to do and didn't see it as

10     their role to go and assist in another municipality.  So there was no

11     large coordinated strategy to deal with these issues.  They were all

12     being done piecemeal.  And I think that was the doctrinal problem that

13     the Republika Srpska leadership had, is that while they had national

14     objectives with the six strategic goals, for example, they couldn't

15     realize those as long as they were continuing to operate on a very

16     decentralised manner at the municipal level.

17        Q.   Well, the difficulty that existed, as a matter of fact, as

18     between the military doctrine at hand and the entire manner in which the

19     Territorial Defence had been set up is something that had been previously

20     recognised at the time of the JNA was involved in fighting; correct?  And

21     if I might be of some assistance to you --

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have 65 ter 6292 on the screen, please.

23        Q.   It might be the easiest way to get you to -- what I'm trying to

24     suggest to you.  It's going to be page 5 in the B/C/S, which we're

25     ultimately going get to.  And as soon as the -- is that the English?

Page 6686

 1     There we go.

 2             Okay.  First of all, just if we could take a look at the dates

 3     just so you know what the date is, which is 1991.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And if we could go to page 6 of the document in

 5     English and page 5 in B/C/S.  And I'm specifically going to

 6     paragraph number 4.  And if we could have that blown up.

 7        Q.   Apart from the discussion about the JNA not wishing to be

 8     involved in this particular war, as we get to paragraph 4, it says:

 9             "This war is specific in many aspects.

10             "Exactly.  The JNA was not prepared for this kind of war.  Many

11     tradition ideas and values that we used to build our defence system upon

12     have been of no use to us at all.  We had to approach an all-out

13     transformation of the army and of the doctrine of its use."

14             So this is clearly a dilemma that was faced by the JNA.  And I

15     take it this is the same dilemma that was faced by General Mladic when he

16     was attempting to build his army, after May of 1992?

17        A.   Well, for the first component of the JNA, I agree.  I mean, the

18     reality is that I'm not aware that any major army, for that matter, has a

19     doctrine or practices portraying to the level of what happens when the

20     country falls apart in civil war.  It is just not something envisioned

21     obviously and the JNA found itself right in the middle of that.

22        Q.   Precisely.

23        A.   Now, General Mladic, he had already been working through that

24     process, and his goal was basically taking the existing pieces that he

25     either had in Bosnia or that were left behind by the JNA and taking them

Page 6687

 1     from a largely decentralised force and creating an overarching command

 2     and control element that would allow them to focus the existing force

 3     towards more operational and strategic goals, as opposed to just being

 4     involved in municipal-level activities.

 5        Q.   And, once again, in terms of talking about military doctrine,

 6     would it be fair to say that at the higher levels it's really quite

 7     conceptual, in terms of what military doctrine is, and as you go down to

 8     the lower levels, then really what you're dealing with is operational

 9     issues and tactical issues?

10        A.   Yes, sir.  And in fact recognizing this particular issue, the VRS

11     made the decision, based on all of their other manning and professional

12     educational shortfalls, that they were going to put the bulk of their

13     professional JNA-trained officers at these higher levels of command, and

14     consequently assume a risk at the lower levels of command which would be

15     filled by individuals who were often reservists and who had nowhere near

16     the professional training and background.

17             So, yeah, I agree.  And in fact they recognised that risk and

18     reacted accordingly to them.

19        Q.   And so we understand, with regard to military doctrine at the

20     lower levels, we're talking about such things, are we not, as, for

21     example, the number of kilometres that a unit of a particular size or

22     character should be able to cover?

23        A.   Those things -- yeah.

24        Q.   As an example.

25        A.   Those things are covered in the combat regulations.  But maybe as

Page 6688

 1     a better example of that, when you look at a brigade structure, there

 2     would be the effort to seed that key command group with professionally

 3     trained JNA officers in a commander and Chief of Staff and maybe the

 4     operations officer roles.  Many of the subordinate commanders who were

 5     not required to operate in such a sophisticated manner would be reserve

 6     officers who would not have that expertise.  So it was at the higher

 7     levels of command is where they kind of tried to create that nucleus of

 8     professional officers.

 9        Q.   Since you mentioned brigade, perhaps just for a moment we can

10     move to the side, and could you give us just a rough understanding of the

11     structure of the VRS in terms of brigades and corps, how that broke

12     itself down.

13        A.   Yes, sir.

14        Q.   Just kind of general, how is an army put together?

15        A.   Well, using the VRS, in April, when they organised, and through

16     May and June, the VRS initially consisted of the Main Staff which was the

17     command and control nucleus of the entire army.  Under it, it had

18     initially five combat corps formations.  A corps, in the VRS vernacular,

19     probably had between 25 and maybe 50.000, I think in one case even higher

20     than that, number of soldiers assigned, and those people would be broken

21     down into various subordinate components that were referred to as

22     brigades.  Each brigade had between 3 and 5.000 soldiers.  There would be

23     between some cases five, some cases seven brigades assigned to a corps.

24     Within each brigade, you would have a number of battalions, each between,

25     roughly, 500 or 700 people.  You would have three, five, sometimes up to

Page 6689

 1     six or seven battalions in a brigade, depending on how it was organised,

 2     and then it keeps going lower.  In each battalion you would have five or

 3     six companies of roughly 100 people.  So, I mean, that was how the

 4     hierarchy was organised.

 5        Q.   And with regard to the formation of the VRS, one of the

 6     difficulties that the VRS experienced with regard to the issue of

 7     military doctrine was that it was an underpopulated army; correct?  If

 8     you follow -- I think you follow what I'm saying.

 9        A.   It wasn't necessarily an issue of the military doctrine.  What it

10     was, was the fact that they did not have the requisite manpower to

11     accomplish the doctrine.  The units themselves were chronically

12     under-manned because the war was not popular, desertion was a fairly

13     regular occurrence.  And perhaps more importantly, the leadership of

14     those units were not properly manned either.  Either having officers in

15     command positions at those lower levels who are not qualified, or the

16     fact that -- and, again, well known within the VRS, that a lot of the

17     officers who were of Bosnian Serb origin who were in the JNA did not

18     serve in the VRS for a variety of reasons.

19        Q.   Okay.  One of the things that I'm driving at here, and perhaps I

20     used the incorrect language, is that in terms of one of the fundamental

21     principles that guides military doctrine with regard to the issue of the

22     population of an army is that there is a recognition of a ratio that

23     should exist between attacking forces and defending forces.  I think it

24     is a three to one ratio, is one of the fundamental principles that come

25     out, and it has come out through the ages of warfare.  And that is what I

Page 6690

 1     was driving at with regard to the issue of the army being an

 2     underpopulated army, among other things.

 3        A.   I don't look at it those terms.  I look at it in terms of when

 4     one looks at the establishment of the army, their basic structure and

 5     what their -- in my army we call it the table of organisation and

 6     equipment, and it reflects the manning, that the units were chronically

 7     undermanned for the size of the units and the type of units that they

 8     had.

 9             Now your application of three to one at a particular point of

10     attack, you know, during the course of combat operations as one saw from

11     1992 to 1995, they would be able to generate the requisite ratios that

12     they needed by moving units in from other areas of the country, or in

13     other areas they would be able to compensate by using fires or other

14     forms of combat power.

15             So I don't look at it in the same view that you do, sir.

16        Q.   Okay.  And since you have introduced a new a concept here which

17     is the concept of fires, perhaps can you explain to the Chamber what

18     fires -- what the that means when you use that particular term.

19        A.   Yes, sir.  When I use the term "fires," I am referring to

20     artillery, mortars, things of that nature.  It is considered to be a

21     combat multiplier rather than when one looks at how a military may attack

22     and how a military will generate combat power at the point of attack or

23     at a point on the battlefield where it wants to, troops, the manoeuvre

24     formations, fires, the artillery units, those are all part of that

25     equation.

Page 6691

 1        Q.   Now, with regard to the Bosnian Muslim army, would it be fair to

 2     say that you do not have any exact figure for what the population was of

 3     that army?

 4        A.   No, sir.  But I am aware that the population of the Bosnian

 5     Muslim army did well exceed that of the Bosnian Serb army.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to the leadership of the Bosnian Muslim

 7     army, those individuals, some of the individuals we were speaking about

 8     yesterday, Mr. Rasim Delic, Mr. Halilovic, Mr. Hadzihasanovic, among

 9     others, all had previously been in the JNA; correct?

10        A.   I believe so, yes, sir.

11        Q.   And you mentioned earlier that this was a unique situation

12     because what had happened was the country had fallen into a civil war.

13     What you had here was you had all participants in the conflict working

14     under some of the same, if not -- well, I put it that way, some of the

15     same historical understanding of how to wage a war.  They all were

16     inculcated with the notion of All People's Defence.

17        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, they were all trained the same way, so, as a

18     result, their views on how to conduct military operations all tended to

19     be very familiar.

20        Q.   Okay.  Now, with regard to the issue concerning the amalgamation

21     of the various aspects of the VRS, was the VRS also comprised of an

22     independent police unit, or were those individuals who were actually part

23     of the armed forces?

24        A.   I'm not familiar with what independent police unit you might be

25     referring to.

Page 6692

 1        Q.   I'm asking a question.  I'm asking the question whether there was

 2     an independent police units that you came across.

 3        A.   There was an independent protection regiment, the 65th Protection

 4     Regiment that worked for the Main Staff, but within the structure of the

 5     VRS there were no independent units.

 6             If you are referring to the special police brigade that operated

 7     not with the -- that wasn't under the army's control nominally; that was

 8     under the Ministry of Interior.  Is that what you're referring to?

 9        Q.   You -- yes.  And the 66th?

10        A.   I'm sorry, 65th Protection Regiment.

11        Q.   And the 65th protection regiment that worked for the Main Staff,

12     what did you understand their responsibilities to be?

13        A.   Buy the former doctrine --

14        Q.   Let's --

15        A.   Right.  They were supposed to be in charge of protecting key

16     facilities and things of that nature.  They basically worked for the

17     Military District command, and they were in charge of the security of

18     many of the key military logistical or other facilities.

19             During the actual conflict, the 65th Protection Regiment was used

20     as an assault force and would frequently be found all over the

21     battlefield engaged in combat operations.

22        Q.   And you indicated they were under the Ministry of Interior.  And

23     was there --

24        A.   No, sir.  The special police brigade was under the Ministry of

25     the Interior.

Page 6693

 1        Q.   Right.

 2        A.   The 65th Protection Regiment was directly under the command of

 3     the Main Staff of the VRS.

 4        Q.   Ah, okay.  Good.

 5             Now, with regard to the Drina Corps, the Drina Corps was not,

 6     shall we say, a child of the JNA, was it?

 7        A.   Correct, sir.  The corps headquarters had no former JNA lineage

 8     as the other corps did.

 9        Q.   And when -- and when was the Drina Corps formed?

10        A.   I believe the date that it was organised, at least the

11     headquarters was organised, is the 1st of November, 1992.

12        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to the Drina Corps when you said that they

13     had no JNA lineage, I take it that by that you mean they -- it was a

14     hodgepodge put together, as opposed to the other corps that had some form

15     of structure that had been pre-existing before the JNA left?

16        A.   I wouldn't put it "hodgepodge," but certainly it did not have the

17     benefit of the nucleus of a former JNA Corps to build around, like, for

18     example, the East Bosnia corps which was made of the nucleus of the

19     former JNA 17th Corps or the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps headquarters which

20     was made up of the nucleus of the former JNA 4th Corps.

21             So that that respect when they created the Drina Corps

22     headquarters, it required them to pull resources from other elements in

23     order to create that.  They did not have that JNA nucleus to build around

24     from the beginning.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 6694

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Where did these elements come from, given the fact

 2     that all other soldiers would have belonged to other units?

 3             THE WITNESS:  The -- in this regard, the soldiers themselves, the

 4     brigades were relocated from one corps, the older, either East Bosnia

 5     Corps or Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, which shared responsibility for Eastern

 6     Bosnia.  So the actual brigade elements themselves were just

 7     resubordinated.

 8             The personnel that made up the corps headquarters came from

 9     either the Main Staff, the corps commander, for example, the 1st Corps

10     commander, General Zivanovic, before he was the corps commander in the

11     Drina Corps, he was the chief of artillery for the Main Staff.  Other

12     officers would come in from other locations in the army, so they just

13     drew them from those locations.  But the units that ultimately made up

14     the Drina Corps existed in -- as units in other forms and were just

15     simply resubordinated.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

17             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

19        Q.   With regard to the issue of command and control, could you give

20     the Chamber is rough understanding of what is meant by those terms.

21        A.   In a military sense, command and control is the process by which

22     the individual who is in charge is able to issue orders.  Those orders

23     flow down to the subordinates who would follow them, and that the

24     subordinates' compliance with those orders flows back up to the

25     individual who issued them.

Page 6695

 1             Very simply put, and, of course, within the context -- you know,

 2     much of what we call military doctrine revolves around the processes that

 3     take place within that to ensure that those people give orders, that

 4     they're transmitted down to subordinates, that they're complied, and the

 5     compliance of those orders is again transmitted back up.

 6        Q.   With regard to the JNA and the Territorial Defence, I suggest to

 7     you that this is an area where doctrines would diverge?  And, if I might,

 8     because I see -- I see your mind is turning ahead.  Let me make the

 9     following proposition to you, which you then can accept or reject, or

10     discuss with me.

11             Which is: the JNA command and control system consisted of unit

12     commands, institution directorates, specialized administrative and

13     command structure.  The TDF consisted of territorial staffs, territorial

14     unit commands, territorial institution directorates, and specialized

15     administrative and command organs dealing with specific spheres in the

16     Territorial Defence?

17        A.   Okay, I see where you're driving now.

18             Certainly the JNA command system was organised along more

19     traditional lines, and the Territorial Defences command and control

20     system was organised on a much more decentralised level to reflect the

21     fact that in an occupied country, the command and control system that the

22     JNA had in place would not be able to exist, just because obviously the

23     JNA would not be able to exist like that.

24        Q.   Okay.  Now, with regard to the distinction between these two

25     doctrines as they relate to command and control, they would directly

Page 6696

 1     affect, would they not, issues concerning subordination and discipline?

 2        A.   I disagree that they would affect issues dealing with

 3     subordination.  Potentially they would deal with issues related to

 4     discipline.  I -- again, I don't know many of the issues related to the

 5     Territorial Defence because relative, particularly to where my field of

 6     expertise is with respect to the Drina Corps in July 1995, it was

 7     operating off of the JNA command and control model, not that of the

 8     Territorial Defence.

 9        Q.   With regard to the issue you have just raised, which is that it

10     was operating off of the JNA model, I'd like a little help here, if I

11     could with regard to what I understand to be in command and control

12     areas, that they're basically two kind of command and control principles.

13     One is, as we have been discussing, the decentralised fashion, and one is

14     what we have left a little bit more open which is the centralised form of

15     command and control.

16             Are you with me?

17        A.   Yes, sir.

18        Q.   Okay.  With regard to the VRS, is it your contention that they

19     were a centralised form of command and control with a subordinate staff

20     population that was - and I may be being a bit bold in my position -  but

21     in large measure, populated by officers and reservists who had not

22     received that kind of training and had come from the military doctrine of

23     Territorial Defence, that being a decentralised form of command and

24     control.

25        A.   No, sir.  I think -- it's inaccurate, because while you had

Page 6697

 1     different models that the Territorial Defence and the JNA operated under

 2     with respect to how they would be expected to perform in wartime, the

 3     reality was that the officers were one and the same.  The active

 4     officers, I mean, even the reserve officers, they were not trained

 5     differently; they all received the same training.  And, you know, again

 6     one of the reasons for me, why we never focussed on the

 7     Territorial Defence model is that in April of 1992, I'm sorry, in June of

 8     1992, I believe it is, the Republika Srpska creates their Law on Army and

 9     the Law on Defence, which lays out exactly what the command and control

10     apparatus of the army will be.

11             So that is the model that they followed.

12        Q.   Well, I suggest to you that -- that the reality of what was

13     occurring on the ground and the reality of what is written in the book

14     brings to mind there's many a slip twixt the cup and the lip, and that

15     the model that was written was not the model that was in fact followed?

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Guy-Smith kindly speak into the

17     microphone.  Thank you.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes, I will.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon.

20             MR. HARMON:  Your Honour, could Mr. Guy-Smith identify the

21     time-period he is talking because the question is extremely general.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure.  Not a problem at all.

23        Q.   I'm referring to the period of time that you were focussed on,

24     which is 1995, July.

25        A.   Well, sir, as I guess you would take from the thrust of my

Page 6698

 1     reports, and on command with respect to the Main Staff corps and brigade

 2     and the narratives, I would disagree with that assertion.

 3        Q.   Yes, I would assume that you would.

 4             I want to move to an issue where I'm sure we probably will agree.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Mr. Guy-Smith is inaudible, I'm sorry.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 7        Q.   I'm going to move to an issue which I'm sure you and I will agree

 8     upon which is the importance of the unity of command.

 9        A.   Correct, sir, that is an important principle.

10        Q.   Could you please explain to the Chamber what unity of command

11     means.

12        A.   Hopefully I will paraphrase it correctly from the relevant Law on

13     the Army where it is discussed.  But unity of command is the principle

14     that there is one commander, that the orders from that commander are to

15     be followed, that outside influences should not penetrate that

16     relationship.  It's basically, it's singular command.  And in the case of

17     the VRS ultimately, singular command of the army under the Supreme

18     Commander, which would be President Radovan Karadzic.

19        Q.   I'm going add to a component to that and see if you agree.  I

20     think it is something that you may have previously said which is that you

21     cannot have a function where you have multiple commanders in one unit.

22        A.   I think even if one looks back at the trials of the Soviet army

23     facing the German invasion where they had multiple commanders and one saw

24     the results I think everybody learned a lessen that that doesn't work.

25     You have to have a singular commander.

Page 6699

 1        Q.   And the singular commander, I believe you mentioned for

 2     Republika Srpska was Radovan Karadzic; correct?

 3        A.   By virtue of position of the President, he was in fact the

 4     commander of chief of the armed forces, yes.

 5        Q.   And directly under him with regard to matters military would have

 6     been General Mladic; correct?

 7        A.   With matters with respect to the VRS, yes, sir.

 8        Q.   Okay.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Would that be an appropriate time.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If it suits you, you have two more minutes --

11     [Microphone not activated]

12             I was saying for the record I would like to mention something

13     that I forgot to mention at the beginning of the session this morning,

14     that we are still sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I just -- I forgot something.  If I could have

16     the 65 ter number which is 6292 admitted as defendant's next in order.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's admitted.  And may it please be given an

18     exhibit number.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D103.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

22             We will take a break and come back at quarter to 11.00.

23             Court adjourned.

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 10.46 a.m.

Page 6700

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could please have Exhibit P2248 up on the

 3     screen, and I'm going specifically be going to page 4, section 2 of that

 4     particular document.

 5        Q.   With regard to the issue of unity of command --

 6        A.   I'm sorry, sir, if I could maybe conveniently stop you here.

 7     Both versions I'm looking at are in Serbo-Croatian, so -- I am assuming

 8     one version should be an English version.

 9        Q.   Oh, you can read Serbo-Croatian.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Harmon.

11             MR. HARMON:  Mr. Butler has the documents in front of him,

12     perhaps he can refer to the -- [Overlapping speakers] ...

13             THE WITNESS:  Here we go.  I'm sorry.

14             MR. HARMON:  -- set of documents in hard copy -- [Overlapping

15     speakers]...

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:

17        Q.   Sure.  If you prefer to use your hard copy.

18        A.   Now that I know what we're talking about, that's fine.

19        Q.   But if you want to go to your hard copy, please do so.  Whatever

20     works best for you.  It works best for me in hard copy because I'm going

21     blind.

22        A.   Just works best for me in a language I can understand.

23        Q.   Understood.

24             With regard to the issue of unity of command, you discuss in your

25     report the 1984 JNA brigade rules, I'm starting at section 2.0, with

Page 6701

 1     regards to the responsibilities of a brigade commander.

 2             And understanding that this is dealing with the issue of command

 3     of a brigade, you state:

 4             "The command of the brigade is part of an integrated system of

 5     command and control which are based on adopted principles of command?"

 6             And I believe we have, for the most part, already discussed those

 7     issues, have we not?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, they were the adopted principles of command

 9     that were articulated by the JNA and SFRY armed forces.

10        Q.   Excellent.  I'm not going to concern myself with the second

11     sentence, but with regard to the third sentence, it says:

12             "To this end command must integrated, continuous, secure,

13     flexible, effective, and operational?"

14             And you go on to say, once again quoting from a previous JNA

15     manual, which is a 1983 JNA manual for the work of command and staffs:

16             "The command relationship is based on the principle of unity,

17     unity of command and subordination.  It is defined in the relationship

18     between the superior and his subordinate.  The command relationship

19     pervades the entire system of the armed forces from the SFRY Presidency

20     to the soldiers."

21             I'd like to stop there for a moment.  Because of what you have

22     told us here, I take it that when we were discussing earlier the

23     Supreme Commander, Radovan Karadzic, and his direct subordinate,

24     Ratko Mladic, that this is the exact principle that was adopted by the RS

25     that had pre-existed at the time of the JNA.  Correct?

Page 6702

 1        A.   Yes, sir, that is a fair characterization.

 2        Q.   I'm going to continue here.

 3             "It is an obligation to execute the tasks set by one's superior

 4     or competent officers and organs in an accurate and proper manner."

 5             And before we go any further, you have -- there are two different

 6     concepts there.  One is superior, and the other is competent officer.  Do

 7     you interpret the term here "competent officer" to involve an

 8     understanding of a hierarchical relationship, or does it have to do the

 9     ability of the officer to do something?

10        A.   I attribute this within the hierarchical nature in so much as the

11     competent officer is one who is appointed to do a certain -- appointed

12     within the hierarchy to be able to give those types of orders.

13        Q.   Okay.  And you continue, so we'll continue:

14             "And act in accordance with the military regulations in their

15     execution."

16             And I take by that you're not only referring to the general

17     military regulations that were promulgated at the time but also orders

18     that would occur at the time of battle, for example?

19        A.   Yes, sir.

20        Q.   Okay.  I want to go to the next sentence which is:

21             "Any disruption in the command relationship, such as

22     circumvention of or wrongful interference with the chain of command is a

23     sign of military disorganisation."

24             Now I take it that sentence embodies the concept that we were

25     referring to before when you were talking about the failed experiments

Page 6703

 1     with multiple, I believe, you said Russians fighting against the Nazis in

 2     World War II?

 3        A.   I think in this particular context where it is referring to is

 4     more along the lines of a situation where other officers would come in,

 5     or even non-military officers, political officials would come in and try

 6     and give orders or try and influence the chain of command in a particular

 7     military unit.

 8        Q.   Oh, I see.  With regard to what you've just said, in terms of the

 9     issues as they relate to military doctrine, being the mechanism whereby

10     the national objectives are engaged, if you have distinct national

11     objectives, would it, in your estimation, be fair to say that the attempt

12     to influence one national objective to another would be something that

13     would be of concern with regard to the language that is here, in terms of

14     wrongful interference?  And that was probably in-artfully put.

15        A.   Yes, sir, I don't understand what you're asking.

16        Q.   Okay.  Let me do that again for you.

17             With regard to the issue of the unity of command, the unity of

18     command necessarily flows from military doctrine; correct?

19        A.   Yes, sir.

20        Q.   Okay.  And the military doctrine necessarily flows from the

21     national objective that exists at the time; correct?

22        A.   Yes, sir.

23        Q.   Okay.  Where you have distinct national objectives; for example,

24     the difference between what was occurring in FRY during, let's say, 1994,

25     the embargo time, and the Republika Srpska, the attempt to influence

Page 6704

 1     would be an example of the wrongful interference that we are discussing

 2     here.  Correct?

 3        A.   I guess where I would have difficulty in answering that question

 4     is only in so much as I don't know what the national objectives of the

 5     FRY were in that respect.  It wasn't an area of particular study for me.

 6     So I can't particularly --

 7        Q.   Oh.

 8        A.    -- help out on that question, sir.

 9        Q.   Looking at it, then, not in the specific abstract but the general

10     abstract, if you have competing national objectives, would the attempt to

11     influence be something that would be of concern with regard to the

12     language that is contained herein?

13        A.   I'm -- you're too abstract now.  I just don't track what you're

14     trying to ask, sir.  I apologise.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are you talking, Mr. Guy-Smith, are you talking

16     about completing national objectives within the same nation or in two

17     different nations?

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, I'm actually talking about competing

19     national objectives within two different nations.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But then -- and I guess this is it why the witness

21     can't follow you.  I can't follow you too.  Because -- because, sir,

22     within the particular nation, either of the two, each one has its own

23     objective, and there is nothing competing with that.  If you have a

24     competing objective with another nation, that's what brings you to war

25     with that nation.

Page 6705

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  True, Your Honour.  And I was going in a slightly

 2     -- in a slightly different fashion, and I will try one more time and then

 3     perhaps --

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But how does it fit into command and control?

 5     That's what I don't understand because if -- you don't have command and

 6     control over another nation.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I understand.  I understand.

 8        Q.   I'm not dealing with the issue of warring nations, okay.  What

 9     I'm -- what I'm dealing with here is where you have two nations that are

10     seemingly aligned in their general purpose during a conflict but they

11     have distinct objectives; one, for example, is attempting, during the

12     conflict to obtain peace; the other one, for example, during the conflict

13     is attempting to within the war.  But they have some of the same

14     theoretical bases upon which they are existing.

15             In that situation, if one of the commanders of one nation state

16     attempts to influence a commander of another nation state, would that

17     fall into the concerns that exist here, or do you see this as being

18     something that just deals with the specific issue internally in a nation

19     state?

20        A.   I guess the best way to answer that is that it would be

21     situation-dependant.  The rules that are envisioned here, particularly

22     when we are talking down to, you know, a brigade level, are fairly

23     specific.  The abstract that you've mentioned, I mean, I guess I can

24     envision, you know, something similar along the NATO alliance where a

25     group of countries operates in general concert although one must

Page 6706

 1     acknowledge that each nation state has their own individual objective

 2     that, at the top levels of leadership, that they operate potentially at a

 3     different hierarchical and control mechanism than you might see an

 4     individual brigade of an individual national state at that lower level.

 5     So, I mean, I think it is just too abstract to be able to give a yes or

 6     no answer to.  It is situation-dependant.

 7        Q.   Fair enough.  But with regard to what you've said here which is

 8     that at the top levels of leadership they operate potentially at a

 9     different hierarchical control mechanism, that is something that you --

10     that you cannot comment on with regard to the research and analysis that

11     you did in terms of your study?

12        A.   Well, I can with respect to the Republika Srpska.

13        Q.   Okay.

14        A.   Not with respect to --

15        Q.   Anything else but the Republika Srpska.

16        A.   Correct, sir.  I mean --

17        Q.   Fair enough.

18        A.   Yeah.

19        Q.   That's fair.  Which takes me to my next point which is that the

20     study that you have done is legitimately focussed on a level lower than

21     the top levels of leadership.

22        A.   No, sir.  I mean, within the framework of the Republika Srpska,

23     that -- the whole series of studies goes to the highest levels of

24     leadership within the Republika Srpska.

25        Q.   Okay.  And within any other republics, for example, the Republic

Page 6707

 1     of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska Krajina, or the

 2     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, you did not do that analysis.  It's

 3     confined to the Republika Srpska.

 4        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

 5        Q.   Fine.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could turn to -- still in the same

 7     document, if we could turn to 2.7.  And I'm just -- want to make sure

 8     that something is understood.

 9        Q.   Within 2.7 you indicate that the issue of appointment is

10     addressed in Articles 153, 155, and 370 of the RS Law of the army.

11     Articles 153 and 155 deal with "the appointment of military personnel to

12     formation posts according to service requirements."

13             And with regard to the issue of "service requirements," how are

14     you defining that particular term?

15        A.   I don't define it.  I believe the definition that is attributed

16     to it is the service requirement being the coded positions in each of

17     these formations for how many colonels, how many majors, how many

18     captains.  So the phrase "service requirements" is actually the -- the

19     posting structure of the military, how many -- what their manpower

20     requirements are.

21        Q.   Excellent.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could now turn to page 18 of the same

23     document, section 4.  I think it's coming up.

24        Q.   If you have your hard copy there, so time doesn't go a wasting,

25     we are at the disciplinary authority of the VRS brigade commander and

Page 6708

 1     Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff over subordinates section.

 2             And with regard to this particular section, first of all, if we

 3     could -- I think you'll take it as being true that the time-period that

 4     we're talking about is -- is a time-period in which Karadzic has declared

 5     a state of war.

 6        A.   In July of 1995, with respect to Eastern Bosnia, it was still an

 7     imminent threat of state of war.  It was not a fully formalised state of

 8     war that was declared, with the exception of the Srebrenica municipality,

 9     I believe, on the 15th of September.  I'm sorry, 15th of July.

10             So for most of the Drina Corps are that I'm discussing, the legal

11     state is an imminent threat of war.

12        Q.   If you can help me then.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could just, then, go to page 22 just for a

14     second here so I understanding something.

15        Q.   And looking at section 4.11, it says:

16             "With respect to the time-period in question, RS President

17     Radovan Karadzic declared 'a state of war' in the Srebrenica Skelani

18     municipality on 14 July 1995."

19        A.   Correct, sir, but again as I said that does not encompass the

20     entire Drina Corps area.  So that's why you have got to just make that

21     differential.

22        Q.   And then you go to say:

23             "In addition this declared state of war was expanded to the

24     entire territory of the Republika Srpska 28 July."

25        A.   Correct, sir.

Page 6709

 1        Q.   Which is somewhat distinct from what you said, which was 15th of

 2     September.

 3        A.   I'm sorry, I meant to say 15th of July.

 4        Q.   Okay, perfect.  Great.

 5             Now going back to this particular section, going back page 18.  I

 6     take it that the disciplinary authority here as it relates to brigade

 7     commanders could also be found to resonate higher up the chain; correct?

 8        A.   Correct, sir.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And so that the same disciplinary authority that you're

10     referring to here is the disciplinary authority that Mladic would have

11     over those below him; correct?

12        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe there are provisions under law that explain

13     that.

14        Q.   And, I mean, ultimately that Karadzic would have over the entire

15     army.

16        A.   Correct, sir.

17        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to those issues -- if we could now go to

18     the next section of your report, which is section 5.

19             And before we discuss section 5, did you have occasion, while you

20     were engaged in your research and analysis, to review the Law on Military

21     Courts and Military Prosecutor, and the guidelines and criteria with

22     regard to criminal prosecutions that were promulgated in the

23     Republika Srpska?

24        A.   Yes, sir, I did.

25        Q.   Okay.  I take it that the first --

Page 6710

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have section 5, please, which is

 2     page 23.

 3        Q.   And looking at section 5.0, I think it is pretty clear that as

 4     early as the 13th of May, 1992, Karadzic has issued an order with regard

 5     to the rules of international law of war on the army, right?

 6        A.   Correct, sir.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Now, if we could turn to 1D03-0054.

 9             We're having trouble getting it up.  Great.

10        Q.   Right now it's in a language I think you don't understand, and in

11     a moment it should be in a language that you do.

12             Okay.  You will -- you will note that it this is a decree on the

13     proclamation of the Law on military Courts, and it's dated 30th December,

14     1993, and I take it that this is one of the documents that you analysed

15     with regard to the issues that involve themselves concerning criminal

16     prosecutions?

17        A.   Yes, sir, as part of the VRS military disciplinary process.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could I have this particular -- I'm not going to

19     go through this piece by piece.  It's just it hasn't come into evidence

20     yet, and I think it is critical for an understanding of your report.

21     Could I have this as defendant's next in order, please.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's admitted.  May it please be given an

23     exhibit number.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D104.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

Page 6711

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  The next document is 1D03-0046.  And once again

 2     I'm going to be asking essentially the same questions with regard to that

 3     document.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Could you give the number again, please.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  1D03-0046.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure.

 8        Q.   This document is a document that was produced in the Official

 9     Gazette of the Republika Srpska on the 28th of November, 1994, and I take

10     it once again this is one of the documents that you relied upon with

11     regard to your analysis and research?

12        A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And could we have that marked as defendant's next

14     in order.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's admitted.  May it please be so marked,

16     please.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D105.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And could we have next 1D03-0001.

19             Okay.  Could we go to -- this is a 1992 document.

20             Could we go to the next page.

21        Q.   And I'm doing this just because the first page had virtually

22     nothing on it.  And I take it that this document, once again is a

23     document that you concerned yourself with when you were engaged in your

24     analysis with regard to the issues that you were asked to consider.

25        A.   Correct, sir.

Page 6712

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have this marked as defendant's next in

 2     order.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's admitted.  May it please be so marked.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D106.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 7        Q.   Now you take that you also took -- took a look at the Republika

 8     Srpska Law on the Army; Law on National Defence, February 1992; and Law

 9     on Defence, June 1992?

10        A.   Correct, sir.

11        Q.   Okay.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we then have sequentially 65 ter 6605.

13     After that will be 6569 and 6950 -- the first one, I do apologise, is

14     already in as -- it's in as Exhibit P191.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's 6605.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes, I do apologise.  It is already in as P191,

17     Your Honour.

18             6569.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Is what we have here, 6569?

20             THE REGISTRAR:  That's correct, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I honestly can't tell, until it gets bigger on

23     the screen, Your Honour.  I do apologise.  I just can't see it.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Welcome to the club.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.  This is a document you relied on; correct?

Page 6713

 1        A.   Yes, sir.

 2        Q.   Okay.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could I have admitted as defendant's next in

 4     order.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's admitted.  May it please be given an

 6     exhibit number.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D107.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And I believe the last one in this series is

10     6950.

11             God, I hate going blind.

12        Q.   Is this another document that you had an opportunity to use in

13     your research?

14        A.   Yes, sir.

15        Q.   Okay.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have marked as defendant's next in

17     order.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's admitted.  May it please be marked.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D108.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:

22        Q.   With regard to your analysis, did you also have occasion to

23     review the manual for Command Staffs, which is, I think, entitled the

24     rule of -- role of corps of ground forces?

25        A.   The manual for Command Staff is the --

Page 6714

 1        Q.   Hold on, let me --

 2        A.   -- is different.

 3        Q.   Yeah, I think it is different.  I have written something here,

 4     and something else -- let me just double-check.  Yes, okay.  The manual

 5     for Command Staffs, which is 6397.

 6             Did you have occasion to review that document?  Obviously you

 7     must have, because you corrected me.

 8        A.   Yes, sir, I relied on that as a component of my reports.

 9        Q.   Okay.  That document -- that document, do you know if that

10     document ever moved from its draft position into a final position, and,

11     if so, when?

12        A.   I am not aware that it ever moved from its draft position to a

13     final position.  Actually, that wasn't uncommon with a number of the

14     regulations.  But having said that, it was applied.

15        Q.   Okay.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have that marked as defendant's next in

17     order.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It is so marked.  May it please be given a number.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D109.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Would application of the document not ipso facto

21     mean that it is, therefore, in the final stage?

22             THE WITNESS:  What the practice of -- and there are a number of

23     other documents that you will see regulatory things like this that are

24     listed as either draft or provisional.  And it was not uncommon under

25     their particular system that they would publish and implement these as

Page 6715

 1     draft regulations.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And apply them.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Apply them.  And then, based on years of lessons

 4     learned, they would go in and finalize them over time.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 7        Q.   There's a last document that I'd like to discuss with you, and

 8     that's 6015.  And it's the rule corps of ground forces, provisional.

 9             Now, I don't know if you can be of any assistance.  I need to ask

10     my colleague if they can be of any assistance because there are two

11     translations for this document.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which colleague?

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Probably the one that knows more about this stuff

14     would be is Carmela, honestly.  I mean I think she probably -- I mean,

15     she understands the disclosure better than anybody at least on that side,

16     from what I understand, no insult meant to Mr. Harmon whatsoever.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Except that you can't talk to Ms. Javier.

18                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I believe that the 5 September is the official,

20     but I'm not positive about that.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Harmon.

22             MR. HARMON:  The translation; there are two translations.  The

23     translation has -- the revised translation has a document ID 0039-5376ET.

24     That's the --

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  Then that's the one that we should --

Page 6716

 1     that's the one ...

 2             THE WITNESS:  I am familiar with this document; I did rely on it.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  I'm just -- I would like the original

 4     document and the appropriate translation moved in as defendant's next in

 5     order, whichever one it may be, and I think that we can sort that out.

 6     We can either sort this out immediately or sort it out it the very near

 7     future.  We'll take that matter up with Mr. Registrar, if that works for

 8     the Court.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That works for the Court.

10             It's admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit number.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D110.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:

14        Q.   I'd like to backtrack for a moment, if I could.

15             When we were speaking earlier today, we were discussing, among

16     other things, the manner in which you dealt with what I'll call evolving

17     information concerning your reports and of the -- not only the notion but

18     the reality that when you came across a particular mistake, or error,

19     that you remedied it.

20             Do you recall that?

21        A.   Yes, sir.

22        Q.   Okay.  Could you tell me what the word "asanacija" means?

23        A.   Asanacija.

24        Q.   Thank you.  You speak better than I do.

25        A.   Only on this particular word, sir, as -- as I expect you know,

Page 6717

 1     there are a lot of different definitions that are associated with it.

 2             The definition that I use and that I used in my reports and

 3     testimony reflects the definition that we have from one of the JNA

 4     manuals.  I think it is a 1979-dated manual on those types of issues,

 5     related to battlefield, health, medical services and safety-related

 6     issues dealing with the refuge of war on the battlefield.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And when you say -- is that the "refuge" or the "refuse"?

 8        A.   Refuse.

 9        Q.   That which is left over after the battle is done?

10        A.   Correct, sir.  Primarily reports dealing with biological waste

11     products, being, you know, dead animals, dead soldiers, things of that

12     nature.

13        Q.   And with regard to that particular issue just generally, if you

14     could help me for a second, I take it that this is it not an uncommon

15     concern, at least militarily, that after there's a battle, something must

16     be done with the environs in order to make it habitable again.

17        A.   Correct, sir.  It's a basic, you know, battlefield sanitation

18     measure.

19        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to the testimony that you have given, I

20     believe, that you mentioned yesterday that you interpreted the word to

21     mean burying prisoners?

22        A.   In the context of that particular document, yes, sir.

23        Q.   Okay.  When you say in the context of that particular document,

24     this is a conversation that you have had at a previous time, have you

25     not, in another trial?

Page 6718

 1        A.   Yes, sir.  As you're quite aware, I suspect --

 2        Q.   I think I might be.

 3        A.   Colonel Pandurevic and his Defence team offer a different, both

 4     definition and meaning to what that word is.

 5        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to that, and I want to get right to that

 6     point.

 7             I believe that's found in your Srebrenica narrative, is it not?

 8        A.   The revised narrative, yes, sir.

 9        Q.   Yes.  And it's paragraph -- I want to say it's 13.12, but I could

10     be mistaken.  No, I made a mistake.

11             This is it with regard to the Pandurevic discussion, and I do

12     apologise, because I have written down the wrong page number.

13        A.   If you give me a few seconds, sir --

14        Q.   Sure.

15        A.    -- I believe I can assist you on that.  I think I know where you

16     want to go on this.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I was so careful about this one too.  Dear, dear.

18             THE WITNESS:  I believe you were at -- or where you want to be is

19     7.72, sir.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:

21        Q.   Yes.

22             Now, with regard to -- with regard to this particular part of

23     your report, how do you come to the different, what I would call,

24     translation of this word?

25        A.   Well, sir, and again as I explained at some length during that

Page 6719

 1     particular trial, the use of this word in context of what was happening

 2     on the battlefield at the time is where I make the assertion that what he

 3     is discussing is the burial of the bodies of the prisoners.

 4             I say that because when one looks at the other activities that

 5     are occurring, particularly knowing that on this particular day, the

 6     Zvornik Brigade is not dealing with burying any of its own dead or issues

 7     of that nature, I conclude that the only possible explanation, what

 8     Colonel Pandurevic is trying to tell the corps command is the burdens of

 9     burying the bodies of the dead prisoners.  They were the only dead that

10     day.

11        Q.   Okay.  All right.  If we could go to P2245; I understand your

12     explanation, which is I understand not the revised report, but what we

13     would call the initial report that was authored on the 15th of May, 2000.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And if we can go to page --

15        Q.   I think you will find it at page 94, section 13.12.

16             And before I ask you any questions, if you could familiarize

17     yourself with that particular section, 13.12.

18        A.   Yes, sir.

19        Q.   Okay.  This is -- this is the area where I believe you had some

20     considerable discussion with, I believe it was Mr. Haynes concerning the

21     accuracy of your report and whether or not there were any errors

22     contained therein or not.

23             First of all, do you just recall the general conversation as

24     between yourself and Mr. Haynes about this matter?

25        A.   Yes, sir, I believe, like I said, this was the particular issue

Page 6720

 1     of my summarizing the conclusion here.  His concern, of course, was I did

 2     not do a direct literal lift of the language like I did earlier in the

 3     report.  I in fact summarized it for my conclusion.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Well, as a matter of fact, it -- would it be fair to say

 5     that with regard to the quoted language here, and I'm starting with the

 6     sentence which is where you have been before, it's about -- it's a little

 7     over halfway down in this particular paragraph:  "Later that same

 8     day ..."

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   Okay.  With regard to that, you agreed that the phrase "security

11     operations" was a technical error; correct?

12        A.   Correct, sir.

13        Q.   You conceded, with regard to the issue of the word that we were

14     just discussing which you pronounced much better than I have, that you're

15     putting that word in parentheses is not a proper translation; correct?

16        A.   I don't know if I conceded that.

17        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

18        A.   What I did say and maybe to shorten it all up, what I did say is

19     if there were any doubt, that the reader should go back to the original

20     context of -- or the original text of the actual document.

21        Q.   Mm-hm.  And, as a matter of fact, you were asked a question, if

22     I'm not mistaken, by Judge Agius with regard to whether or not there was

23     a literal translation or not.  And what you said in that regard was to go

24     back to the actual text; correct?

25        A.   Correct, sir.  I mean, this is a summary that I -- and I

Page 6721

 1     summarized for my conclusion whenever there is any doubt, and one of the

 2     reasons why I so heavily footnote my document - and, in fact, on the

 3     electronic version you can actually pull up the document in question that

 4     has been footnoted - I always revert back to -- you know, the reader back

 5     to the original document.

 6        Q.   And I believe with regard to the quoted language "security

 7     operations," we've discussed that.

 8             And the other one was the quoted language here, "let the

 9     prisoners go," was that another place where there was a technical error

10     with regard to the information that's contained within the report?

11        A.   Correct, sir.  I believe the exact translation is "let them go,"

12     if I'm correct, yeah.

13        Q.   With regard to these issues -- and the only reason I'm asking the

14     question is because when we started your testimony you were kind enough

15     to correct a discrete portion of your report by deleting some language in

16     a footnote so that your report would be technically accurate.

17        A.   Yes, sir.  But I'm operating under the assumption that everybody

18     has my prior transcripts and all the prior corrections that have been

19     made over the course of trials on this, and that the corrections that I

20     made was one that had not been caught previously.

21        Q.   I see.  So apart from what I have just noted, then, any other

22     corrections to be made to your report are, as you put it, to be found in

23     your prior testimony?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  I believe there were a couple of identified footnote

25     citations and things of that nature that were either transposed or in the

Page 6722

 1     wrong location, and I think we have dealt with them as part of my prior

 2     testimony, yes, sir.

 3        Q.   With regard to your testimony here, however, we have not had the

 4     benefit of those corrections; correct?  I don't mean here today; I mean

 5     just since the time you have been with us.

 6        A.   Again, like I said, they're all former transcripts.  I don't know

 7     what has gone by with regard to that.

 8        Q.   Okay.  You just -- you don't by any chance know off the top of

 9     your head --

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just make sure you are near the mike,

11     Mr. Guy-Smith.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.

13        Q.   You don't know by any chance off the top of your head just how

14     many days you have testified in these prior proceedings?

15        A.   Um, I'm thinking about 21.

16        Q.   I'm thinking you're about right.  Okay.

17             You mentioned to us in your testimony that the -- the column size

18     was somewhere between, I believe, 12 and 15.000.

19        A.   That is correct.  Those are the generally accepted numbers, sir.

20        Q.   Okay.  And in your narrative, I believe you mentioned that the

21     column size is between 10 and 15.000.

22        A.   Yes, sir.

23        Q.   All right.  And I understand that there may be a mere 2.000 in

24     terms of distinction between the two, but is -- are we to rely on the 10

25     to 15.000 figure or the 12 to 15.000 figure with regard to column size?

Page 6723

 1        A.   Sir nobody was standing at the beginning of the column with a

 2     counter, so --

 3        Q.   All right, I appreciate that.  But since you are the person who

 4     has given both of those numbers, I'm just trying to figure out which

 5     number we should rely upon with regard to the column size?

 6        A.   I'm comfortable with the 12 to 15.000.

 7        Q.   All right.  When Pandurevic, on the 15th of -- I believe it was

 8     the 16th, I'm sorry, July, decided to let the column through, this was in

 9     reaction, as I understood it, to his appreciation which had been

10     developing the day before, of the magnitude of the military threat that

11     the column posed?

12        A.   Yes, sir, I believe that's correct.

13        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to the military threat that the column

14     posed, I believe you've told us that it's estimated that one-third of the

15     column was armed.

16        A.   Correct, sir.

17        Q.   Okay.  And that, I believe that in some of the footage some of

18     the last footage that we saw yesterday, we saw at least one or two

19     soldiers -- I'm sorry, one or two individuals in camouflage clothing, I

20     believe, carrying weapons.

21        A.   Yes, sir.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, with regard to the decision that was made to let the

23     column through, that decision, would you characterize that as being an

24     independent decision, a decision that comes from a centralised command

25     structure, or a decision that comes from a decentralised command

Page 6724

 1     structure?

 2        A.   I don't think that that would apply.  I mean, the decision was

 3     made by Colonel Pandurevic, the lawfully appointed commander after that

 4     brigade.  Colonel Pandurevic made the decision on his own and then

 5     notified his superior command that he had done that.  Obviously his

 6     superior command did not view that as a decision that they wanted happen.

 7     They -- they viewed that as something counter to the orders.  But having

 8     said that, I don't think that that particular decision is characterized

 9     either as -- under a centralised or a decentralised structure.  It

10     happened within the structure of the VRS.

11        Q.   You raise an interesting point because you say that -- that his

12     superior command did not view that as a decision they wanted to happen;

13     they viewed that as something counter to the orders.

14             So with regard with that decision having been made counter to the

15     orders, I'm trying to get some understanding here with regard to how such

16     a decision by Pandurevic falls into the discussion that we've been having

17     in a more general sense, admittedly, concerning command and control.

18     Because it seems to me what you just said is that he didn't follow

19     orders.

20        A.   That is correct, sir.  He didn't follow orders of his superior

21     command, which were to essentially engage in and destroy the column to

22     the extent that he could.  The orders that he gave as the brigade

23     commander, he was entitled to give as the commander.  So, I mean, again,

24     I don't know how that particular discussion falls under a centralised or

25     a decentralised structure.  He was operating within the centralised

Page 6725

 1     structure of the army of the Republika Srpska.  He gave an order that he

 2     was entitled to give as the commander, even though it ran counter to the

 3     guidance he had received from his superior organs.  And then he informed

 4     them of that.

 5        Q.   Let me just stop you there.  You said guidance which is distinct

 6     to an order.  Is it your testimony that he received a guidance with

 7     regard to how this should be handled or he received an order with regard

 8     to the issue of this particular column?

 9        A.   My understanding is his orders were to engage the column.  So I

10     don't want to make it sound like he had -- there was an option, an

11     optional thing.  He was sent back from Zepa with various re-enforcements

12     in order to defend his zone and engage the column, and that is what they

13     expected him to do.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Is it correct that before he gave this order he

15     had sent a report to them telling them of the problems he was faced with

16     and asking for assistance?

17             THE WITNESS:  If going back in time, when he arrives on 15 July,

18     he does report back to the superior command, as well as subsequently

19     informing them of the -- his growing perception of the strength of the

20     column and everything else.  By the 16th of July, he makes the judgement,

21     as the man on the ground there, that he can't successfully engage the

22     column and that the best thing that he can do is to allow it to proceed.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I understand that.  Prior to the 16th, he had

24     reported the problems that he was faced with and asked for assistance

25     from his superiors.

Page 6726

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  And in fact prior to 16th he was heavily

 2     involved in combatting the problem.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Did he get that assistance?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I think he did.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  He did get assistance?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  Through the day of the 15th as well as

 7     the 16th, additional reinforcements were being rushed to the Zvornik

 8     battlefield area, so he was receiving reinforcements.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But still allowed the column to go through?

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, he -- again, as the commander on the

11     ground, he made that decision in order to allow the column to pass --

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Was it because notwithstanding the

13     re-enforcements, the column was still overwhelming?

14             THE WITNESS:  Well, sir, that is a point of contention in the

15     ongoing trial.  It is my position, based on my reading from the documents

16     that that is it in fact correct.  He made the judgement that even with

17     the reinforcements that were coming in, that he could not militarily

18     contest the passage of the column without taking a significant number of

19     casualties.  His position is that he allowed the column to pass as a

20     humanitarian gesture.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

22             Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

24        Q.   With regard to the issue of any disciplining that would have been

25     done in relation to his decision to let the column pass, who would have

Page 6727

 1     been his superior to make such a determination of discipline?

 2        A.   His first level superior to make that decision would have been

 3     the corps commander, Colonel Radislav Krstic.  Above that, would have

 4     been General Ratko Mladic.

 5        Q.   And above Mladic, would there have been Karadzic, or would it

 6     have stopped, in your estimation, based upon the laws that you have

 7     analysed and reviewed, and your understanding of the history of this

 8     discrete period of time?

 9        A.   No, sir.  I believe that given the laws that I reviewed, that

10     certainly as the Supreme Commander and also you know the minister of

11     Defence, there would have been a political component as well, and

12     certainly Karadzic and the minister of Defence would have had a say in it

13     as well.

14             And when I talk about discipline it's not just if the context of

15     a military court martial, so to speak.  It could also be a decision to

16     relieve him of his command.

17        Q.   What other thing -- I understand the issue with court martial.

18     But apart from relieving him from his command, what other kinds of

19     discipline were available to be imposed?

20        A.   Again, it depends on what context.  If we're talking about a

21     disciplinary context of his failure to follow orders, it would have been

22     -- you know, he would have been potentially or could have been

23     potentially relieved of command and reassigned.  It could have been

24     administratively demoted or sanctioned in another way.  If we're talking

25     about the context of his involvement in the criminal acts related to his

Page 6728

 1     decisions and those of the Zvornik Brigade certainly the military court

 2     system would have been a process that should have been played.

 3        Q.   I see.  Okay.  Thank you.  I'm going to move away from that issue

 4     and go to something which is perhaps more concrete because we don't yet

 5     have an understanding of -- of geographically the Srebrenica enclave.

 6     And I'm hoping you can be of some assistance us in that regard.  I don't

 7     know if you still have the --

 8        A.   The map.

 9        Q.    -- the map.

10        A.   I don't.  Yes, sir, I do; it was folded.

11        Q.   Which is P2400.

12             You indicated yesterday that the area that is encircled in

13     purple, as I understood it, represents the Srebrenica enclave?

14        A.   Correct, sir.

15        Q.   Okay.  And within the -- within that enclave, there are a number

16     of different cities or settlements; correct?

17        A.   Correct, sir.

18        Q.   Now, I've heard the term "Bandera triangle," B-a-n-d-e-r-a.  Is

19     the Bandera triangle a specific part of the Srebrenica enclave?

20        A.   It is geographically an area that is to the south and west of the

21     town of Srebrenica.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could scroll -- I'm going to scroll down on

23     the screen.  Excellent.  Okay.  It's an area which is -- and perhaps with

24     the help of the usher here ...

25        Q.   Can you give us a -- an imagistic representation with the use of

Page 6729

 1     the trusty electronic pen of the Bandera triangle.

 2        A.   I believe that is it the approximate area we are referring to.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And the Bandera triangle contains within a part of the

 4     Jadar river; correct?

 5        A.   I think so, yes.

 6        Q.   And the entire -- the entire area, the entire area of the

 7     Srebrenica enclave -- that's fine, thank, you Mr. Registrar.

 8             You know what, we should probably -- I'm not quite done, if you

 9     could mark that -- inside of that triangle with a B to represent Bandera.

10             Could you do that?  Do you have a pen?

11        A.   Oh, I'm sorry.

12        Q.   No problem.

13        A.   I thought you were referring to the usher.

14        Q.   Sorry, I don't think he can mark for you.  Somehow I don't think

15     the Judges would like that too much.  It is bad enough when either

16     Mr. Harmon or I testify, when I get too far astray here.  Thank you.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have that admitted as defendant's next

18     in order.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We'll do this just now.  But just before we do

20     that, I don't whether you are able to help us, I see this map is very

21     scant on the legend.

22             Are you able to tell us what the dots on the perimeter of the

23     Srebrenica enclave marked with letters of the alphabet denote?

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I can.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What do they denote?

Page 6730

 1             THE WITNESS:  They are the locations of United Nations outposts

 2     that were along the perimeter.  They had these observation posts.  They

 3     were identified alphabetically, and that is what dots depict.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 5             The map is admitted into evidence.  May it please be given an

 6     exhibit number.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D111.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 9        Q.   And with regard to the area that is contained within the -- the

10     purple outline, it's my understanding that area is approximately

11     60 square kilometres; correct?

12        A.   I'll take your word for that.  It sounds about right.

13        Q.   I actually think I gleaned that from one of your testimonies, as

14     a matter of fact.

15        A.   It's been a while, sir.  But as I said, I think it sounds about

16     right.

17        Q.   Now, if we look at the left-hand side of the map, up where it

18     says Tuzla, there's an area which is in pink.  Do you see that area?

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated]

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm sorry, if you could scroll down.  Scroll

21     down, sorry -- I mean scroll up.  Up, down.  Okay, stop right there.

22        Q.   If you see where it says BiH?

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   And then it says Tuzla, and there's an area which is in pink?

25        A.   Yes, sir, I believe that depicts the city environs of Tuzla.

Page 6731

 1        Q.   Is where the city environs of Tuzla, is that also where the

 2     airport was located?

 3        A.   I believe the airport is actually located outside and a little to

 4     the south of the town.

 5        Q.   Okay.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm done with that exhibit.

 7        Q.   Would you agree with me that, on 16th of April, 1993, Srebrenica

 8     was declared a demilitarised zone?

 9        A.   Yes, sir, I believe that's correct.

10        Q.   Would you agree with me that it never became a demilitarised zone

11     and that there was a standing army within the Srebrenica enclave?

12        A.   Yes, sir, I would agree.

13        Q.   Would you agree with me that in 1995, at the time of the spring,

14     there were a number of different locations throughout the region,

15     specifically I'm referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska,

16     where an offensive was mounted by the Bosnian Muslim army?

17        A.   Correct, sir.

18        Q.   Would you agree with me that this time, this point in time, is

19     probably the most dramatic point in time where there is a breakdown

20     between the Bosnian government and UNPROFOR?

21        A.   I don't know whether you would be correct or not.  I didn't study

22     the relationship between the -- I assume when you're talking Bosnian,

23     Bosnian Muslim.

24        Q.   Yes, thank you.  I made a mistake I asked you not to make.

25     Precisely so.  Bosnian Muslim.

Page 6732

 1        A.   I don't know the answer to that.  That was not something that I

 2     engaged in.

 3        Q.   Did you study at all in your analysis the concerns that the

 4     Bosnian Muslim army had with regard to the difficulties that UNPROFOR was

 5     creating for its successful winning of the war?

 6        A.   My -- my knowledge of that is, in large part, based on -- and I

 7     think it's footnote 72 of my report, the 1999 United Nations report

 8     dealing with Srebrenica, and particularly the eastern safe areas that

 9     they published, and I believe in that particular report, there is a fair

10     amount of discussion on that particular issue.

11        Q.   I take it you would also agree with me that the 28th Division of

12     the Bosnian Muslim army was -- had successfully been tying up a -- two

13     brigades of men from the Drina Corps after the spring offensive and prior

14     to July 1995?

15        A.   I would expand it even more so.  I would say that they were

16     successfully tying up at least two brigades of the Drina Corps from the

17     creation of the safe area in 1993 to that period.

18        Q.   Okay.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Would that be a convenient time?

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That would be.

21             We'll take a break and come back at half past 12.00.

22             Court adjourned.

23                           --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

Page 6733

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 2        Q.   Following up from your last answer, would you agree that the

 3     Bosnian Muslim army, in its condition having successfully tied up a

 4     number of the Drina Corps brigades, was composed of officers and soldiers

 5     who came from the same military doctrine that we have been discussing,

 6     promulgated by the JNA from the same laws that we have been discussing in

 7     the general sense, and obviously I think you've already told us were JNA

 8     officers, as the VRS?

 9        A.   Well, sir, the manpower of that particular army, the officers

10     were, to the degree that they were former JNA officers, or trained by the

11     JNA, and the manpower, again, all did their mandatory conscripted service

12     within the JNA except for those, of course, the younger kids joining the

13     army who began their military service you know after the JNA had already

14     gone away.  So to that degree, I think that's a fair statement.

15        Q.   Okay.  And, I mean, obviously because we're dealing with a

16     relatively unique situation that being of a civil war, in which a

17     standing army, that being the JNA, ultimately had a breakup in which

18     officers that had previously all been together went into separate armies

19     and oftentimes armies against each other, it makes sense, having come

20     from much of the same tradition, whether they be as we've just discussed,

21     Bosnian Muslims, or Bosnian Serbs, or Croatians, that they would follow

22     that which they had learned over many years as professional soldiers.

23        A.   Certainly in the earlier years of the war.  Gradually as they

24     learn their own lessons and develop perhaps unique tactics or unique

25     operational lessons from their own combat experience, they might differ.

Page 6734

 1     But by and large everyone followed along the lines of the former JNA.

 2        Q.   As a matter of fact, I think that you even make such a comment in

 3     what is at 2248 at paragraph 1. -- 1.4 where you indicate:

 4             "However for a variety of reasons, few updated regulations were

 5     published by the VRS during the war."

 6             And your footnote is:

 7             "Given the linkage of the between the Officer Cadre of the VRS

 8     and the VJ, it is not surprising there was almost no migration away from

 9     established JNA (and later) VJ military regulatory basis."

10             And then you have one notable exception was the publication of

11     the provisional regulations on service in the army of the Serbian

12     republic, issued on 18 August, 1992.

13        A.   Correct, sir, for the VRS, that is exactly right.

14        Q.   What -- one final question with regard to something that you have

15     mentioned in your report, the same report, at P2248, and that's with

16     regard to -- you mention an organisation known as the 30th Personnel

17     Centre.

18             Did you have occasion to study in your analysis the 30th

19     Personnel Centre?

20        A.   Not the in-depth mechanics of the centre per se.

21        Q.   Okay.

22        A.   My knowledge of the centre reflects the fact that the former

23     professional officers of the JNA who were assigned to the VRS were still

24     administratively dealt with the by the VJ 30th Personnel Centre.  That's

25     the degree that I am aware of it --

Page 6735

 1        Q.   Okay.  And you can take it no further than that.

 2        A.   No, sir.

 3        Q.   Okay.  I'm sorry.  Helicopters.

 4             Are you aware of the -- I'm going start with the findings that

 5     were made in the Krstic Judgement, with regard to the issue of

 6     helicopters.  And by that I'm referring to paragraph 24 in which the

 7     Trial Chamber heard credible and largely uncontested evidence of a

 8     consistent refusal by the Bosnian Muslims to abide by the agreement to

 9     demilitarise the safe area.

10             "The Bosnian Muslim helicopters flew in violation of the no-fly

11     zone.  The ABiH opened fire towards Bosnian Serb lines and moved through

12     the safe area.  The 28th Division was continually arming itself, and at

13     least some humanitarian aid coming into the enclave was appropriated by

14     the ABiH."

15             The reason I'm asking if you are familiar that, is you told us

16     that you had worked on the appeal of Krstic, and I take it that you may

17     have well read the judgement.

18             It goes on to say:

19             "To the Bosnian Serbs it appeared that Bosnian Muslim forces in

20     Srebrenica were using the 'safe area,'" which is in quotes, "as a

21     convenient base from which to launch offensives against the VRS and that

22     UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it.  General Halilovic

23     admitted that Bosnian Muslim helicopters had flown in violation of the

24     no-fly zone, and he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with

25     ammunition for the 28th Division.  In moral terms, he did not see it as a

Page 6736

 1     violation of the safe area agreement, given that the Bosnian Muslims were

 2     so poorly armed to begin with."

 3             So --

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon.

 5             MR. HARMON:  Just clarity on the question, Your Honour.  Is the

 6     question whether Mr. Butler is aware of that passage that Mr. Guy-Smith

 7     has read from the Krstic Judgement?  That the question?

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That's the question.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We're waiting for that question, all of us.

10             MR. HARMON:  Thank you.

11             THE WITNESS:  I've read the Judgement.  I can't say that that

12     particular -- or at least parts of that come to mind.  I am aware of

13     General Halilovic's comments.

14             Going perhaps back to the beginning where I base my knowledge of

15     that particular issue, and again, referring to footnote 72 of my revised

16     narrative, which is the United Nations report on Srebrenica, after our

17     exchange I wanted to be sure that I was in fact correct, and I would

18     refer the reader back to paragraph 222 of the United Nations report where

19     they in fact acknowledge their knowledge of these helicopter flights into

20     the eastern safe areas, and in May of 1995, the fact that one had been

21     shot down.

22             So that's where I'm basing as an initial point of departure, from

23     my knowledge.  I'm also aware obviously of VRS documents which date their

24     knowledge of these helicopter flights occurring as well as their efforts

25     to interdict it.

Page 6737

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 2        Q.   In addition to that, are you aware of the testimony of

 3     General Hadzihasanovic of the 6th of April, 2005, with regard to this

 4     issue?

 5        A.   No, sir, I'm not.

 6        Q.   Okay.  You've mentioned that your awareness of Halilovic's

 7     testimony in this regard, although did you not rely upon it, as I

 8     understand, are you aware of the fact that there was testimony also

 9     received with regard to the specific issue, by that I'm just referring to

10     the issue of helicopter flights and the violation of the no-fly zone by

11     the Bosnian Muslim army from Mr. Radinovic?

12        A.   I'm aware of -- I guess it was profess or Radinovic's testimony.

13     I don't know whether he specifically -- he was over a period of a number

14     of days too.  I don't recall at this juncture whether or not he stated

15     that or not.

16        Q.   Okay.  Are you aware of the testimony of any members of UNPROFOR

17     or DutchBat with regard to that particular issue?  Once again, the issue

18     of the flying of helicopters.

19        A.   Again, I can't recall the testimony, whether that issue came up

20     or not.

21        Q.   Okay.  And finally, I'd like to show you a document -- or I

22     believe that we have agreement with regard to a document.  And I'm

23     looking across the -- across the landscape to my colleague on the other

24     side, which is the document that had been previously discussed with

25     Mr. Williams, which is 1D01-1881.

Page 6738

 1             You have a different number because you have a number from a

 2     different case.  But it's the same document.  This is --

 3             MR. HARMON:  This is the document, the final analysis of the

 4     Srebrenica and Zepa air lift [Overlapping speakers] ...

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  [Overlapping speakers]...  that's correct.  And

 6     it's dated the 17th of February, 1996, and I believe there is an

 7     agreement --

 8             MR. SAXON:  [Overlapping speakers] ...  You were right.  I agree

 9     with Mr. Guy-Smith.  We agreed that that this document should come into

10     evidence to clarify the matter of the helicopters.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

12             MR. HARMON:  Thank you.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:

14        Q.   See, the helicopter discussion wasn't so bad after all.

15             MR. HARMON:  I think we should give it an exhibit number.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have an exhibit number on that, please.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes.  That's admitted.  May it please be given an

18     exhibit number, Mr. Registrar.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D112.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And if I could have but one brief moment.

22        Q.   Mr. Butler, I made you a promise at the beginning of my

23     examination of you, and I hope I kept my promise, and I haven't kept you

24     for too long.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon.

Page 6739

 1             Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 2             MR. HARMON:  I have no questions, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5                           Questioned by the Court:

 6             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have one or two questions I

 7     would like to put to you.  I would like to clarify a few points in your

 8     report.

 9             First of all, since you analysed all the military operations

10     around Srebrenica, in mid-July, did you see any documents stating that

11     there were VJ military in that area at that time?

12        A.   No, ma'am.

13             JUDGE PICARD:  [Interpretation] That was my first question.

14             Furthermore, on looking at the map of this area, we see that the

15     Drina delineates the border in that area.  The border between Bosnia and

16     the former republican -- Yugoslav republic.  And the former Yugoslav

17     republic, in the north of the area.

18             So this is my question.  On the other side of the river was there

19     the Serb army?  Was the Serb army on the other side of the river?  And

20     could they see what was happening close by?

21        A.   It depends on what you mean by could they see what's happening.

22     As opposed to -- you know, did they have the means to know what was

23     happening?  And the reason why I qualify that is, is obviously if you're

24     talking about sight lines across the Drina river, they're very limited.

25     But some of the activity, for example, in one particular instance one of

Page 6740

 1     the survivors of an execution notes that the bus convoy that was taking

 2     him from the Bratunac area to the area in Zvornik, actually at one point

 3     crossed over one of the bridges into Serbian territory, drove up and then

 4     re-crossed back over at Zvornik.  There are other instances where

 5     individuals who attempted to escape, actually swam or came across the

 6     Drina river or found other ways across the river into Serbia and were

 7     apprehended mostly by the local police forces there, and then those

 8     forces in contact with the Republika Srpska military made arrangements to

 9     turn them back over again to RS custody, with respect to Srebrenica.

10             So given the types of activity that was occurring, again

11     situation-dependant on which particular unit you're talking about and

12     where they are, you know, there were opportunities for them to know.  If

13     you're limiting it to just mere sight line, it might be pretty difficult

14     in that respect.

15             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Thank you for your rather accurate

16     answer.

17             I have another question for you.  This is something you discussed

18     in your report, and we have discussed it quite extensively.  Personnel

19     from the Ministry of Interior, policemen.  And this is not very clearly

20     explained in your report.  I'm not quite sure whether these people

21     belonged to the military police or to the civilian police.  I believe

22     that they -- the military police was present on the ground, and I believe

23     that the civilian police was also there, and what I'm talking about is

24     the Zvornik area.

25             Now, as far as the civilian police is concerned, in this

Page 6741

 1     particular case, was it placed under the command or the order of the MUP,

 2     or was it placed under the command of the military?

 3        A.   If we're talking about the police that are operating in the

 4     Zvornik municipality from roughly the 15th and beyond, they remained

 5     under the command of the head of the CSB, Mr. Vasic.  However, they were

 6     operating under the control of the army.  They were actually sweeping

 7     various areas of the battlefield, where they were engaged in either being

 8     engaged against the column as well as securing some of the rear areas and

 9     they were doing that under the control of the military commander,

10     Colonel Pandurevic.

11             When the RS police forces from, for example, the 2nd Sekovici

12     Detachment and the 1st P JP which moved from the road area on the morning

13     of the 15th and then moved to the Zvornik area as part of reinforcing

14     Colonel Pandurevic for his fight against the column, again, they still

15     remained under the command of Colonel Borovcanin.  They operated under

16     the control of the Colonel Pandurevic, and that command relationship, as

17     it were, is codified under Republika Srpska law in the Ministry of the

18     Interior.  And it notes that when these various police units are

19     operating in a military zone and operating in concert with the army, that

20     while the army commander has some ability -- while the police commander

21     remains in command of the unit, they operate under the direction of the

22     army.

23             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] In your report, and this is

24     something I heard from Mr. Vasic, at one point in time he refused to

25     cooperate with the military when it came to mass executions, for

Page 6742

 1     instance.  That's what he says anyway.

 2        A.   Again, going back to the Republika Srpska Law on the Ministry of

 3     the Interior, one of the aspects of that law is that before the police

 4     forces fall under military control, that the minister of defence and the

 5     minister of the interior jointly agree as to what the limits of those

 6     tasks will be.  And obviously both the army and the police commanders are

 7     aware of what those limits are.

 8             So as long as the military commanders are giving orders within

 9     the limits of that defined resubordination, if you will, the police have

10     to follow them.  If the military commander is giving orders outside the

11     limits of that prearranged agreement, then the police are not obligated

12     to follow them.

13             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

14             Now to follow up on this, I -- we also discussed Military

15     Tribunals, and we discussed the fact that the military, like

16     Colonel Pandurevic, could be court martialed because he had not obeyed

17     the orders.

18             I have another question in this regard.  Was one single military,

19     who was prosecuted for the crimes that were committed in Srebrenica?  And

20     when I say prosecuted, I mean prosecuted by the Military Tribunals in the

21     Republika Srpska.

22        A.   Not to my knowledge, ma'am.

23             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] No one, according to what you

24     know, not a single one has been prosecuted?

25        A.   No, ma'am.

Page 6743

 1             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have one last question.

 2             You discussed at length General Zivanovic's replacement by

 3     General Krstic on the 13th of July.  I don't know if you know about this,

 4     because in your report you say that the reasons for his replacement were

 5     not very clear.

 6             Have you since had any documents that would shed some light on

 7     the reasons for which he got replaced?  And how important is it that he

 8     got replaced?

 9        A.   There, at the time, particularly as these reports were drafted,

10     didn't know the answer to that.  As the investigation has continued,

11     there were two general stories related to General Zivanovic being

12     replaced.  One particular story is that he was replaced as a result of

13     his health reasons and, of course, General Zivanovic notes that when he

14     was interviewed by the ICTY.  There's actually a very quick clip where

15     General Zivanovic is talking about his blood pressure being something

16     over like over 200 over 300 at this point.

17             So, I mean, his story is in fact that, you know, he ultimately

18     was relieved and retired as a result of his health.

19             There is another story floating around obviously, and again

20     difficult to corroborate, that he was identified using military resources

21     from the Drina Corps and from the 5th Engineers for his own personal

22     gain, and -- respect the construction of a chicken farm in some location.

23             General Mladic was very strict about those particular types of

24     issues.  And the other story going around is that General Zivanovic was

25     in fact, you know, replaced because of his use of that, those military

Page 6744

 1     resources for non-military issues.

 2             I don't know that it -- that's particularly important to the

 3     larger Srebrenica crime base, where it was important for us is because as

 4     a component of General Krstic's proceedings, he hotly contested when he

 5     assumed command of the Drina Corps.

 6             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  It was very

 7     clear in the trial against General Krstic.  It was important to know, of

 8     course, when he had actually assumed the command of the army.  But in

 9     this case, this might be somewhat less important.

10             That was my last question.  Thank you very much.

11        A.   Yes, ma'am.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I wasn't going to ask any questions, but I just

13     want it ask -- get an answer to part of Judge Picard's questions that she

14     put to you and part of which was not answered.

15             At page 68, lines 11 to 12, she asked you whether -- I beg your

16     pardon.

17             Lines 15 to 16.  Line 16 specifically:  Was there Serb army on

18     the other side of the river?

19        A.   I can't specifically tell you where the VJ military units were

20     located along the Drina river, sir.  I don't know the answer to that.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But were they located along the Drina river at

22     all?

23        A.   I don't know -- again, I'm not familiar with the dispositions of

24     where those units would have been in July of 1995.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

Page 6745

 1             Any questions Mr. Harmon?

 2             MR. HARMON:  Yes, I do, thank you.

 3                           Re-examination by Mr. Harmon:

 4        Q.   Judge Picard as you some questions, Mr. Butler, about could the

 5     army see what was happening from the territory it occupied?  In other

 6     words, in the FRY, was there a direct line of sight to events that were

 7     occurring in the Republika Srpska?

 8             Let me take you to the map, P2400, Mr. Butler, and ask you --

 9     first of all, there is an red dot near Kozluk contiguous with the river,

10     the Drina river.  Do you see that red dot?  In fact the right-hand edge

11     of that dot is on the river.

12             Have you been to the Kozluk site, or do you know about where it

13     was located in respect of the Drina river?

14        A.   Yes, I know where it is it located in respect of the Drina river.

15        Q.   Where was the mass execution side?

16        A.   It was actually right on the river-bank area.

17        Q.   Okay.  And on the river-bank area in the RS; correct?

18        A.   Yes, sir.

19        Q.   And the other side was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

20     correct?

21        A.   Correct, sir.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, in respect of -- you mentioned in your evidence that

23     some people fled the enclave and swam across the Drina river.  They were

24     captured by what units, to your knowledge?

25        A.   I don't know which units captured them per se.  I know that where

Page 6746

 1     the investigation gains visibility of them is that they are turned over

 2     to the Serbian police who then coordinate with the VRS units on the other

 3     side of the border to turn these people back over to the VRS custody.

 4        Q.   And were in fact people -- some of the people who went across the

 5     river turned back over to the RS?

 6        A.   Yes, they were, sir.

 7        Q.   Do you know what -- do you know their fate?

 8        A.   I believe all of them were killed.

 9        Q.   Were some people who went across the river and were detained by

10     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia police in whatever formation, did they

11     survive?

12        A.   For Srebrenica, the individuals for Srebrenica, I don't -- at the

13     state of my knowledge when I left, I don't believe so.  For Zepa, I am

14     aware that those that crossed over the river did survive.  So I can't say

15     whether or not the investigation has found any -- you know, in the recent

16     years has found any individuals from Srebrenica who made it across the

17     river who were then returned back to their custody and survived.  I just

18     don't know the answer to that.

19        Q.   So the answer to the question is you don't know the answer to

20     that?

21        A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, I know what my state of knowledge is.  I don't

22     know --

23        Q.   All right.

24             MR. HARMON:  I have no additional questions.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you, Mr. Harmon.

Page 6747

 1             Mr. Guy-Smith?

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.  First of all, just a quick transcript

 3     correction which would be on page 68, line 10, I believe that,

 4     Mr. Butler's answer was, No, ma'am.  And at the balance of that line is

 5     to Judge Picard's question.  So just to make sure that is taken care of.

 6                           Further cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

 7        Q.   Do you know with regard to those people who went into FRY, when

 8     they were stopped by the police, which police they were stopped by?  Were

 9     they stopped by the customs police?  Were they stopped by the local

10     police?  Do you know that?

11        A.   No, sir, I don't.

12        Q.   Okay.  Do you know what the relationship those police had with

13     any part of the government, as to whether or not they were under the

14     auspices under the Ministry of Interior; were they under the auspices of

15     some other organisation, Ministry of Defence?  Do you have any

16     information whatsoever --

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith, if he doesn't know which police

18     they are, how would he know which department they fell under?

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Fine.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:

22        Q.   With regard to the statement that you made, you told us that

23     there were people who crossed over the river who were, as I understand

24     it, not returned to the Republika Srpska.

25        A.   Yes, sir.  Related to those individuals fleeing from the Zepa

Page 6748

 1     enclave.

 2        Q.   Okay.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can you tell us the fate of those people from the

 5     Zepa enclave?

 6             THE WITNESS:  It is my understanding that those individuals who

 7     crossed the Drina river from Zepa, that they were in fact, once in Serbia

 8     -- first of all, the RS wanted them back, that the Serbian government

 9     refused and put them under the protection of the ICRC elements that were

10     in Serbia.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Judge Picard has one more question to ask.  I'm

12     sorry, gentlemen.

13             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] It's to follow up on these

14     proceedings.

15             Were there people who crossed the river who managed to flee and

16     who were not arrested afterwards by the Serbian police or army?

17             THE WITNESS:  I am not aware of any individual who came out of

18     that Srebrenica process who crossed the Drina river, managed to either

19     transit through Serbia or whatever state, and then has subsequently

20     approached the Office of the Prosecutor and made that known.

21             So I'm not aware of anyone who fits that criteria, ma'am.

22             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated]

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:

25        Q.     Only with regard to the last question asked by Her Honour,

Page 6749

 1     which is, I don't recall you mentioning any arrest by the Serbian army.

 2     Now, you previously mentioned the Serbian police.  The question has

 3     become somewhat different from where we were initially.

 4             Is it your understanding that the arrests that were made were

 5     made by the local police?

 6        A.   My understanding is I don't know who made the arrests or that

 7     initial detention.  Where we gained visibility on them, from my

 8     perspective, is that when they're in the custody of the local police

 9     elements and that those police elements are contacting the military

10     counterparts in the VRS, primarily the Zvornik and the Bratunac Brigade,

11     identifying that they have individuals and that they want the VRS to take

12     custody of those individuals.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

15             MR. HARMON: [Microphone not activated] -- I just want to ask -- I

16     want to see if I can refresh Mr. Butler's recollection on something; it

17     may or may not refresh his recollection.

18                           Further re-examination by Mr. Harmon:

19        Q.   Mr. Butler, In reviewing intercepts, did you review any

20     intercepts where the Republika Srpska army demanded the return of -- to

21     use the -- I think I will be using, the terms of the intercept, Give me

22     back my Turks.

23             Do you recall an intercept like that?  And could you tell us,

24     first of all, if you recall that intercept and what you know about that

25     intercept and its consequences?

Page 6750

 1        A.   Yes, sir, I do recall the intercept.

 2             The intercept is a conversation with -- and Colonel Beara is one

 3     of the correspondents.  If I'm not mistaken, General Krstic is another

 4     one of the correspondents.  And they are discussing the fact that they're

 5     aware that hundreds of Muslims from the -- you know, former Zepa enclave

 6     had been crossing the Drina river and were in Serbia and that they were

 7     further aware that the Serbs would not turn those individuals back over

 8     to the custody of the Republika Srpska and, of course, the army personnel

 9     were not happy with that development.

10        Q.   So that leads me to my next question because I want to just

11     clarify this point.

12             You say in your answer that they were aware that these people

13     were in Serbia.  They are further aware that the Serbs would not turn

14     over these individuals, you know, back to the custody of the authorities

15     of the army of the RS.

16             Which brings me to my question.  Did the Serbian authorities in

17     that context of that intercept, to your knowledge, turn over the people

18     referred to in the intercept you've described?  In other words was Beara,

19     was Krstic successful in getting from the authorities in Serbia a certain

20     number of people they had in their custody?

21        A.   With respect to Zepa, I believe the answer is no, sir.

22        Q.   Okay.

23             MR. HARMON:  I have no additional questions, Your Honour.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I do not intend on playing ping-pong.  I have no

25     further questions.

Page 6751

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated]

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  No, I don't intend on doing that.  I don't have

 3     any further questions.  And I do have one housekeeping matter that has

 4     been brought to my attention by the Registrar.  It does not relate to

 5     Mr. Butler.  So I'm be happy to take of it.  Absolutely.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated]

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 9             Mr. Butler, thank you so much for coming.  We know are you a busy

10     person, taking time off to come and testify.  This brings us to the end

11     of your testimony.  Are you now excused.  You may stand down.  Please

12     travel well back home.

13             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, sir.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

15                           [The witness withdrew]

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before I turn to you, Mr. Harmon, let's hear the

17     housekeeping matter from Mr. Guy-Smith.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes, I have been informed most kindly by the

19     Registrar that I misspoke myself.  And I called up the wrong 65 ter

20     number at page 43, line 4.  Defence exhibit 108 should be properly 65 ter

21     number 6590, and I think what I did is I transposed the 9 and the 5.  SO

22     the proper number is 6590.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's how we got it.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excellent.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You misspoke earlier.  You said 6950 and corrected

Page 6752

 1     yourself later.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you very much.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

 4             Mr. Harmon, next witness.

 5             MR. HARMON:  We have no additional witnesses for this week,

 6     Your Honour, for the remainder of the day, which I understood --

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Oh, yeah.  To what date do we postpone?

 8             MR. HARMON:  Just a moment, Your Honour.

 9                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

10             MR. HARMON:  I'm informed there are no witnesses for next week,

11     Your Honour, and I can give you the schedule through the Court legal

12     officer.  I don't have it at my disposal, at my fingertips right now.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated] -- actually the 8th is a

14     public holiday.  Is it further postponed to -- no, no, it is not.  Shall

15     we postpone to the 8th then?

16             MR. HARMON:  Yes.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The matter stands adjourned until the 8th of June,

18     quarter past 2.00, Courtroom I.

19             Court adjourned.

20                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.15 p.m.,

21                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 8th of June, 2009,

22                           at 2.15 p.m.