Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 15231

1 Wednesday, 12th September 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good afternoon, everybody, and good afternoon to

7 you, Madam Registrar.

8 If you could call the case, please.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number

10 IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, madam.

12 For the record, all the accused are here. From the Defence teams,

13 I notice the absence of Mr. Haynes, Mr. Bourgon, and Mr. Ostojic. The

14 Prosecution is represented by Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Vanderpuye.

15 The witness is already in the courtroom.

16 So good afternoon to you, Mr. Savcic.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: And we are going to continue with your testimony

19 which we started yesterday.

20 I just wish to remind you of two things; namely, that you are

21 testifying with the solemn declaration that you made yesterday still in

22 force, and, secondly, I want you to remember all the time what I told you

23 yesterday about your right to ask to be exempted from answering certain

24 questions.

25 Mr. Vanderpuye.

Page 15232


2 [The witness answered through interpreter]

3 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon to

4 you. Good afternoon, Your Honours, good afternoon to counsel.

5 Good afternoon, Mr. Savcic.

6 Examination by Mr. Vanderpuye: [Continued]

7 Q. Yesterday when we left off I was asking you about the function of

8 the 65th Protection Regiment, and you had explained the role of the

9 Military Police Battalion in very general terms. Was the regiment also

10 engaged in defensive as well as offensive deployments?

11 A. Your Honours, Mr. Vanderpuye, if you just allow me to expand the

12 answer I started giving yesterday about the military police and its

13 jurisdiction, its purview.

14 Q. Certainly.

15 A. Members of military police units exercised their duties in the

16 spirit of the rules governing the military police and doing the service of

17 the military police. That service includes providing security, thus

18 members of the military police secure command posts, military leaders,

19 stationary and in movement, documents, especially those that are

20 marked "Confidential." They secure assets of military equipment, et

21 cetera.

22 Another duty of the military police is patrol duty. The military

23 police patrol, when the situation requires that, usually with the aim of

24 controlling the military regiment.

25 The third duty is pursuit and search, such as searching for

Page 15233

1 military conscripts who have gone absent without official leave or people

2 who are on the run.

3 Another of their duties is escort, such as escorting prisoners who

4 were remanded in custody by military courts, et cetera.

5 Another duty is military traffic control. I don't think that

6 needs explanation.

7 And yet another duty is crime prevention.

8 These are the duties that military police service encompasses and

9 that I did not have time to enumerate yesterday.

10 And to answer the question you just asked, units of the Protection

11 Regiment are used in keeping with the rules that govern them, in keeping

12 with orders of their superior command, but they can also be used in

13 defensive and offensive actions when the situation and the orders require

14 them to be thus engaged.

15 Q. All right. Thank you very much for that. Now, during July 1995,

16 I just want to get into, very generally, the structure of the regiment,

17 who was your deputy commander?

18 A. According to establishment, it was the deputy commander of the

19 regiment, Colonel Jovo Jazic.

20 Q. And what was his responsibility, just generally?

21 A. He was chief of Staff, and he leads the work of the Staff. That

22 includes the chief of the Operations and Training, chief of Personnel and

23 Reinforcement, chief of Communications, and the Office of General Affairs.

24 You see, it's a bit different on regiment level than at brigade

25 level, but it doesn't have various branches, engineering, artillery, et

Page 15234

1 cetera, and there are no other assistants, so the staff is narrower than

2 is the case at brigade level. He leads the work of these organs, of these

3 bodies.

4 Q. And as your deputy chief of Staff, is he entitled to sign orders

5 on your behalf?

6 A. In my absence, yes. That's why he is my deputy.

7 I have to emphasise before this Court that from 12 October 1994 to

8 23rd June 1995, I was absent from the unit for hospital treatment that

9 resulted from a serious wound. In that case, the commander of the

10 regiment was in the hands of Deputy Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Jazic.

11 Q. If you can briefly outline what the various structures in the

12 regiment were at that time in July 1995.

13 A. You mean the units of the regiment?

14 Q. The units of the regiment and their commanders, if you can recall

15 their names.

16 A. Yes, I remember. If you allow me, I just want to finish with the

17 command of the regiment. We spoke about the staff, and in addition to

18 that, I had an Assistant for Morale, Religious and Legal affairs and an

19 Assistant for Logistics. The establishment envisaged that I should also

20 have an assistant for Intelligence and Security, but due to a shortage in

21 personnel, that vacancy wasn't filled, so I didn't have that assistant.

22 Now, for command, as far as units are concerned in 1995, the

23 regiment had the following units: A Motorised Battalion, a battalion of

24 military police, a sabotage detachment, an artillery rocket battalion of

25 antiaircraft defence, a tank company, a logistical company, and a

Page 15235

1 transport company. That was the structure of the Protection Regiment. And

2 I believe I also had a mortar company that I didn't mention.

3 I have to stress that this structure of the regiment resulted from

4 our practical needs. Initially, the regiment was not structured this

5 way. Initially, it consisted of a battalion of military police, a

6 sabotage detachment, an artillery/rocket battalion, a logistical company,

7 a transport company, and on paper we had a scouting company and a radio

8 reconnaissance company that did not actually exist. The Motorised

9 Battalion, the tank company, and mixed mortar company or battery formed

10 part of the structure.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Savcic. Do you recall the names, in particular, of

12 the members of your Command?

13 A. In the Command, I said the chief of Staff was simultaneously the

14 Deputy Commander, he was Lieutenant-Colonel Jazic Jovo. The chief of

15 training and operations was Vojislav Jarovic, then major. My assistant

16 for morale, religious and legal affairs was Major Miljenko Jankovic. The

17 assistant for logistics was Captain Predrag Slijepcevic. The chief of the

18 office was a warrant office, Drago Mandic [as interpreted]. The commander

19 of the Military Police Battalion was Zoran [Realtime transcript read in

20 error "Smijlovic"] Malovic [as interpreted], major. The commander of the

21 artillery rocket battalion was 2nd Lieutenant Nedeljko Jovicic, the

22 commander of the tank company was Captain Rajko Knezevic. The commander

23 of the Mixed Mortar Company and Battery was second Lieutenant Stevo

24 Jevic. The commander of the Motorised Battalion was Captain First Class,

25 I believe, Radivojevic, and I'm not sure if I mentioned any one of the

Page 15236

1 commanders and commanding officers, perhaps.

2 Q. Just for the record, there is --

3 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Mr. Sarapa.

4 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] I believe in line 5, in fact, page 5,

5 line 19, I believe the witness said "Malinic" and what we have on the

6 record is "Mandic."

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's all right, but I believe

8 that it says here "Zoran Smijlovic." It should be "Zoran Malinic,"

9 battalion of the military police.

10 MR. VANDERPUYE: Line 20.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right.


14 Q. Are you familiar with someone by the name of Aleksandar Lucic?

15 A. Yes. At that time, he was lieutenant or captain, I can't remember

16 exactly, and his duty was deputy commander of the Military Police

17 Battalion.

18 Q. With respect to the Military Police Battalion, where was that

19 headquartered, where was it stationed?

20 A. The command of the battalion and the battalion itself, beginning

21 with the second half of 1993, was stationed in Nova Kasaba on the

22 Milici-Konjevic Polje-Zvornik road.

23 Q. And approximately how many men did that comprise?

24 A. Well, in the command of the battalion, together with the office

25 administration, couriers, around ten persons, not more, including the

Page 15237

1 soldiers who served there.

2 Q. And how was the military -- I'm sorry. How was the Military

3 Police Battalion organised?

4 A. The Military Police Battalion had a command led by the commander,

5 deputy commander, clerk for general duties, and some auxiliary personnel.

6 That was the command.

7 In addition to that, the battalion had four military police

8 companies. The 1st Military Police Company was equipped and trained for

9 anti-terrorist action. The 2nd Military Police Company was the company of

10 armoured personnel carriers, and its primary purpose, in peace time, of

11 course, was to keep law and order, to escort military leaders, control

12 crowds, et cetera: The 3rd and 4th Companies of the Military Police were

13 primarily to secure the command post, that is, a classical guard duty,

14 patrol duty, use of specially-trained dogs, in military police patrols, et

15 cetera.

16 In addition to that, the battalion had a specialised unit that led

17 the work of the duty service of the military police, and that's a service

18 that I forgot to mention when I enumerated all the other units. That was

19 the structure.

20 Q. With respect to each of these companies, can you tell us, in July

21 of 1995 or thereabout, where they were located?

22 A. In July 1995, the battalion of military police was engaged as

23 follows: The 1st Company and part of the 2nd Company of the Military

24 Police were part of the combat group of the Protection Regiment located in

25 Ocadjava area as part of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, that is, in the

Page 15238

1 focus of the defence held by the SRK, and that's halfway between Sarajevo

2 and Trnovo and in the area of Mount Treskavic. So I said that was the 1st

3 Company and part of the 2nd Company, and part of the 4th Company also went

4 into that combat group.

5 The 3rd Company was doing regular guard duty of the command post,

6 including the dogs, and part of the -- part of the armoured personnel

7 carriers was at the Staff and some were on leave, on home leave.

8 Q. The APCs, the armoured personnel carriers, when you say they were

9 at the Staff, do you mean they were at the command post of the Main Staff?

10 A. No, no. They were at that time in the area of Nova Kasaba, at the

11 base of the battalion.

12 Let me just explain what I mean by military police APCs. They are

13 lightly-armoured combat vehicles, armed only with one light machine-gun,

14 7.62 millimetres, used for military police personnel transport, to protect

15 personnel from rifle and light machine-gun fire.

16 Q. All right. Thank you for that. Now, in the beginning of July,

17 were the APCs located in Nova Kasaba or were they located at the Main

18 Staff command post?

19 A. Early in July, or more precisely from the 26th of June onwards,

20 that part of the unit, that is, part of the company of the APC, was at the

21 HQ of the Main Staff, because on the 26th of June there was an attack by

22 the 28th Division against the base of the Main Staff, the HQ of the Main

23 Staff. Since I had not enough forces to defend the Main Staff, I ordered

24 the commander of the Military Police Company, Major Malinic, to go to the

25 area of the command post to defend the command post first and then take

Page 15239

1 other necessary actions. So from the 26th of June onwards, they were on

2 the command post of the Main Staff or, rather, the Protection Regiment,

3 because that's the same location.

4 Q. All right. Now, you'd earlier mentioned that you didn't have an

5 assistant commander for security. Could you explain for us the

6 relationship of the Military Police Battalion and your regiment with the

7 security organ of the Main Staff?

8 A. I can explain. The battalion of the military police was part of

9 the regiment. It was not an independent unit. And the battalion was

10 commanded by the commander of the regiment, through the commander of the

11 MP Battalion. I already said I didn't have an assistant for intelligence

12 and security.

13 What was envisaged for such cases by the rules, it was envisaged

14 that the so-called security support, that is, counter-intelligence

15 service, be performed by the relevant unit. Since the Protection Regiment

16 belonged to the Staff, it was the most logical thing for the relevant

17 organ of the Main Staff to perform that duty. The head of Administration

18 would appoint one operations officer to take care of the

19 counter-intelligence support for the Military Police Battalion.

20 Q. And as it existed in July 1995, was there any specific

21 relationship between the head of the Military Police Battalion of your

22 regiment and officers in the security organ of the Main Staff?

23 A. I don't know exactly -- I didn't really understand the question.

24 Q. Well, from whom did Major Malinic take his orders with respect to

25 the administration of the Military Police Battalion within your regiment?

Page 15240

1 A. He got orders from me, as regiment commander.

2 Q. And with respect to the disposition of the military police units,

3 from whom did you receive your orders?

4 A. From the commander of the Main Staff.

5 Q. And were the orders that you received from the commander of the

6 Main Staff -- are they processed through a type of proposal that is made

7 by officers of the security organ to the commander of the Main Staff?

8 A. Well, that is precisely the role of security organs, that

9 regardless of the level of command, they propose to the commander in which

10 way to use military police units according to the situation.

11 If you allow me maybe now or maybe later, I should say a few words

12 about the tasks of the Administration for Security and security organs.

13 Q. Now would be a good time.

14 A. Let me put it this way: The security organ, and in this case I am

15 talking about the security organs of the Main Staff, i.e., the Security

16 Administration of the Main Staff, was a professional body of the Command

17 of the Main Staff. Its duties were as follows: The first task that the

18 Security Administration and its members had was to document, monitor and

19 prevent any intelligence work by foreign intelligence services or any

20 other bodies involved in intelligence against the Republika Srpska Army as

21 a whole and its institutions, against its documents, plans, armies and

22 equipment. That's the first task, to discover document and prevent the

23 work of foreign intelligence bodies, and this is what only a professional

24 body could do because they were the only ones that were trained to do

25 that.

Page 15241

1 The second task of the security organ was to discover, prevent,

2 document any enemy activities against the Republika Srpska Army.

3 The third task was to draft plans of counter-intelligence

4 protection of the units, organs and institutions of the Army of Republika

5 Srpska.

6 Who was involved in all that? It was the counter-intelligence

7 department with the Security Administration. That was involved in that.

8 In addition to that, the administration for intelligence also had

9 department of military police. What was its role? Its role was to

10 professionally lead the units of military police. In that department of

11 military police which was part of the -- of the Intelligence

12 Administration, there were usually former officers of military police

13 units who occupied all the relevant positions; in other words, there were

14 experienced military policemen who were aware of the issues involved with

15 the work of the military police, and their task was to be engaged in

16 professional work, which ranged from drafting plans and programmes, combat

17 training, equipping the military police units with special equipment that

18 was necessary to carry out military police tasks, and so on and so forth.

19 In other words, a direct link from the regiment command and the

20 Intelligence Administration went through the department of the military

21 police, when military policing was involved.

22 Sometimes on a daily basis a lot of things happened. For example,

23 the chief of the department would call the Command of the regiment and say

24 that they needed escort for officers from the Main Staff; for example,

25 that they needed two, three, to five patrols of members of the military

Page 15242

1 police who would stay on duty for a few days. Food had to be provided for

2 them. These were the tasks that were not imaginary. They were very

3 concrete and very much happening every day.

4 Q. Thank you for that. If I could, I'd like to just direct your

5 attention to late June, early July of 1995, with respect to the

6 disposition of your units.

7 Can you tell us what your assignment was with respect to your unit

8 at the end of June of 1995?

9 A. I have to go back to the overall assignments of the units of the

10 Protection Regiment. I told you where parts of the Military Police

11 Battalion were, they were assigned to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps on the

12 Sarajevo front line. In addition to them, there were also parts of the

13 Motorised Battalion, Mixed Mortar Company, and one part of the Traffic

14 Company. They were all there on that front line.

15 The other units were deployed as follows: The artillery/rocket

16 Division of the antiaircraft defence was in the sector of the command post

17 of the Main Staff, providing combat duty office in case there was activity

18 from the air. The tank company was in the barracks in Han Pijesak. Parts

19 of the Motorised Battalion were deployed on positions facing the Zepa

20 Brigade, i.e., facing the Zepa sector. The sabotage unit as well, which

21 was a very small unit numbering some 20 men at the time, they were also

22 part of the combat group. The logistic company was in Han Pijesak,

23 performing tasks of logistical support for the combat group at the

24 Sarajevo front line as well as for the other units which were deployed

25 elsewhere. The regiment command was always at its command post.

Page 15243

1 Q. Okay. Did you receive any orders at the end of June with respect

2 to conducting any reconnaissance missions in that area, that is, in the

3 area of the Main Staff Command.

4 A. Yes. Your Honours, I have to say something before I answer.

5 I said that from 12 October 1994 to 23rd June, I was

6 hospitalised. On the 23rd of June, 1995, I returned to the command post

7 of the regiment. I was briefed about the situation not only in the

8 regiment but also in the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And

9 sometime in the afternoon, the commander of the Main Staff, General

10 Mladic, and assistant for intelligence, General Tolimir, came to my

11 command post.

12 Having greeted each other and having exchanged some words about

13 health and family, General Mladic told me that on the following day, on

14 the 24th of June, I have to familiarise myself with the physical

15 protection of the command post, because while I was absent from the unit

16 some things were changed in the security system, so he ordered me to look

17 at the situation to see whether the things that had been changed in the

18 time were okay, and if my assessment was that they were not, that I should

19 take measures in order to put things right and in order to improve the

20 situation.

21 I did that as ordered on the following day, and I concluded that

22 some alterations had to be done to some technical positions, that some

23 things had to be improved.

24 On the 25th of June, I carried out preparations for those changes,

25 and then on the 26th of June I ordered that the changes should be

Page 15244

1 started. At the moment when this was being done, an attack on the command

2 post of the Main Staff happened. As a result of that attack, I had seven

3 dead soldiers and a large number of wounded soldiers and officers. One

4 soldier was taken prisoner. And after that attack and after dealing with

5 the sequela of the attack, I brought in part of the armoured company and

6 the tank company. After that, I was ordered by the commander of the Main

7 Staff to undertake intense reconnoitering activities in the direction of

8 Zepa so as to prevent any other such unpleasant surprises as we had on the

9 26th of June.

10 I said to the Commander that I don't have anybody free and that I

11 would have to pull out at least one military police company from Ocadjava

12 sector, that they would have to be very well trained, officers and

13 soldiers with a lot of combat experience, in order to be -- to perform

14 that task. This was approved, and when they arrived at the command post I

15 undertook the activities that you asked me about.

16 Q. All right. Now, with respect to your assignment, did you carry

17 that out, and on what axis did you carry that out, if so?

18 A. That assignment was being carried out. You cannot do it in a

19 limited space of time. It's a continuous activity which is undertaken in

20 order to establish the deployment of the enemy, the situation and the

21 intention. I started performing that task after I had consolidated the

22 situation at the command post, and I went on carrying it out until

23 mid-July, when I was given another assignment, and I embarked on that

24 assignment. In other words, I was performing that assignment towards the

25 front line of the Zepa Brigade, starting from the Karavac village sector

Page 15245

1 to the Drina River and the right neighbour, the neighbour on the right

2 flank, which is the 1st Rogatica Brigade.

3 Q. Okay. I'm just going to ask you to slow down a little bit,

4 because you do have a lot to say, but it's kind of hard to keep up with

5 what you're saying.

6 Now, with respect to discharging this assignment, can you tell us

7 specifically what you did in relation to this reconnaissance that you were

8 carrying out? Did you set up -- well, just tell us what you did,

9 specifically.

10 A. This military police platoon was used to form three reconnoitering

11 groups. I gave them their tasks, I sent them to their concrete axes, and

12 their task was to establish whether the enemy was present on those axes.

13 If they were, then they were given the task to establish what was their

14 strength, what their intentions were, and so on and so forth. In other

15 words, every day I would assign a new axis of movement. The tasks

16 remained the same within the overall task of reconnoitering.

17 Throughout all that time, there was no combat engagement with the

18 enemy. We were able to establish that after the aforementioned attack,

19 they returned to their sectors in which they were normally deployed before

20 that attack. However, we had to keep the situation under control, because

21 when you do things on time, in a planned manner and in an organised

22 manner, it's easier to keep the situation under control than when you have

23 to do it under attack. In other words, I had normal reconnoitering

24 activities that followed the textbook tactic of reconnoitering activities,

25 and I -- it would take me a long time to go into the details of that.

Page 15246

1 Q. Your answer is just fine as it is. Now, from where were these

2 activities carried out?

3 A. The basis for those scouting activities was the Crna Rijeka sector

4 where the regiment was deployed, as well as the sector of the Rogatica

5 Brigade, i.e., the area of responsibility of the Rogatica Brigade,

6 Rogatica village, where we had the abilities to billet men after their

7 tasks. So there were two bases. There were the Borike and Rogatica

8 sectors where these tasks were performed.

9 Q. Now, you said that your assignment had changed at some point.

10 Tell us when that occurred.

11 A. The second assignment, I was given automatic -- I discontinued my

12 previous assignment, and I was given that assignment on the 4th of July,

13 1995. On that day, I was in the sector of the Sjeversko village towards

14 Boksanica, this is where I was at the forward command post of the brigade,

15 and I was given the task to report to the sector of Laze village. That's

16 from Borike, in the direction of the sector of the command post of the

17 Main Staff. And I was told to report to the Barrier 01, which was the

18 code name for the commander of the Main Staff.

19 On my way to that sector, I came across units of the Drina Corps.

20 I saw the chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, Colonel Svetozar Andric

21 there. We greeted each other briefly, and I received my orders from the

22 commander of the Main Staff. The orders were to take the unit that was

23 with me, which was a military police platoon, to carry out an attack on

24 the Laze-Gusinac-Brezova Ravan axis, to break up the combat security of

25 the Zepa Brigade in the Gusinac sector, and later on to take the sector of

Page 15247

1 Brezova Ravan.

2 Q. Now, were you situated in Borike at some point during July of

3 1995?

4 A. I said I was.

5 Q. Okay. And from when to when was that?

6 A. All this time, throughout all these scouting activities, I was

7 using those two bases, one on the right border and the other on the left

8 border. I used Crna Rijeka because I had conditions there to billet the

9 troops, and if I was closer to Borike, I would sleep at Borike. For

10 example, I would be in the Borike sector on the 5th and the 6th, and then

11 on the 7th and the 8th I would be in Crna Rijeka. I would shift between

12 these two positions.

13 Q. During the time you were in Borike, did you -- were there other

14 members of the Main Staff that were also staying there?

15 A. At the beginning of my stay there, there was nobody, and later on,

16 I can't be sure of the date, the assistant commander of the Main Staff for

17 intelligence and security, General Drago Tolimir, arrived at the Borike

18 sector.

19 Q. How long did General Tolimir stay there?

20 A. On the 14th, I was given the second assignment. He remained at

21 the Borike sector, and from then on I really didn't have a possibility to

22 know where he was, whether he remained in Borike, whether he was in

23 Rogatica or in Crna Rijeka. I really don't know. The next time I saw him

24 was after the end of combat activities around Zepa.

25 Q. Did anybody else from the Main Staff stay in Borike during the

Page 15248

1 time that you were there?

2 A. No, no.

3 Q. Now, the facilities at Borike, in terms of communication with your

4 units, were you able to communicate with your units while you were there?

5 A. With some of the units, I had a direct telephone line. As for the

6 Command in the Crna Rijeka sector and the battalion of the military

7 police, as well. With the others, I did not have direct contact. I'm

8 talking about those units that were on the Sarajevo and Romanija front

9 line. That communication went through the Command and the Corps Command.

10 Q. For Borike itself, did you have the facility -- the ability, I

11 should say, to communicate by radio, for example, with your units?

12 A. I said that I only had a telephone connection through a radio

13 equipment, RIU1. I had communication with the Command in the Crna Rijeka

14 sector and the battalion of the military police. That's who I had

15 communication with.

16 Q. Now, in order to make contact with your troops while you were in

17 Borike, did you have to go someplace else in order to, for example,

18 communicate by teletype?

19 A. I don't remember having had the need to send any documents in such

20 a way. The unit that was assigned to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps had been

21 resubordinated to the Corps Command and was being given its tasks from

22 them, so there was no need for me to send any orders in that direction.

23 Q. Well, I'm not talking about orders, particularly. I'm just

24 talking about communication, in general.

25 A. If I had had to do that, I had at my disposal the communications

Page 15249

1 equipment of the Rogatica Brigade, so I'm sure that I would have been able

2 to use those.

3 Q. Now, I just want to draw your attention, if I could, specifically

4 to July 13th. Were you in contact with Zoran Malinic on that day?

5 A. Yes. I was in contact, in telephone contact with him, to be

6 precise.

7 Q. And where were you at the time that you were in telephone contact

8 with him, and where was he, as best as you recall?

9 A. He was in Nova Kasaba, and I was in the sector of Sjeversko

10 village. Borike is a more general and better-known term that we normally

11 use, but to be more precise, I was in the vicinity of the village of

12 Borike.

13 Q. And in relation to -- did you have a conversation with

14 Mr. Malinic?

15 A. Major Malinic called me in the morning on that day. It was in the

16 early morning hours. I can't remember when. He told me that in the Nova

17 Kasaba sector, there were two or three prisoners of war already by then.

18 That's what he told me. And he also told me that he had some members of

19 the Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR who turned to Major Malinic for help

20 because of the combat activities that had taken place in the Srebrenica

21 sector. They did not feel safe to return to their base in Potocari. They

22 came to the barracks and stayed there for the next two or three days. I

23 said, "Okay, make sure that those people were safe." And as for the

24 prisoners of war, treated them as is prescribed by the rules of the

25 military police; put them in adequate facilities and put them under your

Page 15250

1 protection.

2 I have to say that at that moment, Major Malinic had at his

3 disposal no more than 15 men in the Nova Kasaba sector. There was him, a

4 few couriers, the duty service of the military police with a couple of

5 military policemen, and some of the logistics platoon. In other words,

6 there was some 50 [as interpreted] or so men there, and it should not have

7 been a problem to control two or three men who had surrendered. In other

8 words, they were not captured, because until that moment we never left the

9 barracks. These men came on their own to surrender and to seek protection

10 from our unit.

11 Shall I continue?

12 Q. I'll just ask you another question, if I could.

13 First, is what you've related to us what he specifically told you

14 when you had this conversation with him?

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Petrusic, you know I could see you because of

16 the column. The next time you stand up, someone please draw our

17 attention.

18 Yes, go ahead.

19 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there is an error in

20 the transcript at page 20, line 11. It should read "15" rather

21 than "50." The witness said that there were some 15 men there, and it has

22 been recorded as "50." May this be corrected, please. Line 9, I

23 apologise.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I remember the witness specifically

25 saying "15," not "50," so that will be corrected.

Page 15251

1 Thank you, Mr. Petrusic.

2 Go ahead.

3 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.

4 Q. My question was whether or not what you've related to us is

5 specifically what was related to you in this conversation, or is this

6 information that you learned subsequently?

7 A. The information that I shared with you, i.e., when he told me that

8 he had one or two prisoners, or three prisoners of war, i.e., people who

9 had surrendered, and a couple of members of the Dutch Battalion of

10 UNPROFOR, he shared this with me in that telephone conversation, which

11 means I did not learn that subsequently.

12 Q. Now, the telephone conversation that you had, was that over a PTT

13 line or was that done over a radio relay line or radio line?

14 A. I said that the only possibility I had to communicate was a radio

15 relay line, using the telephone RRU1 line. I did not have a PTT

16 connection. There was a problem with telephone lines over there, anyway.

17 I really don't know what it was about, but I did not have a regular PTT

18 line.

19 Q. Did you have any further conversations with Major Malinic during

20 the course of that day, that is, the 13th of July?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And when was the next conversation -- well, first let me ask you,

23 this conversation you had in the morning, about what time was that, if you

24 can recall?

25 A. As I've just told you, it was in the morning, but I really can't

Page 15252

1 tell you whether it was at 8.00 or 9.00 or when. I really don't know.

2 Q. When was the next conversation that you had with Major Malinic?

3 A. I'm not sure about the time, again, but again Major Malinic called

4 me. And then he relayed to me the following information: The situation

5 was getting more complex over there; there was a continuous stream of

6 larger groups of people, mostly members of the 28th Division from

7 Srebrenica who were surrendering, and he was facing a problem. He could

8 not protect those people. He could not protect his men, let alone the

9 prisoners.

10 I told him to call the regiment command and that the company of

11 armoured PCs that was at the command post as of the 26th of June should be

12 sent to the Nova Kasaba sector. I'm talking about some 30 men or so, and

13 their task should have been to reinforce his forces and provide protection

14 for the deployment area, to provide protection for his own men, equipment

15 and the rest. And again I drew his attention to the fact that the

16 prisoners of war should be treated according to the rules of service, that

17 he should take care of his own safety and security, and then that he

18 should also make sure that security and safety should be provided for

19 those people who had surrendered.

20 Your Honours, I have to say something here that you may not be

21 aware of. After that conversation we had, Major Malinic took the

22 following measures: Since among the people who had surrendered, there

23 were some who were wounded and injured, he called up the war hospital in

24 Milici and asked for a medical team to come urgently to extend first aid.

25 Second, he asked from the command of the Milici Brigade that if they had

Page 15253

1 any reserves of bread and other food, that they should send it to the area

2 of Nova Kasaba so that it can be given to the people who, as he saw it,

3 had not eaten for a while and had not even had water for a long time.

4 Despite his efforts, he said that he had been informed that there

5 would also be television teams coming from Republika Srpska, so Major

6 Malinic took that series of measures.

7 He also started registering, listing the prisoners.

8 Q. Was all of this that you've just --

9 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Mr. Vanderpuye, that despite his

10 efforts -- [Previous translation continues...] I love it, so I won't stop

11 her. There, despite his efforts, in line 9 on page 23, it doesn't sound

12 right to me there.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: The witness started saying

14 one thing, and then he moved to another thing, so it turned into a very

15 clumsy sentence.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: I understand that, and I thank you for it. But did

17 you ultimately get the medical -- did Malinic get the medical team that he

18 requested and the food, the bread? Did that arrive or not?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That did arrive. The medical team

20 performed its job, did the triage, and extended medical assistance, some

21 food and water arrived, so the request the major asked for was not just

22 formal, it was something that was done.


24 Yes, Mr. Krgovic.

25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, one correction to the

Page 15254

1 transcript, page 23, lines 9 to 11. The witness said, and it's missing,

2 the television teams not from Republika Srpska showed up in the field.

3 They were foreign television crews. We see the contrary in the

4 transcript.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Was Malinic informed that there would also be

6 television teams coming from Republika Srpska or coming from elsewhere,

7 but not Republika Srpska? What was the information he received?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The information I received was that

9 television crews were coming from several major television companies from

10 the world. They were major television companies, and unfortunately we,

11 locally, do not have one that would count as a major one on the world

12 scene.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Vanderpuye.

14 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

15 Q. Mr. Savcic, you -- was all this information that you've related to

16 us just now, is that information you actually received from Mr. Malinic

17 when you had the conversation with him or is this information that you

18 subsequently learned?

19 A. That information on the measures taken I learned later, but I've

20 already said that in that second telephone conversation, he told me the

21 situation was getting more and more complex. More and more people were

22 surrendering, and that's an important distinction. He did not have enough

23 forces to take prisoners, because that would require performing searches,

24 et cetera.

25 Q. I just want the record to be clear as to what it is he told you

Page 15255

1 versus what it is you know, so that's the reason I'm asking you these

2 questions.

3 Did you learn about this list of registered prisoners that he made

4 during the course of that conversation or did you learn about that at some

5 other point?

6 A. Later, subsequently.

7 Q. With respect to this list, do you know where or what he did with

8 it, or where it could have been found or has been found?

9 A. I met with Malinic on the 27th of July, 1995. On the 27th of

10 July, I was asked to come to the command post of the Main Staff, and

11 General Miletic passed on to me the orders of the commander of the Main

12 Staff, that I should go immediately to the area of Drvar, which is 500

13 kilometres away from Crna Rijeka, because there had been a serious

14 aggravation in that part of the theatre of war. And as I was passing

15 through Nova Kasaba, I had my first opportunity ever to stop by the

16 command of the battalion to see Malinic, and on that occasion we spent

17 about half an hour discussing the recent events in Kasaba.

18 Q. Is that when he told you about the request for triage and food and

19 water?

20 A. Correct. So he took that order I had issued. He acted according

21 to the rules of the service. And in that situation, it was his assessment

22 that those measures were called for and that they were in keeping both

23 with my order and the rules and provisions governing treatment of POWs.

24 Q. And is that when he told you about the foreign television crews or

25 the major television crews that were to be at that location?

Page 15256

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And during your conversation with Mr. Malinic on the 13th, while

3 you were in Borike, do you know where General Tolimir was?

4 A. I think -- in fact, I know he was somewhere there. He might even

5 have been standing next to me. I can't remember.

6 Q. And do you know whether or not he was aware of the situation that

7 Major Malinic was relating to you on the telephone at the time?

8 A. He knew. He was aware of that if only from the conversation I had

9 with Malinic. But whether he also had communications with other people in

10 that broader area, I couldn't tell you.

11 As for the events in Nova Kasaba, he knew about that. He was

12 around, standing next to me. But I don't know about any other

13 communications he might have had.

14 Q. Now, you mentioned that Major Malinic had made a request for

15 additional units, and I believe you've indicated that they arrived. Did

16 he make that request of you or did he make the request of somebody else?

17 A. So when we were talking on the phone, I told him to call up the

18 command of the regiment in Crna Rijeka, that is, Lieutenant-Colonel Jazic,

19 and to make the request. It's not actually units, it's part of the APC

20 Unit that had 30 men who were in Crna Rijeka, reinforcing security, and

21 they were now returning to their initial location because the situation

22 had, in the meantime, changed for the worse in Kasaba and it had improved

23 in the command post.

24 Q. Is there any reason, in particular, why you didn't order it

25 yourself, given the fact that he had made the request or communicated

Page 15257

1 his -- communicated the request to you directly?

2 A. No, just the technical reason, and the technical reason was that

3 this radio relay is more difficult to establish, it's not so good as

4 stationary telephone, as the land line, and I told him to do that part of

5 the job because he had better communications equipment at that moment than

6 I.

7 Q. And in order for these -- in order for these APCs to be moved from

8 Crna Rijeka to Nova Kasaba, that would have to be approved, I take it, by

9 you or somebody else. Is that true?

10 A. I gave my approval for that move, and they were performing, in

11 doing so, their primary task. They were providing security for elements

12 of the combat disposition of the Main Staff, and they were moving to

13 Kasaba, where they were needed at that time. And they were the quickest

14 to arrive with their own vehicles.

15 Q. Now, did that require the approval of the higher command, that is,

16 the command -- the commander, I should say, General Mladic?

17 A. No, it did not. It did not, because I was not issuing a new task

18 to the battalion or, rather, part of the battalion. It was just moving to

19 a different location while continuing to perform its primary task, that

20 is, security service, security provided to an installation and an area.

21 If I had wanted to issue them a completely new task that is not envisaged

22 in the basic plan of use, then I would have required approval from the

23 superior command.

24 Q. With respect to the first conversation that you had with

25 Mr. Malinic, Major Malinic, he indicated to you there was two or three

Page 15258

1 prisoners. Now, with respect to the second conversation, did he tell you

2 approximately how many, even though you've described that the situation

3 was worsening, did he tell you approximately how many prisoners he had on

4 his hands?

5 A. I don't remember him mentioning a specific number, a figure. He

6 said there were many, there were many, and with the forces he had in the

7 area of Kasaba, he was completely helpless.

8 MR. VANDERPUYE: Is it time for the break?


10 MR. VANDERPUYE: All right.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: And in actual fact, once you've raised the issue, we

12 will be proceeding beyond quarter to 4.00.

13 MR. VANDERPUYE: No problem.

14 JUDGE AGIUS. Till five to 4.00, and then we will have a 30-minute

15 break at five to 4.00.

16 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.

17 Q. Now, in his request for reinforcements, is it your testimony that

18 he made no mention as to how many prisoners he was dealing with?

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Meek.

20 MR. MEEK: Excuse me, Your Honour, but I think that misstates the

21 evidence. I don't think that there was a request. I believe this witness

22 has testified that when he talked to Malinic, that he told Malinic what to

23 do, to call the command post. So I think that misstates the evidence.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Vanderpuye.

25 MR. VANDERPUYE: I don't think it misstates the evidence at all,

Page 15259

1 but I'll be happy to rephrase the question.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Then rephrase it, please.


4 Q. When you spoke to Major Malinic, did he make a request for

5 reinforcements or help in controlling the prisoners?

6 A. Of course he did, because he said there were many of them. I

7 don't remember him giving me a figure. It's difficult to make an

8 assessment. It later turned out, and we reached a figure of 1.200 people,

9 but then all he was saying was, "I have many of them, and with the men I

10 have, I can't do anything, I can't provide security for our personnel, let

11 alone the prisoners of war." So these people who had surrendered were in

12 the open air, next to the thoroughfare that had not been closed down yet.

13 There was traffic continuing on it. And if I understood you correctly in

14 your question, he was asking for help. I knew at that moment that I had

15 no more backup to send him than that APC Company.

16 The tank company was difficult to send. They would take a long

17 time, and it was not their job because this was not a combat activity. So

18 I had nothing to send him.

19 Q. Well, how many APCs did you send or were sent, I should say?

20 A. Well, how many did we have, six?

21 Q. And how many men would that be?

22 A. I told you, 30.

23 Q. All right. Now, you know some of the accused in this case; right?

24 A. I know all of them. I know all the accused in this case. The

25 least well I know, Mr. Dragan Nikolic. In fact, I know him very little.

Page 15260

1 Q. And could you -- could you tell us what your relationship is with

2 General Pandurevic?

3 A. General Pandurevic and I belong to the same generation. We were

4 born in 1957. We were born in Sokolac. He's just a few months older. We

5 graduated together from the military academy. We met in 1978, in the

6 first year of our studies, and practically from that day we have been very

7 good friends. That friendship was based first on the fact that we came

8 from the same part of the country. Later, it became a closer friendship.

9 I baptized his children. I was his best man, et cetera.

10 Q. All right. You know Colonel Beara?

11 A. Certainly. I first met Colonel Beara in the second half of 1992,

12 I think around this time of year, September/October. He was chief of the

13 Security Administration at the Main Staff. We know each other well. I

14 don't know what other details you would like about this relation.

15 Q. All right. As the chief of security, he reported to General

16 Tolimir; right?

17 A. That was his immediate superior, so logically he was the one to

18 inform about the duties he had carried out and to receive new tasks,

19 although in principle it's the commander of the unit to which the security

20 organs belonged that handles security activities. So security organs at a

21 higher level lead and govern the work of lower-standing security organs.

22 That is the chain.

23 Q. All right. You know General Miletic?

24 A. I know him. I also know him from mid-1992, when, as I seem to

25 recall, he was a lieutenant-colonel when he arrived at the Main Staff, to

Page 15261

1 become chief of artillery rocket units. And in that first contact -- and

2 I remember clearly the day when he arrived. I remember he helped me a lot

3 in establishing this artillery rocket battalion, because I did not have

4 experience with that. I got the necessary resources and equipment. We

5 later effected reinforcement, filled it with men, and General Miletic was

6 an exemplary worker who was rewarded for his work by appointment to become

7 chief of operations and training at the Main Staff.

8 Q. And you respect General Miletic; right?

9 A. Correct. I respect all of them. They are my comrades in arms,

10 and I have great respect for all of them.

11 Q. Now, you and I have spoken about your testimony prior to today,

12 but have you spoken to anybody else regarding your testimony since you've

13 arrived here in The Hague?

14 A. Apart from talking to you, I spoke to the Defence teams of General

15 Miletic, General Pandurevic and General Gvero. I think that's right.

16 MR. VANDERPUYE: All right. Could I have 65 ter 192, please, in

17 e-court?

18 Q. Do you see this document up on the screen, Mr. Savcic?

19 A. I do.

20 Q. Have you seen that document before?

21 A. I have. The first time I saw it was when I spoke to Mr. McCloskey

22 in Banja Luka less than two years ago, and on that occasion I said what I

23 thought of this document.

24 Q. All right. This is a document -- if we could just page down --

25 that bears your name; right?

Page 15262

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. And if we could just go to the top, it indicates forward command

3 post of the 65th Protection Regiment at the top and a location of Borike,

4 and a time of 1400 hours. Do you have any specific recollection of having

5 prepared this document yourself?

6 A. We have discussed it even here, after I got here to the Tribunal.

7 You showed the bottom of the page a moment ago. It's true, my name is

8 there, but there is no signature. So I've already told you that I don't

9 recall drafting this document myself, and here are a few reasons why I

10 still can't believe I did: First of all, in the heading it says "IKM

11 Forward Command Post of the 65th Protection Regiment," et cetera, "Borike,

12 1400 hours." I did not set up that forward command post. I just led part

13 of that unit that was there. There is no date indicated. This document

14 does not have the format of a telegram, whereas it was supposed to be sent

15 by telegram to the addresses indicated.

16 Next, I cannot suggest something to the commander of the Main

17 Staff or his deputy, because I'm not an assistant commander to suggest and

18 propose. I'm just a subordinate who executes the missions given him.

19 Furthermore, you see, after the first sentence, it says:

20 "Assistant commander of the Main Staff of the VRS for intelligence

21 and security proposes the following measures."

22 So the assistant commander proposes, and I'm the one writing. If

23 he is the one proposing, then why he isn't -- why isn't he the one who's

24 writing?

25 Then I've just noticed that names of units start in small letters,

Page 15263

1 not capitals. That's something that I know. So I cannot say with any

2 certainty that I drafted this, as dictated by Tolimir, but I cannot refute

3 the possibility with 100 per cent certainty, either. I can just say that

4 this document was never received by the commander of the military police,

5 and the commander of the military police never acted upon it.

6 Q. All right. Well, how can you say that it was never received by

7 the commander of the military police? On what information can you make

8 that statement?

9 A. I base that on the statement by Major Malinic. He was 100 per

10 cent convinced that he had never received this and that he had never acted

11 upon this order, because he was never aware of this order.

12 Q. When did you speak to Major Malinic about this specific order? Was

13 it after you spoke to Mr. McCloskey in 2005?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And on how many occasions did you discuss this particular order

16 with Mr. Malinic or anybody else, for that matter?

17 A. I apologise. I didn't quite understand your question.

18 Q. Maybe --

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Josse.

20 MR. JOSSE: It's a difficult question. It should be broken down

21 into, one Malinic, and, two, anyone else, I would suggest.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Thank you for that suggestion.

23 MR. VANDERPUYE: It's well taken. I will do that.

24 Q. On how many occasions did you speak to Major Malinic about this

25 order?

Page 15264

1 A. Once. I was interested whether he remembered this order. He said

2 that he didn't have a clue, that he didn't remember. Not only did he not

3 remember, but he was convinced and he claimed that no telegram bearing my

4 signature arrived at his position on that day or ever, for that matter.

5 Q. All right. Did you speak to anybody else regarding this order

6 between the time that you spoke to Mr. McCloskey in 2005 and the time that

7 you first came here a few days ago?

8 A. No, nobody. Why would I speak to anybody else if those people

9 didn't have anything to do with these things? Here you can see the list

10 of addressees, whom I could not contact, and it would have been totally

11 pointless of me to talk to people who had nothing whatsoever to do with

12 the situation.

13 Q. All right. And when you spoke to Mr. -- to Major Malinic about

14 this particular order, did you discuss with him the specifics of its

15 contents; that is, the text, what it talks about?

16 A. No. To be honest, I didn't. The document was not available to

17 me. I didn't have it on me. Mr. McCloskey had shown it to me in Banja

18 Luka, and we had discussed this document. So I did not go into the

19 contents of the document. I just inquired about the existence of the

20 document. I asked him whether he remembered that he received a telegram

21 from me on the 13th of July. Since he said that he didn't, I really

22 didn't go into the details or the contents of the document. I just told

23 him that it referred to the treatment of prisoners of war. I really did

24 not try to retain the contents, bullet point by bullet point, so I could

25 not discuss the details with anybody.

Page 15265

1 Q. All right. Were you able to determine who the signalsman was with

2 respect to the transmission of this particular document?

3 A. Again, I'm afraid I didn't understand your question. Could you

4 repeat it, please?

5 Q. Would a document normally -- like this normally be sent via

6 teletype or through a signalsman?

7 A. As we look at the heading and the addressees, we see that it had

8 to be sent through the Main Staff, which means that it had to be encrypted

9 on the teleprinting machine of the closest unit that was able to establish

10 a teleprinter communication with the next closest unit. What I'm saying is

11 that things should have been done in that way, with a caveat that I really

12 don't remember ever having sent this document or given it to somebody for

13 transmission.

14 MR. VANDERPUYE: Okay. Can we just page down on the document in

15 e-court, please.

16 Q. Do you see an indication, on the left-hand bottom of that document

17 of a time and date?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. And what does that refer to?

20 A. Handed over -- signals and communications are not my specialty. I

21 don't know what this refers to, whether this refers to whether this -- to

22 the moment when this document was received or transmitted. I really can't

23 be sure. I don't know whether this means that this document was received

24 at that time or whether it was given for encrypted or -- whether it was

25 encrypted at that moment or transmitted to a different point for

Page 15266

1 encrypting. I really don't know.

2 Again, I don't see a stamp here. This is handwriting. There is a

3 signature here, but ...

4 Q. All right. You can't determine from the signature who it is; is

5 that fair to say?

6 A. No, I can't determine, from the signature, who that is, because I

7 did not have my own signalsman, so I really wouldn't know. The logic

8 makes me believe that if this had been transmitted, it should have been

9 done by somebody from the Rogatica Brigade. There were no other units

10 here. It could not have been, let's say, the 16 Krajina whatever from

11 somewhere.

12 Q. Now, with respect to the content of the document itself, if I

13 could just refer you to paragraph number 3. Paragraph number 3 reads:

14 "Commander of the Military Police Battalion shall take measures to

15 remove war prisoners from the main Ilicici-Zvornik road, place them

16 somewhere indoors or in an area protected from observation from the ground

17 or the air."

18 Now, you recall having been put questions concerning that

19 paragraph back in 2005 when you spoke to the Office of the Prosecutor?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. And, in particular, do you recall having been asked what military

22 reason you could think of that all of these prisoners, a thousand

23 prisoners, would have to be protected from observation from the air?

24 A. I remember that question as well.

25 Q. Do you remember what your answer was?

Page 15267

1 A. I remember my answer was that when it came to the protection from

2 observation from the air, that there was a constant threat coming from the

3 NATO Air Force and that there could have been collateral damage in any of

4 those campaigns. That's what I was talking about, and I was talking about

5 a possible mistake as a result of fire from the air.

6 Q. And do you stand by that answer, the answer that you gave back in

7 2005?

8 A. This was never excluded as a possibility. Things happen, mistakes

9 happen. I'm not talking about anybody's intentional shelling of human

10 targets. The way I'm thinking is a pilot of an M-16 MiG, can he see

11 whether the people down there are armed or not armed, whether they

12 represent a tactical group or something? In other words, saying that this

13 did not have to be somebody's planned activity, that a mistake could have

14 happened.

15 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you.

16 This would be a good time to break now, Mr. President.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: How much more time do you need to conclude your

18 direct?

19 MR. VANDERPUYE: I think a good half an hour.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. We'll have a 30-minute break starting from

21 now.

22 Thank you.

23 --- Recess taken at 3.55 p.m.

24 --- On resuming at 4.31 p.m.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

Page 15268

1 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

2 Q. Mr. Savcic, I just want to bring something to your attention, and

3 maybe you can help clarify this.

4 Earlier on in your testimony, when you were talking about the

5 relationship between the security organ and the military police, it

6 appears in the transcript, and maybe it's a translation issue, but it

7 appears in the transcript that you said that there was a direct link from

8 the regiment command and the Intelligence Administration that went through

9 the department of the military police when military policing was

10 involved. And that's on page 11 for my friends --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Please, could counsel speak into the

12 microphone. Thank you.

13 MR. VANDERPUYE: Sorry. That's on page 11, lines 20 through 23,

14 23. The entire paragraph actually runs much longer than that, but that's

15 the part that I would ask the witness to explain.

16 Q. Do you subscribe to that? Is that a correct interpretation of

17 what you said?

18 A. I can't see that on the screen. I can't see what it says there. I

19 really can't. Can you help me with that respect? Can you be more

20 specific? Can you be clear and say what exactly it is that is stated in

21 the transcript?

22 JUDGE AGIUS: The witness doesn't need to bother with the

23 transcript page, et cetera. You go there, please. Read it out slowly,

24 and it will be translated word for word to him in his language.

25 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 15269

1 JUDGE AGIUS: In the meantime, the other teams have the reference,

2 and they can read it accordingly.

3 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes. Just to give it a bit of content, I will

4 read from line 10 down. Maybe that would be better. It says:

5 "In addition to that," talking about the relationship of the

6 security organ or the function of the security organ: "In addition to

7 that, the --" it says "also had a military police. What was its role?

8 Its role was to professionally lead the units of military police, and that

9 department of military police which was part of the Intelligence

10 Administration, there were usually former officers of the Intelligence

11 Administration --" I'm sorry -- "former officers of the military police

12 units who occupied all the relevant positions. In other words, there were

13 experienced military policemen who were aware of the issues involved with

14 the work of the military police, and their task was to be engaged in

15 professional work, which ranged from drafting plans and programmes, combat

16 training, equipping the military police units with special equipment that

17 was necessary to carry out military police tasks, and so on and so forth.

18 In other words, a direct link from the regiment command and the

19 Intelligence Administration went through the department of the military

20 police when military policing was involved."

21 Now, I know that was a pretty long passage, but what seems to be

22 coming out of that is essentially that the relationship between the

23 military police and the security organ --

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Finish the question. Witness, don't start answering

25 the question, because we need to hear what Mr. Meek has to say.

Page 15270


2 Q. -- was limited to the intelligence aspect of that order, and I

3 wondered if that's what you meant or whether you could clarify that.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Meek.

5 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President, but now it's too late for me

6 to object. So ...

7 JUDGE AGIUS: No, it's -- why is it too late for you to object?

8 MR. MEEK: Well, because, first off, it's an improper question.

9 He's trying to ask a question in a leading and suggestive manner insofar

10 as what he says is, "It seems to be coming out of this," well, it seemed

11 to him to be that way, it can seem to me to be a different way, it can

12 seem to the Judges to be even a third way, so --

13 JUDGE AGIUS: That's precisely why a clarification is needed.

14 That's precisely why a clarification is needed.

15 Yes, Mr. Savcic, have you understood Mr. Vanderpuye's question?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Then please continue to give your answer.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The only way I can understand this

19 is a mistake in interpretation. Mr. Vanderpuye is repeating the

20 word "Intelligence Administration," which is an entirely different segment

21 of military activity. I have not mentioned the Intelligence

22 Administration at all. I have mentioned the Security Administration, and

23 I said that the main tasks of the Security Administration are threefold,

24 saying that the bulk of the administration is involved in that, and the

25 three tasks are discovering, documenting and preventing enemy intelligence

Page 15271

1 activity. The second task is to discover, monitor and document any enemy

2 activity. And the third part, pertaining to counter-intelligence, is

3 providing counter-intelligence measures or protection for the entire army

4 and its components based on the intelligence gathered.

5 In practical terms, I'm talking about the structure of the

6 Security Administration.

7 In addition to the counter-intelligence tasks that are performed

8 by specially-trained and educated security organs. The Administration

9 also has on its strength a unit of military police or a department of

10 military police which is engaged in professional matters of military

11 policing at the level of the army, not only at the level of the regiment.

12 And I said what their task is.

13 The Administration for Security is -- carries the tactical

14 development of the police, and hence its obligation towards the units of

15 military police, starting with education, equipment, and so on and so

16 forth. This is what I stated. In other words, and I repeat, although I

17 have not emphasised that especially so far, there's no command line

18 there. I -- if I needed to talk to the Security Administration, I had to

19 send requests. For example, a request to equip the units of the military

20 police, that would be my request in which I would list all the

21 requirements. The Administration would then look at that and would

22 provide the funds in a foreseeable period of time. In other words,

23 there's no command function. Their role is professional, at the level of

24 the battalion and no instructions or programmes can be drafted. I don't

25 know whether I've made myself -- if that was possible, then the role of

Page 15272

1 commander would be obsolete. This would mean duplicating facilities.

2 One more sentence, please, if I may.

3 I know that you have been involved in these issues for a long

4 time, but let me tell you that the relationship between the security organ

5 and the military police, i.e., the unit of military police, is absolutely

6 the same as the relationship of any chief of any branch, for example, the

7 chief of Engineers, the chief of Artillery, the chief of Communications,

8 the chief of Chemical Protection. They are professionals who give

9 suggestions to the commander on the use of respective units. And the same

10 relationship is between the security organ and the military police. There

11 is no other relationship.

12 For that matter, there is a book of rules and regulations that we

13 followed, and there was no room for improvisation there.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Are you happy with that answer, Mr. Vanderpuye?

15 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, I am. Thank you, Mr. President.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's move to the next question.

17 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, sir.

18 Q. Before we left off, I had -- I had you look at this document, and

19 that is the proposal with respect to -- made by the assistant commander

20 for Security and Intelligence.

21 Now, I had asked you about what you had previously said regarding

22 paragraph 3, in terms of an explanation for why prisoners would be --

23 would need to be protected from the air, and you've given your answer. Is

24 there anything you'd care to add to that explanation?

25 A. Yes. I would like to add that subsequently reflecting on that

Page 15273

1 bullet point, with the caveat that this document is authentic and that it

2 originated the way it is stated herein, as I was thinking about this

3 document, I came to a conclusion why these measures should have been

4 necessary, and let me give you my reasons.

5 It arises from the bullet point 3, where the prisoners of war

6 were. They were close to the main road, and there was traffic on that

7 road. Those people were coming from the areas of Srebrenica, Milici,

8 Bratunac, Zvornik. Those people had lived there. They knew each other.

9 Unfortunately, from 1992 there were atrocious crimes happening on both

10 sides, and it was possible that some people recognised each other, that

11 there was some knee-jerk reactions on the part of individuals or groups.

12 So that would be one of the reasons.

13 The second reason would be that these people could not have

14 remained in the open, in days 24 hours long, in July, half of that time is

15 daylight, less than that is night. During the night, it is very difficult

16 to provide security for so many people in such a large area in the

17 conditions of low visibility, with only 15 or 30 men.

18 The next thing that I would like to say is how this is regulated

19 by the rules. I believe that if this came as a proposal from the

20 assistant commander for Security, he must have had in mind certain

21 provisions of the Geneva Conventions that provided for the protection of

22 prisoners of war, also stipulates that they should not be exposed to the

23 general public, and I believe that the assistant commander for

24 Intelligence and Security, with a caveat that the document originated from

25 him, had all that in mind, and this was my first reaction when I looked at

Page 15274

1 the text.

2 Now, the question before the break was why the prisoners should be

3 protected from the air. That's why the first part of my answer went in

4 that direction, and now I have added all the other reasons and all the

5 other thoughts that I have about the document.

6 Q. All right, thank you. Thank you for that.

7 If I could have 65 ter 236(2)(b).

8 Are you able to read what's on the screen before you? If we could

9 just page down a little bit. If you're not able to read it, I can -- we

10 can provide a typewritten version of it. So just let me know and we'll

11 proceed.

12 A. Just tell me, there are two parts here. Do you mean the upper

13 part or the lower part? There's "895" at the top and there is "854300."

14 Q. The lower of the two, "854300," if you could just page down so

15 it's at the top of the page.

16 You know what, I think it would be better if we used the typed

17 version.

18 If we could, Mr. President, could we go into private session for a

19 moment?

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's do that. Let's go into private session,

21 please.

22 [Private session]

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 15275

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 [Open session]

7 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session, Witness, and Mr. Vanderpuye.

8 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 Could I have instead 65 ter 2362C in e-court. Okay, we'll need to

10 go to page 3 of that document and the bottom of the page as well. Okay, I

11 think that's much better.

12 Q. I just want to direct your attention to the section below where it

13 says "14.05."

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now, this is an intercept that refers to, among other things, a

16 soccer field. It refers to a telegram and is dated the 13th of July with

17 a time indicated of 14.05. Given the context and the information that's

18 contained in this document, does it appear to you that the reference to

19 the telegram is a telegram that you've just looked at in e-court?

20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Vanderpuye. Do we have an English

21 translation?


23 JUDGE KWON: The number seems to be wrong.

24 MR. VANDERPUYE: Okay. I'll track it down.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse.

Page 15276

1 MR. JOSSE: Whilst there's a hiatus, we would suggest that the

2 question just asked is a leading one, and when it's re-asked, could it be

3 rephrased, please?

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Josse.

5 What do you have to say to that, Mr. Vanderpuye?

6 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'm a bit preoccupied, I'm sorry, and I can't

7 recall the precise wording of the question.

8 All right, I now see it on the screen and I can rephrase it.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, all right. It's line 7 to 12, anyway.

10 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: You can read it for yourself.

12 Is there a problem, Mr. Vanderpuye?

13 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'm sorry, I was just trying to

14 locate the English translation of the intercept in e-court. I have a hard

15 copy of it, and perhaps I can put that on the ELMO.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Rephrasing the question, in which case Mr. Josse has

17 rephrased it for you.

18 MR. VANDERPUYE: All right. I think everyone can see the English

19 translation now.

20 Q. Mr. Savcic, looking at that intercept, do you see any relationship

21 between the subject matter and the telegram that you've just looked at?

22 A. Well, you see, it's a very short conversation. The only argument

23 that would support the connection between this intercept and the telegram

24 is the football pitch, but there's a problem there. The problem in the

25 time when this originated. It looks like the telegram was first written

Page 15277

1 at 1400 hours, and then the conversation took place at 14.05, when the

2 information was passed on the basis of which the telegram was written.

3 It's not particularly logical, that last expression used there,

4 meaning, "All right, let's do it," but that's not an expression I use, for

5 instance. But there is a time discrepancy, 1400 hours for the telegram

6 and 14.05 for the conversation. If the telegram took place or, rather,

7 was written later, then it would have been more logical. I don't know.

8 Q. Okay. Let me show you 65 ter 2361. That would be C for the typed

9 version, also under seal, and then there's A which should be the English

10 translation. That's also on the third page of the document. At the top

11 of the page. It actually precedes the one we looked at a minute ago.

12 Could I just direct your attention to this intercept, and if you

13 could, please read it to yourself.

14 A. You mean this conversation? I see "R-100."

15 Q. All right. Do you see where it says "1400"?

16 A. Yes, yes, I see that.

17 Q. Sorry, I'm just referring to you what's below that, if you could

18 just read that conversation.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Scroll it down, please.

20 A. I've read it.


22 Q. Now, with respect to this intercept, do you see any relationship

23 between this intercept and the telegram that you've just looked at in

24 e-court?

25 A. Again, the only connection can be the reference to the football

Page 15278

1 pitch and the number, "1.000."

2 Q. Now, there's a reference to somebody in this intercept by the name

3 of Zoka. Do you know who that is?

4 A. I don't know who Zoka is.

5 Q. Do you know if Zoran Malinic had a nickname that he used, whether

6 it was -- did he have a nickname?

7 A. Yes, he did, and his nickname was "Zoka," but that's a very common

8 way to shorten the name of "Zoran," and all Zorans or almost all of them

9 are referred to as "Zoka," but I don't know about the rest. This says

10 Rade and Zoka and others had come. Bosko as well, somebody named Bosko,

11 names that I'm not familiar with.

12 Q. All right. Thank you for that. Now, you indicated that on the

13 14th of July, you encountered or you met Svetozar Andric and you received

14 further orders with respect to the disposition of your unit towards Zepa.

15 Could you just describe for us briefly what you did, where you were, in

16 relation to the operation towards Zepa?

17 A. Could I have this left screen turned on so I can follow when the

18 interpretation is finished? It's fine, it's fine now.

19 So what I said is correct. I did meet with Mr. Svetozar Andric

20 under the following circumstances: I was summoned by General Mladic and

21 ordered to go to the area of Laze village, and on the way I ran into

22 Mr. Andric. I stopped and greeted him, and he told me that the Drina

23 Corps had received an assignment to make sure that the boundaries of Zepa

24 are brought to the limits envisaged by the agreement.

25 I have to say that on that part of the front line, there is a

Page 15279

1 Motorised Battalion from the Protection Regiment. Its combat disposition

2 is oriented towards the Zepa Brigade. When the Drina Corps units came by,

3 Mr. Andric told the most senior officer in that Motorised Battalion, Gojko

4 Petrusic, to show him the combat disposition of the forces in front of the

5 battalion. When they tried to do that, the opposite side fired on them.

6 Gojko Petrusic got killed, so those forces remained on the positions they

7 had reached before that.

8 I said before that I had received orders from General Mladic to

9 use my combat disposition of my battalion to attack in Gusinac and Brezova

10 Ravan direction and capture Brezova Ravan. I immediately proceeded to

11 make preparations for that assignment on the 14th of July, and I did the

12 following:

13 Since we were facing strong, fortified positions, I couldn't

14 capture them just by using infantry, so through the Command of the Drina

15 Corps I requested that two combat -- two firing groups be formed for me,

16 one group of mortars of 120 millimetres from the Bratunac Brigade and

17 another firing group, two cannons, B1, from the Rogatic Brigade. In my

18 request, I indicated where these two groups should be positioned, and

19 that's what I did on the 14th of July. There were no other activities

20 that I could manage, in view of the time of day when I received my

21 assignment, because the terrain was very inhospitable, so that these two

22 firing groups were set up, according to my request, at 1600 hours on the

23 next day, the 15th.

24 Q. And from the 15th through the 25th of July, what was your unit

25 generally engaged in? And I'm only asking for a brief response, if you

Page 15280

1 can.

2 A. On the 15th of July, with a fire of this firing group of cannons,

3 B1, I neutralised the forces in Gusinac and captured that area. In the

4 next period up to the 25th of July, fierce combat raged for the feature of

5 Brezova Ravan.

6 Q. And did you participate in those combat activities with respect to

7 Brezova Ravan?

8 A. That's what I'm talking about. From the 15th to the 25th of July,

9 there was fierce fighting for the capture of that feature, and I was

10 directly involved.

11 Q. Was the feature captured? Was it captured on that day?

12 A. I cannot remember the date exactly, but it must have been the 24th

13 or the 25th of July. I can't be sure which of the two.

14 Q. And following its capture, did you enter Zepa, you or your units?

15 A. Neither my units or other units entered Zepa on that day because

16 we had a decisive order from General Mladic that units must not go into

17 Zepa. Practically from the moment when the enemy lost Brezova Ravan,

18 organised resistance and organised defence of Zepa and the Zepa Brigade

19 ceased.

20 I entered Zepa myself on that day. I went to the check-point of

21 the UNPROFOR in Zepa, stayed there a very short time, returned to the area

22 of Brezova Ravan, where I received orders from General Mladic to move with

23 my unit to the barracks in Han Pijesak and to be there in reserve, as

24 backup, in order to intervene in case of emergency.

25 Q. All right. Just bear with me one moment.

Page 15281

1 Thank you very much, Mr. Savcic. I have no further questions for

2 you at this time.

3 Thank you, Your Honours.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye.

5 Let's go through the list of estimated cross-examinations.

6 Madame Fauveau, you had requested an hour and a half.

7 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, we will try to

8 stay within that time.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

10 Mr. Krgovic, you had requested an hour and a half.

11 MR. JOSSE: I suspect we'll be less than that, Your Honour. It

12 partly depends on questions that others ask. I'm optimistic we'll be less

13 than an hour.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

15 Mr. Sarapa?

16 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] Around five minutes.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Krgovic? Sorry, Mr. Stojanovic.

18 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we were reckoning

19 with 30 minutes, at most.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

21 Ms. Nikolic.

22 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I will have

23 no questions for this witness.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: It's wise. Thank you.

25 Mr. Meek?

Page 15282

1 MR. MEEK: Your Honour, very few questions, maybe five minutes.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you, Mr. Meek.

3 Mr. Zivanovic?

4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I need five minutes as well, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: So that gives us one hour and a half. Okay.

6 Mr. Petrusic, would you like to go first?

7 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't mind going

8 first, but we don't have an agreement between Defence teams. If you

9 request it, then of course.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, you start first.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.

12 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic:

13 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Savcic. My name is Zoran

14 Zivanovic, and in these proceedings I appear for Vujadin Popovic. I have

15 just a few questions for you. They relate to the 25th and the 26th of

16 June that you spoke about; namely, the dates when your units suffered

17 losses, when seven of your soldiers were killed and a certain number was

18 wounded.

19 Could you just clarify for me, who inflicted those losses on your

20 unit?

21 A. The losses were inflicted by the forces of the 28th Division of

22 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Srebrenica, from Srebrenica and

23 Zepa, that is.

24 Q. Were your troops outside the enclaves, practically in the

25 territory held by the Army of Republika Srpska at the time when they were

Page 15283

1 attacked and when the unit suffered these losses?

2 A. They were physically securing the command post of the Main Staff.

3 That is way outside the territory controlled by the Muslim forces.

4 Q. Could you give us an estimate of the distance from the enclave of

5 Srebrenica or Zepa?

6 A. Well, what could it be? I passed that way many times and never

7 paid attention, but if we can translate it into different measures, how

8 many hours on foot from the first line of Muslim defence to the place of

9 attack, it takes at least two hours of fast walking.

10 Q. Could you tell me, those units that attacked your troops, they

11 came precisely from the enclaves?

12 A. Yes.

13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you. I have no further questions.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.

15 Mr. Meek.

16 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 Cross-examination by Mr. Meek:

18 Q. Good afternoon, sir. I'm Chris Meek, and I represent Ljubisa

19 Beara. I just have a few questions.

20 Sir, do you recall, when you spoke with Malinic that he never

21 mentioned Ljubisa Beara being in Nova Kasaba?

22 A. No, he didn't mention Ljubisa Beara or anyone else. Later, I told

23 you, when I stopped by on the 27th of July, he told me that the commander

24 had been there, and I don't remember him mentioning anyone else.

25 Q. And when you say "the commander," isn't it a fact that Malinic

Page 15284

1 told you that General Mladic had been there and spoken to the prisoners of

2 war on the soccer pitch on the 13th?

3 A. Yes. He told me that General Mladic had arrived with his security

4 men. He made a brief speech to the prisoners on the football pitch. He

5 told them that they would all be exchanged. He said to Malinic that

6 trucks and buses would be arriving shortly, that prisoners would be put on

7 those vehicles and sent to Bratunac. As soon as that happened, any role

8 of the units of the Protection Regiment ceased. And I have to emphasise

9 that the Dutch Battalion of the UNPROFOR was there throughout.

10 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, you've just testified recently about the

11 July 14th meeting where you ran into Colonel Andric. Do you recall that

12 testimony, sir?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Isn't it true, sir, that that was the first time that you learned

15 that Drina Corps units were in the area?

16 A. Precisely.

17 Q. And, further, you encountered General Krstic and General

18 Blagojevic there; isn't that true, sir?

19 A. I know that I met up with Colonel Blagojevic on the same day as

20 Andric, but I'm not sure if I encountered Krstic on that same day or some

21 other day, but I know I did encounter him because his command post was by

22 the road that I had to take. So even if I had wanted to avoid him, I

23 couldn't, and there was of course no reason why I would have wanted to

24 avoid him.

25 Q. Sir, are you aware that when the OTP interviewed Zoran Malinic,

Page 15285

1 that he informed them that he had no independent recollection of Mr. Beara

2 being in Nova Kasaba on the 13th, if you're aware?

3 A. I'm not aware of that. I don't know what Malinic told the Office

4 of the Prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal. I know that nobody else but

5 General Mladic was mentioned to me, when it came to senior officers. He

6 was the only one who he mentioned.

7 MR. MEEK: Thank you very much, sir.

8 I have no further questions.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Meek.

10 Mr. Stojanovic.

11 Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:

12 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General.

13 A. Good afternoon.

14 Q. I am Miodrag Stojanovic. Together with my colleagues, we

15 represent Ljubomir Borovcanin and we respect your experience and your

16 participation in the war, and I assume that throughout the war operations

17 you participated in a number of combat activities, together with a special

18 brigade of the police. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. Can we look at an exhibit together, which is 4D00120. This is a

21 document that is part of the file under the title "Returning Lost

22 Positions on Slivnjansko Brdo-Sokoline" in the period from the 1st of May,

23 1994, to the 21st of May, 1994.

24 Just for the Chamber's information, these documents were located

25 on the EDS as part of the collection from the Drina Corps. At this

Page 15286

1 moment, Your Honours, we still don't have a translation, and since we will

2 be using just one paragraph, I am kindly asking the Trial Chamber to allow

3 me to have that paragraph interpreted in the courtroom.

4 Can we look at the page number 3 of this analysis in B/C/S.

5 Sir, can I kindly ask you to pay attention to the first paragraph

6 on that page, page number 3, and if you could, for the sake of the

7 interpreters, could you please read it aloud?

8 A. From the beginning?

9 Q. Just the first passage, starting with: "All forces ..."

10 A. "All forces for active combat and for holding positions are

11 resubordinated to the Command of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade which

12 were commanded by the commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade,

13 Colonel Krstic."

14 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you this about this document: Do

15 you remember that some of the troops of the special brigade of the police,

16 under the command of Borovcanin [Realtime transcript read in

17 error "Brdjanin"], participated in this combat operation? You can see

18 this written in the fifth paragraph.

19 A. Yes, I remember that, I remember it very well.

20 Q. Will you agree with me, then, that you also participated in that

21 operation, together with the other units that were present in that theatre

22 of war?

23 A. Yes, I'll agree with that.

24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I have just been informed that on

25 page 57, line 14, instead of "Unit under the command of Borovcanin," it

Page 15287

1 says "Brdjanin." And I'll kindly ask for this to be corrected. I don't

2 think that this should be a major problem.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: They have done it before.

4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Savcic, the objective of my analysis of this document is this,

6 and it follows from this question: In such operations which involve a

7 special brigade of the police or some of its troops, will you agree with

8 me that these troops are resubordinated to the military unit in whose area

9 of responsibility the operation is taking place?

10 A. Of course. Who else they would receive their orders from? How

11 else would they be able to perform any tasks if those tasks did not arrive

12 from that particular unit?

13 Q. Will we agree, then, that in other such operations in which you

14 participated together with the brigade of the military police, the whole

15 brigade or parts of the brigade were resubordinated to the military police

16 unit in whose area of responsibility they were fighting?

17 A. I witnessed on many occasions, together with the -- with

18 Mr. Borovcanin, starting with the end of 1992 to the end of the war in

19 1995, we had a number of occasions and situations that Protection Regiment

20 and parts of the special brigade of the police were resubordinated to a

21 certain higher command of the army.

22 Q. I am waiting for the transcript. There is no other reason.

23 Can we now look at a different document, which is 4D00725. This

24 is an exhibit that we have already seen. This is the law on the

25 implementation of the law on the interior affairs during war or under an

Page 15288

1 imminent threat of war. Can we look at paragraph 14, which is on page 5

2 of the B/C/S. This is 4DP00725. The document number is 4DP00725.

3 Can we look at page 5 in B/C/S or page 12 in English?

4 While we are waiting for this to come up, let me just tell you

5 that this is a law on the implementation of the law on the interior

6 affairs during the state of war or imminent threat of war, and this was

7 passed on the 29th of November, 1994, and that's -- and it came into

8 effect on the 1st of December, 1994.

9 Can we look at Article 14, paragraph 1 thereof, in which it is

10 stated as follows: "Units of the police, which pursuant to an order of

11 the supreme commander of the armed forces, are sent into combat, are

12 resubordinated to the commander of the unit in whose area of

13 responsibility they're supposed to carry out their combat orders."

14 Do you see that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Will we agree, then, that this is exactly what was confirmed by

17 the answer that you provided to us previously and that your answer arises

18 from this law?

19 A. Yes, this is the law, and it cannot be interpreted in any other

20 way. Way.

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Can we look

22 at the following document, which also confirms your answer. I would like

23 to call up Exhibit number P00008 in the EDS system.

24 Q. And while we are waiting for that, let me tell you, General, that

25 it is an order issued by the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of

Page 15289

1 Republika Srpska. The date is 22 April 1995. As you can see in the

2 document, because of the problems and some ambiguities in the engagement

3 of the MUP units in combat, elaborates on Article 14, I would kindly ask

4 you to look at paragraph 1 in this document, in which it says:

5 "The Main Staff of the army shall, in the future, provide more

6 precise and a more concrete definition of the request to engage and use in

7 combat of MUP units, in keeping with the provisions of Article 14 of the

8 law on ..." that we have just mentioned.

9 My question would be this: This order issued by the supreme

10 commander of the armed forces dated the 22nd of April, 1995, does it also

11 confirm what you've just told us, that you experienced in joint combat

12 activities that involved the special brigade of the police?

13 A. I completely agree with you. I would even say -- give you an

14 example that I sometimes had similar problems despite the fact that I was

15 a member of the army. What does it mean to provide precision and

16 clarification for the request? This means that members of the police

17 wanted to know in advance what task they were being engaged in. For

18 example, sometimes I would be sent to do some policing. I would take

19 certain equipment and arms, and then my policing task would be transformed

20 into a combat task and I would come unprepared. For that reason, there's

21 probably a need, and the president of the Republic responded to the need

22 and defined that in his order.

23 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would kindly ask

24 you to intervene when you deem necessary to stop for our next break. We

25 -- the first time we had a break was at a time somewhat different than

Page 15290

1 normally, so I would kindly ask and I'm entirely in your hands for our

2 next break.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: I stand to be corrected, but I think the next break

4 is due in about 32 minutes.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you wish to have a break now, Mr. Stojanovic?

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I am okay to continue. I don't

8 have a problem with that. I just wanted to hear from you, when you wish

9 your next break to be.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: The next break will be within 18 minutes, 18 minutes

11 from now. All right? Quarter to.

12 If anyone wishes a break now, we'll grant you a break now. I

13 mean, it's -- because I see that there is some kind of conspiracy.

14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] My impression is that my learned

15 friend from the Prosecution would not mind a break now, so I was kind of

16 ...

17 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. We'll have a 20 -- shall we reduce the

18 break? We'll have a 25-minute break starting from now.

19 Thank you.

20 --- Recess taken at 5.30 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 6.00 p.m.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Mr. Stojanovic.

23 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. General, we left it off with the regulations regulating the issue

25 of resubordination of the police to the Army of Republika Srpska, and with

Page 15291

1 the fact that you participated in a lot of combat activities together with

2 the special brigade of the police.

3 My next question would be this: Will you agree with me that in

4 all those combat operations in which you participated together with the

5 special brigade of the police under the command of Mr. Ljubomir

6 Borovcanin, and I'm referring to only those operations, you didn't have

7 any problems executing the tasks that you received from the superior

8 command?

9 A. I will agree with you, there were no problems at all.

10 Q. Thank you very much. Now I would like to show you a few more

11 documents dealing with prisoners of war. You have already spoken about

12 prisoners of war in your examination-in-chief, and in cross-examination

13 you have mentioned prisoners of war who surrendered in the Nova Kasaba

14 sector. Those prisoners of war were members of the 28th Division of the

15 BiH Army. Do you remember that?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. You also spoke about these prisoners in your interview with

18 Mr. McCloskey on the 17th October 2005, and just for those who following

19 that, this is page 57 in B/C/S and 37 in English. On that occasion, you

20 stated, amongst other things, that Zoran Malinic informed you that

21 pursuant to an order by General Mladic, people from the football pitch in

22 Nova Kasaba were handed over to the military police of the Bratunac

23 Brigade in accordance with their territorial competence. This is what the

24 transcript reads, and I'm asking you whether you remember that part of

25 your interview with Mr. McCloskey.

Page 15292

1 A. Yeah, I remember that, but I don't have the transcript in front of

2 me at the moment. If I stated that they had been handed over to the

3 military police of the Bratunac Brigade, then I misspoke. They were

4 actually escorted from that football pitch. They got on the vehicles or

5 buses, which were escorted by one or two soldiers in each of these

6 vehicles. I don't know which unit they were from, and I wasn't interested

7 in finding out.

8 Q. Maybe this would be a good opportunity to dispel that dilemma, and

9 may we look at 1D00196. 1D00196 is the number of the document. This is a

10 transcript of your interview. I would kindly ask you to look at page 57

11 of B/C/S and page 37 in English.

12 General, we will have the document on the screen in a minute. We

13 shall look at it together, and then you can clarify that answer for us.

14 Can we scroll down a little? Very well, thank you.

15 I'm drawing your attention to page number 19 -- I apologise, line

16 number 19 in the transcript, in which you stated as follows:

17 "In Bratunac, they were handed over to the military police of the

18 Bratunac Brigade, which means they respected their territorial

19 competencies."

20 Do you see that, General?

21 A. Yes, I can see that, but I have to correct myself. Later on, we

22 clarified my answer and we said that this was not in Bratunac but, rather,

23 that from the football pitch, they were put onto buses and other

24 vehicles. In other words, they were not escorted to Bratunac or to the

25 Bratunac Brigade. I must have had wrong information. The prisoners of

Page 15293

1 war were handed over in Bratunac, which made me conclude that they had

2 escort to Bratunac. I apologise for this previously erroneous information

3 that I provided.

4 Q. Thank you very much, General. This was an attempt to clarify the

5 answer, and the question that I would like to put to you is this: These

6 prisoners of war, people who surrendered from the 28th Division, from the

7 moment they were loaded onto the buses, were no longer under the

8 protection and authority of your unit, you were no longer concerned with

9 their safety, either personal or the safety of their property; is that

10 correct?

11 A. That is correct. At the moment they got on those buses, the 65th

12 Protection Regiment no longer had anything to do with the prisoners of

13 war, which means that we no longer had any responsibility for them.

14 Q. This is exactly the point of my question, and this is what I'm

15 going to continue, I'm going to continue along these lines.

16 You said earlier on that on one occasion you told Zoran Malinic

17 that he had to abide by the military rules concerning prisoners of war.

18 Do you remember that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

20 Q. And let's round this off. What do you mean by "abiding by the

21 military rules concerning prisoners of war," what do you mean by that?

22 A. I mean their protection, an obligation on the part of the army to

23 provide protection for their prisoners of war.

24 Q. May I continue? Tell me if I'm right or wrong. This applies for

25 the duration of time when they are under your responsibility?

Page 15294

1 A. Precisely so. That's the only time we can guarantee their safety,

2 while they are our responsibility.

3 Q. Let's see how this appears in various documents and regulations.

4 Can we look at Exhibit number P00107, P00107?

5 While we are waiting for the document to appear on the screen, let

6 me just tell you that this is an order for active combat by the Command of

7 the Drina Corps, and the title of the operation is [Realtime transcript

8 read in error "Zvijezda-95"] Krivaja-95. The date on the document is 2nd

9 July 1995. Can we please look at page 5 in B/C/S and page 7, lines 9 and

10 10, in English.

11 Your Honours, there is a mistake in the transcript, page 65, line

12 7. The name of the operation is Krivaja-95, whereas in the transcript we

13 read "Zvijezda-95."

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Stojanovic.

15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, can we look at the fourth line from the top of the page

17 in B/C/S, where it says:

18 "The security organs and the military police will determine the

19 sectors of collection and providing security for prisoners of war and war

20 booty. The Geneva Conventions should be complied with in treating

21 prisoners of war and the civilian population."

22 Can you see that?

23 A. Yes, I can.

24 Q. Can we agree that this is a schematic or a normal way to address

25 subordinated units of the Corps Command when they embark on a combat

Page 15295

1 operation, when it comes to the treatment of prisoners of war?

2 A. This passage that you've just read and that we see on the screen

3 is part of the measures of combat support -- sorry, support to combat

4 operations, namely, the part related to security. I wouldn't really agree

5 that it is standard. Every particular mission requires particular

6 measures of support, including security support. So it's not something

7 that can automatically be applied to the next mission or any other

8 mission. For every mission, in particular, measures of combat support

9 have to be developed so that things would work in an optimal way and lead

10 to success.

11 Q. That's precisely what I want to ask you through the next document,

12 about this development.

13 Could I have 4D0008, and that is an order of the Drina Corps dated

14 13 July 1995. Thank you. I think this is the document. Please look at

15 point 3 in this order.

16 Can we just scroll down a bit?

17 So we are talking about the 13th, General. You will correct me if

18 I'm wrong. This is a development of an elaboration on what you have just

19 discussed, and it says:

20 "The captured and disarmed Muslims are to be placed in adequate

21 premises that can be secured with smaller forces, and immediately inform

22 the superior command."

23 Can you see that?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Does this correspond, precisely to what you've just said, for

Page 15296

1 every particular mission, every particular situation, an order has to be

2 developed?

3 A. That is what practice dictates. It often happens that in a

4 particular situation, things cannot work as was initially planned or the

5 situation changes, like here, when the number of prisoners increased, and

6 appropriate measures had to be taken to accommodate that. We had one

7 situation when the -- at the planning stage, and now in the field things

8 have to be adjusted.

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stojanovic, for the record, line 11, I take it

10 that the 65 ter number should be "4080," not "8."

11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. We have

12 noticed that already. We just waited for the witness to finish his

13 answer. There is indeed a zero missing at the end of this number.

14 Q. General, shall we continue? So the question was: If one of the

15 prisoners of war found themselves in the hands of parts of the military

16 police units that were resubordinated then to the Drina Corps, do you

17 agree with me that they, the special brigade of the police, would have to

18 act in keeping with this order of the Drina Corps?

19 A. Precisely.

20 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please speak into the microphone.

21 Thank you.

22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Now a question in principle. I believe we'll be able to agree.

24 Prisoners of war are a logical consequence of every war. It's a natural

25 development, isn't it?

Page 15297

1 A. Well, most of the time. It often happens in fighting that one is

2 captured and becomes a prisoner of war. It is nothing out of the ordinary

3 in combat activities.

4 Q. So who is responsible in those circumstances in wartime, to take

5 care of prisoners of war, their accommodation, providing food, treatment,

6 et cetera, in principle?

7 A. Well, the person or the entity who is responsible for the area in

8 which the combat activities took place and where a certain number of

9 prisoners of war were taken.

10 Q. Can we agree that in this specific case, if we are talking about

11 the 13th, the Krivaja-95 operation, that would be the area of the Drina

12 Corps?

13 A. Correct, the Drina Corps, but with this order that is still on the

14 screen, the Drina Corps regulated that situation and issued specific

15 instructions to its units on how to proceed.

16 Q. Thank you. And to conclude this subject, this answer you just

17 gave would also apply to the safety of the prisoners of war and preventing

18 them from escaping? Your answer would be the same, wouldn't it?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you. I have one more document to show you.

21 Could we please take a look at 1D00197.

22 We will have it on the screen in a moment, General. You will see

23 that it is an article from June 1994, published in the "Policijac"

24 publication, "Policemen," and it contains an interview with you.

25 Could we scroll down a little and concentrate on the right-hand

Page 15298

1 side?

2 JUDGE AGIUS: For all intents and purposes, Witness, please note

3 that since this extract from a newspaper contains a photo of yourself, we

4 are not broadcasting it outside.

5 Go ahead, please.

6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 Q. Could you please look at one paragraph? I'd like to look at it

8 together with you. It reads -- in fact, you are saying this:

9 "Saric, Borovcanin and I had this idea that we want to take the

10 cooperation between the police and the army to the highest possible

11 level. The special brigade of the police, units for special purposes of

12 the police, have played a huge role in this war."

13 Do you see this?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And I'll complete this. You go on to say:

16 "The special brigade of the police has an extraordinary potential,

17 well-trained and tested fighting men I think that is currently the best we

18 have in Republika Srpska."

19 Can you see this?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. This is just a cue for something I want to ask you. What is your

22 personal and professional experience with Ljubomir Borovcanin as a

23 commander in particular combat activities when he performed that activity

24 instead of Saric? What do you think of him as a person, as a superior

25 officer?

Page 15299

1 A. I first met Mr. Borovcanin in end 1992 when he was the commander

2 of a public security station in Bratunac. We worked together on some

3 cases of paramilitary organisation. We neutralised this evil that was

4 starting to appear in the area of Republika Srpska, and our successful

5 cooperation lasted throughout the war. I cannot now enumerate all the

6 operations in which we worked together, but that cooperation turned into

7 regular practice. Wherever we went, the commanders would assign us to

8 be -- to work side by side, because they knew we had a good mutual

9 relationship and understanding and that would contribute to overall

10 success.

11 I can also say that when one is choosing one's friends, one

12 naturally chooses a person with many moral and human qualities and

13 virtues. Ljubomir Borovcanin was always an example to his subordinates

14 and to his colleagues, and at the height of battle he is a man who makes

15 swift and right decisions which decide the outcome of the battle.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.

17 I have no further question.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Stojanovic.

19 Mr. Petrusic.

20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

21 Cross-examination by Mr. Petrusic:

22 Q. General --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Please speak into the microphone.

24 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Petrusic, and today I'm going

Page 15300

1 to have some questions to you on behalf of General Radivoje Miletic's

2 Defence.

3 Yesterday, on your examination-in-chief, you were stopped in

4 mid-1995, in July 1995, when it came to your military career, and since

5 you've said that you completed the highest military schools, including the

6 General and Command Staff Academy, I'm interested in the period from July

7 1995 until the moment you retired. How did your career develop in the

8 then Army of Republika Srpska?

9 A. Yesterday when I spoke about my career, I didn't say anything

10 about July 1995. I said that I was the commander of the Protection

11 Regiment until January 1996. If I didn't say it yesterday, I'm saying it

12 now. Then I was sent for education to the General Staff School of the

13 then Army of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. Having completed that education, I

14 was assigned to the duty of the assistant chief of the General Staff for

15 Security. I stayed in that office until March 1998. Then I was placed at

16 the disposal of the General Staff.

17 I retired on the 30th of July, 2002.

18 Q. You had an occasion to familiarise yourself with the most

19 important documents concerning the command of the army, of the prewar and

20 postwar of the Republika Srpska?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You talked about the organisation of the 65th Protection

23 Regiment. You mentioned the Motorised Battalion that was deployed in the

24 vicinity of Han Pijesak, or the way I understood it, it was in contact

25 with the Zepa Brigade.

Page 15301

1 A. That's correct. I said at the beginning of my testimony that the

2 Motorised Battalion did not keep its original shape. The need and the

3 situation on the ground, it had to be incorporated into the establishment

4 of the Protection Regiment. The Motorised Battalion that had been

5 mobilised from the ranks of the local population, unlike the other units

6 of the regiment which were made of conscripts, at the very beginning of

7 the war this Motorised Battalion was on the strength of the 1st Romanija

8 Brigade. Since the Command of the 1st Romanija Brigade was in Sarajevo,

9 the Command was almost impossible. That's why it was incorporated into

10 the 2nd Romanija Brigade. And then for the same reasons, the Main Staff

11 decided that this Motorised Battalion which held positions facing the Zepa

12 Brigade should become part of the Protection Regiment.

13 Q. In other words, that battalion was involved in constant conflicts,

14 it came under constant attack by the terrorist groups which came out of

15 Zepa and were moving towards the Main Staff; they were constantly in

16 contact with them?

17 A. That's correct. The elements of the combat deployment of the

18 battalion were always targeted. Those were not motorised companies, those

19 were not major, big targets. They were rather the elements of logistics

20 or the weaker elements. Unless they were protected and secure, elements

21 were targeted most of the time.

22 Q. General, I would kindly ask you to make a short pause after my

23 question. It is not my intention to establish who was it who started the

24 conflict in the area, but we have heard witnesses here who claim that you

25 are the -- the Army of Republika Srpska on the 14th of July, 1992, carried

Page 15302

1 out an armed attack on the population of Zepa, on the town of Zepa. I

2 have information that you were one of the participants in that event. I

3 would kindly ask you to tell us what actually happened.

4 A. I did not participate in those events that you are asking me

5 about. This happened on the 4th of June. On the following day, either on

6 the 5th or on the 6th of June, I reported to the duty to which I had been

7 assigned in Crna Rijeka. But since this went on after the 4th, I got

8 involved in dealing with the problems that had arisen, and therefore I can

9 say that as from the 5th or the 6th, I indeed did participate in those

10 events.

11 I must say that this was not an attack launched by the Army of

12 Republika Srpska against Zepa, not at all. I have to say, Your Honours,

13 that very often there was manipulation with the term "Zepa." Zepa was

14 presented as a town, but the village of Zepa has no more than ten houses

15 all together. Still, this doesn't matter when combat is taking place, but

16 still we need to know the size of the place that is targeted.

17 I was informed that the unit of the Republika Srpska Army had been

18 given orders to move from Han Pijesak to the radio relay hub that is on

19 the feature called "Zlovrh." In order to reach that feature, that feature

20 held a permanent crew of the Army of Republika Srpska which maintained

21 regular radio relay communication with the rest of the territory and the

22 rest of the army.

23 In order to be sure that there would be no misunderstanding, the

24 local authorities, civilian and military authorities, got in touch with

25 the representatives of the Muslim people, and they were explained that the

Page 15303

1 movement of the Army Republika Srpska is aimed at carrying out a

2 logistical task, and the logistical task was to provide the troops at

3 Zlovrh with food, clothes and everything, all the other bare necessities.

4 They were assured by Mr. Ramo Cader [phonetic] that there would be no

5 problem, and this gentleman, I believe, was subsequently the chief of the

6 Staff of the Zepa Brigade or, in any case, he had command position there.

7 And this unit that was put together to carry out the task and consisted of

8 the troops from the sector of Pale gave specific orders not to engage in

9 any provocation which might be misinterpreted, in order to avoid any

10 possible negative consequences.

11 Having been given all these guarantees, they embarked on the

12 execution of the task. They passed several Muslim villages, Stoborani,

13 [indiscernible] and Brloznik, and between Brloznik and Borike villages, in

14 a place that is very conducive to setting up ambushes, the column was

15 attacked, and I believe that the Republika Srpska Army suffered the

16 biggest losses ever in any one day. There were over 50 people killed.

17 The rescue operation to pull out the dead and the wounded lasted for days,

18 and that's the part in which I participated in. In other words, the Army

19 of Republika Srpska was marching. It did not display combat deployment

20 aimed at attacking a village or anything else in the territory populated

21 by the Muslim population.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: And do make sure, this was in 1992, not 1995, is it?

23 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] You are right, Mr. President.

24 When I was putting my question, I said "the 4th of June," but I didn't

25 mention the year.

Page 15304

1 Q. Sir, as the Presiding Judge has just stated, the event took place

2 on the 4th of June, 1992; am I right?

3 A. I didn't pay much attention to the year. When you said "the 4th

4 of June," I know it was in 1992, because in 1995 nothing happened on the

5 4th of June.

6 And there's just one more thing that I would like to add. Within

7 the Zepa Brigade, up to the end of the war, there existed a detachment

8 called "The 4th of June." In other words, one unit within that brigade

9 was named "The 4th of June" to commemorate the losses that they inflicted

10 upon the Army of Republika Srpska.

11 Q. After that, the Army of Republika Srpska did not retaliate, there

12 was no operation staged against the Zepa Brigade or the armed population

13 there, although at the time they existed as the 1st Zepa Brigade?

14 A. You are right, there was nothing. The activity on the part of the

15 Army of Republika Srpska concerning the Zepa territory and with the

16 evacuation of the dead and wounded and some of the equipment, some

17 equipment was left there in order to testify to that tragedy, and I

18 believe that these things can still be found at the location. For

19 example, one torched tank can still be seen there.

20 Q. Were there any other attacks on the part of the Muslims to the

21 moment when the protected area was established?

22 A. Yes, unfortunately, there were.

23 Q. In other words, we can say that when things are put in

24 perspective, the notorious fact that after the establishment of the

25 protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, in both enclaves the Muslims were

Page 15305

1 duty-bound to surrender all their weapons, both their small arms as well

2 as all other types of weaponry?

3 A. Yes, that was the obligation, but they still continued with their

4 combat activities, which proves that the obligation was not complied with.

5 Q. One might also say that the task of UNPROFOR, which had its

6 observation points around both protected zones, and I'm currently talking

7 about Zepa, was to take weapons away from any person or military

8 establishment that they might find on the ground?

9 A. Yes. UNPROFOR were supposed to carry out the militarisation and

10 to take over or assume responsibility for the security of the protected

11 area and the population in that protected area.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Vanderpuye, if at any time questions are put to

13 which you would agree to stipulate, perhaps we can cut the testimony of

14 this witness shorter. For example, this last question, I think you would

15 have agreed without any reservations.

16 So let's proceed, Mr. Petrusic.

17 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. You are correct.

18 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] My next question would call for my

19 learned friend's agreement. I shall still put it.

20 Q. We can then agree that UNPROFOR failed in their mission, because

21 the establishment of the 28th Division proves that that mission failed?

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead. Answer the question, General.

23 A. As I've already said, in light of the combat activities from the

24 area of protected areas, after their establishment, one can say that the

25 UNPROFOR troops failed to carry out their mission.

Page 15306

1 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in light of your

2 remark, I am going to put a few more questions that are a well-known fact,

3 and in the past the Prosecutor has never contested any of these facts, and

4 I'm primarily talking about the attacks that were launched from the

5 protected area of Zepa.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Petrusic, I hate to stop you, but if you're

7 saying that the Prosecution has already agreed to these facts, why put

8 them again to this witness in the first place? That's my first remark.

9 The second thing: What's the relevance, all this, to what we

10 should be talking about?

11 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I said that the Prosecutor has not

12 shown the willingness to accept those facts as notorious, and, on the

13 other hand, when it comes to the relevance in the indictment, it still

14 says that military and paramilitary forces of the Army of Republika Srpska

15 expelled the Muslim population from the territory of towns such as

16 Vlasenica, Visegrad, Han Pijesak, into the area of Zepa.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me for entering into this at this point,

19 but I've been here throughout, obviously, the whole trial.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: I thought you were leaving the courtroom.

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: I will, if you would like me to.

22 We have -- we're willing to stipulate that there were attacks

23 outside the Zepa enclave and there was attacks outside the Srebrenica

24 enclave, and that's aggravated the situation and played part of the role

25 in why these attacks occurred. This is a long part of the history.

Page 15307

1 I would even stipulate that UNPROFOR failed in their mission, and

2 if you would stipulate that the VRS helped them fail. But aside from

3 that, I don't know if that's helpful.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's come to the essence of this gentleman's

5 testimony, please, and to 1995.

6 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Bear with me for a moment, Your

7 Honours, please.

8 Could you please put on the screen P192 and at the same time, if

9 it's possible, P35. I would also like to ask the usher to give the

10 witness hard copies of these two exhibits, because I believe it might be

11 easier for him to follow that way.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Petrusic, do you want them one after the other

13 or juxtaposed?

14 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] If it's possible to split the

15 screen, I would like to have them juxtaposed.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: I think it may be possible, but I stand to be

17 corrected. Yes.

18 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. General, please look at the document on the left, issued by the

20 Main Staff of the VRS on 13th July 1995, signed by the commander, General

21 Ratko Mladic. This document is about preventing secret military

22 information in the area of execution of combat activities from being

23 divulged?

24 A. Yes, I see that.

25 Q. It was addressed to your unit, among others. May I draw your

Page 15308

1 attention to the seal as well, the stamp of receipt. What I can make out

2 there, in this first line, it says it was received at 12.20.

3 A. That's correct, I see the same thing, 13th July at 1220 hours.

4 Q. At any rate, it's much earlier than the time indicated on the

5 document on the right numbered 192?

6 A. Correct, at least one hour and 40 minutes earlier.

7 Q. Now, in the document on the right, the one that you do not claim

8 you issued, there are certain assignments and recommendations as to how to

9 perform certain tasks related to the prisoners of war; is that correct?

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Vanderpuye.

12 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 I note that my learned friend has referred to the time that's

14 indicated on the first line of the document on the bottom right-hand side

15 of the page. I would ask that the witness also be instructed to look at

16 the other times that are indicated on that same document. I'm not

17 entirely sure that it's clear, from the question that was put to him or

18 the answer, that he's had an opportunity to see that. In particular, I

19 would direct his attention to the last line in the square, in the box

20 that's on that document.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye.

22 Witness, you have heard that. Mr. Petrusic, would you proceed,

23 please.

24 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, would you agree that the contents of the order issued by

Page 15309

1 the commander of the Main Staff, General Ratko Mladic, is basically the

2 same as the contents of the proposal you sent to the Main Staff?

3 A. Can I look at the document on the left a bit more so that I can

4 compare?

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. While the witness is comparing, yes,

6 Mr. Vanderpuye, you want to show him a hard copy?


8 JUDGE AGIUS: If that is easier with you, Mr. Petrusic. I see

9 Madam Fauveau nodding, so let's proceed that way. I can't see

10 Mr. Petrusic. This is the problem. He's completely hidden behind the

11 column, so I have to switch from video mode to e-court mode all the time

12 to be able to follow.

13 MR. VANDERPUYE: I have also a hard copy of the other one which I

14 could just hand to him, if it's easier.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you agree to that, Ms. Fauveau and Mr. Petrusic?

16 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, let's compare them item by

18 item.

19 In the proposal of measures from the assistant commander for

20 Intelligence and Security, the first point is to forbid access to all

21 uninvited persons. And in the order of the commander of the Main Staff,

22 we see basically the same, "Ban on access to the area of combat

23 operations."

24 JUDGE AGIUS: This is going to take too long. I suppose you have

25 compared them and contrasted them already. Could you just tell us where

Page 15310

1 they differ instead of telling us where they are similar or identical?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, essentially, they are very

3 similar. The third and the fourth points are a bit different. The third

4 one deals with the battalion of the military police and its assignments,

5 and in the order of the commander of the Main Staff the same paragraph

6 relates to many more units, all units of the Drina Corps and two units

7 attached to the Staff in some organs of the Main Staff. So they are

8 similar, but the order of the commander of the Main Staff applies to a

9 larger number of units and a larger area.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, General.

11 Mr. Petrusic.

12 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, the Prosecutor suggested we look at the stamp again, so

14 if I may ask the e-court directors to show us the box again.

15 I don't know how qualified you are to answer this. It's a

16 question better addressed to an encrypting officer, but if we move P35 to

17 the right -- to the right. Right, that's it. You see the receipt stamp

18 of the Romanija Motorised Brigade indicates the 14th of July, 1995?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. So the time on the last line of this stamp -- could we move left

21 again, to the left? Yes. On the last line, which says: "Transmitted

22 2230", and if we now go back to the very beginning, and you will see that

23 this document was addressed to the Drina Corps, can you see that?

24 A. Yes, the Command of the Drina Corps.

25 Q. And it reached the Command of the Drina Corps, which we know

Page 15311

1 because the documentation from the Drina Corps and the rest was

2 transmitted by the authorities of the Republika Srpska to the OTP, so I

3 believe that the "2230" is the time when the Drina Corps sends this

4 telegram to its subordinate unit, the Romanija Brigade.

5 A. I really couldn't say anything about this stamp. It is the

6 encryption men who are qualified. But it sounds logical, it makes sense

7 that the other documents we have seen took the same path and took

8 approximately the same time. And in this case, we have a document from

9 the commander of the Main Staff which received probably greater priority

10 than some other documents from lower levels.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we can stop here for the day.

12 Mr. Petrusic, you will continue tomorrow, and then we will finish

13 off also the remaining cross-examinations.

14 General, we are stopping here. The same thing -- the same advise

15 I gave you yesterday. You are not to communicate with anyone on the

16 subject matter of your testimony.

17 Have a nice evening, all of you.

18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

19 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 13th day of

20 September, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.