1 Tuesday, 17 October 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Registrar, good morning to you. Could you
6 kindly call the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case
8 number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. The accused are all here.
10 Mr. Pandurevic, making sure that you are receiving interpretation.
11 Mr. Ostojic and Mr. Sarapa are still missing, for justified
12 reason. The rest are present here.
13 Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Thayer for the Prosecution.
14 So, Mr. McCloskey, we understand that you wish to address the
15 Trial Chamber on matters relating to or arising from recent amendments to
16 the Rules, as they may become pertinent to the evidence that you wish to
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,
19 everyone. It shouldn't take much time.
20 As we know, we've gone from an 89(F), which is a very brief rule,
21 to 92 ter. As we read it, we don't see a real practical difference in
22 terms of how we would present such evidence, but we -- our first witness
23 is coming up very soon, and I remember you spoke to us about this a long
24 time ago, about what you had in mind for such witnesses. I believe you
25 said something along the lines that the Prosecution might provide a brief
1 summary of the witness.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: There's the difficulty of the layout of the
3 Chamber. I mean, I have to move to the right in order to be able to see
4 you; otherwise, I have to follow you from the monitor, which I don't like
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, I thought I'd try that out, but it was
7 a little odd.
8 In any event, as I say, in looking at the Rules, we don't see a
9 major practical difference. Most of our witnesses, for old 89(F) or new
10 92 ter or 92 bis, will be functionally doing the same thing, in that we
11 will have, in most cases, trial testimony which will be the material that
12 we'll be relying on and then we'll turn over the witness for
14 What we would like a little guidance on is if, perhaps, you could
15 elucidate on what you had said many months ago to us. We've been watching
16 a bit on how other Trial Chambers are handling this, and I think in some
17 cases they allow up to 30 minutes of direct for such witnesses. We would
18 like the opportunity to ask a few questions, if necessary, for some
19 witnesses, to get out some key testimony. I hope not to have to go to 30
20 minutes' worth. And we also are available to provide a brief summary of
21 key points to the Chamber, either in front of or out of the presence of
22 the witness - I can't recall exactly what you said on that point - and if
23 you still feel that that's something that you would like us to do.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, this matter will come back to you in a more
25 definitive way later on, but there are some points that I can touch upon
1 because they are things that we discussed already and decided upon.
2 The summary that you are referring to, you will find our guidance
3 in the decision that we gave some months back, at the very beginning of
4 the trial; namely, that we deem it fit and proper that when a witness
5 comes here only for cross-examination purposes, be the cross-examination
6 limited or unlimited, we would require the party bringing forward that
7 witness to read out a summary of that witness statement or previous
8 testimony. It will be a brief summary which would serve more than one
9 purpose. One purpose would be to remind or refresh the witness's memory;
10 secondly, to inform the public, because the public would not have had
11 access to the previous statement or transcript. So that is a requirement
12 that we have already indicated.
13 I do also remember discussing amongst ourselves whether, say, if
14 the witness is a Prosecution witness, being produced only for
15 cross-examination purposes because of the application of 92 bis, whether
16 you would be entitled to put some initial or further questions to the
17 witness prior to his or her being cross-examined. And correct me if I'm
18 wrong, our agreement at the time was yes, of course. Yes, of course. I
19 mean time-wise, it depends. I would say that it depends from witness to
20 witness. But any further questions will certainly not be intended to
21 cover matters previously testified upon, just additional, new, fresh
22 issues that would have arisen.
23 So I think I will have a consultation during the first break with
24 my colleagues on these to make sure that I am expressing the opinion of
25 the entire Chamber, but I think I am. I think I am.
1 In the meantime, is there anything else you would like to state
2 on -- to add anyway?
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, Mr. President, that's clear.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. All right.
5 In the meantime, yesterday, we did tell you we were going to have
6 a break, during which we were going to hold some discussions. We had that
7 break. We had also further discussions later on after the sitting,
8 lengthy ones, and I am happy to announce that one of the motions that
9 circumstances had to be considered is rather urgent. We are in a position
10 to determine.
11 We are handing down here and now an oral disposition which will
12 then be followed by a proper written decision, the idea being to allow
13 you, Mr. McCloskey, to prepare better and schedule better the witnesses
14 for the rest of this month and for the coming month. I'm referring to the
15 motion filed by accused Generals Miletic and Gvero, wherein they requested
16 certification to appeal or, alternatively, reconsideration of our decision
17 of the 12th of September, 2006, on the Prosecution's Rule 92 bis motion.
18 In reaching our decision we have, of course, also taken into consideration
19 the response filed by the Prosecution.
20 As I stated a couple of minutes ago, later on this week, we will
21 be issuing a written decision on this motion and response; however, as
22 aspects of the decision will specifically impact witnesses that the
23 Prosecution has scheduled to testify as early as next week or this coming
24 week, we find it appropriate to inform you of the disposition of the
25 motion orally, in advance of it being issued.
1 The Trial Chamber finds that the accused, namely, Miletic and
2 Gvero, in this case have not demonstrated that the pre-conditions for
3 certification established in Rule 73(B) are met in this case. However, we
4 do find that certain of the accused's submissions demonstrate particular
5 circumstances justifying re-consideration in order to prevent even the
6 remotest possibility of an injustice.
7 Accordingly, in our written decision, we will be ordering the
9 First, although the 12th September 2006 decision limits the scope
10 of cross-examination of witnesses 24 and 26 to the issue of forcible
11 transfer, the Trial Chamber is persuaded that the limitation imposed in
12 the decision is no longer appropriate, and orders that the scope of
13 cross-examination of witnesses 24 and 26 will not be limited to issues of
14 forcible transfer.
15 Second, although our decision of the 12th of September, 2006,
16 admits the written evidence of witness 23 without requiring the witness to
17 appear for cross-examination, we are persuaded that admitting this written
18 evidence without cross-examination is no longer appropriate or warranted.
19 Consequently, we will be ordering that the written evidence will
20 now be admitted, only provided witness 23 appears at trial for
22 In all other respects, your motion, Madam Faveau, is denied or
23 will be denied. Yes. And of course Mr. Krgovic.
24 We have done this so that you will, more or less -- because I know
25 there will usually be proofing sessions.
1 Any further preliminary business to transact? Mr. Bourgon? You
2 were wrong, by the way, on Mr. Coster, because his cross-examination,
3 until this decision, was going to be limited only in relation to the
4 transfer of -- forcible transfer. Now it's going to be extended.
5 MR. BOURGON: I stand corrected, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
7 MR. BOURGON: Good morning, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.
9 MR. BOURGON: Good morning, Judges. I'd just like to raise a
10 quick issue in relation to what my colleague just raised concerning the
11 new Rule 92 ter.
12 We have been informed that, further to the decision of the Trial
13 Chamber on the witnesses that have to appear for cross-examination or that
14 have to appear in toto, further to the Trial Chamber's decision on the 92
15 bis application, that some witnesses would be withdrawn by the
16 Prosecution. There are two witnesses I have in mind. I do not have the
17 numbers with me, but I do have the names, so maybe we can move into closed
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move into private session, please.
20 [Private session]
11 Page 2527 redacted. Private session.
9 [Open session]
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's bring in Colonel Franken, please.
11 [The witness entered court].
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning to you, Mr. Franken.
13 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: And welcome back. I'm sorry we had to keep you
15 waiting for this 25 minutes, but we had some preliminary matters,
16 completely unrelated to you or to your evidence, that we needed to
17 discuss. So I thank you for your patience and understanding.
18 We are going to proceed and finish with the examination-in-chief,
19 and then we start with the cross-examinations.
20 Mr. Thayer.
21 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning to you and
22 Your Honours.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.
24 WITNESS: ROBERT ALEXANDER FRANKEN [Resumed]
25 Examination by Mr. Thayer: [Continued]
1 Q. Good morning, sir.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. We left off yesterday discussing the document you signed on 17 of
4 July --
5 MR. THAYER: And at this point I'd ask that we place that document
6 again on e-court, if we could. It's 65 -- well, we have a P number; 00453
7 at this point, 65 ter 453.
8 Q. And while we're waiting for that to be placed on the screen, sir,
9 you testified that when the document was first shown to you it was in
10 B/C/S. Is that correct?
11 A. That is correct.
12 MR. THAYER: And if we could turn to pages 4 and then 5 of the
14 Q. Do you see that document on your screen, sir?
15 A. I do.
16 MR. THAYER: And if we could scroll up to the bottom and then turn
17 to the next page, page 5, please.
18 Q. Sir, after you signed the version that had been translated into
19 English by your DutchBat translator, were you also asked to sign the B/C/S
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. And looking at the document in front of you, do you see your
24 A. Yes. My signature is on the left, lower side.
25 Q. And, again, was that signed by the other two individuals in your
2 A. It was.
3 Q. Sir, why did you sign these documents?
4 A. Well, I already told you that when the ICRC went, together with
5 Major Nikolic, Bratunac Brigade, to inspect the wounded, it was made clear
6 to me by Colonel Jankovic that the signing of this document would be not
7 an absolute condition but would favour the procedure with the evacuation
8 of the wounded in Bratunac and out of our compound.
9 Q. And without getting into too much detail, were those wounded
10 eventually transported?
11 A. Yes. We tried to bring them out quite next to the first convoy
12 that went out with the refugees. They were stopped at the dismounting
13 point, area Kladanj, and sent back by the Serbs.
14 Q. Now, the wounded who were the subject of this document or that you
15 had in mind in deciding to sign this document, when did they actually
16 leave the UN base?
17 A. On the same day. The same day, the 17th.
18 Q. During the course of the events surrounding the signing of these
19 documents and the transportation of those wounded, did you have an
20 occasion to observe Colonel Jankovic's degree of authority?
21 A. Well, it was obvious that he was absolutely in command of the
23 Q. And how was that obvious to you, sir?
24 A. He was the only one who spoke to me and negotiated with me. The
25 representative of the Bratunac Brigade, Major Nikolic, wanted to sit next
1 to him, but he sent him away, in the back of the room where the meeting
2 was. So it was clear that he was the leading man in that delegation.
3 Q. And at some point was there some difficulty encountered by ICRC
4 with respect to one of their convoys?
5 A. That's correct. When the delegation of ICRC came in, the lady in
6 charge was pretty mad because one of her trucks was stopped at the Serb
7 border. It was a truck with emergency supplies. And she protested
8 towards Colonel Jankovic about that. He smiled. He took a mobile phone,
9 had a very short conversation, and said, "The truck is coming."
10 Q. And what, if anything, did you say to him?
11 A. Well, that I was surprised that the Bosnian Serb officer was able
12 to command Serb border troops, and he didn't react. He just smiled.
13 Q. And, again, was this on the 17th that this happened?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. I want to turn your attention, sir, to the 21st of July, the day
16 that DutchBat ultimately withdrew from the base. Up until that time,
17 from, let's say, the 13th of July, did you have freedom of movement to
18 leave the base?
19 A. No, we were not. We were supposed to stay in our compound.
20 Q. And did anyone in particular communicate that to you?
21 A. Yes. Colonel Jankovic made that clear.
22 Q. And would you briefly describe for the Trial Chamber the actual
23 process by which DutchBat left the base.
24 A. Well, on the 21st, we already made arrangements and all wheeled
25 vehicles went in one big column out, direction Bratunac, past the Serb
1 border at what we called the iron bridge. That's a bridge over the Drina,
2 near to Bratunac. And I went out as the last pack with the APCs.
3 Q. And at some point did your portion of the convoy stop?
4 A. That's correct. The APC part had to follow a different route
5 because transport would be arranged that they were brought -- would have
6 been brought back to Zagreb. So passing the iron bridge, I stopped with
7 that detachment about 2 K's away, in a quarry. I was held there.
8 Q. When you say "2 K's," 2 kilometres?
9 A. Sorry, yeah, 2 kilometres, yes.
10 Q. Now, at some point were you asked to meet with anyone in
12 A. Yes. Very shortly, let's say 150 metres before I passed the
13 bridge, I was stopped and was asked to say good-bye to Mladic.
14 Q. And who asked you to say good-bye to Mladic?
15 A. I don't recollect. As I remember, it was the interpreter, the
16 Bosnian -- the Serb interpreter who came to my car.
17 Q. And what was your response?
18 A. I was not willing to do that.
19 Q. Did you observe any type of gathering as you -- and, please, let
20 me -- try to leave a gap. We only have a couple more questions to go, but
21 let's try. Was there any type of gathering that you observed on your exit
22 at Bratunac?
23 A. Yes. Quite close to the bridge there was a party, under which
24 there was General Nicolai - that was a UN general, at the time, a Dutch
25 general - General Mladic, some officers, and Colonel Karremans. And they
1 stood there and were, well, more or less inspecting a parade or something,
2 it looked like that. They saluted when the units passed.
3 Q. And what did you do at that point, sir?
4 A. Nothing. Drive on.
5 Q. Thank you, sir. At this time, I have no further questions.
6 A. Thank you very much.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you so much, Mr. Thayer, also for having
8 concluded your examination-in-chief in almost half the time that the
9 Prosecution had. Practically, it would be half the time that the
10 Prosecution had estimated.
11 Now let's see what the Defence are capable of doing. Have you
12 decided to maintain the same order for this witness? No. Can someone
13 please stand up and --
14 MS. CONDON: Well, Your Honour, we're still going first, but I
15 think there's been some re-arrangement amongst the teams.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. And can I have now an updated
17 estimate of the time, Ms. Condon.
18 MS. CONDON: Your Honour, I certainly hope that I would be
19 finished by 1.00, 12.30 or 1.00.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: 12.30 today, you mean?
21 MS. CONDON: Yes. I think we put in an estimate of one and a half
22 hours to two hours.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. We are going to fall on you before you even
24 know it.
25 Yes, Mr. Meek.
1 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President. The Defence for Mr. Beara
2 will not be cross-examining second.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but I'm asking you in any case.
4 MR. MEEK: I think -- what did we put down? One hour? I believe
5 we put down one hour and I think we're going to stick to that one hour,
6 and hopefully a little bit shorter than that.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. You will soon see what's going to happen.
8 Mr. Bourgon or Ms. Nikolic.
9 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President. The Defence for
10 Mr. Nikolic will go third, and the time estimation at this point is as
11 short as 15 minutes and as long as an hour and a half, depending on what
12 happens with the first two cross-examinations.
13 Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. We
16 were going to examine the witness, as we already announced, until 1.00.
17 According to the plan that we put together during our preparations, we
18 would like to start our cross-examination second.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I think there is some problem with interpretation,
20 because one said "until 12.30"; the other one said "until 1.00."
21 Ms. Condon, when you said "until 12.30," what did you --
22 Ms. Condon --
23 MS. CONDON: Your Honour, I certainly hope that by the second
24 session this morning I'll be concluded. I'll do my best, and I certainly
25 don't intend to --
1 JUDGE AGIUS: We are not going to accept that.
2 MS. CONDON: Your Honour --
3 JUDGE AGIUS: It's unheard of.
4 Yes, Mr. Stojanovic, you said one hour? Okay. You will sit down
5 and we will tell you how long you will be cross-examining the witness.
6 You expect to be cross-examining for one hour? All right. And not until
7 1.00. Okay. All right.
8 Madam Faveau --
9 Thank you, Mr. Stojanovic.
10 MS. FAVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, for the time being, I
11 maintain the two hours I estimated, but it could be shorter, depending on
12 the previous cross-examinations. Besides, I want to tell you that
13 Mr. Gvero's counsel is going to cross-examine before I do this time.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: So, Mr. Josse.
15 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, we originally said an hour. We will be
16 no more than an hour and, I hope, rather less than that.
17 MR. HAYNES: Not less than 20 minutes; not more than 45.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I understand Ms. Condon is going first.
19 Ms. Condon.
20 MS. CONDON: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: And you will soon see how quickly you will finish.
22 Cross-examination by Ms. Condon:
23 Q. Mr. Franken, I'd like to take you to your evidence in relation to
24 the order that you gave for the defence of Srebrenica. Do you recall that
1 A. I do.
2 Q. Now, there was a particular document that we saw which referred to
3 that order on the 9th of July as a seriously meant green order.
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. That's correct. Now, what that means is at that stage DutchBat
6 was operating as a regular army. Is that right?
7 A. That is correct, as far as the defence of -- something happened,
8 sorry. As far as the defence of Srebrenica was concerned.
9 Q. Yes. --
10 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Ms. Condon. Can I ask whether that
11 document is in e-court system or not? Otherwise the Judges would like to
12 be handed over the photocopies.
13 MR. THAYER: Yes, Your Honour, I believe that is in e-court as
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Condon, please proceed.
18 MS. CONDON: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Now, at that time, it's fair to say, isn't it, that the interests
20 of the 28th Division of the BiH and DutchBat are the same?
21 A. The purpose -- yes --
22 Q. Yes?
23 A. -- that's correct.
24 Q. Do you agree with that?
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. In terms of defence of the enclave.
2 A. Well, we were not sure that the 28th Division had the intention to
3 defend the enclave at that stage, because they already showed that they
4 didn't really fight on the edge of the enclave. So I don't know exactly
5 what the objectives of the 28th Division were. They suggested that they
6 wanted to defend the city.
7 Q. Well, assuming that they had that intention, the point is this:
8 That, as you said yourself, DutchBat's role had gone from blue to green.
9 Is that fair?
10 A. That's -- for the defence of Srebrenica, yes, that's fair.
11 Q. Yes. And obviously essential to that is that DutchBat was no
12 longer playing a neutral role.
13 A. That's correct, because we started firing on the Bosnian Serb
14 army. Yes.
15 Q. I just want to ask you a couple of questions about the 28th
16 Division --
17 A. Mm-hmm.
18 Q. -- of the BiH. You said yesterday that in May you had observed
19 them to have new uniforms; yes?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. But it was also the case, was it not, that in May you observed
22 them to have some rather new shiny Kalashnikov guns, rifles.
23 A. We saw several new types of Kalashnikovs.
24 Q. And it's also the case, isn't it, that insofar as your
25 observations of the BiH in terms of humanitarian aid was concerned, you
1 had some views about them hoarding the aid for their own purposes. Is
2 that correct?
3 A. What was reported to me by the opstina itself was that the 28th
4 Division always took a part of the supplies the UNHCR brought in for their
5 own purpose. That is correct.
6 Q. But not only that, you had an opinion about that which you
7 expressed to the parliamentary inquiry, to the Dutch government. You
8 accept that you described that, you said that the 28th Division considered
9 itself so important that, time and again, it reserved a large share of
10 these stocks for the division. Do you agree --
11 A. That's what I said, yes.
12 Q. And you also made reference to what you described as the Pony
13 Express in your evidence to the --
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. Just very quickly, what was the nature of the Pony Express?
16 A. The Pony Express was up to 15 ponies who went out of the enclave
17 in a southern direction, to Zepa, the enclave of Zepa, and came back with
19 Q. Cigarettes, alcohol --
20 A. Yes. For instance, later on we saw cigarettes on the market.
21 Q. All right. Now, just getting back to that point at which the
22 interests of the DutchBat and the BiH are parallel at the 9th of July,
23 prior to that time, there had been discussions, had there not, between
24 DutchBat and the BiH about a coordinated defence?
25 A. As I stated before, yes.
1 Q. And part of that agreement was also that the weapons collection
2 point would be emptied?
3 A. As soon as a real attack would occur, the weapon collection point
4 would be open to -- available for the BiH. That is correct.
5 Q. Mm-hmm. And your evidence yesterday, Mr. Franken, was that you
6 described that discussion that you had with the Chief of Staff of the 28th
7 Division as a strange discussion; yes?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now, is that because it was contrary to the neutral position that
10 DutchBat was supposed to hold that you were having a discussion like that?
11 A. It was not contrary because I had to keep up my independence, my
12 neutrality. We had that strange discussion; yes, that's correct.
13 Q. But that's what I'm getting at is, you're right, you did have to
14 keep up your neutrality because that was part of DutchBat mandate; you
15 agree with that?
16 A. Yes. So I couldn't coordinate a defence in the proper way. That
17 is correct
18 Q. No, but it was a strange discussion because, in an informal sense,
19 you were having a coordinated defence -- anticipating a coordinated
21 A. We were discussing the events, what would happen when an attack
22 came, and the only coordination or, let's say, agreement, as you want to
23 call it, is that we would stay in our OPs and defend there, and the BiH
24 was free to defend the space between our observation posts. "OPs," I
25 shouldn't say that. Observation posts. So there is a kind of
1 coordination, yes.
2 MS. CONDON: I've been told to slow down, Your Honour. I'm
3 obviously just going as quickly as I can.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, if you don't ask for an extra two hours.
5 MS. CONDON:
6 Q. Now, the essence of the agreement - I call it an agreement - that
7 you had between DutchBat and the BiH was the decision -- the agreement to
8 withdraw, wasn't it? I'll withdraw that. Communication of the intention
9 to withdraw.
10 A. We tried to communicate, to coordinate both operations when an
11 attack would occur.
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. If you mean that, yes.
14 Q. Yes. And it is the case, is it not, that the BiH consistently
15 failed to communicate their intention to withdraw to the DutchBat?
16 A. Yes, I know of one occasion that they tried to communicate. It
17 was on the last period at the OP Sierra, S, way down south, and they got a
18 fast yell from somebody, probably they should have understood that they
19 were going, yes. But further on it never happened.
20 Q. And, of course, that then led to the precarious situation for
21 DutchBat in that the BiH presented itself as more of a threat than the
23 A. Well, that's a conclusion I do not --
24 Q. You don't agree with that?
25 A. I do not agree with that. BiH was not a bigger threat than the
1 BSA, but an uncertain factor because local commanders had their own
3 Q. Yes. And the result of that, what you perceived to be, renegade
4 element in the local command resulted in the tragic death of Private van
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. And not only that, there were reports, were there not, of OPs
8 coming under fire from the BiH when DutchBat was attempting to withdraw?
9 A. No, not under fire, but blocked, the crews were blocked. There is
10 one OP who - not confirmed - had fire from a direction which could not
11 have been BSA. That was OP Mike, the situation at Mike.
12 Q. What about OP H? Wasn't there a report that OP H also came under
13 fire from the 28th Division of the BiH?
14 A. OP Alpha?
15 Q. OP H?
16 A. H? No, not as I recall.
17 Q. Not as you recall?
18 A. No.
19 Q. What about OP D? Was there a report that OP D was surrounded by
20 the 28th Division of the BiH?
21 A. OP Delta was in the south, tried to withdraw and then was blocked
22 and surrounded by BiH soldiers who wouldn't allow them to go in the
23 direction of Srebrenica. That is correct.
24 Q. So you agree with that?
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. Now, what about when I made that statement about the threat posed
2 by the BiH for your personnel in the observation post? There was an order
3 issued, was there not, that members were to stay at the OPs until the
4 arrival of the BSA, unless there was an agreement with the local BiH
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. And is the implication -- can we infer from that, that that was as
8 a result of the perceived threat of the BiH upon withdrawing? Is that a
9 fair --
10 A. That's as a result of the incident at OP Foxtrot, the killing of
11 van Rensen, and didn't want to risk that the local commanders started
12 shooting on my men.
13 Q. All right. Now, Mr. Franken, you've given some evidence about,
14 obviously, integral to the purpose behind the blocking positions was to
15 prevent entry into the town of Srebrenica itself.
16 A. That's correct.
17 MS. CONDON: Your Honour, can the witness be shown PIC0008.
18 Q. Do you have that there in front of you, Mr. Franken?
19 A. Yes. I do see a map.
20 Q. Now, you'll see --
21 MS. CONDON: Just perhaps if we go down to -- that's it.
22 Q. You'll see that there are a number of marks that have been made in
23 the vicinity of OP U, E, and F.
24 A. Yes, I see them.
25 Q. Do you see that?
1 A. I see them.
2 Q. Now, as far as you're concerned, do those markings accurately
3 reflect the blocking positions at the south area?
4 A. You should divide them into -- when you see the three marks coming
5 from uniform in the direction of what is here said, "Golf" --
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. -- that these were positions that were taken when we withdrew out
8 of the area of Uniform and Sierra. The positions signed in in the area of
9 Srebrenica - and there's one missing, I see - are the blocking positions
10 that were occupied for purpose of defence of the city itself.
11 Q. Mm-hmm. So the three marks that we see leading up between, as you
12 said, OP U and G, what date do you ascribe those positions as far as ...
13 A. I think these were positions taken during the 10th of July.
14 Q. The 10th of July?
15 A. Yeah.
16 Q. So following on from that, insofar as the order that we saw, your
17 original order of the 9th of July, those blocking positions are the
18 consequence of that order?
19 A. Well, the blocking positions directly on the south edge of the
20 city Srebrenica, those positions in between were positions destined by the
21 company commander withdrawing from that area. We don't drive away like
22 hell, but then we take positions on the way down, keep a watch or an eye
23 on our opponent.
24 Q. But obviously the purpose, the strategic purpose, behind the three
25 blocking positions that you describe as being taken on the 10th of July is
1 that they were elevated, were they not, in terms of ...
2 A. Elevated?
3 Q. As in there on the road --
4 A. They were directly in the vicinity of the road from Zeleni Jadar
5 to Srebrenica.
6 Q. Yes?
7 A. Yes. To control that road.
8 Q. Yes. And as far as the markings that have been made between OP G
9 and H are concerned, there's a section of markings there.
10 A. Mm-hmm.
11 Q. What is your evidence in respect of those markings in terms of
12 blocking positions?
13 A. The three markers north of Golf, G, you have seen, are blocking
14 positions ordered by me with the purpose to defend the city, the three red
15 markers north of G. The other markers are positions probably designated
16 by a company commander in order to keep contact with the Serb forces when
17 they would come or came north.
18 Q. All right. And can you just -- I appreciate you may not be able
19 to be specific. Are you able to say which company commander -- is that
20 the commander of Company B?
21 A. Yes, that was Captain Groen.
22 Q. All right. Now, I appreciate also that while the events of the
23 9th and 10th of July are ongoing, you are obviously at the Potocari
24 base --
25 A. Yes --
1 Q. -- in the operations room.
2 A. -- that's correct.
3 Q. But are you able to give any evidence as to the ability to see the
4 town of Srebrenica itself from any of the blocking positions that have
5 been marked on this map we have in front of us?
6 A. These blocking positions were not directed to the town itself, but
7 they were directed on the approaches to the town.
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. The town is in a hole or in a valley, so we could probably see
10 some of it, but the general idea is that they looked in the other
12 Q. And obviously the general idea, surely, with the blocking
13 positions, is, once they're there, in the town, then it's too late.
14 A. Yeah, the --
15 Q. The whole point was to keep them out of the town.
16 A. Out of the town, yes. I could explain that, but that would be a
17 military, technical discussion.
18 Q. We don't need to descend into that, Mr. Franken.
19 Now, just in relation to the blocking positions and that document
20 that --
21 MS. CONDON: I'm not sure if we can bring that up again.
22 Q. That original document that I showed you of the 9th of July, your
23 seriously meant green order. Let me just take you to page 2 of that
24 document. 2236, is it? I'm not sure whether or not you actually need to
25 see it yourself, but your evidence was yesterday - I think we have it
1 now - that there was an abbreviation under the heading "Coordinating
2 Provisions," the sixth bullet point was "HRMCIS," meaning, your evidence
3 was, be prepared for close air support, to use close air support?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. And it really was the case, was it not, that the use of the
6 blocking positions was a mechanism by which close air support could be
7 called in?
8 A. It's not that the purpose was to get close air support and for
9 that purpose we arranged those blocking positions. Blocking positions --
10 well, I have to get technical because it's quite silly and not effective
11 when you explore close air support, or air support anyway, to an enemy who
12 is still moving, has free movement, in an area like that, where he has a
13 lot of cover. We'll probably hit nothing. The general idea is, if you
14 have a defence or whatever, an enemy is stopped by that defence, so he is
15 more or less static; then you launch your air support, because otherwise
16 the guys won't find them.
17 So there is not the -- the order you give, that you want air
18 support and that's why the blocking positions were there, is incorrect.
19 The blocking positions were there to defend the city, and one of the means
20 you can defend a city with is artillery and air support. The condition
21 for air support is: Try to pin your opponent in a place or an area where
22 the planes can find him, can see them. Okay?
23 Q. Ultimately there's a relationship between the two.
24 A. Yeah, absolutely.
25 Q. Which was my point, really. -
1 A. Sorry.
2 Q. That's all right. Is that the two were connected.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Yes. And in that regard, we looked at, yesterday, another
5 document that you had provided -- a note that you'd provided to Captain
6 Groen. This is a one --
7 MS. CONDON: Again, Your Honour, I don't believe this has an
8 evidence registration number yet, but this is the document that the
9 English translation was provided at 12.00 yesterday. If that document
10 could be brought up.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: It hasn't got a number --
12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it has --
13 JUDGE AGIUS: It's the second of the two documents that were
14 produced yesterday.
15 THE REGISTRAR: The number will be 02264, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I thank you.
17 Yes, Mr. Thayer.
18 MR. THAYER: Yes, Your Honour. I don't want to delay things, but
19 we do have hard copies of the B/C/S translations, if they haven't been
20 received already. Okay. I understand it is in e-court. I just wanted to
21 let everybody know that we have it, if it hasn't been received.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
23 Yes, Ms. Condon.
24 MS. CONDON: All right. Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. Now, I just want to ask you some questions just about how this
1 document came into existence. Now, as I understand it, your evidence was
2 yesterday that it was a written version of a radio message from the VRS.
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. And it was received on or around the 10th of July. Is that
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Are you able to give any evidence as to the original source of the
8 radio message? Who relayed this information to you?
9 A. Obviously the Bosnian Serbs used one of my APCs they took from the
10 OPs, and one of the NCOs, being a POW, read that over that radio contact.
11 So it came in on our command net.
12 Q. And you heard it on the radio, you said.
13 A. I heard it partially. I heard it on the radio.
14 Q. All right. And when you heard it, did you create -- you made
15 notes or wrote it down --
16 A. The ops officer or the chief ops wrote it down and I took his text
17 to inform Captain Groen.
18 Q. All right. So these are just -- in other words, this is, perhaps,
19 your interpretation; is it fair -- this is your interpretation of what was
20 described as the ultimatum from the VRS. Is that correct?
21 A. Well --
22 Q. Yes?
23 A. When somebody writes something you heard, it's always an
24 interpretation. Yes, that's correct.
25 Q. And you also, then, obviously are responsible for what comes under
1 the heading "UN Reaction," I presume. You wrote it as well?
2 A. I wrote it as well, yes, but then the UN reaction was already
3 known, so I didn't write this message immediately after it came in from
4 the BSA. But I obviously waited for the UN reaction and then compiled it
5 and sent it to Groen.
6 Q. Because you appreciate that, as the document currently reads,
7 insofar as the UN ultimatum is concerned, it's incomplete in the sense
8 that it says "if not," and then there is nothing there. And that's
9 certainly the case for the English version and for the Dutch version.
10 MS. CONDON: Perhaps if you just scroll down to the document.
11 Q. And you'll see it says: "UN reaction" --
12 A. And then --
13 Q. -- and then says: "If not, full column." I mean, really, the
14 essence of the UN ultimatum there was air-strikes, was it not?
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 Q. And they were described by your superior, Colonel Karremans, to
17 the representatives of the BiH as massive air-strikes. Is that --
18 A. Yeah, that's correct, in the night of the 10th to the 11th, yes.
19 Q. And that there was a warning that -- well, that obviously
20 Mr. Karremans informed the representatives of the BiH that the southern
21 area of the enclave would be a zone of death. I appreciate you may not
22 have been at the meeting.
23 A. I was not at the meeting, so I don't know what words he used. But
24 within the procedures of air support, we know the killing zone. Killing
25 zone is an area where you try to amass your enemy and be sure that there
1 are none of your own troops in the area.
2 Q. So if there were evidence in this trial to the effect that they
3 were, in fact, the words of Colonel Karremans, you would accept that?
4 A. Could be. Could be.
5 Q. All right. Now, I'd like to take you to the 11th of July, and,
6 again, we have established that you are at the headquarters at Potocari on
7 that day.
8 A. Yes, most of the time.
9 Q. But you received a request, did you not, from Captain Groen, who
10 was the commander of B Company --
11 A. B Company, yes.
12 Q. -- which is situated in the town of Srebrenica, to divert the
13 refugees in the direction of Potocari. Is that correct?
14 A. Well, yes, he suggested to do so. Yes.
15 Q. Yes. And you granted that request.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Yes. So you would agree with the proposition that the movement
18 of -- the stream of refugees from B Company down to Potocari was the
19 result of an initiative taken by Captain Groen.
20 A. Partially, because there has been a movement before on the
21 initiative of the people itself. It was then stopped by the 28th
22 Division. The situation in Srebrenica was out of control, which meant
23 that Groen was not able to perform his orders, to defend the city, because
24 people were in panic and crawling. And then he tried to lead them, in
25 fact, to Potocari by putting some soldiers in front of the column and
1 started to walk in the direction of Potocari. So, in that way, it was an
2 initiative of DutchBat.
3 Q. Yes. You also gave evidence of having received reports of massive
4 shelling --
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. -- in the town of Srebrenica on the 10th of July, including the
7 compound. Is that correct?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. Yes. And so much so that you basically said to your personnel,
10 "Well, don't bother filling in the forms anymore if there's that much
11 shelling going on." Is that correct?
12 A. That is correct. That's right.
13 Q. And despite what you described as massive shelling, you received
14 reports of wounded only. Is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Yes. That was your evidence yesterday.
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. All right. Did you ever, in that regard, receive any reports from
19 the MSF, who was present in the town of Srebrenica, of the numbers of
20 wounded in that regard?
21 A. When they came to -- in the end, when they were evacuated to our
22 compound, I heard, well, probably numbers, but I don't recollect them, how
23 much, because it was pretty filled, yeah. But I don't know numbers. The
24 only thing I know is that when they came in I had, what, 114 wounded
25 brought in.
1 Q. That --
2 A. So I don't know what the total number was.
3 Q. No. But as for that specific -- the reports that we're talking
4 about in terms of the shelling of the town of Srebrenica itself and what
5 the result there was, you simply received no evidence as to the numbers.
6 A. No --
7 Q. The reports --
8 A. I had some reports about it that would mean that there were more,
9 or something. Our attention was a bit drawn to the BSA, not to the
11 Q. Now, turning to the next day, the 12th of July, Mr. Franken, your
12 was that on the morning of the 12th you were being debriefed by Colonel
13 Karremans as to his meeting, his final meeting, with General Mladic at the
14 Hotel Fontana. And as that was going on, buses and trucks arrived. Do
15 you recall that?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Yeah. And you were speaking to an officer, a G4 from Pale, who
18 was in charge of what we called -- what one called "the evacuation of the
19 population." Do you recall that that was your evidence yesterday?
20 A. That was my evidence, yes. Later on that afternoon, yes.
21 Q. But you would certainly not state to this Trial Chamber that the
22 afternoon -- the morning or the afternoon of the 12th of July was the
23 first time you were made aware of a plan to evacuate the refugees?
24 A. No.
25 Q. No. Because, in your mind - in your mind - you were under the
1 impression that the evacuation was something that was pre-arranged between
2 the UN - and I'm not talking about DutchBat; I'm talking about the UN,
3 being UNPROFOR - and General Mladic.
4 A. I heard of the evacuation first on the night before, of course.
5 We knew that something would happen in that direction, in evacuation,
6 because on the -- I recollect the second meeting Colonel Karremans had
7 with Mladic, there was already talk about this event, more or less, and
8 then I got the details when Colonel Karremans came back from the third
10 Q. Yes. But you specifically -- you were subject to a number of
11 debriefings, obviously, on your return from Srebrenica. You had the Assen
13 A. Back in Holland, you mean?
14 Q. Yes?
15 A. Yes. Okay.
16 Q. And in the course of your debriefing on the 7th of September,
17 1995, your statement was that the evacuation of the refugees was arranged
18 and laid down on paper between General Mladic and General Smith.
19 A. That's what you meant.
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. Yes, yes. Okay. Sorry, I didn't understand, obviously, which
22 event you meant.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. But that's correct.
25 Q. And General Smith was based in Sarajevo. Is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. He was General Nicolai's superior?
3 A. That's correct as well.
4 Q. And that was your understanding of the role between each of those
5 parties; that there was --
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. -- an agreement and it was laid down on paper.
8 A. There was an agreement. The fact that it was laid down on paper I
9 discovered when I was back in Holland. At that very moment, I didn't see
10 that paper obviously.
11 Q. No, no. That's all right. And your other statement in that
12 regard was the role of the battalion in this was to implement it, being
13 DutchBat's role was to implement the evacuation.
14 A. The role was to make sure that it was as humanitarian as possible,
15 et cetera, et cetera. Yes.
16 Q. But those were your words. You didn't qualify -- in your
17 statement on the 7th of September, 1995, you didn't qualify it in that
18 regard, as you are now --
19 A. I said implemented. Okay.
20 Q. -- you just said it was to implement it. All right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And, furthermore, DutchBat had received guidelines for this from
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. Yes. Now, you later described those guidelines as vague. You
1 described them as vague guidelines at some stage in your evidence
2 elsewhere. But are you able to indicate to the Trial Chamber, first of
3 all, were the guidelines oral, or were they written?
4 A. I got them oral by Colonel Karremans; later on I saw them written.
5 Q. All right. You got them orally from Colonel Karremans on the 12th
6 of July - is that correct - or the 11th of July?
7 A. The 12th.
8 Q. After he came back from his meeting with General Mladic.
9 A. He came back and he had contact with the UN again. Yes.
10 Q. Sorry, you mean he came -- Colonel Karremans had contact with the
11 UN again, meaning phone contact?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. Yes. As I say, he used the phone.
15 Q. Do you know in particular who he was in contact with?
16 A. No, I don't.
17 Q. You don't know?
18 A. No.
19 Q. It could have been General Nicolai; it could have been General
20 Brantz --
21 JUDGE AGIUS: If he doesn't know, Ms. Condon, he doesn't know. I
22 mean, it could be whoever.
23 MS. CONDON:
24 Q. You indicated that you saw them -- later on, you saw the
25 guidelines in written form.
1 A. Yes, I got something on paper. Yes.
2 Q. And can you indicate when you received those guidelines?
3 A. No, not really. I suppose it was on the 12th, because there was a
4 lot of messaging and ordering coming up and down the line, in the UN
5 line. So I suppose it was on the 12th, but I was a bit busy in those
7 Q. I'm not criticising you for the fact that you can't remember.
8 A. No.
9 Q. Well, are you able to indicate specifically where the guidelines
10 came from?
11 A. No. I only can presume where they came from. Logically, it would
12 have been Sarajevo.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Please, no presumptions --
14 THE WITNESS: Sorry.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: -- I mean, we only require informed answers from
16 you, not presumptions.
17 MS. CONDON: Your Honour, could the witness be shown 1D00035,
18 please, at page -- and I'd like -- perhaps I'll just identify the
19 document, first of all.
20 Q. Do you have that in front of you, Mr. Franken?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You see the cover page of this document is a communication between
23 Mr. Akashi from Zagreb. You obviously know who he was.
24 A. Yes, I know who he was. Yes.
25 Q. Who was he?
1 A. A special delegation, special functionary for the UN, for
3 Q. And there are a number of people, obviously, who this document is
4 being distributed to, one of whom we can see appears to be General Smith,
5 at Sarajevo.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Yes. And ultimately it's to Mr. Annan, who was the then
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And we should, perhaps, identify that it's dated the 12th of July,
11 1995, and it appears, although it is quite faint, that the time at
12 which -- there is a time stamp of 1322 on this document, in the upper
13 right-hand corner. You may or may not be able to see that on the version
14 that you have.
15 Let's take you to page 2 of the document, at paragraph 5, and you
16 just see -- perhaps if you read that paragraph to the point where we see
17 it says, "The plans of UNHCR and UNPF, conveyed yesterday in my Z-1139 to
18 evacuate all those people from Srebrenica wishing to leave, have
19 encountered at least initial resistance from Bosnian government
21 And then I just draw your attention to the third sentence in this
22 paragraph, which reads:
23 "However, at a meeting at 7.45 local time today, with the UNHCR
24 Sarajevo representative and the UNPROFOR Civil Affairs Coordinator,
25 Bosnian Minister Muratovic made the following points:
1 "(a) local Bosnian officials in Srebrenica are not authorised to
2 negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian government, at least until proper
3 communications can be established with them."
4 Now, just in that regard, in terms of Mr. Muratovic, it was the
5 case, was it not, that one of the members of what became known as the
6 refugee committee, Mr. Mandic, with your assistance --
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. -- and your persistence, no doubt, managed to actually make
9 contact on the 12th of July with Mr. Muratovic's office.
10 A. Yes, just with his office or some aide de guerre or something.
11 But he didn't make contact with Mr. Muratovic.
12 Q. No, I'm not suggesting that he made contact. But your perception,
13 because the contact, obviously, never eventuated, but your perception of
14 that was that Mr. Mandic was brushed aside with a story that Mr. Muratovic
15 was at dinner and he didn't want to be disturbed. That's how you saw it.
16 A. That's what I heard, yes.
17 Q. Yes. But that was your opinion that you expressed to the NIOD
18 report, as it --
19 A. That's not only my opinion. When Mandic told me what was going
20 on, I got a bit angry and took the phone myself --
21 Q. Of course you did --
22 A. -- and then I heard the same story again.
23 Q. You were brushed aside yourself.
24 A. Mm-hmm.
25 Q. Yes. Now, there are a number of other conditions that are
1 outlined in this document here insofar as the question of evacuation is
2 concerned. And then, paragraph 6, you'll see that there is a statement to
3 the effect that -- if I can focus your mind on the third sentence: "The
4 BSA also said that they would arrange and provide the transportation for
5 the departure of the population from Srebrenica to Tuzla." Do you see
6 that there?
7 A. I see it.
8 Q. Yes. Now, is it fair to say that this document insofar as it
9 reflects that it was an UNPROFOR plan to evacuate the refugees from
10 Srebrenica, that this document is a reflection of how you understood the
11 situation to be? Is that a fair statement?
12 A. On that very moment, it's not fair to say so. The only thing I
13 had was that the UN told me how to act on behalf of the evacuation. And I
14 didn't read this before, so I can't say whether the complete text of that
15 document covers that, what my mind was at that point.
16 Q. I appreciate that, but you obviously didn't have the benefit of
17 the specifics, as outlined in this document.
18 A. No, absolutely not.
19 Q. But insofar as the essence of the document is concerned and what
20 your perception was, which you've just told us about, that it was agreed
21 between Smith and Mladic --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. -- you would agree that this document reflects that.
24 A. Yes. It confirms my idea at that moment that the UN had at least
25 consented in the evacuation.
1 Q. Yes. And you found yourself in the rather strange position, did
2 you not, of the same people that had ordered you to defend Srebrenica and
3 obviously launch an offensive insofar as the VRS was concerned, within 24
4 hours, you've been ordered to assist.
5 A. It was, in fact, within three hours, because the very morning, on
6 the 12th, I got another order to defend.
7 Q. On the morning of the 12th, so it was even closer.
8 A. You've got to be flexible.
9 Q. But the issue then arose, did it not, that the UN, UNPROFOR,
10 didn't appreciate, the higher-ups, being General Nicolai and Gobillard
11 didn't appreciate the logistical problems that DutchBat had?
12 A. Yes. When you say that -- well --
13 Q. Is that a fair assessment?
14 A. I don't know. The logistical problems were reported to Nicolai.
15 I know that General Nicolai said that the battalions should do it
16 themselves, if you're referring to that, and I made it quite clear that it
17 was absolutely impossible. But further on, I don't know whether the
18 logistical problems of the battalion played any role in their decision to
19 consent in the evacuation.
20 Q. But, as you've -- you've described it like this in the past, in
21 terms of your evidence to the parliamentary inquiry. What you said
22 was: "Mladic made an offer to the UN to do it themselves, but the UN said
23 they were not able to and then approved Mladic doing it, because that is
24 what happened."
25 A. Yes, that is what I understand happened.
1 Q. So the issue there was that DutchBat had some difficulties, did it
3 A. Yes, quite a lot then. Which ones are you referring to?
4 Q. Well, in terms of -- I'm not referring to the question of fuel,
5 but just in relation to the physical, logistical means of carrying out the
6 transport efficiently.
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Yes. And we've already heard evidence that you had food that
9 would last for only 40 hours from the 11th of July; yes?
10 A. Yes, something like that --
11 Q. You've got terrible --
12 A. -- But just for the strength of my battalion, not for 30.000 men.
13 Q. Yes. You've got extreme temperatures in terms of the heat in July
14 out there.
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And you would agree, would you not, that this evacuation was
17 necessary for the welfare of the refugees.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Yes. And if it had to be done, it had to be done quickly.
20 A. That's correct as well.
21 Q. Do you agree with that?
22 A. That's correct, Yes.
23 MS. CONDON: Your Honour, I'm about to move to another topic.
24 Perhaps --
25 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll have a 25-minute break, starting from now.
1 Thank you.
2 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
4 MS. CONDON: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Your Honour, if the witness could be shown 1D36.
6 Q. That document should actually be in front of you, Mr. Franken. Do
7 you see that there?
8 A. I see that document, yes.
9 Q. Perhaps if we have a closer look at this document. This an UNMO
10 situation report that you, no doubt, will be familiar with. Not this
11 report specifically but reports of this nature.
12 A. Yes.
13 MS. CONDON: And if we could turn, please, to page 4 of this
14 report. That's it.
15 Q. You'll see at the top, headed, "Srebrenica Update 12046B," the
16 code there is the 12th of July, at 0746 hours. Is that right?
17 A. Local time. Yes, correct.
18 Q. And if I can just draw your attention to paragraph 5 of that
19 document, you'll see there that there is a statement to the effect, "The
20 DutchBat DCO ..." That's you?
21 A. That's me, yes.
22 Q. "... says that in case of evacuation, UNPROFOR would provide about
23 20 buses and make more trips."
24 Now, is that correct, that you did make that statement?
25 A. No, I'm not aware of that statement. No, absolutely not. I don't
1 know, I never saw this document before, but as far as I am concerned,
2 that's a different DCO.
3 Q. There's one and only --
4 A. There's only one, sorry, but I didn't make that statement.
5 Q. All right. So you would say that insofar as this report, this
6 UNMO report reflects that, it's simply inaccurate.
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. What is your evidence to the Trial Chamber about, generally, the
9 accuracy of these UNMO reports?
10 A. Well, I'm familiar with these kinds of reports but we never got
11 them. It was not -- in the reporting system, DutchBat didn't get the UNMO
12 reports. Once in a while I saw them, but it was not in the normal
14 Q. Do you agree with this proposition: That often the UNMOs would
15 rely upon DutchBat -- that they would get their information from DutchBat
16 to compile these reports?
17 A. Yes. But I don't know, because I never saw the report so I can't
18 confirm or deny that.
19 Q. Mm-hmm. Well, insofar as, obviously, the next statement is --
20 well, before I go to that, you would say, wouldn't you, that that
21 statement as to the provision of 20 buses doesn't reflect the fact that
22 DutchBat had no fuel?
23 A. Does not reflect -- sorry?
24 Q. Okay. I'll rephrase that. Is it if UNPROFOR were -- if DutchBat
25 were to provide buses for the evacuation, just in theory, implicit in that
1 would also be that they had fuel, obviously for transport.
2 A. Yes, of course, and we did not have it. But we didn't have 20
3 buses as well, so ...
4 Q. Okay. I also return to the debriefing that you received from
5 Colonel Karremans when he returned from his final meeting with General
6 Mladic. Now, your evidence has been that you didn't really get an
7 opportunity to get much detail from Colonel Karremans, because, as that
8 was going on, suddenly buses and trucks were arriving. Is that right?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. But what you have said -- perhaps I'll just -- I'll show you your
11 statement of the 26th and 27th of September, just so that there is no
12 dispute. This is 1D33.
13 Now, that's the front page of your statement. Do you see that in
14 front of you, Mr. Franken?
15 A. I do.
16 Q. That's familiar, that statement that you made for this Tribunal.
17 MS. CONDON: If we go to page 5 of this statement, I just want
18 to -- and there is a -- yes, that's it. Paragraph -- if we can just make
19 it a little larger, if possible, a bit further -- if we scroll down,
20 please, Madam Usher. That's it.
21 Q. That paragraph beginning, "Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans was away
22 for two and a half hours," so just to focus your mind on the time here, it
23 is most definitely the morning of the 12th of July, 1995; yes?
24 A. Yes, I agree with that.
25 Q. And what you do say is that he briefed you quickly, but "he was
1 able to tell me that Mladic told him how he wanted the evacuation to be
2 carried out."
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Yes. "Separation of the men from the rest was discussed, as well
5 as when DutchBat was to evacuate."
6 And then, in particular, there are particular details provided to
7 you by Colonel Karremans as to how Mladic wanted the evacuation carried
8 out. Do you see that there? In batches? "Mladic said who should be
9 evacuated first: The wounded" --
10 A. Yes, I see it.
11 Q. "-- women, children and DutchBat." And then you say, "Karremans
12 did not agree with this." That's what you say in the statement.
13 A. If it says so, yes.
14 Q. I'm not criticising you, Mr. Franken. I'm just -- and obviously
15 the basis for that is Franken -- Colonel Franken [sic] saying to you, he
16 proposed these evacuations in batches and I disagreed with it.
17 A. Well, what he said to me, obviously, was that he didn't agree with
18 the way Mladic wanted it to be executed.
19 Q. In that specific, as we see, five -- the provision of five
20 batches, if you like, is the way it's described.
21 A. Yes, as I see it here. Yes.
22 Q. All right. Now, I want to show you 1D24, and I want to take you
23 to page 4 of that document. Now, you'll just see from the cover page,
24 this is the NIOD report which, no doubt, you are familiar with and, in
25 fact, you were interviewed for.
1 A. Yes, I was interviewed. And I'm not familiar with the complete
3 Q. I'm sure you've got better things to do in your spare time. But
4 if you could just go to page 4, and there is a particular paragraph, the
5 final paragraph, if we just scroll down, that begins: "In order to get
6 clarification ..." Do you see that there, "In order to get
7 clarification ..."?
8 A. I see the text.
9 Q. Okay. I'll read it out.
10 "In order to get clarification as to how this was all going to be
11 done, Boering and Rave were sent back to Bratunac, while Karremans went to
12 report to Colonel Brantz."
13 Now, I don't think we've established, but Colonel Brantz was who?
14 A. She was staff of the HQ -- UNPROFOR HQ in Tuzla, sector
15 north-east, it was.
16 Q. "Apart from the question of the surrender and disarming of the
17 ABiH and some comment on the improved atmosphere of the negotiations, the
18 most important bit of information that Karremans had for Brantz was the
19 plan to organise the evacuation in five batches."
20 Do you see that there?
21 A. I see it.
22 Q. "The first one would be the seriously wounded and wounded, the
23 next batch would be the weak, followed by the stronger women and children,
24 then men aged 17 to 60, and lastly DutchBat itself."
25 Do you see that?
1 A. I see it.
2 Q. And you also see that:
3 "The situation report in which Brantz passed on this plan for an
4 evacuation in batches showed that he expected that afternoon to see a
5 start being made only on the evacuation of the first batch - the wounded
6 and the seriously wounded."
7 Do you see it there?
8 A. And there was an added remark in relation to batch four being
9 -- "will be subject to debriefing by the VRS." Do you see that there?
10 A. I see it.
11 Q. So you agree it appears from that communication that Colonel
12 Karremans had for Colonel Brantz, that, in fact, Colonel Karremans was
13 proposing that the evacuation be conducted in five batches.
14 A. Or Colonel Karremans informed Colonel Brantz what the plan of
15 Mladic was. I really don't know. I see this for first time in my life.
16 And it was not part of the communication between Brantz and Karremans,
17 so ...
18 Q. Well, just in relation to that final notation there, "will be
19 subjected to debriefing by the VRS," you see that there --
20 A. I see it.
21 Q. -- about the men?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. There was a perception, was there not, that there were hardly any
24 able-bodied men in and around the compound at Potocari, held by DutchBat.
25 Is that fair?
1 A. Fair is that we saw not many men. That's correct, yes, in that
2 stage, yes.
3 Q. Yes. All right. Well, we'll return to that.
4 A. Okay.
5 Q. Okay? Insofar as the provision of fuel was concerned, your
6 statement and your evidence has been that there was no question in your
7 mind that there was an agreement in relation to the provision of fuel by
8 UNPROFOR for the evacuation. Is that correct?
9 A. In the end I was ordered to give fuel to the BSA; that's correct.
10 Q. Yes. But just before we get to that point where you were ordered
11 to provide fuel after the evacuation --
12 A. Mm-hmm.
13 Q. -- in your -- on your 13th of September, 1995, debriefing, what
14 you said was that "the agreements on the evacuation of the refugees stated
15 that UNPROFOR would supply the fuel."
16 A. Okay.
17 Q. "Whether Smith or Karremans made this arrangement, he did not
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. So, obviously, in your mind, you had received information at some
21 stage that it was either one of them.
22 A. Yes. Obviously somebody in the UN decided that, yes.
23 Q. "Because there was a fuel shortage in the battalion, Mladic
24 supplied it himself initially, and there was talk of an arrangement in
25 exchange for its use afterwards."
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now I put this proposition to you: Was it the case that there was
3 some fuel available to DutchBat to proceed with the evacuation? Do you
4 agree with that?
5 A. No.
6 Q. No?
7 A. To be short, the fuel situation was quite clear. In all my
8 vehicles, I had one -- they have two tanks of fuel; one was filled or
9 partially filled. And I had about 2.000, 3.000 litres in my tanks, my
10 supply tanks. That's all. So that wouldn't be hardly enough to make one
12 Q. All right. As far as you're aware, was any of the 2.000 or 3.000
13 that was in your reserve used at all for the evacuation?
14 A. No.
15 Q. No? None at all?
16 A. No.
17 Q. All right. So your evidence is that what happened was that, in
18 effect, there was -- the VRS advanced the fuel to UNPROFOR. Is that a
19 fair way to describe it?
20 A. In fact, that happened, yes.
21 Q. They said, "We'll provide you with the fuel but you have to pay us
23 A. Again, I don't know what the arrangements were between the VRS and
24 the UN or UNPROFOR on that level. The only thing I know is that I didn't
25 have the fuel. They were driving cars around, so they had the fuel. And
1 when it was ended, the evacuation, I got orders that as soon as we got
2 fuel, to provide the BSA with the amount of fuel that was applicable for,
3 et cetera, yes.
4 Q. And that was 27.000 litres, or something of that --
5 A. Yes, something of that amount. Yes.
6 Q. And that order, you've described that order in the past as having
7 come from Sarajevo --?
8 A. Right.
9 Q. -- but that obviously it would not be directly from Sarajevo
10 because it could come through Colonel Karremans to you.
11 A. Yes, yes, yes.
12 Q. All right. Now, insofar as the evidence of separation is
13 concerned and your observation, it is clear from your evidence that you,
14 yourself, saw no separations of the men.
15 A. No, not the actual separation. I, once in a while, saw columns of
16 men going in the direction of the "White House." That's correct.
17 Q. Now, your evidence has been in the past in your debriefing reports
18 that, in fact, you saw all 239 men that were on your list, which we'll get
19 to, board the buses with their families.
20 A. I saw the last convoys, and in these last convoys concerning the
21 refugees on our compound, there were 251 pulled-out men. That's correct.
22 Q. And also you've given evidence this morning about that document
23 that you signed, of the 17th of July, and I appreciate that you amended it
24 to the extent that you thought it reflected the reality of the situation,
25 by saying insofar as DutchBat escorted the convoys, they were carried out
1 in accordance with --
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. -- proper conventions. However, you agree that you made no
4 attempt, or you didn't -- it didn't occur to you in the amendment of that
5 document to raise any issues or irregularities about the process of the
6 evacuation generally. Do you agree with that?
7 A. Obviously I did not, no.
8 Q. Again, I'm not criticising you.
9 A. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.
10 Q. And obviously -- the obvious irregularities lie in the reports of
11 the nine dead bodies and the one fellow who one of your personnel said
12 he'd seen executed.
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Yes. I know you've been asked about this before. Your response
15 in relation to the nine dead, initially, when Mr. Nuhanovic came to you,
16 didn't he, and said he'd overheard some UNMOs talking about nine dead
17 bodies behind a house, you gave an unusual response, didn't you, given the
18 seriousness of that report.
19 A. For me it was probably not unusual. What do you mean?
20 Q. Well, you said, "Don't spread that bullshit around."
21 A. Yes, I said that. That's correct. It's not unusual when you have
22 30.000 people, half in panic, and then spreading around the story that
23 there were nine men executed. So it's not that unusual, in my mind.
24 Q. Even in that context, though, Mr. Franken, it indicates that you
25 didn't seek to investigate it and take it seriously then.
1 A. I took it seriously, seriously enough to prevent panic between the
2 refugees, because that was the reason that I said, "Don't spread this
3 bullshit around."
4 Q. What about -- again, there were complaints -- all right. Well,
5 just in relation to that issue of the report of the nine bodies, did you
6 send one of your personnel to go -- because you've -- we have seen on the
7 map that you marked yesterday, you were given specific information as to
8 where those bodies were supposedly found. Is that right?
9 A. Well, I was reported that it was about 60, 70 metres from
10 the "White House," in a certain direction by the water, so my conclusion
11 was that.
12 Q. All right. But, naturally, having taken that report seriously,
13 you would then send one of your personnel down to investigate.
14 A. Why? When an officer reporting to me, a good officer, he told me
15 what happened, exactly what happened. So why did I have to send somebody
16 down? I did not.
17 Q. All right. All right. There were reports, were there not, given
18 to you by other members of the refugee committee as to, you know, bodies
19 being found, which you then did get people to go and investigate those
20 locations, and nothing was found, was it?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. That's right. So you were in a situation where it was often very
23 difficult to distinguish between rumour and fact.
24 A. Yes. That's correct again.
25 Q. So insofar as the complaint -- the report of the one fellow who'd
1 been executed, and that was perhaps a little bit more specific insofar as
2 you had Captain Groenewegen telling you that he had seen from a distance
3 soldiers, various soldiers, executing a man?
4 A. Yes. But the report from Groenewegen came through the commander
5 of Charlie Company, C Company, who was in this area, to the colonel, and
6 the colonel told me what happened. So I didn't interfere further on in
7 that thing.
8 Q. But you did give -- as I understand it, you gave -- did you not
9 give Colonel Groenewegen some advice about putting the incident in
11 A. I gave the advice to -- not personally, but I gave the advice to
12 put the report in writing. That's correct.
13 Q. Yes, because what you'd indicated in your debriefing report of
14 the -- I think it's the 20th of September: "It seemed important to
15 Franken to have the witness make a note of the event in writing," which
16 stands to reason, why that's important.
17 A. Because memories of people --
18 Q. No, no. I'm -- that's very important.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, did you ever see that report?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Do you know whether or not he ever made the report?
23 A. I suppose when I give a soldier an order, as commander, that it is
24 done. But I didn't check whether they did.
25 Q. All right. Now, finally --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, page 52, line 4, Groen should be
2 reading as Groenewegen.
3 MS. CONDON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you.
4 Q. Finally, Mr. Franken, I want to turn to the issue of the list of
5 men that was made on your initiative. Now, we just established a moment
6 ago that, initially, Colonel Karremans and yourself shared the perception
7 that there was just a handful of able-bodied men in the compound.
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. And is it fair to say that between the 11th and the 13th of July
10 Colonel Karremans is very much, an understatement would be, a very busy
11 man; yes?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And he is confined, so to speak, to the headquarters, to -- he's
14 not out and about amongst the --
15 A. Yes, that's correct.
16 Q. And you said yesterday that you made -- which is certainly to your
17 credit, you made an effort to get out amongst -- you're around, to see
18 what was going on, to see what was going on in and around the compound.
19 Is that right?
20 A. Not only an effort. I did that at least twice a day. Yes, that's
22 Q. So it would stand to reason, would it not, that you -- that
23 Colonel Karremans would be heavily reliant on you - you're his deputy -
24 for, specifically, any information as to the question of numbers of
25 able-bodied men.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Yes? And if, in particular --
3 MS. CONDON: I'll take the witness -- if Mr. Franken could be
4 shown 1D37.
5 Q. Do you have that in front of you?
6 A. I have a document in front of me, yes.
7 Q. Again, this is a chapter from the NIOD report, and if I can just
8 take you to page 5 of that document, and the third -- there's a paragraph
9 that begins, "However, based on these statements..." and that's what I
10 want to focus your mind on. But then I want to take you to the sentence
11 that begins on the fifth line, that --
12 MS. CONDON: Just there is fine, Madam Usher.
13 Q. "Karremans himself confirms..." Do you see that?
14 A. I see it.
15 Q. "Karremans himself confirms that it is true that at some point he
16 did find out about the list but that the importance of the matter had
17 fully escaped him at the time. There were 50.000 people crowded together
18 in one place. I didn't even though that there were another 280 to 300 men
19 on the compound. Franken told me about this later."
20 Now, would that be accurate, that you would have been the source
21 of any information to Colonel Karremans about the numbers of able-bodied
22 men in and around the compound?
23 A. Now, I don't know whether I'm the only source, but obviously I
24 told him about it, yes.
25 Q. And, obviously, the list was a significant indicator, in your
1 mind, as to what the numbers were.
2 A. Yes, well, that's correct.
3 Q. With --
4 A. On the compound.
5 Q. On the compound. Well, what I am -- is it -- given what you've
6 said about the perception that there were only a handful of -- well,
7 perhaps I'll withdraw that.
8 I'll take you to further down in this document where it says, in
9 the -- the next paragraph, there's a statement -- there's a sentence that
10 begins, "From these statements..." Do you that there?
11 A. Yes, I see.
12 Q. "From these statements it was already decided what Karremans had
13 said about the small presence of men military age outside the compound."
14 A. Mm-hmm.
15 Q. "Only a handful" Right?
16 A. That's a big hand.
17 Q. Well, he's talking about men outside the compound here.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Not inside.
20 A. Mm-hmm.
21 Q. All right? What do you say about that perception held by Colonel
22 Karremans insofar as there being a handful of or a small presence of men
23 of military age outside the compound? Do you agree with that?
24 A. Well, relatively seen to the total amount of refugees, it is a
25 small amount, of course, because there were about, in my estimation, 600
1 or 700 and there were about 25.000, 30.000 people outside there. So,
2 relatively seen, it's a small amount. But I can't read Colonel Karremans'
3 mind, why he said "a handful."
4 Q. I appreciate you can't read his mind. But you would, obviously,
5 disagree strenuously with the proposition that the number of 251 to 300 as
6 being a total number of men of able -- able-bodied men in and around the
7 compound, you would disagree with that?
8 A. That's incorrect. The number 251 was the -- about 60, 70, didn't
9 want to be registered, so about 300 were in the compound and the
10 estimation was that there were about 600 outside the compound.
11 Q. Now, I want to take you now back to 1D36, at page 4. This is that
12 UNMO situation report. And at page 4 of the situation report --
13 MS. CONDON: Yes, 1D36. No, no, that's not the right. 1D36 is
14 the UNMO situation report. We've seen it before.
15 Q. It's the one that you didn't agree with the paragraph that was
16 reflecting your statements. This is it. Page 4 of that document, and
17 paragraph 6, at page 4. You see there it says: "CO DutchBat ..." Do you
18 have that?
19 A. Yes, I see it.
20 Q. "CO DutchBat was told by BSA that they have been given an
21 ultimatum for the BiH soldiers in the compound to hand over all their
22 weapons by 1000 hours today."
23 A. And "today" is probably the 12th of July.
24 Q. Yes, that's right. It then goes on to say: "There are no armed
25 BiH soldiers in the compound." However, you would agree, would you not,
1 that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between
2 a civilian and a BiH soldier when it came to able-bodied men?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Because uniforms were an indication.
5 A. Yes, and parts of uniforms could be an indication as well, but
6 that didn't prove anything.
7 Q. And in that regard, after the refugees left, in and around the
8 compound there were weapons found, weren't there?
9 A. There were two small arms found in the latrines; yes, that's
11 Q. Well, your description in your debriefing report was just
12 "weapons." You weren't specific.
13 A. Yes, okay.
14 Q. Yes?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And furthermore, insofar as the baggage that was left lying around
17 the "White House" was burned, which we heard about yesterday, a consider
18 number of small arms ammunition exploded. That was your report to the
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Do you agree with that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. All right.
24 MS. CONDON: Just pardon me a moment, Your Honour. I have no
25 further questions, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Congratulations. Thank you, Ms. Condon. I couldn't
2 understand exactly who was going next. I know who is going third, but I
3 didn't -- Mr. Stojanovic?
4 Mr. Stojanovic will be cross-examining you; he appears for accused
5 Borovcanin here, together with Mr. Lazarevic.
6 Mr. Stojanovic, he is all yours.
7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:
9 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Franken. Before this testimony,
10 you appeared on the 15th of September, in 2003, in the Blagojevic case as
11 a witness. Is that correct?
12 A. As far as I recollect, yes, that's correct.
13 Q. On that occasion, you testified that shortly before the operation
14 by the Army of Republika Srpska in Srebrenica, there were several attacks
15 from the Srebrenica enclave towards the territory under the control of the
16 Army of Republika Srpska. Do you recall that?
17 A. Yes, I recollect two attacks reported. Yes.
18 Q. Could you please tell us a little more about these two attacks
19 that you talked about.
20 A. As was reported to me by, as I recollect, OP Mike -- sorry, M,
21 observation post M, there were burning houses in the north of the
22 enclave. There was some small-calibre fire heard overnight. That is one.
23 Later on, in a contact with Major Nikolic of the Bratunac Brigade, he
24 indicated that it had been an attack of BiH forces over there.
25 And the second one was an ambush in the area south of the enclave,
1 Zeleni Jadar, you could say, on the way to Zepa, where the BSA told us
2 that seven or nine soldiers were killed in an ambush led by -- obviously,
3 by the BiH.
4 Q. Just so that I can understand, whose soldiers were killed at that
6 A. Bosnian Serb soldiers.
7 Q. Could you please tell us when this happened? Which month in 1995,
8 based on your recollection?
9 A. Sorry, but I'm try to go think of it. It must be around May, I
10 suppose. Yes. April/May, as far as I recollect, but ...
11 Q. Would you agree with me if I said that the burning of the village
12 was on the 26th of June, 1995? Is this date possible?
13 A. It is possible, yes.
14 Q. Thank you. Was it part of your mandate in the Srebrenica enclave
15 to prevent this incident and similar incidents?
16 A. Yes, it was.
17 Q. Do you believe, in view of the objective position that you were
18 in, that you successfully carried out your mandate in terms of this
19 particular point?
20 A. No, absolutely not.
21 Q. Thank you very much for your correctness.
22 Please allow me to show you a part of the text that you wrote
23 entitled "In the Name of Peace - Retrospective."
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] For the purposes of
25 identification, this is Exhibit 2D41. I would like the usher to place the
1 English version on the ELMO so that we can all follow the text, because
2 this document is still not in the e-court system.
3 Q. Mr. Franken, can you please tell us when you drafted this text.
4 A. That should be somewhere in 1996, I suppose. Early 1996 or late
5 1995. I don't know exactly. That book was published, as I recollect, in
6 1996, so somewhere shortly before that I wrote that.
7 Q. At one point, you state: "And then the bomb arrived, an order
8 arrived, of course, an oral order to assist the Serbs --"
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that we are not looking at
10 the original of the text.
11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. "-- which were given the approval to evacuate the population with
13 their own vehicles."
14 Do you see that, Mr. Franken?
15 A. No, I do not see that, but I heard the text and I recognised it.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: [Microphone not activated].
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, thank you. I heard the interpreters point out
19 that they could not follow because they were not seeing it on the screen.
20 Madam Usher, what's the problem, as such? It is --
21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Page 3, paragraph 2 of the
22 English version.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: So it's there so that the witness can have a good
24 look at it.
25 THE WITNESS: I see it now, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. The last six lines, basically, of that
2 paragraph that you see on the screen now.
3 Yes, Mr. Stojanovic.
4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. My question is, Mr. Franken: When you were writing this and when
6 you said that the Serbs had permission to proceed with the deportation of
7 the population with their own vehicles, can you actually tell us who
8 issued or who had granted this permission?
9 A. Yes, I do not know. The UN did, and who in the UN, I do not know,
10 because Colonel Karremans always had the contacts to the higher echelons,
11 so I can't name a general or a person. But it came down the UN line.
12 Q. Thank you. So is my conclusion correct when I say that, based on
13 your understanding, it's not in dispute that the Serbs were given
14 permission to evacuate the population with their own vehicles; but now,
15 today, you cannot say exactly who from the UN system granted this
16 permission. Is this correct?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Thank you. Now I would -- since you've already responded to a
19 series of questions by my learned friend, I would like to put the
20 following question to you: Did, if I understand correctly, and I'm
21 speaking of the Dutch Battalion, they at one point give the Army of
22 Republika Srpska about 27.000 litres of fuel for the requirements of this
24 A. Yes. It was afterwards, but it did happen, yes.
25 Q. Can you please tell us approximately when this occurred.
1 A. To my knowledge, somewhere around the 16th of July.
2 Q. At that point, the evacuation had already been completed as far as
3 the civilian population was concerned. Is that correct?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. And as you said today, it was your mandate to act for the purposes
6 of the evacuation on the 12th and the 13th of July in accordance with the
7 permission that had been granted?
8 A. Yes, that is correct.
9 Q. And that is what you did; that is how you conducted yourself. Is
10 that correct?
11 A. As far as we were allowed to, yes, I did, or we did.
12 Q. On the 11th of July, 1995, the civilian population was in front of
13 the headquarters of the B Company and set off from there, from Srebrenica,
14 towards the UN base in Potocari. Do you remember that?
15 A. I do.
16 Q. Do you know that at one point members of the 28th Division stopped
17 the column of refugees on the road and asked them to return to the town of
19 A. Yes, but that's also another occasion. That happened on the night
20 or evening of the 10th. And the movement on the 11th, led in by personnel
21 of B Company, then there was no 28th Division anymore so nobody stopped
23 Q. What was the reason that the 28th Division of the BiH army would
24 not allow the civilian population to go from Srebrenica to Potocari, in
25 your opinion?
1 A. Well, I do not know. I was a bit puzzled about it, but I did not
2 know. I only can guess, but ...
3 Q. According to your information, how long were the members of the
4 28th Division in Srebrenica, until what time? And when were they on the
5 Srebrenica-Potocari road?
6 A. On the road Srebrenica-Potocari there were the civilians,
7 refugees. The last sign we had of the 28th Division was in the late
8 evening of the 10th when the colonel saw quite a lot of armed men on the
9 marketplace, in the city itself. Afterwards, we never heard or saw
10 anything about that 28th Division.
11 Q. For purposes of clarification, when you say "colonel," does that
12 mean that you are thinking of Colonel Karremans? Is that correct?
13 A. Yes. If I say "colonel," I mean Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans, CO
14 of DutchBat. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Now I am going to ask you to look at an excerpt of
16 video footage.
17 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] This is V006822, and the 65 ter
18 number is P02016. We are going to look at the segment from 9.40 to 9.45.
19 [Videotape played]
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Franken, do you recognise the weapon that is slung across the
22 shoulder of the member of the Dutch Battalion?
23 A. Yes, I do. It's an FAL 7.62 infantry gun, or infantry rifle, I
24 should say. Sorry.
25 Q. Who is the manufacturer of this rifle? Can you please help us?
1 A. FN Browning, Belgium.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at another
4 segment, which is marked V0003914. The 65 ter number is P2007. And it's
5 a segment from 55.28 to 56.10.
6 Q. Mr. Franken, this is a segment -- before we actually look at it,
7 this is material taken on the 16th of July, 1995.
8 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we freeze here for a second.
9 We don't have to look at the whole segment.
10 Q. So this is footage taken on the 16th of July, 1995, when members
11 of the 28th Division of the BiH army crossed into the territory of the
12 village of Nezuk, which was under the control of the 2nd Corps of the Army
13 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do you see this rifle slung across the back of
14 the BiH army member?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. Would you agree with me that this rifle was from the same batch of
17 weapons that we just saw, which was something the member of the Dutch
18 Battalion was carrying?
19 A. Yes, it's the same type of weapon.
20 Q. Is it possible that this weapon was taken from members of the
21 Dutch Battalion?
22 A. Yes, it is possible, but I don't know what date this picture is
23 exactly. I know that the crew of Charlie Company had been attacked or --
24 attacked, no, overwhelmed by about 30, 40 Muslims, and they took then
25 their weapons, et cetera, so ...
1 "Observation Post Charlie," I meant, C. It's in the south-west
2 of the enclave.
3 Q. And did members of your unit at OP Charlie have weapons like this?
4 A. Yes, they did.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at another short
7 segment, which is three minutes long, and it's marked V0003676. The 65
8 ter number is P02017.
9 Q. And before we see the footage, I just want to say this is a
10 section that depicts the members of the 28th Division coming into the
11 territory of the village of Nezuk on the 16th of July, 1995.
12 [Videotape played]
13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. We are looking at this footage, Mr. Franken, and I would like you
15 just to focus on the weapons that are carried by the people in this
16 segment, and then I will have some questions about the weapons.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Stop, stop, stop, stop, stop, stop. Since you
18 intervened to tell the witness what he should be paying careful attention
19 to, do you want to start the footage again? Because I think we were not
20 paying particular attention to that, in any case. So let's start the
21 footage running again, please.
22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 [Videotape played]
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Franken, do you agree that practically all the members of this
1 column are men with weapons, armed men?
2 A. Yes, as far as I saw, that's correct.
3 Q. They have different kinds of infantry weapons. Is that correct?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. By the way, I would like to ask you if you recognise the person
6 now in front of you in this particular frame.
7 A. No, I do not.
8 Q. Thank you. I'm now going to try to show you a document.
9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] ID number 4D26. It's a Defence
10 exhibit, ERN number 01827752, 7752. It's an order by the B&H army
11 commander Rasim Delic of the 6th of August, 1995. Could the usher please
12 assist because the document has now been translated and the translation is
13 in the system as of today. But I'm not sure whether we can use it now.
14 Maybe we can just place it on the ELMO and then focus on the bottom of the
15 first page and the top of the second page. Thank you.
16 Q. Mr. Franken, this is an order by the BiH army commander, Rasim
17 Delic, and as you can see on page 1 of this document, this order is dated
18 6th August, 1995.
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. And it was sent to the command of the 2nd Corps of the BiH army.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. I'm going to draw your attention to one paragraph under 2. The
23 title is "Mobilisation Preparations" or "Organisational Preparations." It
24 says here that:
25 "The newly formed 9th Liberation Brigade will be replenished from
1 the ranks of volunteers, and the following units will become part of the
2 9th Liberation Brigade as their organisational parts."
3 And I'm drawing your attention to the second page in which it says
5 "Amongst others, on the strength of the 9th Muslim Liberation
6 Brigade, a unit called Mudzahid is to find its place and it is now on the
7 strength of the 28th Division and it has 94 troops."
8 My question to you is this: Are you aware of the fact that, under
9 the 283rd Brigade of the 28th Division of BiH army, a company had been
10 formed earlier on and the name of that company was Mudzahid?
11 A. No, I am not aware of that. I was not aware of that.
12 Q. Thank you. In that case, I will not insist on this document. I
13 would kindly ask you to assist us with the following subject.
14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to thank the usher.
15 We will no longer need this document.
16 Q. The Observation Post Papa was in the north of the enclave, in the
17 vicinity of the Yellow Bridge. Is that correct?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. On the 12th of July, 1995, in the morning hours, from that
20 direction, the troops of the VRS started moving towards Potocari. Is that
22 A. That's correct as well.
23 Q. Once the members of the Dutch Battalion hoisted a white flag,
24 these troops skirted the check-point and continued moving towards
25 Potocari. Is that correct?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Help us, please, and tell us: How long did the members of the
3 Dutch Battalion stay in the Papa observation point near the Yellow Bridge?
4 A. I'm just thinking. Papa was withdrawn on the 13th or the 14th. I
5 don't know exactly. Yeah.
6 Q. And this withdrawal from the Papa observation point, did it follow
7 your order, or did they do that of their own will?
8 A. No. A withdrawal is always done on order.
9 Q. Thank you. Did any of the members who had manned the Papa point
10 get captured or did they all return to the base?
11 A. As far as I recollect, Papa returned completely to the base.
12 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you spoke about the information that you had
13 received about the killing of nine persons and one civilian as two
14 completely separate events, and this was on page 78, 79, and 81 of
15 yesterday's testimony provided by Mr. Franken. Do you remember that you
16 told us about that?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. Who provided you with this information? Actually, the two
19 separate pieces of information.
20 A. As I said, the killing of the nine persons was reported to me by
21 First Lieutenant Coster; and the information of the execution of the
22 single person came to me through Colonel Karremans and was reported by the
23 soldier who saw it, through the company commander, C Company, towards the
25 Q. Were you ever told who the dead bodies were, who the persons were
1 who had been killed?
2 A. No.
3 Q. And you never learned the identity of the persons who had shot at
4 those men.
5 A. No, I never did.
6 Q. You also never learned when the persons had been executed, as it
7 was claimed that they were.
8 A. As far as the nine men are concerned, we did not know the exact
9 timing. The report of the soldier was the actual execution, so the timing
10 of that execution, we knew.
11 Q. According to this soldier's report, when did the execution take
12 place, the execution of the nine persons?
13 A. No, sorry, I have to correct you. The soldier reported the single
14 execution --
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think he testified on this in the most clear
16 manner yesterday. I don't think we need to go through it again. He made
17 the distinction between one case and the other, who gave the information,
18 and that's when Mr. Bourgon intervened as well. So any further questions
19 which were not on matters that were not covered yesterday, yes, by all
20 means, because this is related to one of the charges; but otherwise,
21 please, let's avoid repetitions. Thank you.
22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 Q. On that occasion you also mentioned a facility that you referred
24 to as the "White House." Do you remember that?
25 A. Sorry, I didn't hear the interpreter. I'm just reading the text
1 now. Hold.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. The counsel is referring you to that part of
3 the testimony where you referred to the "White House."
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I see it now.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: I suppose he will be following up with a few
6 questions. Thank you.
7 Mr. Stojanovic, please.
8 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Mr. Franken, how long did you refer to that house as the "White
10 House" in your vocabulary?
11 A. Well, from the moment that it was occupied or used by the BSA, it
12 was called the "White House" and ever stayed so.
13 Q. Yesterday, on pages 71 and 72 of the transcript, you said that
14 records were kept of the number of men who entered the "White House," and
15 that the same number of men left the "White House." Do you remember that?
16 A. Yes, and that concerns the period that the UNMOs were there. They
17 kept a number of the men entering and going out, and in time that was the
18 beginning of the afternoon of the 12th.
19 Q. The record on the number of men who entered and left the house,
20 was it kept on the 13th of July as well?
21 A. No. As soon as the UNMOs had to withdraw, we didn't keep up
23 Q. Does this mean that you don't know whether, on the 13th of July,
24 there were any men in the "White House" who might have left the "White
25 House" as well?
1 A. No, that does not mean. We knew that all the time there were men
2 in the "White House" and afterwards transported with that light blue bus.
3 The only thing I do not know is the exact number of men.
4 Q. Thank you. During the night between the 12th and the 13th of
5 July, you stayed at the UN base. Is that correct?
6 A. Yes, that is correct.
7 Q. During that night and in the morning of the 13th, did you receive
8 any information about any killings that had occurred during that night?
9 A. No, I did not. I think that was the night that it got reported,
10 the suicides that we mentioned before.
11 Q. Yes, we heard that yesterday. Allow me to draw your attention to
12 the part of your testimony in the Blagojevic case that is relative to the
13 role of Momir Nikolic. During that testimony, on page 1557 of the
14 transcript dated 15 September, you said, amongst other things, that, on
15 the 15th of July, Momir Nikolic had arrived in the UN base, by car, and
16 you also said that those car belonged to your mechanics. Do you remember
18 A. Yes, I presume Momir Nikolic is Major Nikolic from the Bratunac
19 Brigade, then I remember that. That's correct, yes.
20 Q. Can you help us, please. How come that Major Nikolic found
21 himself in the possession of the car that belonged to your mechanic?
22 A. Yes. You'd better ask Major Nikolic. I do not know. I just saw
24 Q. We will ask him, but I wanted to hear from you first whether you
25 have any knowledge, because you mentioned it. Let me put it to you in
1 another way. Do you know at any point in time Major Nikolic requisitioned
2 that vehicle from your mechanic?
3 A. I don't know at any point in time. I only can repeat what I said
4 before in other testimony. There was a rumour that the mechanic had made
5 a deal with Major Nikolic, point, and then I saw Major Nikolic coming in
6 with his car.
7 Q. And this mechanic of yours, was he a Dutch person or a Bosniak?
8 A. No, he was a -- he was a local, a Bosniak.
9 Q. Why did he arrive on the 15th of July? What did he want from you?
10 A. Major Nikolic came in -- yes, sorry. He wanted me to pay the bill
11 of the hotel where the POWs were held, and asked for the rent of the
12 location the UNMOs obviously had in Bratunac.
13 Q. When you say "the rent of the location," do you mean -- do you
14 mean that he asked for money for the rent of those locations, for the use
15 of those locations?
16 A. Yes. He, or the owner of the hotel, asked for money for the food
17 he obviously gave to the POWs, and Major Nikolic asked for the rent of a
18 bureau, or whatever, in Bratunac. Obviously, the UNMOs did that or rented
19 that or whatever.
20 Q. Did you give him the money?
21 A. Sorry. No, I did not.
22 Q. Why?
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Next question, Mr. Stojanovic.
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Q. And what was your impression of the position that Momir Nikolic
1 held in those days?
2 A. Asked for -- every time he gave another job he had at the Bratunac
3 Brigade that differed from the CO and operations officer, he said he was,
4 anyway, a major of the Bratunac Brigade, and we always considered him as
5 the actual liaison to the Bosnian Serb army, because the official one,
6 Colonel Vukovic, was seldom reachable.
7 Q. Thank you. Yesterday and today you spoke about the compiling of
8 the list of able-bodied men in the UN base. Did Nesib Mandzic participate
9 in the compiling of that list?
10 A. Yes, he did.
11 Q. Did you notice that his name was not on the list?
12 A. No, I did not notice. I -- no.
13 Q. Then there's no point in me asking you why his name is not there,
14 I suppose.
15 A. No. That's correct.
16 Q. And finally let me ask you this: What about Ramiz Becirovic? You
17 mentioned his name yesterday on direct. Did you personally have any
18 contacts with Ramiz Becirovic, before the 11th of July, that is?
19 A. Yes. Ramiz Becirovic, being the Chief of Staff of the 28th
20 Division, I suppose, is the man -- when I spoke to the 28th Division, he
21 was always my counterpart.
22 Q. We've heard testimony by a member of the DutchBat who said that
23 Ramiz Becirovic asked you to provide him with asylum, protection in the UN
24 base. Did he address you personally with such request?
25 A. No, absolutely not.
1 Q. And what about his wife? Did she come to you at any point in time
2 to ask for protection from you?
3 A. No, not -- none of them came personally to me for protection.
4 Q. Do you know that his wife was at the UN base between the 12th and
5 the 13th of July, 1995, together with other refugees?
6 A. No. Well, could be, but there were 30.000 of them, so -- and I
7 didn't know them all personally.
8 Q. Mr. Franken, I'm going to show you Ramiz Becirovic's statement.
9 The number is 4D2 and the ERN number is 01854518 to 4532. Since this
10 statement is in the e-court, I would like to draw your attention to the
11 last paragraph on page 7 and the first paragraph of page 8 of this
12 statement. This is where Ramiz Becirovic says this: Before the
13 aggression against Srebrenica, he had some 140.000 -- for all of us to be
14 able to follow, the English version is page 9, paragraph 3. Page 9,
15 paragraph 3.
16 He says that he's had about 140.000 of the then-German marks and
17 that this money was left with his wife. And when she arrived in Tuzla, he
18 asked her what happened to the money, and then she informed him that, in
19 Potocari, when the Chetniks did the search, she had buried that money in
20 the sand that was in the barrel in the akumulator factory where it was.
21 And this was within the UNPROFOR compound, according to him.
22 Mr. Franken, do you know anything about this money at all? Were
23 there any comments to the effect that that money was later on found or
24 taken away from anybody?
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Stojanovic, what's the relevance of this?
1 Starting from Madam Becirovic's presence in the compound and now
2 Mr. Becirovic's statement about money in Srebrenica, what's the relevance
3 of this, especially in relation to your client?
4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in the indictment,
5 my client is charged with the confiscation of money and valuables from the
6 refugees who were in Potocari. Since my -- to my last question,
7 Mr. Franken said that he never saw Mrs. Becirovic. I will withdraw this
8 question, but I believe that my point, however, was clear.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, the Prosecution did not adduce any evidence as
10 yet in relation to possible confiscation or possession of this particular
11 amount of money. It's up to you.
12 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] With your leave.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: We didn't have it in the records, so we've heard
14 nothing about it until you put the question.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] We have it in the indictment,
16 Your Honour, and since the Prosecution gave up on Mr. Karremans'
17 testimony, it seemed to me that this was my last chance to put a question
18 of this sort. I will move on.
19 Q. Mr. Franken, I would like to ask you this: Do you know anything
20 about the requisition of money or seizing of money from the refugees who
21 were on the UN base on the 12th and the 13th of July?
22 A. As long as they were on the UN base, there was no requisition of
24 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions, and this completes my
1 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to thank the
2 honourable Chamber for the time.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Stojanovic. I think we thank you,
4 too. We are having a break in four minutes' time, so we might as well
5 have it now, Mr. Bourgon, and you will start your cross -- if you are in
6 agreement, of course.
7 MR. BOURGON: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: So we will have a 25-minute break, starting now.
9 --- Recess taken at 12.26 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: So, Mr. Bourgon.
12 Mr. Bourgon is appearing for Mr. Nikolic in this case, and he will
13 be cross-examining you now.
14 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Bourgon:
16 Q. Good morning, sir.
17 A. Good afternoon.
18 Q. As was indicated to you by the President of the Trial Chamber, I
19 represent Drago Nikolic in this case.
20 Now, during your testimony yesterday, you referred to four
21 officers of the Bosnian Serb army with whom you had some dealings during
22 the relevant period, and I would just like to confirm that these four
23 officers are Vukotic. Is that correct?
24 A. That's correct. Colonel Vukovic.
25 Q. Acemovic?
1 A. That is correct as well.
2 Q. Jankovic.
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. And Major Nikolic.
5 A. Of the Bratunac Brigade, yes, sir.
6 Q. Regarding Acemovic and Jankovic, those were, according to you, two
7 colonels reporting to General Mladic. Is that correct?
8 A. They said they came from Pale. They never told me that they would
9 report to General Mladic.
10 Q. That's fine with me. I can live with this answer, for sure. As
11 for Vukotic, you mentioned in your testimony yesterday -- sorry, in your
12 testimony in the Krstic case, that he was from the Skelani Brigade.
13 A. As far as we knew, yes, that's correct.
14 Q. And as far as Major Nikolic goes, you mentioned yesterday that he
15 was from Bratunac Brigade and that he was the liaison to the Bosnian Serb
17 A. Our liaison to the Bosnian Serb army. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. Now, yesterday you also said something that I would like to
19 confirm, where you said that you had to deal with a couple of brigades
20 during the relevant time, and you mention Skelani Brigade, Bratunac
21 Brigade, and you also said - and I quote from page 14, lines 16 to 18 -
22 that you had contact in the Milici area. Is that correct?
23 A. Yes, what we called the Milici Brigade. But "contact" you'll have
24 to give that the context of visual contact, not actually. The only point
25 we actually had contact with are the both mentioned, Major Nikolic and
1 Colonel Vukotic.
2 Q. As a follow-up to your answer, there's one thing I would like to
3 confirm with you and that is, in relation to these events, and that is, of
4 course, from 16 July to 17 July, that you did not encounter anyone from
5 the Zvornik Brigade.
6 A. As far as I know, no, sir.
7 Q. Now, given that you, at some point in time, acted as the S2 for
8 DutchBat - S2, for some people who might not know what that means, the
9 intelligence officer - in some respect, towards the end, you're
10 nevertheless familiar with the existence of the Zvornik Brigade.
11 A. No. We knew that there was a military unit over there. We never
12 referred to it as the Zvornik Brigade, but we knew there was a unit.
13 Q. And, to your knowledge, the Zvornik Brigade was not involved in
14 these events, the relevant events, in July of 1995, to your knowledge.
15 A. We couldn't identify any Bosnian Serb units, sir, so, to my
16 knowledge, no.
17 Q. Now, going back to Major Nikolic from the Bratunac Brigade. A
18 question was put to you by my colleague, and you said that many times he
19 would give you different positions.
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. And that, in the end, it was not possible for you to determine
22 what exactly his position was.
23 A. No. Our idea or our conclusion was that he had some job on
24 brigade level, but that's it, not what job.
25 Q. And in a statement that you gave to the OTP, and that was a
1 statement that you gave on the 26th and 27th of September, 1995, to the
2 Prosecutor, do you remember the approximate time-frame of giving that
4 A. Well, I gave a lot of statements in the last 11 years, sir.
5 Q. No, I don't think -- if there's a need, I can show you the
6 statement, but I don't think it's very important. I would just quote you
7 as saying that "Major Nikolic said that he was the Chief of Staff of the
8 Bratunac Brigade." Is that one of the positions he told you that he had?
9 A. I remember that is one of the positions that he indicated he had,
11 Q. Now, when Major Nikolic is holding on from telling you his
12 position, is he lying to you?
13 A. I couldn't confirm that, sir, because he gave me another position
14 every time. So I did not know when he was lying or -- perhaps he changed
15 positions often. I don't know.
16 Q. And looking specifically at your dealings with Major Nikolic,
17 would it be a fair statement to say that you were not surprised that he
18 would give you different information at different times?
19 A. No, I was not surprised by that.
20 Q. I move on to a different topic. Yesterday, during your
21 testimony - and that is on page 13, lines 19 to 21 - you mention that you
22 had information on the weapons in the enclave to the effect that the 28th
23 Division had some 4.000 to 4.500 small arms and mortars. Do you recall
24 saying that?
25 A. Yes, and the number of 4.500 is referring to the small arms, of
1 course, not to the mortars. But some mortars, yes.
2 Q. Now, this information was available to you based on information
3 gathered by DutchBat II prior to your arrival.
4 A. Yes, it was all the information, that's correct, and given by
5 DutchBat II. I don't know the source of it.
6 Q. And in May of 1995, during of course your tenure at DutchBat III,
7 it was confirmed that you saw the ABiH or 28th Division wearing new combat
9 A. Correct, sir.
10 Q. Now, my question to you is: In your capacity, again, as both the
11 deputy commanding officer, DCO, the S4, and the S2 and sometimes the S3,
12 that you knew that more weapons were coming in the enclave during your
13 tenure, during the time DutchBat III was there.
14 A. We had the idea, yes, that is correct.
15 Q. And in January 1995, when you were -- again, I refer to
16 yesterday's testimony, when you were trying to tackle the problem of
17 freedom of movement, you confirmed that you attempted to go into the
18 Bandera Triangle. Is that correct?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. And that at one time you were stopped by 45 armed men who would
21 not let you go in to the Bandera Triangle.
22 A. That is correct as well.
23 Q. Well, based on that experience -- well, first let me get to one
24 more point, because yesterday, from your testimony, I wasn't sure if there
25 were two incidents or one incident, because you also say - and that's on
1 lines 13 to 20, at page 17 - "patrols were stopped as well and then ended
2 in a blockade. For a couple of days we had to stay in the area."
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Can you give us a bit more information about those events.
5 A. The plan was that altogether five patrols would enter the Bandera
6 Triangle. I was leading the first patrol to go in. And depending on the
7 result of that patrol, the other ones would start. I was about 2 K --
8 sorry, 2 kilometres within the Bandera Triangle when my patrol was
9 stopped. The others also entered and were stopped as well. So it's the
10 same action.
11 Q. And you were held back for almost two days before you could return
12 to your --
13 A. As I recollect, it was about four days, sir.
14 Q. Now, my first question in respect to this episode is that the
15 people who stopped you, those 45 armed men, did they appear to you as
16 acting on their own initiative, or this was organised action?
17 A. Well, the local brigade commander, Mr. Zulfo, was present. He was
18 the one that stopped me in person, and he was backed up by those, about,
19 40 men. So it was not on his -- at least not on the initiative of those
20 men; probably on the initiative of Mr. Zulfo, being the brigade commander
21 of the BiH.
22 Q. So --
23 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. I just want to make sure that the
24 transcript reflects what he says. Was it Mr. Zulfo himself the one that
25 stopped you in person or -- it was?
1 THE WITNESS: It was, backed up by those 40 men, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. I just wanted to make sure that you said
4 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 Q. Now, at least for this single incident, you would agree with me
6 that what you were dealing with was an organised army.
7 A. For this single incident, yes, correct, sir.
8 Q. And my second question with respect to this incident is: In the
9 end, you could never see what was in the Bandera Triangle.
10 A. That's correct as well.
11 Q. And even though you don't know, there could have been a complete
12 army in that triangle. There was enough room there for such, but you
13 don't know.
14 A. Well, we could -- we have insight in about, let's say, 50 per cent
15 of the area, because in that area we had some higher ground. But we
16 couldn't -- a hell of a lot could be concealed over there; that's correct.
17 Q. And we're talking about an area that, you know, realistically
18 speaking, is a good 5 kilometres?
19 A. 5 or 2 kilometres, yes, and going to a point, that's correct.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, because you have used the word "army"
21 twice; once in what I would describe as a microscopic context and the
22 other one in a macroscopic context. I would like to know what the witness
23 understands by "army." What would you understand an army to be?
24 THE WITNESS: An army is a military organisation with command
25 lines, and recognisable as such.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: When you answered the question that was put to you
2 by Mr. Bourgon minutes ago -- yes, at line 20 the question was: "Now, at
3 least for this single incident, you would agree with me that what you were
4 dealing with was an organised army."
5 And you answered: "For this single incident, yes, correct, sir."
6 So could you now quantify, explain, why, having met this first
7 batch of about 40 persons with this certain Zulfo stopping you, you came
8 to the conclusion or you come to the conclusion today that you were
9 dealing, for that single incident, with an organised army?
10 THE WITNESS: My remark concerning the single incident, sir, is
11 because later on the organisation was not that obvious. And on the very
12 moment in that incident, it is loud and clear that the men acting, the 40
13 men, were under command and following orders or guidelines of Mr. Zulfo.
14 So that led me to a conclusion that I had -- I coped with an army unit.
15 My exception for this incident refers to the, let's say, undisciplined way
16 we were confronted later on with, so more or less incorrect. But for this
17 occasion, on that moment, it was clearly an organised military unit.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Bourgon, please proceed.
19 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Now, just to clarify the second question about what you could not
21 see within the Bandera Triangle, I indicated to you there could have been
22 a complete army. Let me rephrase this question. There could have been
23 many more soldiers and many more weapons that you never had a chance to
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Let me move on to a different topic, and that is the taking of
2 observation post Echo, or OP Echo.
3 Before I get into this topic, I would just like to confirm with
4 you that, during your tenure with DutchBat III, you did not have access,
5 nor did you see any of the internal documents, such as orders, operational
6 orders, or reports, within the VRS.
7 A. No, I certainly did not.
8 Q. You did not have access to such documentation.
9 A. No, I did not have access, neither did I see any.
10 Q. So when you drew conclusions about actions taken by the VRS, you
11 could only do that on the basis of your experience and what you saw on the
13 A. Yes, that's correct.
14 Q. Now, when OP Echo was taken - and I refer to your testimony
15 yesterday on page 30, line 25, and page 31, lines 1 to 8 - when OP Echo
16 was taken, you first thought that this was the beginning of a major attack
17 on the enclave, but then you realised that was not the case.
18 A. That's correct, sir.
19 Q. And in the end you concluded that this was one or both of the
20 above, which is a test case or, more importantly, to get control of the
21 road for the BSA to improve their east-to-west connections.
22 A. That's correct as well.
23 Q. Now, in terms of the aim in this particular incident, at the end
24 you concluded that this was the case; but you never were informed of what
25 the aim of the Bosnian Serb army was in taking these actions.
1 A. No, no. That was our own conclusion.
2 Q. I'll move to a different topic. You are familiar, sir, with the
3 term "rules of engagement"?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And I'd like you to confirm, even though this was not discussed
6 but it was discussed indirectly, that your rules of engagement were United
7 Nations rules of engagement, and that the use of force for DutchBat
8 III was limited to self-defence.
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And "self-defence," if you clarify for the benefit of the Trial
11 Chamber, means, unless a member of DutchBat is attacked, you cannot use
12 deadly force.
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. Now, when you gave that green order to B Company on 10 July, then
15 self-defence went down the drain and now you had to act, as you said
16 yesterday, as a real army.
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. So from that point on, would you agree with me that, in fact, you
19 were now [Realtime transcript read in error "not"] engaged in an armed
20 confrontation with the BSA.
21 A. Sorry?
22 Q. With the Serb army. That from that point on, from the moment that
23 order, the green order, was given --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- you were in an armed confrontation with --
1 A. I was, yes, because I read here "you were not engaged," but I was
2 engaged. That's why I stopped, sorry.
3 MR. BOURGON: Probably my mistake, Mr. President. I apologise.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: There's an error in the transcript.
5 MR. BOURGON:
6 Q. Now, of course, you would agree with me also that once you fire
7 back on the Serb army, or any army, this is likely to cause a reaction,
8 that this army will now treat you as hostile and now use force on you.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. I'd like to move on to the ultimatum that you received from the
11 Serb army.
12 MR. BOURGON: And for this I think it would be necessary to put on
13 the ELMO document 02264 that was used yesterday by my colleague. If we
14 can put this document on the ELMO, because it's not on the -- oh, it is?
15 Okay. Sorry.
16 Q. Do you have the document in English before you? Because I only --
17 okay, I've got it in English now.
18 A. I do.
19 Q. Okay. First I'd like simply to confirm -- this was mentioned by
20 my colleague so I'm going to go quite quickly. This ultimatum was
21 preceded by a DutchBat ultimatum or a UN ultimatum, saying: "You stop or
22 we use air-strikes."
23 A. As far as I recollect, that's correct, sir.
24 Q. Now, if you look at this document, initially at the top,
25 basically, it says that the UN does not disarm, and yesterday you said:
1 "The UN is not disarming the Muslims; we will do that." Was that your
2 understanding of that --
3 A. That was my understanding, yes.
4 Q. So the objective, would you agree with me, the objective of the
5 Serb army at that time is that they want to disarm the Muslim army?
6 A. Yes, that was clear on that point. Yes.
7 Q. And, of course, in the process, why not disarm the UN at the same
9 A. If you're busy, yes.
10 Q. Now, this happened on the 11th of July, and that was early in the
12 A. Yes, correct. Or late on the 10th.
13 Q. I'm sorry, yes, you're right. It's on the 10th of July, early in
14 the morning. Now, you had discussions with Becirovic within the enclave
15 concerning the measures to be taken in case of an armed attack.
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. And that was sometime before this 10th. But there was some kind
18 of a mutual understanding between DutchBat and the 28th Division as to
19 about what was likely to take place in case of an attack.
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. And more specifically, after the killing of your soldier, it was a
22 clear-cut directive given to your block commanders that there shall be no
23 withdrawal, unless there would be first an agreement with the 28th
25 A. No, an agreement with the local BiH commander, because the
1 agreement with the division was already there. That was another problem.
2 The problem was that the local commanders didn't listen.
3 Q. I thank you for that clarification; it's very important. So those
4 commanders on the ground could not get permission to withdraw unless their
5 counterpart --
6 A. On the spot.
7 Q. -- from the 28th Division would say, "Okay, you can go."
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Now, that 28th Division, they left and they never told you that
10 they -- when they left?
11 A. No, they did not.
12 Q. And when you had this discussion with Becirovic, he never said if
13 they attacked, we're going to take the high road and go to Tuzla?
14 A. No, he assured me that he was able to defend the enclave during 30
15 days, so a bit different.
16 Q. And according to your testimony - and that's on page 54, lines 13
17 to 19 - you found out on the morning of 11 July that 28th Division had
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. And would you agree with me that this kind of came by surprise?
21 A. Well, I would agree, yes.
22 Q. Now, if you did not know about the intentions of the Bosnian --
23 about the 28th Division, would it be a fair statement to say that the
24 Bosnian Serb army did not know either?
25 A. I suppose not.
1 Q. I'd like to move to part of your testimony yesterday on page 55,
2 lines 9 to 14, when you were speaking about shelling of the column. And
3 you mentioned that you received reports of shelling of the column between
4 -- as it was moving from Srebrenica to Potocari.
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Now, can you confirm that the column itself was never hit?
7 A. I can't confirm, neither deny it, because the report was shelling
8 of the column, and I reckoned that they reported that there were actual
10 Q. If --
11 A. But I didn't ask specifically.
12 Q. And would it be fair to believe that if the column had been hit
13 and had there been a massive casualties, that they would have reported
14 that to you?
15 A. Yes, but they reported that they picked along wounded civilians on
16 their APCs to bring them to the APC -- or to our hospital, that were
17 wounded or injured that took place -- injuries that took place in that
19 Q. And when you evacuated that hospital later on, there was no more
20 than 59 people in that hospital?
21 A. That's incorrect. I don't know exactly how many people came out
22 of that hospital because you know the pictures of the chaos it was. In
23 the end I had about 114 wounded in my compound. Where they came from,
24 whether that were all the wounded out of Srebrenica or whatever, I don't
25 know. I just know that we had 114.
1 Q. But you don't know where they came from?
2 A. No, I don't know.
3 Q. Now, as a professional infantry officer you are aware of the
4 killing radius of the artillery guns and mortars that were used by the
6 A. Yes, I am.
7 Q. And would you agree with me that if the Bosnian Serb army had
8 wanted to shell the column, they had the means to really shell the
10 A. To my information, yes, that's -- well, I want to add something.
11 If they wanted to kill everybody in that column, they could have done
12 that, yes.
13 Q. Now, dealing with the ultimatum, you were asked some questions by
14 my colleague yesterday, and what you said at page 60, lines 11 to 15, you
15 said that the threat to your personnel you did not take that as being too
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And you say that the reason or in your opinion what you expressed
19 yesterday, the only thing they could really do would be to use them as a
20 shelter or a human shield.
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. But then you said that the threat to the people in your compound,
23 that was much higher.
24 A. That's correct again.
25 Q. But there were a lot of DutchBat personnel in your compound.
1 A. Yes, as well.
2 Q. Now, I fail to see any difference between if they do something
3 with from the people they detained from your unit or if they shell your
5 A. Now you're telling me you don't see the difference. I believe
7 Q. Do you see a difference?
8 A. Yes, I see a difference in that way, that if you see that we had
9 about 25.000 people outside, outside were more or less 50 of my men. So
10 the chance that those men would be hit or whatever or all would be hit is
11 relatively small, and I was absolutely and still am absolutely convinced
12 of the fact that that threat to the people was much higher and much more
13 realistic than the threat to kill my POWs or her -- their POWs, but my
14 soldiers in custody.
15 Q. But nevertheless you would agree with me that even though there
16 was maybe a difference in your assessment of the threat, both actions
17 would lead to the same result in terms of what would be the consequences
18 for the Bosnian Serb army?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, I'd just like to go over one comment that you made yesterday,
21 and I think it's important that we look at exactly at what you said. And
22 that is on page -- on lines 16 to 19 of page 60. And I'd just like to
23 give you a chance to maybe tone down a bit what you said yesterday,
24 because you said -- the question was: "How seriously did you take the
25 threat to shell the HQ and the compound with refugees in it?" Now, your
1 answer was: "Very serious because they did that before, and with that I
2 mean firing at the refugees with all means they had."
3 Did the Bosnian Serb army at any time fire on the column with all
4 the means they had?
5 A. Locally it's correct, which I meant was the positions in the area
6 of Papak, being the anti-tank and tanks and the multiple-launch rocket
7 system they did. But, of course, if you -- the possibility to translate
8 that, all the means available to the Bosnian Serb army, that is
9 incorrect. I meant the local means they had available to fire at,
11 Q. So would I be fair to say that what you really meant is they've
12 used artillery before, and if they had to do it again, they'll do it?
13 A. They've used artillery before on those masses of refugees, and if
14 they want to do it again, they probably will, yes.
15 Q. Now, they'll use it again -- just let me quote what you said.
16 "They've used artillery before on those mass of refugees."
17 A. They did.
18 Q. But we've agreed that there was never any major hit on the
20 A. No, we did not agree. I already gave testimony that there was
21 random firing at the city of Srebrenica, and Srebrenica was one mass of
22 people. I reported or I stated that there was firing, artillery firing,
23 and you can say to what extent --
24 Q. I'm sorry --
25 A. -- on the area of Potocari, and there was firing on the refugees
1 going from Srebrenica to Potocari.
2 Q. But you said that had they wanted to kill all those people, they
3 had the means to do that.
4 A. Yes, but that's not in contradiction to what I said before.
5 Q. That's fine. I can live with that answer. I move to another
6 topic, and that is: On page 64, lines 1 to 10 yesterday, you mentioned
7 that there was an infantry attack, at least that was the question that was
8 asked by my colleague. Even though it was a leading question and we did
9 not object, the question was as follows: "There was an infantry attack
10 that commenced at some point that morning. Could you just briefly
11 describe what you observed with respect to that."
12 Now --
13 A. Yes, okay.
14 Q. -- was that an attack or a show of force?
15 A. No -- but that's -- probably, then, I have to explain the military
16 word "attack." When you advance in a deployed formation towards a certain
17 place, that is called an attack formation. If you mean by an attack that
18 they came forward firing, et cetera, et cetera, that is incorrect. They
19 came, deployed in an attack formation, from the area Papa in the direction
20 of the compound Potocari. That's the way you have to read "attack" here.
21 That is my problem. I am an old soldier so I am using military words that
22 are not always clear what is meant by it.
23 Q. I can certainly relate to the language you are using, but I
24 believe it's important for the Trial Chamber to understand --
25 A. No, not a problem.
1 Q. -- that they were not approaching and firing on those refugees.
2 A. No, no. That's clear.
3 Q. About the list of people that was prepared in the compound with
4 the help of the committee and Mr. Mandzic, you mentioned that -- I'm
5 referring to your testimony yesterday, page 74, lines 8 to 12, as well as
6 lines 17 to 22, you mentioned that the object of the list was to give
7 identity to people in danger or people unknown.
8 A. I did.
9 Q. Now, when you mentioned that, what was the object of this list?
10 Only the men, only the young, only the old, or all the men?
11 A. No, only --
12 Q. We already know that Mandzic is not on the list.
13 A. Well, I didn't read that list, as you probably understand, but the
14 object was -- and it was specifically the men that Mladic announced that
15 he would question and check out whether they were criminals or
16 combatants. The object was, sending it especially into Holland, that they
17 would publish it. It is a trick. Amnesty International once did and then
18 it worked. It was the only thing I could think of to do to improve the
19 protection for that vulnerable group of men.
20 Q. And your intent, of course, as you mentioned, is that you wanted
21 to protect these people more because you had heard about yelling and other
22 stuff at the "White House."
23 A. Yes. We were concerned about the fate of those men.
24 Q. Now, if you went through the motion of taking an additional step
25 to protect those men, would you agree with me that this was because you
1 felt quite satisfied about the evacuation of the civilians?
2 A. I didn't have any reports or reason to suspect that there were
3 grave things happening -- sorry, things happening to the women and
5 Q. I just have two more questions. In your statement to the Office
6 of the Prosecution on 26th and 27th September -- now, I will quote the
7 paragraph, what you stated. If there's a need, then I can show you the
8 statement. I would just like you to confirm something which you said, and
9 I will read -- quote verbatim from the statement.
10 "After the evacuation had ended, I saw 70 soldiers in black
11 uniforms with red insignia on their left sleeve outside the compound.
12 Some had red berets, others had black berets, although most of them had
13 nothing on their heads. They stood there, waiting for transport, and left
14 in the direction of Bratunac."
15 A. That is correct. I recollect that.
16 Q. Can you confirm that this is what you saw --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- after the evacuation had ended? To the best of your
19 recollection, were these people involved in the events in and around your
20 compound on those days?
21 A. We did not identify them before. They were there, they gathered
22 there, and it was reported to me that that group was there on that spot.
23 So I went down there myself to watch or to see what was going on, and
24 that's what was going on, what I stated before.
25 Q. And then you mentioned that they left for Bratunac --
1 A. In the direction of Bratunac --
2 Q. -- and you don't know what happened to this group.
3 A. No. They left in the direction of Bratunac.
4 Q. Now, my last question is the following: As a result of the events
5 which took place - I'm saying the relevant time, but I'm always looking at
6 6 July to 17 July 1995 - the only DutchBat soldier killed by one of the
7 parties during these events was actually killed by a soldier from the 28th
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions. Thank you very much,
12 A. You're welcome.
13 MR. BOURGON: This concludes my cross-examination.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Bourgon.
15 Who is next? Yes, Mr. Josse, well, we have about ten minutes
16 left. I suggest you start.
17 MR. JOSSE: I'm happy to start, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, you start, and you obviously continue tomorrow.
19 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
21 Mr. Josse, Major Franken, is appearing for General ...
22 MR. JOSSE: Gvero, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: For General Gvero.
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Josse:
25 Q. Mr. Franken, let me take up where my learned friend Mr. Bourgon
1 just left off with the unfortunate death of Mr. van Rensen. Immediately
2 after that happened, was there any disagreement among the DutchBat command
3 as to what those soldiers at that particular OP should do?
4 A. No, there was not.
5 Q. We know that those soldiers, in fact, walked across Serb lines.
6 A. The soldiers of OP Foxtrot, you mean?
7 Q. I'm talking about those who had come under attack from the ABiH
8 that resulted in Mr. van Rensen's death.
9 A. Yes, and then Foxtrot -- the APC crossed the blockade in the
10 direction of Srebrenica, and halfway down an ambulance took van Rensen.
11 So I do not know what you're talking about when they crossed Serb lines.
12 Q. Because isn't it right -- as long as we're talking about the same
13 company here, who was the company commander?
14 A. Captain Groen, B Company.
15 Q. We are talking about the same company. He was of the view that
16 those OP personnel should, in effect, surrender to Serb forces, wasn't he?
17 A. Obviously.
18 Q. And you were somewhat concerned about that. Is that also right?
19 A. In principle, I'd keep my power and try to get my means and my men
20 back to my own territory, of course. If you refer to a question of
21 Captain Groen being the commander of B Company during the situation where
22 the OP was taken by the BSA, I ordered him to try and get them back. That
23 is correct. But I cannot say there was any discussion or something like
25 Q. Did you, at some point, over the radio say, "You know how I feel
1 about that; I don't want to discuss it any further"?
2 A. I could have said that, yes, because I'm not such a fan of
3 discussions, particularly not in that time. But I don't know whether I
4 said that. The result was that I ordered him, if possible, to take them
6 Q. At some point in time did you refuse Captain Groen permission to
7 withdraw in the direction of the VRS lines?
8 A. Still concerning the OP Foxtrot situation, you mean?
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. I do not remember, but could have been.
11 Q. And eventually you realised that the only option was for those
12 troops to advance toward the VRS line and surrender.
13 A. No. Based on what happened to soldier van Rensen, and knowing the
14 fact that locally there had not been any coordination with the BiH
15 commander, the commander on the spot, I concluded that my troops were at
16 great risk when they went back without that consent of that local
17 commander. And then I said -- I stated before, "Withdraw only if there is
18 a consent with the local BiH commander; otherwise, stay put," which
19 originally -- or, in fact, meant, wait until the Serb troops are there and
20 then surrender to them.
21 Q. And, in reality, as you've already said, when the BiH commander
22 didn't give that permission, your troops only had one option.
23 A. They had one option, yes.
24 Q. Let me move on, if I may. You've been asked various questions
25 over the last two days about Colonel Acemovic.
1 A. Yes, I have.
2 Q. And you described him as a G4 officer. What does that stand for,
4 A. I'm sorry, he said that he was a logistics officer out of Pale and
5 that G4 is on that level, the function of logistics.
6 Q. We're agreed on that. What we're not agreed on is that he was an
7 officer out of Pale. I want to suggest to you that, in fact, he was an
8 officer from the Drina Corps.
9 A. Yes, well, it is possible. He presented himself to me as being a
10 colonel, G4 officer, out of Pale.
11 Q. And I would accept, as I've already said, that he was involved in
12 logistics. His role was assistant commander for logistics within that
13 Drina Corps.
14 A. I believe you.
15 Q. Thank you. You were asked yesterday to draw a depiction on what I
16 think is now IC17 as to where the bodies were found that Lieutenant Coster
17 told you about.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. You were not asked if you were able to deal with the one body that
20 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans told you about.
21 A. I did not deal with that because I -- it was told to me, probably
22 a couple hours after the report came, through Colonel Karremans and I
23 didn't bother with that anymore. I suggested the colonel had dealt with
24 that, but I didn't check.
25 Q. If that photograph or, indeed, another one was placed in front of
1 you, would you be able to annotate it with where you were told that that
2 body had been found?
3 A. You mean the photographs taken of the nine bodies? As far as I
4 know, there is no photograph of the single execution.
5 Q. My fault entirely.
6 MR. JOSSE: Perhaps IC17 could be put on the screen, please.
7 Q. You have marked on that nine bodies, we can see, on the left.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. What I'd like to know is if you'd be able to mark the one body
10 Mr. Karremans told you about.
11 A. No. I only know the vicinity of the area in which it was
12 reported. I was not on the spot. But that goes for the location of the
13 nine bodies as well. If you see marked "bus," "compound," with the arrow,
14 that execution should have been in east -- south-eastern direction, the
15 edge of that meadow, or what is it? In that area the single execution was
16 reported, as far as I recollect.
17 Q. To be fair to you, yesterday you said: "That was directly east of
18 the bus station" --
19 A. Yes, sorry, now I'm making a mistake. It's east of the bus
20 station. Sorry for that.
21 Q. Not south-east.
22 A. No, no, no. Well, east of the bus station, but I tried to point
23 out what I meant on this map, and east of the bus station is correct.
24 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, we would invite the witness to mark where
25 he means, whether it should be on this plan or a new one --
1 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no, by all means, Mr. Josse.
2 Mr. Franken - usher, Madam Usher, could you kindly assist
3 Mr. Franken - Mr. Josse would like you to mark on the same map or on the
4 same aerial image that you have in front of you the site which you believe
5 would correspond with the information that you received or that Colonel
6 Karremans received.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. I was reported that it was behind the bus
8 station and described to me as this area.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. And could you write across "one body"? All
11 Does that satisfy you?
12 MR. JOSSE: It does, Your Honour, and I have no further questions
13 on this topic.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So I think that would provide us with a
15 very convenient time to stop now.
16 I recognise Mr. Thayer. Are you standing for some particular
18 MR. THAYER: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
20 MR. THAYER: If this document could be signed and dated, just so
21 we can make sure that it's absolutely distinguishable from the prior
22 document that has been marked up, please.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: It is the same document. It is going to remain the
24 same exhibit all the time, and then it's a question of referring to it ...
25 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. I'm being informed by Madam
2 Registrar that it can be given a different number, and that would enable
3 us to distinguish it.
4 Just one minor thing. Mr. McCloskey, earlier on, during the
5 initial part of the sitting, you gave a hint that the Office of the
6 Prosecutor may be considering tightening up the indictment and that you
7 would, in any case, come back to us in the course of this week, most
8 likely. Just make it clear, if the Office of the Prosecutor seeks to do
9 anything of this sort, then it would be requested to adhere strictly to
10 the law set forth in our 31st May and 13th July decision. Even if charges
11 are removed, in other words, it's still a motion -- it would still be
12 needed to be considered as a motion to amend, and the same law would
13 apply, all right? So we would expect a motion rather than anything else.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: So I thank the interpreters and the staff --
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please, if we can sign it against the one body.
19 All right. So that brings the sitting to an end. I wish to thank
20 the staff, interpreters and everyone else, for staying with us a few
21 minutes beyond the scheduled time. We will re-convene tomorrow morning.
22 Mr. Josse will continue with his cross-examination, and then hopefully
23 we'll try and finish with you tomorrow, sir, so that you can return back
24 home. I thank you so much.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of
2 October, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.