Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 14251

1 Friday, 24 August 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Madam Registrar. Good morning,

7 everybody. Could you kindly call the case, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case

9 number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, ma'am. All the accused are here. From

11 the Defence teams I notice the absence of Mr. Haynes and Mr. Bourgon. I

12 think that's about it. The Prosecution, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Thayer. The

13 witness Mr. Joseph is present. I take it there are no preliminaries,

14 therefore we -- Mr. Josse?

15 MR. JOSSE: I'm simply rising to start my cross-examination, Your

16 Honour.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I was just going to ask you to precisely do

18 that.

19 Mr. Joseph --.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir?

21 JUDGE AGIUS: You're still testifying pursuant to your solemn

22 declaration of yesterday or of Friday [sic]. With some effort, we will

23 ensure that we finish with your testimony today.

24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.


Page 14252

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse you had about 15 minutes more or something

2 like that?

3 MR. JOSSE: That's correct.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Go ahead.

5 Cross-examination by Mr. Josse: [Continued] .

6 Q. Could we begin this morning, Mr. Joseph, by looking at 6D30 which

7 I hope is the agreement that you have made reference to in the course of

8 your evidence.

9 There it is. Might be worth looking at the top briefly to begin

10 with. Agreement on disarmament of the military-able population in the

11 enclave of Zepa. It says that today, 25th of July 1995, the following

12 agreement was reached between Rajko Kusic on one side, Hamdija Kolak

13 [phoen] from the other side, in the presence of Simon Dudnik as UNPROFOR

14 representative.

15 And it goes through the terms of this agreement.

16 In particular, perhaps if we look at a specific part of it, have

17 you ever seen the agreement before?

18 A. I might have seen it in the past, but I honestly, it's -- this is

19 the first time I've seen it, if so, in a very long time, so it's not

20 jumping out at me. I had been seen a draft agreement that David Harland

21 and I had done that was a different draft demilitarisation agreement, but

22 this does not prompt a memory in me immediately.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Can you -- sorry, Mr. Josse, for interrupting you --

24 can you be specific as to Hamdija Kolak is, please?

25 THE WITNESS: It's possible that meant Torlak instead of Kolak.

Page 14253

1 That's all I can presume. Perhaps they meant Torlak and not Kolak.

2 MR. JOSSE: It's not for me to give evidence, Your Honour, but I

3 think that that's a safe assumption to make.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. I asked the question -- yes, Mr. Thayer?

5 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, perhaps my friend could also show the

6 witness page 2, which also has another date on it, and just for the sake

7 of making sure that he's had a chance to view the whole document before

8 answering, it might be --

9 JUDGE AGIUS: I put my question because whoever that

10 Hamdija Kolak, as it appears on the face of this document, is to have

11 signed this, if he signed this, keep in mind -- you have to mind in mind

12 that he is undertaking also on behalf of who was supposed to be the

13 commander of the ABiH troops on the ground at the time.

14 MR. JOSSE: Well, indeed. The Court has already heard evidence as

15 to that particular difficulty from this witness. I think the Court is

16 going to hear more about that from General Smith in due course as well.

17 Certainly the Defence are aware of that particular issue and/or difficult.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: And that's why I asked who this Kolak is. Thank

19 you.


21 Q. If we do look at the second page, Mr. Joseph, first of all we see

22 that it purports to be signed by Mr. Torlak among others and it also gives

23 a different date, date of the 24th of July. We need to scroll down a bit

24 in the English, please?

25 A. If I might request, is it possible to just have a copy of this so

Page 14254

1 I can read it?

2 Q. You can have mine.

3 A. Okay. Thank you, sir.

4 Q. It's not marked other than the fact I put the number on it. The

5 usher will give it to you.

6 A. Thank you very much.

7 MR. JOSSE: I'm letting the witness read the document, Your

8 Honour, although I in fact only have one supplementary question.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: When you are finished with reading it, Mr. Joseph,

10 let us know, please.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Okay.


13 Q. It follows from what you've already said that this document was

14 not being waved about by anyone presumably on the 26th of July when you

15 returned to the enclave?

16 A. I certainly don't recall it. If I can say a couple there's a

17 couple other things to observe, if I may say so, number 1 being you just

18 have the typed names here without signatures.

19 Q. That's right. I'm not going to comment on that. The Court has

20 heard some other evidence about this from other sources.

21 A. I understand.

22 Q. But dealing with my question, you don't recall people using the

23 same expression, waving it around putting it in front of you?

24 A. No, sir.

25 Q. And in particular, the reference in paragraph 4 to weapons and

Page 14255

1 equipment being returned and UNPROFOR members being unblocked?

2 A. No. No recollection of that, no, sir, and I might add in

3 paragraph 5 it's rather unusual in an UNPROFOR, if UNPROFOR had a role in

4 drafting this, that the weapons would be handed over to the BSA rather

5 than to UNPROFOR. The standard is always weapons are submitted to the UN,

6 not to an adversary or to a warring party.

7 Q. As a matter of curiosity would be able to picture Mr. Dudnik?

8 A. No. I cannot. Don't remember that name.

9 Q. Don't remember the name?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Don't remember the role he played?

12 A. Don't recall. I can't recall. If I had met him, I can't now 12

13 years later, I do not recall the name.

14 Q. I'll be corrected if I'm wrong, I don't know whether it jogs your

15 memory, he was the commander of the Ukrainian battalion?

16 A. Quite possible.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: One question sorry again, Mr. Josse.

18 MR. JOSSE: Of course. Your Honour.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: But this occurred to me when we heard, as you said,

20 other evidence on this document. But at the time the opportunity to put

21 the question had escaped me.

22 If you look at the B/C/S version of this document, which you

23 should have on your screen on your monitor now, paragraph 5, we see VBS

24 there. VBS. Which -- is that a spelling mistake or what, VRS?

25 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I think I can shed some light on this.

Page 14256

1 The B/C/S version is simply I believe an OTP or it may be a CLSS

2 translation of this document. It's not --

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Of which document?

4 MR. THAYER: Of the English agreement that we were looking at a

5 moment ago. So in other words, the B/C/S version is not a version that

6 was created at the time. It is simply a translation of this English

7 document, which we believe was created at the time.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. But my question was related to something

9 somewhat different because the acronym BSA was in use amongst the UNPROFOR

10 people and the other units.

11 MR. THAYER: Yes, Mr. President, but I think that's a spelling

12 mistake as Your Honour noted.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: But the fact that on this English -- on the English

14 version, the acronym BSA is used instead of VRS, is that -- would that be

15 indicative that this was drawn up, that this was drawn up not by the

16 Serbian side, but by UNPROFOR?

17 THE WITNESS: Sir, your question is that because they use BSA

18 instead of --

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Because a document originating from the VRS

20 itself --

21 THE WITNESS: Right.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Wouldn't use the acronym BSA in the first place.

23 THE WITNESS: It's quite possible. It's quite possible that that

24 was the case, sir.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Again, my apologies to you,

Page 14257

1 Mr. Josse. You may proceed, thank you.

2 MR. JOSSE: No problem, Your Honour.

3 Q. I'm going to move on. Could we have a look at 6D131? It's a

4 completely different subject. Now, this is an article that we have found

5 on the internet which purports to be written by you and was produced in

6 the Washington Post on Sunday the 10th of July 2005 entitled "Bystander to

7 a Massacre." Could I first confirm that you did in fact write an article

8 that appeared in the Washington Post by that name at that time?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. And it was written, wasn't it, in the aftermath of the discovery

11 of the Skorpion video?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And you express some background information about the video and

14 about the events in Srebrenica, and initially on the first page, put it

15 into context in relation to more modern day events, particularly in

16 Darfur; is that right?

17 A. Yes. And with a specific reference, not to scale but to the fact

18 that the presence I contrasted it with Darfur when there was then no --

19 probably still is no UN presence, but in Srebrenica there was UN presence.

20 That's -- that was the reference, the contrast.

21 Q. And I am going to have to be for reasons of time constraint,

22 selective, passages I want to ask you about. If you would go to the very

23 bottom of this first page I'm going to read the final paragraph and then

24 it will move over to the second page. "I have thought about these

25 questions more than most. I served as a UN civil affairs officer in

Page 14258

1 Bosnia for much of the three and a half years of war. My colleagues and I

2 received the waves of women and children expelled from Srebrenica before

3 their husbands, fathers, brothers and sons were executed.

4 "About a week later, I found myself in Srebrenica, neighbouring

5 enclave of Zepa, face to face with Mladic, an architect of the massacres.

6 While his forces were finishing the slaughter in Srebrenica, he had turned

7 his sights on Zepa's Muslim men. The Muslim commander, Colonel Avdo

8 Palic, saved his soldiers by hiding them in the forest while he stayed

9 behind to negotiate with Mladic. A colleague and I watched and protested

10 vainly as Palic was seized by Serb troops from our collapsed UN compound

11 and taken away and likely killed.

12 "Because of this experience, and my feelings of responsibility

13 towards Palic, I continue to ask why we let Srebrenica happen and why we

14 don't act to prevent other tragedies. Over time I've come up with three

15 answers."

16 And it's right, isn't it, that you told us yesterday that you feel

17 a sense of responsibility for what happened to Colonel Palic and you have

18 tried to highlight his plight to the international community?

19 A. Yes that would be correct, and to assist his wife in getting the

20 attention of the international community. That's correct.

21 Q. I'm going to pass over the first of your three answers. Basically

22 you say that the United Nations needs staff who are less interested in

23 money and more interested in doing a decent job but that's not of any

24 relevance to this particular case. Second, even the vast majority who are

25 motivated by the desire to do good may still find their principles

Page 14259

1 compromised or confused by organisational loyalty. Many on the staff of

2 the senior UN official in the former Yugoslavia, the Japanese diplomat,

3 Yasushi Akashi, internalised his overarching priority to protect the UN's

4 neutrality and even handedness by avoiding the use of force against the

5 Serbs. Constantly -- beg your pardon, consistently, they rebuffed those

6 who did advocate force like the UN's military commander in Bosnia, General

7 Smith and toned down reports sent to New York to maintain the premise that

8 all sides were equally guilty."

9 Is that an objective approach?

10 A. Yes. I believe so. And if you would like to take the Court's

11 time I would be happy to explain why I believe that's the case. In fact,

12 I would suggest to save time, that if the Court or any of the parties here

13 would refer themselves to the UN's own report on Srebrenica, you will see

14 many of these points admitted to by the UN themselves, submitted by the

15 then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who was earlier the head of DPKL and I

16 think himself feels a good sense of responsibility. So you'll see many of

17 these same points admitted to in a far more official way than my humble

18 opinion piece here in the Washington Post.

19 Q. One other paragraph I'd like to look at. That's scrolling down,

20 "The third and least understood factor in collective passivity toward evil

21 is the prevalent taboo against, 'getting emotional' about death and

22 tragedy. While there is always a risk of rushing to judgement or in

23 allowing particularly graphic evidence to cloud decision-making, the

24 greater risk is for exaggerated clinical detachment. Without a sense of

25 guided outrage, of empathy for victims of abuse, organisation staff, even

Page 14260

1 human rights workers, are prone to 'move on' and accept it when

2 bureaucracies shrug their shoulders."

3 Wasn't that the type of preconception that you had in mind when

4 you went to Zepa on the 20ing of July 1995?

5 A. Precisely. And it applied the same as it did to Serbs in Krajina

6 or anyone else who was a vulnerable minority. So the attitude applies

7 equally to anyone who is vulnerable, the point is that you do not simply

8 shrug your shoulders, oh, let's be detached, let's be detached. And when

9 you get too detached, then you forget that there is a question of human

10 suffering involved. The question is whether you are equally concerned

11 with suffering of Serbs, whether they be in Krajina or in Kosovo or in

12 some other place, as you are with Muslims in this enclave or Croats in

13 another location. That's the issue. Are you equally concerned about the

14 plight of everyone as a human being and as an officer carrying out your

15 duties? And as long as you are, then you're fulfilling your

16 responsibility, but if you maintain a false premise of neutrality which is

17 what the United Nations admitted in its report, a false obsession with

18 neutrality as the overall guiding principle, and non-intervention in

19 peacekeeping which then contorts the situation where you have to struggle

20 in order to maintain your neutrality by suppressing and diminishing the

21 reports that you have on one side and intensifying and exaggerating on the

22 other. And I think that is the situation in Bosnia that was reported in

23 quite some methodical detail by the United Nations in that seminal report

24 on Srebrenica and Zepa.

25 Q. These robust views of yours have clouded your judgement and

Page 14261

1 recollection, I would suggest, of the events that you have described.

2 Isn't that right?

3 A. Of course, that's your opinion, and I do not share that opinion,

4 and I would say, add, to the extent that you imply as you do, that my

5 memory is selective and that this is distorted and especially here as we

6 have the accused listening, I will mention what a Bosnian Serb general

7 told me at a meeting in airport in 1993. And he said to me, "You know,

8 you come in here, it's like a fight, and you don't see when the first guy

9 pushes and then you -- then we come back and hit someone, and then you

10 come in and see and then you just see one side pushing."

11 And what I tried to convey to you there were limits on what I

12 understood and could witness in terms of Zepa. I arrived when arrived. I

13 witnessed what I witnessed. And I reported to this Court what I remember.

14 To the extent that it is -- does not for example, contain elements about

15 attacks by Bosniak Armija on UNPROFOR, it's because I don't recall them,

16 not because I don't wish to convey them. To the extent that they

17 happened, I simply don't recall. I don't recall any Ukrainian officers

18 complaining to me severely about that. In fact don't recall much of a

19 role at all of the Ukrainian company there in this operation. We were

20 doing most of the work and most of the guiding. They did some assistance,

21 but it was our mission and I honestly don't recall that to the extent that

22 that's what you're implying, so no I do not agree with you. And I try to

23 remain true to my oath and report this as I recall it. That's all I can

24 tell you.

25 Q. In conclusion, I'd like to put this to you: Do you agree with

Page 14262

1 this proposition, that to navigate the thick waters of the Bosnian war is

2 not so much an exercise in looking at deliberate dishonesty but of a

3 contrived self deceit? This applies not only to many of the combatants

4 but also to those who came with good intentions to try to make peace. In

5 short, Mr. Joseph, I'm suggesting to you that you are guilty of self

6 deceit. Isn't that right?

7 A. [Interpretation] What can I say? I was there.

8 MR. JOSSE: Thank you. That was translated for me. I've got

9 nothing else.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. I have three other Defence counsel

11 asking to cross-examine. There is Ms. Fauveau requesting one hour,

12 Mr. Ostojic, 45 minutes and Mr. Zivanovic, 20 minutes. Madam Fauveau?

13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

14 Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:

15 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, my name is Natasa Fauveau Ivanovic and I

16 defend General Miletic. I would first like to ask you a few questions

17 about Tuzla. The day before yesterday you said that the buses that had

18 arrived with refugees to the base in Tuzla were not escorted by UNPROFOR;

19 is that correct?

20 A. As far as I recall, that is -- was the case.

21 Q. Never, when those refugees were arriving from Srebrenica and

22 Potocari, you were not at the dividing line between the Muslim and Serb

23 forces, were you?

24 A. No. That is -- no, I was at the Tuzla air base.

25 Q. Do you know that the refugees were leaving -- were getting off

Page 14263

1 Serb buses at the dividing line and then were getting on other buses that

2 took them to their final destination, but these other buses had nothing to

3 do with Serbs?

4 A. That may be the case and it's possible that I knew that at the

5 time at Kladanj. Kladanj was the normal crossing points so it's -- that

6 part is true. I think perhaps what I -- to clarify what I meant was there

7 was no UNPROFOR escort from Srebrenica or Potocari to Kladanj. The fact

8 that they boarded UNPROFOR buses or some other buses, of course, no Serb

9 driver could cross -- would or could cross that line from Kladanj and

10 drive all the way to Tuzla. Of course, there would have to have been some

11 transfer taking place at Kladanj. If I recall, that was the junction

12 point.

13 Q. But you were not in Kladanj, and do not know whether UNPROFOR

14 vehicles had arrived with Serb buses to Kladanj or do you?

15 A. No. I was not at Kladanj but as I understood the case, these were

16 not UNPROFOR-assisted evacuation from Srebrenica. That was my

17 understanding, ma'am.

18 Q. So you cannot say here under oath that you saw the buses arrive

19 without Serb escort, in fact you know nothing about that, do you agree?

20 I'm talking about the buses that came to Kladanj.

21 A. I --

22 Q. And I wanted to add, without UN, without a UN escort. That came

23 to Kladanj without a UN escort.

24 A. I was not witness to the arrival at Kladanj. That is correct. I

25 was not witness there. I was under the understanding that I've already

Page 14264

1 conveyed to the Court.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, if you don't mind, Ms. Fauveau. I

3 accept that, as your explanation. However, did you, at any time, make it

4 a point to receive or did you receive in any case reports from the

5 escorts, UNPROFOR escorts or your escorts, as to the completion of the

6 transportation of the civilians?

7 THE WITNESS: Sir, is your question -- did we get a notice that

8 this is the last bus and no more buses are coming or something liking

9 that.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: No. What I mean to say is this: You obviously had

11 a part to play in assigning escorts to accompany some of the buses.

12 THE WITNESS: Me, personally?


14 THE WITNESS: No, sir, no, sir. I was at Tuzla air base assigned

15 to receive -- assist, assist in the reception of these refugees who were

16 coming in waves. We were at Tuzla air base. We were not at Kladanj. We

17 had no role in terms of that movement from Kladanj to Tuzla, sir.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Who was in charge of that?

19 THE WITNESS: I would imagine it would have been a military

20 operation at Tuzla. There was Dutch control, there was a prominent Dutch

21 role there. It was possible it was Dutch. It was also possible it was

22 French because there was a French contingent in that Kladanj area. So

23 it's quite possible it may have been French, sir, I'm sorry, I just don't

24 know.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

Page 14265

1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Sir, you have partly answered this question already, but do you

3 know whether the UN or the UNHCR or any other international organisation

4 such as the ICRC ever tried to go to Kladanj and escort the refugees from

5 Kladanj to Tuzla?

6 A. There would have to have been UNPROFOR movement from Kladanj on.

7 When I spoke earlier as I've said I was speaking about the movement from

8 Srebrenica to Kladanj. There would have had to have been UN -- and very

9 likely UNHCR, from Kladanj on. But Kladanj is essentially the same as

10 Tuzla air base. It's already in an area that UN is active and operational

11 in. We were not unfortunately - not because we didn't want to be - we

12 were not permitted to be operational in Republika Srpska during the war.

13 Q. Sir, I don't want an argument with you about this. But speaking

14 about this concrete situation, you were in a position to go to the place

15 where the Serbs forces left those refugees, weren't you?

16 A. Me personally?

17 Q. Not you personally. But UN staff.

18 A. Of course UN staff were in Kladanj. Of course. But this is

19 already across the confrontation line.

20 Q. Yesterday you spoke about an agreement, about the demilitarisation

21 of Zepa that you proposed in the July 1995. That was on page 31 of

22 yesterday's transcript. Isn't it correct that in July 1995, Zepa should

23 have been demilitarised long ago?

24 A. That is correct. The original vision for all the safe areas was

25 that they would be demilitarised. That's my recollection. That was the

Page 14266

1 concept that they had.

2 Q. And UNPROFOR and you personally, did you know in 1995 that Zepa

3 was not demilitarised?

4 A. I may have -- if there were fighting there, it -- again, Zepa was

5 not my preoccupation until I was assigned to it. We may well have known.

6 We may well have known. But it was not the exact number of arms or

7 something like this, I don't know but we may well have known and even

8 assumed that it was not demilitarised.

9 Q. When you say "we," who do you mean?

10 A. I mean UNPROFOR and very likely I knew this, but again this was

11 not the preoccupation of mine until I was moved and assigned, had this

12 assignment, but that's correct. I believe it probably would be widely

13 known in UNPROFOR that it was not demilitarised.

14 Q. I understand that you personally were not preoccupied with that,

15 but speaking generally about UNPROFOR in Bosnia, it was UNPROFOR's

16 obligation to oversee the demilitarisation and to see to it that the

17 demilitarisation is indeed carried out; isn't that correct?

18 A. I think that was correct. I'm drawing now on memory. I don't

19 have the UN resolutions. There were a number beginning in 1993. There

20 was a number of resolutions. I used to be able to quote some of them by

21 heart, but as I recall, they were required demilitarisation and of course,

22 they empowered the UN to call on NATO air strikes in a number of instances

23 to "deter attacks," et cetera as far as I recall.

24 Q. And why was the demilitarisation of Zepa discussed only in July

25 1995 when it should have been demilitarised as early as May 1993?

Page 14267

1 A. That's a very fair and interesting question. I don't have the

2 complete answer, but it would involve obviously some cooperation with the

3 UN by both sides, and you would have to engage with others, perhaps

4 General Smith and others, to find out where that cooperation was missing.

5 As I said, we had very little access to Republika Srpska,

6 including to these isolated enclaves. There was no civil affairs presence

7 in Zepa at all ever, as far as I know. Very limited access to the other

8 enclaves. There was that effort beginning in Srebrenica in 1993 started

9 by General Morillon about demilitarisation and in exchange to have

10 UNPROFOR protection, and others can speak far better than I to the details

11 as to why those demilitarisation efforts came to -- had success or did not

12 the have success and the relative responsibility of the parties much

13 better than I can.

14 Q. Have I understood you well to say that demilitarisation was not

15 carried out or could not carried out because the Serbs didn't let you into

16 those enclaves?

17 A. No [Interpretation] No, you have not understood me well. [In

18 English] No. I'm saying that -- I am not the best witness to tell you

19 exactly why these demilitarisation efforts did not come to pass. I'm

20 suggesting to you that among the complicating factors was that we,

21 UNPROFOR, only had -- we had very limited access in Republika Srpska

22 anywhere, and so there might even be limitations as to even how much we

23 know. But I can tell you surely that I'm not the best witness to explain

24 to you why exactly the relative responsibility of the parties as to why

25 these demilitarisation efforts did not achieve more success.

Page 14268

1 Q. The demilitarisation proposal that you mentioned earlier, did you

2 remember to whom you submitted that proposal in July 1995?

3 A. We submitted as best I can recall, and I believe the documents

4 show this, that we sent it on to our higher headquarters including to

5 Zagreb, and we had informal discussions about it. I know one of the memos

6 shows I discussed this with General Tolimir and quite possibly we might

7 have had informal discussions on the Bosniak side as well about that. But

8 formally, the document as the document was first submitted, up our chain

9 of command in UNPROFOR as you wish.

10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show Exhibit

11 number 5D413 to the witness.

12 Q. Sir, can you confirm that this is a memorandum from David Harland

13 dated July 21st, 1995?

14 A. That's certainly what it appears to be.

15 Q. I would like to go to page 2, the last paragraph.

16 Sir, is this paragraph really about an informal conversation with

17 General Tolimir during which you spoke to him about the proposals

18 regarding demilitarisation?

19 A. Probably would have -- yeah, this is referring to a meeting where

20 we would have raised this and discussed it and where he indicated his

21 interest.

22 Q. So it follows from this document that General Tolimir did not

23 refuse that proposal?

24 A. That is correct. But I don't know whether we actually showed him

25 a copy and as you've seen from your copy of the document, the central

Page 14269

1 provision of that demilitarisation proposal was that it had a role for

2 NATO in terms of air strikes, and of course, we placed in it quite clearly

3 that if the Bosniaks refused the agreement, or if they refused to comply

4 fully in implementing the agreement, that that would be taken into account

5 in calling NATO for air strikes. In other words that there would be an

6 onus placed on both sides. That was our effort. That was what we were

7 trying to do with this option, that was already there, under UN Security

8 Council resolutions.

9 Q. I would now like to show you document 5D416. This is also a UN

10 document, a memorandum by David -- from David Harland. We see it is dated

11 as 23 July 1995.

12 A. Yes, ma'am.

13 Q. Let us go to the second page of the document. Paragraph 2,

14 please, on the screen. Sir, I'll give you some time to read this

15 paragraph, which starts, "At about 2.00 p.m. this afternoon."

16 A. M'hm. Yes, ma'am.

17 Q. Is it correct that according to this paragraph, you spoke at

18 length with Mr. Bulajic and you spoke to him about that demilitarisation

19 proposal also?

20 A. According to the record, yes, and I believe that to be the case.

21 Q. And this Mr. Bulajic never opposed demilitarisation, at any case

22 he didn't refuse it, or did he?

23 A. According to this memorandum, which I believe to be accurate, he

24 did not. He -- he apparently showed some interest in and I believe that

25 that's -- this is an accurate reflection of the record. That's -- that

Page 14270

1 would be correct.

2 Q. Mr. Bulajic was a representative of the civilian authorities of

3 Republika Srpska, he was not a military person?

4 A. As far as I recall, that is correct.

5 Q. About the situation in Zepa, and these talks, did you know who

6 really ran these talks, who was -- who was -- who -- in charge of these

7 talks? Were they military or civilian authorities, and please answer only

8 if you really know the answer.

9 A. I can't say that -- with total certainty, that I know the answer.

10 If that's the condition for me to answer, then I can't meet your

11 condition.

12 Q. Let us go back to your demilitarisation proposal. It seems based

13 on the two documents that we've just seen, that the Serbs, both those from

14 civilian structures as well as those from military structures, did not

15 really oppose the demilitarisation proposal. Do you know why that

16 proposal eventually was not realised?

17 A. Ma'am, are you speaking about our demilitarisation proposal, the

18 one of --

19 Q. Yes, sir.

20 A. Yes. I'll be happy to answer your question, and here I think I

21 know the answer quite clearly. I can't say with total certainty, but I

22 believe this to be the case. It never went anywhere because it included

23 the express provision of NATO -- use of NATO air power, and I think for

24 that reason, and 90 per cent that reason, it would have not been welcomed

25 in the UN headquarters, and indeed, had it been presented formally to

Page 14271

1 higher authorities in the Serb side in -- with that provision in it, I'm

2 not so sure that the -- that might have been my acceptance. There might

3 well have been interest in demilitarisation, but I'm not so sure that a

4 start provision about calling in NATO air power would have been so

5 welcome.

6 Q. You're speaking about the Serbs not accepting that possibly due to

7 the NATO air strikes element but that is a speculation of yours. You

8 never reached the final stage in these talks. So nobody ever clearly

9 refused that?

10 A. That would be correct. You could call it informed speculation.

11 Q. At any rate, UNPROFOR or the United Nations stopped that project

12 regarding the demilitarisation. Do you agree with that statement?

13 A. As far as I know, yes. Again, I would refer you, if you have

14 witnesses who are senior UNPROFOR military, it would probably be better to

15 get the answer from them. It seemed to me very soon that we were beyond

16 that, that there was a military situation that had quickly overtaken the

17 situation that possibility of a demilitarisation agreement. At some point

18 that was clear and that was again the role that we were called on to play

19 which was to effect the evacuation of the enclave.

20 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to show you document 6D133, that you

21 have already seen. It was yesterday. Yesterday, when you saw this

22 document, you told us that it was possible that the person that the

23 document is addressed to or the fighting that it is -- that is referred in

24 this document might have been the fighting that you've already heard

25 about. Is it possible that you told us that, that it was about the

Page 14272

1 fighting that took place on the 20th of July 1995, and it is referred in

2 this document? Is that possible?

3 A. I'm rereading your question to me. I didn't follow it. I'm just

4 rereading here on the thing.

5 Q. I believe that the interpretation did not come out very clear.

6 The fighting that you spoke about yesterday, and that this document refers

7 to, could this have been the fighting that you heard when you were in Zepa

8 on the 20th of July 1995?

9 A. As I believe I stated yesterday, yes. This could have been part

10 of that fighting, could have been, absolutely could have been.

11 Q. This is a document that originated from the Ukrainian force, and

12 yesterday you spoke about some of the details of the document. However,

13 when it comes to this particular document, do you have any doubt as

14 regards the accuracy of the information that is conveyed in this document?

15 A. Could I see the entire document, please? It's simply stating that

16 fighting began. So I can't be -- verify the exact time in there but the

17 fact that fighting began, yes. The -- I can't speak to the -- necessarily

18 as to whether the means used were simply those mentioned in this. This is

19 a very short --

20 JUDGE KWON: It is two pages. You can see the next page.

21 THE WITNESS: Oh, I didn't see the next page, sir. Thank you.

22 Right. There is nothing there. This is -- if your question relates to --

23 does this document represent that there was fighting on that day and could

24 this have been the initiation of what I heard, yes. Does it represent a

25 full picture of what happened or was the fighting limited to the means

Page 14273

1 mentioned, no, I can't speak to that, but it could well be that the

2 fighting began that day and that that's what we heard part of.

3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Actually this document doesn't say only that the fighting had

5 started. It, between the Republika Srpska army and the BiH army, with the

6 use of certain means. I'm asking you this question because you also told

7 us yesterday, at the beginning of your yesterday's testimony, that the

8 source of fire that you heard was from the Serb positions, and in your

9 testimony you never mentioned the BiH army at all. You only mentioned the

10 Serb forces. Is that the case? Is it true that it is not just the fire

11 coming from the positions of the Republika Srpska army but that it was

12 actually a battle going on between the two sides?

13 A. Ma'am, I would repeat what I said earlier about the conversation

14 way back and what the Serb general said. You only saw part. I can only

15 testify as to those events that I saw and witnessed. I'm sorry if I can't

16 testify as to the activities of the Armija. I cannot. I cannot say that

17 what they were doing or what they weren't doing. I can only tell you the

18 part that I saw. I was only at OP 2. That was Serb-controlled. That's

19 the only part that I can testify to. I think you can find other witnesses

20 who can give far better testimony than I can as to what the Armija was

21 doing. I concede it's quite possible that they were engaged in a

22 fire-fight. I simply, as this witness, cannot testify to that.

23 Q. Sir, when you were there, how could you determine that the source

24 of fire came from the Serb positions?

25 A. In -- it -- the -- it's quite possible even that we saw firing.

Page 14274

1 You're asking me about events that were 12 years ago. But it is quite

2 possible we saw positions, gunnery positions, and it was clear to us that

3 the spot where we were, this high ground, was completely controlled by the

4 Serb military. That to us was clear. There were various weapons and

5 vehicles associated with that. It would be hard for me now 12 years later

6 to identify, but it was quite clear to me that this was under control and

7 that there were significant presence of weapons. And the firing we heard

8 was from this side.

9 It sounded to us from the way we gauge it; although, hearing is

10 notoriously misleading for anyone. Hearing is not a good indicator but

11 for us, it certainly appeared that this was outgoing. And we didn't see

12 any indication from the Serbs of indication of incoming, such as soldiers

13 running for cover or telling us to take shelter or we didn't see that, we

14 didn't see any indication of what one would expect from a disciplined

15 unit, as the Serbs -- Serb army was, of taking incoming fire at the

16 location where we were.

17 Q. Sir, didn't you say that actually at the given moment, the

18 situation became rather tense and that the Serbs actually told you that

19 you were better off leaving the area?

20 A. They didn't tell us we were better off to leave. They told us to

21 leave. Now, if you want to -- it's fair, if you want to say that they did

22 it out of concern for our safety, you can have that inference. I'm

23 telling you I can only testify as to what I observed. At the time there

24 was a quite serious demeanour. I did not see running for shelter. I saw

25 the appearance of military activity. And we were told to leave. That's

Page 14275

1 what I witnessed. That's what I've testified to.

2 Q. I would like to show you Exhibit 6D91. Yesterday you saw the

3 document. I did not intend to show it to you but I will do nevertheless.

4 Does this document originate from the observation point at which you were

5 located?

6 A. The document itself, one cannot say where the precise location of

7 the document. It isn't necessarily that this was the same specific

8 location. This may well have been. It says targeted the barracks of

9 Ukrainian company. That could have been down and more likely was down in

10 Zepa town, not where we were at the OP 2 in all likelihood, in all

11 likelihood.

12 Q. According to you, the Bosnian force, the Armija, shelled the city

13 of Zepa, and I suppose that it was inhabited by civilian population, that

14 it was only civilian population that was there when the army shelled it?

15 A. I am -- the paragraph Charlie that I'm reading says three mortar

16 rounds directly targeted the barracks of Ukrainian company, numerous

17 explosions registered, also has been hit with a small arms and heavy

18 machine-gun, origin of fire is Armija of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's

19 correct. That's what they are reporting. This witness cannot testify one

20 way or the other as to this, as -- because this witness wasn't there.

21 Q. I would like to move on to another topic. I would like to show

22 you Exhibit numbers 5D417. Sir, you have already had an opportunity to

23 see this document. You saw it yesterday. And you were asked about it by

24 my learned friend just a while ago. I would like to show you paragraph 3,

25 which is towards the end of this page. Do you remember that you actually

Page 14276

1 saw this document yesterday and that you discussed it with my learned

2 friend?

3 A. I believe that is correct, yes. We looked at this document

4 yesterday.

5 Q. Do you remember that yesterday you told us that at the time, which

6 means -- yesterday you told us that -- or actually the day before

7 yesterday, you told us that you saw a copy of the document or the document

8 that this document makes reference to?

9 A. I'm not really following you. Are you asking do I recall actually

10 seeing this document at the time? Is that your question?

11 Q. No. Sir, no, I'm not asking you this. I'm simply asking you to

12 confirm whether you remember that you told us yesterday that you believe

13 that you had seen this document before, when I'm talking about the

14 document I'm talking about the agreement.

15 A. If that's what I said yesterday, I stand by that. I don't have a

16 vivid present recollection of this document, if that's your question. I

17 do not. This -- these reports strike me as accurate and plausible and

18 it's indeed quite likely that I saw this document at the time. But it was

19 Viktor who is reported to have called it in, so it's possible that he was

20 actually holding the document or something or, you know, had more closer

21 scrutiny of it than I did at the time. It's possible as well.

22 Q. And if you could look at the last paragraph, under 6, it mentions

23 the agreement and based on that agreement the civilian population of Zepa

24 was supposed to be provided with an opportunity to declare themselves as

25 to where they wished to reside from then on. Is that correct?

Page 14277

1 A. That's certainly what this says, and I have no reason to believe

2 that that was not in the document at the time.

3 Q. When you arrived in Zepa, during the evacuation campaign, you

4 actually started inquiring among the people whether they wanted to leave

5 or, rather, whether they wanted to stay; is that correct? This is a very

6 simple question, sir.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. This agreement was something that provided for the Muslim forces

9 surrendering. This is what is stated under 2 and 4, Muslim forces were

10 supposed to surrender, according to this agreement.

11 A. Among other things, correct.

12 Q. Is it true, maybe you didn't know it at the time, but I believe

13 that you know it now, that the government in Sarajevo did not want to

14 ratify this agreement, that they would not accept it as such?

15 A. That's possible. I'm not sure what I knew about that but that's

16 quite possible.

17 Q. Can we show page 2 of this document to the witness, please? Can

18 we go to the paragraph which begins with the following words, "At 11.40

19 a.m.". According to this document, Minister Muratovic says that he did

20 not know anything about this document, about this?

21 A. Your question is?

22 Q. Can you confirm that according to this paragraph, Minister

23 Muratovic did not know anything about the agreement or at least that is

24 what he said?

25 A. That's clearly what it says. I have no other basis of knowledge.

Page 14278

1 I can't shed any more light on it but that's clearly what it says, and I

2 have no reason to doubt the accuracy of this report.

3 Q. If you look at the last paragraph of this document,

4 Minister Muratovic expressed a certain doubt about the existence of

5 Hamdija Torlak, he doubted whether Hamdija Torlak actually existed?

6 A. That's what it says.

7 Q. But you yourself knew that Hamdija Torlak did exist?

8 A. Yes. I knew that he existed but I didn't know his exact position

9 or function or his competence to effect or not effect agreements. But

10 that is correct, I knew that he existed, that is correct.

11 Q. What we can also see in this document, which is the penultimate

12 paragraph, is that the Bosnian government was not at all contrary to the

13 evacuation of the Muslim population from Zepa. They did not oppose it at

14 all. Actually, what they wanted was for the evacuation to be carried out

15 under certain conditions.

16 A. What is your question, please, ma'am? I'm sorry, I don't

17 understand your question.

18 Q. Sir, is it true that the paragraph starting with at 11.40,"I

19 called minister Muratovic," and so on and so forth, confirms that the

20 government in Sarajevo was not opposed to the evacuation of the population

21 from Bosnia -- from Zepa as long as it was carried out under certain

22 conditions and the conditions were those that the UNPROFOR supervised the

23 evacuation?

24 A. What my -- I can give you my best judgement on this. I

25 wouldn't -- I wouldn't make a complete inference as to the total position

Page 14279

1 of the Bosnian government from this paragraph. It depends very much on

2 the context, and I'm not here to speak on behalf of the Bosnian government

3 and you should -- those officials are still alive and can speak for

4 themselves and represent what it was -- what their position is. It seems

5 to me the paragraph stands on its face. The minister is expressing

6 concerns with respect to what happened in Srebrenica. Beyond that, how

7 much you want to infer is up to you. It's not really for me to state.

8 Q. In any case, finally, when the evacuation was finished, it was

9 actually carried out in the full presence of the UNPROFOR. The UNPROFOR

10 was there all the time.

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And it was also carried out before the Muslim forces in Zepa

13 surrendered?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. Wouldn't it be correct to say that what happened in Zepa, was the

16 evacuation of the Zepa population, was not the success of Mladic but the

17 success of the government in Sarajevo. Actually it was not Mladic who

18 succeeded by evacuating the population from Zepa. It was the government

19 of Sarajevo and the Muslim forces who succeeded because the Muslim force

20 remained armed after the evacuation of the civilian population.

21 A. Ma'am, is it my role here to ratify your judgements and

22 inferences? I just don't understand -- I'm not sure that this is my role

23 here as a witness. I understood that I was called to this Tribunal to

24 testify as to the events, the observations. If you're asking me for

25 opinions, I'm happy to give them about the total context of this. I'm

Page 14280

1 happy to share those. It would be as an expert and not as a fact

2 witness. But I'm not sure that this is really my role.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Ms. Fauveau and Mr. Joseph. You haven't

4 been summoned here as a witness -- as an expert witness. You've been

5 summoned here as a witness to the facts that you are -- that are to-- that

6 you are aware of. So please, we are not interested, and I'm using this

7 language not in any disparaging way, we are not interested in your

8 opinions because you haven't been called here to express opinions. So if

9 you think that by answering Madam Fauveau's question you would be making

10 an assessment, giving an opinion, which you wouldn't like to give, then

11 you only have to ask not to answer the question. One moment.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE AGIUS: That having been say, of course, Madam Fauveau, you

14 can rephrase, reformulate your question, without asking the witness to

15 give an expert opinion. I could also add that the gist of your previous

16 question to him has more of the nature of a submission than anything else,

17 but I don't want to stop you from reformulating your question or putting a

18 different one.

19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Is it true that Minister Muratovic said that once the evacuation

21 was finished, before the evacuation was completed, the evacuation of the

22 civilian population was complete, the Muslim forces of Zepa would not

23 surrender, they would not surrender their weapons?

24 A. I -- it says what it says. The document says what it says. I'm

25 sorry, I've lot track of the document. I'm not trying to be difficult.

Page 14281

1 There is nothing more I can add to this. The document speaks for itself.

2 I've attested that I believe it to be an accurate record.

3 Q. Sir --

4 A. I don't know how I can better answer the question. Minister

5 Muratovic's position is reflected, I believe to be accurately reflected,

6 in this document and it stands on its own. I don't know that I can shed

7 any more light on this than that.

8 Q. Sir, my question was not related to this document. I wanted to

9 show you another one, but for the time being I'm asking you this. Did you

10 know that Minister Muratovic stated, once the evacuation was completed,

11 that the Muslim forces of Zepa would not surrender? If you don't know,

12 you can simply say, "I don't know about that."

13 A. I may know this if we stop and look at the record but sounds to me

14 a plausible position that you make, as to his position, but I'm not --

15 here I'd have to refer back to some more documents to confirm that but

16 that sounds like a plausible position.

17 Q. I would like to show the witness Exhibit number 5D419.

18 Sir, this is a document dated 27 July. This is a memorandum

19 originating from David Harland.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Please understand me. I'm asking you this because the accused

22 don't have a copy of this document in the language that they understand.

23 That's why some of my questions seem pretty straightforward. This is just

24 to help them understand what the document is about. In the second

25 paragraph of this document, a reference is made to a telephone

Page 14282

1 conversation that you had and during which you said, at -- that at 2.00, a

2 majority of the civilian population had already been evacuated.

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Can we now show the witness page 2 of the same document?

5 In the penultimate paragraph, we are talking about 5.00 in the

6 afternoon of the same day, Minister Muratovic called and said that the

7 Bosnian military in the pocket would not surrender.

8 A. That's what it says.

9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, would it be the

10 convenient time for our first break? And after the break, I will require

11 another ten to 15 minutes approximately.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, certainly. Yes, certainly, Madam Fauveau.

13 Yes, Mr. Thayer?

14 MR. THAYER: Mr. President I don't want to pre-empt Your Honour,

15 but if we could have an estimate from my friends about how much time they

16 have left, you typically do this, but I just wanted to emphasise we

17 have -- our next witness is an investigator who is multi-tasking all the

18 time, and we just want to be able to manage his time as best as possible,

19 please.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: As I have it for the time being it's another 15

21 minutes from Madam Fauveau. Mr. Ostojic, do you still require 45 minutes?

22 MR. OSTOJIC: Good morning, Mr. President. I'll re-evaluate. I

23 think about a half hour to 45 minutes. It's hard to gauge.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Mr. Zivanovic.

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: For the time being I stay.

Page 14283

1 JUDGE AGIUS: So we are where we stood before. 45 minutes to be

2 on the safe side, plus 20, that's an hour and five minutes, plus 15, an

3 hour and 20 minutes. Basically we should finish if there is

4 re-examination, we should finish by the end of the next session.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Before you continue, Ms. Fauveau, for

8 the record Judge Stole had to leave us, unfortunately, and we are

9 proceeding with the sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis. Yes.

10 Yes, Madam Fauveau.

11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12 Q. Sir, in your statement, you spoke much about the evacuation from

13 Zepa. Can we say that the role you played in that evacuation, both

14 personally and as a member of an international organisation, was an active

15 one?

16 A. Yes, ma'am.

17 Q. And, in effect, you and your colleague, Viktor Bezruchenko, as

18 well as local Muslim leaders, organised the -- for the civilian Muslim

19 population to board buses?

20 A. We weren't solely organising. We organised one part of it and

21 coordinated part of it, but it isn't as though we organised ourselves,

22 everything, but you're correct that the Bosniak or Muslim leaders had

23 their role and we had our role and the Serbs had their role.

24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Please show the witness Exhibit

25 number 4D111.

Page 14284

1 Q. This is a statement about the telephone conversation which you had

2 in April 2005, with a representative of the OTP. Could we see the third

3 page, please? I'm referring to paragraph 14. Sir, I'm going to read out

4 this -- what this report says. This is a report about the interview with

5 you, and I will ask you whether you adhere to what you said then. "We

6 started to organise the civilians boarding in the vehicles. I, Viktor,

7 and at least one French officer were very active on this as well as some

8 of the Muslim leaders. I can recall seeing also General Smith there

9 observing the evacuation."

10 A. This is not a very accurate rendering of what I said to this

11 reporter. It's not completely accurate. General Smith was not there that

12 I recall, "Observing" the evacuation. I couldn't rule it out

13 categorically. But it isn't -- that part of it seems -- it's not a

14 complete -- completely accurate picture. We were there. We did start to

15 organise, Viktor and I were there. At one point during the evacuation,

16 yes, there was one French officer who -- who we were cooperating with.

17 That's right. But I can't say that this paragraph is a completely

18 accurate rendering either of what I said to him or what I observed at the

19 time.

20 Q. I would like to focus on what is said about General Smith. You

21 say that you don't remember seeing General Smith observing the evacuation.

22 But you cannot rule that out categorically. Does that mean that today you

23 no longer remember whether General Smith actually observed the evacuation

24 process?

25 A. What I'm saying is that I don't believe this is either an accurate

Page 14285

1 reflection of what I said, even to this reporter, or accurate as to what I

2 observed at the time. What I recall vividly was being at a meeting with

3 General Smith and Colonel Baxter at the top, at OP 2. I don't recall

4 General Smith observing the evacuation. The fact that I don't recall it

5 doesn't mean categorically that it didn't happen. I might not have seen

6 him at some point. I'm just saying when I made this statement, and now,

7 that that part of it is not right, and I don't believe I even made that

8 statement to the person who reported -- I think the person misunderstood.

9 It was done over the telephone. The person who did it was a non-native

10 English speaker, and it's quite possible there was some misunderstanding.

11 Q. Thank you very much.

12 A. De rien.

13 Q. Sir, you are mentioning a French soldier. I'm no longer referring

14 to the statement. I'm asking you about the events at that time in Zepa.

15 Is it correct that UNPROFOR, during that evacuation, deployed additional

16 forces?

17 A. That is correct, yes, ma'am.

18 Q. And a little while ago, you spoke about these international forces

19 arriving at Zepa without any problems, although you had been saying that

20 reaching the enclave was problem -- was a problem, or I'm going to repeat

21 the question.

22 Recently, you spoke about the difficulties that the international

23 organisations had reaching the enclave generally speaking, in the general

24 sense. But these UNPROFOR forces that had arrived to assist in the

25 evacuation were able to reach Zepa without problems?

Page 14286

1 A. That is correct, yes, absolutely correct.

2 Q. Is it correct that while you were actively involved in that

3 evacuation, and while you were in Zepa, that you received no orders from

4 General Mladic?

5 A. As a member of the United Nations, I cannot receive then -- cannot

6 receive orders from any military or political official who is not in the

7 United Nations so that's an impossibility. Did -- did General Mladic

8 instruct us -- this is when you will go down and then did we comply? And

9 yes we went down, or this is the way we are going to do the things? Yes.

10 But formally speaking, I can't take orders from any general, nor political

11 leader, of any side in a party of that conflict. But instructions as to

12 how to -- the modalities for this, were there -- was direction given?

13 Yes, direction was given.

14 Q. Do you agree that under no circumstances General Mladic could give

15 even instructions to General Smith?

16 A. No. He couldn't instruct, but he could convey his views as to how

17 something would go, the same as any military leader of any faction,

18 Bosniak or Croat, but that is a true statement. General Smith can only be

19 ordered within his chain of command.

20 Q. In any case, General Smith would never have followed any

21 suggestion or instruction from General Mladic that would result in

22 infringements of international humanitarian law?

23 A. I would tell you this: I have the highest --

24 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Thayer?

25 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I think we have reached the limits of

Page 14287

1 this line of questioning with respect to what General Smith would or

2 wouldn't do. He will be here as a fact witness about the events in Zepa.

3 The witness has already testified about whether he could take orders from

4 General Mladic, but I think that's sufficient for this line of

5 questioning.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: I stand to be directed by my colleagues, but I think

7 this is a question that should be directed to General Smith and he is

8 best-placed to answer it. Thank you.

9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Sir, if General Mladic had given you an instruction that would be

11 contrary to international humanitarian law, you wouldn't have followed

12 that instruction; is that correct?

13 A. Not -- my -- as I told you, we were, for example, told under

14 international humanitarian law you have to determine the volition of the

15 person to depart, and I told you and explained to this Court what happened

16 and how to disregard it. So I can't say strictly we had in our mind the

17 safety and security, as best we could preserve the dignity, but really it

18 was primarily the safety and security of the people who were being

19 evacuated.

20 Whether that conformed 100 per cent with international

21 humanitarian law, whether that was even in our mind at every point, I

22 can't say. What was in our mind at every point was the safety and

23 security of the evacuation. That is it. And we would weigh of course

24 what General Mladic would or would not say at -- and weigh that. If it

25 would have imperiled the safety and security. If he had directed us to do

Page 14288

1 something that I felt, speaking for myself, would have imperiled these

2 people in some way, within the confines of the peril they were already in,

3 no, I wouldn't have followed that. I don't know if I've answered your

4 question.

5 Q. You have answered my question completely. And I will go a little

6 further now. Is it correct that in wartime situations, in situations of

7 serious crises, when the -- the conflicting parties are sometimes forced

8 to take certain steps to protect civilian population and these steps being

9 on the verge of a legal standards and provisions?

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, if you think that this is a question that you

11 shouldn't answer because it belongs to an expert witness, you're free to

12 ask us not to answer it. Yes, Madam Fauveau?

13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I explain, Your Honour? The

14 witness repeatedly stated that he has rather great experience, he even

15 said unique experience, in the context of the conflict in the former

16 Yugoslavia. That's why I asked this question. But if he thinks that this

17 is not an appropriate question, I shall withdraw it, in fact I wanted to

18 say if the Chamber thinks that this question shouldn't be answered.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: I think if you wish to ask such questions, I mean,

20 you need to phrase them in a way such as not to elicit an opinion, but to

21 seek what his own personal position was at the time. Yes.

22 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I misunderstood. I thought I was

23 awaiting for the respected, esteemed attorney, to rephrase the question.

24 I thought that was what you were getting at.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: More or less, yes.

Page 14289

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for your question.

2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I will continue and perhaps a little later on I will ask a similar

4 question. So what I'm about to ask you now has nothing to do with my

5 previous question. Yesterday, on page 37 of the transcript, you said that

6 Serb soldiers had a full liberty in the area of the other enclave which

7 was in fact under the control of Ukrainian soldiers. Do you remember

8 saying that?

9 A. Yes, ma'am.

10 Q. But Avdo Palic, who was the commander of the Muslim forces in that

11 enclave, also had a full liberty of movement?

12 A. He had full movement in the area of the village. I don't think he

13 had full movement towards the area towards OP 2. Where I saw his --

14 witnessed his movements free and unconstrained were in the village, and

15 then back up toward the hills wherever he was going and wherever the men

16 were hidden.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Sorry, Madam Fauveau, and you are basing

18 this assessment on what you could see at the time that you were there and

19 not on other information.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Exclusively saying what I could observe

21 with my own eyes was Colonel Palic could move about, as we were moving

22 about, in the village at the time of the evacuation, and in the evenings,

23 some points when he decided during the day he would go up into these hills

24 behind us. I don't recall him walking freely up towards OP 2, towards

25 that initial position where we were, sir.

Page 14290

1 JUDGE AGIUS: What I meant to say is that you couldn't account for

2 his movements or the extent to which he could move around in the area at a

3 time when you were not present.

4 THE WITNESS: That would be correct. I can only relate what I

5 observed.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

7 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

8 Q. During the evacuation, and the boarding of the population in buses

9 and vehicles, you never saw anybody being forced to board a vehicle or

10 bus?

11 A. No. If you mean physically, with someone pointing a gun, no.

12 I've already related to you, I believe, to this Court, the fact that it

13 was clear that the issue of volition was already well passed and that

14 these people felt themselves under duress. That was their reason for

15 their departure.

16 Q. When you asked the inhabitants whether they wanted to leave,

17 nobody prevented you from asking them that; is that correct?

18 A. Yes, ma'am, that is correct.

19 Q. And you put that question to some 15 or 20 persons, didn't you,

20 and only one person said that he or she wanted to say but was -- stay,

21 sorry, but was afraid?

22 A. Going on my recollection, that is correct. Only one person said

23 that she didn't want to go, and all of them cried. One said no; all of

24 them cried with her. Correct.

25 Q. When that person said to you she was afraid, and when you doubted

Page 14291

1 her will to leave, did you inform your superiors of that?

2 A. No, ma'am. And not that I recall that we even had means but the

3 answer to that is no, did not.

4 Q. Did you inform General Smith about that?

5 A. No, ma'am.

6 Q. Did you inform General Mladic or even General Tolimir?

7 A. No, ma'am.

8 Q. And when you arrived in Zepa or on the next day, you saw that

9 group of people in the centre of Zepa. You didn't expect to see them

10 there, did you?

11 A. No. I was not sure really what to expect, and we were sort of

12 surprised. We anticipated that we would have to go and sort of group the

13 people, correct.

14 Q. And in your statement, you spoke on several times about

15 impressions. When you saw that large group of people in the centre of

16 Zepa, did you have the impression that those people wanted to leave?

17 A. You're asking for my impressions, and I'm happy to share my

18 impressions with you. My impressions were those people, let's see, your

19 question, wanted to leave. My impression is that these people were afraid

20 for their lives. That's my impression. When someone is afraid for their

21 lives, they want to leave. That's my impression.

22 Q. You personally also, with regard to your experience in the war in

23 former Yugoslavia, you went to several places where there were conflicts,

24 and you had seen crises in other parts of the world too. Can we say,

25 speaking about the people in Zepa, that the fear they felt was more caused

Page 14292

1 by the general situation and the general tension between the ethnic groups

2 after the years of war rather than that -- rather than being due to the

3 situation on that day in Zepa itself?

4 A. You asked this based on my experience, and I can relate this to

5 other areas of former Yugoslavia where I was, and I would say the answer

6 is it was -- the fear was related in my view, in my impression, to this

7 specific situation of being overrun, and I can compare it, if you wish,

8 you mentioned my experience, there was an evacuation of Croats that I

9 participated in in January 1993 following a Croatian attack at

10 Maslenica Bridge. Then a number of Serb forces and Serb irregulars,

11 including Arkan and Captain Dragan came into Krajina, and a number of

12 Croat civilians were killed.

13 And these Croats had been living in, as minorities in Krajina,

14 among the Serbs. They had been living. And it was this change to the

15 situation that injected a situation of crisis, that where some of them had

16 been killed in Drnis and other places, some old people had their throats

17 slit. And that created this atmosphere of great fear and panic. So where

18 they had actually been living under Serb control for sometime, all of a

19 sudden they were afraid and wanted to leave. I would compare it to that

20 situation and say that there had been a change. That these people seemed

21 to be terrified by this change in the situation and that that was their

22 immediate desire to leave.

23 Can I exclude the possibility that they had been isolated and

24 deprived for sometime and that some of them might have wanted to go? I

25 cannot exclude that possibility, but to me drawing on my experience,

Page 14293

1 you're asking for my -- based on my impression based, on my experience,

2 I'm sharing that with you, it was the latter. It was the change

3 situation, an immediate crisis in which these people felt immediately in

4 fearful of their lives, that's my impression.

5 Q. In this particular case of Zepa, fear was caused by the entry of

6 the Serbs in Zepa, the taking of Zepa, which was a consequence of the

7 military victory of the Serbian army; isn't that correct?

8 A. That would be correct.

9 Q. And that couldn't be avoided, could it? What I'm -- what I want

10 to say is, if a military operation is -- takes place, and one side wins,

11 then the defeated side is scared. I'm referring to this concrete moment

12 in July 1995. In 1992 it may have been different, but could anything else

13 be done for the people to avoid the people being scared?

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer? Before you answer the question,

15 please.

16 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I've risen to object initially because

17 the question really was asking, sounded like for speculation, then it got

18 concrete again it seemed. But then it in, my opinion, reverted to again

19 asking a very generalised speculative question. If he feels like he has

20 the -- as Your Honour has made clear before, he has the factual basis --

21 JUDGE AGIUS: I think -- I read the question and again - I stand

22 to be corrected by my colleagues - but I read the question to be

23 Mr. Joseph, having given us an expose on the events in Krajina in 1993 and

24 having lived through the events in Zepa in July 1995, isn't that -- isn't

25 it true that there was a difference in the circumstances? And this is

Page 14294

1 what the question amounts to, and I think he can answer it.

2 Okay. So that's the gist of the question. If it's not the gist

3 of the question, as I understood it to be, then please tell me,

4 Madam Fauveau, but I think it is.

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] It is somewhat different. What I'm

6 interested in is the following:

7 Q. At that moment in Zepa, after three or four years of war, was

8 there anything to prevent the people from being scared, after there had

9 been a military victory of one of the warring parties? Could anything be

10 done to prevent the population from -- of the other warring party from

11 being scared? And I said maybe at the beginning of the war, it was

12 possible, that is in 1992, it was possible, maybe, to find a different

13 solutions.

14 A. I'm going to wait. Let me try to read your question here

15 specifically on the screen. "Could anything be done to prevent the

16 population from being scared?" Of course, theoretically many things could

17 be done to redress the fear of a population. You might think first among

18 them a deployment of UNPROFOR. Well, their confidence in UNPROFOR I think

19 would have been rather low, if not non-existent at that point, and the

20 ability to deploy an adequate detachment especially coming right after the

21 fall of Srebrenica and the situation of the Dutch troops there, I think

22 that was not a possibility. One can think of other things that could be

23 done. There is a panoply of things that could be done to restore

24 confidence. Some --

25 Q. Sir?

Page 14295

1 A. Or something else, some agreement, a political agreement, a peace

2 agreement. Many, many things that could be done. I'm still struggling my

3 best to answer your question. I'm just not sure, maybe I don't understand

4 the thrust of it.

5 Q. I believe that you have understood my question very well and you

6 have answered it, as a matter of fact. You said that most natural thing

7 was to deploy the United Nations, but there were United Nations forces

8 deployed when the Serbs entered the village; isn't that correct?

9 A. That's exactly correct. And that's the point. They were

10 completely ineffectual and we should also point out that this comes

11 contemporaneous with the fall of Srebrenica which no doubt this population

12 was aware of and quite possibly was aware of some of the events following

13 the fall of Srebrenica. So it's quite possible that this influenced their

14 mental state and their attitude of great fear.

15 Q. You have also mentioned the signing of an agreement, and it seems

16 that there was an agreement that was co-signed by the Ukrainian Battalion

17 of the United Nations protection forces.

18 A. As I point out before, I was shown that agreement. I don't recall

19 seeing that agreement. Mr. Josse kindly showed me that agreement. But as

20 I pointed out then, I don't recall actually seeing signatures to it, so I

21 don't know that it was -- it was possibly a draft. You'll notice that the

22 one David Harland and I had was sort of equal stature. It was an unsigned

23 draft. I can't exclude the possibility that a signed copy exists. The

24 copy I was shown was unsigned. That's the only thing I point out but

25 Mr. Josse did indeed show us that copy and I did see it here.

Page 14296

1 Q. In any case, this was a very particular situation in Zepa, and the

2 evacuation of the civilian population was a situation in which the Serbs

3 showed the willingness to eventually allow people to remain in Zepa, if

4 they so wanted.

5 A. I can't exclude that possibility. I can't exclude that

6 possibility. Perhaps, if someone had wanted to remain, I can't exclude

7 that possibility, that that -- that would be true. I know that the -- our

8 understanding was clear, that our mission was to evacuate, Serbs provided

9 the vehicles, and we assisted and helped coordinate this onward movement.

10 That is correct.

11 Q. Thank you very much. I have no further questions, sir.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Madam Fauveau. Who is going next,

13 Mr. Ostojic or Mr. Zivanovic? Mr. Ostojic.

14 Cross-examination by Mr. Ostojic:

15 Q. Good morning, Mr. Joseph. As you know, my name is John Ostojic

16 and I represent Mr. Ljubisa Beara. How are you?

17 A. I'm fine, good morning to you. [Interpretation] I give my regards

18 to everybody present.

19 Q. I'm going to ask you a couple of questions today, and I hope not

20 to be repetitive. I'd like first to have a better understanding of your

21 position as a civil affairs officer. Was your immediate boss and

22 supervisor the senior civil affairs officer, Mr. Harland?

23 A. It was --

24 JUDGE AGIUS: I think he explained yesterday.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes, sir.

Page 14297

1 JUDGE AGIUS: -- who his superior was.

2 MR. OSTOJIC: Fair enough.

3 Q. Sir we looked at some of these memorandums or situation reports

4 that you outlined for us. In some of them your name appears directly

5 under Mr. Harland's and in others it does not. Can you explain to me why

6 in some of them your name appears on it and in others it doesn't?

7 A. I think on the ones that would appear, David would have been

8 trying to show that this was a collaborative effort probably that's --

9 that would be the reason.

10 Q. As a civil affairs officer, in 1995, were you required to maintain

11 records and notes while negotiations were on going between various warring

12 or political parties?

13 A. No requirement.

14 Q. How would you be able to convey any of the demands of one party,

15 if you met, as you've testified already, with Minister Muratovic, how

16 would you be able to recall and convey that information to your superiors?

17 A. Whoever would be senior in that meeting would convey and normally

18 would be fastidious with a record. Whether there was a written

19 requirement to do that would be something else, but normally would be

20 fastidious with notes but the senior person would convey that information.

21 Q. When were you tasked to go to Zepa in July of 1995, were you given

22 written instructions as to what your task was?

23 A. No, not that I recall.

24 Q. Your task, and I think your job at that point, was to attempt to

25 evacuate the civilians of Zepa, correct?

Page 14298

1 A. That was my understanding of what our role was to do.

2 Q. And just briefly, although I think you can explain it and you may

3 have already, the purpose to evacuate the civilians because there was a

4 war going on and there was fighting and the use of, as you describe

5 before, both small and very heavy machine-guns and mortars and other types

6 of ammunitions, correct? And to get them out of harms way in essence,

7 isn't that true?

8 A. No, sir. That would not be an accurate. It was because of a

9 specific situation where this enclave, like the one before it, Srebrenica,

10 had fallen. That is the -- was the specific triggering event for this

11 evacuation.

12 Q. Now, you mentioned just briefly on page 44 just moments ago that

13 there was a loss of confidence in UNPROFOR, although you surmised that by

14 the people in Zepa and then you said that it was not possible to deploy a

15 detachment of UNPROFOR. What would a reasonable detachment be to send out

16 to Zepa in July of 1995?

17 A. The reasonable size?

18 Q. M'hm.

19 A. Well, I would refer you more to reports of the UN Security Council

20 which they prepared their own three options light, medium, and heavy. I'm

21 sure it's well known to the Court and others. It's probably more

22 authoritative than what I can tell you.

23 Q. Well, would you consider 150 UNPROFOR troops to be, if that's a

24 figure that I'd use.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

Page 14299

1 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, if we could have some specificity as

2 to when in July of 1995 we are talking about, because that could make a

3 tremendous difference if we are really talking about what options were

4 available.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Sir, I think that's a fair comment. At the same

6 time, I think you are also moving a little bit too fast. Please allow a

7 short pause between question and answer. You both speak the same language

8 and it's creating a little bit of difficulties.

9 MR. OSTOJIC: I will, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: I know you will, Mr. Ostojic.

11 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm just drawing your attention because you've been

13 overlapping actually.

14 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you. I don't agree with my learned

15 colleague's objection. I don't know if the witness, if it makes a

16 difference for the witness, but for the sake of going on how about if we

17 just pick the date of the 26th of July of 1995.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Fair enough. And let's stick to that, then.

19 THE WITNESS: If you would be good enough to restate the question,

20 sir, please.

21 Q. Let's take the 26th of July 1995. What would you consider the

22 deployment of 150 UNPROFOR troops coming into the enclave of Zepa

23 [indiscernible], immediate, light or large?

24 A. I'll tell you, the question of the size of that contingent is in

25 my view relevant but secondary to the willingness to use all aspects of

Page 14300

1 the safe area resolution, including NATO air power. That was where the

2 real deterrent lied, especially at that point after the situation in

3 Srebrenica with the overrunning of the Dutch troops.

4 So the actual size, others are far more expert than I in

5 determining precisely the number of troops needed from a ground

6 perspective. From my perspective that was secondary to the willingness

7 and ability to use NATO air power. What would have provided confidence to

8 the people on the ground is -- would be difficult to say how much.

9 Q. Fair enough. As a fact witness, Mr. Joseph, are you aware that in

10 on or about July 25th and 26th, 1995, actually there is a deployment of

11 about 150 UNPROFOR troops to the Zepa enclave?

12 A. That would be correct as a part of the evacuation. Their mission

13 is not to stay, and as I reported as soon as the wounded convoy left, this

14 was -- triggered great panic among the population.

15 Q. So would I be wrong sir to suggest to you that the deployment of

16 those 150 UNPROFOR troops was for the reinforcement of the Ukrainians that

17 were there? Would that be incorrect?

18 A. I would say respectfully that would be incorrect.

19 Q. Okay. Well, let's look at 6D29, as it's coming up, you were

20 telling us a little bit about Lieutenant Colonel Baxter. Would you

21 refresh my recollection how he fits into the hierarchy?

22 A. I think his title was military assistant to General Smith.

23 Q. And this is 6D29 is a sit report, a situation report, captioned

24 memorandum from David Harland with the initials "SCVAO," which is just

25 Senior Civil Affairs Officer, correct?

Page 14301

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Now just quickly Directing your -- and you saw this report

3 yesterday, directing your attention to the last page and the second

4 paragraph of that page. I'll give you a chance to read it, but my first

5 question is this is a report being written by Harland, so it seems as if

6 Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter is giving him this information, correct?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Okay. Just read the second paragraph, really, the first sentence

9 is what we are discussing now.

10 A. That is -- I read it and yes, sir.

11 Q. Well, in that, doesn't it clearly say that Baxter reported that

12 UNPROFOR had deployed about 150 additional troops into the enclave to

13 reinforce the 79 Ukrainians there?

14 A. It does, it does -- it does. It doesn't say to reinforce them in

15 what mission. It doesn't say. And I would -- my recollection is their

16 mission was not to remain in place and secure as permanent deployment in

17 the safe area. That's my impression, military obviously, General Smith

18 and others can state it far more authoritative than I can.

19 Q. We will ask them, I'm sure.

20 A. Sure.

21 Q. Now, sir, also we discussed briefly, and you saw in the video

22 yesterday, I think, the ICRC truck; do you remember that?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. And now do you remember that on or about July 26th, 1995, there

25 were actually two ICRC teams in the enclave?

Page 14302

1 A. What I recall and what I testified to is that I recall ICRC being

2 there exclusively to deal with the evacuation of the wounded, and it would

3 have been on that day, probably that was the day, yes, sir.

4 Q. Would you remember if there was more than one team?

5 A. That I can't be sure of.

6 Q. Help me understand this: How many people constitute an ICRC team?

7 A. Not for me to say. I have to defer you respectfully to ICRC.

8 Q. Just look at the next sentence in that same Exhibit 6D29. There

9 senior civil affairs officer David Harland seems to say in addition to

10 UNPROFOR civil affairs, a JO team and two ICRC teams were in the pocket.

11 Do you see that?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. And sorry, I'm being told that I'm overlapping with you and I

14 apologise. It's making it difficult for everyone, so I'll try to be more

15 patient?

16 A. [Interpretation] Maybe it would be easier in Serbian.

17 Q. [Interpretation] I don't want to speak Serbian with you because it

18 would make me look bad. [In English] I don't know if that was a correct

19 translation. I think he can verify it but okay. Sir, is there any reason

20 to dispute that which we see on Exhibit 6D29, which is a memorandum from

21 David Harland to John Ryan?

22 A. No, I can't dispute what you see there. If it's the reference to

23 two ICRC teams, no, but whether a team constituted two vehicles or not, I

24 simply can't recall that detail.

25 Q. And I understand that, and we'll have some other people who can

Page 14303

1 perhaps help us out with that. I'd like to ask you a little bit about

2 that which you mentioned on page 48 yesterday, line 12, and that was a

3 book that you seem to have with you while you were in Zepa in 1995 called

4 "The Documents on the Laws of War." Do you remember that, mentioning

5 that?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And who is the author of that book?

8 A. I -- there is -- it's an edited legal treatise. It contains the

9 Geneva Conventions and assorted other things. I don't know what the -- if

10 there is an author or someone who compiled it, I don't know who it is.

11 Q. Who issued the book to you?

12 A. It was my own book.

13 Q. So you brought that from America when you went on your first

14 mission?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. And did you carry it with you when you went to Africa as well?

17 A. I was not on a conflict mission in Africa, but I had it with me in

18 every conflict place in former Yugoslavia, and I believe I took it to --

19 with me to Iraq in 2004 when I was in Iraq.

20 Q. And do you still have that book?

21 A. I do, sir.

22 Q. And who else other than yourself had that book in the former

23 Yugoslavia in July of 1995?

24 A. Former Yugoslavia is a big country. I don't know who else would

25 have had that book.

Page 14304

1 Q. If you had -- if you know, did David Harland would have it or

2 John Ryan, would they have had a copy of that book as well?

3 A. No, but they might have had copies of the Geneva Conventions and

4 other documents.

5 Q. Yesterday, sir, the honourable Judge Prost asked you a question,

6 and I believe it was on line 12, I mean page 12, lines 9 through 11, and

7 she asked you, and this is while you were still in Tuzla, what kind of

8 information did you have on the status of the Bosnian Muslims at that

9 time. Do you remember generally the question?

10 A. If I remember correctly, if it's a question I'm recalling, the

11 Honourable Judge Prost asked me about the information we had about the men

12 of Srebrenica, if I'm recalling the right question.

13 Q. That is correct. I think you answered, sir, without specifically

14 citing it, that you had talked to or heard from General Smith that he

15 talked to General Mladic, et cetera. Do you remember that?

16 A. Right. I believe I stated that a senior -- I asked a senior

17 UNPROFOR officer what had happened to the men, and I was told I was

18 relayed as I recall, that General Mladic had said --

19 Q. Men were released?

20 A. Men were released, some of them were released and that they are

21 making their way back, they're walking there. That's what I recall being

22 told. Sir, just a point of reference on that -- sorry.

23 Q. Sir, did you try on the 19th of July 1995, while you were in

24 Tuzla, to obtain any information from the ABiH about the Muslim men in

25 Srebrenica?

Page 14305

1 A. No, sir. And no, and not that I would believe that they would

2 have any information. We were consumed with dealing with the refugee

3 influx, and getting our own people out. There was an interpreter,

4 civilian, Bosniak interpreter, who we were in telephone contact with in

5 Srebrenica and he, I can remember speaking to him on the line directly, he

6 was terrified because the Dutch were going to pull out and leave him

7 behind, and he was desperate and asked for our assistance, and we provided

8 it. And I got an instruction to the Dutch that said basically you will

9 not leave without getting this guy out.

10 Q. With all due respect, I'm not sure I understand your answer fully,

11 so if you can help me. Why is it that you think the ABiH wouldn't have

12 information about his own military men who were coming through a forest or

13 in a column?

14 A. First, they were not my, as a civil affairs officer, primary

15 interlocutor. At that time, our mission as civil affairs was focused on

16 dealing with this civil influx, the refugee influx. That's first. Second

17 answer, if you want me to give a larger answer, I don't know what kind of

18 means captured military men would have to convey back to their

19 headquarters about their situation. Perhaps I don't know, maybe I'm

20 missing something.

21 Q. I'm not sure how the word "captured" got into the equation. Let

22 me show an exhibit in a moment, but it's our information sir that the

23 United Nations knew, as early as July 19, 1995, that at least 4.000 ABiH

24 men who were coming through this column made it to Tuzla and most of them

25 were soldiers, some of them were civilians. Do you remember seeing any of

Page 14306

1 that influx of men who were soldiers of the ABiH?

2 A. No. I was at Tuzla air base, and I don't recall hearing of this

3 or seeing it. I cannot recall that. At the time that I was at Tuzla air

4 base, nor do I remember hearing of it when I was returned to Sarajevo.

5 Q. Let me show you 2D17.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Thayer?

7 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I just ask my friend to disclose the

8 list of documents they intend to use on cross-examination. We haven't

9 received it yet.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic.

11 MR. OSTOJIC: All the documents are in e-court, and we didn't

12 anticipate using this document until we heard the testimony, and I don't

13 think there is any others -- that's not the right one, actually -- but I

14 can give him a hard copy with some of my notes on it if the Court is

15 willing and counsel to accept that, but I have it down as 2D17 which is

16 previously identified and marked as an exhibit; which is the report, if I

17 can just identify for the record, dated the 19th of July 1995 to Mr. Annan

18 at the United Nations New York from Akashi, UNPF-HQ, Zagreb with the

19 initials following.

20 The report we've seen previously with Mr. Ruez among other

21 witnesses, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Are you satisfied with that explanation, Mr. Thayer?

23 MR. THAYER: I am. If there is no list, there is no list.

24 MR. OSTOJIC: With the Court's indulgence and I apologise I do

25 have some --

Page 14307

1 JUDGE AGIUS: [Microphone not activated] We still don't have the

2 right document on the screen, Mr. Ostojic.

3 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes. And --

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

5 MR. THAYER: We may be able to assist. If we have the ERN, we may

6 be able to call it up I believe on Sanction or go through another document

7 already in e-court.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic.

9 MR. OSTOJIC: It has a number R 0082071. It's a two-page

10 document, the next page would obviously be 72.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Is it -- has it been given already a Defence 2D--

12 MR. OSTOJIC: I thought it did. That's why I gave it. On my

13 records I have it as 2D17 and that's obviously not accurate. Much to my

14 chagrin.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: If you could check that. Do you have your own copy

16 that you could put on the ELMO? I know that you said there are some

17 personal notes there.

18 MR. OSTOJIC: They are not -- they are just some calculations that

19 I made, but I can do -- yes of course.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Because I think that will speed up matters.

21 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm being assured by our staff that there is nothing

23 in the records with the number that you --

24 MR. OSTOJIC: I'll check that. My apologies to the Court and to

25 counsel. Thank you, Your Honour. I think it might be 2D03, because 3 was

Page 14308

1 the third document. Thank you for your assistance.

2 Q. All I'd like for us to do is if we can scroll down or move the

3 document, so we could see if it's on the ELMO to the latter portion of the

4 document. It's on e-court now, they said? So I could have mine maybe.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: I think you can -- [Microphone not activated]

6 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. I apologise, Mr. Joseph, I know your time is valuable and I'll try

8 to short circuit this. Now, if you look at that last paragraph on that

9 first page which is, I think, paragraph 4 directing your attention to the

10 third sentence there starting with the letters "ABiH." Do you see that?

11 A. Paragraph 4, third sentence, beginning ABiH.

12 Q. ABiH 2nd corps report, do you see that?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. They report what, a further 4.000 DP, which is displaced persons,

15 mostly soldiers including some civilians have entered the Tuzla area,

16 correct?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Okay. This is an UN report. Do you recognise it at all?

19 A. I don't. I didn't -- I don't recall ever seeing it.

20 Q. Do you know the parties who are either sending or receiving this

21 outgoing cable? Do you recognise them, I take it?

22 A. If you flip back to the top, it was Akashi as I recall sending

23 this to UN headquarters in New York.

24 Q. Now, is there any reason we should doubt that, that it was

25 reported to them at the United Nations or to some United Nations personnel

Page 14309

1 that there were 4.000 Muslim men who arrived, most soldiers, some

2 civilians, in the Tuzla area?

3 JUDGE AGIUS: I think he has already confirmed to you that he has

4 no knowledge of that. So how can you expect him to answer this question.


6 Q. How is it possible, Mr. Joseph, with all due respect that you

7 didn't notice 4.000 Muslim men on July 19th, 1995?

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

9 MR. THAYER: It's asked and answered, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: He simply didn't -- doesn't know about it. He never

11 knew about it then and he doesn't know about it now.


13 Q. Who, sir, was the person in charge from the United Nations

14 standpoint, UNPROFOR or others, to gather this type of information if it

15 wasn't the civil affairs officer, to determine how many men, how many

16 women may have arrived from Srebrenica?

17 A. It would have been -- with respect to military, you would have had

18 mainly UNPROFOR military, but it might well have been the civil affairs

19 officer there, Ken Biser, who was the guy, and I may well have been

20 already deployed to Sarajevo at the time this message occurred. But I

21 would add that I think one can state fairly that UNPROFOR was not

22 omniscient about the situation in Srebrenica.

23 Q. What About other information, and we're talking about the

24 Honourable Judge Prost's question, you may have had at that time. What

25 else would have been available to the UNPROFOR or the civil affairs

Page 14310

1 officer or officers, military, to obtain information of what was happening

2 to those men from Srebrenica on July 19th, 1995?

3 A. Sorry, what other sources?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. Of what was happening?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Presumably, if the -- up to the point that the Dutch were still

8 there, they -- and were observing, presumably, the Dutch, but I'm not

9 privy, I don't know when the Dutch actually pulled out so -- but

10 presumably that would be the source. There was no civil affairs presence,

11 there never was a civil affairs presence in Srebrenica.

12 Q. Are you aware, sir, that from time to time, there were some

13 conversation that were being purportedly being intercepted between various

14 parties? Do you know anything about that?

15 A. I don't and I wasn't privy to it.

16 Q. Do you know, sir if there were ever any aerial images that were

17 being taken of places by various governmental agencies in or around the

18 Srebrenica or Zepa area in July of 1995?

19 A. Later, I understood that the US had gotten -- had taken these

20 images which apparently showed mass graves, et cetera, but I wasn't aware

21 of that at the time.

22 Q. Okay. Now I want to discuss another topic with you, and this is

23 the topic of screening. You mentioned it a couple times. Are you

24 familiar, sir, with the term "triage"?

25 A. Yes.

Page 14311

1 Q. And is that the process for screening military-aged men, in

2 essence?

3 A. Triage, I'm familiar with the term in the concept of a dealing

4 with the -- a result of a disaster where you triage the people who can be

5 saved, those who are beyond saving, and then those who can be saved you

6 make some --

7 Q. A priority list?

8 A. Priority, right.

9 Q. You never heard that term from a military standpoint, is that what

10 you're telling me?

11 A. That's the context in which I've heard it.

12 Q. So you've never heard it in a military context, correct?

13 A. Not other than the context I've conveyed to you.

14 Q. You stated on page 45 yesterday in lines 21 through 27 that in

15 general terms, if you have a male of military age, you were perceived to

16 be military by the then-governing perceptions of things. Do you remember

17 basically that comment you made?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. And who had that perception, sir? All the parties?

20 A. I think that that was -- that was just the generalised perception.

21 If you were military age, a male of military age, was sort of -- would be

22 perceived to be military.

23 Q. If you capture a POW or an enemy combatant and you want to screen

24 him or triage him, to set a priority to see if he has more or less

25 information, how would you go about doing that?

Page 14312

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

2 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I think this is far beyond the scope

3 of any direct or cross-examination that's been undertaken so far.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: What do you have to say to that, Mr. Ostojic?

5 MR. OSTOJIC: I know Mr. Joseph actually is a fact witness, but he

6 raised the issue of screening, and I'm just trying to follow if he has any

7 other knowledge about that. And if he simply doesn't, I can move on. I

8 just don't want any comments that he made in connection with screening to

9 be utilised because he wasn't involved necessarily in that process if it

10 involved prisoners of war and enemy combatants. So I could live with that

11 if that's what Mr. Thayer --

12 JUDGE AGIUS: But there is agreement that he was not involved in

13 that process, what's the point of proceeding further with your question?

14 MR. OSTOJIC: I thank you for the agreement, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Don't qualify my statements. I'm just putting it to

16 you, if there is agreement, I don't think it can be disputed that he

17 himself was not involved in the screening process, what's the point of

18 putting the question.

19 MR. OSTOJIC: Just because he mentioned it several times Your

20 Honour in his two and a half days of testimony, but I'll move on if the

21 court wishes again.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.


24 Q. Sir directing your attention to your involvement directly in Zepa,

25 can you tell us sir the extent of the involvement that the Bosnian Muslim

Page 14313

1 government in Sarajevo had with respect to both the surrender and

2 evacuation of that enclave?

3 A. I think, especially as I see the record, it shows that they were

4 heavily involved.

5 Q. Is it fair to say that the local Bosnian Muslim leadership in

6 Zepa, when I say local, were not willing to fight on and had been trying

7 to negotiate a surrender or an evacuation for several days but couldn't do

8 so because of the pressure that was put to them by the Bosnian Muslims in

9 Sarajevo?

10 A. I honestly can't speak to that one way or the other. I'm not

11 trying to suggest that it wasn't the case. I just simply cannot really

12 speak to that. I don't know that I really can shed any light on that.

13 Q. You were there. You don't remember that? You negotiated with

14 Minister Muratovic. You don't remember that at all, Mr. Joseph?

15 A. I was with Muratovic in Sarajevo prior to returning.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Stop, stop.

17 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, the question was asked and answered and

18 now the questions are getting argumentative.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Agreed. One moment.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Move to your next question because in

22 any case, the witness has answered your question.

23 MR. OSTOJIC: I'd like to show the witness to follow up on that

24 question 6D29, if I may.

25 Q. It's a sit report memorandum dated 26th of July 1995. It's the

Page 14314

1 same one we just looked at, Mr. Joseph, moments ago, with respect to

2 Lieutenant Colonel Baxter. If I can kindly ask that the second page be

3 shown again. Now instead of looking at the second paragraph let's read

4 the first paragraph where Mr. Baxter is informing Mr. Harland as what his

5 feelings were based on his assessment of the situation in Zepa, the same

6 situation that you were involved in for several days negotiating with

7 various parties. Do you see what Mr. Baxter feelings were at that time?

8 A. The assessment at the bottom?

9 Q. No, the first paragraph on the top.

10 A. Oh, yes. Right. That's certainly his assessment and his feeling

11 as is reported there.

12 Q. Okay. Well, is it true, sir, that when you first started

13 negotiating with Minister Muratovic that he actually, during your meeting

14 with him in discussing the Zepa crisis, that he said that there should be

15 an arrangement made to allow for a limited evacuation of those people; the

16 Bosnians would like to withdraw? Do you remember that at all? This would

17 have been on or about July 23rd, 1995?

18 A. My memory of that meeting is really limited to what I see in the

19 record, and it sounds certainly plausible to me and could be the case.

20 I'd have to, you know, look back. I don't have a vivid recollection of

21 that meeting, and I'm trying to work with you here.

22 Q. I appreciate that and I'm just going to direct your attention to

23 5D416 because we haven't discussed it, but it's a document that has been

24 used previously. And as it comes up I'm just going to directs your

25 attention to the first paragraph where it identifies yourself and

Page 14315

1 Mr. Harland as being in a meeting with Minister Muratovic and then the

2 three points that the minister asked you or asked -- yeah, you to convey

3 to the Serbs. It's on the second page, please. If you could just scroll

4 down a little bit for Mr. Joseph and us, and I think it's the second --

5 it's in the middle of the paragraph, the second point, I guess, ii, do you

6 see that?

7 A. Right, right.

8 Q. "There should be an arrangement made to allow for a limited

9 evacuation of those people the Bosnians would like to withdraw?"

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Who are those people that they were referencing during that

12 meeting on or about July 23rd, 1995?

13 A. Honest, genuinely I don't know, I honestly don't know. That's all

14 I can tell you.

15 Q. Okay. Maybe I'll try to refresh your recollection. Do you think

16 Minister Muratovic was trying to evacuate certain civilians or was he more

17 concerned in your view, since you met him, that he was trying to evacuate

18 certain military soldiers that he had in the area?

19 A. It might well have been that he was trying to evacuate civilians,

20 it's possible and to leave the military there. It's quite possible that

21 that was what he had on his mind.

22 Q. But you don't remember as you sit here, correct?

23 A. Honestly, I do not.

24 Q. Do you know that five days later on the 28th of July, 1995, the

25 same sit report, same type of sit report, and I don't have the number but

Page 14316

1 it's R0123906 is the cover page, and on that sit report, sir, it's again

2 from David Harland to John Ryan copying various people, on July 28th 1995

3 is the date. The subject is "Negotiations on Zepa [11]." On that it

4 talks about the various meetings that you may have attended, et cetera, in

5 the second to the last paragraph, I'll read it for the sake -- I could put

6 it on the screen. If the Court allows.


8 MR. OSTOJIC: On the ELMO, if you would prefer it, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: I think it would be more practical at this point in

10 time.

11 MR. OSTOJIC: I apologise.

12 Q. My learned friend I'm just going to direct him to that last page

13 and the Court, but if the Court would like to look at the front first

14 pages to show that the date is actually the 28th, I'd be happy to show it,

15 or if Mr. Joseph would like to see it he's welcome to do so?

16 A. What are we looking at.

17 Q. If would you like to look at the front page to see the date?

18 A. Sure, sure.

19 Q. If we can just scroll down, there we go, we're perfect there. I

20 have it a little highlighted there, and I look at the second to the last

21 paragraph which starts, "At about 12 noon." Do you see that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You can read it to yourself and we can all read it. At that

24 point, sir, July 28th, the civilians were evacuated, correct?

25 A. That is correct.

Page 14317

1 Q. And it seems at least at that point that with the involvement of

2 the civil affairs office, yourself and Mr. Harland, that the minister was

3 still holding out for a surrender. Was he not?

4 A. You really have to talk to David Harland about this. Because he

5 was in Sarajevo all through these memoranda, and he was dealing with

6 this. And we were getting just dribs and drabs in Zepa, and I had only

7 that one meeting with Muratovic prior to going back. So we were there

8 dealing with Tolimir and company and Palic, et cetera, and --

9 Q. And that's fair sir, and thank you for that, and we will try to

10 get to Mr. Harland to explain some of this for us. Now, am I correct if I

11 wanted to summarise kind of your involvement, at least in Zepa with all

12 due respect, that the evacuation lasted probably three days or a little

13 over? Would that be right?

14 A. I don't know really whether it was two or three days. I don't --

15 we would have to refer to these memoranda to determine. It might have

16 been two days.

17 Q. And the atmosphere was very tense during the whole time, correct?

18 A. The atmosphere was very stressful, very stressful. That I can

19 tell you. And as I explained, there was spontaneous semi-riot that

20 ensued. There were other examples of nerves being on edge and tension.

21 Q. And you, your team, managed to get all those people who had come

22 to the centre and were willing to go boarding the vehicles, correct?

23 A. That is correct. Those who came were there. We boarded, and got

24 them out. Whether they made it to their destination or not, I don't know.

25 Q. But I'm using the word specifically, sir, "willing to go." You

Page 14318

1 agree with me on that, do you not?

2 A. As I tried to say, most respectfully, the question of volition to

3 me was rather overtaken by the military situation there, and one -- you'd

4 have to have an argument and a discussion and debate, and I'm not sure the

5 Court would want, about the meaning of "willing" is. If someone feels

6 that if they stay at their home, they will be killed. Is that -- and then

7 you come in and say, "get on the buses," is that willing or is that not

8 willing. I mean, don't know if we need to take the time to debate that.

9 [Speakers overlapping]

10 JUDGE AGIUS: I think this issue was thoroughly dealt with,

11 particularly during the cross-examination of Madam Fauveau. So I suggest

12 that if there is anything extra or different that you would like to ask

13 the witness, please by all means do so by all means, but otherwise don't

14 put questions which more or less or not more or less, which the witness

15 has already clearly given his position on.

16 MR. OSTOJIC: Mr. President I was just leading up to my point

17 actually.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: [Speakers overlapping]

19 MR. OSTOJIC: -- on the same page, but it's actually I wanted to

20 ask him a couple of other follow-up questions.

21 Q. Sir, in preparation for your testimony, if I may -- in preparation

22 for your testimony, were you able to review your witness statement and

23 information report?

24 A. Yes, if it's the one I think you're referring to, I had that

25 opportunity, yes.

Page 14319

1 Q. There were two reports, one a witness statement which you gave on

2 the 11th of April 2003 to the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, correct?

3 A. That would be correct. I don't have that in front of me but --

4 and I don't have a photographic memory so -- but, yes, I had an

5 opportunity to review these statements, yes, sir, that's correct.

6 Q. And the information report was done, as you even earlier said,

7 telephonically by an attorney, trial attorney, Salvador Viada, and an

8 investigator, Olli Salo, on or about -- sorry, February 9th, 2005?

9 A. One report was done telephone, another report was done in person

10 and another -- the one -- with Olli Salo, I believe, that was the one by

11 telephone.

12 Q. And that's the one we looked. Can we have 4D111 up on the screen

13 please, again?


15 Q. If I can have the third page of that document? Which bears the

16 last three ERN numbers 305 on it.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, your attention is being drawn by the

18 interpreters that they are finding difficulties in catching up with both

19 of you.

20 MR. OSTOJIC: I do sincerely apologise. I'm trying to go slow and

21 try to keep within the time limits given that the break is approaching but

22 I do apologise, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE KWON: This is not the first time, Mr. Ostojic. It's not

24 the tone of your speech.

25 MR. OSTOJIC: I understand fully.

Page 14320

1 JUDGE AGIUS: As I was told when I was a little boy that the way

2 to have -- the way to heaven is covered with good intentions. So let's

3 try to make the interpreters' life a little bit less difficult. It

4 already is, Mr. Ostojic, believe me.

5 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Q. Sir, I'm directing your attention to the interview that you gave

7 telephonically to the Office of the Prosecutor, specifically paragraph 17

8 of that interview. Do you see that, where you, sir, discuss with them how

9 long the evacuation lasted?

10 A. Yes, I do sow that.

11 Q. Basically all I did was read that?

12 JUDGE AGIUS: It applies to you as well, Mr. Joseph.

13 THE WITNESS: My apologies.

14 MR. OSTOJIC: May I proceed, Your Honour?



17 Q. Mr. Joseph I'm almost done, and I apologise if I've interrupted

18 you. I'm directing your attention to paragraph 17 of this Exhibit 4 D111.

19 And there, apparently the investigator, the trial attorney and the

20 investigator who interviewed you telephonically, they wrote down or

21 recorded, as they say on the first page, what your comments were as you

22 remembered them in 2005, and you clearly used the word "willing," correct?

23 A. That is correct. You can see the word "willing" on that report.

24 And may well have used it.

25 Q. And no where, at least in this paragraph or this report, did you

Page 14321

1 discuss the issue of duress or fear of the civilians that you were

2 evacuating; is that correct?

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.

4 MR. THAYER: Your Honour with that question I would request that

5 the witness be provided an opportunity to review the rest of the report.

6 I think that would be only fair before he answers that question.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic?

8 MR. OSTOJIC: Mr. President, this witness has already stated that

9 he's reviewed the report in preparation for his testimony earlier this

10 week and possibly before. But it's not a question of finding it. It's

11 clearly not in that paragraph. I don't know what the objection is other

12 than that it might be to coach the witness into not answering the

13 question, but I find it inappropriate unless there is a legal basis to

14 make an objection to a question. The witness is sophisticated enough, as

15 we've seen, and intelligent enough, as we've seen, that he doesn't need

16 Mr. Thayer to tell him that he might need the report in order to quantify

17 or qualify his answer.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: My experience tells me that this debate should not

19 be continued in the presence of the witness if it is to be continued in

20 the first place. Yes, Mr. Thayer.

21 MR. THAYER: Your Honour --

22 JUDGE AGIUS: If the witness wishes to -- have the opportunity to

23 look at the document, then of course he's -- he is old enough and

24 experienced enough to ask, and such -- and then we'll decide, but I don't

25 think at this point we should discuss this any further. Mr. Joseph?

Page 14322


2 Q. Would you like me to restate the question, Your Honour?

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please.

4 MR. OSTOJIC: Maybe I'll try to avoid so that it doesn't draw

5 another helpful objection.

6 Q. Mr. Joseph, do you remember whether you talked to the investigator

7 and the trial attorney in 2005, that you told them anything about this

8 fear and duress that you spoke about in your testimony here in open court

9 regarding the civilians in Zepa in July of 1995?

10 A. Sitting here today, I can't recall without looking at the whole

11 report there what all I said about duress. I can tell you that even the

12 very paragraph that you are referring to states that the atmosphere was

13 very tense. If you would like me to elaborate as to the source of that

14 tension, I'm happy to do so. It is from the fact that the Serbs had taken

15 the pocket. That was the source of the tension, the very tension that is

16 mentioned in this paragraph, and there may be other references elsewhere

17 in the document there. I genuinely believe that I've addressed this

18 trying honestly to work with you in my testimony and nothing will convince

19 me that there was not great, great fear on the part of those departing,

20 nothing will convince me of that.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't want to interrupt you much, Mr. Ostojic, but

22 I don't know if you wish really to proceed with this line of questions,

23 especially considering what is contained in the last sentence of the next

24 paragraph in the same document. "However, the civilian in Zepa seem to

25 have some information of the events in Srebrenica. And this was a factor

Page 14323

1 which made them be even more concerned of their safety."

2 Yes, Mr. Thayer?

3 MR. THAYER: And with all due respect to my learned friend, Your

4 Honour, he referred specifically to the report. We can look right at this

5 page, as Your Honour has done, and look at paragraph 13. We can just

6 settle the issue right now, right here, while the document is in e-court

7 and avoid wasting further time on redirect examination.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know if you wish to pursue this line of

9 questions, but I think the perspective of the use of the word "willing to

10 go," words "willing to go" in this section, if you isolate them from the

11 rest of the context of the same document and of his testimony, where does

12 it get you?

13 MR. OSTOJIC: Your Honour I'm not debating with the witness. I

14 just wanted him to clarify that those were his words that he used in his

15 statement, and I think I'm beyond that.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: He's confirmed that.

17 MR. OSTOJIC: Whatever the Court wishes, I will do.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: He has confirmed that.

19 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.

20 Q. Sir, I'd like to just -- another topic just quickly and that's on

21 the involvement of the Bosnian military in the attack that they may have

22 had on the UNPROFOR units in Zepa. Were you familiar before your

23 assignment the extent of their threats or actual attack on those various

24 observation posts or buildings?

25 A. As I believe I testified, we were aware that there were these

Page 14324

1 allegations. I may have even been aware of some of the reports about

2 this. I don't know that I had confirmation of any of this. And I don't

3 recall, and I'm stressing recollection here, I don't recall that aspect

4 being impressed upon me by the Ukrainians when we arrived. I concede that

5 events that I was not witness to might have transpired. I simply can't

6 testify to them.

7 Q. I'm talking about only the events that and the facts that you

8 know, so you didn't know that the UNPROFOR observation posts were overrun

9 on July 19th, 1995, for example?

10 A. Overrun by whom?

11 Q. The Bosnian government forces.

12 A. No.

13 Q. Did you know, sir, that the UNPROFOR observation posts were

14 disarmed, a number of them, in fact, by the Bosnian government forces?

15 A. No. As I've tried to testify, what we observed with my own eyes,

16 which is most -- hopefully most relevant to this Court, these proceedings,

17 is that I saw when I came, I believe it was the 20th, that the

18 Observation Post 2 had been overrun by the Serb army. That's the part

19 that I can testify to. I simply can't testify to the other part, and this

20 witness is not stating that it did or didn't happen. This witness simply

21 can't testify to it.

22 Q. Let me show you this exhibit again with the Court's assistance

23 because it doesn't have an exhibit number, but it's a situation report

24 dated the 19th of July 1995, and I promise you it's the last exhibit, and

25 with ERN or bait stamp number R 0123425, it's a memorandum from Mr. David

Page 14325

1 Harland to John Ryan with I believe Mr. Edward Joseph's name, I believe

2 right under Mr. Harland's. Sir I'm directing your attention while you're

3 looking at that to the very last paragraph of that first page where I was

4 actually reading from?

5 JUDGE AGIUS: What page?

6 MR. OSTOJIC: Page 1.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Usher, page 1.

8 THE WITNESS: Right. I think I stated that we were aware of these

9 threats and allegations, and I believe I stated yesterday that or the day

10 before, I've lost track now, of -- that Silajdzic had denied it and I make

11 no judgement as to Silajdzic veracity or whether or not he was telling the

12 truth. I make no judgement whatsoever. So I don't know what more -- how

13 I can say to you about this. Yes, we were aware of these allegations.

14 Whether in fact what happened, whether these observation posts were in

15 fact overrun, whether there had been heavy machine-gun fire that had been

16 mentioned in another, I don't -- I was not witness to any of that. I

17 don't recall the Ukrainians talking to us about any of that. I also don't

18 recall any hostility showed by the Ukrainians towards Palic in the entire

19 time that I was there and that he was in the compound and had he been

20 directing heavy machine-gun fire at them, and had one might have expected

21 that. I'm -- that is something I can tell you I didn't observe and I was

22 in a position to observe that, and I observed no apparent hostility

23 manifested towards Palic from the Ukrainians. Whether that's conclusive

24 or not, I don't know. I can only tell you what I observed.


Page 14326

1 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Joseph, I'm not asking you about the

2 incidents which you just described which was after your return to Zepa

3 during the negotiations of both the surrender and the evacuation. I'm

4 asking you on the first day that you got there, on the 19th of July 1995,

5 or the 20th, as you sometimes thought that it was, on those early days, we

6 are not talking about Silajdzic now and those negotiations where threats

7 were allegedly made. We are talking about your document from -- with your

8 name on it, with the senior civil affairs officer's name on it, describing

9 exactly what happened. Nowhere in that third paragraph does it, sir, say,

10 "someone has alleged that they've overrun the observation posts." Do

11 they?

12 A. I'm sorry, I've lost the thread of your question. I'm sorry, sir.

13 Q. You're mixing the issues that we've discussed yesterday and today

14 with you with respect to Silajdzic. This has nothing no do with the

15 threat that may or may not have been made on or about July 23 or 25, 1995.

16 This is actually a report, your initial report, setting forth precisely

17 that which you and your senior civil affairs officers understood the

18 situation to be in Zepa on the 19th of July 1995. Correct?

19 A. Correct. I think I've already stated so, that, yes, this reflects

20 that we understood there were these threats, yes, correct. Their full

21 extent, I can't attest to simply because I'm not in -- I thought that was

22 the reason for this further questioning. I'm sorry, I thought you were

23 trying to get me to provide, shed some more light or something on this.

24 That would --

25 Q. I'd like you to shed more light, but how many observation posts

Page 14327

1 did the Bosnian government forces overrun? Do you remember?

2 A. I don't know that they overran any or all. I don't know. I'll

3 say that again. I don't know that they overran any or that they overran

4 all of them.

5 Q. And you don't know how many they disarmed, if any, correct?

6 A. I don't know that they disarmed any or that they disarmed all.

7 Q. And who would know that? Mr. Harland, do you think?

8 A. Mr. Harland might know that. Someone in the military chain would

9 better know that, and I would best direct you, if I can say so

10 respectfully, if you're having General Smith, I can think of no better

11 source than General Smith, or perhaps one of the Ukrainian officers who

12 were present on the scene.

13 Q. And one final question, sir. Where would the civil affairs

14 officers obtain such information? Would that have been from General

15 Smith?

16 A. It could have -- waiting. It could have been anywhere in the

17 military chain. It didn't necessarily have to be General Smith. It could

18 have been from some operations officer, it could have been anywhere in the

19 chain.

20 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Joseph. It was my pleasure.

21 A. You're welcome. Thank you, sir.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Ostojic. Mr. Zivanovic, but I

23 think it's time for the break.

24 You still require 20 minutes?

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, Your Honour.

Page 14328

1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So we'll have a 25-minute break now, and

2 I think you need to regulate yourselves. We'll have 20 minutes for sure

3 after the break, plus if there is going to be re-examination, you would

4 know how long that's going to take. I still have to inquire whether we

5 have questions from here but I doubt it. So make your own assessment,

6 please.

7 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 1.06 p.m.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

10 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I just wanted to advise the Court that

11 Mr. McCloskey had to attend to an urgent case-related matter. If he

12 resolves it, he will rejoin us but he had to tear himself away from the

13 Court.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. And will you be raising the issue

15 that we were informed that you would like to raise a matter, and we told

16 you let's leave it until after -- you will do that.

17 MR. THAYER: Two very brief matters, Mr. President.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Mr. Zivanovic.

19 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic:

20 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Joseph.

21 A. Good afternoon.

22 Q. I'm going to focus all of my questions on the time that you spent

23 at the air base in Tuzla. This was sometime in mid-July 1995. The day

24 before yesterday, on direct, you mentioned a female who was clutching on

25 to the barbed wire fence, and you also told us that you had spoken to her.

Page 14329

1 Do you remember that?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. She told you that she was expecting the arrival of men from

4 Srebrenica, that she had heard that they were around there, and that she

5 was hoping to maybe find her husband or her son among them?

6 A. She had heard a rumour that the men were encamped there on

7 adjacent -- on an adjacent part of the Tuzla air base, which was not true

8 of course.

9 Q. Does this mean that at the time the men from Srebrenica had not

10 arrived there at all?

11 A. Not at the air base. That is for sure.

12 Q. Could you please tell me whether you asked her if she was so eager

13 to see that, why she didn't leave through a gate, why she didn't leave by

14 a normal way to check whether the relatives that she was looking for had

15 indeed arrived?

16 A. Number 1, we were aware of no men. I certainly was not aware of

17 any men who had arrived there, number 1. So I was not aware to suggest

18 any other access point for her to theoretically be relocated with her

19 loved ones, so that's -- that's why I would not have had any useful

20 suggestion for her -- for her.

21 Q. I did not mean that you were to give her any suggestions as to

22 what to do, but why didn't you ask her why she was climbing on to the

23 wire -- barbed wire fence, why she didn't opt to leave through the gate?

24 A. She had heard -- as far as I can remember, she was at one point in

25 the camp where she had heard the men are just on this other side, and

Page 14330

1 there was no gate at that point. There was this barbed wire fence, as far

2 as I can recall, and she was standing there attempting tentatively to try

3 to scale and then step back and scale, and to do her best to try to get

4 over it when I approached her and then that conversation took place, as I

5 recall.

6 Q. Do you remember whether, in front of the base, at the time, there

7 were any displaced persons hanging around, not in the base, within the

8 perimeter, but outside the perimeter of the base?

9 A. No, I don't recall that. We were flooded with displaced persons.

10 I think this memorandum, the -- one of them, I think the one from Akashi

11 used the figure of 25.000. So we had 25.000 displaced persons coming to

12 this location within two days. Is it possible that some of them were

13 placed outside the gate? I suppose it's possible. And I know we were

14 overwhelmed, so indeed it's quite possible that some were outside the

15 gate. I don't recall any male displaced persons at that time. I only

16 recall female displaced persons, aside from perhaps some children.

17 Q. I'm going to show you an exhibit, which is 1D373. Could you

18 please look at the document, because I am going to put some questions to

19 you based on that document.

20 Kindly look at the document, the date is 14th July 1995. Could

21 you please look at the item 1(D) of this document?

22 A. Sir, I'm looking at it.

23 Q. Could you please tell me whether it is indicated here that on that

24 date, in front of the base, there were 9.000 people, some of whom tried to

25 break into the base but the base could not accommodate them. And if they

Page 14331

1 entered the base on their own, they might stray across minefields on the

2 base?

3 A. Are you asking me to confirm that this is what this documents

4 says?

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. We can all read it. That's what it says.

7 Q. Thank you. I am asking you whether this might have been the

8 reason for which this woman could not leave the base via a gate, but,

9 rather, opted to climb over the fence.

10 A. All I can tell you is how I remember the events, sir. All I can

11 tell you is how I remember the event. Whether there was a connection --

12 I'm in fact glad that you put this here because it shows just how bad I

13 used the term overwhelmed and that's reflected here in the document, and

14 that's where our attentions were, and I'm telling you this is how I

15 remember this event. I remember it distinctly, and whether it was because

16 these people were grouped outside or for some other reason she for some

17 reason had heard that the men were there, that's how I recall the event.

18 Q. Thank you. During your tour of duty in Tuzla, which lasted for

19 about a week, did you learn about the arrival of the men from Srebrenica?

20 Did you receive any such information?

21 A. Now I tell you I really don't recall hearing about that. Is it

22 possible that there was some mention of some -- I -- my best recollection

23 is I -- I don't remember. I remember that being a question mark. I

24 remember that being a question mark. If that doesn't accord with what

25 actually happened, I can't say, I'm only giving you my recollection that

Page 14332

1 that was the fate of the men was a question mark. That was as I recall

2 it.

3 Q. Did you collect any data about that from others?

4 A. About the fate of the men or?

5 Q. About the people arriving from Srebrenica, how many arrived from

6 Srebrenica, whether they indeed arrived, when if they did, had anybody

7 been killed on the way there, what their fate was, or similar information?

8 A. That would have been natural, very natural, for UNPROFOR and the

9 UNHCR, to collect all of that data, and it's possible I was even privy to

10 some of it. I'm telling you here, August, 2007, I don't recall terribly

11 much about that, and there -- perhaps we were made aware of maybe some who

12 had arrived or something like that but in my -- my general recollection is

13 that the fate of the men, at least the vast majority, was a giant question

14 mark. That's my recollection today.

15 Q. Could you also tell me, please, whether displaced persons who

16 arrived in Tuzla, were ever registered? Do you remember that?

17 A. That would have been the role of UNHCR. That would have been

18 exactly their mandate. And that was not our mandate but that was their

19 role, and I presumably these people were registered. I would presume that

20 they would do that. We were -- we were there at the air base dealing with

21 this situation that Akashi is saying is bad and rapidly growing worse.

22 That was our primary focus, and working with everyone, throwing ourselves

23 into it, to try to best address that immediate situation. That was our --

24 that was our focus.

25 Q. Did you come by the information that a certain number of people

Page 14333

1 who were not accommodated at the air base were accommodated at the

2 so-called collection centres? Did you come by that information? And did

3 you ever learn the number of the people who might have been accommodated

4 in that way?

5 A. Not that I recall now. I don't remember that. It's possible --

6 let's -- it's possible that UNHCR was taking some of the people to

7 collective centres. We were dealing with this displaced persons influx

8 crisis at the air base, so I was not aware of this other information. I'm

9 sure UNHCR has good records on that.

10 Q. I'm going to ask you to look at another report. This is 1D374.

11 The date is July the 17th, as you may well see. If I'm not mistaken, your

12 name can be found here as the drafter of the document. Could you please

13 explain whether this means that you were the one who drafted or prepared

14 this report?

15 A. [Interpretation] As they say it in French, "bien joue." [In

16 English] Yes, indeed it appears that I was the drafter of this.

17 Q. Could you please try and tell us whether on that same page, under

18 the title, "Main points," if you look at the first sentence, the first

19 bullet point?

20 JUDGE KWON: If -- Mr. Joseph, if you could put it on the ELMO.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I have a second copy to put.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes, I know that --

24 JUDGE KWON: It's very strange. Your number is not correct.

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: My number is correct but it is not in the e-court.

Page 14334

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Any way, let's speed this up. It's on the ELMO now.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. The first sentence reads, "Men who fled Srebrenica arrive in Tuzla

4 area after week-long ordeal." This is the information that you had at the

5 time. Can you now turn to page 2 of the same report? Does it say here

6 that interviews were carried out with a certain number of persons who had

7 all described the events that they had been through in a similar way, and

8 does it say in the report that some 12.000 to 15.000 of them left

9 Srebrenica between the 10th and 11th of July, that some 5.000 or 6.000 of

10 them crossed over to the territory under the control of the 2nd Corps

11 south of Sapna, and that this happened the night before, and that some

12 3.000 or up to 3.000 people had been killed on the road mostly by land

13 mines and in fighting the Republika Srpska army troops, that an unknown

14 number were captured, that some committed suicide, and that an unknown

15 number of them left for Zepa? Is this the information that you were privy

16 to at the time, the information that you had been given?

17 A. If I drafted that, yes, I would have been privy to that.

18 Q. Thank you. And one more thing. Could you please look at the

19 following page? The subtitle reads, "Collective centres." It says here

20 that there are approximately 17.000 persons housed in collective centres,

21 among eight different communities in the Tuzla-Drina canton. The exact

22 number of people are given as a breakdown of these collective centres.

23 Can you tell me whether this is the information that you had at the time,

24 that you had been given by the authorised personnel who made the lists of

25 those displaced persons?

Page 14335

1 A. Presumably, yes. It doesn't say the source, but I'm sure we had a

2 qualified source and that's why I put it in the memo that apparently I

3 drafted.

4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] That is all. Thank you very much.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Zivanovic. Is there

6 re-examination, Mr. Thayer?

7 MR. THAYER: There is, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead. How long will it take?

9 MR. THAYER: I will do my very best. I understand the path to

10 heaven is paved with good intentions, but I will do my very best to

11 complete the redirect in time today. I have cut my examination in half.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: I wouldn't like to see Mr. Joseph stay here the

13 weekend.

14 MR. THAYER: Nor would I, Mr. President. With Madam Usher's

15 assistance, if we could just put up one document very quickly. And in

16 fact we will have to put up a couple of documents so -- this is -- we've

17 seen this page already. It is the third page of the witness's information

18 report from 2005. 4D111.

19 Re-examination by Mr. Thayer:

20 Q. You were asked where in paragraph 17 of this report did you

21 discuss the issues of duress or fear of the civilians that you were

22 evacuating. I just want to give you an opportunity to look at that page

23 of the report. I turn your attention first to paragraph 11. "Next

24 morning I saw big number of local women, children and some very old men

25 sitting and waiting in the town square. This is a vivid memory for me, as

Page 14336

1 I remember these people being very much afraid and tense, it very much

2 reminded me of the situations with the evacuees from Srebrenica," is that

3 accurate, sir?

4 A. Yes, it is.

5 Q. Paragraph 13, "I knew we could not happy any parties with their

6 ethnic cleansing and therefore I approached the civilians and asked if

7 they wanted to leave Zepa. Several of them replied that they would like

8 to stay where their homes are and but there was no one to protect them and

9 therefore they feel their lives being threatened. I could sense the

10 atmosphere being very nervous, especially when they saw a VRS jeep parking

11 nearby and some VRS soldiers stepping out, the clear message these

12 civilians gave to was that they were terrified if they were left alone

13 with the VRS;" is that correct, sir? Is that what you told the

14 investigators over the phone?

15 A. Yes, particularly the last part I think some licence might have

16 been taken with the English and the phrasing, especially in the first

17 sentence there, but that -- the gist is absolutely correct, and I think

18 I've so testified.

19 Q. Now, sir, I want to turn your attention to the draft

20 militarisation agreement, and again I'm afraid we are going to need -- it

21 will I think just be faster if we put it up on the ELMO. Just page 1.

22 You've been shown this by several of my friends. I just note that if you

23 turn your attention to the first two paragraphs, the -- where it says, "if

24 you can see it, Bosnian Serb forces continue to bombard the safe area of

25 Zepa and its civilian population with heavy weapons and continue to make

Page 14337

1 armed incursions into the safe area." Do you see that, sir?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. Second paragraph, "Bosnian Serb forces have also subjected

4 UNPROFOR troops to attacks with small arms and heavy weapons. They have

5 further threatened to intensify these attacks, especially against the

6 peacekeepers in an observation post which is surrounded by Serb mines if

7 NATO launches air attacks." Now, you are the author of this draft

8 agreement; is that correct?

9 A. Co-author, that is correct.

10 Q. Do you recall the source or sources of this information?

11 A. It would have been the same with respect to allegations about what

12 the army was doing. It would have been from UNPROFOR military, probably,

13 that's where we would have gotten the information.

14 Q. Sit-reps or civ-reps?

15 A. In conversations with operations officers and UNPROFOR military.

16 Q. Okay. I'd like to show you another document. And for the record,

17 it is 03279250 through 9252. This has been previously disclosed to the

18 Defence. If we could Madam Usher just turn to the second page first?

19 This is a memo dated 15 July, it's a Sector Sarajevo weekly situation

20 report. The heading is, "Serb assault on Zepa begins, UNPROFOR forces

21 under attack by the Serbs are powerless." You see that, sir?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Do you see the second paragraph where it says "the Ukrainians

24 remained in position and shortly after 1500 the Serbs began to bombard

25 them and the Bosnian forces around the perimeter of the enclave?"

Page 14338

1 A. Yes, I see that.

2 Q. Okay. Now, if we could turn to the next page, do you see the top

3 where it says, UNPROFOR's position in the pocket has also been difficult.

4 The 79 Ukrainians in the pocket have been under Serb bombardment since 27

5 June with the tempo increasing this week? Early in the week, the Serbs

6 tried to force the Ukrainians out of OP 9 at the southern end of the

7 pocket. Later in the week OPs 1, 2 and 3 at the south western end of the

8 pocket were also attacked. You see that?

9 A. Yes, yes, sir.

10 Q. And the next paragraph, "The attacks came after an ultimatum from

11 the Serbs delivered on 30 June that UNPROFOR should withdraw from the

12 pocket immediately."

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but before you answer that question,

14 Madam Fauveau?

15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I know that the

16 Prosecutor is in a hurry, but I really do not see the point of reading out

17 this document. Could the witness say whether he remembers anything of the

18 events of the last days in Zepa? I -- the date of 27 June has been

19 mentioned here and the 15th of July too. Does -- is the witness in any

20 way involved and does he have any knowledge of the documents mentioned?

21 MR. THAYER: Mr. President I have one question that I'm about to

22 put to the witness that I hope will wrap all that up.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's hear it, then.


25 Q. Do you recall receiving any of this information at or about the

Page 14339

1 time this report was written, sir? Do you recall?

2 A. At this point, I can't recall that. That is a factor of memory

3 after 12 years. I simply don't recall it and have the same caution that I

4 mentioned with respect to memory of events concerning allegations about

5 the Armija. I just don't have the recollection now.

6 Q. Okay. I want to show you another document?

7 JUDGE KWON: If you could give us the 65 ter numbers, if you refer

8 to documents, for record.

9 MR. THAYER: Yes. And Judge Kwon, these particular reports do not

10 have 65 ter numbers. These are documents that we are just using in

11 response to some issues that have been raised on cross-examination. But

12 they've all been disclosed long, long ago, in some cases referred to in

13 particular in the witness statements or in the information reports or in

14 the proofing notes.

15 Q. Sir, I'm showing you a document which has been marked ET -- I'm

16 sorry, 04258574. It is a one-page or English translation is a two-page

17 translation of a combat report. If we go to the second page, it's signed

18 by Rajko Kusic. Is that the same Kusic, sir, that you recall meeting?

19 A. Rajko Kusic, that's correct.

20 Q. And it's dated 15 July at 1 in the morning. I just want to turn

21 your attention back to the first page, sir. Under the heading UNPROFOR,

22 where it says "Check-point number 2 Boksanica, where the UNPROFOR

23 commander has been located, has been put under the control of our forces.

24 An agreement was reached with him not to attack with the condition that

25 they should not open fire on our battle formation which he accepted with

Page 14340

1 the request to leave his positions where they are, and he would in return

2 provide information on enemy activity and would not call in NATO air

3 force."

4 Now first of all, sir, that first sentence referring to OP 2

5 being under Serb control, is that consistent with your observations on the

6 ground at the time that you were there?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Second, with respect to the information of the Ukrainian commander

9 agreeing to provide information of enemy activity and not to call in NATO

10 air force, have you ever received that information before, sir?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Does that information surprise you, sir?

13 A. We -- I take judgement from the Honourable Judges here. This

14 would -- do you want me to share my impressions, definitive knowledge?

15 What is appropriate for this witness to share with the Court?

16 JUDGE AGIUS: The question is a simple one.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we can move on, Mr. Thayer.


20 Q. Do you recall the video clip Mr. Josse showed you yesterday with

21 an ICRC jeep and what appeared to be French APCs? I think that you

22 identified that that location looked to you like it was OP 2. Do you

23 remember that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. And my friend, I think tentatively assumed that the date was 27

Page 14341

1 July. My question to you is would vehicles waiting to enter into the town

2 of Zepa have to pass through OP 2 first?

3 A. That was -- my understanding was that that was the entry point

4 through to the -- I don't believe that there was another access point.

5 Q. So is it possible that this footage was taken on the 26th or even

6 on the 25th?

7 A. Right. I couldn't be certain as to the date that that footage was

8 taken and that those vehicles were there.

9 Q. And sir you were also shown a document in which Colonel Baxter

10 said that many houses were burning, apparently torched by departing

11 Bosnians, and were you asked about whether you were aware of that as being

12 a policy. You answered that you were not. And that you did not see that.

13 Did you ever see or hear of Bosniaks torching their own homes as they --

14 as they fled their territory?

15 JUDGE AGIUS: At which time frame are you referring the witness

16 to?

17 MR. THAYER: Mr. President in his time in Bosnia.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: In his time in Bosnia, okay.

19 THE WITNESS: Throughout the time that I was in Bosnia?


21 Q. Yes. Did you receive reports of Bosniaks torching their own

22 homes?

23 A. Let me say, if I can, answer this way, in Zepa, I did not observe

24 any Bosniaks torching their own homes. With respect to other locations,

25 I'm not sure. It was not -- here I'm giving a wider view as based on my

Page 14342

1 experience in there. It was not typically the modus operandi for Bosniaks

2 being forcibly expelled to burn their homes. That was not typically their

3 MO. I can't be categorical and say that it never happened. I would not

4 want to be categorical and say it did not happen but that was not the

5 typical MO. There were other examples I can share with the Court of folks

6 who left and burned their homes behind, but it was not a typical Bosniak

7 or Muslim MO that I was aware. But I cannot be categorical and say that

8 it never happened either.

9 Q. Now, finally, sir, your proposed demilitarisation agreement refers

10 to the bombardment of the civilian population. You yourself saw the --

11 what you had described in the report as being a bombardment starting on

12 the 20th. You were asked some questions by my friend, Madam Fauveau,

13 about reducing the fear of the population. Do you think not bombarding

14 the civilian population of Zepa might have helped reduce the fear that you

15 saw?

16 A. Undoubtedly.

17 MR. THAYER: Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Thayer? Judge Kwon? Yes, Madam

19 Fauveau.

20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I must ask you to

21 allow me to put a very brief question and that would be the direction to

22 the last question asked by my learned friend. The question is: At the

23 moment of evacuation, which was between the 25th and the 27th of July, was

24 there any shelling?

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Can you answer that question, Mr. Joseph,

Page 14343

1 please?

2 THE WITNESS: Was there any shelling? Doesn't show the transcript

3 here, was -- was there any shelling between?

4 JUDGE AGIUS: 25th and 27th of July.

5 THE WITNESS: When we were there? There was no shelling that on

6 us during that evacuation. I do not recall any shelling. There may have

7 been firing but not any shelling in the town or during that evacuation

8 that I can recall.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. So we don't have any further questions

10 for you, Mr. Joseph. On behalf of my colleagues and the Tribunal, I

11 should like to thank you for having --

12 THE WITNESS: Sorry just one thing for give me it just occurred to

13 me during the break that earlier Mr. Josse's last question I only had an

14 answer in Serbian, and I just would like to say for the record that I do

15 not consider myself self-deceited or however else you want to phrase it.

16 I just wanted to put that in the record. The answer to his question is

17 no. Thank you.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you for having come over to give evidence and

19 on behalf of everyone I wish you a safe journey back home.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Now, either Mr. McCloskey or Mr. Thayer.

21 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, two brief items are we have had

22 discussions among the Defence, and we have agreed pursuant to the request

23 of one of the teams to switch the order of two witnesses next week. So

24 Witness 132 will precede witness 139. I'll send out my usual schedule in

25 e-mail this afternoon to confirm, but I wanted to put everybody on notice

Page 14344

1 if everybody wasn't.

2 The second is in connection with our previous request to take

3 the week of the 1st through the 5th of October off, we would kindly ask

4 the Court, this is after consultation with our friends, who are unanimous

5 in joining this request, that we also take the following Monday off, the

6 8th of October. We have Dean Manning arriving from Australia. We will be

7 on the tail end of another witness who will have been giving extensive

8 testimony and who may not be finished by then. We believe that we will be

9 able to save time if we have that extra day of preparation, it will

10 ultimately result in a more efficient, and we hopeless time consuming,

11 presentation of the evidence if we have that day off.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll discuss that. We've started discussing, and

13 we just want to make sure that if we grant this break, it's because we too

14 believe that you really need it. So we'll come back with our position

15 sometime next week. Thank you. Have a nice weekend, everybody.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Monday, the 27th day of August,

18 2007, at 9.00 a.m.