1 Wednesday, 2 July 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Madam Registrar. Could you kindly

6 call the case, please.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number

8 IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, ma'am.

10 All the accused are here.

11 From the Defence teams, I notice the absence of Ms. Tapuskovic.

12 I notice the absence of Mr. Ostojic and Mr. Nikolic for the Beara team

13 which therefore is not represented as yet this morning.

14 Is Mr. Lazarevic here? Yes, okay.

15 And then I don't see any other absences from the Defence.

16 Prosecution is just Mr. McCloskey.

17 Mr. Beara, we waited seven minutes to see if your lawyers were

18 turning up or not and we have got no news so we had to start. However,

19 you have a right not to have the proceedings continue in the absence of

20 your lawyers. There has been no explanation from them, although some of

21 my staff is trying to contact them.

22 You can also waive this right that I have just mentioned, which

23 would mean that we can proceed in their absence and eventually hopefully

24 they will turn up. What is your choice?

25 THE ACCUSED BEARA: [Interpretation] Yes, I think we can continue

1 with the proceedings. They will probably come soon.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you, Mr. Beara.

3 We are also sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis this morning for the

4 first session. That's because our colleague Judge Stole is busy with

5 something urgent that has come up and he will be with us after the first

6 break. Official business is what I mean.

7 And I understand there are some preliminaries, no?

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE AGIUS: I take it that your preliminary was in relation to

10 the Beara motions in any case, Mr. McCloskey, no?

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. And given that, it's

12 probably more productive to wait.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, all right. That's what we were going to

14 suggest in any case. So thank you and let's bring in Colonel Vuga.

15 [The witness entered court]

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Dobar dan, Gospodine Vuga.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: We are going to proceed with your testimony today.

19 Mr. Zivanovic.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

21 WITNESS: PETAR VUGA [Resumed]

22 [Witness answered through interpreter]

23 Examination by Mr. Zivanovic: [Continued]

24 Q. Good morning, Mr. Vuga. I will continue where we left off, but

25 before we do that, could you please take your report, because we'll take

1 another tack now. Your report is the first document in your binder, so

2 take it out, please. And we will start with point -- with 3.4, with

3 paragraph 3.4 in your report. It's 1D1175, page 29 in B/C/S, and page 34

4 in English.

5 In this part of your report, you wrote about threats to security

6 in the area of the Drina Corps pending the establishment of UNPAs in

7 Srebrenica and Zepa. Could you please tell us, in light of the facts you

8 presented in your report, to briefly describe the situation in this area

9 just before the UNPAs were established?

10 A. Before the UNPAs were established, in the area of the Drina

11 Corps, the security situation was rather complex, inasmuch as various

12 activities were taking place. Operations were conducted on a large

13 scale, and there were many of them. Those operations posed a threat to

14 the population, to certain features and installations, and completely

15 disrupted life in that area. That would be most briefly. The operations

16 themselves are listed in the report and they tell us that the situation

17 required certain measures to be taken for normalcy to be restored. These

18 actions and operations were variegated from incursions of sabotage and

19 terrorist groups to actions by paramilitaries of the

20 then-still-unrecognised Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that the

21 consequences of these actions in some locations were catastrophic,

22 disastrous.

23 In one part of that area, around 30 Serb villages were almost

24 completely destroyed and evacuated. Around 10 villages remained around

25 Bratunac and Srebrenica that were still holding out, that were not yet

1 destroyed. A later attack targeted even those villages, leaving five

2 ethnically pure Serb villages that were not evacuated and destroyed. The

3 destruction was not justified by military need. It was instead a result

4 of well-thought-out activity aimed at maximising the damage to that area.

5 A specific feature of all this was that the method of destruction

6 was relentless and undiscriminating. In Srebrenica itself, very serious

7 problems occurred, and there was total disruption to the security of the

8 Serb population. And that manifested itself specifically and

9 particularly in the killing of Zoran Zekic, an MP in the assembly and the

10 president of the SDS in Srebrenica. After that, there occurred a massive

11 departure of the Serb population from Srebrenica. The killings and

12 ambushes that were set up caused great fear and sowed panic amongst

13 people because they thought it was not safe to move around any more or to

14 even stay there and that resulted later in many other problems.

15 Q. I let you see the judgement in the Naser Oric case and you had

16 occasion to read it in that judgement. You saw that some of those

17 attacks on Serb villages were noted. But tell me, if you remember, who

18 was designated as the source of those attacks? Which groups?

19 A. It was the groups that acted from Srebrenica against the

20 surrounding area but primarily it was paramilitary units that were

21 organised locally. That is their basic characteristic, that they were

22 organised locally. They originated from that area and they were active

23 in that area. They participated in the internal conflict in that region

24 and the point of that activity was to inflict great damage and losses.

25 That is why these units were organised and they were active in that area

1 where they stayed and where they were deployed.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: I would like to draw your attention to our two

3 decisions on adjudicated facts, one very recent, following a motion that

4 you yourself filed, the other one in the early stages of the trial that

5 deals precisely with the events that your questioning the witness about.

6 We wouldn't like to have repetitions. In other words, you

7 already have these adjudicated facts, and in addition, if you also look

8 at the decision on the agreed facts, you also find repetitive concessions

9 from the Prosecution that during the 1993-19 95 period, when Srebrenica

10 and Zepa were declared protected enclaves, there were these incursions.

11 So if we could speed up on this issue and move on to your next area.

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thanks.

13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vuga, you have seen that it is emphasised in

14 these decisions that civilians also took part in those attacks.

15 A. Yes, it is noted in those decisions.

16 Q. Can you tell us now about the security aspects that occurred as a

17 result of these attacks which were mounted not only by paramilitary units

18 but also by civilians in Srebrenica?

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, one moment.

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey?

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's too vague. We need a time frame for that in

23 order it to be relevant --

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: -- and connect with the Judge's order.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: That's a fair comment, Mr. Zivanovic. If you could

2 be more specific as to which period of time you're referring to.

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: For whole time we referred to the period before

4 the establishment of safe areas. It means from the beginning of the war

5 in Bosnia in April 1992 until the April 1993, when safe areas were

6 established.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Colonel.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The security aspect of the

9 involvement of civilians or massive involvement of civilians, outside any

10 military units, added on to the threat and it became a general threat.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, for the record, the Chamber notes that

12 Mr. Ostojic entered the courtroom at 9.22. Mr. Ostojic, we have started

13 and continued the sitting after having asked your client if he waived his

14 right, which he did.

15 MR. OSTOJIC: Sorry to interrupt, Mr. President and Your Honours.

16 I sincerely apologise to the Court, the counsel, the accused, the

17 Prosecution and the witness.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.

20 Q. [Interpretation] In this part of your report you stated that only

21 in 1992, 376 actions took place. Could we look at 1D1283, please?

22 It's in your third binder.

23 A. I'm trying to find it. 1D?

24 Q. 1283.

25 A. I have it on the screen.

1 Q. You did take into account this document when you wrote your

2 report. What does it represent?

3 A. It represents the total number of actions, the time when they

4 occurred, the units involved and the nature of attacks. We can see that

5 these are hamlets, small towns and villages, and we can see which village

6 or hamlet was targeted by attacks in the relevant period, and we can also

7 see the total number of these attacks, and we can see that the attacks

8 were almost daily. Sometimes we have more than one attack in one day.

9 There was not a single quiet day in this whole area throughout that

10 period.

11 Q. The document records all combat actions in this area from 1992 to

12 1995?

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, one moment. Mr. McCloskey?

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is -- this is leading. He's just going over

15 his report on the screen, it's always going to be leading. This person

16 should not need his report in front of him to testify. This seems to me

17 to be right in the heart of the area that really isn't part of --

18 contested part of this case.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, exactly. This is what I tried to explain to

20 Mr. Zivanovic, who, however, seems to ignore what I have stated.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, we are all in agreement here. You

23 don't need to dwell on these events. Please move on to your next topic.

24 And obviously, if -- with this understanding, because last thing we would

25 want to do is not to be fair. If at any time this chapter of events is

1 opened by the Prosecution, then we will reopen all doors to you, but in

2 the meantime, please go ahead. Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just to reiterate, the Prosecution agrees there

4 were plenty of good and legitimate reasons for the VRS to attack

5 Srebrenica in July 1995 and that there were also some that, as you know,

6 were part of the Prosecution's case were not and that a mixed motive

7 situation is what we have here. I do not disagree that there were plenty

8 of legitimate reasons for this attack.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: They have been established by this Tribunal as

10 well. So let's move to your next item.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I would just ask the witness how many victims,

12 Serbian victims, fell in this period of time.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. That's a legitimate question.

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Could you tell me, if you know, in this period, before the UNPA

16 was established, how many Serb people fell victim to these attacks?

17 A. From the documentation I had, 2.100 people fell victim to these

18 attacks before the UNPA was set up.

19 Q. Can we now look at 1D1162?

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: I apologise --

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: -- for interrupting. The CLSS version of the

23 final report is not in e-court. This is apparently a draft that's in

24 e-court and we will be objecting to anything, that a draft comes in, so

25 if you could fix that, we would appreciate it.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic. Do you want to consult with

2 your assistant?

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, I must consult to see what -- the final

4 version.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: I suggest while you are consulting, you switch off

6 your microphone.

7 [Defence counsel confer]

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I cannot tell you right now anything about it.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. But keep in mind the words of

10 Mr. McCloskey, that you otherwise have an objection.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed, please.

13 Does the witness know out of these 2.100, how many were military

14 and how many were civilian?

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Vuga, when you look at this list, do you know how many people

17 were soldiers and how many were civilians?

18 A. There is no classification in the list, not of that sort. You

19 could only look at the years of birth and try and guess who members of

20 the military formations were. I did not do that because I did not have

21 the relevant data that would enable me to do that.

22 Q. Mr. Vuga, we come to the period that concerns the establishment

23 of the protected area, of which you spoke on page 31 of the B/C/S

24 version, or page 36 of the English version of your report. I'm not going

25 to ask you to look at the document of the Security Council of the United

1 Nations establishing the protected areas or the disarmament agreement.

2 We have seen all these more than once. My question to you is this: What

3 was the position of the warring parties regarding the disarming or the

4 implementation of the disarmament agreement?

5 A. The position of the warring parties contradicted each other. The

6 Serbian side, on the same day, on the 18th of April, issued an order

7 which served as the foundation for the implementation of the agreement,

8 whereas on the Muslim side, an order was issued to the effect that the

9 agreement should not be complied with and that the arms should be kept,

10 and the rest is history.

11 Q. Did you find this position in any of the documents that were

12 available to you or in any other source?

13 A. The first position can be found in the order of the Main Staff of

14 the Army of Republika Srpska issued on the 18th of April 1993. That's

15 the Serbian position. As for the Muslim position, I found that in the

16 book by Sefer Halilovic entitled, "Crafty Strategy," who spoke about his

17 actions from the moment he signed the agreement onwards.

18 Q. Can we now please look 1D7221.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat the number?

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] 1D721.

21 Q. Could we please look at page 3 in B/C/S and page 2 in the English

22 version of this book? In the B/C/S version, it can be found in the

23 penultimate paragraph, the penultimate sentence as well, and in the

24 English translation it is the last paragraph at the bottom of the page.

25 Tell me, please -- could we please look at 1D1285?

1 I believe that this is one of the documents that you have already

2 spoken about. Could you please tell us something about the details of

3 this document? What did the Serb side order thereby? Who issued the

4 order and what is the order about?

5 A. I said that the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, on

6 the 18th of April 1993, on the day when the agreement was signed, sent an

7 order which referred to the cease-fire and the actions regarding

8 Srebrenica. This was delivered to the Drina Corps and the East Bosnia

9 Corps and the order outlines details of the cease-fire, the actions to be

10 executed during the cease-fire, and what actions are to be expected and

11 carried out in the forthcoming period. Everybody was duty-bound to carry

12 out the order and implement it because the protected areas of Zepa,

13 Srebrenica and Gorazde were in their area of responsibility, and it also

14 said in the order that some actions will be carried out according to the

15 agreement but that they would be carried out in the forthcoming period.

16 The agreement was not very precise. It lacked some details. And

17 that's why the second agreement was signed. It should have provided more

18 details about the actions. However, this order enabled the

19 implementation of the second agreement and the conditions that it would

20 contain.

21 Q. Now I would like to ask you this. We know that this agreement

22 was not implemented and there is no dispute about the fact that the

23 demilitarisation was not carried out, and I will not dwell upon these

24 issues. Can you tell me, however, whether you were able to establish how

25 many Serbs were killed during the existence of the enclave, i.e. from the

1 establishment of the protected area to its fall on the 11th of July 1995?

2 A. Yes. When I analysed the list that was submitted to me, I

3 established, based on the times of death, that in 1993, which was the

4 first year, 594 Serb victims fell, 594 Serbs were killed. Obviously, I

5 can't give you the date. The agreement was signed on the 18th of April

6 and one can conclude that most of that happened because the month of

7 April was one-third of the year and 594 people were killed in that year,

8 after the agreement was signed.

9 Q. And did you establish how many victims fell later on, in 1994 and

10 1995?

11 A. The second piece of information is more reliable because during

12 those years the area existed continuously. In 1994 and in 1995, until

13 the moment the protected area was abolished after the events that

14 happened, there were another 591 victims in the area. So this was in --

15 during the time when the area was completely functional as a protected

16 area.

17 Q. You said that this was confirmed. Let me just make sure that you

18 established the number of these victims from the same list that I've

19 already shown you, which was 1D1162.

20 A. Yes. I was able to establish that from that list. I looked at

21 the list, and looking at the times when they were killed, I could

22 establish how many were killed in 1993, 1994 and 1995, and I analysed

23 this but I separated the year 1993 to show that the protected area did

24 not exist throughout the whole year but in looking at the dates and times

25 of death, you can see that the number of victims continued to grow.

1 Q. The list depicts the year when these people were killed?

2 A. Yes, Mr. Zivanovic. This is depicted in the list.

3 Q. You are saying that these facts are also confirmed by some other

4 documents testifying to the attacks against the Serbs while the protected

5 area existed. Could you please give us the title of some of these

6 documents, if you can remember them off the cuff?

7 A. Yes. There is a document which shows that during the functioning

8 of the protected area, about the actions of the sabotage units. The

9 command of the 28th Division sent its report to the command of the 2nd

10 Corps in Tuzla, which speaks about the fact of the Muslim people and

11 about several sabotage and terrorist actions carried out by groups from

12 Srebrenica and it also lists casualties and damage inflicted on the Serbs

13 in the area and on the Serb forces. And the figure that is mentioned

14 there is 70 members of the Republika Srpska army. So this is a very

15 strong form of action or influence against the environment.

16 In an order that was issued in June 1994, it says, and it was

17 issued by the Army of Republika Srpska, but then abolished the 18th of

18 April order. It is mentioned that attacks were being carried out from

19 the protected area against the local population and the units of Army of

20 Republika Srpska. Therefore, this order confirms that the actions

21 continued and that there was not enough control of the zone in terms of

22 its demilitarisation. So these would be the documents that speak about

23 the victims that fell even after the protected area was established.

24 Q. In your report, you also speak about the planning of some major

25 actions, not only sabotage and terrorist actions. I'm talking about item

1 3.20 in your report. And you mention also --

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection to the non-specificity. They seem to

4 be equating sabotage actions which are -- and terrorist actions as being

5 the same and that soldiers that die as victims. So if we could be

6 clearer on our language, because that, I don't think it equates with the

7 reality.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic, taking note of what

9 Mr. McCloskey said, would you like to rephrase the question, which you

10 haven't finished in any case?

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Tell me, please, what was the nature of the actions that you

13 speak about and that were carried out from the enclaves against the

14 targets in the Serbian villages?

15 A. I suppose that this is due to the translation and due to the

16 context of the protected area. This is not combat activity. This is

17 sabotage actions from the protected areas, and this was the nature of

18 these attacks. This was not a regular combat. I looked at the protected

19 area, its nature and actions that were carried out from there. There was

20 no combat there. Combat had been discontinued and no combat activity

21 could take place in view of the agreement that had been reached. One has

22 to say that these were sabotage and terrorist actions that were launched

23 from the protected areas and not regular combat activities that were

24 taking place. These were impossible, because the agreement was in place

25 at the time.

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'd just like to mention that the witness said

2 two times "terrorist," the word "terrorist" action, but they were not in

3 record. Actually, he mentioned this word after "sabotage," after the

4 word "sabotage."

5 JUDGE AGIUS: I can see it on line 21 at least.

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, but two times before that he mentioned the

7 word "terrorist."

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I would assume line 16, I would assume line

9 16, but let's move. Let's move, let's move.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thanks.

11 Q. [Interpretation] In addition to these actions, were some other

12 military actions of a larger scale prepared while the protected area

13 existed in Srebrenica? Was anything prepared from that area?

14 A. Yes. A major action was being prepared and the aim was to

15 establish corridors between the zones of Zepa, Gorazde, and Srebrenica,

16 so that these three might be connected with the territory under the

17 control of the Muslim forces. Later on, in the further stage of these

18 activities, they would have been enlarged until the moment they could be

19 liberated. This was the main idea behind the actions. So there would

20 have been final liberation of the temporarily occupied territories which

21 meant the territories that were at the time under the Serb control.

22 Q. Can we please look at document 1D740?

23 Can you tell me, are you familiar with this document?

24 A. Yes, I am.

25 Q. Are you able to tell us now who wrote this document and to whom

1 is it addressed?

2 A. It was written in the staff of the Supreme Command of the armed

3 forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and it is sent to the

4 command of the 8th Operative Group, Srebrenica.

5 Q. Does this document designate the territories that were to be the

6 target of the planned action?

7 A. This was an idea from the commander of the 8th Operation Group,

8 Naser Oric. It was later verified, and analysed, pointing out the risks

9 involved, but they still decided to proceed with preparation and

10 implementation. The territories are designated and the axes along which

11 corridors were to be established, and later on, activities were to

12 continue along the lines that I already described.

13 Q. Do you know whether, in order to execute such an action and all

14 the other actions that were planned, whether the forces in the enclave

15 had enough manpower, equipment, weapons?

16 A. At the time when this idea was launched, the forces in the

17 enclave were still not sufficiently organised. Prior to that, they were

18 recognised and they were reorganised, from the 8th Operation Group, the

19 28th Division was established, and that resulted in a new approach to

20 this whole operation. Of course, they were not to act alone. They were

21 to act in coordinated action with the forces of the 2nd Corps of the BH

22 army along the axes indicated. But at that time those forces were in the

23 process of being organised precisely for tasks and missions of this type.

24 Q. Can you tell us if any actions were launched in this period to

25 arm the enclave in order to mount larger-scale military operations, and

1 if so, how?

2 A. Of course, the reorganisation of units in Srebrenica, without

3 additional arms supply, would not result in a force sufficient for such a

4 large-scale operation. It was organised to -- air drops of arms were

5 organised so that the units in Srebrenica could perform all the other

6 preparations, including primarily the training of men to use the weapons

7 supplied. That was done, and there exists an analysis that provides

8 rather reliable information on how much weaponry was supplied to

9 Srebrenica, and the analysis ends with the note that Sarajevo even did

10 not have that amount of weapons to defend itself in 1992-1993. They had

11 less weapons than Srebrenica.

12 Q. Can we now look at document 1D744?

13 A. I found the document.

14 Q. This document bears two different dates, two different years. I

15 see the 17th of February 1996 in the header, and a bit lower down, 17th

16 February 1995. Could you just tell me -- I believe this document

17 contains a table on page 9. You see these amounts in the bottom right

18 corner. Can you tell us exactly what it means, UBS, 10 T and MTS, 5 T?

19 A. These are totals of lethal combat material, 10 tonnes, and

20 materiel and equipment, 5 tonnes. Those -- this is different materiel,

21 in terms of purpose, but all this served to equip and arm the 28th

22 Division. It means that this amount of materiel was delivered by air to

23 Srebrenica.

24 Q. We see from this that it was before March, that is before the

25 establishment of the UNPA. Can we now move on to the next page? Before

1 March 1993. Let us look at the amounts delivered later.

2 A. There is one section referring to 1995.

3 Q. You mean on the previous page? I didn't see that. Can we move

4 back to the previous page?

5 A. On that page, in number 8, we see 20th March 1995.

6 Q. Let's move on to the next page. Can you see here how much

7 equipment was shipped?

8 A. These are flights to Zepa. 17 tonnes of lethal materiel was

9 delivered and 6 tonnes of materiel and equipment. We see 26 passengers.

10 I have nothing more to say about that.

11 Q. Mr. Vuga, you have studied quite a few documents about materiel

12 and equipment and lethal materiel delivered to Srebrenica and Zepa. Have

13 you seen even one document whereby the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina

14 decided to deliver food or medicine to their troops in these areas?

15 A. No, I have not found a single document that could indicate that

16 Srebrenica and Zepa were supplied with food and other things the army

17 needed, except combat equipment.

18 Q. Could we now look at 1D745? You recall this document, don't you?

19 A. Yes, I found it.

20 Q. You probably remember this. I'd like you to focus on page 6.

21 What kind of document is this? I forgot to ask you that.

22 A. This discrepancy in dates tells us something about the time this

23 document was drafted. The previous analysis was presented to the

24 assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the way army General Rasim Delic

25 thought convenient. He describes these activities and qualifies the

1 nature of these activities in the conclusion. He describes all the

2 things that were done for the protected areas Srebrenica, Zepa and

3 Gorazde to be militarily enabled as opposed to what has been done in

4 connection with the agreement. This rationale was presented when the

5 assembly was familiarised with this analysis.

6 Q. Could we look at paragraph 2 on page 6, only the second sentence,

7 which says, "What can we say about resistance if even with so many

8 anti-armour weapons, not a single tank was destroyed?" Can you tell us

9 what are anti-armour resources?

10 A. Those were guided anti-armour missiles that Srebrenica was

11 supplied with. But I would like to highlight another aspect here that is

12 very important in my view. This is an assessment of how the equipment

13 was used, not the lack of equipment or the deficiencies of that

14 equipment. What is important is that there is no answer to the question

15 why the equipment provided was not adequately used, as had been expected

16 and planned. In fact, there is no answer to the question whether

17 Srebrenica was militarily captured or was lost by its defenders in some

18 other way. That is, in fact, the dilemma that Rasim Delic presented to

19 the assembly.

20 Q. Could you clarify one more thing? This anti-armour equipment, is

21 it considered to be heavy or light weaponry, if you know of course?

22 A. I don't know how it is classified. I know this equipment but I'm

23 an air force man and I cannot tell you about how it is classified.

24 Q. Thank you. Let's move now to June 1995. It is reflected in your

25 report in para 3.30. You wrote there about one order of the 2nd Corps.

1 I would like you to tell us what kind of order that was. I will give you

2 the number of the exhibit in a moment. 1D946. It seems that this

3 document has not been translated, so tell us briefly what does it deal

4 with, because you refer to it in your report?

5 A. I referred to this order because, on the 17th of June 1995, that

6 is 15 days or so before Krivaja 95, the 28th Division was ordered to

7 carry out preparations to launch an offensive, and the order says that

8 all these preparations need to be carried out in order to stretch thin

9 and inflict damage upon aggressor forces, and there is a section that

10 refers to Zepa in case of an attack mounted from Zepa. It was an effort

11 to tie up and stretch the Serb forces in this area as thin as possible so

12 that combat activities in other areas could be affected more efficiently

13 because it was difficult, because it would have been difficult for the

14 VRS to get reinforcements. It was a synchronised operation with

15 comprehensive actions throughout the region, discloses the real nature of

16 Srebrenica as an area where an army was deployed.

17 Q. Does this document mention coordinated action with any other

18 element? And if so, which?

19 A. I said a moment ago that it was to be a synchronised operation,

20 which means that the moment of attack, the time of attack, would be

21 determined later, but preparations were aimed at preparing the forces,

22 that everything that needs to be done be done and that the capacities of

23 the 28th Division would be evaluated correctly so that they would not be

24 threatened and the activities of the UNPA would not be compromised. They

25 wanted to avoid compromising the UNPAs as a basis for these activities of

1 forces organised in this way. This was a preparation for what was to

2 come later, that is a combat operation launched by these forces.

3 Q. When you were looking at all the documents dated after the 17th

4 of July 1995, the documents of the BiH army, did you find any trace of

5 actions being carried out pursuant to this order?

6 A. Actually, what is written in the reports about the sabotage and

7 terrorist actions that were carried out from the area, and the reports

8 were sent to the command of the 2nd Corps, coincides with the preparatory

9 order and the future actions that were to ensue. This is a report on the

10 contribution of the forces in Srebrenica to the fight of the Muslim

11 people. This is a short report showing what was done in the area with

12 regard to what is stated herein.

13 Q. Mr. Vuga, I also wanted to ask you this: In the documents that

14 you perused, could you obtain any information as to whether the Bosnian

15 authorities, i.e. the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, allowed the

16 Muslim population or soldiers to leave the protected areas of Srebrenica

17 and Zepa in the course of their existence up to July 1995?

18 A. Judging by what I could see in the document that concerns the

19 fate of a group from Zepa that had tried to leave Zepa and go to the

20 territory under the control of the Muslim forces, measures were taken and

21 it is clear that there was a ban imposed on the population in the

22 protected areas to leave those protected areas.

23 Q. Thank you. You have mentioned this report about the actions that

24 were carried out. Let's please look at that report. Actually, we will

25 look at it a little bit later.

1 For the time being, let's look at the report dated 23 June 1995.

2 This is 1D742. 1D742.

3 A. Well, I have it on the screen and I can follow it there.

4 Q. Let's just see whether it has been translated. I believe it has

5 been. Could you please tell us, just briefly, what is this report

6 related to?

7 A. It was drafted on the 30th of June 1995, and it is a

8 chronological overview of the actions that were carried out and the

9 results thereof. I looked at the report from the security point of view,

10 the security in the area of Srebrenica and its surroundings, and it has

11 been established that this was a very grave form of threatening the

12 safety of units and a violation of the status of the protected area.

13 From the security point of view, this was a great warning about the

14 status of safety around the area and the need to establish a system of

15 protection that would prevent the things that had been happening up to

16 then.

17 Obviously, there were gaps through which these sabotage and

18 terrorist units could pass through. While there was a lull in the combat

19 activities during the cease-fire and during the existence of the

20 protected area after the signing of the agreement, they could still

21 achieve such effects and they could still inflict damage. Somewhere

22 towards the end, there is a conclusion saying that 70 or around 70

23 members of the Army of Republika Srpska had been liquidated in this

24 reporting period or the period that this report refers to. This is a

25 rather convincing document portraying things as they were at the time.

1 Q. Tell me, please, this was all happening in the area of defence of

2 what corps or what unit?

3 A. The protected area of Srebrenica and the 28th Division were in

4 the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps.

5 Q. Let's go back to 1D283. This is a list of combat activities of

6 the 2nd Corps. Can we go immediately to page 11 in B/C/S or page 17 in

7 the English translation? [In English] Sorry. [Interpretation] 1D1283.

8 I apologise. I've given you the wrong pages. In B/C/S, it is

9 page 17 and the English it is 25.

10 A. Could you please give us the numbers?

11 Q. It is ERN 618. I'm sure you'll be able to find it.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: It is the sequential

13 number on the list that we are talking about.

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. The sequential number 618. Could you please explain what this is

16 about?

17 A. This is about an attack on Visnjica, on the 25th of June 1995.

18 Q. Thank you. And could you please look at the following bullet

19 point or the following sequential number which is 619?

20 A. Yes. This is the Defence of Srebrenica operation which took

21 place between 26th of June and 16 July 1995.

22 Q. On the 26th of June, was there an attack by the Army of Republika

23 Srpska on Srebrenica?

24 A. Throughout all this time, there was a situation which was defined

25 by the relationship which was described in the testimonies of the members

1 of Dutch Battalion who said that Srebrenica was not attacked but that

2 actions were carried out from Srebrenica that provoked the Serbian side

3 to respond at the places where those actions were organised, and the

4 Dutch Battalion members themselves say that they were between two fires

5 but that they were at cross-fire and that they were threatened. There

6 were no other activities. Srebrenica did not come under any other attack

7 that would call for this type of action or reaction to them.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please speak into the microphone?

9 Thank you.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Did you get that, Mr. Zivanovic?

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, just a moment, please.

12 Q. Mr. Vuga, did you find anywhere else that this date was the

13 beginning of the action on the part of the Muslim army and that this was

14 something that is part of this fight for Srebrenica?

15 A. We looked at this preparatory order where this is mentioned, but

16 there are no other documents that would point to such activities. There

17 is just a reference to the corridors and there is also the order that

18 followed after the preparatory order of the 2nd Corps of the BiH army

19 that was sent to the command of the 28th Division in Srebrenica.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Could we take a break now?

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, of course. So let's have a 25-minute break.

23 The time now is -- I don't have it here. Anyway, 10.25, yes.

24 --- Recess taken at 10.24 a.m.

25 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, we'll deal with the other matter,

2 Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Ostojic, later on, all right? Thank you.

3 Mr. Zivanovic.

4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I would just like to

5 inform the Trial Chamber that the final version of translation was in

6 e-court. The only difference is because the final version has no exhibit

7 numbers, draft has.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Thank you.

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Vuga, before we move to the specific duties of deputy

11 commander for security in the Drina Corps, I'm just going to show you one

12 more document which is related to what we have just talked about. This

13 is document 1D1295.

14 You have seen this document. It hasn't been translated. It's

15 handwritten, as we can see. Can we just move to page 4 right away so

16 that we can see who drafted the document? Do you see? Can you read the

17 name?

18 A. Yes. The name is legible. It's Ramiz Becirovic, major, acting

19 commander of the land forces, 28th Division.

20 Q. Thank you. Can we move to -- go back to page 1, please? I only

21 wanted to ask you about two things from this document. I wanted to go to

22 item number 4, paragraph numbered 4. It's on this page, fine. Can you

23 see this first column, what does it indicate? Can you please tell us?

24 A. The first column indicates the defence liberation unit which was

25 the mainstay of the combat actions and that was the 28th Division of the

1 land forces, took part in combat, 6.000, the commander Ramiz Becirovic,

2 active officer, his pre-war rank. I cannot read that part. He was a

3 reserve officer before the war. His rank was captain, and the rank

4 during the combat operation was major.

5 Q. Let's move to page 2, please, and just look at paragraph 12

6 there. Can you please read out paragraph 12, nothing more than that?

7 A. "Date of execution of combat actions, the 26th of June, until the

8 16th of July 1995, and it lasted or the combat actions went on for 21

9 days."

10 Q. Thank you. I would now like to move to the part of your findings

11 on page 35 in the B/C/S version and page 34 -- actually page 34 in the

12 B/C/S version and page 41 in the English version.

13 It's 1D1175, the document. And in your copy of the report, it's

14 page 34, at least I think so. We are going to look at item 4.1. Let's

15 look at the B/C/S version too.

16 Mr. Vuga, first you told us, in the first part of this chapter,

17 that the name of the military action was wrong, from the perspective of

18 military terminology and military doctrine, so I would ask you now to

19 please explain this view of yours.

20 A. Based on the definition that was given in the documents and the

21 qualification of the Krivaja 95 operation or action, I looked at the

22 military terminology and looked up the form of action that would be

23 described in a specific way and from the point of view of the forces that

24 were engaged and the objective and the tasks that were set before the

25 units who were executing the assignment, I came to the conclusion that

1 the name "operation" is inconsistent with the nature of the combat action

2 or the level and the organisational units and the forces participating

3 and the objective, that they are inconsistent with this term. The

4 objective that was set was to improve the tactical position of the units

5 in the area or around the area in order to prevent further actions which

6 were mentioned before, I don't want to repeat that, from the zone, and in

7 order to establish a more effective control of the border area of the

8 zone. But also to stop communications, physical links, between the

9 protected area and -- between the protected areas of Zepa and Srebrenica,

10 in both directions. So pursuant to that definition, operation, it could

11 not have been an operation, that could not have been at the operation

12 level because the forces that were executing the activity and the

13 objectives and the tasks set do not have such a character. And in my

14 opinion, also pursuant to what was actually happening.

15 Q. You said in your report something about the strength of the Drina

16 Corps units at that time in July 1995. Can we now look at 1D379, please?

17 This is in 4.2 of your report, in the B/C/S version, it's on the

18 following page. And on the English, in the English copy, it's all ready.

19 In item 4.2 of your report you mentioned the number of members and you

20 referred to this document, in particular, and said that lesser forces

21 were or fewer forces were engaged for this Krivaja 95 action. So I would

22 like to ask you, if you can, to tell us something about this.

23 A. My conclusions on it being a smaller force are based on two

24 documents. The first document is the one that we are looking at now,

25 which gives the strength of the Drina Corps in July 1995. The other

1 document is the order for offensive combat actions or assault combat

2 actions of operative number 1, where it says that the corps units

3 continue to execute their defence assignments that they had been engaged

4 on before, and I'm going to continue to use the term that is being used,

5 "Operation," even though I would like to note that what I said in that

6 respect still applies. So in reference to such strength and the size of

7 the defence assignment, a smaller corps force could be engaged here.

8 Q. In this part of your report, you go on to say something about the

9 engagement of the security organs or, rather, the duties of the security

10 organ which would arise from the preparation of an action like this,

11 regardless of whether we refer to it as an action, operation, or some

12 other name. Can you please tell us something about it briefly?

13 A. The -- these forces dealt with the security aspect. The military

14 aspect was entrusted to broader forces. What I was interested were the

15 duties and the status of the security organs in respect of execution of

16 their assignment, in terms of the units that were executing the defence,

17 pursuant to the order, and the units overall participating in the Krivaja

18 95 action because, in a way, their engagements were divided. Before, it

19 was more directed to the units and to a lesser degree to the area around

20 Srebrenica because the situation was more stable. Now, suddenly, this

21 whole thing changed and the security organs were issued new assignments

22 in relation to the Krivaja 95 operation.

23 So that was the aspect from which I viewed the engagement of the

24 forces, because it had to do with the security organs from the

25 perspective of their duties and responsibilities as far as general

1 security measures were concerned within commands and as far as the

2 counter-intelligence security was concerned that dealt with the

3 activities of the units, their deployment and everything else relating to

4 this particular issue.

5 Q. I would now like to ask you to move to the organisational and

6 establishment composition of the security organs of the command of the

7 Drina Corps, or actually I would like you to tell us what this

8 organisation was supposed to be pursuant to regulations, what was the

9 establishment force of the Drina Corps organ supposed to be in July 1995.

10 So could we look at document D1296?

11 In the original, this is on page 15 and the English

12 translation -- in the English translation, it's on page 23. The heading

13 is on the last line and then the actual paragraph begins on page 24.

14 However, there are no numbers in the translation. The translation refers

15 to the original document as far as numbers are concerned.

16 The security section is in front of number 57 in the original

17 version. So we have the composition of that sector there. In the

18 English version, I think we would need to move to the next page, because

19 on page 23 we only have the heading, "Security section," not the

20 substance.

21 It seems that there is a technical error, so there is no number

22 57 in the translation. I don't know how this happened. Even 58/1 is

23 missing. I don't know if this is because of the page break or due to

24 some other reason but --

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I would imagine it's because of the page

1 break. Can we go back one page? You see you have it there, you have

2 chief 57, 58 and 58/1.

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Vuga, I would like to ask you to tell us what according to

5 establishment would be the composition of the security section of the

6 Drina Corps command?

7 A. Before I answer, I would like to clarify a term that is being

8 used in two instances which are different. One is the organ bezbednost,

9 the security organ, and the other one would be the Drina Corps security

10 organ or the command security organ. The security organ in everyday

11 terminology would be the authorised officer in the security organ who has

12 certain authorities and by establishment is posted to a function where he

13 performs his duties. The command security organ is an organisational

14 establishment structure in the command entrusted with executing the tasks

15 that are within its purview. So by leaving out the words, "command,"

16 when we are talking to security organs, we would maybe think that we are

17 talking about an organ, but when we say "security organ," we mean the

18 officer. But when we say command security organ we mean a body which is

19 within the command which is in charge of or entrusted with security

20 assignments which are part of its assigned duties.

21 So now we could communicate without confusion about what a

22 security organ is and what a command security organ is. I hope that I

23 have managed to explain the difference clearly enough so that when we

24 discuss security organs, we always know precisely what we are referring

25 to.

1 Q. You have done that quite clearly, but quite quickly, so I would

2 just like to ask you to slow down a little bit in your explanations.

3 A. Yes, yes, thank you. I'm going to explain much more in my

4 explanation and I will try to do that.

5 Q. I would just now like to ask you to respond to the question that

6 has to do with the establishment formation for the security organ.

7 A. Now we are speaking about the security organ of the command of

8 the Drina Corps. The security organ of the Drina Corps command, by

9 establishment, is called the security section. The security section of

10 the Drina Corps command comprised -- its composition was given by

11 establishment and we see it right here in front of us under number 57 and

12 on. The section was headed by the chief of the section. He was a

13 colonel by establishment. His deputy for counter-intelligence affairs

14 would be the next person in line whose duties by establishment were

15 within the section, and these duties were set down. His rank would be

16 Lieutenant Colonel. The next assistant chief of the section would be the

17 person in charge of security staff affairs. It's very important to note

18 the names of these assistants because later, in the performance of its

19 duties in the section, these assistants were considered as officers

20 within the sectors of their duties, and you can see that this is somebody

21 who is in charge of counter-intelligence affairs and a person in charge

22 of security staff affairs. So you can already see the division of labour

23 between throws who are working within the command and those who would be

24 working in the section. Then we have three other establishment posts.

25 These would be desk officers.

1 Q. Can we now move to next page of the B/C/S text? I believe we

2 also need to move on to the next page in English.

3 A. Under 58/2, we see desk officer. We have three officers in this

4 rubric, three desk officers in the section, who also have certain duties

5 assigned to them within the section. They are mainly dealing with

6 counter-intelligence affairs. We have an officer for military police,

7 desk officer for military police. This is noteworthy because this

8 officer is extremely important to the section chief when military

9 police-related affairs are concerned, professional management and

10 guidance, and some affairs related to equipping the military police,

11 where the security administration was technically responsible for

12 providing equipment. It was through the security administration that

13 equipment was supplied and delivered to the military police to the extent

14 it was possible to actually be done at that time.

15 Then we have an administrative -- assistant administrative

16 officer, operator-typist and a driver. So we have this number of

17 officers with a structure of ranks determined by establishment.

18 The general conclusion about this section is that it is a very

19 well-developed structure which has a complement by ranks that indicates

20 their job is to do very complex and very extensive security affairs.

21 Otherwise, the complement would be different. This section would look

22 different. I had occasion in the Yugoslav People's Army to elaborate on

23 the work of intelligence officers at corps level and I know exactly what

24 was the work-load of individuals. If there are only as many as we see in

25 this section then their work-load would be very high, both in the units

1 and in the area of the corps that they are covering.

2 Q. To make this clearer, out of these nine persons, do all of them

3 deal with security matters or there are perhaps some who do not work

4 strictly on security matters, although they are part of the section?

5 A. Some of these are authorised officers in the security section who

6 have IDs of security officers and may apply methods of security organs

7 based on the powers given them. Those are personal powers. That is

8 powers vested in the persons that are not assignable to other persons or

9 other security organs. All these officers, save for the assistant for

10 security staff affairs, are security organs who are authorised to apply

11 these methods of work and the desk officer for military police, because

12 in the segment of their job that is related to crime, the officer in

13 charge of military police participates in these jobs as an authorised

14 officer in the security organ, whenever the military investigating judge

15 entrusts him with such work. He has to be an authorised officer in the

16 security organ.

17 That is the composition and the method of work, speaking of

18 individuals, whereas the section as a whole discharges the security

19 function in the way it is regulated by the rule of service of the

20 security organ under the guidance and command of the chief of the

21 security section. So they are under the command of the chief. The chief

22 gives them their assignments, he monitors their performance, and he

23 reports to his own superior, the corps commander, on the work of the

24 section. That is the security section of the Drina Corps command, from

25 the viewpoint of establishment, the way establishment envisaged that it

1 should be organised and that it should function.

2 Q. Just a clarification. Can you look at the last two items on the

3 list? Are they also security officers?

4 A. I finished my previous answer with the desk officer for military

5 police. The assistant administrative officer, operator-typist, is not an

6 authorised officer, although he is working with the security section,

7 and, of course, the driver.

8 Q. Now, compared to this prescribed situation, what was the actual

9 complement of the security organ in July 1995?

10 A. We can hardly talk about a full complement. We can talk about

11 the chief of the section and one civilian who was a technical clerk

12 processing documents, and the other vacancies were not filled, and we

13 could say that the chief of section was the whole section, as far as the

14 actual functioning is concerned. In that sense, it is astounding to look

15 at his work-load and what he was actually able to do in the area of the

16 Drina Corps in view of all that was going on, not only according to

17 establishment but looking at the reality.

18 Q. When you say there was another person, a technical assistant, who

19 would that be in the establishment?

20 A. 58/4, the administrative assistant, operator-typist. But even he

21 did less than was envisaged by the establishment. It was a civilian who

22 was doing as much as he was able to do. An assistant administrative

23 officer, operator-typist, would be a more complex job because it implies

24 available of certain technical resources. It doesn't matter where this

25 technical resource would be used. It's important that it is available.

1 Q. Does it follow from that that only one person dealt with all the

2 security affairs in the command of the Drina Corps?

3 A. Well, according to the actual complement, one person, the chief

4 of the section, was both the authorised commanding officer in the

5 security section authorised to apply methods of the security organ, and

6 he was the chief for all the other affairs, fulfilling the duties of all

7 these other people who were not actually there. This work had to be done

8 because the work is dictated by needs, not by prescribed complement.

9 Q. You told us a moment ago that the security chief was able to

10 issue orders, was able to command only over those persons who were

11 employed in the very section, security section, of the command of the

12 Drina Corps. Does it mean that he had command over just this one other

13 person that you mentioned?

14 A. Precisely.

15 Q. Now, could you please move on to the Operation Krivaja 95 itself?

16 It's P107, Prosecutor's Exhibit 107. In your report, it's in paragraph

17 4.22. It's on page 38 in your copy. We need the first page of this

18 document. I believe this is page 2.

19 First of all, look at the first paragraph of this document and

20 try to see what were the security aspects, if you see any, what are the

21 security problems highlighted in this paragraph?

22 A. In the third item, we see, "in the past few days, especially

23 active are Muslim forces from the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica. They

24 continue to infiltrate sabotage terrorist groups which are attacking

25 unprotected villages."

1 This is the reason why the security situation needed to be

2 analysed as defined in the order itself. It is obvious that security

3 problems had escalated and become extremely serious in the area of the

4 corps and they were more pronounced in the protected area of Srebrenica

5 than before. So that the security organ, which was involved, had to be

6 involved in evaluating the security situation and had to propose

7 measures. The security organ had to derive from this specific tasks for

8 the period when this order had to be implemented.

9 In addition, the operations being prepared were one more reason

10 to ensure that units prepare safely and move into action with the

11 adequate security support and counter-intelligence support. From this,

12 we clearly see what problems and tasks were facing the security organ and

13 what it had to do.

14 Q. Can we now look at the lower part of this paragraph? We see a

15 description of the enemy, deployment of enemy military forces. From this

16 document, can you see whether the Army of Republika Srpska had accurate

17 information about the enemy at the time?

18 A. The Army of Republika Srpska, judging by what we read in the

19 order, was well-acquainted with the deployment of the enemy. It had good

20 counter-intelligence about this and knew the exact disposition of enemy

21 forces, which means that it was not in the dark as to who it was facing.

22 Q. Can we move on to the next page, paragraph 4? English page 3.

23 What is the set objective of this action? It's in paras 1 and 2,

24 in passages 1 and 2 of this paragraph, in fact. Can you make an

25 assessment from this set objective what number of prisoners of war could

1 be expected in the execution of this action?

2 A. I have already said something about the name of this operation,

3 and the scale of the operation as planned defines it in my opinion as a

4 tactical action. In terms of the way it was to be achieved, we see that

5 it was about repelling enemy forces towards the enclave and narrowing

6 down the enclave and cutting off communications between Zepa and

7 Srebrenica enclaves. The aim was to stop this communication and place

8 this sector under complete control.

9 The set objective and the planned scale gave no indication

10 whatsoever that any significant number of enemy -- of the enemy could be

11 taken prisoner because the objective was tactical, that is to reduce

12 Srebrenica to the narrow urban zone. It was not about capturing enemy

13 units. So there are no elements to conclude that there would be a large

14 number of prisoners of war. On the contrary, all the elements indicate

15 that only a small number of prisoners of war was expected. That was the

16 evaluation.

17 Q. Could we now move on to the fifth page of this document? It's

18 page 6, I believe, in English. It's para 10(b) -- sorry, page 7, 7 in

19 English.

20 Tasks are set here for the security organs. We see the heading

21 in the original on the previous page, but we don't actually need it at

22 this moment. You have seen this document more than once. Tell us more

23 about your opinion on the assignment of tasks to take care or accommodate

24 any prisoners of war that may be taken during this action and the tasks

25 of the security organ related thereto.

1 A. I particularly analysed the tasks given to the security organ

2 because it's set out in the objective, and in my report that was my job.

3 I was somewhat surprised or nonplussed by the fact that security organs

4 were designated to identify areas of collection, together with the

5 military police, to determine the areas of collection of prisoners of war

6 and war booty. In all my prior testimony, I continuously pointed out

7 that it was not the job of security organs, it's not within their scope

8 of work, not within their purview.

9 On top of that comes the fact that all I said about threatening

10 activities, we could see that the security organ had its hands full with

11 the problems that were within its own purview, within its own scope of

12 work, and they had a lot to do in keeping with the rule of the corps,

13 which designates the security organ as responsible for all security

14 affairs in the command and the primary organ responsible for

15 counter-intelligence. So this assignment to the security organ is not

16 consistent with its functional purpose, but it's also not consistent with

17 the objectives of this operation, from the viewpoint of security.

18 Q. How do you understand, in this paragraph, the term which says,

19 sectors will be designed or determined? How do you understand this term

20 "sector"? What is its meaning in the military terminology?

21 A. The definition of a sector is rather vague from the point of view

22 of precision, so that I can say only that a sector is a rather vague

23 area. It has to be denoted by something, by a name, by a feature, where

24 it is situated, so one could reach the feature that is part of that

25 sector. The sector is defined by the security organ and says what it

1 comprises. The sector is only a task, and you have to say which sector

2 it is in this particular document, the sector features here only for the

3 purposes of giving a task and later on the sector is defined in greater

4 details.

5 Q. Tell me, please, war booty is mentioned here. Could you please

6 tell us whether there is a document, a norm regulating the work of the

7 security organ? Is the war booty mentioned as such?

8 A. As far as the security organs are concerned, there is no

9 reference to either prisoners of war or war booty. There is a special

10 provision about war booty and how to treat war booty. War booty is

11 something that is part of the purview of the logistics. They have to

12 deal with the war booty. This is beyond the scope of activities of the

13 security organs and I would not be able to provide any specific answer to

14 this question.

15 Q. You also looked at another version of this same order for active

16 combat. On its first page, you can see that this is copy number 3 of

17 this order. However, there is another version of the same order, which

18 is 1D382, and it is entitled, "Copy number 2." Did you ever compare

19 these two versions of the -- of the order?

20 A. In my report, I have stated that I have compared these two texts

21 and I was able to find some differences in them. On the page defining

22 the task that we have just discussed, a correction has been made, which

23 has not confirmed the task of the security organ such as was featured in

24 the first copy, but, rather, the sector of the collection of prisoners of

25 war was directly determined.

1 Q. Let us just wait a minute for the text to appear on the screen.

2 This is on page 5 in the B/C/S version and the penultimate page in the

3 English version. I believe that it is page number 6.

4 Could you please go one page back in the English text? Go back

5 to the previous page. Now we have it. Yes. Now, could you please

6 continue? And I apologise for interrupting you. We were not able to

7 follow your words without the text on the screen.

8 A. I'm looking at the second line from the top of the page where it

9 says that the security organs and the military police, and let me not

10 read any further. This has been crossed out with a felt-tip pen. And

11 then on the margin, it says, the sector of where prisoners of war will be

12 collected is Pribicevac.

13 Q. Prisoners of war?

14 A. Yes, prisoners of war and war booty. That is something else

15 added on top of the handwritten sentence but obviously the first sentence

16 was about prisoners of war.

17 Q. Now my impression is that that is -- that this is lacking from

18 the translation. I can't see it in the English version.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's inside. It's not written in the margin like

20 the original.

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, sorry.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Satisfied with that?

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, yes.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Can you now tell us, please, what is your position, what is your

2 conclusion with regard to these corrections in the document that we are

3 currently discussing?

4 A. Since I've already spoken about the task of the security organs

5 and their attitude towards prisoners of war in dealing with those issues,

6 one can say here that what is written here is completely in accordance

7 with the purview of command with regard to the prisoners of war, so it is

8 within the purview of the command and not of the security organ. So my

9 opinion would be that whoever corrected the text completely complied with

10 the regulations in terms of the work of the security organ.

11 Q. Can we now look at 1D1294? 1D1294, yes.

12 I see we don't have a translation, so could you please briefly

13 tell us about this document? What is it about? Just very briefly.

14 A. This is an order for active combat, operative number 1 of the

15 command of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade issued on the 5th of

16 July 1995. This order followed the order that we have just discussed.

17 This is a document that regulates all the issues of the engagements of

18 the Bratunac Brigade in the tasks given to it.

19 Q. Can we now look at the document to see how the security issues

20 have been regulated by this document? This is on page 5 of this

21 document, and I'm talking about providing security during combat. Look

22 at item 3, please.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey?

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry, did we get an English translation of that?

25 I know there is one. It should be in e-court. We can give you a land on

1 that.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Can't help you there. Yes, Mr. Zivanovic?

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I believe that the document is -- was translated

4 but I cannot see that.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Many years ago. And it's -- we'll get it up for

6 you here.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Do we have it in e-court? No. All right. We'll

8 try to --

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry, if we can find it, we'll get it now.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. McCloskey. Let's proceed, Mr.

11 Zivanovic.

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. How does this document regulate the collection of prisoners of

14 war and war booty or the issue thereof in more general terms?

15 A. In a nutshell, the collection of prisoners of war and war booty

16 is regulated just as in the item that we just discussed in the operative

17 number 1, order for combat, by the command of the Drina Corps. What I'm

18 saying is this: I'm not commenting upon the contents of this order but

19 in terms of security, this order regulates obligations towards prisoners

20 of war in the way as provided for by the handwritten corrections in

21 felt-tip pen. That's how things were regulated.

22 Q. Who issued this order? And you will find it on the last page of

23 the document.

24 A. The order was issued by the commander of the Bratunac Brigade.

25 Q. Let's go back to the document that we saw a little while ago,

1 which is 1D382. Can we have page number 5?

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: In meantime, I would just like to inform the

3 Trial Chamber that the translation of previous document is marked as

4 5D01107.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Can you verify that, Madam Registrar, please, or

6 Prosecution? 1107.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Prosecution 3025, too. Between those numbers, we

8 ought to be able to find it.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. So let's go ahead.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. In addition to what you have pointed our attention to,

12 handwritten on the margin, there is another part of the text that has

13 been crossed out. Could you please tell us what it is and whether it is

14 also in keeping with the rules regulating the work of the security organ?

15 A. This thing that was first written and then crossed out is not in

16 keeping with the rules of the security organ because the security regime

17 in the areas of the units is established by the unit commanders, whereas

18 the security organs propose measures that should be applied within the

19 framework of the security regime. They should be implemented and their

20 application should be controlled. This is something that commanders

21 should order but something that is proposed for the commander's order or

22 decision, depending on the type of command that is in place at the time.

23 That is why there is no separate document as an instruction about the

24 security regime. Rather, it is part of the order-issuing document.

25 Q. Could you please tell me whether you are able to read the

1 handwritten words on the margin?

2 A. The only thing that I can read is, "no, no" on both sides of the

3 text. These are the only two words. There is no other comment provided

4 next to that.

5 Q. And now, based on the combat documents and all the other

6 documents that you were able to peruse, would you be able to say whether

7 in the course of the Operation Krivaja 95 or whatever this military

8 operation should be called, there were any prisoners of war taken up to

9 the moment when enclaves were separated and the objective of the

10 operation was achieved?

11 A. According to the documentation that I perused, I could not find

12 any traces or any information pointing to the fact that in the course of

13 the realisation of Krivaja 95, there were any prisoners of war, and

14 especially there were no such prisoners that would have been treated

15 according to the items by the security organs. Not even according to

16 this order that has not been drafted according to the rules of the work

17 of the security organs.

18 Q. Did you see any documents providing information about the places

19 where the military police of the Drina Corps were during the course of

20 this operation, i.e. when this operation was planned and executed?

21 A. I came by a document which provides very precise information as

22 to the situation, the deployment of the military police of the Drina

23 Corps in the month of June. In a nutshell, this document provides

24 information to the effect that 90 per cent of the military police were

25 engaged in those tasks.

1 Q. We are going to look at 1D1078.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat the number?

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] 1D1078.

4 Q. When was this report compiled? Would you be able to tell from

5 the stamp in the left-hand side corner?

6 A. This is a report of the command of the 5th Battalion of the

7 military police. It was drafted on the 7th of July 1995.

8 Q. Can we please look at item 5 or paragraph 5 in this document?

9 Can we go to next page, please?

10 We have the translation but we don't have the original second

11 page. I can provide it to be shown on the ELMO.

12 Let's look at item number 5 of this document. Tell me, please,

13 when you look at item number 5, can you conclude that the unit or a large

14 part of the military police of the Drina Corps was engaged in tasks which

15 are not prescribed by the rules of service of the military police?

16 A. It says in this item that in the past month and since the report

17 was drafted in the month of July, obviously the report refers to the

18 month of June, 90 per cent of the unit was carrying out combat tasks in

19 the zone of responsibility, according to this report, combat tasks were

20 not military policing tasks. They were part of the combat activities of

21 the units that were carried out in the area listed further on. I'm not

22 going into the details of the geography. What matters is that this was

23 combat and not the regular military policing duties, the mere fact that

24 says it was beyond the scope of the activity of the military police.

25 Q. Can you just read the rest, where they were engaged until the

1 full stop?

2 A. "Engaged in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Romanija

3 Motorised Brigade, area Kocari where it still is, and then it says one

4 squad of the military police was engaged in combat actions in repelling

5 an enemy attack in the area of responsibility of the 1st Brcanska

6 Infantry Brigade, the area of Vis."

7 Q. I wanted us to focus on this part of the sentence which says

8 where they still are, where it still is. In view of the time when this

9 report was drafted.

10 A. I understand.

11 Q. Can we now move back to page 1? It is in e-court. And it's in

12 the fourth paragraph.

13 Can you see from this paragraph how many military policemen

14 actually remained in the Drina Corps to perform their regular duties?

15 A. In this paragraph, there is a clear separation between engagement

16 in a purely military police activity from engagement in combat

17 activities. Even for the military police tasks, 13 military policemen

18 were doing military police work, either rotating or continuously as

19 dictated by the needs of service. Part of the work was taken in rotation

20 and divided by various services. We looked at various services of the

21 military police when we spoke about escorting prisoners of war. We also

22 have the duty service of the military police that was organised here.

23 Q. Did you get hold of a document or a piece of information that

24 would indicate that the military police of the Drina Corps escorted

25 military prisoners -- prisoners of war?

1 A. I never found such information in documents.

2 Q. I'd now like to look at P33. Are you familiar with this

3 document?

4 A. I am.

5 Q. What does it say?

6 A. It's a document of the Main Staff. We see from the heading that

7 the President of Republika Srpska was informed about the situation around

8 Srebrenica and the conditions that were created and the objective that

9 was attained in the operative document number 1 of the command of the

10 Drina Corps. That is very briefly the substance of this passage. And

11 the President of the republic is happy with the results achieved around

12 Srebrenica and agrees to continue with activities around Srebrenica to

13 disarm Muslim terrorist gangs and to achieve a complete demilitarisation

14 of the Srebrenica enclave. That means the president is informed and he

15 gives his consent.

16 And then it goes on to say, "President of Republika Srpska

17 ordered the continuation of combat operations, that full protection be

18 given to UNPROFOR members and the Muslim civilian population, and that

19 they be given guarantees of safety if they cross over to the territory of

20 Republika Srpska." The text goes on to detail treatment of facilities

21 and other issues relevant to combat operations and restraint and

22 refraining from destroying civilian targets. The substance is what the

23 President of Republika Srpska ordered.

24 Q. This order of the President of the republic, was it executed in

25 part or in whole?

1 A. It was executed, as far as objectives and tasks are concerned.

2 Srebrenica was demilitarised and the follow-up activity was to disarm

3 Muslim armed units in the areas where they were found. So it was a

4 process. Disarming was carried out simultaneously with the

5 demilitarisation of Srebrenica, but yes, this task, this order was

6 executed as the combat activities proceeded.

7 Q. About these tasks that you discussed, where Vujadin Popovic was

8 the security organ of the Drina Corps, was given tasks related to various

9 sabotage activities of the Muslim forces, did you see anywhere in the

10 documents that there existed other serious security problems that he had

11 to deal with under the rules of service, problems that were his job to

12 deal with?

13 A. When I spoke about the security section of the Drina Corps

14 command, I said briefly that their work-load was very high and their job

15 was very complex, the section was not properly supplied with personnel

16 and that most of the work was done by the chief of the section who was

17 the only professional in the corps command whose job it was to perform

18 counter-intelligence.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, one moment. Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry, this is repetitive, it's non-responsive

21 and if we could just get to an answer. Perhaps if the question was not

22 so vague he could focus but the question doesn't have any time frame on

23 it.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic and Mr. Vuga, I mean the

25 question was a very simple one basically and I agree with Mr. McCloskey,

1 it wasn't vague, except that there isn't a time frame. So let's place a

2 time frame to it and you be more specific, Mr. Zivanovic, and you too,

3 and please try to be concise in your answer, colonel, as much as you can.

4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. So my question is: At this time, when the action Krivaja 95 is

6 beginning, did you find any documents indicating any activities that

7 required the engagement of Vujadin Popovic as the security organ of the

8 command of the Drina Corps?

9 A. Yes. I have seen such documents. He was engaged in

10 counter-intelligence work, very well developed and very extensive.

11 Q. I would like to look at document 3033.

12 Are you familiar with this document? If you are, tell me what

13 you can about it.

14 A. I'm familiar with the document. It talks about the operation

15 action which is the most complex operation for the security organs of the

16 RS. The document says that it was ordered to assassinate -- it had been

17 ordered to assassinate the commander of the Main Staff, Lieutenant

18 Colonel -- sorry, Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic, and the assistant

19 commander for security and intelligence, Major General Zdravko Tolimir.

20 It makes the security organs responsible for taking the measures listed

21 in the document.

22 Q. Can you clarify the extent and the nature of work that Popovic

23 had to do in this connection under the rules of service? That's the

24 question.

25 A. The extent and nature of his job requires a lengthy explanation

1 but I'll just say that his work was such that in every area of the zone

2 of the Drina Corps where these two senior officers were expected to

3 appear, he was responsible for counter-intelligence support, for

4 organising security for these officers. Lieutenant Colonel Popovic was

5 responsible for all that.

6 Q. From which side was this attack expected? Is there any -- is

7 there any significance in the name of this operation, Judas?

8 A. In the situation that prevailed there at the time, it's quite

9 natural that the Muslim side was doing its best to perform its mission

10 against the commander of the Main Staff and his assistant, but this name

11 tells us that it was something organised internally, within Republika

12 Srpska, and in the territory under the control of the VRS. That's where

13 this contracted murder was to take place.

14 Q. When you say under the control of Republika Srpska or the VRS,

15 does that include the Army of Republika Srpska itself?

16 A. Anyone who would be involved in this action would be included,

17 and the security organs had to find out how and where it is being

18 organised.

19 Q. In para 4 of this document, it says that auxiliary files will be

20 kept in the corps security department. What does that mean?

21 A. Well, that is the realisation of the obligation to collect

22 information throughout the territory and that everything has to be

23 available in the auxiliary files so that a quick evaluation of all the

24 intelligence would be possible and so that adequate measures would be

25 taken, again in an organised and centralised way, based on that

1 evaluation. These auxiliary files were to be kept in the security organs

2 in the area of the corps.

3 Q. To what extent does the security organ of the corps has to be

4 engaged on a task like this?

5 A. In terms of rules and in reality, an operative action is the most

6 demanding type of engagement for the security organ in the VRS.

7 Q. This document is dated 20th April 1995, and the actions connected

8 with Srebrenica occurred in July 1995. Can you tell us whether this

9 action could cease to be topical, could have ceased to be topical in July

10 of 1995?

11 A. These actions are of such a nature that the lapse of time does

12 not matter unless they have been executed. It is the execution that

13 is -- and full commitment that are decisive for detecting those who are

14 preparing this type of action.

15 Q. Yesterday, or the day before yesterday, you said that one of the

16 jobs of the security organ was to protect military information from the

17 enemy, from enemy intelligence services. Can you tell us, were you able

18 to see from the documents what was the extent of the activity of the

19 enemy intelligence service in the area of the Drina Corps and to what

20 extent did the security organ, that is Vujadin Popovic, have to be

21 engaged in countering enemy intelligence work?

22 A. As for information leaks, they were accounted for partly by leaks

23 in communication and another part by enemy reconnaissance. I know

24 reliably from documents of the Muslim side that this is true, because

25 they indicate very precisely the deployment of units of the VRS, that is

1 certain parts of the Army of Republika Srpska, and that information could

2 have been collected only through intelligence work, on site, by listening

3 to communication, through interception, and through the work of agents.

4 That is how information was collected by the enemy side on the Army of

5 Republika Srpska, and it was up to those who are in charge of protecting

6 the VRS to respond appropriately.

7 Q. Let us now look at 1D1077.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Is there a problem? No. All right. Do we have

9 the English translation of this document? All right. Let's proceed and

10 then in five minutes' time we will have a break, Mr. Zivanovic.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Mr. Vuga, could you please tell me whether you took into account

13 the document that you have on the screen now?

14 A. Yes. I took it into account and I studied it from the point of

15 view of security.

16 Q. When it comes to this document and its item 1, it deals with the

17 aggressor, and that's the title of this item. Who is the author of this

18 document, could you please tell us? We don't have the translation so it

19 will help us.

20 A. The document is from the command of the Vitez Brigade, and it

21 gives information about the Army of Republika Srpska and about the area

22 of responsibility of the Vitez Brigade.

23 Q. Do you know which units of the Army of Republika Srpska were

24 comprised by this report, i.e., by the situation as described herein?

25 A. I was only interested in the Zvornik Brigade and its battalions.

1 As for the rest, this was within the purview of the intelligence staff

2 who collected information about the trenches, the number of troops in

3 them and so on and so forth. What I'm saying is that I did not go

4 through all the items but it is really surprising to see how much detail

5 has been collected about the Army of Republika Srpska. This was the

6 essence and the point of everything that is written herein. In other

7 words, there is so much detail, there is so much precision in this

8 document that one had to use everything available to them in order to

9 analyse everything and to give it a certain significance. This is one of

10 the reasons for me to say that the intelligence activities were very

11 highly developed against the Army of Republika Srpska and particularly

12 against the Zvornik Brigade.

13 Q. Could you please tell us the date of the document, when the

14 document was drafted?

15 A. It was on the 21st of June 1995.

16 Q. In your view, at the time, was it necessary for the security

17 organs of the corps to engage to a higher scale in order to counter this

18 type of activity on the part of the enemy?

19 A. One could conclude from this that the threat for security by

20 revealing secret information created a major need for the organs of

21 security to do whatever they could to engage in other -- in the forms of

22 counter-intelligence in order to prevent the leak of information and that

23 the counter-intelligence activity of the security organ had to be at the

24 highest level because it is obvious that a lot of information had been

25 leaked or obtained through covert activities of the enemy's intelligence

1 service.

2 Q. You mentioned the movement along the territory, but because of

3 the speed this has not been registered.

4 A. Yes. Reconnoitring or moving through the territory.

5 Q. Can you please repeat that so that it may be recorded?

6 A. What I was saying is that one part of the findings in the

7 intelligence information, this is the intelligence information about the

8 aggressor, as is stated herein, could have only been collected by

9 reconnoitring the terrain on the part of the persons who could either

10 secretly or openly move across the territory, and had the possibility to

11 collect such information.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Mr. Zivanovic, we'll have a break now of 30

13 minutes. We need 30 minutes because we have got other things to discuss,

14 other matters to discuss. In the meantime, colonel, when we resume,

15 please keep in mind two things: One is to try and shorten your questions

16 as much as you can and stick to the point, to the substance of the

17 questions that are put to you and not go beyond; and secondly is to go a

18 little bit slower. We overhear, we sense a lot of tension in the

19 translation booths. They really have to make an effort to catch up with

20 you. If you could kindly speak a little bit slower.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that my apologies are no

22 good but I'll do my best to act in accordance with your words.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. We'll have a 30-minute break.

24 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

25 --- On resuming at 1.05 p.m.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, and we leave five minutes towards

2 the end, five or a little bit more than that so we hear what

3 Mr. McCloskey has to say about the Beara motions.

4 Mr. Zivanovic.

5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Mr. Vuga, we have arrived at the 11th of July and the entry of

7 the Army of Republika Srpska in Srebrenica. When you perused all the

8 documents that you analysed, did you come by a document showing the

9 reaction of the opposing side to the entrance of the Army of Republika

10 Srpska into Srebrenica? Can we please look at 1D1954? 1D954.

11 This document has not been translated, so I would kindly ask you

12 to tell us who the author of the document is, what is its form, and who

13 it was sent to.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm going to object to the use of a one-page

16 document dated July 11th that could have been translated. This is a

17 significant time frame, a significant document. If he can save that for

18 another time to go over it, he's going to be a long time, I just see no

19 reason why a document like this cannot be translated. To be in the dark

20 on there is just not -- it's prejudicial to the Prosecution.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Why hasn't it been translated, Mr. Zivanovic?

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It was submitted for translation two months ago,

23 as far as I know. I'll check it, I'll double check it, but as far as I

24 know, all our documents were submitted two months ago.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Anyway.

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: We can read it out is one thing because it's so

2 short.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed, and if we encounter problems that

4 are justified, then we'll have a ruling on it. But in the meantime,

5 let's proceed, please.

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Mr. Vuga, could you tell us briefly who the author of the

8 document is, what is its form, if you can tell us, and who it was sent

9 to?

10 A. The document was drafted by the command of the 2nd Corps of the

11 BiH army. This is a telegram. It was drafted on the 11th of July 1995.

12 And the essence of the document refers to the activities in the depth of

13 the temporarily occupied territory. And its form is actually an order.

14 It was sent to the commands of all the divisions of the land army to the

15 commanders, to the command of the forward command post of the 210th

16 Brigade, I can't explain the abbreviation NM, as well as to the command

17 of the forward command post of the 2nd Corps. So it was sent to the

18 commands of all the divisions, which is very important at this moment.

19 This is a document which in no uncertain terms very seriously

20 points to the changes in the manner the activities were conducted in

21 comparison to the manner they had been conducted up to then. And it also

22 points to the fact that the experiences speak that the partisan form of

23 combat was not sufficiently used and that it was necessary to improve the

24 use of the troops given the characteristics of the terrain which are

25 conducive to this type of activities.

1 Further on, it is stated that the partisan type of fight is

2 intensified and especially sabotage activities.

3 This is the essence of the document, and it defines the type of

4 actions in the upcoming period.

5 Q. If you look at the stamp, where it says "telegram," can you see

6 the time when the telegram was actually dispatched?

7 A. The telegram was dispatched on the day when it was drafted, on

8 the 11th of July, at 2210 hours. There is no time indication when the

9 document was drafted, but it was drafted and dispatched on the same day.

10 Q. Mr. Vuga, on that day, was there any document issued by the

11 organs of Republika Srpska concerning prisoners? Could you tell us, if

12 you know?

13 A. Based on my insight into the documents, at that moment there was

14 still no document referring to prisoners of war. I base my statement on

15 the documents that I saw.

16 Q. And was a document drafted to define the treatment of the

17 citizens who resided in Srebrenica at the moment when the Army of

18 Republika Srpska entered Srebrenica?

19 A. There is a document with the same date, actually it was a

20 decision by the President of Republika Srpska. According to the

21 document, a civilian commissioner, Miroslav Deronjic, was designated for

22 the civil affairs in the municipality of Srpska Srebrenica. That was on

23 the 11th of July, about the same time.

24 Q. Do you know what Miroslav Deronjic was at the time, what was his

25 position, if you know, if you can remember?

1 A. I don't know his previous position, but I read in the decision

2 what he was appointed to become.

3 Q. What tasks was he entrusted with in terms of the citizens who had

4 resided in Srebrenica up to then?

5 A. I paid special attention to item 4 in this decision, which

6 outlined the competences and obligations of Miroslav Deronjic with regard

7 to the citizens of Srebrenica and how the citizens of Srebrenica should

8 be treated.

9 Q. Could you please tell us, in very brief outlines, what the

10 President of the republic ordered the commissioner to do?

11 A. He was ordered to treat all the citizens who had participated in

12 combat against the Army of Republika Srpska as prisoners of war. He was

13 supposed to contact both military and civilian organs and to make sure

14 that the citizens who had participated in combat be treated as prisoners

15 of war. As for the rest of the citizens, they were to be given a choice

16 as to the place where they wanted to reside. They were to be guaranteed

17 safety if they moved or remained in the territory of Republika Srpska.

18 This is the essence of the matter when it came to the prisoners of war

19 and the authorities of the commissioner for civil affairs, Mr. Miroslav

20 Deronjic.

21 Q. Can you now tell us or explain the meaning of the word which is

22 used in item 4 of this decision, the commissioner will make sure that the

23 civilian organs treat anybody who participated in combat against the Army

24 of Republika Srpska as prisoners of war? What does this mean when he

25 says "make sure" or "ensure"?

1 A. In this context, as it is written, in view of the role of the

2 commissioner, to make sure or ensure means that he had the authority to

3 make sure that the decision of the President of the Republika Srpska be

4 implemented. In other words, all the other organs listed in the document

5 should act upon the commissioner's requests because the President

6 entrusted him with the authority to implement his decision about the

7 prisoners of war. This is the meaning of the expression "to make sure"

8 or "ensure."

9 Q. Can you now tell me, in item 3 of this decision, it says --

10 A. I don't have the decision, and that's a problem.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I have the decision?

13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. This is

14 Prosecutor's exhibit number 10. I apologise. I've not called it up on

15 the screen.

16 Q. Mr. Vuga, in item 3, a reference is made to the fact that the

17 commissioner, in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior, will

18 establish the functioning of the public security station. You mentioned

19 that in your report. Would you please tell me whether this was indeed

20 done, whether this part of the decision was indeed implemented?

21 A. In the documents that I looked at and analysed, I could see that

22 this part of the decision started being implemented on the day when the

23 decision was issued, which means that this was implemented because there

24 is a document, a subsequent document, pointing to the activities that

25 were carried out in that sense. It may be said that this part of the

1 decision was implemented, given the fact that measures were put in place

2 for its implementation, the process was launched and was carried through.

3 Q. I have provided you with some exhibits, and we have also seen

4 some video footages, showing that on the 11th of July, when the Army of

5 Republika Srpska was entering Srebrenica, Vujadin Popovic was also there.

6 The tasks that he had, according to the rules, and in view of the

7 prevalent situation, did these tasks call for his presence in Srebrenica

8 on that day?

9 A. His presence in Srebrenica was mandatory.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. That objection -- or that question

12 suggests that the rules -- that from the rules we can tell what he was

13 assigned to that day which is impossible. If he wants to ask what

14 rules -- what the rules say he could have been doing in that situation, I

15 guess that's all right, but he is suggesting that from the rules we can

16 tell what he was doing, and that's objectionable, in my view.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I shall rephrase my question.

19 Q. Mr. Vuga, you were telling us about the rules governing the work

20 of the security organs and regulating that work. The tasks arising from

21 the rules and the specific situation that you have described for us in

22 great length, did they all call for the presence of Mr. Vujadin Popovic

23 in Srebrenica on the 11th of July 1995 when the Army of Republika Srpska

24 was entering the enclave?

25 JUDGE AGIUS: I think he understood your objection,

1 Mr. McCloskey. Yes?

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, and the rules obviously can't call for

3 Colonel Popovic to be in Srebrenica either. So that question is

4 objectionable as well.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, but it derives from the rule. It is the

7 point of my question, whether it derives from the rule.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: He's in Srebrenica on the orders of his

9 commander. I don't know where the rules come into this unless he wants,

10 as again give him a hypothetical given the situation what might a person

11 in this situation be doing, but I'm -- again that may be speculative.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Stick to your -- yes, Mr. Bourgon?

13 MR. BOURGON: Mr. President, I disagree with my colleague from

14 the Prosecution. This question is perfectly legitimate in terms of do

15 the rules, can the rule justify the presence of a person in Srebrenica?

16 We will have similar types of questions when we continue with the same

17 witness and, Mr. President, I object to that question -- to that -- I

18 oppose the objection of the Prosecution. Thank you.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, do you wish to add anything, Mr. Zivanovic?

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I can rephrase my question. It will avoid any

21 further discussion with the Prosecution.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Then let's see how you can rephrase it

23 and if it will solve the problem, if there is a problem.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. On the 11th of July, could the presence of Vujadin Popovic in

1 Srebrenica be justified from the point of view of rules regulating the

2 work of security organs?

3 A. I did not hear your question.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: That's what we needed. I'll read it out again as

5 put to you by Mr. Zivanovic. Are you receiving interpretation now? Yes.

6 Mr. Zivanovic asked you the following: "On the 11th of July, could the

7 presence of Vujadin Popovic in Srebrenica be justified from the point of

8 view of rules regulating the work of security organs?"

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, it could be.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. We saw him at the police station in Srebrenica in one video. My

12 next question, therefore, is: Could his visit to that police station be

13 justified by the same rules?

14 A. His visit to the police station is completely consistent with his

15 role and tasks that he had as the chief of the security organ of the

16 Drina Corps.

17 Q. When you said that his appearance in Srebrenica on the 11th of

18 July 1995 could be justified by the rules, could you explain in greater

19 detail how and why?

20 A. A more detailed explanation would go as follows: 1, the security

21 situation in Srebrenica was very complex. There was no disarmament of

22 the enemy units in Srebrenica. 2, the weapons that we knew existed in

23 Srebrenica were not under control and could be accessed by who knows who.

24 It was not under the control of the VRS. 3, the operative action Judas

25 was ongoing. 4, Ratko Mladic was coming and moving through Srebrenica.

1 According to the operation Judas the engagement of Popovic was necessary

2 and required. From the security point of view, the situation was

3 completely disrupted and the security was the responsibility of the Drina

4 Corps until all the authorities were established and began to function as

5 ordered by the President, Radovan Karadzic. All the other

6 counter-intelligence work that was not taken off the agenda with the

7 entry into Srebrenica did not cease; it continued even after the VRS

8 entered Srebrenica.

9 Q. I don't think I need to show you these exhibits again, but we

10 have seen that on July 12, a large number of Muslims concentrated in the

11 UN base in Potocari and around it. From the documents you have studied,

12 were you able to establish whether this group consisted entirely of

13 civilians or it included perhaps some non-civilians?

14 A. From the documents that I analysed, I found one document issued

15 by the Muslim side which says that among the refugees there were around

16 300 members of the 28th Division.

17 Q. Could we look at document 1D463? I believe the English

18 translation, the passage that we need, is on the next page. Could you

19 scroll down to the bottom of the English text? Yes, we need to move on

20 to the next page in English.

21 The sentence begins on the previous page and continues on this

22 page. Tell us, please, do you see that passage in the document? First

23 of all, tell us whose document is this and when was it drafted?

24 A. It's from the General Staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 It was written on the 12th of July 1995 at 1325 hours.

1 Q. Let us look at the last paragraph but one that begins with the

2 words, "Tonight." In English it begins on the previous page and

3 continues on this one.

4 A. We need the next page as well.

5 Q. I don't think so. I think the sentence is on this page in

6 Serbian.

7 A. It's hard to read because of all the problems I'm facing now.

8 I'll try the other pair of glasses.

9 Q. It's in your third folder. Or if you want, I can read the

10 sentence.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: He has problems with eyes.

12 Q. [Interpretation] Do you see now? It has been zoomed in. It's

13 the sixth line from the bottom.

14 A. Yes, I found it. "Around 2300 hours tonight, we had between 15

15 and 20.000 refugees who were sitting in the area of combat activities

16 together with 300 fighting men of the BH army in the base in Potocari".

17 Q. Is that the document?

18 A. Yes.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I think we can stop here and deal with

20 the other issues.

21 Colonel, we are going to stop here for today with your testimony

22 because we have got some procedural matters that we need to discuss.

23 We'll see you again tomorrow morning at 9.00, and thank you so much.

24 [The witness stands down]

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. I will try to go over

2 the outline of our response to the Beara motion and provide you some

3 information on our continuing discussions with them on these and related

4 matters. Regarding --

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Will you be dealing also with the latest motion

6 about the video conference request?

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Regarding 92 bis statements, with respect to the

10 proposed 92 bis statements, we agree with the Beara team's filing on that

11 issue except in two areas. We -- first we agree that 21 of the 22

12 proposed 92 bis witnesses listed in paragraph 8, that's fine, but the one

13 we object to, and it may be better to go into private session just

14 because sometimes it's -- the names will help.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's do that. Let's go into private session for a

16 short while, please.

17 [Private session]

18 (redacted)

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3 [Open session]

4 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session.

5 MR. OSTOJIC: With respect to the character witnesses, we have

6 minimised them and we have provided many of the character witnesses

7 through 92 bis and the Prosecution has been most cooperative in agreeing

8 to accept them under those terms. The other ones go to pattern and

9 conduct. The Muslim, the Macedonian, the Croatian witnesses that we hope

10 to bring to this Court will show that they had both personal and

11 professional involvement with Mr. Beara and I think it's important for

12 this Court to hear that evidence. So I do object to them calling it

13 irrelevant, but if he does have specifically some that he believes may in

14 his mind not be fully understandable, I'll share with him my thoughts on

15 it in more detail.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you, both. Please try to continue

17 talking amongst yourselves and if there is any kind of development in

18 this area, please come back to us before we hand down our decision, which

19 is to be expected probably Friday. Not later than that any way.

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: The one thing I didn't say, it's hard to imagine

21 starting the case on this coming Monday, though that may be the way it

22 is. I don't think I'm going to take too long with the cross-examination

23 of this witness, though, just because the lack of information that we

24 have currently.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but anyway, I'll come to this tomorrow

1 morning. In the meantime, you will have a little bit more opportunity to

2 talk amongst yourselves and see who will be cross-examining or examining

3 this witness, so more or less, if you could update your estimate of how

4 much time you will require. Yes, Madam Fauveau?

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, regarding the Defence

6 of Mr. Miletic we would like to tell you that we will not have any

7 questions.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I'll come back to you tomorrow on this

9 because we have to leave the courtroom. Thank you.

10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

11 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 3rd day of July,

12 2008, at 9.00 a.m.

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