1 Tuesday, 29 September 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning to everyone in and around the
7 courtroom. Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case for today.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
9 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-81-T,
10 the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Could we have the
12 appearances for today, please, starting with the Prosecution.
13 MR. SAXON: Good morning, Your Honours. Dan Saxon, April Carter,
14 and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
16 And for the Defence.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
18 everyone in and around the courtroom. Daniela Tasic, Chad
19 Tina Drolec, Novak Lukic, and Gregor Guy-Smith on behalf of Mr. Perisic.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
21 Mr. Tucker, just to remind you, you are still bound by the
22 declaration which you made at the beginning of your testimony to tell the
23 truth, the whole truth, and nothing else but the truth.
24 Thank you so much.
25 Mr. Guy-Smith, yesterday just as the Court was adjourning, you
1 stood up. I just want to confirm with you because I thought you spoke
2 spontaneously with me. Did I understand you to say you want the witness
3 to give you a copy of the intelligence he received?
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: That is correct.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: On what grounds do you want it?
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: So I'm in a position to determine whether or not
7 the information that he received which was memorialized --
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: No, not for what purpose, on what grounds.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: On the grounds that this information which is
10 critical for the preparation of the Defence and its appropriate for
11 cross-examination, since it's a matter upon which the witness is
12 testifying. On those grounds.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Is it --
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: It's something I believe pursuant to Article 21
15 that the Defence would be entitled to. If there's intelligence
16 information which he is testifying about and there is a need to
17 cross-examine with regard to that information, we should be in a position
18 that we are able to do that. The only way that we can do that is by
19 having the underlined information which the witness is asserting that he
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: He had intelligence, yes. You don't know whether
22 this intelligence was oral, written, CD, tape or what? You haven't even
23 established that. And you are not entitled to any intelligence that he
24 has -- he has told you the content of the intelligence, that's what you
25 were entitled to.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well perhaps -- I understand what the position
2 is. I'm not -- if I understand the Court's ruling --
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: There's no ruling. I'm discussing with you. I
4 haven't ruled. I'm discussing with you.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. As I understand what the Court just said
6 then, it says I'm not entitled to any intelligence unless he has told you
7 the content of the intelligence; that's what you're entitled to. I'm not
8 understanding exactly what you mean by that, Your Honour. If the --
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, what I mean is he has told he has received
10 intelligence. You can ask him what is the intelligence. I'm not quite
11 sure what you -- when you say you want a copy of the intelligence what
12 you mean.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Very well. Well, then, that's something
14 that we will deal with in cross-examination. But I have a question so
15 perhaps I get some guidance from the Court. Which is, Assuming for
16 purposes of discussion that the intelligence received - and I choose to
17 use the word "information" as opposed to "intelligence" for the moment
18 because I think that intelligence is a particular term of art within the
19 military world - but the information that he has received is something
20 other than oral, then I would be making a request for that information so
21 that I can test the accuracy of his testimony.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, I'm saying to you, unless a document has
23 been read by the witness either to refresh his memory in court or not,
24 you are really not entitled to it. He is just telling you what he has
25 received, and unless you can give me authority for that entitlement.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: So, I really do wish to be clear here,
2 Your Honour, because I think it's a matter of some importance.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes. It is very important indeed.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: So am I to understand, then, that if a witness
5 testifies about something orally with regard to documents that he has
6 read which are not in the possession of the Defence and not readily
7 available and not in the possession of the Prosecution, that we are not
8 entitled to have those documents?
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: You are not entitled to have any document that the
10 witness has not looked at in court, that has not used in court.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well if he --
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Unless you can give me authority for that
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: By extension, if an individual says for
15 example --
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think, Mr. Guy-Smith, we can't speculate.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: We can't speculate.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, my concern only is this --
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm going to make --
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: -- because if the issue comes up and there is a
22 document in question and I ask for it, based upon what the Court said
23 rather than have the long discussion again, then I believe that based
24 upon what you've said thus far, if I'm understanding you properly, that
25 it would be a direct limitation on cross-examination --
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: There's no direct limitation, sir. You are
2 entitled to cross-examine on anything that is before the Court. If the
3 witness brings a document before the Court, you are perfectly entitled to
4 it if he has looked at it and used it to refresh his memory or in any
5 other way refers to it by having it before him.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I think the Court's ruling severely hampered the
7 Defence's ability to cross-examine. However, we'll reach this issue
8 obviously once cross-examination occurs, and we'll find out whether or
9 not there is a document or documents or other forms of memorialised
10 information upon which he relied and upon which he has testified here
11 today, and we'll discuss it again at that time.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed. And by extension I realised I picked up
13 yesterday, in fact, when you made that demand for that document that
14 perhaps the Court made a dangerous precedent and created an attitude of
15 entitlement by asking the witness on your behalf whether or not he was
16 prepared to avail his diary.
17 Now, let me just check with you, Mr. Tucker, did you yesterday,
18 when being questioned by Madam Carter, read from the diary?
19 THE WITNESS: I did not, sir.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. You are not obliged to give that diary to
21 anybody. Okay.
22 Madam Carter.
23 MS. CARTER: May we briefly go into private session, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
25 [Private session – RENDERED PUBLIC BY ORAL ORDER – SEE
1 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Hold on, please.
3 We are in private session, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Carter.
5 MS. CARTER: Based on Your Honours's last statement, I am not
6 certain if the diary is to be tendered to Mr. Gregor Guy-Smith.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: No, ma'am.
8 MS. CARTER: It is not.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, ma'am.
10 MS. CARTER: Okay.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: For purposes of the record, I strongly object. I
12 believe we are entitled to the diary. In those trials that I've been in
13 here as well as at least one trial in which my co-counsel has been when
14 the issue of diaries existing have come up with witnesses who have
15 testified independent of the issue, as I recall - and I say as I recall
16 because I don't wish to make a misstatement of fact or of law - we
17 have -- the Defence has been entitled to have those documents --
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is it --
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: -- for purposes of cross-examination and for
20 practical preparation of the defence.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: In respect of what issue, sir?
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Independent of the issue as you've characterised
23 it as whether or not the witness has referred to any particular diary or
24 notes or anything else in his cross-examination where there is a document
25 that directly affects -- that directly affects the facts upon which the
1 Trial Chamber is to decide and directly affects the circumstances upon
2 which the witness is testifying to, it would be in our respectful
3 submission --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, the Court has ruled.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: It would be in our respectful submission a
6 complete violation of the Defendant's right.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, the Court has ruled. You can --
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: We are not entitle today the diary either?
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: The Court has so ruled, sir.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO:
14 Madam Carter.
15 MS. CARTER: Given the Court's very clear ruling at this point
16 then we will not need private session. We were only going to establish
17 any -- hold on one moment, Your Honour. May I consult with counsel.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may.
19 [Prosecution counsel confer]
20 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, given the Court's ruling, we do not
21 seek any further private session. We would like to continue examining
22 the witness, and I would ask for the previous exchange to be made public,
23 as it does not -- the intention of the private session was in order to
24 address the -- any national security concerns. Given the Court's
25 rulings, that is now moot, thus we would not need this in private
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you very much.
3 May the Chamber please move into open session and may -- the
4 Chamber orders that the exchange that took place in private session be
5 made public.
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Carter.
9 WITNESS: PYERS TUCKER [Resumed]
10 Examination by Ms. Carter: [Continued]
11 Q. Colonel Tucker, when we left your testimony yesterday you were
12 discussing the convoy in which General Morillon and yourself
13 participated. Can you please explain to us how that convoy came about?
14 A. Can you remind me of which particular convoy you are talking
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: I could be of some help, it's the 27th and
17 28th of March.
18 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Of which year are we talking?
20 MS. CARTER: 1993, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
22 MS. CARTER:
23 Q. Sir, can you please describe for the Court how that convoy came
25 A. The UNHCR aid convoy of which arrived in Srebrenica around the
1 27th, 28th, was a convoy with food coming from Belgrade through Zvornik
2 into Srebrenica. And it came about because of the pressure which had
3 been put on the Bosnian Serbs in order to allow that humanitarian aid
4 through into Srebrenica.
5 Q. Okay. What type of pressure are you describing?
6 A. This is the -- firstly, the meetings and the requests which
7 General Morillon had been making of the Bosnian Serb leadership, and
8 secondly, there was intense international pressure as well and intense
9 media interest around the world during that time about the situation and
10 events in and around the enclaves, particularly around Srebrenica.
11 Q. Okay. I'll take the international pressure and the media
12 interest in turn. In regards to the international pressure, what was
13 going on at the end of March 1993?
14 A. In terms of international pressure, bearing in mind that I was in
16 a few because as you can imagine I had an awful lot on my hands. The
17 details you would need to look into international media. I'm not able to
18 report about those myself. What I do know is that in Belgrade the
19 French ambassador, the UK
20 representations to the government in Belgrade to request the
21 government in Belgrade
22 on the Bosnian Serbs in order to encourage the Bosnian Serbs to allow
23 these humanitarian aid convoys through.
24 Q. Thank you. How long had there been attempts to get that convoy
1 A. I believe that the convoy which went through on the 27th, 28th
2 went through fairly quickly and easily unlike the convoy which went
3 through around the 13th of -- no, around the 18th or so of March, which
4 had been held up in Zvornik for, I believe, something like two or three
6 Q. Now, you indicated that there was also media interest in the
7 events in Srebrenica. What was being covered and what media outlets were
8 covering it?
9 A. I can only say that I myself saw several newspapers, things like
10 the London Times, the -- an American newspaper, I can't remember which,
11 and I saw some press summaries which had been compiled by the
12 French embassy in Belgrade
13 of attention to at that time.
14 Q. Inside of Bosnia and Herzegovina command were media reports being
16 A. Yes, they were.
17 Q. How were they being monitored?
18 A. There was a small team of, I forget what they were called, press
19 information or P info. And when we arrived in Bosnia in October 1992,
20 they monitored the international media. But in about January or
21 February, they also hired some local people, in other words, who spoke
22 Serbo-Croat in order to be able to monitor local media. By local media
23 what I mean is media inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and media from -- this is
24 print media, and radio media from Belgrade
25 Q. Was the Srebrenica enclave being covered in the international and
1 local media?
2 A. It was.
3 Q. Okay. And actually, upon reviewing your transcript from
4 yesterday, I was actually referring to the convoy that you've just
5 previously spoke of on the 18th of March. So if we can back up in time a
7 You were indicating yesterday that the -- that was the third
8 specific time that aid had arrived to Srebrenica. Can you please
9 describe the incidents surrounding that aid?
10 A. That was the second time that aid got in. The first time was the
11 beginning of December 1992. The second time was around the
12 18th of March. And then the third time was around the 27th or the
13 28th of March.
14 Q. For clarity of the record, you had indicated that the airdrops
15 were in reference to the second time?
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. In regards to that March 18th aid, how did that come about?
18 A. That came about because General Morillon went to the front line
19 at the Yellow Bridge
20 negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, and on the way to the Yellow Bridge
21 I received -- I gained intermittent radio contact with the convoy which
22 was blocked in Zvornik. The convoy had been reported having been there
23 for a number of weeks, and was continuously being -- being blocked.
24 General -- this was the first time we had -- the Bosnian Muslims
25 in Srebrenica had allowed us to go down to the Yellow Bridge
1 vehicles, the Canadian armoured personnel carrier of which I mentioned
2 yesterday, and a jeep. When we arrived at the confrontation line at the
3 Yellow Bridge
4 keep the front line open, and I will take the jeep and go to Zvornik and
5 try and unblock the convoy and come back.
6 When -- General Morillon then disappeared off down the road. I
7 should also say that the excuse of "there is fighting going on," was very
8 often used by all sides in order to justify the blocking of humanitarian
9 aid convoys.
10 Q. You indicated in that answer that that was the first time that
11 you were able to leave the enclave. What do you mean by that?
12 A. The rest of our party was being detained in the enclave by the
13 Muslim -- by the Bosnian Muslims and was being prevented from leaving the
15 Q. What were the Muslims' concerns?
16 A. The Muslims' concerns were that there were many thousands of
17 starving refugees in the enclave that they were being -- that food was
18 being prevented from getting through, and that they had many people dying
19 of injuries from the fighting and people dying of starvation. And they
20 wanted to draw world attention to the plight of the people in Srebrenica.
21 And it was for that purpose that they had prevented General Morillon and
22 the UN party in Srebrenica from leaving Srebrenica when we tried to leave
23 Srebrenica on the 11th or the 12th of March.
24 Q. You indicated that there were many people that were dying from
25 the fighting. What do you mean by that?
1 A. The -- there was quite heavy fighting going on around the --
2 around the pocket. And in the building opposite the PTT building, which
3 is where the Bosnian Muslims had put General Morillon and the UN party,
4 this building was the Srebrenica hospital. And around that time, between
5 10 and 20 people were dying every night from wounds received in fighting.
6 And we would see the graves being dug every morning in the cemetery which
7 was a little bit further down the road.
8 Q. Are we talking about combatants, civilians, a combination?
9 A. I don't know, because in that part of the world just about
10 everybody had items of military clothing.
11 Q. Okay. Now, you were describing the hospital directly in front of
12 the PTT building. Was there any other feature about that building that
13 was of note to you?
14 A. When we arrived in Srebrenica, opposite the PTT building at the
15 foot of the little slope which came down from the hospital was a pile of
16 rubbish, which was covered with snow when we arrived, it was very cold --
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me once again would I ask Ms. Carter to
18 control her witness. The question was:
19 "Was there any other feature about that building that was of note
20 to you?"
21 He is discussing something which is not the building.
22 THE WITNESS: May I continue?
23 MS. CARTER:
24 Q. I'll rephrase the question.
25 Was there any feature near the building in front of you that was
1 of note to you?
2 A. Yes. This pile of rubbish which I was telling you about. When
3 the sun started shining, sometimes it started warming up that pile, and
4 it was a pile of human remains cut off arms, legs, hands, fingers,
5 et cetera. Refuse from this hospital which the hospital staff had --
6 were simply dumping in this pile.
7 Q. How did this pile of human remains strike you?
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Objection, relevance.
9 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, the conditions in which
10 the Muslim population were living in in Srebrenica is relevant as well as
11 the fact that it's these conditions that were -- or why the Muslim
12 population was trying to bring international attention on their plight.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe ask -- phrase the question to elicit that
14 very information you have just said.
15 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.
16 Q. Sir, what type of conditions were the Muslim populations living
17 in in Srebrenica?
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm going to object to that question as
19 being asked and answered. We heard about that yesterday. Extensively.
20 MS. CARTER: I will rephrase a third time.
21 Q. Sir, what was significant about the pile of human remains?
22 A. The significance was that the population in Srebrenica, the
23 people in Srebrenica had given up hope and basic human decency and basic
24 human respect and basic hygiene. They just weren't bothering with any
25 more. You looked in their eyes, and they were dead.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just ask, where did these pieces of human
2 remains come from?
3 THE WITNESS: They came, I presume, from the hospital which was
4 just up the hill. By just up the hill, I mean about 10 metres up the
5 slope. And that -- when Larry Hollingsworth from UNHCR who was in
6 Srebrenica with us realised what this was, he berated the Srebrenica war
7 committee and shamed them into cleaning this up and clearing this up, and
8 it was off-cuts from the hospital.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: When you say the Srebrenica war committee, of
10 which army?
11 THE WITNESS: This is the mayor of Srebrenica and the senior
12 elected officials of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: What was observable around this pile of human
14 remains? What could you observe with your senses around this pile?
15 THE WITNESS: When the sun was shining on it, it stank.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: And when the sun was not shining?
17 THE WITNESS: Night snow fell and then it was just a pile -- it
18 looked like another pile of rubbish.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, you may proceed, ma'am.
20 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Sir, at the time that you were being held in Srebrenica, did you
22 or members of your team have contact with the civilian population?
23 A. Yes, we did.
24 Q. You indicated that one of the -- or, a concern was international
25 attention. Was that the sole concern of the civilian population?
1 A. The biggest concern of the civilian population was simply
2 survival and getting food. Getting international attention was merely a
3 means to the end of getting food and surviving, no longer being attacked,
4 and having a future.
5 Q. When you spoke with the civilian population, did you have
6 conversations in regards to UN presence -- excuse me, specifically
7 UNPROFOR presence in other villages?
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm going to object to the question on the
9 grounds of relevance.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: I just don't understand the question, but I don't
11 think it is irrelevant. But if you can make it clear. I don't know what
12 you are trying to ask the witness here, ma'am. Look at what you've asked
13 on the screen.
14 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour, the specific question, if I were
15 to put the piece of information that will tie it together would be a
16 leading question, so I'm attempting to step by step ask the question.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: But what you have just asked, I don't understand
18 what you are saying.
19 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.
20 Q. Did the civilian population describe incidences where UNPROFOR
21 was present in other villages?
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry, there are two problems with the
23 question. I maintain my relevance objection, and secondly, the civilian
24 population is -- will become ultimately unsourced hearsay. Who did he
25 speak to? When? What about? These are really relatively basic ways of
1 asking questions and proceeding especially when you are dealing with the
2 issue of hearsay which is what we are dealing with right now. And
3 Ms. Carter is seeking to elicit unsourced hearsay about something which
4 she believes is relatively critical, and the answer which she may well
5 obtain as it relates to a civilian population disallows the Defence to
6 engage in any meaningful cross-examination with regard to testing the
7 information that the witness claims he heard in the absence of having
8 some way of identifying the authors of the information apart from a
9 civilian population.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
11 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, it's impossible to ask
12 who was making a statement until we determine what the statement was. We
13 have determined that the witness has in fact been speaking with the
14 Muslim population. We are now trying to elicit what they were speaking
15 to them about. And only then can you determine individually the
16 conversations that were being had, thus the Defence's objection is
18 Further, the Defence is assuming that he will not be able to
19 cross-examine on these points. This is not an appropriate objection to
20 be made during the Prosecution's case. He can test his theories. He can
21 ask his questions during his own case. However, given the behaviour and
22 the objections that have been made over the past two days, Defence
23 counsel seeks to place his own case in the context of the Prosecution's
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: First of all, I don't believe that the objection
1 that I've made has been dealt with. Second of all, I don't seek to place
2 my own case in the context of the Prosecution's examination-in-chief.
3 What I do seek to have occur here is for there to be some sense of order
4 with regard to the way in which evidence is taken. And if we do not have
5 identifiable authors of information, there is no way that we can
6 cross-examine that information.
7 Now, I believe that Ms. Carter is putting the horse before the
8 cart. Who did you talk to? When did you talk to them? How many trials
9 have we been in with those questions that are asked.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, we don't have to give a class on
11 how to lead. The objection is overruled. It's premature. Obviously at
12 the time when the witness is not able to tell us who he talked to, that's
13 the time when you can rise. And at this stage we do know that in this
14 Tribunal hearsay evidence is admissible. However, I still say -- and
15 therefore, the objection is overruled at this stage as premature.
16 Madam Carter, the question as phrased, I don't know what you are
17 saying. If we can go back to it. You'll have to think of rephrasing it
18 in such a way that it is intelligible not only to the witness and you
19 yourself but also to the Court.
20 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.
21 Q. Sir, were UNPROFOR members or troops present in other villages
22 around the enclaves?
23 A. The only UNPROFOR members who were in some of the villages in the
24 enclave were the UN military observers who I mentioned yesterday.
25 Q. Okay. What occurred when the UN military observers left the
2 A. When the UN military observers left the villages -- when they
3 left the villages they were no longer in a position to observe what was
4 going on in the villages, so I'm puzzled by the question.
5 Q. What did -- when you were discussing matters with the population
6 inside of Srebrenica, what did they tell you occurred when the UNMOs left
7 the villages?
8 A. I'm sorry, I don't follow the question because I did not hear
9 anything or any statements about what happened before or after the UNMOs.
10 What happened was that the UNMOs reported to me what they had observed or
11 what they had been told when they were visiting.
12 Secondly, is that the villagers -- sorry, the refugees in
13 Srebrenica told me through Mihailov, General Morillon's body-guard, what
14 they had been experiencing, and we went through the pattern yesterday.
15 One thing which did happen, and it's not about the villages, is that we
16 were told that --
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Then it's non-responsive to the question.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Carry on, Mr. Tucker, please. Just finish off
19 what you were saying.
20 THE WITNESS: Was that we had been in Konjevic Polje, if you
21 recall, about five days previously. We were told that after
22 General Morillon had left Konjevic Polje, that it had been heavily
23 shelled and attacked and had been seized by the Bosnian Serbs. The
24 inference being that whenever General Morillon or the UN visibly left an
25 area, that it was then heavily shelled.
1 MS. CARTER:
2 Q. Thank you, sir. At the point in time that General Morillon and
3 yourself were allowed to leave Srebrenica, where did you go?
4 A. The first place we went to was to Zvornik. And after Zvornik we
5 went through to Tuzla
7 Q. Okay. When you came back to Srebrenica, what happened?
8 A. We tried to get back into Srebrenica, but we were stopped at the
9 bridge over the Drina River
10 in our jeep by the side of the road. The next morning we were still
11 being refused permission to go back into Srebrenica, and that was the day
12 when the helicopter evacuation of injured out of Srebrenica took place.
13 Q. Can you please describe what -- the helicopter evacuation that
14 took place, how did that transpire?
15 A. One of the issues which I described yesterday was that the
16 Bosnian Serbs insisted on inspecting and questioning every man of combat
17 age in order to assess whether or not they were war criminals, as they
18 described, guilty of the attacks on Bosnian Serb villages in January of
19 that year. And that made it impossible to evacuate wounded from the
20 Srebrenica pocket. Therefore, General Morillon arranged for helicopters,
21 UN helicopters, to fly from Tuzla
22 these heavily injured people, mainly coming from the hospital which I
23 referred to about ten minutes ago.
24 When the helicopters -- we actually saw the helicopters because
25 we were stuck at this bridge. We actually saw the helicopters flying up
1 the valley to Srebrenica. And when the helicopters landed, the landing
2 site was shelled by artillery, and two United Nations personnel, Canadian
3 soldiers were injured, and a number of Bosnian Muslims were killed.
4 Q. At any point in time was that shelling investigated?
5 A. Yes. I personally went to the landing grounds when I got back
6 into Srebrenica after being in Belgrade
7 27th, 28th of March, and went to --
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: This is how long after this shelling?
9 THE WITNESS: About four days. And I went to look at the -- the
10 shell craters in order to see if I could establish anything about the
11 shell craters.
12 Q. Were you able to establish anything about the shell craters?
13 A. Firstly, people who had trained in artillery can, by looking at
14 what's called "splash marks" of an artillery crater, can identify within
15 a few degrees the direction from which the shell had come. Secondly, the
16 size of the shell crater can give an indication of the type of shell
17 which had been fired. And --
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Tucker, we have to cut you short. The
19 question was:
20 "Were you able to establish anything about the shell crater?"
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, the shell had been fired from the direction of
22 Bratunac, in other words, from the direction which the shortest distance
23 from there to the Drina River
24 of the shell holes was some of the largest I had seen in the whole time
25 that I was in Bosnia
1 a metre below ground level. The hole was that large. And this was
2 frozen ground. So it was a very high, very large calibre artillery gun
3 which had fired that shell, and that shell had come from the direction of
5 MS. CARTER:
6 Q. After reviewing the shell crater, did you do further
7 investigation in regards to the origin of that shell?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Do you have any indication or any belief based on your
10 investigation as to which side fired that shell?
11 A. My belief, I say again my belief is that it was fired by a heavy
12 calibre artillery gun of at least 155 millimetre calibre. I never saw
13 such guns in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. My belief was that it was
14 fired from north of the Drina River
15 Q. What led to that belief?
16 A. The fact that I had not seen such heavy calibre artillery guns
17 ever deployed in -- by the Bosnian Serb military.
18 Q. Sir, was this the sole incident that -- where you had indication
19 that Serbia
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm going to object. Now we are elevating
21 a belief based upon a limited examination into an indication.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think, the witness said it came from north of
23 the Drina
24 be wrong.
25 MS. CARTER:
1 Q. Sir, which side of the Drina River
2 fired from?
3 A. From the Serbia
4 Q. And which military do you believe fired this artillery round?
5 A. The Serb -- sorry, the army headquartered in Belgrade.
6 Q. Is this the sole incident where you had indication that
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Same objection.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, it's the same sole incident that he had the
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: If it's a belief, it's different than an
12 indication. They are very different words. They have very different
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter, do you have any response to the
16 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, I would ask for a
17 specific legal objection as often happens, a specific --
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: The specific legal objection is that the question
19 as framed is one, leading, and two, it assumes a fact which is not in
20 evidence. Which is the issue of an indication. An indication is not a
21 belief. An indication is potentially something upon which an objective
22 determination can be made. This gentleman has discussed his beliefs.
23 There's not been a discussion about objective determinations. His
24 beliefs he is entitled to, and I have no objection to him testifying
25 about his beliefs. Whether they are true or not is another matter, but I
1 have no objection to him testifying about his beliefs.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Carter.
3 MS. CARTER: I will rephrase the question.
4 Q. Sir, outside of this 155 millimetre shell, were there any similar
6 A. Yes, I am aware of one other situation. The UN had a team of UN
7 military observers who were accommodated in the Hotel Yugoslavia which is
8 in Serbia
9 And about 5 kilometres north up the river from Zvornik. They reported to
10 me that they had frequently seen artillery guns in position on the proper
11 Serb -- Serbia
12 pointed roughly west. In other words, towards Tuzla. That is a report
13 -- a factual report which were made. They also reported hearing
14 artillery being fired from that area, but they never actually saw
15 artillery being fired, nor did they obviously see in which direction
16 actual firing was taking place.
17 It is from those two reports, it is my belief that those guns
18 were being fired into Bosnia-Herzegovina, into the Tuzla area, because I
19 can think of no other logical reason for guns in that location being
20 fired. There were no training areas in that location. That is my
22 Q. Were the UNMOs the only persons reporting firing from Serb side
23 into Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. There were reports from peasants who we spoke with in the
25 Srebrenica enclave who also reported hearing guns being fired from the
1 northern side of the Drina River
2 Q. Thank you, sir. Moving back to the convoy that you were trying
3 to bring into Srebrenica, we last left you sleeping in your trucks
4 because you were not being allowed through. What happened the following
6 A. We went back to Zvornik because we had been prevented from
7 getting back into Srebrenica.
8 Q. What happened in Zvornik?
9 A. We met with more Bosnian Serb military and authorities in order
10 to continue to remonstrate about why we were not being allowed through.
11 And I believe that was the time when, if you recall I mentioned
12 yesterday, being put into Major Pandurevic's office and seeing the map on
13 the wall.
14 Q. Once you left Zvornik, where did you go next?
15 A. Then I believe we went to Belgrade
16 to the -- taken across the bridge back to the Serbia proper side of the
17 river, and met by a cavalcade of police cars from Serbia proper who then
18 escorted us up to Belgrade
19 Q. And are the meetings -- this meeting with Milosevic, are these
20 the meetings you described yesterday first with Milosevic second with
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. After those meetings, what happened next?
24 A. Then we went back to Zvornik and back into Srebrenica. That was
25 the time when I carried out the investigation of the artillery shells at
1 the football field in Srebrenica that I described a few minutes ago.
2 Q. When you arrived back in Srebrenica, how were you received?
3 A. We were received a very -- we were given a tremendous welcome and
4 we were very gratefully received, and people again had hope in their --
5 in their eyes. It was an extraordinary -- it was an extraordinary
7 Q. When you say you were gratefully received, can you please
8 describe the scene.
9 A. There were large numbers of people gathered outside the PTT
10 building, which is the building where we had been accommodated. And they
11 cheered and were extremely happy to see us -- to see us come back and
12 declared Morillon the saviour of Srebrenica, et cetera, et cetera.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just for the sake of clarity for the Chamber, who
14 are these people? Were these people Bosnian Serb soldiers who had been
15 blocking you as you tried to get into Srebrenica before, or were these
16 people the villagers that had held you hostage because they wanted to
17 draw attention to the international community?
18 THE WITNESS: These people were the refugees who were camped out
19 in the outdoors outside and around the PTT building and in all open
20 spaces in Srebrenica.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Now, initially you had been refused passage
22 out of Srebrenica because they wanted to draw international attention.
23 What was the reason for this change of attitude towards you?
24 THE WITNESS: The change of attitude came about because
25 General Morillon had demonstrated to these people that when he had
1 promised that he would come back that he had indeed come back because
2 they were also very anxious that when Morillon left, as he had done at
3 Konjevic Polje as I described a few minutes ago, that they would then be
4 shelled, and that shelling had not taken place. And that he had come
5 back and that he had managed to get humanitarian aid convoys in which had
6 been blocked for many months, and they were extremely relieved and --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: You say that in the time between the landing of
8 the helicopters and your return from Belgrade, that is in the four days,
9 humanitarian aid had come in?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, if I may, sir, if I could just go back through
11 the chronology. We arrived in Srebrenica around the 11th, 12th of March.
12 We were then blocked for about three, four days, and we were only allowed
13 to go down to the Yellow Bridge
14 eventually they allowed us to go down with two vehicles and Morillon
15 collected this first convoy to get into Srebrenica while we were there,
16 which came in around the 18th or so.
17 When that convoy came back into Srebrenica, it was the first time
18 that General Morillon had effectively delivered aid to the pocket. We
19 were then -- went out of the pocket to Zvornik, to Tuzla, back to
20 Zvornik, back to Srebrenica, back to Zvornik, back to Tuzla, then back to
21 Zvornik, and up to Belgrade
22 got in and this was around the --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, that's what I wanted to ask. Thank you
24 so much.
25 Yes, Madam Carter.
1 MS. CARTER:
2 Q. Going back to the differentiation of how you were received versus
3 how you left, at page 14, line 3, you indicated that the -- the people
4 inside of Srebrenica had given up hope. How do you know that the people
5 of Srebrenica had given up hope?
6 A. I don't know that the people of Srebrenica had given up hope. I
7 have a belief from looking at their faces and from seeing the -- that
8 pile of human remains from the hungry and starvation that there was from
9 the appalling conditions that they were living in, from the fact that
10 they were making no efforts to improve their position, however bad it
11 was, they were not organising themselves in order to do anything. They
12 were just passive. And that's not the behaviour of -- because you would
13 always, even in the worst of conditions, do something. These people were
14 just not doing anything. They were not even sharing the -- inside
15 Srebrenica there were three basic groups of people. There were the
16 refugees --
17 Q. Sir, let me actually pause there and move to the pile of bodies
18 that you just referenced in your statement. How close to Srebrenica's
19 main street was this pile of human remains?
20 A. It was not a pile of bodies. It was a pile of bits and off-cuts
21 of human bodies. It was at the side of the street. In other words, the
22 equivalent would be it was on the pavement.
23 Q. Okay. Meaning specifically, if you can lay out the geography of
24 Srebrenica, was this on a main thoroughfare, a side-street, where was
25 this pile of bodies? I'm sorry, pile of body parts.
1 A. It was on the main street through Srebrenica, the road which
2 passed immediately outside the PTT building and went up to the centre of
3 the town. It was on the road which lay between the PTT building and the
4 Srebrenica hospital.
5 Q. Okay. Were the refugees that you described, were they passing
6 this pile?
7 A. The refugees were not moving up and down in large numbers. The
8 refugees were just squatting around it and there were refugees squatting
9 next to this pile because they had nowhere else to go, they had nowhere
10 else to live. They were just squatting.
11 Q. You've described what you saw in regards to the lack of hope.
12 Were you discussing the situation of the refugees with them?
13 A. Yes. We were asking them why they were not doing anything and
14 their responses varied from "what's the point?" to "they'll kill us
15 anyway," to "what can we do?" to "we have got nothing," to "the locals in
16 Srebrenica" -- in other words the original population in Srebrenica --
17 "aren't doing anything to help," and "whenever we go into one of their
18 gardens ..." or whatever, "... they kick us out," et cetera.
19 Q. All right. Now, you said you received a -- almost a hero's
20 welcome when you returned back to Srebrenica. What did General Morillon
21 do once he arrived back in Srebrenica?
22 A. We started setting up home in the PTT building in order to -- by
23 "setting up home" what I mean is that initially we had been quartered in
24 the PTT building by the Srebrenica war committee and effectively were
25 kind of being held prisoner there. When General Morillon came back after
1 the first visit to the front line and he had proved to the refugees that
2 he was trustworthy and that he had adhered to his promise, that had he
3 come back and he had not deserted them, then the Muslims removed the
4 guards around the PTT building and we moved our luggage and our rucksacks
5 and our sleeping bags and our equipment out of the vehicle, out of our
6 vehicles, and into the building as a demonstration of intent to stay.
7 Q. At any point in time during the week that this convoy was being
8 established and brought in, did General Morillon make any statements to
9 the people in Srebrenica?
10 A. Yes, he made a statement to the assembled crowd who were
11 surrounding the PTT building. He made the statement from a window of the
12 PTT building, and he described the effort he was making to try and
13 provide relief to the enclave, the effort he was making to get
14 humanitarian aid through. And at the end of it he declared Srebrenica to
15 be under the protection of the United Nations.
16 Q. Was General Morillon's statement in regards to the protection of
17 Srebrenica by the UN ever memorialised?
18 A. Yes, I drafted the statement, it is in my notebook, and he read
19 it out from my notebook and -- sentence by sentence, and Mihailov
20 translated it in Serbo-Croat sentence by sentence so that the population
21 could understand it. And General Morillon added in his own handwriting a
22 sentence at the end. And then he verbally said the final statement about
23 the United Nations -- about Srebrenica now being under the protection of
24 the United Nations. He added verbally because I had not written that
1 Q. Was General Morillon's speech ever broadcast or discussed outside
2 of Srebrenica?
3 A. Yes, it was. There were several journalists present who reported
4 it, and I understand that afterwards, that the speech received very
5 prominent attention around the world and very particularly his final
6 sentence about Srebrenica now being under the protection of the
7 United Nations.
8 MS. CARTER: May I have one moment to discuss with counsel.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may.
10 [Prosecution counsel confer]
11 MS. CARTER: I'd like to call up 65 ter 9216.
12 Q. Sir, do you recognise the document in front of you?
13 A. Yes, it's a document that I saw after I got back to -- back to
15 Q. Who is -- you've indicated that the headquarters for BH command
16 was in Kiseljak and that you had been reporting in to them. Is this
17 report consistent with the practice of reporting?
18 A. What happened is that I would from Srebrenica report on a regular
19 basis, sometimes every two hours, sometimes every six hours, certainly at
20 least once a day by radio, by HF radio from wherever I was to an HF radio
21 in Kiseljak and provide a report. That didn't always work because the HF
22 communications were sometimes difficult. We also sometimes used the
23 American TacSat radio which I referred to yesterday.
24 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. Now, the information that is
25 contained in regards to the Srebrenica evacuation, who would have
1 provided this information to the headquarters?
2 A. Myself.
3 MS. CARTER: We can move to page 2.
4 Q. Sir, who would have been providing the information that led to
5 the assessments that are listed on paragraphs 8 and 9 and then on the
6 third page at 10 and 11? Who would have provided that information?
7 A. The underlying information came from myself, from a report which
8 I radioed through. I must emphasise that of course the reports which I
9 radioed through to Kiseljak were always approved by General Morillon. I
10 did not send them just because I wrote them.
11 Q. And I'd like to move to the third page in regards -- and focusing
12 on paragraph 11. Was it the assessment of you and Morillon that:
13 "If free passage with transport cannot be arranged for the
14 refugees in the Srebrenica pocket within the next 7 to 14 days,
15 indications are that the Serbs will carry out a genocidal cleansing of
16 the entire enclave, resulting in the potential death of up to 80.000
17 human beings. In any case, there's little hope that current efforts to
18 get the Serbs to halt their attack will be successful. They are unlikely
19 to stop this offensive until the enclave is cleared one way or another."
20 A. The essence of the message is what I radioed through to Kiseljak.
21 However, I do not recall using the language "genocidal cleansing."
22 Q. What did you believe was happening in the enclaves?
23 A. We believe that the enclaves -- the Bosnian Serbs had decided to
24 sort out the enclaves once and for all and were bent on removing them
25 from the map.
1 MS. CARTER: I'd like to tender 65 ter 9216 into evidence.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before we do that, can we have a look at the first
3 page, please. Sir, can you explain to us that date at the top of the
4 document. I see it's 202355A March 23.
5 A. That means -- the date is the 20th of March. The 2355 is the
6 time that report was filed. And Alpha is the time zone in which the
7 report was filed. Time zone Alpha is the time zone that we are in here
8 today; it's one hour ahead of GMT
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Now, you were asked -- you have just
10 told us that you don't recall using the language "genocidal cleansing."
11 What language do you recall using?
12 THE WITNESS: By memory I say that if the Serbs continue their
13 actions, Bosnian Serbs continue their actions, it will have the most dire
14 consequences for the population and refugees of the Srebrenica pocket.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: You also used a few minutes ago that they will
16 remove them from the map. What did you mean by "remove them from the
18 THE WITNESS: What I'm trying to describe is that they would
19 capture the pocket and that the population would then be removed. Now,
20 I'm speaking about beliefs, sir, because this is something that was
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: You were making a prediction, yes.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, because this is conjecture. Based on past and
24 experience and knowledge, that would be partially the transportation of
25 people and pushing them over the front line into the Bosnian Muslim area,
1 and it would be partially killing.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Partially killing -- Can the owner of that phone
3 please switch it off. Thank you.
4 Thank you.
5 Madam Carter, you may proceed.
6 MS. CARTER: Sir, may I have 65 ter 9216 admitted into evidence.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Before the Chamber admits it into evidence, it
8 should be noted that the translation in B/C/S indicates a date of
9 March 1999. It should probably be corrected for purposes of the record.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith. Madam Carter, will you
11 see to it. Can we control our phones, please. Can you see to it that
12 that translation is correct.
13 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll MFI
16 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: 9216 is admitted into evidence and marked for
18 identification. May it please be given an exhibit number.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours, this document shall be
20 admitted into evidence under Exhibit P2694 marked for identification.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
22 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, this is the end of my
23 examination-in-chief. However, I would now seek to move into private
24 session briefly.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry, ma'am, can you do that after the break?
1 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll take a break and come back at a quarter
3 to --
4 MS. CARTER: Excuse me, Your Honour, apologies. No, it cannot
5 wait due to the broadcast going out.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: What can't wait?
7 MS. CARTER: Going into private session and addressing with the
8 Court. I do apologise.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't understand you, ma'am.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: It's a redaction issue, I believe, that she wants
11 to raise.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: What are you saying? What can't wait?
13 MS. CARTER: There will be a redaction issue, but we'd like to
14 deal with that in private session.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: But we are not in private session.
16 MS. CARTER: I'm asking to move into private session.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. May the Chamber please move into private
19 [Private session]
11 Pages 9208-9212 redacted. Private session.
1 [Open session]
2 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
6 Q. Sir, let me start with -- I'll just ask you a question as a
7 matter of courtesy. I've called you the witness; I've called you
8 Mr. Tucker; I've called you Colonel Tucker; and I'm not sure precisely
9 what you would like to be called or if you have any preferences. And I
10 would like to take care of that matter first of all so that as we begin
11 this conversation or dialogue we are in a position to at least be dealing
12 with each other politely.
13 A. Colonel Tucker would be the correct appelation. Thank you, sir.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well, then, Colonel Tucker.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry, Colonel Tucker, I've been calling you
16 Mr. Tucker all the time. I'll make a note of that.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH:
18 Q. Before we start with some more substantive matters, I'd like to
19 just address two specific issues that have been raised earlier in
20 conversation just to get some clarification so I know of what I speak.
21 You have brought with you a number of documents which I believe
22 are fairly characterised as being notes that you took during the period
23 of time that you were in the region in 1992 and 1993; is that correct?
24 A. That is correct, sir.
25 Q. You also have supplied to the Prosecution, and I don't know
1 whether this is in addition or independently of those notes that you have
2 brought with you, notes that you took in that same period of time; is
3 that correct, sir?
4 A. No, the only copies that I have made available to the ICTY is
5 those notes that you just mentioned. I have myself not made any other
6 documents or copies of documents available to either the ICTY or the
8 Q. Okay. So then I'm comfortable in my assertion that the notes
9 that you brought with you are notes that you previously have provided to
10 the Prosecution in this case?
11 A. Whether those notes have been made available to this Prosecution,
12 I cannot be sure. I have given evidence in a number of --
13 Q. That's correct, you have.
14 A. -- Prosecutions here, and I've made those notes available. And
15 they were copied and numbers were recorded for each page that was copied
16 on previous trials. Whether they have been passed to the Prosecution or
17 not is obviously beyond my knowledge.
18 Q. With regard to the notes that you have previously provided, those
19 are the notes that you provided, I believe, in the Galic trial, number
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. In the Oric trial, number two.
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. And then also in some other proceeding, if I'm not mistaken, or
25 is that the extent of it?
1 A. There were -- there was another trial which people asked me
2 about, but I believe I was not able to really support it.
3 Q. Now, with regard to the notes that you took, as I understand your
4 testimony, you were the assistant to General Morillon; correct?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. You were the assistant to General Morillon for a number of
7 reasons, not the least of which is that you also are, from what I
8 understand at least, bilingual and maybe more than that, and you speak
10 A. I speak English, French, German, and Dutch.
11 Q. Well, you have me at an advantage.
12 With regard to your position as an assistant to General Morillon,
13 you took notes, obviously among other things, of meetings that
14 General Morillon was involved in; correct?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. And you've told us that you've -- you've told us as a matter of
17 fact you took notes for a myriad number of meetings in your testimony the
18 other day.
19 Now, with regard to the information that is contained in your
20 notes, if I understood your testimony correctly - and I may be making an
21 assumption, and that's why I want to make sure that I'm correct
22 here - when General Morillon was speaking with somebody, for example,
23 General Mladic, he was not speaking the same language as General Mladic,
24 was he?
25 A. No, General Morillon invariably spoke English and there was
1 always an interpreter who was actually translating across. And one of
2 the reasons that General Morillon selected Mihailov to be his body-guard
3 was in order to get independent feed-back as to the accuracy of the
4 translations that were being made because we had some experiences where
5 interpreters had taken liberties with what was being translated.
6 Q. Understood. And so the gentleman who was General Morillon's
7 body-guard, Mihailov, was your fail-safe mechanism for purposes of
8 ensuring that the information that was occurring -- that was being
9 transmitted as between General Morillon and others - and for the moment
10 let's use General Mladic as an example - was accurate information;
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. And then I take it that what occurred was you also conferred with
14 Mihailov during the note-taking process to ensure that the information
15 you were taking down, that you were memorialising, was as accurate as it
16 possibly could be?
17 A. Yes, sir, usually we did that during the breaks. I can only
18 recall one instance when Mihailov during the negotiations coughed loudly
19 to bring to our attention that there was something improper going on.
20 Q. I take it that was cleared up?
21 A. That was cleared up, yes.
22 Q. Whatever it was. Now, is it fair to say that you have relied in
23 the past, in your testimony in the Galic case and your testimony in the
24 Oric case, you have relied on your notes for purposes of refreshing your
25 recollection as to what transpired in meetings?
1 A. That is correct. It is an obvious statement that these meetings
2 were 17 years ago.
3 Q. Of course. And with regard to this specific trial, did you have
4 occasion prior to coming to testify here to run through your notes to get
5 a little -- a freshen up, as it were, so that when you came here you were
6 in an ability as once again to as accurately as possible relate
7 information to the Chamber with regard to your recollection of what
8 occurred during those meetings?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And that included obviously, as we've discussed, dates of
11 meetings; right? And it's also included participants in meetings as well
12 as the subject matter; correct?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Now, above and beyond your notes, you've also had occasion to
15 give a number of statements to the Office of the Prosecutor with regard
16 to many, if not all, of the same matters that you've testified to here
17 since yesterday; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And have you had an opportunity prior to your testimony here
20 today to review those statements as well so that when you came into court
21 you were in a position once again to fully, completely, and as accurately
22 as possible transmit to the Chamber that information that you had
24 A. Yes, I was proofed, I believe is the term, on Sunday.
25 Q. When you were proofed, I take it you took a look at your
1 statements because you made more than one?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. And you had occasion to review them?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Did you find it necessary after reviewing your notes and your
6 statements to correct any of your previous memorialisations as they
7 related to date, participants, or subject matter?
8 A. No, not the previous ones.
9 Q. Okay. And that takes care of -- that takes care of one part of
10 my concern because I think what we may have just done is recopied your
11 notes again; I have a sneaking suspicion that may be what occurred,
12 although I'm not positive yet but.
13 With regard to your testimony, you made a statement yesterday
14 that you received intelligence concerning the matter of payment - and you
15 were talking about the payment of salaries. Now, before we go my
16 further, you may have heard me make a distinction earlier today between
17 that of information and that of intelligence. And I'd like to before we
18 go any further discuss that issue, which is as I understand it from a
19 military standpoint, information is precisely that, it's that which is
20 received by anybody, often times by analysts; and that once that
21 information is analysed, that information is what we call intelligence.
22 Is that a fair statement?
23 A. That's fair description.
24 Q. So when we use the term here that we received intelligence,
25 because I think there may be as a matter of fact some disconnect or
1 perhaps decollage between the issue of information and intelligence, that
2 when you were using the term that you received intelligence, are you
3 talking about some form of analytical report, or are you talking about
4 just hard facts that you've received?
5 A. What I'm talking about is intelligence personnel telling me the
6 the information that I described. I did not myself personally see the
7 raw material or even know the source of where that information came from.
8 What's happened was that I was told by intelligence personnel that,
9 et cetera.
10 Q. And when you say you were "told by intelligence personnel," I
11 take it the information you were given was a conclusion, the conclusion
12 being, based upon reports or other sources that we have reviewed and
13 analysed, it is our conclusion that ...
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Whatever it may be?
16 A. Yeah. That is correct.
17 Q. And in this particular situation, so we are clear, you did not
18 see any hard data?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. But you spoke to somebody or some bodies?
21 A. It was in a briefing about the whole of the situation in Bosnia
22 where there were many subjects on the discussion, and this was merely two
23 sentences worth during a much larger briefing.
24 Q. Okay. Can you identify for us when that meeting occurred with
25 any further specificity than that you've given us already?
1 A. It was in -- it was two particular briefings. One would have
2 been around March or -- sorry, not March, April or May 1996. And the
3 second would have been about June, maybe early July 1996.
4 Q. Now, did you -- with regard to the time that you were working,
5 and I apologise, I forgotten --
6 A. It was the permanent joint headquarters, PJHQ which is the UK
7 crisis management headquarters which was set up in April 1996.
8 Q. Very well. When you were working with the crisis management
9 headquarters, if I might, did you once again engage in memorializing your
10 meetings by note-taking?
11 A. I did, but those notes from that time I no longer have.
12 Q. Okay. As you sit here today, are you in a position, I'm asking
13 the question in steps because you may at some point say no to me, are you
14 in a position to identify for us the intelligence officer or officers
15 that you spoke with concerning the matter of the conclusion of payment of
16 salaries being made?
17 A. No, I can't remember their names.
18 Q. And that occurred in 1996?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Some 13 years ago, if my math is correct?
21 A. That's correct, yeah, yeah.
22 Q. Okay. You've told us that you arrived in Sarajevo at the end of
23 October; true?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. And as I understand it, you arrived, I believe, on the 25th or
1 the 26th?
2 A. About that, yeah.
3 Q. About that time.
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. And when you say "about that time," give or take a couple of days
6 on either side or give or take a couple of days on the short side meaning
7 before the 25th?
8 A. I would need to check my actual notes, but it was either the
9 25th or the 26th. I don't think it was the 27th.
10 Q. At the time that you arrived, there was at that point in play the
11 issue of Mladic meeting with, if I'm not mistaken, either General Tus or
12 Bobetko concerning a cessation of hostilities agreement; correct?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. And to set the stage properly, what had occurred was that a
15 meeting had been requested by Mladic, had been set up in the party to
16 meet General Mladic with regard to cessation of hostilities was Bobetko;
18 A. Mladic originally requested to meet with General Tus, however,
19 unknown to General Mladic, General Tus had retired and his position had
20 been taken over by Bobetko. There was then an argument with Mladic who
21 didn't believe this for a couple of weeks, and believed he was being
22 fobbed off with Bobetko. But then eventually he accepted this and then
23 met with Bobetko.
24 Q. I'm going to spend a moment on the matter of being fobbed off,
25 not because of anything other than, as I understand it from testimony
1 we've heard earlier, like ranks meet like ranks, so that a higher ranking
2 officer is not likely to be meeting with somebody from the other side who
3 is of a lower rank as a general proposition. When folks meet, generals
4 meet generals, colonels meet colonels, majors meet majors? It's somewhat
5 of a, as I understand, the military protocol that exists?
6 A. It was very prevalent there. It wasn't exactly rank meets rank,
7 it's more position meets position. In other words, the commander of one
8 army meets the commander of the other army, the deputy commander, because
9 they weren't necessarily always exactly the same rank.
10 Q. In that regard, for example, although it seems, and I mean this
11 as a compliment, not as anything disparaging, you and Morillon in many
12 senses were kind of joined at the hip in much of what was being done and
13 what was trying to be achieved that a meeting with you and General Mladic
14 would not work?
15 A. No, I was always a servant of General Morillon. The person
16 having the meeting with General Mladic was General Morillon. I never had
17 any meetings other than in a very very few cases in my own right with
18 anybody. As you accurately described yesterday, I was the scrivener.
19 Q. I was not being disparaging there either.
20 A. It's factual.
21 Q. It's often times a very important position to have.
22 Just in passing, with regard to the issue of the importance of
23 rank meeting rank or position meeting position, it was -- one of the
24 things that was readily apparent to you, and by that I mean to
25 General Morillon and you, is that General Mladic, who I believe at one
1 point told that you he was Napoleon of the Balkans; is that correct?
2 A. That is absolutely correct.
3 Q. Was not someone who was going to be meeting with people who he
4 felt were not in a position to respond to his requests, demands,
5 concerns, or whatever else they may be. He was looking for somebody --
6 he was looking not for another Napoleon because you can only have one
7 Napoleon, but he was looking for somebody of high stature; correct?
8 A. Mladic had two motives: One was that he only wanted to meet with
9 people of his own level who would be able to get things done. The second
10 is that he and all the other senior representatives of the
11 Republika Srpska were continually seeking recognition that they existed
12 as an independent entity, and therefore they were very particular that
13 the formalities and the appellations and so on were as if they were
14 recognising the existence of Republika Srpska as an independent entity.
15 Q. Okay. And that was a theme that was not only mentioned by
16 Mladic, but also was mentioned by Karadzic in meetings; correct?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And one of the things that happened - and once again for the
19 moment I'm just speaking generally with regard to meetings - one of the
20 things that occurred at least on one occasion if not more is that when a
21 specific request for something to occur was asked of Mladic, he would
22 defer to his president?
23 A. That is absolutely correct.
24 Q. And at times when a specific request was asked of Karadzic, he
25 would defer to his assembly?
1 A. That is absolutely correct.
2 Q. And in those situations, they were indicating to you that there
3 was a political process that existed that had to be respected internally;
5 A. They were continually trying to emphasise that fact.
6 Q. And also that there was a relationship between the military
7 component that was headed by General Mladic and the political executive
8 component that was headed by Dr. Karadzic; correct?
9 A. Yes, they tried to maintain that point.
10 Q. Okay. Obviously with regard to meetings that you had with such
11 individual as Mladic and Karadzic, these were of critical importance to
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. Okay. You testified, as I understand it that the first meeting
15 that you had with Mladic, Karadzic, and others was on the
16 27th of October; right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Okay. And that was a meeting -- that was a meeting that, as I
19 understand it, not from your testimony yesterday but from your -- from
20 some other documents that I've read, was a meeting that dealt with the
21 issue, among others, that dealt with the issue of cessation of
23 A. Yes, it dealt with a whole range of issues, as you can imagine.
24 Q. Okay. Now, the day before on the 26th, you had met with Mladic;
1 A. No, I believe on the 26th, I said 25th, 26th was when we arrived
2 in Sarajevo
3 with Mladic. Having said that, General Morillon, I believe, had met with
4 Mladic previously in his previous role as deputy command of UNPROFOR in
5 Krajina, but I don't know any details about that.
6 Q. Sorry. With regard to the first time that you met
7 General Mladic, was that in the presence of Karadzic? That was all
8 together; right?
9 A. I believe it was all together. I would need to check my notes.
10 The main thing that I recollect of that meeting was that it was with
11 Mladic in Lukavica and Mladic was being very insistent. He started the
12 meeting off by demanding that all communication to the to him be
13 addressed to Republika Srpska Krajina. General Morillon stated that he
14 had sent a letter to Madam Plavsic in order to try and expedite
15 permission to deploy the Canadian battalion and permission to deploy the
16 French battalion in Petrovac. Mladic told General Morillon that he made
17 a big mistake in approaching, in writing to Madam Plavsic, Madam --
18 Q. If I can interrupt you. And I thank you for your answer because
19 I think it's all quite interesting, but my question was, Was that in the
20 presence of Karadzic?
21 A. I would need to check my notes in order to confirm that precisely
22 on that specific day because as I said, that was 17 years ago.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may interrupt, I am sorry, Mr. Guy-Smith,
24 we've been throwing around dates of 26th, 27th October. Just so that we
25 don't have to look elsewhere in the transcript for the year, can we just
1 give it a year, please.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Surely.
3 Q. That would be 1992 that we are referring to; correct?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. I note that you indicated that all communications to him be
6 addressed to the Republika Srpska Krajina, and --
7 A. Not Krajina.
8 Q. -- I think you may have misspoke and you meant the
9 Republika Srpska?
10 A. Yes, General Morillon asked him, What about the Krajina? And
11 Mladic said, That's a separate republic; that's the
12 Republika Srpska Krajina.
13 Q. You'll recall in your testimony yesterday you indicated that in
14 the first meeting that Karadzic was present. And the reason I'm trying
15 to get an understanding of this is that was the meeting in Lukavica?
16 A. The meeting with Mladic on the 27th was in Lukavica. The meeting
17 at which Karadzic was present and Professor Koljevic, the one where I
18 referred to the census map, that took place in Pale.
19 Q. So that would have been the next day, the 28th? Let me see if I
20 can be of some help to you here, and I'm going to read you something and
21 see whether or not this is of any help to you. And I'm reading from the
22 statement that you gave. This is only for purposes of refreshing your
23 recollection. This is the statement that you gave on the 6th and
24 7th of September, 2000; the 27th of July, 2001, and the 5th and
25 6th of March, 2002. And you say:
1 "General Morillon's first appeal to the RS leaders to secure
2 deployment of CanBat was in a form of a letter to Mrs. Plavsic which he
3 wrote on 27 October 1992
4 Which I think you had just discussed.
5 "At that time we thought she was more influential, and we later
6 found out she was. The same day, I what present at a meeting between
7 General Mladic and General Morillon. This meeting took place in
8 Lukavica. I have some photographs that were taken after its conclusion.
9 This was my first meeting with Mladic. Karadzic was in Geneva."
10 Is that correct?
11 A. Yes, I think that Karadzic was in Geneva for at least ten days or
12 so, and in fact we believed that Mladic took advantage of the fact that
13 Karadzic was in Geneva
14 order to try and capture or cut Sarajevo
15 Q. Now, as I understand the first meeting, that meeting dealt with
16 CanBat 2 deployment to the Banja Luka area; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Mladic informed you that he did not have the authority to agree
19 to this, but he would discuss this with the government?
20 A. I think he said it was a matter for the Bosnian Serb Assembly.
21 Q. Okay. During that meeting, Mladic and Morillon also discussed
22 the issue of freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR convoys
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. And also was discussed the issue of demilitarisation?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. And when you say that the issue of demilitarisation was
3 discussed, could you please just briefly for the moment, because we will
4 be discussing it later again, touch upon what was discussed with regard
5 to the issue of demilitarisation as it related to this meeting?
6 A. There were two dimensions to demilitarisation. One was Sarajevo
7 itself, and the lifting of the siege. Mladic refused to use the language
8 or accept the language siege or surrounded. What Mladic insisted was
9 that he was merely holding his own terrain and protecting his own people
10 inside his own terrain. He said that if the Muslims were either willing
11 to hand all their weapons to the -- in Sarajevo - this is to the
12 United Nations - or were willing to allow Serb -- Bosnian Serb police
13 into Sarajevo
14 and out for all.
15 On the second issue was heavy weapons, and when General Morillon
16 asked Mladic about his heavy weapons and requested Mladic to remove his
17 heavy weapons away from around Sarajevo
18 was willing to do so providing that the Muslims handed all their weapons
19 over to the United Nations and disarmed. If you want specific detail --
20 Q. No, that's fine for the moment because there's -- as I think we
21 both understand, there's a further discussion, specifically about
22 demilitarisation with Oric when you are in Srebrenica, and there's a
23 further discussion with the war committee about demilitarisation as a
24 manner of solution when you are in Srebrenica.
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. Which is a different aspect once again to that matter.
2 What you've mentioned here is one of the tensions, I think, that
3 did occur, and the analysis, as I understand it, from a review of your
4 documentation is that Mladic equated his heavy weapon use with the
5 strength of the BiH Army's infantry?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. And in a very real sense, what we had occurring at the time was
8 that the Bosnian Serb Army had greater heavy weaponry; correct?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. And the BiH Army had more infantry?
11 A. They had many more people. They were much more populace, but
12 only armed with infantry weapons obviously, and not that many.
13 Q. Now, did you have at that time - I'm talking about the very first
14 meeting - was there any discussion at that time about the concept of
15 Territorial Defence that existed in the former Yugoslavia?
16 A. The -- the thing which I recall Mladic saying was that he was
17 holding his own territory. He demanded that that --
18 Q. Sorry?
19 A. He claimed the territory in order to defend his people. However,
20 he did not at that time, I recall, talk about Territorial Defence or
21 militia or anything like that, that only came up in much later
23 Q. Before -- okay. Before you came to Sarajevo, were you aware of
24 the -- of the manner in which the former Yugoslavia had determined how to
25 defend itself in case of incursions after World War II? And just briefly
1 here because I don't want to get into a long history discussion, briefly
2 here, Tito had created not only an army, but it created the concept of
3 Territorial Defence where every able-bodied man between a certain ages
4 was available for fighting for the Defence of not only their country, but
5 also their specific region; correct?
6 A. That's absolutely correct. And it's also the context in which
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina was the arms depot of the former Yugoslavia because of
8 its mountainous terrain, in the centre, in the heart of the former
10 bulk of the ammunition and equipment which was stockpiled in -- on the
11 ground bunkers and depots was within Bosnia-Herzegovina and that that was
12 one of the reasons why western intelligence assessment was that the
13 Bosnian Serb Army had, and I think one of the quotes was, Had enough
14 ammunition to continue the combat operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the
15 intensity that they were going for a further ten years.
16 Q. Okay. With regard to the issue that you've just raised again
17 which is western intelligence assessments, there once again we are
18 talking about information that has been compiled and analysed upon which
19 conclusions have been drawn, this conclusion being a conclusion with
20 regard to the ability to wage war?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Okay. In that regard, are those reports that you looked at?
23 A. Those were briefings we were given before we deployed into
25 Q. So similar --
1 A. Would have been September 1992.
2 Q. So similar to the other situation, I take it there are no notes,
3 it was oral, and you cannot remember who gave you this information; or am
4 I wrong?
5 A. No, it would have been briefings in Moenchengladbach before we
6 departed and they were intelligence staff officers who participated. And
7 as you can imagine, we were preparing for deployment; there were many
8 things going on. And part of briefings were intelligence briefings and
9 western intelligence was scrambling to pull together as much information
10 as it could obviously prior to --
11 Q. Sorry, the answer to my question would be no notes and no
12 identification of the individuals?
13 A. That's correct, yeah.
14 Q. After the meeting with Mladic concerning cessation of hostilities
15 and other things, but I'm going to focus on the cessation of hostilities
16 because something -- as I understand it, the first meeting occurred,
17 which is that although Mladic had called for the meeting, ultimately what
18 occurred was that Bobetko signed, Mladic did not sign the cessation of
19 hostilities agreement in the first instance?
20 A. The meeting with -- to be clear, this first meeting that I
21 attended with Mladic on the 27th of October, nothing was signed. The
22 meeting that Mladic eventually had with Bobetko was towards the end of
23 November, and at that meeting Bobetko, if I remember, actually at the
24 meeting, actually in a flourish signed the declaration. But Mladic
25 refused to sign and left the meeting not having signed it.
1 Q. Did there come a point in time when Mladic did sign?
2 A. I believe, but again would I need to check. I believe he signed
3 it one or two days later or at a next meeting.
4 Q. Okay. And what is -- for the Chamber's purposes, what is the
5 effect of a signed cessation of hostilities agreement?
6 A. Well --
7 Q. Obviously there are two parts to this. Let me back up because I
8 think your chuckle deals with a certain aspect.
9 If followed, what would have been the effect of cessation
10 hostilities agreement at that time?
11 A. I would assume that once a leader or senior officer has signed a
12 cessation of hostilities, that he would then issue orders within his
13 chain of command in order to order his forces not to carry out conduct --
14 combat activities.
15 Q. Just as a general matter, can you tell the Chamber in your
16 estimation how many cessation of hostilities/cease-fire agreements do you
17 think you brokered during the time that you were there?
18 A. Many. How many? 10, 20, 30, I don't know. There were so many
19 of them, and none them were ever adhered to.
20 Q. When you say "none of them were ever adhered to," would it be
21 fair to say that both parties - and by that I mean the Bosnian Serbs and
22 the Presidency as you called it - broke those cease-fires?
23 A. Yes. All -- in my view all three parties, the Bosnian Muslims,
24 the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Serbs broke cease-fire agreements
25 when it suited them.
1 Q. Okay. And in regard to the breaking of the cease-fire
2 agreements, I think that you came to a position concerning cease-fire
3 agreements in general. And I'm referring you to some prior testimony in
4 which you stated:
5 "We have been trying to negotiate cease-fire since we had arrived
6 in Bosnia
7 the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted a cease-fire or cease fires to cover
8 all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in other words they wanted to consolidate
9 their gain and consolidate what they had taken, whereas the Bosniak
10 leadership declared that they wanted cease-fires."
11 And I think that you should have said "they didn't" --
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
13 MS. CARTER: If we could please have the source of the quotation.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Oh, yes, I apologise. That's page 5795,
15 lines 1 through 9 in IT-03-68-T.
16 "The reality of the way they behaved was that whenever they were
17 under pressure militarily from the Serbs, they wanted local cease-fires,
18 but then contrived to try to break those cease-fires and provoke the
20 THE WITNESS: That is correct. What would happen is that the
21 Bosnian Serb intent, as I described from the beginning, as I described
22 General Mladic in his first meeting and in the meeting with Karadzic,
23 they continually tried to emphasise, We want to be our own entity; we
24 want the status quo to be recognised; we want recognition; we are -- we
25 want a cease-fire across the whole front line.
1 The Presidency publicly declared that they wanted a cease-fire as
2 well. The practical reality was that they did not recognise the
3 status quo and wanted to take back territory which had been seized by the
4 Bosnian Serbs and therefore were carrying out local attacks. When those
5 local attacks were eventually repulsed by the Bosnian Serbs because
6 typically it took them a day or 2 to repulse them because the Bosnian
7 Serbs were numerically weak all the way around this very long and tangled
8 front line, the Muslims would usually make initial progress until such
9 time as the Bosnian Serbs had first mustered heavy weapons against them.
10 And secondly, if it was a serious incursion, had managed to move their
11 reserves, their regular forces around in order to push the -- the
12 incursion back in order to re-establish the front line.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH:
14 Q. Okay. So it would be -- and I take it that this is something
15 that you experienced from the time that you first arrived in
16 October of 1992 until you left in 1993?
17 A. Yes, there was another dimension to it, which was that our
18 UN deployment in Bosnia
19 facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need, our mandate
20 was not to engage in the fighting. And it was a constant attempt by the
21 Presidency to try and inveigle the United Nations forces in fighting on
22 their side against the Serbs.
23 Q. Since you've raised that particular matter which is the constant
24 attempt by the Presidency which would be the Bosniak Muslims --
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. -- to try and inveigle the United Nations forces in fighting on
2 the other side against the Serbs. I would like to discuss with you for a
3 moment an incident concerning mortar fire emanating from the
4 Kosevo Hospital
5 A. I believe you are referring to an incident when some UN forces,
6 some UN personnel were delivering diesel fuel to the hospital saw a
7 mobile detachment of light mortars who had deployed -- this is Bosniak --
8 Bosnian Muslim military inside Sarajevo
9 and had fired from the grounds of the hospital at some forces surrounding
11 knowledge that the Bosnian Serbs surrounding Sarajevo had mortar-locating
12 radar, that is radar of which is capable of seeing artillery shells
13 mortar shells in the air, and from that calculating the location from
14 where they had been fired because the Bosnian Serbs then immediately
15 fired counter-battery fire as quickly as they could back at the location
16 from which the outcoming fire had come.
17 However, the location where this fire had come from was obviously
18 Kosevo Hospital
19 as it were, came in, of course, it landed on Kosevo Hospital
20 remember correctly, a press conference had been arranged by the
21 Presidency at the hospital half an hour later, and effectively the
22 incoming Serb fire landed on the hospital around the time of the start of
23 the press conference.
24 Q. When you say a press conference was called, who called that press
1 A. I don't know the details of who called them --
2 Q. I'm sorry, I meant which -- I was asking a much more general
3 question for the moment. Was that the Presidency that called it or the
4 Bosniak --
5 A. It was somebody on the Presidency side.
6 Q. Now, you had information, if I'm not mistaken, that the head of
7 the hospital was someone who not only supported the general cause of the
8 Presidency, but was, I think, a radical hardliner?
9 A. That, I can't recall.
10 Q. Okay. I'm referring -- quoting, counsel, to IT-98-29-T page
11 10.022. These are questions that are being asked by Judge Nieto-Navia.
12 In relation to what you've told us about firing coming from the
13 surroundings of the Kosevo Hospital
14 from two sources. Do you recall receiving information from two sources?
15 Firstly a British sergeant and then from journalists?
16 A. I think we may be mixing events up.
17 Q. Oh, well, let's -- if we have more than one incident where
18 there's been firing from the Kosevo Hospital
20 A. We had reports, but unconfirmed, not much more than rumour, that
21 mortars were being fired now and then from Kosevo Hospital. It was only
22 when this -- this British sergeant physically saw it while he was
23 delivering, that we had what we considered to be confirmed proof.
24 And the instance about journalist was a totally second -- that's
25 a totally different event which I believe is the one you may be referring
1 to which is when some mortar rounds were fired at General Morillon's
2 headquarters in Sarajevo
3 as opposed to the "Presidency" which is where the government of the
4 Bosnian Muslims was.
5 Q. And with regard to that incident, when General Morillon's -- is
6 that his home or his headquarters?
7 A. His headquarters. Well, it was where we lived as well.
8 Q. Both.
9 A. It was both.
10 Q. Well, with regard to the incident concerning the residency
11 involving the Bosniak side firing, could you tell us what the date was?
12 A. The -- there were two incidents. One was on the
13 24th of December, 1992, and the second was at dawn on Christmas day, the
14 25th of December, 1992.
15 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the Kosevo Hospital matter, Judge
16 Nieto-Navia went on to ask you questions concerning whether or not you
17 knew of any firings or mortars emanating from any other hospitals in
19 on to explain that the Kosevo Hospital
20 why the Kosevo Hospital
21 to fire from such an area?
22 A. I don't know about unique, but it looked to me like most other
23 hospitals I know which are some large buildings and in between the
24 buildings you have car parks and open space, and it was in this open
25 space between the buildings that the mortars had been fired from as
1 reported by the British sergeant.
2 Q. Okay. And there was a third thing that I mentioned, which was
3 the issue of the hardliner.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm now referring the Court and counsel to page
6 Q. You answer as follows to -- this is Judge El Madhi question with
7 regard to other hospitals, I misspoke myself. You say starting at
8 line 4:
9 "I must answer in several steps. The first step is to say that I
10 have no knowledge from such firing from the proximity of other hospitals
11 in Sarajevo
12 Which we've just discussed.
13 "Secondly, the other hospitals in Sarajevo were very different
14 types of buildings."
15 Which is why I alluded to the fact that the Kosevo was unique.
16 "Kosevo Hospital
17 quite a large area. The other hospitals were solid, single buildings
18 with a building next to it maybe, so they did not lend themselves to the
19 kind of tactic."
20 And I think that's a kind of tactic that you've described that is
21 available where you had a mobile mortar unit. And then you say:
22 "The third thing is that the head of Kosevo Hospital
23 us as a radical hardliner and was someone who we believed would have
24 certainly supported this kind of tactic in the greater interest as he saw
25 it of supporting the Bosniak cause whereas the directors of the other
1 hospitals were, in our view, much more medically focused and refused to
2 have anything to do with the kind of action that the director of the
3 Kosevo Hospital
4 And that was what I was referring to when I mentioned there was a
5 hardliner. Do you, by any chance, recall the name of the director of the
6 Kosevo Hospital
7 A. Now that you've refreshed my memory on that, I do recollect there
8 was something about the head of the Kosevo Hospital
9 here now what his name is. It's possible that it might be mentioned in
10 my notes, but I would -- I would have no idea where it is without
11 spending a long time trolling through my notes.
12 Q. While we were on the issue of hospitals, one of the other matters
13 brought to your attention was the smuggling of explosives in oxygen
14 bottles to the hospitals; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, oxygen bottles would be, if I'm not mistaken, certainly a
17 form of humanitarian aid, and certainly something that would be critical
18 and necessary for a functioning of a hospital; correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Would it be appropriate in your view for explosives to be
21 smuggled into a hospital through the use of oxygen bottles which
22 ostensibly are being delivered for purposes of humanitarian aid?
23 A. It would have been a breach of the agreements between the warring
24 factions and with the United Nations to smuggle explosives or weapons of
25 any form hidden inside humanitarian aid.
1 Q. Now, with regard to the issue of explosives being found in a
2 delivery of what is ostensibly humanitarian aid, would that be, in your
3 view, a basis upon which it would be reasonable to search a convoy that
4 is, and I'm using the word "claiming" not in a pejorative sense, but
5 claiming to be delivering solely humanitarian aid, with that as an
7 A. I'm now speaking personally. I would have an understanding for
8 that desire, but I would also maintain that regardless, such searches
9 should not in any way, shape, or form be used in order to prevent
10 humanitarian aid from getting through or getting through at all.
11 Q. I appreciate that, but that's not my question.
12 A. Yes, but it's my point, sir.
13 Q. I understand, but that's not my question, sir. My question is
14 that given that it would be inappropriate to be using humanitarian aid
15 for a military purpose, would it not be reasonable to search the convoy?
16 I'm not getting any further than that at the moment, and we'll have
17 further discussions about convoys and searches and stopping in -- after
18 the break, but would that be an unreasonable thing to do?
19 A. Providing that it did not be used as an excuse to stop the aid
20 getting through.
21 Q. So, if you were aware that a humanitarian aid convoy contained
22 weapons, it is your position - so we're clear - it's your position that
23 the convoy should go through --
24 A. No.
25 Q. -- with the weapons?
1 A. No, it was our position that no weapons should be allowed
2 through, and we -- whenever we became aware or had suspicions that
3 weapons might be hidden in humanitarian aid, we searched them ourselves
4 as well. And on a number of occasions, we found weapons and made the
5 strongest protest to whichever side was responsible for placing those
6 weapons in the humanitarian aid.
7 Q. Okay. Well, as a matter of reality, the strong protests that
8 were made, be they to one side or the other as we've discussed
9 cease-fires, often fell on deaf ears; correct?
10 A. Like most requests for humanity in that part of the word.
11 Q. I see.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Would this be an appropriate time?
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: It would indeed be. We'll take a break and come
14 back at half past 12.00. Court adjourned.
15 --- Recess taken at 11.57 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.29 p.m.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: May I proceed?
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought I did say yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: You are welcome.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH:
23 Q. I want to go back now for a moment and deal with some chronology
24 dates if I could. And as I understood it, around the
25 31st of October, 1992, is when the Bosnian Serb army attempted, as you
1 said, to split Sarajevo
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Now, after that time, moving into the month of November, in the
4 month of November, as you recall, were there convoys that went out of
6 A. Yes, there were convoys going out of Sarajevo towards Gorazde.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. In -- there were many other convoys that UNHCR were delivering
9 all around Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I do not recollect all of them.
10 Q. Very well. Now, right around that -- right around the
11 4th or 5th of November, do you recall there being negotiations between
12 the Presidency, represented, I would take it by Izetbegovic; Pale
13 represented, I would take it by Mr. Dr. Karadzic; and the Croatian
14 represented by, I'm not sure, concerning convoys of buses of Serbs and
15 Croats, Serbs leaving Sarajevo
17 A. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. Now, was there -- with regard to the representative for the
19 Croatian side, which we've kind of touched upon lightly, but actually
20 they were pretty much of an important consideration at that time, the
21 representative for the Croatian side would that have been Bobetko?
22 A. No, Bobetko was at that time in the Croatian Army General Staff,
23 in other words, based out of Zagreb
24 first thing to say is the negotiations for that particular action were
25 conducted between headquarter Sector Sarajevo or through the facilities
1 of headquarter Sector Sarajevo rather than through my own headquarters.
2 Q. I see.
3 A. And they were dealing with -- they were dealing -- headquarter
4 Sector Sarajevo
5 Sarajevo PTT building which was the headquarter Sector Sarajevo who had
6 communications through to Lukavica which was the military headquarters
7 there. The Serb -- sorry, the Bosnian Croatian negotiator, I do not know
8 who that was. My guess would be Colonel Siber.
9 Q. Very well. Now, after the negotiations in early November, I
10 believe that there was another meeting that you had around the
11 14th of November, and that was a meeting that you had with General Galic,
12 do you recall that?
13 A. I couldn't here today say, Yes, it was the 14th. But yes there
14 was certainly a meeting with General -- there were a number of meetings
15 that General Morillon had with General Galic around that time.
16 Q. Let me read you from the statement that I've read to you from
17 before and see whether that refreshes your recollection with regard to
18 that which you have said previously concerning the meeting with
19 General Galic on the 14th. This would be page 10:
20 "On 14 November we had a first meeting with
21 General Stanislav Galic in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters at
22 the Lukavica" -- my apologies, "... barracks outside Sarajevo
23 the airport. Galic was not at the level of someone who Morillon would
24 normally meet with."
25 And I think there you are referring to once again the position
1 rank matter that we've discussed previously which is people of -- I am
2 sorry. Military men and women of equal rank in position meet with each
3 not lower or higher?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. "I believe Morillon was trying to get in touch with Mladic about
6 agreement with the deployment of CanBat 2 to the Banja Luka area, but
7 Morillon was having difficulty getting in touch with Mladic."
8 Now, is this the same CanBat 2 discussion that had been going on
9 probably since October?
10 A. Yes, that is correct. And if you recall in March, I referred to
11 a Canadian battalion stuck outside Zvornik; that was that same battalion
12 five months later.
13 Q. When you say there were a Canadian battalion stuck outside of
14 Zvornik, was that close to the Zvornik bridge?
15 A. Yes, as you went across the Zvornik bridge from the Bosnian side
16 and entered the Serbian side, if you turned immediately left, there was a
17 long road and parking area and the Canadian battalion which is lined up
18 row upon row of vehicles with the soldiers just living on the vehicles
19 and in little tents they pitched alongside their vehicles.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could have, I believe it's 1D00-2594, which
21 is an aerial view of a bridge.
22 Q. I'd like you to --
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sorry, it's D22. My apologies. Defence 22. I
24 made a mistake.
25 Q. Do you have that in front of you?
1 A. Yes.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, I guess it is under seal that
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: My apologies. I suppose we should -- I don't
5 know why it is, but I suppose we should go into private session.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
7 [Private session]
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Registrar.
20 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. This bridge seems to have obtained an elusive quality --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can the Chamber assume that as the picture stands
1 north is north, south, east, west --
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, I believe that's right.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: We can assume that.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
5 Q. Now, Mladic, who Morillon was trying to get ahold of with regard
6 to the CanBat deployment issue, was unavailable?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. And you learned that Mladic as a matter of fact was engaged in
9 fighting, was he not?
10 A. This was probably in the aftermath of the last attempt to attack
12 Q. Okay. And is it your understanding that that's where Mladic was
13 on the 14th? Because you say here:
14 "I believe that Mladic was preoccupied dealing with his emergency
15 down in south-east Bosnia
16 from the Croats."
17 A. That's a totally different matter. That was the attack in the, I
18 can't remember the name of the place, I have it in my notes, I can point
19 it out on the map.
20 Q. Okay. But with regard to the south-east portion of Bosnia
21 this attack was occurring, that was -- was that an attack involving only
22 Croatian forces, or was that an attack that was involving a combination
23 of Croatian forces and other forces, if you know?
24 A. We had no personnel in the area in order to verify one thing or
25 the other. What Mladic told us was that it was a combination of Bosnian
1 Croat forces reinforced by Republic of Croatia
2 forces commanded from Zagreb
3 Q. Was there -- would that have been -- I'm mentioning an area to
4 you to see if that refreshes your recollection. Would that have been
6 A. Trebinje.
7 Q. Trebinje?
9 Q. And now, with regard to that particular battle, if I'm
10 understanding correctly, Mladic was fighting two separate sets of forces
11 at that time. One would have been Croatian forces, and the other would
12 have been the army of the BiH, the Bosnia-Herzegovina forces; is that
13 correct? He was fighting on two front?
14 A. Yes, effectively it was three fronts because --
15 Q. Three fronts.
16 A. -- there were the ABiH, in other words, the
17 Muslim Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then from time to time he was also
18 engaged in fighting with the HVO which was the Croatian -- sorry the
19 Bosnian Croatian military, who at that time were, I believe, commanded by
20 Brigadier General Petkovic. And then thirdly was with the HV who were
21 the army of the Republic of Croatia
22 and headquartered in Zagreb
23 Q. And with regard to the information that you had, and I'm going
24 back now to, for a minute, to the issue that he had raised in terms of
25 being not on equal footing in terms of weaponry as opposed to infantry,
1 did you have information with regard to the size of these various forces,
2 and by that I mean the HVO, the Croatian Army, as you've articulated, and
3 the BiH?
4 A. Similarly, we had intelligence assessments which had been
5 prepared prior to our deployment and continued to be developed whilst we
6 were deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the ABiH had a very large
7 number of people who by definition, because they were Yugoslav, had done
8 national service and therefore knew how to use weapons. All of them,
9 virtually any adult male in Bosnia
10 arms. However, they didn't have that many small arms, and they had very
11 very few heavy weapons.
12 The HVO, which is the Croatian militia inside Bosnia, they were
13 by comparison much better equipped, and they were equipped by the HV.
14 And there was a clear communication line up from Split, up from the
15 direction of Split
16 had easy access to whatever equipment the Croatian authorities in Zagreb
17 made available to them.
18 The HV itself, the Republic of Croatia
19 even better equipped than the HVO, and were purchasing equipment on the
20 international arms market and were having equipment made available to
21 them from international arms sales.
22 Q. And with regard to the strength of those -- strength of those
23 respective armies in terms of men or fighting soldiers, are you in a
24 position to give us those numbers?
25 A. Well, it's a kind of meaningless question because literally any
1 adult male could pick up a weapon and they all had items of military
2 uniform. And it was often very difficult to identify what's a soldier as
3 in a professional soldier who has been trained versus what is somebody
4 who is actually a civilian, however, who has done military service and
5 actually knows how to use a small arm.
6 Q. I see. Okay. So just in terms of a better understanding of
7 that, with regard to those villages that were under pressure, as you've
8 discussed, can you tell us in those villages how many of the villagers
9 were either directly involved with the ABiH, under let's say for example
10 the authority of Oric who was, I believe, the commander of that -- of the
11 Srebrenica enclave, or who were fellow travellers, by that I mean were
12 sympathetic to the Bosnia
13 A. I would -- and again I'm making estimates. This is not because I
14 have specific information to say. The reality was that inside the
15 Srebrenica enclave, the Muslims had very few small arms. Naser Oric --
16 Q. Sorry, I'm asking you about able-bodied fighting men, not about
18 A. So can you then repeat the question?
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
20 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I would object. The question as asked
21 is precisely what Colonel Tucker was trying to answer. It's been
22 reformulated now.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, it's not. Can you tell us in those villages
24 how many of the villagers were either directly involved with the ABiH,
25 let's say, for example under the authority of Oric or who were fellow
1 travellers? That has nothing to do with the issue of arms.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which is the distinct from the numerical strength
3 of the HV, HVO, and ABiH.
4 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour, however when it's reformulated
5 he's asking simply about the able bodied fighting men and trying to
6 further limit. I believe that the witness should have the opportunity to
7 answer the first question asked in regards to who was present in the
8 village -- I'm sorry, inside of Srebrenica.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you objecting because of the chronology of the
10 questions, or are you objecting because the question itself is
12 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I'm objecting to the fact that the
13 witness is not being able to answer the questions asked.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: But if he is not able to answer the questions
15 asked, then he says, I'm not able to answer. Is that a ground of
17 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, he wasn't -- he did not say that he
18 could not answer the question. He began to answer the question, was cut
19 off by Mr. Gregor Guy-Smith, and then was asked a separate question. And
20 so we're asking for the witness to be able to --
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry. The prior question where he was cut
22 off, okay, can you refer us to the transcript where that happened?
23 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour, it's at 76 starting at
24 page 7 is the initial question -- I'm sorry. No, I'm sorry, that's a
25 repeat. My apologies.
1 The initial question is coming in at page 75 starting at line 15.
2 He begins to answer at line 22, is cut off, and is asked a separate
3 question starting on line 25. I would ask for the witness to be allowed
4 to respond to the question that was asked.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: With regard to the question that I asked,
6 Colonel Tucker's answer was unresponsive. I'm happy to ask the same
7 question again that I asked on page 75 in its verbatim form.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Just ask it. Could you just ask the
9 question instead of giving just the background information. If we ask
10 short questions and we get short answers, we have our communication much
11 more --
12 MR. GUY-SMITH:
13 Q. You have testified that there were villages under pressure, and
14 you have told us what you learned was the manner of attack by the
15 Bosnian Serb forces; correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. With regard to those villages that you've testified to being
18 under pressure, can you tell us how many of the villagers were under the
19 command of the ABiH Army in that area commanded by or Oric, Naser Oric?
20 A. I obviously do not have intelligence as to the numbers, as I was
21 not at those villages. What I can say is that it is my understanding,
22 which was also confirmed by Naser Oric when Morillon spoke with him, that
23 the villages had in them the villagers plus on many occasions refugees
24 who had fled to those villages. However, that there were no combatants
25 in those villages. There was a second group of people who were
1 combatants and who were, as you would describe it, in the chain of
2 command as it were of Naser Oric, and the main determinant was the
3 available of weapons.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: But how many of those combatants were there, that
5 were under Naser Oric?
6 THE WITNESS: I would estimate it was probably several thousand
7 around the perimeter of the Srebrenica enclave. But that's purely a
8 personal estimate. It's not something we ever bothered to try and assess
9 because it was to us meaningless information.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: And in which villages specifically were these
11 people located?
12 THE WITNESS: These people weren't located at villages. These
13 people were located on the front line. And as the front line was moved
14 as it was pressed back, obviously these people withdrew --
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do I then understand you to be saying that your
16 answer of several thousand combatants under Naser Oric is actually not
17 answering Mr. Guy-Smith's question because now you are telling us of an
18 estimate on the front line, not an estimate of the numbers in the
20 THE WITNESS: The estimate of several thousand is for the entire
21 Srebrenica pocket. I am not in a position to be able to say however many
22 combatants there may or may not have been at any particular village at
23 any particular time.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith. I hope I haven't
25 confused the issue further.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, I don't think you have at all, Your Honour.
2 Q. Do you recall the issue of convoys being sent to Srebrenica on
3 the 17th of November between Morillon and Mladic?
4 A. If I remember --
5 Q. In 1992?
6 A. If I remember correctly, that was when Mladic had told Morillon
7 to provide a route, and he had or his staff had amended the route in
8 order to try to ensure that it bypassed areas of difficulty. And there
9 was a meeting around that time between General Morillon and
10 General Mladic that I recall Mladic frequently getting up and going out
11 of the meeting as he was getting updates from his own staff about the
12 progress of the convoy.
13 Q. And that was a meeting in which you commented, and see whether or
14 not this is accurate, once again referring to your statement, you say at
15 page 11:
16 "Lieutenant-General Mladic barely made any effort to conceal the
17 the fact that nothing could or would happen in Bosnian Serb held BH
18 without his specific approval. It was very apparent that he made all the
19 practical military decisions that mattered."
20 A. Yes, that was very obvious.
21 Q. Okay. With regard to the meeting that Mladic and Morillon had
22 concerning convoys, something I think rather dramatic happened on the
23 17th of November, which is that the UNHCR suspended all deliveries of
24 relief to Eastern Bosnia, both to Bosnian Serbs and other communities.
1 A. Yes, I remember that, that happening. It was driven by a couple
2 of things.
3 Q. Okay. Before we get to that, to put this into a context, what
4 has occurred is prior to the UNHCR suspending the delivery of
5 humanitarian aid, Mladic has imposed particular conditions upon the
6 convoy being able to travel; correct?
7 A. Yes, he did lay a number of constraints.
8 Q. And then independently in reaction to those constraints, the
9 UNHCR made a determination that they would suspend the delivery of
10 humanitarian aid because in their view it was necessary to have a global
11 assessment of needs as well as a deeper statement of cooperation by
12 authorities at a central and local level; correct?
13 A. That's a loose description.
14 Q. Well, I'm referring to what you said in your statement, and I've
15 actually quoted what you said, which is:
16 "The UNHCR suspend on 17th of November all deliveries of relief
17 to Eastern Bosnia, both to Bosnian Serb and other communities pending a
18 global assessment of needs as well as a deeper statement of cooperation
19 by authorities at a central and local level."
20 A. There was more to it than that.
21 Q. Okay. Now, I want to deal with the issue here of the suspension.
22 Because as I understand it what happened was that a letter was written by
23 the UNHCR which indicated that a suspension would occur.
24 A. Yes, I believe that's correct.
25 Q. And when the letter was written that indicated that a suspension
1 would occur, at that point in time what was your reaction, by "your" I'm
2 talking about Morillon and you obviously, to the independent action of
3 the UNHCR to suspend understanding that they did that, of course, in
4 light of what they understood to be Mladic's demands?
5 A. My recollection is that Morillon was quite upset and quite angry.
6 Q. Did there -- did there come as a result of this suspension a
7 meeting between Morillon and the head of the UNHCR concerning the fact
8 that humanitarian aid was being suspended by the very organisation that
9 should be delivering it?
10 A. Morillon believed that it was his duty to keep trying to get aid
11 going through regardless of whatever the obstacles or difficulties put in
12 their place. UNHCR had the same belief but believed, and again I'm going
13 by recollection from a long time ago, believed that they needed to take
14 this stand temporarily in order to try and achieve the greater objective
15 of getting freedom of movement, et cetera. And there's a disagreement
16 between Morillon and UNHCR about the means to achieve the end, the end
17 being that aid gets through.
18 Q. And so what you have now is you have, as I understand it, three
19 different views of how aid is to get through. You have the Mladic view
20 of how aid is to get through, you have the Morillon view which is aid to
21 get through at any cost, and I'm not -- excuse me, not at any cost, but
22 aid -- get it through?
23 A. Yeah, yeah.
24 Q. And you have the UNHCR view that is that they are -- I'm making
25 an assumption here, that they are an independent organisation and nobody
1 is going to dictate in any fashion whatsoever how humanitarian aid is to
2 be delivered?
3 A. I believe that's a fair summary.
4 Q. Okay. How long did UNHCR suspend the delivery of humanitarian
5 aid as a result of their decision that they needed to take a stand with
6 regard to this issue?
7 A. I can't remember exactly, but what I do know is that before the
8 end of November, humanitarian aid convoys were once again moving.
9 Q. And that is as a matter of fact the convoy that leaves sometime
10 around, I think, the 27th of November?
11 A. That is one particular convoy which went through to -- which
12 eventually didn't succeed in getting through to Srebrenica. What I need
13 to emphasise here is that we've been talking and focusing obviously on
14 convoys to the enclaves, but there are dozens and dozens of other convoys
15 going to other parts of Bosnia
16 fact that there are also many other UNHCR activities, not just these
17 particular convoys.
18 Q. You had earlier mentioned, and I just want to grab the point
19 while it's fresh in the mind, you had earlier mentioned that your mandate
20 was a mandate under, I believe, you said Chapter 6?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. And in that regard you were not -- were not to engage in
23 fighting, those are the words that you used, you said as a matter of fact
24 on page 60:
25 "Our mandate was not to engage in the fighting."
1 I wanted to ask you about that, which is, when -- if you are
2 aware of this, when the mandate changed from a Chapter 6 mandate to a
3 Chapter 7 mandate, at that point didn't the mandate remain the same with
4 regard to engaging in the fighting? Didn't the mandate remain as being a
5 peacekeeping mandate as opposed to some other form of mandate which
6 caused a whole series of other confusions ultimately, but from the outset
7 the mandate was never for UNPROFOR to engage in any fighting?
8 A. The key difference is that under Chapter 6 in order to achieve
9 whatever the mandate is in Chapter 6, you are not allowed to use force.
10 Whereas under Chapter 7 the UN force is allowed to use force in order to
11 achieve its mission. And that's the key difference between Chapter 6 and
12 Chapter 7; it's the use of the permissibility of the UN to use force.
13 Q. So, it's your position that the UN can -- an UNPROFOR force can
14 use some form of aggressive action in order to achieve the mandate of
15 delivering of humanitarian aid, is that your position?
16 A. Under Chapter 7, however we were not operating under Chapter 7,
17 we were operating under Chapter 6 which does not permit that.
18 Q. If I were to suggest to you, Colonel Tucker, that that
19 interpretation is a relatively novel one in terms of what we've seen in
20 this trial and that we have heard a fair amount of testimony that the
21 mandate under Chapter 7 was peacekeeping and the only time that
22 aggressive force could be used was in self-Defence, would that -- would
23 you disagree with that interpretation of the mandate under Chapter 7?
24 A. Under Chapter 6, self-Defence was, of course, also permitted; but
25 under Chapter 6 we were not allowed to take any actions on one side or
1 the other.
2 Q. I don't think you've answered my question, sir, my question is --
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
4 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I believe that asking the witness to
5 explain in expertise on Chapter 7 of the UN mandate is inappropriate. He
6 has described what his personal experiences were under Chapter 6, to go
7 forward and ask him to render opinions on Chapter 7 would go outside the
8 province of this witness.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I believe that he has made a very clear
11 distinction with regard to what his mandate was under Chapter 6, and he
12 recognizes that he would have had a different ability and a different
13 position under Chapter 7. And it's for that reason that I'm asking that
14 question. Because when he initially answered the question, he mentioned
15 that he did not have the mandate to engage in fighting, which I found to
16 be curious strange since the articulated mandate under Chapter 7 didn't
17 allow for UNPROFOR forces to be allowed in fighting either.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah, I guess, Mr. Guy-Smith, the point here is
19 that --
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I guess the point here is that obviously Mr. --
22 beg your pardon Colonel Tucker is not testifying as an expert on the
23 mandate of the UNPROFOR. That's his understanding.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's all I can do is ask him for his
25 understanding. I'm not asking --
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: And I think he has given it to you, he says under
2 Chapter 7 they can bull-doze to deliver aid. Under Chapter 6 they
3 cannot; they can only defend themselves. So his understanding is that
4 Chapter 7, you can defend yourself, you can bull-doze to open your way
5 for humanitarian aid. Under Chapter 6 --
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I guess you can shoot too.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Bull-doze meaning aggression. Under Chapter 6
8 it's only self-defence.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's his understanding.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. If that's his understanding --
12 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH:
14 Q. When you returned to the crisis headquarters, were you made aware
15 of any of the rules of engagement that had been imposed on the UNPROFOR
16 forces during the time in Sarajevo
17 A. When I was at the crisis management headquarters, that was 1996.
18 That was after the --
19 Q. That's right.
20 A. -- the NATO deployment, which was under totally different rules
21 of engagement. The -- when I was in Bosnia in 1992/1993 we were under
22 Chapter 6 --
23 Q. Sorry, my question is very simply. When you were at the crisis
24 headquarters, were you made aware of the rules of engagement that existed
25 in Sarajevo
1 A. No, it was not part of the -- we were interested in the rules of
2 engagement under which the NATO force, which was deployed to Bosnia
3 to operate.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: You know, it will be helpful if you just answer
5 the question and stop there. Don't volunteer information about NATO
6 because that's not the question. The question is about UNPROFOR. You
7 were not given those -- you were not made aware of the rules of
9 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: No. Thank you.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH:
12 Q. There was a meeting, now I'm back in a meeting with Mladic,
13 Karadzic, and General Morillon, that would have been the
14 27th of November, 1992, in which again the issue of CanBat, the
15 deployment of CanBat came up. Do you recall that?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. In that meeting, Karadzic affirmed the position that Mladic had
18 taken the day before that the question of the deployment of CanBat 2 to
19 Banja Luka
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. And that once he had gotten an answer from his assembly, he would
22 get back to you with regard to that issue?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Now, in that meeting there was a discussion in which Dr. Karadzic
25 and Morillon agreed on the route for the convoy to Srebrenica; correct?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Okay. And as a result of that agreement between Morillon and
3 Karadzic, I take it that Morillon then went back to the UNHCR and said,
4 Listen, we have a way of getting humanitarian aid through that area;
5 could you please reconsider your suspension and fire up the trucks?
6 I'm being somewhat colloquial, but I think you get the intent of
7 my question.
8 A. I cannot confirm when UNHCR lifted -- I can't confirm
9 specifically when UNHCR lifted their suspension that you referred to a
10 number of minutes ago. What I can confirm is that a convoy left -- it
11 was a UNHCR convoy and that it eventually got through to Srebrenica.
12 Q. Ultimately Karadzic did get back to you with regard to the issue
13 of deployment of CanBat 2; correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And what occurred was that the assembly did not, as I understand
16 it, approve the deployment of CanBat 2 along the lines that had been
17 discussed and once again placed some other conditions with regard to what
18 government or governments would engage in the transportation of CanBat 2?
19 A. I can't remember here sat now of what the reasons for the -- but
20 I do know that -- I can confirm that the answer was no and some other
21 conditions were laid down.
22 Q. Okay. And is the statement that you -- is the statement that you
23 previously made that, once again referring to the statement that we have
24 been talking about on 28th November, the first UN convoy to reach
25 Srebrenica since the beginning of the war arrived; is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And then you go on to say:
3 "The overall impression that we had at this point as a regards
4 the Bosnian Serbs' objective was that they now wanted peace. They
5 thought the war was over and were primarily interested in consolidation
6 and recognition of what they had."
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. And that would -- that would fall into line with the discussion
10 that we were having earlier with regard to the issue of cessation of
11 hostilities agreement; right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And that also falls into line with the discussion that we've had
14 concerning how the differing parties, and by that I mean the
15 Bosnian Serbs and the Presidency viewed the issue of cease-fire and
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. Okay. And I think it would be fair to say obviously that as a
19 result of what happens in the ensuing days, by that I mean within a very
20 short period of time, the Presidency is not of the same mind with regard
21 to the issue of peace because as a matter of fact they once again begin
22 an aggressive action with regard to breaking out of Sarajevo in the early
23 part of December 1992?
24 A. Yes, that's correct.
25 Q. I keep on having this voice behind me saying 1992, which I think
1 is a good thing. Okay.
2 Now, in terms of what we have now is some humanitarian aid coming
3 through. We've had some success in that regard, which I take it you are
4 pleased with, I mean not totally satisfied, but at least this is a move
5 in the right direction; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You have a clear impression based upon the meetings that you've
8 had with Mladic and Karadzic that they are interested at that time in
9 reaching a peaceful solution; correct?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. And you have the exact opposite view from the Presidency, which
12 is they are not quite ready for peace because -- go ahead, sorry.
13 A. They were not ready for peace, because the peace that the
14 Bosnian Serbs were trying to impose was seized through force of arms and
15 they did not accept or agree what had been seized through force of arms
16 and were therefore trying to continue and redress the situation.
17 Q. And what's happening with the Croatian contingent now?
18 A. The Croatian contingent are sitting fairly quiet at the moment
19 watching what's going on. There had been some nasty fighting between the
20 Croatian -- sorry, the Bosnian Croats and the Muslim Croats in September
21 and October down in the -- down south of Vitez, but that had stopped by
22 the time of November.
23 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the state of affairs in Sarajevo
24 which I think you have discussed with us. You've indicated that it was
25 bitterly cold, I believe?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And that there was difficulty with the delivery in situ of gas
3 and electricity; is that correct?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. With regard to that issue, in the same manner that Bosnian
6 forces -- or I should put it in other terms, let me start over again.
7 In the same manner that there had been aggressive acts by trucks
8 with mortars near Kosevo Hospital
9 Bosniaks in Sarajevo
10 something which you discussed with Judge Orie as being a predicate to the
11 exploitation of misery. Do you recall this?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to this specific issue?
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we just clear this -- okay. Before we clear
15 it, Madam Carter.
16 MS. CARTER: I would just like that page citation.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yeah, it's coming.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: While you are looking for the page citation, did
19 the witness discuss with Judge Orie somewhere in the corridors, or is
20 this a Chamber?
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Oh it's -- no, I don't think he had a discussion
22 with Judge Orie in the corridors that I would know about. This is
23 something that is discussed in trial.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think. Let's place it on the record that it was
25 a discussion with Judge Orie in court.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's where I was going.
2 Q. I'm referring to IT-98-29-T, and I'll be dealing with a couple of
3 different pages. But with regard to the particular issue that we are
4 discussing right now, that would be page 10.030 where you were asked the
5 following questions by Judge Orie, and the following responses ensued:
6 Judge Orie, starting at line 9:
7 "I'm trying to understand this. The supplies of water,
8 electricity, and gas also served their own population, referring to the
9 Presidency authorities. What was the specific reason why they would play
10 tricks which would result in not restoring the supplies when their own
11 population would suffer from it? Do you have any explanation about
13 And your response, Colonel Tucker:
14 "I do have an explanation and it is as follows: There were
15 elements within the Bosnian leadership who believed that the only way to
16 take back that which had been taken from them by the Bosnian Serbs, that
17 could only happen by either international intervention in Bosnia or by
18 the provision of arms and ammunition to Bosnia, which was not possible at
19 that time because of the arms embargo. Those people believed that the
20 only way to secure such international assistance was to depict the
21 situation in Sarajevo
22 would be willing to intervene. Therefore, it was not in their interest
23 to see any improvement in the situation in Sarajevo. It was not in their
24 interest to see any -- to see the lot of the civilian population improve.
25 To put it bluntly, the more suffering, the better because that played to
1 the television cameras and would ultimately lead to the pressure that
2 they wanted in order to achieve international intervention."
3 Judge Orie:
4 "Would that be, in three words, exploitation of misery?"
5 Your answer, Colonel Tucker:
6 "Could you say that again, sir?"
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Judge Orie:
9 "Would that be, in three words, exploitation of misery?"
11 "Absolutely, sir."
12 I take it you stand by that?
13 A. That's correct. The only thing I would say is that that was some
14 elements, not all.
15 Q. I understand. I understand. As 1992 went to rest, that's 1992,
16 and 1993 came into the fore, you began to receive some relatively strong
17 complaints from the Bosnian Serbs with regard to attacks on them and
18 attacks on Serbian villagers in the area such as the Srebrenica enclave?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Okay. And those attacks were attacks that were emanating from
21 Naser Oric's command; correct?
22 A. Whether they were originating from Naser Oric's command, I cannot
23 confirm. What I can confirm is that the Bosnian Serbs claimed that these
24 attacks were originating out of the enclaves, and that Naser Oric was in
25 command in the enclaves.
1 Q. And as a matter of fact, one of the things that they were -- was
2 being brought to your attention was a massacre of some Serb civilians, I
3 believe in Kravica?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. Now, shortly thereafter you began to receive information from the
6 Presidency -- before I go there, I take it that with regard to that
7 information did you or Morillon make arrangements in January when you
8 received this information to go to the region to determine the accuracy
9 or the validity of those complaints at that time in January?
10 A. Not in January, because what happened in January is that central
12 Q. It did indeed. In February you received some information, I
13 believe from, among others, President Izetbegovic and Ganic with regard
14 to the massacre at Cerska, and that massacre included relatively strong
15 allegations with regards to people being put in houses and burned, the
16 entire village was burned to the ground, that some 700 wounded or more,
17 and I'm not sure about the figure --
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. -- were in that particular village and this needed your
21 A. That's essentially correct.
22 Q. Okay. And President Izetbegovic and Ganic made arrangements with
23 the -- and I'm asking here, the war committee in Srebrenica to
24 facilitate, at least from their standpoint, your entry into Srebrenica;
1 A. I can't confirm whether they made arrangements, with whom they
2 made arrangements. They simply told General Morillon that they would
3 inform the people inside the enclave that General Morillon was going to
4 try and come into the enclave in order to see for himself what the
5 situation was.
6 Q. Okay. Now, by that point in time, by that I mean in
7 February of 1993, had you seen the radio communication centre at the PTT
8 building in Sarajevo
9 A. I think you mean the radio communication centre in the Presidency
11 Q. Thank you.
12 A. To which the answer is yes, I had.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, that particular communication centre was, I
14 think is, as you've perhaps put it previously, well equipped, strong, it
15 may not have been the most up-to-date system, but it was a system that
16 certainly could handle sophisticated communications?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. Okay. And that was in Sarajevo
19 A. In the Presidency building in Sarajevo.
20 Q. When you, and I'm jumping ahead now for a moment, when you got to
21 Srebrenica, there ultimately came a time when you were shown the same
22 kind of radio communication centre that I believe was in -- was it the
23 PTT building of the Srebrenica which was the headquarters of the war
24 committee; correct?
25 A. That's correct. It wasn't the same as the setup in Sarajevo
1 it was still a pretty comprehensive setup. It wasn't as large as the one
2 in the Presidency building.
3 Q. And as a matter of fact, what occurred with regard to you
4 becoming aware of that radio communication centre was that when the
5 decision was made for Morillon to make the speech which you alluded to
6 earlier speaking to Ms. Carter, some journalists had indicated to you or
7 told you that this particular radio communication centre existed,
8 something that you did not know beforehand, not information that had been
9 shared with you by either the war committee or Naser Oric; correct?
10 A. Correct. If I remember correctly, the journalists were actually
11 permitted by the war committee to use the radio equipment in order to
12 communicate their dispatches back to Sarajevo
13 their newspapers, radios, or whatever.
14 Q. When you decided to go into the Srebrenica area, you made
15 arrangements to get there by way of a helicopter; correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Okay. Now, where did that helicopter leave from and where did it
18 land in the Srebrenica enclave?
19 A. This is a French national helicopter which was assigned to
20 United Nations which took off from Kiseljak and then flew to Tuzla
21 landed in Tuzla
22 Q. Now, with regard to the - and I'm not sure what you call them, I
23 guess it would be the coordinates or the route - was there at that time a
24 recognised, I don't know what you call it, air route or air bridge?
25 A. Air corridor.
1 Q. Air corridor, thank you so much. Was there a recognised air
2 corridor into Srebrenica?
3 A. No. There was only an air corridor to Tuzla. Which is why --
4 that's where we were dropped off.
5 Q. Okay. And was that an air corridor that you frequented? That
6 UNPROFOR frequently used?
7 A. No, the first time it was used was when we flew from Kiseljak to
9 corridor was used was when we went from Kiseljak to Tuzla in order to go
10 into Srebrenica itself. Those were the first and second times that that
11 corridor was used.
12 Q. Now, with regard to the issue, because there two issues we
13 have -- well, there are many issues we have on this trip, but there are
14 two, I think, major issues that have been brought to your attention by
15 the various sides. One is the massacre at Kravica and the other is the
16 massacre at Cerska. Right?
17 A. There are two massacres at Cerska that I mentioned. The first is
18 the allegation by the -- by Izetbegovic and Ganic that people have been
19 locked in houses and the houses burnt down and killed in the houses. The
20 second was an allegation by the Bosnian Serbs that Serbs had been
21 massacred by the Muslims in Cerska?
22 Q. Okay. With regard to -- and I'm now going to jump ahead for a
23 moment. I believe it was on the 22nd of March you attended a funeral,
24 but sometime around the 22nd of March you were shown a series of bodies
25 that were decomposed bodies that the Bosnian Serbs indicated to you were
1 the people who had been massacred; correct?
2 A. We were shown firstly to the site where the excavations were
3 going on and there were forensic investigations going on and we saw these
4 investigations going on, saw a number of decomposing bodies, and we were
5 shown the building in which one of the survivors of the massacre claimed
6 he had seen Bosnian Muslims killing these Bosnian Serb villagers.
7 We were then after that taken to the funeral which was actually
8 in, in fact, it was on the outskirts of Bratunac.
9 Q. And with regard to that particular incident, and by that I mean
10 your viewing of the bodies and your going to the particular crime scenes,
11 you did not make any specific reports with regard to that visit that you
12 made to the crime scene in Kravica because that wasn't your mission or
13 your task; right?
14 A. I did report what had happened, what we had seen, and it was
15 again part of the radio communications that I've described previously.
16 And we indeed reported this to the headquarters, BH command back in
18 Q. Just so I'm clear, so I understand, with regard to the crime
19 scene that you went to, you made no specific report about that; correct?
20 A. No. I reported that we had been to this scene at Kravica, that
21 the Serbs had made these allegations to us about what had happened, and I
22 repeated those allegations, and they were reported to Kiseljak.
23 Q. Okay. Perhaps you can be of some help to me in that regard.
24 Apart from the first statement that we've been discussing, you also made
25 a statement on the 20th and 21st of September, 2002, and the
1 1st and 2nd of November, 2002, in which you said on page 16 of that
3 "I did not make any specific report with regard to the visit that
4 we made to this crime scene in Kravica. The reason for this was that our
5 mission and task in Bosnia
6 humanitarian aid reached those in need and to support all efforts to
7 reduce the bloodshed and prove the safety of the civilian population in
8 the region."
9 You go on to say more, and I want to be fair to you because I can
10 tell you exactly what you said.
11 "Furthermore, in my view there was little substance to record.
12 In general, I sent reports to Kiseljak at least daily and on occasion
13 every two hours. Other than the report, we had visited Kravica, I do not
14 believe I gave any specific details in those reports."
15 So as I understand it, with regard to the issue of there being a
16 specific report concerning the -- what had been characterised as a
17 massacre of Serbian villagers, you did not memorialise that in any
18 fashion at the time of the event other than the oral reporting that you
20 A. What I did was, if I remember correctly, was provide a report of
21 what had happened that day. On that day, this visit had taken place and
22 I reported that we had conducted this visit. And that we had been to
23 this -- the scene of this alleged massacre. And that we had seen bodies.
24 What I did not do was try and collect legal evidence as to what had or
25 had not happened because that -- the collection of legal evidence in
1 order to support subsequent prosecution, that's what I meant was not part
2 of my task and objective at the time.
3 Q. Okay. I was trying to understand what you meant when you said
4 you did not make a specific report, you clarified that?
5 A. I did not make a legally --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: A legal inspection.
7 THE WITNESS: A legal inspection.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH:
9 Q. With regard to the other area that -- the Cerska area, you didn't
10 go to Cerska, did you?
11 A. I went to the outskirts of Cerska, it was Morillon himself who
12 physically went into the village itself.
13 Q. Okay. And before he went into the village, you had, apart from
14 meeting with Izetbegovic and Ganic who had told you about the horrors
15 that had occurred, you also spoke, I believe, with Naser Oric about that
16 when you were in Srebrenica and Oric - would it be fair to say? - echoed
17 the same, which is that people were burned in houses and that there were
18 hundreds, 700 or more, who had been wounded; correct?
19 A. Your mixing up two separate events. The issue of being burnt in
20 houses, Naser Oric echoed. The issue of the claim that there were 700 or
21 so wounded in Konjevic Polje, that was a claim which was made by
22 Izetbegovic and Ganic, which was one of the reasons leading to
23 General Morillon's decision to go there to investigate the actual
24 situation on the grounds himself.
25 Q. Above and beyond Izetbegovic Ganic and Oric, you also had
1 occasion to speak with a Bosniak commander in Tuzla?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Who also gave you that same information?
4 A. Yes, he was also very specific about the accusation of people
5 being burned in houses.
6 Q. Okay. Apart from those individuals who you mentioned, did
7 anybody else on the Bosniak side, which I will call for, as you have, the
8 Presidency side, give you further information concerning the burning of
9 people in houses, or are we left with Izetbegovic, Ganic --
10 A. I think Izetbegovic, Ganic, the Bosniak commander in Tuzla
12 Q. Morillon went to Cerska, he examined the area; correct?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. He made a number of determinations about what occurred, one,
15 there had been heavy fighting; correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Two, the number of wounded was not in the neighbourhood of 700
18 but rather much less?
19 A. That's the number of wounded which we found in Konjevic Polje.
20 It wasn't actually General Morillon who determined that. It was somebody
21 from Medicins Sans Frontieres who went around all the houses in Konjevic
22 Polje in order to triage the injured for evacuation, and it was he who
23 came back and said there are not 700 here, there are about 70 here. 700
24 is a specific number, the 70 is --
25 Q. It was 73 give or take a couple.
1 A. Something like that.
2 Q. And with regard to the issue of people being burned, Morillon
3 said --
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I refer the Court and counsel to IT-03-68
5 page 5831, starting at line 15 of your examination by Mr. Di Fazio of the
6 Office of the Prosecutor:
7 "Q. Did he report any bodies in houses that had been burned?
8 "A. General Morillon said that he had unfortunately -- that he
9 was unfortunately familiar with the smell of burnt human flesh and that
10 he had walked around the village and that he had not smelled that smell
11 and that he had not seen anything which indicated that anyone had been
12 burnt or there had been people burnt inside houses."
14 A. That's correct.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Would this be a convenient time?
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: That would be a convenient time. And before we
17 move, let me just indicate that ID00-8093 was not tendered. Was that
18 your intension?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's correct, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Secondly, we obviously haven't
21 finished today. It looks like we had been scheduled to finish today with
22 this witness. We may have difficulties tomorrow with interpreters. We
23 may not be able to sit a full session. How much longer are you likely to
24 be with the witness?
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: I don't believe based upon what I see here that I
1 have any -- that I have -- I don't believe I have much more than a
2 session. I believe I can get it done in a session, I think with a --
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: With a bit of thought over the evening. I will
5 do what I can to make sure that my hopes become a reality.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Can we impress on you to do those thoughts
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Indeed so.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: We will then adjourn to tomorrow, but before we do
10 so, Colonel Tucker, I must again warn you, it's my duty unfortunately,
11 but I do know you know it you are not supposed to talk to anybody about
12 the case, not even your counsel, until you are excused from the
14 Court stands adjourned to tomorrow 9.00 in the morning,
15 Courtroom II. Court adjourned.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.
18 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day
19 of September, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.