071127ED

Page 18259

1 JUDGE AGIUS: It's nice to see you again. We are going to proceed

2 with your examination-in-chief.

3 Mr. Thayer, later on in the week, presumably, we will come down

4 with a scheduling order, and one of the things we are going to make clear

5 and insist in a rigid way is the conclusion of the Prosecution case by

6 the -- by a specific date. So please try to stick to the time that you

7 have indicated for the examination-in-chief and possibly even shorten it.

8 Thank you.

9 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President. I have already shortened

10 it some, and I will do my best to shorten it further. Good morning to you

11 and Your Honours. Good morning, everyone.

12 WITNESS: LOUIS FORTIN [Resumed]

13 Examination by Mr. Thayer: [Continued]

14 Q. Good morning, Colonel.

15 A. Good morning.

16 MR. THAYER: May we have 65 ter number 2986 back up on e-court,

17 please? I'm sorry, 2968. I misspoke. If we may have the second page of

18 each version, please?

19 Q. Colonel, focusing on the final paragraph of each document, you

20 reported this conversation indicates that General Gvero promised that he

21 would do his utmost to keep the situation in the region of Srebrenica

22 under control, which he thought quite possible because of his competent

23 military there. What happened this day only served to complicate the

24 situation in the region of Srebrenica and would ill effect the situation

25 there.

Page 18260

1 The next sentence reads: "He would have had the full insight into

2 the situation in the Srebrenica area by next morning. That was why he

3 suggested another contact by phone only next morning. He suggested that

4 no air power be used by that time."

5 Sir, at the time that you made these notes, took this report,

6 again, was this the first time that a senior VRS Main Staff officer

7 suggested that you call back or that there be a further future

8 conversation so he could check on the situation, see what was going on

9 with his troops?

10 A. It was not, and by then it was clear to us that it was just --

11 they are just trying to delay so they could complete the plan.

12 Q. Now, in this report that you typed up, General Gvero refers to

13 close air support and says, I believe on two occasions in this

14 conversation, according to your notes, your report, that he wants the

15 close air support stopped. Do you recall that, sir?

16 A. That's correct. I do.

17 Q. Now, had a decision at this time, approximately 1810 hours on the

18 11th, had a decision been made within UNPROFOR about whether or not to end

19 the close air support?

20 A. Yes. In fact, it's mentioned in the first sentence of that

21 document, that the aircrafts were no longer over Srebrenica but they were

22 still at General Gobillard's disposal. So, yes, we had stopped the close

23 air support that had been ongoing earlier that evening.

24 Q. And to your recollection, sir, was that decision not again to use

25 close air support, was that decision conveyed to the VRS, or was something

Page 18261

1 else conveyed to the VRS in this conversation?

2 A. I'm not sure what you're getting at.

3 Q. Okay. I apologise. That was a terrible question.

4 The final decision not to employ close air support again in

5 connection with the VRS attack on Srebrenica, was that final decision

6 communicated to the VRS?

7 A. I don't believe it was. We had suspended close air support at

8 that time, if I remember correctly, because some Dutch soldiers had been

9 captured by the VRS, and they threatened to kill them if we kept hitting

10 them with close air support, so we stopped.

11 Q. And do you recall with any specificity what actual planes were

12 stopped and who in Sarajevo actually gave the order to stop them?

13 A. Well, the BH command gave the order and the acting commander at

14 the time was General Gobillard. He may have acted through the Chief of

15 Staff of BH command, who was General Nicolai. I know that two Dutch F-16s

16 had engaged; two Americans F-16s followed, but I'm not sure that they

17 were-- they dropped anything; and A-10s were -- two A-10s were next to

18 come and they were stopped.

19 Q. And, just briefly, what type of capabilities does an A-10 have,

20 and do they have anything in particular that's relevant to close air

21 support?

22 A. The A-10s are the best aircraft for that kind of air task. They

23 are slower. Their pilots do basically only that, fire on ground support.

24 So they are better trained, and they have a big cannon which is much more

25 accurate. Accuracy, in the case of close air support, is important

Page 18262

1 because the limiting definitions of that type of action usually mean they

2 are being employed in close support to our -- or in close proximity to our

3 own troops. So accuracy is important.

4 Q. You mentioned some threats to DutchBat peacekeepers. Did you ever

5 learn, during this period of time, about other threats to UN peacekeepers

6 or to civilians which were made on 11 July?

7 A. Yes. As the VRS advanced, the Dutch withdrew from most of their

8 positions, and they concentrated in the Potocari compound where I guess

9 they had their main base, company base, as well as most of the population

10 of the enclave of Srebrenica that was in the surrounding area. They all

11 fell back in the Potocari compound. At one point, again to stop us from

12 using close air support, the Serbs threatened to shell the compound, with

13 the people in it, of course.

14 Q. Sir, I want to change topics slightly for a moment. Do you recall

15 listening to a radio transmission from Zepa during the VRS attack on that

16 enclave?

17 A. Yes. We had more than one radio communication with Zepa.

18 Q. Okay. Do you recall a particular transmission which involved a

19 civilian representative from Zepa, speaking over the radio or

20 communications device?

21 A. It was one of the three civilians that I would later meet in Zepa

22 when I went down there. I believe his name was Horlak. He spoke to us.

23 We were by then back in PTT building in our own headquarters, in the ops

24 room. The Ukrainians had the HF communication with their company in Zepa,

25 and he was using the same equipment that the Ukrainians had at their

Page 18263

1 command post in Zepa to talk to us in the ops room.

2 Q. And do you recall with any specificity what this civilian

3 representative that you remember as Mr. Horlak was saying or reporting to

4 you?

5 A. I can't think of it right now. I know I have notes of that

6 conversation.

7 Q. Okay. Are those notes contained in your journal? Is that where?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Okay.

10 MR. THAYER: Then what I'd like to do is if we may have 6D00165 on

11 e-court, please.

12 Q. While that's getting loaded up, I think everybody here has heard

13 something about this journal that you kept. Would you just please

14 describe what it is, what it was, and how you created it?

15 A. Well, every day, while I was in Bosnia, I took notes of important

16 events as they occurred. I also took detailed notes of all the meetings

17 that I attended, most of the time with one of the generals that I was

18 serving, meetings with either the Bosnians, the Serbs, civilians

19 representative, government officials, military officers. Those notes,

20 usually I typed them up the same evening, because as I was saying

21 yesterday, there were meetings more than one usually every day, and I

22 wanted to get this done before I started taking notes again the next day.

23 Also, I had a daily agenda in which I took notes of a more

24 personal nature. So when I got back, when I got back home at the end of

25 the mission, I put together a journal. I wrote a daily paragraph based on

Page 18269

1 MR. THAYER:

2 Q. From what you observed and what you learned, what were some of the

3 challenges that Colonel Verhoglyad faced as -- in his command, and how did

4 he respond to some of those challenges, if you know?

5 A. Well, that particular Ukrainian Battalion was certainly not of the

6 best quality of soldiers, from my understanding. From many discussions

7 with Colonel Verhoglyad was that they were all volunteers and basically

8 fleeing their own country because they were in trouble back there. So

9 lots of discipline problems both in the enclaves where they were, but more

10 so in Sarajevo and in still barracks with the Ukrainians soldiers there.

11 Colonel Verhoglyad, of course, wanted to change that perception

12 because the French, who consisted more than half of the troops, and

13 headquarters of the sector did not pay too much attention or give too much

14 credit to the Ukrainians, of course. Colonel Verhoglyad wanted to change

15 that. He first, I believe, had to convince his own national headquarters

16 to provide better troops, better equipment, and he did quite a bit of work

17 to come up with a better contribution in time for IFOR, when there was a

18 transfer of authority to NATO.

19 Q. Sir, did you ever hear any reports or rumours about the Ukrainians

20 either in the Zepa enclave or elsewhere, the peacekeepers, being involved

21 in any improper trade with anyone?

22 A. I heard stories about high usage of fuel. They had nowhere to go

23 basically, and their fuel usage was higher than units who were patrolling

24 in other areas. So we suspected, we knew, Colonel Verhoglyad knew, that

25 they were trading that fuel with the Serbs for, I don't really know what.

Page 18270

1 This became annoying because we had problems resupplying our own

2 troops in the various enclaves, and fuel was a major commodity.

3 Q. Do you recall at all when these reports of trading fuel were

4 supposed to have occurred? Do you recall whether it was before you

5 arrived, during your time there?

6 A. I don't recall anything specific. All I can say is that these

7 facts came to my knowledge at about the same time as we were paying

8 attention to them in Zepa and Gorazde, so when those events started

9 occurring.

10 Q. And, sir, did you ever hear any complaints or any information

11 about the Ukrainian peacekeepers being partial to one side or the other?

12 Did you ever hear any talk of that as well?

13 A. Well, it was discussed, mostly among the French, that the

14 Ukrainians were pro-Serb. They could more easily leave -- live on the

15 Serb side than anyone else. In fact, after the hostage crisis in May, we

16 had orders that no UNPROFOR soldiers were to go in Serb territory, and

17 that order lasted for many weeks. However, we still needed to keep in

18 touch around Sarajevo with the Serb liaison officer, and we used the

19 Ukrainians to do that because they could travel back and forth and not be

20 made hostage.

21 MR. THAYER: Now, if we may look at 65 ter number 2502, please?

22 Q. Now, sir, we looked at a couple of these during your proofing

23 session, and to save time I'm just going to show you one.

24 Do you recognise what this is?

25 A. It's a report prepared by David Harland who was a civil affairs

Page 18271

1 officer at the sector level.

2 Q. And I note for the record that it's the 15th of July 1995, and

3 it's headed, "Sector Sarajevo, Weekly Situation Report."

4 Colonel, would you regularly receive these weekly sit-reps in the

5 course of your duties?

6 A. They were addressed to the sector commander, as you see in the

7 internal distribution; and, basically, all operational reporting or UN

8 paper work that went to the commander first went through me. So I saw

9 most of those.

10 Q. And so you would review them, is that fair to say?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Is that correct? Okay.

13 And if you would share with the Court, Colonel, how useful or not

14 useful did you find Harland's reporting?

15 A. Actually, I find them useful in that he was good at gathering

16 information from various sources and putting it all together. And in the

17 diary, I sometimes -- I know early on I talked about the use of the

18 military observers, which knew a lot of stuff, but it was not very well

19 integrated into how we processed that information at the sector level.

20 Let's just say that the proper staffing reflections were not

21 concerned, most of the time as they concerned UNMOs. But David would

22 always get the information: The information from the UNMOs, the UNHCR who

23 had convoys everywhere, from himself or his travels, or other civil

24 affairs officers who were on the ground who had a different perspective.

25 So those -- I found those reports usually normally accurate but

Page 18272

1 enlightening, in that his sources were wider.

2 MR. THAYER: Now, if we could look at page 2 of the English and

3 we'll stay on page 1 of the B/C/S.

4 Q. When we met, you told me you couldn't recall all the information

5 in -- regarding Zepa in this report. I just want to ask you about a

6 couple of sections in it.

7 If we could go to the -- or if I could direct your attention to

8 the paragraph that begins, "Last Saturday."

9 A. M'hm.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session now. Any time you need to go

11 into private session, please let us know.

12 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.

14 MR. THAYER:

15 Q. "Last Saturday, 8 July, the Bosnians asked UNPROFOR to return the

16 127 weapons that had been handed over to UNPROFOR following the

17 demilitarisation agreement of May -- or of 8 May 1993."

18 Sir, do you recall receiving any reports or information concerning

19 the Bosnians attempts to get back or retrieve weapons that had been handed

20 over?

21 A. Yes. Well, we had weapons collection point in most of the

22 enclaves, including Sarajevo and around Sarajevo, on both sides. Both

23 factions had to put their heavy weapons in weapon collection point. Those

24 are the weapons that are being talked about, and the Bosnians wanted to

25 have those weapons to defends themselves.

Page 18273

1 Q. And if we could go -- if I could just focus your attention on the

2 very last sentence of the very last paragraph there.

3 MR. THAYER: This would be, on the B/C/S version, the third full

4 paragraph that appears on the B/C/S side, the last sentence.

5 Q. "On the same day, the commander of Bosnian forces in the pocket

6 threatened to kill UNPROFOR soldiers if they did nothing to help defend

7 the pocket."

8 Colonel, what information do you recall receiving, if any, about

9 the Ukrainian company being threatened or actually attacked by either of

10 the warring parties during the attack on Zepa?

11 A. In fact, they had, as I started to describe earlier, they had OPs

12 around the enclaves and they had their check-point at the top of the road,

13 check-point 2, and they had a command post down in the village.

14 Some of the OPs were blocked by the Serbs to prevent them from

15 going anywhere. Some were blocked by the Bosnians with attempt by the

16 Bosnians to get the weapons and the equipment that the Ukrainians had.

17 There was a pressure by the Bosnians on the Ukrainians at their

18 command post in the village, to give them all the weapons, one-quarter of

19 their ammunition. So they were pressured on both sides. Of course, as we

20 saw earlier in the discussion with Mr. Horlak, they were putting a lot of

21 pressure for us to do something, to either give them weapons or provide

22 close air support to stop the Serb attack.

23 Q. And having reviewed this particular report by David Harland, do

24 you have any reason to doubt its accuracy or truthfulness of the

25 information contained in it?

Page 18277

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. Would you describe how that came to pass, please?

3 A. Well, we decided -- it happened about ten days later, around the

4 26th of July; and this, what we just saw, had been ongoing for those

5 further ten days. We decided to reinforce the Ukrainians in Zepa; and

6 since we could not prevent the Serbs from reducing that pocket, we were

7 going to make sure that the population was looked after and evacuated

8 safely. So we decided to reinforce the Ukrainians by sending French and

9 Russian troops.

10 General Gobillard, the best means of communications to keep in

11 touch with either BH command, the force commander, the people in the

12 pocket, and all the procedural around the use of aircrafts and things like

13 that, he felt he had to stay at PTT. So he sent me to be his eyes and

14 ears to Zepa, in Zepa.

15 Q. Now, with respect to the movement of the civilian population out

16 of the Zepa enclave, Colonel, by the 26th, when you were sent down there,

17 what's your understanding of what had already happened?

18 A. Well, the evacuation started before I got there. What we wanted

19 to do is make sure that each bus or vehicle carrying evacuees out of Zepa

20 to Kladanj in Bosnian territory, which is where they were supposed to be

21 evacuated, that each bus or vehicle was to have one UN soldier on board.

22 Basically, the task of those soldiers was to make sure that the

23 vehicle got to Kladanj, and that nobody was pulled off the vehicle by the

24 Serbs on the way there.

25 Q. And why was that an objective?

Page 18278

1 A. Well, without having all the details of what had happened to the

2 Srebrenica 15 days earlier, we knew, we had information that many

3 thousands Bosnian males had disappeared and have been killed.

4 Q. Now, do you recall specifically with whom you travelled to Zepa on

5 the 26th?

6 A. I travelled with Colonel Chinouihl. He was the senior French

7 engineer on staff at headquarters Sector Sarajevo.

8 Q. And did you make it to Zepa straight away, sir?

9 A. Oh, no. We got stopped at every Serb check-point on the way; and

10 when we got to Rogatica, we were stopped there for 18 hours.

11 Q. And what, if anything, do you recall seeing or doing while you

12 were at Rogatica?

13 A. When we attempted to -- every time we saw an opportunity to just

14 drive through, obtain authority to carry on to Zepa, negotiate, argue, and

15 try to move out of there, at one point we saw buses and other vehicles

16 driving in the opposite direction, full of Bosnian evacuates from Zepa.

17 We entered that they had a soldier on board, most did. At one

18 point, we saw a dump truck with nobody, with no UN soldier and about 50

19 people sitting on the metal bed of the dump truck with a big tarp over

20 them. It was probably -- that was in July. It was probably close to 50

21 degrees in the back of -- in the back of that dumptruck. When we didn't

22 see any UN soldiers there, we basically stood in front of the vehicle.

23 Colonel Chinouihl took the initiative and stood right in front of

24 the vehicle and I joined them, and we said, "This vehicle is not going

25 anywhere until we have a UN soldier to put on board." They got excited,

Page 18279

1 cocked their weapon, and threatened us, Chinouihl and I. And, eventually,

2 we saw -- eventually they calmed down and they agreed to what we were

3 saying.

4 We got the people off the truck, to take a bit of fresh air; and,

5 eventually, a bus returning with four or five Ukrainian soldiers from

6 Kladanj drove by and we got one, and we told him to get on the truck and

7 make sure that it made its way to Kladanj.

8 Q. Would you --

9 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Were the passengers male, female, or

10 mixed?

11 THE WITNESS: Mixed, but mostly very young and very old, Your

12 Honour.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

14 MR. THAYER:

15 Q. And can you describe, sir, what, if anything, you did to help any

16 of those elderly people off the dumptruck?

17 A. Well, we -- I remember this very old lady, and it was really hot

18 in the back of that truck. It was hot outside, hot and humid, and even

19 more so in the back of that truck. She had trouble, basically, unfolding

20 her legs to be able to walk off the truck, so we helped her off, helped

21 her to walk a little bit and get some air. That's the one thing I

22 remember in particular.

23 Q. And where did you spend that night, sir, the night of the 26th?

24 A. Well, other than that episode, it was at night-time in the

25 evening, we slept in our vehicles. I was personally in a small French

Page 18280

1 armoured vehicle. A very cramped space, to put it mildly.

2 Q. That brings us to the 27th. What did you do that day?

3 A. Well, eventually, we were let through. We drove to Zepa and not

4 to the village but to the check-point on top of the hill, which was, as I

5 said, probably a kilometre or a kilometre and a half from the village,

6 where we met other UN troops that had been sent, as well as people being

7 evacuated and Serbs getting about their business of evacuating those

8 people.

9 Q. And when you arrived at this check-point, did you meet or speak

10 with any UN officers in particular?

11 A. Well, Colonel Chinouihl and I went to -- we found Colonel Germain

12 the Colonel Germain who was a French legionnaire, who had been sent there

13 along with the Russians reinforcements, and we asked him about what was

14 going on, what was the situation.

15 Q. Do you know how long he had been in Zepa?

16 A. I'm not sure.

17 Q. So what did you do and what did you see while you were there at

18 that check-point?

19 A. Well, when I got there, I remember the people. The road coming

20 from the village was a one-way road attached to the side of a cliff

21 basically going up, and so trucks would come up to the large parking area,

22 check-point 2, unload the Bosnian civilians that they had taken from the

23 village. They would be transferred to buses, and those buses would then

24 go to Kladanj. There were mostly old people or young kids with their

25 mothers, and it was a bit - how should I put it? - unreal feeling to see

Page 18281

1 that.

2 These people were basically forcibly removed from their house,

3 trying to keep their family together. I saw a young mother with two kids

4 trying to keep them together and move on the bus, and a Serb soldier

5 prodding her along, most of the time without any emotion, but in some

6 cases with screaming. And all those UN soldiers were around watching it,

7 basically with arms along their side, having abandoned -- nobody did

8 anything.

9 Q. You mentioned screaming, sir. Who was screaming?

10 A. I remember one Serb basically clowning around. He had -- I guess

11 he felt very powerful in the middle of it all, and he was clowning around

12 and screaming at people, "Get on the bus, move faster," at least I assume

13 that's what he was saying.

14 Q. Can you describe the condition of these civilians that you saw?

15 Take your time and describe what you saw.

16 A. Well, they were sad, of course, but -- in fact, they were

17 emotionless. They were -- we knew they were being forced to leave

18 everything behind, and they had to go basically with the clothes they were

19 wearing and that's it. They were, as we say in French, "resignes avec

20 leur sort."

21 Q. And, roughly, what does that mean? My French is pretty

22 elementary?

23 JUDGE AGIUS: It's "reconciled with their destiny." Let's move.

24 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Or with their fate.

Page 18282

1 MR. THAYER:

2 Q. Now, did you see General Mladic at this check-point at some point?

3 A. Yes. He was there. In fact, shortly after our arrival, Colonel

4 Germain told Chinouihl and I that Mladic had been meeting with three

5 civilian representatives from the Bosnian of Zepa and that he was about to

6 meet again with them.

7 So we asked one Serb soldier to find us room -- or, no, to be able

8 to attend that meeting, and he went and talked to the individual. I don't

9 know who it was at the time. The individual came back and he said, "You,"

10 pointing at me, "Can come with an interpreter." I was travelling with a

11 French legionnaire soldier of Slovenian origin.

12 So he and I went and attended the meeting, and the person who had

13 been approached and said, "Yes, the Canadian can come," was Mladic.

14 Q. So what did you do?

15 A. I went and sat down. He showed me where to sit beside him, to

16 attend that meeting.

17 Q. And would you describe the meeting?

18 A. Well, there was -- it didn't start right away. The three Bosnian

19 representatives were brought to the meeting place. They seemed in decent

20 enough shape. They didn't seem to have been mistreated or anything, a bit

21 unsecure, probably, but nothing else that I could see.

22 It didn't start right away. But when it started, it didn't seem

23 to be an agenda. It was more like, "Are we going to sign that agreement,"

24 something they had discussed before, I guess; and then veiled threats,

25 which I don't remember the details, but basically that he didn't need all

Page 18283

1 three of them to reach that agreement.

2 Q. When you say "he," who are you referring to, sir?

3 A. Mladic.

4 Q. Do you recall the names of any of those representatives or their

5 faces?

6 A. Only one, Horlak or Torlak, who I mentioned earlier, that I

7 recognised his face; the others, no.

8 Q. If we may look at some video very, very briefly, without referring

9 to any particular date, I just want to see whether you recognise any

10 faces, sir.

11 MR. THAYER: We are going to be looking at P02489.

12 Q. We are just going to play a very brief clip, and I'll ask you if

13 you recognise anyone.

14 [Videotape played]

15 MR. THAYER:

16 Q. Sir, anybody in that clip, which started at approximately 12

17 minutes 7 seconds and we paused at 12 minutes 15.9 seconds, is there

18 anybody you recognise there as a civilian representative that you met

19 during your time in Zepa?

20 A. Yeah, the one with the white shirt who is shaking hands with

21 Mladic, the last one shaking hands with him, is the one I recognise.

22 Q. In the short sleeve shirt, sir?

23 A. Yeah, that's correct.

24 Q. We are going to play another clip.

25 MR. THAYER: This is 65 ter 2491. We are going to start the clip

Page 18284

1 at 46 minutes and 6 seconds.

2 [Videotape played]

3 MR. THAYER:

4 Q. Sir, we have paused the frame at 46 minutes, 12.3 seconds. Do you

5 recognise anyone in this clip?

6 A. Yes. On the left, I see Lieutenant-Colonel Germain, French

7 legionnaire. Facing us is Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Baxter who was the

8 military assistant to General Smith. On his right is General Rupert Smith

9 who was commander UNPROFOR at the time and who joined me at that meeting

10 we were just talking about shortly after it started.

11 Q. And just to be clear for the record, the individual that you've

12 referred to as Lieutenant-Colonel Germain is the individual without the

13 beard to the left of the frame; is that correct?

14 A. Correct.

15 MR. THAYER: If we continue rolling the clip.

16 [Videotape played]

17 MR. THAYER:

18 Q. We've paused at 46 minutes, 25.4 seconds. Do you recognise anyone

19 in this clip, sir?

20 A. Well, the one we see, the closest, is Mladic. Behind him with the

21 mustache is Indic. He was the one who was our main contact or liaison

22 officer with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, that would be Lieutenant-Colonel

23 Indic.

24 Q. Okay. Thank you, sir.

25 MR. THAYER: We are done with the video.

Page 18285

1 Q. Would you please summarise briefly what you occur happening during

2 the rest of this meeting?

3 A. Well, shortly after it started, General Smith arrived and he

4 joined the meeting, and then Mladic was trying to get the Bosnian to sign

5 an agreement. However, UNPROFOR had many guarantees to provide in that

6 agreement and guarantees we could not provide.

7 So General Smith intervened and took the three Bosnian civilian

8 representatives aside to tell them, "Don't sign that because we can't

9 offer the guarantees that Mladic says that we can offer, so you will sign

10 without those UNPROFOR guarantees."

11 He also told Mladic that these people were local representatives.

12 They were not representatives of the Bosnian government. Basically, one

13 of the aspects of that -- of the agreement relied on an eventual exchange

14 of prisoners, which needed to be negotiated at much higher level. So

15 these people could not agree to some of the things Mladic was asking them

16 to agree to.

17 Q. After this meeting, what do you recall doing next? Did you go

18 anywhere?

19 A. After that, Mladic drove down to Zepa village, and I followed with

20 Lieutenant-Colonel Germain. I went down to the Ukrainian command post in

21 the village where they were set up, and that's where I met Colonel

22 Verhoglyad who was already there, the Ukrainian deputy commander.

23 Q. What did you see going on down in the village centre there, sir?

24 A. There were Serb soldiers, not the most clean-cut types. I guess

25 they had been fighting, or you know, for a while, evacuating or looting.

Page 18286

1 I saw trucks go by with fridges, with cows in the back. I guess they were

2 going around the houses and taking whatever was worth taking.

3 Q. How would you describe the looting that you saw?

4 A. Well, there was -- there were a few houses on fire, not -- there

5 was a kind of a central place where I was. There were no fires nearby.

6 But further down, I could see houses burning, and I heard the occasional

7 shot in the background, weapon being fired. And at one point, I'm not

8 sure if it's that same day, I believe so, Mladic with his camera crew was

9 trying to offer water to an old lady who was sitting on the stairs of a

10 big building there. They were in charge.

11 Q. Where did you spend the night of the 27th of July, Colonel?

12 A. I stayed in the Ukrainian compound in Zepa village. I guess it

13 was a school that they were using for their rooms there.

14 Q. That brings us to the 28th. Do you recall what you saw going on

15 in the village that morning?

16 A. Well, if I remember, I'm not sure if what I saw was the afternoon

17 before or the morning after, more of the same. There were still Serb

18 soldiers there, and I walked around with the interpreter that I had, the

19 French legionnaire, and we talked to some of them.

20 Q. And what were those Serb soldiers doing?

21 A. Nothing specific at that point, because they were -- the

22 evacuation of the village itself was completed, I believe, at that time;

23 although, I can't say the same about the whole enclave. No, there was

24 the looting still, and grabbing whatever they could, putting it on

25 trucks. One of them wanted to see my gun, so I showed him after making

Page 18287

1 the proper safety procedures.

2 Q. Now, you referred to an old woman that you encountered. Can you

3 just describe -- describe that encounter and describe what, if anything,

4 you did in connection with her?

5 A. It's the old woman that Mladic had been offering, I think, water

6 and chocolate to her, in front of his camera crew. It was a show of poor

7 taste any way. After that episode, we took her - "we" being the my

8 interpreter and I - we took her to the Ukrainian compound. She didn't

9 want to go. She was very scared, but we finally convinced her not to stay

10 in the village. We wanted her to -- we wanted her to rest, to give her

11 something to eat, and she didn't want to go into the school, the building

12 that the Ukrainians were using.

13 So we -- I got some soldiers to get a mattress inside, take it

14 outside under the shade of a tree, so that she could sit down. There was

15 an old man who had been old, in relative terms. He might have been 50 to

16 60 and who already was in the Ukrainian compound. So we asked him to come

17 out and help us convince her that she was safer there and to stay there,

18 which he did.

19 Q. And what arrangements did you make, in connection with these two

20 people, for their transportation?

21 A. Well, I had to leave shortly after, but I made sure that the

22 Ukrainians knew that they had to take these people out and that they

23 should be evacuated properly and not be left on their own; and by then,

24 because Verhoglyad was there, I trusted that they would do that job

25 properly.

Page 18288

1 Q. What did you do later in the day?

2 A. We drove back up to check-point 2, and that's where we met General

3 Gobillard, who had travelled to Zepa that day; and then after meeting

4 there, we travelled back to Sarajevo.

5 Q. And while you were with General Gobillard at check-point 2, did

6 you have any meetings with any VRS officers?

7 A. Yes. I know I have some notes, but I don't remember the -- that

8 part very well.

9 Q. Okay.

10 And before we get to the notes, do you remember who the meeting

11 was with?

12 A. [No verbal response]

13 Q. I see you shaking your head, so we'll go to the document straight

14 away.

15 MR. THAYER: If we could have 65 ter number 2969 on e-court,

16 please.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: You want this in open?

18 MR. THAYER: Open session is fine, Mr. President. Thank you.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.

20 MR. THAYER: If we could zoom out a little bit on the English,

21 just to get the full. Thank you.

22 Q. Can you read that document, sir?

23 A. Yes, I can.

24 Q. Do you recognise what that is?

25 A. Yeah. This is a report of that meeting that I personally wrote.

Page 18289

1 It's my handwriting.

2 Q. And who is this meeting with, sir?

3 A. General Tolimir.

4 Q. And who?

5 A. And General Gobillard who had travelled to Zepa that day.

6 Q. And if we read the header line, the underlined portion, can you

7 just read what that says, sir?

8 A. "Meeting, General Gobillard, Tolimir, Zepa Ukrainian check-point 2,

9 28 July 95 at 1720."

10 Q. And if you would, just take a couple of moments to read this first

11 page.

12 A. M'hm.

13 Q. At paragraph 1(A), you indicate that one of the things that was

14 discussed, one of the matters discussed was the reasons for taking 36

15 Bosnian civilians from the last two convoys on the evening of 27 July and

16 for taking one other Bosnian civilian at check-point 2 on the afternoon of

17 28 July.

18 Sir, do you recall who had this information about the 36 Bosnian

19 civilians and the one Bosnian civilian at check-point 2?

20 A. Well, General Gobillard had that information. I don't know where

21 from, because I drove up from Zepa village to check-point 2 at that day to

22 meet him there and I didn't have that information.

23 MR. THAYER: And if we turn the page to page 2 in the English,

24 please, and that will also have to be page 2 of the B/C/S.

25 Q. At the top of the English, you write that: "General Tolimir

Page 18290

1 explained that these civilians were, in fact, males of military age, 18 to

2 60, and that they had lied about their age to try to escape from Zepa.

3 This included the 12 slightly wounded."

4 Do you recall hearing any information about these 12 slightly

5 wounded?

6 A. No, I don't.

7 Q. Do you recall anything about General Tolimir?

8 A. Yes. He was not entirely sober, and it seemed to be a usual state

9 for him, according to General Gobillard at least.

10 Q. Okay, sir. I see we are at the break time. I only have about

11 five minutes left of my examination in chief, so we'll pick up when we get

12 back.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's have the break. Let's have the break. But

14 whoever is going first with the cross-examination, please be prepared.

15 Thank you.

16 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: You've got your five minutes, Mr. Thayer. I see

19 that you are going to make it ten.

20 MR. THAYER: I'll move.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.

22 MR. THAYER:

23 Q. Sir, I wanted to follow up with a question about the video clip

24 that I showed you previously. You identified one of the Muslim

25 representatives you recalled as wearing the white short sleeved shirt.

Page 18291

1 Is there a name that you associate with that individual in the

2 short sleeved shirt?

3 A. Yes. It's Horlak or Torlak. I'm not sure the name.

4 Q. Okay. Now, while you were in Zepa, do you recall seeing any other

5 VRS officers of any rank other than Generals Mladic and Tolimir?

6 A. No, I don't.

7 Q. And are you familiar with the name Avdo Palic?

8 A. Yes, I am.

9 Q. And who do you recall him being?

10 A. He was the Bosnian military leader of whatever troops the BiH army

11 had in the Zepa pocket.

12 Q. And do you recall seeing him during your time in Zepa?

13 A. I think I did, but I don't recall.

14 Q. Okay. Now we were looking at some notes you took of your meeting

15 with General Tolimir and General Gobillard. What did you eventually do

16 with those notes, do you recall?

17 A. Well, we -- whenever I drafted notes quickly like that in

18 handwriting, it meant they had to go. So BH command definitely got a copy

19 and probably the force commander's office as well in Zagreb.

20 Q. And when do you recall finalising the -- those notes?

21 A. Well, as usual, as soon as we got back to the office, I would get

22 into doing this; and in this case, the fact that they are handwritten

23 tells me that it happened fast, that we needed to share that information

24 very quickly. Otherwise, I would have waited later at night and typed

25 them up.

Page 18292

1 Q. And when do you recall returning to Sarajevo, sir?

2 A. Sometime on the 28th, I believe, after that meeting with Tolimir

3 at check-point 2, I think we headed back to Sarajevo.

4 Q. And did you ever return to Zepa?

5 A. No, I didn't.

6 MR. THAYER: If we may have 65 ter 2969 back up on e-court.

7 Q. I just have a few more questions for you, Colonel.

8 MR. THAYER: And if we may go to page 3 of the English, and that

9 is page 2 of the B/C/S.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you want this in public, in open session, or in

11 private session?

12 MR. THAYER: Public session is fine, Mr. President. Thank you.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

14 MR. THAYER: If we go towards the bottom -- middle to the bottom

15 of the English, and we will be focusing on about the lower third of

16 paragraph 3 of the B/C/S.

17 Q. Just quickly, there is a reference, and you write, you

18 report: "As for the Bosnian military, it seems that they are ready and

19 willing to drop their weapons and surrender provided that they obtain firm

20 guarantees for their safety from UNPROFOR."

21 Do you remember where you got that information from, sir, to

22 include in these notes of the meeting?

23 A. I'm sorry, I don't.

24 MR. THAYER: If we turn the page in English, and we can stay on the

25 same page in B/C/S.

Page 18293

1 Q. Please focus your attention on the passage that begins with the

2 word, "Note."

3 "Shortly after General Gobillard's departure, the Serbs took

4 Mr. Mehmet Hanic, mayor and leader of the War Presidency of Zepa, under

5 custody since they didn't need him any more and he is of military age.

6 They had been using him as a mediator with the people of Zepa. It is

7 believed that Mr. Hajric honestly and courageously did his best to save

8 his people."

9 Now, do you recall taking this note, sir?

10 A. I do.

11 Q. And can you explain how something that happened after you left

12 made it into your note? Do you know what the source of this information

13 was?

14 A. I'm not sure of the exact source, but I remember how these things

15 happened. I would put, as a note, something that I learned in between the

16 time of the meeting and the time that the actual transcript was produced.

17 If it was pertinent to that meeting or to that report, I would add

18 it as a note, like this. It's probably on returning to Sarajevo, to

19 sector headquarters, that I got this information, either from the ops room

20 or perhaps from Mr. David Harland, who was in touch with the civil affairs

21 officer who was still at Zepa when I left.

22 Q. Do you recall the name of that civil affairs officer, sir?

23 A. It could have been Ed Joseph or Viktor Bezrouchenko.

24 Q. Now, do you know or did you receive any information as to whether

25 Mr. Hajric was ever seen alive again?

Page 18294

1 A. I don't know.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: I think that needs to be clarified. You don't know

3 what?

4 THE WITNESS: I never had that kind of information, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.

6 MR. THAYER: Now if we just look at paragraph 5, if we just scroll

7 down a bit, and this is also paragraph 5 in the corresponding B/C/S

8 translation.

9 Q. "General Tolimir suggested that since UNPROFOR had accomplished its

10 task of evacuating the civilians, and since it was not willing to help

11 with the Bosnian military, it should withdraw."

12 Do you recall where this information came from, sir?

13 A. It was during the meeting.

14 Q. You're reporting what Tolimir actually said during the meeting?

15 A. Yes.

16 MR. THAYER: And if we may turn to the last page of the English,

17 please? That would be page 5.

18 Q. This refers to the whereabouts of Avdo Palic?

19 A. M'hm.

20 Q. "General Gobillard asked if it was true, as General Mladic had

21 said, that Palic was dead. "Tolimir announced," General Tolimir announced,

22 "that like every army they used propaganda to affect the morale of its

23 enemy and that this information that he could not confirm himself was

24 probably such propaganda."

25 Do you know where General Gobillard got that information about

Page 18295

1 Avdo Palic?

2 A. Probably, when he got to check-point 2, on the top there of the

3 hill at Zepa. I was still down in the village, so he probably talked to

4 some of the officers, UN officers, who were there and got that information

5 from them.

6 Q. And did you ever learn what Colonel Palic's fate was, sir?

7 A. No, I didn't.

8 Q. And, again, there is some initials here at the bottom of the page.

9 Can you identify those?

10 A. It's my signature.

11 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Colonel.

12 MR. THAYER: I have no further questions.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Thayer.

14 Let's go through the estimated time for cross-examinations once

15 more. So far, it's only the Pandurevic team that does not intend to

16 cross-examine this witness.

17 Do I have a confirmation of that, Mr. Sarapa?

18 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

20 Then, Mr. Zivanovic, you asked for 30 minutes. Do you still need

21 the 30 minutes?

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'll not cross-examine this witness, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

24 Mr. Ostojic, you asked for one hour.

25 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you. About 45 minutes to

Page 18296

1 an hour, I think.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Ostojic.

3 Ms. Nikolic, you had asked for ten minutes.

4 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. We will not

5 have any questions for this witness.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

7 Mr. Lazarevic, you had asked for 15 minutes.

8 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. It is very unlikely

9 that we will have any cross-examination for this witness.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I thank you.

11 Madam Fauveau, you had asked for an hour and 15 minutes.

12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: And do you stick to that?

14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Well, I'll try to be as short as

15 possible and be finished in an hour and 15 minutes.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you.

17 Mr. Krgovic or Mr. Josse, you had asked for two hours -- a revised

18 estimate for two hours and 30 minutes.

19 MR. JOSSE: Yes, Your Honour. Certainly no more than that, and I

20 hope perhaps to cut it down to two hours.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

22 So that gives you an idea that it's very unlikely that you finish

23 your testimony today, but that you will certainly finish it tomorrow.

24 Madam Fauveau, I gather that you are going first. Go ahead.

25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

Page 18297

1 Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, my name is Natacha Fauveau-Ivanovic

3 representing General Miletic.

4 So, first, let's look at your statement with the OTP in 1996.

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] This is document 6D152. Could we

6 please show page 3 to the witness, at the bottom of the page. I need the

7 bottom of page 3 and page 4.

8 Q. So, in this statement, you were talking about the meetings held

9 with the different commands of UNPROFOR; and on the third line, from the

10 bottom of the page, you say and I quote: [In English] "This meeting with

11 the BH command MA Serb, a very important function, they ensured the link

12 between the sector and BH command was operating smoothly. I and the other

13 MAs would use these sessions to ensure that Generals..."

14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we move to the next page.

15 Q. "... that Generals Smith and Gobillard, as well as Gobillard's

16 successors, fully understood one another. There was important given the

17 different languages and cultural and military differences in perception

18 and reactions."

19 [Interpretation] So what I'm interested in is the last sentence.

20 You're talking about different languages, cultural, and military

21 differences in perception and reactions. Does this mean that each officer

22 saw and analysed the situation according to what he knew in his own

23 environment, so according to his own military experience?

24 A. Not quite. That's why we had those sessions to make sure that

25 this didn't happen, and we had -- they had sessions to get –

Page 18298

1 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Sorry to interrupt you like this. But

2 Madam Fauveau and Mr. Thayer and you, Major, please draw our attention

3 straight away when we need to be in private session. I'm not quite sure

4 whether this part should be in open or in private session.

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think that the OTP agrees to have

6 this in public session.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. But draw our attention straight away when you

8 think that we should be in private session. Thank you.

9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

10 Q. So I understand that you had meetings to make sure that there was

11 coherence. But if there had been no meetings of the like, wouldn't it be

12 that each officer would analyse the situation according to his own

13 background and his own experience?

14 A. Yes, of course, but that doesn't mean that they would be

15 different. Lack of meetings did not necessarily mean lack of coherence.

16 Q. But since there were officers that came from all different

17 countries and had different cultural backgrounds, and who came from

18 different armies, I'm not talking about coherence that may or may not

19 exist; I'm talking about the fact that all these UNPROFOR officers had

20 different backgrounds.

21 So is it true that they all had different habits, they all had

22 different ways of operating within an army?

23 A. Not quite. They were all NATO trained, including the French who

24 were trained on NATO procedures. So we had that common background:

25 Dutch, British, French, and Canadian.

Page 18299

1 Q. What about the Ukrainians, or the Egyptians?

2 A. No. They didn't have that common background of NATO training.

3 Q. In your statement, you talk about the way your sector was

4 organised, and you say that the commander of the sector had three deputy

5 commanders and the head of staff right below him.

6 What exactly was the hierarchical connection between these four

7 people?

8 A. Well, they were -- the three deputies were at the same level, and

9 they accomplished similar functions for their own national contingent.

10 The Chief of Staff, who was Russian, had similar functions toward his

11 national contingents, as the other deputies did, but he was also running

12 the headquarters staff for the general.

13 Q. Who replaced General Gobillard when he was not in Sarajevo?

14 A. Depending on who was present, there was often absence for either

15 leave back home or meeting elsewhere. It was in descending order, the

16 deputies, which were given a seniority before I got there: The Egyptian

17 deputy was the senior, then the Ukrainian, and finally the French.

18 Q. Could you tell us who was the head of General Gobillard's staff?

19 A. The Chief of Staff, you mean?

20 Q. [In English] Yes, Chief of Staff?

21 A. It was Colonel Demurenko.

22 Q. [Interpretation] What nationality was he?

23 A. Russian.

24 Q. Yesterday, you said that the name of General Miletic was a name

25 you heard in July 1995. Do you remember this? On page 95, you said this

Page 18300

1 yesterday.

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. You also said, on page 82, that during the Srebrenica events, you

4 spent a great amount of time in the UNPROFOR HQ because General Gobillard

5 was the acting commander at the time?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Do you remember this?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. When General Gobillard was acting commander, he had contacts with

10 the officers in charge, the higher officers of Republika Srpska army,

11 right?

12 A. Some of them, yes.

13 Q. And you have no recollection that at the time, in July 1995,

14 General Gobillard had contacts with General Miletic?

15 A. No. And I'd have no -- I don't recall, no.

16 Q. And you have no recollection that General Nicolai would have had

17 contacts with General Miletic over that same period, in July 1995?

18 A. No, I don't recall.

19 Q. And you have no recollection that -- of the name of General

20 Miletic being mentioned during the meetings you had in Zepa?

21 A. It's possible, and I know I have something on him in my notes.

22 But off the top of my head, I don't recall, no.

23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we please show the witness a

24 document 5D532?

25 Q. This is information provided by the OTP after the meeting you had

Page 18301

1 with representatives of the OTP last Sunday.

2 Could you please read this first paragraph, but just for yourself.

3 A. Okay. M'hm.

4 Q. Is it true that during this meeting two days ago, on Sunday,

5 November 25th, you told the Prosecutor that you believed you heard about

6 Miletic in September 1995?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. You earlier you said that in your notes you believe you have

9 something about Miletic, but it's not this September meeting. It's not

10 this meeting of September 24, 1995?

11 A. It likely is, yes.

12 Q. I apologise. I was talking about the meeting of November 24,

13 1995.

14 A. Well, both -- both of those meetings appear in my notes. I did

15 not attend the first one, but I attended the other one, and I don't really

16 remember that meeting.

17 Q. Yesterday, on page 81, you said that you were not really sure of

18 the duties of General Miletic, but you said that he was a deputy to

19 commander Mladic, as well as probably head of the intelligence or the

20 security sector.

21 Isn't it true that when you were saying this, you were just

22 assuming that it was the truth, but, in fact, you never really knew what

23 the exact function of General Miletic was?

24 A. All I knew is that he was a senior officer in the VRS army, above

25 corps level, so in General Mladic's staff, but I did not know his exact

Page 18302

1 function.

2 Q. Isn't it true that when you arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina in May

3 1995, there was an ABiH offensive ongoing?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. This offensive was led from demilitarised zone, including

6 Sarajevo?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. When the Serbs reacted to this offensive, they were given an

9 ultimatum to stop their response against the BiH army.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

11 MR. THAYER: Perhaps it would be helpful to have a date or

12 something to tie this down to the actual events.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Fauveau. I think that's a fair comment.

14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we please show the witness

15 document 6D152, the statement he made with the OTP, page 10, third

16 paragraph.

17 I quote: [In English] "In response to the Bosnian attack, the

18 Bosnian Serbs started to fire their weapons which had been gathered in the

19 WCPs. The sector issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to stop firing

20 and to return their weapons to the WCPs by noon on May 25, 1995."

21 [Interpretation] I believe that this answers the question from my

22 learned colleague.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Does it, Mr. Thayer?

24 MR. THAYER: Yes, it does, Mr. President.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

Page 18303

1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Sir, is it true that when the Serbs responded to the Bosnian

3 attack, they were issued an ultimatum from UNPROFOR?

4 A. Yes, but there is a larger context here. Weapons in WCPs are

5 heavy weapons, which were collected under UNPROFOR supervision in weapon

6 collection points. Those are the weapons that the Serbs were using that

7 we didn't want them to use; and, also, they strangled the city and the

8 city was starving. So that's one reason why we tried to negotiate more

9 food into the city and the Bosnians tried fighting their way out with

10 light weapons.

11 Q. Fine. I'm not contesting this right now. But before the Bosnian

12 Serbs responded, the Muslims did attack from a zone that was supposed to

13 be demilitarised?

14 A. Well, as I was alluding to, "demilitarise" meant having heavy

15 weapons under UN supervision in weapon collection points, not all types of

16 weapons. It was impossible to do, on both sides.

17 Q. Yes. But in this offensive that started from Sarajevo, the ABiH

18 army, and within Sarajevo also, within the DMZ zone, the ABiH was also

19 using heavy weapons?

20 A. Not at that time, no. Eventually, everybody was using their heavy

21 weapons because weapon collection point ceased to exist, but not at that

22 time.

23 Q. Isn't it true that at the moment, during this offensive, the

24 representative of the ABiH, General Delic, for example, did not want to

25 speak about peace?

Page 18328

1 report, the weekly report, that David Harland wrote on 2nd of July 1995

2 that we saw earlier.

3 Q. Is that situation report we referred to?

4 A. It's a weekly report.

5 Q. Oh, the weekly report. Did you review any situation reports?

6 A. No, other than reports that are in my diary, which we've been

7 through some parts of, and there are situation reports in there.

8 Q. Now, you mentioned with Mr. Harland?

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Please make pauses.

10 Thanks.

11 MR. OSTOJIC:

12 Q. You mentioned, with respect to Mr. Harland and his weekly report,

13 that you found it to be useful and reliable.

14 Did you find that to be true for the situation reports that you

15 received on a daily basis from the various organisations that were

16 providing information to you in July of 1995?

17 A. Well, not always. This is, how to say, the various sources of

18 information that we had provided us with information that was accurate

19 from their perspective, from their point of view, but not necessarily a

20 complete picture of what was going on. That was the difficulty, trying to

21 put all these bits and pieces seen from different angles into a complete

22 picture. In addition, it's like watching TV in 2-D and trying to describe

23 something in 3-D.

24 Q. Well, share with us, if you will, how did you confirm or verify

25 the accuracy of, for example, the sit reports that you may have received

Page 18329

1 from the civil affairs office?

2 A. We cross checked the information with what we were receiving from

3 other sources, which was basically their means of verifying; and also

4 sometimes ask additional questions of the persons who wrote the report or

5 other sources of information to verify the information. That's as a

6 general procedure.

7 Q. What sources would you look to verify if a senior civil affairs

8 officer sent you a report, a sit report, on the activities that may have

9 been happening on or around Srebrenica on July 17th, 1995?

10 A. Srebrenica, you say?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. I'm not sure what report you're talking about.

13 Q. Okay. Well, I'm just generally trying to understand. You said

14 that in order to verify the accuracy of certain reports, you would check

15 with other sources, and my question simply is: What other sources would

16 you use or check with, in order to verify the accuracy of information that

17 may be transmitted to you through a senior civil affairs officer, such as

18 Ken Biser?

19 A. Well, in the case of Srebrenica, on July 17, I don't know.

20 Q. And why is that?

21 A. Our part, the role that General Gobillard played in the Srebrenica

22 event as acting commander UNPROFOR, lasted until July 12th; then he

23 reverted back to his role as sector commander, so we did not have access

24 or time on a daily basis to keep an eye on Srebrenica. We were already

25 busy with what was developing in Zepa.

Page 18330

1 Q. Okay. So help me with this: Today, on page 20, lines 3 through

2 5, you said that: "We had information that many thousands Bosnian males

3 had disappeared and had been killed." Are you saying that that was true

4 as of July 12th 1995?

5 A. I'm not sure. But in between, in between the events of Srebrenica

6 and Zepa, in between July 12th and July 18, 19, 20th, that information

7 started to appear.

8 Q. Where did you get that information?

9 A. I'm not sure. I don't recall.

10 Q. Does your diary reflect it at all?

11 A. I don't recall either.

12 Q. Well, we know you're under oath, and as a reasonably prudent

13 military man, Lieutenant-Colonel, how could you make that statement

14 without having any verification as to the source and as to its accuracy?

15 Can you help me understand how you came up with that?

16 A. Well, this is something that was coming out from many sources at

17 that time. What can be construed as a rumour initially becomes a more

18 important fact as the time goes on, but I cannot recall exactly how I got

19 that information or when I started getting it.

20 Q. Well, do you recall at all obtaining information from a senior

21 civil affairs officer that thousands of men who may have been killed were

22 killed mostly by mines, land mines?

23 A. I don't recall that specificity, no.

24 Q. Do you recall hearing from a senior civil affairs officer that men

25 who were killed leaving Srebrenica to break through Tuzla that they were

Page 18331

1 killed through legitimate combat engagements?

2 A. I don't -- I don't recall the specifics of what I hear.

3 Q. So when you tell us under oath here that you knew at that time

4 that there were thousands of Bosnian males who had disappeared and had

5 been killed, really that's just something that is speculation on your part

6 because you don't know how they were killed, when they were killed, or

7 where they were killed; correct?

8 A. When you hear something that big and that important and it's

9 starting to take shape as fact and it is important in how the people in

10 the other pockets will behave, yes, you take it into account, sir.

11 Q. Well, Ed Joseph was with you in Zepa, was he not?

12 A. Not with me; but he was in Zepa, yes.

13 Q. And you remember seeing him there, correct?

14 A. I think so.

15 Q. Okay. Well do you remember discussing with him what his opinion

16 was as to these Muslims who may have been killed while trying to cross

17 into the BiH 2nd Corps-controlled territory?

18 A. I don't recall that conversation.

19 Q. Well, let me show you an exhibit.

20 MR. OSTOJIC: 1D374, if I may.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

22 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, if there are any Defence lists of

23 cross-examination documents, we would appreciate it. We've only had two,

24 I think, sent to us -- three sent to us so far. If my friend has a list,

25 we would appreciate receiving that.

Page 18332

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic?

2 MR. OSTOJIC: This really came up, Your Honour, based on his

3 testimony today, as I said on page 20. So it wasn't anticipated that he

4 would make that statement. So we didn't create a list including this, but

5 we adopted the other exhibits. Because of his testimony today, I thought

6 it was prudent to show him this. In fact, in his witness statement of

7 1997, the witness clearly states he had many discussions and liaisoned

8 with the civil affairs office many times.

9 So I think, because it's an exhibit, and the Prosecutor had an

10 opportunity to meet with the witness, this may be an exhibit given his

11 testimony that he should be shown. I don't think it comes as a surprise

12 to the Lieutenant-Colonel or the Prosecution, so it's not on my list.

13 MR. THAYER: Well, IF there is a list, Mr. President, as my friend

14 just referred to, we would appreciate receiving that, according to the

15 procedure that's been clearly established for sometime.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: As I understand it, Mr. Thayer, the question is not

17 whether you should or can make use of this document with the witness now,

18 there not being a list, that's not -- or there not being a list supplied

19 to the Prosecution.

20 The whole point is this: The Prosecution is saying that now that

21 you have more or less made up your mind what your cross-examination is

22 going to focus upon, if there -- if you have a list of documents that you

23 are going to make use of in the course of your cross-examination, you're

24 being asked to hand it over to the Prosecution.

25 MR. OSTOJIC: I don't have a prepared list, Your Honour. I was

Page 18333

1 just going to use the list provided by my colleagues on the Defence and

2 also the list that was provided by the Prosecution. This came up as a

3 result of his testimony that was not anticipated, so I couldn't predict

4 that he would have this statement that he made. So, therefore, that was

5 not presented in a list that I provided to him.

6 I did not provide that. But I think it's a document that's fair,

7 and I think it's a document based on his testimony that I should have a

8 right to examine this witness on.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: I think you are avoiding the issue. The issue is:

10 Now that you have started your cross-examination, and that in your mind

11 you know exactly what documents you will be making use of, you should have

12 a list and you should have handed that list to the Prosecution.

13 MR. OSTOJIC: I can create a handwritten list if that's what the

14 Court will be instructing me. I will be using 1D374, 1D373, 2D0003, also

15 6D165 and 6D152, for the most part. Thank you.

16 MR. JOSSE: I will provide the list for you. I will write that

17 out.

18 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Josse. Is that satisfactory for the

20 time being, Mr. Thayer?

21 MR. THAYER: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed. Go ahead.

23 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.

24 So if we can have 1D374 on the screen, please, just the first page

25 would be adequate for now.

Page 18334

1 Q. Do you know what this is, sir?

2 A. A report from Ken Biser, Sector North-east.

3 Q. What do you call that, just a report from Ken Biser or is it a sip

4 report?

5 A. It says, "Srebrenica-Tuzla Update."

6 Q. Also, if you look at third section that's highlighted on the

7 bottom on the main points, it talks about Zepa as well, under main points,

8 third indentation paragraph?

9 A. M'hm, yeah.

10 Q. And this was a report drafted, as it says, by Edward Joseph;

11 correct?

12 A. Where do you see that?

13 Q. Right underneath on the right-hand side, the third or fourth box,

14 it says, "file reference number, drafter."

15 A. Okay, yeah.

16 Q. And now, sir, would this also be considered, like Mr. David

17 Harland's reports, as being useful and reliable?

18 A. I don't know. I did not deal with Mr. Joseph at all or regularly,

19 and this is a report in sector -- sent from civil affairs officer, Sector

20 North-east, which if we did not deal with. I was at Sector Sarajevo.

21 Q. Did you deal with Ken Biser at all?

22 A. I don't know him.

23 Q. Now, in your witness statement, it says that, and I'll read it

24 just so that I'm accurate, that: "You maintained liaison and ongoing

25 discussions with civil affairs, UNHCR and ICRC."

Page 18335

1 MR. OSTOJIC: It's on page 3, second to the last paragraph,

2 counsel.

3 Q. What do you mean when you said that you maintained liaison and

4 ongoing discussions with civil affairs? What does that really mean?

5 A. Those who were assigned at our level. In our case, Sector

6 Sarajevo was David Harland and Viktor Bezrouchenko.

7 Q. Now, this letter was copied to Mr. David Harland, was it not; or

8 this sit report, as we call it?

9 A. Yeah, I see it.

10 Q. So would it have been the responsibility of David Harland to

11 inform you and your section of the contents of this report as to what the

12 situation may have been in Srebrenica as of July 17th, 1995?

13 A. We had no responsibility over Srebrenica.

14 Q. Okay. Well, based on your comments that you had information, that

15 many thousands had disappeared and had been killed, that's what I'm trying

16 to gather. Where did you obtain that information, and I'm trying to just

17 see if this would help reflect -- refresh your recollection?

18 A. Like I said, I'm not sure of the exact source. I can tell you

19 there were more than one. But because this is something that was building

20 up day to day, and as I mentioned, we military officers there could not

21 ignore that kind of information in our planning and actions.

22 Q. I'm not suggesting that you should ignore it. But if you look on

23 the second page of that document, sir, on the first full paragraph - with

24 the assistance of the usher - if you can just read that to yourself.

25 I'm really going to just highlight that first paragraph and that

Page 18336

1 third subsection within that first paragraph that starts with, "Up to

2 3.000 were killed on the way, mostly by mines and BSA engagements."

3 Will you let me know when you've had an opportunity to read the

4 complete paragraph, sir?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, does that help refresh your recollection as to whether or not

7 these thousands disappeared and had been killed were killed on the way as

8 they were considered escapees, as you say in the first word in that

9 paragraph, mostly by mines and BSA engagements?

10 A. Well, as I said, this story, if I call it that, was building up

11 from day to day. Paragraph 2 states: "Other reports state that 2.000 to

12 3.000 men have been taken." They didn't have the full information either

13 at that time.

14 Q. Well, how do you know that?

15 A. Because this is how I -- this is how things happen.

16 Q. Well, what did you do, sir, to verify whether or not that

17 information was accurate?

18 A. Well, I don't recall the details, but we talked regularly with

19 David Harland in this case. I'm not sure -- I'm sure he would have

20 reported on that to us.

21 Did he show us the report? I don't recall. Were we satisfied

22 with that information? Probably not. We wanted to know more. We wanted

23 to know for sure.

24 But in any case, we were already very busy with Zepa by that time.

25 Q. Well, do you recall writing any correspondence or requesting

Page 18337

1 additional information in connection with the number of Bosnian Muslims

2 who may have died as a result of land mines while they were trekking

3 through the column to Tuzla or Kladanj?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Did your superiors at all request that information?

6 A. I don't know.

7 Q. Did your subordinates?

8 A. I don't know. Like I said, I was -- we were -- at 17 July, we

9 were back at sector headquarters doing our sector job. We had been at

10 UNPROFOR for four days. Now we were back at sector headquarters and busy

11 with Zepa.

12 Q. Okay. Did you -- at anytime, after Zepa was concluded, did you go

13 back to verify how many thousands or Bosnian Muslims were killed by mines?

14 A. No, not me personally, but I was not the only UNPROFOR soldier in

15 theatre.

16 Q. Well, who from UNPROFOR, who was in that theatre, went back to try

17 to confirm that data?

18 A. Well, likely people from BH command.

19 Q. But who? Do you know anyone in particular?

20 A. No, I don't. I don't want to speculate on who in particular, but

21 the structure would look for that information.

22 Q. Being a military man, do you know what "an engagement" means?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What does it mean?

25 A. It means usually enemy troops coming in contact.

Page 18338

1 Q. Does that mean that it's a one-sided fire-fight or does engagement

2 means that there was a response by one side as well as the other side or

3 that there was actually a fire-fight between two opposing enemy factions?

4 A. No, it could be one side.

5 Q. Do you know whether or not the Bosnian Muslims, who were making

6 their trek through the column from Srebrenica, were armed?

7 A. I don't know, but I know that they were armed Bosnians in

8 Srebrenica.

9 Q. Do you know how many?

10 A. No. I -- I know that I've seen estimates and it's probably in my

11 diary, but I don't recall.

12 Q. I couldn't find that in your diary. Would a fair estimate be

13 anywhere from 5.000 to 6.000?

14 A. Oh, no. I heard much lower than that, but I'm not -- I'm not

15 sure.

16 Q. Well, did the Prosecutor share with you what their investigator

17 thought how many armed Bosnian Muslims were going through the forest and

18 on to Tuzla?

19 A. No, they didn't.

20 Q. Did they share with you, sir, any reports from their purported

21 military analyst, Richard Butler?

22 A. Never heard the name.

23 Q. Can you tell me, sir, because of your qualifications that we heard

24 yesterday and your combat experience, do you think it's important for

25 someone to render an opinion with respect to a military situation, such as

Page 18339

1 that that evolved in Srebrenica and Zepa, that an individual who is going

2 to give such opinions have at least some combat experience?

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

4 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, my friend knows that that's not the

5 reason why this witness is here. That is inappropriate, wasteful question

6 in terms of time.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Agreed. Couldn't agree with you more. Yes. Could

8 you please proceed to your next question, Mr. Ostojic?

9 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.

10 Q. Sir, what does it mean "to extract a population"? Are you

11 familiar with that term?

12 A. Yes. That's a term that's -- that was used, but we usually said,

13 used the word "evacuated."

14 Q. So "extract" really means the same as evacuated; correct?

15 A. It should.

16 Q. Okay. Now, did you use that word or have you used that word?

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Perhaps, yes.

20 Q. Now, is it -- am I correct that General Smith's priority, with

21 regard to Zepa, was to evacuate or, as I think you put it, extract the

22 population and then the Ukrainians? Would that be accurate?

23 A. It became that, that after sometime, yes, I remember that.

24 Q. Well, how soon after the events unfolded?

25 A. I can't recall for sure.