080110IT

Page 19334

1 concluded your examination-in-chief and that we were about to start the

2 cross-examination. Is that correct?

3 MR. THAYER: That's correct, Mr. President.

4 [The witness entered court]

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning to you, Colonel, and welcome back.

6 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir. I'm happy to be back.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I also wish you a happy new year, and we can

8 now proceed with the various cross-examinations.

9 WITNESS: JOSEPH KINGORI [Resumed]

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, are you going first?

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] [No Interpretation]

12 Mr. Zivanovic.

13 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kingori.

15 A. Good morning, sir.

16 Q. I will start my cross-examination by the very beginning.

17 You carried out some preparations before you arrived in the former

18 Yugoslavia, where you worked as an UN observer. You say that you had a

19 round of preparations first in Kenya, in Nairobi, and then in Zagreb.

20 What I want to know is before you arrived in Srebrenica, did you

21 prepare, did you receive any instructions, any information that pertained

22 to your work in that particular area?

23 A. Your Honour, the care of preparations that we had before going to

24 Srebrenica was mainly -- mainly a brief on how the situation was, and

25 especially anywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was always taken to be

Page 19335

1 different from the other areas of the former Yugoslavia, so one had to get

2 a proper brief and proper instructions, proper training on how to handle

3 the situation inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it was taken to be more

4 risky as compared to other areas of enclave.

5 Also, the kind of issues inside there were a bit different. By

6 this, I mean you find there was more fighting inside there than other

7 areas like, let's say, Eastern Krajina, where I was for about six months,

8 and also the other areas of Croatia.

9 Q. Well, at any rate, you received detailed info on both of the

10 warring parties in and around the Srebrenica enclave; am I right in that,

11 sir?

12 A. Yes, you are right on that.

13 Q. You said your principal responsibility was to monitor any

14 violations of the ceasefire agreement. These ceasefire violations, did

15 those include holding or keeping military units inside the enclave, with

16 the obvious exception of Dutch-Bat, who were there as part of the UN

17 contingent?

18 A. What there is was that the violations to the ceasefire agreement

19 were several. It's only that I do not have a list on them right now, but

20 they are written. One of them was now that no one should be able to have

21 arms inside a safe area, and that is why all the Muslims were disarmed and

22 all the arms, all the heavy weapons and small arms, machine-guns and all

23 that, were taken to a safe place, and that is the Dutch-Bat compound.

24 That is where they were kept. This was happening in all other

25 demilitarised areas, not just Srebrenica. It's in all other areas.

Page 19336

1 Q. Before your arrival in the enclave during your preparations, were

2 you informed that the Muslim forces in the enclave had been disarmed or

3 had surrendered their weapons to the UN?

4 A. Yes, Your Honour, I was informed about that. And even when I

5 arrived, when I was being shown around, I was taken to Bravo Company

6 compound, where I was shown all the heavy weapons that were taken from the

7 Muslim side. They were there. They were safe under Dutch-Bat protection.

8 Q. Who were you informed by, I mean, about the fact that the Muslim

9 forces within the enclave had been disarmed?

10 A. That information came from the UN headquarters in Zagreb; the UNMO

11 headquarters also in Zagreb; and, also, when we entered the enclave, from

12 the UNMOs, themselves, who were inside there. The information was

13 available to almost everybody that had to have it. Everybody knew what

14 had been done on the demilitarisation.

15 Q. Among other things, you received instructions back in Zagreb about

16 the way in which you would be sending your reports to your superior

17 command. That was your evidence, wasn't it? Were you told at the time

18 what those reports should comprise?

19 A. I really do not get your question. Please say it again.

20 Q. Did you receive any instructions as to what your reports should

21 comprise, the reports that you were -- started admitting to your superior

22 command in Tuzla?

23 A. Yes. We received -- we were told what to put in the report; and,

24 as the military observers, generally there was a lot of -- you know, a lot

25 expected from you, in that you were to report on each and every activity

Page 19337

1 going on inside your AOR; that is, area of responsibility, be it military,

2 humanitarian, or any other type of activities going on around there.

3 One was expected or supposed to report on it to the UN

4 headquarters, because though you may think it may not have a direct impact

5 on the activities going on, that information could be needed by other

6 people in the UN system who could use it for their own purposes.

7 Q. What about the information that you forwarded in your reports, did

8 they have the same confidentiality level?

9 A. Yeah. All the information that we were sending was directly for

10 UN consumption.

11 Q. Did you use codes in order to forward this type of information?

12 A. We did -- we did not use any codes, because our system was very

13 clear on the line to which you are transmitting that information and to

14 the recipient.

15 Q. You would fax this type of information, would you not?

16 A. There were different ways of transmitting this kind of

17 information. One of them was definitely, as you're saying, through a fax.

18 The other one, you could encode and use a radio to transmit, and for the

19 other guys on the other side to decode and get it on paper so that they

20 can understand what you really mean. Also, we could use our own net, our

21 own net; that is, our transmission net, our line. You could talk to

22 somebody and tell him what exactly happening.

23 So there are different means of transmitting, and also maybe a

24 final one, which was a bit difficult, I tell, but still could be done, was

25 to get a copy and take it by road. You can take it as a letter to

Page 19338

1 wherever you want it taken.

2 Q. Another question: Before you arrived in Srebrenica, did you

3 receive any instructions to take notes?

4 A. I don't understand what you mean, but if it is a matter of taking

5 notes, that was our main occupation. As observers, that was our main

6 occupation, to take notes wherever we went.

7 Q. That was the responsibility of every single UN observer in the

8 area, was it not?

9 A. It really was. In fact, an independent notebook was our main

10 weapon. That is why we were not harmed. That is all we had, and that is

11 what we were using to write what we found in the field and report the

12 same.

13 Q. How many notebooks were you supposed to keep?

14 A. There was no issue of notebooks, the number you're supposed to

15 keep, or the number you're supposed to do anything with. What there was

16 is that you write using whichever means that you can, if it is a notebook,

17 if it is a piece of paper, provided the information reaches whoever needs

18 to have it; that is, the UN system. So there is no limitation of the

19 books you could keep.

20 Q. If my understanding is correct, you had two notebooks; right? Is

21 that right?

22 A. Yeah, I had two that I used. But notebooks, there was no

23 limitation.

24 Q. Did you use both these notebooks to basically take down the same

25 type of information?

Page 19339

1 A. Not necessarily.

2 Q. Can you explain what the reason was for you to actually have two

3 different notebooks, sir?

4 A. In fact, one could have even more notebooks. There's no

5 limitation on two. That is first and foremost. Secondly, sometimes you

6 could find you're not seeing the other notebook that you are using, so you

7 pick another new -- new book because they were available. We just go out

8 there, use it, then come back. If later on you still cannot find that one

9 or it's misplaced, you can still take another new, fresh book, and go.

10 If you found the old one, you can still use the old one, to

11 continue it with your notes, because what is important here is not -- we

12 were not doing a bookkeeping. It's not a matter that you've got to

13 continue with the same system. No. It's what you find, what you write,

14 you report. Essentially, that was the main purpose of the notebooks, and

15 that is what we were doing.

16 So it really did not matter how many you had or whether you were

17 to use this notebook for now or for this week or for this month and then

18 the other one for the other month. Really, it did not matter. It's the

19 way you want.

20 Q. You recently handed over one of those volumes that you kept to the

21 OTP. I realise that it contains dates up to the 9th of July, to the

22 extent that I've been able to inspect the volume. I didn't have much

23 time. Is that true, sir?

24 A. Yeah, that's true.

25 Q. You destroyed the other volume. That is what you said. What I'd

Page 19340

1 like to ask is to think back and see if you can remember whether you

2 recorded in that other volume also events leading up to the 9th of July

3 alone.

4 A. Actually, in the other notebook, it was information that went all

5 the way up to the last day, almost, I think, the last day of our stay in

6 the enclave. That should have been around 20th, 21st, somewhere there,

7 which I felt if it landed on the Bosnian side, BSA side, I could get

8 myself in trouble. I feared for my life at that time, and some of the

9 issues I had written, I had encoded all the names and other activities

10 that each and every individual had done.

11 I feel -- I felt at that time that if it landed on some people on

12 our way out, anything could have happened to me. So I feared for my own

13 safety, and that is why I destroyed it.

14 Q. Yes, I understand that. You said that, after all; however, what I

15 want to know is this: Speaking of the first volume that you destroyed,

16 did you share the fact with anyone; and if so, when?

17 A. That other volume, we were -- the only other person I think we

18 shared with was Major Tetteh, because we were with him there throughout,

19 so at least he knew what was inside there. I may have saved another, you

20 know, something, I can't remember, but to whoever, concerning what was

21 inside there, in that it was a bit sensitive.

22 The activities which were going on there, I had written almost

23 everything. That included the personalities; the activities; you know,

24 the issues they were doing there; you know, everything. It was -- it was

25 very sensitive. It was -- according to me, it was very sensitive and had

Page 19341

1 to be -- had to be destroyed.

2 Q. I realise that you and the two remaining UN observers, on the 22nd

3 of July, held a briefing at the UNMO HQ in Zagreb or in Tuzla, I'm not

4 certain based on just this document.

5 What I'd like to ask you is: Do you remember the meeting that the

6 three of you held with the UNMO people? I assume this was some sort of

7 superior command.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 1D470, which

9 has been marked for identification.

10 Q. If you look at the title, you see that this was a debrief of UNMOs

11 from the Srebrenica enclave. Do you remember holding a meeting like that?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] We shall no longer be requiring

14 this exhibit. We'll be returning to it at a later stage.

15 Q. But there's another thing I would like to ask you now: Did you

16 receive any instructions, before you arrived in the enclave, about your

17 own freedom of movement? Were you instructed that you were authorised to

18 move throughout the enclave, freely and unhindered?

19 A. Yes. We got that brief that our freedom of movement was

20 guaranteed, and we could patrol any area within the enclave.

21 Q. And you encountered no difficulty in that, did you?

22 A. We did, we did. We encountered several times some restriction of

23 movement from one area to the other.

24 Q. Who caused this trouble for you? Who hampered your movements?

25 A. Sometimes we could get problems from the BSA side and sometimes

Page 19342

1 from the Muslim side.

2 Q. Are you saying that the Republika Srpska Army was there within the

3 enclave?

4 A. Yeah. In some areas, they were inside. In some areas, they were

5 deep inside the enclave area.

6 Q. Can you please mark those areas for us where you encountered the

7 Republika Srpska Army?

8 A. Where do I mark?

9 JUDGE AGIUS: He's asking you where?

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Can you please name the villages and places?

12 A. Some of these areas were to the south, where the BSA were; that

13 is, mainly to the southern -- southern side. That is where we could

14 encounter them and could prevent us from going further into the enclave

15 towards the separation line. They had entered deeper into the enclave,

16 beyond the ceasefire line. So when we tried to go to the ceasefire line,

17 they would prevent us from going there, and that was mainly to the

18 southern side. I can't remember those villages. If you show me a map, I

19 can show you.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Colonel, exactly. This is what I was going to ask

21 you. If you were shown a map, would that help you remember the names of

22 these villages or at least the specific area to which you are referring

23 to?

24 THE WITNESS: Certainly, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you have a map available, Mr. Zivanovic?

Page 19343

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: No, Your Honours. I did not expect this answer.

2 Q. [Interpretation] Can you please tell me when it was that this

3 happened, that you encountered RS Army units deep within the enclave,

4 hindering your movements?

5 A. I really cannot remember the dates, but definitely they are there.

6 Q. You informed your superiors about that, did you?

7 A. Yes, we did.

8 Q. Having inspected your reports, I encountered no such indications.

9 It would follow, would it not, that this was going on at a time that was

10 not referred to in those reports; right?

11 A. Your Honour, I doubt whether you have all the reports from UNMO

12 Srebrenica to UNMO Tuzla or UNMO Zagreb. I don't think you have all of

13 them.

14 According to what I've gone through, mainly these are reports

15 from -- you know, of our own transmission, but not directly from UNMO

16 Srebrenica to the other consumers. I wish we had daily all of them or

17 daily sit-reps from UNMO Srebrenica. You can find somewhere a certain

18 time or area where we indicated that we were prevented, because I can

19 remember about two or three occasions where we could not be able to

20 penetrate. You could not go beyond a certain point, because the BSA were

21 inside. You could not even go further to see all the area up to the

22 ceasefire line.

23 One of them I remember. I think there's even an indication where

24 our Serb interpreter -- our Muslim interpreter was being asked some

25 questions by the BSA, and they were very much -- very serious on it, and

Page 19344

1 they really did not want to see him there. That is one of the occasions

2 where they were preventing us from going further to the ceasefire line,

3 meaning they were already inside the enclave.

4 Q. There had been a number of Dutch-Bat officers here to give

5 evidence in this case, people who were holding observation posts in the

6 area at the time, yet none of them ever told us that the BSA ever crossed

7 the confrontation line in order to enter the enclave.

8 You do agree that they would have had to cross the confrontation

9 line in order to access the enclave territory itself, do you not?

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Thayer.

11 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I don't believe that that question

12 accurately reflects the evidence that the Chamber has heard to this point.

13 I don't want to make a huge issue out of it, but it's a matter of record.

14 I just wanted to --

15 JUDGE AGIUS: If it needs to be discussed, it will be discussed in

16 the absence of the witness, that's for sure. I'm not in a position to

17 agree or disagree with you, because I don't want to interfere.

18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I do not insist on the answer.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's proceed with your next question, then.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Among other things, you said that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

22 or rather, that side occasionally hindered your movement within the

23 enclave. Can you tell us approximately when that was taking place and

24 where?

25 A. I think I've answered that before, but the area, that was mainly

Page 19345

1 to the southern side, the BSA. The BSA were hindering us mainly to the

2 southern side, and this is where they were deep inside, inside the

3 enclave. In fact, most of the time -- some of the times when we were

4 patrolling there, we could find -- we could find them inside and we could

5 talk to them. If you look at the map, you'll find their actual location

6 at that particular moment. They are inside the enclave. You tell them

7 so; they say no. As far as they are concerned, that is their own

8 territory.

9 Also, even the Dutch-Bat, if you remember, it's one of the

10 meetings that we had, and the Dutch-Bat were being told by the Muslims

11 that they have positioned their OP deep, deeper, deeper inside the

12 enclave, allowing the BSA to come closer and deep inside the enclave. That

13 one is there in one of the reports that are already here, so that was

14 happening.

15 Q. Does it mean that you did not see the BSA go past these

16 observation posts and the separation lines that were in place?

17 A. Your Honour, I think one thing to note is that the observation

18 posts -- some of the observation posts were erected deep inside the

19 enclave. The OPs were not all necessarily on the ceasefire line, and this

20 sometimes became the concern of the Muslims, that the Dutch-Bat were

21 erecting their OPs inside the enclave giving the BSA some leeway into

22 coming nearer the OPs, meaning they've already crossed the ceasefire line

23 and into the -- into the Srebrenica safe area; that is, the enclave. So

24 that was there, and it has been documented.

25 Q. Thank you. Concerning your freedom of movement within the

Page 19346

1 enclave, did you have any problems with the Muslim side? Did it happen on

2 occasion that they would hinder your movement or deny access to some parts

3 of the enclave?

4 A. Your Honour, it happened, especially to the -- on the -- this one

5 I can remember, the Bandera Triangle area. In that area, sometimes they

6 were preventing us from going inside there, and we complained. We were

7 complaining, and it's documented also.

8 Q. Can you tell me who it was that hindered your movement, that

9 prevented you from going there? Were those people armed? Were they

10 soldiers?

11 A. In the Bandera Triangle, that was a very active area, so sometimes

12 you find some guys with arms or even some without arms, but they tell you,

13 "No, you cannot go beyond this point." But whether armed or not armed,

14 they tell you that, you think twice before you cross. Of course, you try

15 so you can see the extent which they react, but of course you don't want

16 to go beyond a certain limit.

17 After coming back to Srebrenica, we would report to the Muslims

18 about, you know, that they were denied access to that area, and we would

19 also report it to the UN HQ using the normal channels.

20 Q. What explanation were you given, what reason were you given, for

21 the hindering of movement, or rather, denying access to that part of the

22 enclave?

23 A. When they were denying us access beyond a certain point, they were

24 just telling us that, "You're not allowed to be over there. We can't let

25 you go beyond there" No reasons were, you know, given at all.

Page 19347

1 Q. During your stay within the Srebrenica enclave, you were able to

2 tour a number of villages within the enclave. Did you meet, in any of

3 those, any Muslim armed forces, apart from the area you just referred to?

4 A. You'd rarely find any Muslims with arms, very rare, and I think --

5 I think it's only once or twice that we found, on the streets, you know,

6 Muslims that were armed; but, otherwise, those guys never had arms. I

7 mean, we could not see them armed at all. I think once or twice, but not

8 more than that.

9 Q. Were you ever prevented from visiting a facility that you had an

10 interest in, at which weapons or ammunition may be found, or anything else

11 for that matter?

12 A. No.

13 Q. What about food warehouses?

14 A. No.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, because your last -- or your previous

16 question and the answer given could lead to different interpretations.

17 You asked him: "Were you ever prevented from visiting a facility

18 that you had interest in, at which weapons or ammunition may be found, or

19 anything else for that matter?" And the answer was: "No."

20 But I think what needs to be established, first and foremost, is

21 whether he actually ever had the intention or tried to visit or visited

22 any facility, any such facility.

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, that's correct, Your Honours. Sorry.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: And then we can understand his answer better.

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 19348

1 Q. I will repeat my question: Did you ever try to enter a facility

2 to try and see whether there were any weapons, or ammunition, or other

3 material which was not allowed?

4 A. During my stay in Srebrenica, we were not denied -- you know,

5 there was no place where there was arms that we were denied access to or a

6 place we suspected had arms and we wanted to inspect and then were denied,

7 not at all.

8 Q. Thank you. You were also visiting all of the observation posts

9 held by Dutch-Bat; is that correct?

10 A. Yeah. In most cases, we would visit most of them, yeah.

11 Q. Were you informed about whether the enclave inhabitants were free

12 to leave it? In other words, were they able to leave the enclave without

13 an approval from the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

14 A. I really do not get what you mean, but the -- we were never told

15 that the Muslims, you know, were free or not free to move. What there is

16 is that there was always no authority given. Because in exiting or entry

17 into Srebrenica, one had to get authority from the BSA. But for the

18 Muslims to leave the enclave, I don't think there was any of that kind of

19 authorisation.

20 Q. In other words, you were uncertain whether such an approval was

21 requested or not?

22 A. Your Honour, the -- the kind of entry or exit from the enclave by

23 the Muslims was not in a way that one had the right to get authority, like

24 we were doing, because with us we had the right to request authority to

25 leave or to enter the enclave, and that had to go through all the channels

Page 19349

1 concerned. So that approval can come back as approved or denied.

2 But for the Muslim side, there was no such a system. But what was

3 happening and what we could get was that sometimes they, themselves, were

4 arranging, through their own private ways, on how to get out and how to

5 get in, to get out to get the food supplies or some other supplies through

6 the system that I called earlier the almost mafia system, sort of, in that

7 you pay your way out and then later on you can come back. That system was

8 working, and we reported on it.

9 Q. You have already testified on that. I'm trying to be precise and

10 put clearer questions to you.

11 Do you know for a fact that the Muslim authorities did not

12 prohibit the enclave inhabitants to leave it? Do you know anything about

13 that; and if so, what?

14 A. I do not know anything about that.

15 Q. Thank you. Prior to your approval in the enclave, among other

16 things, were you instructed to cooperate with Dutch-Bat that was within

17 the enclave?

18 A. That was normal. I mean, as a UN organ, we were to cooperate in

19 almost everything, one of them being that they were the main suppliers of

20 our food and even water. We were getting most of our supplies through

21 them, the food that we could go there for lunch, that is, hot meals, and

22 then come back. Also earlier on, we were sometimes exchanging

23 information, and also we were holding meetings sometimes together.

24 Observers -- military observers are mainly independent of the

25 other systems, but cooperation, both laterally and also up or down was

Page 19350

1 encouraged, you know. Only that your reporting does not necessarily have

2 to be the same as theirs, because we had our own unique way of reporting,

3 which was different and very, you know, reliable.

4 Since we, as observers, are not armed, we could be able to access

5 any part of the enclave or anywhere else where the Dutch-Bat sometimes

6 could not be able to access. With us, almost every area was open, you

7 know, for us to go. But for any armed troop, be it a Dutch-Bat or any

8 other, there's some areas they could not get access. In fact, some areas

9 they were asking us to escort them to that place so they can see whatever

10 they want.

11 Q. As a part of that exchange of information with Dutch-Bat, were you

12 also informed of the activities of the Muslim forces that were inside the

13 enclave?

14 A. Your Honour, there was no system whereby they should or ought to

15 have reported to us on anything. There was no such a system.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, use on your part of the

17 word "activities" is too generic. I would suggest that you specify which

18 activities you are referring to.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'm referring to military activities.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Then be specific.

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: I think the witness has answered that, but you're

23 free to put the question again.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. As a part of information exchange with Dutch-Bat, were you

Page 19351

1 informed of any military activities of the Muslim side within the enclave

2 and outside the enclave?

3 A. Your Honour, unless it's on a specific case that maybe you have in

4 point, there was no system whereby they were or ought to have told us

5 about the military activities of, you know, both inside and outside. By

6 this, what I mean is that the -- the way they were reporting, we didn't

7 necessarily have to know what -- what they have seen. But at certain

8 times they could call us. At times they could tell us, if there's

9 anything that they want us to go and investigate, they could ask us to go

10 and investigate a specific case, but not general.

11 Q. If I understand correctly, you used three interpreters during your

12 stay there, two of which were Muslims and one was a Serb. Were they

13 duty-bound to follow your instructions, the instructions issued by the

14 UNMOs, as representatives of the UN?

15 A. Yes, they were.

16 Q. They had no independence in their course of action whatsoever, I

17 presume.

18 A. I don't -- I don't understand your question.

19 Q. I won't insist on it. It is not very significant. I will move on

20 to the events in July 1995.

21 You told us that you were billeted in the PTT building and that

22 you stayed there until the 9th of July, after which you withdrew to the

23 base of the UN at Potocari. First of all, do you recall the size of that

24 building? How many floors does it have?

25 A. Oh, I can't remember very well, but it was about four or -- I

Page 19352

1 don't -- around four or five. I cannot recall very well.

2 Q. You were quartered at the top floor, isn't that correct, you and

3 the other UNMOs?

4 A. No, we were not. We were at the basement, the bottom, the bottom

5 floor, the bottom one.

6 Q. In the building, there was a small military communications room,

7 as you said, in the same building, that is. Can you recall whether there

8 was anything else inside the building, any other offices, institutions,

9 organisations?

10 A. Your Honour, I cannot remember whether there was anything else,

11 but there was that communication room up there. I think that's -- that's

12 all I can remember.

13 Q. You said that on the first day of shelling of the enclave, that

14 you told the Srebrenica inhabitants not to leave their houses; is that

15 correct?

16 A. Yes, Your Honour. We requested them to stay indoors so that they

17 can be slightly safer.

18 Q. If I understood your words correctly, at the time Srebrenica town

19 was shelled, I believe you counted some 250 shells which fell on the town

20 that day.

21 A. Yeah. Yeah. We counted around that number -- that number of

22 shells.

23 Q. Tell me, please, since the town was shelled so fiercely, why did

24 you not tell the people to leave the town, where they would be safer?

25 A. We could not tell them to do that because, first and foremost,

Page 19353

1 that number of shells were not falling on just one particular place. The

2 250 are the reported shells, but they were not falling on one particular

3 grid or one particular point. Secondly, where would we have told them to

4 go to? We could not tell them just to leave their places. We could not.

5 In fact, our aim - and that is why later on we tried to establish

6 contact with Peter - was to ensure that in the first place the shelling

7 stopped. That is why we wanted to talk to the BSA side so that they can

8 stop the shelling of that enclave, but not for us to tell the people to

9 leave, because where do we tell them to go. Which area was safe for them?

10 If the enclave, which is a safe area, is not safe for them, now, where

11 else would you have told them to go?

12 So our immediate reaction at that time was to try to tell them to

13 play it safe: "Be safe wherever you are, stay inside. If you go outside,

14 there is a possibility that you will be hit." Even inside the buildings,

15 they weren't safe, but we felt it was slightly safer inside the buildings

16 than out there where you could be hit by shrapnels. So we could not tell

17 them to go to any other place, because even ourselves were there.

18 Q. Since you referred to 250 shells you counted that day, does it

19 mean that they were falling all over the enclave, and that is the number

20 of shells fired at the enclave as a whole and not the town itself?

21 A. I think in our report it's written somewhere that it was

22 Srebrenica and Potocari. I think it is there written somewhere.

23 Q. In your assessment, then, it was safer to remain in Srebrenica

24 itself rather than leave the town and go to the nearby forests?

25 A. Your Honour, it's always good to be safe. That's what I believe.

Page 19354

1 Secondly, a place you know is better than one you really do not know. If

2 you tell them to go into the forests, you don't know who is inside those

3 forests. There could be soldiers, BSA soldiers with small arms, who can

4 actually kill them at once because they can see them.

5 You know, when you're firing with live shells, sometimes you hit,

6 sometimes you miss. So it's a matter of whether you'll be hit or not,

7 and then being not that accurate because you cannot say it is as accurate

8 as small arms, because with small arms you can see your target. With

9 these ones, it is blind. You're estimating that it will land on that

10 particular area. So it was, as far as we were concerned, safer to stay

11 inside than to tell them to go to the bush, because in the bush, you don't

12 know who -- who is inside there.

13 Q. You also said that on that day, surprisingly, and given the

14 intensity of shelling, there weren't too many victims in Srebrenica. You

15 were also surprised to see that the shelling was also aimed at the

16 marketplace, the hospital, and the PTT building, but however that those

17 location were not hit. Are you telling us that the BSA was actually

18 targeting those buildings?

19 A. As far as we were concerned, when you see the concentration, that

20 is, the hit the shells are getting around a certain area, obviously you

21 know maybe that is the particular place they are targeting. They may not

22 be getting it directly, but you see that that is their target. That is

23 what they really want to get. That can also be seen from the time - I

24 can't remember whether it was on the 9th or the 8th - when they targeted

25 the PTT building. It is in our report there that we could see they're

Page 19355

1 targeting it. We could see the landing of the shells. You could see the

2 actual targeting of that particular building. It's only they are not

3 getting it.

4 So you can easily get -- from the analysis of the number of

5 incoming shells and the actual places they are landing on, you can easily

6 get that. You can analyse and get where they're targeting.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, I don't know if you intend to

8 belabour this issue further, but he did testify at some length on this

9 issue and how he could actually establish whether a particular site was

10 being targeted or not, when he was being examined in chief. But it's up

11 to you, anyway.

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, thanks. I will just ask a few more questions

13 about this issue.

14 Q. [Interpretation] Can you tell me this, then: How do you explain

15 that those buildings which were targeted on that day, the marketplace, the

16 hospital, and the PTT building, were not hit? Could it be because the BSA

17 did not have proper weapons to be able to execute that?

18 A. Well, I remember saying this earlier, that most of these artillery

19 weapons, most of the times they are inaccurate. They are not very, very

20 accurate. Also, considering that they are high trajectory, that is, it's

21 not a direct hit, and then where you're firing them from is from a blind

22 point; that is, it's not a point where you're seeing your target.

23 Q. You've already explained that. Thank you. I do not wish to waste

25 When one is targeting a target in such an indirect way, could

Page 19356

1 there be an observer placed nearby which reports back on the coordinates

2 so that the targeting can be corrected? I'm not a soldier, myself, but I

3 believe this is how things are usually done when one wants to hit

4 something.

5 A. You're right. You're saying it like a soldier, in that most of

6 the time there must be a way of correcting or adjusting. If you don't hit

7 your target, you may try to adjust a bit. That is why you would find,

8 after hitting this place, maybe the next -- the next one from that

9 particular weapon, because it's not all of them. From that particular

10 weapon, you find it may hit maybe slightly to the right. Sometimes they

11 may go even to the center. So all those adjustments, they're done.

12 Q. However, after missing these three buildings, they didn't engage

13 the same targets the same day in order to finally hit them; is that

14 correct?

15 A. Your Honour, you're asking -- it's like I was not on their side.

16 I was not there so I don't know what they were actually doing. Only that

17 what I know is they did not hit those targets properly, and especially the

18 hospital. But the marketplace, obviously they hit. They hit the area.

19 They hit the marketplace several times. But the hospital, they were

20 missing it. So I don't know what they were doing on their side, but mine

21 was just an assessment that maybe that's what they were targeting. It's

22 just that they were not -- they were not hitting it.

23 Q. I want to move on to the 8th of July, the second day of shelling,

24 when you were informed by the Chief of Staff of the Army of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina that over 100 shells had landed on Srebrenica.

Page 19357

1 Tell me this, please: Were you in Srebrenica at all on the 8th of

2 July?

3 A. Yes, Your Honour, I was.

4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: If I may have a moment, please, to find what I'm

5 looking for.

6 Q. [Interpretation] I was able to locate a statement given by your

7 interpreter, Hasan Mahanovic [as interpreted], provided on the 22nd of

8 August, 1995.

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] It is 1D451. Hasan Nuhanovic.

10 Can we please move on to the next page.

11 Q. If you look at paragraph 2, it says that because of the shelling

12 just before the fall of Srebrenica, the UNMOs, on the 8th of July,

13 abandoned their positions. Is that true, sir, and that he was the only

14 one who remained there to send information on what was going on?

15 A. That was not correct. Hasan Nuhanovic was never left in our PTT

16 building when we left. When we abandoned the PTT building, we did not

17 leave him there. In the first place, he was not there,, he was out in the

18 field, as far as we were concerned. We tried to look for him. We waited

19 for him. We could not get him, and he was somewhere out there, looking

20 for his relatives. We have written our report on that. It is somewhere

21 in what you already have, but he was away and that is why we only left

22 with the other interpreter.

23 Q. But you can't rule out the possibility that you left Srebrenica on

24 the 8th of July, as he says, can you?

25 A. Your Honour, we need to get to where we left. I think there's a

Page 19358

1 report on when we left the enclave -- the PTT building. It is somewhere

2 here. So if you can get it, I can get the actual date. But the point is

3 we did not leave Hasan Nuhanovic in our PTT building. In fact, when we

4 were leaving, when we left in the evening, he was not there. We could not

5 find him. It was we left around 6.00 and we dismantled everything,

6 including our communication.

7 So we could not have left him to continue communicating to

8 anybody. There was nothing left in that PTT building, as far as UNMO

9 activities were concerned. There was nothing at all for them.

10 Q. But you were not in touch with him again before the fall of

11 Srebrenica, were you?

12 A. Hasan, we were not in touch with --

13 Q. With Hasan Nuhanovic, yes.

14 A. Hasan Nuhanovic, we were not in touch with him until much, much

15 letter, when he appeared in the Dutch-Bat compound. He's the one who

16 brought himself to the Dutch-Bat compound much later, and he said he was

17 out there looking for his relatives, who he did not know where they were

18 and he had to stay there looking for them.

19 Q. Thank you. According to our information, on the 9th [as

20 interpreted] Of July a member of Dutch-Bat named "Renssen" was killed.

21 Did you go there to see exactly what happened?

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. One moment before you answer the question.

23 Mr. Thayer.

24 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, this objection may need to be heard

25 outside the presence of the witness, and it is one -- it is one that I

Page 19362

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Go ahead.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. Kingori, I will repeat the question that I asked you before

4 the break. I made a small error concerning the date.

5 According to our information, on the 8th of July, 1995, Dutch-Bat

6 Private van Renssen was killed. My question is: Did you go to the scene

7 and did you ascertain the circumstances under which he had been killed?

8 A. Your Honour, this private was, as far as I can remember, killed

9 by -- by an impact, I think, from the BSA side. I'm not very sure about

10 it. But maybe if you can show me the record, maybe I can remember. I

11 cannot remember that one. But I know he was killed and I know about the

12 report, and I think I was involved in it.

13 Q. My question is: Did you personally go there to ascertain the

14 circumstances and cause of his death?

15 A. I did not personally do that.

16 Q. Is this something that was done by your other colleagues, another

17 military observer, perhaps?

18 A. Yeah, another military observer. I cannot remember who that was.

19 But anything done by a military observer, we own it up.

20 Q. Thank you. Did you tell anyone about the cause of Private

21 Renssen's death?

22 A. "Anyone." I don't understand what you mean by "anyone," but we

23 reported about it. We reported.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: But, again, I mean, the question that you put to him

25 is a little bit tricky, at least as the way we have had it translated.

Page 19363

1 You asked him specifically about reporting about the cause of Private

2 Renssen's death, not the death itself but the cause. I don't think that,

3 from his previous answer, he gave an indication that he was aware of the

4 cause of Private Renssen's death. So I think you have to either rephrase

5 your question or --

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: No, I'll -- I'll leave this question.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. You told us that one of the things discussed at your meetings with

10 BH representatives in the enclave was also the attacks and ambushes set up

11 by the BS Army against the Muslims who were on their way back from Tuzla,

12 where they had travelled to, to collect certain goods and supplies. You

13 do remember that, sir, don't you?

14 A. Yes, I remember that.

15 Q. Can you tell us exactly what sort of goods or supplies they were

16 bringing back from Tuzla? I'll try to be more specific. Did that include

17 weapons, ammunition, and the like?

18 A. Your Honour, not as far as I am aware of. In other words, what I

19 know is that the kind of goods they were bringing back were food stuffs

20 and that kind of thing, but of course we never went anywhere to inspect

21 what they were bringing back. But I'm aware mainly, you know, most of the

22 goods they were bringing in was food stuffs for the locals, because there

23 was no food inside the enclave other than what the UNHCR was giving them.

24 So mainly those are the supplies they were bringing in.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: If you never went to inspect or carried any

Page 19364

1 inspections, how come you know exactly what they were bringing in? What's

2 the source of your information, in other words?

3 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the source of information was the

4 resupply in the local market. Whenever these guys went out, you could see

5 the amount of goods that had been brought in are more than you had seen

6 maybe the previous day, the previous week, or something like that, because

7 we were monitoring the prices of goods and you could find now the goods

8 are more than they were before, meaning there has been a resupply.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. But if there were no inspections, this fact

10 alone does not rule out the possibility that weapons were also being

11 brought over from Tuzla; is that correct? You wouldn't expect, if weapons

12 were also being transported from Tuzla, you wouldn't find those in the

13 market?

14 THE WITNESS: Definitely, if -- if the arms were being brought in,

15 you wouldn't expect them to be in the market. But at least you could know

16 or you could hear, because we were talking with these people almost

17 continuously. Sometimes, yes, they may not reveal that they have brought

18 in weapons. But as far as we knew, there were no weapons, you know,

19 coming in.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.

21 Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Q. In other words, I understand you're claiming that no weapons or

24 ammunition were being sold openly; therefore, it is your inference that

25 those people who went to Tuzla never brought back any weapons or

Page 19365

1 ammunition. Is that your inference, sir?

2 A. Your Honour, that is correct. That is what I'm talking about.

3 But also, on the other hand, since the agreement for these people to get

4 out was -- and come in was being done by the BSA through, you know, using

5 their local contacts and the payments therein, I don't expect these people

6 could have allowed the Muslims also to bring in weapons to fight them. So

7 it's our conviction that definitely they were just bringing in food stuffs

8 and other essential commodities.

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have Exhibit

10 1D464. It seems that it has not yet been translated, although we put in a

11 request for this last month. I will tell you what sort of a document this

12 is.

13 This is a letter to the -- by the General Staff of the BH Army to

14 the 1st Corps Command. This is an interim report by Army General Rasim

15 Delic. The report was submitted on the 13th of July, 1995. It talks

16 about the aid that was delivered into the enclave by the BH Army, 2nd

17 Corps.

18 Can we please move on to the next page of this document. There is

19 a table there indicating the items that were delivered.

20 Q. At number 1, we see "Bullet," "7.62 times 39." That's what it

21 says. Then under "Srebrenica," it says "354.656 items" or "pieces."

22 Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] 658, yes, my apologies.

25 Q. Then you see other types of bullets being mentioned: 7.62 times

Page 19366

1 54, 20.000 of those; 7.9-millimetre, 26.520; and then rifle launch

2 grenade, 35 of those; 96 hand grenades, 425; RPG with the optical site,

3 probably, 44; and then RPG, 7; missiles, 292; hand-held grenades, 59; and

4 then a rocket-launcher, 107-millimetre, one; and then 107-millimetre

5 missiles, 28 of those. There are a lot of items in this table. I'm not

6 going to take you through the entire list.

7 But my question is: Is it possible for all of these to be brought

8 into the Srebrenica enclave without the UN observers noticing anything?

9 A. Your Honour, what I can tell you is that these kind of weapons,

10 there seems so many that have come in without us knowing, although of

11 course we were not patrolling each and every corner daily, each and every

12 minute, each and every hour. But at the same time these kind of weapons,

13 for them to have come in at least to Srebrenica, I think is a little bit

14 difficult for us to contemplate. I doubt, I doubt, unless they were kept

15 somewhere near the forest or somewhere that we could not tell. Because

16 most of the activities going on inside there, we had to have a bit of

17 knowledge about it. These kind of weapons, I don't know.

18 Q. Among other things, you said that one of the things discussed at

19 your meetings with the BH authorities in the enclave was also the frequent

20 objections following attacks on villages, especially those in the Bandera

21 Triangle. That was part of your evidence here. Do you remember that,

22 sir?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. And you also said that ordinary farmers were often attacked on

25 those occasions. How did you know that the people who came under attack

Page 19367

1 on those occasions were just ordinary farmers?

2 A. Your Honour, we could go there to investigate, and the people we

3 were talking to, we -- we found they were just ordinary farmers, and that

4 is -- that is the evidence we used. You know, they are there, you can see

5 they are normal farmers, and that's it. They were not armed, they were

6 not in combat -- combat gear and all that; and so their activities, at

7 least you could see, they are farming. They have farms, so that's why we

8 could ordinarily report that they were farmers.

9 Q. I understood you to be saying that you had no access to the

10 Bandera Triangle. Sometimes you were stopped by armed people and

11 sometimes you were stopped by unarmed people. That was in answer to one

12 of my previous questions during this examination.

13 A. That's true.

14 Q. I'm under the impression that this is not consistent with what

15 you're telling us now; namely, that when looking at those people who were

16 inside the Bandera Triangle, you concluded that those were ordinary

17 farmers, unarmed, those who were subjected to attacks. Do you not find a

18 contradiction there, sir?

19 A. Your Honour, there's no contradiction. What there is -- what

20 there is is that when the attack occurred or when an attack occurred and

21 we went there to investigate, the injured and those whose farms the bombs

22 had fallen on, you find they're ordinary farmers. That does not mean that

23 we were not stopped earlier or would not be stopped later by people who

24 were armed. It does not change any of those, because the stopping could

25 not -- is not necessarily in the same place. The Bandera Triangle was

Page 19368

1 big. And when you find ordinary farmers farming in their fields, and they

2 had, that does not mean that you would not be stopped the following day by

3 an armed soldier. So it's a bit different and it's not necessarily a

4 contradiction. It's only that the people we found there during those

5 attacks were ordinary farmers, but at the same time we have also reported

6 that at times we were stopped by armed people. That does not contradict

7 each other.

8 Q. You knew that they were ordinary farmers because, when you spoke

9 to them, they carried no weapons, and they said so; is that right?

10 A. Your Honour, not that alone. I've just said that, first and

11 foremost, they said they were ordinary farmers. Secondly, you would find

12 them carrying out the farming activities. You would find them there, in

13 the farms, carrying out their ordinary farming activities, and that would

14 force you to believe that they are actually ordinary farmers.

15 Also, another factor is sometimes you find their ages, some of

16 them were old, old men and women, who ordinarily would not be at war,

17 would not be armed, I mean, would not be soldiers. So you're forced to

18 believe that actually these -- these are ordinary farmers.

19 If you found a young, energetic, and highly versatile people, then

20 you may think that these can easily convert to soldiers at night or during

21 other times. But when you find some of these old people, you know, they

22 are just in their farms, they have their implements and all that, you

23 believe these are farmers, and that is what convinced us that that is so.

24 Q. Are you saying there were no military targets in the Bandera

25 Triangle?

Page 19369

1 A. I did not say that. What I meant is in that area -- part of that

2 area, we were not allowed to go. So, I mean, the areas we were allowed to

3 go, we could see there were no military targets. But maybe in the areas

4 we were not accessing, maybe they were, maybe they were not. But as far

5 as we were concerned, the areas we were going, we were finding farmers

6 going on with their normal farming activities.

7 Q. Thank you, sir. You also say that, in a way, you were taken aback

8 to hear that members of the Republika Srpska Army had requested that the

9 Muslims leave the enclave?

10 A. I don't understand what you mean, but of course at one point or

11 other the BSA had told us that they -- they didn't want the Muslims inside

12 the enclave. It is on record.

13 Q. And they stated no reason for that, did they?

14 A. They gave varying reasons or many reasons that they were giving.

15 One of them, and it's on record here, is that they did not want to have

16 Muslims who were supported by fundamentalists in their midst. They did

17 not want to have a country where they have Muslims supported by

18 fundamentalists.

19 Another point was that they really felt uncomfortable with Muslims

20 living inside their own area, because they believed that area belonged to

21 the -- to the Serbs. So they didn't want them there.

22 There are varying reasons, and it's all documented.

23 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Mr. Zivanovic, if I can interrupt a

24 minute.

25 I thought you would ask some more questions on the death of

Page 19370

1 Private Renssen.

2 Mr. Kingori, you answered to Mr. Zivanovic that, as far as you can

3 remember, Private Renssen was killed by an impact from the BSA. Could you

4 expand on that? Could you tell us, as far as you can remember, how he

5 died?

6 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, thank you for taking me back slightly.

7 With this soldier, I also remember saying that I am not the one

8 who went to investigate; though, as observers, we owned up to that

9 report. We are the ones who made that report, and I cannot remember

10 fully. He was killed by a shell. Actually, I think it was either a

11 bullet or something, but I cannot remember very well from which side it

12 came from. But I think it was from the BSA, only that I'm not very sure

13 about it at the moment.

14 JUDGE KWON: What is your base why you think it was from the BSA?

15 THE WITNESS: Because it was in an OP -- or maybe I'm confusing

16 the two incidents altogether, because I can remember very well there was

17 one who was killed by the BSA and there was another who was killed by the

18 Muslims when they were trying to withdraw. So in these two scenarios, I

19 cannot remember which one exactly is which one.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead, Mr. Zivanovic.

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Based on your last answer, I realise that two Dutch-Bat members

25 were killed on that occasion. Is my understanding correct, sir?

Page 19371

1 A. Yeah, there are two.

2 Q. You don't know who the other soldier was, what his name was, since

3 we have never heard of the other one, really?

4 A. In fact, I don't have the names of either.

5 Q. Thank you. You also mentioned the fact that the Republika Srpska

6 Army units took up the Echo or Eco Observation Post?

7 A. Yeah, they did.

8 Q. Prior to that, had there been any warnings or explanations as to

9 why this would be done?

10 A. In fact, the taking of the OPs by the Bosnian Serbs was not in a

11 system that maybe there were discussions that, "We are going to take it,

12 or it will not be taken," only that they would launch an attack and take

13 the OP. To them, they felt that, as far as they were concerned, there

14 were some Muslim soldiers around the OPs, and that is what they wanted to

15 finish. And at the same time, when they were -- they were attacking the

16 OPs, to them it was an advancement. They were going more towards the

17 enclave, and also prevent them being observed from those OPs.

18 So it was multi-pronged, in that it was multifaceted. They were

19 looking at different things so that they can reach their objective and be

20 closer, and also not be observed in their activities by the other side.

21 Q. Sir, were you ever there for any meetings related to this

22 observation post, the Echo Observation Post? Were you in touch with

23 representatives of the Republika Srpska Army when this was discussed?

24 A. Which meeting was that, if I may, because I'm not very sure which

25 meeting that was? But on OP Echo alone, maybe I need to refer to the

Page 19372

1 document, because I cannot remember whether that -- or concerning that

2 meeting.

3 Q. Did you ever receive any explanations or announcements from any

4 Dutch-Bat members, for example, that the Republika Srpska Army was about

5 or had every intention to take OP Echo?

6 A. Yes, we had that. The -- either the CO Dutch-Bat or his deputy or

7 the LO team once mentioned to us that the BSA are intending to taking over

8 the -- in fact, it's not taking over. Those guys had said that the OP be

9 removed from its -- from that particular location. That is what they had

10 told the Dutch-Bat, to remove the OP. Then if later on when it was not

11 removed when Dutch-Bat said or insisted that they cannot remove the OP, I

12 think that is when they -- they went in there and took over the OP.

13 Q. I will show you a statement given by one of the officers of

14 Dutch-Bat. His name was Evert Rave, and he was under commands, direct

15 subordination.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] The number of the statement is

17 1D452.

18 Let us go to page 3 of the statement, please, the penultimate

19 paragraph.

20 Q. Could you please read it to yourself?

21 A. Which paragraph, please?

22 Q. The penultimate one: [In English] "The 31st May meeting was held

23 at Observation Post Echo. The Serbian representatives were ..."

24 Can you see it?

25 A. Yes, I can. Yes, I've read it.

Page 19373

1 Q. Were you notified of this conversation between Dutch-Bat

2 representatives with the representatives of the BSA concerning these

3 activities on the Muslim side that they complained about?

4 A. Your Honour, the only thing we got from these people was that the

5 BSA were complaining that the OP should be removed, as it was being used

6 by the Muslims. Nothing more than that. And further to that, these

7 reports by -- by Dutch-Bat were not necessarily all of them communicated

8 to us. So most of the things we would not get, so -- but at least we got

9 that concerning the reason why the BSA wanted the OP removed.

10 Q. Was it true that Muslims made use of UN observation posts?

11 A. Your Honour, the OPs were Dutch-Bat. We had no OPs of our own.

12 So if they were used by -- if they were being used by the Muslims, really

13 we were not aware.

14 Q. Among others, we heard statements here and testimonies of some

15 Dutch-Bat officers. I can tell you that one of them told us - and he was

16 a deputy commander of the battalion by the name of "Franken" - among other

17 things he said that upon his arrival to Srebrenica, he was told that the

18 Muslim forces within the enclave had between four and four and a half

19 thousand pieces of light weapons and a number of mortars.

20 In the transcript, it is page 2438, lines 11 to line 2 on the next

21 page.

22 Were you told perhaps that the Muslim forces in the enclave, at

23 the time of your arrival, were in possession of some four to four and a

24 half thousand pieces of infantry weapons?

25 A. Your Honour, when you say "infantry weapons," I hope you mean

Page 19374

1 light weapons, small arms. As far as we were concerned, all the heavy

2 weapons and the machine-guns were all in the custody of Dutch-Bat.

3 Q. You've told us that. I'm asking about light weapons now.

4 A. Light weapons in the possession of the -- of the Muslims, we

5 ourselves, let's say myself, I was not aware that officially they had

6 those weapons. I was not aware.

7 Q. The same officer, when giving the statement, also said that in May

8 1995, he observed that the Muslim soldiers were furnished with new

9 uniforms, and he would see them in Srebrenica. Is it possible that you

10 did not observe the same thing?

11 A. This one we observed. They told us and we observed it.

12 Q. We have the statement of another Dutch-Bat officer given on the

13 6th of October, 2006 - page 3058, line 24, to page 3060, line 34 - where

14 it says that as of mid-June 1995, when visiting Srebrenica, he would see

15 more and more Muslim soldiers. Did you observe the same thing? This

16 witness's name was "Koster."

17 A. Yeah. We witnessed that and we reported that we were -- we even

18 saw some soldiers with some -- some weapons. And in our report somewhere,

19 we reported to the BiH CO -- Chief of Staff, that is, Ramiz, that we are

20 now seeing some soldiers with some small arms. So at least -- but one

21 thing to remember here is that the kind of weapons we are talking about,

22 you really cannot compare with what was the BSA -- with the BSA.

23 Some of these, you find two or three people with some guns, and

24 that is after a very long time, and this you cannot compare with the kind

25 of weaponry that was with the BSA, that whenever you saw them, they were

Page 19375

1 fully armed. We had a list of weapons that they had, artillery shells,

2 missiles, rocket-launchers, and all that.

3 So the only reason we reported this was that it looked a bit

4 abnormal. The Muslims were not supposed to have any weapons. But one or

5 two times or occasions, we saw some people with a few guns, you know, two

6 or three guns or something like that, and we had to question that. Where,

7 what is happening, "Where are you getting these weapons?" That is on the

8 record that we asked the Chief of Staff about it.

9 Q. Concerning what you said, that you had seen some people with

10 weapons, I can tell you that the same witness told us that at the time

11 there were so many armed Muslim soldiers that no obligations concerning

12 the demilitarisation of the enclave could be met, since Dutch-Bat had

13 insufficient personnel.

14 He says that at page 3067, lines 11 to 22, which gives me the

15 impression that there were many armed people there.

16 A. As far as we were concerned, as observers, we never noticed that,

17 that there were very many armed Muslim soldiers in the enclave. And if

18 maybe someone from Dutch-Bat noticed that, he never brought it to our

19 attention, because most of the time if they noticed something similar to

20 that, they would tell us to go out there and investigate. And this time,

21 no one told us to go and investigate, so I don't know. I'm not disputing

22 what he said, but it depends on what he means by "many." I don't know.

23 Q. I will try to clarify, and I will go back to Major Franken's

24 testimony. He told us here that the Muslims in Srebrenica were organised

25 along the lines of the organisation of a division, with respective

Page 19376

1 brigades which had been assigned their respective areas.

2 Did you know that there were brigades in Srebrenica at the time

3 you were there?

4 A. At the time I was there, Your Honour, the -- we know there was a

5 Chief of Staff. There was, I think, 28 Division or something like that,

6 which was later changed to 8 Radio or something like that. The

7 organization, you cannot really call that an establishment. I don't know.

8 Inside the enclave, you cannot call that like a military organisation or

9 an establishment, in that the -- that kind of hierarchal order where you

10 have a division, brigades, all the way up to the unit or subunit level,

11 really did not exist, as far as we could see. That kind of organisation

12 like was evident on the BSA side. It really did not exist in such -- in

13 such a structure. Such a structure was not there.

14 And if I may tell you, the -- anyone, even a guerrilla, guerrilla

15 group, can pretend to have an organisation. It's true, you see it that

16 the structures are there. But if you look at the people leading, really,

17 it does not make it a proper military organisation. It was not -- it was

18 not as established as we could see, evidently, on the BSA side.

19 So I really cannot place the organisation inside the enclave, that

20 is, of the Muslim side, at the same level as the BSA side. Really, that

21 was not a proper military structure. I don't know, because maybe there's

22 some things maybe outside the enclave. But as far as we were concerned,

23 inside the enclave we could not see such structures, and especially in

24 operation. It was -- it was not operable.

25 Q. Do you question Major Franken's testimony, that there was

Page 19377

1 divisional structure in place with respective brigades with their areas of

2 responsibility?

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.

4 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I think the question has been asked and

5 answered sufficiently.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: I think so.

7 Yes, move to your next question, please.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, I'll move to the next question.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: And you've got approximately 15 to 18 minutes left.

10 Thank you.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll show another document, 1D467.

12 This is a document from the Staff of Armed Forces in Srebrenica, dated the

13 28th of July, 1995 [as interpreted], which is after the enclave had been

14 demilitarised. Here we see the units, which at that moment of the report

15 were inside the enclave.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.

17 MR. THAYER: Just a correction for the record, Your Honour. The

18 document I'm looking at is dated the 28th of July, 1993. I'm not sure if

19 I'm looking at the right document or not, but that's what I'm looking at.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I believe I said the 28th of July,

21 1993. If I misspoke, I apologise.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: No. It's the transcript which may be wrong, so that

23 has been put on record now. Let's proceed.

24 Thank you, Mr. Thayer and Mr. Zivanovic.

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC:

Page 19378

1 Q. We see here all of the units which were within the Srebrenica

2 enclave as of the 28th of July, 1993, onwards. At the time, the enclave

3 was allegedly demilitarised. We can see here clearly that there was

4 Potocari Brigade with three battalions; then Suceska Brigade with three

5 battalions; then Kragnjivoda Brigade.

6 Did you go to any of these villages? Did you see there any

7 members of these brigades?

8 A. Your Honour, areas like Suceska and all those areas, we visited.

9 We went there. I personally went to most of these areas, and there was no

10 such an organisation that we could see. In 1995, when I was there, you

11 could not see any such an organisation.

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at 1D472 next.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Let me get this clear in my mind.

14 The Suceska Brigade would have been in the Bandera Triangle, and I

15 don't have any doubts about that.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I don't know exactly.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: But the Suceska Brigade would be the one under Zulfo

18 Tursunovic, and I think the witness said that they were prevented from

19 entering into that area, so I need to clarify this. I don't know the

20 Kragnjivoda Brigade, whether that would also fall within the Bandera

21 Triangle. I can't remember right now. But I think you need to

22 distinguish information that you could get at firsthand by being able to

23 go there and information that you couldn't get because you were prevented

24 from visiting the locations.

25 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, a brigade has a minimum of three units,

Page 19379

1 three infantry units, excluding the -- the support weapons; and if you put

2 the support weapons, really you are seeing a very big force, because one

3 unit has got around 1.000 soldiers. That is one unit. So here we are

4 talking about a minimum of three units, meaning over 3.000 soldiers, and

5 that small Bandera Triangle could not hold 3.000 soldiers and you fail to

6 see. The kind of area that we were prevented from going was not that big.

7 In fact, if we can calculate the whole of the Srebrenica enclave, the

8 whole of Srebrenica enclave could not hold a brigade. The whole of it, it

9 can could not hold a whole brigade. So maybe even in the Suceska area, or

10 the Bandera Triangle area, even if you are to hold anything like a

11 brigade, definitely you could have seen some.

12 I'm not saying, by the way, that there were no military

13 activities, because there may have been reasons why they were denying us

14 to some particular areas. But what I am saying is that definitely it

15 could not have been a brigade in that particular area.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go to 1D472, please. The

17 text is in English.

18 Q. It has not been translated, but I don't believe that represents a

19 problem for you. This was a published piece of text.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go to the last page of it,

21 the very end, the last paragraph.

22 Q. You'll see a name appearing there, Carlos Martins Branco, and this

23 is the place where he worked and the time he wrote this. Are you familiar

24 with the name?

25 A. I may have forgotten. I'm not very familiar with this name.

Page 19380

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [No interpretation]

2 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Zivanovic.

3 Mr. Thayer.

4 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, just so we could have some

5 clarification for the record, if we could have a little bit of background

6 or foundation from my friend as to any date on which this document was

7 written. All we have is a subject, contact type which appears to be an

8 e-mail perhaps of some sort that was distributed. I, frankly, can't tell

9 what it is and whether, in fact, this individual is the author. If we

10 could just have some proffer of its providence, I think it would be

11 helpful before there is further questioning on this document.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic.

13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: This document was widely published on the

14 internet, and I don't know the exact date of this, but I believe it was in

15 2005. I'll provide this date. I have to check it, but I'd like to -- to

16 put some other questions related to this letter to refresh the memory

17 of -- to refresh the memory of the witness about it.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. But we will need to know, anyway, because all

19 we have here is a page from the document that we can see, not knowing

20 exactly what document we're talking about. I mean, you may know and

21 Mr. Thayer may know, but we don't, and we need to follow, too.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'll try to -- to find it and to inform the Trial

23 Chamber, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.

25 MR. THAYER: I mean, Your Honour, we've never seen this document

Page 19381

1 before. I have no familiarity with this individual or the document,

2 certainly.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Were you given notice of the intended use of

4 this document?

5 MR. THAYER: Today, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We put it in e-court on Monday.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. We weren't with you at the time.

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: No.

10 Q. [Interpretation] Let us go back to the beginning of the text,

11 since I believe it can refresh your recollection once you have seen who

12 this refers to.

13 Look at the first paragraph, the second -- rather, the third

14 sentence: [In English] "I was UNMO deputy chief of operations. Officers

15 of UNPF adhere to level and my information is based upon the briefings of

16 UNMOs who where posted to Srebrenica during those days and some UN reports

17 not to disclose to public opinion."

18 A. Yes, I've read that.

19 Q. [Interpretation] Do you recall the person now?

20 A. Your Honour, that name does not ring a bell at all.

21 Q. Judging by the sentence we've read out, we can conclude that this

22 person also worked as an UNMO, and he specified clearly what his title

23 was. He also specified that he had contacts with military representatives

24 in Srebrenica. One of those was yourself. Did you have any contact with

25 the military observers at this level?

Page 19382

1 A. Are you -- I don't get what you mean, because if you mean that at

2 the level of the operations officer, chief operations officer at the UNPF,

3 really we were not -- we were not operating together, as such, in that we

4 were sending reports from our base in the -- in the -- in the team to the

5 headquarters through the normal channels. So by the time it got to the

6 headquarters in Zagreb, really, I don't know who was consuming it. But at

7 least we, at the team level, were just sending the reports -- the reports

8 out there. There were very many military observers, so they necessarily

9 may not have known that particular individual. I think, at that time we

10 were 300 or so, if not more, military -- I think close to 700 military

11 observers. I'm not very sure, so it's difficult to know each and every

12 observer.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: What does the acronym "UNPF" stand for?

14 THE WITNESS: It stands for United Nations Protection Force. That

15 is the one short for UNPROFOR.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: I didn't know it, either. And what's "Ruder"? Have

17 you ever heard of the name "Ruder & Finn Global Public Affairs."

18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I am not aware of this, but it could be

19 something funny. I don't know. It's not something official that we used

20 to have. I think he's trying to say that his source is not from the

21 blues, maybe. I don't know.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: And did you, yourself, as an UNMO, form part of UNPF

23 or not?

24 THE WITNESS: Ours was strictly UNMO, United Nations Military

25 Observers, and the UNPF, the UNPROFOR, itself, were, if I can use those

Page 19383

1 words, the armed part, and that is the battalions, et cetera.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.

3 Yes, Mr. Thayer.

4 MR. THAYER: Perhaps I could provide a little bit of

5 clarification. At a particular time, and I'm not sure this is going to be

6 disputed, at a particular time the formal name was changed to "UN

7 Protection Force," and my understanding was that at theatre level, this

8 would have been based at Zagreb, at least the UNMO element of UNPF. But

9 for practical purposes, there is no distinction between "UNPROFOR"

10 and "UNPF." It just depends on what period of time we're speaking about.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go to paragraph 10.

12 Q. Based on the text, Mr. Branco had information about the things he

13 referred to in the text, and that information came from the conversations

14 he had with UNMOs in Srebrenica and from the reports of the UN which were

15 not available to the public.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] The last paragraph, please, the

17 previous page, the previous page, the last paragraph.

18 Q. Among other things -- well, you can read it for yourself, after

19 which I will have a question.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. It is clear that Mr. Branco, who was in Zagreb at the time,

22 learned about these armed attacks on the Serbian villages surrounding the

23 enclave from two sources, the UN military observers in the field and from

24 certain confidential sources, these being the reports of the UN not open

25 to the public. My question is this: Did the UN military observers inform

Page 19384

1 their command in Zagreb about these military attacks of the Muslims in the

2 Srebrenica enclave against the Serb villages surrounding the enclave,

3 causing heavy casualties among the civilians?

4 A. Your Honour, during my stay there, I never witnessed anything like

5 that.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. That doesn't mean that they didn't

7 occur, does it?

8 THE WITNESS: It does not mean they did not occur, but that I did

9 not witness during my, I think, four months or so stay there.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, Witness, it has it's own connotations, that

11 means being present and seeing with your own eyes. Did you hear about

12 such attacks, without being -- without having witnessed it?

13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, what I meant was not that I did not

14 personally see. What I mean is that during my whole tour, no reports

15 reached us. We did not witness, and we were never - not necessarily me,

16 myself, as a person, but observers - heard anything like that.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Mr. Zivanovic, you have reached the two

18 hours that you had asked for, if you could kindly conclude.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'm very close to the end.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. In this same letter --

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Or rather, can we please look at

24 paragraph 14, which is on the next page.

25 THE WITNESS: Which one is it?

Page 19385

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Just a moment, please. Would you scroll down,

2 please.

3 [Interpretation] It's the paragraph that reads: "It is also

4 important to register the pathetic appeal of the President of Opstina,

5 Osman Suljic."

6 Q. Do you see that?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Let me draw your attention to the penultimate sentence: [In

9 English] "... observers who were never allowed to inspect the food reserve

10 deposits."

11 It would seem to follow that a military observer from Zagreb that

12 the UNMOs in Srebrenica had not been allowed to look at or inspect the

13 food reserves in Srebrenica. Is that right?

14 A. That's not true.

15 Q. Was such a report ever sent to the UNMO in Zagreb?

16 A. It's not true. We never reported on anything to do with that.

17 And if you look from the beginning of that paragraph, where it says that

18 the military observers to say to the world that the Serbians were using

19 chemical weapons, and that the same gentleman later accused the media.

20 That is a gentleman, I'm taking it to mean "as." It's a bit of a

21 distortion in the whole paragraph, because even when we wrote about all

22 that, we said we were told by Mr. Osman Suljic, but we could not verify

23 the information. We could not confirm it. It's on record we have said

24 that.

25 So even this where he is talking about the humanitarian situation,

Page 19386

1 that we were not allowed to inspect the food reserves, is not correct. We

2 were going to the stores, ourselves, to check the food situation. Also,

3 we were also -- we also were getting records from the UNHCR. So we were

4 in constant touch with the situation as it was.

5 Q. And you also inspected the storage facilities in Srebrenica

6 containing food; is that right, sir?

7 A. Yes, we were. We were inspecting them. We were going to the

8 stores. We could inspect, and we were even, at times, counting the items,

9 item by item. This is what is available; this is what is there.

10 Q. You saw the storage facilities belonging to the 28th Division, I

11 assume, did you not, containing food?

12 A. For the -- the food for the -- for the people in the enclave?

13 Q. [In English] For military, for the people from the ABiH Army.

14 A. If there were a separate store, other than the one that we knew

15 and the one we were inspecting, I'm not aware. But the one we used to go,

16 that is where all the foods were kept, and we were able to go and inspect

17 it. I can even say that according to how the situation is, this food may

18 not last a particular period of time. And when it is enough, we could say

19 now we have enough food for about two months, one month, two months, or

20 something like that. So we were able to inspect the stores.

21 Q. You monitored the food situation in Srebrenica, among other

22 things, did you not?

23 A. I did, Your Honour.

24 Q. Did you know that the BH Army was consistently seizing a portion

25 of humanitarian aid and food?

Page 19387

1 A. We were told of that at a particular moment. That is the time we

2 were told that these guys sometimes seize a bit of food. Also, even some

3 of the consumers were also selling part of the humanitarian food that they

4 were getting, in that they used part of it and they sell part of it. So

5 all these activities were happening. But the -- the extent to which the

6 -- the army was keeping food, in terms of storage, and if they were

7 keeping it, whatever, that is something we -- we did not know.

8 Q. I do have a number of questions left, but we've reached the

9 two-hour mark and my time is up; therefore, there is one last question

10 that I would like to ask you.

11 You tell us that the UNMOs are expected to be impartial and share

12 no bias. My question is: Is it your assessment that you were an

13 impartial observer during your mission in Srebrenica?

14 A. Your Honour, no doubts about that, no speck of doubt. I was

15 impartial. We, as military observers, were impartial. As far as I know,

16 all of us who were there. And, personally, I was very impartial and never

17 sided with any, any of the sides. We were friendly to both, and we could

18 speak freely with either side, that is, the BSA and the BiH side, and they

19 also had trust in us, as military observers. There is nothing that could

20 indicate that we were partial in any way whatsoever.

21 Personally, I had contacts with both sides at any level, and the

22 meetings are recorded. There is no single time that my report or reports

23 were ever biased at all. Even the evidence that I give, even whatever I

24 say concerning that particular situation, is not biased, will never be

25 biased. It's just based on the truth as I observed and as I saw it on

Page 19388

1 ground and as recorded.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, sir. I have

3 no questions.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.

5 Let's revise the time indicated by the various other Defence teams

6 for cross-examination.

7 Mr. Meek, you had asked for one hour?

8 MR. MEEK: Yes.

9 Good morning, Mr. President.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.

11 MR. MEEK: From this time in the testimony and the

12 cross-examination, I don't believe I have any questions; however, I

13 would --

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Reserve it?

15 MR. MEEK: -- request to delegate 30 minutes to Mr. Borovcanin's

16 team, Mr. Lazarevic.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.

18 MR. MEEK: -- and reserve the right to ask a few questions, if

19 need be.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.

21 Ms. Nikolic.

22 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

23 At this point in time, Mr. Nikolic's Defence has no questions for

24 this witness. I would also like to ask the Chamber to grant some of our

25 time to Mr. Borovcanin's Defence, 20 minutes. That is what we ask. Thank

Page 19389

1 you.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.

3 Thank you, Ms. Nikolic.

4 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I also wanted to advise the Court of a

5 stipulation into which the Prosecution and the Nikolic team have agreed to

6 enter, and that is simply that any reference to a Major Nikolic does not

7 refer to the accused Drago Nikolic.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Thayer. You confirm that, I suppose,

9 Ms. Nikolic.

10 Now, Miletic. Madame Fauveau, you had asked for two hours.

11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Perhaps a bit

12 shorter, but I will know more after the cross-examination of my colleague

13 for Mr. Borovcanin, once the Borovcanin Defence is over with their cross.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Krgovic, Mr. Josse.

15 MR. JOSSE: We stick by our estimate, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Haynes.

17 MR. HAYNES: Unlikely to be anything. I'm open to offers for

18 anybody who wants some of my time.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I'm attempted to ask Mr. Lazarevic whether he

20 would be able, having at his disposal all this extra time, to finish, say,

21 in two weeks' time.

22 Mr. Lazarevic, how long do you think your cross-examination will

23 last? You had asked for an hour and a half, initially.

24 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes, Your Honour, I have to be realistic. I was

25 expecting that some of the topics that I intended to cover during my

Page 19390

1 cross-examination would be covered by Mr. Zivanovic, and I have to admit

2 that once parted, however, some other topics opened. On the other hand,

3 when we compared the documents that we intended to use during the

4 cross-examination of this witness, documents that Madame Fauveau intended

5 to use, we basically found out that more or less these are almost the same

6 documents.

7 So it is very likely that we are going to cover a number of topics

8 in our cross-examination, but I believe that it's going to last for at

9 least two hours, maybe two hours and 10 minutes, 10 or 15 minutes.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Let's start, then.

11 You're next.

12 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes, and if Your Honour could --

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Maybe you could introduce yourself to the witness,

14 please.

15 MR. LAZAREVIC: If Your Honours could bear with me for one second,

16 just to prepare myself. I will have to --

17 JUDGE AGIUS: If you want the break now, we can have the break now

18 rather than in 15 minutes' time.

19 MR. LAZAREVIC: Well, I don't think we need to break. I just need

20 to take the stand and --

21 JUDGE AGIUS: No. What I meant was we are scheduled to have a

22 25-minute break in 15 minutes' time. If you want to have the break now,

23 we can do that, which would give you the opportunity of preparing yourself

24 better.

25 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes. Well, Your Honour is right. I mean, that's

Page 19391

1 a better idea.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Agreed or not?

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE AGIUS: So we'll have a 25-minute break starting from now,

5 and then we'll continue.

6 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 12.48 p.m.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Lazarevic, are you ready?

9 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Then proceed, please.

11 One thing. We expect you to make an effort, however small or big

12 it is, to finish with this witness tomorrow. Okay? Thank you.

13 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes, Your Honour, we'll bear this in mind, and I

14 think we will be able to complete it by tomorrow.

15 Cross-examination by Mr. Lazarevic:

16 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Colonel Kingori. My name is

17 Aleksandar Lazarevic. I represent General Borovcanin before this

18 Tribunal. I have undertaken before this Trial Chamber to do a number of

19 things. I hope you can help me with that.

20 Some of my questions will be simple in nature, "yes" or "no"

21 questions, basically, so could you please comply. If you come across

22 something that you don't think is clear, please let me know so that we can

23 do it as quickly and efficiently as possible. Thank you.

24 I would like to go briefly through your evidence so far, which

25 will hopefully enable us to go through everything that you told this

Page 19392

1 Tribunal and OTP investigators about Srebrenica, briefly.

2 You made a first statement on the OTP on the 24th and 25th of

3 September, 1997, did you not?

4 A. Yes, I did.

5 Q. After that, on the 31st of March, and this continued on the 3rd of

6 April, 2000, you gave evidence before this Tribunal in the Krstic trial;

7 right?

8 A. You're right, Your Honour.

9 Q. This is your next evidence before the Tribunal. It started in

10 December and it goes on now; right?

11 A. Correct, still going on.

12 Q. As you make statements to the OTP and while giving evidence both

13 in the Krstic trial and here, you spoke the truth and nothing but the

14 truth, to the best of your recollection; is that right, sir?

15 A. That's correct, Your Honour.

16 Q. Before you started your evidence in this trial, I assume you had a

17 chance to go through your previous statements, the statements that you

18 made to OTP investigators. You had a chance to read again your evidence

19 in the Krstic trial; is that right, sir?

20 A. You're right, I was able to go through it.

21 Q. You also had a chance to make any amendments, things that you

22 believed were not entirely precise. You shared all this with the OTP, any

23 potential amendments, and these were included in the so-called "proofing

24 notes," right?

25 A. Yeah, we went through proofing.

Page 19393

1 Q. Did you perhaps have a chance to inspect the notes made by

2 Mr. Thayer about the proofing session that he held with you? Were you

3 shown those notes perhaps before you start your evidence, or were you not?

4 A. I don't know which specific notes you are talking about. Maybe

5 you can tell me.

6 Q. My apologies. I'll try to be as explicit as I can.

7 After my learned friend Mr. Thayer finished proofing you, he made

8 certain notes. These notes were then served on all of the Defence teams.

9 Did you perhaps have a look at the notes that Mr. Thayer made during your

10 proofing session?

11 A. I didn't go through his notes, only that we went through my

12 statements and all the other evidence together with him, and that is the

13 proofing session. But his notes, if he made any, I did not go through

14 them.

15 Q. Fine. If necessary, I'll be showing you those. But I'm asking

16 you, for the time being, is whether you've seen them, and you've given an

17 answer. Can we now please move on to the gist of your evidence.

18 You made a statement to the OTP, and I've drawn your attention to

19 it at the beginning of this cross. I see that you describe the task of

20 the UNMO mission in Srebrenica in the following way: "Spotting any

21 violation of the demilitarisation agreement and organising meetings

22 between the warring parties, with a view to finding a long-term solution.

23 The remit also included mediation between the warring parties and the UN

24 battalion that was in charge of seeing the ceasefire implemented."

25 So that is a description of your mission, of the UN mission, that

Page 19394

1 you provided in your statement to the OTP. This is page 2 of the English

2 and page 2 of the B/C/S. I'd like to ask you something about this.

3 Is my understanding correct that your principal task was to spot

4 any violations of the demilitarisation agreement? Was that the principal

5 element of the UNMOs' mission there?

6 A. Our mission was to monitor any VCFAs; that is, violations to the

7 ceasefire agreement. Monitor and report the same.

8 Q. Indeed. We'll come to that in a moment. You are aware, though,

9 that there was an agreement, a ceasefire agreement, between the Serb

10 forces and the BH Army forces; right?

11 A. Your Honour, the ceasefire agreement was an agreement between the

12 two warring parties, and which was actually done through mediation. They

13 came up with something that really was concrete and had to be followed by

14 the same warring factions.

15 Q. Can I just clarify my question? I see there is talk here in the

16 transcript of a ceasefire agreement, and what I meant was the

17 demilitarisation agreement. I'm talking about the demilitarisation

18 agreement. Do you know if there was any such agreement in place, was it

19 signed, and, finally, was this not a basis on which the UNMOs arrived in

20 the Srebrenica enclave?

21 A. If I may say -- say again, ours was to monitor and report any

22 VCFAs, and there are stipulations. There are issues written in the VCFAs,

23 and those were the ones we are -- we were monitoring. If there was any

24 demilitarisation agreement, I do not know about it. What I know is that

25 in the VCFAs that were agreed - and I think this was called the Qatar --

Page 19395

1 whatever, Qatar agreement or something like that - the issues agreed

2 therein included the demilitarisation of -- establishment of a safe area

3 for the Muslims, and here we're not talking just about the Muslims.

4 The issue was if it is -- you know, if we look at the UN context,

5 the issue was on people who were -- who could be easily violated against,

6 that is, the minorities in a particular area. That is why we had safe

7 areas in -- in Srebrenica, Zepa, and I think there was also Sarajevo and

8 another one, Gorazde. Also, if we go to the Croatian side, we had

9 somewhere, I think in -- there was an area, I think, called "Bihac."

10 There was Bihac and some other safe areas which were established by the UN

11 together for the disadvantaged or the minorities in that particular area.

12 It was called "safe area," so as to ensure that those people who

13 are inside there, their survival is guaranteed by the UN, and that is why

14 there were military contingents; that is, the battalions were posted in

15 those specific areas to ensure the safety of those particular people who

16 were either disadvantaged or they were sort of a minority in the

17 particular area.

18 Q. I thank you for this comprehensive answer. I'm afraid, however,

19 that we are to some extent talking at cross-purposes. I will try to ask

20 you a very specific question.

21 You, as a UN military observer, was it not your task to observe,

22 for example, that one of the parties was arming itself to a considerable

23 extent, for example, the BH Army within the enclave, and to report this to

24 your superiors? Was it not your task to monitor that perhaps there were

25 weapons being brought into the protected area or was that not your task?

Page 19396

1 A. That formed part of our tasks.

2 Q. Thank you very much. That was my understanding as well.

3 I would like us now to look at a document. I'm not sure whether

4 you've had a chance to see it or not.

5 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] We have both the B/C/S and the

6 English. This is 5D502.

7 Can we please have this displayed.

8 Q. Colonel, let us identify the document. It's called the Agreement

9 on the Demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa, concluded between

10 Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic and General Sefer Halilovic on the 8th of

11 May, 1993, in the presence of Lieutenant-General Philippe Morillon.

12 In essence, this is one of the fundamental documents that defined

13 the ceasefire and demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa.

14 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] This is what I'd like us to be

15 looking at, paragraph 3, which is in fact on the next page. Article 3,

16 rather, which is on page 2 of the English, and the same applies to the

17 B/C/S.

18 Q. Please, Colonel, feel free to go through Article 3 before I ask my

19 question. Just let me know as soon as you are done.

20 A. Yeah, I've gone through it.

21 Q. Thank you very much. Based on this agreement, the Serb side and

22 the Muslim side - and this was something that was mediated by the French

23 General Morillon - reached an agreement. According to Article 3, within

24 the demilitarized zone, all weapons, ammunition, explosives, mines, and

25 combat supplies were to be handed over. You see that that's what it says,

Page 19397

1 don't you?

2 Was it not your task to do just what Article 3 states, to monitor

3 this process and to provide any observations as to whether this process

4 was, in fact, being complied with, as well as to forward any of your

5 observations to your superiors?

6 A. Your Honour, if I may take you back slightly, when we entered the

7 enclave, let's say myself, when I entered the enclave, that was the early

8 part of 1995, this demilitarisation had already been done. So here what

9 we are seeing is an enclave which has already been demilitarised, all the

10 weapons handed over to the Dutch-Bat, as they're saying, to the UNPROFOR

11 people; that is, in this particular area. They were in the Dutch-Bat

12 compound, and that I witnessed. I saw that that had been done. So we did

13 not go there to witness the demilitarisation. It was already done.

14 Q. That's fine. I fully understand your answer. So all of this is

15 happening in 1993, and the agreement dates back to 1993.

16 You arrived there in April 1995. According to your evidence, the

17 demilitarisation is already completed. However, what if there are other

18 weapons reaching the enclave at the time, would it not be part of the

19 agreement to inform your superiors about anything like that?

20 A. You're right, that is part of our work. If we find, we report

21 immediately. That is true.

22 Q. Thank you very much. Let me ask you a very specific question now.

23 In April 1995, which is when you, in your capacity as a UN

24 military observer, arrived in the Srebrenica enclave, did you know that a

25 significant amount of weapons and combat supplies had been brought into

Page 19398

1 the enclave? I'm referring to the period between April and July, which is

2 a time at which you, too, were at the enclave.

3 A. Your Honour, that I was not aware of. Anything that we witnessed,

4 we were reporting it directly to the UN headquarters. The only thing we

5 can talk about here is when we noticed a few of the BiH soldiers moving

6 around with weapons, and we reported that. But any kind of a resupply

7 that you may be insinuating, really, we did not get notice of it and we

8 did not report on it.

9 Q. Very well. Thank you for this answer.

10 Sometime ago my learned friend Mr. Zivanovic showed you document

11 1D464. The date is the 13th of July. BH Army Commander Rasim Delic is

12 behind this document, based on your answer. I understood you had certain

13 misgivings about the accuracy of this document, since there were large

14 amounts of ammunition, weapons, and combat supplies being mentioned there.

15 Am I correct in assuming that you're not entirely certain about

16 precisely those amounts mentioned there of ammunition, weapons, and combat

17 supplies being brought into the enclave?

18 A. Your Honour, it's not even about the -- the amount of weapons.

19 It's actually about the weapons themselves. That kind of -- the

20 quantities that we have seen there is a bit -- is a bit high, for sure.

21 Secondly, the -- the resupply, if it ever occurred, did not get to our

22 notice. So something we do not know, we can't know about, really we could

23 not have reported on. So that one, I really do not know whether it

24 actually occurred or not.

25 Q. Very well. Fortunately, some time has elapsed since your

Page 19399

1 testimony in the Krstic trial. Various Defence teams and the OTP have

2 since come into possession of a huge number of documents, because many of

3 the archives that had been closed have since opened their doors. As a

4 result, we have in our possession at this point a lot of documents that we

5 did not have back then.

6 I would like to show I was sequence of four documents, and then we

7 can continue our examination.

8 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have 5D00011.

9 Q. Colonel, as you're looking at this document, just in order to

10 familiarise ourselves with this, I will tell you that this was a document

11 produced by the chief of the BH Army General Staff, Hadzihasanovic. The

12 date is the 21st of April, 1995. We're looking here at equipment received

13 by the 28th Division of Srebrenica and the 285th Zepa Light Infantry

14 Brigade.

15 Therefore, on the 21st of April, 1995, you were already in the

16 enclave, yourself, were you not?

17 A. I was. I was inside there.

18 Q. I assume, based on your previous answer, that you did not, in

19 fact, notice these amounts, weapons and all the rest, in the enclave when

20 you were there. But are you familiar with this name, Brigade General

21 Enver Hadzihasanovic? Is this a name and a rank that cropped up at any

22 time in your time in the Srebrenica enclave?

23 A. I am not familiar with that name. Is it "Madzi" or "Hadzi"?

24 Q. Hadzi, Hadzi. I'm sorry. It may be an error in the transcript.

25 General Enver Hadzihasanovic, Chief of the BH Army Staff, a very

Page 19400

1 high-ranking officer within the BH Army.

2 A. I don't know him at all.

3 Q. That's fine.

4 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please move on to 5D00012

5 [Realtime transcript read in error "000512"]. My apologies. It has been

6 misrecorded. I was looking at the document instead of following the

7 transcript. This is 5D00012. [In English] 12.

8 Q. [Interpretation] You'll see, Colonel, this document is very

9 similar to the previous one, produced by the same person, a person not

10 familiar to you, the only difference being the dates on which these combat

11 supplies were delivered. This is the 27th of April, so that is a full

12 week later than the previous one, and this is what was delivered:

13 Horseshoes, shells, uniforms, and other necessities.

14 This is another report produced by Chief of Staff General Enver

15 Hadzihasanovic about the distribution of equipment to the 28th Division in

16 Srebrenica and the 285th Zepa Light Infantry Brigade.

17 Did you perhaps see any shells arriving in the enclave,

18 60-millimetre, 82-millimetre shells, 120-millimetre shells? Did you

19 perhaps see these arrive in Srebrenica during the months that you were

20 there, April specifically?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Very well. But you were a UN observer and you analysed artillery

23 weapons quite a bit, and you talked about this in your reports:

24 82-millimetre shells, 120-millimetre shells. These are quite powerful

25 artillery weapons, are they not?

Page 19401

1 A. Yeah, they are. They are. That is the 120-millimetre. These are

2 mortar, so they are powerful, of course.

3 Q. Thank you very much.

4 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now move on to

5 4D0005.

6 Q. Colonel, I will be pointing you to the relevant portions of this

7 document, but I first want you to look at the title page so we know what

8 this is about. So the date is the 30th of July, 1996. The place is the

9 Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Army Commander Rasim

10 Delic is presenting a report on the military causes of the fall of

11 Srebrenica. So that's what this is about.

12 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please go to page 4 and

13 page 5 in the English; whereas, in the B/C/S we're at page 4.

14 Q. If you look at the upper portion of this page, the upper half, you

15 see a part of this paragraph, and the beginning is on the previous page in

16 the English. Can you please look at this, and then we can go back to the

17 previous page.

18 A. Yeah, I've seen it.

19 Q. The lower half of the page, as you see, General Rasim Delic is

20 speaking before the BH Assembly, and he says that they transported the

21 following supplies to Srebrenica, excluding Zepa. That's what it says,

22 meaning Zepa had no role to play in this. So this information concerns

23 the Srebrenica enclave alone.

24 Can you please look at what this is about. What do we see there?

25 Tell me this, sir: Having seen this, and this is quite comprehensive,

Page 19402

1 that all sorts of ammunition and weapons mentioned there, as well as

2 communications equipment and the rest, did you notice any of these in the

3 Srebrenica enclave at the time?

4 A. No, I did not.

5 Q. I have a question stemming out of the previous one.

6 Can you tell us what the reason could be due to which General

7 Rasim Delic, the Army of BH commander, would present this in his reports

8 to the Assembly unless it was true? Could he have had a reason to lie to

9 his president and to the Assembly, that you know of?

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.

11 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I'm -- I don't have a particular problem

12 with the subject matter, but it really does call for speculation to get

13 into Commander Delic's head, as it were.

14 MR. LAZAREVIC: If I may answer this, I'm not asking to -- I'm not

15 asking the witness what Commander Delic meant. I asked him whether he

16 knows any reason why he would lie. If he doesn't know any reason, then he

17 can simply say, "No."

18 JUDGE AGIUS: I think, from his previous answer, it's very clear

19 that he can't give you more information than he has given you already. So

20 would I suggest you move to your next question.

21 MR. LAZAREVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. [Interpretation] The latest exhibit I want to show you now is

23 4D0002, in regards of this line of questions.

24 Colonel, during your testimony, on several occasions you mentioned

25 Ramiz Becirovic. This leads me to conclude that you knew him and that you

Page 19403

1 had contact with him. On the 11th of August, 1993 [as interpreted], Ramiz

2 Becirovic provided a statement to the -- 1995, I apologise. Ramiz

3 Becirovic gave a statement to the Military Security Service office of the

4 2nd Corps of the Army of B and H. What we have before us is the

5 statement. I wanted to show you a part of that statement; and in the

6 course of your testimony, we will go back to this statement at a later

7 stage.

8 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] For now, let us look at page 14 in

9 the B/C/S and page 17 in the English version. Could we please see the

10 bottom portion of the page, the third paragraph from the bottom.

11 Q. Can you read it for yourself, please? It begins with: "All the

12 heavy weapons were in use throughout the combat ..."

13 [In English] "A mountain gun remained in its position during the

14 firing..." [Interpretation] That is the paragraph I am interested in.

15 A. Yes, I can see it.

16 Q. You've read it, I see. As a military observer of the UN, who was

17 in the Srebrenica enclave at the time, did you register any use of the

18 mountain gun or heavy artillery and mortars by the Army of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina attacking the Serb side?

20 A. I think one point you need to get first clear is it's not

21 indicated where it was mounted, where was it located, which grid

22 reference, so that we can know whether it was closer to where we are,

23 because we could not hear everything in the whole enclave. You know, you

24 should know our location in the Srebrenica PTT building, so we may not

25 know. Is there a grid reference so we can know?

Page 19404

1 Q. Unfortunately, I cannot assist you any further regarding this

2 issue. I am not in a position to know where the artillery pieces of the

3 28th Division were. What I wanted to know is whether you registered any

4 use of heavy artillery on the part of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

5 the enclave. That was my question.

6 A. Your Honour, we did not. We did not notice any.

7 Q. The consequence of the fact that you did not notice any such thing

8 is that such information does not figure in any of your sitreps during the

9 relevant period; is that correct?

10 A. Correct, Your Honour. That is why you cannot find it in here in

11 our reports, because we did not notice, we did not hear. And if it

12 happened, it may have happened maybe elsewhere, very far from our

13 location, that is, but not where we could hear. The same as on the other

14 side, what we could not hear, what we could not notice or get reports on,

15 we could not report on it.

16 Q. Yes, I agree fully. One cannot report on things one did not see

17 personally or did not gain any information about. But I do have a

18 question concerning the documents we saw here. It's a hypothetical one,

19 and I expect to receive a hypothetical answer to it.

20 If we presume that all of the documents are correct and that all

21 of the weapons actually found its way into the enclave at that time, if we

22 presumed that the Muslim forces opened artillery fire on the Serb

23 positions from within the enclave, and if we conclude that in your sitreps

24 there is no mention of it, does it mean that you did not perform your task

25 as a military observer in a proper manner?

Page 19405

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.

2 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, particularly as phrased, I'm objecting

3 to this question. First of all, it's a hypothetical question, and he's

4 asked for a hypothetical answer to a hypothetical question. So on that

5 basis alone, I would respectfully submit it's just not a proper question.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: You can rephrase your question. I think Mr. Thayer

7 is right. You can ask him if he has an explanation.

8 MR. LAZAREVIC: I will rephrase the question. Yes.

9 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, you heard what Judge Agius just said.

10 If everything in the document is correct, do you have an explanation that

11 you can offer as to why that did not appear in your reports?

12 A. Your Honour, if this document is correct and that all the weapons

13 listed therein and the report given here is correct, then, really, I

14 cannot understand why we did not -- we do not see them. What there is is

15 that the reporting, when one is giving out his report, and especially

16 after failing in combat, the kind of connotations you put in there may try

17 to -- you may be trying to abdicate yourself.

18 I'm not saying that what was written here is wrong. What I'm

19 trying to explain is that this is not what we observed. Ourselves, we did

20 not observe anything like this during our entire stay in that place.

21 And at the same time, for these kind of weapons to have been in

22 that place, at least we could have observed a bit of firing activities

23 using heavy weapons from the enclave, and definitely we could have

24 reported on it.

25 You should note that our observations were not mainly based on

Page 19406

1 what you see as a person, because you may not see the firing itself. But

2 if you hear the shells zooming over, you know, going across to whichever

3 side, definitely you know this is coming from such-and-such a place to

4 such-and-such a place. And our observation, during our whole stay there,

5 we did not notice any heavy weapons firing shells across to the other

6 side. We did not notice that. If there was any, really, we did not

7 notice it and we did not report on it.

8 Q. For the time being, we will leave the subject; although, I may

9 revisit it tomorrow with a few additional questions.

10 Apart from monitoring whether any weapons are being introduced

11 into the enclave, your role was also to observe whether there were any

12 attacks from within the enclave on the part of the Army of B and H against

13 Serb positions and further into the Serb-held territory, is it not?

14 A. That is true, you are right.

15 Q. If I understood your testimony correctly, you were never informed,

16 no one ever told you of any attacks carried out by the Army of B and H

17 during the time when you were in Srebrenica as an observer, from within

18 the enclave outwards towards the Serb-held territory.

19 You testified here earlier, at page 19168 of the transcript and

20 19169, lines 1 to 5. You said that you did not recall any situation in

21 which the Serb side complained about any attacks on their territory from

22 within the enclave. Do you still stand by your testimony at that time?

23 A. Your Honour, I still believe by what I say at that time.

24 Q. Very well. Did you have any information, during your stay there,

25 that there was a plan in place by the Army of B and H that by conducting

Page 19407

1 frequent attacks from the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa against

2 Serb-held territory, to tie up the Serb forces and to prevent them from

3 being engaged in other theaters, such as the Sarajevo theatre, were you in

4 possession of such information?

5 A. I really did not get what you mean. But if it is the -- from the

6 Bosnian, that is, the Muslim side engaging the other -- the BSA side so

7 they don't go elsewhere, I don't think we had that at all. We did not.

8 Q. That was the gist of my question, and I can see you understood it

9 well.

10 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us have a look at Exhibit

11 5D0003 now. I think we still do not see the English version, page 1.

12 It is here now. Thank you.

13 Q. Colonel, this document is dated the 30th of June, 1995,

14 operational time 5.00 p.m. It is an operational report forwarded by the

15 Chief of Staff, Major Ramiz Becirovic, to the 2nd Corps Command in Tuzla.

16 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us see page 2 of the document.

17 Q. Let us know when you are done with the first page so we can move

18 on to the next page, and then we will discuss the document itself.

19 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us please go to page 2 now,

20 and then we will discuss the document itself.

21 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I've seen it.

22 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Thank you. Colonel, having familiarised with the contents of the

24 document, let us go back to page 1, specifically item 3, which

25 reads: "With the aim to distract the enemy forces and direct your

Page 19408

1 attention elsewhere from the Sarajevo theatre and to focus their attention

2 on Srebrenica and Zepa, on the 29th of June of 1995," and so on and so

3 forth.

4 In any case, on the 26th of June, 1995, you were in Srebrenica,

5 were you not?

6 A. Say that again, please.

7 Q. In item 3 that you saw, in which we can see that: "In order to

8 divert enemy forces from the Sarajevo theatre and stretch them out towards

9 Srebrenica and Zepa," on the 26th of June, 1995, et cetera, concerning

10 this I wanted to ask you the following: At that time, you were not in the

11 Srebrenica enclave, were you?

12 A. On the 23rd of June, I was there.

13 Q. In item 2, it says: "In order to prevent enemy forces from

14 sending additional forces from the Srebrenica and Zepa areas to the

15 Sarajevo theatre, two acts of sabotage were carried out near Srebrenica on

16 the 23rd of June, 1995, at Osmace, and on the 23rd of June, 1995, at

17 Bijelo Stijenje near Koprivno, and the following results achieved: seven

18 Chetniks," et cetera.

19 This was also taking place while you were in Srebrenica; is it

20 correct?

21 A. That's indicated, show that I was there?

22 Q. Yes. Well, according to Ramiz Becirovic's reports, who you know,

23 or rather, who you knew, in these operations 13 Chetniks were killed. I

24 suppose you are familiar with the term "Chetnik," being a derogatory term

25 for a Serb soldier. I believe you recall that. In those operations,

Page 19409

1 there were 13 Chetniks killed; and then 7 Chetniks killed in item 2; and

2 in item 3, it says that the acts of sabotage were carried out deep into

3 the enemy territory, to the range of 20 to 40 kilometres in the area of

4 Han Pijesak and the Vlasenica municipalities and the following locations,

5 and then we have a list. Then we move on to the next page to learn what

6 had happened.

7 In your reports, there is no mention of these events which,

8 according to this document, took place on the 23rd the 26th of June,

9 1995.

10 A. Okay. Let us familiarise ourselves with the issues at hand here.

11 These activities occurred outside the enclave, it's written here, on the

12 BSA side. The BSA never complained to us about such activities; hence, we

13 did not know that it had occurred. Obviously, if the Muslims carried out

14 these activities, they could not tell us that, "We have carried out these

15 activities." The same as if the Bosnian Serbs were to carry out any

16 military activities, they would not tell us that, "We carried out these

17 military activities."

18 But the aggrieved or the ones that had been hit would have told us

19 definitely that, "We have been here by these people. We are complaining.

20 Why are they doing this to us?" Then we would go there to investigate and

21 report on the same.

22 So in this case, if the BSA were hit by the Muslims, really, they

23 did not report to us. They never complained, and so we could not have

24 known about it, and we never reported on it. But if we could have heard

25 maybe the firing, because we could see 20 or 30 kilometres deep into the

Page 19410

1 BSA side, that is far deep inside. Even if we were in Srebrenica town

2 itself or even if we could have been patrolling nearby, about 20, 30

3 kilometres inside, definitely we could not have heard and we could not

4 have known unless told about it from the other side. No one complained

5 and no one told us about it.

6 Q. Yes. Since we have only two minutes left, let me see if I

7 understood your answer correctly.

8 Concerning these incidents in which a great number of Serb

9 soldiers were killed and during which sabotage groups from Srebrenica and

10 Zepa penetrated deeply into the Serb-held territory, well, you were not

11 informed of any of these events and that is why we do not find them in any

12 of your reports? Am I understanding this correctly?

13 A. Please add the following to what you've said, in that we were not

14 patrolling the BSA side. Our main AOR was inside the enclave. Anything

15 happening deep inside the BSA-held territory, unless reported to us by the

16 BSA, really, we had no control and we could not go there to see. So if

17 you add that to what you've already said, I agree that is my answer.

18 Q. I understand. In any case, if an attack was carried out from

19 within the enclave by ABiH members who were inside the enclave, if such an

20 attack had happened, you would have been obliged to report on it?

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.

22 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I think we truly have exhausted this

23 area of questioning.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: I think so. The line "what if," Mr. Lazarevic, has

25 been, "What came to our knowledge is in this report. What couldn't come

Page 19411

1 to our knowledge, we couldn't report." This keeps on being repeated.

2 I think we can adjourn for today. We'll continue tomorrow at 9.00

3 in the morning.

4 Thank you, Colonel. Thank you, Mr. Lazarevic and Mr. Thayer.

5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

6 to be reconvened on Friday, the 11th day of

7 January, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.