1 Monday, 16 December 2002

2 [Sentencing Hearing]

3 [Open session]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Would the Registrar call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is Case Number

8 IT-00-39 and 40/1-S, the Prosecutor versus Biljana Plavsic.

9 JUDGE MAY: The appearances.

10 MS. DEL PONTE: Your Honours, I appear as Prosecutor, along with

11 my senior trial attorneys, Mark Harmon and Alan Tieger, who together are

12 responsible for the detailed aspect of the conduct of this case. Carmela

13 Javier as case manager. Thank you.

14 MR. PAVICH: Good morning, Your Honours. Robert Pavich and Eugene

15 O'Sullivan on behalf of Biljana Plavsic.

16 JUDGE MAY: Madam Prosecutor, before we begin, let me say this:

17 We have received a joint request for an order under Rule 70 in relation to

18 one witness. These are exceptional circumstances. And it being a joint

19 application, we propose to grant it. In doing so, we should make it plain

20 that we are not setting a precedent at all, because as I say, the

21 circumstances of this case and these proceedings are exceptional.

22 Yes.

23 MS. DEL PONTE: Thank you, Mr. President. Before I proceed with

24 my introductory remarks, there is a short procedural point that might best

25 be dealt with at the outset. Today's hearing is in a public session, but

1 a key document, the factual basis for the plea of guilty, was filed

2 confidentially by the parties on 30 September. There is now no reason for

3 that document to remain under seal, and it would facilitate today's

4 proceeding, which I understand are to be broadcast live in the former

5 Yugoslavia, if a document were now made public. And therefore ask the

6 Chamber to order that the status of that document be changed so that it

7 can be referred to without difficulty.

8 I only seek the immediate unsealing of that particular document;

9 others should remain confidential until the end of the hearing.

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE MAY: The document will be unsealed.

12 MS. DEL PONTE: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 Your Honours, sentencing hearings are, by their nature, public

14 events central to the criminal justice. It is by open process in the

15 Court that the members of society learn about the nature of crimes

16 committed and the responsibility of individuals for them. It is often a

17 painful process, but it is a necessary one. I believe that today's

18 hearing is of unusual importance in bringing to light what occurred during

19 the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is the first time in this

20 Tribunal that a senior figure in the former Yugoslavia indicted in a top

21 leadership role has admitted responsibility for horrific crimes committed

22 during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23 Mrs. Plavsic has pled guilty to count 3 of the indictment, which

24 is a comprehensive charge of crimes against humanity comprising

25 persecution and ethnic cleansing, crimes which resulted in untold

1 suffering for many thousands of innocent victims. Many of those who

2 survived will bear the scars for the rest of their lives, and I wish to

3 stress that there is nothing in the nature of a plea of guilty which in

4 any way alters the seriousness of the crimes themselves. They are of the

5 utmost gravity and are fully detailed in the relevant schedules to the

6 indictment. In my submission, the gravity of the crimes should be the

7 Chamber's primary consideration when determining sentence.

8 Leaders have a duty to protect all citizens of a country, and

9 crimes committed against people who deserve protection are all the more

10 serious as a result. Nevertheless, it is of enormous significance that

11 Mrs. Plavsic accept before this Chamber that horrendous crimes were

12 committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that she acknowledge her own

13 individual criminal responsibility for them. Her position stands in sharp

14 contrast to that of other leaders of the period, who either continue to

15 deny that crimes occurred or who try to keep themselves beyond the reach

16 of international justice.

17 Your Honours, we should not forget that this Tribunal is

18 ultimately itself an instrument of peace. Reconciliation in the Balkans

19 will not be achieved so long as denial persists. The plea of guilty by

20 Mrs. Plavsic rests upon the acceptance of two inescapable truths: First,

21 that the massive crimes set out in count 3 of the indictment did take

22 place as they are described; and second, that in playing the role she did,

23 she bears criminal responsibility. Unless those stark truths are

24 confronted honestly, as they are in these proceedings (supported of course

25 by other findings in the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal)

1 there can surely be little hope for true reconciliation in society in the

2 former Yugoslavia.

3 I do not suggest that the plea of guilty by Mrs. Plavsic should

4 compel instant forgiveness from victims or indeed from the Chamber. The

5 crimes are too serious for that. In her plea of guilty, and certainly in

6 her dealings with my office, the accused has not sought to gain personal

7 advantage or to evade responsibility for what she herself has done. But

8 the fact of the plea in itself must be an important step towards

9 reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It must help to break down

10 revisionism and denial, and I hope that it will compel others to face up

11 to the reality of what happened during the conflict.

12 Your Honours, the Chamber will hear more on these aspects of the

13 plea from eminent witnesses called to give evidence in the course of the

14 next two days, as it will hear more on the crimes themselves and the role

15 played by Mrs. Plavsic. In their commission, I would now, therefore, ask

16 Mr. Harmon to outline in greater detail to you exactly how the proceedings

17 will unfold.

18 Thank you very much, Mr. President.

19 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Madam Prosecutor.

20 Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. Good morning to my

21 learned friends from the Defence.

22 The purpose of my opening remarks is to provide you with an

23 overview of the oral and written evidence that the Prosecution and the

24 Defence will adduce at this hearing and to identify for you the witnesses

25 who will testify and to describe the nature of their testimonies.

1 Both the parties in this litigation have conscientiously

2 endeavoured to identify critical issues and evidence that can assist Your

3 Honours in determining what is a just sentence for Mrs. Plavsic for her

4 admitted criminal responsibility for a crime against humanity. During the

5 next two days, we will present this evidence to you.

6 In considering the legal framework for this sentencing hearing,

7 the parties have considered the Statute of the Tribunal, the Tribunal's

8 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the jurisprudence of the Tribunal.

9 We are in agreement as to the factors that are proper and relevant for

10 your consideration, and we have addressed each of them comprehensively in

11 our respective sentences briefs that were filed on the 25th of November,

12 2002. Those factors are:

13 One, the gravity of the offence;

14 Two, the individual circumstances of the convicted person;

15 Three, any aggravating and mitigating circumstances;

16 And four, the general practice regarding prison sentences in the

17 courts of the former Yugoslavia.

18 During the course of the next two days, we will be focussing our

19 attention on and presenting evidence about the first three of those

20 factors. The fourth factor, that is, the general practice regarding

21 prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia, will not be

22 addressed by the Prosecutor during this evidentiary hearing, as we have

23 addressed it comprehensively in our sentencing brief at paragraphs 35

24 through 39.

25 The evidence that will be submitted to you in the next two days

1 will be divided into three distinct blocks of evidence. The hearing will

2 commence with Prosecution witnesses and evidence that will focus on the

3 gravity of the offence to which Mrs. Plavsic has entered a guilty plea.

4 According to the jurisprudence of this Tribunal, it is the most important

5 factor to consider in determining sentence. I refer Your Honours to the

6 Trial Chamber judgments in Delalic and Kupreskic and to the Appeals

7 Chamber judgment in Aleksovski.

8 Now, turning to the crime to which Mrs. Plavsic has entered a

9 guilty plea. Its scale is simply immense. Count 3 of the indictment in

10 the four schedules annexed to it describe a persecutory campaign that was

11 waged in 37 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina between July 1991 and

12 December of 1992. The victims of this discriminatory campaign were

13 principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, although other victims

14 from other ethnic groups were ensnared in its hideous web. I refer, for

15 example, to the Bosnian Serbs who rejected the policies of Mrs. Plavsic

16 and who remained in Sarajevo throughout the long and terrible siege.

17 The persecutory campaign that was directed at non-Serbs included

18 killings, unlawful detentions, destruction of non-Serb homes, businesses

19 sacred sites and the forcible expulsion of whole populations of non-Serbs

20 from areas claimed by the Bosnian Serbs.

21 We acknowledge at the outset of this hearing, Mr. President, and

22 Your Honours, that we cannot present the evidence that comprehensively

23 addresses the magnitude of the collective and the individual human

24 suffering and the material destruction that resulted from this persecutory

25 campaign, nor can we fully demonstrate the corrosive consequences of this

1 campaign and what consequences occurred in 1991 and 1992 and continue

2 presently today to erode the social fabric in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A

3 fortiori, our submissions are but the dust on the mountain of human

4 experience and suffering and can only be illustrative of the past and

5 present consequence of this crime against humanity.

6 We propose that the voice of the victims be heard through four

7 Prosecution witnesses. The first of these Prosecution witnesses will be

8 Mr. Mirsad Tokaca. He's a representative of Bosnian state commission that

9 was established in 1992 to gather and collect evidence of war crimes

10 committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his testimony will touch on the

11 scale and the scope of the crimes committed and the impact on the

12 victims. He will also discuss how a failure to talk openly about these

13 crimes impedes reconciliation.

14 The second Prosecution witness will be Mr. Adil Draganovic, who is

15 a representative from the Alliance of Former Camp Inmates of Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina. His testimony on behalf of thousands of former camp

17 detainees will focus on the camps, the conditions in some of these

18 facilities, and the impact that these detention crimes had on the lives of

19 the detainees, including his own life, and he will share with Your Honours

20 his personal experience as a detainee in both Sanski Most and in the

21 Manjaca camp.

22 The third Prosecution witness will be Mrs. Teufika

23 Ibrahimefendic. Mrs. Ibrahimefendic is a psychotherapist and clinical

24 coordinator at Viva Zene, a non-governmental organisation based in Tuzla

25 but was established in 1994 and which is funded by the European

1 Community. Viva Zene provides psychosocial support to victims of war,

2 specifically to women and to children. Her testimony will permit

3 Your Honours to hear from a clinical practitioner's point of view the

4 effects of war trauma on victims and the effects of that trauma on the

5 victims today, ten years after these crimes occurred.

6 We will augment the testimony of these three witnesses with

7 written submissions of two types. First, we will augment the testimonies

8 with submissions of witnesses who have testified in other cases. We have

9 selected victim testimony from eight past or ongoing trials. Those trials

10 being the Tadic, Jelisic, Krnojelac, Stakic, Kvocka, Brdjanin and Talic,

11 and Vasiljevic cases. We will also submit to Your Honours an expert

12 demographics report which was prepared by demographers Ewa Tabeau and

13 Marcin Zoltkowski, that illustrates the significant decline of the

14 non-Serb population in the 37 municipalities that were claimed by the

15 Bosnian Serbs.

16 The segment focussing on victims will conclude with the testimony

17 of Professor Elie Wiesel, author, moralist, and recipient of the Nobel

18 Peace Prize. He will address Your Honours on behalf of the victims and

19 their need and humanity's need for justice to be rendered in this case.

20 The second segment of evidence will relate to factors in

21 mitigation. The Defence will guide you through this portion of the

22 hearing. These factors do not derogate from the gravity of the crime, but

23 they may mitigate from the sentence to be imposed. Indeed, Mr. President

24 and Your Honours, the Prosecutor has identified in paragraph 22 of its

25 sentencing brief factors in mitigation that we believe merit your

1 consideration. Those factors include Mrs. Plavsic's entry of a guilty

2 plea, her acceptance of responsibility, her remorse, her voluntary

3 surrender to the Tribunal, her age, her post-war conduct, and her previous

4 good character.

5 The Defence witnesses who will testify on behalf of Mrs. Plavsic

6 are Milorad Dodik, who is the president of the Party of Independent Social

7 Democrats in the Republika Srpska; Ambassador Carl Bildt, the first high

8 representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Ambassador Robert Frowick, the

9 former OSCE head of mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10 The final block of evidence will be witnesses who are common

11 witnesses to both the Prosecution and the Defence. Their testimony will

12 focus on Mrs. Plavsic's plea of guilty and how it has contributed to the

13 establishment of truth for the events described in the indictment and how

14 that plea can contribute to reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The

15 parties to this litigation share the view that it is only through the

16 establishment of truth about what occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina that

17 the fragile and vital process of reconciliation can begin.

18 Furthermore, we agree that it is only through the establishment of

19 truth that the unhealthy shackles of revision that debilitate the former

20 Yugoslavia and that foster suspicion, ethnic hatred, and civil unrest can

21 be broken.

22 The witnesses who will testify in this segment of the hearing are

23 Ambassador Madeline K. Albright, former US Permanent Representative to

24 the United Nations from 1993 to 1997 and former United States Secretary of

25 State from 1997 to 2001. She will be examined by both of the parties.

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1 The second witness will be Dr. Alex Boraine, who is a former member of

2 parliament in South Africa, and he has served as the Deputy Chairperson of

3 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. He is the founding president of

4 the International Centre for Transitional Justice.

5 Finally, the evidentiary portion of the hearing will conclude by a

6 statement to the Trial Chamber by Mrs. Plavsic. On Wednesday afternoon,

7 the parties will make their final submission, and it will be Mr. Alan

8 Tieger, my colleague, who will make those submissions on behalf of the

9 Office of the Prosecutor. It is the expectation and the hope of both the

10 parties in this historic litigation that the evidence adduced during the

11 next two days of hearing will assist you in your deliberations and in your

12 arriving at a just and proper sentence. Thank you.

13 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Harmon, there's one matter I would be grateful if

14 you would deal with. It doesn't appear in the submissions or the briefs.

15 Or if it does, then I've overlooked it. That concerns the issue of

16 cooperation with the Prosecutor. It is one of the factors which we are

17 bidden to take account of, and I can see no reference to it. Perhaps you

18 would like to think about what you would say about that and address us on

19 it, and the Defence also, if there's anything they want to address us on

20 that topic.

21 MR. HARMON: Thank you.

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll hear the evidence.

23 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Might I make a brief opening statement,

24 Your Honours.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course.

1 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honour. Good morning to the

2 Trial Chamber and to my learned friends from the Office of the

3 Prosecutor.

4 Your Honour, it is not an overstatement, we believe, to describe

5 what will take place in this courtroom over the next three days as the

6 most important sentencing hearing which has been or will be conducted at

7 this Tribunal. A political leader charged with serious violations of

8 international law, including crimes against humanity, has voluntarily

9 submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Subsequently, she

10 acknowledged that forces under leadership which included her conducted a

11 campaign of persecution which was organised, systematic, and widespread.

12 She has admitted guilt and accepted legal responsibility for her part in

13 this persecution. This admission and acknowledgement is detailed in the

14 documented factual basis of her guilty plea made public this morning. We

15 are confident that this document will withstand the intense scrutiny to

16 which it is certain to be subjected.

17 Against this admission of guilt and acceptance of responsibility,

18 the Trial Chamber must weigh Biljana Plavsic's extraordinary acts of

19 leadership and courage after the war, her acceptance of responsibility

20 before this Tribunal, and the effects of this hearing itself, which she

21 sees as an opportunity to build toward reconciliation. Her acts of

22 mitigation extend to the mission of the Tribunal, which itself was created

23 to restore peace and security to the region by establishing accountability

24 and promoting reconciliation. International diplomats at the highest

25 level will testify that Biljana Plavsic was instrumental, if not

1 indispensable in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords in the months and

2 years following the agreement. As president of Republika Srpska, and at

3 great personal and political risk, Mrs. Plavsic confronted corrupt

4 political and governmental structures, exposed and fought organised crime,

5 and took strong measures to re-establish the rule of law following the

6 war.

7 In addition to her work implementing the Dayton Agreement, the

8 Chamber will be asked to consider the positive effects of her guilty plea

9 as the only political leader willing to step forward and act responsibly

10 for wrongs committed during the war. This is seen as so important that a

11 number of highly respected international politicians and moral leaders,

12 including Nobel Peace laureates have volunteered to participate in this

13 hearing.

14 Finally, Mrs. Plavsic will address herself to this Chamber and the

15 people she had the responsibility to serve as leader. In the end, this

16 Chamber will be left to pronounce a sentence which will reflect all

17 aspects of this extraordinary hearing. Those are my opening remarks on

18 behalf of

19 Mrs. Plavsic.

20 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

21 Yes, the Prosecution to call its evidence.

22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the first witness is Mr. Mirsad Tokaca.

23 [The witness entered court]

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness take the declaration.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

1 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if you would like to take a seat.

3 WITNESS: MIRSAD TOKACA

4 [Witness answered through interpreter]

5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, may I begin by noting that the

6 Prosecution has prepared and the Court has been provided with some binders

7 containing proposed exhibits. In that connection, I would ask the Court's

8 permission for Ms. Javier to take her place adjacent to the witness in

9 order to facilitate with the presentation of the exhibits for the

10 following two witnesses.

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Examined by Mr. Tieger:

14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Tokaca.

15 A. Good morning.

16 Q. Can you tell the Court your present position, sir.

17 A. I am now, and as from 1992 - to be more precise, August of 1992 -

18 secretary of the state commission for collecting facts regarding war

19 crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, I'm not receiving any translation.

21 Q. Mr. Tokaca, how long have you served in that position?

22 A. For more than ten years. In August, it was exactly ten years, so

23 ten years and four months.

24 Q. Mr. Tokaca, when was the commission with which you have served for

25 that period of time established?

1 A. The commission was established by a decision of the Presidency of

2 the 28th of April, 1992.

3 Q. And what was its purpose?

4 A. Its role is to collect all relevant facts relating to crimes

5 against humanity, grave violations of human rights, and all relevant

6 documents, material evidence, witness statements, reports of competent

7 international state and non-governmental institutions which during that

8 period were involved in one way or another in the developments in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 In addition to that, the task of the commission was to establish

11 contact with non-governmental organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

12 outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a view to collecting information from

13 them that they had at their disposal, and also to seek to inform the

14 public as to what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of the

15 important tasks of this commission was to create an atmosphere within

16 which people would freely and without fear speak about what had happened

17 to them.

18 And finally, one of the very important tasks of the commission was

19 to cooperate with bodies of the United Nations, which in that period were

20 involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I have in mind, in the

21 first place, the commission of experts of the United Nations and also

22 investigating teams that came to Bosnia-Herzegovina, our aim being to help

23 them in their investigation.

24 Q. Can you tell us briefly the professional and ethnic backgrounds of

25 those who served on the commission.

1 A. Not only customarily but according to the laws that were in force,

2 all the bodies that were formed in Bosnia-Herzegovina were multi-ethnic.

3 So the commission had two parts, the expert and political part.

4 The political part of the body consisted of three members: one

5 Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. And the expert segment or section that

6 I led was also multi-ethnic. Though, we couldn't apply the criterium

7 fully because there were 20 experts involved and the prime consideration

8 was their capability. We wanted them to be independent, intellectuals,

9 professionals who could in a professional manner achieve their task at the

10 highest possible standard. It was multi-ethnic. There were Jews, Serbs,

11 Bosniaks, Croats, and of different religions as well.

12 Q. Mr. Tokaca, although I don't want to go into great detail about

13 the methodology adopted by the commission, I'd like you to provide the

14 Court with some understanding of the approach that was taken in gathering

15 the evidence in fulfillment of the commission's mandate.

16 A. We were guided by the conventions on human rights and the Geneva

17 Conventions on the customs of war, so that the methodology we applied was

18 based on those documents.

19 The main instruments we used were, in the first place, interviews

20 with witnesses and victims, people who were actually victims or who had

21 indirect knowledge as to what happened to some other people. Of course,

22 in addition to those direct contacts, there was investigation on the site,

23 collecting photo and video documents, and various other reports which

24 could assist in our in-depth investigations. For, I am sure, Their

25 Honours and everyone following these proceedings will realise that these

1 were only initial stages and nobody knew what would really happen

2 ultimately, so that these were quite new and novel developments to which

3 we had to adjust.

4 Q. Can you give the Court some idea of the scope of the commission's

5 work. Approximately how many documents has the commission gathered?

6 A. It is really a very voluminous undertaking. To this day, we have

7 collected almost a million pages of various documents, more than 5.000

8 statements in our archives, various reports, about 20.000 photographs,

9 videotapes, and a large number of other documents and reports of the

10 institutions that I have already mentioned.

11 Q. And how many witnesses has the commission interviewed?

12 A. More than 5.000.

13 Q. How many witnesses, Mr. Tokaca, have you personally met with and

14 talked to about their experiences?

15 A. With more than 1.000 witnesses. Of course, it was not my task to

16 take statements from them. My task was to establish the initial contact

17 with them. And if the situation so required - because these were large

18 teams consisting mostly of volunteers - then I, too, would take statements

19 from witnesses. But I can say that I certainly read all 5.000

20 statements.

21 Q. Have you also travelled to areas where crimes took place?

22 A. Of course. This was a component part of my activities and my main

23 task, because I realised from the moment -- from the first moment that

24 without looking for victims, it is impossible to establish the facts. In

25 the conditions we were working in, in a town under siege, I and my

1 associates availed myself of every possible opportunity to get out of

2 Sarajevo, either on foot or when the blue routes were opened, to visit all

3 the locations which were of interest to us. On the one hand, to establish

4 contact with potential witnesses; and on the other, to develop our own

5 network, which we managed to establish in Tuzla, Zenica, Travnik, Mostar,

6 in a number of places, because that is what the situation required of us.

7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, may I ask that Exhibit 1 be placed on

8 the ELMO.

9 Q. Mr. Tokaca, Exhibit 1 depicts the 37 municipalities that are

10 listed in this indictment. Let me ask you, sir, if you are familiar with

11 the events that took place in those municipalities through your work with

12 the commission.

13 A. Regarding any place on this map, be it marked in blue or still

14 remaining white, virtually from each of these municipalities we have data

15 and I am personally familiar as to what was going on in those

16 municipalities.

17 Q. Mr. Tokaca, in light of your decade-long efforts with the

18 commission, I'd like to ask you to provide the Court with some assistance

19 concerning the details of the events listed in the indictment and to which

20 Mrs. Plavsic has pled guilty, and I'd like you to concentrate your

21 testimony, of course, on the 37 municipalities shown in Exhibit 1 and upon

22 the events that took place in 1992.

23 First, Mr. Tokaca, I'd like to ask you about the relative size of

24 the Muslim and Croat communities in the municipalities that are shown on

25 Exhibit 1. Were Muslims and Croats the majority population in a number of

1 those municipalities?

2 A. As you said yourself, you are familiar with the structure of

3 Bosnia. In some places the Bosniaks were irrelative and some an absolute

4 majority. In some municipalities, like Bijeljina, the Serbs were in the

5 relative or absolute majority. It is not possible to find a single area

6 which can be considered clearly dominated by one ethnicity. For instance,

7 Foca, the proportion was 51 to 49 per cent. The same applied, for

8 instance, to Cajnice. Visegrad, more than 50 per cent were Bosniaks.

9 Rogatica, 60 per cent were Bosniaks. Bijeljina had a majority Serbian

10 population. Bratunac had about 80 per cent Bosniak population. So when

11 talking about municipalities in the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

12 with the exception of Bijeljina municipality, most of the municipalities

13 had a majority Bosniak population.

14 In Brcko, it was more mixed because there were Croats, Bosniaks,

15 and Serbs. The relative majority were the Bosniaks. And going towards

16 Bosnian Krajina, from Doboj, via Prnjavor, Prnjavor had a majority Serb

17 population; Banja Luka, again a relative majority were Serbs. But no one

18 had an absolute majority. In Prijedor the relative majority were

19 Bosniaks. Sanski Most was half half; Kljuc, also. So either these

20 municipalities had a Bosniak majority or the population was more or less

21 balanced evenly between the various ethnic groups.

22 Q. Were you able to determine from the witnesses you spoke to the

23 nature of their lives before the war with their neighbours of other

24 ethnicities? What was communal life like according to the witnesses who

25 met with the commission?

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1 A. Actually, we would begin each of our interviews with that

2 question, what the relations were like before the war. And my experience

3 tells me - and I can only speak on the basis of the reading of those

4 witness statements - that the answers were that they were harmonious,

5 tolerant, relations of mutual respect. There was a firm social structure

6 that existed based on firm rules of reciprocal respect. There were people

7 living together. I am talking about towns now, with 50 to 100,000 people,

8 where that was even more true where people could not be identified by

9 their ethnic or religious affiliation. And a very pronounced

10 characteristic of Bosnian Krajina, that people would be best men in each

11 other's families. There were a lot of mixed marriages. It was a compact

12 social structure within which no ethnicity was isolated. Even in villages

13 which could be described as purer ethnically, though I do not like that

14 word, people from various villages communicated amongst each other.

15 We asked witnesses whether there were conflicts of any kind or

16 disputes based on religion, based on ethnicity, and not in a single

17 statement that I have read did people say that there were conflicts.

18 There may have been disputes over property, over land, plots at the

19 borders. Even between brothers and relatives these occur in Bosnia. But

20 they were never motivated by any ethnic affiliation or differences in

21 religion. So I can say as a person who spent all my life in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sarajevo after all, was a harmonious life, when

23 people couldn't even recognise each other by name because there were many

24 names on the basis of which you could not tell who was who.

25 Q. Mr. Tokaca, I'd like to turn now to what happened to those

1 communities and to the crimes listed in the indictment. Can you provide

2 the Court with some understanding of the scale of -- and scope of forcible

3 expulsions that took place in the 37 municipalities shown in Exhibit 1.

4 A. Very briefly. I can say that there were few municipalities in

5 which the brutality and scope of expulsion was an exception and not the

6 rule. So I will begin with the exceptions, even though they are not

7 linked to 1992 but are important in the overall context.

8 There's only one place that can be an exception, and that is a

9 locality close to Bijeljina, called Janja, in which people remained to

10 live but they were expelled in 1995; and partly Banja Luka, which from

11 1992 until the end did have cases of expulsions but all the people were

12 not expelled. Everything else, going from Zvornik, Bratunica, Vlasenica,

13 Visegrad, and the other municipalities in Eastern Bosnia, and especially

14 along the Sana River Valley, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuc, these places

15 were really subjected to brutal expulsions accompanied by violence,

16 because only by brute force was it possible to separate people. The

17 Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats did not live in isolated communities that

18 could be controlled, so it was only by brute force that people could be

19 separated, some expelled, and others kept to stay. So all these areas

20 that I have mentioned were subjected to forcible expulsions in the first

21 place of the Bosniak population but also the Croats. When talking about

22 Croats, they lived around Brcko and in very small numbers around the Drina

23 River. But they did live in Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc. So the

24 method was basically always the same, lightning attacks, shelling, and

25 then mechanised units entering villages and towns, the beginning of

1 violence, and everything else that followed.

2 Q. Mr. Tokaca, the Court has been provided with a demographic report

3 which illustrates the disparity in the populations of the Muslim and Croat

4 communities in the various municipalities between 1991 and 1997. In Foca,

5 for example, where the percentage of Muslims and Croats was 51 per cent in

6 1991, it was 3.8 per cent in 1997. Can you provide us with any indication

7 of the extent to which those expulsions took place in 1992 as opposed to

8 any succeeding years?

9 A. Actually, 70 per cent, and I can assert that with a great degree

10 of certainty, occurred in 1992. In fact, the year 1992 was a key year for

11 everything that would follow. And in particular, the period from April

12 until the end of 1992, and in particular, May, June, July, and August.

13 They were months of intensive expulsion of people from their age-old

14 homes. And I can tell you that today, as I sit in this courtroom, only

15 6 per cent of the expelled population has actually physically returned to

16 these areas, the Podrinje area, that is, the Drina River valley.

17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tieger, it would be helpful to know, when we deal

18 with figures like 70 per cent, what the number of that is. Obviously, it

19 can only be an estimate, but it would be helpful to us to know what that

20 is, if you would come to that at some stage, please.

21 MR. TIEGER: Certainly, Your Honour.

22 Q. Mr. Tokaca, can you provide the Court with some guidance on the

23 specific numbers of Muslims and Croats expelled from the various

24 municipalities, recognising, sir, that you don't have those figures in

25 front of you, and that, as I mentioned before, there is a demographic

1 report which provides the differences between the 1991 populations and the

2 1997 populations.

3 With respect to any particular municipalities, for example, can

4 you indicate the scale of the expulsions based on the raw numbers of

5 people who were expelled?

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, and remembering we're dealing with 1992 here.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, of course. Of course,

8 Your Honour. I am focussing on 1992, but I'm just trying to make some

9 comparisons. By way of example, Foca: If you know that 51 per cent of

10 the population were Bosniaks and if you know that after the end of 1992,

11 there were virtually no Bosniaks left there, then it's pure mathematics.

12 Out of the 50.000, 50 per cent is 25.000, which means about 25 or 24.000

13 people were actually expelled from their homes. They didn't live there

14 any more. The situation was similar in Bratunac, people who ended up in

15 the Srebrenica enclave. I said that Bijeljina was to some extent an

16 exception, where everything was over at the end of March, beginning of

17 April, and a lot of people remained to live there, especially in Janja.

18 And that is an exception. As for all the others, Sanski Most, Kljuc,

19 Prijedor, more or less, the situation there was similar; that is, an

20 enormous number, the vast majority of people, left their homes not

21 voluntarily but by force. They were forced out.

22 Q. And perhaps you can provide the Court with some additional

23 understanding of the nature and the scope of the expulsions if we focus

24 even more narrowly on particular villages.

25 Were there some villages occupied by Muslims or Croats that no

1 longer existed after the campaign of persecutions in 1992?

2 A. Of course. An enormous number of villages which physically are

3 totally destroyed and no longer exist. In our archives, in our register,

4 our analyses show that more than 800, that is, 850 villages, have totally

5 been razed to the ground, especially in the areas I have been referring

6 to, so that in those villages, there are no inhabitants, be they Croats or

7 Bosniaks.

8 There's a whole series of villages. We could list them; we could

9 name them. For example, villages in which entire families have

10 disappeared, Srnja, Jelicka. In the area of Sanski Most and Kljuc, the

11 Draganovic family, the Potonic family. Then the village of Biljani in

12 which 250 people were killed in a single day. So one could list these

13 examples endlessly. I thought that my time was limited and wish to

14 respect that limit, but I do have some notes if I may be allowed to use

15 them. I could give you names of families or villages in which people

16 disappeared in a day.

17 In Nevesinje, the Colak/Hodzic family. And we found in a well

18 people who were killed. They were elderly, 70, 80, 90 years old. The

19 Stedin village. The well-known cases in Visegrad, the burning in

20 Pionirska Street, in Alispahic Mehmed's house where only one woman

21 survived. Then Foca. I have listed here about 10 families which have

22 been exterminated, Srnja; Hajric; Hodzic, nine members; Ceric, eight

23 members; Selimovic, 7; and so on and so on. I thought that this Tribunal

24 has already been provided with much of this evidence so that I didn't

25 think that it would be necessary for me to provide additional evidence.

1 But unfortunately, it is a very, very long list of villages, Hrnici,

2 Velagic, Biljani, Krasulje, Srnjani, Pehovo, Krustovo, Ogruc, in which

3 entire families or a large number of family members were killed in one

4 day; others expelled; villages destroyed.

5 I visited some of those villages after the war, and it was very

6 hard to find a single house intact. I visited Kozarac. I couldn't go

7 there immediately after the war. I went there in 1997, and it was already

8 in the reconstruction phase. But one couldn't judge from that everything

9 that had been destroyed. So unfortunately, the list is very long. And if

10 I were to go through it, it would take days.

11 Q. In the villages you mentioned, how long had there been a Muslim or

12 Croat presence and community?

13 A. All those people -- that is to say, when we're talking about the

14 Bosniaks and the Croats who had lived there and who were expelled, but the

15 Serbs, too, that lived alongside them, these were all people who had lived

16 there for centuries. They were people who had very deep roots there.

17 They had their traditions there, their customs, their culture, their

18 monuments, their cemeteries. So these were all families who had lived

19 there for a very long time, lived in the area for a long time. They were

20 not people who had moved into the area recently. For the most part, they

21 were people who had lived there a long time.

22 Q. Well, let's turn our attention, now, then to the means that were

23 employed to forcibly expel those people from those communities.

24 Beginning, for example, in Eastern Bosnia where the first wave of

25 expulsions began, can you provide the Court with some understanding of the

1 means that were used to force the Muslims and Croats from their

2 communities?

3 A. The method was always the same, it never differed in that period,

4 April - or rather the end of March and April 1992. There were no major

5 differences. There were these precipitous lightning artillery attacks,

6 the bombing of villages, the entry of units. Well-trained tank armoured

7 units would storm the villages. And you have a whole scale of violence

8 that was unleashed from that moment on.

9 I said a moment ago, and let me remind you of that, if I may, that

10 they wished to use brute force. Brute force was used to frighten the

11 people, to get them moving. There was no other way of doing it. So there

12 were killings. The killings that took place took place largely straight

13 away. There were lists that these people had with respect to the

14 different units. They were well-trained units who stormed the villages,

15 and then what followed was a manhunt. The women were separated from the

16 men. They were taken off in unknown directions to camps, to prisons.

17 There were expulsions and persecutions. People were expulsed to other

18 areas. And others who were not expulsed, they were frightened and fled to

19 other areas. For example, a portion of the people from Bratunac escaped

20 towards Srebrenica. From Vlasenica, the same thing happened. If they

21 weren't able to go to Tuzla and Svornik, they would try and escape towards

22 Srebrenica. And the people of Visegrad from the Zepa enclave. And the

23 people who were not able to flee in those first few days would take

24 shelter and refuge there.

25 And for a long time, although the people were hit by such a great

1 calamity, they were taken by surprise, they were shocked. They just

2 couldn't believe that something like that was going on. And they expected

3 that things might come to an end, that it would all go away. So people

4 just didn't believe that this was happening, and many people paid with

5 their lives for staying on their own thresholds at home. And when you

6 asked me for how long people had been living there and when I spoke about

7 the traditions of life in the area, according to Bosnian tradition, for

8 all people they were all very closely connected to their homes. And the

9 people were very loathe to leave their thresholds, leave their homes, and

10 many of them paid with their lives for their disbelief about what was

11 going on.

12 And in this whole scale of violence, which took different forms,

13 there were sexual assaults there. Women were raped. And I don't think

14 you can find a single town on this map - that has been recorded on this

15 map, of course, somewhere, the intensity was high, such as in Foca, for

16 example. Bratunac, Vlasenica, cases in points, Svornik, Prijedor, Brcko,

17 and so on, where you have a very high level of rapes that took place. But

18 they were rapes - how can I put this - and an expert expressed this at a

19 meeting recently: They weren't an expression of sexuality or sexual need

20 and sexual gratification. It was an attempt to demonstrate the sexual act

21 as an expression of violence so that in traditional families - and Bosnia,

22 as you know, is a traditional, conservative area - regardless of the

23 economic group of people, you can see similar characteristics. And rape

24 was always considered a tarnishing of honour for any family. So this was,

25 I think, a bomb that exploded, and the waves that the bomb issued led to

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1 terrible fear amongst the population.

2 And in addition to the rapes, I can also enumerate tens of other

3 forms of abuse: The killing of a hodza, for example, in a school in

4 Bratunac, for example. He was ordered to drink some alcohol or to change

5 his faith, and he refused to do so and they killed him. So there was this

6 violence and humiliation, and they were targeting the population to

7 humiliate it, to humiliate the victims, so that every self-respect would

8 be stifled in the victims. I know that my time is limited, so I will take

9 care of the time and not use up too much of Their Honours' time.

10 Q. For those people who remained, for those Muslims and Croats who

11 remained in the municipalities after the initial attacks, and for those

12 who were not taken away to camps, can you describe, beyond the description

13 you've just provided, what life was like for those Muslims and Croats?

14 Did they -- what was the nature of their civil life in those communities

15 before the time they actually were expelled or fled in fear?

16 A. I am talking about what people said in their statements; that is

17 my basis. And I can take that as an example, and also I took the example

18 of Janja, which was an exception, whereas the people lived there in 1992

19 and they were expelled in 1995. And we asked them what the conditions

20 were in which they lived, and all of them said that they were permanently

21 afraid, expecting somebody to come and knock at their door and expel them

22 from their own homes, to take them away to do forced labour, because the

23 people were exposed to humiliating behaviour, conduct.

24 They were a highly -- some of them were high intellectuals, and

25 they were sent out to clean the streets. They were treated as second-rate

1 citizens in those towns, Banja Luka, for example, or towns in which there

2 were no military operations at one point, Prijedor and those areas. In

3 that period, they were quite uncertain as to their fate, and they had no

4 legal protection. The laws did not protect them. There were no laws to

5 protect these people in any situation that might arise.

6 Looting, the storming and ransacking of houses on the pretext that

7 they were searching for weapons, taking personal property and so on, so

8 that there was this general insecurity for the people that remained there.

9 Q. Were Muslims and Croats separately identified from Serbs in those

10 municipalities? Were there ways of marking who was a Muslim or Croat or

11 identifying who was a Muslim or Croat in contrast to a Serb?

12 A. This was how it was: People knew each other very well. They knew

13 who lived where. However, there were even some cases in Krajina, for

14 example, in Prijedor and Sanski Most, where they placed bands, ribbons, on

15 people. And there were statements where this is mentioned, although this

16 was not widespread. There were individual cases in which people were

17 branded in this way. There was no need for that because people knew each

18 other very well, and so the people that stayed on knew who they were.

19 They knew each other.

20 Q. You mentioned the taking of personal property and the destruction

21 of personal property. Can you give the Court some idea of what happened

22 to the cultural property, the monuments and sacred sites of the Muslims

23 and Croats in those municipalities.

24 A. Well, it was like this: I said that to all intents and purposes

25 people's lives would end in a flash. They would leave with something they

1 could carry in a carrier bag or put in a rucksack. Now, "looting" meant

2 the destruction and seizure of property, and this took place in two ways.

3 And I should like to ask the Court's indulgence to describe this.

4 Private property was taken. Private property was destroyed.

5 Valuables were taken away. Gold, which is part of the culture of the

6 Bosniak people -- they knew that they possessed gold. It was a

7 tradition. It wasn't a question of the material value, the worth of those

8 items. They had cultural, historical value. Many families had things of

9 great value too. But usually they brought back memories, and these

10 memories were taken away from them.

11 When you talk about cultural and historical heritage -- we're

12 dealing with towns along the Drina River or in the Krajina area - for

13 example Foca, Visegrad, Zvornik, cases in point - they were ancient towns

14 in which various buildings existed dating back from the Middle Ages to the

15 present day. And these buildings marked the region, and it was they that

16 were destroyed. Mosques were destroyed. Houses and buildings, which

17 through their architecture reminded the people of the traditions -- the

18 architectural traditions of the area, they were destroyed completely. The

19 names of towns, the toponyms were changed. Everything that in any way was

20 reminiscent of the past, this was destroyed. From Aladza, for example,

21 the Aladza Mosque in Foca, the mosques in other parts of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It wasn't five or ten. We're talking about hundreds

23 of buildings and facilities of this kind that were razed to the ground,

24 either by placing explosives there or because they -- the tankists

25 underwent training in those buildings and targeted them. They were

1 buildings that were destroyed or demolished. And I have a catalogue about

2 that, and we have an extensive archives with photographs as to where and

3 under what conditions those buildings were destroyed. And we're preparing

4 a special conference that will be held next year devoted to that topic,

5 but that's subject aside.

6 MR. TIEGER: Could I ask that Exhibit 2 be placed on the ELMO,

7 Your Honour.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Mr. Tokaca, do you recognise what is shown in Exhibit 2?

10 A. Yes, yes. That is the Aladza mosque in Foca, which is a pearl

11 amongst the cultural heritage in this part of Europe. I can say that

12 quite frankly. It is 450 years old. It is a building which could have

13 served to -- for people to be proud of it. And as I said, the Serb

14 authors have written beautiful things about this particular mosque and

15 others like it.

16 Q. Mr. Tokaca, turning to another subject. Did the commission

17 investigate the incidents of mass killings in the municipalities shown in

18 Exhibit 1?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Can you give us -- I'm sorry. I'm just asking if you could

21 provide the Court with some understanding of the scale of mass killings

22 that took place in 1992 in those municipalities.

23 A. 1992 is a key year when we're talking about these kinds of

24 events. And I wish to link it to the problem of missing persons directly

25 because I engaged in an extensive study for the UN commission. Mr. Mesud

1 Novak led the commission, which dealt with the problem of persons listed

2 as missing. And in studying this issue, he arrived at this conclusion:

3 The people who were collected, separated from their families, separated in

4 groups, women, children - and sometimes the women separated from their

5 children - were the object of mass killings. And that study showed this

6 unequivocally to me because the curve, the statistical curve of these

7 events in May, June, July showed that the largest portion, 80 per cent in

8 fact - and we excluded Srebrenica, because it wasn't relative at that

9 time - but they were concentrated in those first few months, or rather,

10 the middle months of the year 1992, May, June, July, August, to quote an

11 example.

12 For example, of 208 persons who were listed missing in Dragosicka

13 [phoen], all of them disappeared in that period of 1992. So the problem

14 of their disappearance, the disappearance of people, and the mass killings

15 of people, and the mass graves that we were to discover later on confirmed

16 that out. And for the killing of 250 inhabitants of the Biljani village,

17 we knew about that in 1992 but we didn't know what was actually going to

18 happen. And it was only in 1996 when we exhumed the graves did we

19 discover the fate of the 188 people who were thrown into a military

20 compound near Kljuc, above Kljuc, on a slope, an elevation above Kljuc.

21 And there were other similar instances.

22 Q. How many incidents of mass killings were brought to your

23 attention, and how widespread were they?

24 A. Our investigations, although they comprised the entire period, but

25 without doubt 80 per cent -- I can safely say that 80 per cent of those

1 events took place in 1992. And we recorded 1.100 cases of mass killings

2 of persons and 320 sites, potential sites where these bodies can be

3 found. And for the most part, these investigations are underway today as

4 well and they are reliable information. So the scenario was like that. I

5 described it. I described how people were collected up and taken off in

6 unknown directions.

7 Of course, if we agree what we mean when we say "mass killings,"

8 because experts differ as to what the term "mass killing" means. Is it 3,

9 4, or 5 people, 50 people, 100 people, or a military operation in which

10 one day in individual sites and locations you kill 3 or 200 persons? So

11 what do we mean by "mass killings"? But the criteria we used was that it

12 is three or more persons at one given point in time and with the intent to

13 kill these people, when villages were stormed and persons found there

14 killed. Had there been more people in the village, more people would have

15 been killed most probably. Had fewer people been there, fewer people

16 would have fallen victim.

17 Q. Mr. Tokaca, before I move on, I failed to ask you about the mosque

18 shown in Exhibit 2. Can you tell us quickly what happened to that

19 mosque.

20 A. It was mined, blown up. And I visited the site. Parts of the

21 mosque were found scattered along the Drina River bank. Other pieces of

22 it were scattered and dispersed. And there were other similar examples in

23 which buildings of this kind were blown up.

24 Q. And did that happen in 1992?

25 A. Yes, 1992.

1 Q. Mr. Tokaca, you spoke about mass killings. Did you launch a

2 project in an effort to determine how many people had been killed in

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina during the conflict?

4 A. Yes. Everything that happened in those five years led me to

5 undertake one project. And there are two reasons for that, very vital for

6 what we're doing, regardless of the importance for this Tribunal, but for

7 the purposes of this Tribunal. For example, the victims in

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina are still being manipulated. After the end of military

9 operations, a list was not drawn up, a regular population census to see

10 how many victims there were. So investigations of this kind were not

11 undertaken. There are still tendencies to cover up the facts and figures

12 about the victims and casualties, and they are -- the victims are being

13 manipulated. But we shall endeavour to complete our project and to arrive

14 at precise data as to all the victims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all those who

15 were, according to the 1991 population census, inhabitants of BH. We will

16 register the civilian victims, people who were killed in different ways,

17 people who were members of different military formations, units.

18 And the third category, the third part of the project would

19 comprise of the persons who are listed as missing. We do have certain

20 records and files, and this is an open issue, an outstanding issue. And

21 in our assessment, it is 20 per cent of the total number of victims. So

22 it is our goal in the coming two years, if possible, to complete this

23 project and have a complete list of all the victims. At this point in

24 time, in our database we have 90.000 names of victims. But this is an

25 incomplete project, as I say. It has not been finished yet. And I am

1 fully conscious of the fact that it must be completed if the truth is to

2 be seen in its complexity and entirety.

3 JUDGE KWON: Just before you go on, Mr. Tieger, I wonder if the

4 state commission to which this witness, Mr. Tokaca, belonged has ever

5 produced or published a comprehensive report of what the commission has

6 found so far and whether it's available in either one of our working

7 languages.

8 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Tokaca, can you provide the Court with guidance

9 on that.

10 A. Yes, I can. Of course. Unfortunately, a comprehensive report has

11 not yet been drawn up. We are applying a different method. As the scope

12 of the crime, the massive scale of the crimes, as such it cannot be

13 recorded in one comprehensive report. And so in order to objectify this

14 whole issue -- and I can say that not all the research and investigations

15 have been completed because this is not possible yet. This is a

16 preparatory phase. We prepare individual reports on specific issues.

17 These are reports that are ongoing, and we're doing them together with

18 international experts and we have organised an international conference to

19 be held every other year in Sarajevo. And at these conferences we discuss

20 certain issues. In 1999, we looked at violence against women, for

21 example, assaults against women. In 2001 we looked at the problem of

22 children. Next year we're going to look at the cultural and historical

23 heritage and problems related to that.

24 Once we complete that part of the project, we will undertake an

25 extensive report, which will be a sort of conclusion. They will represent

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1 conclusions. And I am intensively involved in the commission for

2 reconciliation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are have been working along

3 those lines for several years, and the scale and scope of the crimes are

4 the obstacle to having this extensive report, and the commission working

5 too.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 JUDGE MAY: Can you help us, give us some idea, dealing with the

8 scale of killings, how many people were killed in 1992, the period that we

9 are dealing with.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Without any doubt, Your Honour, yes,

11 I can tell you that. It is quite certain that in 1992, that that year,

12 1992, had the most massive victims, and the figure is not below 50.000.

13 But as I say, we will complete our data information, our facts and

14 figures.

15 But let me show you on the map and take it in order. Can we look

16 at the map. Let's start with Foca. The minimum number -- the lowest

17 number was 1.000 persons. Sanski Most, at least 1500 people. Prijedor,

18 at least 2.000 people. Bratunac, at least 1.000 persons. Zvornik -- the

19 same holds true for Zvornik. So using minimum figures, minimum estimates

20 in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this figure, as I say, would be a

21 minimum of 50.000 persons. Unfortunately, due to the limiting factors

22 that makes all this difficult - we're a small commission, just 15 members,

23 15-odd persons, most of them volunteers, people who worked on a voluntary

24 basis - they did not receive any assistance. We were unbiased,

25 unprejudiced. So within the frameworks of our possibilities and material

1 resources, we did what we could. But we do expect to get support to

2 complete the job to arrive at a final figure for the victims and

3 casualties, to avoid all manipulation with the figures of victims, which

4 does happen very often, because sometimes this figure exceeds 300.000 if

5 someone feels it is politically advantageous to bandy about figures of

6 that kind.

7 MR. TIEGER:

8 Q. Mr. Tokaca, am I correct that the -- sir, the commission's mandate

9 was to identify victims of war crimes, irrespective of nationality?

10 A. Absolutely correct. We focussed throughout on the victims,

11 irrespective of ethnicity. We were not interested in classifying them in

12 this way or anything else.

13 Q. Then just to clarify. With respect to the -- to those killed whom

14 you identified in your answer before, in the 37 municipalities indicated

15 in the indictment, in such places as Foca and Bratunac and Zvornik, what

16 percentage of those persons killed were Muslims and Croats?

17 A. In all the municipalities, practically all those killed were

18 Bosniaks, Muslims, and Croats. There were even - and I have to say this.

19 I do apologise, but I have to say this - there were some Serbs who were

20 killed as well, some Serbs who helped their neighbours, Serbs who were

21 victims too, the victims of those who wanted through force to destroy all

22 the mutual links, the good neighbourly relations, the ties between

23 friends, between families on the basis of kumship relations, marriages as

24 well, mixed marriages. So when I go through all this database, it is

25 difficult to find a single municipality -- even if we focus on this circle

1 of municipalities alone that we're talking about in 1992, it is difficult

2 to find ones where Serbs, too, were not the victims of brute force in

3 cases when they attempted to assist their neighbours. So that if need

4 be - although I am not prepared for this - but if need be I could focus

5 more extensively on this. Although, I tried to rest on the important

6 points. But I must prevail upon you that that did happen too.

7 Q. Mr. Tokaca, you mentioned that you had been involved in work

8 toward reconciliation. In view of your lengthy efforts to identify the

9 scale and scope of the crimes committed and in light of your work toward

10 reconciliation, can I ask you your view of the potential contribution

11 toward reconciliation of Mrs. Plavsic's acknowledgement of the crimes and

12 acceptance of responsibility.

13 A. Absolutely so. On the very day that I read about this

14 recognition -- admission of guilt, some journalists came to me and I

15 stated this publicly. Although, in certain circles this triggered off a

16 different reaction, and there were people who did not agree with it. And

17 it was logical that there are such people. But it was my position that it

18 was an extremely courageous, brave, and important gesture and that it

19 represents support to what is the ultimate aim of all of us, I feel; that

20 at one point normal conditions of life should be resumed in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but in the entire

22 region as well. So I see this as being essential, and I do believe and

23 hope that this admission of guilt comes from the heart. And I don't wish

24 to doubt that it does. Indeed. It is a courageous gesture on the part of

25 a woman - and I repeat, a woman - who has come to realise, who has

1 understood that serious crimes against humanity did take place, and that

2 is why it is worthy of respect.

3 We can individually think what we like. But if we look at it in

4 general terms -- and let me also draw your attention to one other point:

5 There is still strong polarisation in Bosnia and in the entire region.

6 Criminals are still considered to be national heroes. And that is not a

7 good thing for peace. It is not a good thing for reconciliation amongst

8 people. And that is why I consider it to be so important. I consider,

9 and I know I am absolutely sure and certain, that there are many other

10 people who have not told their tales. And so when His Honour, the judge,

11 asked me whether we have completed our final report, I say we have not

12 because many stories have still to be told. And any such report would not

13 be comprehensive. It would not be the whole truth, as yet. And what this

14 August Tribunal is doing is a contribution to that whole truth and it is

15 particularly important for those people to speak up who in any way

16 perpetrated crimes, committed crimes, because I deeply believe and I am

17 quite sure from what I have been doing for the past ten years, that people

18 did crimes under different conditions and circumstances. Many of them

19 were pushed into them. They did not always do this of their own free

20 will. And that is why this recognition of guilt is so important, that we

21 can continue this narrative. For me, it would be a bad thing if

22 Mrs. Plavsic were to remain silent. She should speak up. She has to

23 speak up. She was a university professor. She worked with youth, with

24 the young people. She lived in my own town. And I knew her from that

25 ambiance, I know her as a university professor. So it is important for

1 our children. Not so much for us. It is important for your our

2 children.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I would like to ask you if you can identify and

4 isolate in more specific terms why you believe the acknowledgement of guilt

5 will contribute to reconciliation. I mean, you have spoken generally. I

6 mean, can you be more specific.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When somebody acknowledges such a

8 grave crime, then this necessarily must have some influence on others who

9 have committed similar crimes because it is difficult to conceal such

10 acts. Because there are very intensive efforts being invested to conceal

11 crimes, and these efforts are still in evidence. Of course, I speak from

12 my own point of view. I still cannot get hold of certain facts which I

13 think are obvious, they shouldn't be a secret. But they are being

14 concealed. And these would clarify many things. Many people who are

15 aware of the sites of mass graves won't say where they are. So one

16 confession can start off a chain reaction. It could motivate other

17 people. It could assist them. I don't know how to be more specific in

18 explaining my view. This doesn't mean that somebody will not be held

19 responsible because he has confessed, but this requires inner strength on

20 the part of the individual. It's like when you start to topple dominos,

21 and we are in doing this beginning this process. And that is why I

22 consider this to be so important. I come from that area, and I know how

23 difficult it is for people to start talking and to confess. Even the

24 witnesses are afraid to speak. They are still afraid.

25 Just recently, in Banja Luka, for example, the broadcasting, a

1 very moving documentary film of a mother looking for her child who finally

2 found her has been banned. So this burden of silence is very dangerous

3 for any society, and that is why I think Mrs. Plavsic's acknowledgement of

4 guilt can be a motivating factor for many others. Of course, they will be

5 treated here in this Tribunal as individuals with all human rights

6 guaranteed by law, and of course they will get the penalty that they

7 deserve with all the mitigating circumstances that we are talking about

8 now.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have come to the time for the break.

10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tieger, have you much longer with this witness?

11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this is a perfectly appropriate time. I

12 have finished my questioning.

13 JUDGE MAY: You have finished. Any questions from the Defence for

14 this witness?

15 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE MAY: Very, well. Mr. Tokaca, that concludes your

17 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International Tribunal to give it.

18 You are free to go.

19 We'll adjourn now for half an hour.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too, Your Honours.

21 [The witness withdrew]

22 --- Recess taken at 11.06 a.m.

23 --- On resuming at 11.37 a.m.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, the next witness will be Mr. Adil

1 Draganovic.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Harmon, he's going to testify pretty much as

3 to the happenings in 1992?

4 MR. HARMON: Yes, his testimony will be limited to the events in

5 1992, and specifically focussed on the camps, both in a broader sense and

6 his specific experiences in camps.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Would you be careful to structure the

8 questions so as to elicit the kind of evidence that we need.

9 MR. HARMON: Yes, I will. Thank you.

10 [The witness entered court]

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

13 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If you would like to sit down.

15 WITNESS: ADIL DRAGANOVIC

16 [Witness answered through interpreter]

17 Examined by Mr. Harmon:

18 Q. Mr. Draganovic, first of all, let me thank you for coming,

19 accepting the Prosecutor's invitation to enlighten the Trial Chamber about

20 the matter of detention facilities and camps. If you could begin, first

21 of all, by stating your full name and spelling your last name for the

22 record, please.

23 A. My name is Adil Draganovic.

24 Q. Could you spell your last name for the record, please.

25 A. A-D-I-L, first name. Draganovic: D-R-A-G-A-N-O-V-I-C.

1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Draganovic. Let's begin your examination by

2 focussing on your background. First, Mr. Draganovic, you are a law

3 graduate from the University of Sarajevo law school, and you graduated

4 from that institution in 1976. Is that correct?

5 A. Yes, it is.

6 Q. Would you tell the Judges what your current profession is.

7 A. I am currently a judge, that is, president of the municipal court

8 in Sanski Most.

9 Q. When did you assume that position?

10 A. I have been a judge since 1982. I first worked as a judge in

11 Bosanska Dubica, and I have been working in Sanski Most since 1987. From

12 1988 -- ever since 1988, I have been president of the court in Sanski

13 Most.

14 Q. And you are a Bosniak. Is that correct?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. I would like to turn my attention to the Alliance of Former Camp

17 Inmates in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And if you could tell the Judges what

18 that alliance is, what its origins are, and what its purpose and goals

19 are.

20 A. The Alliance of Detainees of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a voluntary

21 association of citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, former camp inmates. It is

22 a multi-ethnic alliance formed in 1996, mostly by citizens of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina who spent some time in concentration camps during the

24 aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. The aim of the alliance is to draw

25 up a list of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and other people who

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1 spent time in the concentration camps of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the

2 aggression for the period from 1992 until 1995, and to make a list and

3 classification of detention places, camps, to list them for the whole

4 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to provide appropriate documentation

5 for presenting the truth about the aggression against Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina primarily for the needs of criminal processing of war crimes

7 committed in the territory Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those who had formed,

8 founded, planned, and committed acts of violation of international norms

9 in the areas which we call concentration camps.

10 The Alliance of Camp Inmates of Bosnia-Herzegovina is comprised of

11 municipal associations and cantonal associations of camp inmates and the

12 regional association of camp inmates for the territory of Republika

13 Srpska, as well as the association of camp inmates formed abroad in the

14 countries in which former inmates of concentration camps are now

15 residing.

16 Q. Mr. Draganovic, what is your position within that organisation?

17 A. I am a member of that organisation, and on a voluntary basis I am

18 a legal advisor and expert for investigating the documentation.

19 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how you collect the data that you

20 do collect and how it is maintained.

21 A. The Alliance of Camp Inmates of Bosnia and Herzegovina compiles

22 files for each individual citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina who spend time in

23 a concentration camp and who joined his local association or the alliance

24 of his own free will. So data are entered on several pages, and these are

25 printed forms for each inmate, and that inmate is also duty-bound to write

1 a report indicating when he was detained, where, who was detained with

2 him, to mention witnesses who can corroborate his story, what time he

3 spent there, who arrested him, what acts of violence he was exposed to,

4 when he was released, data about his family, his place of residence, place

5 of birth, et cetera. These are all data that are necessary for research

6 and for analysis which we carry out in the alliance.

7 Q. Now, can you tell me how many former detainees have been

8 registered by your association.

9 A. According to some data which are still incomplete, lists have been

10 compiled of camp inmates in the alliance and we are dealing with figures

11 amounting to several tens of thousands of inmates. But we haven't

12 completed the process of registration and listing of all inmates, so that

13 this is still ongoing in all the municipalities, cantons, and abroad. At

14 this point in time we have between 7 to 10,000 files of camp inmates in

15 our database. However, in the cantonal associations and municipal

16 associations, there are also data banks, so that we still have not

17 compiled an exhaustive list, nor have we registered all the inmates. But

18 this process is underway, and it will certainly take several more years to

19 complete. I can say that according to the lists and estimates, there is

20 no doubt that up to 100.000 people may have spent some time in

21 concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 Q. Now, Mr. Draganovic, based on your personal experiences and based

23 on your work with the alliance, do you feel you're in a good position to

24 inform the Trial Chamber about the conditions in those detention

25 facilities and camps?

1 A. On the basis of my own personal experience, as well as the

2 documents and conversations with many victims or people who spent time in

3 the concentration camps, I can talk of the suffering that the people

4 experienced in those concentration camps all over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 Q. Mr. Draganovic, if we could turn to the first exhibit, which is

6 Exhibit 3, which is a map. And this map depicts the 37 municipalities

7 that are contained and identified in the indictment to which Mrs. Plavsic

8 had entered a guilty plea. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how many

9 detention facilities in 1992 -- by the end of 1992 were in those

10 municipalities.

11 A. In those 37 municipalities, there was a total of 408 concentration

12 camps or, rather, areas in which people were detained by force and exposed

13 to physical and mental abuse. Those are reliable data, based on documents

14 that we have at our disposal in Bosnia-Herzegovina in our alliance.

15 Q. Now, Mr. Draganovic, you yourself were detained in two facilities,

16 and I believe your experiences in both a very small detention facility and

17 a large facility, the Manjaca camp, can be a prism through which the

18 Judges can appreciate the conditions that you and other inmates

19 experienced. And I'd like to, therefore, start with your initial

20 detention. Can you tell the Judges about your initial detention. Where

21 did it occur? What were your duties and responsibilities at the time you

22 were detained?

23 A. As I said, I was president of the municipal court of Sanski Most,

24 and I was performing my duties. I did not wish to abandon the

25 municipality of Sanski Most, although I received threats that I would be

1 killed and executed as well as my family unless I leave the municipality

2 by May 15th, 1992. I stayed until the end in the court, until the 15th of

3 May, when Serb forces or Serb - let me call it authorities, illegal

4 authorities at the time - came under arms and simply threw me out of court

5 under threat of arms, and both me and my other Bosniak colleagues, judges,

6 and deputy prosecutor. So that from the 15th of May on, I was at home.

7 For a time, I went to stay with a relative in Kljuc, and then I returned

8 on the 25th of May.

9 On the 25th of May, I was taken into custody by armed forces, the

10 police, the military police, the civilian police. I was taken out of a

11 car by force under threat of arms and taken to the police station in

12 Sanski Most where they locked me up in a room, detention cell, in the

13 police station or the public security station in Sanski Most.

14 Q. If we could turn to the next exhibit, which is Exhibit 4, that is

15 on the ELMO, and will appear before you, Mr. Draganovic, on the screen, is

16 that the police station where you were detained?

17 A. Yes, it is. That is a public security station in Sanski Most. I

18 was detained behind this building. There were cells there for daily

19 detention. This wasn't a real prison. They weren't prison premises but

20 just for keeping people in custody during the day. And there were nine of

21 us in that cell.

22 Q. Mr. Draganovic, one question before you continue describing the

23 conditions in that location. How long were you detained in that one cell

24 at this location?

25 A. I was detained in that cell from the 25th of May, 1992, until the

1 17th of June, 1992.

2 Q. Can you tell the Judges about the conditions that you experienced

3 in that cell and your fellow detainees, as well.

4 A. The conditions we were kept in were disastrous. The very next

5 day, the SDS leaders of Sanski Most came and told us that we would be

6 killed and that our heads would roll first in Sanski Most. This very

7 threat was so serious that I realised that I would be killed, as did all

8 the other people who were with me. There were nine of us detained there

9 for -- this is an area of 2 by 2 and a half, which is totally closed in.

10 There's no light or air.

11 The window of the cell was boarded up with a steel sheet with a

12 few holes made with ordinary nails. So we didn't have enough air. There

13 was no light. We couldn't lie down. There were no conditions for life in

14 that cell. Our bodies were totally wet with perspiration. When we were

15 taken into the cell, the walls were white or yellow painted. However,

16 several days later, they became black with mould, and they started to

17 stink so that the conditions were really unbearable.

18 Twice, they would open the door for five to ten minutes for us to

19 go to the toilet if we had to and to eat. However, all this was in great

20 fear, and people under arms were there. Groups of soldiers and policemen

21 would take us out, and they would mistreat us, threaten us, spit at us,

22 humiliate us. While we were in the cell, they would throw against the

23 steel sheet that covered the window hard objects saying that they were

24 grenades, and we were terrified. And we waited for death to come at any

25 moment. Whenever they came and opened the cell, they came with fresh lies

1 and misinformation so that we were kept there in constant uncertainty and

2 fear.

3 Next to this cell was another one that was full of men. These

4 were all prominent citizens, civilians, of Sanski Most who had held

5 positions in the authorities or leaders of political parties or teachers

6 or prominent businessmen.

7 Q. Mr. Draganovic, could you describe to the Judges the sanitary

8 conditions that were available to you and your fellow detainees during

9 those three and a half weeks.

10 A. While we were in that cell, I've already said, it was only twice

11 that we were able to get out. Maybe even once a day. We had to relieve

12 ourselves in the corridor, which was about 5 to 8 metres long. And at the

13 end of that corridor, there was a lot of faeces, and it was -- it smelled

14 very bad. We had very little water. There were no sanitary conditions.

15 Conditions were catastrophic. And when the corridor became full of

16 excrement, they took us out to dig a hole behind these premises next to

17 the wall of the stadium. And then they told us that we were digging a

18 hole where they would bury us after killing us. During my time there, for

19 a couple of days I was in a bad state of amnesia because of all the

20 propaganda messages that reached me and because of the investigations and

21 accusations that were false against me, and I knew where this was leading;

22 it would lead me to death, as it would all the others who were with me

23 there.

24 Q. Now, after you were -- concluded your stay at Sanski Most, where

25 did you go? Where were you transferred?

1 A. One morning - it was the 17th of May, 1992 - the warden of the

2 prison, Vujanic Drago, who was a colleague of mine - he was a legal man

3 in -- he's in Banja Luka now - came up with a list and read out my name

4 from the list and the name of another man, another detainee, who was in

5 the same cell as me. Jakupovic Ismet was his name. And we went out

6 believing that we would be released, not knowing what was actually going

7 on.

8 However, he ordered us to bow our heads and to place our hands on

9 our backs, and two armed policemen went round about us with their weapons

10 cocked at us and we followed these two and left the compound of the police

11 station. We had to run the gauntlet of Serb policemen, soldiers, and

12 civilians, who spat at us and called us by derogatory names, insulted us,

13 humiliated us, and they led us on some 50 metres to the Betonirka building

14 or facility where the Bosniaks were detained. And I got onto a truck. I

15 was forced to get up onto a truck there.

16 Q. Where were you transported to?

17 MR. HARMON: And if I could have the next exhibit placed on the

18 ELMO, Mrs. Javier.

19 A. They transported us to Manjaca. Actually, we didn't know where

20 they were taking us until we actually arrived there.

21 Q. And were you a detainee at Manjaca until the 14th of December,

22 1992?

23 A. Yes, I was.

24 Q. Now, Mr. Draganovic, there is an image before you. It is

25 Prosecutor's Exhibit 5. Can you take a look at that exhibit and can you

1 tell the Judges what this exhibit represents.

2 A. On this photograph, you can see a shed in Manjaca, a stable, and

3 that's where these people were. That's where I am myself. I'm on the

4 left at the bottom of the shed. There were six stables like this, and

5 they were all full of detainees, who were illegally deprived of all human

6 rights and brought to this place and held here right up until the camp was

7 shut.

8 Q. Now, were these people non-Serbs? Were they Bosniaks and Croats?

9 A. These were predominantly Bosniaks. There was a lesser number of

10 Croats and a few Serbs as well, deserters from the Yugoslav People's Army

11 who did not want to go to war in Croatia --

12 Q. Now, Mr. Draganovic --

13 A. -- and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14 Q. Could you inform the Judges what the conditions were like,

15 focussing on the sanitary conditions, the weather conditions, whether you

16 had sufficient basic necessities such as shelter, clothing.

17 A. When they brought us to Manjaca, they started to beat us up

18 physically, each of us in turn as they read out our names to get down off

19 the truck. We had to run the gauntlet of soldiers, policemen, Serb

20 soldiers, and they beat us with different objects, wooden poles, batons,

21 and so forth. And once we all got off the truck - and there were 23 of us

22 in the truck - they forced us into the camp one by one with our heads down

23 and hands behind our backs. They then forced us into a stable, which was

24 known as Konjusnica, the horse stable, and I spent eight days there in

25 that stable and I was beaten every day, like all the others who were with

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1 me in that horse stable. And at one point there were more than 70 of us

2 there.

3 Q. Mr. Draganovic, what were the sanitary conditions like? And

4 Mr. Draganovic, just -- I need to inform you that our time is limited,

5 so -- and I'm watching the clock, so -- we have one other witness to

6 proceed with before 1.00, so if you can be brief on that but complete, I

7 would appreciate it.

8 A. Very well. There were no sanitary conditions. They were awful,

9 because this was a stable for livestock. And you can see from the

10 photograph what the stable looked like. The size of it was 16 metres by

11 50 metres. And in each of those stables, there were between 500 and 700,

12 sometimes even 800 persons. And that's where we spent our entire time.

13 It was cold in the stables. We slept on the floor, on the

14 concrete floor. We relieved ourselves there in the compound, between the

15 stables during the day and in a bucket at night, a bucket which was placed

16 by the door.

17 There was not enough water. The water there was was

18 contaminated. We drank the water from the river -- from the lake, and it

19 didn't have the minimum hygienic conditions. It wasn't potable water. To

20 begin with, there was actually no water at all. Quite simply, we had no

21 water. We had been beaten up, and I had received so many beatings that

22 I'd lost -- that my mouth was completely dry. I wasn't able to speak,

23 like all the other ones too.

24 As to the sanitary conditions and all the other conditions, I can

25 tell you this, in a word: The conditions were disastrous. They were

1 inhuman and really brutal.

2 Q. Now, you've mentioned beatings. Very briefly, were detainees

3 killed as well?

4 A. There were beatings and they went on all the time, especially in

5 the first two or three months. After that, the beatings became less

6 frequent. So until the International Red Cross had registered us and

7 until the journalists were there, international representatives,

8 journalists, and so on, and the representatives of the International Red

9 Cross -- but until that time we were beaten permanently, the whole group

10 that was there. And in the camp at that time there were 5.434 of us

11 exactly at that time.

12 Then -- you had one more question, I believe. Could you repeat

13 it, please.

14 Q. Were there killings as a result of those beatings?

15 A. Yes, there were killings too. As a result of the beatings, there

16 were killings of people, both in the camp and outside the camp. I saw

17 with my very own eyes how some people were killed.

18 Q. Mr. Draganovic, I'm going to turn to the topic of food that was

19 available in the camp.

20 MR. HARMON: And Mr. President and Your Honours, we have two short

21 film clips. The first film clip, just to give you a preview, because it

22 is a very short clip, is a view of the preparations that were made by the

23 Bosnian Serb authorities for the reception of the International Community

24 to come to the camp. You'll see it looks like Camp Abundance. It's a

25 virtual cornucopia of food available. In fact, Mr. Draganovic is in one

1 of the images carrying loaves of bread. I'll display that, and then I'm

2 going to ask Mr. Draganovic some questions. And then I'm going to go to a

3 second film clip that shows the actual condition of the people who were

4 housed in Manjaca.

5 So if we could play the first film clip. And then,

6 Mr. Draganovic, I will ask you to comment on it briefly.

7 This is Exhibit 6.

8 [Videotape played]

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You saw me wearing a white shirt a

10 moment ago. I just passed by. And this is the day that the journalists

11 came to the camp for the first time and were allowed in. They waited at

12 this entrance gate which was now opened. You saw it in the previous

13 clip. They waited there. And there were large quantities of bread that

14 had been brought in on that particular day and piled up in the area. They

15 took us to carry the bags of bread into the other camp, or to come up to

16 the gate so that the journalists could take photographs of us.

17 MR. HARMON:

18 Q. Now, that obviously did not represent the amount of food that was

19 available to each of the detainees during your period of incarceration. I

20 would now like to play the next clip and have you comment on it.

21 MR. HARMON: If we could go to Prosecutor's Exhibit Number 7.

22 [Videotape played]

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are typical images of the camp

24 inmates in the stables.

25 MR. HARMON:

1 Q. Do you recognise any of these people in these images?

2 A. I do. I recognise this man. He is a relative of mine and his

3 surname is Draganovic, too. He is from Kljuc, from Pudin Han. I

4 recognise all these people, in fact.

5 What I want to say is that in the first three months, it was a

6 camp of hunger. People were starved. There was not enough food. And

7 what food there was was poor quality food. We had two very small meals a

8 day. In the morning, half a cup of warm tea, but it wasn't actually tea.

9 It was just warm water without any sugar, and a piece of small bread. And

10 let me also tell you this: 90 loaves would be cut up for two and a half

11 thousand men which meant that one loaf of bread was divided into 20 or 40

12 pieces, and each of the inmates got a small piece of that bread. But they

13 were so thin they were transparent.

14 Q. What was the average weight loss of the detainees, if you know

15 that, in the Manjaca camp?

16 A. I can state quite freely on the basis of what I saw and what I

17 myself experienced that the inmates lost between 20 and 30 kilograms of

18 bodily weight. And this was also noted by the representatives of the Red

19 Cross who came to photograph the situation after they had registered us

20 because the state we were in, had not the International Red Cross arrived

21 and had not the UNHCR arrived, we would have all died of starvation.

22 Q. Mr. Draganovic, I'm keeping my eye on the clock and mindful of the

23 fact I have another witness, I want to touch on a number of other topics.

24 First of all, you were released from Manjaca camp on the 13th of

25 December. And briefly, did you have to sign a document in order to get

1 your release from the camp, and can you tell the Judges very quickly what

2 that document consisted of and what you were told about that document.

3 A. Each of us had to sign a document, and it was at the office in the

4 command that we did this, saying that we were leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina

5 for good, forever, and never to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that we

6 agreed to be taken over by the UNHCR, or rather the International Red

7 Cross, in order to be deported elsewhere.

8 Q. Now, Mr. Draganovic, can you describe the dehumanising effect that

9 the conditions of the camp that you experienced had on you and your fellow

10 inmates.

11 A. We don't have much time, but I could go on forever on this

12 subject. But let me just tell you this: I had serious -- it had serious

13 repercussions on my physical and mental health. And from the day I was

14 released, I have been undergoing medical treatments throughout. I am an

15 intellectual. And in a way, I have managed to get back to normal life.

16 However, I do still suffer lasting serious consequences of physical and

17 psychological trauma. And the same happened to the other inmates.

18 Let me say that in all the camps, including Manjaca, many people's

19 health was impaired, destroyed. And I think it cut their life down by ten

20 years, shortened their life by ten years. Many people have also died.

21 For Sanski Most and Prijedor, I can say that after the war ended in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, up until the present day, according to some facts and

23 figures that we have, about 500 of the former camp inmates died, their

24 ages ranging between 40 and 50, in that age group. And the Alliance of

25 Camp Inmates will be drafting a comprehensive study for the whole of

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina in that respect.

2 MR. HARMON: Now, if we can put the next exhibit on the ELMO.

3 It's Prosecutor's Exhibit Number 8. And this, Your Honours, is a

4 photograph of an individual -- individuals at the Omarska camp.

5 Q. And my question to you, Mr. Draganovic, was the lack of food that

6 was present at Omarska -- I'm sorry, at Manjaca unique, or were other

7 inmates at other locations also malnourished as a result of not getting

8 enough food?

9 A. On the basis of research and from what I know in talking to

10 people, to other inmates, the methods were the same throughout. And these

11 pictures are proof of that from the infamous Omarska camp.

12 Q. In addition to this picture showing lack of food, you described in

13 your testimony in your experiences in Omarska physical abuse, lack of

14 sanitation, lack of proper clothing necessary to endure winters, and other

15 sorts of deprivations. Was that, in your view and based on your research,

16 also the case in many other of the detention facilities that were in the

17 37 municipalities that are in the indictment?

18 A. Well, let me give you a short answer to that question: In all the

19 places of detention, the same or similar methods were applied, and people

20 suffered. And the object was quite obvious.

21 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I need to proceed with great haste

22 because of my other witness, but I will draw Your Honours' attention to

23 Prosecutor's Exhibit Number 11.

24 Ms. Annink-javier, if you can put that particular exhibit on the

25 ELMO.

1 Mr. President, we have three exhibits, Prosecutor's Exhibit 10,

2 11, and 12. And these are excerpts from the Special Rapporteur for Human

3 Rights, Mr. Mazowiecki. These are contemporaneous reports that were made

4 in 1992, and there are highlighted portions of these reports that I have

5 shown to the witness.

6 Q. And given the shortness of time, Mr. Draganovic, I'd just like to

7 you to confirm: Have you had an opportunity to look at these excerpts and

8 do you confirm the contents of them?

9 A. I apologise. I wasn't getting the interpretation so I wasn't able

10 to understand what you had asked me.

11 Q. Mr. Draganovic, yesterday, did I show you some of the Security

12 Council Mr. Mazowiecki reports? Did we review some of those and some of

13 the excerpts in those?

14 A. Yes, I have looked at those excerpts of the reports.

15 Q. And are those excerpts accurate?

16 A. Completely accurate, all the excerpts that I looked at.

17 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I have no additional questions. Thank

18 you very much.

19 Mr. Draganovic, thank you very much.

20 JUDGE MAY: Have the Defence any questions?

21 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No questions, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Draganovic, that concludes your evidence. Thank

23 you for coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to

24 go.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too, Your Honours.

1 [The witness withdrew]

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Harmon, we'll go on in the session until 10

3 minutes past 1.00.

4 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much.

5 My next witness, Mr. President, will be Mrs. Teufika

6 Ibrahimefendic. As a summary to Your Honours while the witness is being

7 brought into court, Mrs. Ibrahimefendic is a health-care professional who

8 has been treating war trauma victims since 1994. And she will give you,

9 from a clinician's point of view, in other words, on a detailed,

10 on-the-ground, day-to-day, her experiences in dealing with people who were

11 traumatised, specifically women and children who were traumatised, during

12 the relevant period of time of this indictment and who remain

13 traumatised. And she will describe to you some of the problems that they

14 are experiencing and they confront in everyday society in Bosnia.

15 [The witness entered court]

16 JUDGE MAY: Could the witness take the declaration.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

18 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

19 WITNESS: TEUFIKA IBRAHIMEFENDIC

20 [Witness answered through interpreter]

21 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to sit down.

22 Examined by Mr. Harmon:

23 Q. Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, if you would move up a little bit closer to

24 the microphone. Thank you. And let me first of all thank you for coming

25 to the Tribunal to participate in this very important hearing. I've had

1 an opportunity to tell the Judges a little bit about your background while

2 you were being -- while you were coming into court and before you were

3 coming into court. What I would like you to do, first of all, is have you

4 state your name and if you would spell your last name for the record,

5 please.

6 A. My first name is Teufika. Surname Ibrahimefendic,

7 I-B-R-A-H-I-M-E-F-E-N-D-I-C.

8 Q. And rather than have you tell the Court about your qualifications,

9 I will state your qualifications. And if you can agree with me if my

10 recitation is accurate, we can proceed much faster.

11 Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, you're a psychotherapist for Vive Zene, which

12 is a non-governmental organisation in Tuzla; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And you are a member of the management team and a clinical

15 coordinator in charge of outpatient development programmes with the

16 traumatised victims that that particular programme deals with; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In addition, you carry -- you're a psychotherapist who carries a

19 case load of her own; correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, from an educational point of view - and I'll just review all

22 of this, and then if you can confirm this - you went to secondary medical

23 school in Tuzla in 1967. Between 1970 and 1972, you were at higher

24 school, where you were trained as a social worker. Between 1975 and 1980,

25 you attended the University of Sarajevo and received a degree in

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1 psychology and pedagogy. And additionally, you have taken the following

2 course work: In 1995 and 1996, you received a certificate from the World

3 Health Organisation and Columbia University for course work related to war

4 trauma. In 1996 and 1997, you had course work at the University of Koln

5 in psychosocial counselling for work with traumatised women and children,

6 a total of 300 hours of training. Between 1998 and the year 2000, you had

7 300 hours of training in psychodrama, which is a special method of work

8 with women and children traumatised by war. That programme was sponsored

9 by the European Community. You've had three years of training in Gestalt

10 therapy. You've had 200 hours of training in body therapy. Between 1997

11 and 1998 you have had training in therapy through painting and additional

12 training in family therapy. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Turning to your work experience. Between 1967 and 1970, you were

15 a paediatric nurse. Between 1970 and 1994, you were a psychiatric social

16 worker at the clinical centre at the hospital in Tuzla. And from 1994 to

17 the present, you are a psychotherapist at Vive Zene. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, you lived in Tuzla at the beginning of the

20 war and have remained there until the present day; is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Briefly, can you describe the community that existed in Tuzla

23 before the war started.

24 A. Tuzla was known as a city with a large measure of democracy. We

25 can say that. The pre-war elections brought into power the reformist

1 forces, and we felt free - I can put it that way, quite frankly - in our

2 deliberations and in thinking of the future, and we felt that there was

3 something ahead of us. And it was in an atmosphere of this kind while the

4 war was going on in Croatia that rumours began to spread that the war

5 would come to Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. There were intimations from the

6 neighbouring states, from Croatia, for example, and through the media.

7 And I must say that I myself and my friends, the people I worked with, did

8 not have sufficient information about all this, and we were rather afraid

9 and rather upset. We were confused. And for all these reasons, and

10 because of the situation, we thought that the worst would never actually

11 happen. We were optimistic in our outlook. We had hopes for the future.

12 However, with the beginning of 1992, as of March, in fact, 1992,

13 the situation changed. There was a lot of uncertainty. People were

14 rather nervous, confused. There was fear, quite a lot of fear and panic.

15 And people began to prepare for a sort of war. Nobody could actually know

16 how long this war would go on for and what kind of war would be waged and

17 what can happen in such a war. And it was in this atmosphere of panic

18 that reigned in Tuzla that many people sent their children out of town and

19 the majority of the Serb inhabitants started leaving town. But other

20 ethnic groups started leaving too. Some of the better educated people and

21 well-to-do people started sending their children off to their relatives

22 who lived elsewhere and who lived abroad too. And we felt this tension in

23 the air. We felt that something was looming, that something was going to

24 happen.

25 I worked in the hospital at that time, and I must say that we

1 didn't undergo any special preparations for war but perhaps we did do some

2 preparatory work with respect to the Red Cross. There were some activists

3 there, and they had special assignments and positions if war would break

4 out for collecting blood, for the needs and requirements of the hospitals

5 during the war.

6 Q. Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, let me -- let me stop you there because I

7 want to turn to the war and the commencement of the war. The Judges have

8 heard from the first witness who testified in these proceedings about an

9 enormous number of crimes that took place throughout Bosnia. And when the

10 war started -- I want you to focus on the refugee crisis in Tuzla. Would

11 you tell the Judges what happened once the events of the war occurred in

12 municipalities that surrounded Tuzla and the refugee crisis that descended

13 upon Tuzla.

14 A. The first refugees started arriving at the beginning of April from

15 the surrounding villages and from Zvornik. People were in a panic,

16 anxious, confused. They carried very few belongings with them. Even the

17 town itself was not ready to accommodate them, so they were put up in a

18 sports centre in Tuzla. They came to the clinic offering to give blood

19 because they said that there was a war going on over there. Those were my

20 first contacts with them. And the medical services were equipped for

21 extending first aid and the Red Cross was involved in providing food. But

22 there was also a degree of solidarity among the population of Tuzla, so

23 they came to their assistance, carried food, et cetera.

24 However, already at the end of April and the beginning of May

25 large numbers of people came to Tuzla. I can't know the exact figures

1 because I wasn't directly involved. I do know that special services were

2 formed to register the number of arrivals in Tuzla, because officially the

3 war in Tuzla started on the 15th of May, when Tuzla was blocked and no one

4 from that day on could leave the town and those who happened to be there

5 had to stay there.

6 At the time, the town - that is, the 15th of May - the town

7 started losing its civilised aspects. We were deprived of electricity, of

8 water. It was general chaos and panic. And then at the end of May and

9 the beginning of June, fresh groups of refugees started arriving from

10 other municipalities, like Bratunac, Zvornik, Bijeljina. So I think that

11 the largest numbers came from those municipalities, though there were also

12 some from Doboj and from municipalities in other parts of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, depending on if they had friends or acquaintances

14 there. So that is why they came.

15 Q. And can you tell me, from the point of view of their mental

16 health, can you describe the condition of those refugees. Were they

17 traumatised? Can you tell the Court what it was that traumatised these

18 people, from your point of view, from your observations.

19 A. The people had lived through an emotional shock. They were

20 completely distraught. They simply were not conscious of what was going

21 on. They weren't conscious of the realities around them. They found it

22 very hard to deal with problems like food and clothing, the essentials, in

23 other words. The medical staff who took care of them at the time would

24 extend medical aid, depending on whether there was any physical trauma.

25 As for emotional suffering, I must admit that in those days we couldn't

1 pay much attention because there was a shortage of professionals.

2 Everyone was confused. The town simply wasn't prepared for such a chaos

3 and such a vast number of people seeking aid. So they had to rely on

4 their own forces and deal with their own fears and emotions. Somebody

5 just had to be close by to show them some attention, empathy, but to calm

6 them down, maybe encourage them, to make some suggestions by way of

7 solutions, to offer them food, clothing, to evacuate those in bad

8 condition, the elderly and children.

9 Many children were then hospitalised because they were physically

10 exhausted and sick, as many women had covered large distances on foot. It

11 took them several days to reach the town from their villages. They had

12 fled their homes, which had been destroyed or burned down. They withdrew

13 to the woods, and then they somehow managed to reach Tuzla. So once they

14 arrived, they were physically exhausted, no energy, no strength in them.

15 They could hardly take care of themselves and their children. Everything

16 was so confusing. It was a situation that left some very bad memories,

17 not only for the women who came but for all of us who were living there,

18 because we, too, were helpless in a sense.

19 Q. Now, let me ask you, Mrs. Ibrahimefendic: You mentioned to me

20 yesterday - and I'd just like you to confirm this - the initial services

21 to deal with the mental elements of the trauma that these people had

22 suffered was insufficient in Tuzla at the time, and ultimately the

23 International Community, along with volunteers from the medical community

24 in Tuzla, started to mobilise, to pay attention to those kinds of

25 problems. Is that correct?

1 A. Yes, that is correct. Professionals, psychologists,

2 psychiatrists, social workers at first simply didn't know what to do.

3 They had their professional experience with care. So they approached

4 these people on a man-to-man basis, without any specialised knowledge

5 linked to trauma, because this was something new for all of us. A large

6 group of civilians in one place, in a disastrous situation that was

7 suddenly provoked, so that it took time for us to consolidate, to realise

8 that what we had to do, and then we volunteered to visit these refugee

9 settlements.

10 Q. Ms. Ibrahimefendic, let me interrupt you because we're spending

11 some time on background and I have a limited amount of time here, and I

12 want to spend more time on the issues that you can address in a

13 professional sense.

14 So if you could, first of all, tell us and tell the Chamber a

15 brief description of Vive Zene, when it was founded, when it was created,

16 what its purposes are, and what kind of work it does. And if you could do

17 that briefly, I would appreciate it.

18 A. I shall just say that the end of 1992, beginning of 1993, experts

19 started arriving from abroad who offered to us the first training in

20 trauma, how to deal with it. And then a group of women in 1993 arrived

21 from Germany to assist the women and children, the traumatised children in

22 Bosnia. They knew that there was a large influx of refugees to Tuzla, so

23 they focussed on Tuzla. And in 1994, Vive Zene received the first

24 refugees for stationary accommodation. Vive Zene is a nongovernmental

25 organisation which, to this day, is providing psychological and social aid

1 to traumatised women and children, those traumatised by war or some other

2 trauma. And in our centre, an exhaustive programme is provided in the

3 stationary facility and in the outpatient clinic and in refugee

4 settlements.

5 Just now, I'm working in two such refugee settlements with

6 refugees and the population as a whole. And in the outpatients'

7 programme, we work with those who need aid. And the more serious

8 conditions are accommodated in stationary facilities together with the

9 children.

10 Q. Now, let me ask you, this, Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, are

11 the -- actually, let me preface it by saying this: The Court is

12 interested in hearing about the types of symptoms and the trauma that

13 exists for the victims that occurred in 1992, the events that occurred in

14 1992. And I know in talking to you, you continue to treat people who

15 remain traumatised from the events in 1992. If you can separate, please,

16 in your testimony the -- put aside the war trauma victims that you have

17 been treating who were traumatised from January of 1993 onwards and focus

18 your testimony on those victims who were traumatised in 1992, that would

19 be helpful to the Trial Chamber.

20 And if we could just begin by saying you are involved principally

21 in dealing with the psychosocial services to women and children who were

22 traumatised. The question I have is: The types of trauma and the

23 symptomology of what you're seeing in Vive Zene, is it typical of the

24 types of symptoms and trauma that is being seen and is being reported at

25 other treatment locations throughout Bosnia?

1 A. First of all, let me say very briefly what trauma is and how we,

2 or rather I and my whole team, have addressed it over the past ten years

3 and how we defined it, or rather adjusted it to our context. There are a

4 large number of clinical definitions of trauma. But the definition of

5 trauma that corresponds best to our context is that trauma is an event

6 provoked by abnormal conditions under threat, which means a condition sets

7 in in which the body is in jeopardy, under threat, and threat to personal

8 integrity and exposure to coercion. These are initial traumas among

9 people who arrived in 1992 and 1993, consists of a feeling of intensive

10 fear, helplessness, inability to control the situation, and the feeling

11 and fear of being destroyed, because war is a major catastrophe. It is a

12 great triggering event, an event that can lead to the person being unable

13 to react.

14 A human being has instinctive reactions to flee or to fight when

15 an event is adequate. But this was an event of great stress, a

16 threatening event, and the action is not provoked. And an enormous amount

17 of fear sets in and a feeling of helplessness that I've already said,

18 inability to control the situation, fear of being killed, of being

19 destroyed, of his body simply disappearing. In some cases, more serious

20 cases, the body may go through nervous breakdown, and these did happen.

21 The stress was too strong for people to be able to cope with these

22 situations. And then symptoms developed; memories of an event which

23 tormented them. They do not wish to think about them, but they are forced

24 to think about them. They keep going back to those events, remembering

25 them in fragments, as if they were a part like a flashback.

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1 And then this leads the individual back to the condition he was

2 in. And then other kinds of symptoms occur, also the wish to avoid

3 remembering. And there's this constant conflict between these imposed

4 flashbacks and the wish not to think about them. And he is constantly

5 expending energy, "I don't wish to remember but yet the pictures keep

6 coming back and forcing themselves on me." And then later on, as the

7 trauma develops, there's a reaction to trauma, and other symptoms set in:

8 Insomnia, various kinds of fear, hyperactivity, on the one hand. And on

9 the other, there can be hyposensitivity, that is, lesser sensitivity.

10 Narrowing of consciousness. "I can no longer feel anything. I cannot let

11 myself feel anything."

12 Q. Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, my question I asked you is whether the types

13 of symptoms that you described and that you're still seeing today from the

14 events and traumas of 1992, are those types of symptoms affecting people

15 who were being treated for trauma in other parts of Bosnia? And if you

16 can answer that yes or no.

17 A. Yes. Trauma is trauma.

18 Q. And are there other organisations besides Vive Zene that are

19 treating people who are traumatised from the war and from the events in

20 1992? And if so, can you briefly list those organisations that are

21 being -- that are treating these types of victims elsewhere?

22 A. In Tuzla, there are several organisations financed by the

23 international community. For instance, there is Amica of Italy, financed

24 by Italy; Amica Educa, financed by Switzerland; the Amica of Friends, from

25 Germany; T and I from Sweden. There are other organisations in Sarajevo,

1 Prijedor, Banja Luka that we cooperate with and that we are in touch

2 with. For instance, in Zenica, there is the Medica Zenica organisation

3 since 1993, also financed by the Germans. And there are some other

4 organisations whose names I cannot recall just now, but I do know that

5 there are many organisations. I think there are about 160 of them in all

6 dealing with trauma victims, war-trauma victims, with a view to providing

7 prevention and protection of mental health. And they are dealing with the

8 refugee population, which is treated as the normal population, but which

9 are high-risk mental conditions.

10 Q. All right. Now, these people who have been traumatised, just if

11 you could confirm this for the Judges: Yesterday when we talked, you said

12 some of the traumatic events that caused the people who continue to suffer

13 today and whom you continue and your organisation continues to treat, the

14 causes of those trauma included seeing relatives killed, having people's

15 houses burned, having to be forced out of communities where they had

16 lived, having ruptured the social and environmental fabric of the

17 community. Is that correct? Is that the source of the kinds of traumas

18 that continue to haunt and effect the people you are treating today?

19 A. The traumatic event is any event that can provoke a stressful

20 reaction. For example, forced expulsion from one's home, forced

21 separation from the family, witnessing a killing, torture, rape, a person

22 need not be present, but he or she may hear from someone else, so that

23 very frequently, children are traumatised simply because they heard adults

24 talking about their experiences. A traumatic event is also a lack of

25 water or food. We have registered about 13 or 14 traumatic events either

1 personally experienced or hearing from others about those experiences.

2 Q. And are --

3 A. But to this day, there are reminders of trauma. That is what we

4 discussed yesterday; ordinary triggers can lead to renewed traumatisation

5 and memories of those events. For example, last week a woman told me

6 "When I see somebody with a beard, I'm frightened immediately." Or if,

7 on television, they see images reminding them of the war, they take them

8 back to the situation they were in years ago.

9 Q. And you mentioned to me yesterday an event where a woman saw a

10 marble. Could you just very briefly, very briefly, describe to the Judges

11 what that sort of trauma was about.

12 A. The woman comes from Svornik municipality, a village there. She

13 was forced out of her house, together with her husband and children. I

14 think they were expelled from nine villages of the Svornik municipality,

15 and this was preceded by a roll call, by mistreatment, searches of houses,

16 surrender of weapons, drawing up of lists. And then they separated the

17 men from the women. Her husband was taken, together with her father and

18 three brothers. And she never heard anything about him again. She was

19 left with two daughters and one son. In that condition, she arrived in

20 Tuzla.

21 And then in the refugee settlement in Zenica, a shell fell. And

22 in 1995, her only son was killed so that she was again traumatised.

23 Again, she had experienced a great tragedy. She found herself in an even

24 worse, stressful situation. And when she joined our project with her two

25 daughters, a little boy was playing with marbles, and she fainted. She

1 totally lost control over all her bodily functions, and it took time for

2 her to muster up strength to recount her story. So that an ordinary

3 marble can trigger their mental pain and mental suffering.

4 Q. Can I take it from what you told me yesterday, she associated the

5 ordinary marble with the son that she had lost?

6 A. Yes, that was a reminder. The marble was a reminder of what had

7 happened to her son. Of course, she linked the two together.

8 Q. Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, what I'd like you to do is please tell the

9 Judges now, since you're treating this community of victims who remain

10 traumatised from the events in 1992, can you tell the Judges how the

11 trauma affects these people in their ordinary everyday life of

12 reintegrating into Bosnian life and society?

13 A. I would like to say in that connection that trauma is a process.

14 And in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one could apply Hans Keilson's division

15 into sequential traumatisation, so that one cannot say that trauma is an

16 act of rape or an isolated traumatic event. But trauma is the pre-war

17 period, the exile, the return. All this is part of trauma. So that

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina is now in a traumatic situation, and it is very hard

19 still to provide effective aid linked to the protection of mental health

20 in such a traumatic situation.

21 The symptoms now present differ substantially from the initial

22 ones so that the presence of fear for many years leads to withdrawal,

23 isolation, passiveness. Life in refugee centres for many years

24 accumulates the stress so that all the refugees are tired of this refugee

25 lifestyle. They are tired of expectations, they are tired of inefficiency

1 at all levels. Sometimes they don't have any feelings left. Sometimes

2 they are hyper-reactive, aggressive, angry. They find it difficult to

3 deal with their pain and suffering. Whereas on the other hand, nothing is

4 happening; their position is not being changed. So as a result, not only

5 their mental condition, the health of their entire body is deteriorating.

6 That is how I would put it.

7 Because there's very serious concern for their health as to what

8 will happen. And in this atmosphere, many dream of going to other

9 countries, and large numbers have left Bosnia. Those who have stayed

10 behind have to grapple with day-to-day problems and situations which are

11 extremely traumatising.

12 Q. Can you explain to the Judges the types of problems that children

13 who were traumatised in 1992 are experiencing today? And please, base

14 that on your own experiences as psychotherapist in your treatment of these

15 children.

16 A. On the basis of my personal experience and the research that has

17 been done in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Sarajevo in particular, for

18 instance, the results obtained are that children are terribly easily

19 scared, that they're excessively tied and dedicated to their mother when

20 they're already in puberty. These were all children who were small in

21 1992, who could not feel the care and attention of mothers in those days

22 because mothers were preoccupied with their own problems, on the one hand;

23 and on the other, the conditions in which they lived resulted this these

24 symptoms.

25 They have also had problems sleeping, depression. They cry

1 easily. They're sad. And sometimes they become aggressive. Variations

2 in concentration, problems with studying, incontinence, a large number

3 tend to withdraw into themselves, to be isolated. They lead a life in

4 isolation without friends and are very active. That would roughly be the

5 picture of the condition of children today; of course, those I'm working

6 with.

7 Q. So what you're saying, Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, is that ten years

8 after the events that have been the subject of this particular

9 indictment -- ten years after those events there are victims who continue

10 to be traumatised and who continue to be affected by those events.

11 A. Yes. Remembering events of that kind, a series of traumatic

12 events, events of that kind cannot be forgotten. You can't forget the

13 trauma of it because it is imprinted on the memory through the senses, the

14 eyes, the ears, what they heard, what they felt, what they saw, and this

15 all lays an imprint on the brain, so that all investigations done into

16 trauma say that traumas can never been forgotten. Traumas have to be

17 treated, however, and taken care of, and people ought to be given the

18 chance of feeling that they are protected and that they can feel free to

19 recount their traumas and what happened to them and thus become integrated

20 into society and that this should become part of their lives, part of

21 their life's experience, which will help them ultimately in the future.

22 Q. Now, the percentage of people who continue to be traumatised - and

23 I'm talking about the events from 1992 - the percentage of those people

24 who are receiving the type of care and treatment that is offered by Vive

25 Zene and by these other organisations, Amica, that you identified, is a

1 very small portion of the victim community; is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. From your point of view in terms of recovery, in terms of the

4 types of successes that you're seeing in your programme, can you tell the

5 Judges a little bit about that.

6 A. It is a highly complex and difficult question to answer, and it

7 calls for general mobilisation at all levels, the pooling of resources.

8 It is difficult to explain this in a few words, although I myself am an

9 optimist. I think that many things are changing and have changed, but

10 that in the future many more centres should be set up which will be able

11 to cater to these needs and give care and attention and to foster an

12 atmosphere in society to encourage people themselves, to put forward their

13 experiences, not to be ashamed of them, so that they could become educated

14 and gain more knowledge about traumas, because the more people know about

15 what traumas are, what they entail, they will have greater control over

16 their lives and thus have the feeling that they are in control of their

17 lives, that they are able to make their own decisions, and that they can

18 be taught to be people who will demonstrate that everything that they have

19 lived through and experienced has given them a dose of wisdom, which is so

20 important in life generally.

21 Q. Mrs. Ibrahimefendic, from the therapeutic point of view, from the

22 proper balance and regaining one's equilibrium mentally, what is the value

23 of being able to talk about the events, as opposed to not talking about

24 them and internalising them?

25 A. People have to talk about these events. They have to talk about

1 them because trauma demands that events be verbalised, and that is a form

2 of recovery. It is the way to go about it. If we say things out loud and

3 give shape and form to them and if our feelings and sentiments --

4 actually, we have to verbalise our feelings, our sentiments. They must

5 gain verbal expression. And once they gain verbal expression, we'll be

6 able to see that these sentiments don't have the power -- the terrible

7 power that they had before. They don't seem as terrible as they once

8 did. And there should be discussions about this subject because unless

9 there are discussions, unless people talk about what happened to them,

10 they will feel isolated. Not only individuals but groups of people will

11 become isolated. There will be an isolation of ideas. So it is a

12 necessary requirement to talk about it, to talk about what happened.

13 Q. And once the people that you are treating are able to talk about

14 that, do you see that they are healthier in terms of their mental state?

15 And then I'd like you to comment lastly - because we're just about

16 out of time - how the ability to talk about the events of the war could

17 contribute to a greater understanding and tolerance and possibly

18 reconciliation within Bosnia. And these would be your personal views.

19 A. The first part of your question, what was that?

20 Q. Can you just tell the Chamber how talking about the events from

21 the war can create a healthier person and how it could contribute to a

22 greater understanding and tolerance among the people in Bosnia and

23 possibly contribute to reconciliation.

24 A. Talking about it is a healing process. It helps heal; so that it

25 is indispensable. People must be able to communicate amongst themselves

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1 and to communicate with themselves ultimately. And if I view this from

2 the aspects of therapy, then this is how I see it: A trauma took place

3 between 1992 and 1995, and memories of that trauma still persist. They

4 still give rise to fears and anxieties. They are still secret fears that

5 can be poisonous, because it is difficult in normal life to keep a

6 secret. But to keep secrets of this nature, that were caused by trauma,

7 is even more difficult. It is even more disruptive and poisonous to the

8 individual. That is why it is absolutely indispensable that each and

9 every person, each and every individual becomes fully conscious of what is

10 really going on now, today. And this awareness, this consciousness of the

11 present, would be a starting point.

12 They have to ask themselves, "What am I really feeling now, at

13 this point in time, from the aspects of 2002? If I look at the year 2002,

14 what is it that I see? What is it that I am doing now? What is it that I

15 wish? What can I do," so to become conscious and aware of oneself at the

16 present time. And if we become aware of ourselves, we will have control

17 of ourself. We will have the feeling of being able to control the

18 present, to control ourselves and our relations with others, to control

19 the situation. We won't be helpless. We won't be impotent. We will feel

20 that we are able to undertake something. And then in this way we will

21 create a feeling of security and safety for ourselves.

22 All that happened to us is behind us now, and then from this

23 position of security and safety - and that's what I do in my therapy - I

24 am now going to go back to 1992 from the vantage point of a secure 2002

25 and see what I thought at the time, what I felt at the time, what my

1 wishes were at the time, what I did at the time and what I felt. And this

2 would be linked up. It would be a linkage to history for each and every

3 person in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They would be able to link this all up. It

4 is a story, a narrative, a tale. Each of us has their own. We have our

5 own histories. And it is this story, this tale that we tell, that can

6 give birth to something new, to build bridges, bridges of trust and

7 confidence of frankness and security and honesty. It can lead us into a

8 situation in which we will be able to console people or to calm down

9 others, to encourage others yet again in all this, so that this could

10 ultimately bring about a healthier relationship amongst people, a

11 relationship of three ethnic groups, three religions and three cultures

12 together, three in one.

13 But to also set oneself a distance, because in the period that has

14 gone by there were things that happened to set us apart. We must accept

15 that. That is true and that is what happened. And we must give serious

16 consideration to this. We must be conscious and aware of all the things

17 that came to pass but we must also be conscious of the future and try to

18 lend some sense to the past, to give it some meaning, to lend it the

19 characteristic of having happened. That would be what I can say on that.

20 Q. Well, thank you very much, Mrs. Ibrahimefendic.

21 MR. HARMON: That concludes my examination, Mr. President, Your

22 Honours.

23 JUDGE MAY: Have the Defence any questions?

24 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No questions, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE MAY: That concludes your evidence, Mrs. Ibrahimefendic.

1 Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

2 We'll adjourn now for the usual break, an hour and a half.

3 [The witness withdrew]

4 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.13 p.m.

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1 --- On resuming at 2.43 p.m.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, our next

4 witness is Professor Elie Wiesel whose testimony will be heard by

5 videolink. I understand that the technicians have advised that that

6 procedure is now ready.

7 JUDGE MAY: Very well. If the witness would take the

8 declaration.

9 [The witness appeared via videolink]

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

14 Yes, Mr. Tieger. Thank you, Your Honour.

15 WITNESS: ELIE WIESEL

16 Examined by Mr. Tieger:

17 Q. Professor Wiesel, good afternoon, and thank you for joining us in

18 this important proceeding. I'd like to begin, rather than asking you to

19 recite your background at length, to simply affirm the following

20 highlights which I will state now.

21 You are the author of 40 books, some of which address your

22 experience in concentration camps in World War II. In 1986, you received

23 the Nobel Peace Prize as, in the words of the Nobel committee, "a

24 messenger of mankind who is one of the world's important spiritual

25 leaders." You are the founder of the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity,

1 established to combat intolerance and injustice, and have yourself used

2 your public stature to plead for justice for oppressed peoples in the

3 Soviet Union, South Africa, Vietnam, Biafra, Bangledesh, and in Bosnia.

4 Is that correct, sir?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Professor, both the Prosecution and Defence have asked you to

7 offer your testimony to this Chamber. I understand that you have prepared

8 a statement, and I would ask you now to address the Court.

9 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, having been approached by both

10 Prosecution and the Defence for Mrs. Biljana Plavsic, I am offering myself

11 as a witness for whom nothing matters more than the fate of the victims.

12 To understand their suffering and make others understand it, too, is for

13 me not only a moral duty, but also a way of serving justice.

14 I realise that the war in the Balkans has ended, but its history

15 has not. The pain of war continues to weigh down on the families of the

16 victims, and in a sense, on our collective conscience, just as it forces

17 us to draw lessons from it for the future.

18 The war in the Balkans is an especially heavy burden on its

19 victims and its families. For the orphans, be they children or adults,

20 the world is no longer the same. A woman who has been raped remains so

21 for life. That has been established. Their dreams have become

22 nightmares. For them, the past lives on in the present. Those guilty of

23 crimes against humanity are responsible for this as well.

24 What is the proper definition of a crime against humanity? In

25 simple psychological terms, it is a crime committed against the humanity

1 of another person, and also, so to speak, against one's own. A person who

2 starves and rapes helpless women takes away their humanity and his own as

3 well. In committing these crimes, the criminal cuts himself off and

4 excludes himself from a society which claims to be moral and civilised.

5 In legal terms, a crime against humanity is the gravest abuse of

6 power. It is the official or even "legal" implementation by a government

7 of a system designed to humiliate, persecute, deport, imprison, and murder

8 innocent and defenceless civilian communities and individuals.

9 In reviewing the charges against the accused, I remembered my

10 visit to her war-torn and tormented country in late 1992. There, I met

11 with several Serbian leaders, at least two of them this Tribunal has

12 charged with the same crimes against humanity: Slobodan Milosevic and

13 Radovan Karadzic. In Sarajevo and Banja Luka, and elsewhere, all my time

14 was spent listening to the survivors speaking about the anguish inflicted

15 on them by the Serbian leaders. They often broke off, unable to finish

16 their stories. For those who see them fall, their tears also form part of

17 the indictment.

18 The importance of this trial is recognised universally. The act

19 of bringing to light the reality of the crimes committed is as important

20 as punishing their perpetrators. More often than not, once in high

21 government positions, those responsible for crimes against humanity rely

22 on being able to use their evil power to mask and pervert the truth, if

23 not to bury it forever. They count on lies; and even more, on the

24 knowledge that people forget.

25 Here at the Tribunal, international justice must also take on the

1 responsibility of keeping the memory alive. For the victims and their

2 survivors, this remains the absolute priority.

3 The problem does not arise in the case of Mrs. Plavsic, since she

4 has acknowledged her responsibility and guilt in the atrocities

5 perpetrated by her government against the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina. A political figure respected amongst her peers, a university

7 graduate distinguished by a Fulbright scholarship, she held a leading

8 position in the highest circles of her country. As such, she approved the

9 objective of dividing the citizens of Bosnia by force. She was familiar

10 with Radovan Karadzic's address of 1991 threatening the Muslims with

11 extermination. And worse still, she often, if not consistently, supported

12 the efforts of the Serbian military in their abominable acts of ethnic

13 cleansing.

14 Population transfer, cruel and inhumane treatment of civilians,

15 forced labour, use of prisoners as human shields, Mrs. Plavsic supported

16 it at all.

17 How was she able to do that? How did she reconcile that with her

18 education, culture, conscience? How did she hope to remain at peace with

19 herself while forging an alliance with that part of some people which is

20 ignominious and shameful?

21 I do not know whether Mrs. Plavsic will speak or how she believes

22 she must explain or can explain her actions. I know only that nothing can

23 and must justify or excuse a crime against humanity.

24 That said, the fact that she is the only accused to have freely

25 and wholly assumed her role in the wrongdoings and crimes set out in the

1 indictment, even though she once moved in the highest circles of power in

2 her country, could and should make her an example for similar cases. So

3 far, the others accused in other similar trials have, on the whole, chosen

4 to repudiate the truthfulness and truth of their crimes in the hope of

5 assisting those who falsify history to sow the seeds of doubt amongst an

6 uninformed public.

7 In reading and rereading the indictment against Mrs. Plavsic, I

8 began to wonder about her personality. She is not accused of having

9 personally participated in the persecution, torture, and murder of

10 innocent human beings, but of having exploited her position within the

11 leadership to encourage and support the crimes. It was also in her name

12 that she allowed the torturers to torture and the killers to kill. Now,

13 then, how could a woman like her, a renowned intellectual, undoubtedly

14 intelligent and gifted, how could she remain silent in the face of so many

15 violations, so much humiliation, so many crimes, so much spilled blood,

16 and so many summary executions ascribed to the servants of the government

17 of which she was one of the leaders? How could she remain human in the

18 face of such a betrayal of humanity?

19 Mr. President, Your Honours, allow me to reiterate this to you:

20 In addressing you today, it is the victims I have in mind. To avenge

21 them? Certainly not. Vengeance has never been my motivation or

22 inspiration. Quite simply, I don't believe in it and never have. It is

23 not to avenge my people, but to ensure that they do not die a second time;

24 that, as an adult, writer, and teacher, I have devoted myself to

25 preserving their memory, and also to defending the prisoners of fate or

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1 the victims of despair, the starving children, and those who have been

2 uprooted and hounded out. In other terms, to defend their human rights.

3 Here, too, before you, Mr. President, Your Honours, this remains my sole

4 concern.

5 More specifically, I have not come to plead extenuating

6 circumstances of Mrs. Plavsic. The role of the witness is to speak out

7 and call for justice without passing sentence. Were all the suffering of

8 the victims to be placed on one side of a set of scales, how many years of

9 prison would it take on the other to achieve a balance? In this respect,

10 too, the civilised world is relying upon you and upon your conscience.

11 Your sentences will reverberate across national and ethnic borders.

12 Through the work that you and the Court accomplish, the words uttered in

13 this courtroom will be taken in, studied, and remembered far beyond the

14 frontiers and far across the centuries.

15 As for the witness that I am, today I simply wish to tell you that

16 your deliberations and verdict will be present everywhere crimes against

17 humanity have sown bereavement and despair or will do so in the future.

18 Today, Mr. President, more than ever before and more than anything

19 else, we know that humanity needs hope. It is for you to give us the

20 pledge that it is not misplaced. Thank you.

21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Professor.

22 I have nothing further, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE MAY: Do the Defence wish to ask any questions?

24 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE MAY: Professor, thank you for coming to give evidence which

1 we've now seen and which is now concluded. As I say, thank you very

2 much. And that brings your evidence to an end.

3 [The witness's testimony via videolink concluded]

4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

5 JUDGE MAY: We've got the statement of the last witness in the

6 bundle. Do you want it exhibited?

7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I believe all those exhibits will be

8 introduced at one time, if that's permissible for the Court.

9 JUDGE MAY: You want it exhibited.

10 MR. TIEGER: Yes.

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. It will be given an appropriate number.

12 Yes. Well, I'm just going to ask the registrar if the exhibits

13 are plain for the record. And if so, I guess we'll move to the Defence.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, yes, the statement will be marked as

15 S13. We have Exhibit -- the Prosecution exhibits so far have been marked

16 S1 to S13, with the statement being the last one.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Pavich.

18 MR. PAVICH: Your Honours, the Defence wishes to call Mr. Milorad

19 Dodik.

20 [The witness entered court]

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

23 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

24 WITNESS: MILORAD DODIK

25 [Witness answered through interpreter]

1 JUDGE MAY: We don't seem to have had a translation of that.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English channel? Can the

3 English be heard?

4 JUDGE MAY: I don't seem to have got that. It's not on the

5 transcript.

6 Yes. Would you try again, please.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

8 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If you'd like to take a seat.

10 MR. PAVICH: May I proceed, Your Honour?

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Pavich.

12 Examined by Mr. Pavich:

13 Q. Mr. Dodik, will you please give us your full name and spell your

14 last name, please.

15 A. My name is Milorad Dodik, so D-O-D-I-K. And M-I-L-O-R-A-D, first

16 name.

17 Q. Thank you for coming with us this afternoon, Mr. Dodik.

18 Will you please tell us what position, if any, you hold -- elected

19 position in the Republika Srpska today.

20 A. Today I have no official position except being a deputy in the

21 People's Assembly of Republika Srpska, and I am president of a political

22 party.

23 Q. What are your duties and responsibilities as a deputy in the

24 parliament of Republika Srpska?

25 A. They are prescribed by law and include the obligation to attend

1 parliament sessions in accordance with the political programme that we

2 have, to represent the interests of voters who gave me their trust at the

3 elections.

4 Q. Would you please identify for us the name of your political party,

5 Mr. Dodik.

6 A. It is called the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, and it

7 is active throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a

8 parliamentary party both at the level of Republika Srpska and at the level

9 of the other entity of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is

10 also a parliamentary party at the level of joint institutions of Bosnia

11 and Herzegovina. In Republika Srpska, there are deputies from this party

12 who are both Serbs and Croats; therefore, it is multi-ethnic in nature.

13 Q. What position do you hold with the party, Mr. Dodik?

14 A. I am president of that political party; ever since it was founded

15 in 1996.

16 Q. When did you first become active in politics in the region?

17 A. I became active in politics upon graduation from the School of

18 Political Sciences in Belgrade; that was sometime in 1985. And in the

19 period up to 1990 I was president of the local government in the

20 municipality of Laktasi; from 1988 sometime until the end of 1990.

21 Q. Were there significant elections held in the year -- in the fall

22 of 1990 and in the summer, I should say, of 1990 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23 A. Yes. That year in the autumn the first multi-party elections were

24 held, and they were important because there were several parties

25 participating in the election and not, as hitherto, only one political

1 party.

2 I was a member of the Alliance of Reformist Forces, a party that

3 was formed at the level of the whole of the former Yugoslavia, and its

4 president was the prime minister at the time of Yugoslavia, that is,

5 Mr. Ante Markovic. And in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the president of that same

6 party for Bosnia-Herzegovina was Dr. Professor Nenad Kecmanovic from

7 Sarajevo. I was president of the regional board of that party for Banja

8 Luka and also a member of the top leadership of the party for Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina. At those elections, I became a deputy of that party in the

10 Assembly of the then-Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was 12 or 13 of us

11 from that party, and we were in the opposition at the time.

12 Q. Can you tell us briefly, Mr. Dodik, what the political platform of

13 that party, your party, was.

14 A. The political platform of the party was the preservation of

15 Yugoslavia as a community, which should have undergone transformation in

16 the sense of the ownership relations in the country, so that the problems

17 that existed at the time between the republics and also the nations should

18 be resolved by peaceful means and through political dialogue. And the

19 ultimate proposition was that the former Yugoslav republic should remain

20 within a community which would have some common competency, such as

21 foreign policy, the monetary sphere, the armed forces, and a unified

22 economic area, and that on the basis of those principles the community

23 should be preserved and the area prepared as a whole for approaching --

24 joining with the European Union.

25 Q. Mr. Dodik, you mentioned other parties during that election. Can

1 you tell us briefly about the most significant other parties that existed

2 during that election campaign.

3 A. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, several political parties came to the

4 fore at the time. There were many that took part in the elections. But

5 the most significant political parties were the Party of Democratic

6 Action, which is the party of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, whose positions were

7 absolutely nationalistic, and it was the first of such a nature to be

8 formed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was followed by the Serbian Democratic

9 Party and the HDZ, which had already existed in Croatia and which

10 developed its own branch in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So these three political

11 parties were the most powerful, and they were the absolute winners at the

12 elections. And also, there was the Alliance of Reformist Forces that I

13 have talked about and to which I belonged, and the Party of Reformed

14 Communists, the SDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which also won a certain number

15 of seats in parliament, and then there were some smaller parties like the

16 Liberals and some others, but really of less significance.

17 Q. You mentioned one or identified one party as a nationalist party.

18 Were any of the other major parties in your opinion taking nationalist

19 positions?

20 A. Yes. The SDS as well, whose positions were to protect Serbian

21 national interests; and the same applies to the HDZ, which was a party

22 that gave absolute priority to the defence of Croatian national interest

23 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore,

24 these three parties -- the SDA, that is, the Party of Democratic Action,

25 was designed to represent Muslim or Bosniak national interests; the SDS,

1 that was designed to protect the Serbian national interests; and the HDZ,

2 to defend Croatian national interests. And in those parties the members

3 were exclusively people from those ethnicities.

4 Q. Did Biljana Plavsic become active during this campaign?

5 A. I had heard of the name of Mrs. Biljana Plavsic from earlier on as

6 an important member of the academic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

7 in political terms I was not aware of her political commitments until

8 those elections. I noticed her in the political sense for the first time

9 when she was a candidate for a member of the Presidency of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina on behalf of the Serbian people. The Presidency had

11 seven members. Two members were elected from each of the three nations -

12 that is, the Muslim, the Serbian, and Croatian nation - and one member

13 represented the other ethnicities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I heard of

14 Mrs. Plavsic's name for the first time when I saw it on the list of

15 candidates for the Presidency.

16 Q. Did you know her by reputation at that time?

17 A. I said that up until then I had heard of Mrs. Plavsic as an

18 academician, as a respected professor at Sarajevo University. In the

19 election campaign itself conducted within the framework of the Serbian

20 Democratic Party, she spoke at those rallies. I didn't notice that she

21 was very active. But in any event, she was a candidate of that party at

22 the time. And I was, however, involved with the campaign of the party

23 that I belonged. And in those days these were opposing parties, competing

24 parties. And at the time I really did not notice any particular political

25 involvement by Mrs. Plavsic.

1 The elections showed that the three nations or ethnicities

2 extended absolute support to their national parties. The Serbs voted for

3 the SDS; the Bosniaks for the SDA; and the Croats predominantly for the

4 HDZ; and a very small number of people voted for the Alliance of Reform

5 Forces and for the SDP of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6 Q. What were the results of this election regarding Mrs. Plavsic

7 herself?

8 A. She was voted into the Presidency in direct elections. She was on

9 a joint list for members of the Presidency. And on behalf of the Serbian

10 people, she represented the Serbian people together with Mr. Koljevic in

11 the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the Bosniaks, there was

12 Alija Izetbegovic, and Fikret Abdic. And for the Croats, I know there was

13 Franjo Boras. I don't know who the other representative was. And the

14 others were represented by Ejub Ganic.

15 Q. Did these three parties that you've mentioned, the nationalist

16 parties, did they continue to promote parties that served their particular

17 ethnic groups throughout the year of 1990 and 1991, as far as you could

18 see?

19 A. At the time, I was a witness of cooperation among those three

20 political parties. And this helped establish institutions of authority in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the basis of an agreement among these three

22 political parties that we have mentioned, a government was set up, that

23 is, the executive council of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And according to the

24 agreement among the parties, each party had a certain number of ministers

25 in that government. The joint parliament was headed at the time by

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1 Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, who was the speaker. And for almost a year, or a

2 little less, after the election, that is, up to sometime in June 1991,

3 that is, from the elections until the month of June, the cooperation

4 between these three parties was good.

5 In June 1991, what happened was that the Croatian parliament took

6 a decision to leave Yugoslavia as a community. And from then on, many

7 differences arose among those three political parties, and also the

8 political conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina became far more complicated.

9 After that decision, the HDZ and the SDA supported Croatia's secession and

10 its right to secession from Yugoslavia. The SDS demanded and advocated

11 the preservation of Yugoslavia as a community so that after that event,

12 significant political differences among those three political parties came

13 to the fore.

14 Q. Did Mrs. Plavsic continue to hold her position through this

15 period, through June of 1991, in the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina as

16 the Serb -- as one of the Serbian representatives in the Presidency?

17 A. Yes, that was the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not the

18 government. Yes, Mrs. Plavsic did remain in that body. I could see her

19 at parliament meetings where she was mostly present. But I can hardly

20 remember her ever taking the floor at those meetings.

21 Q. Did she continue to be a member of the SDS leadership during this

22 period?

23 A. Yes, I think that she was a member of the SDS at the time. As far

24 as I know, she wasn't a member of the top leadership of the SDS but was a

25 member of the party. In those days, I was a deputy representing the

1 opposition in that same parliament.

2 Q. And how long did you continue to be a deputy representing the

3 opposition in that parliament?

4 A. For as long as it existed, and I think this was up until February

5 1992 when the parliament met for the last time, or it may have been the

6 end of January. Anyway, from June up until next February, there was a lot

7 of political debate in the parliament. And at those meetings, the debates

8 focussed on political issues. And it was quite clear that as a rule, the

9 representatives of these three political parties, or rather the presidents

10 of these three parties, Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Karadzic, and Mr. Stjepan

11 Klujic, who was then the leader of the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina, were

12 among the most frequent speakers. That was when the idea came up to call

13 a referendum on the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I must say

14 that this was sometime in the autumn when the decision was taken --

15 Q. That was the autumn of 1991, Mr. Dodik?

16 A. Yes, yes, that's right. The decision was taken by a majority of

17 votes of these two political parties, that is, the SDS, Mr. Izetbegovic's

18 Party of Democratic Action, and the HDZ, headed by Stjepan Klujic. The

19 Serbian Democratic Party at the time was against that referendum.

20 We, in the opposition, considered this to be a very serious matter

21 which could provoke a major crisis and even war. We didn't take part in

22 the vote itself, but we felt that this issue should have been avoided.

23 Q. When, in fact, did that vote take place?

24 A. I think this was towards the end of that year. And the reaction

25 of the population was such that the Serbs did not vote at that referendum,

1 but the referendum did have the majority of the two other nations or

2 ethnicities. And I think that this was an event that predetermined

3 subsequent major conflicts that occurred. The impression was that a

4 formal majority needed to be obtained for such a major issue as the change

5 of a status of a republic, and this was pushed through by the Bosniaks and

6 Croats; whereas on the other side, the Serbs felt in jeopardy because any

7 future decision -- in any future decision-making, they could be outvoted,

8 and that is why they felt extremely frustrated. I have to say that I

9 personally did not take part in the vote on that referendum because I felt

10 that it wouldn't bring anything -- any benefit to anybody in

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 Q. Can you describe the political situation following the referendum

13 until you left your position in the parliament.

14 A. Generally speaking, it was a state of euphoria on both sides that

15 I have just described. The Bosniaks and Croats were very glad to take

16 part in the referendum and to vote in favour of the constitution of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a separate state outside the former Yugoslavia,

18 where the Serbs were resigned. And in places where Serbs lived, people

19 did not go and cast their votes. This deepened the political rift on an

20 ethnic basis due to the fear of outvoting and fear of being dominated,

21 that I have already referred to. And as a result, I think that all

22 subsequent events revolved around this struggle and debate as to whether

23 the referendum was correct or not. And of course, everyone had his own

24 arguments in favour or against based on what I have already said.

25 What happened then was that within the framework of a

1 parliamentary group of Serbian deputies, I think this was in November

2 1991, a separate assembly of Serb deputies of Bosnia-Herzegovina was

3 formed, the aim of which was to continue to assert and defend what in

4 those days were considered to be Serbian national interests, and that was

5 the preservation of Yugoslavia as a community that we were familiar with

6 from the past.

7 In Croatia, the armed conflict of significant proportions had

8 already started. And this, without any doubt, had major influence on

9 developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 Q. Did at some point the actions of the Serbian leaders result in the

11 declaration of a government by the Serbs?

12 A. Yes, the event that I have referred to, the formation of the

13 parliament by Serbian deputies. And this was not an elected government;

14 this happened several months later when it already became obvious that the

15 conflict had started and that there was no possibility any longer for

16 maintaining the bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina in operation.

17 Q. I think you told us that you left the parliament in Sarajevo in

18 the spring of 1992. Is that correct, Mr. Dodik?

19 A. In the spring, the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina was no longer

20 working. It was impossible physically for the parliament to continue

21 operating because after February, there were sporadic armed conflicts.

22 And then as of April that year, major conflicts which made impossible the

23 holding of parliamentary meetings. And I attended the last parliament

24 meeting - I think it was the last one - held at the end of January or the

25 beginning of February of that same year.

1 Q. You've mentioned the Serbian government that had been proclaimed.

2 Did that government consist of a Presidency during this period, in the

3 spring of 1992?

4 A. I think it was not proclaimed then, not the Serbian Presidency,

5 that is. But I'm not quite sure of the date, but I think it may have been

6 in March that the government was set up, of the Serbian Republic of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, by that assembly which assembly meeting was held in

8 November 1991.

9 Q. Did Biljana Plavsic hold a position in that government, Mr. Dodik?

10 A. She was a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

11 which was still functioning in those days. So she was a member of the

12 body to which she had been elected in October 1990. That Presidency

13 sought and made every effort to calm those sporadic incidents and to seek

14 and find a solution by political means. And I do know and I noticed

15 Mrs. Plavsic's involvement at that time. During those months, together

16 with Mr. Fikret Abdic and Mr. Franjo Boras, and she were in Bosanski Brod,

17 where these incidents had occurred. I know that they also went to

18 Bijeljina and to Kupres. So as representatives of the Presidency of

19 Bosnia and Herzegovina in those days, that Presidency would send a mixed

20 delegation into the field to try and deal with problems. I think that the

21 other bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the parliament and also the

22 government, had more or less stopped operating.

23 Q. And did there come a time when the Presidency essentially stopped

24 operating as it had been created through the election of 1990?

25 A. Yes, I think that was after April. I don't know whether a session

1 of that particular Presidency was held, the one that was formed in 1990,

2 or not. I can't say for sure. Perhaps there was another one towards the

3 end of April, but I'm not quite sure. But what I do know is that after

4 that, after the conflicts that started to take on great proportions, that

5 the national homogeneity that was done and the functionaries at the level

6 of Bosnia-Herzegovina remained within the frameworks of their political

7 parties and their ethnic groups or nations.

8 Q. I'd like you to direct your attention now to the period from April

9 of 1992 until the end of 1992, during the time that the BH Presidency, as

10 it had been elected in 1990, no longer existed. Did Biljana Plavsic hold

11 any positions in the Republika Srpska at that time, April until December

12 of 1992?

13 A. I know that there were several assemblies of the then-Serbian

14 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at which Mrs. Plavsic was not present at

15 those meetings. I think she was in Sarajevo at the time and that it was

16 only in June or the beginning of June, rather, that she left Sarajevo with

17 the assistance of the organisation of the international forces. And after

18 she left --

19 Q. I'm sorry. Why was it necessary for her to leave the -- Sarajevo

20 with the assistance of international forces?

21 A. I know that that is what happened. It's a fact. Now, I don't

22 know -- I suppose Mrs. Plavsic was a prominent personage and therefore she

23 and her family were exposed to dangers precisely because of the conflict

24 that was going on in Sarajevo itself and that her presence -- further

25 presence there after the month of June was putting her life and the life

1 of her family in danger. That is how I understood it, and that is how it

2 was. And at that time the leadership, the Serb leadership, was already

3 located at Pale from the month of April onwards.

4 Q. And did Biljana Plavsic continue to be a part of that leadership

5 from April until the end of 1992, as far as you could see?

6 A. I assume that communication was impossible while she was still in

7 Sarajevo between that leadership and herself, the leadership up at Pale

8 and herself because she was in Sarajevo. But I know that after that time

9 she did appear at the meetings. She attended parliament sessions, the

10 ones we had, and I noticed her presence there then. I don't know exactly

11 when she tendered her resignation to the membership of the Presidency of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I know that people talked about it for a time and

13 that the Presidency was constituted of the Serbian Republic of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that was its name and title.

15 Q. Can you tell us what your situation was from April to December of

16 1992, Mr. Dodik. Did you continue to hold any positions, either

17 representative positions or governmental positions?

18 A. I didn't hold any positions within the government. At that time

19 let me say that I considered that during those times my participation in

20 the parliament would have been normal, of the Serbian Republic of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And as a deputy, I agreed to continue my work in that

22 same parliament. I was never a member of the Serbian Democratic Party,

23 and at the time I took part in and behaved in conformity with my own

24 sentiments, linked to political actions. So regardless of the fact that

25 those were difficult times, I thought that people recognised me in the

1 parliament as a man who thought differently about all those events.

2 And I think that it was at the end of April that I was mobilised

3 to join the Army of Republika Srpska, or rather, the army at that time,

4 which in May became the Army of Republika Srpska, and I was there until

5 the end of that year. I was mobilised and involved in it. But at the

6 same time, I took part in the parliament sessions that were held, several

7 of them, or rather, the Assembly of the Republika Srpska.

8 Q. Did there come a time in late 1992 when you observed that Biljana

9 Plavsic had separated herself from the leadership of the SDS?

10 A. Well, I can only say what I saw at the parliamentary session

11 meetings. I did not have any other information as to what was going on at

12 any other meetings or in the relations they had amongst themselves. But

13 at the end of the year - I think it was a parliamentary session that was

14 held in Prijedor, actually - but it was quite obvious that Mrs. Plavsic

15 had quite a different position with respect to the overall situation and

16 the fact that an informal group of wartime profiteers were turning what

17 was happening to their own ends and to enrich themselves. And she stood

18 up to this fact, to this fact that they had become close to some leader

19 circles in Republika Srpska, and she spoke out against this loud and

20 clear. And this unequivocally left the impression that there was reason

21 to do so in that respect.

22 Q. From that point on, how would you describe what you could see as

23 her relationship with the leaders of the SDS, from the point of this

24 confrontation in late 1992?

25 A. This was always present when parliament made its decisions on

1 different points, and there was a clear difference that was evident as to

2 what Mrs. Plavsic advocated and what the other portion of the leadership

3 advocated of the then-Republika Srpska. I think that this conflict had at

4 its core the activities of some ministers of the judiciary and the police

5 force at that time, and I remember that Mrs. Plavsic attacked very

6 severely the work and practice of those two ministries during those years,

7 that is to say, the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993. And I also

8 know that Mrs. Plavsic still was the vice-president of Republika Srpska at

9 the time.

10 My role and presence also allowed me to observe all these things

11 and how parliament functioned. The dominant role was played by the

12 Serbian Democratic Party, and I have to say that I was witness to several

13 proposals put forward by Mrs. Plavsic at that time which were not accepted

14 by the parliament, and they related to the work of the two ministries I

15 mentioned a moment ago. And she advocated that the ministers be replaced

16 and that they -- the whole thing must be put under control, and she was

17 dissatisfied with many things, which were not brought out into the open at

18 the time, but there was discussion that they had to be taken away from the

19 government.

20 Q. I believe she continued to hold that position as the

21 vice-president until sometime in 1996; is that correct, Mr. Dodik?

22 A. Yes, that is correct. She was the vice-president of Republika

23 Srpska throughout those years. And let me say once again that my meetings

24 and encounters with her work and her positions were through the work of

25 the parliament of Republika Srpska. And let me also say that in addition

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1 to the struggle to normalise the work of the government of Republika

2 Srpska, that she would often come forward in parliament with her efforts

3 to gear the work of the government to help the refugees; that is to say,

4 the Serbs coming in from Croatia into the Federation of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their numbers rose from one month to the next.

6 And she also took part in discussions of a humanitarian nature linked to

7 Serb refugees that were pouring into the area of the then-Republika

8 Srpska, and I know that regularly she would tour places like schools,

9 sports halls, and others, factory halls where the refugees were

10 accommodated, and she would speak about the situation she encountered

11 there. And she asked the government to have an adequate programme for

12 taking care of those people and for their accommodation.

13 Q. Was this what you perceived to be her major work during this

14 period, after she had distanced herself from the leadership of the SDS

15 until 1996, Mr. Dodik?

16 A. Well, I think that was her exclusive involvement; that is to say,

17 she dealt with humanitarian issues. And I can say with absolute certainty

18 before this lofty Tribunal that the sentiments during those days, months,

19 and years that Mrs. Plavsic in the leadership of Republika Srpska in the

20 political sense of the word was completely marginalised. And quite

21 simply, this was evident at all the parliamentary sessions that were held

22 because many of her proposals from the humanitarian sphere were outvoted

23 by the deputies of the party that she until that time formally belonged to

24 herself. So I'm a direct witness of that kind of situation.

25 Q. Now, you had mentioned, Mr. Dodik, that she held the office of

1 vice-president until sometime in 1996. What happened at that time that

2 caused her to leave that position?

3 A. I think she remained a member of the -- or rather the

4 vice-president of the republic formally until the first elections were

5 held after the Dayton agreements. They were elections that were held in

6 September or October of 1996. In the meantime, because of the great

7 pressure that was brought against Karadzic to relinquish the post of

8 president, I remember that at the time as the deputy, she was the acting

9 president once again in preparations for the post-Dayton elections and for

10 agreements with the international community, which unleashed cooperation

11 to implement the Dayton Accords.

12 Q. Was there a meeting of the Serb Assembly following the Dayton

13 Accords in early 1996 that you can recall, Mr. Dodik?

14 A. Yes. I think there was an assembly session, perhaps at the end of

15 January or the beginning of February or before February. It was at Mount

16 Jahorina where the Dayton Peace Agreements were discussed. And I know

17 that the atmosphere was that the agreement was a bad thing for the Serbs

18 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was the prevalent view. And that the Serbian

19 Democratic Party did not accept them, and the discussion was on those

20 grounds. We, from the opposition at the time, considered that the

21 agreement should be accepted and that it should be put into practice.

22 First and foremost because it brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

23 also it defined the groundworks for the political system for

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 And according to us, there were considerable mechanisms to protect

1 Serb national interests within them as well, because there were

2 institutions of the Republika Srpska and within the joint institutions of

3 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, mechanisms through decision-making and

4 parity participation at all levels of decision-making in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I should like to note at the time, Mrs. Plavsic

6 in a brief address, in a short speech she made, she was closer to our

7 views, our way of thinking, although there were few people who would state

8 so in public on the basis of the need to accept the Dayton agreements

9 because for the simple reason that the leadership at Pale considered that

10 this was a transitional phase which would lead to quite a different

11 situation ultimately.

12 Q. At that time, was Mrs. Plavsic supporting the Dayton agreement

13 even though almost everyone else and all the leadership in the SDS was

14 against it?

15 A. I have already said that it was very difficult at that time to be

16 definitively along the lines of the Dayton agreement. But what I myself

17 felt was a good thing was that the doors were open for acceptance of it,

18 because this was a transitory phase before we accepted the Dayton

19 agreement in chapter and verse. And I remember that Mrs. Plavsic said

20 that Dayton was not to the advantage definitively of anyone but that

21 everyone was dissatisfied, the Bosniaks, the Croats, and the Serbs alike.

22 And that what was its value was the peace that it brought, and so that we

23 should take the road of peace.

24 And therefore, I considered that this was far different from the

25 positions that said that the Dayton agreement should be rejected, that it

1 was unacceptable and did not reflect the interests of the Serb people at

2 all. So there was a discussion along those lines on the other side of the

3 leadership.

4 Q. Did there come a time when Mrs. Plavsic became acting president?

5 And can you describe how that came to be. Briefly, Mr. Dodik, because we

6 have only about 15 minutes left, and there are several important points we

7 still need to cover.

8 JUDGE MAY: In fact, we started rather later, 2.45, so we'll go on

9 until 4.15.

10 MR. PAVICH: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to say once again that I was

12 in a sort of opposition status. I don't know the details of the event

13 itself; that is to say, when Mrs. Plavsic and Mr. Koljevic replaced each

14 other's position. And according to the Dayton agreement, this

15 was -- Karadzic had to withdraw. And what was important to me as a man

16 from the opposition was that Mrs. Plavsic promoted under those conditions

17 a maximum possible neutral position for preparing the political elections

18 and the activities of other political parties who had been set up in

19 Republika Srpska and throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina in large numbers. So

20 the elections took place eight months after the signing, rather nine

21 months after the signing of the Dayton agreement. Therefore, in that

22 respect, I do know what her work was like.

23 As to some other details, I can't say that we had any encounters

24 at that time. But from this prism, I can say and testify that the

25 possibility was open for the establishment of other political parties, and

1 that the accent was placed on representation and the possibility of having

2 them represented through the media and elsewhere.

3 Q. And did Mrs. Plavsic become an elected president at some point

4 during this period?

5 A. Yes, she did. At those particular elections, the first elections

6 to be held after Dayton.

7 Q. And that was in what month and year, Mr. Dodik?

8 A. That was in -- at the end of 1996.

9 Q. And from the end of the Presidency that Mrs. Plavsic held, did it

10 have an unusual power to it? And I'm referring you now specifically to

11 the power to dissolve the parliament. Do you recall whether it had that

12 power, Mr. Dodik?

13 A. After those elections, there was no Presidency of Republika Srpska

14 any more, but the functioning president of the republic, and

15 vice-president, one vice-president of the republic, was inaugurated. And

16 the competencies or authorities of the president, among others, was the

17 right to dissolve parliament, or rather the Assembly of Republika Srpska.

18 Q. And was that a power that Mrs. Plavsic held then during the last

19 part of 1996 and the first half of 1997, Mr. Dodik?

20 A. When she was elected president of the republic, she did have that

21 constitutional power. According to the constitution of Republika Srpska,

22 among others, she had the power to dissolve the assembly and to hold new

23 elections.

24 Q. During this period then, from the fall of 1996 to the summer of

25 1997, were you able to determine whether she continued to support the

1 implementation of the Dayton agreement, Mr. Dodik?

2 A. Yes, there were more and more activities along those lines. A new

3 organ was introduced, the OHR, for supervising and monitoring the

4 implementation of the Dayton Accords on the part of the international

5 community. And when the first high representative arrived in

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was able to note that there was a great deal of

7 activity on the part of all the organs in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the

8 elections cooperating with the OHR. And as an opposition man myself, this

9 was indicative to me that matters in the leadership of Republika Srpska

10 were not functioning, and the fact that Mrs. Plavsic, at one point in

11 time, as president of the republic, transferred her cabinet to Banja

12 Luka. She didn't stay on up there at Pale.

13 Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Dodik, approximately when that occurred.

14 A. I think that this took place at the start of her mandate, her term

15 of office, as president of the republic.

16 Q. And do you know what the purpose of that decision was? Did she

17 give a public reason?

18 A. I think the aim was to enable the normal functioning of it without

19 an atmosphere which had reigned up until then, in my view. And they

20 thought that it was necessary for Mrs. Plavsic just to be an exponent of a

21 policy or to carry out certain orders.

22 Q. Was that decision to transfer the parliament opposed by other

23 members of SDS, to your knowledge, Mr. Dodik?

24 A. Yes. Well, it wasn't very evident at the time. But with

25 subsequent events, we saw that there was a difference. We came to realise

1 that there was a difference in the leadership of the Republika Srpska, and

2 this came to the fore at the beginning of Mrs. Plavsic's term of office

3 when she continued, through the institutions of the system, to settle

4 accounts and unmask the various criminal affairs that were going on. And

5 through the organs of Republika Srpska, that is to say, the police force

6 and other of its organs, she endeavoured to have them wind up in court and

7 have a legal epilogue to them. And that is when they opposed her being in

8 Banja Luka. They wanted her to return to Pale, and that was the

9 culmination of all these relationships. Sometime in mid-1997, or more

10 exactly in August, she used her right to disband -- to dissolve

11 parliament, the parliament of Republika Srpska, and she called for new

12 elections to be held.

13 Q. Before she did that, in your opinion had her actions exposed

14 herself to political and personal risk? I'm talking now about the actions

15 that you mentioned, transferring the government and the parliament to

16 Banja Luka from Pale, actions to implement Dayton. Can you recall any

17 specific incidents that represented the political and personal risk that

18 she had exposed herself to in making these decisions?

19 A. I said that her cabinet, her offices functioned in Banja Luka,

20 whereas parliament continued to function at Pale. And precisely because

21 of this difference and the fact that parliament was at that time under the

22 direct control of -- the majority control of the SDS, in fact, parliament

23 implemented the policy advocated at that time by that particular political

24 party. And I think that the events that followed testified to just how

25 much this was dangerous, this dissolution of parliament. And I know that

1 Mrs. Plavsic during those days at that time spent all her time in her

2 office, days and nights. She never went to her apartment. Also for

3 security and safety reasons.

4 Q. Was there a time when she was at an international conference and

5 felt it necessary to return because of a crisis? I'm talking now about

6 the summer of 1997, before she dissolved the parliament and after the

7 transfer to Banja Luka.

8 A. Yes. She travelled to London to attend a meeting there. And

9 quite literally, because an urgent meeting was called of the

10 then-leadership of the SDS, which took advantage of this particular moment

11 when she wasn't there and the fact that the political situation had

12 deteriorated in Republika Srpska generally, she had to come straight back

13 from the airport to Republika Srpska. And in Belgrade, when the plane

14 touched down - and the public knows this very well - she was detained

15 there in a separate room, a premises of the Belgrade airport. And after a

16 certain amount of time she was deported to the border between Yugoslavia

17 and Republika Srpska, or rather, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where responsibility

18 for her was taken on by the police force of Republika Srpska. And several

19 hours later, some people from the Army of Republika Srpska brought her to

20 Banja Luka. And she did not go to Pale, which was the initial objective

21 of the leadership of the SDS. That is what I know about all that. That

22 is my interpretation of the events.

23 Q. When she was arrested and detained in Belgrade, this was in the

24 summer of 1997, Mr. Dodik?

25 A. Yes, that's right. I think it was July 1997, thereabouts.

1 Q. Who was the President of Serbia at that time, Mr. Dodik?

2 A. The President of Serbia was Mr. Milosevic.

3 Q. Nonetheless, did she proceed and dissolve the parliament after

4 this incident?

5 A. Yes. Several days after this turn of events some decisions were

6 made by the leadership at Pale, and her stay in London was used to

7 inaugurate the then-vice-president of Republika Srpska, with all the

8 competencies and authorisations that the president had so as to ensure

9 control over that position of president. And Mrs. Plavsic looked at the

10 overall relations and the situation, the conflicts, et cetera, and used

11 her constitutional right to dissolve parliament and call for new elections

12 to be held.

13 Q. Did you participate in those elections, Mr. Dodik?

14 A. Yes, I did. Already at that time I was the president of the

15 Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, a party that had been formed on

16 the 15th of January, 1996.

17 And I must say -- let me just point out one more thing: In

18 1994 -- sometime towards the end of 1994, in fact, I and a group of

19 deputies who did not belong to the Serbian Democratic Party at that time

20 in that first parliament of Republika Srpska established an independent

21 deputies group, of which I was president. So after Dayton, the Alliance

22 of Independent Social Democrats was formed. I was president of the party,

23 and the party took part in the elections independently.

24 Q. And those elections occurred in the fall of 1997, Mr. Dodik?

25 A. Yes, that's right. They were extraordinary parliamentary

1 elections of Republika Srpska.

2 Q. By that time had Mrs. Plavsic formally removed herself from the

3 SDS and formed a new party?

4 A. Yes. After parliament was dissolved, several weeks later,

5 perhaps, a new political party was formed of the Serbian national

6 alliance, of which she was president, and she put herself forward at the

7 elections. And this was a political party which at the elections was one

8 of the stronger ones. Actually, it came second.

9 Q. And this was a party that came in second even though it had

10 existed only for a matter of months?

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. What were the results generally of the election? You've mentioned

13 that her party came in second. Can you tell us about your party and the

14 SDS and any others that you believe were significant at that time.

15 A. My party was elected to parliament. We had two deputy seats. But

16 what was most important at that point in time was the fact that the SDS no

17 longer had absolute authority in parliament. It was a relative winner,

18 but it didn't have a political ally with whom it could achieve a majority

19 to form the government in Republika Srpska. So I think that was the

20 greatest achievement of those elections, that the SDS no longer had

21 absolute power.

22 Q. And as a result of those elections, did Mrs. Plavsic gain the

23 presidency?

24 A. She was the president. The elections were just for the parliament

25 of Republika Srpska. She continued to perform her office. The mandate

1 was from 1996 to 1998. And these extraordinary elections were just for

2 members of parliament. So she remained president of Republika Srpska

3 after those elections as well, and at the same time she was president of

4 this political party that I have identified.

5 Q. As president, did she have the right to nominate the candidate for

6 prime minister?

7 A. Yes. She alone has the right as the president of the republic to

8 nominate the prime minister. At the time, it was sufficient to have a

9 parliamentary majority to form the government without the SDS and the

10 Serbian Radical Party. And Mrs. Plavsic then nominated Mr. Ivanic as the

11 prime minister elect, though he did not represent any political party at

12 the time. He was politically uninvolved in the sense of being a member of

13 any political party. He was a person who was known in the public as an

14 expert, as a professional. And in those first weeks she gave the mandate

15 to Mr. Ivanic to compose a cabinet, and Mr. Ivanic for reasons he

16 explained at the time returned the mandate. Maybe two or three days prior

17 to a parliamentary session which was to elect the government he returned

18 the mandate, claiming that he could not compose a government.

19 Q. Did she then nominate you, Mr. Dodik?

20 A. Yes, she then gave me the mandate to form a government.

21 Q. And were there parties that were opposing her nomination of you at

22 that time?

23 A. Yes. The Serbian Radical Party was against it, and there was a

24 major media and political campaign against that nomination. Nevertheless,

25 at a meeting of the parliament of Republika Srpska that was held on the

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1 18th of January, 1998 the government was elected, of which I was the prime

2 minister, with a majority vote which did not include representatives of

3 the SDS and the Serbian Radical Party.

4 Q. Who were the leaders of the SDS at that time, primary leaders,

5 that opposed your nomination and election?

6 A. The SDS was still the most powerful political party in

7 parliament. It had the largest number of seats. And together with the

8 radicals, they had 39 deputies. And to have a majority, they needed 42.

9 So they were a strong grouping. As far as I know, the president at the

10 time was Aleksa Buha, I think it was, who was president of the Presidency

11 of Serbian Democratic Party, as it was called then.

12 Q. Who was the leader of the radical party at that time?

13 A. At that time the leader in Republika Srpska was Nikola Poplasen.

14 But the general, if I can call it that, the general president, the overall

15 president of that party is Mr. Seselj.

16 Q. Mr. Dodik, I'd like to talk now briefly. And you've described for

17 us the efforts that you made together with Mrs. Plavsic during this period

18 from 1997, while the two of you held office, to continue to work toward

19 the implementation of the Dayton Accords and what was your priority in

20 that implementation.

21 A. I have to say that our main and joint priority then was to

22 integrate Republika Srpska within international political relations on the

23 one hand; and on the other, to join international financial courses which

24 would provide for stabilisation and reconstruction of Republika Srpska,

25 reconstruction of the damages suffered during the war. I had full support

1 of Mrs. Plavsic for these priorities, and together we were active to join

2 in international affairs and assert the provisions of the Dayton Accords,

3 which implied a communication within international representatives and it

4 also implied a settlement of the domestic situation within the

5 competencies of the government and also adequate representation and

6 participation in the work of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7 So this was very hard work, to which Mrs. Plavsic as president of the

8 republic fully contributed and assisted the government for as long as it

9 existed. And I must say that one of the more difficult parts of the

10 Dayton accords was the process of the return of refugees, and this was a

11 dominant theme and a dominant area that we were committed to. And our

12 assessment was that we need to ensure the formal preconditions for that

13 return, that is, the restoration of property rights. And Mrs. Plavsic and

14 her party, as well as the government, supported all activities designed to

15 that goal. And while she was still a president, there was a major debate

16 on the law on the restitution of abandoned property which was passed in

17 1999. Several months after she ceased to be president, but in any event,

18 her party played an active part in that.

19 Q. She ceased to be president, and that brings us to the election,

20 Mr. Dodik, of 1998. Can you tell us whether she took any political risks

21 in that election, which I believe resulted in her defeat as a candidate

22 for Presidency?

23 A. It is a fact that Mr. Poplasen won those elections, being the

24 joint candidate of the Serbian Democratic Party and the Serbian Radical

25 Party. In view of the fact that in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

1 a candidate needed to be elected who would represent a grouping of

2 political parties, the coalition that we had that was called Sloga at the

3 time, Mrs. Plavsic abandoned her presidential campaign to assist

4 Mr. Radisic's campaign for membership in the Presidency. And as a result,

5 she lost the presidential elections and Mr. Radisic won the elections for

6 a member of the Presidency. So he defeated the candidate for the Serbian

7 Democratic Party and the Serbian Radical Party who was Mr. Krajisnik.

8 Q. Mr. Dodik, I'd like to ask you now a question that I'm sure has

9 been asked you many times. How can you justify, as a Serb, your work and

10 Mrs. Plavsic's work to dedicate yourselves to the implementation of the

11 Dayton Accords?

12 A. I personally believe that the events we have mentioned here and

13 the acts taken by Mrs. Plavsic to dissolve parliament and call the new

14 elections preserved Dayton, not only in Republika Srpska but in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was as a result of that that an internationally

16 acceptable government took over in Republika Srpska which could work on

17 the implementation of the project which was called the Dayton agreement.

18 We frequently discussed this, and we knew that the Dayton agreement had

19 many good things in it that suited the interests of the Serbian people as

20 well, and that it needed to be implemented. And that is why we supported

21 the implementation of the Dayton accords. We didn't see it as something

22 being directed against the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But we felt that

23 only through adequate activities, through the institutions of the system,

24 and assuming responsibility for the implementation of that agreement could

25 we preserve it.

1 Any neglect or undermining or ignoring the provisions of that

2 agreement most frequently ended up by the responsibility for the

3 implementation being taken over by the high representative, and that is

4 why we felt that our political and every other responsibility was to

5 assume responsibility to the implementation of the Dayton Accords. Of

6 course, there were certain problems with regard to understanding for each

7 and every move and the timeliness of those moves, but the overall

8 implementation of the Dayton Accords was never called in question.

9 Q. Do you believe that that overall implementation of the Dayton

10 Accords served all the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina? And if so, please

11 explain why you believe that.

12 A. Yes, the Dayton Accords without any doubt showed that there was no

13 victor of the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So no reward was

14 given as a result of the war to any people. It was also a compromise with

15 respect to requirements of all three parties that were in conflict in

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And such a compromise did not fully satisfy any

17 particular party to the conflict. And it was a framework within which a

18 path to peace was to be found, a path to the stabilisation of relations, a

19 path to reconciliation and better understanding of what were until

20 yesterday warring parties, and all of which should have resulted in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming integrated within European trends.

22 The various political parties from the war and wartime political

23 leaders stood by their maximalist demands and frequently interpreted the

24 Dayton agreements exclusively from positions of their own interests, which

25 to a high degree prevented the comprehensive implementation of the Dayton

1 agreements. But like any other process, it has its ups and downs, and I

2 am convinced that what happened in 1997, that is, the extraordinary

3 elections, definitely preserved and defined the commitment of Republika

4 Srpska to the Dayton Accords.

5 MR. PAVICH: Thank you very much, Mr. Dodik.

6 I have no further questions, Your Honours.

7 MR. TIEGER: We have no questions, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Dodik, that concludes your evidence. Thank you

9 for coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now, half past 9.00, tomorrow morning.

12 [The witness withdrew]

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

14 at 4.15 p.m., to be reconvened on

15 Tuesday, the 17th day of December, 2002,

16 at 9.30 a.m.

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