1 Tuesday, 17 December 2002
2 [Sentencing Hearing]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Harmon, are you calling the next witness?
7 MR. HARMON: Yes. Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, my
8 learned friends from the Defence. I am. The next witness will be
9 Dr. Madeleine K. Albright.
10 JUDGE MAY: I understand we have a representative of the United
11 States Government here in Court.
12 MR. HARMON: Yes, that's correct, Judge May. I was going to
13 introduce Mr. Clifton Johnson, who represents the United States Government
14 and whose presence has been authorised by the Trial Chamber. Mr. Johnson
15 is seated at the amicus bench.
16 [The witness entered court]
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if the witness would stand, please, to take the
19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
20 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat.
22 WITNESS: MADELEINE ALBRIGHT
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Harmon.
24 Examined by Mr. Harmon:
25 Q. Good morning, Dr. Albright.
1 A. Good morning.
2 Q. I thank you very much for attending these proceedings to assist
3 the Trial Chamber in this sentencing hearing. I will commence my
4 examination by asking you to focus on certain elements of your
5 professional career. You are and have been a professor. Could you
6 describe to the Trial Chamber your work in academia.
7 A. Yes. I have been a professor of international relations at
8 Georgetown University, the School of Foreign Service, where I concentrated
9 on generally international relations but also the study of changes in
10 communist systems. And that has been my academic interest my whole life.
11 Q. And you have been a professor at Georgetown since 1982 through
13 A. That is correct. And I am there again, having started teaching as
14 an endowed professor this last semester.
15 Q. What position did you hold with the United Nations?
16 A. I was the United States Ambassador to the United Nations from the
17 period of 1993 through 1996, the permanent representative.
18 Q. What position did you hold with the United States Government?
19 A. I was Secretary of State of the United States from 1997 until
21 Q. Now, Dr. Albright, you've had a lifelong interest in the Balkans.
22 Could you tell the Trial Chamber about your personal background and about
23 what precipitated that interest in the Balkans.
24 A. Yes, thank you. Mr. President and Your Honours, I have spent my
25 life in many ways interested in the former Yugoslavia. My father, who was
1 a Czechoslovak diplomat was the press attache to Yugoslavia from 1937 to
2 1938, and then he returned as the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Yugoslavia
3 from 1945 to 1948. I lived there as a child from 1945 to 1947, when I
4 then went to school in Switzerland.
5 And I think in terms of countries that I feel most closely
6 knowledgeable of and associated with, beyond the United States and
7 Czechoslovakia, it's really Yugoslavia. And after -- as I grew up, it
8 became a constant academic interest to me, and I obviously spent a lot of
9 time, both in undergraduate and graduate school, looking at events in
10 Yugoslavia and then followed it very closely throughout the years.
11 Q. Dr. Albright, before I get into my next line of questioning, to
12 put into context the plea of guilty in this case: As you know,
13 Mrs. Plavsic has entered a plea of guilty to count 3 of the indictment,
14 persecutions. That count entailed a policy of ethnic separation by force
15 and was implemented through events and crimes such as killings,
16 detentions, unlawful detentions, destruction of cultural property,
17 destruction of non-Serb homes and residences and businesses, forced labour
18 and the like. I bring that to your attention because the period of the
19 indictment ends in December of 1992 and you commenced your duties at the
20 United Nations in 1993.
21 But my first question, then, is: When you arrived at the United
22 Nations and while you were serving in that capacity, can you describe to
23 the Trial Chamber the UN's level of interest and concern in the events
24 that were occurring in the former Yugoslavia.
25 A. Well, first of all, let me say that I followed very carefully all
1 the events that preceded 1992, because basically we were watching the
2 disintegration of Yugoslavia; the war with Slovenia, then Croatia, and the
3 whole effect of what was going on in the region on not only the Balkans
4 but in terms of Europe and generally how these issues would be dealt
5 with. We were besieged in many ways by endless photographs and news
6 stories about the horrors that were taking place throughout the region.
7 When I -- in 1992, before I took office, it became very evident to
8 anyone really watching what was going on were reminisces of pictures that
9 reminded one of World War II. I am a child of Europe, having been born in
10 Czechoslovakia, and spent the war in England. I'm very familiar with the
11 horrendous pictures that came out during that time, and it seemed to me a
12 repeat of seeing people herded into buses and trains, being taken away,
13 families separated, and horrendous stories coming out in terms of the
14 crimes that were taking place. So when I arrived at the United Nations, I
15 was fully familiar with the brutality that had been taking place in the
17 What was evident when I arrived at the UN was that it was going to
18 be the major subjects of our discussions at the Security Council.
19 Obviously, with the peacekeeping operations taking place, that was a major
20 subject for the Security Council practically on a daily basis, in terms of
21 getting reports from the ground that went to the Secretary-General's
22 representative, who would appear -- or she would appear sometimes in
23 Security Council briefings to tell us what was going on. So obviously,
24 then, the Security Council major effect.
25 Then every part of the UN was somehow engaged in trying to deal
1 with this horrendous story. The High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako
2 Ogata, would come in to the Security Council and describe the terrible
3 things that were happening to people in terms of the loss of their homes,
4 the necessities to set up camps for them, the problem of feeding them, the
5 whole host of humanitarian activities; and then the Human Rights
6 Commissioner would also describe some -- the terrible things that were
7 happening to people in terms of the rapes that were taking place, the
8 separation of families, the killing of people in front of their families.
9 So that was a major subject of discussion.
10 The General Assembly also was concerned in terms of general
11 debate. So every part of the UN was involved in dealing with the Bosnian
13 Q. And why, Dr. Albright, did the international community perceive
14 that the events that were occurring in the former Yugoslavia were a threat
15 to peace and security?
16 A. Well, I think that what became evident was that the disruptions
17 within the Balkans themselves were causing us to think about what the
18 effect of that was on regional security; people fighting each other in
19 Europe at the end of the twentieth century, huge numbers of immigrants
20 that were leaving the former Yugoslavia, questions about deepening ethnic
21 strife that in fact were of a level that we hadn't seen in Europe since
22 the end of the Second World War. And there was a question as to how this
23 was not only affecting the Balkans but the neighbouring region. I always
24 believed that the Balkans were of strategic interest to the United States
25 and to the world community in terms of its closeness to the Middle East as
1 well as its importance in terms of Europe itself, so this kind of ethnic
2 fighting in Europe at this time was something that was disrupting the
3 regional stability.
4 Q. And, Dr. Albright, I know you touched on, briefly, the violations
5 of human rights in international humanitarian law that were occurring in
6 Bosnia and in the former Yugoslavia and that you were receiving some sorts
7 of reports, both from the media and from UN sources. Can you expand on
8 the concerns specifically about violations of human rights that were being
9 addressed in the United Nations.
10 A. Well, I think that what was most evident were the crimes that were
11 being committed against women in terms of their being raped and raped in
12 front of their families and then removed from their families. There were
13 issues also of people being tortured. We saw pictures of people being
14 taken into what could only have been labelled as concentration camps and
15 beaten and general types of torture that were evident.
16 It also was clear that property was being destroyed, that people
17 were being driven from their homes only because of who they were, not
18 because of anything that they had done, and just general atrocious
19 conditions in terms of human beings and crimes against humanity, and their
20 specific human rights in not being able to exist within the societies
21 where they had come from.
22 I met with a lot of victims and victims' families, who would
23 describe at great length the kinds of horrors that were being perpetrated
24 that seemed to me unimaginable in the second half -- or the 1990s of the
25 twentieth century. It was unimaginable that these kinds of things could
1 be going on and that they were being done, it seemed from everything that
2 I was hearing, in a deliberate way, not by accident of some drunk soldiers
3 or something, marauding, but as part of some kind of a plan to eradicate a
4 group -- various groups of people.
5 Q. Dr. Albright, in response to the types of crimes that the media
6 was reporting and in order to achieve a fair and objective picture, did
7 the United Nations ask that a commission of experts, first of all, be
8 formed to investigate violations of human rights and crimes in the former
9 Yugoslavia? And in addition, did they ask for a special rapporteur to
10 examine and investigate human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia?
11 A. What was happening was the following when I arrived: I know that
12 there had been a great deal of interest already exhibited by the
13 international community in terms of trying to deal in a judicial way with
14 the problems that were going on, and material was being accumulated, and
15 then it was decided that it would be useful to have a commission of
16 experts come together in order to assess the material.
17 And I was very pleased that one of my first votes when I
18 arrived -- I arrived in February, and during that month, we voted in order
19 to make sure that a War Crimes Tribunal was established based on the work
20 of the expert commission, so that there was very much a move in order to
21 try to assign guilt and also to make sure that there was punishment for
22 the crimes that were being committed. So there was a systematic way to
23 put together a judicial proceeding. We did, in fact, talk about the
24 precedent of Nuremberg and the fact that this was a very important step in
25 the international system to be able to create a judicial way of dealing
1 with these horrendous crimes.
2 Q. I will come to the issue of the creation of the Tribunal in just a
3 few minutes, and I'd like to deal with that in greater detail. I'm quite
4 interested, Dr. Albright, in your experiences in Bosnia, your travels to
5 Bosnia. And perhaps if you could discuss other representatives who were
6 members of the United Nations who also travelled and their reactions to
7 seeing what was occurring in Bosnia.
8 A. Well, first of all, I think that it was very important to see on
9 the ground what we had been hearing of from the victims. And I had
10 travelled not only in Bosnia but also in Croatia and other parts of the
11 region. And actually, my first -- one of my first trips was in Croatia,
12 to Vukovar where I saw mass graves. And then in Bosnia, on my first trip
13 there, seeing the destruction in Sarajevo - a place that Americans had
14 gotten very used to seeing on television during the Olympics and seeing a
15 peaceful Sarajevo - seeing that completely destroyed. I went to the
16 marketplace that had been blown up and saw the destruction there, and
17 basically again met with victims on my various trips to the region. And
18 it was so evident, the scars that were being borne not only by the
19 physical parts of Bosnia but by the people who were terrified. And I met
20 with various groups, and I met with Serbs and non-Serbs at times to listen
21 to what they were describing as pure chaos and mayhem, as they had been
22 moved out of their homes in the middle of the night and transported to
23 various places, and just a complete sense of dislocation.
24 It was very hard for me as somebody who had not only lived in
25 Yugoslavia as a child but I had gone back to visit at various other times
1 in the 1960s when Yugoslavia was viewed as the most progressive of the
2 communist countries, to all of a sudden see that it had fallen back into
3 barbarity, and that kind of barbarism that was evident everywhere.
4 Q. Now, the UN addressed the humanitarian disaster that took place in
5 the former Yugoslavia. You touched on it briefly by discussing Mrs. Ogata
6 and her reports. Can you describe to the Trial Chamber the dimensions of
7 that humanitarian disaster as it was reported in the United Nations.
8 A. Well, Mr. President and Your Honours, what we heard were,
9 practically on a daily basis, reports from various representatives of the
10 UN system come in to say that hundreds of thousands of people had been
11 displaced. There was great concern, obviously, during the winters that it
12 would be difficult to get food to them. There were issues of how to do
13 air drops and to make sure that actually they went to the right places;
14 that there were people totally without homes. I used to talk about the
15 fact that people would be moved from one home to another. Nobody was in
16 their right house, and then there was not a house at the end of the line,
17 so that there were many, many homeless, and the numbers were in the
18 hundreds of thousands. So it was complete displacement, and obviously a
19 lot of people tried to get out. Some of them were able to escape to
20 Western Europe and come to the United States, but for the most part,
21 people were wandering around in a hapless and dazed way throughout the
23 Q. Now, to address the level of suffering that was occurring as a
24 result of the crimes that were being committed in Bosnia, UNHCR responded,
25 the United Nations responded. But also, there was a huge effort by
1 nongovernmental organisations as well to respond to the humanitarian
2 crisis. Is that correct?
3 A. That is correct. And I would meet with a variety of
4 nongovernmental organisations in order to assess their needs. Doctors
5 Without Borders were there, Oxfam, a variety of organisations that were
6 trying to be involved in the feeding of people and in trying to make sure
7 that there was not a duplication of effort, and that people -- that there
8 was good coordination with the United Nations.
9 The very hard part that we found, not only in Bosnia but generally
10 in peacekeeping operations, was how to make sure that the people were
11 continually fed and taken care of, even as fighting was going on, and
12 trying to do it, I think, in a most neutral way. I think that was the
13 part about Mrs. Ogata's effort, was that she and her people was
14 nondiscriminatory in terms of trying to help everyone that had in fact
15 been displaced.
16 Q. I'd like to turn your attention to the issue of another matter you
17 touched on, and that is the creation of the Tribunal. Could you share
18 with the Judges why the member states of the United Nations voted for the
19 creation of a Tribunal, what the concerns were, what issues it hoped to
20 address, what goals it hoped to achieve.
21 A. Well, I think that all of the people that were involved in it -
22 the permanent representatives and the Security Councils, the nonpermanent
23 ones and others who were not on the Security Council - were very much
24 aware that we were involved in something new, though discussing the
25 Nuremberg precedents, that this was not a war of victors, that we were
1 really dealing with a situation that was ongoing, that the procedures had
2 to be established that would not only identify individual guilt and
3 expunge the collective guilt but make sure that proper punishment was
4 meted out. And it was in many ways being present at the creation of a
5 brand-new organisation.
6 I must say that we ran into a great deal of scepticism. It was
7 easy enough to take the first vote in February to get the Tribunal
8 created, but nobody really believed that it would work. There were
9 questions about how the Judges would be selected. I must say that
10 especially the women permanent representatives of the United Nations
11 wanted to make sure that there would be women Judges because so many of
12 the crimes had been committed against women in terms of rape and
13 horrendous crimes. And so the Judges were then selected by the entire UN
15 And then the question was how to get a prosecutor. And that was
16 very complicated, and nobody thought that would happen. And then nobody
17 thought that there would ever be a court that actually functioned, that
18 would be set on what the precedents were going to be. And we then in May
19 voted on how the -- 1993, voted on how the procedure of the Tribunal would
20 work. And then still nobody thought it would work. They said that there
21 would never be indictees, and then they said there would never be any
22 trials, and then they said there would never be any convictions, and there
23 would never be any sentencing. And at each part along the way, I would
24 point out that they were wrong.
25 And one of the reasons that I think that it is so important that
1 this procedure is going forward is to show that they were all wrong, that
2 this -- that the Tribunal is very much a part of the international
3 judicial system that is playing a very essential role, I think, in making
4 sure that this individual guilt is assigned, that punishment is meted out,
5 and that there can be reconciliation. I think that was the whole purpose
6 behind having such a Tribunal, so that there could ultimately be the
7 reconciliation of the various people that were innocent as a part of
9 Q. All right, Dr. Albright, thank you very much.
10 MR. HARMON: That concludes my portion of the examination. I'll
11 turn over to Mr. Pavich the remaining portion of the examination. Thank
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
14 Examined by Mr. Pavich:
15 Q. Good morning, Dr. Albright.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. I think we just ended on a note of reconciliation, and I'd like to
18 take that and talk for a moment about another effort, I believe, that was
19 made by the international community to ultimately try to heal what you've
20 described. And I believe that's the Dayton Peace Agreement and the peace
22 Can you tell us a little bit about the period immediately before
23 those negotiations: At that point, what the situation was and what you
24 hoped to achieve in these negotiations that took place in Dayton.
25 A. Well, first of all, I think that everyone needs to know about the
1 fact that throughout this entire time there were efforts to try to find a
2 political solution to what was happening in Bosnia, a way that would
3 enable Bosnia to be a multi-ethnic state that respected the various groups
4 that were within it. And there were a number of efforts made. And Dayton
5 was really the final effort that was made to reconcile various
6 differences, to create a -- the new structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
7 which it was going to be possible for there to be political
8 reconciliation. I must say that a very complicated political structure
9 was set up which would allow the Republika Srpska to function and the
10 Croatian/Bosnian Federation to function, and then to have them work
11 together through a series of unified political structures. No question
12 that it was very difficult, but it did create the platform for the kind of
13 reconciliation that we were looking for in multi-ethnic approaches.
14 Q. I think we'll be hearing from Mr. Carl Bildt a little bit later
15 today, and I think he can probably tell us a bit more about the details
16 about those negotiations, so I won't take our time this morning to discuss
17 that at this point.
18 I was very interested in your speaking a bit about your
19 background, especially how your background affected your perception of
20 what was happening in 1991 and 1992. In preparing for the negotiation and
21 in these negotiations, was it also, I think, important to consider the
22 background from World War II that had occurred? In order to bring the
23 parties together, was that an important element to take into
25 A. I think that as somebody who knew the history of the whole region,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 I think that it was important to understand what the differences were
2 among the people. But from my perspective, and I say the reason that I
3 was so horrified by what I saw, was that I had actually seen the people in
4 Yugoslavia live together and intermarry and saw it as a place where there
5 had been a certain amount of respect for the various ethnic groups. So
6 for me, when I saw the fact that there was systematic elimination,
7 non-Serb minorities in various places or majorities in others, and the
8 suffering that people were going through simply because of their ethnic
9 identification, I found it repugnant.
10 I also must say that there were many Serbs that I met with,
11 innocent Serbs, that I felt were also caught up in something that became
12 much larger than they were. But my own background, I think, taught me a
13 lot about the history of the country, the importance of the multi-ethnic
14 and multi-religious aspect of it, and I was deeply saddened and moved by
15 the fact that that was all being destroyed.
16 Q. Were there still some wounds from World War II that were -- had
17 been unhealed, either through the communist period and right up until 1990
18 and 1991 that you took into consideration in the negotiations?
19 A. Well, I think that there had been a sense that the way that
20 Yugoslavia had been set up was that there had been discrimination against
21 the Serbs, that they had been, from their perspective, seen as victims. I
22 think the part that was difficult to absorb was that the Serbs were in
23 fact -- practised victim-hood in a certain way as a result of what had
24 happened in World War II, but I think it led them in the wrong direction.
25 And, in fact, while there could be a great deal of sympathy for things
1 that happened in World War II, they never were or could have been or
2 should have been an excuse for the kinds of things that happened later.
3 And the truth is that for all countries and all post-communist
4 countries there's a question about how much you can live in the past and
5 how much can be rectified out of World War II. So I was deeply troubled
6 by what I saw and I felt that Serb dominance was not an adequate way to
7 respond to some of the trauma that had happened in World War II.
8 Q. You mentioned that a large number of refugees -- by the time that
9 the Dayton peace talks had taken place, there were a large number from all
11 A. There were. There were clearly people from all ethnic groups
12 wandering around. And I remember various meetings that I had with Serbs
13 in various parts of the region where they felt that in fact they, too, had
14 been moved out of their homes, which they had been in the Krajina, for
15 instance, and the question was how people could get back to their rightful
17 I think the problems that exist in many ways have to do with then
18 the governmental policies which exacerbated or played up on some of the
19 very human feelings that existed among those people who were just being
20 moved around. And I think that -- that was what concerned us as
21 government people, to see what the policies had been that made this come
23 Q. You mentioned the Krajina. Did you have an opportunity to talk to
24 some Serb victims in the Krajina?
25 A. I did. And in Krajina, the issue had been -- is that there had
1 been -- the Serbs had been moved out by the Croats. The question was
2 whether they would be able to come back in. I went to a village where in
3 fact it was now time to move the Serbs back into that area. The houses
4 had already been marked by Bosnian Croats who had decided that they would
5 go back there, and I remember one of the most poignant meetings was with a
6 family that had tried to move back into this village and their -- the old
7 grandmother had managed to stay there. She had been in hiding for a long
8 time. And when I met with the family, they were multi-ethnic themselves.
9 I mean, the Serb was married to a Croat whose brother was married to a
10 Muslim. And yet they were not able really to recreate their lives. And
11 that was the most poignant part of what was going on.
12 Q. So the Dayton Agreement, what were you hoping to accomplish by
13 implementing the Dayton Agreement? What were the goals? What were the
15 A. I think that what we were trying to accomplish was to figure out a
16 political way that would allow a variety of minority rights to be properly
17 respected for a governmental structure to be able to exist which allowed
18 various groups to live together and have a certain amount of autonomy in
19 their decision-making but at the same time create a country whereby
20 democratic procedures would be inherent, where there would be elections
21 where people lived up to what they had agreed to, where there would be a
22 functioning judicial system, police, and there would be some ability to
23 return to some sense of normalcy. And I think, to a great extent, that
24 slowly was able to be accomplished.
25 Q. And were there certain key people that you worked with and had an
1 opportunity to observe in working toward the implementation of Dayton?
2 A. There were. And I think that the issue here was that there were
3 those people who determined that the best way to accomplish what they
4 wanted was to work through Dayton; and Mrs. Plavsic was one of those
5 people. I must say that my first impressions of her were based on what I
6 had read and was very disturbed by the fact that she --
7 Q. You don't believe everything you read.
8 A. No. But I know what I saw and I know what I heard, actually, in
9 her own words of being a spokesperson for some of the policies that came
10 out of Banja Luka and that represented Republika Srpska. And I found them
11 repugnant, and I didn't understand why she would be involved in things
12 like that. So when -- but on the other hand, it was very -- it became
13 evident that she was one of the people who saw the Dayton Accords as a way
14 to achieve some sense of justice and normalcy, so -- and that became
15 evident in some of the meetings that we had.
16 Q. You said initially you were very reluctant and sceptical to work
17 with her. Can you describe how your relationship with her developed over
18 time, please.
19 A. Yes. As I said, I mean, I had only heard her on television or
20 read comments that she made. And we were first in the same place in
21 Central Portugal in the spring of 1997, when there was a meeting about --
22 one of those PIC meetings where we talked about the reconstruction of
23 Bosnia. I was not very eager to have any contact with her at that point.
24 Then we began to talk about how to implement Dayton, and
25 Mr. Galbraith, who was in charge of the Dayton implementation, said that
1 he -- there were indications that Mrs. Plavsic was interested in pursuing
2 a positive approach.
3 I went to Banja Luka to meet her. We had a very formal meeting in
4 the town hall there, and she responded in a very proper but, I think, kind
5 of strained and constrained way. I didn't feel that I had a chance to
6 really understand what was happening and whether she would be supportive.
7 So I asked whether I could meet with her separately.
8 We then went into her back office, and we talked at some length
9 about what her intentions were, and it was at that stage that it became
10 evident to me that she understood all the things that had gone wrong;
11 never, however, giving up on the idea -- I mean, she's a pro-Serb
12 nationalist. I think that was very evident. But she felt that Dayton was
13 something that was worth supporting, that might in fact bring about in a
14 peaceful way some of the things that she wanted, which was dignity for the
15 Serbs. So I think that was a very important meeting and that was one
16 where I could see that she wanted to have -- wanted to go about this in a
17 democratic way. I must say I was surprised, given what I had read about
18 her. But in later months it became evident to me that she had decided to
19 follow this path and that she was doing it at some risk to herself.
20 Q. And can you tell us a little bit about those later months, the
21 path that she followed and the risks that she took.
22 A. Yes. Well, first of all, we engaged then in a number of telephone
23 conversations over the months; some of them where we actually agreed and
24 many where we did not agree. But, for instance, one of the issues that
25 happened a month after we met -- during that summer in July, there had
1 been arrests of some Serbs that had been involved in crimes, and she
2 called me or we had a conversation in which she objected to what had gone
3 on, and I described to her why we thought the people were guilty. She was
4 interested in the information, I think accepted the fact that she had not
5 had all the facts. She, however, said that some of the people that had
6 been picked up have been innocent. We then did -- she was right about
7 that, and those people were returned. So we had -- you know, we had
8 pretty tough conversations, but they were very straightforward and she
9 said what she thought and I said what I thought, and I thought it was good
10 that we were able to have those -- those kinds of conversations.
11 She then -- the succeeding part of this was -- had to do with the
12 election for presidency, and she had decided that she really did want to
13 publicly state that her position was for -- in support of Dayton, which
14 was not easy in the Republika Srpska, given the fact that the more radical
15 elements of the Bosnian Serbs were very much around and were also running
16 for office. And I met her, and we -- during that campaign she again made
17 it very clear that she wanted to support Dayton; and as a result of it,
18 she lost the election. So I think that from my perspective, she did what
19 she said she would do. She was a woman of her word on what she stated she
20 was for, in terms of Dayton, believing ultimately that what she wanted
21 accomplished for the Serbs could best be done through the Dayton process.
22 Q. Did you have any sense during your conversations, meetings, work
23 with her that at any time she had anything other than the Serbs' interest
24 at heart?
25 A. I think she had the Serb interest at heart. I think she -- she
1 admitted many times that what she really wanted to see was justice for the
2 Serbs. I mean, she was never a person who hid that fact, and that was a
3 major element for her. I think she was supportive of the Serbs. But she
4 was also supportive of Dayton, and I think that is where the difference
5 lies. But in the conversations that we had, she would always make very
6 clear that she was pro-Serb. I don't think that there was a time we got
7 together that she didn't give me a book about Kosovo and that it was Serb,
8 and we had discussions all the time about that, but --
9 Q. About Kosovo?
10 A. About Kosovo and about Milosevic and about the importance of
11 living -- of the Serbs having what was rightfully theirs. But my feeling
12 really was that the reason that I spent time talking with her and dealing
13 with her is that she was the vehicle in Republika Srpska for making sure
14 that the Dayton Accords were carried out. That was what we were
15 interested in. That was what the international community was interested
16 in. And she stood up for that at times when it was very difficult, when
17 there were those who wanted to destroy the Dayton Accords.
18 Q. In addition to working toward the implementation of Dayton, did
19 she take every opportunity to bring to your attention the plight of the
20 Serb victims?
21 A. She did. She did. And I also talked about the plight of the
22 other victims. But we did talk about the victims, and I think that there
23 was an understanding about the horrors that had taken place. And, you
24 know, I found her a very kind of conflicted individual, if I might say, in
25 terms of knowing that she wanted to make sure that Serb interests were
1 protected but at the same time understanding the necessity of going
2 through with the Dayton process, which I think she really stood up for in
3 many different ways. But she has -- I think she obviously was involved in
4 horrendous things prior to that and then began to see that the Dayton
5 Accords were the best way to accomplish what was necessary.
6 Q. Did you ever -- there's been a description of your relationship
7 with her on many occasions that she basically was a puppet of yours,
8 someone that had abandoned her people's principles in order to follow
9 whatever the West at that point was pushing Serbs toward for her own
10 benefit. Can you tell us whether there's any truth to that.
11 A. Well, I would completely disagree with that, and I think our
12 conversations would indicate it. This was not a person who would simply
13 say, "Yes, you're doing the right thing." I mean, we would have very
14 complicated conversations about whether this was appropriate or not. She
15 thought that a lot of the actions we were undertaking were actually
16 strengthening Belgrade, and I said I didn't think so. I mean, we had very
17 intense discussions, some pleasant and some unpleasant. I definitely
18 think that she is a woman with her own mind, a very strong one, some of
19 which worked positively and some of which previously had been quite
20 negative. So I would never describe her as somebody that was my puppet.
21 I think that's a ridiculous description.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Pavich, can you tell us who described her in
23 that way.
24 MR. PAVICH:
25 Q. Dr. Albright, I think you're familiar with a number of
1 descriptions along those lines.
2 A. If I might say, Your Honour, I think that there were people
3 generally -- I don't think that I was particularly highly regarded in
4 Belgrade and that there were descriptions within the Serb papers that
5 described me that way, that described Mrs. Plavsic that way. People that
6 were trying to discredit both of us.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
8 MR. PAVICH:
9 Q. Obviously, it's no simple matter for you to be here this morning.
10 Can you tell us, Doctor, why you've made the effort to come to this
11 sentencing hearing.
12 A. Well, there are a number of reasons, sir. And that is that, first
13 of all, I feel very strongly about the War Crimes Tribunal. I felt when
14 we created it at the United Nations that it was the international
15 community's way of dealing with the horrendous crimes at the end of the
16 20th century in a way that reflected the best of our various legal systems
17 and our desire to assign this individual guilt, so that collective guilt
18 could be expunged and so that the victims would, in fact, have some
19 vindication. There's no way, for instance, to ever walk anything back.
20 People can't be unraped.
21 But I think that I saw it as a process that would help people and
22 make sure that the proper punishment was given and that there could be
23 reconciliation. So I have been very much in favour of this Tribunal, and
24 I wanted to show, in fact, that it is the only method whereby we can deal
25 with some of these terrible crimes and to make sure that future crimes
1 don't happen. It has a deterrent aspect, I hope, also. And I wanted to
2 show my support for the process.
3 But I also think that we have to show respect for those who have
4 pleaded guilty, who have, in fact, accepted that personal responsibility
5 and are prepared for the appropriate punishment. So I think that it is a
6 very important step to make sure that this procedure, that this process
7 really works. And it's my respect for the Tribunal that has brought me
8 here because I believe it has played and will continue to play a real
9 essential role, not only in terms of mending things in the Balkans, but
10 obviously the work that is being done in Rwanda. And then the work that
11 it just shows can be done when people of goodwill decide that there is a
12 legal process and that it is the civilised way to deal with issues.
13 So that is why I believed it was important. I think the
14 reconciliation aspect is key, the punishment is important, and then I
15 really did it, finally, for the victims. I met with so many of them, and
16 I think that it is important that they know that there is justice.
17 Q. And in talking about the victims, Dr. Albright, as you've said,
18 all the victims, Serb, non-Serb victims, do you believe that this hearing,
19 acceptance of responsibility, the hearing, helps us to help them to move
20 past what's happened? Not only the victims but their children and
21 children's children?
22 A. I do believe that. People always talk about closure, which I
23 think is probably a concept that we all understood in some form or another
24 in terms of personal travail. And I think it does help. And I think that
25 there is a sense that their stories will have gotten out and that there is
1 personal responsibility accepted for their crimes, that it isn't just a
2 faceless group of people that are responsible. Now, everybody knows that
3 you can't rectify all the injustice that was done, but I think it goes a
4 long way to having that happen. And so I do think that that is a very
5 important part.
6 I felt also, from my own perspective, that having been invited by
7 the Prosecutor as well as you to appear, that it was important to show
8 that the process does work on behalf of the victims, that in fact that
9 both sides of the Court is determined to make sure that the victims'
10 tragedies are in some way recognised and, in the words of Elie Wiesel, who
11 says them so often, that these kinds of things don't happen again.
12 Unfortunately, they do. But I think that the more we try to remind
13 ourselves that they cannot happen again, that is essential.
14 Q. When you speak of victims, you speak of victims throughout the
15 former Yugoslavia, in Krajina, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, all of those, with
16 regard to the Tribunal's charge?
17 A. I do think, you know, while it is a well-known fact that most of
18 the victims were non-Serb, I think that it is evident that there were
19 victims among all parts of the ethnic communities. And as I said, I made
20 a special effort, both when I was Ambassador at the United Nations and
21 then as Secretary of State to recognise the fact that there were victims
22 from all of the ethnic groups. And I made it a point of meeting with
23 Serbs and with Croats and with Bosniaks and various of their
25 I met a number of times with the Serb religious representatives,
1 with -- whether it was various bishops and patriarchs, because I felt that
2 there were victims on all sides. There's no question. And that people
3 were being murdered and raped. I do think - I know - that there was more
4 systematic effort in terms of getting rid of the non-Serbs.
5 Q. You mention Serb bishops. Do you remember Bishop Artemije from
7 A. Yes, very well. Yes.
8 Q. He has probably given you a few Kosovo books as well.
9 A. Yes, he has given me a lot of Kosovo books, and I visited with him
10 in his monastery and, in fact, was given many pictures of destroyed
11 monasteries. But the problem here is that a tragedy of the kind that took
12 place in the Balkans is that it knows no end unless there is a political
13 solution, which I think Dayton was the beginning of. And I think in
14 Kosovo, we are in the process of working out and that ultimately there can
15 be some reconciliation among the people. And to repeat myself, the
16 reconciliation can only come when it is evident that there is an impartial
17 judicial system that is assessing who is guilty and who is innocent, and
18 then metes out the proper punishment.
19 Q. And through that, reconciliation can be done?
20 A. I believe so, and I think that if ordinary Serbs and Bosniaks and
21 Croats can look at each other say, "I didn't do it, but this was directed
22 from the top," or, "This particular person is responsible for it," I think
23 that it helps in terms of the reconciliation. And I think a recognition
24 of this Court is essential. And what Mrs. Plavsic has done is to plead
25 guilty and has recognised the authority of this Court. I think that is
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 very important.
2 Q. Thank you very much, Dr. Albright.
3 A. Thank you.
4 JUDGE MAY: Dr. Albright, thank you for coming to the Tribunal to
5 give your evidence. We are grateful. You are free to go.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you so much.
7 [The witness withdrew]
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Pavich.
9 MR. PAVICH: We're prepared to proceed when the Court is ready,
10 Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MAY: We're ready.
12 MR. PAVICH: We're prepared to call Mr. Carl Bildt, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MAY: While we're waiting for the witness, it occurs to me
14 we may be able to deal with one or two procedural matters. Mr. Pavich, we
15 seem to be making good progress through the evidence in terms of time.
16 MR. PAVICH: We do.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We wondered if we might not finish today.
18 MR. PAVICH: That would have to be a joint, I think, decision
19 among the colleagues. I think that we are prepared to do whatever the
20 Court feels is the most appropriate way to proceed.
21 JUDGE MAY: We'll see what progress we can make. We've got
22 another case, as you may know, which we're going to hear tomorrow
23 morning. And the longer we can spend on that, obviously the better. But
24 we'll see.
25 But there is one matter we would wish to be addressed about today,
1 and that is the issue of provisional release which has been raised by the
2 parties. And we would be grateful if we could hear your submissions about
3 that today.
4 MR. PAVICH: I don't think there's any difficulty in being able to
5 do that, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
7 Yes, we'll have the witness.
8 MR. PAVICH: Your Honours, we've supplied the Courts with certain
9 exhibits. Tab 2 that has been provided to you this morning contains the
10 curriculum vitae of Mr. Carl Bildt. We don't intend to have him go
11 through it in detail; we'll simply highlight it when he takes the stand.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 JUDGE MAY: If the witness would take the declaration.
14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
16 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Pavich.
19 WITNESS: CARL BILDT
20 Examined by Mr. Pavich:
21 MR. PAVICH:
22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Bildt.
23 A. Good morning.
24 Q. Mr. Bildt, we've already supplied the Court with a copy of your
25 extensive curriculum vitae. I would like, however, for you to just give
1 us a summary of the past ten years of your professional career. Actually,
2 a bit more than that; going back to 1991, please.
3 A. Yes. You would be aware of the fact that my background is
4 primarily one in Swedish politics for quite some time, serving as member
5 of parliament for a quarter of a century and Prime Minister in the early
6 1990s, and fairly heavily involved in international affairs and European
7 affairs during that entire time period.
8 I was Prime Minister in the early 1990s - that's part of the
9 picture - between October 1991 and then up until the autumn of 1994. In
10 that capacity, although quite a lot of issues are on the table of a Prime
11 Minister, needless to say - and these were somewhat dramatic times in the
12 history of Europe - the issues of the conflict in former Yugoslavia was
13 fairly high up on my list. We were involved in the initial discussions
14 concerning the questions of recognition or how to handle the breakup of
15 former Yugoslavia. We were also involved from the Swedish side, needless
16 to say, in the different peacemaking efforts, be that within the context
17 of the United Nations or within the context of the OSCE. We played an
18 active role in the OSCE summit, I think, it was December of 1992. Sweden
19 was the chairman-in-office of the OSCE during 1993, played a fairly active
20 role on the different issues at that particular time.
21 We supplied forces for all of the different UN missions. That was
22 in Croatia somewhat more limited, in Macedonia, and of course in Bosnia
23 during that particular period. And even more significantly, we took
24 probably a great number of refugees, in relation to the size of the
25 country, than any of the other European countries outside of the region.
1 And the burden of receiving that continuous inflow of refugees was, as a
2 matter of fact, one of the key political issues in my country at that
3 time. I had to deal extensively with that and paid a number of visits to
4 the region itself as part of that also during my time as Prime Minister.
5 Then, of course, ending that, I was asked in the spring of 1995 to
6 take over from David Owen, Lord Owen, who had been the European Union
7 co-chairman of the International Conference on former Yugoslavia, since,
8 if I remember it rightly, August of 1992, when he succeeded -- when ICFY
9 was set up and he succeeded Lord Carrington. I was asked initially and
10 formally both by the US and the UK, when I was formally approached and
11 formally appointed by France that had the presidency of the European Union
12 at that particular time, and I started that assignment in early June of
13 that year. That brings us up to my more formal and direct involvement
14 with the affairs.
15 Q. You mentioned, Mr. Bildt, your visits to the region during the
16 period that you were Prime Minister of Sweden. Can you tell us a little
17 bit about those visits, sir.
18 A. Well, I paid a couple of visits down. And those were, of course,
19 primarily visits where I went to the -- to the UN command, which was in
20 Zagreb at the time, but also field visits. Those were somewhat restricted
21 because of all the security concerns associated with that. But I had the
22 occasion then to meet with all of those that were responsible for the
23 international efforts as well as to see, primarily in Croatia then, the
24 carnage that had been brought by the war and also meet some of the
1 I remember going up to the Bosnian border in December 1992,
2 Bosanska Gradiska, and meeting a huge column of refugees coming across.
3 And one of the oddities of history is that one girl was obviously, when we
4 tried to retrace history, that was in that column, is now as a matter of
5 fact sitting as a member of parliament in -- in Sweden. So I was there on
6 a number of occasions.
7 Q. So you did have some direct experience, then, in 1992 with the
8 refugee situation, both in Sweden and in Bosnia itself.
9 A. Well, needless to say, we had a huge inflow of refugees from the
10 entire area but primarily, needless to say, the Bosnian war at that time,
11 but also from other areas.
12 Q. And were these refugees from any particular group, or were they
13 from all the ethnic groups?
14 A. It differed according to how the conflict was developing. And as
15 those of you here who have been dealing with the refugee issues knows, it
16 tends to be -- it's somewhat difficult to explain why different groups go
17 to different areas. There could be historical factors, there could be
18 that there was a rumour in one part of a country or one part of a conflict
19 zone that you're supposed to go to a particular area. I don't think there
20 was anything in particular. We did receive people from all over the
21 region, from all faiths, all nationalities. Some were different in
22 different times. I don't have any firm numbers on that.
23 But the numbers were extremely high and the inflow -- the rate of
24 inflow into the country was demanding for the local capacity to absorb
25 during part of the period. So we had -- apart from everything else, we
1 had -- apart from the humanitarian and moral imperative to make peace, we
2 did see very clearly how the conflict was impacting upon the possibilities
3 of other European societies to continue to live their normal lives,
4 primarily, of course, those societies that took a very large number of
5 refugees. Sweden, I think Austria, I think Switzerland were at the top of
6 the list, if I remember. Somewhat -- somewhat different groups in the
7 different countries -- Norway as well.
8 Q. You spoke, of course, of the importance to make peace. I think
9 you've actually written a book called "Peace Journey." I'd like to speak
10 a moment now about the Dayton Peace Conference and the efforts to make
11 peace through that conference. Can you tell us what your role was in that
13 A. Well, could I ask, for the sake of --
14 Q. And you may want to give us a bit of background in order to
15 explain that role.
16 A. Yes, I can give a lot of background on that. But yes, for the
17 sake of completion, I served then as -- as the EU Special Representative
18 and Co-chairman of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia,
19 including then the Dayton Peace Conference and co-chairman of that. Then
20 as High Representative of Bosnia up until the summer of 1997. Then I
21 would have formally left the Balkans - although, you never leave the
22 Balkans, as some of you may be aware of -- but was called back in the
23 spring of 1999, when I was asked by the UN Secretary Annan, Kofi Annan, to
24 be his special envoy to the Balkans, and served in that capacity with
25 numerous, different issues, including an element of Bosnia, up until last
1 summer. That, for the completion of the record.
2 Dayton. I think it will take some time until there will be
3 written a complete and honest account of the different efforts that were
4 undertaken from 1991 and onwards to prevent war and later on to make peace
5 in the different conflicts. It's not necessarily the most honourable
6 record of the international community ever. That just said for the record
7 without going into the details.
8 When I entered in late spring 1995, the ICFY effort was
9 concentrated primarily on the other areas of the conflict. The direct
10 peacemaking efforts in Bosnia had been taken over since a year back,
11 roughly, by the so-called contact group of the leading countries. That
12 was Russia, Germany, France, the UK, and the United States. And although
13 I was formally ICFY, I was reporting more directly to the contact group
14 and I was also asked to be the lead of the negotiations for a while since
15 the United States had decided to step back after a rather intense period
16 of engagement during the spring.
17 Now, my task then was to complete some of the negotiations
18 underway, primarily with Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade, to try to facilitate a
19 somewhat more -- somewhat more comprehensive approach from the
20 international community to making peace in Bosnia. I think one of the
21 problems we had up until that time was that since the international
22 community was not united on the shape of a possible peace in Bosnia, it
23 was somewhat difficult to get the warring parties to agree. And I was
24 very firm in my conviction that if we can't get agreement within, say, the
25 contact group on the shape of a peace deal, our efforts to try to
1 negotiate the warring parties was not likely to be successful.
2 Now, the summer of 1995 turned out, as you are aware of, to be the
3 worst period of the war since late spring and summer of 1992. And I think
4 one of the reasons for that was that there was a feeling that the war must
5 end and peace must come. So all of them were playing the last part of
6 that particular game, and we know all of the horrors and all of the
7 brutalities associated with that.
8 That speeded up the agreement in the international community on a
9 more comprehensive approach to peace and that led directly to Dayton and
10 the decisive meeting, in my opinion - that was in September, September 7th
11 in Geneva - where we, under the chairmanship of US Ambassador Holbrooke,
12 got together the Foreign Ministers of Yugoslavia, of Croatia, and of
13 Bosnia, and also members or representatives of the more directly warring
14 parties of Bosnia, in an agreement that set out the framework for what
15 later turned into the Dayton Peace Agreement.
16 Then in Dayton, of course, we had to deal with all of the details,
17 and as you are aware, the devil is in those details. That was how to
18 divide up territory according to the principle of 49/51. There had been
19 action on the ground, as you are aware of, during the late summer, early
20 autumn, primarily in Western Bosnia by the Croat army - it was the regular
21 Croat army - and by the Bosnian army, the Bosnian Muslim forces that had
22 made it somewhat easier, it has to be said, to reach that particular
24 Then it was a question of setting up the details of the
25 construction of this Bosnia, which should be a united, independent,
1 sovereign country composed of two very autonomous entities: The
2 Federation, which had already been forged in January of 1994; as well as
3 the Republika Srpska, which was recognised really for the first time
4 September 7th at that particular Geneva meeting; and then united by common
5 Bosnian institutions.
6 Q. Would you please remind us -- and I'm uncertain that I've asked
7 you this, but what was your position at the Dayton Peace conference
9 A. Well, I was, formally speaking, co-chairman. The formal structure
10 of the Dayton Peace Conference was that there was a chairman, and that was
11 the US representative to the contact group. That was Ambassador Richard
12 Holbrooke. There were two co-chairmen. There was myself, representing on
13 some sort of way -- representing the European Union. That was a difficult
14 issue, since the European Union didn't have any legal personality at the
15 time. But I was de facto coordinator of European efforts, working very
16 closely with Ambassador Holbrooke on quite a number of issues. And there
17 was then a second co-chairman, which was Mr. Igor Ivanov, who was at that
18 time the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and as,
19 of course, being during last year as a Foreign Minister for the Russian
20 Federation. The three of us worked extremely closely together and dealt
21 with all of the issues with the exception of the issues of military
22 implementation that were dealt with exclusively by the NATO countries.
23 And coming from Sweden, I was only an observer to those particular
25 Q. You mentioned the parties that were directly involved. I'd like
1 to point you for the moment to the Bosnian Serb delegation. Was Mrs. --
2 was Mrs. Plavsic a member of that delegation?
3 A. No, as a matter of fact, there was no Bosnian Serb delegation. I
4 mean, one of the things that perhaps made Dayton possible was the fact
5 that we had then devised a new mechanism for dealing with these particular
6 issues. I mean, the -- history is a complex business.
7 In the summer of 1994, the contact group had effectively failed to
8 get negotiations going between what we can call Sarajevo and Pale, to
9 simplify things beyond what you can really defend to history. And there
10 was no way that could be done.
11 Then we have been operating with what we refer to as Plan B. That
12 was Milosevic in Belgrade. Get Belgrade to recognise Bosnia, the borders
13 and sovereignty and the principles for a political settlement and then to
14 have that sort of imposed on the Bosnian Serbs the one way without -- in
15 Dayton or prior to Dayton we sort of compressed both of these approaches
16 into a model, whereby we sort of relied -- historians would have
17 [indiscernible]. But anyhow, this was the only way at the time. We
18 relied on Tudjman in Zagreb to deliver the Bosnian Croats and we relied on
19 Milosevic to deliver the Bosnian Serbs, and then Sarajevo in the middle.
20 That meant that there was no Bosnian Serb delegation.
21 Q. There were Bosnian Serbs attending --
22 A. There were Bosnian Serbs that were attending as part of the joint
23 delegation that had been set up, and those were, if I remember it right --
24 I mean, the number one was Mr. Krajisnik, who was there. There was a
25 military representative, General Tolimir, if I remember correctly. There
1 were probably others that I can't remember. I think Mr. Buha might have
2 been there as well. They played a rather limited role in the
4 Q. I'm interested in the absence of Mrs. Plavsic. In the years that
5 you were observing and involving yourself in this conflict, did you have
6 an opportunity to determine what her involvement in the leadership was?
7 A. Well, I was -- when I took over - and that's always essential when
8 you do these things - I was -- I had, of course, to study the entire --
9 what you might call the paper trail of the peace efforts in all of
10 Yugoslavia and all of Bosnia. So I had to go through all of their -- all
11 of the negotiations that had been going on. So on paper I knew the
12 positions of everyone concerned during all of those negotiations. And
13 then concerning the role of Mrs. Plavsic, it was obvious to me that she
14 had not been a real part of the RS leadership for that entire time period
15 because she had never been brought in in any of the discussions and any of
16 the decisions and any of the meetings that had been asked to deal with
17 critical issues of war, peace, and power. And that applied, of course, to
18 these particular ones as well.
19 Q. I'd also ask -- like to ask you to explain to us in your approach
20 to Dayton, in your preparation for Dayton -- I think you've written that
21 it's not possible to understand this conflict unless you understand 1941.
22 Can you explain that for us, please.
23 A. Yes, I think I can. Well, in all fairness to all of you and to
24 myself, I don't think I had that recognition at the time, when you talk
25 about the preparation for Dayton. I don't think I was as aware of that as
1 I became later on. And primarily when I lived in the country -- I mean, I
2 moved to Sarajevo literally in the last days of December and early days of
3 January 1995/1996 and lived then for a year and a half --
4 Q. As the high representative?
5 A. -- as the high representative throughout the country and, of
6 course, had extremely many occasions to sit down and talk with persons
7 concerning their personal history and their personal faith in all parts of
8 Bosnia. And I was -- I mean, I was horrified then.
9 And when I noted that so many times you could see that where
10 something had happened during the '40s, atrocities, brutalities, ethnic
11 murders, ethnic cleansing, all of it. You are aware of it. We saw the
12 things coming back at the same place. And I think I've written about
13 this. And my -- the conclusion I draw from that was that without a
14 thorough process of reconciliation, there's always a risk of the horrors
15 coming back.
16 And I think one of the great failures of Yugoslavia of Tito was
17 that for reasons that had to do with the political nature of the regime
18 and with the great power policies at the time, that process never took
19 place, with some exceptions he put the lid on and there was no discussion
20 of what really happened during the 1940s. And that meant that stories,
21 sometimes true, sometimes not, were passed on from mother to daughter,
22 from father to son, were never able -- were never allowed to be discussed
23 in public. And when the lid was off and there was no state structure to
24 contain and when everything was up for grabs again in the early 1990s, all
25 of those stories came back and made it far easier to inflame nationalist
1 and -- or extreme nationalist and ethnic passion. So it was -- I found
2 during my years living in Bosnia of extreme importance to know that
3 history and of extreme importance to the future to learn from it the
4 importance of the process of reconciliation for preventing one or two
5 generations from now from going through this again.
6 Q. Was it your hope at the conclusion of the negotiations in Dayton
7 that you had created something that might ultimately lead towards
9 A. Yes. Of course. Of course it was. But -- we knew, all of us,
10 that that was not enough. I mean, Dayton was a start, and Dayton
11 was -- Bosnia is only part of the picture. In my opinion, there was no
12 way that we can be successful with sorting out the one bit after the other
13 of the entire Posavina region. It's really for the people living there
14 more than it is for us. So it has to be in the region as a whole. It has
15 to a comprehensive political settlement; it has to be a comprehensive
16 reconciliation; it has to be over time a comprehensive integration to the
17 structures we have in the rest of Europe.
18 Dayton was a compromised peace. I think that was necessary.
19 These sorts of, essentially, to a very large extent civil conflicts can
20 only be sorted out by compromises, but compromises by their nature are
21 difficult. No one loved Dayton. And our task was to get them on, all two
22 sides, all three sides, or however many sides you want to see it as, as to
23 gradually not love Dayton but accept Dayton as the way forwards, as the
24 part of trying to sort out the problems of the entire region.
25 Reconciliation, reintegration, stop forces of disintegration in other
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 areas as well.
2 Q. Following the conclusion of the negotiations and the signing of
3 the agreement, you then were given another responsibility; to actually
4 work toward the implementation of which you had worked to create. Can you
5 tell us how you came to take that position, please.
6 A. Well, I was then asked to take on the position of high
7 representative, and that was a position that had been set up during the
8 Dayton negotiations. It had been preceded by some discussions in the NATO
9 council, if I remember it rightly, where there had been a sort of
10 difference of emphasis between the Americans and the Europeans. The
11 Americans had been very much stressing the military part of the
12 implementation, NATO forces moving in after the end of the war and staying
13 there for one year. That was the doctrine at the time.
14 The Europeans somewhat more, without sort of denying the forces of
15 military implementation, separation of forces and all of that, stressing
16 more of the complex issues of long-term political and civilian
17 implementation. And while the Americans were then taking command of the
18 military implementation structures, it was seen as natural to have a
19 European to take care of the civilian political aspects. And I was then
20 asked, both by the US and the Europeans, to take on that responsibility.
21 I was somewhat reluctant, knowing the complexities of the issue and the
22 fact that Dayton was just a fragile start. But at the end of the day, I
23 accepted and moved to Sarajevo, and I -- for all of the difficulties
24 involved in that, I don't regret that decision.
25 Q. What authority were you given in order to try to accomplish --
1 A. Well, essentially none. That's one of the -- and you don't need
2 to rely on me, you can read the book by Richard Holbrooke who agrees that
3 that was one of the mistakes of Dayton, that there was overemphasis on the
4 military issues, and the authority given to the high representative was
5 essentially only authority -- it was a moral authority, political
6 authority, but to coordinate the different efforts. Of course, I sort of
7 extended that authority in different ways on my own.
8 And later on, in the late autumn of 1997, well after I had left,
9 the decision was taken to give the high representative also more direct
10 executive authority in Bosnia. I didn't have that. Whether I should have
11 had it or whether I shouldn't is a matter for the historians.
12 Q. Before we break - and after the break, I think we'll cover with
13 you the actual implementation of Dayton - you mentioned some of the
14 mistakes -- or you mentioned at least one of the mistakes of the
15 agreement. And I think we'll be talking after the break about the first
16 problem that confronted you; that was the problem of Sarajevo.
17 Can you tell us how the negotiations either failed to solve that
18 problem or built it into what you would ultimately be dealing with as the
19 high representative.
20 A. Well, the Dayton -- I believe we spent three weeks in Dayton. It
21 seemed like an eternity at the time. But of course, it was a very short
22 period in view of all of the issues that we had to deal with. A lot of
23 those days were really spent on I would even call it inter-Western issues
24 of the details of the command structures for military implementation.
25 So a lot of the issues that we were then confronted with on the
1 ground hadn't really been gone through with sufficient detail in Dayton.
2 And one of them, which was the first one that confronted me, was the
3 question of transfer of authority in different areas. When the so-called
4 Interentity Boundary Line was established, that followed to a very large
5 extent the line at which hostilities had ceased. But there were important
6 areas where we had to sort of transfer, move from the line of
7 confrontation to the new Interethnic Boundary Line.
8 And in some of those areas, there were sizeable populations;
9 roughly, I would say, up to a hundred thousand people. That was primarily
10 but not only in the Sarajevo area. And we were asked, the military
11 command, the commander of IFOR, and myself, to undertake that transfer of
12 authority or transfer of those territories within 90 days. So we had
13 90 days to build reconciliation in some of the areas that were most hotly
14 fought over during the war.
15 Q. Did you feel that that was a practical or realistic amount of
16 time, and did you encourage the parties to reassess that?
17 A. Well, the parties had no way of reassessing it because it was in
18 the agreement.
19 Q. I'm sorry, I'm talking about at the time of the agreement, in the
20 negotiations themselves.
21 A. We did, but there was -- we did. There were numerous -- this goes
22 back to the Sarajevo issue. There were numerous different approaches to
23 Sarajevo on paper discussed in Dayton. You might remember that in the
24 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, remnants of that one was still with us, because to
25 some extent that's the most elaborate piece of paper that had been done.
1 The idea was to have Sarajevo under separate administration under the UN;
2 Mostar under European Union administration. The Mostar thing happened;
3 the Sarajevo thing did not happen. That was one of the plans that was
4 discussed in Dayton. That did not happen.
5 At the end of the day, I think that was shut down by
6 Mr. Milosevic, if I remember it rightly, and one of the reasons was also
7 that it was a highly complex structure, the government structures of
8 Sarajevo that we then had to set up. And there was simply not the time
10 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic have an opportunity in these negotiations to
11 extend, or at least to advocate to extend, that 90-day period to a more
12 realistic period?
13 A. Mr. Milosevic, whom you know, is a fairly ruthless negotiator --
14 JUDGE MAY: I think, Mr. Pavich, we may be moving into an area
15 which is more appropriate in another trial - namely, Mr. Milosevic and his
16 conduct - I think less appropriate in this one.
17 Perhaps we could adjourn now and resume at half past. Mr. Bildt,
18 would you be back then, please.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.59 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 11.30 a.m.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Pavich.
22 MR. PAVICH: Thank you, Your Honours.
23 Q. Mr. Bildt, I'd like to draw our attention now to the actual
24 implementation, the work on the ground, the details, as you say, of the
25 Dayton Accords. Can you tell us what the situation was when you took your
1 position in Sarajevo.
2 A. Well, as I said before the recess, Dayton was just a rather
3 fragile beginning of the process of trying to overcome the divisions of
4 the country. And the Dayton deal was strange in a way which I think was
5 unavoidable, but it left us with a Bosnia that was essentially three
6 states or three statelets, or the two of them supposed to sort of make up
7 a Federation. Now, these three states were effectively three armies and
8 police structures. And the immediate task was the military
9 implementation, to separate the Federation forces from the Serb forces and
10 to implement a new IEBL, Interentity Boundary Line. But that was the easy
11 part of it. I mean, you can send in huge military forces and separate
12 armies, because effectively you can say to them, "If we don't -- if you
13 don't move your forces, we bomb you," and people normally take notice
14 concerning those arguments.
15 But my task was really to bring people together, and I couldn't
16 threaten them with bombing if they didn't love each other. And I didn't
17 have very many other instruments. The task was also somewhat difficult in
18 that the provision was that it was only after elections were held that we
19 could start the process of setting up the first institutions of Bosnia,
20 the council of ministers and the presidents. So I had first to facile all
21 of the military implementation issues and the transfer of authority in the
22 different areas, then to try to make some sort of reasonably decent
23 elections. They were no more than that, but they were reasonably decent
25 And then after that -- and now we are nearly a year later, to have
1 the first meetings trying to set up the common Bosnian institutions. So
2 it was -- and in the meantime, of course, enormous humanitarian issues.
3 We had very large numbers of refugees in the countries and displaced
4 persons and outside of the country. The country was thoroughly
5 devastated; not all of it, but most of it. And --
6 Q. And we spoke before the break about Sarajevo.
7 A. That was the -- that was the immediate task, because the -- it was
8 obvious that that was going to be a major challenge. We were going to
9 transfer authority over territory where perhaps up to 100.000, in this
10 particular case as a result of the war, Serbs lived. And that was really
11 the test case. Was it possible for those to stay when that was
12 transferred to Federation authority, or were we to be confronted with a
13 new massive refugee problem? In this particular case, not refugees from
14 war but refugees from peace, which would then vastly complicate, of
15 course, the entire issue of refugee return, which was central to long-term
16 implementation and acceptance of the Dayton Agreement. And right from the
17 start after the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, I sent my later
18 first principal deputy, Michael Steiner, down to start the process of
19 negotiations and --
20 Q. Mr. Steiner is now the United States representative in Kosovo --
21 A. Well, not the United States; United Nations.
22 Q. I'm sorry, United Nations. Excuse me.
23 A. There's a distinction to be made.
24 He's there in -- head of UNMIK in Kosovo, and he was my first
25 principal deputy high representative, I think, was the rather extensive
2 Q. Did you have any contact during this period with Mrs. Plavsic?
3 A. Yes. He started. When I came down, we established the office.
4 On my second day, I went to Banja Luka for a number of reasons. One of
5 them was that, of course, from the very start, I saw as one of the major
6 challenges to establish links with those in the Republika Srpska that were
7 likely to have a more positive attitude towards the implementation of the
8 Dayton agreement than I knew I was going to encounter going up the road to
9 Pale. So I went there to meet with the Prime Minister at the time,
10 Mr. Karadzic, and Mrs. Plavsic. The reason I wanted to see Mrs. Plavsic
11 was also that in order to see if something could be done for the Sarajevo
12 transition, I wanted to have a person on the Serb side in those Sarajevo
13 suburbs that was credible and credible to the Muslim authorities in
14 Sarajevo, credible to the Serbs, and that could not be easily just put
15 aside by the Pale authorities.
16 Q. Why did you choose to meet with her?
17 A. Well, she was vice-president of Republika Srpska, but I was also
18 recommended to talk with her by a rather senior - then senior and still
19 senior - politician on the Bosnian Muslim side who said: "Go to
20 Mrs. Plavsic. She is reliable on these kinds of issues. You could talk
21 with her and get a name from her." And I did get a name from her. And
22 that particular person, then, which we established contact with, then
23 established contact with the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo and did
24 everything that he could in order to facilitate.
25 That entire thing, has to be said, failed, and failed miserably.
1 And we got roughly up to hundred thousand refugees. But it has to be said
2 that we were not helped either by the provisions of the peace agreement
3 nor by the authorities, neither in Sarajevo nor Pale. I mean, the leading
4 voices in Sarajevo really wanted to take over these areas Serb-free. And
5 the leading authorities in Pale wanted to bring all of the Serbs out;
6 first, to consolidate Republika Srpska with Serbs; and secondly, of
7 course, to demonstrate that one couldn't live together. And what was
8 striking with my first meeting with Mrs. Plavsic, and that is - it's not
9 something I'm saying now; I wrote about it at the time - was that the line
10 that she took with me in private meetings was distinctly different in that
11 she said that she wanted to help in preventing a new wave of refugees for
12 humanitarian reasons, but that she also wanted to preserve the
13 possibilities of Serbs and Muslims and Croats living together again in
14 Sarajevo. And it was obvious that if you were going to start peace
15 implementation with a massive new wave of refugees and with further
16 disintegration, then that was going to complicate the task. That
17 eventually happened. And that was a failure by everyone concerned.
18 But I think it's worth noting that Mrs. Plavsic, from that very
19 early day, took a different line. It also has to be said that that line
20 had no consequence. She was sitting in Banja Luka, far away from the
21 centres of power, without any executive authority whatsoever concerning
22 the actual conduct of events.
23 Q. Did you continue to work with Mrs. Plavsic in the course of
24 carrying out your responsibilities as high representative?
25 A. I did. During the different phases of -- we're talking about the
1 long period that stretches more -- well, a year and a half of continuous
2 challenges of different sorts. It did develop during the latter part of
3 the spring of 1997 into a major confrontation with Mr. Karadzic. From
4 April and onwards, my first priority, which was not widely known at the
5 time, and all of the activities were outside the -- what was available to
6 the media at the time, was directed towards getting Mr. Karadzic away from
7 the position as president of Republika Srpska. Because he was still fully
8 in control and formally in command of everything.
9 Q. This was in early 1996, Mr. Bildt?
10 A. That was in early 1996. You can say from April onwards, up until
11 we secured two agreements. If I remember, the first one on June 22nd,
12 where it was agreed that he should not be seen, not be heard, not be
13 noted. And the second agreement on June 30th where he agreed, somewhat
14 reluctantly, to put it rather mildly, to transfer all of his authorities
15 as president of Republika Srpska to Mrs. Plavsic in accordance with the
16 rather elaborate provisions of the Republika Srpska constitution.
17 This was a result of very extensive pressure, and I threatened the
18 position of fully fledged sanctions by the UN Security Council on Serbia
19 if that did not happen. That led to Mr. Milosevic being fairly active,
20 although he was not particularly in favour of Mrs. Plavsic assuming that
21 particular position. He had another candidate. But it ended up with
22 Mrs. Plavsic assuming that responsibility. In the first days of July, I
23 think, of 1996, she took over as acting president of Republika Srpska; was
24 then, of course, later confirmed in an election in September, if I
25 remember it right.
1 Q. When she accepted that responsibility, was it clear that it would
2 entail personal and political risk?
3 A. I don't think that -- well, I don't know, obviously, her judgement
4 of that situation. I was not fully aware at that time of the magnitude of
5 the challenges and the risks that we were going to be faced in the
6 confrontation inside Republika Srpska during the following, I would say,
7 14, 15, months, which brought us to the brink of armed confrontation,
8 coups, and perhaps even some sort of civil war at that time.
9 Q. Before we get that far along, can you tell us what other projects
10 were your priorities during these early months once or at the same time
11 you were working on an agreement for Mr. Karadzic's removal?
12 A. We were working on a quite a number of things. To be complete, I
13 have to add that a lot of our attention was taken up by what I call the
14 Federation issues, relationship between the Muslims and the Croats. I did
15 not work very much with that. That was the responsibility primarily of
16 Mr. Steiner, working in cooperation with US Ambassador John Kornblum.
17 While I was dealing more with the BH relationship, Sarajevo and Republika
18 Srpska, as well as the internal issues in Republika Srpska.
19 We had all of the humanitarian issues. We had the beginning of
20 economic reconstructions. We were still dealing with some of the regional
21 issues. I mean, I had still remaining responsibilities for the region as
22 a whole, and I was at that time also, strangely enough, trying to
23 encourage the leading international activists to take a somewhat more
24 proactive approach on the issue of Kosovo. That was a thing that did not
25 result in very much at that particular time. But those issues also took
1 up some amount of time.
2 And we had all of the daily coordination issue between the
3 different international activists, the military forces, the IFOR, NATO
4 command, OSCE, Ambassador Frowick, the preparations for the elections,
5 which was a very complex issue, UNHCR. We had the police issues, would
6 return to those --
7 Q. The election issues -- I think the election issues we can deal
8 with Ambassador Frowick --
9 A. I think that is more appropriate. That is more appropriate
10 because they were under his direct responsibility. I was having a
11 coordinating and supporting role.
12 Q. You mentioned the police issues. Can you tell us a bit about
13 that, please.
14 A. That comes somewhat later. That's really -- that's what really
15 caused the major confrontation a year later, spring 1997, summer 1997, and
16 early autumn 1997. Because the police issues are -- we have seen that in
17 other -- we have seen that in Kosovo and other areas as well. They are
18 really critical. If you haven't got decent police forces, you can never
19 establish a rule of law. And if you don't establish rule of law, you can
20 never have a functioning democracy; you can never have refugee return.
21 So the police forces that we inherited, so to say, in Bosnia was,
22 of course, police forces that had been built up to support the political
23 ambitions of the respective leadership to a very large extent. There were
24 elements of old Yugoslav police, but there was also substantial elements
25 of rather speedily recruited local thugs that had been brought in to do
1 the nasty work on all sides of that particular war. And later on we saw
2 the necessity and had the possibility to work very actively on trying to
3 reform police. That -- we started in Sarajevo, by the way - but that's a
4 separate story - and then Mostar. That's also a separate story. But then
5 on --
6 Q. It seems that -- I'm sorry, but it seems as though refugee return
7 and reform of the police structure were very much connected.
8 A. They were very much connected. I mean, refugee return was
9 connected with most things. It was connected with the very structure of
10 the deal, whether we were going to accept de facto mono-ethnic areas or
11 whether we were trying to recreate something that had been lost through
12 the war. I was always of the opinion that I don't -- I never believed
13 that everyone was going to move back because I was extremely firm in
14 saying that if everyone wants to move back, we are not going to deny the
15 right of anyone to move back. But for that to be possible, there was a
16 necessity of safeguarding the environment. And in the beginning, everyone
17 that tries to move back -- and I'm talking about moving back to areas
18 where they were going to be a minority. Most of the return of the
19 refugees were to areas where your own people, so to say, were in the
20 majority. But really all of the instances of minority returns in the
21 beginning were met with violence. It doesn't make much of a difference
22 which area we're talking about. Nearly all of them were met with
23 violence, sometimes very brutal violence; houses being blown up, people
24 being threatened. Massive action was taken.
25 And the only way that we could deal with that was essentially to
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 long-term reform police forces, long-term -- try to get some sort of rule
2 of law in those particular areas so that the Muslims could return to
3 Republika Srpska, Serbs could return to Sarajevo, Croats could return to
4 Sarajevo or to other areas. And this, of course, struck at the heart of,
5 if we are now in Republika Srpska, to the power structure of Pale they
6 were dependent less on the military - the war had ended - more on the
7 police, also in order to operate these sort of smuggling networks and the
8 other networks that were essential for financial purposes but also to
9 operate the sort of structures of political intimidation that were
10 essential for the political power in -- not only there but primarily
12 Q. How would you describe Mrs. Plavsic's role in working with you in
13 dealing with these critical problems of refugee return and reform of the
14 police structures? Was she helpful or was she more than helpful?
15 A. Well, she was starting with refugee issues, she was very much
16 concerned with the refugee issues; primarily, it has to be said, all of
17 the refugees that were in the Republika Srpska. At the end of the war,
18 there was a vast refugee problem primarily in the western parts of Bosnia,
19 and that was the -- both the Krajina Serbs. I can't remember, 200.000,
20 300.000, of that order. And then the --
21 Q. That was from the Croatian Krajina?
22 A. That was from the Croatian Krajina. Sorry.
23 Q. And when did they become refugees?
24 A. Well, that's the August 1995.
25 Q. I think you'd mentioned that as being one of the most difficult
1 periods of the entire war.
2 A. That can be said. I mean, the entire summer: We had Srebrenica;
3 we had the Croatian Krajina offensive and all of those hundreds of
4 thousands of people fleeing in; then there was the subsequent fighting in
5 Western Bosnia. I mean, that left a huge number of refugees in the Banja
6 Luka and Western -- Western Bosnia, Western Republika Srpska. And to that
7 was then added the -- up to 100.000 further displaced persons coming out
8 of the whole -- the Sarajevo fighting. So there was an immense immediate
9 refugee and humanitarian issue that she was obviously very concerned
11 To that came the issues of what we could call minority return. I
12 use that phrase, although, in some cases, the question of people returning
13 to areas where that particular nationality had been the majority before
14 the war, but we called it minority return at the time. And those were
15 very tricky, as I said.
16 I remember -- or I re-read my book -- the conversations I had with
17 President Izetbegovic in Sarajevo and President Plavsic in Banja Luka, and
18 they were fairly similar in the sense that we first had to get the court
19 to recognise the right of property, that this apartment belongs to that
20 person, not to the person that is living there. That was difficult in
21 itself. We managed to do that somewhat earlier in Banja Luka than in
22 Sarajevo. Then it was a question of getting the police to --
23 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Bildt, you say you managed to do that a bit earlier
24 in Banja Luka. Did Mrs. Plavsic play any role in helping you to do that?
25 A. I don't think so, no, because that was essentially a question for
1 the -- however that was done. I can't give you the details of it, but I
2 don't think so.
3 But the second stage was of course then to get the police forces
4 to evict those that were living in those particular apartments in favour
5 of those that had reclaimed the apartments, and that was a difficult
6 issue. And I discussed it extensively with Mrs. Plavsic as well as
7 Mr. Izetbegovic.
8 Now, it has to be said that both of them had their number one
9 concern for those people that were living in those particular apartments
10 because very often it was a question of people who had lost everything
11 somewhere else and had nowhere to go. So if we sent in the police, we
12 were effectively putting them on the street with nowhere to go. And we
13 had problems with the police forces, both in Sarajevo and in Banja Luka.
14 At the end of the day, Mrs. Plavsic accepted the logic and the law
15 and tried to help in getting those -- some of those early evictions.
16 Numbers were very small in the beginning, but it was the start that was
17 horrendously difficult. It's always the start that is difficult. Now we
18 are talking, of course, in all parts of Bosnia -- or fairly significant
19 numbers of refugees. So the -- but we broke the ice, and she was part of
20 that process.
21 Q. Now, you've mentioned reforming the police structures. That,
22 you've told us, was a bit of a more long-term project.
23 A. Yeah, that can be said.
24 Q. Was Mrs. Plavsic an integral part of that, and did that involve
25 her exposing herself to political and personal risk?
1 A. It did. It did. Because then we entered the sort of spring or --
2 now we are late winter or spring of 1997, and our attention - I'm now
3 talking about the international side - during the latter part of 1996 had
4 been concentrated more on setting up the common Bosnian institutions. I
5 mean, lengthy negotiations in this particular case on the Serb side with
6 Mr. Krajisnik, who was the elected Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency;
7 less immediate focus then on the Republika Srpska internal issues. But
8 then it shifted very much to those.
9 And there was also the increasingly -- increasing confrontation
10 between Mrs. Plavsic, the president in Banja Luka, and the Pale powers, if
11 I use that particular term. That was heating up by the day and centred
12 around quite a number of different issues where we increasingly needed to
13 support -- I wouldn't say her, but needed to support what was, after all,
14 the constitution of Republika Srpska and the constitution of Bosnia. She
15 was the elected president, and she was clearly under threat.
16 The first -- the first instance that I noted or I was aware of
17 when she was threatened was in -- we became aware of a plan to unseat her
18 at the meeting of the SDS main board in Pale I think on March 22nd,
19 according to my notes. We considered that positively dangerous and took
20 proactive measures to both safeguard the place where she was staying and,
21 at the end of the meeting where they could not move forward with their
22 plans because we had also taken some other action that was disturbing, the
23 plans that were there from the Pale power side, we judged that it would be
24 too dangerous to have her travel by car from Pale to Banja Luka because of
25 the risk of her being apprehended, attacked, and worse than that perhaps,
1 was too great, and we offered her -- that was the first time we offered
2 her NATO helicopters. And she accepted that offer and was then lifted out
3 of Pale de facto and to safety in Banja Luka. That was the first time.
4 And then there were -- I had three or four cases where there were
5 what we judged at the time as serious, direct, also physical threats
6 against her as part of attempts by Pale to get rid of her, because they --
7 they judged that Dayton -- full Dayton implementation was a threat to
8 them. They were right in that. While others judged that full Dayton
9 implementation was a benefit to Bosnia and to the Serbs, and that was the
10 nature of the confrontation.
11 They managed in the spring of 1996 to get rid of the then Prime
12 Minister Karadzic, which caused a major confrontation. But he was not a
13 major figure, it has to be said. It was courageous up to -- up to a
14 point. But Mrs. Plavsic, of course, had another credibility and another
15 position, as elected president of Republika Srpska. She was then, from
16 their point of view, a far greater threat, far more difficult to deal
17 with. And of course, accordingly, the measures that we had to take to
18 protect the constitutional authority of Republika Srpska were also more
20 And I don't know if you want me to go into the different other
21 instances, but ...
22 Q. Well, I'd like to have you discuss with us the efforts that you
23 and she, if you were working in coordination, were making in order to
24 continue to undertake and accomplish the reforms that were required under
25 the Dayton implementation. And if there were risks associated with that
1 continued effort, please tell us.
2 A. Well, it was -- the thing that became the crunch was the police
3 issues, as we indicated. And here it was not only myself - I was
4 coordinating - but it was a joint approach taken by -- there was then a
5 new SRSG of the UN mission, Mr. Ky Eide.
6 Q. Please tell us what those -- that acronym represents.
7 A. All right. SRSG is Special Representative -- this is UN language,
8 Special Representative of the Secretary-General. So he was heading the UN
9 mission in Bosnia. The UN mission mandate was, to a very large extent, an
10 IPTF mandate - IPTF being the International Police Task Force - which was
11 monitoring and overseeing the reform of the police forces. Then I was
12 working very closely together with the IFOR, or at that time SFOR
13 commander, commander of the stabilisation force, which was also in the UN
14 at that time. That was General Crouch. He was a commander of the 7th
15 Army, the US Army in Europe.
16 Q. That's the military force.
17 A. That's the military force. And the three of us sort of made up a
18 sort of calendar on the police reform issues. And here we had, during
19 April, May, June, extensive meetings with Mrs. Plavsic and the Minister
20 for Police Affairs, Mr. Kijac, in which we tried to get those reforms
21 accepted. And it was -- it became rather obvious fairly early that
22 Mr. Kijac was playing another game, and that led to a very serious
23 confrontation with us and between Mrs. Plavsic and Mr. Kijac. And the
24 final crisis was -- one of the final crises was -- I had then formally
25 left but I was in touch on more than a daily basis in order to support my
1 successor as high representative, Mr. Westendorp, in late June, when I
2 think it started with Mr. Kijac firing one of the key police heads in
3 Banja Luka who was effectively supporting the constitutional rule,
4 Mrs. Plavsic then firing Mr. Kijac, and Mr. Kijac then again firing the
5 police in Banja Luka, and that led to the situation when Mrs. Plavsic was
6 off to the UK on an official visit. I think we advised her that it was
7 unsafe to return to Banja Luka.
8 Q. She was in London?
9 A. She was in London on an official visit, if I remember it right.
10 She was then advised to go back via Belgrade. It turned out to be less
11 good advice because she was apprehended at Belgrade airport by police.
12 And that led to - because we were then aware of this - heavy diplomatic
14 Q. Mr. Dodik told us a bit about this yesterday, but was only able to
15 tell us as much as that she had been apprehended in Belgrade. Can you
16 tell us what happened after that?
17 A. She was apprehended in Belgrade. Diplomatic intervention from UK,
18 US, I would say, helped to sort out the situation on Belgrade airport.
19 And she was escorted, I would assume, by Yugoslav police to the border of
20 Bosnia. We were then aware that the plan was to transfer her to Republika
21 Srpska, that is, to Pale police, and the intention was then to take her
22 into some sort of detention. And I'm not quite certain, but I mean, there
23 were obviously plans to take her into sort of what they call psychiatric
24 treatment to get rid of her the one way or the other, to get her out of
25 the picture.
1 But we were lucky in that our forces got to the place quicker than
2 the Pale police forces. So we were able to protect her from that. That
3 was effectively done by my office in coordination with SFOR, the NATO
4 forces, and then to bring her safely back to Banja Luka.
5 That did not sort out that particular issue, of course, because
6 that led to the confrontation continuing. And during the days that
7 followed, we had to take further steps in Banja Luka to protect in
8 different ways, because then we had also information at some point in time
9 during those very days that forces of a rather special kind had been sent
10 out from Pale in order to get at her.
11 And we - and by this strange phrase "we," I mean the sort of
12 collective international community - deployed certain forces and certain
13 resources to interdict and prevent, and we did interdict and we did notice
14 and we did prevent different sorts of activities. We cannot be certain
15 what would have happened if that had not been the case, but that was the
16 case. It was clearly a very threatening situation. This was to be
17 repeated later on with the Brcko riots and, of course, came to a head in
18 early September confrontation in Banja Luka, which was also bordering --
19 "on the verge of open warfare" is to carry it somewhat too far, but
20 extensive use of violence at that particular time. But at the end of the
21 day, constitutional rule in Republika Srpska prevailed.
22 Q. Was she a necessary part of that?
23 A. I think she was essentially. Would not have -- you never know.
24 History is a strange thing that happens only once. I would say that -- I
25 mean, take the theoretical experiment of taking her out of the picture and
1 say that the Pale people would have dominated the entire period. Would we
2 have been able to do the things we did in terms of peace and
3 implementation? I would say not without significant use of force and most
4 probably not with insignificant bloodshed, when it came to both refugee
5 return and the internal confrontation of Republika Srpska. The fact that
6 she was defending constitutional rule in Republika Srpska and we were able
7 to support that and we were able to protect it when it was clearly under
8 attack facilitated things.
9 Saying this, I'm not saying that we sorted out everything. We did
10 not. A lot of things we did not sort out. There were numerous issues on
11 which Mrs. Plavsic and myself had disagreements. We were not satisfied
12 with the pace of implementation. My task was to pressure the authorities
13 all over Bosnia to do more every day. My task was never to be satisfied.
14 But without her, it would have been very different and more dangerous and
15 almost certainly more violent.
16 Q. You told us about the work to reform the police structure. Do you
17 recall whether there was any effort made to replace or remove the general
18 of the army Republika Srpska, the commander?
19 A. Oh, yeah, that was earlier, when she -- that also goes to the
20 issue of constitution rule. She, in whenever that could have been, late
21 1997, of course, fired the commander, the then-commander, General Mladic.
22 And the reason was I think that he was really not -- he was really not
23 part of the constitution structure. He was not obeying political demands
24 and was accordingly fired. That led to rather tense situation where he
25 took military action or threatened military action. That was then in the
1 eastern parts of Republika Srpska. He was from Han Pijesak, setting up
2 roadblocks, taking over television transmitters, and threatening to march
3 on Pale, of all places. That did not happen. And he, in some sort of way
4 at that time, accepted that he was fired.
5 Q. And who was it that took the responsibility of doing that?
6 A. Well, the president of Republika Srpska has rather extensive
7 authority, including that one. So it was only she who could, according to
8 the constitution, take that particular decision. And the fact that -- the
9 fact that the constitution of Republika Srpska had been written with very
10 extensive authority to the president - I mean, you can speculate why that
11 had been the case, but that was the case - made it possible for her to
12 take increasingly robust action in favour of peace implementation. I say
13 "increasingly" because it was -- in the beginning, it was, of course, a
14 situation where all real power was in Pale, in spite of all formal powers
15 being in Banja Luka. And at the end of this particular process, or when I
16 sort of left the more active scene, there was far more real power in Banja
17 Luka, but it was not complete. This was a struggle of the two Republika
18 Srpskas, or the two competing visions; one in cooperation with the
19 international community, and one in confrontation both with Dayton and the
20 international community.
21 Q. Was it in the Serbs' interest to cooperate with the international
22 community insofar as the future of the Serbian people was concerned? I
23 know you've written about this in your books.
24 A. Well, in my humble opinion, all of the peoples of the area had an
25 interest in first ending the war. It was a horrible war, truly horrible
1 war. But they also had an interest in setting up, and we had an interest
2 in setting up, constitutional structures that could gradually facilitate a
3 reconciliation and gradually facilitate them living together and gradually
4 finding a new form of equilibrium in the entire region. I'm not quite
5 certain we have succeeded with that yet. But that is clearly in the
6 interest of everyone in the region.
7 Then by the nature of things - and I said that earlier and I think
8 it's important to understand - the Dayton peace was a compromised peace;
9 it was not the victory of the one over the one. Everyone seeks victory in
10 war. But at some point in time, one often has to accept a compromise.
11 And that meant -- as I said, no one loved Dayton. And the warring
12 parties, if I use that particular phrase, in much the same way as I think
13 it was Klauzevic who once said that, "War is the continuation of politics
14 by other means." I quickly learned that peace implementation to the
15 former warring parties was the continuation of war by other means.
16 They all continued to work for their particular war aims, although
17 in peace, and my task was then to try to -- I shouldn't say "my" -- of the
18 international community, to try to get them to reconcile to the fact that
19 this compromise is the best available. Not perfect; the best available.
20 The only alternative is further conflict, and that is clearly in the
21 interests of be they Serbs, or be they Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Serbs or
22 Bosnian Croats or Kosovo Albanians or whatever, and gradually facilitate
23 the economic reinvigoration of the region and people moving back from
24 other parts - Sweden, for example, or wherever - and moving back inside
25 the country.
1 But it was not easy, and we are not there yet. I mean, I'm here.
2 We're all here as part of the process of reconciliation. If we don't
3 succeed in that, we would succeed in really nothing, just -- a cycle of
4 revenge and retribution will never bring peace; only reconciliation can
5 bring peace.
6 Q. Mr. Bildt, you say that we're all here contributing to the process
7 of reconciliation. Biljana Plavsic's acceptance of responsibility and
8 this hearing, your presence here, can you tell us how in your view that
9 contributes to this process.
10 A. Well, first, and I've said this in my UN capacity also to the
11 Security Council, I think several times, that I think the task of this
12 Tribunal as first time really in international history of this sort is of
13 immense importance. To establish justice, but justice not as an
14 instrument of revenge and retribution, because that, we can go on forever
15 and forever with; but justice as an instrument of reconciliation.
16 We mentioned before - you led me to talk about the importance of
17 the events of the 1940s to what happened in the 1990s - and I think the
18 great failure of Tito's Yugoslavia to achieve more than very superficial
19 recognition -- there was the slogans of brotherhood and unity; but below
20 those slogans, there wasn't the true reconciliation. They hadn't really
21 sorted out what happened, so to be ready to sort out what happened so that
22 one could say that: "Right and wrong, this is what was done, and we
23 accepted the responsibility, and the truth is of immense importance." And
24 for all of the -- for all of the immediate importance, of course, of all
25 of the peace implementation issues, refugee return and the setting up of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 institutions and economic revitalisation and all of that, is really
2 success or failure of reconciliation that will decide.
3 And I do think, as I've said, that Mrs. Plavsic - and I'm dealing
4 with the history from early 1996 and onwards, or 1995 and onwards -- she
5 was courageous in supporting peace implementation. She was not a
6 supporter of the Dayton agreement; there were hardly any of those around
7 in the first days. But later on, she accepted. She was a firm supporter
8 of constitutional rule. She took great personal risk with that. Others
9 must judge the issues of the Tribunal. I think the fact that she has been
10 speaking very openly about these issues and what happened does contribute
11 to reconciliation in a way that few other of the then-active political
12 leaders of the region have done.
13 MR. PAVICH: Thank you very much, Mr. Bildt.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Bildt, on the question of reconciliation,
15 that the trial process in itself contributes to reconciliation, the trial
16 process at the Tribunal, irrespective of the outcome, whether it ends in
17 conviction or acquittal. I think what I would be interested to hear from
18 you is why does a guilty plea make a contribution to the process that is
19 special? Because the trial process, in any event, is a contributory
20 factor, and the guilty plea is a part of that process.
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I completely agree with particularly
22 the statement that the trial process in itself is a contribution to
23 reconciliation in that when you, in other cases, go through details of
24 what happened and gradually get that accepted by all of the people on the
25 ground, if I might use that phrase, it over time contributes to
1 reconciliation. It is not easy; it is not always working like that. It's
2 not always successful initially. But that is the aim. And I do think - I
3 have views on this - but I do think that overall, that contribution is
5 I think a plea of guilty, of course, provided that it's seen as
6 credible - and credibility is not something that Mrs. Plavsic lacks in her
7 convictions - does contribute substantially to reconciliation as well.
8 That political leaders -- I mean, I belonged to those -- I wasn't there in
9 the early 1990s, as you are aware of. But of course, I have been living
10 with all the early 1990s, when I have been living with a lot of the people
11 who were there and I have been talking with them, I mean, my view, her
12 role was more symbolic than substance in the decisions and in the
13 structures and all of that.
14 But anyhow, she was vice-president of Republika Srpska. And she
15 has now sort of accepted responsibility publicly for things that happened
16 that we are all aware of. No doubt, that is a significant contribution to
17 reconciliation. I mean, the Tribunal proceedings in the cases where you
18 don't have an admission of guilt should also and could also and does also
19 contribute to reconciliation, although it's a far more difficult process
20 because it's then contentious, as you are aware, and it sometimes results
21 in more of a propaganda battle. But of course, when there is an
22 admission, it's a completely different ball game in terms of the effect on
23 reconciliation, in my opinion.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: And I would imagine that her leadership role
25 would also be significant.
1 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. It would be. I mean, she was -- you
2 could, of course, argue that the fact that she is sitting here today is a
3 result of the fact that she -- that the international community and
4 Mrs. Plavsic had cooperated very closely. I have described some of the
5 events during the 1996 and 1997 time period. When I left, this
6 continued. When she somewhat late in the day was informed that she was
7 the subject of what was I think a sealed indictment - I wasn't there at
8 the time, but I have spoken to the people who were - her immediate
9 reaction was to come to The Hague. Justice needs to be done. She has not
10 been brought here. She came here. And that is -- there has been no other
11 senior political leader, senior military leader that I am aware of of that
12 case. I was involved in the early discussions, of course, when
13 we -- during the period when I was in Bosnia when there was a question of
14 both apprehending people who were indicted and getting some people
15 transferred here under different circumstances or difficult
17 But when she was late in the day informed, she said: "I'll go to
18 The Hague." And then, of course, this has resulted in this particular
19 proceeding with her pleading guilty on one of the counts.
20 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Bildt, that concludes your evidence. Thank you
21 for coming to the Tribunal to give it.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
23 [The witness withdrew]
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. O'Sullivan.
25 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Our next witness is Robert Frowick. While he's
1 being brought in, Your Honour, I'll point out that in the blue folders we
2 provided you this morning, at tab 3 is Mr. Frowick's previous affidavit;
3 and at tab 4 is his curriculum vitae.
4 [The witness entered court]
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, would the witness take the declaration.
6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
7 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
8 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat, Mr. Frowick.
9 WITNESS: ROBERT FROWICK
10 Examined by Mr. O'Sullivan:
11 Q. Good afternoon, sir. Would you please state your name, for the
13 A. Good afternoon. Robert Frowick.
14 Q. Thank you. Sir, the Chamber has received a copy of your
15 curriculum vitae, which you provided to us. And I will not go into great
16 detail on that, but I will ask you some questions about your background
17 and ask you to confirm a few things for us.
18 Is it correct that you have worked in the foreign service of the
19 United States government from 1960 to 2001?
20 A. Not continuously. I retired from the career service in 1989, but
21 I've been repeatedly called back to assignments and some considerable
22 effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina in recent years.
23 Q. And your diplomatic postings over the years have taken you to
24 Europe and in particular Eastern Europe and Asia; is that correct?
25 A. Well, yes, I would say the bulk of my career centred on East-West
1 relations in Europe. I've had a few trips to the Asia Pacific region to
2 discuss the East-West phenomenon in Europe.
3 Q. In 1986, you received the personal rank of ambassador, I believe.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Of particular significance to these proceedings, I'd like to just
6 confirm two things with you: In 1999 and 2000, you were the Deputy
7 Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Dayton
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. And from 1995 to 1997, you were the Head of Mission -- OSCE
11 mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. In fact, I believe you were the initial Head of Mission in Bosnia
14 following the Dayton Agreement.
15 A. That's right. And we had to set up that mission from scratch.
16 Q. Well, can you briefly tell the Chamber of your mandate with OSCE
17 under the Dayton Agreement.
18 A. Under the Dayton Agreement, OSCE was asked to assume three
19 principal tasks in that peace process: One, to supervise the electoral
20 process for early post-war elections at all levels of governance;
21 secondly, to take a leading role in democratisation efforts in the country
22 and to work along various United Nations agencies to strengthen respect
23 for human rights. And the third task centred on regional stabilisation,
24 political and military efforts: First of all, to offer the auspices of
25 the OSCE for negotiations and confidence in security-building measures and
1 then help implement those measures; and secondly, to work on arms control
2 efforts. In the early months of the -- of the peace process, for example,
3 we succeeded in reaching agreement on a subregional arms control
4 agreement, which was, I think, quite significant in helping to stabilise
6 Q. You said that one of your objectives was supervising elections.
7 Under your mandate, were there any conditions that you set for holding
8 free elections?
9 A. Well, frankly, I thought that the Dayton Agreement, however
10 important and vital it was in stopping the war, laid out a prescription
11 for electoral process which was quite unrealistic. It called for the
12 holding of free and fair and democratic elections within six to nine
13 months from the signing of the peace agreement - the signing took place on
14 14 December 1995 in Paris - and for elections of all levels of governance,
15 that is, for a joint Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a parliamentary
16 Assembly of the House of Representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the House
17 of Representatives for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the
18 Republika Srpska Presidency, the Republika Srpska National Assembly, and
19 if feasible, it was said, for cantonal assemblies and municipal governing
20 bodies as well, and to do all of this under conditions of freedom of
21 movement, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and in a neutral
22 political environment.
23 Now, I think it was illusory to think that we could do all of that
24 within just a few months, but I took the position as the head of the
25 mission and ex officio the chairman of the Provision Election Commission
1 that we would have to do the best we could.
2 Q. I'd like focus for a few minutes on the September 1996 elections,
3 which I believe were elections for the Presidency of RS and the National
4 Assembly of RS; is that correct?
5 A. They were included in the list that I just gave.
6 Q. What position -- did you hold any specific position in connection
7 with the September 1996 elections?
8 A. Well, yes. Under Dayton, it was our responsibility in OSCE to
9 create a Provision Election Commission. We did so before the end of
10 January 1996. Then we used that commission to establish rules and
11 regulations to govern the process. As the head of the mission, I was also
12 overseeing the build-up of cadre all over the country, really - we had a
13 very extensive presence - to be able to gain enough strength and momentum
14 so that we could possibly hold elections within some months after the
15 signing of the agreement. So I was centrally involved in the whole
17 Q. In the period leading up to the September 1996 elections, did you
18 meet with Mrs. Plavsic?
19 A. At first I don't recall meeting with her. I met with President
20 Krajisnik, the Bosnian Serb member of the joint presidency of the country
21 on numerous occasions, and Mr. Buha and various others. But my first
22 recollection of meeting with Mrs. Plavsic was when she was with a group in
23 the summer of 1996 after the 14 June Florence meeting and about the time
24 that the high representative, Carl Bildt, had begun to act to strip
25 Mr. Karadzic of some of his authority as the President of Republika
1 Srpska. I recall seeing her in meetings at that time.
2 Q. Was Mrs. Plavsic in the meeting with other members of the SDS? Is
3 that correct?
4 A. That's right.
5 Q. And what was your message to the SDS leadership in relation to
6 these elections and Mr. Karadzic?
7 A. Well, the reason I was meeting with him at the time -- this -- and
8 we're talking about late June, early July 1996, I had taken a position,
9 the firm position at the Florence meeting that something had to be done
10 about Mr. Karadzic continuing to hold public office even though the
11 constitution of the country agreed that Dayton indicated that anyone
12 indicted by this Tribunal and refusing to answer a summons to come to the
13 Tribunal could not hold public office. I remember talking with Carl Bildt
14 about that, and he indicated that he was -- he had a plan underway.
15 At the end of June, it became clear that action had taken place to
16 strip Mr. Karadzic of his authority as the president of Republika Srpska
17 but nothing was happening vis-a-vis his role as the head of the party. My
18 view as the head of the Provisional Election Commission was that something
19 had to be done about that before we started the campaign. I couldn't
20 countenance a situation in which the SDS party, headed by Mr. Karadzic,
21 would simply go forward with a normal electoral campaign. So I indicated
22 that either he had to step aside or we would disenfranchise that SDS
24 Q. Now, you've mentioned that Mr. Karadzic was both president of RS
25 and the president of the SDS party. How powerful a position was it in
1 that part of the world and at that time being the party leader?
2 A. Well, you know, it brings to mind debate I had with certain
3 individuals there who took the position that public office refers to --
4 only to governmental office, and I thought the reality was we were dealing
5 with a continuing effectively communist kind of order in Republika Srpska
6 under the authority of Pale; and in that kind of a system, the party
7 really rules. And to be head of a party was tantamount to being the most
8 significant public office in that entity, and I was determined to
9 interpret the constitution that way and use -- use this as the basis for
10 my action to possibly have to disenfranchise the SDS.
11 Q. Now, during those meetings with the SDS leadership where you put
12 forward the position that Mr. Karadzic should step aside, did any members
13 of the SDS react?
14 A. Well, yes, all of them tried to -- tried to resist. I would say
15 in those, Mrs. Plavsic seemed to be studying that question and myself and
16 I guess I was studying her to some extent too. I'd heard that she was the
17 iron lady of Republika Srpska during the war, and I guess we both kind of
18 approached one another cautiously to try to understand what each of us was
19 attempting to do. She did not try to resist this in any way. I think
20 that was the main distinction between her and her colleagues.
21 Q. How was Mr. Karadzic eventually removed from his position as
22 President of RS and SDS and from public life generally?
23 A. Within a few days of the end-of-June events, when it was announced
24 that, as Carl Bildt has indicated, that Mr. Karadzic was relinquishing his
25 powers of the Presidency to Mrs. Plavsic - and I took the view that he
1 would -- that Karadzic would also have to relinquish his prerogatives as
2 head of the party - I started a whole series of steps to get across that
3 this was a firm position by OSCE.
4 For example, within days I met with the SDS leadership. Then I
5 went to Stockholm where there was the annual meeting of the OSCE
6 parliamentary assembly, and I took this position to the public. While I
7 was there, I got a call to attend an urgent meeting of the contact group
8 in London to discuss the matter. I agreed to do that but indicated that
9 I'd had an appointment immediately after Stockholm with Mr. Milosevic in
10 Belgrade to discuss the matter. At the time, I was the beneficiary of
11 tremendous support from Switzerland as chairman-in-office of OSCE, and
12 that support included the use of a Lear jet so I could move quickly from
13 one place to another.
14 I met with Mr. Milosevic. I tried to persuade him to have -- to
15 induce Karadzic to step aside. Essentially he said this was going to take
16 some time, and I felt that I didn't achieve much with him. I went to the
17 contact group in London to discuss it, and then I wanted to meet with the
18 Russians at an authority -- authoritative level. At the time, Moscow was
19 busy with a visit from Vice-President Gore of the United States, as I
20 recall. But within a few days I was asked to go to Moscow, and I
21 discussed it with Foreign Minister Primakov in his office on the very eve
22 of the commencement of the campaign, which had been rescheduled to start
23 on the 19th of July.
24 Now, in the meantime, on the 16th of July, Richard Holbrooke - so
25 important to the Dayton negotiations - appeared in Sarajevo and wanted to
1 do something to strengthen the Bosnian Serb compliance with the Dayton
2 Agreement, and he fastened upon this endeavour to remove Mr. Karadzic from
3 public office. He went to Belgrade, and on -- late on the 18th he was
4 hammering out an agreement under which Mr. Karadzic would relinquish once
5 and for all his powers of the Presidency as well as the Presidency of the
6 party and remove himself from public office. So I was able to announce on
7 the 19th, as the campaign got underway, that we suddenly had a boost to
8 its integrity.
9 Q. How did the results of the September 19th, 1996 elections affect
10 the political life in Republika Srpska?
11 A. Well, the -- within the various institutions that were brought
12 into being as a result of the elections -- again, we had the Republika
13 Srpska Presidency. Biljana Plavsic had been elected President. And the
14 National Assembly had been elected. I think the fact that Mrs. Plavsic
15 then had that authority put her into a whole new situation. There had
16 already been indications that she wanted to accept the Dayton Peace
17 process, I think, more than just about any of the other leading colleagues
18 of the SDS. So it seemed as if there was some hope for a greater
19 progress. Because my experience had been that the two sources of major
20 resistance to the whole peace process were in Pale, on the one side, and
21 then West Mostar, among ultra-nationalist Bosnian Croats there.
22 With regard to the election of the National Assembly of Republika
23 Srpska, I might note that going into those elections, the SDS party had
24 totally controlled the Assembly and had used it to thwart various efforts
25 toward peace in previous years, but coming out of those elections, that
1 83-seat Assembly found the SDS controlling only 45 seats, enough to
2 control events but not to fully dominate it as it had before.
3 Q. Do you recall Mrs. Plavsic's inaugural speech as president of RS
4 in October 1996? And if so, what do you recall about that speech?
5 A. Yes. I recall also meeting Mrs. Plavsic shortly before the
6 September elections, and the first time I really spoke with her and asked
7 her for a special mandate for holding the municipal elections, because in
8 August we'd made a decision that we should postpone the municipal
9 elections in order to ease the burden that we had in organising elections
10 at all levels of governance. All the rest of them went forward. But on
11 the municipal elections, we decided to wait a while. And she agreed to
12 that mandate.
13 Then the next time I saw her was, I think, October 19th in Banja
14 Luka when she gave her inaugural address. And I sat there and listened
15 carefully to what she said, and I was impressed with the fact that she was
16 getting across to all concerned that the Dayton Agreement was a
17 compromise. It didn't meet all of Bosnian Serb concerns, but it was
18 something that should be honoured, as I recall her arguing, in part
19 because it had legitimised the creation of the Republika Srpska and given
20 the Bosnian Serb people a chance for peace with stability.
21 Q. Once elected president of RS, did Mrs. Plavsic work with you and
22 the OSCE?
23 A. Yes. I would say rather infrequently at first, but throughout
24 1997 we had increasingly close contacts with all of the things that she
25 was involved in and challenging in Pale.
1 Q. Perhaps we can come back to that in a few minutes.
2 You've already mentioned a couple of times the municipal
3 elections, and perhaps we can discuss this for a moment or two. You said
4 that these elections did not take place in 1996 as planned. Could you
5 tell us why.
6 A. Well, the -- in the municipal scene, we had had during the war the
7 main military struggle over the cities of Sarajevo under siege one after
8 another, key localities like that. And although the war was over, the
9 political struggle continued and it was going to be very, very contentious
10 to hold elections which, under the rules of the game, would enable people
11 who used to live there - for example, let's say Muslims in Srebrenica - to
12 be able to vote themselves back into a municipal Assembly. We decided to
13 wait a while to face that particular challenge.
14 Mrs. Plavsic, in the fall of 1996, in a situation in which there
15 was increasing stability across the entire country over efforts by some to
16 go back, to sort of push their way back into where they had lived before,
17 and violence was flaring, she decided, she told me, that there was too
18 much instability and that, therefore, she was withdrawing her mandate.
19 But shortly after that, her legal counsel and ours from OSCE were
20 engaged in intensive efforts to write a new mandate, and on the 30th of
21 November we reached agreement on a new mandate, which included Republika
22 Srpska in the effort to go forward with municipal elections in due
23 course. That was significant in its timing because the following day, the
24 1st of December, in Lisbon there was an OSCE summit at which all these
25 issues were discussed and considered, and the summit in turn was followed
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 by a peace implementation conference meeting in London, where agreement
2 was reached that the municipal elections should take place in summer
4 Q. When, in fact, did those municipal elections take place in 1997?
5 A. They took place 13/14 September 1997.
6 Q. I'd like to move now to 1997. And early in that year, did
7 Mrs. Plavsic tell you anything about her relations with the SDS at that
9 A. Yes. In the spring, I began to see Mrs. Plavsic increasingly
10 frequently and she was beginning to engage in a manifest struggle with
11 Pale and expressing concern to me about the fact that in Pale those that
12 still remained around Radovan Karadzic, although he was out of the public
13 eye, were engaged in illicit trade, were refusing to pay ordinary customs
14 revenues or taxes on what they were doing, and in a way denying the
15 treasury of Republika Srpska funds that she needed to help her people. I
16 was struck by the fact that her central focus was on trying to do things
17 for the Bosnian Serb people. And she wasn't quite sure how to deal with
18 this, but she was increasingly frustrated and, I think, angry over that
20 Q. In what way did the lack of funding affect life in RS, as she saw
22 A. Well, because of the obstructionism from Pale, the international
23 community basically was refusing to provide much funding to Republika
24 Srpska. I remember at the London meeting in 1995, sitting beside
25 Madeleine Albright, who was then the US permanent representative at the
1 time, and she and others argued that unless the parties complied with the
2 peace agreement, the peace process, the international community would not
3 agree to provide the massive funds that were manifestly needed to rebuild
4 the country. The Bosnian Serbs were -- the ordinary people there were
5 victims of this lack of funding month after month, although a great deal
6 of funding was going in elsewhere in the country, and this was something
7 she was trying to deal with.
8 Q. By the middle of 1997, did Mrs. Plavsic decide to take steps to
9 deal with these problems?
10 A. Yes, she did. In the summer -- we've already heard of how she
11 took the decision to remove police authority and begin -- and she began to
12 make some changes.
13 On the 3rd of July, she called me into her office in Banja Luka
14 and said she was considering options and one of them was to dissolve the
15 Republika Srpska National Assembly that had only been elected the previous
16 September. And she said, "Now, if I do this, will OSCE agree to supervise
17 this?" Because there was no clear mandate for that. And I said I
18 couldn't tell her immediately, that this was -- it would have to be a
19 decision of the OSCE permanent council in Vienna. I was reporting every
20 three weeks or so to the permanent council in Vienna. But I kind of
21 signalled to her that I would try to be helpful to her in her quest.
22 Q. And did Mrs. Plavsic in fact dissolve the Assembly?
23 A. Then she did. She acted to dissolve the Assembly. This was an
24 act that enraged Pale. I can remember talking with Mr. Krajisnik, who
25 said, "There is no way that we will agree to going forward with new
1 elections of the Assembly." The first time I talked to him about it,
2 there was a great deal of resistance to it. The RS -- Republika Srpska
3 constitutional court took up the matter. I think one of the persons in
4 the court tried to more or less support the position of President Plavsic,
5 and he was beaten up by thugs. I met with him. I saw how severely beaten
6 he was. So we were into a rather dramatic confrontation between her and
7 those in Pale.
8 Q. Did Mrs. Plavsic's decision to dissolve the National Assembly and
9 hold these elections put her at personal and political risk?
10 A. Well, very much so. I remember meeting her not long after that
11 and from then on in situations in which she was clearly at risk, and on
12 some occasions she was staying in her office around the clock and I had
13 heard that IFOR troops were helping to secure the situation there for her
14 in Banja Luka, although IFOR was -- these were SFOR troops by then. SFOR
15 was most reluctant to engage in police activity; nevertheless, it was
16 taking some extraordinary steps to help her.
17 Q. What was the international community's reaction to the initiative
18 taken by Mrs. Plavsic to hold these extraordinary elections?
19 A. Well, if you consider myself part of the international community,
20 I was, I think, the first off the mark to try to be supportive and to
21 argue with the OSCE permanent council that yes, there were risks involved,
22 but in order to make the peace process go forward, sometimes one had to
23 take risks. We'd already proven in the case of Karadzic effort that that
24 was a way to advance, and I thought here was another opportunity. I
25 argued the same kind of thing in contact group meetings and so on, and
1 gradually momentum developed to support the idea of the new elections.
2 The contact group agreed in September 1997, as I recall, to support the
4 Q. Was there a body called the Venice Commission which was involved
5 in this process?
6 A. Yes, after the debate over the prerogatives of the constitutional
7 court and its decisions within Republika Srpska, pressure mounted for an
8 international body to move into the picture. The Venice Commission was
9 prevailed upon, and a decision was taken there to uphold Mrs. Plavsic's
10 right to dissolve the Assembly.
11 Q. Can you tell us briefly what the Venice Commission was.
12 A. As I understand it, it was a legal body to which the Europeans,
13 the European Union and Council of Europe, referred in order to make a
14 judgement of this kind.
15 Q. In this period, did Mrs. Plavsic break with the SDS and form a new
16 political party?
17 A. Yes, with events moving quickly that September, after the contact
18 group agreed to support the idea, and with considerable turmoil, tension
19 in Republika Srpska, she created a new party in late September, as I
20 recall, the SNS, the Serb National Alliance. Late September. And the
21 elections were to be held that fall, so she didn't have much time. But
22 she was able to attract some members of the SDS and others to join her.
23 Q. You mentioned earlier that it was in this period leading up to the
24 November elections that your contacts with Mrs. Plavsic increased. Could
25 you tell us a bit about those contacts.
1 A. Well, yes, they became very intensive, indeed. And in fact, I was
2 meeting with her more than anyone else in the country, although I
3 continued to have to meet with the political leaders on all sides and
4 attend various international gatherings to generally move things forward.
5 But I was seeing her quite frequently and trying to work out modalities
6 for these extraordinary elections, settle a time frame and so on.
7 Q. The fact that Mrs. Plavsic had created a new party so late in the
8 process, at that time, was it -- I assume that it was not a foregone
9 conclusion that she would win at the polls?
10 A. There were many who were very worried about what might happen
11 because the SDS had all of the advantages of financial resources, control
12 over media, and, you know, prior controls over elections with Kaderja
13 [phoen], to man polling stations and all of those things. And there were
14 some who asked the question: If the SDS feels as if it's going to lose
15 something here, maybe it wouldn't cooperate and maybe we can't have a
16 proper election and maybe she'll be defeated. But I argued, while the SDS
17 had those levers of power, she had something that seemed to me - and this
18 was simply subjective - but it seemed to me, she had a message for the
19 ordinary Bosnian Serb people that was gaining increasing resonance.
20 And that fall, when she created the party, she went out into a
21 vigorous campaign to emphasise, above all, her concern over the
22 corruption, the illicit trade of the people in Pale, how they were
23 avoiding paying their due taxes and so on, lining their own pockets, while
24 most of the Bosnian Serb people were suffering, and she was trying to do
25 something about it. And so I thought she did have the potential of the
2 Q. What were the results of the National Assembly election --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Please repeat the
5 THE WITNESS: Mrs. Plavsic achieved a stunning victory. It did
6 not seem apparent at first because it took a while for the definitive
7 results to come in. But for example, the SDS, which prior to 1996 had
8 controlled the National Assembly, had emerged from 1996 with 45 of the 83
9 seats. In 1997, in these extraordinary elections, the SDS presence
10 dropped to only 24 seats and even with the Radical Party could not form a
11 government any longer.
12 MR. O'SULLIVAN:
13 Q. Did this mean that Pale had lost its power base in the Assembly?
14 A. Yes, it had lost its power base. And Mrs. Plavsic, as the results
15 became clearer, was the architect at putting together what was in effect a
16 multi-ethnic coalition of 44 members of the National Assembly against the
17 39 combined SDS and Radicals and was able to shift power effectively from
18 Pale to Banja Luka and in fact began shifting all of the agencies of
19 government to Banja Luka.
20 Q. And the shift -- the transfer of government offices from Pale to
21 Banja Luka took place after these elections?
22 A. Yes. And I should add that I was leaving my position as the OSCE
23 Head of Mission in December. As you say, the elections were 22/23
24 November. My finale in a way was at the Bonn Peace Implementation meeting
25 in December; and even then, we weren't entirely clear what the results
1 would be.
2 Q. What was the ethnic of this Assembly after those elections?
3 A. There were 18 Muslim and Croat deputies in the Assembly, and they
4 joined the Sloga coalition that Mr. Dodik has spoken about, which included
5 a variety of parties from the different ethnic backgrounds. And it was a
6 very heterogeneous group. I thought -- I should add, there's some
7 misunderstanding, I've noticed, by writings of people who should know
8 better that in 1996, we already had a result of 18 Muslim and Croats
9 elected to that National Assembly, but they had absolutely no power at
10 all. And they were in the opposition to the SDS. This time, they were in
11 the governing coalition. And while they were checkmated effectively by
12 many of the Bosnian Serb deputies, still, they were part of the governing
14 Q. Did the results of these elections have any impact on financial
15 assistance to RS?
16 A. The results of those elections, in my opinion, represented a very
17 significant breakthrough and an advance for the Dayton peace process
18 because of what I have been just been discussing, and it opened the way to
19 much closer working relationship between the Bosnian Serb leadership of
20 Mrs. Plavsic and her colleagues and the international community. And
21 finally, in early 1997, the international community started bringing in
22 substantial funds to help her and to help this effort, and at last the
23 Bosnian Serb people were beginning to become beneficiary of such help.
24 Q. Let me conclude by asking a few questions about Mrs. Plavsic. How
25 important was she to you and your work as the Head of Mission in Bosnia?
1 A. I would say that she became increasingly important in the over two
2 years that I was involved in that position. I think what I've just
3 indicated should demonstrate that fact. She was decisive in making these
4 changes in Republika Srpska. And remember, what I'm talking about is the
5 electoral process; peaceful democratic change through elections. That is
6 the instrument she was in support of.
7 Q. To that extent, she supported the Dayton agreement?
8 A. Yes, she was singular on the Bosnian Serb side in supporting the
9 Dayton agreement.
10 Q. In your view, did she show political courage and conviction?
11 A. Well, from the very beginning, she always had political courage.
12 It was tested mightily in the summer and fall of 1997 when she confronted
13 Pale, as she did. She didn't waiver. She saw it through, and she won.
14 Q. And finally, in your view, did she support democracy and the rule
15 of law?
16 A. Yes. Because of the nature of her attack against Pale, I have
17 thought of her as, in a way, attacking corruption, injustice, and becoming
18 the champion within Republika Srpska of a struggle against criminality.
19 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Thank you. I have no further questions, Your
21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Frowick, thank you for coming to the International
22 Tribunal to give your evidence. You're free to go.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
24 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now. Half past 2.00.
25 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.58 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 2.32 p.m.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. The next witness is Dr. Alex
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE MAY: If the witness would take the declaration.
7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
8 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
9 WITNESS: ALEXANDER LIONEL BORAINE
10 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
11 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Examined by Mr. Tieger:
14 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Boraine. Thank you for joining us today. Can
15 we begin, please, by having you state your full name and spell your last
16 name for the record.
17 A. Alexander Lionel Boraine, B-O-R-A-I-N-E.
18 Q. Dr. Boraine, I'd like to begin by covering some aspects of your
19 background. As I understand it, you grew up in South Africa during the
20 time of apartheid and your reaction to and abhorrence of the injustices of
21 apartheid led you first to the ministry of the Methodist Church in South
22 Africa; is that correct?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. And is it correct, sir, that you were eventually elected head of
25 the Methodist Church in South Africa?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. As I further understand it, your service in that position provided
3 you with an even greater understanding into the destructive nature and
4 injustices of apartheid and to strive to do more to directly combat it,
5 and for that reason you left the ministry and entered politics.
6 Okay. What role did you have in politics and where did you serve
7 and for how long?
8 A. I was elected as a member of parliament in Capetown, one of the
9 constituencies in that city, and started in 1974 and served for 12 years.
10 Q. And did you leave the parliament on your own accord? And if so,
11 what were your reasons?
12 A. I went into parliament thinking that by confronting the people who
13 were oppressing the majority, that one could make some difference, offer
14 some alternatives, oppose. But things got steadily worse, and by the
15 middle of the 1980s South Africa was a military state. There was an
16 atmosphere in the country which was violent, and I didn't think there was
17 any point in continuing to debate issues when my country was on fire, so I
18 walked out of parliament, yes.
19 Q. And after that, did you found an institute?
20 A. Yes. I wasn't sure what I should be doing. It seemed so utterly
21 hopeless to try anything at the time. But after consultation with a lot
22 of people who were being hurt most, I started an Institute for a
23 Democratic Alternative in South Africa, IDASA, whose main purpose was to
24 try to shift away from the politics of oppression and the politics of
25 resistance to the politics of negotiation as a way forward for my
1 country. And we did exactly that, both inside and outside the country.
2 Q. And did you participate in the negotiations that precipitated the
3 end of apartheid?
4 A. Yes. For that very difficult four years, yes.
5 Q. Now, in the aftermath of apartheid and its end, did it become
6 apparent that the legacy of the past abuses would have to be addressed for
7 the country to be sustainable?
8 A. Yes. It seemed to me that if this fragile democracy had any
9 chance of succeeding, then you really had to come to terms with the past,
10 which was often cloaked in darkness, in propaganda, in lies. And so I
11 actually started a new institute called Justice In Transition, with a
12 focus mainly on dealing with the past for the sake of the future.
13 Q. And at some point did President Mandela ask you to become the
14 co-chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
15 A. Yes, that's right.
16 Q. When was that?
17 A. That was in 1995.
18 Q. And in that capacity, you worked with Bishop Tutu; is that
20 A. That's correct, yes.
21 Q. Now, I'll ask you more about your experiences with and the
22 insights gleaned from your work with the commission. But since leaving
23 the commission, have you taught at the law school at NYU?
24 A. Yes, for the last three years, I have been teaching there. First,
25 as a visiting fellow; then as a full-time teacher while I was trying to
1 write a book; and then now on a part-time capacity, but I still teach
2 there, yes.
3 Q. I understand your book is entitled "Country Unmasked" and it
4 details the work of the commission and the relevance of the commission to
5 other parts of the world.
6 A. That's right, yes.
7 Q. As a result of your work, did you become involved with assisting
8 other countries in their efforts to come to grips with the legacy of past
9 abuses following mass atrocities and conflict?
10 A. I think because the South African Commission was public and
11 televised and on radio, it was noticed in many parts of the world. And I
12 think that some countries that were in transition themselves thought they
13 may be able to learn something from our own experiences. Some of them
14 seemed to imagine that you could simply take the South African experience
15 and duplicate it, which of course you can't. But it did mean that I was
16 constantly being asked to visit many countries to advise incoming
17 presidents or ministers or human rights groups about the nature of
18 transition, how to tackle the past, and how to build a future based on a
19 human rights culture.
20 Q. In an effort to expand that contribution, did you become the
21 founding president of another institute?
22 A. Yes. The institute for -- the Centre for Transitional Justice.
23 This was only about 18 months ago. We have grown remarkably, and we now
24 work in about 15 different countries: Latin America, Africa, the Balkans,
25 Northern Ireland, and Southeast Asia.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Dr. Boraine, as you know, one of the issues raised and discussed
2 during the course of this hearing has been reconciliation and the
3 contribution to reconciliation that Mrs. Plavsic's acknowledgement of
4 crimes and acceptance of responsibility may have. For that reason, both
5 the Defence and the Prosecution have asked you to come here to assist the
6 Court in understanding that issue of the hearing.
7 Let me ask you, first, then, sir: Based on all your experiences,
8 what role does accountability generally play in the process of
10 A. I would have to say that if accountability was not present, then
11 the reconciliation would be a contradiction in terms. I think systems of
12 criminal justice exist not simply to determine guilt or innocence, but
13 also to contribute to a safe and peaceful society. And therefore, these
14 systems are absolutely critical in the process of reconciliation. They
15 are not at odds. They are not a contradiction. In my experience,
16 accepting responsibility for terrible crimes can have a transformative and
17 traumatic impact on the perpetrator, but also on the victims and the wider
18 community. Such acceptance, whether by a guilty plea in a criminal case
19 or in some other forum, can, I believe, be a significant factor in
20 promoting reconciliation and creating what I would call space for new
21 attitudes and new behaviour. It has that potential; I'm not saying it's
22 always realised.
23 But the ICTY was established not only to determine guilt or
24 innocence of individual accused, but, and I quote: "To contribute to the
25 restoration and the maintenance of peace," and again, I quote: "To
1 contribute to the settlement of wider issues of accountability,
2 reconciliation, and establishing the truth behind the evils perpetrated in
3 the former Yugoslavia." And in the case of the accused, Ms. Biljana
4 Plavsic, these objectives, I think, take on special meaning. After all,
5 Mrs. Plavsic is -- was the former president of Republika Srpska, has pled
6 guilty to the crime of persecutions on political, racial, and religious
7 grounds for acts committed in more than 30 Bosnian municipalities in
8 1992. And with this act, this act of acceptance of guilt, she assumes
9 responsibility for those horrors that many Serb leaders continue to deny.
10 We should, therefore, never forget or seek to minimise the crimes
11 for which she has assumed responsibility. And the list of crimes is
12 almost like a litany of death: A killing of defenceless civilians,
13 torture, physical and psychological abuse, sexual violence, the forced
14 displacement of entire communities, the existence of detention camps where
15 thousands of prisoners were kept in inhumane conditions and many killed,
16 the razing of entire villages. Thus, any effort to achieve justice and
17 reconciliation that fails to recognise the enormity of these crimes will,
18 I think, jeopardise the transformative potential of Mrs. Plavsic's
20 Q. What would you consider to be the significance of a plea of guilty
21 by someone like Mrs. Plavsic for reconciliation or, for that matter, of
22 the statements that she made accompanying that plea?
23 A. I think, very briefly, four things: One, as a Serb nationalist
24 and former political leader of some significance, her confession sends out
25 a very crucial message about the true criminal character of the enterprise
1 with which she was engaged. It really takes very seriously what
3 And secondly, it also sends a powerful message about the
4 legitimacy of this Tribunal and its functions. It's important to
5 recognise that Mrs. Plavsic surrendered herself to the Tribunal,
6 voluntarily travelled to The Hague. Too often, this Tribunal has
7 constituted the focus of anger and grievance among leaders and large
8 segments of the public in Serbia and Republika Srpska, rather than
9 focussing on the war criminals in their midst.
10 In the third place, Mrs. Plavsic has apologised and called on
11 other leaders to examine their own conduct. I think this is particularly
13 And fourthly, this acceptance of responsibility may demonstrate to
14 victims that at long last someone has acknowledged their own personal
16 Genuine reconciliation, in my view, in the former Yugoslavia will
17 remain illusive until responsibility is accepted by those who through
18 defiant declarations or silent indifference explicitly or implicitly
19 endorse these atrocities. Mrs. Biljana Plavsic has taken this crucial
20 first step, so different from so many other leaders from that part of the
22 Q. And in what way do you envision this as a first step?
23 A. I think that any acknowledgement as significant, as grave, as
24 public as this doesn't happen just once or instantaneously. I think it's
25 a series of steps. We have been reminded that appropriate weight should
1 be given to her role in ending a war and seeking to implement the Dayton
2 Peace Accords. Her role in seeking to steer her people away from the
3 violent nationalism that she herself helped to foster should be recognised
4 as one of a series of steps.
5 I think that another step which would help this Tribunal and
6 probably help so many of us outside of this Tribunal as to how it was
7 possible for such madness to occur at such a rate and in such deep
8 intensity. And I think a further act of contrition would be for her to
9 tell the world how this really came about; not because we are merely
10 curious but I think because it would assist people in the region to have a
11 better understanding in helping them to come to terms with this, but more
12 especially that it could help in helping other countries to avoid the same
13 mistakes. So I think that this is a -- this is a process and could have
14 enormous impact if it was followed through.
15 Q. Now, in the context of a couple of earlier remarks, you referred
16 to the impact on victims. Let me ask you what -- what role victims play
17 in this process of accountability and dispensing justice.
18 A. I think that victims ought to be at the very centre. The problem
19 is we don't like victims very much because they make demands. They cry to
20 be heard. And in the very nature of things, in criminal justice it's --
21 it's very difficult to find the time and the energy and the place so that
22 they do become central and are very often marginalised.
23 If we are going to try and blend accountability with
24 reconciliation or to strike the right balance between punishment and
25 forgiveness, to focus on a sordid past but also on a more hopeful future,
1 then it's imperative that we should be guided first and foremost by those
2 who have borne the brunt of past injustice. Full justice cannot ever be
3 delivered if it is done at the expense of the victims. They need to be
4 heard. And I think all of us have to learn to listen much more than
5 perhaps we do right now. Reconciliation can all too easily be undermined
6 if victims feel that their pain and suffering has not been given
7 sufficient recognition in both judicial and non-judicial processes
8 established to respond to gross violations of human rights.
9 I must caution, however, that respecting the experiences and views
10 of victims does not mean putting words in their mouths or characterising
11 them as either insisting on retribution or being amenable to lenience.
12 The fact of the matter is that victims are as complex and veiled as human
13 beings themselves and they demand proper consideration of their pain and
14 their different perspectives, but to be heard in terms of accountability
15 and reconciliation is imperative.
16 Q. I want to turn to your understanding based on your work with the
17 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the importance of
18 confession, acceptance, reconciliation, and particularly accountability in
19 a process such as this.
20 A. Well, I think the first thing I have to point out, I suppose is
21 fairly obvious, is that the South African Truth and Reconciliation
22 Commission was a commission and not a court. Many do confuse the two
23 sometimes, but truth commissions are neither the same as judicial bodies,
24 nor, I hasten to add, an adequate substitute for them. Truth commissions
25 are non-judicial bodies and have -- and as such have far fewer powers than
1 do courts. They have no power to put people in prison. They cannot even
2 enforce their recommendations, even though they may be quite good.
3 But on the other hand, it's my experience not only in South Africa
4 but elsewhere that truth commissions can potentially complement the work
5 of courts in several ways: First, by establishing the broad causes and
6 consequences of past abuses; by gathering, organising, and preserving
7 evidence that can be used by the commission and in prosecutions; providing
8 a public platform for victims through public hearings. In South Africa,
9 we heard over 22.000 victims, and obviously other truth commissions have
10 heard lots of people as well. But I make that point because a commission
11 is geared to do just that. And fourthly, it can make far-reaching
12 recommendations regarding victim reparation and necessary legal and
13 institutional reforms.
14 Now, the commission in my own country was unique in that unlike
15 any other commission, it had the authority -- in fact, it was bound by the
16 draft constitution to grant amnesty to perpetrators of
17 politically-motivated crimes. I don't think that this kind of commission
18 would be desirable or constructive in the former Yugoslavia. These
19 amnesty provisions were arguably the greatest but also the most
20 controversial innovation of the commission.
21 Ultimately, we received over 7.000 applications for amnesty, which
22 came as a considerable shock because the general view was that no one
23 would come forward. Why would they? But of course there was both the
24 carrot-and-the-stick approach, and that, I think, brought many of the
25 perpetrators to come and to confess. But we, perhaps rightly or perhaps
1 wrongly, did not ask of them that they should apologise or show
2 contrition. The reason why we did that was because we thought it could be
3 so easily abused and contrived. And it was far better if it was a much
4 more spontaneous --
5 Q. Dr. Boraine, excuse me --
6 A. I just want to finally underline that in truth commissions, when
7 people come and ask for amnesty, there is a degree of accountability. And
8 one of the conditions of the South African legislation was that the full
9 account had to be given in order for amnesty to be considered. And if the
10 judges of the supreme court who sat on the amnesty committee felt for any
11 reason whatsoever that full accountability had not been given, then
12 amnesty would obviously be withheld. But I do think that there is a very
13 clear distinction between a court, and certainly a Tribunal, and a truth
15 Q. What did you find to be the impact on victims and even on the
16 perpetrators themselves of acknowledgements of responsibility and
18 A. I think one of the positive features of the South African
19 commission was that it responded to a plea by victims, and it's the same
20 cry that I've heard all over the world in so many different cultures and
21 different languages, and it goes something like this, quite simply, and
22 yet desperately: "I want to know what happened. I want to know why it
23 happened. I want to know where the body is of my loved one. I want to
24 know." And this was certainly a very strong plea and an articulate cry
25 from thousands of victims in my own country because so many people had
1 been spirited away, so many people had disappeared, so many assassination
2 squads had been at work. And I think the fact that perpetrators came and
3 told sometimes very grizzly stories of what they had done was almost a
4 relief to the victims. They actually faced the perpetrators, because
5 obviously they were encouraged to attend the amnesty hearings and, indeed,
6 were provided with transport and provision to do. And I think that
7 victims were saying: "We are anxious for information or for knowledge,
8 but we want more than that. We want acknowledgement. We want an
9 acknowledgement that someone was responsible for what happened to our loved
10 ones." And this knowledge and acknowledgement, I think, was extremely
11 important. But also through personal story-telling, a public process got
12 underway, a silence was broken, and this led to multiple story-telling
13 exercises throughout the society at community level.
14 It has to be acknowledged that, of course, perpetrators who came
15 forward to give confessions did so with the expectation of getting
16 something out of it. It was a kind of quid pro quo. They hoped that by
17 making full confession, they would be saved from appearing in court or
18 going to prison. But I have to admit that sitting and watching and
19 listening for two and a half years, I was struck by the number of
20 perpetrators who actually did confess and apologise; many broke down,
21 quite literally, as they gave their public testimonies and asked of the
22 commission that we organise meetings between themselves and their
23 victims. Sometimes the victims agreed; sometimes they refused. But the
24 instances where they agreed, I must say it was quite a remarkable
25 experience for me.
1 One could go on and on about this, but let me stop there.
2 Q. Now, I asked you about the impact on victims and perpetrators of
3 the process of accountability and particularly acknowledgements of
4 responsibility. Can you give us some greater understanding of the
5 potential impact on societies at large.
6 A. Well, I think the uniqueness of the South African experience was
7 that it was the first ever commission not to be held behind closed doors.
8 This meant that there was total access to the public, but also to the
9 television cameras and radio and the print media. And this meant, of
10 course, that a whole country participated in this exercise. The simplest
11 and the poorest country in my country, who were amongst the greatest
12 victims, had access to a little transistor radio and could hear the
13 translation into their own language and could participate. And it became,
14 I suppose, a kind of national catharsis. It created debate and argument
15 and difference and acknowledgement and denial all over the country. And I
16 think truth-telling by victims and perpetrators struck a very powerful
17 blow against amnesia in my country.
18 Let me perhaps summarise the relevant lessons which come to me as
19 I think about that process as it relates to people who confess and
20 apologise. First, full disclosure in confessions is critical. The
21 absence of detail can render a confession vacuous and insignificant.
22 Second, all victims will not react to the same way to confessions by their
23 victimisers; but in some cases, and in many cases, reconciliation becomes
24 possible through confession. Thirdly, expressions of remorse, when
25 genuine and voluntary, can sometimes provide a measure of closure for
1 victims. And fourthly, broad publicity of the causes, the nature, and the
2 extent of the gross violations of human rights is extremely important.
3 In South Africa, we, as I already referred to, did not ask for any
4 public apology or act of contrition. I think we were probably wrong in
5 that. And as you may know, one of the countries, East Timor, that we work
6 in, low-level perpetrators are able to avoid prosecution provided that
7 they participate in community reconciliation processes whereby they
8 confess, apologise, and agree to perform an act of reconciliation,
9 community service. And I'm convinced that confessions and apologies can
10 be cheapened if they are not accompanied by the appropriate remedial
12 Q. Now, we've heard some references in earlier testimony to the
13 impact that acknowledgements of responsibility might have in reducing
14 tensions or further potential conflict. Has your work provided you with
15 any insights into the -- into any linkage between acceptance of
16 responsibility and reduction of tensions or the potential for further
18 A. Well, I have no doubt that admissions of responsibility,
19 particularly from civilian and military leaders, I think that's key, can
20 help prevent basic points of fact from continuing to be a source of
21 conflict or bitterness. And this, of course, in turn, can help to reduce
22 tensions in society and thereby facilitate peaceful coexistence or
23 reconciliation, so there is a potential to break the cycle of violence and
24 create a more sustainable peace as a result.
25 I think confessions can also help to expose the hypocrisy and the
1 lies of others; and I think also on an individual level, confessions,
2 especially remorseful ones, have the potential to generate a kind of
3 forgiveness on the part of victims and help to deter private acts of
5 On the other hand - and I really do want to underline this - one
6 must not overstate the potential, the individual, the social impact of
7 confessions. Reconciliation and healing, whether it be at an individual
8 or societal level, generally requires much more than confessions in both
9 short term and long term. In the circumstances here, it certainly
10 requires judicial punishment for wrongdoers, and there are those who argue
11 that the 1960 domestic trials in Germany helped the international
12 community and even the holocaust survivors to see Germans in a different
13 and more positive light as a direct result of that -- those criminal
15 And then secondly, in addition to confessions, I think victim
16 compensation programmes - and one looks at Chile for their reparations
17 programme for the families of murdered and disappeared - helped to restore
18 for some victims, at least, a greater trust in the state and the society
19 in these more different and positive light as a result of the removal of
20 abusers from office.
21 I think, too, that in many countries the process of reconciliation
22 cannot really start, even though some make confessions, until the war is
23 at an end. And Mozambique is a classic case.
24 In my own country, where -- an almost miracle took place, where
25 everybody - including many of us - in the country expected the end to be
1 more of a bloodbath than anything else. And through negotiation, we were
2 able to find a new way forward. But even that -- even the measure of
3 reconciliation which took place there -- unless the vast black majority
4 are given access to decent housing, education, healthcare, jobs, well, you
5 can kiss reconciliation goodbye. In other words --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Dr. Boraine, I think you have come to a matter
7 that I wanted to raise. It is: How do you measure the effect of
8 reconciliation? For example, in your own country - and South Africa is
9 quite often referred to as an example in this respect - but to what extent
10 is it the outcome not just of reconciliation but of a wider negotiating
11 process of which reconciliation is but one part? And I wanted to ask you
12 whether any surveys or studies have been done to measure the effect of
13 acknowledgement of guilt in the reconciliation process. Is it something
14 that has been scientifically measured?
15 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think that some people have
16 mistakenly talked about the South African model as political negotiations
17 and then a Truth and Reconciliation Commission -- my own view is that
18 reconciliation started when former enemies stopped killing each other and
19 sat round a table and started negotiating a new constitution. For me,
20 that's -- that's a kind of litmus test, that it was not merely words but
21 people who actually hated each other, people who were trying to kill each
22 other, sat round this table, as I said, and negotiated a new
23 constitution. And it was extremely difficult.
24 I remember the security police in my country who had a list of
25 people who were -- who were, as they saw it, legitimate targets; the
1 African National Congress, for example, by name, by photograph. And a
2 year later -- this was 1989 in a state of emergency. A year later, these
3 same security policemen were now having to guard and protect the people
4 they were given licence to kill. And that's a huge change.
5 It is not something, however, that I think you can ever say has
6 arrived or been accomplished. It's always a process, and there will be
7 setbacks, and there certainly were in my country and there are still --
8 there's still much to be done. The baggage that we carry there after 300
9 years of colonialism and racism is enormous, and it's extremely tense at
10 times --
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: If I can interrupt you. I think the question
12 that is before us is much more specific. I mean, if there has been
13 reconciliation in South Africa, to what extent has truth-telling,
14 acknowledgement of past wrongs contributed to that? Has it been a
15 significant factor? Because the claim that is being made here is that the
16 plea of guilt, of guilty, will contribute significantly to the
17 reconciliation process in Yugoslavia, and that is the specific issue which
18 I think we have to grapple with. So in looking at South Africa, I ask the
19 question: If there has been reconciliation, to what extent has
20 truth-telling and acknowledgement of past wrongs been a significant factor
21 in that process?
22 THE WITNESS: I am -- I have a bias as someone who participated
23 very directly in the shift which took place in South Africa, so I'm
24 subjective. But I have to say that I have no doubts that the opportunity
25 to break the silence, for people to tell their stories, both,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 interestingly enough, victims and perpetrators, have played a significant
2 role in easing the very real tensions and even hatred in my own country.
3 I think the fact that whites, who were largely responsible for this,
4 apartheid, denied over and over again that the horrific things which were
5 published all over the world - but not in my country - denied that this
6 could ever have happened. And when they -- once they had listened first
7 to the victims -- and even then they said, "You're exaggerating." But
8 when the perpetrators came -- and no perpetrator is going to come and talk
9 about things which throw a very, very bad light on him or her unless they
10 are true. And I think that absolutely devastated many, many people and
11 broke the denial in many instances and I think did -- and I don't want to
12 exaggerate: There were many other factors, but I do think that the
13 exercise brought a very significant measure of reconciliation to South
15 Whether that is true elsewhere or whether it's appropriate here or
16 in the former Yugoslavia, I cannot tell. But everywhere I have been in
17 the world, I have found that one - only one - of the aspects which have
18 been extremely helpful in creating a climate where people can begin to
19 co-exist is this act of truth-telling, of truth delivery.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Dr. Boraine, can I follow up on His Honour Judge Robinson's
23 question and ask you, if I can, if you have any thoughts on the specific
24 -- the specific role that Mrs. Plavsic's plea or her actions can have on
25 reconciliation in former Yugoslavia, particularly with regard to the
1 general possibilities that you mentioned earlier.
2 A. Well, firstly, I hope very much that Mrs. Plavsic's actions will
3 prompt other leaders responsible for similar crimes to acknowledge their
4 culpability, to recognise the jurisdiction of this Court, and to accept
5 the appropriate punishment. I think this is a factor which has been so
6 lacking in former Yugoslavia. And I've been to that region on many
7 occasions and talked with people from the highest to the lowest. And
8 there does seem to be a stubborn resistance and a denial. I think that
9 when someone who is in a significant leadership position actually makes
10 the break, as has been done in this case, and can prompt - and who knows
11 whether this will help or not - but there is a potential, at least, of
12 prompting other leaders to come forward. And I hope very much that that
14 I think it's also true that her statements could - could - help
15 catalyse or initiate a process of honest truth-telling and acknowledgement
16 throughout former Yugoslavia. So I don't think it's necessary for a
17 handful of people to be indicted and tried when one accepts all the
18 limitations which exist. But I think the problem is much more deep than
19 that; and therefore, if there could be some form of truth-telling, which
20 may be very different from the South African model, but in order to
21 achieve justice and truth and reconciliation, if her actions can help
22 precipitate that, then I think it would be very significant indeed.
23 Truth-telling and truth-recovery should be a part of a comprehensive
24 effort to deal with the past. And so I think in those ways, her own
25 acknowledgement, her own apology, her own appeal to leaders could play a
2 Q. Dr. Boraine, I just want to ask you one last question, and I want
3 to therefore provide you with the opportunity to share with the Court any
4 last observations or comments that you would like to make about the issues
5 that you see as significant in today's hearing.
6 A. Yes, I'll try. Your Honours, the courts have an important role to
7 play in the creation of accurate historical record. I listened with great
8 interest to President Jorda in Sarajevo last year when he and I shared a
9 panel where he made the point that a Tribunal can't try everyone - it's
10 just impossible - and that a Tribunal can't listen to every victim, even
11 though they need and deserve to be heard; that a Tribunal can't always
12 calculate the patterns and the causes of the horrendous crimes which took
13 place; and it's difficult for a Tribunal on its own to pull together and
14 piece together a collective memory where people begin to agree at least on
15 some certain basic facts. And that is why I think that - and I think he
16 was correct in what he said - a multiplicity of efforts are going to be
17 required. And if Mrs. Plavsic's contribution can assist in that, then I
18 think we should be ready to encourage others to do otherwise.
19 I want to, in conclusion, very strongly support her call to all
20 leaders on all sides in the past conflict to examine their own conduct.
21 There have been a limited number of apologies, but they have been partial
22 at best and have not been backed up by reparative programmes in favour of
23 victims. Instead, apologies have generally been accompanied with
24 noncooperation with the ICTY, one-sided trials at a national level, and
25 ongoing intimidation of local minorities. If the region's citizens and
1 leaders are not prepared to seriously confront the demons of the past, the
2 next generation will bear the consequences.
3 And it does seem to me, in my final sentence, that looking at
4 Mrs. Plavsic's record, both in terms of the seriousness of her crime, and
5 also in her change of behaviour and her acknowledgement and confession,
6 that in some way, she seems to have grasped a second chance, and is to be
7 commended for that, but much more importantly, I think the people of
8 former Yugoslavia deserve a second chance and to move away from the
9 prejudices and the hatreds of the past to a more tolerant, a more decent
10 future with human rights as its centerpiece. And if her behaviour and her
11 actions and her words can assist the people of that part of the world who
12 have suffered so much, then I hope that with time and courage, the cause
13 of narrow nationalisms will wane, and pluralistic societies grounded in
14 human rights and the rule of law will emerge. The reality is there is no
15 other choice that can guarantee sustainable peace in the region.
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Dr. Boraine. I have nothing further,
17 Your Honours.
18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Pavich, any questions?
19 MR. PAVICH: No, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MAY: Dr. Boraine, thank you for coming to give evidence to
21 the Court. We are grateful. You are, of course, free to go.
22 [The witness withdrew]
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Pavich.
24 MR. PAVICH: Mrs. Plavsic would like an opportunity to address the
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, she may do so. If she wishes to stand, she can;
2 or if she wishes to sit, she may sit. As she wishes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honours,
4 Madam Prosecutor, Counsel: I'm thankful to have this opportunity to speak
5 today. Nearly two years ago, I came before this Tribunal, having been
6 charged with participating in crimes against other human beings, and even
7 against humanity itself. I came for two reasons: To confront these
8 charges and to spare my people, for it was clear that they would pay the
9 price of any refusal to come.
10 I have now had time to examine these charges and, together with my
11 lawyers, conduct our own investigation and evaluation. I have now come to
12 the belief and accept the fact that many thousands of innocent people were
13 the victims of an organised, systematic effort to remove Muslims and
14 Croats from the territory claimed by Serbs. At the time, I easily
15 convinced myself that this was a matter of survival and self-defence. In
16 fact, it was more. Our leadership, of which I was a necessary part, led
17 an effort which victimised countless innocent people.
18 Explanations of self-defence and survival offer no justification.
19 By the end, it was said, even among our own people, that in this war we
20 had lost our nobility of character. The obvious questions become, if this
21 truth is now self-evident, why did I not see it earlier? And how could
22 our leaders and those who followed have committed such acts? The answer
23 to both questions is, I believe, fear, a blinding fear that led to an
24 obsession, especially for those of us for whom the Second World War was a
25 living memory, that Serbs would never again allow themselves to become
1 victims. In this, we in the leadership violated the most basic duty of
2 every human being, the duty to restrain oneself and to respect the human
3 dignity of others. We were committed to do whatever was necessary to
5 Although I was repeatedly informed of allegations of cruel and
6 inhuman conduct against non-Serbs, I refused to accept them or even to
7 investigate. In fact, I immersed myself in addressing the suffering of
8 the war's innocent Serb victims. This daily work confirmed in my mind
9 that we were in a struggle for our very survival and that in this
10 struggle, the international community was our enemy, and so I simply
11 denied these charges, making no effort to investigate. I remained secure
12 in my belief that Serbs were not capable of such acts. In this obsession
13 of ours to never again become victims, we had allowed ourselves to become
15 You have heard, both yesterday and today, the litany of suffering
16 that this produced. I have accepted responsibility for my part in this.
17 This responsibility is mine and mine alone. It does not extend to other
18 leaders who have a right to defend themselves. It certainly should not
19 extend to our Serbian people, who have already paid a terrible price for
20 our leadership. The knowledge that I am responsible for such human
21 suffering and for soiling the character of my people will always be with
23 There is a justice which demands a life for each innocent life, a
24 death for each wrongful death. It is, of course, not possible for me to
25 meet the demands of such justice. I can only do what is in my power and
1 hope that it will be of some benefit, that having come to the truth, to
2 speak it, and to accept responsibility. This will, I hope, help the
3 Muslim, Croat, and even Serb innocent victims not to be overtaken with
4 bitterness, which often becomes hatred and is in the end
6 As for my own people, I have referred today to their character. I
7 think it, therefore, important to explain what I'm speaking of. There now
8 stands in the centre of Belgrade a great domed church, still under
9 construction, the construction begun in 1935. Our people have persevered
10 in building this church as a monument to a man who more than any other
11 formed the character of the Serbian people. That man was the great
12 St. Sava. The path he followed was marked by self-restraint and respect
13 for all others. A great diplomat who gained the respect of his people and
14 the world around him, a man whose character has become deeply ingrained in
15 the Serbian people. It is the path and example of St. Sava that the great
16 Serbian leaders have followed, even in our own times, demonstrating a
17 noble endurance and dignity, even in the most difficult circumstances.
18 One need only point to Bishop Artemije Radosavljevic, who to this
19 very day is a voice crying out for justice in what has become for Serbs
20 the wilderness of Kosovo. Tragically, our leaders, including myself,
21 abandoned this path in the last war. I think it is clear that I have
22 separated myself from those leaders, but too late. Yet, this leadership,
23 without shame, continues to seek the loyalty and support of our people.
24 It is done by provoking fear and speaking half-truths in order to convince
25 our people that the world is against us. But by now the fruits of this
1 leadership are clear. They are graves, refugees, isolation, and
2 bitterness against the whole world, which spurns us because of these very
4 I have been urged that this is not the time nor the place to speak
5 this truth. We must wait, they say, until others also accept
6 responsibility for their deeds. But I believe that there is no place and
7 that there is no time where it is not appropriate to speak the truth. I
8 believe that we must put our own house in order. Others will have to
9 examine themselves and their own conduct. We must live in the world and
10 not in a cave. The world is always imperfect and often unjust, but as
11 long as we persevere and preserve our identity and our character, we have
12 nothing to fear.
13 As for me, it is the members of this Trial Chamber that have been
14 given the responsibility to judge. You must strive in your judgment to
15 find whatever justice this world can offer, not only for me but also for
16 the innocent victims of this war.
17 I will, however, make one appeal, and that is to the Tribunal
18 itself, the Judges, Prosecutors, investigators; that you do all within
19 your power to bring justice to all sides. In doing this, you may be able
20 to accomplish the mission for which this Tribunal has been created.
21 Thank you.
22 JUDGE MAY: Is that your case, Mr. Pavich?
23 MR. PAVICH: It is.
24 JUDGE MAY: Then that concludes the evidence, then.
25 It's too late to hear speeches, but there are two matters on which
1 you could perhaps help us. The first is provisional release. The other
2 is the point of cooperation which I raised yesterday.
3 Yes, Mr. Harmon.
4 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Mr. President. I
5 thought it was the Defence who was going to speak regarding provisional
6 release. But if you give me the floor, I'm ready to do so.
7 MR. PAVICH: I'm perfectly willing to defer.
8 JUDGE MAY: Well, there are two issues. The first is provisional
9 release; the second is cooperation. Now, it may be better if we dealt
10 with the cooperation first and then moved on to provisional release.
11 Perhaps the Prosecution can help us on that first one.
12 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Regarding
13 cooperation, it should be said that the accused, Madam Plavsic, did not
14 cooperate and has not cooperated. Up to today, we have no indication of
15 cooperation on the part of Madam Plavsic. But as the Prosecutor of this
16 Tribunal, I wish to add nevertheless that I continue to believe and hope
17 that Madam Plavsic will decide to cooperate with us.
18 I wish to tell you, Mr. President, that Article 101 of our Rules
19 of Procedure and Evidence, which speaks of serious and continuous
20 cooperation, is naturally -- substantial cooperation is not applicable in
21 this case because, as I have just said, up to this point, there has not
22 been any cooperation. That is what I wish to say by way of information
23 for the Chamber. Thank you, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Pavich, is there anything you would like to add to
1 MR. PAVICH: No, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Pavich. We'll hear you on provisional
6 MR. PAVICH: Mr. O'Sullivan will address the Court, Your Honours,
7 with your permission.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course.
9 MR. O'SULLIVAN: The Chamber will have had the opportunity to see
10 our filing on provisional release and the documents in annex and support
11 thereof. I don't think it would be beneficial to repeat our submissions,
12 which are relatively short, but we submit that this is a case which is
13 appropriate for a continued provisional release in light of the precedent
14 as well that are cited in our filing, the Gruban case. The Prosecution
15 does not oppose the provisional release, the continued provisional release
16 of Mrs. Plavsic. Security measures are in place. And we submit that the
17 continuation of her release after the guilty plea of October 2nd, the
18 circumstances having not changed in that regard but for the undertaking by
19 the government to supply and provide adequate protection for her warrant
20 in favour of you granting this request.
21 JUDGE MAY: Effectively, you're asking that the status quo
22 continues, although it is, of course, exceptional to grant provisional
23 release in these circumstances.
24 MR. O'SULLIVAN: That's correct, as it was on October 2nd. And as
25 you say, we are asking for the continuation of the status quo.
1 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
2 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we agreed that
3 Madam Plavsic be provisionally released once she pleaded guilty. In fact,
4 the legal situation of the accused has not changed; therefore, as Defence
5 counsel has said, we are not opposed to Madam Plavsic being able to remain
6 in provisional release until the Trial Chamber has rendered its
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Madam Prosecutor, you say the circumstances have
9 not changed, as did counsel for the Defence. But wouldn't you consider
10 the hearing a significant factor of change, the hearing that has taken
11 place today?
12 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. I believe that
13 the situation is the same from the moment she pleaded guilty. Today, we
14 just heard witnesses that can assist the Trial Chamber in rendering their
15 judgement, which will be when you consider it opportune. Therefore, in
16 fact, what we have been doing during these two or three days is to hear
17 not witnesses of guilt; these were witnesses which illustrated, as you
18 saw, various conditions and, above all, other elements, mitigating
19 elements, because we were able to hear facts regarding the conduct of the
20 accused since 1995, the Dayton accords, and all that. That hasn't really
21 changed anything regarding her pleading of guilty, but the situation until
22 a decision is rendered by your Chamber seems to me to remain unchanged.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous interpretation continues]... bring one
24 closer to the determination of sentence.
25 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] That's true, Your Honour. But
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 until the sentence is determined and pronounced, in my humble opinion, the
2 position of the accused remains the same.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well.
4 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider the position and give our decision on
5 that matter tomorrow.
6 We're to hear final submissions. It's fairly late, Mr. Harmon.
7 Would you rather start tomorrow morning?
8 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour, we would.
9 JUDGE MAY: Tomorrow afternoon.
10 MR. HARMON: That's correct. And Your Honour, we have some
11 housekeeping matters that would conclude the evidentiary portion of the
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
14 MR. HARMON: I have two additional submissions to make to
15 Your Honours. They would be Prosecutor's Exhibits 14 and 15.
16 Prosecutor's Exhibit 14 is the annex to our submission on our sentencing
17 brief. In my opening statement, I mentioned to Your Honours that we would
18 be augmenting the testimony of the witnesses with illustrations of
19 testimonies from eight different trials. They were selected to be
20 representative of the crimes that are described in the indictment and to
21 which Mrs. Plavsic has entered a guilty plea. They are, as I say,
22 illustrative only. They cover the broad sweep of illegal acts that are
23 described in the indictment, including killings, rapes, illegal
24 detentions, deprivations in camps, burnings of villages, et cetera. So we
25 would be submitting these, Your Honour, as an exhibit to Your Honours for
1 your consideration.
2 And the last exhibit, Exhibit 15, is a report prepared by two
3 demographers, Ewa Tabeau and Marcin Zoltkowski. And this report is
4 entitled "Ethnic Composition and Displaced Persons and Refugees in 37
5 Municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 and 1997." And I would
6 direct your attention particularly to two illustrations in this exhibit,
7 figures 12 and 13. And therefore, with the submission of these last two
8 exhibits, we would move into evidence Prosecutor's Exhibits 1 through 15.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, very well.
11 Yes, Mr. O'Sullivan.
12 MR. O'SULLIVAN: We have five exhibits we would wish to tender,
13 and perhaps the...
14 When the person from registry is finished, she can assist us in
15 giving numbers to these five exhibits.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the affidavit of Mrs. Madeleine
17 Albright will be S16; the curriculum vitae for Mr. Bildt will be S17; the
18 curriculum vitae for Mr. Frowick will be S18; the affidavit of Mr. Frowick
19 will be S19; and the statement of Mr. Larry Hollingworth will be S20.
20 MR. O'SULLIVAN: And we move for admission of those five exhibits,
21 Your Honour.
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
23 If there are no further matters to raise, we will adjourn now.
24 Half past 2.00, tomorrow afternoon.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
1 at 3.50 p.m., to be reconvened on
2 Wednesday, the 18th day of December, 2002,
3 at 2.30 p.m.