1 Tuesday, 27 November 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Madam Registrar. Could you call the
7 case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case
9 number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Madam.
11 All the accused are here. From the Defence teams, I notice the
12 absence of Mr. Meek, Mr. Bourgon, and Mr. Haynes.
13 For the Prosecution, we have Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Thayer present.
14 Before we start, General Pandurevic, news have reached us this
15 morning that your father has passed away. This is a preeminently
16 humanitarian Tribunal, tries to set the example of being humanitarian at
17 all times, and showing how important it is to be humanitarian. We know
18 this is a sad moment for you; and this morning, before we do anything
19 else, we wish to share with you the sorrow you feel and convey to you our
20 condolences, to you and the rest of your family.
21 THE ACCUSED PANDUREVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Do let us know through your lawyer when you ever the
23 memorial service so we can see what we do about it.
24 Good morning to you.
25 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: It's nice to see you again. We are going to proceed
2 with your examination-in-chief.
3 Mr. Thayer, later on in the week, presumably, we will come down
4 with a scheduling order, and one of the things we are going to make clear
5 and insist in a rigid way is the conclusion of the Prosecution case by
6 the -- by a specific date. So please try to stick to the time that you
7 have indicated for the examination-in-chief and possibly even shorten it.
8 Thank you.
9 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President. I have already shortened
10 it some, and I will do my best to shorten it further. Good morning to you
11 and Your Honours. Good morning, everyone.
12 WITNESS: LOUIS FORTIN [Resumed]
13 Examination by Mr. Thayer: [Continued]
14 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
15 A. Good morning.
16 MR. THAYER: May we have 65 ter number 2986 back up on e-court,
17 please? I'm sorry, 2968. I misspoke. If we may have the second page of
18 each version, please?
19 Q. Colonel, focusing on the final paragraph of each document, you
20 reported this conversation indicates that General Gvero promised that he
21 would do his utmost to keep the situation in the region of Srebrenica
22 under control, which he thought quite possible because of his competent
23 military there. What happened this day only served to complicate the
24 situation in the region of Srebrenica and would ill effect the situation
1 The next sentence reads: "He would have had the full insight into
2 the situation in the Srebrenica area by next morning. That was why he
3 suggested another contact by phone only next morning. He suggested that
4 no air power be used by that time."
5 Sir, at the time that you made these notes, took this report,
6 again, was this the first time that a senior VRS Main Staff officer
7 suggested that you call back or that there be a further future
8 conversation so he could check on the situation, see what was going on
9 with his troops?
10 A. It was not, and by then it was clear to us that it was just --
11 they are just trying to delay so they could complete the plan.
12 Q. Now, in this report that you typed up, General Gvero refers to
13 close air support and says, I believe on two occasions in this
14 conversation, according to your notes, your report, that he wants the
15 close air support stopped. Do you recall that, sir?
16 A. That's correct. I do.
17 Q. Now, had a decision at this time, approximately 1810 hours on the
18 11th, had a decision been made within UNPROFOR about whether or not to end
19 the close air support?
20 A. Yes. In fact, it's mentioned in the first sentence of that
21 document, that the aircrafts were no longer over Srebrenica but they were
22 still at General Gobillard's disposal. So, yes, we had stopped the close
23 air support that had been ongoing earlier that evening.
24 Q. And to your recollection, sir, was that decision not again to use
25 close air support, was that decision conveyed to the VRS, or was something
1 else conveyed to the VRS in this conversation?
2 A. I'm not sure what you're getting at.
3 Q. Okay. I apologise. That was a terrible question.
4 The final decision not to employ close air support again in
5 connection with the VRS attack on Srebrenica, was that final decision
6 communicated to the VRS?
7 A. I don't believe it was. We had suspended close air support at
8 that time, if I remember correctly, because some Dutch soldiers had been
9 captured by the VRS, and they threatened to kill them if we kept hitting
10 them with close air support, so we stopped.
11 Q. And do you recall with any specificity what actual planes were
12 stopped and who in Sarajevo actually gave the order to stop them?
13 A. Well, the BH command gave the order and the acting commander at
14 the time was General Gobillard. He may have acted through the Chief of
15 Staff of BH command, who was General Nicolai. I know that two Dutch F-16s
16 had engaged; two Americans F-16s followed, but I'm not sure that they
17 were-- they dropped anything; and A-10s were -- two A-10s were next to
18 come and they were stopped.
19 Q. And, just briefly, what type of capabilities does an A-10 have,
20 and do they have anything in particular that's relevant to close air
22 A. The A-10s are the best aircraft for that kind of air task. They
23 are slower. Their pilots do basically only that, fire on ground support.
24 So they are better trained, and they have a big cannon which is much more
25 accurate. Accuracy, in the case of close air support, is important
1 because the limiting definitions of that type of action usually mean they
2 are being employed in close support to our -- or in close proximity to our
3 own troops. So accuracy is important.
4 Q. You mentioned some threats to DutchBat peacekeepers. Did you ever
5 learn, during this period of time, about other threats to UN peacekeepers
6 or to civilians which were made on 11 July?
7 A. Yes. As the VRS advanced, the Dutch withdrew from most of their
8 positions, and they concentrated in the Potocari compound where I guess
9 they had their main base, company base, as well as most of the population
10 of the enclave of Srebrenica that was in the surrounding area. They all
11 fell back in the Potocari compound. At one point, again to stop us from
12 using close air support, the Serbs threatened to shell the compound, with
13 the people in it, of course.
14 Q. Sir, I want to change topics slightly for a moment. Do you recall
15 listening to a radio transmission from Zepa during the VRS attack on that
17 A. Yes. We had more than one radio communication with Zepa.
18 Q. Okay. Do you recall a particular transmission which involved a
19 civilian representative from Zepa, speaking over the radio or
20 communications device?
21 A. It was one of the three civilians that I would later meet in Zepa
22 when I went down there. I believe his name was Horlak. He spoke to us.
23 We were by then back in PTT building in our own headquarters, in the ops
24 room. The Ukrainians had the HF communication with their company in Zepa,
25 and he was using the same equipment that the Ukrainians had at their
1 command post in Zepa to talk to us in the ops room.
2 Q. And do you recall with any specificity what this civilian
3 representative that you remember as Mr. Horlak was saying or reporting to
5 A. I can't think of it right now. I know I have notes of that
7 Q. Okay. Are those notes contained in your journal? Is that where?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Okay.
10 MR. THAYER: Then what I'd like to do is if we may have 6D00165 on
11 e-court, please.
12 Q. While that's getting loaded up, I think everybody here has heard
13 something about this journal that you kept. Would you just please
14 describe what it is, what it was, and how you created it?
15 A. Well, every day, while I was in Bosnia, I took notes of important
16 events as they occurred. I also took detailed notes of all the meetings
17 that I attended, most of the time with one of the generals that I was
18 serving, meetings with either the Bosnians, the Serbs, civilians
19 representative, government officials, military officers. Those notes,
20 usually I typed them up the same evening, because as I was saying
21 yesterday, there were meetings more than one usually every day, and I
22 wanted to get this done before I started taking notes again the next day.
23 Also, I had a daily agenda in which I took notes of a more
24 personal nature. So when I got back, when I got back home at the end of
25 the mission, I put together a journal. I wrote a daily paragraph based on
1 my -- that day's page of my diary, and then I cut and paste all the other
2 notes taken in theatre without altering them. Basically, I just cut and
3 paste them into the chronological order of the diary.
4 Q. And then what did you do with your original notes, Colonel?
5 A. Handwritten notes?
6 Q. Yes, sir.
7 A. I dumped most of them.
8 Q. Okay.
9 MR. THAYER: If we may turn to page 127 of the English --
10 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment.
11 Mr. Josse?
12 MR. JOSSE: Could we go into private session, please?
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's go into private session for a short
15 [Private session]
11 Pages 18265-18267 redacted. Private session
24 [Open session]
25 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session. Thank you.
1 MR. THAYER:
2 Q. From what you observed and what you learned, what were some of the
3 challenges that Colonel Verhoglyad faced as -- in his command, and how did
4 he respond to some of those challenges, if you know?
5 A. Well, that particular Ukrainian Battalion was certainly not of the
6 best quality of soldiers, from my understanding. From many discussions
7 with Colonel Verhoglyad was that they were all volunteers and basically
8 fleeing their own country because they were in trouble back there. So
9 lots of discipline problems both in the enclaves where they were, but more
10 so in Sarajevo and in still barracks with the Ukrainians soldiers there.
11 Colonel Verhoglyad, of course, wanted to change that perception
12 because the French, who consisted more than half of the troops, and
13 headquarters of the sector did not pay too much attention or give too much
14 credit to the Ukrainians, of course. Colonel Verhoglyad wanted to change
15 that. He first, I believe, had to convince his own national headquarters
16 to provide better troops, better equipment, and he did quite a bit of work
17 to come up with a better contribution in time for IFOR, when there was a
18 transfer of authority to NATO.
19 Q. Sir, did you ever hear any reports or rumours about the Ukrainians
20 either in the Zepa enclave or elsewhere, the peacekeepers, being involved
21 in any improper trade with anyone?
22 A. I heard stories about high usage of fuel. They had nowhere to go
23 basically, and their fuel usage was higher than units who were patrolling
24 in other areas. So we suspected, we knew, Colonel Verhoglyad knew, that
25 they were trading that fuel with the Serbs for, I don't really know what.
1 This became annoying because we had problems resupplying our own
2 troops in the various enclaves, and fuel was a major commodity.
3 Q. Do you recall at all when these reports of trading fuel were
4 supposed to have occurred? Do you recall whether it was before you
5 arrived, during your time there?
6 A. I don't recall anything specific. All I can say is that these
7 facts came to my knowledge at about the same time as we were paying
8 attention to them in Zepa and Gorazde, so when those events started
10 Q. And, sir, did you ever hear any complaints or any information
11 about the Ukrainian peacekeepers being partial to one side or the other?
12 Did you ever hear any talk of that as well?
13 A. Well, it was discussed, mostly among the French, that the
14 Ukrainians were pro-Serb. They could more easily leave -- live on the
15 Serb side than anyone else. In fact, after the hostage crisis in May, we
16 had orders that no UNPROFOR soldiers were to go in Serb territory, and
17 that order lasted for many weeks. However, we still needed to keep in
18 touch around Sarajevo with the Serb liaison officer, and we used the
19 Ukrainians to do that because they could travel back and forth and not be
20 made hostage.
21 MR. THAYER: Now, if we may look at 65 ter number 2502, please?
22 Q. Now, sir, we looked at a couple of these during your proofing
23 session, and to save time I'm just going to show you one.
24 Do you recognise what this is?
25 A. It's a report prepared by David Harland who was a civil affairs
1 officer at the sector level.
2 Q. And I note for the record that it's the 15th of July 1995, and
3 it's headed, "Sector Sarajevo, Weekly Situation Report."
4 Colonel, would you regularly receive these weekly sit-reps in the
5 course of your duties?
6 A. They were addressed to the sector commander, as you see in the
7 internal distribution; and, basically, all operational reporting or UN
8 paper work that went to the commander first went through me. So I saw
9 most of those.
10 Q. And so you would review them, is that fair to say?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Is that correct? Okay.
13 And if you would share with the Court, Colonel, how useful or not
14 useful did you find Harland's reporting?
15 A. Actually, I find them useful in that he was good at gathering
16 information from various sources and putting it all together. And in the
17 diary, I sometimes -- I know early on I talked about the use of the
18 military observers, which knew a lot of stuff, but it was not very well
19 integrated into how we processed that information at the sector level.
20 Let's just say that the proper staffing reflections were not
21 concerned, most of the time as they concerned UNMOs. But David would
22 always get the information: The information from the UNMOs, the UNHCR who
23 had convoys everywhere, from himself or his travels, or other civil
24 affairs officers who were on the ground who had a different perspective.
25 So those -- I found those reports usually normally accurate but
1 enlightening, in that his sources were wider.
2 MR. THAYER: Now, if we could look at page 2 of the English and
3 we'll stay on page 1 of the B/C/S.
4 Q. When we met, you told me you couldn't recall all the information
5 in -- regarding Zepa in this report. I just want to ask you about a
6 couple of sections in it.
7 If we could go to the -- or if I could direct your attention to
8 the paragraph that begins, "Last Saturday."
9 A. M'hm.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session now. Any time you need to go
11 into private session, please let us know.
12 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
14 MR. THAYER:
15 Q. "Last Saturday, 8 July, the Bosnians asked UNPROFOR to return the
16 127 weapons that had been handed over to UNPROFOR following the
17 demilitarisation agreement of May -- or of 8 May 1993."
18 Sir, do you recall receiving any reports or information concerning
19 the Bosnians attempts to get back or retrieve weapons that had been handed
21 A. Yes. Well, we had weapons collection point in most of the
22 enclaves, including Sarajevo and around Sarajevo, on both sides. Both
23 factions had to put their heavy weapons in weapon collection point. Those
24 are the weapons that are being talked about, and the Bosnians wanted to
25 have those weapons to defends themselves.
1 Q. And if we could go -- if I could just focus your attention on the
2 very last sentence of the very last paragraph there.
3 MR. THAYER: This would be, on the B/C/S version, the third full
4 paragraph that appears on the B/C/S side, the last sentence.
5 Q. "On the same day, the commander of Bosnian forces in the pocket
6 threatened to kill UNPROFOR soldiers if they did nothing to help defend
7 the pocket."
8 Colonel, what information do you recall receiving, if any, about
9 the Ukrainian company being threatened or actually attacked by either of
10 the warring parties during the attack on Zepa?
11 A. In fact, they had, as I started to describe earlier, they had OPs
12 around the enclaves and they had their check-point at the top of the road,
13 check-point 2, and they had a command post down in the village.
14 Some of the OPs were blocked by the Serbs to prevent them from
15 going anywhere. Some were blocked by the Bosnians with attempt by the
16 Bosnians to get the weapons and the equipment that the Ukrainians had.
17 There was a pressure by the Bosnians on the Ukrainians at their
18 command post in the village, to give them all the weapons, one-quarter of
19 their ammunition. So they were pressured on both sides. Of course, as we
20 saw earlier in the discussion with Mr. Horlak, they were putting a lot of
21 pressure for us to do something, to either give them weapons or provide
22 close air support to stop the Serb attack.
23 Q. And having reviewed this particular report by David Harland, do
24 you have any reason to doubt its accuracy or truthfulness of the
25 information contained in it?
1 A. No, I don't.
2 Q. Sticking with the topic of the attack on Zepa, Colonel, do you
3 recall what role, if any, NATO aircraft played during the VRS attack on
5 A. We had air presence, as it is called, at one -- at one point, but
6 we did not use the aircraft neither close air support or air strikes for a
7 number of reasons. The situation on the ground was confused, and the --
8 similar to the situation we were talking about in Srebrenica yesterday.
9 Also, the Ukrainians did not have a tactical air command post present to
10 direct -- to talk to the air planes and direct their fire on the ground.
11 It is essential to make sure that bombs fall where they are supposed to.
12 So that was, in my view, the major military hurdle to using close
13 air support in the case of Zepa.
14 Q. Now, even though there was no actual close air support employed in
15 connection with the VRS attack on Zepa, were there any consequences to the
16 actual air presence over Zepa?
17 A. They didn't like it, and that was relayed to us. I remember that,
18 but I don't remember the details of their reaction.
19 Q. Okay. Well, before we go to your diary --?
20 MR. THAYER: Well, let's just go into private session, if we
21 could, Mr. President, straight away.
22 [Private session]
11 Page 18275 redacted. Private session
22 [Open session]
23 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session.
24 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. Sir, did there come a time when you personally went to Zepa?
1 A. Yes, I did.
2 Q. Would you describe how that came to pass, please?
3 A. Well, we decided -- it happened about ten days later, around the
4 26th of July; and this, what we just saw, had been ongoing for those
5 further ten days. We decided to reinforce the Ukrainians in Zepa; and
6 since we could not prevent the Serbs from reducing that pocket, we were
7 going to make sure that the population was looked after and evacuated
8 safely. So we decided to reinforce the Ukrainians by sending French and
9 Russian troops.
10 General Gobillard, the best means of communications to keep in
11 touch with either BH command, the force commander, the people in the
12 pocket, and all the procedural around the use of aircrafts and things like
13 that, he felt he had to stay at PTT. So he sent me to be his eyes and
14 ears to Zepa, in Zepa.
15 Q. Now, with respect to the movement of the civilian population out
16 of the Zepa enclave, Colonel, by the 26th, when you were sent down there,
17 what's your understanding of what had already happened?
18 A. Well, the evacuation started before I got there. What we wanted
19 to do is make sure that each bus or vehicle carrying evacuees out of Zepa
20 to Kladanj in Bosnian territory, which is where they were supposed to be
21 evacuated, that each bus or vehicle was to have one UN soldier on board.
22 Basically, the task of those soldiers was to make sure that the
23 vehicle got to Kladanj, and that nobody was pulled off the vehicle by the
24 Serbs on the way there.
25 Q. And why was that an objective?
1 A. Well, without having all the details of what had happened to the
2 Srebrenica 15 days earlier, we knew, we had information that many
3 thousands Bosnian males had disappeared and have been killed.
4 Q. Now, do you recall specifically with whom you travelled to Zepa on
5 the 26th?
6 A. I travelled with Colonel Chinouihl. He was the senior French
7 engineer on staff at headquarters Sector Sarajevo.
8 Q. And did you make it to Zepa straight away, sir?
9 A. Oh, no. We got stopped at every Serb check-point on the way; and
10 when we got to Rogatica, we were stopped there for 18 hours.
11 Q. And what, if anything, do you recall seeing or doing while you
12 were at Rogatica?
13 A. When we attempted to -- every time we saw an opportunity to just
14 drive through, obtain authority to carry on to Zepa, negotiate, argue, and
15 try to move out of there, at one point we saw buses and other vehicles
16 driving in the opposite direction, full of Bosnian evacuates from Zepa.
17 We entered that they had a soldier on board, most did. At one
18 point, we saw a dump truck with nobody, with no UN soldier and about 50
19 people sitting on the metal bed of the dump truck with a big tarp over
20 them. It was probably -- that was in July. It was probably close to 50
21 degrees in the back of -- in the back of that dumptruck. When we didn't
22 see any UN soldiers there, we basically stood in front of the vehicle.
23 Colonel Chinouihl took the initiative and stood right in front of
24 the vehicle and I joined them, and we said, "This vehicle is not going
25 anywhere until we have a UN soldier to put on board." They got excited,
1 cocked their weapon, and threatened us, Chinouihl and I. And, eventually,
2 we saw -- eventually they calmed down and they agreed to what we were
4 We got the people off the truck, to take a bit of fresh air; and,
5 eventually, a bus returning with four or five Ukrainian soldiers from
6 Kladanj drove by and we got one, and we told him to get on the truck and
7 make sure that it made its way to Kladanj.
8 Q. Would you --
9 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Were the passengers male, female, or
11 THE WITNESS: Mixed, but mostly very young and very old, Your
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
14 MR. THAYER:
15 Q. And can you describe, sir, what, if anything, you did to help any
16 of those elderly people off the dumptruck?
17 A. Well, we -- I remember this very old lady, and it was really hot
18 in the back of that truck. It was hot outside, hot and humid, and even
19 more so in the back of that truck. She had trouble, basically, unfolding
20 her legs to be able to walk off the truck, so we helped her off, helped
21 her to walk a little bit and get some air. That's the one thing I
22 remember in particular.
23 Q. And where did you spend that night, sir, the night of the 26th?
24 A. Well, other than that episode, it was at night-time in the
25 evening, we slept in our vehicles. I was personally in a small French
1 armoured vehicle. A very cramped space, to put it mildly.
2 Q. That brings us to the 27th. What did you do that day?
3 A. Well, eventually, we were let through. We drove to Zepa and not
4 to the village but to the check-point on top of the hill, which was, as I
5 said, probably a kilometre or a kilometre and a half from the village,
6 where we met other UN troops that had been sent, as well as people being
7 evacuated and Serbs getting about their business of evacuating those
9 Q. And when you arrived at this check-point, did you meet or speak
10 with any UN officers in particular?
11 A. Well, Colonel Chinouihl and I went to -- we found Colonel Germain
12 the Colonel Germain who was a French legionnaire, who had been sent there
13 along with the Russians reinforcements, and we asked him about what was
14 going on, what was the situation.
15 Q. Do you know how long he had been in Zepa?
16 A. I'm not sure.
17 Q. So what did you do and what did you see while you were there at
18 that check-point?
19 A. Well, when I got there, I remember the people. The road coming
20 from the village was a one-way road attached to the side of a cliff
21 basically going up, and so trucks would come up to the large parking area,
22 check-point 2, unload the Bosnian civilians that they had taken from the
23 village. They would be transferred to buses, and those buses would then
24 go to Kladanj. There were mostly old people or young kids with their
25 mothers, and it was a bit - how should I put it? - unreal feeling to see
2 These people were basically forcibly removed from their house,
3 trying to keep their family together. I saw a young mother with two kids
4 trying to keep them together and move on the bus, and a Serb soldier
5 prodding her along, most of the time without any emotion, but in some
6 cases with screaming. And all those UN soldiers were around watching it,
7 basically with arms along their side, having abandoned -- nobody did
9 Q. You mentioned screaming, sir. Who was screaming?
10 A. I remember one Serb basically clowning around. He had -- I guess
11 he felt very powerful in the middle of it all, and he was clowning around
12 and screaming at people, "Get on the bus, move faster," at least I assume
13 that's what he was saying.
14 Q. Can you describe the condition of these civilians that you saw?
15 Take your time and describe what you saw.
16 A. Well, they were sad, of course, but -- in fact, they were
17 emotionless. They were -- we knew they were being forced to leave
18 everything behind, and they had to go basically with the clothes they were
19 wearing and that's it. They were, as we say in French, "resignes avec
20 leur sort."
21 Q. And, roughly, what does that mean? My French is pretty
23 JUDGE AGIUS: It's "reconciled with their destiny." Let's move.
24 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Or with their fate.
1 MR. THAYER:
2 Q. Now, did you see General Mladic at this check-point at some point?
3 A. Yes. He was there. In fact, shortly after our arrival, Colonel
4 Germain told Chinouihl and I that Mladic had been meeting with three
5 civilian representatives from the Bosnian of Zepa and that he was about to
6 meet again with them.
7 So we asked one Serb soldier to find us room -- or, no, to be able
8 to attend that meeting, and he went and talked to the individual. I don't
9 know who it was at the time. The individual came back and he said, "You,"
10 pointing at me, "Can come with an interpreter." I was travelling with a
11 French legionnaire soldier of Slovenian origin.
12 So he and I went and attended the meeting, and the person who had
13 been approached and said, "Yes, the Canadian can come," was Mladic.
14 Q. So what did you do?
15 A. I went and sat down. He showed me where to sit beside him, to
16 attend that meeting.
17 Q. And would you describe the meeting?
18 A. Well, there was -- it didn't start right away. The three Bosnian
19 representatives were brought to the meeting place. They seemed in decent
20 enough shape. They didn't seem to have been mistreated or anything, a bit
21 unsecure, probably, but nothing else that I could see.
22 It didn't start right away. But when it started, it didn't seem
23 to be an agenda. It was more like, "Are we going to sign that agreement,"
24 something they had discussed before, I guess; and then veiled threats,
25 which I don't remember the details, but basically that he didn't need all
1 three of them to reach that agreement.
2 Q. When you say "he," who are you referring to, sir?
3 A. Mladic.
4 Q. Do you recall the names of any of those representatives or their
6 A. Only one, Horlak or Torlak, who I mentioned earlier, that I
7 recognised his face; the others, no.
8 Q. If we may look at some video very, very briefly, without referring
9 to any particular date, I just want to see whether you recognise any
10 faces, sir.
11 MR. THAYER: We are going to be looking at P02489.
12 Q. We are just going to play a very brief clip, and I'll ask you if
13 you recognise anyone.
14 [Videotape played]
15 MR. THAYER:
16 Q. Sir, anybody in that clip, which started at approximately 12
17 minutes 7 seconds and we paused at 12 minutes 15.9 seconds, is there
18 anybody you recognise there as a civilian representative that you met
19 during your time in Zepa?
20 A. Yeah, the one with the white shirt who is shaking hands with
21 Mladic, the last one shaking hands with him, is the one I recognise.
22 Q. In the short sleeve shirt, sir?
23 A. Yeah, that's correct.
24 Q. We are going to play another clip.
25 MR. THAYER: This is 65 ter 2491. We are going to start the clip
1 at 46 minutes and 6 seconds.
2 [Videotape played]
3 MR. THAYER:
4 Q. Sir, we have paused the frame at 46 minutes, 12.3 seconds. Do you
5 recognise anyone in this clip?
6 A. Yes. On the left, I see Lieutenant-Colonel Germain, French
7 legionnaire. Facing us is Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Baxter who was the
8 military assistant to General Smith. On his right is General Rupert Smith
9 who was commander UNPROFOR at the time and who joined me at that meeting
10 we were just talking about shortly after it started.
11 Q. And just to be clear for the record, the individual that you've
12 referred to as Lieutenant-Colonel Germain is the individual without the
13 beard to the left of the frame; is that correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 MR. THAYER: If we continue rolling the clip.
16 [Videotape played]
17 MR. THAYER:
18 Q. We've paused at 46 minutes, 25.4 seconds. Do you recognise anyone
19 in this clip, sir?
20 A. Well, the one we see, the closest, is Mladic. Behind him with the
21 mustache is Indic. He was the one who was our main contact or liaison
22 officer with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, that would be Lieutenant-Colonel
24 Q. Okay. Thank you, sir.
25 MR. THAYER: We are done with the video.
1 Q. Would you please summarise briefly what you occur happening during
2 the rest of this meeting?
3 A. Well, shortly after it started, General Smith arrived and he
4 joined the meeting, and then Mladic was trying to get the Bosnian to sign
5 an agreement. However, UNPROFOR had many guarantees to provide in that
6 agreement and guarantees we could not provide.
7 So General Smith intervened and took the three Bosnian civilian
8 representatives aside to tell them, "Don't sign that because we can't
9 offer the guarantees that Mladic says that we can offer, so you will sign
10 without those UNPROFOR guarantees."
11 He also told Mladic that these people were local representatives.
12 They were not representatives of the Bosnian government. Basically, one
13 of the aspects of that -- of the agreement relied on an eventual exchange
14 of prisoners, which needed to be negotiated at much higher level. So
15 these people could not agree to some of the things Mladic was asking them
16 to agree to.
17 Q. After this meeting, what do you recall doing next? Did you go
19 A. After that, Mladic drove down to Zepa village, and I followed with
20 Lieutenant-Colonel Germain. I went down to the Ukrainian command post in
21 the village where they were set up, and that's where I met Colonel
22 Verhoglyad who was already there, the Ukrainian deputy commander.
23 Q. What did you see going on down in the village centre there, sir?
24 A. There were Serb soldiers, not the most clean-cut types. I guess
25 they had been fighting, or you know, for a while, evacuating or looting.
1 I saw trucks go by with fridges, with cows in the back. I guess they were
2 going around the houses and taking whatever was worth taking.
3 Q. How would you describe the looting that you saw?
4 A. Well, there was -- there were a few houses on fire, not -- there
5 was a kind of a central place where I was. There were no fires nearby.
6 But further down, I could see houses burning, and I heard the occasional
7 shot in the background, weapon being fired. And at one point, I'm not
8 sure if it's that same day, I believe so, Mladic with his camera crew was
9 trying to offer water to an old lady who was sitting on the stairs of a
10 big building there. They were in charge.
11 Q. Where did you spend the night of the 27th of July, Colonel?
12 A. I stayed in the Ukrainian compound in Zepa village. I guess it
13 was a school that they were using for their rooms there.
14 Q. That brings us to the 28th. Do you recall what you saw going on
15 in the village that morning?
16 A. Well, if I remember, I'm not sure if what I saw was the afternoon
17 before or the morning after, more of the same. There were still Serb
18 soldiers there, and I walked around with the interpreter that I had, the
19 French legionnaire, and we talked to some of them.
20 Q. And what were those Serb soldiers doing?
21 A. Nothing specific at that point, because they were -- the
22 evacuation of the village itself was completed, I believe, at that time;
23 although, I can't say the same about the whole enclave. No, there was
24 the looting still, and grabbing whatever they could, putting it on
25 trucks. One of them wanted to see my gun, so I showed him after making
1 the proper safety procedures.
2 Q. Now, you referred to an old woman that you encountered. Can you
3 just describe -- describe that encounter and describe what, if anything,
4 you did in connection with her?
5 A. It's the old woman that Mladic had been offering, I think, water
6 and chocolate to her, in front of his camera crew. It was a show of poor
7 taste any way. After that episode, we took her - "we" being the my
8 interpreter and I - we took her to the Ukrainian compound. She didn't
9 want to go. She was very scared, but we finally convinced her not to stay
10 in the village. We wanted her to -- we wanted her to rest, to give her
11 something to eat, and she didn't want to go into the school, the building
12 that the Ukrainians were using.
13 So we -- I got some soldiers to get a mattress inside, take it
14 outside under the shade of a tree, so that she could sit down. There was
15 an old man who had been old, in relative terms. He might have been 50 to
16 60 and who already was in the Ukrainian compound. So we asked him to come
17 out and help us convince her that she was safer there and to stay there,
18 which he did.
19 Q. And what arrangements did you make, in connection with these two
20 people, for their transportation?
21 A. Well, I had to leave shortly after, but I made sure that the
22 Ukrainians knew that they had to take these people out and that they
23 should be evacuated properly and not be left on their own; and by then,
24 because Verhoglyad was there, I trusted that they would do that job
1 Q. What did you do later in the day?
2 A. We drove back up to check-point 2, and that's where we met General
3 Gobillard, who had travelled to Zepa that day; and then after meeting
4 there, we travelled back to Sarajevo.
5 Q. And while you were with General Gobillard at check-point 2, did
6 you have any meetings with any VRS officers?
7 A. Yes. I know I have some notes, but I don't remember the -- that
8 part very well.
9 Q. Okay.
10 And before we get to the notes, do you remember who the meeting
11 was with?
12 A. [No verbal response]
13 Q. I see you shaking your head, so we'll go to the document straight
15 MR. THAYER: If we could have 65 ter number 2969 on e-court,
17 JUDGE AGIUS: You want this in open?
18 MR. THAYER: Open session is fine, Mr. President. Thank you.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
20 MR. THAYER: If we could zoom out a little bit on the English,
21 just to get the full. Thank you.
22 Q. Can you read that document, sir?
23 A. Yes, I can.
24 Q. Do you recognise what that is?
25 A. Yeah. This is a report of that meeting that I personally wrote.
1 It's my handwriting.
2 Q. And who is this meeting with, sir?
3 A. General Tolimir.
4 Q. And who?
5 A. And General Gobillard who had travelled to Zepa that day.
6 Q. And if we read the header line, the underlined portion, can you
7 just read what that says, sir?
8 A. "Meeting, General Gobillard, Tolimir, Zepa Ukrainian check-point 2,
9 28 July 95 at 1720."
10 Q. And if you would, just take a couple of moments to read this first
12 A. M'hm.
13 Q. At paragraph 1(A), you indicate that one of the things that was
14 discussed, one of the matters discussed was the reasons for taking 36
15 Bosnian civilians from the last two convoys on the evening of 27 July and
16 for taking one other Bosnian civilian at check-point 2 on the afternoon of
17 28 July.
18 Sir, do you recall who had this information about the 36 Bosnian
19 civilians and the one Bosnian civilian at check-point 2?
20 A. Well, General Gobillard had that information. I don't know where
21 from, because I drove up from Zepa village to check-point 2 at that day to
22 meet him there and I didn't have that information.
23 MR. THAYER: And if we turn the page to page 2 in the English,
24 please, and that will also have to be page 2 of the B/C/S.
25 Q. At the top of the English, you write that: "General Tolimir
1 explained that these civilians were, in fact, males of military age, 18 to
2 60, and that they had lied about their age to try to escape from Zepa.
3 This included the 12 slightly wounded."
4 Do you recall hearing any information about these 12 slightly
6 A. No, I don't.
7 Q. Do you recall anything about General Tolimir?
8 A. Yes. He was not entirely sober, and it seemed to be a usual state
9 for him, according to General Gobillard at least.
10 Q. Okay, sir. I see we are at the break time. I only have about
11 five minutes left of my examination in chief, so we'll pick up when we get
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's have the break. Let's have the break. But
14 whoever is going first with the cross-examination, please be prepared.
15 Thank you.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: You've got your five minutes, Mr. Thayer. I see
19 that you are going to make it ten.
20 MR. THAYER: I'll move.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
22 MR. THAYER:
23 Q. Sir, I wanted to follow up with a question about the video clip
24 that I showed you previously. You identified one of the Muslim
25 representatives you recalled as wearing the white short sleeved shirt.
1 Is there a name that you associate with that individual in the
2 short sleeved shirt?
3 A. Yes. It's Horlak or Torlak. I'm not sure the name.
4 Q. Okay. Now, while you were in Zepa, do you recall seeing any other
5 VRS officers of any rank other than Generals Mladic and Tolimir?
6 A. No, I don't.
7 Q. And are you familiar with the name Avdo Palic?
8 A. Yes, I am.
9 Q. And who do you recall him being?
10 A. He was the Bosnian military leader of whatever troops the BiH army
11 had in the Zepa pocket.
12 Q. And do you recall seeing him during your time in Zepa?
13 A. I think I did, but I don't recall.
14 Q. Okay. Now we were looking at some notes you took of your meeting
15 with General Tolimir and General Gobillard. What did you eventually do
16 with those notes, do you recall?
17 A. Well, we -- whenever I drafted notes quickly like that in
18 handwriting, it meant they had to go. So BH command definitely got a copy
19 and probably the force commander's office as well in Zagreb.
20 Q. And when do you recall finalising the -- those notes?
21 A. Well, as usual, as soon as we got back to the office, I would get
22 into doing this; and in this case, the fact that they are handwritten
23 tells me that it happened fast, that we needed to share that information
24 very quickly. Otherwise, I would have waited later at night and typed
25 them up.
1 Q. And when do you recall returning to Sarajevo, sir?
2 A. Sometime on the 28th, I believe, after that meeting with Tolimir
3 at check-point 2, I think we headed back to Sarajevo.
4 Q. And did you ever return to Zepa?
5 A. No, I didn't.
6 MR. THAYER: If we may have 65 ter 2969 back up on e-court.
7 Q. I just have a few more questions for you, Colonel.
8 MR. THAYER: And if we may go to page 3 of the English, and that
9 is page 2 of the B/C/S.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you want this in public, in open session, or in
11 private session?
12 MR. THAYER: Public session is fine, Mr. President. Thank you.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
14 MR. THAYER: If we go towards the bottom -- middle to the bottom
15 of the English, and we will be focusing on about the lower third of
16 paragraph 3 of the B/C/S.
17 Q. Just quickly, there is a reference, and you write, you
18 report: "As for the Bosnian military, it seems that they are ready and
19 willing to drop their weapons and surrender provided that they obtain firm
20 guarantees for their safety from UNPROFOR."
21 Do you remember where you got that information from, sir, to
22 include in these notes of the meeting?
23 A. I'm sorry, I don't.
24 MR. THAYER: If we turn the page in English, and we can stay on the
25 same page in B/C/S.
1 Q. Please focus your attention on the passage that begins with the
2 word, "Note."
3 "Shortly after General Gobillard's departure, the Serbs took
4 Mr. Mehmet Hanic, mayor and leader of the War Presidency of Zepa, under
5 custody since they didn't need him any more and he is of military age.
6 They had been using him as a mediator with the people of Zepa. It is
7 believed that Mr. Hajric honestly and courageously did his best to save
8 his people."
9 Now, do you recall taking this note, sir?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. And can you explain how something that happened after you left
12 made it into your note? Do you know what the source of this information
14 A. I'm not sure of the exact source, but I remember how these things
15 happened. I would put, as a note, something that I learned in between the
16 time of the meeting and the time that the actual transcript was produced.
17 If it was pertinent to that meeting or to that report, I would add
18 it as a note, like this. It's probably on returning to Sarajevo, to
19 sector headquarters, that I got this information, either from the ops room
20 or perhaps from Mr. David Harland, who was in touch with the civil affairs
21 officer who was still at Zepa when I left.
22 Q. Do you recall the name of that civil affairs officer, sir?
23 A. It could have been Ed Joseph or Viktor Bezrouchenko.
24 Q. Now, do you know or did you receive any information as to whether
25 Mr. Hajric was ever seen alive again?
1 A. I don't know.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: I think that needs to be clarified. You don't know
4 THE WITNESS: I never had that kind of information, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
6 MR. THAYER: Now if we just look at paragraph 5, if we just scroll
7 down a bit, and this is also paragraph 5 in the corresponding B/C/S
9 Q. "General Tolimir suggested that since UNPROFOR had accomplished its
10 task of evacuating the civilians, and since it was not willing to help
11 with the Bosnian military, it should withdraw."
12 Do you recall where this information came from, sir?
13 A. It was during the meeting.
14 Q. You're reporting what Tolimir actually said during the meeting?
15 A. Yes.
16 MR. THAYER: And if we may turn to the last page of the English,
17 please? That would be page 5.
18 Q. This refers to the whereabouts of Avdo Palic?
19 A. M'hm.
20 Q. "General Gobillard asked if it was true, as General Mladic had
21 said, that Palic was dead. "Tolimir announced," General Tolimir announced,
22 "that like every army they used propaganda to affect the morale of its
23 enemy and that this information that he could not confirm himself was
24 probably such propaganda."
25 Do you know where General Gobillard got that information about
1 Avdo Palic?
2 A. Probably, when he got to check-point 2, on the top there of the
3 hill at Zepa. I was still down in the village, so he probably talked to
4 some of the officers, UN officers, who were there and got that information
5 from them.
6 Q. And did you ever learn what Colonel Palic's fate was, sir?
7 A. No, I didn't.
8 Q. And, again, there is some initials here at the bottom of the page.
9 Can you identify those?
10 A. It's my signature.
11 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Colonel.
12 MR. THAYER: I have no further questions.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Thayer.
14 Let's go through the estimated time for cross-examinations once
15 more. So far, it's only the Pandurevic team that does not intend to
16 cross-examine this witness.
17 Do I have a confirmation of that, Mr. Sarapa?
18 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
20 Then, Mr. Zivanovic, you asked for 30 minutes. Do you still need
21 the 30 minutes?
22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'll not cross-examine this witness, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
24 Mr. Ostojic, you asked for one hour.
25 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you. About 45 minutes to
1 an hour, I think.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Ostojic.
3 Ms. Nikolic, you had asked for ten minutes.
4 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. We will not
5 have any questions for this witness.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
7 Mr. Lazarevic, you had asked for 15 minutes.
8 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. It is very unlikely
9 that we will have any cross-examination for this witness.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I thank you.
11 Madam Fauveau, you had asked for an hour and 15 minutes.
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: And do you stick to that?
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Well, I'll try to be as short as
15 possible and be finished in an hour and 15 minutes.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you.
17 Mr. Krgovic or Mr. Josse, you had asked for two hours -- a revised
18 estimate for two hours and 30 minutes.
19 MR. JOSSE: Yes, Your Honour. Certainly no more than that, and I
20 hope perhaps to cut it down to two hours.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
22 So that gives you an idea that it's very unlikely that you finish
23 your testimony today, but that you will certainly finish it tomorrow.
24 Madam Fauveau, I gather that you are going first. Go ahead.
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
1 Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, my name is Natacha Fauveau-Ivanovic
3 representing General Miletic.
4 So, first, let's look at your statement with the OTP in 1996.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] This is document 6D152. Could we
6 please show page 3 to the witness, at the bottom of the page. I need the
7 bottom of page 3 and page 4.
8 Q. So, in this statement, you were talking about the meetings held
9 with the different commands of UNPROFOR; and on the third line, from the
10 bottom of the page, you say and I quote: [In English] "This meeting with
11 the BH command MA Serb, a very important function, they ensured the link
12 between the sector and BH command was operating smoothly. I and the other
13 MAs would use these sessions to ensure that Generals..."
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we move to the next page.
15 Q. "... that Generals Smith and Gobillard, as well as Gobillard's
16 successors, fully understood one another. There was important given the
17 different languages and cultural and military differences in perception
18 and reactions."
19 [Interpretation] So what I'm interested in is the last sentence.
20 You're talking about different languages, cultural, and military
21 differences in perception and reactions. Does this mean that each officer
22 saw and analysed the situation according to what he knew in his own
23 environment, so according to his own military experience?
24 A. Not quite. That's why we had those sessions to make sure that
25 this didn't happen, and we had -- they had sessions to get –
1 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Sorry to interrupt you like this. But
2 Madam Fauveau and Mr. Thayer and you, Major, please draw our attention
3 straight away when we need to be in private session. I'm not quite sure
4 whether this part should be in open or in private session.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think that the OTP agrees to have
6 this in public session.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. But draw our attention straight away when you
8 think that we should be in private session. Thank you.
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
10 Q. So I understand that you had meetings to make sure that there was
11 coherence. But if there had been no meetings of the like, wouldn't it be
12 that each officer would analyse the situation according to his own
13 background and his own experience?
14 A. Yes, of course, but that doesn't mean that they would be
15 different. Lack of meetings did not necessarily mean lack of coherence.
16 Q. But since there were officers that came from all different
17 countries and had different cultural backgrounds, and who came from
18 different armies, I'm not talking about coherence that may or may not
19 exist; I'm talking about the fact that all these UNPROFOR officers had
20 different backgrounds.
21 So is it true that they all had different habits, they all had
22 different ways of operating within an army?
23 A. Not quite. They were all NATO trained, including the French who
24 were trained on NATO procedures. So we had that common background:
25 Dutch, British, French, and Canadian.
1 Q. What about the Ukrainians, or the Egyptians?
2 A. No. They didn't have that common background of NATO training.
3 Q. In your statement, you talk about the way your sector was
4 organised, and you say that the commander of the sector had three deputy
5 commanders and the head of staff right below him.
6 What exactly was the hierarchical connection between these four
8 A. Well, they were -- the three deputies were at the same level, and
9 they accomplished similar functions for their own national contingent.
10 The Chief of Staff, who was Russian, had similar functions toward his
11 national contingents, as the other deputies did, but he was also running
12 the headquarters staff for the general.
13 Q. Who replaced General Gobillard when he was not in Sarajevo?
14 A. Depending on who was present, there was often absence for either
15 leave back home or meeting elsewhere. It was in descending order, the
16 deputies, which were given a seniority before I got there: The Egyptian
17 deputy was the senior, then the Ukrainian, and finally the French.
18 Q. Could you tell us who was the head of General Gobillard's staff?
19 A. The Chief of Staff, you mean?
20 Q. [In English] Yes, Chief of Staff?
21 A. It was Colonel Demurenko.
22 Q. [Interpretation] What nationality was he?
23 A. Russian.
24 Q. Yesterday, you said that the name of General Miletic was a name
25 you heard in July 1995. Do you remember this? On page 95, you said this
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. You also said, on page 82, that during the Srebrenica events, you
4 spent a great amount of time in the UNPROFOR HQ because General Gobillard
5 was the acting commander at the time?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Do you remember this?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. When General Gobillard was acting commander, he had contacts with
10 the officers in charge, the higher officers of Republika Srpska army,
12 A. Some of them, yes.
13 Q. And you have no recollection that at the time, in July 1995,
14 General Gobillard had contacts with General Miletic?
15 A. No. And I'd have no -- I don't recall, no.
16 Q. And you have no recollection that General Nicolai would have had
17 contacts with General Miletic over that same period, in July 1995?
18 A. No, I don't recall.
19 Q. And you have no recollection that -- of the name of General
20 Miletic being mentioned during the meetings you had in Zepa?
21 A. It's possible, and I know I have something on him in my notes.
22 But off the top of my head, I don't recall, no.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we please show the witness a
24 document 5D532?
25 Q. This is information provided by the OTP after the meeting you had
1 with representatives of the OTP last Sunday.
2 Could you please read this first paragraph, but just for yourself.
3 A. Okay. M'hm.
4 Q. Is it true that during this meeting two days ago, on Sunday,
5 November 25th, you told the Prosecutor that you believed you heard about
6 Miletic in September 1995?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. You earlier you said that in your notes you believe you have
9 something about Miletic, but it's not this September meeting. It's not
10 this meeting of September 24, 1995?
11 A. It likely is, yes.
12 Q. I apologise. I was talking about the meeting of November 24,
14 A. Well, both -- both of those meetings appear in my notes. I did
15 not attend the first one, but I attended the other one, and I don't really
16 remember that meeting.
17 Q. Yesterday, on page 81, you said that you were not really sure of
18 the duties of General Miletic, but you said that he was a deputy to
19 commander Mladic, as well as probably head of the intelligence or the
20 security sector.
21 Isn't it true that when you were saying this, you were just
22 assuming that it was the truth, but, in fact, you never really knew what
23 the exact function of General Miletic was?
24 A. All I knew is that he was a senior officer in the VRS army, above
25 corps level, so in General Mladic's staff, but I did not know his exact
2 Q. Isn't it true that when you arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina in May
3 1995, there was an ABiH offensive ongoing?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. This offensive was led from demilitarised zone, including
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. When the Serbs reacted to this offensive, they were given an
9 ultimatum to stop their response against the BiH army.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
11 MR. THAYER: Perhaps it would be helpful to have a date or
12 something to tie this down to the actual events.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Fauveau. I think that's a fair comment.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we please show the witness
15 document 6D152, the statement he made with the OTP, page 10, third
17 I quote: [In English] "In response to the Bosnian attack, the
18 Bosnian Serbs started to fire their weapons which had been gathered in the
19 WCPs. The sector issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to stop firing
20 and to return their weapons to the WCPs by noon on May 25, 1995."
21 [Interpretation] I believe that this answers the question from my
22 learned colleague.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Does it, Mr. Thayer?
24 MR. THAYER: Yes, it does, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Sir, is it true that when the Serbs responded to the Bosnian
3 attack, they were issued an ultimatum from UNPROFOR?
4 A. Yes, but there is a larger context here. Weapons in WCPs are
5 heavy weapons, which were collected under UNPROFOR supervision in weapon
6 collection points. Those are the weapons that the Serbs were using that
7 we didn't want them to use; and, also, they strangled the city and the
8 city was starving. So that's one reason why we tried to negotiate more
9 food into the city and the Bosnians tried fighting their way out with
10 light weapons.
11 Q. Fine. I'm not contesting this right now. But before the Bosnian
12 Serbs responded, the Muslims did attack from a zone that was supposed to
13 be demilitarised?
14 A. Well, as I was alluding to, "demilitarise" meant having heavy
15 weapons under UN supervision in weapon collection points, not all types of
16 weapons. It was impossible to do, on both sides.
17 Q. Yes. But in this offensive that started from Sarajevo, the ABiH
18 army, and within Sarajevo also, within the DMZ zone, the ABiH was also
19 using heavy weapons?
20 A. Not at that time, no. Eventually, everybody was using their heavy
21 weapons because weapon collection point ceased to exist, but not at that
23 Q. Isn't it true that at the moment, during this offensive, the
24 representative of the ABiH, General Delic, for example, did not want to
25 speak about peace?
1 A. I don't know.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we please -- I think here we
3 need to go into private session because this is document 6D165. It's the
4 diary, the journal.
5 [Private session]
11 Page 18305 redacted. Private session
12 [Open session]
13 JUDGE AGIUS: We are back in open session, Madam.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This is a memo dated July 2nd, 1995.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we move to page 3, please?
17 The two last paragraphs are the ones I'm interested in.
18 A. I don't see the whole text. It's too narrow. Good.
19 Q. In the paragraph right under the heading, "Location of Bosnian
20 weapons a problem," there is the following: [In English] "Since the
21 Bosnian offensive began two weeks ago, the number of Bosnian heavy weapons
22 operating from near UNPROFOR facilities has significantly increased."
23 [Interpretation] So early in July 1995, didn't the ABiH army
24 operate with heavy weapons out of Sarajevo?
25 A. Yes. But, as I pointed out earlier, between May, your initial
1 questions, and July, the big change was the WCPs were not functional any
2 more, so everyone was using heavy weapons.
3 Q. But when these WCPs no longer operated, didn't it mean that the
4 DMZ was also no longer operational?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Do you remember that in June 1995, the UNPROFOR had many problems
7 with the ABiH army? At the time, notably the ABiH army was restricting
8 the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR?
9 A. You'd have to be more specific.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Then we need to move into private
11 session again, please.
12 [Private session]
11 Pages 18308-18314 redacted. Private session
14 [Open session]
15 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] This is a cable sent by Mr. Akashi
17 to Mr. Annan.
18 Q. On the stamp, at the top of the page...
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Top of the page, please.
20 Q. ... it says: "95, July 11, 2147 hours."
21 A. I see that.
22 Q. 2147. Does this mean that the cable was sent at 2147 hours?
23 A. That's a fair assumption. The stamp is UNPROFOR communications.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 2 of the
25 same document?
1 Q. See paragraph B in this document? In the middle of this document,
2 there is a sentence starting with, "Following." In this part of the
3 cable, it reads as follows: [In English] "Following consultation with the
4 Bosnian government, and in order to avoid a continued humanitarian
5 catastrophe, agreement will be solicited from the Bosnian Serbs to allow
6 all residents of Srebrenica, including all men, to leave for Tuzla if they
7 so wish.
8 "The Dutch will be instructed to remain in the Srebrenica enclave
9 at least until arrangements have been negotiated and finalised with
10 Bosnian Serbs authorities for the departure from the enclave of those
12 [Interpretation] Could we say that this cable was a follow-up of
13 the contact that Mr. Akashi had had with the people at the UNPROFOR
14 headquarters in Sarajevo?
15 A. Probably, amongst many other contacts he must have had in times of
16 crises like that. We never stopped discussing, gathering information,
17 exchanging ideas.
18 Q. According to this cable, the UNPROFOR was supposed to ask the
19 Serbs for help in order to evacuate the population, the Muslim population,
20 from Potocari.
21 A. It says, "agreement to allow all residents of Srebrenica to leave
22 for Tuzla."
23 Q. You're absolutely right. In any case, the initiative calling for
24 evacuation came from UNPROFOR?
25 A. By that point, after three or four days of Serb pressure, yes.
1 Q. And as follow-up, after all these contacts that UNPROFOR had with
2 the BiH government, as well as with Mr. Akashi, the commander of DutchBat
3 held a meeting with General Mladic.
4 A. And your question?
5 Q. Well, I want to know whether a meeting was actually organised on
6 the evening of the 11th between the commander of the DutchBat and General
8 A. I don't know about that.
9 Q. I'd like to show you --?
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] If we could please first go back to
11 private session.
12 Q. I'd like to show you 5D165 [as interpreted].
13 [Private session]
12 [Open session]
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. I remember this was discussed; but by whom
14 exactly, I don't recall.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Isn't it true that Zepa was supposed to be demilitarised in 1993?
17 A. I don't know. Anything that happened prior to May 1995, which was
18 arrival, I can't say for sure.
19 Q. Do you remember that when -- according to the information you
20 obtained, do you remember that when Tolimir received this suggestion that
21 Zepa be demilitarised, July 1995, that he seemed to be interested by this
23 A. I don't recall that, but it's possible.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we please now move to private
25 session, because I would like to show the witness his diary, 6D155 [as
2 [Private session]
11 Pages 18320-18321 redacted. Private session
1 [Open session]
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Fauveau.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. Sir, do you remember that when the evacuation of the population,
5 civilian population, of Zepa was finished, General Tolimir proposed to you
6 to go and see -- that the UNPROFOR should go and see in the forests around
7 whether there were still people who needed to be evacuated? Do you
8 remember that?
9 A. You're referring to the meeting General Gobillard held with
10 General Tolimir at check-point 2, is it?
11 Q. Yes, indeed, sir.
12 A. Yeah, I don't recall that specifically, but it's possible. There
13 was one thing at that point that was -- that was unsure. We estimated
14 that there were three -- 2.000 to 3.000 people remaining in Zepa at that
15 time. According to the Serbs, they were all BiH army. According to us,
16 at least half were civilians, but we were unsure of those figures.
17 Q. I would like now to go to private session.
18 [Private session]
11 Pages 18323-18326 redacted. Private session
13 [Open session]
14 JUDGE AGIUS: And, also, because you speak the same language,
15 please allow a short pause between question and answer.
16 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. Sir, again, my name is John Ostojic. I represent Mr. Ljubisa
18 Beara. I'd like to ask you some preliminary questions.
19 First, if you will, list for me the documents that you reviewed
20 with the Prosecutor in preparation for your testimony here yesterday and
22 A. Parts of my diary; the notes of the meeting that I had prepared
23 following the conversation on the phone between General Gobillard and
24 Gvero; notes of another meeting -- yes, notes of the meeting between
25 General Gobillard and General Tolimir at check-point 2 in Zepa; and a
1 report, the weekly report, that David Harland wrote on 2nd of July 1995
2 that we saw earlier.
3 Q. Is that situation report we referred to?
4 A. It's a weekly report.
5 Q. Oh, the weekly report. Did you review any situation reports?
6 A. No, other than reports that are in my diary, which we've been
7 through some parts of, and there are situation reports in there.
8 Q. Now, you mentioned with Mr. Harland?
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Please make pauses.
11 MR. OSTOJIC:
12 Q. You mentioned, with respect to Mr. Harland and his weekly report,
13 that you found it to be useful and reliable.
14 Did you find that to be true for the situation reports that you
15 received on a daily basis from the various organisations that were
16 providing information to you in July of 1995?
17 A. Well, not always. This is, how to say, the various sources of
18 information that we had provided us with information that was accurate
19 from their perspective, from their point of view, but not necessarily a
20 complete picture of what was going on. That was the difficulty, trying to
21 put all these bits and pieces seen from different angles into a complete
22 picture. In addition, it's like watching TV in 2-D and trying to describe
23 something in 3-D.
24 Q. Well, share with us, if you will, how did you confirm or verify
25 the accuracy of, for example, the sit reports that you may have received
1 from the civil affairs office?
2 A. We cross checked the information with what we were receiving from
3 other sources, which was basically their means of verifying; and also
4 sometimes ask additional questions of the persons who wrote the report or
5 other sources of information to verify the information. That's as a
6 general procedure.
7 Q. What sources would you look to verify if a senior civil affairs
8 officer sent you a report, a sit report, on the activities that may have
9 been happening on or around Srebrenica on July 17th, 1995?
10 A. Srebrenica, you say?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. I'm not sure what report you're talking about.
13 Q. Okay. Well, I'm just generally trying to understand. You said
14 that in order to verify the accuracy of certain reports, you would check
15 with other sources, and my question simply is: What other sources would
16 you use or check with, in order to verify the accuracy of information that
17 may be transmitted to you through a senior civil affairs officer, such as
18 Ken Biser?
19 A. Well, in the case of Srebrenica, on July 17, I don't know.
20 Q. And why is that?
21 A. Our part, the role that General Gobillard played in the Srebrenica
22 event as acting commander UNPROFOR, lasted until July 12th; then he
23 reverted back to his role as sector commander, so we did not have access
24 or time on a daily basis to keep an eye on Srebrenica. We were already
25 busy with what was developing in Zepa.
1 Q. Okay. So help me with this: Today, on page 20, lines 3 through
2 5, you said that: "We had information that many thousands Bosnian males
3 had disappeared and had been killed." Are you saying that that was true
4 as of July 12th 1995?
5 A. I'm not sure. But in between, in between the events of Srebrenica
6 and Zepa, in between July 12th and July 18, 19, 20th, that information
7 started to appear.
8 Q. Where did you get that information?
9 A. I'm not sure. I don't recall.
10 Q. Does your diary reflect it at all?
11 A. I don't recall either.
12 Q. Well, we know you're under oath, and as a reasonably prudent
13 military man, Lieutenant-Colonel, how could you make that statement
14 without having any verification as to the source and as to its accuracy?
15 Can you help me understand how you came up with that?
16 A. Well, this is something that was coming out from many sources at
17 that time. What can be construed as a rumour initially becomes a more
18 important fact as the time goes on, but I cannot recall exactly how I got
19 that information or when I started getting it.
20 Q. Well, do you recall at all obtaining information from a senior
21 civil affairs officer that thousands of men who may have been killed were
22 killed mostly by mines, land mines?
23 A. I don't recall that specificity, no.
24 Q. Do you recall hearing from a senior civil affairs officer that men
25 who were killed leaving Srebrenica to break through Tuzla that they were
1 killed through legitimate combat engagements?
2 A. I don't -- I don't recall the specifics of what I hear.
3 Q. So when you tell us under oath here that you knew at that time
4 that there were thousands of Bosnian males who had disappeared and had
5 been killed, really that's just something that is speculation on your part
6 because you don't know how they were killed, when they were killed, or
7 where they were killed; correct?
8 A. When you hear something that big and that important and it's
9 starting to take shape as fact and it is important in how the people in
10 the other pockets will behave, yes, you take it into account, sir.
11 Q. Well, Ed Joseph was with you in Zepa, was he not?
12 A. Not with me; but he was in Zepa, yes.
13 Q. And you remember seeing him there, correct?
14 A. I think so.
15 Q. Okay. Well do you remember discussing with him what his opinion
16 was as to these Muslims who may have been killed while trying to cross
17 into the BiH 2nd Corps-controlled territory?
18 A. I don't recall that conversation.
19 Q. Well, let me show you an exhibit.
20 MR. OSTOJIC: 1D374, if I may.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
22 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, if there are any Defence lists of
23 cross-examination documents, we would appreciate it. We've only had two,
24 I think, sent to us -- three sent to us so far. If my friend has a list,
25 we would appreciate receiving that.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic?
2 MR. OSTOJIC: This really came up, Your Honour, based on his
3 testimony today, as I said on page 20. So it wasn't anticipated that he
4 would make that statement. So we didn't create a list including this, but
5 we adopted the other exhibits. Because of his testimony today, I thought
6 it was prudent to show him this. In fact, in his witness statement of
7 1997, the witness clearly states he had many discussions and liaisoned
8 with the civil affairs office many times.
9 So I think, because it's an exhibit, and the Prosecutor had an
10 opportunity to meet with the witness, this may be an exhibit given his
11 testimony that he should be shown. I don't think it comes as a surprise
12 to the Lieutenant-Colonel or the Prosecution, so it's not on my list.
13 MR. THAYER: Well, IF there is a list, Mr. President, as my friend
14 just referred to, we would appreciate receiving that, according to the
15 procedure that's been clearly established for sometime.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: As I understand it, Mr. Thayer, the question is not
17 whether you should or can make use of this document with the witness now,
18 there not being a list, that's not -- or there not being a list supplied
19 to the Prosecution.
20 The whole point is this: The Prosecution is saying that now that
21 you have more or less made up your mind what your cross-examination is
22 going to focus upon, if there -- if you have a list of documents that you
23 are going to make use of in the course of your cross-examination, you're
24 being asked to hand it over to the Prosecution.
25 MR. OSTOJIC: I don't have a prepared list, Your Honour. I was
1 just going to use the list provided by my colleagues on the Defence and
2 also the list that was provided by the Prosecution. This came up as a
3 result of his testimony that was not anticipated, so I couldn't predict
4 that he would have this statement that he made. So, therefore, that was
5 not presented in a list that I provided to him.
6 I did not provide that. But I think it's a document that's fair,
7 and I think it's a document based on his testimony that I should have a
8 right to examine this witness on.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I think you are avoiding the issue. The issue is:
10 Now that you have started your cross-examination, and that in your mind
11 you know exactly what documents you will be making use of, you should have
12 a list and you should have handed that list to the Prosecution.
13 MR. OSTOJIC: I can create a handwritten list if that's what the
14 Court will be instructing me. I will be using 1D374, 1D373, 2D0003, also
15 6D165 and 6D152, for the most part. Thank you.
16 MR. JOSSE: I will provide the list for you. I will write that
18 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Josse. Is that satisfactory for the
20 time being, Mr. Thayer?
21 MR. THAYER: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed. Go ahead.
23 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 So if we can have 1D374 on the screen, please, just the first page
25 would be adequate for now.
1 Q. Do you know what this is, sir?
2 A. A report from Ken Biser, Sector North-east.
3 Q. What do you call that, just a report from Ken Biser or is it a sip
5 A. It says, "Srebrenica-Tuzla Update."
6 Q. Also, if you look at third section that's highlighted on the
7 bottom on the main points, it talks about Zepa as well, under main points,
8 third indentation paragraph?
9 A. M'hm, yeah.
10 Q. And this was a report drafted, as it says, by Edward Joseph;
12 A. Where do you see that?
13 Q. Right underneath on the right-hand side, the third or fourth box,
14 it says, "file reference number, drafter."
15 A. Okay, yeah.
16 Q. And now, sir, would this also be considered, like Mr. David
17 Harland's reports, as being useful and reliable?
18 A. I don't know. I did not deal with Mr. Joseph at all or regularly,
19 and this is a report in sector -- sent from civil affairs officer, Sector
20 North-east, which if we did not deal with. I was at Sector Sarajevo.
21 Q. Did you deal with Ken Biser at all?
22 A. I don't know him.
23 Q. Now, in your witness statement, it says that, and I'll read it
24 just so that I'm accurate, that: "You maintained liaison and ongoing
25 discussions with civil affairs, UNHCR and ICRC."
1 MR. OSTOJIC: It's on page 3, second to the last paragraph,
3 Q. What do you mean when you said that you maintained liaison and
4 ongoing discussions with civil affairs? What does that really mean?
5 A. Those who were assigned at our level. In our case, Sector
6 Sarajevo was David Harland and Viktor Bezrouchenko.
7 Q. Now, this letter was copied to Mr. David Harland, was it not; or
8 this sit report, as we call it?
9 A. Yeah, I see it.
10 Q. So would it have been the responsibility of David Harland to
11 inform you and your section of the contents of this report as to what the
12 situation may have been in Srebrenica as of July 17th, 1995?
13 A. We had no responsibility over Srebrenica.
14 Q. Okay. Well, based on your comments that you had information, that
15 many thousands had disappeared and had been killed, that's what I'm trying
16 to gather. Where did you obtain that information, and I'm trying to just
17 see if this would help reflect -- refresh your recollection?
18 A. Like I said, I'm not sure of the exact source. I can tell you
19 there were more than one. But because this is something that was building
20 up day to day, and as I mentioned, we military officers there could not
21 ignore that kind of information in our planning and actions.
22 Q. I'm not suggesting that you should ignore it. But if you look on
23 the second page of that document, sir, on the first full paragraph - with
24 the assistance of the usher - if you can just read that to yourself.
25 I'm really going to just highlight that first paragraph and that
1 third subsection within that first paragraph that starts with, "Up to
2 3.000 were killed on the way, mostly by mines and BSA engagements."
3 Will you let me know when you've had an opportunity to read the
4 complete paragraph, sir?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Now, does that help refresh your recollection as to whether or not
7 these thousands disappeared and had been killed were killed on the way as
8 they were considered escapees, as you say in the first word in that
9 paragraph, mostly by mines and BSA engagements?
10 A. Well, as I said, this story, if I call it that, was building up
11 from day to day. Paragraph 2 states: "Other reports state that 2.000 to
12 3.000 men have been taken." They didn't have the full information either
13 at that time.
14 Q. Well, how do you know that?
15 A. Because this is how I -- this is how things happen.
16 Q. Well, what did you do, sir, to verify whether or not that
17 information was accurate?
18 A. Well, I don't recall the details, but we talked regularly with
19 David Harland in this case. I'm not sure -- I'm sure he would have
20 reported on that to us.
21 Did he show us the report? I don't recall. Were we satisfied
22 with that information? Probably not. We wanted to know more. We wanted
23 to know for sure.
24 But in any case, we were already very busy with Zepa by that time.
25 Q. Well, do you recall writing any correspondence or requesting
1 additional information in connection with the number of Bosnian Muslims
2 who may have died as a result of land mines while they were trekking
3 through the column to Tuzla or Kladanj?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Did your superiors at all request that information?
6 A. I don't know.
7 Q. Did your subordinates?
8 A. I don't know. Like I said, I was -- we were -- at 17 July, we
9 were back at sector headquarters doing our sector job. We had been at
10 UNPROFOR for four days. Now we were back at sector headquarters and busy
11 with Zepa.
12 Q. Okay. Did you -- at anytime, after Zepa was concluded, did you go
13 back to verify how many thousands or Bosnian Muslims were killed by mines?
14 A. No, not me personally, but I was not the only UNPROFOR soldier in
16 Q. Well, who from UNPROFOR, who was in that theatre, went back to try
17 to confirm that data?
18 A. Well, likely people from BH command.
19 Q. But who? Do you know anyone in particular?
20 A. No, I don't. I don't want to speculate on who in particular, but
21 the structure would look for that information.
22 Q. Being a military man, do you know what "an engagement" means?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. What does it mean?
25 A. It means usually enemy troops coming in contact.
1 Q. Does that mean that it's a one-sided fire-fight or does engagement
2 means that there was a response by one side as well as the other side or
3 that there was actually a fire-fight between two opposing enemy factions?
4 A. No, it could be one side.
5 Q. Do you know whether or not the Bosnian Muslims, who were making
6 their trek through the column from Srebrenica, were armed?
7 A. I don't know, but I know that they were armed Bosnians in
9 Q. Do you know how many?
10 A. No. I -- I know that I've seen estimates and it's probably in my
11 diary, but I don't recall.
12 Q. I couldn't find that in your diary. Would a fair estimate be
13 anywhere from 5.000 to 6.000?
14 A. Oh, no. I heard much lower than that, but I'm not -- I'm not
16 Q. Well, did the Prosecutor share with you what their investigator
17 thought how many armed Bosnian Muslims were going through the forest and
18 on to Tuzla?
19 A. No, they didn't.
20 Q. Did they share with you, sir, any reports from their purported
21 military analyst, Richard Butler?
22 A. Never heard the name.
23 Q. Can you tell me, sir, because of your qualifications that we heard
24 yesterday and your combat experience, do you think it's important for
25 someone to render an opinion with respect to a military situation, such as
1 that that evolved in Srebrenica and Zepa, that an individual who is going
2 to give such opinions have at least some combat experience?
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
4 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, my friend knows that that's not the
5 reason why this witness is here. That is inappropriate, wasteful question
6 in terms of time.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Agreed. Couldn't agree with you more. Yes. Could
8 you please proceed to your next question, Mr. Ostojic?
9 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
10 Q. Sir, what does it mean "to extract a population"? Are you
11 familiar with that term?
12 A. Yes. That's a term that's -- that was used, but we usually said,
13 used the word "evacuated."
14 Q. So "extract" really means the same as evacuated; correct?
15 A. It should.
16 Q. Okay. Now, did you use that word or have you used that word?
17 A. I don't know.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. Perhaps, yes.
20 Q. Now, is it -- am I correct that General Smith's priority, with
21 regard to Zepa, was to evacuate or, as I think you put it, extract the
22 population and then the Ukrainians? Would that be accurate?
23 A. It became that, that after sometime, yes, I remember that.
24 Q. Well, how soon after the events unfolded?
25 A. I can't recall for sure.
1 Q. Now, do you remember, sir, as you sit here, whether or not General
2 Smith met with Mr. Izetbegovic?
3 A. I don't recall.
4 Q. Now --
5 A. I didn't work for General Smith.
6 Q. I understand. You kept some copious notes and diaries of various
7 meetings, and we'll go through them in a bit.
8 Do you know if General Smith proposed that the evacuation of the
9 population in Zepa follow the same model as that in Srebrenica?
10 A. I don't recall that. I suspect you're going to show me.
11 Q. I am. Thank you.
12 I think, because of the ruling that we go into private session, I
13 would ask that we go into private session, so we could examine his diary
14 in some detail?
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's do that. Let's go into private session.
16 [Private session]
11 Page 18341 redacted. Private session
4 [Open session]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session.
6 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
7 Q. We are back in open session, sir. Do you remember the meeting
8 that General Smith had with General Mladic on or about July of 1995?
9 A. What date?
10 Q. I don't have the date in your witness statement, but it was
11 approximately the date when they were discussing the evacuation of the
12 population together?
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
14 MR. THAYER: Well, if my friend can't provide a date, perhaps
15 referring or showing the witness the actual witness statement might be
16 helpful, since he just referred to it.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I suppose you can do that.
18 MR. OSTOJIC: I will in due time, Your Honour. Just let me ask a
19 preliminary question; and if my -- if counsel would permit, that would be
21 Q. Sir, do you remember that General Mladic actually in discussing
22 with -- do you remember that they had a meeting?
23 A. Yes. There was one such meeting where I was present. That's why
24 I'm asking "when," because they talked at other times.
25 Q. Well, let's talk about the meeting that you were present, because
1 we want to know what you, as an observer at that meeting, what you
2 remember about that meeting.
3 Just that one meeting, whenever it was, sir, do you remember that
4 General Mladic requested that UNPROFOR guard the POWs?
5 A. I don't recall that.
6 Q. Do you remember, sir, that General Mladic insisted that the men of
7 military age between 18 and 55 disarm themselves, and that they be
8 protected and guarded by UNPROFOR?
9 A. I remember that he wanted them disarmed, but I don't remember the
10 other part.
11 Q. Well, let's look at your statement, as my learned friend wanted us
12 to, which is 6D153.
13 MR. OSTOJIC: If we could turn to page 24 of that statement, and
14 it's the first full paragraph, sir.
15 MR. JOSSE: The 27th of July.
16 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
17 Q. Sir, in looking at your statement from November of 1997, when you
18 were interviewed with the Office of the Prosecution, you describe a
19 meeting in which General Smith arrived. He had a meeting with General
20 Mladic, and they discussed actually the POWs in Zepa; correct?
21 A. M'hm.
22 Q. And do you see in the fourth line down, after identifying that
23 what Mladic told General Smith, you continue to identify Mladic as the
24 person "he." You state that: "He," Mladic, "stated that men between 18
25 and 55 had tried to escape and been killed." Do you see that?
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. Do you know what he's referring to there, sir?
3 A. Men from Zepa who had tried to escape from the pocket.
4 Q. Do you think that's what he's referring to?
5 A. I think so.
6 Q. You don't think that he's referring to perhaps something that
7 happened at the Kravica warehouse within a week of the time of this
8 meeting or within ten days?
9 A. I don't see why.
10 Q. Okay. How about the next sentence, where he says: "He," again
11 Mladic "wanted men between those ages to disarm themselves and be guarded
12 by UNPROFOR." Do you see that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Is that accurate?
15 A. Well, if I reported it, it's because it was discussed. It doesn't
16 mean we have the means to do it.
17 Q. I'm not shifting any responsibilities to you, sir, unlike some
18 other witnesses and people. I'm suggesting to you is: Is it a fact,
19 since you identified that in your statement that you signed, that in fact
20 Mladic wanted the men between those ages to disarm themselves and wanted
21 them to be guarded by UNPROFOR. That's a request that he made; correct?
22 A. That's correct.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. We have to stop here for today, Mr. Ostojic.
24 We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. Thank you, Major. We'll
25 see you again tomorrow morning.
1 Thank you.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day of
4 November, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.