1 Monday, 2 June 2008.
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, everybody. And to you
6 Madam Registrar, if you would call the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
8 everyone in the courtroom. This is IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus
9 Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. For the record, all the accused are
12 Amongst the Defence teams I notice the absence of Mr. Ostojic and
13 is Mr. Sarapa here or not? No. He is absent too. Mr. Petrusic is here.
14 For the Prosecution it's Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Vanderpuye.
15 So, welcome back.
16 We do have a lot of issues that we could raise but we have every
17 intention to proceed with as much celerity as possible and necessary
18 break these down into parts. Today we'll deal with those which are more
19 urgent and more relevant to this and the next couple of sittings.
20 May we remind you, with some emphasis, to your obligations
21 pursuant to our order concerning the presentation of evidence and the
22 conduct of parties during the Defence cases which we issued on the 26th
23 of May? Pursuant to paragraph 3(A) of that order, within seven days of
24 the provision of the list of witnesses for June by the Popovic team, the
25 Prosecution and the remaining Defence teams were obliged to provide an
1 estimate of the total time expected to be taken cross-examining each
2 witness. Now, it seems that not everyone has grasped the idea and also
3 the procedure that needs to be followed. Some of you have sent an e-mail
4 to the Senior Legal Officer, Prosecution provided provisional time
5 estimate for cross-examination. Other have just informed the Senior
6 Legal Officer without an indication of even whether the Prosecution was
7 being informed and Mr. Zivanovic was being informed, so we would like
8 you, please, to follow the following procedure.
9 Your position needs to be communicated formally by means of a
10 filing. That's how we would like you to do it. At the end of the day
11 between sending an e-mail to the Senior Legal Officer and making a proper
12 filing, there isn't much difference. But it would enable us to make sure
13 that everyone is properly informed.
14 Again, paragraph 3(B) of the order states that by 5 p.m. on
15 Friday of each week during the Defence case, the Prosecution and the
16 remaining Defence teams shall provide the Trial Chamber and other parties
17 with an estimate of total time to be expected to be taken cross-examining
18 each witness. Now, the Prosecution filed a notice in time giving its
19 estimate and the Nikolic and Miletic teams sent e-mails.
20 Borovcanin and Gvero filed theirs on Sunday, which was beyond the
21 time limit. Please, again, we are not -- we don't intend to make a
22 mountain out of this mole hill but please stick to the timeframes that we
23 have indicated and if possible use the form of filing.
24 There is -- I move on to a motion from Mr. Zivanovic, which I
25 will refer to as the Popovic Defence team Rule 92 bis motion. We are
1 going to rule on this orally now.
2 On the 19th of May 2008, the Popovic Defence team filed a
3 confidential motion for admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis in
4 which he proposed to admit the statements of six witnesses without
5 cross-examination. That motion appears to have been modified according
6 to the Trial Chamber by Mr. Zivanovic's subsequent filing of a notice
7 concerning the witnesses schedule and the estimated time for their
8 examination on the 23rd of May 2008. In the notice, the Popovic Defence
9 team notes that one of the six witnesses, Danilvic -- Danojlovic will
10 testify as a viva voce witness for Pandurevic. Popovic also states that
11 he will move to convert another of the witnesses, that is Vukicevic to
12 viva voce status based upon the Prosecution's initial opposition. The
13 Popovic Defence team also appears to indicate that he will call another
14 of these witnesses, that is Witness Ilic, for viva voce testimony. In
15 its response, which was filed on the 28th of May 2008, the Prosecution
16 did not oppose the admission of any of the six statements. It does,
17 however, note that it wishes to cross-examine both Ilic and Danojlovic
18 and that it does not wish to cross-examine witness Vukicevic. The Trial
19 Chamber construes the Popovic Defence team motion and his subsequent
20 notice as withdrawing his Rule 92 bis requests to admit the statements of
21 witnesses Danojlovic and Ilic. As to the remaining four witnesses, at
22 issue in the motion, the Prosecution does not oppose the admission of
23 their statements and does not seek to cross-examine any of them. The
24 Trial Chamber has reviewed the statements and has determined that each is
25 appropriate for admission without cross-examination pursuant to Rule 92
1 bis. Accordingly, the statements of witnesses Vukicevic, Jusufovic,
2 Mazibrada, and Vlaisavljevic are provisionally admitted without
3 cross-examination pending their receipt in a form that fully complies
4 with the requirement of Rule 92 bis(B). Is that clear to you,
5 Mr. Zivanovic? You need to follow this formality before they can
6 actually be admitted.
7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, it is, thank you, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: So, we have cleared that as well.
9 Now, there was -- Mr. Haynes and Mr. McCloskey, accused
10 Pandurevic filed a motion on the 26th of May 2008, to amend his 65 ter
11 list by adding one document. Then subsequently three days later, on the
12 29th of May, Popovic's Defence team filed a similar motion, namely to
13 amend his Rule 65 ter exhibit list with five exhibits pertaining to
14 Witness that I'm not going to mention here.
15 My understanding and the information that the Trial Chamber has
16 received based on the information that the Trial Chamber has received, is
17 that the opposition does not oppose these two motions. I just want a
18 confirmation of that following which we'll proceed with granting the two
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's correct, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you and I ask you for the record, not
22 because I wanted to verify.
23 Having heard you, Mr. McCloskey, we grant both motions
24 considering that there are justified and no opposition is forthcoming
25 from the Prosecution.
1 Now, when we had the Pre-Defence Conference, you will recall that
2 we had discussed at some length a problem, an issue, pending between the
3 Prosecution and the Popovic Defence team about whether the Popovic
4 Defence team had provided the Prosecution with proper adequate 65 ter
5 witness summaries. I am informed, and again you will need to confirm
6 this to me, that an agreement has been reached and that the Prosecution
7 has no further reason to uphold or continue with their objection or with
8 their presentation to the Trial Chamber. Is that correct, Mr. McCloskey?
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President, we have no further objection.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: And I'm assuming then that you are going to
11 formally withdraw this motion. You can withdraw it orally here if you
12 want to.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I'll -- I withdraw that at this time.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. I think we have covered what
15 is -- what was more urgent for the purpose of this sitting.
16 I will soon be proceeding with the admission of the first
17 witness, but I take it, Mr. Zivanovic, that you want to address the
18 Chamber before that and I also see -- one moment, because Ms. Fauveau is
19 quicker than both of us. Yes. Madam Fauveau?
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.
21 I would just like to tell you that I informed my colleague,
22 Mr. Zivanovic, that I had a very brief intervention before he starts. I
23 would like to talk about the order regarding the order of the
24 cross-examinations so I would like to ask you before the first witness
25 begins to testify, I would like you to clarify a point in this order.
1 According to the order, the parties who have already cross-examined a
2 witness may have a redirect when a new topic is raised during the
3 examination-in-chief led by the Prosecutor. The clarification that I
4 would like to ask you to make is the following: The Defence, after the
5 examination-in-chief of the Defence, says that they have no questions and
6 if during the cross-examination of the Prosecutor a particular issue
7 is -- arises, would the Defence have the right to put additional
8 questions after the cross-examination of the Prosecutor even if they had
9 not cross-examined previously the witness?
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. We are not going to provide you with a
12 general rule applicable throughout the entire trial. We'll entertain
13 such requests if and when they arise, and they will be decided on whether
14 it's in the interest of justice to grant or not to grant. That's the
16 So Mr. Zivanovic, you asked some weeks ago to -- for an
17 opportunity to make an opening statement, which you have now. Please go
18 ahead. After that, we'll bring your first witness. Thank you.
19 [Accused Popovic Defence Opening Statement]
20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours. Good morning, Your
21 Honours. The Defence team of Vujadin Popovic is in the unique position
22 to begin presentation of its case, uncertain that the Prosecution has
23 ended the presentation --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please read slower.
25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Such position requires corresponding opening
2 In the first place, although we have got the green light to
3 appeal the decision to reopen the Prosecution case, I'm going to state in
4 the open court how it badly affected the Defence of my client. By doing
5 so, I do not intend to elaborate the factual and the legal arguments,
6 since it will be done in our appeal. But the interest of justice and the
7 right of my client for a fair trial compels me to summarise very briefly
8 serious impact on the right of my client to have a fair trial.
9 Five weeks after conclusion of its case, the Prosecution asked to
10 reopen it on the ground of new evidence on the events unrelated for the
11 acts from the indictment. It was done while the Defence was fully
12 engaged in preparation of its case and despite a relevance of such
13 evidence for preparation of our Defence, the Prosecution decided not to
14 disclose it for whole four weeks.
15 It seriously affected the right of my client to a fair trial in
16 two ways. First of all, our unawareness misled us not to direct our
17 attention toward new evidence, to rearrange our Defence strategy and find
18 corresponding evidence. Moreover, the Prosecution decided to disclose
19 this evidence not before our Defence submitted military expert report.
20 In the second place, unlike the other Defence teams, we had to
21 divide our attention in next three weeks between the preparation of our
22 Defence and challenging the motion to reopen the Prosecution case.
23 But despite of all mentioned disadvantages, we shall begin this
24 morning the presentation of our evidence. Due to uncertainty as to
25 reopening of the Prosecution case, I shall not address in this opening
1 statement acts and conduct of the accused, but only the crime base to the
2 extent that we dispute.
3 But before the listing these issues, I want to state clearly that
4 our defence does not deny the large but still unknown number of Muslim
5 men was executed after the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995. It was
6 apparently a serious crime punishable under both national and
7 international law.
8 However, we strongly deny that such crime amounts to genocide.
9 Similarly, we dispute the charge from paragraph 25 of the indictment,
10 that VRS and MUP forces murdered over 7.000 Muslim men and boys. Our
11 submission is that such allegations have been widely and unnecessarily
12 exaggerated to meet one of the requirements for genocide charge.
13 Therefore, in the course of our case, we shall bring several
14 experts who will challenge the findings of the Prosecution demography,
15 DNA and forensic expert witnesses.
16 Our Defence also denies that Srebrenica ever became a safe area
17 in the true sense of the term. We shall demonstrate that the decent
18 intent of United Nations Security Council to protect civilian population
19 from the war sufferings was perverted by decision of B and H authorities
20 to keep their its 6.000 people strong units. We shall prove that from
21 the onset of the Bosnian war until the very end of the enclave,
22 Srebrenica was the focal point of organised subversive activities against
23 both civilian and military targets on the territory of Republika Srpska.
24 We shall document that B and H authorities forbade Muslim
25 civilians to leave the enclave preventing and punishing all those who
1 attempted to do that. We shall prove that it was done both in order to
2 provide cover from potential retribution anticipated after attacks on
3 surrounding Serbian villages and to provide logistic by misappropriation
4 of humanitarian aid designated for the civilian population.
5 It is our submission that VRS had a full right to neutralise such
6 constant, two years long threat. Consequently, we submit that operation
7 Krivaja 95 was a legitimate military operation against enemy forces
8 undertaken just after all other means for disarming 28th Division were
10 We further submit that the movement of Muslim civilians displaced
11 in Potocari and disported to the B and H territory was a result of
12 explicit request made by civilians and conveyed to General Mladic by
13 DutchBat commander. Refusal of such request meant the prohibition to
14 civilians to leave the enclave and would be a serious crime against their
15 freedom of movement.
16 Accordingly, I strongly oppose to the language of the indictment
17 describing the acts in Potocari as separation of the Muslim men and boys
18 from their families. We have demonstrated that the ABiH soldiers,
19 disguised in civilian cloth, were mingled among the refugees in Potocari.
20 We shall document that the VRS had legitimate right to isolate and arrest
21 all suspected enemy soldiers, and they did it.
22 There is no arrest without separation of detained individuals
23 from those who remain free, including their families. The language of
24 the Prosecution avoids saying clearly that VRS arrested the Muslim men in
25 Potocari as suspected enemy soldiers, being aware of legitimacy of such
1 act. It, however, charges the accused with legitimate and unavoidable
2 consequence of such act, the separation of arrested people from those who
3 remained free. By stating this, I would like to emphasise that
4 subsequent maltreatments, abuses and executions of detainees were
5 completely illegal acts, punishable both under national and international
7 But their detention was legal.
8 Our Defence will also prove that all Muslim men in Srebrenica,
9 from 16 to 65 years of age, were eligible and mobilised into armed forces
10 according to the B and H laws. We shall argue that they left Srebrenica
11 on 11 July 1995 to Jaglici and Susnjari complying with the orders of
12 competent Srebrenica. In support of this submission I show the
13 inspection of the brigade from the 8th Operative Group carried out on the
14 second anniversary of the ABiH in May 1994.
15 This video depicts the unarmed Muslim men, all in civilian
16 clothes, arrayed in the various brigades of the 8th operation group of
17 ABiH. The video was obtained in the course of our investigation from the
18 association of the former camp inmates of Republika Srpska. It has not
19 been translated yet.
20 [Videotape played]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Is there anything wrong? I see. Okay. Do you
22 want to proceed with this? Because I think it makes very little sense
23 going through it as it is.
24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, we have a problem with sound, but the video
25 depicts those brigades consisting just of men in civilian clothes arrayed
1 and presented as a various brigade members.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. You will be producing this in due
4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, yes.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: However, despite of military character of the
7 column breaking through the territory held by VRS, it was not attacked
8 while past the first line of Srebrenica encirclement. At the time, it
9 clearly demonstrated the absence of an intent on the part of VRS to kill
10 all the Muslim men from the column and specific intent to commit genocide
11 in corroboration of this submission you will see the statement of B and H
12 Prime Minister, Hasan Muratovic in his speech on the session of the B and
13 H parliament held in August 1995, discussing the causes of the fall of
14 Srebrenica and Zepa. The whole session was recorded on two CDs, and I
15 will ask to play it from --
16 [Videotape played]
17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'm afraid we have again the problem with sound.
18 Excuse me, may we have a very short break for two or three minutes to
19 resolve this sound problem?
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Of course.
21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
22 [Defence counsel confer]
23 [Videotape played]
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Ready to go?
25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, yes, we are. We will go back to the
1 inspection of the 28th Division units.
2 [Videotape played]
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Since the audio is too
4 poor to interpret from, we are merely reading out the B/C/S transcript
5 provided by the Defence.
6 "The material strengthening of the military forces successful
7 fulfilment of tasks and functional duties in the war units as well as
8 exceptional results achieved by the war units, it all reflected upon the
9 strengthening of the morale. As regards the second anniversary of the
10 formation of the staff of the armed forces of Srebrenica, which is now
11 the command of the 8th operational group of Srebrenica as part of the 2nd
12 Corps of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina I commend the
13 following soldiers.
14 The command of the 283rd Light Brigade ready for inspection,
15 commander Halilovic, Huso, reporting."
16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We can stop here. Thank you. I would just like
17 the Trial Chamber to know that we provided the translation booth with
18 B/C/S text of these video clips. It was the inspection of 282 Brigade.
19 We have the similar clips but we'll not show it to save the Court time of
20 the other brigades from the 28th Division.
21 I hope we will be able to do that through testimony of our
22 investigator, Mr. Pero Mijatovic.
23 The next video clip is the statement of B and H Prime Minister,
24 Hasan Muratovic, in his speech on the session of B and H parliament held
25 in August 1995, discussing the causes of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa.
1 [Videotape played]
2 HE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The same situation applies
4 to this clip.
5 "Mr. Hasan Muratovic, Prime Minister, would like to speak.
6 Dear Mr. Chairman, MPs, ladies and gentlemen. Let me briefly
7 summarise a few things."
8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We have identified Mr. Muratovic and I would ask
9 to play the same video from 21 minutes, 47 seconds.
10 [Videotape played]
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The interpreters were not
12 provided with this part of the footage and the audio is too poor to
13 decipher the speech itself.
14 [Voiceover] "There is a question that should be clarified,
15 whether Mr. Akashi had agreement with Mladic that people from Srebrenica
16 should leave for Tuzla and that he would let them pass through. That
17 needs to be explored. It was carried by the western press on several
18 occasions and there were some theories coming from UN representatives
19 that the people from Srebrenica should be let to pass peacefully through
20 to Tuzla, therefore there are great chances that such an agreement
22 With some people from Srebrenica, I tried to talk about whether
23 they had been told about such a possibility. Since there is a fact in
24 existence and that is that our people were not shot at while they were
25 coming out of the first encirclement of Srebrenica."
1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Mr. Muratovic however corroborated another
2 submission of our Defence regarding intercept evidence. I would ask to
3 play the same video from 16 minutes 5 seconds.
4 [Videotape played]
5 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Our army possesses a lot of audio
6 tapes, tapes with executions on them, and about orders that the groups
7 breaking through to Tuzla should be killed. We also have an intercept in
8 which backhoe loaders and excavators were requested to dig mass graves."
9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you. This statement clearly corroborates
10 our submission that B and H authorities are in possession of
11 contemporaneous audio records of the intercept conversations. However,
12 they refused to hand over such materials to this Tribunal, to avoid
13 undermining of authenticity, reliabilities, and probative value of
14 intercepts introduced in this and previous Srebrenica-related cases.
15 We have challenged many conclusions by the Prosecution's military
16 expert, Richard Butler through a number of witnesses, exhibits and
17 testimony of our military -- and testimony of our military expert, we
18 shall prove his erroneous interpretation of evidence related to the
19 Srebrenica events in July 1995.
20 Finally, we found that the background of the Srebrenica events in
21 July 1995 is incomplete and misinterpreted. The first instance of such
22 misinterpretation is the six strategic objectives of the Serbian people
23 in B and H. We shall prove that it was nothing more than the plan made
24 by European Union and its representative Portugal diplomat Cutileiro
25 generously conceded to prevent the war in Bosnia. We shall prove that
1 those objectives were not criminal but incorporated in Dayton Peace
2 Agreement, document by which the war in Bosnia was ended.
3 It will be clarified through our first witness,
4 Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik. I'm aware that the background of the acts charged
5 in the indictment is not main subject of this case. However, such
6 information is very significant for comprehensive assessment of the
7 events from the indictment. Because of that, it requires short but fair
8 presentation of relevant background information. Accordingly, we shall
9 address this issue as briefly as possible, not going into unnecessary
10 analysis, polemics and details. I decided to present our view on the
11 matters through short video clips from a number of DVDs from our exhibit
12 list. I will not present this morning all these videos in their entirety
13 in order to save the Court time. However all this video will be tendered
14 into evidence. In presentation of the background, I submit that causes
15 of the war in Bosnia could not be neglected.
16 This complex and sensitive issue is summarised in the best way in
17 the following clips from our exhibits from video, "The war which could be
18 avoided." The film was divided in 32 chapters, each of them depicting
19 the stage of war in former Yugoslavia. It explores the causes of war,
20 the responsibility of main actors and contains the statements of many
21 diplomats, politicians, journalists and military officers from United
22 States, United Kingdom, Germany and former Yugoslavia. All details on
23 authors of the film could be seen at the end of any chapter.
24 Unfortunately, I'm just informed that the clips are not the same when
25 presented at this video from this place, so I'm afraid we will not be
1 able to show them right now.
2 If the Trial Chamber let us, we will do that after some break,
3 after break.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you wish to have a break now?
5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, Your Honours, thank you.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE AGIUS: We have a logistical problem in that we had planned
9 other things precisely to coincide with the break taking place at 10.30
10 which we can't move now because it's too late. So we have a commitment
11 at 10.30. How much time do you require to fix this thing?
12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I hope 10 to 15 minutes.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll have a 10 to 15 minutes now so that you fix
14 it, then we will continue, stop at 10.30 and then try to recover as much
15 ground as we can as we go along, okay?
16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.
17 --- Break taken at 9.53 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 10.08 a.m.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, have you sorted out your technical
21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, I resolved them, and I apologise to the
23 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't need to apologise. These things happen,
25 Yes, I recognise Mr. Nicholls.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Morning, Your Honour, sorry to interrupt, I just
2 noticed Mr. Haynes isn't here. I don't know if Your Honours noticed
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Haynes is absent and in the meantime, I
5 also wanted put on record that during the first part of the session,
6 Mr. Mitchell, Christopher Mitchell, for the Prosecution also turned up.
7 Let's proceed.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Because Mr. Sarapa is absent too today,
10 unfortunately. All right. Mr. Pandurevic, we have a problem. Do you
11 insist on your client's -- on your lawyer's presence?
12 THE ACCUSED PANDUREVIC: [Interpretation] No, sir.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. Let's go ahead. Yes,
14 Mr. Zivanovic?
15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: The video clips we shall see right now summarise
16 our view on the background of Srebrenica events from the indictment. The
17 first of it is the video of the war which could be avoided. We can play
18 this video from 13 minutes 5 seconds. The clip we shall see right now
19 presents a statements of the prominent British journalist, late
20 Ms. Nora Beloff and the former U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker.
21 [Videotape played]
22 " ... until there was an agreed arrangement it might take years
23 or decades or perhaps might be impossible. Until then it had to be
24 recognised these were the internationally recognised branches. If German
25 and Austrian leaders still believe that Slovenia and Croatia could be
1 separated from Yugoslavia without a wider war the Americans strongly
2 believed otherwise.
3 "Because we said if Yugoslavia does not break up peacefully,
4 there is going to be one hell of a civil war. It nevertheless broke up
5 non-peacefully, it broke up through the unilateral declaration of
6 independence by Slovenia and Croatia and the seizing by these two
7 country's republics of their border posts which was an act of force and
8 which was an act that was in violation of the Helsinki principles, but
9 the European powers and the United States ultimately recognised Slovenia
10 and then Croatia and then Bosnia as independent countries, and admitted
11 them to the United Nations. The real problem was that there was a
12 unilateral declaration of independence and a use of force to gain that
13 independence rather than a peaceful negotiation of independence which is
14 the way it should have happened."
15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We can stop here and we can move to 47, 16
16 seconds. It depicts the statements of the British diplomat,
17 Lord Carrington, who was also involved in search for political solution
18 of the Yugoslav crisis.
19 [Videotape played]
20 "This was a war that European leaders believed could have been
21 avoided. The Bosnian Serbs until comparatively recently had been in the
22 majority in Bosnia and then the Muslims who had a very much higher birth
23 rate than the Serbs became the predominant, the majority population and
24 this of course was something very hard for the Serbs to swallow and they
25 made it abundantly plain very early on that they were not prepared to
1 accept the situation in which there was an independent Bosnia under the
2 constitution which then prevailed and indeed under the constitution which
3 then prevailed it was illegal for Izetbegovic to declare independence
4 because any constitution framed in that magnitude had to be agreed by all
5 three parties.
6 "Privately --"
7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We can stop here. The next clip from the same
8 film is related to the Cutileiro Peace Plan for Bosnia. Please play from
9 50 minutes 55 seconds.
10 [Videotape played] " ... politics of diplomacy then
11 Secretary of State James Baker wrote that ambassador Zimmerman strongly
12 advised him to recognition of Bosnia. Recognition of Bosnia, however,
13 violated the most basic diplomatic norms. For a government to be
14 recognised it must be in full control of its territory, it must have
15 clearly established borders. It must also have a stable population. Not
16 a single one of these essential conditions existed in Bosnia in February
17 of 1992 when Zimmerman made his recommendations. US intelligence
18 analysts predicted that recognition would lead to war."
19 JUDGE AGIUS: For the record, Mr. Haynes has entered the
21 MR. HAYNES: I'd like to say sorry to the Court and to
22 Mr. Zivanovic, I'm very sorry.
23 [Videotape played]
24 " ... would be a serious mistake.
25 "We did some different opinions in early 1992, as the Americans
1 supported the recognition of Bosnia, whereas we, the Europeans, believed
2 that we should first establish a framework for the whole region.
3 "Basically the policymakers ignored the analysts and by late
4 January, early February, US policy had come around to the view that we
5 would recognise Bosnia and we wanted the Europeans to recognise Bosnia
6 along with us so from mid-February on we were pushing the Europeans hard
7 to recognise Bosnia and we were thinking about how we would do that and
8 have the US recognise Croatia and Slovenia at the same time.
9 With American support, recognition of the separate Bosnian state
10 was now inevitable. Lord Carrington tried to avert disaster by
11 appointing Portuguese president, Jose Cutileiro, to find common ground
12 between the Serbs Muslims and Croats before an independent Bosnia was
14 "I asked him to go to Sarajevo and Lisbon and have talks about
15 the three parties in Bosnia to see whether or not an agreement could
16 become -- could be reached. [Indiscernible] state, I mean a state, an
17 independent Bosnian state within some sort of federal idea
19 "The Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims all signed the pact known
20 as the Lisbon agreement on March 18th, 1992. This set up a central
21 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and three ethnic cantons on the model of
23 "It was the last chance, I think, to try and preserve Bosnia
24 before the war broke out in Ernest.
25 If the Lisbon plan had been adopted, British author and BBC
1 journalist, Misha Glenny, wrote later the war in Bosnia probably would
2 not have happened but two days after signing it following a meeting with
3 American ambassador are Warren Zimmerman, Izetbegovic changed his minds
4 and disavowed his signature.
5 "Izetbegovic turned around and reneged as he's reneged on other
7 "Zimmerman later acknowledged to David Binder of the New York
8 Times that Izetbegovic had reluctantly signed the agreement to gain
9 European recognition. More than a year after the blood shed began in
10 Bosnia, Zimmerman also admitted that the Lisbon plan was not bad at all
11 but recalls telling Izetbegovic if you don't like it, why sign it?
12 "Zimmerman told Izetbegovic look, why don't you wait and see what
13 the US can do for you meaning we will recognise you and then help you out
14 so don't go ahead with the Lisbon agreement, don't accept the Cutileiro
15 Plan and just hold out for some kind of unitary Bosnian state, so this is
16 a major turning point in our diplomatic efforts.
17 "The American administration made it quite clear that they
18 thought that the proposal of Cutileiro were unacceptable.
19 "With no agreement amongst the Muslims, Serbs and Croats and with
20 all sides mobilised for war, the European community voted as the US
21 insisted to recognise Bosnia on April 6th along with Slovenia and
22 Croatia. This act, Roger Cohen of the New York Times later wrote was as
23 close to criminal negligence as a diplomatic act could be. Indeed
24 international recognition and the outbreak of the Bosnian war were
25 simultaneous, the world put light to the fuse."
1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, we can stop here.
2 We shall also challenge the misinterpretation of the events in
3 the spring 1992, when the Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces
4 allegedly attacked and occupied cities, towns and villages including
5 Bijeljina and Zvornik.
6 The Prosecution disregarded the relevant fact that the Serbs in
7 Bosnia held the 70 per cent of B and H land as a legal private property.
8 I play the next clip corroborating this submission. These are well known
9 western journalists, their names could be found in previous sequences of
10 the film. I will take -- it will take less than a minute. Please play 1
11 hour 7 minutes 10 seconds.
12 [Videotape played]
13 " ... trying to create balance of what the Bosnians were doing at
14 the same time
15 "The press would have us believe that the Serbs have seized the
16 two-thirds of Bosnia. The fact is the Serbs had lived in that territory
17 for 1500 years and the fact is they are farmers, and they are spread all
18 over the landscape so they have always been on two-thirds of the
20 "The statement that has become an absolute shade that the Serbs
21 have taken over 70 per cent of Bosnia, again the underlying assumption is
22 that there were no Serbs in Bosnia before the conflict started when in
23 reality, much of the land of Bosnia was Serb land before the fighting
24 ever began. But the implication is that the Serbs dropped in from some
25 other planet and just took over nearly two-thirds of the country."
1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you. And the last clip from this video is
2 the good instance of untrue information with inflated casualties, from --
3 it is related to another east Bosnian enclave Gorazde, which was in the
4 area of responsibility of Drina Corps. Please play from 1 hour 43
5 minutes 50 seconds.
6 [Videotape played]
7 " ... Western Herzegovina. Two months after the Markale
8 Marketplace explosion, the Bosnian government would have its first
9 success in getting NATO to intervene against Bosnian Serb targets near
10 Gorazde. With help from an American military advisor, Muslim forces
11 launched attacks against six Serbian villages around Gorazde. When
12 Serbian forces responded, American television broadcasts portrayed
13 fighting around Gorazde as if it were an unprovoked attack on a safe
15 "The Serbs punished Gorazde throughout the day. At one stage,
16 shells were raining down at the rate of one every 20 seconds.
17 "Shells are now dropping at random into the city centre, the
18 hospital has taken direct hits on its roof.
19 "There was a dramatic transmission from a hand radio operator
20 supposedly based in Gorazde.
21 [Not interpreted]
22 "US president Bill Clinton and Bosnian government vice-president,
23 Ejup Ganic, urged UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali to
24 authorise air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. NATO airplanes did
25 indeed launch a limited air strike against Serbian targets. But further
1 air strikes were called off by commander Michael Rose, who realised that
2 Muslim forces had manipulated UN agencies with false casualty and damage
4 Instead of 2.000 people injured and 700 people killed, fewer than
5 200 people were injured. Instead of the hospital being destroyed, only
6 one shell had passed through the roof.
7 As he flew by helicopter into Gorazde following the fighting Rose
8 was asked about US satellite reports that nearly every house in Gorazde
9 was damaged.
10 "Yes, practically every house in Gorazde has been damaged, but
11 most of the damage to Gorazde was done in the fighting that had taken
12 place some two years before when the Bosnian government forces drove the
13 Serbs from this town and there were 12 and a half thousand Serbs at that
14 time living there and they were all driven off. The way to distinguish a
15 house that's been damaged by fighting where a shell has hit it and a
16 house that's been damaged by ethnic cleansing is if its got no roof, no
17 doors, no window frames, and nothing in the house at all and there are
18 burn marks up in and bullets spread around the walls. That is the house
19 that's been damaged by ethnic cleansing. A house that's been damaged by
20 shelling has a shell hole in it, and there are still people trying to
21 live in that building with their furniture because they've got no where
22 else to go. That's something you can't see from satellite. And of
23 course, at that time, the international image of what had happened in
24 Gorazde very different from the reality. What was dangerous was that
25 policies were going to be put together on both sides of the Atlantic,
1 about what we should do in Gorazde but these policies had been put
2 together on totally flawed information.
3 "According to respected British military analyst, Jonathan Eyal,
4 the ham radio operators whose live reports were carried on American
5 television networks were not even based in Gorazde."
6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you. However, it is my submission that
7 most important and real background of the events from the indictment are
8 atrocities perpetrated by Muslim forces in east Bosnia from the very on
9 set of the war in the early spring 1992 until early July 1995 when the
10 operation Krivaja was launched. We have gathered 25 videos illustrating
11 the crimes committed in villages around Srebrenica, Bratunac and
12 Vlasenica in order to illustrate it I'll play just a few clips although
13 we shall tender all of them into evidence through our investigator,
14 Mr. Pero Mijatovic, who provided them from the association of the former
15 camp inmates of Republika Srpska.
16 This material is not translated, so I tried to select the most
17 relevant parts where the picture speaks everything. Please play the
18 first one.
19 [Videotape played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "In addition to all the other
21 civilian casualties, the elderly and the women, two children have also
22 been killed. One was four and the other was nine or ten. They were
24 "What was their names? Dragan Visnjic and Dragana, his sister.
25 "How old were they? Dragan was four, and she was nine.
1 "Hold on, hold on, wait. What? My little child, there you go,
2 so that it holds like that. Her whole head is shattered."
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Okay. We can stop here.
4 The second video clip shows the burial in Vlasenica of the
5 victims murdered in late September 1992 in Cerska and Podravanje. This
6 video is the second of three CDs illustrating the aftermath of the
8 [Videotape played]
9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We can stop here, thank you. And the last --
10 sorry, and the last of the video clips is recorded in May 1995, just a
11 month before operation Krivaja 95 was launched. It depicts the massacre
12 committed during and after the attack on Rupovo Brdo on May the 7th,
14 [Videotape played]
15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We can stop here, thank you.
16 Thank you, Your Honours. We finished -- I have finished my
17 opening statement and the Defence is now ready to call its first witness,
18 Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik. Thank you.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I think before that we'll have the break. We will
20 reconvene in 25 minutes' time. Thank you.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: So, Mr. Zivanovic, first of all I wish to thank you
24 for having stuck to your estimated time for the statement, opening
25 statement. Your first witness is Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik?
1 [The witness entered court]
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, good morning to you, Mr. Krajisnik.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: You are -- you have been summoned as a Defence
5 witness by the Defence team for Mr. Popovic. You are aware of that?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm aware of that.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: So you are also familiar with our rules, one of
8 which requires that before you start giving evidence, you are expected to
9 make a solemn declaration to the effect that you will be testifying the
10 truth. Are you prepared to make that solemn declaration?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Registrar, if could you give him the text
13 and, Mr. Krajisnik, if you could read it out, please, and that will be
14 your solemn undertaking with us.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
16 speak the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
17 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Krajisnik. Please make yourself
20 comfortable. There are a few things that I need to explain to you.
21 Now, I take it that you have accepted to give evidence in this
22 case after having been duly approached and asked to give evidence. Is
23 that correct?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Now, it's common knowledge that you have stood
1 trial here, been found guilty and sentenced, and you have an appeal
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: There are two issues that arise out of that
5 straight away, that I need to discuss very briefly with you. I know that
6 in your proceedings, in your trial, and I think also in the appeal
7 proceedings, you have decided to conduct your own Defence. Do you
8 confirm that?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do indeed, yes.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: But these are different proceedings, in which you
11 are only involved as a witness. According to our rules you still have a
12 right to be assisted by counsel should you choose to ask for this or to
13 request this. Has this been explained to you?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It has been, yes.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: And have you asked to be assisted by counsel for
16 the purpose of today's testimony?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The registrar has offered me the
18 services of counsel, which I declined and decided to appear here without
19 a counsel.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So you are confirming to us now that
21 you don't require or you don't request the assistance of counsel?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: The next thing I wanted to alert you to is a right
24 that you have which is common to all witnesses here, and it applies to
25 you because, for all intents and purposes, your case is still pending
1 before the Appeals Chamber and your testimony here could potentially
2 prejudice your case before the Appeals Chamber. So I need to alert you
3 to a right that you have, to ask to be exempted from answering any
4 question that may be put to you which, rather than incriminating you,
5 could prejudice your appeal before the Appeals Chamber, but which could
6 also perhaps expose you to criminal proceedings which could be
7 incriminatory in your respect, in your regard. Now, in such instances,
8 irrespective of who is asking you this question, you have a right to ask
9 us, the Trial Chamber, to exempt you from answering such questions.
10 We -- this right is not absolute. We can choose to grant such an
11 exemption or we can choose to compel you to answer the question that is
12 put to you.
13 If we compel to you answer the question that is put to you, then
14 the consequence is that if in answering that question you're truthful,
15 whatever you say, and which could be incriminatory, will not be used
16 against you in future proceedings before this Tribunal or elsewhere.
17 Do you understand the import of this advisory that I am -- have
18 just explained?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do, Your Honour. Thank you
20 very much.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So there is one final thing that I need
22 to communicate to you.
23 You are currently in detention in the -- at the Detention Unit
24 that we have here in Scheveningen, and I understand that you are being
25 detained together with the accused in this trial.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, with two of them.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Two of them. We need to place, to put in place an
3 order for your segregation from these accused for the entire duration of
4 your testimony here, after which, of course, the segregation will stop.
5 So in these circumstances that you have confirmed, namely that you are
6 currently being detained together with some accused in this trial, on
7 behalf of the Trial Chamber, I am ordering that you be segregated from
8 them during the course of your testimony. In case you fail to understand
9 why, I will just explain to you that this is a standard procedure and it
10 is directed at minimizing any risk of interactions that might have an
11 effect on the reliability of a witness's testimony. So you understand
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do, but I would like to inform
14 you about one thing, if you will allow me.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, of course, Mr. Krajisnik. Go ahead.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The deputy head of the Detention
17 Unit, Mr. Fraser, invited me on Thursday or Friday, I don't remember what
18 day, to come to see him and ordered me to segregate myself from Mr. Beara
19 and Mr. Borovcanin, and he established a regime. I spend all my days in
20 my room whereas they are in their own rooms or in the common room, so we
21 don't have any contact with each other, when we go for walks we never
22 went together. I promised that I would obey the regime and they have
23 done the same. He told me that he had already received an order to that
24 effect from your Trial Chamber.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: The order hadn't been communicated. Of course,
1 there were discussions and we wanted to know whether you were being
2 detained with others or whether there was any segregation in place
3 already as sometimes there is, and we also made clear that this would be
4 forthcoming so that the Detention Unit commander or deputy commander
5 would have advance notice of this and take the -- make the necessary
6 preparations but that's about it.
7 Anyway, the position is what it is. You're expected to last here
8 giving evidence for a few days. I think we've come to the stage when
9 Mr. Zivanovic can start.
10 Mr. Zivanovic, please go ahead.
11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.
13 Examination by Mr. Zivanovic:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Krajisnik.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. I would kindly ask you to tell us for the record or to confirm
17 your name. It is Momcilo Krajisnik, is it not?
18 A. Yes, I know that there has been to be a break between your
19 question and my answer and that's why I'm making a short pauses.
20 Q. You're correct there.
21 I would kindly ask you just briefly to give us your age and your
22 ethnic background?
23 A. I was born on the 28th of January 1945, and I'm a Serb.
24 Q. Could you please tell me about your educational background?
25 A. I have a degree in economics. I have a masters degree in
2 Q. And could you also tell us about your professional background?
3 A. I worked before the first multi-party election in a company
4 called Energoinvest. There was a member of the management board of one
5 of the daughter companies. After the multi-party elections in 1990, I
6 was elected a member of parliament and later on as the speaker of the
7 parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the war, and before the war as
8 well, from October 1991 until 1996, I was the speaker of the Assembly of
9 the Serbian People, i.e. of Republika Srpska. After the Dayton Accords,
10 I became a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After that,
11 for a year, I was in private business, and I've been here since 2000, a
12 detainee in Scheveningen.
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let me start by asking you one thing that
14 interests all of us here, something that would be the main topic of your
15 testimony here. First of all, do you remember that you were presiding
16 over a session of the Assembly of Republika Srpska that was held on the
17 12th of May 1992 in Banja Luka?
18 A. Yes, I do. I did.
19 Q. Do you remember that at that session, a debate was held on the
20 strategic goals of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
21 A. Yes, I remember that.
22 Q. Did you personally take the floor? Did you participate in the
24 A. I participated in the wording of the strategic goals before the
25 very session. During the session itself, I participated partly in the
1 discussion in order to summarise the debate and that was part of my
2 engagement within the framework of the debate on the strategic goals, on
3 the six strategic goals.
4 Q. At that time, which means on the 12th of May 1992, when this
5 session took place, had the armed conflicts already started in
7 A. Yes. Armed conflicts were already underway.
8 Q. Can you tell us briefly about the atmosphere at that session of
9 the National Assembly of Republika Srpska? What was the mood of the
10 assemblymen? What was their attitude towards their then political
12 A. This was the first assembly session after the beginning of the
13 war, or the armed conflict. I invited the assemblymen to Pale, but they
14 couldn't come because the territorial communications had been
15 interrupted. That's why we went to Belgrade, and from Belgrade we took a
16 plane to Banja Luka, and we held the session there. The session -- the
17 atmosphere was rather heated. Every assemblyman had brought the
18 impression from their own area, some people had members of family killed,
19 some lost their homes, some had been through ill-treatment. A lot of
20 families had been separated so the overall situation at the session was
21 very grave. And the assemblymen, to put it that way, were only prepared
22 to say no. They were against everything. Their attitude was negative.
23 They put up resistance to the danger that was imminent and to something
24 that was new to them which was war, that nobody had been aware of before
25 the war actually started.
1 Q. Let us go back to the development of the strategic goals that you
2 referred to a moments ago. Can you tell me what the basis for the
3 wording of the strategic goals was?
4 A. In late April, between the 27th of April and 2nd or 3rd May, I
5 can't recall the exact date now, a meeting was held as part of the
6 conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Lisbon, if I remember well. We
7 achieved certain things there, we corrected the situation on the map, and
8 some other matters, and we were quite optimistic that a settlement was
9 looming there. We were told that through bilateral contacts, we should
10 try and form an agreement on our respective views. After the conference,
11 we went to Pale. We also went to Herzegovina in an attempt to formulate
12 our next steps. On the 11th of May, a public announcement was made that
13 the conference would be stopped. At that point, we presented our view as
14 to the way in which the Serb delegates, the members of the Serb
15 delegation of Republika Srpska, would develop their position for the
16 negotiations. Through the six strategic goals, we defined all the views
17 that we had previously advocated and suggested in the negotiations.
18 These were some points that we believed we could achieve and upon which
19 we believed we had the agreement of the two other sides, the Croat and
20 Muslim, and the fourth party which was the international community.
21 This was the formulation of our positions. We acted upon the
22 suggestion that the Serb delegates, as representatives of the Serb
23 people, were not in tune with the sentiment of the people when
24 negotiating with the international community. This was a way of
25 informing the international community and the public at large about our
1 positions, since all the meetings and sessions we held were public.
2 Q. If my understanding is correct, the discussions about the
3 strategic goals held at the various sessions were public, in other words,
4 the members of the public could follow what was going on at the session
5 through direct broadcasts or press coverage?
6 A. Yes. All our sessions were public. The transcript of the
7 sessions indicate that many people were present who were not MPs. For
8 instance, I recall one Captain Galic having been presents there, and I'm
9 sure that there were others. It was also open to the public at large.
10 The room housing these sessions had a public gallery which was open to
11 anyone who wanted to follow what was going on.
12 Q. I will show you the minutes from that particular assembly
13 session. This is Prosecutor Exhibit P025. Do you recall this document
14 by glancing at its cover page, although we can go through all the others?
15 I believe you had an opportunity to look at the document during our
16 proofing session.
17 A. The minutes and the transcript of the session was something that
18 was known and discussed in my case too.
19 Q. Do you recall who was it who spoke about these goals, who
20 explained the goals to those present at the session?
21 A. As part of the report on the current situation, Mr. Karadzic
22 explained the six strategic goals to the MPs present.
23 Q. To refresh your memory, I will read out part of the minutes from
24 the session held on the 12th of May 1992. That's page 12 in e-court.
25 And you will have occasion to see what it's all about. That's the last
1 paragraph. And it reads?
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We don't have the
4 Q. The Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency the
5 government the council for national security we formed have adopted
6 strategic objective priorities of the Serb people or rather the strategic
7 goals of the Serb people, the first of which is the separation from the
8 other two ethnic communities, separation of the state.
9 Can you please clarify what sort of separation is referred to
10 here in respect of the -- or in relation to the other two ethnic
12 A. This strategic goal was a demand that we had reformulated, and
13 this was the position of the international community that within
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, we were able to have our own constituent unit which
15 we could style as a state or any sort of unit. In order to set it up as
16 a constituent unit, the Cutileiro Plan laid out the way in which it was
17 to be done, by separating into different entities along an ethnic
18 principle, where individual municipalities would be separated into
19 separate constituent units and this would have been the way of achieving
20 this goal.
21 Q. The separation of the three ethnic communities, was it part and
22 parcel of the Cutileiro Plan?
23 A. These strategic goals were, in fact, reformulated Cutileiro
24 principles which we believed we could achieve through negotiations, along
25 with all the other aspects upon which we had the consensus of both the
1 international community, on the one hand, and the Croat and Muslim sides
2 on the other.
3 Q. Thank you. Let me show you one other document, and ask you
4 whether this is another part of Cutileiro Plan. This is Exhibit 1D1156.
5 The first paragraph or chapter of the document under A reads that
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a state composed of three constituent units
7 based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic
8 and other criteria.
9 Do you recognise these principles from the Cutileiro Plan?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. Can we now turn to the next page, or, rather, page 3 of the
12 document where, under E, the following is stated, and this is true for
13 both of the versions, that a working group will be established in order
14 to define the territory of the constituent units based on national
15 principles, and taking into account economic, geographical and other
17 Do you recall this other principle from the Cutileiro Plan as
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. There is a map that goes with this plan, which indicates the
21 makeup of the population as it was in the previous years. I will not be
22 asking you about these -- the map, but did there exist a map that was
23 produced by representatives of the international community led by
24 Mr. Cutileiro?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Please look at Exhibit 1159. 1D1159.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Seems to be some problem with that because we can't
3 find it either.
4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps the map can be placed on
5 the ELMO and the witness can have a look at it.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: If it's readily available, I think that would be a
7 good suggestion, but for the future, check the reference number because
8 it doesn't seem to tally.
9 Yes, your question, Mr. Zivanovic?
10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. If you can see the map, can you please confirm for us that this
12 is indeed the map?
13 A. Yes. This is the map that was produced following the meeting in
14 early May 1992 and I'm referring to the meeting in Lisbon. I believe it
15 was held in Lisbon.
16 Q. Thank you. Can you please explain how this meeting came about,
17 or, rather, how this idea came about of negotiating with the help of the
18 European Community or, rather, its representative, Mr. Cutileiro?
19 A. Once the referendum on independence was scheduled in Bosnia,
20 which was in late January 1992, we received an initiative document to the
21 effect that a representative of the international community would come
22 with a proposal that would form a compromise between our option, whereby
23 we wanted -- we, I mean the Serb side -- to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 within Yugoslavia, and the option espoused by the Muslim and Croat sides,
25 whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina should become a state independent of
1 Yugoslavia. They were testing us to see whether we were prepared to have
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina recognised as an independent country and having
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina cantonalized where we would have our own cantons or
4 regions. We were told that the principle would be the majority of
5 different ethnic groups in different parts of the country. The first
6 mediator in that effort was the leadership of Serbia, specifically
7 Mr. Milosevic. Later on, Mr. Cutileiro also showed up and presented
8 these principles and that was how the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina
9 commenced at the time.
10 Q. Before the commencement of the conference, was a plebiscite held
11 at which the Serb people were given an opportunity to state whether they
12 wanted an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina or some other alternative?
13 A. Yes. It was held.
14 Q. Can you tell us briefly what the upshot of that was?
15 A. By absolute majority, over 90 per cent of the population, of the
16 Serb population, and this included also a small percentage of Bosnians,
17 Muslims, that's to say and Croats, and a small percentage of those who
18 declared themselves to be Yugoslavs, these members of the population
19 opted to stay within Yugoslavia.
20 Q. Did I understand correctly that consenting to the Cutileiro Plan
21 would mean giving up the decision or the results of the plebiscite?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. It was a significant concession that the Serbian side made at
24 that time?
25 A. That is correct, and I wish to explain, if I may.
1 Q. Please do so.
2 A. On the 15th of October, against the constitution, the Muslim and
3 Croatian side came up with a memorandum establishing a platform
4 concerning the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian MPs vetoed
5 it, and we were told then that we did not have the right to refuse an
6 independent Bosnia on behalf of the Serbian people because the other side
7 claimed that the Serbian people were divided and that there were many of
8 them who were in favour of the independent Bosnia. We organised a
9 referendum in order to establish how and what it is that the Serbian
10 people want and whether they wanted a decision they had adopted. It was
11 done in order to feel the pulse of the people. When we said that we
12 would accept independent Bosnia, but regionalized, we wanted to offer a
13 compromise solution which, again, required a referendum on the part of
14 all citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Serbian people. We
15 would not -- we did not play it upon the Serbian people, so to say, but
16 our wish was to feel the pulse of the public. When I say, "We," I meant
17 the negotiating team. We were told either you accept a compromise or you
18 lose everything, and we were in favour of a compromise. We stood by
19 those principles throughout the negotiations, until the very end.
20 Q. According to the Cutileiro Plan and according to the strategic
21 goals you set up, was it envisaged that within those predominantly
22 ethnic -- uni-ethnic entities there would be space for people of other
23 ethnic backgrounds?
24 A. Certainly. In no way did we strive for any movements of
25 population. That was completely excluded.
1 Q. I wanted to read to you the third strategic goal. I will not go
2 through all six of them since they are not overly relevant for the case
3 here. However, I would move to the third goal now. It reads, "The third
4 strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the Drina River valley, that
5 is eliminate the Drina as a border separating the two worlds." Please
6 clarify the third strategic goal, given that there is a mention of the
7 Drina River valley and a corridor there as well as the border between the
8 two worlds. Firstly, please explain whether the corridor and the borders
9 referred to were two separate issues or one and the same?
10 A. Before the international community was included in early 1992, we
11 had had frequent contacts of the three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I
12 represented Bosnia and Herzegovina in the negotiating team when
13 negotiating with Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and other republics. During
14 those negotiations with the Muslim side, we put forth our reasons as to
15 why we cannot accept an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina and us being
16 separated from our home land, that is Serbia, and why it is that we
17 cannot accept that a proper, so to say, border be set up along the Drina.
18 There was the same position that the Croatian side had. As was confirmed
19 later, a solution came up, put forth by the Muslim side. They said, "We
20 don't have to have a border with border posts and requiring people to
21 move about with passports. Those borders have to be permeable, for
22 example if one wants to go from Bosnia to Serbia, one shouldn't need a
23 passport." And that applied to Croatia as well. Mr. Izetbegovic during
24 the first congress of his party, stated that clearly.
25 I think it was in December 1991, when he said no matter what the
1 solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina is going to be, there will be no border
2 at the Drina River, it will not require having a passport. And in that
3 way, that represented a relief, psychologically speaking, to our side.
4 As you will see in the negotiations and in the Dayton agreements as well
5 as the Cutileiro Plan, special links were envisaged between the entity of
6 Republika Srpska with the other so-called neighbouring states. Of
7 course, the federation enjoyed the equal status. That was primarily upon
8 our request although the Muslim side was to use it as well because there
9 were Muslims in Serbia as well as the Croatian side in Bosnia because the
10 neighbouring state of Croatia was nearby. That was the reason why we
11 inserted this goal as such.
12 As for the corridor, if you study Mr. Karadzic's presentation or
13 his speech, he said, "We can now see enclaves in the eastern part of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the corridor is there to link up our different
15 territories. As one of our priorities we stated that we wanted links
16 among the different parts of our constituent unit. Mr. Cutileiro said
17 the following: These are the principles and as for the corridors and the
18 rest, you have the right to agree on them with the other side, even if it
19 requires an exchange of territory. That is why we introduced a corridor
20 between the southernmost part of our ethnic territories which is southern
21 Herzegovina and Romanija as well as Semberija and this includes the other
22 corridor which however was not part of your question.
23 Q. You mentioned that it was Mr. Alija Izetbegovic's idea. Please
24 have a look at Exhibit 1105. It is 1D1105.
25 This is Mr. Izetbegovic's speech during the first congress of his
1 party, the Party of Democratic Action. Please have a look at page 2, its
2 ultimate paragraph.
3 Mr. Izetbegovic says --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the
5 official translation.
6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. "In such a situation, a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina in a free
8 community of nations is the only guarantee of dignified and free -- of a
9 dignified and free life, not only for the Muslim people but for the Serbs
10 and Croats as well. Given the ethnic makeup, such a Bosnia-Herzegovina
11 needs to develop special relations on both -- with both Serbia and
12 Croatia. Irrespectively of their mutual links, that is the links between
13 those two independent states. We believe that needs to be resolved, the
14 Serbs should not have a feeling that they are divided from Serbia with a
15 state border. The same applies for Croatians. Therefore, no passports
16 for the Serbs along the Drina or the Croats along the Una River."
17 Does this sentence accurately reflect what Mr. Izetbegovic said
18 concerning the future borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
19 A. Mr. Izetbegovic fairly stated what he had stated during the
20 negotiations. This is correct.
21 Q. Let us go back again to the principles of the Cutileiro Plan. It
22 is 1D1156. We've already seen that. Page 2. Page 2, please. In both
23 versions, in the English it spills over to page 3. It is chapter D.
24 Have a look at the last sentence. It reads, "A constituent unit may
25 establish and preserve links with other republics and states provided
1 that they are in keeping with inviolability of Bosnia-Herzegovina as
2 such." Does this correspond to the Cutileiro Plan principles?
3 A. Yes, and they were later termed special parallel links or
5 Q. The sentences we quoted from Mr. Izetbegovic's speech, as well as
6 this particular sentence taken out of the outlines of the plan concerning
7 the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the same thing that you
8 envisaged as part of one of your strategic goals of the Serbian people?
9 A. Yes. However, in the goals, it was reformulated.
10 Q. But the essence of it is the same?
11 A. Yes, it is.
12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] If I may have a moment?
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I read the entire minutes of the assembly session
14 of the 12th of May 1992. However, I did not see any mention of any
15 decision being adopted according to the strategic goals. I did not see
16 that there was a vote of acceptance or anything of that sort. Can you
17 tell me whether a decision was made at the session, a formal legally
18 binding decision, or not?
19 A. There was no decision made and there was no vote on the strategic
21 Q. Was it because the presentation of the strategic goals was there
22 merely to acquaint the MPs with --
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Nicholls?
24 MR. NICHOLLS: I've been holding back but there has been several
25 leading questions and now I'm going to start to object.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So you're put on notice Mr. Zivanovic,
2 and you need to adjust your style of questioning accordingly. Thank you.
3 Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Can you explain what were the reasons that no decision was made
6 concerning the strategic goals?
7 A. The strategic goals were there as a type of information, the goal
8 of which to acquaint the MPs with what the delegation's position was at
9 the negotiations. It could have happened that there was a vote on the
10 objectives because that was the first session, and we were under a lot of
11 pressure and the agenda was extensive. However, it did not happen
12 because it wasn't our goal to oblige anyone by adopting any decisions.
13 Our goal was to continue with the negotiations.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I had occasion to see, and I showed to you, an
15 Official Gazette of Republika Srpska. It's edition of the 26th of
16 November 1993, in which the strategic goals were published in the form of
17 a decision. Please explain how that came about.
18 A. I can respond in two ways, depending on the decision of the
19 Appeals Chamber -- sorry, Trial Chamber, because I keep having the
20 Appeals Chamber in mind.
21 I can tell you what I recall, and I can tell you what is it that
22 I found out during my appeal proceedings, and something I discovered by
23 chance since our last meeting on Friday. It has to do with the
24 publication of this decision. And I can now tell you what it is that I
25 recall and it is up to you whether you wish to hear the other two pieces
1 of information, because these represent two missing links in a chain of
2 which I wasn't aware at the time of my testimony.
3 I recalled what was happening with the strategic goals up until
4 the session. I know why we presented them. However, I had no knowledge
5 of them being published. I had forgotten that, and only when I reviewed
6 the documentation here, I conducted different investigations and I came
7 up with certain results. This is what I recall, and this was part of my
8 testimony. When testifying in my case, I based it on that. I testified
9 on what I remembered, and I was unable to view the whole background and
10 the situation. This is what I can recall off the cuff. I never, at the
11 time, knew that the strategic goals had been published. I may have
12 forgotten, but it is only now that I'm filling in the gaps in my memory.
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm not going to insist on you belabouring your
14 answer with that respect. However, we heard an explanation here --
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Nicholls?
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry to interrupt, just to clarify, if I can i
17 I'm not sure it's clear from the answer, what time the witness was
18 referring to when he said, "I never at that time knew that the strategic
19 goals had been published." Is that a reference to the time he testified
20 in his trial which was the way it appears.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you understand -- Mr. Krajisnik, do you
22 understand what Mr. Nicholls' concern is? Yes? Can you enlighten us on
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I can remember, if my
25 memory serves me correctly, up to the moment when I arrived here in the
1 Detention Unit, I don't remember ever having been aware of the strategic
2 goals being published. Let me put it this way: I did not have them
3 available to me because I was not aware of them. I only knew that they
4 were discussed at the assembly meeting, and I knew that they were never
5 voted upon. This is what I meant when I provided my answer to
6 Mr. Zivanovic.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Yes, does that satisfy your concern?
8 Yeah, okay. Mr. Zivanovic?
9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we've had a witness here, actually an expert
11 witness, who told us that the strategic goals had not been published for
12 a long time because they would have revealed a criminal act, that that's
13 the reason why these goals were not published in the Official Gazette.
14 A. That's not correct.
15 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, one moment, stop, stop. Yes, Mr. Nicholls?
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we have the reference, please?
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Mr. Zivanovic? Who were you referring to.
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It was in one part of testimony of Mr. Butler.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Butler. I imagined so but --
21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I cannot say right now what the part of his
23 JUDGE AGIUS: This isn't how it shouldn't be. If you're prepared
24 all the time to give a specific reference if you're referring to a
25 particular part of someone else's testimony. Yes.
1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I just got the pages.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is page 19672 until 675 -- 674.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Nicholls?
5 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: I take it you will check while we proceed. Yes,
7 Mr. Krajisnik, do you wish Mr. Zivanovic to repeat his question? Or do
8 you still have a memory of it?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember the question.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Then go ahead.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I answered that what the expert
12 witness said was not correct, and I can prove that by documents that I
13 have discovered in the meantime, since Friday, actually, on Saturday,
14 when I was preparing myself for this testimony, I came across some
15 documents, and I can show you how the decision was taken and why the
16 decision was only published on the 25th of November 1993. I can give you
17 the whole course of the process leading to the publication of the
19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Tell me, please, from the moment when the debate on the six
21 strategic goals took place at the National Assembly session in May 1992
22 and further on, did the political leadership of the Republika Srpska kept
23 on insisting on these goals in the negotiations with the other parties
24 and in the negotiations that were being carried out under the auspices of
25 the international community?
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Nicholls?
2 MR. NICHOLLS: Just again, it's a leading question.
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I don't believe so.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't believe so?
5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yeah.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE AGIUS: We have no doubt in our mind, not even the least
8 possible doubt, that of course this is a leading question, so please be
9 kind enough to rephrase it, Mr. Zivanovic.
10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, I'll do that, thank you.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, was the international community
12 ever informed about these strategic goals from 1992 onwards?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. When it comes to these strategic goals, were they the foundation
15 for striking some future deals and concluding some negotiations?
16 A. Some 15 minutes ago, I said that based on those principles, we
17 conducted all of our negotiations up to the Dayton Accords which means
18 that we advocated these goals and we insisted on these goals being
19 implemented during the negotiations because they were the reflection of
20 what had been agreed by the four sides at the beginning of 1992.
21 Q. And as for these strategic goals, were they incorporated and to
22 what extent in the Dayton Peace Accords?
23 A. As for the strategic goals that we advocated during the
24 negotiations, all we got was Republika Srpska and the corridors. We did
25 not get the part of Sarajevo that we had agreed upon. We did not get
1 access to the sea because the proposal that was adopted by the Dayton
2 Accords was not signed and was not attached to the final version of the
3 Dayton Accords. In my view, it was not the goal for them to be realised.
4 It was the goal to work on those and to achieve Republika Srpska and to
5 achieve an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, and to lay
6 down a foundation for independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, one moment, Mr. Nicholls?
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Don't wish to interrupt, Your Honour, but I found
9 the portion of the transcript my friend referred to. For the record what
10 Mr. Butler said, on page 19764 in answer to a question, answer: My
11 understanding is that while the actual strategic objectives were
12 articulated in May 1992 for whatever reason the government of Republika
13 Srpska did not decide to publish those in their own Official Gazette
14 until 1993. I don't know the exact reason why they elected to do that."
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Which does not really correspond with what you
16 suggested to the witness, Mr. Zivanovic.
17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'm sorry, I'll double check it. Sorry.
18 Anyway --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, let's go ahead. It corresponds more with
20 what the witness himself said. Yes, Mr. Zivanovic?
21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. I just wanted to ask you this: When it comes to the strategic
23 goal referring to the borders between the two worlds, as it is stated
24 therein, was that ever realised?
25 A. Well, if we got an internal border between Republika Srpska and
1 the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that was translated into us having
2 separated ourselves or ended up with a regionalization or cantonization.
3 This is the -- where the internal borders were drawn between
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.
5 Q. And what about the other borders that are referred to in
6 strategic goals as borders between the two world, in other words between
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the one side and Serbia and Croatia on the other
9 A. Well, this is the interpretation that we have mentioned and we
10 have seen which was articulated by Mr. Izetbegovic, and this is not to
11 have a feeling of borders between the two worlds, meaning between
12 Republika Srpska, i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia. However, he was
13 talking about the psychological border between the Serbs on the one side
14 of the Drina and the other side of the Drina because that was the problem
15 and that was the reason why special links were established.
16 Q. Can you please also tell me whether that goal has ever been
18 A. In Bosnia-Herzegovina today there are no passports to be flashed
19 at the Drina River. You can cross the Drina River with your personal ID.
20 There is a border, but you don't need a passport to cross that border.
21 It is well known that Bosnia-Herzegovina is on one bank, on the other
22 there is Serbia, and all the people can cross without any visa, without
23 any special requests, which is beneficial for both the citizens of Serbia
24 as well as for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this does
25 not apply only to Serbs but to all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
1 all citizens of Serbia and the same situation is on the Una, on the
2 border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia which means that all
3 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina can cross freely into Croatia which is
4 an independent site on the other bank of the river Una.
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik. That will be all. I have no further
6 questions for you.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Zivanovic.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. All right. I see Mr. Meek and Madam Fauveau
10 conversing. You both asked to cross-examine Mr. Krajisnik. I saw your
11 filing this morning, Mr. Meek. Who is going first?
12 MR. MEEK: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. At this
13 time we have no questions on cross-examination for this witness.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you, Mr. Meek.
15 Then let's go round. Madam Nikolic?
16 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours at
17 this moment I would kindly ask the Trial Chamber to allow us a 20-minute
18 break in order to consult with your clients because the information in
19 chief has been curtailed significantly.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Fair enough, Madam Nikolic. In the meantime,
21 before we break, can I have an indication as to who else wishes to
22 cross-examine? I know that you wish, Madam Fauveau, if you still wish to
23 cross-examine the witness?
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I have to consult my client,
25 Mr. President.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Fair enough. Let's have a -- would 25
2 minutes be enough for you? Madam Nikolic?
3 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] I think so, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. In the meantime, should we find
5 ourselves surprised a second time today, are you in a position to start
6 with your cross-examination, Mr. Nicholls?
7 MR. NICHOLLS: I am, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right, thank you. A 25-minute break.
9 --- Break taken at 12.12 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: So as you noticed, we have Judge Prost missing.
12 She is on official business and she will be away the rest of the sitting
13 today and also tomorrow. She'll be back with us on Wednesday, when we
14 will be sitting in the afternoon and not in the morning.
15 So that means we are sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis, okay?
16 Mr. Meek, you still don't wish to cross-examine this witness?
17 MR. MEEK: That's correct, Mr. President. At this time we have
18 no questions.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Madam Nikolic or Mr. Bourgon?
20 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President. I will have a very short
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Please go ahead.
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Bourgon:
24 MR. BOURGON:
25 Q. Good morning, Mr. Krajisnik.
1 A. Good afternoon.
2 Q. My name is Stephane Bourgon, and I am counsel in these
3 proceedings on behalf of Drago Nikolic. My cross-examination will be
4 rather short. I only have a couple of questions for you. The first one
5 being the following: Based on your testimony and the answers you gave to
6 my colleague, Mr. Zivanovic, it would appear to me that the Republika
7 Srpska government and assembly did everything that could possibly be done
8 in order to avoid the war in Bosnia. Would you agree with that?
9 A. Yes. My view is that you're right.
10 Q. And my second question, Mr. Krajisnik, is: Looking back at your
11 personal role and involvement as the president of the Republika Srpska
12 Assembly during the war in Bosnia, and I refer to the period from 1992 to
13 1996, what knowledge do you have, if any, of the existence of a policy
14 within the Republika Srpska government, and/or assembly, to get rid of
15 the Muslim or Croat population living in Bosnia?
16 A. No, there did not exist such a plan.
17 MR. BOURGON: Thank you very much, Mr. Krajisnik, I have no
18 further questions.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Bourgon.
20 Mr. Lazarevic?
21 MR. LAZAREVIC: As we already indicated, we will have no
22 cross-examination of Mr. Krajisnik.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: I just wanted to confirm that with you.
24 Madam Fauveau?
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Very briefly, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Please go ahead.
2 Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, you said a while ago, page 47,
4 that you could explain why the decision to publish the strategic
5 objectives had been taken only the 25th of November 1993. Could you
6 indeed tell us why this decision to publish these strategic objectives
7 was taken practically a year and a half after the assembly of 1992?
8 A. Could you please read out exactly what I said? Because I'm
9 afraid that it might have been mistranslated. I didn't say that I could
10 explain why the decision was taken at the time but why it was published
11 at the time.
12 Q. Indeed there is a problem of interpretation. This is precisely
13 the question I wanted to ask. Could you explain why the decision to
14 publish the strategic objectives was taken only in 1993?
15 A. I would like to refrain from correcting you. Rather I shall
16 explain what you're most probably interested in. I said that I could
17 explain the course of the events that I explained in my appeals brief and
18 what I was able to ascertain in the documents that I was perusing since
19 Friday. And I can tell you why there was this error committed in the
20 publication of the decision concerning the six strategic goals. If
21 you're interested I can explain that.
22 Q. Could you say briefly why this decision was published in November
24 A. Here is my answer. Before I came across the relevant documents,
25 I was not able to remember why it was published at a later date. What I
1 will say now has to do with the documents that I came by during my appeal
2 and it will be based on the documents that I was able to peruse whilst I
3 was preparing to testify for Mr. Zivanovic. First of all, on the 9th of
4 June 1992, at the session which was of a consultative character, the
5 following decision was taken: That the strategic goals and the map of
6 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina be published and that they be
7 sent to the international community. This was the penultimate item of
8 the agenda of the extended meeting of the Presidency. It can be easily
9 located, and I have the relevant minutes here with me.
10 After that, an enactment was developed, namely conclusions which
11 explicitly state what Mr. Karadzic stated at the meeting held on the 12th
12 of May 1992, or rather at the session held on that date. This differs
13 from the text of the decision as published later, and I have that
14 particular document as well. I had signed it.
15 Next, and this is something that I'm speculating about, it wasn't
16 clear whether it was decided whether it should be published in the
17 Official Gazette or whether it should simply be published provided to the
18 public. Somebody corrected the minutes in their own hand and this was
19 something that I was able to find out on Saturday. I can also explain
20 why it was that I only realised this last Saturday and not before. In
21 this way, the conclusions were formulated in the form in which the
22 decision was in fact published on the 25th of February 199-- 25th of
23 October 1993. The decision was ultimately typed out, but you can see
24 that at the very session, the decision did not state that the strategic
25 goals should be published in the Official Gazette. It was merely said
1 that it would be made public because one cannot publish the map in the
2 Official Gazette. That's why I gather that the intention was simply to
3 have the decision known in -- to the public rather than publish it in the
4 Official Gazette. Let me just give you an aside. Orders and binding
5 mandatory documentation is published in the Official Gazette. One would
6 not publish conclusions in the Official Gazette. For that reason, the
7 decision was not published in the Official Gazette. Now we come to the
8 year 1993.
9 We had it in the archives but it had not been published in the
10 Official Gazette. Next, in the month of October of 1993, a report on the
11 four years work of the assembly of the Republika Srpska was being
12 prepared. A lawyer came to my office, and he was describing to me the
13 events of the four years that would be included in the report and he came
14 across that decision. And he made a note in which he said the decision
15 was not registered anywhere in the Republika Srpska documentation or
16 signed. At that point, I must have signed the decision because it bears
17 my signature and it was forwarded for publication. This report, which
18 was published in October of 1993 makes reference to the fact that the
19 assembly had debated or adopted strategic goals, and I'm referring to the
20 assembly meeting of the 12th of May 1992. I have all the paper work that
21 I have referred to. I have it here. I can show it to you. Now, why did
22 I not give this to Mr. Zivanovic? I had not been aware of the
23 corrections or the minutes that were made while I was testifying. I only
24 learned about this during my appeal because my investigators gave me
25 numerous documents. The decision had been published in ten copies or
1 more, and enclosed with it was the transcript from the assembly meeting
2 complete with the two documents I mentioned, the two conclusions. It was
3 on the basis of these documents that I was able to make the necessary
4 links that I lacked, pointing to the reason why the decision was not
5 published in 1992 but rather in 1993. Now, on the 20th of June 1992, the
6 decision had gone through the protocol. It was entered into the protocol
7 book or the logbook, and we have that particular logbook dating back from
8 1992. All the documents were entered under the 12th of May whereas this
9 particular decision was entered into the logbook under the date of the
10 20th of July. This is the extent of the information I was able to come
11 by, and that I wished to convey to the Trial Chamber in order to try and
12 explain why the events took this course, and this is the extent of the
13 knowledge that I referred to while I was testifying a moment ago.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Merci, Madam. Mr. Krgovic.
15 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] We have no cross-examination of
16 this witness.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: I haven't seen the transcript as yet. All right.
18 Thank you. Mr. Haynes?
19 MR. HAYNES: No, thank you.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Which means, Mr. Nicholls.
21 Now, Mr. Zivanovic had estimated nine to ten -- actually nine
22 hours for the examination-in-chief of this witness, and -- but I have
23 also another document which says six hours. How long do you anticipate
24 your cross-examination will last or will take?
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours I anticipate I will go into tomorrow.
1 I'll have to go through the transcript tonight. I think I will be able
2 to cut it down somewhat, but I will, I think, have a few hours. There is
3 some new information here that I frankly don't completely understand.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: What do you mean by a few hours?
5 MR. NICHOLLS: I think I can do it probably in less than my
6 original estimate. Perhaps two sessions.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay but do you anticipate you will need the whole
8 of tomorrow?
9 MR. NICHOLLS: No.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: No. Which means you need to have your next witness
11 available tomorrow, Mr. Zivanovic.
12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I do.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Which means other colleagues are going to stand up
14 and say they are not yet prepared. Yes?
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this witness is very
16 important for the Defence of Popovic. He arrived only this morning. He
17 will have a session, a proofing session, and if we begin tomorrow, we
18 will have no possibility to have this witness before he begins. And
19 also, this is the same for other colleagues of the Defence. This puts us
20 in an impossible situation because we still haven't received the list of
22 JUDGE AGIUS: You're referring to Lazic, I take it? Your next
23 witness will be Miljenko Lazic or --
24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: That's correct.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: That's correct. So what's the problem with that,
1 Madam Fauveau?
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think there was a problem of
3 interpretation. It's also for Beara and Popovic Defence and Miletic, so
4 the Defence of Popovic will have an opportunity to have a proofing
5 session today with the witness, but the Beara Defence and Miletic Defence
6 will not have this possibility.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but we can't go on like this. That's why
8 when we had the Pre-Defence Conference I said, and I repeated it, I don't
9 know how many times, that you need to organise yourselves. We are not
10 here to waste time. Tomorrow we start with Lazic, and you will need to
11 tell us beforehand, Mr. Zivanovic, whether you will still intend to
12 utilise the 17.5 hours that you had indicated or whether you will do as
13 you did today, cut down from nine hours to one hour.
14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: 17.5 hours is time estimated for my examination
15 of my colleagues and cross-examination. My examination --
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Including everyone? Tomorrow you will start with
17 Lazic and then we will try to organise yourselves in a way which if you
18 need to go last you will go last and similarly if the Beara team needs
19 more time, we will make arrangements accordingly, but we start with Lazic
21 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we go into
22 closed session -- private session, previously, please.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Of course. Let's go into private session for a
24 short while.
25 [Private session]
18 [Open session]
19 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session, which also means basically,
20 ladies and gentlemen, that I need to repeat to you that we need to
21 organise ourselves or rather you need to organise yourselves accordingly.
22 We have our own problems. When this happens we have to liaise with our
23 staff because things or events drop on us and we have to react
24 accordingly. So as I take it, you may find yourself -- when I say you,
25 it could be whoever, I don't know who will be in charge of Lazic -- that
1 you may find yourself needing to cross-examine this witness even earlier
2 than you may have anticipated. Which then leads me to another problem.
3 On paper, we were looking at this week and a good part of next week
4 almost entirely devoted to Krajisnik and Lazic. It may well turn out to
5 be different. Don't bring us to the situation, Mr. Zivanovic, when we
6 approach one of the days towards the end of this week with no witnesses
7 here, present here, in The Hague to give evidence.
8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Your Honour, we bring our -- we do our best to
9 bring the next witnesses as soon as possible. Thank you.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Otherwise, I can guarantee you full
11 cooperation from the Trial Chamber, but don't put us in an impossible
12 position because we have responsibilities of our own and accountability
13 of our own. Yes, Mr. Nicholls, you can start your cross-examination.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: I just want to say very briefly Your Honours as
15 you recognised it can create problems for us as well in our scheduling
16 and so that if -- I also understand that estimates change but if we could
17 be informed as soon as possible that direct is going to be cut by 75 per
18 cent that would be helpful.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: And it would be helpful not only to you but -- and
20 to the other Defence teams, but definitely also to the Trial Chamber.
21 And our staff. Because we usually have detailed one member of the staff
22 to examine and report back to us on each witness that is anticipated.
23 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Nicholls:
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 Q. Sir, Mr. Bourgon briefly started talking about your role, the
2 role that you played, during the time that you were speaker of the
3 Republika Srpska Assembly. You remember that?
4 A. I do.
5 Q. And he asked you, I don't have it on my screen but to confirm
6 that it was never the purpose to, paraphrasing, chase other ethnicities
7 out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, correct?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Let's talk a little bit, briefly, about your role in that
10 conflict. You've been convicted in this building of crimes against
11 humanity, correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. You've been convicted of murder or extermination for
14 approximately 3.000 human beings, correct?
15 A. I haven't come here to testify about my role but rather of the
16 six strategic goals or should I say of two of those. That's why I would
17 like to ask the Trial Chamber to allow me not to answer these questions.
18 If we may focus on the central issues for which I was called to appear
19 here. I would not wish to be misunderstood or I would not wish my
20 statements to be abused for the purposes of my appeal. That is a
21 separate case that I will be dealing with.
22 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour I'm going briefly to some questions
23 that go directly to the witness's credibility. These are simply facts I
24 wish to put on the record.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead. If we need to explain to the witness the
1 correct position at law, we will do so but in the meantime I think you
2 can move safely to your next question.
3 MR. NICHOLLS:
4 Q. You were also found guilty, criminally responsible, for the
5 forcible removal of more than 100.000 Muslims and Croats, correct?
6 That's what your trial judgement says in paragraph 1144.
7 A. I was convicted for ethnic cleansing and persecutions, and I
8 don't know what number that is.
9 Q. And since Mr. Bourgon brought up your role, in assessing your
10 responsibility, the Trial Chamber found that your involvement in your
11 position was crucial to the commission of the crimes charged in the
12 Prosecution's indictment, correct?
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic?
14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I would object to this question because it goes
15 to analyse the judgement in the -- another case, in the case of the
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Goes directly to his credibility, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: It's a direct question which is very simple to
19 answer, if the witness is au courant or knows the details of the
20 judgement that was rendered against him. The question is a very simple
21 one, whether he agrees the fact that the Trial Chamber that decided his
22 case found that his involvement and his position was crucial to the
23 commission of the crimes charged in the Prosecution indictment. It's not
24 whether he believes it was so or not or whether he agrees with the
25 decision of the Trial Chamber but whether the Trial Chamber actually did
1 decide in that manner, in that -- so, Mr. Krajisnik, from your
2 recollection of the judgement, final judgement, of the Trial Chamber, do
3 you agree that the Trial Chamber found in your respect that your
4 involvement was crucial to the commission of the crimes charged in the
5 Prosecution's indictment in your case? Whether you agree with the
6 finding is another matter. We are not asking you to comment on that.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber found that I was
8 one of the key individuals in the joint criminal enterprise, which had as
9 its goal the expulsion of the non-Serb population.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. That should suffice. Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
12 Q. Last question on this topic. You testified in your case for 40
13 days, at paragraph 888 of the judgement, in a special section on your
14 credibility, the Trial Chamber found that you were of "very low
15 credibility." Correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. All right. I want to go now to the 16th Assembly session which
18 you've discussed. As president of the assembly, you chaired that
19 session, right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you chaired, correct, virtually I think all but one sessions
22 of the RS Assembly?
23 A. I believe that that's correct. There were meetings that I left
24 early on but I definitely participated in them. So my answer is I was
25 present at all the sessions but one, though I may have left some of them
1 early on so I might have been present throughout or in part.
2 Q. Okay. Could we have P25 up, please? That is the 16th Assembly
3 session. While we are waiting for that to come up, at this same assembly
4 session you recall the army of the -- what would become called the VRS
5 was established formally?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And Ratko Mladic was appointed commander?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. If we could go to the English, page 13, it's the -- actually,
10 it's 13 in both, I believe. And I don't know if anybody has the English
11 up. I don't. If anybody needs it. Okay. In any event I just want to
12 go over the way Karadzic enunciated the first strategic goal. I think my
13 friend read the first part. I want to continue. The first such goal is
14 separation from the other two national communities, separations of
15 states. And then he continued: "Separation from those who are our
16 enemies and who have used every opportunity, especially in this century,
17 to attack us. And who would continue with such practices if we were to
18 continue to stay together in the same state.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Top of the page, please, on the screen.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what your question is.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: I haven't gotten to my question yet.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.
23 MR. NICHOLLS:
24 Q. You recall Karadzic saying that at the session?
25 A. I don't recall saying -- I don't recall him saying that but I
1 believe his submission was along these lines. I don't remember his exact
3 Q. You can see it in the transcript.
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. And there --
6 A. I see it.
7 Q. -- clearly he's talking about the separation of peoples.
8 A. Not about the separation of peoples. I can explain to you why he
9 used such terms, because I knew the background, and I knew what his
10 intention was.
11 Q. Well, your answer then is no, it is not about separation of
13 A. No.
14 Q. Okay. Let's go quickly now to the 42nd assembly session, 65 ter
15 number 3305, page 1 in the English, page 71 in the B/C/S. Previously had
16 a little difficulty getting this correctly into e-court, so I hope it
17 comes up now. This is -- excuse me. Sorry, this is the 18th and 19th of
18 July 1994. Page 71 of the B/C/S. And it should be on numbered page 1 in
19 the English. The part I want you to focus on is as follows: "We know
20 for sure that we have to give something up."
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Where is it, roughly, in the page, top, first half,
22 second half? Upper, lower half? What?
23 MR. NICHOLLS: It's at the bottom of page 71, excuse me, and the
24 top of page 72 in the B/C/S.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: In English. I'm not bothered about the --
1 MR. NICHOLLS: In the English, it's in the middle paragraph.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
3 MR. NICHOLLS: It's correctly up on the screen now in English.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, okay.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: But for the witness we need to go to the next
6 page, 71, as I said. I'll read it out while we are waiting and if you
7 need to read it on the screen, you can.
8 Q. Dr. Karadzic said at this session: "We know for sure we have to
9 give something up. That is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt. If we wish
10 to achieve our primary strategic aim which is to get rid of the enemies
11 in our house, the Croats and Muslims, and not to be in the same state
12 with them any more."
13 Again, this is Dr. Karadzic talking about not being in the same
14 state with persons of other ethnicities, correct?
15 A. That is not correct.
16 Q. Okay?
17 A. The interpretation should differ. Had we explained it a moment
18 ago it would have been clear now. One needs to know what the basis, the
19 background, of this discussion was. As far as I can recall it had to do
20 with the plan put forth at the assembly. Had I been able to see the
21 agenda I would have been able to tell you exactly what it was about.
22 Q. All right. And very briefly, if we can have P02755 up on the
23 screen, this is the Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska from the
24 26th of November 1993. Publication on the decision on the strategic
25 objectives for the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And let me just
1 read in the preamble which is under the number 386, "At its session held
2 on 12 May 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina adopted the following decision." And then it lists the six
4 strategic objectives. Very briefly, just to be clear we hadn't seen this
5 yet in the direct, this publication refers to exactly the same 12 -- same
6 strategic objectives enunciated in the 12th May session in Banja Luka,
8 A. It is not correct. These strategics differ from those formulated
9 by Mr. Karadzic and differ from the conclusions I mentioned.
10 Q. All right. Let's look at the 16th Assembly session and see what
11 was spoken of there.
12 Now, Bosanska Krupa was one of the municipalities of the ARK,
13 Autonomous Region of Krajina, correct?
14 A. No. Not at first, because only one of its parts was a part of
15 the ARK. I don't know when it became a part of the ARK. Perhaps even
16 after the end of the war. In any way, it didn't follow the same
17 procedure that the other municipalities with the predominant Serb
18 majority did.
19 Q. It's a municipality west of Banja Luka, correct?
20 A. You are right.
21 Q. It's -- parts of it at least are along the Una River, correct?
22 A. That municipality is on both sides of the Una.
23 Q. All right. Now, a man you know, Miroslav Vjestica, was a member
24 of the RS Assembly from Bosanska Krupa?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. He attended the 16th Assembly session in Banja Luka?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. He spoke at that assembly session?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. And I see you remember, but anyway, let's go over what
6 Mr. Vijestica said. That's again 16th Assembly session which is P25, go
7 to page 25 of the English, beginning on page 21 at the bottom, I guess,
8 of the B/C/S. Maybe on page 22 of the B/C/S, but what I still have on my
9 screen is the prior assembly session. Or later assembly session.
10 That's right. Thank you.
11 Let me go through a little bit about what Mr. Vijestica said.
12 This will take a moment, Your Honour, for me to read this. I want to put
13 it in.
14 "Mr. President,' steamed people's deputies, members of the
15 Presidency, dear guests, I will briefly tell you, inform you, of the
16 situation in the theatre of war in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska
17 Krupa." And then he talks about how he will try to be brief.
18 He begins immediately talking about the six strategic goals which
19 he has heard that day on 12th May in Banja Luka.
20 "I give my full consent to all the strategic goals that have
21 been proposed, but I would like to note that individuals must be
22 appointed and operationalized who shall be responsible for carrying out
23 the activities related to each individual goal. Because I do not believe
24 it is sufficient to declare here that the Sava River is our border and
25 then learn, in the course of the day, that Bosanski Brod has fallen and
1 that there are no more Serbs there and so on." And he continues a little
2 bit further down. "What have we done in the Serbian Municipality of
3 Bosanska Krupa? I must tell you to remind you all that Serbs compromise
4 only 24 per cent of the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa. There
5 are 14.500 of us and there are 47.000 Muslims. As our president has
6 said, we, in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, did not want the
7 war but we were forced into it."
8 And for a little bit further down, he says:
9 "For a year and a half we have been preparing for war in the
10 Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa because we knew that there would
11 be war and that it could not be avoided." And then he continues and
12 begins to talk about what is going on now, on the ground, in Krupa.
13 "Thank God we did get to our borders because that's how we had
14 envisaged them and drawn them and you people's deputies know well that
15 the right bank of the Una River would be our border and that the right
16 bank of the Una River must be the border after all, the natural border of
17 the Serbian Republic of B H." And it continues.
18 "That was what we kept claiming and that was why we did get to
19 the right bank of the Una River. This is where we stopped, where we dug
20 in. We have mined the right bank. We have mined the iron bridge, the
21 wooden one, we have blown up, and now we are preparing for Bosanska
22 Otoka. God willing, in two to three days we shall mine the bridge in
23 Bosanska Otoka connecting it with Bosanski Novi. This will be done, I
24 guarantee it. What are our adversaries doing? At the moment, they are
25 all in Cazin Krajina. On the right bank of the Una River, there are no
1 more Muslims in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa. All the
2 enclaves that were there, Rapusa, Veliki, Vrbovik, Ostroznica, Babic,
3 Muslim Jasenica and Zavir, we have evacuated them. So there will be none
4 there for the duration of war operations. Will they have a place to
5 return to? I think it is unlikely, after our president told us the happy
6 news that the right bank of the Una River was the border." He continues
7 on the next page to discuss the disarming which is taking place by the
8 SDS in Bosanski Novi, and Sanski Most. And he says, "I think the Muslims
9 will be disarmed there as well."
10 Now, your response as the next speaker to that speech by
11 Mr. Vijestica, which is on page 22 of the B/C/S and page 26 of the
12 English, is, "Thank you." And then you tell who is going to speak next.
13 Mr. Vijestica told you in that session about what was happening
14 in Bosanska Krupa, correct?
15 A. What happened?
16 Q. Yes. He told you, perhaps you knew this at the time, that only
17 24 per cent of the population was Serb, right? That was in his speech to
18 you. Correct?
19 A. Yes, he said 24 per cent. I believe he said that. That's when
20 he stated the figure.
21 Q. And he told you what had happened in his municipality to the
22 Muslim population, right?
23 A. Vijestica said what you read.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Krajisnik. Mr. Zivanovic?
25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is a misstatement. He addressed to the
1 assembly not to the witness personally.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: But the witness was included and he was chairing.
3 So what difference? Yes, Madam Fauveau?
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In fact, this is a
5 misinterpretation because Mr. Vijestica was only talking about the right
6 bank of the Una River, and he never mentioned the left bank of the Una
7 river whereas earlier we heard something else.
8 MR. NICHOLLS: [Previous translation continues] ... totally
9 inappropriate objection. That is a totally inappropriate objection.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I agree with you. Let's proceed with your
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.
13 Q. He told you, and everyone else present --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't need to go into this because when you are
15 in a meeting you address the chair in any case.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. That his understanding after Mr. Karadzic's enunciation of the
18 strategic goals, was that the Muslims would not be allowed to return.
19 That's what he said, didn't he?
20 A. Please, if you wanted the truth, then you should have shown us
21 his interview to the Prosecutor's Office. It was all explained by
22 Mr. Vijestica. I read that interview, and I can offer you my
23 interpretation. I can tell you what it was that I thought he was talking
24 about. There is the OTP interview in which he explained it all. Let us
25 have a look at the interview, and you'll see what it is that he said.
1 Q. That is not my question. My question is just that it's correct
2 what we've got written down here, he said that his understanding was that
3 the Muslims would not be allowed to return. That's what he said at the
4 assembly session, correct?
5 A. And he explained it in his interview to you, as to what he meant.
6 Q. Okay. So the answer to my question is yes, and now you're
7 referring to an interview. Right?
8 A. Well, I think I'm being prevented from stating my answer in full
9 and my answer is what I said.
10 Q. Okay.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Fauveau?
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] At any rate, I believe that the
13 Prosecutor should not say that the Muslims were not able to come back.
14 Where exactly?
15 MR. NICHOLLS: I have no idea what the objection is.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't either. It's probably that there is no
17 specificity as to where exactly they would not be able to return. I
18 think we can move on to your next question, Mr. Nicholls. Otherwise we
19 are going to go into the argument what the right bank of the Una River
20 meant, whether it was restricted to that part relating to Bosanska Krupa
21 or whether it extended to other sections. Let's move to your next
22 question, please.
23 MR. NICHOLLS: Okay. If I can just say for the record I think
24 it's pretty clear for from the text it says the Muslims have been
25 evacuated from these enclaves in our municipality, they won't be able to
2 JUDGE AGIUS: He answered the question. Let's move, Mr. Bourgon.
3 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move to your next question, please.
5 MR. NICHOLLS:
6 Q. I want to talk now, in the time we have left today, about some
7 events shortly after the 16th Assembly session. All right?
8 A. Go ahead.
9 Q. Now, if we could have 65 ter 3252, please? This is from the
10 first page in both languages. This is a first Partizan Brigade command
11 document from the 12th of June 2006. Excuse me, that's not correct, the
12 14th of May 1992. Of a meeting which took place amongst members of
13 presidents of various Serbian municipalities in the ARK area and some
14 military commanders.
15 We can see the agenda is number 1, review of the military and
16 political situation in the municipalities. Number 3, messages from the
17 meeting of the armed forces of Serbian Krajina and the army of the
18 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Banja Luka on 12 May 1992.
19 Present at this meeting, I'll go through some of them, commander of the
20 30th Partizan Division, Colonel Stanislav Galic; commander of the 6th
21 Partizan Brigade, Colonel Branko Basara, who was then the 6th Krajina
22 brigade commander later. Chief of the 30th Division, Lieutenant Colonel
23 Stevan Kokovic, and the commander of the TO for Kljuc, Major Bosko Lukic;
24 president of Kljuc municipality, Jovo Banac and others.
25 If we go now to page 3, it's page 3 in both languages, the
1 president of the Mrkonjic Grad municipality, Milan Malidza presented the
2 conclusions from the meeting held in Banja Luka. First, when you
3 answered this when you were questioned at it before in your own trial,
4 Mr. Malidza attended the 16th Assembly session, correct?
5 A. Mr. Malidza was a deputy. He was probably at the meeting. He
6 was both a deputy and the municipal president.
7 Q. And the strategic goals, if we look at the top of the page,
8 formulated at the meeting in Banja Luka, were presented and it lists
9 them, One, there must be a state separation of the three national
10 communities. Two, the corridor, Krajina must be connected with Serbia,
11 along the bank of the Sava. Three, creation of a corridor along the
12 Drina River valley so that Serbian people control both the left and right
13 bank of the Drina River. And four, establishing the borders of the Una
15 Those six strategic goals from two days earlier in Banja Luka,
16 are now being discussed at this meeting, right?
17 A. You can see from this piece of paper that there was some such
18 discussion at that meeting.
19 Q. Right. And if we go to the next page, bottom of page 3 in the
20 English, it's on 4 in the B/C/S, at the end of the meeting Colonel Galic
21 proposes implementation of the decisions of the meeting in Banja Luka but
22 submit them to commands of units and municipalities and these conclusions
23 are unanimously adopted.
24 This is now the strategic goals being submitted immediately, two
25 days later, to military commanders in the field, correct?
1 A. It is not. This is the only discussion in all of the documents I
2 received that took place after the meeting, and I went through all of the
3 documents when I was in Belgrade. On that day I was in Belgrade.
4 Q. This document -- I'm not talking about other documents or
5 documents you couldn't find -- to shows that the goals are disseminated
6 to military leaders, correct? The military is briefed on the strategic
7 objectives, correct?
8 A. It is not correct. This was a local meeting at which a deputy
9 informs the audience of the events at the assembly session, and this was
10 not a lonely example. It wasn't the goal per se that people should be
11 informed and disseminated throughout Republika Srpska concerning the
12 strategic goals.
13 Q. And there is no reference anywhere in this document or in some of
14 the other documents we will look at to Mr. Malidza who was present at the
15 session explaining to all these military and local SDS leaders that these
16 are purely political objectives tied to the Cutileiro agreement? In
17 fact, there is a vote to implement these goals on the ground, right? Do
18 you agree?
19 A. No. Mr. Prosecutor, on the 9th of June, an order was issued to
20 inform the general public about the strategic goal and the map of the
21 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the same should be
22 disseminated to the international community. In other words an order was
23 issued for that to be disseminated in the general public. I can provide
24 you with the minutes so you can see for yourself. It was on the 9th of
25 June, only a little bit later than this.
1 Q. Why would that be done on the 9th of June if the entire session,
2 as you say, was open to the public like every session and covered by the
3 press and everybody knew what was announced there already?
4 A. This is my conclusion. On the 9th of June, a decision was made
5 to draw an instruction for the implementation of the Geneva Conventions.
6 This was done by Karadzic and Mladic and the Minister of Defence, and it
7 was said, okay, let's inform the general public as to what we want to
8 achieve from the negotiations. Send the strategic goals to the general
9 public, show them the map, and inform the general community, to the
10 European community or international community. I can provide you with
11 the minutes and you can find it there.
12 Q. I think I have time for one more question on this document.
13 The third strategic goal, as published, and basically as
14 discussed -- I'll try to get the exact language -- establishment of a
15 corridor in the Drina River valley and the eradication of the Drina River
16 as a border between the Serbian states. That's what it says in the
17 gazette. You've explained that, if I understood you correctly, that what
18 the third strategic goal was about was ease of border crossing for
19 psychological reasons you shouldn't have to use a passport, you can just
20 use your local ID, right? Did I get your explanation correct of what
21 strategic goal 3 was?
22 A. That's the third strategic goal contains two of our requests to
23 be presented during the negotiations. One was to allow us to have
24 special links and not to have to use passports to cross the Drina. And
25 second of all, an exchange of territories in order to end up with the
1 corridor linking up our corridors and to have a Muslim enclaves across
2 that area. That is the essence of that strategic goal.
3 Q. Last question for today: So Milan Malidza, who was present at
4 the 16th Assembly session, got it terribly wrong two days later when he
5 explained what strategic goal 3 was when he said creation of a corridor
6 along the Drina River valley so that the Serbian people control both the
7 left and the right banks of the Drina River; is that right?
8 A. Every person who interprets a thing interprets that thing the way
9 they find fit at the moment. I'm not saying that this is done on
10 purpose. I'm not saying that he did it on purpose in order to play to
11 the gallery. But he did not interpret the way we envisaged for that
12 strategic goal to be implemented.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: We need to stop there for today. We will resume
14 tomorrow morning at 9.00. Thank you.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 3rd day of June,
17 2008, at 9.00 a.m.