Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 23230

1 Thursday, 3 July 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: So, Madam Registrar, good morning to you. Could

7 you call the case, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,

9 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-05-88-T, the

10 Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, thank you. Good morning, everybody.

12 All the accused are here. From the Defence teams I notice

13 the absence of Ms. Tapuskovic, Mr. Nikolic,

14 and I think that's it. Prosecution is

15 represented today by Mr. McCloskey.

16 Do you think you will finish today, Mr. Zivanovic?

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. And could I ask you, Mr. Ostojic, if you

19 intend to cross-examine this witness?

20 MR. OSTOJIC: Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours. We

21 do for the time estimate 45 minutes to an hour, but I think Madam Nikolic

22 may have direct.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I'm coming to Madam Nikolic. And Ms. Nikolic,

24 do you still intend to examine this witness as your witness?

25 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, yes. We will

Page 23231

1 have some questions, and we need about four hours for those.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Mr. Lazarevic?

3 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes, good morning, Your Honours. We indicated 20

4 minutes for cross-examination of this witness. I will stick to this

5 estimation for the moment. I will have to wait for this witness to

6 finish his examination-in-chief, and then we will make a final decision.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Fauveau yesterday indicated that she doesn't

8 have any. And Mr. Krgovic?

9 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honour. I indicated one hour,

10 but I think we will have ten minutes, even that.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Haynes? You had requested

12 two hours initially.

13 MR. HAYNES: That may be a little pessimistic. Maybe by about

14 100 per cent. I think we will probably be about an hour.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. All right. Thank you. So we know where we

16 are, and your cross-examination as things stand at present, Mr.

17 McCloskey? You had originally stated four hours.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: At present I don't have anywhere near four hours,

19 but we will have to see, obviously, but at present, no. Nowhere near

20 four hours.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Then we can start again, Mr. Zivanovic.

22 Good morning, Colonel Vuga.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. Good

24 morning to everybody in the courtroom.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Mr. Zivanovic will proceed with his

Page 23232

1 examination-in-chief.


3 [Witness answered through interpreter]

4 Examination by Mr. Zivanovic: [Continued]

5 Q. Mr. Vuga, first of all let me ask you to clarify a term that you

6 used yesterday. In many documents issued by the Army of Republika

7 Srpska, the same term is mentioned. You said yesterday that the groups

8 that launched attacks from the protected area were sabotage and terrorist

9 units. From the point of view of military terminology and the

10 terminology of the security organs, this term, "terrorist," is it

11 justified; and if it is, why is it justified?

12 A. By the selection of targets and by the consequences of attacks,

13 the notion of terrorism implies sowing of terror among the population and

14 in the environs. Any form of activity that produces such effects and

15 attacks on facilities which are not purely military by nature have the

16 characteristics of terrorist actions. If we are talking purely and

17 exclusively about military facilities during combat between the warring

18 parties when a cease-fire is not in effect, then we are talking about

19 sabotage actions. The difference between the two lies in what I've just

20 explained.

21 Q. Thank you. And now I would like to ask you to go back to point

22 4.25 in your report on page 38, and 46 in the English translation. The

23 number of the document is 1D1075. And I'm referring you to item 4.25 in

24 your report.

25 The report is in the first binder, and the document that we will

Page 23233

1 discuss is in the third binder. The report is in 1D1175, the report

2 itself. Were you able to locate that document?

3 A. Yes, I was.

4 Q. In your report, you referred to this document, so I would kindly

5 ask you to tell us briefly what the document is all about.

6 A. If we are on the same page, then we are talking about the term of

7 corps.

8 Q. I believe that we are not on the same page. Your report is item

9 or chapter 4.25. I apologise.

10 A. Well, that's a different matter.

11 Q. I apologise.

12 A. Could you provide more detail of the essence of your question,

13 please?

14 Q. Did you find chapter 4.25 of your report? This is about a

15 document dated 11 April 1995.

16 A. This is an instruction if I'm now on the right page.

17 Q. You are.

18 A. An instruction of the security organ of the Main Staff of the

19 Army of Republika Srpska, which refers to the arrest and bringing in

20 prisoners of war and other persons. I studied the document from the

21 point of view of security. The instruction that was sent to the security

22 organs in the lower level units subordinated to the corps command refers

23 to the purely professional matters that concern the apprehension and

24 bringing in of persons in order to prevent the leak of information

25 through these persons that they might have collected during their

Page 23234

1 bringing in because some weaknesses had appeared in this part of the

2 tasks of the officers who had identified the places of their collection

3 and the directions of their escort. Those who were escorted were in a

4 position to collect information that would have been of some interest for

5 the side that they worked for.

6 Q. Tell me, please, does this document refer only to prisoners of

7 war, or does it also refer to other persons who were arrested?

8 A. This document refers to anybody who was arrested and prisoners of

9 war.

10 Q. Mr. Vuga, in your report, you also speak about the obligations of

11 Vujadin Popovic in relation to the operation that the Army of Republika

12 Srpska was engaged in in Zepa. As a security organ, what were his

13 obligations vis-a-vis an operation of that kind?

14 A. The obligations of the chief of the security staff of the Drina

15 Corps as well as the assistant commander for security in Zepa operation

16 were primarily to make sure that the system of command functioned safely.

17 In other words, he was duty-bound to secure the command post from which

18 the combat operation would be commanded, and he had to secure it in such

19 a way as to not disrupt the system of command. He had to provide

20 counter-intelligence security and organize measures of security within

21 the command itself, such measures that would provide for the

22 uninterrupted functioning of the command post.

23 Q. When such activities are carried out, providing security for the

24 command post in such operations, when is that done and where?

25 A. There are some critical points that must be controlled. The most

Page 23235

1 critical point is the time of preparedness of the command post and

2 putting it in function because it is at that very moment that the enemy

3 tries to interfere, knowing that it is very complicated to start from

4 scratch at the moment when combat is about to start. This is a very

5 critical moment, and that's when all the security measures have to be in

6 place and they have to start functioning properly.

7 Q. We are talking about Vujadin Popovic's duties, and I'm going to

8 show you a number of documents dating back to 1995, ones that we came by

9 at least. I don't think you have them in your binder, but you will be

10 able to see them on the screen. When you do, could you please tell us

11 whether such tasks fall under the purview of the security organ and into

12 what groups of tasks that you spoke about during earlier days.

13 Could we please now look at 1D1076.

14 Did you have an occasion to see this document?

15 A. I did have an occasion to see this document, yes.

16 Q. Could you please tell me whether such tasks as indicated in this

17 document fall within the purview of the security organ?

18 A. Yes. This is a document which belongs to the part of the

19 professional guidance by the security organ along the

20 counter-intelligence line.

21 Q. Can we now look at 1D977?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please speak into the microphone?

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, the interpreters have drawn our

24 attention that you need to speak into the microphone as much as you can,

25 please. Thank you.

Page 23236

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. [Interpretation] 1D977, please. I don't think we have a

3 translation of this document yet, so could you just briefly explain to

4 the Trial Chamber the nature of this document?

5 A. This document points to the fact that a person under a false

6 identity was supposed to be found in Republika Srpska engaged in some

7 activities, and his real identity did not match the documents. The

8 obligation is the same -- similar if not the same as in the previous

9 document. This is a counter-intelligence task in order to establish his

10 whereabouts and what his activities were.

11 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at 1D979?

12 This is another document that has not been translated, so I would

13 kindly ask you briefly what the document is about. Would you like to

14 have it blown up on the screen?

15 A. No. It's not necessary. I was reading, but it was not easy to

16 recognise it. Now it's okay. This is another counter-intelligence

17 document, and it refers to a report of the security organ. They are

18 duty-bound to take measures to see how he was trying to persuade people

19 to abandon the army and everything else that was behind it.

20 Q. This is about --

21 A. Yes, the troops of the Army of Republika Srpska are being

22 persuaded to emigrate abroad, and it is not excluded that these are also

23 counter-intelligence activities against the Army of Republika Srpska.

24 Q. Can we now look at 1D1288.

25 Do you see the document?

Page 23237

1 A. Yes, I can see it.

2 Q. Can you tell us briefly about the nature of this document?

3 A. The counter-intelligence work is aimed at looking at the

4 activities of the American intelligence service and whether it is

5 targeted at the Drina Corps and the commands subordinated to the Drina

6 Corps. In other words, this document shows some of the

7 counter-intelligence activities of the security organ.

8 Q. Since the document has not been translated, can you just briefly

9 tell us something about the nature of this document? What is it exactly?

10 A. The nature of this document points to the fact that the lorry

11 drivers of the UNHCR in the territory of Republika Srpska were actually

12 people who were engaged by the American intelligence service as is stated

13 herein.

14 Q. So this document expresses a doubt that these people were

15 involved in intelligence?

16 A. This is about an obligation to establish that for a fact.

17 Q. Can we now look at 1D981.

18 Do you recognise this document?

19 A. Yes, I do. I recognise it.

20 Q. Can you say something about it?

21 A. This is a very significant document for the security organs

22 because the security organs had a long-term task according to this

23 document, and that task was to engage in counter-intelligence and look at

24 the volunteers arriving from the SRJ in order to discover among them

25 those with different motives and intentions because their arrival did not

Page 23238

1 always coincide with the interests and goals of the Army of Republika

2 Srpska. That is why this had to be borne in mind, and their true goals

3 and intentions could come to the fore at any given moment.

4 Q. Can we now look at 1D539.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Could the counsel please repeat the number?

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Sorry, 1D539.

7 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is in e-court. I found it in e-court. 1D539.

9 I found it in e-court. It is on my display.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Is that the one?

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is okay.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. We can proceed, then. Thank you.

13 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Vuga, can you see this document? Can we zoom in a bit?

15 A. I have nothing on my screen.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Usher, could you assist the witness, please?

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Before you answer, Mr. Vuga, I believe you saw in previous

19 documents, and it's in this one as well; can you tell us to whom were all

20 these documents sent by the security organ of the Drina Corps?

21 A. All of these documents were sent to chiefs of security organs of

22 subordinated units. Let me not read the list. Units subordinated to the

23 Drina Corps.

24 Q. Thank you. Could you now look at this one, as well, and tell us,

25 does this also fall within the scope of work of security organs?

Page 23239

1 A. It does, but it doesn't fall within counter-intelligence. It

2 falls within staff and command affairs because these affairs are

3 conducted following orders down the chain of command, so there is an

4 order. And pursuant to that order, security organs are to take the steps

5 required here.

6 Q. Since this one is not translated yet, can you just tell us

7 briefly what is required, what is demanded, by this document?

8 A. Measures were required to be taken to protect the secrecy of

9 places and areas where UNPROFOR members who were arrested were kept.

10 Q. Can we now move to 1D983?

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

12 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry. Could we at least find out who sent

13 that document, what date it was? I mean, I couldn't tell from that. I

14 mean, this series of -- we are completely in the dark on this but a few

15 basics.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, could you give us that information, Mr.

17 Zivanovic, or --

18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: All of these documents were sent by security

19 chief of Drina Corps, Mr. Vujadin Popovic. It is a whole series of

20 documents.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Does that satisfy you, Mr. McCloskey?

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: I couldn't make the date out, and the time period

23 of taking UN prisoners is of interest. I can recognise some words in

24 here, but I won't say which words I can recognise.

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 23240

1 Q. Can we then come back to the previous document, 539, and you will

2 tell us, Mr. Vuga, about the date.

3 A. I don't see the document anymore, but it was the 23rd of June.

4 Yes, it's back now.

5 Q. It's not the document we have just seen on the screen. The

6 previous one.

7 A. The previous one was sent on the 31st of May, 1995. It was sent

8 by the security section of the command of the Drina Corps. At that time,

9 it was Lieutenant Colonel Popovic. I said earlier it was sent to the

10 security organs of the units subordinated to the Drina Corps.

11 Q. I think that will suffice. Can we now move on to 1D983? Are you

12 able to tell us, first of all, are you familiar with the document?

13 A. Yes, I am. It refers to preventing leaks in radio traffic, and

14 discipline is required in radio traffic. The attention of security

15 organs is drawn to the fact that they should monitor this problem with

16 the means that they have at their disposal. That includes

17 counter-intelligence, finding how and why; but also within the purview of

18 command and staff affairs down the chain of command this problem is to be

19 dealt with.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: If there is anything mentioning the change of

22 frequencies in this document, could it be read out?

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic. I can't help either.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Since we don't have a translation for this, could you read it and

Page 23241

1 tell us -- I am sorry, I just see -- I just saw that this document was

2 translated but it's filed under 3D319. 3D319 is the translation. So

3 maybe we don't need to read it. The whole 3D319 can be shown because it

4 was found on two lists.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: No. That's a transcript. 3D.

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] 3D319.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: If there is some mention of frequencies in this

8 paragraph. I think it's short. If it's there, I --

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Let me ask you, what is the heading in this document?

11 A. "Discipline In Radio Communications, Observations." This

12 document was drafted based on observations made.

13 Q. Another thing I want to know, is the security of radio

14 communications part of the responsibilities of the security organ?

15 A. Prevention of leaks of information is the job of security organs,

16 regardless of how these leaks occur. In this case, we are dealing with

17 leaks through radio traffic and radio communications intercepted by the

18 enemy and the enemy's ability to do that. It refers to using devices for

19 data protection and more frequent changes of frequencies so that

20 communications cannot be listened to if they are being listened to on one

21 frequency. If various frequencies are used, the enemy will get one part

22 of the message but not all of it. The security organs are required to do

23 whatever the regulations require them to do to prevent leaks in radio

24 traffic whenever they have information that such leaks can occur and they

25 can respond.

Page 23242

1 Q. We've heard here that the VRS had various types of equipment for

2 protecting radio communications, radio relay communications, et cetera.

3 Can we see from this document which particular types of equipment are

4 referred to? If you can see that.

5 A. One of the devices is mentioned here, S-35, for cryptographic

6 data protection. I've already said something about the degree to which

7 it is necessary to protect a particular document. The information within

8 a document is protected in such a way that for as long as this document

9 is topical, premature leaking is prevented. Information that is leaked

10 once it is no longer topical is not so significant. In fact, it has a

11 historical significance.

12 Q. [No interpretation]

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please repeat the number of the

14 document?

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] 1D987.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. What is this document about? Does it also fall within the

19 purview of security organs?

20 A. It does fall within the scope of work of security organs because

21 the topic of this document - that is activities - was a subject of abuse

22 and problems in these communications that were maintained in the area of

23 the Drina Corps through sponsorship, but also on the territory where

24 sponsors were active in locations where it was not desirable and there

25 was the possibility of abuse of this sponsorship. Counter-intelligence

Page 23243

1 work is called for here to see what was going on without disturbing

2 regular forms of work.

3 Q. Mr. Vuga, could you just look at one more document, 1D990.

4 Do you recall this document? Was it within the scope of work of

5 security organs?

6 A. It was. It has two dimensions. The Main Staff ordered how to

7 treat journalists and reporters. Security organs had an obligation as

8 counter-intelligence agents in the area of the corps to keep this kind of

9 work under control, as well, and to have full information about what is

10 going on; but we see also from this document that this order was not

11 consistently executed, so the security organs are reminded once again to

12 activate measures of protection and to warn journalists and reporters

13 that they may not visit without a special permission from the Main Staff.

14 It falls within command and staff affairs but also within the area of

15 counter-intelligence protection of sensitive spots.

16 Q. I believe on the first day of your testimony one document of the

17 BH army was mentioned ordering general mobilisation of all men of

18 military age. Can you tell us if you have ever seen a document after --

19 saying that after the demilitarisation and the proclamation of Srebrenica

20 as an UNPA there occurred a demobilisation of men living in those

21 territories?

22 A. I'm trying to recall if I found a single line of text written

23 about that. No, not a single word or a single line about demobilisation.

24 Q. We know -- I mean, you certainly had seen documents related to

25 the column that started moving from Srebrenica towards the territory held

Page 23244

1 by the BH army. Can you tell us whether there were also unarmed men of

2 military age in that column?

3 A. Yes. There were also unarmed men of military age.

4 Q. Can you tell me if you know, what was the reason for that

5 decision to include in the column unarmed men of military age alongside

6 members of the 28th Division? Have you seen any documents or any other

7 information that could explain this?

8 A. There is a decision communicated in one of the documents to form

9 this column provided with armed escort so that they could go through the

10 territory controlled by Serb forces and reach or rather break through to

11 the territory held by Muslim forces. Military experience and military

12 knowledge tells us that there is no army that can relinquish or sacrifice

13 so easily a whole division with all its equipment. A division with all

14 its equipment is a formidable force, a very necessary one.

15 Q. In the documents that you analysed, were you able to find out

16 what was happening with those people in that column who ended up in the

17 territory held by the BH army after the 16th and the 17th of July, 1995,

18 and later?

19 A. To make my answer very brief, there are several documents, and

20 one of them speaks explicitly about how they were received and the kind

21 of units that were organised from the 28th Division, how volunteers were

22 recruited among them to go back to the territory they came from so that

23 they could be infiltrated and help those who had not yet managed to break

24 through to the territory held by the BH Army.

25 Q. Can we now see document 1D1280. 1D1280. It's the wrong

Page 23245

1 document, I'm sorry. Can we look at 1281? This one is wrong too. I

2 apologise. We are not going to show documents any more.

3 Could we go back now to the 12th of July, 1995. From the

4 documents that we have, we know that at that time Vujadin Popovic was

5 seen in Bratunac and in Potocari. Since you know what was going on in

6 Potocari at that time, tell us whether his presence in those locations

7 was justified from the viewpoint of his regular duties.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey?

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: This assumes the fact that not in evidence that

10 this man knows what was going on in Potocari at the time. Perhaps a

11 foundational question would be, you know, what based on your view of

12 whatever --

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, fair enough. Fair enough.

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Very good point. I'll ask it that way.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Please, Mr. Zivanovic.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Vuga, do you know what was going on on the 12th of July,

18 1995, in Potocari? Have you seen that from the documents you studied?

19 A. I did analyse documents dealing with the developments in Potocari

20 on the 12th, and these documents speak of large number of people who

21 found themselves in Potocari, either in the UN base or around it, or

22 should I say UN forces located in Srebrenica. That was a very variegated

23 group, a large mass of people that was awaiting a denouement of all these

24 events. Since it was the territory of the Drina Corps, the security

25 organ and the military police acting pursuant to regulations had the

Page 23246

1 obligation to gain an insight into all these developments to prevent a

2 possible surprise because there was no control yet over this large mass

3 of people, and anything could be expected to originate from that large

4 group of people that would endanger security. High-risk situations in

5 general incorporating such a large component of security risk require the

6 presence of a security organ who would be able to quickly evaluate the

7 situation and select the best response from his own area of work as well

8 as provide adequate information to others who would take adequate steps

9 within their respective scope of work. That was the role of Popovic.

10 Q. To clarify what you just said, you said there was a large number

11 of people in the UN base and outside the base. Can you tell us more

12 closely who these people were, at least their ethnicity?

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment before you answer. Mr. McCloskey?

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. I don't see why this is relevant for

16 there witness to tell us what we have been hearing for over a year now,

17 what --

18 JUDGE AGIUS: And he testified on this, also, yesterday with

19 reference to a particular document that Mr. Zivanovic showed him.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: That's true, but Mr. McCloskey asked for

21 foundation.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. All right. Go ahead. Go ahead. Go ahead.

23 Fair enough.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Vuga, can you now tell me this: You spoke about this

Page 23247

1 yesterday, and you said that amongst other things there are also

2 documents showing that there were also BiH army soldiers among the

3 refugees in Potocari. According to the rules that were in force at the

4 time, was there a legal foundation to separate those for whom there was a

5 suspicion that they were members of the armed forces of the enemy from

6 the group of refugees?

7 A. The regulation on the service of the military police and the

8 instruction on the use of the military police provide for the military

9 police to check refugees and to try and discover those persons who merged

10 with the refugees in order to hide their identity and to move together

11 with the refugees most commonly to the side that will guarantee them

12 safety as they see fit. Second of all, the security organ is duty-bound

13 in those terms to establish whether that process from the point of view

14 of the profession evolves in a proper manner and on the other hand to

15 take over such persons for whom it has been established under the

16 regulations that the military police should hand them over to the

17 security organ.

18 Q. When you say the military police hands over persons to the

19 security organ, do we know who these persons are? Could you please be

20 more specific?

21 A. This is provided for by regulations, which say that any crime

22 that might have been committed by these persons and which fall within the

23 purview of the security organs' duties, they have to be handed over to

24 the security organ. Everything else, everybody else, will be prisoners

25 of war which will be checked once the conditions for that are in place.

Page 23248

1 Q. Persons who are separated in this way from the group of

2 civilians, will they have their freedom of movement and communication

3 limited? Do the regulations allow for these persons' freedom of movement

4 and communication to be limited, that they be separated from the rest of

5 the group?

6 A. According to the criteria that are envisaged, the separating

7 people from the group represents the limitation of their freedoms of

8 movement and communication. As soon as they were separated, these people

9 were placed under the so-called isolation.

10 Q. Would this be similar to an arrest?

11 A. This is identical to an arrest. However, when a person is

12 arrested, you know in advance the reason for which the person is

13 arrested, whereas in this particular case, the -- all the actions that

14 are necessary to establish that should follow after the event.

15 Q. Can we now look at Prosecutor's document number 242.

16 Are you familiar the document? Can you see it all right on the

17 screen?

18 A. I'm familiar with the document.

19 Q. Can you just briefly tell us the nature of this document. What

20 is it?

21 A. This document is a list of 387 names of persons for whom there is

22 a suspicion that they committed war crimes and who were supposed to be

23 identified in the place where identification was being carried out, in

24 all such places. This was the obligation of all those who were involved

25 in identifications, primarily the MP, because military police are charged

Page 23249

1 with identification of people as well as all those who had other duties

2 when recording the names of the people in such places where conditions

3 for that were in place.

4 Q. Can we now move to the last page of the document just to look at

5 the date when it was drafted. You will find the date at the bottom.

6 A. The date is 12 July 1995 in Bratunac.

7 Q. Mr. Vuga, you have already told us something about Zepa

8 operation. Did you come by information as to what had happened with the

9 units that participated in Krivaja 95 once Srebrenica was taken? Do you

10 know what happened to them after that?

11 A. Once Srebrenica was taken, both units had participated in Krivaja

12 95, so those units were redirected to another task, which was to take

13 Zepa following an order that ensued after that.

14 Q. What happened with the order by the Supreme Commander to disarm

15 all Muslim terrorist gangs? I believe that's the precise word that was

16 used in this document dated 9 July. We've already spoken about it, and

17 if you want to do that, we can look at it again. Does this mean that

18 these units were not sent into that operation?

19 A. The fact that they were redirected to Zepa confirms the fact that

20 they did not continue any activities regarding the disarming of the

21 Muslim forces that had left Srebrenica by then.

22 Q. And now can we look at Prosecutor's Exhibit number 131. I

23 believe you have it in your binder.

24 A. I have the document.

25 Q. Could you please tell me, who was it who sent this document and

Page 23250

1 who signed it?

2 A. The assistant commander, Major General Zdravko Tolimir, and the

3 date on the document is 13 July 1995.

4 Q. Can I now ask you, please, to look at the time when the document

5 was dispatched?

6 A. The time is 2230 hours. This is when the document was

7 dispatched, on 13 July 1995.

8 Q. What was Mr. Tolimir's position at the time?

9 A. At the time, Zdravko Tolimir was the assistant commander of the

10 Main Staff for security and intelligence.

11 Q. Can you just briefly tell us the outlines of this document. What

12 is it that Mr. Tolimir indicates in this document?

13 A. This document is information or information about the fact that

14 in Sjemec in the facilities of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade,

15 there are accommodations for 800 prisoners of war, and it says further on

16 if there is not enough room for them to be accommodated, they could be

17 accommodated in Sjemec where they could be engaged in farm work. They

18 would tend to horses, pigs, and sheep. In other words, they would be

19 involved in the farming activities as stated herein.

20 Q. Mr. Vuga, in this courtroom we heard that the Army of Republika

21 Srpska when planning and executing the Krivaja 95 operation had a

22 predesigned plan to kill all able-bodied Muslims that would be arrested

23 or that would surrender to them. Could you please tell me whether you

24 came by any document demonstrating that before the 13th of July, 1995,

25 any such plan existed?

Page 23251

1 A. Mr. Zivanovic, after the analysis of all the documents that were

2 studied from the point of view of security, one could get a grasp of

3 their main contents and see whether the security aspect of these

4 documents point to a possibility that prisoners of war might be killed

5 contrary to the Geneva Conventions and the customs of war under

6 international documents and the laws of Republika Srpska. The documents

7 that I studied contain quite a number of orders to the units and officers

8 engaged in Krivaja 95, ordering them to strictly comply with the

9 provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The president, moreover, orders a

10 step further, which is to make sure that civilian facilities were not

11 destructed unless it was so required by military goals. In other words,

12 I did not come by anything that would point to the fact that there might

13 be an instance of killing of prisoners of war from the point of view of

14 planning and execution of the Krivaja 95 operation before the date that

15 you indicated and asked me whether there was anything to such an effect

16 in the documents issued before the 13th of July, 1995, i.e. before the

17 time indicated on the document that is now on the screen.

18 Q. From the point of view of the list that you looked at, does this

19 list tell you that at the time no such plan was in place?

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, leading.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. It is leading, Mr. Zivanovic. If you could

23 rephrase it, although I think it's too late now.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Vuga, what was the purpose of drafting a list of potential

Page 23252

1 prisoners of war in this particular situation that we have just spoken

2 about as it was on the 12th of July, 1995?

3 A. The purpose of compiling a list of war crime suspects was to

4 place them under a special treatment because they were in for a procedure

5 that would establish exactly whether they are liable or not according to

6 the rules of Republika Srpska and international conventions regarding the

7 separation of persons that might be subject to further processing. In

8 order for them to be separated from the rest of the group, such a list

9 had to be compiled. And that was its main purpose, to separate such

10 potential suspects from those who did not fall under that category.

11 Q. Does this mean that there should have been a different treatment

12 between war crime suspects and others?

13 A. In part, this is contained in my previous answer. As soon as

14 they are separated, that means that they would be processed, and let me

15 put it this way: This was a more strict form of isolation aimed at

16 making sure that these persons would not become subject of exchange or

17 anything else because they were potentially criminally liable.

18 Q. Within that context, how do you look at the letter that you see

19 on the screen sent by General Tolimir, the list that contains his

20 proposal for a certain number of prisoners of war to be accommodated in

21 the facilities indicated in the letter?

22 A. The mere fact that a certain number of prisoners of war will be

23 involved in farm works according to this letter points to the fact that

24 they would be treated in a different way in view of the fact that they

25 were not on the list, so they could enjoy the status of prisoners of war

Page 23253

1 rather than of persons that are in for a criminal procedure pending

2 against them.

3 Q. In the chain or in the hierarchy of the Republika Srpska army,

4 was it possible to create a plan about killing of all able-bodied men who

5 were either arrested or who surrendered themselves without a person in

6 the position of General Zdravko Tolimir being aware of that?

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel Zivanovic please come closer to

8 the microphone.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By his position -- by virtue of his

10 position, General Tolimir had to be informed about everything that was

11 going on in the Army of Republika Srpska and particularly when it came to

12 the activities surrounding Krivaja 1995, which is confirmed by this

13 document. In other words, he's speaking about prisoners of war that the

14 President of the republic ordered to be disarmed, and also he said that

15 all those who had participated in combat against the Army of Republika

16 Srpska should be treated as prisoners of war. In other words, General

17 Tolimir must have been aware of what was going on. If not, he could not

18 have issued such information because it would have been pointless.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I'm sorry. My question was not interpreted in full because I

21 said part of it while not speaking into the microphone. I will restate

22 that part of the question, and you will either leave your answer as it is

23 or answer differently. So my question is: Was it possible to have a

24 plan to kill all able-bodied men who surrendered or who had been captured

25 without a person like General Zdravko Tolimir in the position that he

Page 23254

1 held knowing anything about it at the time when he sent this letter?

2 A. To a question phrased like that, I can answer that it would have

3 been possible only if General Tolimir had been completely left out of the

4 loop as far as this plan is concerned. General Tolimir as a member of

5 the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska would have been otherwise

6 involved in that plan. He would have had to execute it.

7 Q. Was it possible for him in his position to know nothing about

8 such a plan?

9 A. He -- I said he was assistant commander for security and

10 intelligence affairs. By virtue of his position, he would have been the

11 best-informed man in the VRS.

12 Q. Thank you. Now, tell me something else. From the document you

13 had occasion to analyse, what happened later on that 13th of July, 1995?

14 Do you know what happened with the column that was moving from Srebrenica

15 towards the territory held by the BH Army?

16 A. The column that had been formed and was escorted or was breaking

17 out under arms came into the area of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. They

18 launched a breakout, and from the documents I analysed that disposition

19 was such that it really had the nature of a breakout from encirclement,

20 and that is the main feature of that stage of entry of the column into

21 the area of the Zvornik Brigade because the whole territory they were

22 breaking out of was under the control of the VRS.

23 Q. On that day, was any decision made regarding prisoners? Did you

24 come across or analyse one of the documents of the Drina Corps command

25 or, more precisely, the Drina Corps commander from that time? Could we

Page 23255

1 look at P36, please.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, could we get more precise on what day? I

4 mean, it's not exactly clear to me.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic?

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is omitted obviously. It was the 13th of

7 July.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I really need a break

9 now.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's have the break. Would 25 minutes be

11 enough for you?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it will be enough, Your

13 Honour.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So we'll have a break of 25 minutes.

15 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.

16 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Vuga, before continuing with my questions, over the break we

20 realised that you seemed to be tired. If that is indeed the case, please

21 say so, and then the Chamber may discuss any possibilities in relation to

22 that. Please tell us if you are extremely tired.

23 A. The Chamber gave me the choice to decide how far I can go. When

24 going through the testimony in my head, I realised that I may have caused

25 some damage in terms of providing the answers which are not the best, but

Page 23256

1 I will do my utmost to keep it up.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, because this is a statement that

3 doesn't really make me feel serene, and serenity of mind is perhaps one

4 of the most important requisites for good judgement on our part on a

5 daily basis.

6 Are you in a position to continue? If you have a preference, if

7 you think that you shouldn't continue, that we should give you a complete

8 rest today, then I can assure you we will find absolutely no difficulty

9 at all, Colonel. We are not here to make it difficult for anyone.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I

11 understood you well. It was my mistake that at a certain point -

12 however, it wasn't today but yesterday - I didn't provide the best of

13 explanations and I couldn't go at full thrust, but I feel all right now.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Then let's continue, Mr.

15 Zivanovic.

16 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Vuga, previously, when you were talking about the documents

18 you analysed, you mentioned what was taking place with unarmed

19 military-age men who left Srebrenica in the column and found themselves

20 in the territory that was controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 I tried showing you some documents. However, I made an error, but now I

22 have the right figures, the right numbers, and I want to show them to

23 you, and perhaps then you can tell us whether these were the documents

24 you had in mind. That is 1D1080.

25 A. I have the English version on the screen.

Page 23257

1 Q. I believe you will be able to see it now in the B/C/S original.

2 Is that one of the documents, Mr. Vuga?

3 A. It is. There is also a document of the 28th of July in the form

4 of a report pertaining to the 27th of July from the 2nd Corps command of

5 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which states that the 2nd Corps command

6 had registered 2.311 fighters, members of the 28th Division, who were

7 assigned to different units, and they were undergoing training and being

8 rearmed in order to re-establish that unit again.

9 Q. Let us move to 1D1081 next. I believe that is the document you

10 have in mind. [In English] Scroll down, please.

11 A. Yes, that is the document I mentioned. This is a report which

12 indicates the exact figures of those members who arrived per units. That

13 is the report I had in mind. There is other data, but this data is

14 closest in terms of being nearest to the date concerned.

15 Q. [Interpretation] Let us go back to where we left it off before

16 the break. I asked you whether you know of the existence of an order of

17 the Drina Corps command concerning the 13th of July, 1995, which referred

18 or may have referred to POWs.

19 Could we please look at P36 next.

20 A. I have the order before me.

21 Q. Please tell us briefly what did you conclude from this order?

22 A. The Drina Corps command on the 13th of July, 1995, as very urgent

23 sent this order to the commands of all subordinate units of the Drina

24 Corps, as well as to the forward command post of the Drina Corps for

25 information so that they could carry out their tasks in relation to the

Page 23258

1 issue concerned. The document states, "Blocking the passage of Muslim

2 groups to Tuzla and Kladanj. Order." My attention was drawn to the

3 first item of the order just below the heading. I just wanted to say

4 that this obliged all the units. They were being informed that

5 military-aged men from the enclave were tasked to divide themselves into

6 groups and with arms to go in the direction of Tuzla and Kladanj. It

7 reads further that among those, there are those who are criminals and

8 villains who will stop at nothing to avoid being captured, and they will

9 try to reach the territory that was under the control of the Muslims.

10 This was a warning which stated that in addition to some armed and

11 unarmed military-aged men who were supposed to be disarmed, all those

12 involved will have to deal with those from the column who are qualified

13 as such in the document. The idea behind this document warned those who

14 were supposed to implement those tasks to be cautious so as to avoid any

15 surprises and losses due to being careless and poorly informed in terms

16 of what the enemy concerned was like.

17 That is important because each commanding officer issuing an

18 order is duty-bound to provide sufficient information that will provide

19 for a successful implementation of the task or order involved.

20 Q. In item 1 of the order -- well, based on that, can you tell us

21 who the order was sent to and who was supposed to implement it?

22 A. As I read at the beginning, it was sent to the commands of all

23 subordinate units and the IKM for information.

24 Q. Thank you. The second item of the order is interesting in its

25 part which says that all those who can carry weapons should be engaged.

Page 23259

1 How do you interpret this part of the order? I have referred to only one

2 part of the item. Perhaps I should have read out the whole sentence.

3 A. It is clear from what you've said that this was a full

4 mobilisation of all those who were able to participate in combat, i.e. to

5 participate in the execution of the task as formulated therein.

6 Q. In item 3 of the order, it is specified what needs to be done

7 with those who are captured and disarmed. I won't go through the

8 document item by item, but I wanted to ask you this: In this order, did

9 you see a separate task assigned to the security organ in relation to

10 prisoners?

11 A. In this order, there is no task requiring the attention of

12 security organs. Their participation as part of this task was such that

13 they carried out their own tasks as envisaged by the scope of activity

14 and responsibilities of security organs. This only had to do with the

15 security organs in cases that they have operational possibilities to

16 provide information to the organs of the command and those implementing

17 this task on the whereabouts of those groups and how one can secure as

18 much information as possible on that groups. That was the task of the

19 security organ because it had to do with the territory controlled by the

20 VRS. In that territory, there was a security regimen in place ordered by

21 the relevant commanders who were supposed to deal with the issues of

22 security within their different areas of responsibility.

23 Q. Analysing these documents, did you come to learn what was

24 happening with the column on that very day, the 13th of July, 1995,

25 beginning with the evening hours or, rather, afternoon hours onwards?

Page 23260

1 I'm talking about the 28th Division column, which was pulling out of

2 Srebrenica.

3 Could we please have a look at 1D965. Let us have a look at the

4 front -- first page to be able to see what the document involved is.

5 Mr. Vuga, did you have occasion to analyse this document?

6 A. Yes. I analysed certain parts of this document.

7 Q. It seems that the translation has not arrived yet. Can you tell

8 us, what is this document?

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Given that it's so short and it's dated 27 July,

11 the question was about 13 July. Perhaps Mr. Zivanovic could just read

12 this because I've just been in the dark on about 12 documents now.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Thank you, Mr. McCloskey. Fair enough. Mr.

14 Zivanovic?

15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes. We may move to page 4? [Interpretation] We

16 can go to the bottom of the page. There is a paragraph -- I've just been

17 informed that we do have a translation. It is 5D355.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 3D355.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Page 5 in English.

20 Q. I'm interested in the 13th of July, 1995, in particular the

21 second part of the document, which begins with 1930 hours. I believe

22 it's on the next page of the English translation.

23 A. I have that in B/C/S in front of me.

24 Q. However, in the English translation, it is page 6. It begins

25 with the paragraph beginning with, "At 7.30 p.m. " Could you please

Page 23261

1 clarify for us what this concerns and whether you analysed this part of

2 the document?

3 A. I did analyse it from the point of view of consequences and the

4 security situation. It was interesting because it pointed to a real

5 possibility of an attack on Zvornik with the aim of stretching out the

6 forces of the VRS and the Zvornik Brigade that were in control of the

7 terrain to make it easier for the column to more easily reach the

8 territory along the route they had envisaged. One -- among one of the

9 things that were carried out was to construct false communication

10 networks that were supposed to give an impression that there were other

11 units - in fact, non-existent - which posed a threat to Zvornik. It was

12 done in such a way that the various commands and intelligence organs of

13 the VRS should be given wrong information that would make them conclude

14 that the attack might be real.

15 Q. Could you just clarify this last bit in the passage, I quote,

16 "especially when the action of NORA was incorporated against Zvornik."

17 What is NORA?

18 A. It's an artillery weapon, and it was named when it was designed,

19 a new piece of rocket artillery. This confirms what I said earlier.

20 This was designed to create a convincing piece of disinformation so

21 convincing that nobody could ignore it, that they had to take measures of

22 defence depending on how great they evaluated the danger to be.

23 Q. Can you tell me how did the VRS react to this threat to Zvornik?

24 Were you able to see that from the documents?

25 A. Yes, I was. I was able to see how the VRS reacted, and that

Page 23262

1 confirmed that this piece of disinformation was convincing.

2 Q. Could we look at document P165.

3 Did you take this document into account? What does it refer to?

4 A. It's an interim report on electronic reconnaissance. It comes

5 from the command of the Drina Corps, the 4th radio reconnaissance

6 platoon, and you see in the heading that it was provided to the

7 intelligence administration of the Main Staff of the VRS, to the

8 intelligence section of the Drina Corps, to the forward command post,

9 that is to the commander personally, to the Zvornik Infantry Brigade, and

10 to the Birac Infantry Brigade. The document speaks about forces coming

11 from Tuzla, forces of the BH Army coming from the Tuzla sector, headed by

12 Naser Oric. It says they came across our forces in the Planinci sector,

13 and it says that Naser Oric is boasting of all that he had achieved in

14 that area. Let me not go into detail. The document speaks for itself.

15 It says their aim is to create -- to wreak havoc.

16 Q. Can we have 1D698, please.

17 Did you analyse this document?

18 A. Yes, I did. It's a document from the command of the Drina Corps.

19 Q. What does it say, briefly?

20 A. First of all, it refers to an evaluation made regarding the level

21 of threat in the area covered by the Drina Corps and a demand to mobilise

22 non-assigned conscripts to prevent the infiltration of sabotage terrorist

23 forces and previously crushed Muslim forces from Srebrenica. It seems

24 from the document that the situation in the area of the Drina Corps had

25 become extremely complex since it was necessary to carry out a

Page 23263

1 mobilisation to restore security to the level necessary for the execution

2 of tasks.

3 Q. Can we look at 1D651.

4 Have you had occasion to see this document? What is it about?

5 A. Yes, I have seen it. This document is a report on Muslim units.

6 It says, "Intelligence has been collected through electronic surveillance

7 that Naser Oric had made a breakout." We have seen that from the

8 previous document, that he had reached the Krizevici sector, that he was

9 going to Planinci in order to link up with a group from Srebrenica in

10 order to wreak havoc in Zvornik. So it's very specific as to their

11 intention.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The next paragraph reads, "I have

14 ordered complete mobilisation in Zvornik and that everyone be sent to

15 positions for defence."

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think this is for sure a one-page document, and

17 I recognise the name Vinko down there. Could we have him read this so we

18 can be in tune with what it says.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Who is going to read it?

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'm just informed that we have a translation of

21 the document.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, which is what?

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: 3D318.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: 3D318.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Don't want to be suspicious, but I would hope

Page 23264

1 that we could have English documents if they are up there. It seems they

2 come up whenever I object.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, from my position here, I can see that Mr.

4 Zivanovic was blissfully unaware of the existence of the translations and

5 that he is being fed the information from some of his colleagues, so I

6 don't have any -- I don't share any suspicions in his regard. But,

7 again, you've done a wonderful job, Mr. Zivanovic. You've been very

8 prepared. You have caused us very little problems, but this could have

9 been averted.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Your Honours, we haven't got the information that

11 the document was translated under our exhibit number. This is the

12 problem.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Also, I mean, I would assume that you submitted the

14 same document to the CLSS for translation, and one of the things that we

15 have been trying to avoid all along is duplicating the work of the CLSS

16 staff, which are already inundated with work. But anyway, let's move,

17 not waste more time.

18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.

19 Q. I believe you came in your answer to this point about general

20 mobilisation in Zvornik?

21 A. Yes, that everyone should be mobilised and sent to positions. We

22 see how seriously this was taken on the basis of intelligence collected,

23 and it is suggested that Pandurevic and Legenda return to their zones to

24 take measures to redress the consequences, if any, and to prevent

25 catastrophe.

Page 23265

1 Q. Let us look at two more documents on the subject, 1D1291.

2 Can you tell us, did you take this document into account as well?

3 A. Yes, I did. And very briefly, it's a response to the demand of

4 the Drina Corps command from the Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska,

5 which is acting upon the request cited earlier concerning mobilisation.

6 Q. This situation in Zvornik that you described that began in the

7 evening of the 13th until this mobilisation, did it require the presence

8 of the security organ of the Drina Corps in that territory?

9 A. All the information that we have discussed so far and the

10 procedure that was ordered in relation to the defence of Zvornik, the

11 mobilisation that was to be carried out, and from these words, "to

12 prevent a catastrophe," we see that all this needed to be done with

13 maximum security measures; otherwise, it would indeed have caused a

14 catastrophe to the defence of Zvornik, and we see that from the response

15 of this organ that demanded the return of Pandurevic and Legenda. So in

16 view of the responsibility of the command of the Drina Corps for

17 mobilisation on its territory and in keeping with the rule on

18 mobilisation, security organ of the Drina Corps had the obligation to

19 take any measures within its jurisdiction to provide counter-intelligence

20 support for this mobilisation, which was extremely important at that

21 moment. He was alone, as we had occasion to note, and he could only do

22 that by going to Zvornik because it was in Zvornik, in fact, that the

23 whole situation had repercussions.

24 Q. We have looked at all the rules governing the work of security

25 organs, and in your report you mention the rule on mobilisation, which is

Page 23266

1 1D5693. Tell us, does this rule prescribe such obligations and duties

2 for the security organ, and if it does, what are these obligations

3 exactly?

4 A. In my report, I stated precisely what the responsibilities of the

5 security organ are pursuant to the rule on mobilisation.


7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Drop the 5?


9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] This document has not been

11 translated yet.

12 Q. But still, could you tell us very briefly, does this document

13 envisage any obligations for the security organ in relation to

14 mobilisation?

15 A. It does, but it's in another passage. The heading says, "Support

16 of mobilisation." There are various sorts of support to mobilisation,

17 various types. There are several.

18 Q. Can we move on to the following page, please? The same document.

19 Can you now tell us, which part of this document prescribes the

20 duties of the security organ?

21 A. Paragraph 2, the security support. This is where the security

22 support issues are regulated, and on the right-hand side, in this area

23 here, and I can't see the page number, under 321, it says -- bullet point

24 3, where it says, "Measures for the timely discovery and prevention of

25 intelligence, reconnaissance, sabotage, and other subversive activities

Page 23267

1 of the internal and external enemy targeted and aimed at jeopardising

2 preparations and execution of mobilisation." In this particular case, it

3 is all about the execution of mobilisation because mobilisation had been

4 ordered with an immediate effect.

5 Further on, under 322 a reference is made to the

6 counter-intelligence evaluation, and we've already spoken about the

7 measures contained therein. In this particular case, it should have

8 applied to the immediate situation in Zvornik.

9 Q. Mr. Vuga, was it possible during this period of time that we are

10 talking about for these duties and tasks in -- not to be performed by

11 anybody in the corps if Vujadin Popovic was not available to perform

12 them? Is it possible that during this period of time there was nobody to

13 attend to these duties, so they would not be carried out?

14 A. The importance of the duties of the security organ and the

15 importance of mobilisation as an action, of importance for combat,

16 provide for those actions to be carried out in very secure conditions.

17 The mobilisation activity is of critical importance under the conditions

18 that prevailed at the time, and putting mobilisation in jeopardy would

19 jeopardise the whole of the defence given the conditions. In other

20 words, it should not have been allowed for mobilisation to fail for one

21 reason or another and especially for the reasons of security.

22 Q. I'm going to have just a few more questions for you, but tell me,

23 please, if you're in any way indisposed, tired, or --

24 A. Let's continue. Put your questions.

25 Q. You said that the security tasks cannot be transferred to anyone

Page 23268

1 else when we are talking about the rules governing the work of the

2 security organ, the regulations, and all the other instructions. What

3 about the tasks relative to mobilisation? Could those duties of the

4 security organ be transferred to somebody else or, to put it in more

5 simple terms, could Vujadin Popovic have charged somebody else with

6 mobilisation issues?

7 A. As far as I can remember, I said that no authorities could be

8 transferred to other people because those were personal, and there was a

9 document proving that that was the case, and I'm talking about the

10 official ID of the security organ. What stands behind all this is the

11 following: The part concerning the counter-intelligence evaluation, the

12 collection of information by applying the methods of work of the security

13 organ, is absolutely non-transferrable, and it is within the exclusive

14 purview of the persons vested with the relevant authorities. This would

15 be my answer or part of my answer, and the answer is that what Colonel

16 Vujadin Popovic was supposed to do in Zvornik could not have been done by

17 anybody else in view of the prevalent situation at that moment.

18 Q. And the last thing I wanted to ask you about is this: When

19 analysing all the documents, did you come by any documents showing how it

20 all ended with the column? How did the whole column situation end? Can

21 you tell us about that?

22 A. When it comes to the end of the situation with the column, there

23 are documents reaching up to the month of September that speak of the

24 instances of groups of people appearing or individuals who had been in

25 the column and who were still trying to reach the territory under the

Page 23269

1 control of the Muslim side. They appeared in the area where the column

2 had been broken up. I'm not able to precisely define when the whole

3 thing ended because in my view a threat to security by its intensity and

4 by everything that happened ended earlier in terms of my conclusions.

5 This happened subsequently, after the critical events that we are talking

6 about, after the execution of prisoners of war, where it was carried out,

7 and the rest was dealt with successively as could be done by the forces

8 controlling the territory. When they came in contact with the remains of

9 that column, they would take them prisoners. That's my end to your

10 question as to how this ended.

11 Q. I would say that my question was not very precise. Let me

12 rephrase the question and ask you, do you know what happened when the

13 main body of the column that was trying to break through from Srebrenica

14 to the territory under the control of the BH army?

15 A. Very well. Now I have been redirected in more precise terms, and

16 I can tell you this. A corridor was opened to let through the unarmed

17 persons from the column into the Muslim territory, and this happened on

18 the 16th of July. This corridor functioned up to the 17th. There is

19 information to that effect on the Muslim side about the passage and

20 reception of these persons among whom there were also unarmed members of

21 the 28th Division. Later on, they were registered in the list that we

22 saw just a little while ago, and we saw how they were treated

23 subsequently. That is as far as the column is concerned or at least that

24 part of the column that was in the corridor and that was let through

25 during that period of time.

Page 23270

1 Q. We have information according to which Vujadin Popovic received a

2 number of tasks, among which to go and report on the events that happened

3 on the day when the corridor was opened. My question to you is this:

4 Can you tell us whether such a task would be in keeping with the function

5 that he discharged and the other tasks that he had?

6 A. In view of the purview of the security organ's duties and in view

7 of the situation that prevailed at the time when these events were taking

8 place, there is a very important fact that I would like to convey and

9 share with you so that you may be able to understand what I'm talking

10 about, and I'll try and be brief. Based on experience, the territory of

11 the Zvornik Brigade had been used to move arms into Srebrenica. The

12 length of that line at the moment was about 80 kilometres. That's where

13 the group infiltrated with the arms for Srebrenica being --

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Colonel. Mr. McCloskey?

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: This was a very specific question. If we could

17 get the answer and then the explanation just because that's the

18 appropriate procedure, and this is going to be a continuing issue,

19 obviously, as we have additional questioning by additional counsel.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Colonel, we appreciate the big efforts that you are

23 making in trying to answer the questions and trying to give as much

24 information as you can. On the other hand, the practice here is to stick

25 to the question as much as possible and resort to explanations and

Page 23271

1 further details only if necessary, considered necessary by you, and

2 normally you would ask us to go beyond what you're being asked or to

3 explain your answer. In this case, I suggest that you answer the

4 question and you continue to explain precisely why your answer is what it

5 is.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was just reaching

7 the end of my explanation, but it doesn't really matter. I'll answer the

8 question.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead, then. Go ahead.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is how things stand. There

11 was a great deal of risk in the corridor where it was opened because the

12 corridor also functioned during the night. If any -- there was a --

13 quite a likelihood for a group to pass through in an opposite direction

14 and bring arms to those who were not able to break through. And that

15 would have created a huge problem in depth, and I provided my explanation

16 to show what the basis was for that evaluation that had to be taken into

17 account and that had to be acted upon urgently and without any delays.

18 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. In view of the rules and tasks of the security organ, what degree

20 of presence and what length of presence on the part of Vujadin Popovic

21 was requested in the area?

22 A. What I'm talking about does not have any temporal limitations.

23 This is the issue of a situation that cannot be put in any specific

24 terms. A lot of time lapsed, and a lot of the circumstances that

25 prevailed at the time and that had to be taken into account can no longer

Page 23272

1 be assessed at this moment.

2 Q. From the point of view of his tasks, was it indispensable for

3 Popovic to be there until the moment the corridor was finally closed?

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Colonel. Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is vague. Where? And what time period?

7 JUDGE AGIUS: The time period I think --

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: We've seen this witness go off and try to answer

9 his own questions based on imprecise questions, and that's what's going

10 to happen again.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: The question is not imprecise because if Mr.

12 McCloskey followed the answer of the witness, he told us that the

13 corridor was opened on 16th July and closed on 17 July. It was the

14 answer of the witness.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Time-wise, I think you are right. Yes, Mr.

16 McCloskey?

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: We've just left, I believe, Colonel Popovic at

18 the IKM. Is that where we are, or are we somewhere else?

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: He spoke about IKM. I don't know.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Where did he have to be according to you?

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: My question was should he be -- if he had to be

22 at the Baljkovica when the corridor was closed? It was my question.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Then answer -- that's more simple, and

24 the witness can answer it.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My simplest answer would be yes,

Page 23273

1 and I've already provided ample elements to show why.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Thank you. My last question for you, Mr. Vuga: In the overall

4 analysis of the documents that you analysed, did you come across any sort

5 of participation of Vujadin Popovic in the execution of the prisoners of

6 war?

7 A. In my report, I was very concrete. In terms of my attitude

8 towards documents, in operative and combat documents that I analysed, I

9 did not come across the role of -- or participation of Vujadin Popovic in

10 the execution of the prisoners of war. There are witness statements that

11 I analysed and provided my opinion about, but no witness statements could

12 help me to arrive at a reliable conclusion or help me to form an opinion

13 that would be unambiguous as to the role of Vujadin Popovic in this act

14 of execution, and this would be my answer based on what I put in my

15 report, and I adhere by that statement.

16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Vuga. I have no further questions.

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I have finished my examination.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Zivanovic. Ms. Nikolic, do you

19 wish to start now, or do you wish to break now? It's up to you.

20 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe this would

21 be a very good moment for a break. It would allow me to organise my

22 questions.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: We will have a 25-minute break starting from now.

24 Thank you.

25 --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.

Page 23274

1 --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Colonel, I understand you wish to address the

3 Trial Chamber. Do I have the right information?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wanted to say, Your Honour, that

5 the work so far and everything that has happened so far has made an

6 impact on my situation that you're aware of, and a break until tomorrow

7 would allow me to recover and be better suited to continue working.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. By all means, Colonel. We fully understand,

9 and you will find us cooperative.

10 So you can withdraw, and if you're feeling all right, then we

11 continue, we resume, tomorrow morning at 9.00, and take it up from there.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you for your understanding,

13 Your Honour, and I shall do my best certainly.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.

15 [The witness withdrew]

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Now, it's not over yet.

17 Now, yesterday, we had a short discussion, us and Mr. Ostojic and

18 Mr. McCloskey, on pending matters arising in the wake of the various

19 Beara motions. And we left it off with the following understanding, that

20 you would continue discussing amongst yourselves and if there is any

21 information you would like to communicate to the Trial Chamber, to come

22 forward. We've heard nothing from you. So we have continued discussing

23 and deliberating on the various issues involved, and we have given

24 instructions to our Senior Legal Officer to approach you on two issues,

25 one which needs a feedback from the Prosecution and another one which

Page 23275

1 needs a feedback from you. Those relate, then, to a written decision

2 that we need to hand down very shortly.

3 However, there are some matters that we are in a position to

4 decide today, and they are logistical ones mostly. One of them relates

5 to the Beara Defence request for a further opening statement, which has

6 not met with any opposition from Mr. McCloskey or from the Prosecution.

7 We have discussed it amongst ourselves, and we are deciding it here and

8 now orally. You are being -- your motion is being granted, Mr. Ostojic.

9 You will have the opportunity to address the Trial Chamber again with a

10 further opening statement on your part. However, we don't agree with the

11 amount of time that you have asked for. You've asked for 90 minutes. We

12 have agreed that 60 minutes will be abundant and should be enough for you

13 to be able to address the Trial Chamber.

14 In acceding to your motion, however, we also want to make it

15 clear that you have the responsibility of trying to avoid unnecessary

16 repetition of what you have already stated in your previous opening

17 statement.

18 Then there is the other issue from which the Prosecution has

19 steered away, namely when you should start with your Defence case. We

20 have put everything in the basket and we have considered everything,

21 including previous exchange of consultations on this and submissions and,

22 of course, also to the instances when we made it clear that you are to

23 anticipate more or less that the Zivanovic Defence case would practically

24 -- or come to an end at the end of this week or thereabouts.

25 We understand that you also may encounter some problems, also,

Page 23276

1 because some of the issues remaining have not yet been decided but only

2 marginally so. So we have decided that irrespective of when the

3 Zivanovic case actually comes to an end - whether that would be Monday or

4 Tuesday, we don't know - you will start your Defence case on Thursday,

5 the 10th of July. And naturally, we expect you to start with your

6 opening statement and then proceed with your first witness.

7 So you have one week within which to organise yourself, and then

8 you take it up from there.

9 There is a final matter that we were discussing and that we have

10 been discussing, namely your most recent motion for the testimony of one

11 guy to be heard by video conference, by videolink. We are trying to

12 avoid deciding that, if necessary -- if possible, sorry, if possible, and

13 for that purpose, we are suggesting that you engage into an open

14 discussion with the Prosecution and see if you are prepared to convert

15 that witness from a viva voce one to a 92 bis one, and in that case

16 whether the Prosecution would be inclined or ready not to cross-examine,

17 not to want to cross-examine that particular witness, whom they have in

18 any case already stated to be an irrelevant witness.

19 Anyway, we expect to you come back to us latest first thing

20 tomorrow morning on this with an agreement or a notice of absence of

21 agreement, after which then we will proceed with -- in that case we will

22 proceed with our decision.

23 All right?

24 Is there anything else you wish to discuss? And then you will

25 receive a written decision on all the witnesses that the Prosecution has

Page 23277

1 objected to under Rule 92 bis, and that will be written. Maybe some

2 other issues maybe decided, maybe decided orally, particularly on one of

3 the issues that we have asked John Cubbon to discuss with you, all right?

4 Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: I was just thinking of one issue. If I could ask

6 the Defence, well, with your knowledge, that if they are going to be

7 using B/C/S documents that they know that they haven't had translations

8 for, could they identify those for us as soon as possible? Because

9 naturally, we get very big lists from them because we understand that you

10 can't always pick exactly which ones you're going to do, but if we could

11 get the ten or four or hopefully none. I know there's -- with mostly

12 English speaking people leading that may not be a problem, but if we are

13 aware of that we can go to the document on the list and try to help

14 ourselves to it because right now I don't -- it's hard to do it when

15 there are so many documents and we're not sure which ones meet that

16 category.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Fair comment. Mr. Ostojic, this concerns you

18 more than anyone else at the given -- given the moment, the time. Yes?

19 MR. OSTOJIC: I understand. I don't foresee a problem on that

20 issue.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. So we'll resume tomorrow

22 morning.

23 And in the meantime, Mr. Ostojic, I know that you will need to

24 prepare for next Thursday, obviously. If you encounter problems, could

25 you please come back to us at the earliest?

Page 23278

1 MR. OSTOJIC: Mr. President, the only problem I would foresee is

2 that the victim and witness protection unit, when we spoke to them on

3 numerous occasions, most recently yesterday, they have to have travel

4 plans, arrangements, so I just don't know, and I'll check with them

5 immediately after this session, and some of them, they needed more than

6 seven days in order to procure visas and passports in some instances, as

7 well, so my only concern is with respect to that. That's why I was

8 requesting a firm date so that we could coordinate with them as well.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but that would have meant giving up

10 practically seven days of hearing, and that's not possible. We've come

11 down to two because we realise that at least a week is required in most

12 instances if there has been no preparations, but we would assume with our

13 advisory, previous advisory, you would have started the ball rolling in

14 any case.

15 MR. OSTOJIC: And we have, Your Honour, and it's just a matter of

16 they want a firm date as to when I should bring the witnesses here, and

17 if it was my preference I'd have them here now, but they said that that

18 was unreasonable because they don't know when they are going to testify.

19 I'm just informing the Court of that. That's all.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. But if there are real substantial

21 problems where we could help, do let us know, and if there are then

22 impossible problems, problems that are impossible to solve, we'll see

23 what we can do, all right?

24 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. That's it.

Page 23279

1 So Ms. Nikolic, tomorrow morning you will need to be ready to go.

2 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.

4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.45 p.m.,

5 to be reconvened on Friday, the 4th day of July,

6 2008, at 9.00 a.m.