1 Thursday, 8 November 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.28 p.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good afternoon, Madam Registrar. Could you call the
7 case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is the case
9 number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, ma'am. Good afternoon, everybody. All
11 the accused are here. From the Defence teams I notice the absence of
12 Mr. Ostojic and Mr. Bourgon. Prosecution is Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Thayer.
13 General Smith is present already. Good afternoon to you, General.
14 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: We are going to proceed with Madam Fauveau's
16 cross-examination and then we'll move to the next. Madam Fauveau.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
18 WITNESS: RUPERT ANTHONY SMITH [Resumed]
19 Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau: [Continued]
20 Q. Good afternoon, General. You were part in several military
21 operations in several countries. Would you agree that in well-planned
22 military operations to the greatest level of detail, even in this case
23 it's hard to avoid having civilian casualties?
24 A. It can be hard to avoid civilian casualties. It's not necessarily
25 the case, though, in all military operations.
1 Q. Do you remember having a meeting with Mr. Akashi and General
2 Janvier in June 1995?
3 A. At least -- I had at least one meeting, yes.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown Exhibit
6 Q. It was a meeting in Split on the 9th of June 1995, and I'd like to
7 show you page 3. May we see paragraph 12? In the last part of the
8 paragraph, one can read that General Janvier said the following: [In
9 English] What would be most acceptable to the Serbs would be to leave the
10 enclaves. It is the more realistic approach and it makes sense from the
11 military point of view. But it is impossible for the international
12 community to accept. [Interpretation] What I'm interested in here is
13 whether you were sharing this opinion. Did you think that the most
14 realistic approach was for UNPROFOR to leave the enclaves and that it made
15 sense militarily speaking.
16 A. Can I have time to read the whole of this document before I answer
17 this? I want to refresh my memory of this particular --
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, by all means, General.
19 THE WITNESS: Could we go to the first page, then, please?
20 And can we go down the page now, please?
21 And to the next page?
22 And on?
23 Oh, that's quicker. Thank you very much.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: We've given the witness a hard copy.
25 THE WITNESS: And the question?
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
2 Q. My question was the following: Did you share the view that the
3 most realistic approach was that UNPROFOR left the enclaves and that this
4 approach made sense from a military point of view?
5 A. No, I'm not sharing that view.
6 Q. When Srebrenica fell, it was certain that the territory would be
7 split between the Republika Srpska and the Federation of
9 A. What do you mean, the territory of Srebrenica or the whole of
11 Q. I mean the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina but when Srebrenica
12 fell, there were also ongoing negotiations about -- relating to splitting
13 the territory?
14 A. There were certainly ongoing negotiations. In one way or another
15 they had been going on throughout the whole of this war, but there was no
16 certainty as to where the split would be.
17 Q. You mentioned the meeting you had with Mr. Carl Bildt in Belgrade
18 on the 15th of July 1995, after the fall of Srebrenica. During that
19 meeting with Mr. Bildt, did he mention to you a meeting he had a few days
20 before but that was after the fall of Srebrenica, with the Minister of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Sacirbey?
22 A. He might have done. I don't recall it.
23 Q. I would like to show you Exhibit 5D513. It's an excerpt from
24 Mr. Carl Bildt's book where he described that meeting. Can we show page
25 3? I'd like to draw your attention to the paragraph -- well, that's on
1 the right-hand side and that's the paragraph starting with the news that
2 and in the middle of the paragraph it says the following: [In English] "I
3 was meeting Foreign Minister Sacirbey in one of those charmless, half
4 furnished rooms given to the members of the European Members of Parliament
5 in the parliament of Strasbourg. Surprisingly, I was more upset by what
6 had happened than he seemed to be. His calm reactions and controlled
7 arguments still seemed me to be a mysterious piece of the Srebrenica
9 "Srebrenica, he said, had always been a problem for his
10 government. They knew that the peace settlement would mean the loss of
11 the enclave. So from this point of view what had happened made things
13 [Interpretation] I would like to ask you the following: You had
14 many contacts with Bosnian authorities, and did you also have the feeling
15 that losing Srebrenica made things easier for them?
16 A. No, I didn't, and I don't recall anyone raising anything -- saying
17 anything like that.
18 Q. I would like to show you another document, it's a UN document.
19 It's Exhibit 5D40. In fact, it's a document sent by Mr. Akashi to
20 Mr. Annan on the evening of the 11th of July, right after the fall of
21 Srebrenica. As you can see, a copy of this document was sent to you as
22 well for your information. I know that you arrived in Sarajevo not at
23 that time but at a later stage, but when you arrived, did you have the
24 opportunity to see this document?
25 A. I would expect that I did read it, yes.
1 Q. I would like to go to page 2 of this document. It's the paragraph
2 starting with B and then goes on UNHCR. And this paragraph, the following
3 is said: [In English] "UNHCR reports that 80 per cent to 90 per cent of
4 the population of Srebrenica total population is 40.000 people are
5 displaced persons who fled fighting earlier in the war. Thus they do not
6 have long standing ties to homes and property in the enclave and will
7 probably be interested in leaving for Tuzla. An UNHCR local staff member
8 in Srebrenica reported today that virtually everyone in the enclave wishes
9 to leave."
10 [Interpretation] So this paragraph confirms that the population of
11 Srebrenica wanted to leave after the fall of Srebrenica.
12 A. That's what it states, the UNHCR man is saying. Yes.
13 Q. And then it further down, not the next sentence but the one after,
14 the following is said: [In English] "Following consultation with the
15 Bosnian government, and in order to avoid a continued humanitarian
16 catastrophe, an agreement will be elicited from the Bosnian Serbs to allow
17 all residents of Srebrenica including all men to leave for Tuzla if they
18 so wish. The Dutch will be instructed to remain in the Srebrenica enclave
19 at least until arrangements have been negotiated and finalised with
20 Bosnian Serbs authority for the departure from the enclave of those
22 [Interpretation] So we can deduct from this part that it was
23 indeed the Bosnian government that initiated the departure of the
24 population from Srebrenica with the help of UNPROFOR.
25 A. I'm not sure who initiated the -- I mean, reading that document,
1 it doesn't say that the Bosnian government initiated the idea. But
2 according to that document, that's what they are doing, yes.
3 Q. From a strictly military point of view, can we say that the
4 capture of Srebrenica by the Serbs was justified?
5 A. There is no military justification for a military act. It's --
6 the justification is in its political setting. So I don't think I can
7 answer your question.
8 Q. Okay. I'm going to rephrase it. First of all, can the witness be
9 shown Exhibit 5D493? That's an excerpt from the NIOD report which refers
10 to some of your declarations. Can the witness be shown page 2? So I'd
11 like to draw your attention to the first sentence of this page where it
12 says, [In English] "After the event too, it transpired that UNPROFOR had
13 viewed the eastern enclaves as untenable. In an interview General Smith
14 admitted that Srebrenica would fall sooner or later."
15 [Interpretation] And then later on, there is a summary of your
16 meeting with Mladic on the 7th of March 1995. Do you remember giving an
17 interview where you said such things, that Srebrenica would fall sooner or
19 A. I don't remember that. And I would go back to what I have said
20 before. Putting myself in Mladic's position, I could conceive of these
21 actions and the reasons for doing them. And I think that's what I'm
22 talking about when I'm being questioned for that report.
23 Q. It's quite possible, because looking at paragraph 2, the second
24 sentence, the following sentence is said: [In English] "In early 1995,
25 General Smith had told the US ambassador in Sarajevo, if I were Mladic I
1 would take the enclaves."
2 A. Again, I don't think I did say take. I've used the word myself,
3 squeeze, all along. Those were the words I was using when I was
4 discussing my thesis.
5 Q. [Interpretation] But you were in contact with the US ambassador
6 while you were in Sarajevo?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. I would like to show you a video recording from 1993, and given
9 your position at the Ministry of Defence, I was wondering if maybe you
10 could tell us a few words about this video. But before watching it, I
11 would like to ask you the following question. When you worked for the
12 Ministry of Defence, did you have information that UNPROFOR members
13 carried members for --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Carried weapons, interpreter's correction.
15 MS. FAUVEAU:
16 Q. -- for Muslim fighters?
17 A. You mean supplied weapons to the Bosnians?
18 Q. Yes, quite.
19 A. No. I had no information of that.
20 Q. I'd like to show you a video that lasts approximately two minutes
21 and 20 seconds. It's Exhibit 5D488.
22 [Videotape played]
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Fauveau, we are not receiving any sound. I
24 don't know if it is accompanied --
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, if there is a
1 transcript, it's in Arabic and I was unable to understand it and besides,
2 I'm mostly interested in the pictures more than the sound. I have two
3 more videos where I have a transcript.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Just one moment, yes, Mr. Thayer?
5 MR. THAYER: I'm just wondering if we have any information about
6 where this video came from other than the year, which we have been given,
7 the location or anything else about the providence or location, anything,
8 any details whatsoever?
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely. I received this
10 video from the office of the Republika Srpska in charge of cooperation.
11 The video was shot in 1993 in Zenica and I think I already said that it's
12 a video from 1993.
13 Q. So this is a British vehicle, isn't it?
14 A. It's a British flag on a white vehicle. I can't tell you any more
15 than that.
16 Q. Yes. I fully accept that. Can we carry on watching it?
17 [Videotape played]
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think we can stop.
19 Q. What we see on this video is that UN vehicles or at least vehicles
20 having UN colours carried fighters that we called the Mujahedin.
21 A. Is there a question?
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. I wouldn't interpret it like that.
24 Q. Still, you said that when you were -- worked for the Ministry of
25 Defence, you never heard of such things, but during your time in Bosnia,
1 did you hear that UNPROFOR units were involved in such actions, i.e.
2 supplying weapons or equipments or even fighters, all this for the
4 A. I heard allegations to that effect in -- when I was in command,
6 Q. And did those allegations include the humanitarian convoys?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. I would like to show you the recording 5D518, and we have a
9 transcript for that. I hope we'll be able to hear it. And in any case, I
10 have a written transcript as well.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Has General Smith been given a copy of the
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm being told that
14 there is no B/C/S sound for technical reasons, I guess.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Fine. But if there is going to be a
16 question, I would imagine there will be, he needs to know what is
17 supposedly stated in this video here.
18 Take your time to read it, General, and then if it's necessary to
19 watch the video clip, we do. If not, we can proceed with the question.
20 [Videotape played]
21 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
22 "At the Ilidza checkpoint, the Serbian army discovered 24.500
23 bullets in United Nations trucks authorised to transport humanitarian aid
24 to Muslims in Hrasnica.
25 "A convoy transporting humanitarian aid from the airport to Butmir
1 and Hrasnica was stopped today in Ilidza. Followinga routine check by
2 Ilidza military police members, it was discovered that the containers with
3 flour had a false bottom with steel boxes. This was good enough reason to
4 question the regularity of the convoy.
5 "Members of the French Battalion who were escorting the convoy
6 were not able to tell us what was in the bunkers beneath the containers.
7 "The convoy was held up, members of UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and the
8 police were called in and in their presence the check was carried out.
9 The containers were off-loaded from the trucks and with the help of crane
10 the upper part of the containers were detached from the platform to which
11 they were attached.
12 Journalist: "Mr. Popadic, the check is now complete. Tell us
13 what you have discovered in the trucks transporting humanitarian aid to
15 Mr. Popadic: "Found in the trucks which left for Hrasnica this
16 morning at 0945 hours were 5.000 rounds of 12.7 ammunition, and 19.540
17 rounds of 7.9 sniper ammunition. They were discovered, as you could see
18 for yourself, in the false bottom under the containers. This is the
19 second time that we have found aid for the Muslim forces side in weapons
20 and ammunition in humanitarian aid in the zone of responsibility of the
21 Ilidza Brigade.
22 Journalist: "Did you see whose ammunition it is? Do you know?
23 Where is it from?
24 Mr. Popadic: "All the ammunition was produced in the Konjic and
25 was transported by air to Sarajevo airport and then by land. On this
1 occasion it was being transported and escorted by the French forces and
2 this quantity of ammunition was discovered.
3 "We asked for the UN gentlemen for official information but we
4 got none because, as they explained to us, they are not authorised to give
6 "In an informal talk with the UNHCR representative, he claimed
7 that they have nothing to do with the trucks or containers and that they
8 were responsible exclusively for the load being transported in the
9 containers and that they are not interested in what is under the
11 "The representatives of the Foreign Legion excused themselves by
12 saying that they only escorted the convoy and the UN police claimed that
13 they would examine the case and inform us of the results as soon as
15 "Right now we do not yet know who loaded the trucks at the
16 airport and where the ammunition was loaded. We do not know what is
17 happening with the checks at the airport and how many such convoys have
18 gone past, but one thing is certain and that is that this is the umpteenth
19 time that we see that UNPROFOR is transporting and distributing weapons
20 and ammunition to the Muslims under the guise of humanitarian aid."
21 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, I think I owe you an explanation about an event in Ilidza
23 in 1994. This is what this clip is about so that was before you arrived
24 in Bosnia. Here is my question: In 1995, while you were in Bosnia, Serbs
25 usually or frequently said that the roads to Ilidza was being used to
1 supply weapons to the Muslim troops by humanitarian convoys, that is by
2 humanitarian organisations and UNPROFOR.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm not quite sure that you have understood that
4 this is the question.
5 THE WITNESS: Oh, I see, I'm sorry, I thought that was a
7 JUDGE AGIUS: I quite understand why. But it is a question.
8 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I don't recall that being said in the
9 way you have just said it. There was a -- there was undoubtedly suspicion
10 that other things than purely humanitarian aid could get on -- be put on
11 vehicles and so forth. That was said to us on a number of occasions and
12 not only about Ilidza.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I'd like now to show you another video clip. It is a clip related
15 to an incident which took place at Rogatica, it was a check-point for
16 Bosnia, in 1995, while you were serving in Bosnia. It is Exhibit 5D519.
17 I have a transcription of this video clip, and I must warn you the
18 sound in the B/C/S version is of very poor quality.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could this video clip be shown,
21 [Videotape played]
22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
23 "Along with food for the people of the Muslim enclave of Zepa, the
24 UNHCR representatives were transporting ammunition for Muslim soldiers.
25 "At the Rogatica check-point, a routine inspection of the convoy
1 loaded at the UNHCR warehouse in Pancevo turned up ammunition o various
2 calibres hidden among the goods, mainly the flour, and in the cabs of the
4 VRS soldier: "While inspecting the convoy, in about the fifth
5 sack I checked using a knife, I noticed there was something in the flour.
6 When I carried out a regular inspection, I discovered the ammunition.
7 "Without a doubt this sort of conduct represents the severest form
8 of criminal activity and is utterly in contradiction with the mandate and
9 nature of humanitarian missions.
10 "Whether or not they felt caught in the act by the ammunition
11 found in the convoy the leader and one of the drivers reacted as follows:
12 Convoy member: I do not know anything about the ammunition found in the
13 flour and I have nothing to say.
14 Convoy Member: "I don't know where the ammunition in the truck
15 came from. I don't know what to say, I cannot say anything really.
16 Commander of the Army of Republika Sprska, Colonel General Ratko Mladic,
17 sent protests to the UNHCR offices in Sagreb, Belgrade and Pale, and asked
18 that competent officials there take immediate measures to avoid similar
19 incidents in the future.
20 "General Mladic also informed the UNHCR representatives about the
21 fate of the convoy that was stopped and its personnel. General Mladic's
22 statement said that the goods will be confiscated and appropriate legal
23 measures taken against those responsible.
24 "What else can we say as we watch the images from Rogatica that
25 best testify to the human nature of international humanitarian
2 "Need we remind them that they have always been welcome and safe
3 on the Serbian side in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina? Need we remind
4 them that the food for the Muslim population arrives in these convoys
5 above all because of the understanding of the Serbs? Need we remind them
6 how many times this understanding has been abused? Should they ask
7 themselves who has the right to transport ammunition and weapons along
8 with food?
9 "It seems they should.
10 Pictures tell best and most eloquently on whose side the truth
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
13 Q. In this video, mention is made of a letter of protest sent by
14 General Mladic to the UNHCR representatives. Did you have meetings with
15 the UNHCR on allegations of supply of weapons to the Muslims by
16 humanitarian convoys?
17 A. When was this incident?
18 Q. In 1995.
19 A. Yes, but when in 1995?
20 Q. In April 1995?
21 A. April 1995. I don't recall a meeting -- a specific meeting with
22 UNHCR on this subject, and I remark that General Mladic is writing to the
23 UNHCR elsewhere than Sarajevo. So I don't know where this convoy came
24 from. It doesn't appear to have UNPROFOR with it at all.
25 Q. This convoy came from Pancevo.
1 A. Remind me where that is. Could you remind me where that is?
2 Q. This is in Serbia.
3 A. So it came from Serbia to Zepa?
4 Q. Yes, sir.
5 A. I'm not very clear how it gets to Rogatica then.
6 Q. I can't tell you, I'm afraid.
7 A. It seems a rather long route. I don't recall this incident. And
8 I'm working solely off this transcript.
9 Q. At any rate, my question was of a more general nature. While you
10 were in Bosnia, did you have meetings with UNHCR representatives
11 concerning the supply of weapons to Muslims?
12 A. No. I do not recall having a meeting about that.
13 Q. When the Serbs were saying that UNPROFOR was involved, and I'm not
14 talking about that specific incident but more generally involved in the
15 supply of weapons to Muslims, did you investigate the matter?
16 A. When I had a specific allegation, yes, we would investigate it.
17 Q. Do we have reports that were drafted after the investigations
18 you're talking about?
19 A. I would imagine so. I don't recall the -- what bureaucratic
20 process took place.
21 Q. Were you informed of the outcomes of such investigations?
22 A. I expect I was. Again, I would have -- I can't recall a specific
24 Q. Would you agree that the transport of weapons and equipment --
25 such equipment in humanitarian convoys is forbidden?
1 A. Yes. It wasn't what we were supposed to be doing.
2 Q. And in a particular armed conflict, when one party clears convoys
3 through its territory so that humanitarian aid can reach the population of
4 the other party, the authorising party is entitled to check whether or not
5 such convoys do not carry forbidden equipment?
6 A. Yes. That's -- indeed, that was what was agreed and done.
7 Q. I'd like to go back to the statement you gave to the Office of the
8 Prosecutor in August 1996. It is Exhibit 6D180. While this statement is
9 being displayed on the screen, I have one preliminary question. Is it
10 true that -- or do you remember that in this statement, you described a
11 contact you'd had with various representatives of the military and
12 political authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska?
13 A. I don't know. I need to look at the piece of paper to see whether
14 it's true but...
15 Q. Very well.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 2 of
17 his statement?
18 Q. I'd like to draw your attention to the last paragraph in the
19 English version, or the next-to-last paragraph, to be more specific. You
20 referred to the contacts you'd had with President Izetbegovic and in this
21 paragraph, in the middle of the paragraph, indicates that you met him
22 quite frequently.
23 A. M'hm, yes.
24 Q. Take a look at the next paragraph, you're talking about your
25 meetings with Vice-president Ganic. The last line of there paragraph
1 indicates that you met him regularly and sometimes even three times a
2 week. It's the last line on this page.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And I guess that you're talking here of the period up to the
5 accident suffered by Vice-president Ganic which took place at the end of
6 June. Could we now move to the next page, please?
7 In the next paragraph, you talking about your contacts with
8 Mr. Silajdzic, and at the very bottom of the page -- could we display the
9 very bottom of that page, please? You mention contacts with the Bosnian
10 military authorities, with General Rasim Delic, General Hajrulahovic,
11 General Dudakovic.
12 Now, I'd like to show you the third paragraph on that same page,
13 please. You're talking about the contacts you had at the time with
14 Minister Muratovic, and in the third line of that same paragraph, you
15 indicate that you met with Muratovic more often than with any other
16 Bosnian government official.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. If you were meeting Mr. Ganic three times a week, how many times a
19 week did you meet with Mr. Muratovic?
20 A. I can't remember to that amount of detail. There would be
21 occasions when it might be at least three times a week but probably not,
22 when I was meeting Ganic at that rate.
23 Q. Could we move to the next page, please? In the middle paragraph,
24 the third paragraph, you're talking about your contacts with Radovan
25 Karadzic, and somewhere in the middle of the paragraph, you indicate that
1 you had no meetings with him after the hostage crisis in May and June
2 other than a brief encounter in December which was the last time you saw
3 him. Could you confirm that you never met Karadzic after the hostage
4 crisis in May and June 1995?
5 A. I think that's right except for that last meeting in December, is
6 it? Yeah.
7 Q. Then you talk about your contacts with Momcilo Krajisnik, and I
8 don't know how often you met Momcilo Krajisnik. Could you please tell us
9 how often you met him? How many times did you have meetings with him?
10 A. I can't tell you the precise amount of times, no. What does it
11 say in that paragraph? I might be able to help you more if I could read
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness the last
14 paragraph, please?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes. I can't remember any great number of meetings
16 after that period of April-May, but I really can't remember.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we show the next page to the
18 witness, please?
19 Q. First we're talking about Nikola Koljevic and Aleks Buha. If you
20 want I'll give you time to read both paragraphs. I'd like you to tell me
21 how many times you had the opportunity to meet these two people. I'm not
22 asking for a specific answer but an approximate number.
23 A. I would have thought that Koljevic was much the same amount of
24 times as I did Krajisnik, and I'm trying to remember how many times I saw
25 Buha, but I do remember him at the end in that paragraph but I can't
1 recall, certainly not a higher incidence than Professor Koljevic.
2 Q. The last person referred to here, and I'm talking here about
3 politicians, is Mr. Zametica and here I believe this is clear enough since
4 you said [In English] The company of Karadzic with the exception of when I
5 met him in the company of Koljevic.
6 [Interpretation] In the case versus Slobodan Milosevic, on the 9th
7 of October 2003, page 27364 of the transcript, you said that you'd met
8 General Mladic some ten times in total. Is that an accurate figure, more
9 or less?
10 A. I'll -- as long as we keep it at "some." We'll live with ten,
11 yes. I would have to go back and find the diary and all the rest of it to
12 be any more precise.
13 Q. Would you agree that your contacts with the Bosnian authorities
14 were more frequent and regular than your contacts with the representatives
15 of the Republika Srpska?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Don't you think that such a difference in the contacts you had
18 with one party and the other could lead the Serbs to think that you and
19 UNPROFOR were partial and pro-Muslims?
20 A. No, I don't think it at all. We often asked to go and talk to
21 Serb officials and were denied, and there was just as much opportunity to
22 talk to us if people had wanted to.
23 Q. A moment ago, when I mentioned your meetings with President
24 Karadzic, I spoke about the hostage crisis. Is it true that those
25 hostages were free during the first half of the month of June?
1 A. Yes. I think they were all freed by the end of, certainly by the
2 end of June.
3 Q. But they were not freed on the same day, all of them, I mean?
4 A. No. They were freed in a series. Again, I'd have to go and look
5 at bits of paper to give you any detail.
6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have no further
7 questions for this witness.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Merci, Madam.
9 Who is next? Who is going next? Have you come to an agreement
10 between you? I see you hesitating, Mr. Josse. I don't know. Usually we
11 expect you to tell us --
12 MR. JOSSE: Well, I'm clearly going to be the longest, and I
13 suspect by far the longest of those who are yet to cross-examine this
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Before I ask to you proceed with your
16 cross-examination, can we have a review of the time you require. The
17 Popovic Defence team had asked for 30 minutes.
18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We will not cross-examine this witness, Your
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. That's -- the Nikolic, I think yesterday you
21 sent a message that you will not be cross-examining the witness. Do you
22 confirm that, Madam Nikolic?
23 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, thank you very
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Merci, Madam. Mr. Meek?
1 MR. MEEK: Your Honour from what I've heard so far, I don't
2 believe I'll have any cross-examination.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Meek. Mr. Lazarevic?
4 MR. LAZAREVIC: It is unlikely that we will cross-examine this
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Haynes?
7 MR. HAYNES: Similar.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. And Mr. Josse, you were unsure whether it
9 would be four hours or six hours?
10 MR. JOSSE: I'm still unsure.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's start then. You seem to be the only
12 one left.
13 MR. JOSSE: Well, I've got no option. It's clearly now or never,
14 Your Honour.
15 Cross-examination by Mr. Josse:
16 Q. Sir Rupert, my name is David Josse and along with Dragan Krgovic,
17 I represent General Gvero. Actually, the very first subject that I want
18 to ask you about was the matter you literally alluded to in the last
19 answer you gave to Madam Fauveau and that relates to notes that you have
20 of the events that you have been describing. You mentioned a moment ago
21 as well a diary. What diary is that, please?
22 A. I'm not talking of a diary. I was talking about diaries such as
23 would be available perhaps in some record or other of what I did.
24 Q. At the time of these events, in other words when you were UNPROFOR
25 commander, did you keep any sort of personal diary?
1 A. As an agenda, as what I was doing on tomorrow or the next day, do
2 you mean? Or as a record of my thoughts?
3 Q. Well, I meant more the latter but --
4 A. No, I didn't keep the latter.
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. There is a -- there was undoubtedly a pocket book of some
7 description somewhere in which I said to myself, I must ring my wife
8 tomorrow or whatever.
9 Q. Yes. Ms. Cmeric is a lady, who you just saw indicating to me, has
10 the advantage over both of us. She understands both English and B/C/S and
11 she is indicating to me that I am going far too fast because of course
12 everything that I say and you say needs to be translated into two other
13 languages. It's primarily my fault, and I will try and go much more
15 A. So will I.
16 Q. When you produced your witness statement in August of 1996, we see
17 on the front cover that Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter was present. Now I
18 appreciate that this was a long time ago, but to what extent did he assist
19 you in writing that statement?
20 A. My memory as I dictated it, and would occasionally ask him about a
21 particular event before putting, you know, dictating that bit of it. I
22 can't -- I think that's what I did. I'm not entirely sure. And then
23 presumably there was a draft which I then corrected.
24 Q. You and he, I assume, had parted by then. That is, you were both
25 in different jobs which were not connected to one another. Is that
2 A. Again, my memory, and that might be helped if we saw the date on
3 the top of the document.
4 Q. It's the 14th of August of 1996.
5 A. Well, at that time, we are definitely not in the same jobs. I'm
6 not entirely sure what he was doing then. So if we are both together,
7 he's come out to my headquarters in Northern Ireland.
8 Q. And in fact in due course, he was promoted to full colonel and
9 then became a brigadier; is that correct?
10 A. That is right.
11 Q. Yes. We have been informed, in what are called the proofing notes
12 that Mr. Thayer provided to us, that the following -- and I'll read it out
13 if I may. "At the time of his interviews with OTP in 1996, and later with
14 NIOD, he had some documents which he had retained from his time as
15 commander UNPROFOR. The documents were ones which had gone out under his
16 signature and also consisted of Baxter's notes of meetings at which he was
18 "He does not recall giving copies of these documents to the OTP;
19 although, he did refer to them during the interview and the witness
20 statement clearly refers to them. He believes he gave copies of the
21 documents to NIOD. He destroyed the documents when he was at SHAPE"
22 First of all, SHAPE is a NATO --
23 A. Yes, it's the anagram for the supreme headquarters allied powers
24 you were.
25 Q. My second question is what documents are you referring to there,
2 A. When I left the command, there were what you might call my
3 personal files. They would contain -- it contained copies of those
4 documents such as we've seen, the reports by Baxter and reports, those
5 documents I drafted myself, such as that one we've seen again of the
6 situation immediately after the fall of Srebrenica, when I've just got
7 back into Sarajevo. They went with me when I left the headquarters.
8 Q. And you can confirm that they were destroyed at some point in
10 A. To the best of my knowledge they were all got rid of when I left
11 the service in -- which, when I was at SHAPE.
12 Q. Now in preparation for the 1996 witness statement, you were
13 clearly and understandably reliant on the fairly full memoranda from
14 Baxter, many of which this Court has already seen; is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. When you came to prepare for the -- your evidence in the cases of
17 Slobodan Milosevic, Dragomir Milosevic, and now in relation to these seven
18 accused, did you have any other notes which you were or are able to refer
19 to at all?
20 A. Other than -- and I don't actually remember whether I did --
21 because if I remember correctly, I'm still serving when the Milosevic case
22 is -- occurs, I'm -- I don't have anything other than those to refer to
23 when they existed. I answered that, but yes.
24 Q. And one or two other questions on this. Your book, "The Utility
25 of Force," fairly extensive chapter on Bosnia, correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Primarily you deal with events in a chronological sequence. How
3 did you gather the material together for that in order to recount your own
4 personal tale and movements?
5 A. Well, some of it's memory. Some of it's drawing on other
6 accounts. I don't actually remember having any difficulty in going
7 through the dates of -- and the general flow of that chapter, and if we
8 were referring to anything, it was looking up things like the UN report on
9 Srebrenica and so forth, which were -- gave us the details we required.
10 Q. Did you as a matter of interest have Baxter's memoranda to hand?
11 A. No, I don't think I did. They would have gone by then.
12 Q. And you can confirm that you do not have in your possession any
13 personal note that relates to this time, of any detail? I'm not
14 referring, let me hastily add to personal mementos or jottings of a few
15 words, but I'm talking about significant --
16 A. I do not think I possess the documents such as we've been having
17 shown here, tucked in some file somewhere we may find one or two, but I
18 don't have a great sort of body of documents, no.
19 Q. Thank you. Moving on, if I can deal with this very briefly and
20 it's fairly obvious, you are relating to us events that took place over 12
21 years ago, memory fades over a 12 year period; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You have understandably peppered your evidence with the words, "I
24 think" and "to the best of my recollection" for obvious and sensible
25 reasons. Do you agree with that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. The past 12 years have been busy years for you, some in services
3 you've described, and when you retired from the British army, you
4 continued to lead a busy and active professional life?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. So much so, and I don't mean to embarrass you here, but by way of
7 example you couldn't fit into your schedule an hour to see me prior to
8 giving evidence in this case. That's an illustration of the sort of busy
9 professional life you lead, sir, correct?
10 A. Indeed.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: We have another five minutes until the break.
13 MR. JOSSE: I was going to move on to another --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I think looking to your eyes I thought.
15 MR. JOSSE: I think I can finish the next subject in five minutes.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead.
17 MR. JOSSE:
18 Q. Next subject, Sir Rupert, relates to protocol and it's protocol of
19 whom you dealt with and who dealt with whom when you were UNPROFOR
20 commander. For the most part, your point of contact was Mladic? He being
21 your fellow commander, correct?
22 A. Yes. A point of contact, I'm not sure is quite the word I'd use,
23 but it was he I needed to convince, if you like. It was he who was going
24 to make a decision.
25 Q. Bearing in mind that General Janvier was the force commander, and
1 was your superior, you being the UNPROFOR commander, how did that work in
2 relation to your and his, that is Janvier's dealings with Mladic?
3 A. In -- what happened after the bombing in May was that the dealings
4 with General Mladic was taken over by General Janvier, but there was
5 nothing before that that said that either one or other of us must be the
6 person doing the dealing with Mladic. The division, if you like, of to
7 who was doing this occurred after May and after the meeting in Belgrade,
8 both of us were dealing with General Mladic, as I recall it.
9 Q. And lower down the chain, would you agree that there was quite
10 strict protocol so that, for example, in sector Sarajevo, General
11 Gobillard's direct counterpart was General Milosevic?
12 A. Yes, as a general rule, that's how it worked. There was a
13 matching of the hierarchies.
14 Q. And I think your Chief of Staff, General Nicolai's counterpart,
15 was General Milovanovic; is that right?
16 A. Yes. If we looked at the organisational diagrams.
17 Q. Communication within UNPROFOR, do you recall how you communicated
18 with Janvier, English or French or through an interpreter?
19 A. We communicated in English directly, him to me, me to him, but
20 General Baxter spoke good French -- I beg your pardon, Colonel Baxter
21 spoke good French. And so if there was any great difficulties, we could
22 go back into French and check, and I can't remember his name but one of
23 General Janvier's equivalents to Baxter had very good English so there was
24 another check that way.
25 Q. And what about with Gobillard?
1 A. Again, in English, but there was Colonel Baxter again, and General
2 Gobillard had an English speaker on his staff.
3 Q. I can tell you his name. I think his name was Fortin, does that
4 name mean anything to you?
5 A. It rings a bell.
6 MR. JOSSE: Thank you, Your Honour. That's a convenient moment.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Josse. We will have a 25-minute
9 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 4.14 p.m.
11 MR. JOSSE:
12 Q. Sir, a matter connected to protocol that I want to ask you about
13 relates to mementoes and gifts that UNPROFOR senior officers gave to the
14 generals of the warring parties. Was that something that you personally
15 engaged in?
16 A. I don't think I did. I don't recall it. I remember being given a
17 small token by President Karadzic when I left. I don't think I handed
18 anything over myself. And I certainly didn't see General Mladic when I
19 was leaving.
20 Q. And perhaps it's my fault. I was more interested in the exchange
21 going the other way, that is UN senior officers giving mementoes or gifts,
22 really mementoes is what I'm interested in, to the generals of the three
23 warring parties. Did that happen as far as you know?
24 A. I don't think it happened in my case, and I can't recall of a case
25 where it was done by others in my time, that I was aware of.
1 Q. I appreciate that being in the middle, as you undoubtedly were, of
2 a war is not the same as being in a war oneself. However, I'm curious as
3 to whether this type of gesture is or was something that UN generals were
4 encouraged to partake in in order to try and smooth the waters with the
5 generals who were actually fighting the war?
6 A. I don't think there was any encouragement to do it. No one was
7 being urged to do it. And as I say, I can't actually think of a case
8 where I knew it was happening, and I don't think I did it. I certainly
9 don't remember doing it.
10 Q. And you didn't do it for what reason? Because you rather than me
11 putting words in your mouth, you tell us, please.
12 A. The idea didn't -- I don't think it occurred to me to do it, and
13 I -- I don't recall having the -- what sort of gift are we talking about?
14 This is a question I've asked to myself. Are we talking about the sort of
15 regimental plaque that one might have had as some token?
16 Q. Yes, sorry to interrupt, that's exactly what I had this mind?
17 A. Then maybe that would be the sort of currency of that sort of
18 thing, and you might pass one of those over, yes. But I don't think I
19 did, and if I did, it was part of the, if you like, ritual dance of these
20 events rather than anything of any meaning.
21 Q. Okay. I'm now going to turn to the various meetings that you had
22 with General Gvero, but perhaps before do I that, to put it into context,
23 it's right, isn't it, that he is not mentioned at all in your book
24 "Utility of Force"?
25 A. Well, I believe that to be the case but we could go and check the
1 index, if you wish, but I don't think I mentioned General Gvero, no.
2 Q. It's also right that his name did not crop up when you were giving
3 evidence in the case of Slobodan Milosevic?
4 A. I don't recall using his name then either, no.
5 Q. Now, I'm going to begin, so that we are all clear, with the four
6 meetings that you had with him for which minutes exist, and the first of
7 these you have told us about occurred on the 20th of April at Pale and the
8 minute is P2936. And I think we can go straight to the third page because
9 we've already looked at the second page, where you told us, and I'll
10 summarise this, that you were accompanied by Mr. Akashi, Karadzic,
11 Koljevic, Krajisnik, and Gvero were present from the Bosnian Serb side.
12 And we can --
13 A. Could I just -- I was accompanying Mr. Akashi. He was the
14 Secretary-General's representative, not me.
15 Q. Explain the significance of that, please?
16 A. He is my, if you like, political superior.
17 Q. I may come back to that in a moment when we look at the entry in
18 relation to Sarajevo airport but before we do that, let's have a look at
19 paragraph 9, where you deal with the issue of safety and resupply of UN
20 personnel. Do you recall whether General Gvero had anyone to assist him
21 at the meeting?
22 A. No, I don't recall that.
23 Q. I want to suggest that he had a man there called Marjanovic, I'm
24 going to spell that, that's M-A-R-J-A-N-O-V-I-C, who was some sort of
25 chief of technical services within the VRS. Do you recall anyone like
1 that being there?
2 A. No, I don't remember that.
3 Q. It's a possibility; is that correct? You're not saying --
4 A. I'm not saying he wasn't. I just don't recall it.
5 Q. Thank you. And again, in paragraph 9, we can see that
6 Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter describes my client's explanation as rather
7 inadequate. What I want to suggest is that General Gvero said that it was
8 the belief of the Main Staff that there were sufficient fuel reserves and
9 that we can see that that is minuted by General -- by Colonel Baxter,
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, the issue was taken up again after the meeting, as we can see
13 from the remark, this line in private discussions continued, my word, with
14 General Smith after the meeting. I know it's an awfully long time ago.
15 Do you recall how long those private discussions after the meeting took?
16 A. I would imagine we went and had a meal after this and that the
17 most those discussions -- those -- took place by either before the meal
18 or -- and/or during the meal at the absolute longest.
19 Q. Yes. It may be -- I'm going to suggest to you that there was no
20 meal on this occasion because if we do go back a page to page 2 and
21 paragraph 7 we can see that the minute tells us that, "Karadzic and
22 Krajisnik left early on the pretext that they wished to go to church." So
23 you didn't have a meal with either of them, did you?
24 A. Not unless they came back from church, no. I'm -- I was only
25 surmising that there had been a meal.
1 Q. And you were unlikely to have a meal with General Gvero alone in
2 the absence of Karadzic and Krajisnik. Would you agree with that
4 A. Yes, I don't suppose we had it alone, but there had been lots of
5 other people there as well.
6 Q. Okay. Well, I think we are agreed that this discussion outside
7 the confines of the meeting would not have taken place for very long?
8 A. No. That's for sure.
9 Q. And you understandably asked my client how he knew about the fuel
10 situation, and I suggest to you that what General Gvero said was that the
11 VRS had carried out some research into how many consumers of fuel there
12 were within the enclaves, some sort of technical analysis based on motor
13 vehicles, electricity use, generators, factories, that sort of thing, does
14 that ring a bell at all?
15 A. No, I don't, I don't even remember any more than the absolute
16 outlines that we'd had -- he was there at the meeting and this matter came
18 Q. I'm going to go on putting my case and I think that we may find
19 over the next hour or so that you won't recall a number of things I'm
20 going to put to you. Could I suggest this, sir, Sir Rupert, that if you
21 say I don't remember, the Trial Chamber will know that you don't remember
22 and it's a possibility. If you say that what I'm suggesting to you is
23 incorrect, you make that clear so that we have a distinction between I
24 don't remember and no, that is not correct.
25 A. I'll follow that line.
1 Q. Moving on, he then explained that the VRS technical services had
2 also looked at the amount of fuel that was going into the enclaves, and
3 they looked at these two figures and the result was that sufficient fuel
4 was being allowed into the enclave at the relevant time. That's the
5 conversation that I suggest took place outside the confines of the
6 meeting. What do you say about that?
7 A. It may have done and to a degree it's supported by the conclusion
8 in that paragraph that he said that there was enough fuel.
9 Q. Now, I'm going to briefly look at with you at the use by
10 Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter of the word "inadequate." Madam Fauveau has
11 asked you at some length about smuggling. You accept that smuggling went
12 on, the extent to which is clearly a matter of debate, would that be fair?
13 A. I accept that those incidents occurred. I don't accept that it
14 went on in quite the way you're describing.
15 Q. Okay. Let's have a look, please, at 5D31. This, let me tell you,
16 is a Muslim document, that is a document produced by the chief of the
17 state security sector of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina dated the 12th
18 of January of 1996, and it deals with a wide variety of allegations of
19 crimes committed in the Srebrenica area. I would like to go in the
20 English to page 10 and in the B/C/S -- we're finding the page. The bit in
21 English that I want to draw your attention to reads as follows: "In
22 September 1994, Oric took 2.000 litres of fuel from humanitarian aid of
23 which he gave 600 litres to Zulfo Tursunovic while he kept 1400 litres at
24 his home in Potocari."
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Page 6 of the B/C/S apparently. Any knowledge of that type of
2 activity on the part of a man I'm sure you have heard of, Naser Oric?
3 A. Of that, I did not know. That is a new piece of information to
4 me. That he might have done such a thing was perfectly possible.
5 Q. And of course, were he to do that, the result would be that there
6 would be insufficient fuel -- the result might be that there was
7 insufficient fuel for the other inhabitants of the enclave. That stands
8 to reason, doesn't it?
9 A. Indeed.
10 Q. Could we move now to 1D19? This is another Bosniak document.
11 Though it's headed 23rd of February 1995, it's undoubtedly written in
12 1996. It's a review of the events in Srebrenica, the year before, by a
13 Brigadier Jasarevic and it's sent to Rasim Delic. And page 3 of the
14 English is the first part I'd like to draw to your attention, about
15 two-thirds of the way down the page, and at page 4 in the B/C/S.
16 It says, "The increasing mistrust felt by citizens of Srebrenica
17 for the civilian and military leadership was encouraged by the unequal
18 allocation and manipulation of goods provided by humanitarian aid. Naser
19 Oric and municipal officials, Osman Sulic, Adnan Salilovic [phoen] and
20 Hanj Fedic [phoen] were linked to this. There is information indicating
21 that these men smuggled humanitarian aid, weapons, oil, et cetera, and
22 that they collaborated with members of UNPROFOR and even with the
23 aggressor in their smuggling activities."
24 Now, bear in mind that this is what I would describe as an
25 admission against interest because it's a Bosniak document, not a Serb
1 document. That doesn't mean to say it's true, of course, but that is
2 something to bear in mind.
3 Could you comment on what I've just read out?
4 A. I recognise the name Oric. I don't recognise the other three of
5 that paragraph named in that paragraph. And you don't -- this doesn't
6 surprise me as a -- a report after the event, as people start to find out
7 what was actually happening.
8 Q. Did you know about it at the time?
9 A. No. I didn't know what that is saying there. That, that in every
10 one of these situations, there were power struggles going on, that people
11 were hoarding, manipulating the distribution of aid, is common to these
12 circumstances, anywhere in the world, let alone here. So that's why I'm
13 not surprised that this is found to be happening.
14 Q. The next document is a Serb document, shortly after the meeting
15 that I'm asking you about. It's 6D72, please. It's a report from a
16 Colonel Andric to the command of the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade dated the
17 12th of May of 1995. It's described -- I know you haven't yet got it on
18 the screen, but it's described as an order to prevent smuggling of fuel by
19 UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and other organisations.
20 And it says, "We have received information that members of
21 UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and other international organisations have been
22 transporting fuel illegally to Muslims in the enclaves of Sarajevo,
23 Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica.
24 "They smuggle fuel in double or large tanks on combat and
25 non-combat vehicles which they empty in the enclaves leaving just the
1 quantity needed for their return journey from the enclaves to the
2 territory of the FRY or the RS." And then there is an order as to how to
3 prevent this smuggling taking place.
4 Any knowledge, Sir Rupert, at the time, of smuggling using that
5 particular method as particularised by Colonel Andric in this report?
6 A. I have no knowledge of us doing that at all, and if I had, it
7 would have been stopped. We were not, as far as I'm concerned, and I'm
8 speaking for UNPROFOR, smuggling fuel into those enclaves.
9 Q. My concern of course is the use by Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter of
10 the word "inadequate" for Gvero's explanation. The documents that I've
11 just presented put what he was saying into some sort of context. Would
12 you say that's fair?
13 A. It might have done, although I think what you've just been showing
14 me is after the conversation we were having with General Gvero in the
15 chronology of events.
16 Q. Well, only --
17 A. I can't speak for the word inadequate. I can't remember
18 sufficient of it, of the conversation, as to why he used that word. It
19 seemed to be appropriate at the time, I suggest.
20 Q. I'm not going to quibble about that but I'm attempting to put it
21 into some sort of context, and I think you're broadly speaking accepting
22 that. But you're the witness, I'm not.
23 A. I accept that on the basis of these documents, that would be a
24 greater argument than the single word inadequate would cover, but I don't
25 think those documents or anything like that argument was produced at that
2 Q. Yes. I want to broaden this out briefly with one other document,
3 which Your Honour has been disclosed very recently. That's not in itself
4 a criticism but an observation and which hasn't yet been assigned a
5 number. We have -- it's certainly not in e-court. We have a few hard
6 copies of it. So perhaps if the usher could collect them. I'm told that
7 the translation booths have all been provided with one of these, as has
8 Mr. Thayer.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Josse.
10 MR. JOSSE:
11 Q. It's restricted document that Mr. Akashi sent to Mr. Annan in New
12 York, and it deals with the humanitarian situation in Croatia and
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's dated the 6th of July of 1995. And quite a
14 wide-ranging analysis of humanitarian aid, and let me acknowledge that
15 this is broadening the subject out to humanitarian aid in general rather
16 than specifically fuel. You are welcome to read it; you particularly want
17 to read paragraph 4, I suggest, and I would draw the Trial Chamber's
18 attention to paragraph 4, which deals with the eastern enclaves.
19 Whilst you're doing that, it has been sensibly suggested to me
20 that I give the ERN number for the record. I'll do that now. It's
21 R 0082030 through to R 0082035.
22 And then at the back of this are some rather interesting tables.
23 Not so much the one that's labelled "table 1" which is I think a
24 projection of needs. More the second table, which is described as UNHCR
25 food distribution to Bosnia-Herzegovina, distribution versus requirement,
1 93, 94, 95, and we can see that in January, February, March, and April,
2 the percentage of requirement accomplished was actually fairly good.
3 MR. JOSSE: Could I ask the usher to turn to that page on the ELMO
4 so that at least the accused can follow my line of cross-examination?
5 It's the penultimate page of the document, Madam.
6 Q. Would you agree with the question that I've just asked, Sir
7 Rupert? I'll repeat it.
8 A. If you would.
9 Q. Yes, we can see that January, February March and April of 1995,
10 the percentage of requirement accomplished was actually fairly good.
11 A. Yes. I think you need to be -- I mean, they are fairly good like
12 then but they are not the requirement. And but this I think is applying
13 to the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 Q. Indeed.
15 A. The --
16 Q. Would these figures have been broken down into the various regions
17 and in particular the eastern enclaves?
18 A. They might -- how does that -- I haven't seen the other tables
19 because they mention different areas in the -- the reason is that the
20 different areas are broken out in the main document. Yeah -- yes, if
21 you -- I've got a third table on the back. It just says
23 Q. That's right. And that's an important --
24 A. And there they are breaking it out by -- in more -- more finely,
25 as it were, but it's only for the month of June.
1 Q. Exactly.
2 A. And that doesn't -- that's the follow on from that one.
3 Q. Okay. We can see in paragraph 4 that the text suggests that part
4 of the difficulties in May was the fact that there were "The air strikes,
5 UNHCR was forced to cancel some convoys to Gorazde for security reasons
6 while others were denied access by the Bosnian Serbs." And that's
8 A. Yes, yes.
9 Q. Isn't it?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Would you agree that that may have had a knock-on effect in June
12 as well?
13 A. The shortfalls had to be made up, if that's what you mean, yes.
14 Q. Well --
15 A. Or do you mean subsequent convoys?
16 Q. Subsequent convoys. What I really mean by that is would that have
17 been an inhibiting --
18 A. Oh, yes, I think so, yes.
19 Q. And I'm not going to take you through what the rest of that
20 paragraph says. We can read it. It's of note, though, is it not, that
21 about five lines down, it says, "Access to Srebrenica and Zepa was,
22 however, unhindered." That's in May.
23 A. Sorry I've lost the place.
24 Q. Paragraph 4, about five or six lines down.
25 A. Ah.
1 Q. I'll repeat it. Access to Srebrenica --
2 A. Sorry I was too far down the paragraph.
3 Q. -- and Zepa was, however, unhindered?
4 A. Okay.
5 Q. So that's clearly significant when we consider this. If we could
6 turn briefly to the first page, we see at the very bottom, internal
7 distribution. Am I right it doesn't include you?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Why would that be?
10 A. Well, this is -- first of all, it's a superior headquarters.
11 Secondly, he's reporting on UNHCR business, not mine, if you like. And
12 the UNHCR was a separate, and from my point of view, supported
13 organisation. I didn't run it. I wasn't in charge of it.
14 Q. But you had responsibility, or a large say, explain to us please,
15 in making sure that these conveys reached the destination they were
16 intended for?
17 A. The mandate, if that's the best word for it, was to protect
18 humanitarian convoys and see that they got there, yes. But they -- I
19 wasn't choosing what was carried in, the size of the convoy, or to whom it
20 was to go.
21 Q. Okay. I'm going to --
22 A. And when they were run through Serbia, and out of Belgrade, I
23 didn't necessarily have anything to do with them at all.
24 Q. As I say I'm going to move back, if we can, to the document that
25 these questions emanated from which was P2936. Could that be put back up
1 on the -- in e-court, please, last page? I'm going to go to paragraph 10
2 on Sarajevo airport. This part of the discussion clearly took place
3 before your private discussions with my client after the meeting, because
4 it's apparent that Karadzic was present, and we see that the minute says
5 that Krajisnik was upset that a particular pledge he had made had not been
6 honoured, and then it says, "This issue provoked some heated discussion
7 between Karadzic and General Gvero." As I recall, Mr. Thayer, in his
8 examination-in-chief, asked you about that, and you said that you couldn't
9 remember any details about that heated discussion. That's right, isn't
11 A. Yes, it is.
12 Q. However, would you accept that it would be -- it was not a usual
13 occurrence for a Lieutenant General, I'm talking about Gvero here, to
14 engage in a heated discussion in front of the UNPROFOR commander, with the
15 person who purported to be his supreme commander, namely Dr. Karadzic? A
16 fairly startling event, wasn't it?
17 A. I don't know how startling it was. It was sufficiently of note
18 that it's recorded as part of the meeting, but I don't remember -- as I
19 said to you, I don't know that it was that remarkable or I might have
20 remembered it.
21 Q. That's really what I want -- really what I was inquiring about.
22 Were you aware, either then or subsequently, that very specifically
23 Karadzic and Gvero had some significant and public disagreements at that
24 particular point in time?
25 A. No. I wasn't aware of that.
1 Q. And it's not something that you became aware of subsequently from
2 any briefing, anything you read, anything like that?
3 A. I don't remember any briefing or anything like that, no.
4 Q. Excuse me. The next meeting is the 25th of July in Han-Kram at
5 the hotel Jela. It's 274 -- can't read my own handwriting, as usual -- 7.
6 2747. It's another minute from Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter. I'd like to
7 begin at paragraph 1, if I may. This was -- no. -- A meeting as we see
8 at the Jela restaurant, and it says General Mladic was accompanied by
9 General Gvero.
10 And it says, at paragraph 2, that Zepa dominated the meeting,
11 Mladic arrived carrying an agreement, so on and so forth, and then it
12 says, as you have also told us, that after two hours you and Mladic
13 decided to move to Zepa.
14 First thing I want to suggest to you is that Gvero and Mladic did
15 not arrive at this meeting together. Gvero arrived there some time before
16 Mladic. Any recollection of that?
17 A. I think that was -- I'm just trying to remember. Of those series
18 of meetings, there was certainly one when Mladic arrived separately.
19 Q. I don't --
20 A. It could easily have been that one.
21 Q. I don't want to take unfair advantage because I'm going to suggest
22 the same about the meeting on the 31st of July and indeed the minute
23 confirms that for the 31st of July?
24 A. Then I may be remembering the latter one.
25 Q. But I --
1 A. But I have no -- if -- I don't remember them arriving neither
2 together or separately.
3 Q. And in fact I suggest that Gvero got there by car and Mladic got
4 there by helicopter. But moving on, you asked my client, again
5 understandably, whether Mladic was going to turn up, and he said, "Yes,
6 but he," Gvero, "wasn't sure where Mladic was." Any recollection of that?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Gvero went on to say that he hadn't spoken to Mladic directly. He
9 had simply -- he, Gvero, had simply been told to come to this meeting with
10 an interpreter. No recollection?
11 A. No, I don't, I don't --
12 Q. Could you give me a moment, please? In this regard, let's have a
13 look, if we may, at P1339. This -- I'm sorry, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: A? B?
15 MR. JOSSE: Well, I want the English version. I'm afraid mine is
16 not A -- very grateful, thank you. As always, Your Honour is ahead of me.
17 Q. This is a very brief intercept and just stopping for a moment,
18 you've been asked a little bit about intercepts. I'm sure you appreciate
19 this, and I'm probably teaching my grandmother to suck eggs, here, Sir
20 Rupert, but these are Bosniak intercepts of VRS activity. I say that
21 because there are a number that I'm going to turn to in the course of my
22 cross-examination. And this is extremely short, and the original, which
23 is on the right of this screen, is handwritten, and then in fact, C, I
24 think, is a typed version of the B/C/S. But it's also an original
25 document because it was typed up by the intercept operators after the
1 event and from that, we know that this intercept occurred at -- on the
2 25th of July.
3 Take that from me. I'll be corrected if I'm wrong by my learned
4 friends. We see the time in the English, 10.44, and it's very simple
5 someone says, "Where is Miletic?" Second person replies, "He went to see
6 Gvero." And then the significant bit is, "Tell Gvero to be at the place
7 where he is supposed to receive Smith at 11.30 with that girl."
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse, I'm noticing that in the English version,
9 you're correct, it says 10.44 but in the original, which we also have on
10 the screen, it says 10.35.
11 MR. JOSSE: I'm grateful to Your Honour's beady eyes, Mr. Thayer
12 may have -- I don't have an explanation.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
14 MR. THAYER: I think if display 1339 C, which is the B/C/S
15 original printout of the call, that is upon which the English translation
16 of 1339 A is based.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
18 MR. JOSSE: I'm never sure whether these should be broadcast, Your
19 Honour. I don't know.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: There is no name of the person. I don't think we
21 have a problem there.
22 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: One -- yes. There is the location, however. There
24 is the location. So no broadcast. I don't know if we have had broadcast
25 already. But you will look into that, Madam registrar.
1 MR. JOSSE: May I explain to the witness he may be rather bemused
2 by this exchange.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
4 MR. JOSSE:
5 Q. General, very briefly, we've heard in this trial from quite a
6 number of these operators. They are all protected witnesses, and so their
7 identity mustn't be revealed to the public.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: And there was no broadcast of these documents,
9 incidentally, Mr. Josse.
10 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
11 Q. The point that I'm coming to is this seems to suggest that Gvero
12 is being told to meet you at 11.30 with that girl, who may well be an
13 interpreter I would venture to suggest, and though it doesn't indicate
14 categorically that he's not with Mladic, that is the overwhelming
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Okay. I'll move back to where I was at. Could 2747 be put back
18 into e-court, please? Whilst you were waiting for General Mladic, apart
19 from offering you a drink, my client spoke to you about various things
20 unrelated to matters at hand or the war, and he explained to you that he
21 was familiar with the British political system and that he'd studied that
22 as part of his thesis on comparative political systems. Any recollection
23 of that?
24 A. No. I'm afraid I haven't.
25 Q. Apparently he discussed with you the role of the speaker in the
1 House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Prime Minister, and then he
2 discussed with you various political philosophers, including J.S. Mill,
3 John Adams, Robert Owen, and Bertrand Russell. Does that ring any bell at
4 all, sir?
5 A. No I'm afraid it doesn't. How long were we waiting for Mladic?
6 Q. 30 minutes.
7 A. Thank you. No, I don't remember this.
8 Q. Mladic then arrived, the discussion took place. What I suggest is
9 significant is that Gvero did not take any part in the meeting in Zepa.
10 In short, he did not come to Zepa. You've explained you went there by
11 road, Mladic went by helicopter, Gvero did not go there, certainly at this
12 juncture. Would you accept that?
13 A. Yes, I accept that.
14 Q. The next meeting I'd like to turn to, please, is on the 31st of
15 July, the one at Mrkonjic Grad, which is 2947. We can see in paragraph 1
16 of this minute that this took place at the Balkana motel at 1200 hours and
17 you, apparently your helicopter had apparently been engaged and damaged,
18 and then the last two sentences at paragraph 1 say, "General Mladic
19 arrived, allegedly from the front line, some 45 minutes late for the
20 meeting. General Smith was met by General Gvero who remained throughout."
21 So this clearly, A, indicates that Mladic was late, and, B, that Gvero and
22 Mladic arrived there at separate times, correct?
23 A. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. I want to suggest to you that in that 45 or so minutes, one of the
25 things that Gvero did was to point out to you, from the terrace of the
1 motel, where his home was in the distance in Mrkonjic Grad. What do you
2 say about that?
3 A. My memory of that 45 minutes, if 45 minutes it was, is quite
4 different. I was extremely irritated. I had just had my helicopter
5 engaged and shot down when I was flying on a controlled route.
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. And my memory of that was addressing myself to General Gvero and
8 telling him if that happened again, I was going to get extremely
9 exercised. I don't recall him telling me where he lived, but he might
10 have done.
11 Q. I suppose that in those circumstances, what Gvero might have done
12 was to try to calm you down?
13 A. He might have done, yes. I don't recall other than venting my
15 Q. Yes. Do you have any recollection of learning during the course
16 of that meeting that Gvero was from Mrkonjic Grad?
17 A. I don't, although I have a general memory that that was the case.
18 Whether I remember it from that meeting or some other time, I don't
20 Q. And one of the things that he discussed with you, very specific
21 matter, was the local custom which was to have scything competitions, hay
22 scything competitions and that was a particular pass time of the
23 inhabitants of that part of Bosnia. Does that jog your memory at all?
24 A. I'm afraid it doesn't, no.
25 Q. And I could particularise what we suggest occurred during that
1 time. He talked to you about the fact that there was an association of
2 national traditional sports, he described these sports to you, and in fact
3 he mentioned that his niece's husband, whom he named, was a particular
4 local champion in the art of scything, does that help you at all?
5 A. I'm afraid it doesn't. I had other things on my mind at the time.
6 Q. But again, what you're saying is it's a possibility?
7 A. Oh, yes, I can't say it didn't happen.
8 Q. Excuse me. Do you recall whether Gvero had anyone supporting him
9 so to speak prior to Mladic's arrival?
10 A. The picture in my mind of his -- of him on his own, but there were
11 certainly one, if not two other officers there, when we had the meeting in
12 addition to Mladic; one of which I recall as being the air defence
13 commander at Banja Luka.
14 Q. Does the name Savo Sokanovic mean anything to you?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Let's look at the minutes of this meeting, and paragraph 4,
17 please, because that relates to General Gvero. We can see that discussion
18 took place of the HV/HVO offensive and the humanitarian issues that flowed
19 from that, and you made clear in your evidence-in-chief that the
20 international community in general, and the Bosnian Serbs in particular,
21 faced a huge refugee problem as a result of this, correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And it appears that what Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter said was the
24 gravity of this problem to the Serbs is quite evident, Mladic has
25 appointed General Gvero to be responsible for managing the humanitarian
1 and refugee problem. And that is obviously a reference to the problem
2 caused by the flood of refugees from that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3 or from the Krajinas. I don't want to get hung up on political entities
4 for the purpose of this question, but from that area, correct?
5 A. No. That's correct. This is the people going -- moving people --
6 the volumes of people moving, yes.
7 Q. And at paragraph 7, as we've already seen, the minutes say, "Zepa,
8 little progress was made on the Zepa issue as the matter is clearly not
9 high on Mladic's current agenda." Basically didn't feature in the meeting
10 to any great extent, correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I'd next like to go to the meeting of the 25th of August but
13 before I do that, let's look, if we may, briefly, at the meeting of the
14 22nd of August, which is P2949. I want to contrast the 22nd of August
15 with the 25th of August, if I may. The 22nd of August meeting, General
16 Gvero was not present at that meeting, correct?
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 Q. And in paragraph 2, we can see the interesting description of the
19 meeting by Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter where he says a fascinating meeting
20 which lasted five hours and included a barbecue lunch in magnificent
21 surroundings, this being a place called Borike near Zepa, correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And there is various descriptions of Mladic's appearance and his
24 mood and what happened at that meeting, but you regarded that meeting as
25 something of a success, and as a step in the right direction. Would that
1 be fair, Sir Rupert?
2 A. Yes, it was, yes.
3 Q. And then, you met with Mladic again three days later on the 25th
4 of August, that's P2950, when both Generals Gvero and Tolimir were
5 present. I'll just wait whilst that is put into e-court. And in
6 paragraph 2, the minute describes the meeting as, "A brief and
7 business-like meeting."
8 In other words, it was really rather different to the meeting of
9 three days earlier where, as you've told us, Gvero wasn't present and you
10 had this long leisurely lunch in the magnificent surroundings of Borike.
11 Would that be a fair contrast?
12 A. Yes. I mean it was very different meetings. Not only just the
13 time and place, but I don't think it was quite as, the contrast wasn't
14 quite the one that one is long and leisurely, a great deal of business was
15 done, particularly because Mladic at the previous meeting, Mladic had all
16 his other commanders there, and they were as much involved in -- the
17 barbecue and so forth was as much for Mladic and them, or rather Mladic
18 with them, as with the people with me.
19 Q. Sorry, who did Mladic have with him on that occasion?
20 A. There were other commanders, there. If you go back, you can see
21 that there were other commanders at the Mladic -- at the meeting in
23 Q. That's 2949 again, please.
24 A. Not his assistant commanders but --
25 Q. Thank you. The minute says the meeting was attended by two of the
1 local BSA brigade Commanders, several of Mladic's staff officers who have
2 responsibilities for the area, and one local Gorazde civil official.
3 A. Hmm.
4 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Riley [phoen] who is mentioned, was the British
5 Gorazde force commander, correct?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. Now, we have seen minutes for three meetings where Gvero was, for
8 want of a better expression, at Mladic's side. I want to suggest to you
9 that when these meetings took place, Gvero said nothing or certainly
10 nothing of any import at all. What do you say to that suggestion?
11 A. He said little and was clearly in support of Mladic, who was the
12 dominant member of the meeting, at least from the Bosnian Serb side, on
13 all those occasions.
14 Q. And take this from me, certainly no suggestion of Gvero saying
15 anything in any of the minutes produced by Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter?
16 A. Correct. This is Mladic's meeting.
17 Q. Thank you. Now, I'm going to move on to a different but related
18 topic, and this is the evidence that you gave at page 17556 of the
19 transcript, that on -- the last time you left Zepa, you had an encounter
20 with General Gvero. The first thing I would like to try and do in this
21 regard is find out the date of this alleged meeting. Perhaps I could help
22 you in this regard.
23 In your witness statement which has been much referred to already,
24 at page 19, I don't think it needs to be put into e-court for this
25 purpose, you say the following: "In the course of the period 26 to 29
1 July, I visited the pocket three times and there met with Mladic twice."
2 Does that mean, Sir Rupert, that your last visit was on the 29th of July?
3 A. I don't remember. We -- I'd have to find some journal or whatever
4 of my movements. I think I went on consecutive days, and if the first day
5 I'm there is the 26th, then it's 27, 28 are the other two days, but I have
6 no better reference than that.
7 Q. I don't mind confessing that one of the reasons I was at pains to
8 ask you about notes and diaries at the start of this cross-examination was
9 for this very reason. You've just said, "I'd have to find some journal."
10 What do you mean by that, please?
11 A. Well, there may be or may have been some record of my movements
12 kept in the headquarters. If we haven't got it, then it probably doesn't
13 exist any more, if it existed at all.
14 Q. I've got one document that might help, certainly -- that I wish to
15 bring to your attention, and that's 6D198. This is a document that this
16 Trial Chamber has seen quite a lot of. This type of document, correction.
17 I don't think it's specifically this document has been seen but this type
18 document. And it's a report from David Harland to John Ryan and General
19 Gobillard among others of events that day.
20 The second page we can -- can't see, don't need to go to it, it
21 says "Negotiations on Zepa, (11)," we have got it there, that's helpful,
22 "update, at 8.00 a.m. this morning, Ed Joseph called from Zepa," and I
23 only mention that to put it into some context. If we could then turn to
24 the last page, please, top paragraph deals with events at 9.00 a.m.,
25 paragraph below that, the events at 10.00 a.m., and then the third
1 paragraph down says at about 12 noon, I spoke with General Smith who said
2 that he had just seen Muratovic and that the Sarajevo was still holding
3 out for something other than complete surrender.
4 If you saw Muratovic in Sarajevo at 12 noon on the 28th of July,
5 could you have been in Zepa that day?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Explain how, please.
8 A. Well, I would have driven there. It would be late in the
9 afternoon that I was there, if I drove that afternoon. I don't know, been
10 there by 4.00, 4.30.
11 Q. So it's possible but it doesn't jog your memory one way or the
12 other, correct?
13 A. No, that doesn't help me.
14 Q. When you had this encounter with General Gvero, who precisely -- I
15 know it's a long time ago but this is important --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- were you travelling with, please?
18 A. Almost certainly Colonel Baxter, Captain Bliss or Dibbs, who were
19 my -- two of my interpreters, and my immediate protection detail headed by
20 Warrant Officer Davidson.
21 Q. When you saw Gvero, what type of vehicle was he in?
22 A. The picture in my mind is of a saloon car, a black -- I can't -- I
23 couldn't put a name, a type to it or anything like that.
24 Q. Was that saloon car accompanied by any other vehicle or vehicles?
25 A. I don't remember.
1 Q. Have you any idea who if anyone Gvero was travelling with?
2 A. No. Again, the picture in my mind is of him standing beside the
3 vehicle near this check-point.
4 Q. Could we have -- I think it's P -- could I have a moment -- 2493
5 in e-court, please? I think the reason it's taking a moment is it's a map
6 and maps take a little longer to load. Yes.
7 Now, I'm going to ask the usher to give you a pen, Sir Rupert, and
8 to mark, if you can, where on this map you say this encounter took place.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you wish to zoom in?
10 THE WITNESS: It would help if I could see a bit more clearly.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Which part, Mr. Josse?
12 MR. JOSSE: That's up to the witness, Your Honour. I'm entirely
13 in his hands.
14 THE WITNESS: Okay. Go to the centre and bring it out, zoom me in
15 a little bit. Okay. Hold it there. I've got to try and remember how
16 we -- how this worked.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: We can zoom further, zoom in further, if you wish.
18 THE WITNESS: No, I'm just -- this is an exercise in memory of a
19 map that I wasn't following because other people would drive me there. So
20 I'm having -- can we now -- can we come out now, please? That will do.
22 I have difficulty in doing this.
23 MR. JOSSE:
24 Q. Sorry, would it help if you were given a pen and you marked the
25 direction from which were you coming or going or --
1 A. It's as easy to say it. From memory we used to drive from south
2 to north, having come in from -- on the road to Gorazde, we then went
3 north, and at a point somewhere in the vicinity, I think, of the place
4 marked Brezova Ravan, there was a check-point, not a -- not the Ukrainian
5 check-point. This was a Bosnian Serb army check-point, where you turned
6 off and actually entered, if you like, the Zepa area itself. And it was
7 there that I met. But precisely where that is on that map, I couldn't
8 tell you from memory.
9 Q. And so it appeared that General Gvero was going in which
11 A. Into the pocket.
12 Q. Does the --
13 A. And I was coming out of it.
14 Q. Does the expression "IKM" mean anything to you?
15 A. No.
16 Q. It's not a trick question. It's the expression we use in this
17 courtroom, I think from the B/C/S language, for forward command post?
18 A. Ah.
19 Q. Do you know where the forward command post for this Zepa operation
21 A. I saw the -- some of the communication vehicles up on the hill
22 near -- on our way in, in the vicinity of this check-point. You had to
23 enter, I think you went through the check-point and then those vehicles --
24 some of those communications vehicles were there.
25 Q. So you think it was in that area, do you?
1 A. I think it was in that vicinity.
2 Q. And that was based on your observation of these communication
4 A. Yes, yes, yes.
5 Q. Returning specifically to the encounter, did you note it anywhere?
6 A. I didn't, no.
7 Q. When was the first time you told any investigator or lawyer about
8 this encounter?
9 A. Oh, I think it was when Mr. Thayer and I met the other day, and we
10 were talking through what you would call it the proofing thing.
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. And I said what I then told the Court when he asked the question.
13 Q. 22nd of October of this year?
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. Is there any -- it's right, isn't it, that in addition to your
16 witness statement, you've been interviewed for various information reports
17 in 2002 on two occasions, interviewed in relation to the Slobodan
18 Milosevic case, which of course accept is a different albeit related
19 matter, Dragomir Milosevic case likewise? Is there any reason why you
20 haven't previously mentioned this to anyone associated with the
21 investigation and prosecution of crimes attached to this Tribunal?
22 A. I can only suppose because we haven't -- I haven't been asked
23 about, you know, going through the events of Zepa in that way.
24 Q. Was there any reason you didn't mention it to Mr. Thayer in what
25 is -- we've termed your expert statement which in fact amounted to a
1 question and answer session with him in July of 2006?
2 A. No. I can't -- I can't say there was -- I didn't mention it. I
3 don't know -- didn't occur to me perhaps. There is no reason for it.
4 Q. I mean, you were asked in that interview about -- very
5 specifically about my client's role within the VRS and to draw various
6 conclusions about it, weren't you?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And, indeed, when you were answering questions, whether they were
9 of an expert time or not, that Mr. Thayer posed to you towards the end of
10 his examination-in-chief, you chose this as a specific example of my
11 client at work within the VRS, yet you didn't mention it to him at all in
12 the July 2006 interview. Can you explain that, please?
13 A. No, I can't. I didn't.
14 Q. Do you have any recollection of being told, after this encounter,
15 of Gvero being in the pocket and what he was up to there at that time?
16 A. No, I don't.
17 Q. Which UNPROFOR officers remained within the Zepa enclave after you
18 left for the last time?
19 A. It would be the Ukrainian commander, and I can't remember his name
20 and --.
21 Q. Dudnik, sir.
22 A. And I --
23 Q. Sorry, Dudnik was his name, yes.
24 A. And I think there was civil affairs officers -- officer there but
25 I'm -- I'm not sure it was still Ed Joseph or the --
1 Q. Bezrouchenko?
2 A. -- Ukrainian. Yes. Which of those I'm not sure, but I think we
3 left the civil affairs man there as well, yeah.
4 Q. I'd like you to have a look at a video still, please.
5 [Videotape played]
6 MR. JOSSE: Stop it there. Stop it.
7 Q. Just bear with us, please. A few technical difficulties.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: We need to get back to the video and particularly to
9 the still where -- which Mr. Josse indicated. It went out of sight too
10 quickly for me to take note of the notation of the information.
11 MR. JOSSE: Yes. It's on the operator's screen. I can see that
12 here but that's no good to the Chamber or more particularly to the
14 JUDGE AGIUS: No. We need to go back a couple of slides before
15 that map.
16 [Videotape played]
17 MR. JOSSE: There. Okay. I'm going to -- it's not --
18 JUDGE AGIUS: I think you can proceed with your question.
19 MR. JOSSE: Yes.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Unless you are asking him about the kind of look
21 he's giving to Mladic, in which case we would need to see that closer.
22 MR. JOSSE: No. I think that might be a bit risky, that line of
23 cross-examination, Your Honour.
24 Q. I was going to ask you about the man sitting behind you, who was
25 looking on rather intently in the discussion?
1 A. In that snap where you've got, as we are looking at it, Baxter is
2 on the left, I'm on the right, and there is a man sitting between us,
4 Q. Yes.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: And we've got the still now. Do you recognise that
7 THE WITNESS: The man in the middle?
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
9 THE WITNESS: No, I don't.
10 MR. JOSSE:
11 Q. That's, I would suggest to you, General Krstic. Does that name
12 mean anything to you?
13 A. Yes, it does, yes.
14 Q. Who do you recall Krstic to be at that time?
15 A. I think he was one of the corps commanders if I recall correctly.
16 Q. Yes. He was the commander of the Drina Corps at that time. He
17 was the man who I would suggest to you was in charge of the operation, the
18 military operation, at Zepa. Does that ring any bells?
19 A. It would have been in his corps area, I think, yes.
20 Q. Now, he was involved in that and I think there is no dispute and
21 you'd accept this, wouldn't you, that General Tolimir was in charge of the
22 evacuation process?
23 A. Yes. I saw that, yep.
24 Q. And the evacuation process was finished on what day, do you recall
1 A. I don't, but it's probably tied in with, I think I -- the
2 evacuation was over, if that helps us find this date, which is why I was
3 not -- I was leaving on that last of the three days.
4 Q. Right. So at the point that you had this encounter with General
5 Gvero, the evacuation was over. That's what you're saying?
6 A. I think it was, yes.
7 Q. I'd like to deal, if I may, with some evidence, for want of a
8 better word, relating to Gvero's movements at that particular time. We
9 know that he was in Mrkonjic Grad on the 31st of July, don't we, because
10 you and he saw each other?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. How far is Mrkonjic Grad from Zepa, please?
13 A. I couldn't tell you without a map, long enough. You've -- for the
14 Serbs you had to drive around the north so --
15 Q. Could we have a look, please, at a document just before the break?
16 That's 6D195. Mr. Meek very helpfully is suggesting that I should perhaps
17 have identified that video clip with some precision, in fact I didn't
18 identify it at all. I'm going to get some assistance in that regard now,
19 Your Honour.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
21 MR. JOSSE: It's P2491, and though I didn't specify the point in
22 the video, in terms of the time, I made it quite clear the image to which
23 I had referred the witness to, so I think there is no further problem
25 46.24 minutes. Grateful to Ms. Cmeric.
1 Q. The document that's on the screen, Sir Rupert, is basically a
2 digest type news report from a Bosnian news agency called the VIP news
3 report. It's the bottom of that first page that I'd like to ask you
4 about, please. Take it from me, because we could look at the next page
5 that makes this clear, this appears to be a digest of the 31st of July of
6 1995, and it says "BSA commander, General Ratko Mladic, arrived on
7 Saturday in Drvar 20 kilometres north of Grahovo and continued organising
8 the Serb defence in the region with the help of assistant chief of the
9 General Staff General Milan Gvero and other aides."
10 A. Sorry I can't find that.
11 Q. Bottom left-hand corner.
12 A. I've got you. I'm sorry, okay. I'm there.
13 Q. So assuming this digest report to be correct, it would suggest
14 that -- I'm going to help -- bearing that in mind, could we get into
15 e-court 6D196, please? I think this will help clarify where I'm going.
17 So this is a calendar that we have produced for July of 1995, and
18 we can see that the 31st of July, which is when you had the meeting in
19 Mrkonjic Grad and when this press report is dated, was a Monday. The
20 press report that I have just read out refers to a Saturday, so assuming
21 the press report to be correct, that would place Gvero in the Drvar region
22 on the 29th of July. I accept that there are a number of assumptions in
23 that question but the logic would be correct, wouldn't it?
24 A. If all those assumptions are satisfied, yes.
25 Q. I'm next going to take to you a couple of intercepts.
1 MR. JOSSE: It may be a convenient moment, Your Honour. I haven't
2 finished with this topic. I've got a little way to go.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. We'll have a 25-minute break now. Thank
5 --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 6.12 p.m.
7 [The witness stands down]
8 JUDGE AGIUS: No witness?
9 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I asked for witness to remain out of
11 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, before you create trouble, we are
12 sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis as from now for the rest of the sitting.
13 Judge Kwon had to absent himself unexpectedly so that's it. Yes,
14 Mr. Josse?
15 MR. JOSSE: Really, it's to try to assist with timing. Very
16 briefly, the -- pursuant to the Chamber's request, the Defence counsel met
17 last night to discuss future scheduling, 98 bis and so on and so forth.
18 Most of us then had a meeting with Mr. McCloskey before the start of the
19 sitting today, and one of the things that emerged from that is it would
20 probably be desirable if the Chamber set aside a period of time tomorrow,
21 certainly no more than half an hour, to air and debate these matters prior
22 to the break.
23 Now, of course that fits in to the next question is how long I'm
24 going to be with this witness. Your Honour, I'm still not exactly sure.
25 I find it very difficult to give a precise estimate. I'm certainly going
1 to be most of tomorrow. But we will make every effort to try and finish
2 him tomorrow prior to the second break. But if that's not possible, then
3 clearly he will have to come back, if the Chamber is agreeable to have a
4 short period for the scheduling matters during the last session tomorrow.
5 I thought it worth mentioning now.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE AGIUS: What's definite, Mr. Josse and the others, is that
8 we need to finish with this witness tomorrow. That's priority number 1.
9 MR. JOSSE: Well, I will be able to finish in the time that I
10 have -- that I have at my disposal which is tomorrow. Of course,
11 Mr. Thayer says at the moment he has a little bit of re-examination. If
12 we don't get to the -- I understand the Chamber is making that the
13 priority over the scheduling, thank you.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Of course if there will be time we will discuss the
15 scheduling as well. Yes, Madam Fauveau?
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, yesterday I received
17 the response of the Prosecution to my motion related to UNPROFOR
18 documents, about 100 documents have been identified by the Prosecution and
19 they are currently asking for Rule 70 authorisation from the United
20 Nations before they disclose these documents to me.
21 I have no idea what's inside these documents but, still, I would
22 like to reserve the possibility for this witness to come back on the 23rd
23 of November, if in the meantime we receive the documents and if it appears
24 that he should be cross-examined on the basis of these documents.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Right. Thank you, Madam Fauveau.
1 Let's bring the witness in.
2 [The witness entered court]
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Josse?
4 MR. JOSSE:
5 Q. Just before I proceed with a few other documents, I should have
6 asked you earlier, can you remember the time of day that this encounter
7 with General Gvero took place?
8 A. I think it's in the afternoon.
9 Q. Was it --
10 A. Towards the end of the day.
11 Q. Was it light or was it dark?
12 A. No, it was light but it was towards the end of the day.
13 Q. Do you recall what sort of time it got dark in Bosnia in July?
14 A. Oh, quite late.
15 Q. Can you help, be more specific?
16 A. I'd have said 9.00.
17 Q. Could we have a look at 6D199? One other document before we get
18 to the intercepts that I had promised. This is another one of Harland's
19 reports dated the 29th of July also headed negotiations on Zepa, 13.
20 Page 3, I think we can go straight to. Middle of the page, we see
21 it says, "Ed," clearly referring to Ed Joseph, then spoke and repeated
22 that General Tolimir had told General Gobillard that UNPROFOR could
23 evacuate the men of Zepa directly if the Bosnians would accept an all for
24 all prisoner exchange.
25 This seems to suggest that Gobillard was in Zepa on the 29th of
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Do you recall him going there after you had finally departed?
4 A. I don't know that he came after me but that was -- I don't
5 remember him being there at the same time as me. So it is probable that
6 he was after me.
7 Q. And this also confirms that as of the 29th of July, Tolimir was
8 still active in the pocket, correct?
9 A. If that report is about the 29th, the events on the 29th.
10 Q. Take that from me.
11 A. Okay.
12 Q. Okay. Could we look at P1376, please? P1374, please. It's 1374
13 A is the English, B is the B/C/S. Now, this, Sir Rupert, is an intercept
14 dated the 29th of July, and we'll remember from the calendar we saw
15 earlier that's the Saturday. It seems to have been intercepted at 2230
16 hours, so quite late on. It involves a man from London, apparently a
17 corps captain, and a man called Rajko Banduka. Do you know who Rajko
18 Banduka was?
19 A. No.
20 Q. He was an assistant to Mladic's just to help you. And in the
21 middle of the page, we see that the man from London says, and this is in
22 B/C/S, not in English, "Oh, thank God, may I speak to General Mladic or is
23 he in the field?"
24 Banduka, his assistant says, "He's in the field, Gvero is in the
25 field too." And then if we look down a few lines, Banduka says, "Because
1 he's there, where it's critical."
2 Now, critical at that time was the Krajina, not Zepa, would you
3 agree with that?
4 A. I'm -- I wouldn't know if that's what they thought was critical.
5 Q. Well of course you wouldn't but I'm asking --
6 A. From my point of view, Zepa was still the most critical, but I
7 could see that Mladic might think it was otherwise.
8 Q. Thank you. And then if we look at P1376 --
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
10 MR. THAYER: Sorry for the intervention, that's 1376, just to
11 prevent confusion.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Thayer.
13 MR. JOSSE: The intercept I've just shown?
14 MR. THAYER: I thought you called for intercept 1376.
15 MR. JOSSE: That's the next one, please. So, again, A, English,
16 B, B/C/S.
17 Q. This involves various individuals. This man called Savo, you
18 remember I asked you about Savo Sokanovic. I'm going to suggest he was
19 one of the participants. He was Gvero's direct subordinate, but you've
20 already told us you don't recall that. A man called Rajko, a man called
21 Mico, and at some point Mladic was also involved. And it begins with a
22 conversation between Rajko, who I would suggest is the same Rajko Banduka
23 and significantly this is the 30th of July, it's a Sunday, and this again
24 was in the evening at 2215.
25 And about five or six lines down, Savo says, "All right. Our
1 boss, yours and mine, is in the native town of my boss, now let's speak to
2 me." And it goes on. And what I'm trying to suggest in this intercept is
3 it would suggest that the boss he's referring to is General Gvero, who was
4 in his native town, namely Mrkonjic Grad, where you saw him the following
5 day. Can you comment on that at all?
6 A. Yes. It would have seemed to be saying that, yes.
7 Q. Now, what I want to suggest to you, Sir Rupert, is that you are
8 mistaken when you say that you saw Gvero at that check-point, as you left
9 the pocket on the last time you were there. Is it a possibility that you
10 are mistaken?
11 A. I have a very clear memory of this event. I would be easily
12 persuaded it wasn't on the last day, it was on the middle day, certainly
13 wasn't on the first day, but I have this memory of coming out of the
14 pocket, going through that check-point, and seeing this car and meeting
16 Q. For the avoidance of any doubt, the case I'm putting to you is it
17 took place on Monday and Gvero was not there at that place at any time at
18 all. What do you say to that?
19 A. As I say, I have this clear memory of such a meeting.
20 Q. And are you in a position to comment at all as to first of all why
21 this wasn't, to use Mr. Thayer's word, memorialised anywhere in the 12
22 years since you say this happened?
23 A. Largely because I don't -- nothing has triggered the memory and
24 nothing -- there has been no reason for me to have it.
25 Q. And --
1 A. Or declare it.
2 Q. And would you accept that you might be mistaken bearing in mind
3 and - I'll be corrected if I'm wrong - there isn't a jot of supporting
4 evidence for Gvero's presence in Zepa at any of those given days?
5 A. I accept that there is nothing but my word for it, yep.
6 Q. And that there are in this case thousands, tens of thousands,
7 hundreds of thousands of pieces of paperer, and not one of them suggest
8 Gvero was there. I suggest to you that that is an indication that you are
9 wrong, sir.
10 A. It may be an indication and that's for others to decide, but I can
11 remember what I'm remembering.
12 Q. I'm going to move on to a completely different topic.
13 You were asked by Mr. Thayer about information that you received
14 from the pocket when you had taken command of UNPROFOR, and you dealt in
15 some detail with the JCOs. Were there any intelligence sources that were
16 able to relay information to you?
17 A. About Zepa?
18 Q. About Srebrenica, I beg your pardon.
19 A. About Srebrenica. None that were available to me at the time.
20 Q. If -- I'm going to ask you some questions in a few moments of
21 time. If for security or other operational reasons, you don't want to
22 answer them, just say so and I will not press the point. Perhaps it's
23 easiest though if I show you a document so you know what information I do
25 Could we have 6D181 in e-court, please? This, Sir Rupert, was one
1 of the information reports that I've alluded to earlier and indeed parts
2 of it Madam Fauveau showed you in the course of her cross-examination.
3 It's page 5 that I'm interested. And this is headed "SAS and the Truth of
4 the Actual Situation on the Ground." "The SAS entered safe area after
5 May, I think." Just stopping there, the SAS are British army special
6 services, correct?
7 A. Correct, yes, yes.
8 Q. "There were no SAS when I visited in March. Late April, early
9 May, we get them in. I would have been involved in the process of sending
10 them in to improve general communications and to provide the forward air
11 controller capacity. This was a great help but a couple of men have
12 limited coverage and not senior enough to be in the debate but it allowed
13 me to check ground truth."
14 Can you expand on that at all, please?
15 A. Yes, and if this is what you mean by intelligence, then, my answer
16 was incorrect. I did do this thing. I put those people in there. If
17 that's what you mean by intelligence, then I misunderstood. I thought you
18 were referring to higher authorities.
19 Q. I was thinking at one point of asking a few more questions before
20 showing you this, but I thought it only fair actually bearing in mind this
21 may be an issue of sensitivity, albeit it was 12 years ago, that I show
22 you the information that is in the public domain already.
23 A. Indeed. And I don't -- that you put your own patrols out isn't in
24 my book, my understanding, intelligence.
25 Q. I'm not going to dispute that.
1 A. I want to be -- you to understand that those are the terms on
2 which I was answering your question. Do you want me to say about what
3 these -- what I wanted these to be doing, these people?
4 Q. Please.
5 A. The -- what I wanted was to have a link that I could rely on in
6 terms of its communication, and that came with those -- that unit, the
7 JCOs. It gave me a direct link to that commanding officer. He knew that
8 these people were there. It wasn't a secret from him. And the -- and
9 that gave me a reliable link if I wanted to use it or he wanted to use it.
10 It put the forward air controller, because that's what those
11 people could do as well, that I could rely on in to the pocket. And as
12 I've said, it gave me a way of double checking information to be sure that
13 what I was hearing was tested against some other set of eyes and ears.
14 Q. Were the JCO and these SAS men one and the same?
15 A. Yes, they were. The JCOs came from the special SAS.
16 Q. Do you recall when they left the enclave, Srbrenica, this is?
17 A. My memory is they came out with Dutchbat on whatever the day was,
18 21st, I think it is, of July.
19 Q. Briefly and simply, how did they communicate with you, directly,
20 through a third party, through Baxter? That's really what I'm interested
22 A. I see. No. They had their own commander, who was in my
23 headquarters, and the communications went to that commander and then to
25 Q. Bearing in mind their presence in the pocket, how was it that you,
1 when you were on your leave, didn't learn more about what was going on?
2 A. The -- because I was getting my reports from my headquarters and
3 not directly from Srebrenica.
4 Q. And why -- Mr. Baxter was clearly a very capable man. He was
5 speaking to you on a daily basis, correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Why was it that he wasn't getting this information from these JCOs
8 and saying to you, "General, things have reached an absolute crisis point.
9 It's not a very good idea you sitting on this island in Croatia."
10 A. Indeed, that's what eventually it was decided. That's how I got
11 called back.
12 Q. And on that particular topic, you have said categorically in your
13 evidence here that the decision after the Geneva meeting was made by
14 Janvier and Akashi allowing you to go back on leave; is that right?
15 A. Correct, yes.
16 Q. Could we go to the next page of this document? At the top, five
17 lines down, it says, "Akashi and I think Janvier were both there and I
18 imagine I asked them both together if I was to return to duty in Sarajevo.
19 I was told not to return to duty and went back on holiday."
20 Your use there of the word "imagine" is rather different, I would
21 suggest, to your evidence in this case where you were adamant that it was
22 down to Janvier and Akashi. Can you explain that?
23 A. I can't remember the question that I'm answering. If I was asked,
24 for example, did I ask them separately or together, I might have answered
25 it that way. I don't know the -- exactly why that is reported that way.
1 What I'm quite clear about is that at the time in Geneva I am -- there was
2 a conversation that went on in which it was discussed whether or not I was
3 coming off leave and the answer was to go back on leave.
4 Q. This was an important decision, wasn't it?
5 A. In retrospect.
6 Q. Well, I would concede that with hindsight, it was not just an
7 important decision but the wrong decision. Are you trying to shift the
8 blame to Messrs. Janvier and Akashi?
9 A. No.
10 Q. It was their call, not yours? That's your evidence?
11 A. And I'm not quite clear what the blame is.
12 Q. I'll move on. The JCOs, as far as you were concerned, they were
13 fairly and properly there as part of UNPROFOR's role in the safe area
14 agreement; is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The VRS clearly didn't know that you had your own -- I was going
17 to use the word "intelligence," but it doesn't really matter what word we
18 use, your own source of information from British soldiers as to what was
19 going on?
20 A. I think they did know. It wasn't something we could have easily
21 hidden. They were in British army uniforms, and they must have been seen
22 going in.
23 Q. The -- I want to ask you briefly about the issue of information
24 getting in and out of the enclave and Bosnian Serb concerns about it.
25 Could we have a look, please -- you've mentioned it earlier -- at the UN
1 report on these events, which is P528? And it's page 55 of this rather
2 mammoth document that I would like you to have a look at.
3 Could we scroll down, please? It's paragraph 238. And the
4 first -- this is headed, "During the preparation of this report, only two
5 sources were able to recall any possible signs of an imminent attack on
6 Srebrenica and at that only in the days immediately preceding the
7 offensive to come."
8 The first of those I'm not going to ask you about. Three lines
9 from the bottom, though, it reads as follows and I'll read this slowly:
10 "In another instance, an international humanitarian worker, not based in
11 Srebrenica, recalled having heard rumours sometime earlier, that the Serbs
12 might be planning to shrink the pocket. He mentioned this to a colleague
13 based in Srebrenica, adding that if he ever saw anything which might
14 substantiate the rumours, he would send him a short coded message, 'Say
15 hello to Ibrahim.'.
16 "On 4 July, while escorting a humanitarian convoy, he saw what
17 appeared to be military preparations from Karakaj, where he crossed into
18 Bosnian-Serb-held territory from Serbia down to Bratunac. He saw some
19 heavy weapons and tanks and near Bratunac, tank tracks. On the basis of
20 that he contacted his colleague in Srebrenica that day, asking him to say
21 hello to Ibrahim, the signal of concern was passed on to DutchBat."
22 The Serbs, and I dare say the Bosniaks as well, had to contend,
23 didn't they, General, with UN workers, humanitarian workers, acting in
24 effect as spies for and against them. It was a fact of life?
25 A. They were not necessarily operating in support of for and against
1 them. The UN worker might quite reasonably report to the UN what he saw.
2 Q. But this was not that. He was clearly reporting this to a
4 A. Does it say that? I thought it said he was an international
5 worker and he passed it to DutchBat.
6 Q. Well he said it passed it to a colleague, perhaps I should say, so
7 it would suggest that he passed it to a non-military person, a person who
8 then passed it on to DutchBat.
9 A. I read that as being the colleague was one of his international
10 workers in -- presumably in whichever organisation this man is in which it
11 doesn't tell us.
12 Q. Well, be that as it may, would you accept the proposition in my
13 question, that the parties had to accept as a fact of life that there were
14 humanitarian workers who would in effect act as spies for and against
16 A. I accept that there were these people, if you like, a third party,
17 between and amongst the other two parties. I don't accept that they
18 necessarily acted as spies for and against them. They may well have been
19 reporting information, and quite properly so, to their own people.
20 Q. I'm going to move on to another issue.
21 Would you accept that during your tenure as UNPROFOR commander,
22 Mr. Akashi struck a more conciliatory tone than you?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. From your point of view, rather than his, because of course you
25 can't speak for him, why was that?
1 A. His business, his role, was -- and particularly as I understood he
2 understood it -- was to negotiate, to set out, to bring a cease-fire,
3 cease-fires about. I think he arranged in total over his time some 26 of
4 them or were party to them. And I believe that's what he was setting out
5 to do and that would involve always seeking to negotiate and so forth.
6 Q. The same question in relation to the force commander, General
7 Janvier. Would you accept that he struck a more conciliatory tone than
9 A. In part, I do, yes. In part, I accept that. It's for entirely
10 different reasons.
11 Q. Tell us, please.
12 A. He, and we saw this in that document which had to be given to me
13 in hard copy, it was about a meeting in Split in June, I think, he, as I
14 understood him, saw our role in a way that we were peacekeepers in the old
15 sense of the word, if I -- old, I don't mean old. In the previous sense
16 of the word, in the experience of the -- if I can put it this way -- Cold
17 War form of peacekeeping, where both parties agreed that you were needed
18 there, that you stood in the middle and prevented them going back to
19 fighting again, like in, say, Cyprus, on the green line.
20 Q. And in terms of the specific effect of this, it's right, isn't it,
21 that you didn't have any meetings with the VRS in June of 1995?
22 A. Certainly not at a senior level. And I don't think I had any.
23 Q. Could we have a look at paragraph 197 of the same document, which
24 is page 47? It says, "On the basis of interviews conducted during the
25 preparation of this report, it has been confirmed that the force commander
1 met with General Mladic on those three occasions in June 1995. The main
2 purpose of the meetings was to maintain a channel of communication with
3 the BSA because the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina had
4 severed contact with General Mladic not wanting to be seen -- sorry, not
5 wanting to be or be seen conducting business with those responsible for
6 taking troops under his command hostage. The special representative of
7 the Secretary-General had concurred with this line of approach and was
8 aware on each occasion when the force commander went to meet General
10 That's a correct statement of fact, isn't it?
11 A. Yes, yes, yes.
12 Q. What was your view of Janvier doing -- conducting these meetings
13 with Mladic?
14 A. Perfectly proper thing for him to do.
15 Q. Was he doing your dirty work for you?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Why not?
18 A. Again, I think it's covered in that document of Split, but I hold
19 and held the view that you shouldn't get yourself into a position where
20 you're negotiating when the other chap's got the thing that you're
21 negotiating about. You're on a very weak ground. And so I wasn't about
22 to start getting into any discussions with General Mladic until my
23 hostages were clear of him. Otherwise, I was at a disadvantage.
24 The -- if my superior wished to carry out these negotiations, that
25 was entirely within his remit and there were reasons that we needed to
1 carry out some negotiations in order to get the aid convoys in. But I
2 didn't think it was the right thing for me to be doing it, and said so.
3 Q. Did you at the time, or do you with the benefit of hindsight, feel
4 that at any stage, you personalised your dealings and battles, for want of
5 a better word, with Mladic?
6 A. Of course it's personal. You're seeking -- you're dealing with
7 another man. It's personal like this courtroom is personal. If that's
8 what you mean, then, yes, it was personal.
9 Q. Well, let's have a look at an extract from your book, please, at
10 page 366. I need to get the number. 6D186. Page 366, please. Could we
11 scroll down, please? And scroll up, please.
12 In the middle of the page, we see it says, "The third set of
13 targets were those intended to change Mladic's intentions by attacking his
14 personal sense of control. Clearly, the combined effects of the first two
15 categories of targets impacted on this too. All the bombing was aimed at
16 undermining him as a commander, but I also sought to attack specifically
17 his need to control.
18 "An example of such a target was a military facility in the
19 village where his parents were buried. It was attacked repeatedly in the
20 knowledge that in Mladic's culture a failure to protect the bones of one's
21 ancestors is something of a shameful dereliction of family duty.
22 (Matching these attacks and to increase the pressure, we told the Bosniak
23 prepares that Mladic could not look after his parents' remains.)"
24 That's personal, isn't it, Sir Rupert?
25 A. Yes, I just said we are seeking to change another man's mind.
1 Q. And you were effectively at war with him, weren't you?
2 A. At this stage, yes.
3 Q. And to help the Trial Chamber, what stage was this?
4 A. We are in September, after the London Conference decisions, and
5 after the bombing in Sarajevo.
6 Q. And you felt that the UN were entitled to bomb the graves of the
7 VRS commander for what reason?
8 A. I wasn't bombing.
9 Q. I beg your pardon, the graves of his ancestors, I beg your pardon?
10 A. I wasn't bombing that. I was bombing the military facility.
11 Q. Well, explain what I've just read out, please?
12 A. Because the -- my understanding of it all was that the -- where
13 his ancestors were buried was in the vicinity of that village and that's
14 where this military facility was.
15 Q. You in the book were not much kinder to the civilian leadership of
16 the Republika Srpska, I would suggest. Let's have a look at page 347.
17 You're describing -- scroll down a little, please. No the other way.
18 You're describing, the bottom of 346 which we don't need to look at, your
19 first visit to Pale.
20 You say, "on my side I had with me my military assistant Jim
21 Baxter, the UN chief of civilian affairs, Enrique Aguilar my spokesman
22 Gary Coward [phoen] And a couple of interpreters. Opposite us were the
23 three Ks, Karadzic, Krajisnik, and Koljevic, classified in my head as the
24 mad, the bad, and the looney, who were the political leaders of the
25 Bosnian Serbs. And of course, Mladic with one of his chiefs of staff."
1 Not a very "politique" thing to describe Mr. Krajisnik as bad or
2 Mr. Koljevic as an looney, is it?
3 A. I didn't at the time. I said it was classified in my head.
4 Q. But that was the attitude you took with you into these various
5 meetings with these gentlemen. Would that be correct?
6 A. It was my classification of them. I don't think it was my
7 attitude towards them, no.
8 Q. So your classification in your head did not affect your attitude,
9 is that your evidence?
10 A. That would be my case, yes.
11 Q. In passing, we also note that you describe Mladic as being there
12 with one of his chiefs of staff, another error, correct? Technical error,
13 but another error?
14 A. Technical error, yes. If I can sell enough books then I'll be
15 able to correct it.
16 Q. Well, I bought a couple of copies, you'll be pleased to hear.
17 A. Thank you.
18 Q. One last thing on this subject. It's back to P528 and could we go
19 to page 97, paragraph 453, please? Now, put this into context whilst it's
20 being got up on the screen. This is in a section called "Resumption of
21 air and ground attacks." So again we are talking about September, when
22 the air war resumed.
23 Paragraph 453 says this: "Despite these statements, supporting a
24 strong line and now conveying a much broader interpretation of resolution
25 836, the Secretariat took exception to a statement made at a press
1 briefing by the UNPROFOR spokesman just before the air campaign resumed."
2 'The aim is to cripple the BSA war machine and render its military
3 capabilities so devalued that General Mladic is forced to negotiate.'
4 "The Secretariat indicated to UNPF that it had been 'frankly
5 appalled' to read the UNPROFOR spokesman's statement and reminded the
6 mission that the declared aims of the air operation were to ensure the
7 safety and security of the safe areas, notably by forcing the withdrawal
8 of BSA heavy weaponry from around Sarajevo. The Secretariat emphasised
9 that the United Nations had no mandate from the Security Council to
10 cripple the BSA war machine and would not obtain such a mandate if it
11 sought it.
12 "There was no immediate response from Sarajevo prompting a second
13 message instructing UNPROFOR spokesman to curb their 'verbal blood lust.'
14 UNPF replied that it hoped the Secretariat would support its objectives,
15 the air and land operations in which it was then engaged."
16 Sir Rupert, were you responsible for the verbal blood lust that
17 your spokesmen so happily meted out to the VRS?
18 A. As the commander I accept responsibility for my subordinates. I
19 think though that the question the subordinate was answering, and this is
20 after the resumption, yes, is -- he was describing the NATO action, and
21 what you're showing is the point I raised earlier, I think yesterday, that
22 you had this -- you had two organisations involved, one UN, the other
23 NATO, each with a different political purpose or forum to answer to. And
24 they came together in Sarajevo. And I think that's where that particular
25 answer emanated from.
1 Q. I'm going to ask you a little bit about that tomorrow, but is your
2 evidence that the verbal blood lust was down to NATO and not UNPROFOR?
3 A. No, no, no. We said that. I can remember the fuss.
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. But I think -- my memory is he was answering a question, as it
6 was, as to what NATO was doing rather than the UN. It became -- I
7 remember it enough to remember that it was a fuss.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. That brings us to the end of the sitting.
10 We'll resume tomorrow and that's in the morning at 9.00. Thank you,
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Friday, the 9th day of
14 November, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.