080710ED

Page 23515

1 Mr. McCloskey.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm told that's page 18 from that report.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Page 18. Thank you.

4 So we have now finished the first Defence case, and we are

5 starting with the second today. In the meantime, before I give the

6 floor to Mr. Beara, there is a motion from the Nikolic Defence team

7 which I would kindly ask you to attend to and come back to us at your

8 earliest, please, with your response.

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. That will be done with all

10 the rest.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. And Mr. Ostojic. You have 60

12 minutes.

13 Defence Opening Statement:

14 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours. May it

15 please the Court, my learned friends from both sides of the table, Mr.

16 Beara and other accused.

17 Your Honours, it is certainly a privilege after two years to be

18 able to have an opportunity again to address you, and once again, on

19 behalf of the Beara Defence we thank you for that opportunity.

20 We've heard a lot of evidence, but I think we have not heard a

21 sufficient amount of evidence. My preliminary remarks are that proof

22 that crimes have been -- have occurred or that they have been

23 committed is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of an

24 individual. Criminal proceedings require much more, and they require

25 that the Prosecution establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused

Page 23516

1 is responsible for crimes before a conviction can be entered. I

2 raise that because the issue of burden of proof comes to mind, and we

3 must remind ourselves once again that we, the Defence, have no burden

4 whatsoever to prove any element or any facts in this case. The burden

5 of proof as decided by the decisional authority in this Tribunal is that

6 it remains with the Prosecution throughout the trial, even the phase

7 of the Defence case.

8 That burden, as heavy as it may be, which is to prove beyond a

9 reasonable doubt, is a cardinal principle of criminal law. The burden

10 never shifts to the accused or the Defence, and by choosing to present

11 evidence during this phase of the proceedings, we are not suggesting or

12 intimating that we are accepting or shifting that burden to ourselves;

13 but rather, it is a further step in the process and the interest of

14 justice to assist this honourable Trial Chamber to see

15 the areas and issues which have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt

16 And to show the Trial Chamber where certain reasonable inferences may be

17 drawn in favour of the accused.

18 The first issue I'd like to discuss and establish with the

19 evidence that we'll bring is the issue between evacuation and deportation

20 or forcible transfer. In paragraph 78 of the second

21 amended consolidated indictment, the Prosecution alleges against Mr.

22 Beara that he planned, organised, and assisted in the gathering

23 together, detaining, and transporting of Muslim men. They further

24 allege that he supervised, facilitated, and oversaw the men from Potocari

25 that they be placed in detention centres in the Zvornik

Page 23517

1 area. What evidence do we expect to bring forth and why?

2 Initially, I must tell the Court that one of our witnesses,

3 although she is a joint witness, is a demographer, Dr. Svetlana

4 Radovanovic. She will hopefully come during our case, as we've

5 identified her on the list of witnesses for July to assist, the Trial

6 Chamber and to show us that defects and the flaws in the OTP's

7 demographic analysis through experts which they have brought. We also

8 believe that through her testimony she will further reveal not only the

9 flaws in that analysis but the flaws used in the methodology and the

10 conclusions reached by the demographic experts that the OTP provided to

11 the Court.

12 We believe that her evidence will assist us in giving us more

13 accurately the number of citizens and the population that existed in

14 Srebrenica at that critical time. In keeping things in context, I

15 think it's important to know whether those citizens in Srebrenica were

16 themselves refugees and whether or not the government of BiH at any

17 time and specifically in 1993, expressly as we've seen from time to time,

18 prohibited them from exiting Srebrenica. Their willingness or

19 voluntariness to leave will be an issue that will be discussed as some

20 length.

21 The movement or removal of the civilians in cooperation with

22 DutchBat was an evacuation in our opinion and as a result a military

23 necessity and was not either deportation or forcible transfer.

24 When we see the allegations in paragraph 78 of this second

25 amended consolidated indictment, we look again at the words that they

Page 23518

1 have alleged of planned, organised, and assisted. Although I must say

2 that I believe the OTP evidence is not only doubtful, it doesn't exist in

3 that regard with respect to Mr. Beara. A key focus for us,

4 and I think this Tribunal, should be the whereabouts of Mr. Beara

5 during these critical time periods. We know several things that the

6 OTP did during their investigation and during the presentation of

7 their evidence as well as through witnesses that they brought forth here

8 at trial, and they acknowledge that they have no evidence whatsoever of

9 Ljubisa Beara's whereabouts from July 16th through July

10 31st, 1995, and I believe that in January of this year Mr. Butler plainly

11 and reasonably said so.

12 In addition, the OTP, when it comes to Mr. Beara, although

13 they make these vast allegations, have no evidence whatsoever as to

14 his whereabouts from July 1st through July 11th inclusive, 1995. Given

15 that, when we look at the allegations there is no such evidence with

16 respect to planning, organising, or assisting. The evidence was not

17 brought forth, and once again it is not our burden to share with the

18 Court where the whereabouts of Mr. Beara, was but there should be enough

19 reasonable doubt and lack of evidence to acquit simply by the evidence

20 that they brought forth and/or lack thereof.

21 Nevertheless, in the interests of justice and in the spirit of

22 having this Court have evidence that we believe is probative and

23 relevant, we bring forth evidence and, again, although not our duty and

24 certainly not our burden, to show, reveal, and expose the weaknesses in

25 the OTP's theory.

Page 23519

1 Evidence will be called and has been heard that the VRS at

2 that time was divided into six geographical-based corps in a very vast

3 territory. The 1st Krajina corps, the 2nd Krajina corps, the

4 Sarajevo-Romania corps, the Herzegovina corps, the east Bosnia corps, as

5 well as from what we know from this trial, the Drina Corps.

6 We asked the question, would the VRS or any military and its

7 Main Staff, despite the spring 1995 offensive in the Krajina areas and

8 in the Birac area, simply ignore who fail to send any of its staff

9 officers to those regions during July 1995? We know briefly the answer

10 to that question because the Office of the Prosecution brought one

11 witness, Mihajlo Milovanovic, who is the Chief of Staff, and he states

12 that he was on the other front, namely in the Birac area or in the east

13 Bosnia corps. We have evidence and we hope to present evidence and

14 expect to present that evidence to you that from July 16th for

15 approximately 10 to 12 days, Mr. Beara went to various subordinate corps

16 in the VRS throughout that vast territory including the 1st Krajina

17 corps, the 2nd Krajina corps, and the east Bosnia corps.

18 According to the Prosecution, no one went to that area even

19 though there was a war brewing and combat engagements existing on all the

20 fronts, both east and west, as well as north and south. It would be

21 unrealistic to believe that the entirety of the Main Staff or the

22 entirety of the VRS was concentrated in the enclave of Srebrenica and/or

23 Zepa.

24 The evidence will be elicited from people who were at these

25 various subordinate corps as well as from, we expect, Mr. Ljubisa Beara's

Page 23520

1 driver, Milos Tomovic. I must spend some time to discuss

2 this witness with the Court. Mr. Beara's driver was interviewed by

3 the OTP on one occasion. We heard that briefly from their lead

4 investigator at the time, Tomas, Tomas Blascyk, and he indeed informed

5 the Office of the Prosecution of the whereabouts of Mr. Beara. He

6 informed them that he drove Mr. Beara both to the 1st, 2nd, and east --

7 1st, 2nd Krajina corps and the east Bosnia corps as well. Why their

8 investigator and why their analysts were not privy to that information

9 will be a discussion that we will submit to this Court at a later time,

10 namely during closing arguments.

11 They have had this information for a long time, and yet they

12 don't utilize it, but they leave us in the dark. Similarly, the

13 Office of the Prosecution knew or should have known that when a very

14 frightened and scared individual with no counsel or representation and

15 absolutely no preparation erroneously states under oath on the record

16 that he himself was never in Belgrade on July 13th or 14th, 1995, we

17 believe that it is the duty of the Prosecution, having all the

18 evidence that they have seized in their possession to assist this

19 witness to obtain a clear and honest record. Mr. Tomovic in his

20 interview states that he was not in Belgrade in July 13th, 1995, which is

21 simply not true. How do we know? When assisted to refresh

22 his recollection, and this is evidence we hope and expect that you

23 will hear, when Mr. Tomovic was assisted and his recollection

24 refreshed, he recalled and verified that indeed he was in Belgrade on

25 July 13th, 1995 on the order of Zdravko Tolimir.

Page 23521

1 Seems simple enough, but it becomes more complicated. As I am

2 sure all are thinking how was is and what was used to refresh his

3 recollection? Again, we used evidence that was in the possession of the

4 OTP to assist and to probe and to find the truth of the matter. We asked

5 initially Mr. Tomovic whether he kept a diary; he said no. But we found

6 the diary, and it was not the diary of Mr. Beara or Mr. Tomovic but it

7 was a diary of an American journalist from Phoenix, Arizona, of Serbian

8 decent.

9 This American journalist was also interviewed by the Office of

10 the Prosecution in his diary that he kept contemporaneously with the

11 visits that he had in the Srebrenica, Belgrade, and Pale and Sarajevo

12 areas were in July of 1995. He took down daily records of people that he

13 met, who drove him, where they drove him from. This daily

14 record indicates on the date of July 13th that Mr. Robert Djurdjevic

15 from Phoenix, Arizona, the American journalist I referred to, was picked

16 up by Milos Tomovic. When we inquired of Mr. Tomovic if he has a

17 recollection of that American journalist, he said he did, but he couldn't

18 remember the dates. He said, I remember picking up an

19 American Serb from Belgrade and drove him down to Vlasenica because he

20 was required and insisted on having a meeting with General Mladic. On

21 the cover of this diary and then also in the diary as my learned

22 friends know, this journalist in detailed fashion shows where Mr.

23 Tomovic drove him, what they observed, where the checkpoints were, and

24 whom they encountered with.

25 On the cover of that diary, I believe that it says written by the

Page 23522

1 journalist himself, that this diary should not be opened or disclosed for

2 two to three years until after the war in the former Yugoslavia ceases.

3 This diary was created at the time and kept contemporaneous with the

4 events that have occurred and unlike other documents was not at any time

5 in anybody's possession but the Office

6 of the Prosecution and was not altered or manipulated with.

7 When we initially met with Mr. Tomovic, we asked, do you

8 remember anything else; are you sure that it was the 13th? He

9 couldn't. When we showed him the diary, although it is in English and we

10 translated it for him and showed him the specific dates that were

11 conspicuous on the diary, his first reaction was, oh, my God; that

12 means that I lied to the Prosecution when I told them I never went to

13 Belgrade on the 13th of July, 1995.

14 Mr. Tomovic never lied to the Prosecution when he was

15 interviewed. Mr. Tomovic was scared. Mr. Tomovic as most witnesses when

16 they are confronted with the Prosecution request to talk about events

17 that are horrific and tragic was certainly intimidated. Mr. Tomovic made

18 a mistake. The support to confirm that Mr. Tomovic actually was in

19 Belgrade in July 13th, 1995, is independent, and it should be accepted by

20 this Court without debate.

21 The rest of the story, of course, deals directly with the

22 whereabouts of Mr. Beara. Milan Stanic, our investigator, and Milos

23 Tomovic will address those issues: Who drove with Milos Tomovic when he

24 went to Belgrade? Who else but the person that Mr. Tomovic normally and

25 regularly drives?

Page 23523

1 When we look in the context of what was happening July 12th, the

2 Muslim men escaped to the forest unbeknownst to the VRS, unbeknownst to

3 the Drina Corps. The Drina Corps find themselves in a situation where

4 they are not engaged in battle in Srebrenica itself. The 12th

5 negotiations were being conducted to evacuate the civilian population

6 with DutchBat in participation. For most parts, the event of Srebrenica

7 occurred quickly, quietly, and it was over. Of course, Mr. Beara's

8 birthday is the 14th of July. We've discussed that on numerous occasions

9 or at least in our last opening two years ago. Mr. Beara had reason to

10 go to Belgrade, and the evidence we produce will help illustrate those

11 reasons and where he was specifically on that day.

12 Now, we know and we understand that mere presence or absence at

13 the scene of a crime does not render a person either culpable or

14 innocent, especially given the overly broad and in my opinion rather

15 diluted theory of Joint Criminal Enterprise that the Prosecution alleges

16 against us. Nevertheless, we firmly believe that the whereabouts of Mr.

17 Beara and, indeed, significantly while addressing the issues of planning,

18 organising, and assisting become all the more important.

19 I'm not sure if Mr. President is indicating for me to stop.

20 Okay. Thank you.

21 The evidence is consistent in this regard as to Mr. Beara's

22 whereabouts, and we've seen even from the presentation of the evidence

23 that the Prosecution called that Mr. Beara was not seen ever in

24 Srebrenica, and we can take a look at any of those videos. He was never

25 seen in Potocari, and we have those videos as well. He was never seen at

Page 23524

1 the Hotel Fontana at either the first, second, or third meeting; And

2 certainly, he wasn't even seen at Mr. Zivanovic's retirement party.

3 It's significant for many reasons. The obvious one, he wasn't

4 seen because he was not there. He physically was not in that area or

5 territory during that time period. It's also significant because we

6 believe that it shows what I referenced two years ago, a detachment that

7 Mr. Beara was not within a close knit group and did not follow Mladic or

8 others and was excluded particularly from key and relevant situations.

9 In fact, I believe our first witness today will testify about

10 this detachment and will give the Court some background on it because

11 keeping it in context is relevant and should be permitted. Before the

12 VRS was formed, the Court should understand where Mr. Beara was and who

13 was his subordinate. For example, this next witness we hope will

14 establish for the Court that as late as 1990 and 1991, Mr. Zdravko

15 Tolimir was a subordinate to Mr. Beara. When Mr. Tolimir goes to the VRS

16 and several months later - approximately six, if I'm correct - Mr. Beara

17 joins the VRS and he becomes not a superior or doesn't remain a superior

18 to Mr. Tolimir; he becomes his subordinate, despite the fact that Mr.

19 Tolimir is nine to ten years younger than Mr. Beara. And all of us who

20 have studied any military code and know anything about rank can

21 appreciate the significance of that evidence and the import that it has,

22 and in our view, the relevance it has as to why Mr. Beara was indeed

23 detached from General Mladic and others.

24 Naturally, the VRS was a newly formed army, and it had

25 numerous conflicts within itself as well as the political parties and the

Page 23525

1 pro-Serbian nationalists, both for power, position, and rank within their

2 territory. The dislike or the displeasure, lack of trust and lack of

3 cooperation, and quite candidly, the lack of relations is perhaps best

4 illustrated by the feelings, attitudes, and opinions that the civilians,

5 including Dr. Karadzic, had for former JNA officers. The former JNA

6 officers were not pro-Serb nationalists. The new political wave and the

7 new political party seeking, as the Prosecution alleges, a different

8 makeup of Bosnia or Serbia or former Yugoslavia were indeed these

9 pro-nationalists. Mr. Beara was politically, diametrically opposed to

10 the politics that were being brewed in the area at that time.

11 We have a witness and witnesses to help further establish that

12 for the Court. For example, Dr. Srdja Trifkovic who the Prosecution

13 seems to suggest, informally and maybe even formally, that he may not be

14 relevant. Here is also another American journalist of Serbian descent

15 who is an advisor to Dr. Karadzic not only in 1992 and 1993. He was at

16 -- in Pale ^ in July of 1995. He was with Dr. Karadzic and the other

17 civilian power brokers who were discussing and examining the facts as

18 they unfolded in the territory. This also is quite candidly confirmed

19 and corroborated by the witness whose diary we cited in the beginning of

20 our discussion here today. He writes that he also met Dr. Srdja

21 Trifkovic in Pale, that he discussed with them and they know each other

22 obviously from before because they are both journalists.

23 I think Dr. Srdja Trifkovic and I believe expect and believe that

24 his testimony will enlighten us as to how diametrically opposed the

25 civilian pro-Serb nationalists were when it came to specifically JNA

Page 23526

1 staff security officers. There was not just, as I've mentioned, a

2 dislike or displeasure. There was strong animosity and a strong

3 distrust. We raise this point, and although this issue is on appeal,

4 because the Prosecution admitted evidence of a deceased individual

5 without giving us the opportunity to cross-examine him and the Court,

6 with all due respect, granted the evidence of a Miroslav Deronjic who as

7 we know was a civilian within Bratunac in 1992 through 1995.

8 It's incredible to suggest that Dr. Karadzic being so

9 diametrically opposed politically having not only animosity but, indeed,

10 hatred for security staff officers that he would entrust and convey a

11 secret message purportedly to kill Bosnian Muslim men in the Srebrenica

12 area. It's not only illogical; it's unreasonable, and there is no basis

13 for it whatsoever despite the Prosecution's attempt to give that

14 testimony to the Court through the deceased Mr. Deronjic.

15 On the other hand, we know that the civilian Mr. Deronjic was

16 very close to Dr. Karadzic. On that same notion, we find it incredible

17 that indeed Mr. Karadzic or Dr. Karadzic would have used an intermediary

18 although he had direct access to Mr. Deronjic could have conveyed any

19 such message if indeed that message was ever conveyed. We suggest that

20 it was not, but just the inferences the Prosecution is trying to suggest

21 to this Court and the way in which they speculate as to how things

22 unfolded just do not have a sound basis in any of the facts or in logic.

23 Other witnesses such as Dr. Srdja Trifkovic that we expect to

24 call will also further establish that there was this great hatred and

25 animosity by the civilians, not only at the national level through Dr.

Page 23527

1 Karadzic but also at the local level in Bratunac through Mr. Deronjic.

2 Going back a little bit to the whereabouts of Mr. Beara, some of

3 us may be thinking, what about the witnesses that the Prosecution called

4 and tried to lead evidence in that seemed to suggest, supposedly, that

5 Mr. Beara was at a site where killings were being either about to happen

6 or were already completed?

7 We bring forth two specific categories of witnesses in this

8 regard. First, we bring to this Court an expert witness, a psychologist

9 here from the Netherlands who has, in my view and I think the view in all

10 of us in this courtroom, an excellent reputation. He is an expert who

11 will share with us, and his name is Professor Vodned [phoen]. He is an

12 expert who will testify, and I think the issues are relevant, to the

13 purported whereabouts of Mr. Beara, and he will specifically address

14 those witnesses that erroneously claim they saw someone or described

15 someone that the Prosecution is alleging is Mr. Beara.

16 At the end of the day, he will address with us through direct

17 examination the flaws and weaknesses of such purported identification,

18 premised on both recognition and identification. These two, although

19 simple concepts, are quite distinct. One is do you recognise someone you

20 have met before, and the other category is identifying someone for the

21 first time. We believe that through our cross-examination we've raised

22 enough doubt that those witnesses were incorrect and erroneous, that that

23 was Mr. Beara who they came claimed or who the Prosecution claims they

24 have seen.

25 Further, with Mr. Wagner, we believe that he will not only

Page 23528

1 discuss how and why these witnesses are unreliable by looking at certain

2 indicia of suspicion. He will also share with us the flaws caused and

3 the failures committed by the Office of the Prosecution during its

4 investigation by failing or refusing to properly conduct and show these

5 witnesses a relatively simple and straightforward objective photo board,

6 as it's called, which is a group of pictures, as I'm sure we all know, of

7 people who look similar or have similar characteristics. This photo

8 board is actually a very, very important issue for both Professor Vodned

9 and it should be in this case. If the Prosecution want to stand by those

10 witnesses, we must ask ourselves why didn't they use a photo board? We

11 will hear from Professor Vodned that it is a very inexpensive and simple

12 procedure and that any investigator in the smallest of towns is familiar

13 with it.

14 But in this case, what is unique and special is that the

15 Prosecution did use a photo board in this case. The Prosecution knows

16 how to use a photo board. The Prosecution selectively chose not to use a

17 photo board in this case, but in two instances they tried to do it; and,

18 my apologies to Mr. Popovic and his counsel, one was of Mr. Popovic

19 with the testimony of a witness who was an executioner at a site.

20 They executed the Prosecution and counsel for Mr. Popovic a stipulation

21 in that regard, and affixed to that stipulation is an eight-man photo

22 board of eight similarly looking individuals, and they asked this witness

23 who testified here, you mentioned that it was a lieutenant-colonel and/or

24 colonel that you saw at the site. This witness was given a photo board,

25 and he said, no, these people on this photo do not contain the

Page 23529

1 individuals -- on this photo board do not contain the individuals that I

2 recall seeing at the site who were giving me orders to execute Bosnian

3 Muslims. That same witness, however, was shown a prejudicial photo board

4 of Mr. Beara. He was shown a picture with Mr. Beara in the centre, The

5 only - and excuse me - older individual within the picture, the only

6 individual whose rank is clearly depicted and his stripes clearly

7 depicted on his left breast. That photo board is what Professor Vodned

8 will tell you causes great prejudice. If that witness said that he saw a

9 colonel or lieutenant-colonel and you show him a picture with one

10 individual, a colonel who should be older, and if you show him a picture

11 with that individual's stripes and rank, it should be easy to detect who

12 the individual is.

13 We were fortunate enough that that witness, also, as with Mr.

14 Popovic, he rejected that photo and said this is not affirmatively the

15 witness or the person I saw at the killing site when I was executing

16 Bosnian Muslims. That, too, is in a stipulation that we filed, and it's

17 before the Court. It's relevant because our expert will complete the

18 story and show that the Prosecution had the ability but no interest to do

19 a photo board with all, not just some, witnesses.

20 Who was Ljubisa Beara? We've spent significant or at least some

21 time discussing his whereabouts, and we'll get back to that for the other

22 period. But who was he? During our evidence, we expect to show that Mr.

23 Beara throughout his professional career and his personal life was a man

24 who fostered and promoted multiethnic unit and tolerance. The evidence

25 we expect to call will reveal that Mr. Beara when possible throughout his

Page 23530

1 career and specifically during the most difficult times during the war in

2 former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995 helped, assisted, organised, and

3 saved a large number of Jewish citizens from the former Yugoslavia. And

4 when we say large number, it's my personal knowledge from speaking with

5 this particular witness that he gives credit to Mr. Beara for saving, in

6 his words, in the first time in the history of the world that the Jews

7 were not persecuted or killed. He believes as being the head of that

8 commission that Mr. Beara is the individual who was not only instrumental

9 but it would not have been accomplished without Mr. Beara's assistance.

10 The number according to this witness was approximately 1.500 Jewish

11 citizens that Mr. Beara helped evacuate and help safe during the 1992 to

12 1995 period.

13 We have evidence and will bring forth the evidence that Mr.

14 Beara also helped Croatians as well as Macedonians during that war. We

15 have evidence and we expect to bring evidence to this Court, if necessary

16 with your assistance, that Mr. Beara throughout the war also assisted and

17 helped Bosnian Muslims. He had from time to time both subordinates and

18 colleagues who were Bosnian Muslims.

19 Mr. Beara did indeed save some of these individuals from

20 remaining in an area even such as Bratunac. One witness in particular,

21 his family was from Bratunac. Mr. Beara assisted his family and others

22 that he did not know, meaning friends of this individual that he knew

23 that he helped save, to leave because Mr. Deronjic and these civilians

24 came in and we know because weave heard and seen the plea of Mr. Deronjic

25 as to what occurred in Bratunac at that time. Mr. Beara did help save

Page 23531

1 those people, he couldn't save everybody. Didn't save anyone and by no

2 question and never alleged he was not responsible to save anyone.

3 Or everyone.

4 We expect to present evidence that Mr. Beara did not and could

5 not have the specific intent necessary for the crimes that are alleged

6 against him. I will address that a little later, time permitting.

7 My learned friend asked a question, was in there a conspiracy

8 then against Mr. Beara? Very, very difficult and complicated to prove.

9 It is not our burden to prove whether there was a conspiracy. We bring

10 forth the facts. But let me share with you one fact in particular, and

11 that's a proofing note on the 23rd of October 2007. And I believe it may

12 have an ERN number -- I mean, a 65 ter number. I was unable to find it

13 but I do have the ERN number and I'll just share with the Court so the

14 record is complete. That is ERN number 0624-2637.

15 We think that examining that issue will shed further light as to

16 how, when and why certain individuals like Deronjic and Dragan Mirkovic

17 and others in the Bratunac area who were civilians had lied and

18 fabricated evidence and stories. No doubt they had a motive. Crimes

19 occurred before their very eyes, both in 1992 and in 1993.

20 This document that I referenced and proofing note of the 23rd of

21 October 2007 is also of a former local individual from that area. He was

22 convicted and he pled guilty, but when he was proved and it was evidence

23 that the Prosecution sought to leave, my learned friend Julian Nicholls,

24 who I'm sorry he is not here and I apologise for referencing him because

25 he is not here, he conducted that interview. And

Page 23532

1 with all due respect to him, I think he certainly has the qualities -- or

2 was a Defence attorney or has the qualities to be one.

3 He records honestly in that proofing statement portions of that

4 discussion with Mr. Nikolic. First he tells us that the witness stated

5 that he learned through information that, among others, Dragomir Vasic,

6 Miodrag Josipovic and Dragan Mirkovic held a meeting at the Bratunac MUP

7 headquarters after the killing. I don't think we are argument about

8 this. This is discussing after the Kravica killing. Never mentions Mr.

9 Beara. Mr. Beara was not there, did not participate in any such crimes

10 that occurred there.

11 Point 2 from the 23rd of October 2007 proofing note, same

12 document, Mr. Nicholls records that this witness also stated that:

13 "Beara had nothing to do with the burial of the bodies at Glogova."

14 Point 3, same document, Mr. Nicholls records that this witness

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 The civilian authorities in Bratunac did not know Ljubisa Beara.

19 Even those who claim that they met him during those events supposedly for

20 several minutes or moments while they were conducting the transfer of

21 detainees never before met him or had an encounter with him or under any

22 circumstances would not have accepted or discussed any of the matters

23 that the Prosecution has alleged that have occurred as it relates to

24 Mr. Beara.

25 They had their local military officers who they placed in power

Page 23533

1 in that community. Military men they knew, military men that they

2 supported and military men perhaps whom they conspired with. The

3 Bratunac civilian authorities did not need any outside influence to

4 assist them in the transportation of civilians or Bosnian Muslims in

5 1995. Their strong fisted or iron fisted power and authority by

6 specifically Deronjic in Bratunac shows us that they did this very thing

7 in 1992 and 1993. They were lost, the civilians in Bratunac, and were

8 unaware how they should handle POWs. They were confused as to which

9 sites can be utilized to hold and detain these individuals in 1995?

10 Hardly, given that they experienced this very same thing, unfortunately,

11 two or three years earlier.

12 They needed no assistance, no consultation, coordination or

13 facilitation to detain these Bosnian Muslims from Ljubisa Beara. It is,

14 indeed, we suggest a conspiracy and we will bring forth evidence of

15 individuals who will help further define those civilians, specifically

16 Mr. Deronjic. We also will bring a Muslim witness, we hope, who will

17 share with us what his views were of Mr. Deronjic, but not from a

18 civilian perspective, but from a military perspective. This young man

19 was in the JNA and he knew how Deronjic or what Deronjic felt about JNA

20 officers. How he treated them and how he felt, Deronjic that is, was

21 above both the military and the law.

22 Interestingly, the Prosecution in its indictment also

23 mentioned a relative, although I'm not sure if it's a first cousin, I

24 think Nenad Deronjic, who committed crimes during this area in the

25 Bratunac vicinity. Of course he did. Any relative, friend or family

Page 23534

1 member of that power structure there had the green light to commit that

2 because Deronjic was a strong-fisted power broker and allowed it to

3 happen.

4 Genocide. As with all the other counts in the indictment

5 including extermination, persecution, murder, et cetera, the OTP again

6 alleges that Mr. Beara organised, coordinated and facilitated the

7 detention, transportation and summary execution of these Bosnian Muslim

8 men. I suggest to the Court that they never answered the most simple and

9 straightforward question. If you are going to make a claim that we've

10 organised it, coordinated and facilitated it, inform us by whom were you

11 so given such an order. When? Where? What was said to whom?

12 They, during our 98 bis submissions, claimed that there was this

13 order. They have no details to that claim. It's merely a speculative

14 claim that Mladic passed an order to Mr. Beara. When? What was said?

15 They are going to argue, well, certainly those types of things are not

16 recorded. Certainly we've seen from witnesses in evidence such as

17 Mr. Vasic, he plainly writes: "Killing. Killings are occurring and we

18 are structuring it and we are assisting in it," in his July 1995 report.

19 Their expert witness said that word "killing," "killings," doesn't mean

20 really killings. It means something totally different. I suggest that

21 the Prosecution is selective in their prosecution and I believe the

22 evidence will help assist us in revealing that.

23 You must also be wondering, but what about the intercepts. The

24 intercepts seem to suggest, according to the Prosecution, that there was

25 only one man called Ljubisa, one man who has a nickname or is called

Page 23535

1 Ljubo at that time.

2 We are presenting evidence to help define who Ljubisa Beara was

3 by presenting evidence of people who knew him before, during and after

4 the July 1995 period, and will confirm that indeed Mr. Beara had a rather

5 distinct dialect formed from the Herzegovina and Croatia influences. One

6 witness is an expert witness, Dr. Remetic. He is a linguist but also a

7 specialist in dialects. He will help us and I believe will opine that

8 after he read and analysed the intercepts, after he met and evaluated

9 Mr. Beara's speech pattern and current dialect and distinct speech, that

10 the intercepts which merely mention Ljubo, or a derivative of that,

11 without compromise to the identity, meaning it does not say that it was

12 Ljubisa Beara on the other line, cannot and should not be attributed to

13 Mr. Beara. Furthermore, Dr. and Professor Remetic will address the use

14 of the term "triage" and how it has multiple meanings and in fact does

15 exist, despite what the Prosecution seems to suggest, in the military

16 lexicon.

17 We believe that evidence is critical and important because you've

18 heard from the intercept operators. And despite our attempts at

19 cross-examination with them to show that they have added or changed and

20 in sometimes, in our view, respectfully, manipulated those logbooks and

21 intercept books, those intercept operators clearly said we took down

22 things verbatim. If someone spoke in a different dialect, we would

23 record it and we wouldn't record it any other way. There's no evidence

24 in those intercepts that that was the dialect that Mr. Beara uses now,

25 used then and used his entire life. Those speech patterns cannot be

Page 23536

1 changed or altered. Those intercept operators should have and would have

2 quite candidly, wrote down the dialect Mr. Beara uses and used if he was

3 the person who was involved in the intercept conversation. He was not

4 and therefore you do not see that anywhere throughout the intercept

5 documentation that is been brought forth.

6 We do also have additional witnesses in connection with the

7 intercept. Specifically an individual who will talk about how the wiring

8 -- and I'm just not certain if he is going to ask for protective measures

9 so -- I believe that he may. He is going to show us how someone can call

10 from a third place and get connected to Badem who will then switch him

11 and have a conversation with Zlatar. So this person calling from, let's

12 say, Belgrade, calls Badem and Badem connects him with the individuals at

13 Zlatar.

14 The way the Prosecution sets their case, they put the person in

15 Belgrade, they place them at Badem and say, He was there because he has a

16 conversation with Zlatar and Zlatar is calling the Badem IKM or command.

17 Untrue. That's not the way the communication system worked at that time

18 nor how it worked at any time. This witness will help flush out those

19 issues for us and we expect that his testimony will be quite relevant and

20 will be rather revealing.

21 Finally, on issues of genocide, extermination, persecution.

22 Recently in the appellate court in the Naser Oric case rendered its

23 judgement. In that case, the Honourable Justice Schomburg had what I

24 felt was a quite interesting quote from Sir Isaac Isaacs -- and it is Sir

25 Isaac Issacs, I actually checked it twice. I don't know verbatim but it

Page 23537

1 really challenges Your Honours and us all to say that we can and should

2 re-evaluate legal and factual issues and it's our opportunity to do so

3 here. It's our duty to do that. We do not, and suggest that you won't,

4 but to simply argue that genocide was found in the Krstic case or in the

5 Blagojevic case is not sufficient. I think in those cases, with all due

6 respect to them, the evidence that we've evaluated was in far greater

7 detail, I think the evidence in those cases did not examine the

8 anthropology or the archeology or the pathology significance of these

9 issues and we invite the Court to look at that, as I'm sure you have, and

10 respectfully I'm suggesting it, let's not persistently use precedents as

11 a way to suggest that we are correct. Let's re-evaluate the facts and

12 the law and to determine, regardless of what those decisions said,

13 whether or not there was indeed genocide that was committed here. We

14 suggest with the highest of respect to the victims and to the families

15 and to the people of Bosnia, that there was no genocide. There were

16 tragic and horrific crimes that occurred. But there was no genocide in

17 our view.

18 We will present evidence and one, I believe, although the Court

19 hasn't ruled but it has not drawn an objection from the Prosecution

20 through 92 bis, and that is the evidence of Dr. Chester Moore, an

21 anthropologist. We also will call a forensic anthropologist to the

22 stand, hopefully next week, Dr. Debra Komar from Albuquerque, New Mexico.

23 We believe that both, and specifically Dr. Komar, will address and

24 discuss with this Court the notion of minimum number of individuals as

25 referred to here "MNI."

Page 23538

1 She will also address some of the more salient and significant

2 points where she believes that the anthropologist and archeologists that

3 the OTP called failed in their duty to properly maintain, record and

4 secure data and or relevant findings.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: You've still got time.

6 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you. I just wasn't sure, Your Honour. I saw

7 you looking at me and -- thank you.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Why shouldn't I be looking at you?

9 MR. OSTOJIC: Well, it frightens me at times. But Thank you,

10 Your Honour. I didn't know if you were giving me a signal, so that's my

11 only concern.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead.

13 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.

14 Finally, coupled with our evidence that we were going to bring in

15 our case, and he was a joint witness and my learned esteemed colleague

16 Mr. Zivanovic brought him, when we look at that anthropologist evidence

17 from Dr. Komar and Dr. Moore, and we also take into consideration Dr.

18 Dusan Dunjic's evidence, which is our evidence, as well, we can see that

19 very important points, I believe, or at least we tried to make those

20 points, and Dr. Dunjic tried to explain it during his testimony when he

21 tried to convey to the Court, I believe that if you are going to

22 determine or render an opinion with respect to manner of death, you must

23 in all instances know what the cause of death was. In no instance can

24 you conclude what the manner of death is, homicide, if you not know what

25 the cause of death is.

Page 23539

1 Dr. Dunjic as other experts used this sample methodology, and he

2 picked out several - I think it was 50, 52 - examples of autopsy reports

3 to suggest that it is not plausible, not reliable that one can conclude a

4 criminal act such as homicide occurred when they identify it under the

5 category "manner of death" when in fact under cause of death the

6 pathologist would write "unknown" or "undetermined." If you don't know

7 how someone died, you certainly don't know why he died, whether it was a

8 killing or by any other means.

9 This sample methodology Dr. Dunjic used revealed that in far too

10 many instances we had this undetermined cause of death and that

11 unrealistically homicide was identified as the manner of death. In

12 any event, we expect to thoroughly analyse these autopsy reports in

13 order to further establish that many thousands died during what

14 Richard Butler himself coined and identified "legitimate military

15 combat engagements."

16 It is striking that in the autopsy reports the OTP experts

17 find no combat engagement or no legitimate military combat engagement

18 death. Not one person. We believe just that very fact causes not

19 only suspicion but renders their forensic pathologist and

20 anthropologist expert reports and opinions to be rendered unreliable.

21 Further, I have been personally in contact with several Bosnian

22 Muslims who were victims of crimes during the 1992 period. Although

23 difficult, I expect and hope that they continue to have the courage to

24 speak with me and that they can honestly recollect for this Trial

25 Chamber consistent with the statements that they gave authorities when

Page 23540

1 they were they -- ultimately they reached Tuzla, consistent with the

2 statements that they gave the Office of the Prosecution at times when

3 they were interviewed. They've defined and described for us that

4 hundreds, thousands were killed in these legitimate military combat

5 engagements.

6 Further and perhaps finally on the issue of genocide, the

7 honourable Alan Dershowitz in discussing the holocaust that occurred in

8 Nazi Germany, describes genocide, and he is an esteemed colleague of ours

9 because he practices before this Tribunal. He describes the word

10 "genocide" and says, there's no doubt that it happened in Germany by the

11 Nazis. However, he says that the view that genocide occurred in

12 Srebrenica is negated by the very evacuation, removal, or deportation,

13 legal or illegal, of the women, children, and elderly men. His

14 suggestion is, and we believe that in order for there to have been

15 genocide or any genocidal intent, "The children had to be killed first

16 because they were the genetic future. They are the genes."

17 In this case, it is, we think, extremely significant that during

18 the evacuation process in Potocari, Srebrenica, as well as in Zepa, the

19 children, women, and men were indeed evacuated. We believe it was a

20 result of military necessity. We believe it was military necessity

21 because no one knew whether there was going to be resistance to the VRS

22 during that time period. The VRS didn't even know what the reaction

23 would be of the Bosnian Muslim military. They were quite surprised as

24 we've seen from videos that there was no resistance. In fact, on the

25 11th, perhaps planned on the 10th, the Bosnian army of the 28th Division

Page 23541

1 went to the woods in Susnjari. These are significant matters. The VRS

2 had no knowledge that there would be no resistance. If there was any

3 attempt or any suggestion of this genocidal intent, I believe that you

4 will find just from those facts that genocide did not occur and that at

5 the very least Mr. Beara did not have genocidal intent, not only because

6 of his absence or lack of presence in the area, given his complete and

7 consistent professional attempts to try to save people of all ethnic

8 backgrounds, that he did not participate or knew of such intent if it

9 existed; and quite honestly, I suggest that it did not.

10 Finally, I'm sure the Prosecution wants to discuss the

11 logbooks, another piece of evidence that they seem to claim and have

12 weaved into this -- its corroborative type of evidence. It's not

13 corroborative. We will bring evidence to show this Court, again, through

14 expert and fact witnesses to show the Court not only that there was a

15 manipulation and an alteration of these medical records -- sorry, of

16 these logbooks, but that in fact there's great inconsistency if we look

17 beyond just the dates highlighted by the Prosecution. One of our experts

18 in this case is the esteemed Professor Gogic. He is still in the process

19 of examining and reviewing that. We have his preliminary report on this

20 data, And we hope that when is he lists out for us what the indicia or

21 factors of suspicion are, and I think we as reasonable people can know

22 that some of the factors are control and custody of the logbook. If it's

23 maintained in a proper custodial fashion, you are not as suspicious. If

24 one individual holds it, moves it, opens it, reviews it, pulls out pages

25 from it, of course you should be suspicious. The next indicia of

Page 23542

1 suspicion is did anyone admit or can we see evidence of post facto

2 additions, even simple dates. Did anyone open the book and insert

3 anything in the book? If they did, even in one instance, we suspect the

4 document. The Prosecution nonetheless says we admit that these dates

5 were added, but that's all we are going to admit to here. These indicia

6 of suspicion and things such as placement of entries, obliterated pages,

7 ink colours, are important, I think, for the Court to read if you are

8 going to rely at all on these logbooks.

9 We think that the evidence, and I hope to call - because I've

10 personally met with some witnesses that I am being challenged with now; I

11 am having some difficulty, but I think it's important for the Court to

12 hear it - that in intercepts and in logbooks people were adding

13 individual's names in order to shift blame and responsibility. That's

14 not a defence, and it's not our defence to suggest that others are

15 culpable or to suggest that an empty chair may be responsible for the

16 crimes that occurred as they suggested in the Krstic or Blagojevic case

17 when it relates to Mr. Beara. That is not a defence. It never has been,

18 and I'm sure it won't pass muster here.

19 Finally, I want to discuss, if I may, pressure, pressure towards

20 an accused, pressure from the Prosecution, pressure even from his own

21 lawyers to give the OTP something, anything, so that they may finalise

22 the plea negotiations that were being discussed. We have a very, very

23 scared confidential witness who was present during the time that some of

24 these negotiations were being undertaken between the Prosecution and an

25 (redacted)

Page 23543

1 (redacted)

2 We hope that in the interests of justice that that confidential

3 witness will come forth as he promised he would and will share with the

4 Court how the Prosecution conducted these plea agreements or that plea

5 agreement, how the Prosecution asked after years and months of this

6 witness not mentioning Mr. Beara, all of a sudden when there was

7 something, consideration on the table, and pleas from the Prosecution

8 with fists slamming on the desk, pressure from his own counsel, this

9 individual ultimately suggests and supposedly offers that, again, others

10 were responsible. He acknowledges his culpability, not sufficiently in

11 our view, but he also in spreading his web of lies also tries to

12 encapsulate and include Mr. Beara.

13 It will be difficult, and I know this, to bring this witness

14 here. He said he'd come. He is very, very afraid. He is an honest man.

15 He is a lawyer. He is a person who has worked at this Tribunal for some

16 time. We think that it is important for this Tribunal to get the entire

17 picture. Thank you.

18 Your Honours and Mr. President, we expect that through this

19 evidence, although I highlighted some, not all of the evidence that we

20 hope to bring forth, that you will respectfully find that indeed there

21 is reasonable doubt on all the charges against Ljubisa Beara and that the

22 OTP has failed to meet its burden of proof as mandated.

23 Thank you very much once again for the opportunity to address

24 you.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Ostojic.

Page 23544

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

3 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll have a break now of 30 minutes because I have

4 a meeting, and we'll start with the first witness immediately after.

5 Thank you.

6 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

7 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

8 [The witness entered court]

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: You are most welcome.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm the presiding judge. My name is Agius. My

14 colleague to my immediate right is Judge Kwon; then there's Judge Stole,

15 and to my left I have Judge Prost.

16 This is the case against Popovic and others. You've been

17 summoned here to give evidence by the defence team for Colonel Beara,

18 Ljubisa Beara, And you are the very first witness.

19 Before you start giving evidence, our rules require that you make

20 a solemn declaration to the effect that the course of your testimony you

21 will be speaking the truth and the whole truth. The text has just been

22 handed to you now. Please read it out aloud, and that will be your

23 solemn undertaking with us.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

25 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Page 23545

1 WITNESS: SPIRIDON ALACOV

2 [Witness answered through interpreter]

3 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, sir. Please make yourself

4 comfortable.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: As I read it, it's Mr. Nikolic from the Beara

7 Defence team who will be examining you first, And then he will be

8 followed on cross-examination by some others presumably. Mr. Nikolic, if

9 you could also introduce yourself to the witness, please.

10 MR. NIKOLIC: [Microphone not activated]

11 MR. OSTOJIC: Mr. President, the microphone doesn't seem to work,

12 if we could have a little assistance.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: He can try the other one.

14 MR. OSTOJIC: This one doesn't work either, Mr. President.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: I heard a microphone.

16 MR. OSTOJIC: Mine is on now.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Switch his off, please, and let him switch his on.

18 MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for the assistance.

19 Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to everyone in the courtroom.

20 Q. Mr. Alacov, I want to introduce myself. My name is Predrag

21 Nikolic, attorney at law.

22 THE INTERPRETER: The counsel's microphone is off again.

23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

24 JUDGE AGIUS: In the meantime, in order not to lose time, would

25 you mind exchanging places with him, Mr. Ostojic.

Page 23546

1 MR. OSTOJIC: Not at all, but my microphone doesn't work either.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yours is not working either now. And -- oh, none

3 of them? Only mine, I mean, that I can understand. And I have no

4 daughter to impress today, but will you try again?

5 MR. NIKOLIC: [Microphone not activated]

6 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know. I can't help you from here. I mean,

7 mine seems to be working fine, but ... Even my colleague's is not

8 working.

9 MR. OSTOJIC: Mr. President, it seems that when the witness's

10 microphone is on it deactivates our microphones. At least, that's what

11 it seems to be.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know. Yeah, yeah, but it's on now. Can we

13 work with one microphone with the witness? All right, then. Let's

14 proceed.

15 Examination by Mr. Nikolic:

16 Q. [Interpretation] It seems we have dealt with the difficulty. I

17 will introduce myself again. Predrag Nikolic, attorney at law, from

18 Ljubisa Beara Defence team. Good morning. It seems that the microphone

19 is working now and we can continue. Could you please introduce yourself

20 for the record by saying your first and last name as well as the date of

21 birth and place of birth. You don't need to stand up.

22 A. My name is Spiridon Alacov. I was born in 1943 on the 20th of

23 January, 1943.

24 Q. Tell me briefly what your educational background is.

25 A. I was born in Ohrid. I completed my elementary and secondary

Page 23547

1 school in the field of economic affairs. After that, I enrolled at the

2 military academy in Belgrade in 1962. I completed the ground forces

3 academy in 1965, after which I was sent to my first garrison, which was

4 in Raska, between Kraljevo, and Mitrovica. I spent a year there at the

5 position of the platoon commander within an infantry company, after which

6 I was transferred because of the needs of the service to the officer

7 platoon of the guard's brigade in Belgrade providing direct security for

8 the then President Tito. I was there until 1970 when I was transferred

9 to the Benkovac Garrison. To clarify, that is between Knin and Zadar and

10 Dalmatia. I was platoon --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- company commander until 1972

13 when I was transferred to the garrison of Lastovo the island of Lastovo.

14 My duty there is was security organ at the naval barracks. I was there

15 until 1976 in late August. From there, I was sent to Belgrade to attend

16 the staff -- command staff academy. After having completed that academy

17 in 1976, I was transferred to the garrison of Split. I was the desk

18 officer within the counterintelligence group of the naval military

19 district.

20 I remained at that post until 1983 or 4. I was then

21 transferred to the security department of the command of the naval

22 district as the desk officer for security. I was there until August

23 1988, and due to the needs of service, I was sent to the garrison of

24 Knin. I was the chief of the security organ of the 9th corps,

25 also known as the Knin corps. I remained in that position until late

Page 23548

1 August or mid-August 1990, whereupon I returned to Split to the

2 establishment post of assistant chief of the security department of the

3 military naval district in charge of staff security affairs. I remained

4 there until the end of my professional military career, which was by late

5 June 2000.

6 In the meantime, because of the well known events in the

7 former Yugoslavia, I left Split together with my command for Kumbor, and

8 I retired from there. That was my career briefly put.

9 Q. Thank you. In your answer, you mentioned several locations of

10 your service: Lastovo, Split, Knin, and Kumbor. Did all these locations

11 fall in the area of the naval military district of Split?

12 A. Yes, all of those garrisons were under direct command of the

13 naval military district headquartered in Split.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Please pause before answering.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: More or less, we are synchronized, the interpreter

16 and myself, because you've been overlapping and you are creating

17 difficulties. Mr. Alacov, try to allow a short pause after Mr.

18 Nikolic has finished his question in the same language you speak because

19 the interpreters have still got to translate to us who don't understand

20 your language.

21 Yes, Mr. Nikolic. Sorry for having interrupted you like this,

22 but it was necessary.

23 MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 Q. Mr. Alacov, to go back now to the period when you were on

25 Lastovo, what was your position there?

Page 23549

1 A. In the garrison of Lastovo, I was the security desk officer at

2 the naval military garrison barracks there. It was the first post I had

3 in the field of security.

4 Q. Did you ever meet Mr. Beara, and if so, on what occasion?

5 A. Yes. Immediately after my arrival in Lastovo, a few months after

6 that, perhaps two or three months later, Mr. Ljubisa Beara, together with

7 a team from the counterintelligence group, officially visited Lastovo

8 attending to some tasks assigned to him by his superiors. Upon his

9 arrival in Lastovo, Mr. Ljubisa Beara introduced himself and explained

10 that he was there to attend to some business that needed to be done in

11 that territory. He introduced himself and then his colleagues.

12 Q. Judging by your answer, you were at the time working for the

13 security service. Was that closely related with the counterintelligence

14 group?

15 A. Yes, the spheres of activity overlap as well as the competences

16 of the counterintelligence group and our garrison. It had to do with the

17 army units. My competence was the unit I worked in. I was in charge of

18 its internal security. However, the jobs are almost identical, and they

19 overlap in many segments of activity.

20 Q. Was that overlap the reason why you met Mr. Ljubisa Beara?

21 A. Yes. It is customary when one goes to an area covered by a

22 certain security organ that that person from the outside should introduce

23 themselves. Mr. Ljubisa did so not only for the official reasons, but he

24 seemed to be very pleasant. He introduced himself, and we spent time

25 together during the period that he was there. It was only a few days,

Page 23550

1 but we also saw each other outside working hours.

2 Q. Mr. Alacov, and last of all, you were still a young man,

3 relatively young for someone involved in security activities. What

4 impression did you gain after having met these counterintelligence

5 officers, in particular Mr. Ljubisa Beara?

6 A. By that time, I had only begun working for the security service,

7 and that contact meant a lot to me, particularly because on the island of

8 Lastovo there were no other security organ members. And I don't know how

9 familiar you are with that, but Lastovo is a remote island, and travel

10 and communication via telephone was made difficult. I made the best use

11 of that meeting, and Mr. Ljubisa was very open, and he was kind enough to

12 explain to me some things that pertained security, what one needs to do,

13 focus on, and what methodology to use. Although it was not his task, he

14 did so as an experienced member of the security organ. That situation

15 contributed much to my knowledge in that first phase of my work.

16 Q. As far as I can see, it was an incentive for your future work.

17 Were you able to later in the course of your work contact and ask Mr.

18 Ljubisa Beara's opinion on various things, regardless of whether it was

19 directly related to your work as the security officers but maybe only

20 because you had a question that had to do with your sphere of activity

21 alone rather than his?

22 A. When we met, we didn't only discuss official affairs. Ljubisa

23 was very accessible, very open, and although it was a very brief period

24 of time, our relationship resembled two people who have known each other

25 for awhile. Just before he departed, he invited me to drop by their

Page 23551

1 office whenever I am in Split to either have a cup of coffee together or

2 a chat, and whenever I had time and travelled to Split, I did go to their

3 offices in my free time, in my spare time, and contacted him.

4 Q. From your answer, it seems that the next post you held was in

5 Split. What was your duty there?

6 A. Having completed the command staff academy in 1978, I was

7 transferred to the garrison of Split. My establishment post there was

8 the desk officer of the counterintelligence group of the naval military

9 district. In that period, the naval captain at the time, Ljubisa Beara,

10 was no longer with the counterintelligence group. As far as I can

11 recall, at first he was the desk officer of the security department of

12 the command of the military naval district.

13 Q. Did you continue your relationship not only in professional terms

14 but also privately?

15 A. Yes. Along professional lines as the desk officer, he was

16 supposed to supervise my work. We worked in the same sector, but it was

17 then that we began spending time together privately but it lasted for a

18 short while only. As far as I can recall, Ljubisa Beara in early 1979

19 was transferred to the garrison of Kumbor to work for the security organ

20 there.

21 Q. On your -- or rather, on his return from Kumbor, was he at any

22 point your superior?

23 A. Yes. He was my immediate superior when he took up the post of

24 chief of the security department of the counterintelligence group.

25 However, he had a superior role, also, while he was deputy chief of the

Page 23552

1 security department, while I still held the post I had in the

2 counterintelligence group and the desk officer in the security

3 department.

4 Q. Mr. Alacov, your relations are now those of superior and

5 subordinate. Can you describe to me the characteristics of Ljubisa Beara

6 as a superior; how did he treat you and other subordinate officers?

7 A. As a superior officer, I can say that he was very correct, always

8 willing to help, always ready to guide, to provide guidance and to

9 explain how things should be done. He asked that things be done well and

10 in a timely manner.

11 As I said, neither I nor my colleagues ever hesitated to

12 consult him, to ask him for guidance, to ask him for advice or for

13 instructions as to how best to do our tasks.

14 Q. Tell me, please, at that time in Split, what was the ethnic

15 breakdown of the security organ you worked in?

16 A. Well, I can tell you that it was heterogenous. There were

17 Slovenians, Muslims or Bosniaks, Croats, Macedonians. At that time, we

18 didn't pay special attention to people's ethnic background. There was

19 Hazim Begovic, who was a Muslim or Bosniak; there was Vjeloslav Runje,

20 who was a Croat; Miloje Garanovic, who was either a Serb or a Macedonian,

21 he was born in Skopje; and there were other persons, so there were people

22 from all the parts of the former Yugoslavia, all the republics.

23 Q. Now that we are talking about the ethnic makeup, let me ask you

24 about your ethnicity.

25 A. I was born in Macedonia, so according to my place of birth I am a

Page 23553

1 Macedonian. My parents were Macedonian. I grew up in Macedonia and

2 lived there for awhile.

3 Q. Thank you. I see that at one period you served in Knin. What

4 post did you hold there and in what unit?

5 A. I served in Knin from the end of August 1988 until August 1990.

6 There I was appointed head or chief of the security organ of the 9th

7 Corps. At that time, the 9th Corps was being established and that

8 command was being formed at the time.

9 Q. So in 1990 you returned to Split. Did you return to the same

10 post?

11 A. Yes. Yes, I still had the same post and the same function.

12 Q. Let's dwell a little on the end of 1990 and the beginning of

13 1991. What was the security and political situation like bearing in mind

14 that wartime tensions were already mounting in Croatia?

15 A. From the end of 1989 and even before that, ethnic tensions began

16 mounting. Various events upset people, and nationalism began to awake on

17 both sides. The tensions escalated to such an extent that people began

18 to build barricades made of logs; and as the Knin area has a mixed

19 population, there are villages with Serb populations and villages with

20 Croat populations, people built barricades to protect themselves from one

21 another. People organised themselves because they wanted to avoid being

22 taken by surprise. Relations deteriorated to such an extent that this

23 later became an armed conflict.

24 Q. Let's dwell a little on the city of Split. You yourself said

25 that ethnic tensions grew. Your service had a heterogenous ethnic

Page 23554

1 makeup, so to what extent did all this effect the work of the service?

2 How was it reflected in the work of the service?

3 A. Generally speaking, among the members of the security organ

4 relations were quite stable. We didn't feel the influence of these

5 events to a large extent. Some persons would as a joke rather than

6 anything else start putting forward their ethnic affiliation, not

7 maliciously. Before that, we hadn't paid attention to other people's

8 ethnic backgrounds, but now we started taking an interest in who was from

9 where and what their ethnic affiliation was. It was then that I learned

10 that Ljubisa Beara was a Serb and not a Croat. All the time I had

11 thought he was a Croat because he used the Croatian dialect with a

12 Dalmatian accent, or rather, the Croatian language and he used the

13 Dalmatian dialect, but he continued to speak in the same way as before,

14 not just he but others also. I can say that Ljubisa Beara and the others

15 tried very hard to retain the unity of the service. I can tell you about

16 an incident that happened, a colleague of ours who worked in the

17 archives.

18 Q. Just a little bit. We are straying from our topic, so excuse me

19 for interrupting. We spoke about the mounting tensions in Split. What

20 were the causes of this mounting tension, and what was the position of

21 the JNA organ and the military naval district?

22 A. If you are referring to the position of members of the army, of

23 the territory military district and the overall situation, we were

24 subject to all sorts of pressure. Certain officers -- well, they started

25 following us, or rather, the members of the ZNG started following us

Page 23555

1 around, threatening our families, denying the commands of the units

2 supplies which were absolutely necessary, such as food, power, water;

3 telephone lines were cut off, and this was mainly in 1990 and onwards.

4 They harassed our families, especially those of members of the security

5 organs and the commanding officers of the military naval district and its

6 command.

7 Q. At that time, was Ljubisa Beara your superior officer?

8 A. Yes, he was. It was precisely then that he was chief of the

9 security department and I was assistant chief of the security organ for

10 staff security affairs, and I was directly subordinate to Captain Ljubisa

11 Beara.

12 Q. Bearing in mind everything you've said, the provocations and so

13 on, I'm interested in Ljubisa Beara's response as a superior officer who

14 had certain responsibility for organising the service under these

15 circumstances. Please give me some examples as to how and in what

16 direction he made attempts to deal with this situation within his

17 service.

18 A. Well, both before this period and especially during this period,

19 he insisted that all tasks be carried out in a highly professional manner

20 in the spirit of the rules and regulations governing the work of the

21 security organ and the armed forces of the SFRY. He did not permit any

22 deviation from this or any improvisation. He especially insisted that we

23 guard ourselves and our units from any unwanted consequences either with

24 respect to other persons, especially civilians, or anybody else.

25 Q. What measures did he order to be taken in relation to these

Page 23556

1 provocations, such as cutting off electrical power, water, and other

2 utilities, which all, you will admit, caused nervousness among you?

3 A. The organs of command took measures through the official

4 authorities as far as was possible at the time and as far as this

5 functioned at the time to avoid such things happening. From time to

6 time, these things were dealt with and they would stop but then they

7 would happen again. Ljubisa Beara through representatives of the

8 ministry of the interior in Split and other institutions made efforts to

9 have these situations resolved peacefully without the use of force or any

10 other undesirable measures, and force was not used until the breakout of

11 the armed conflict.

12 Q. Did this situation cause the awakening of nationalism among

13 individuals within the command?

14 A. As for extreme situations regarding the awakening of nationalism

15 in the security organ, this did not happen, but people did begin to leave

16 the service, for example, and they were allowed to do this without any

17 obstruction. They did this quite legally. Among the first to leave was

18 then Captain Curko Stojan. He was the first to legally leave the

19 security organ and take up another post, and later on he left the navy.

20 He left the JNA altogether.

21 Among the others, I wouldn't say they were hostile, but there

22 is an event that sticks in my mind which occurred in the office of

23 Flag Officer Petrovic, Color Sergeant Dragan Petrovic, who was then

24 taking care of the archives within the security organ. He was in

25 charge of the archives, and I was there when Ljubisa Beara entered

Page 23557

1 his office and color sergeant Petrovic took from his -- took

2 from his desk a Sajkaca. This an old fashioned Serbian cap with a

3 Chetnik symbol. He put it on his head, and he said, Ljubo, look at this.

4 He was a non-commissioned officer but yet he addressed him as Ljubo, by

5 his first name, because that shows how close we are. We were on

6 first-name terms, all of us. So when Ljubisa Beara was the captain of a

7 war ship saw this, he told him to take that cap off his head. He said

8 that such things could not be kept on the premises of the armed forces.

9 They couldn't be brought to the office. He told him to pack it up and

10 take it back where it came from, and he criticized him for bringing

11 such things on to our premises.

12 I apologise to the interpreters, but I don't think there is any

13 need for me to stress that the Sajkaca cap is not a nationalistic symbol

14 per se. It's a regular traditional cap worn even nowadays in Serbia,

15 however, without the symbol.

16 Q. Mr. Alacov, I'm interested in this situation and the reaction of

17 such an officer such as Officer Ljubisa Beara in the situation where

18 certain people were leaving the service on the one hand. On the other

19 hand, the barracks were being blockaded; there were tensions; electricity

20 and water supply were cut off. How did he try to deal with those things,

21 and what instructions did he give you?

22 A. Whoever expressed their wish to leave the security organ or the

23 armed forces of the SFRY, that was approved without any pressure or

24 obstacles. Some people expressed their wish for the pressures they felt

25 to move to other services of the armed forces, whereas some others stated

Page 23558

1 that they wanted to leave the armed forces altogether. Whoever expressed

2 such a wish, their request was met, and the Naval Captain Beara stood by

3 the principle that the work is prescribed by the rules of service of the

4 security organ, that such work is voluntary and that whenever somebody

5 wants to leave, may do so. However, that person is still under the

6 obligation to keep state and other secrets.

7 Q. Mr. Alacov, all of us who hail from the region know of an event

8 that took place in Split that was carried by the media. It is usually

9 referred to as the Split Strangler incident. Can you tell us what

10 happened, and how did the security service deal with it? Who headed the

11 security's activities pertaining to that, and how was it all concluded?

12 A. The propaganda that was in place at the time generally speaking

13 and across all spheres of politics blurred everyone's vision. Some

14 people believed all of the information that was served by various media.

15 It culminated in early May 1992. They said it was spontaneous; however,

16 I believe otherwise. In any case, there was a gathering in front of the

17 naval military district command building, and it was blocked. The truth

18 of the matter was that people were sent from their companies to go and to

19 come in front of the building and demonstrate against what they termed

20 the Serbian army, although at the time we were still the Yugoslav army.

21 Q. Why was that incident characteristic? Why was it called the

22 Split Strangler?

23 A. It is a well known incident because certain extremist groups

24 among the mass of people there tried to create chaos. It was clear that

25 they were seeking to provoke the use of force. The incident is well

Page 23559

1 known because the first soldier of the JNA was killed by the name of

2 Gesovski of Macedonia. He was a sentry and did nothing to cause fire

3 being opened at him. It is also known for certain extremist groups which

4 acted violently against the security forces. A group of them mounted an

5 armoured vehicle, an armoured personnel carrier, that was there to

6 provide security for the command. There was a very strong young man who

7 grabbed a soldier whose head was protruding through an opening of the

8 armoured carrier, trying to pull him out of the vehicle by the neck. We

9 were instructed strictly to avoid any use of force. We could have used

10 ammunition and explosives, but there were masses of people there, and had

11 something like that happened, there would have been many more innocent

12 victims except for the strangler. He was called the strangler because he

13 grabbed the soldier by the throat trying to pull him out and nearly

14 killed him.

15 Q. You said that you were instructed not to use mines and weapons.

16 Who issued that order?

17 A. The command. I know that the naval captain had a role in that.

18 He himself suggested that force be not used, and when assigning tasks he

19 would regularly instruct us that we should resort to arms only if

20 strictly necessary, as the last resort in trying to save our lives. He

21 suggested to the command that an order be issued prohibiting the use of

22 weapons.

23 Q. We can see that there was a lot of provocation, that a soldier

24 was hurt. Did the security service try to identify the perpetrators?

25 A. Just another thing concerning the event before I answer. When

Page 23560

1 the command of the naval military district was blocked by the citizens,

2 some extremist groups also blocked the movement of a column of armoured

3 personnel carriers, which were on their way to the naval military

4 district command to provide additional security. That part of the unit

5 was stopped along the road by an extremist group. A crew was kicked out

6 of an armoured vehicle, and it was taken away, the vehicle, that is. By

7 constant talks and negotiations over the phone with MUP representatives,

8 the naval Captain Beara managed to have the armoured carriers brought

9 back and secured by our personnel. Later on, they were indeed returned

10 to the unit they had been taken from. Therefore, there was no use of

11 force or weapons, and it was done in that way.

12 Sorry, your question was?

13 Q. Let's take it slowly. Answer this first, please: How do you

14 know that it was Ljubisa Beara himself that contacted and talked on the

15 phone with the MUP representatives?

16 A. Since it was practically a state of emergency, we were constantly

17 in our offices in a state of ready, and I was in the office at the moment

18 when he spoke on the phone. I was with the naval captain Beara. There

19 were several such conversations that took place to deal with other cases,

20 as well, but this was the one I was referring to.

21 Q. To go back to one of my previous questions, I don't think you've

22 answered that, did the security service take any measures in order to

23 capture the perpetrators?

24 A. Yes. Since there was a lot of damage and a human life was lost

25 and among other things, it also constituted an attack on a legally formed

Page 23561

1 armed forces in Croatia. We tried contacting the MUP, without much hope,

2 though, but the security administration insisted that we take measures to

3 identify the main players, in particular, the killer of the soldier and

4 the strangler's identity as well as the identity of the remaining three

5 persons. I cannot recall their names off the cuff. A lot of time has

6 passed. We were assigned the task from the security administration as

7 well as their assistance in dealing with that issue.

8 With that goal in mind, the then chief of the security

9 administration, General Aco Vasiljevic arrived at the naval

10 district. He issued instructions and helped us to deal with the

11 situation. In a short span of time, we managed to identify those

12 people and to apprehend them and detain them in the military prison.

13 Later on, they were interrogated and taken over by the court. I know

14 that finally they were exchanged. Excuse me, we did not manage to

15 apprehend the person who opened fire killing the soldier, but according

16 to our information that person enjoyed the protection of the organs of

17 the MUP of Croatia.

18 Q. Mr. Alacov, did Mr. Ljubisa Beara take part in that operation,

19 and if so, what was his role?

20 A. Yes. As head of the security department, he was the person in

21 charge of the operation. We drew up a plan of action. We assigned

22 people and went through a process of preparation with them. He also

23 managed the operation until its completion. It was done, I should say,

24 without any use of weapons or any beatings or anything of the sort.

25 Q. Obviously, the operation and the incident was at the peak of the

Page 23562

1 tensions. In your sector, that is, the security organ, what was the

2 ethnic makeup at the time? Was it still mixed?

3 A. Yes. A few people had left by the time, such as Crnko, that I

4 mentioned, later on Zoran Radic left as well. There were a few others

5 who left, but in total there weren't many of them, and the makeup was

6 still heterogenous, and it remained so even up until the time that we

7 were relocated to Kumbor. I may be more specific if needed.

8 Q. Take it slowly, please. In the course of your answer, you

9 managed that Ljubisa had a particular accent and that you thought him to

10 be Croatian for that. However, now you know that he is a Serb, and at

11 the time of that operation you knew that as well. In the course of such

12 tensions, did he ever act inappropriately or did he present himself as a

13 nationalist?

14 A. I never noticed anything of the sort. He continued behaving and

15 speaking in the same fashion. At no moment did I see that he had any

16 bias, that he held anything against people of other ethnicities.

17 Q. A moment ago you said that the naval military district command

18 was relocated to Kumbor. Why did it take place and when?

19 A. After the May events and contrary to the promises made by the

20 authorities that the tension would be reduced and problems resolved, the

21 situation grew even more complex. Our electricity was being cut off as

22 well as the water supply, food supply, and we were no longer able to use

23 regular communication routes and modes of transport. There were other

24 things as well. There was a danger of us being completely cut off so

25 that we would be forced to surrender the command facilities. That is why

Page 23563

1 in the course of August, a decision was made that was supposed to provide

2 for the continuity of command, and for that reason a part of the command

3 was supposed to be relocated to a forward command post, as we would say

4 in the armed forces. That was supposed to take place on the island of

5 Vis. The commander left for the island with some other members of the

6 command. It was also foreseen that the shifts would take up to a week.

7 However, around the 9th or 10th of September, we were indeed cut off

8 completely and blocked, and those people who were on the island of Vis at

9 the time remained there. I was one of those. We remained there until

10 the moment that the entire command and units were taken outside Croatia.

11 It was all preceded by a long-lasting process of negotiation

12 under the auspices of many international organizations, which by that

13 time had arrived in the territory. We negotiated with the authorities to

14 provide for a safe pullout of the forces, their family members, and

15 equipment from the territory of Croatia. It was towards

16 the end of 1991, December 1991, although I cannot recall the exact

17 date. It was then that the last unit pulled out of Split.

18 Q. Mr. Alacov, we'll move on to another topic now. At the time you

19 were serving in Split and in Knin - but let's talk about Split first -

20 was General Tolimir serving in Split?

21 A. Yes, at the time he was a captain. Before that, he had served in

22 Velas in Macedonia and he and another captain, Steta, were transferred to

23 fill vacant posts -- vacant establishment posts in Split. I can't recall

24 the exact years they arrived, but it was sometime around 1983. It might

25 have been a year before or a year later, I'm not sure, but both Tolimir

Page 23564

1 and Captain Steta were appointed to the establishment post of desk

2 officers in the counterintelligence group of Split. That was the first

3 time I encountered Tolimir, when he arrived there.

4 Q. At that time, what duty was Ljubo Beara performing when Tolimir

5 arrived in Split?

6 A. I think it was at that time that he had returned from the Kumbor

7 garrison, and as far as I can recall he was appointed assistant chief of

8 the counterintelligence service of the Split naval military district, or

9 rather, chief of the security department.

10 Q. At that time, was Beara superior to Tolimir?

11 A. No. He was not his direct superior officer. The chief of the

12 counterintelligence group was his immediate superior, and he was

13 subordinate to the chief of the counterintelligence group, but there were

14 contacts and exchange of information and experience, provision of

15 instructions, but only as regards professional matters, the technical

16 aspects of the job.

17 Q. So at that time you were there -- so can you tell us what the

18 relationship was between Beara and Tolimir? Were they merely acquainted

19 as officers, and what was their professional relationship?

20 A. Well, if you want to talk about their personal relationship, I

21 just mentioned that Ljubisa was a very open, accessible, friendly person.

22 As we had spent a long time there and socialized for a long time, I knew

23 that, but as far as I know he didn't socialize with Tolimir especially.

24 Their contacts were purely professional as far as I know. They didn't

25 visit each other's homes to the best of my knowledge, and at that time

Page 23565

1 there was already a circle of friends who knew each other from before

2 whom he socialized with, so as far as I know they didn't have any private

3 social contacts.

4 Q. As you were in Split until the dislocation of the military naval

5 district, at that time was Tolimir in Split the whole time?

6 A. Tolimir was in Split and held the same establishment post until

7 August 1990, except for the period when he went for further training. In

8 August 1990, he came to the Kumbor garrison to replace me at my

9 establishment post, and I returned to Split.

10 Q. You said that he came to your place in Kumbor, to your post in --

11 A. No, in Knin, sorry. It was in Knin that he took up the

12 establishment post of chief of the security organ of the command of the

13 9th Corps, and he replaced me at that post. I do apologise if I said

14 Kumbor. I meant Knin.

15 Q. And you had been in Knin up to that point?

16 A. Yes, from 1988 until August 1990.

17 Q. Who at the time was the commander of the 9th Corps known as the

18 Knin corps?

19 A. The commander of the 9th corps was General Trajcevski, Tomislav

20 Trajcevski, who arrived from the command of the then 3rd Army in Skoplje.

21 Q. The 9th corps or the Knin corps as it was called, was it part of

22 the military naval district of Split?

23 A. Yes. The 9th corps was directly subordinate to the command of

24 the military naval district in that period.

25 Q. I see that you mentioned in that period. Was there another

Page 23566

1 period when it was not part of the military naval district?

2 A. When the armed conflict started and towards the end of 1991, the

3 9th corps was subordinate to the General Staff of the armed forces of the

4 SFRY along one chain of command. It was in the rear of the command of a

5 military naval district, and in operative terms part of it was under the

6 command of the General Staff.

7 Q. Mr. Alacov, please tell me, in that period at any point was

8 General Mladic the commander of this corps?

9 A. While I was the -- while I was serving in Knin, Mladic did not

10 hold any position in the 9th Corps. When I left in August 1990 and when

11 Tolimir arrived, Spiro Nikovic, General Spiro Nikovic was appointed

12 commander, but he didn't stay there long. Perhaps a year. I didn't see

13 Mladic, but I heard that he came to Knin, but this was certainly after

14 June 1991.

15 Q. Although you assume that General Mladic arrived and took up the

16 corps commander only in June 1991, the military naval district and you as

17 officers and the security organs and Ljubisa Beara as the chief of that

18 organ remained in Split for a certain time because you said that in late

19 1991, you were dislocated. Do you know whether in that period Mr. Beara

20 and General Mladic had either private or official contacts?

21 A. Let me tell you that for a while Mladic was Chief of Staff, and

22 after Nikovic left he took up the duty of commander. And let me also

23 tell you that in view of the situation at the time, it was very difficult

24 to move around and communicate, and there was very little time, or

25 rather, no time for any personal contacts and for socializing. I have no

Page 23567

1 information or knowledge that Beara ever socialized with Mladic. It's

2 possible that there were brief professional official contacts when they

3 both went to briefings at our command while it was still possible or in

4 the course of brief visits by the security organ, Beara to Knin. But

5 this may have amounted to two or three visits in that period to the best

6 of my recollection.

7 Q. Answering my questions, you said that General Tolimir moved from

8 Split to Knin in 1990 if I remember correctly. Please tell me, to the

9 best of your knowledge did he go back to Split or did he remain in the

10 Knin corps?

11 A. After the dislocation of the units of the military naval district

12 from the territory of Croatia, the 9th corps remained for awhile on the

13 territory it was responsible for so that Tolimir also remained with that

14 unit. But I don't know until when because after we left, I lost contact

15 with him.

16 Q. So the military naval district had a new headquarters, a new

17 area; can you tell us where this was?

18 A. That was the Kumbor garrison in the Montenegrin coastal area.

19 Herceg Novi was the first -- the nearest larger town.

20 Q. Before you, there were huge tasks. You had to find headquarters

21 for the command. Who coordinated this work on behalf of your service,

22 and did you have any cooperation with the civilian authorities?

23 A. If you are referring to Montenegro, on the territory of

24 Montenegro, yes, we did have direct cooperation, and certain civilian

25 facilities were given over to our use for the accommodation of our units

Page 23568

1 and commands.

2 Q. Colonel Beara was in the administration in Kumbor at the time.

3 Did he organise the work of the service?

4 A. Yes. Persons, or rather, members of security organs from all the

5 units were there in a small area. We were overstaffed, and in view of

6 the new needs and circumstances, a new establishment structure had to be

7 put in place and appointments made, or rather, the establishment post had

8 to be filled, and administratively the status of all these persons had to

9 be dealt with and Captain Beara was in charge of all this. He proposed

10 certain solutions to the command of what was by then the navy.

11 Q. From your testimony today, it follows that you spent quite a long

12 period of time either serving with or close to Beara from the beginnings

13 of your work in Lastovo until Kumbor where you were from, or rather, this

14 is the period from 1973 to 1991. And when did you part ways, you and

15 Colonel Beara finally?

16 A. Well, we never did, but we did say farewell in July 1992 when he

17 left to take up another establishment post. I think it was for awhile in

18 the security administration and then I don't know; he went to the Army of

19 Republika Srpska.

20 Q. Well, this was a long time ago, 1992, but I see that you knew

21 each other well, that you were friends, as you say. Can you describe

22 Ljubisa Beara to me as he was in 1992 when you saw him for the last time?

23 What is the image that sticks in your mind? What did he look like

24 physically?

25 A. Well, I'll take the liberty of saying that as for three or four

Page 23569

1 months we had been separated, he was in Split and I was on Vis. Our

2 first encounter was in Kumbor after August 1991, and our next meeting was

3 in late January 1992. He looked as he usually did but was a little

4 thinner. He is a tall man. If I have to describe him physically, he had

5 sideburns. He wore glasses. He looked after his appearance. He was

6 neat and tidy, always clean shaven, always appropriately dressed. His

7 clothes were always clean and ironed. I especially remember his shoes

8 because they were always very shiny, as if they were patent leather

9 shoes. That's how shiny they were.

10 Q. Very well, Mr. Alacov. Evidently, Ljubisa Beara is a man you

11 remember as a good man. Were you ever in a situation including these

12 dramatic times in Split ever to observe or sense or feel that Ljubisa

13 Beara took up a nationalist stance in relation to anybody, not just

14 professionally but in your private socializing?

15 A. In relation to me, there was never a gesture, never a statement

16 where he ever expressed any sort of nationalist sentiment. He never

17 offended me in any way, and I never observed him acting in that way

18 towards anybody else either. On the contrary, in that very sensitive

19 situation he never paid attention to people's ethnic background, to

20 people's religious affiliation, but when appointing people to

21 establishment posts, all he cared about was people's qualifications and

22 the quality of their work.

23 In those critical years when nationalism was burgeoning and

24 negative tensions were mounting, he appointed Major Tole Zarko as

25 battalion commander, for example. I also know that in that critical

Page 23570

1 period, he helped while I was in Knin my subordinate captain Peter Jukic

2 to be from Knin to Split and to be appointed -- and he was a Croat by

3 ethnicity, and he was appointed to the establishment post of the security

4 organ in the protection regiment. This protection regiment was a very

5 important unit.

6 After the dislocation to Kumbor, the then-lieutenant commander

7 Ramiz Dugalic who was a Muslim was appointed deputy chief of the

8 counterintelligence group, so there are other examples to demonstrate

9 that he did not have any prejudices against people of different ethnic

10 affiliations. Although I am a Macedonian, I remained at the

11 establishment post I held before, and this was a leading position in

12 the security organ.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Alacov, for your exhaustive replies.

14 MR. NIKOLIC: Your Honours, I have completed my

15 examination-in-chief.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: That's why I didn't interrupt you before as we were

17 approaching the break time because I noticed you were approaching the

18 end. I thank you, Mr. Nikolic, I thank you, Mr. -- or Colonel Alacov.

19 We'll have a short break now of 25 minutes. And then we'll start with

20 the cross-examinations. Thank you.

21 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

22 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Zivanovic, do you wish to cross-examine the

24 witness?

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: No, Your Honour. Thank you.

Page 23571

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. [Microphone not activated]

2 Madam Nikolic, do you wish to cross-examine the witness?

3 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] No, thank you, Your Honour. No

4 questions for this witness.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Lazarevic has already indicated there is no

6 cross. Correct, Ms. Fauveau?

7 MS. FAUVEAU: No questions, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: No questions from the Miletic Defence team. We are

9 not aware you would like to cross-examine the witness.

10 MR. JOSSE: Well, I was about to apologise for the fact that we

11 hadn't provided a filing. Apologies, anyway. It won't surprise the

12 Trial Chamber. No, we have absolutely no questions for this witness

13 whatsoever.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Mr. Sarapa, would you like to

15 cross-examine this witness? Okay. Thank you.

16 MR. SARAPA: No, thank you.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: That brings us to you, Mr. Vanderpuye.

18 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, Mr. President. I'll have brief

19 cross-examination.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please Go ahead.

21 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

22 Cross-examination by Mr. Vanderpuye:

23 Q. Good afternoon to you, sir. My name is Kweku Vanderpuye.

24 MR. VANDERPUYE: He's not hearing? Okay.

25 Q. Thank you. Colonel Alacov, you can here me now; is that right?

Page 23572

1 All right. Good afternoon to you. My name is Kweku Vanderpuye, and on

2 behalf of the Prosecution, I'm going to put some questions to you in

3 relation to your direct examination.

4 A. Please go ahead.

5 Q. Okay. Now, the very last thing that you spoke about before we

6 broke about a half an hour ago is you indicated that you were not aware

7 of any particular event in which Mr. Beara had offended anybody or paid

8 any particular attention to a person's ethnic background. Do you

9 remember that testimony?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Sir, are you familiar with the term "Turk" as is used to describe

12 a Bosnian Muslim?

13 A. I heard of such a term. Do you mean when used in derogatory

14 fashion? Well, I never heard that word from Captain Beara; at least, I

15 was never present on such occasions.

16 Q. What about the term "balija"? Have you heard that term?

17 A. I did hear about that term.

18 Q. Okay. And is that a derogatory term as well?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. In fact, it's an extremely offensive and demeaning term, isn't

21 it?

22 A. Depends on one's understanding and depending on what occasion it

23 is used. There are different offensive words in particular in the

24 Serbian language which can have a particular weight given the context or

25 the situation in which they are used.

Page 23573

1 Q. All right. Is that the kind of language that you would expect a

2 high-ranking officer in the army to use?

3 A. If it is an official communication, in that case it would be

4 inappropriate. If -- on the other hand, if we have two people speaking

5 in jest or in their unofficial capacity, then it could take place

6 especially among those of us who hail from the south. One could then

7 hear terms of such nature.

8 Q. Well, have you ever heard Mr. Beara use those terms?

9 A. I was never present on such an occasion, and I don't remember him

10 using such terms. Maybe even I used some terms in different situations

11 but ...

12 Q. All right. Now, Let me acquaint you with a document that's 65

13 ter 539. Now, this is a document as you can see from the bottom that is

14 type-signed Ljubisa Beara. It's dated 16th August 1995, And this is a

15 communication; it says supreme military corps; it has a strictly

16 confidential number 15/95. You can see right there, right in the first

17 line where Mr. Beara is referring to all the POWs from the former balija

18 enclave of Zepa. Do you see that, sir?

19 A. Yes, I do.

20 Q. If you go on a little bit further on in the document, you can see

21 right after there is a reference to the members of the VRS, on the next

22 line it says that members of the VRS and RS Republika Srpska MUP and the

23 security organs who will interrogate the captured balija in order to

24 provide criminal justice documentation. Do you see that? That's right

25 there in the second line of the second paragraph.

Page 23574

1 A. I can't see it very well, but I'll take your word for it. I

2 trust that what you read is correct.

3 Q. All right. Let me take you down to the third paragraph, and if

4 you look at the last sentence of that, you can see where it says to do

5 this to investigating judges with typists and deputy prosecutor should be

6 sent to Serbian correctional facilities to so the criminal law?

7 "Documentation can be formed immediately after the interrogation of the

8 balija." Do you see that?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10 Q. In relation to one of the last questions that was put to you, you

11 also indicated that when it came to making appointments, that all Mr.

12 Beara was concerned about was the qualifications and the quality of the

13 work of the people that he was selecting. Do you recall that?

14 A. Yes, I do. I remember.

15 Q. Let me acquaint you with another document. Could I have 65 ter

16 3502 in e-court, please. All right. We don't have the English -- yeah,

17 we do have the English. Okay. This is a document -- if we can go to the

18 second page just for a moment so I can show the gentleman that this is a

19 document that is signed by -- you see that it's signed by Ljubisa Beara?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. Now, this is a document that is dated 27th November 1995.

22 Has a number, strictly confidential number of 12/46-701/95, and what it

23 talks about is choosing a number of NCOs and soldiers from the military

24 police battalion as a personal escort for members of the Main Staff.

25 Now, if you go, if we could, if we could go to the bottom of this page in

Page 23575

1 the B/C/S, and if we could go to the second page in the English. The

2 second paragraph of the English, it reads "The NCOs and soldiers

3 appointed for escort duty should excel in military conduct and appearance

4 as well as in military knowledge and well-mannered behaviour in similar.

5 They may only be Serbs and not those from mixed marriages or those whose

6 family members live in the territory controlled by the enemy." These are

7 among the criteria that Mr. Beara has specified are to be found or to be

8 observed in filling this position.

9 This relates to more than just whether or not a person is

10 qualified, doesn't it, sir?

11 A. Yes. That is correct factually speaking, and that is what it

12 says. However, we seem to be forgetting one fact, and that is that in

13 the period that I talked about, while the unified Yugoslavia was still in

14 existence, that at that time there was still the army of Yugoslavia that

15 existed. However, this period is in 1995 already when the opposing

16 parties were Serbs and Muslims, Bosniaks. To me, it seems normal that

17 when choosing the candidates for a post like that one bears in mind

18 certain things. This should not be insulting to anyone, the fact that I

19 as a Macedonian or another person who is a Bosniak would not be

20 considered. The conditions were different; the situation was different

21 from that when we were still together. I talked about the period before

22 June 1992. After that, we went our separate ways.

23 Q. All right. I think you actually said in your testimony that you

24 never parted ways even though physically you parted. What I'd like to

25 know is whether or not in your view the words that are written here

Page 23576

1 reflect somebody's or a person's paying attention to a person's

2 ethnicity above all in relation to filling a qualified position?

3 A. I think that what they had in mind was to choose the persons who

4 would fully implement the tasks they were assigned, much as you would

5 choose your work team. On top of their abilities, you also consider who

6 and what they are. By the same token, the other side also has the right

7 to choose the people who are going to be assigned certain tasks. To my

8 mind, this is no insult or disadvantage that someone may not be

9 considered for a certain position. I should not be offended if I am not

10 appointed as your assistant because I was not qualified, and in this

11 particular consideration other circumstances played a role too.

12 Q. And That qualification can just depend on who it is you happen to

13 have married before the conflict in your view? That's right, Mr.

14 Alacov, isn't it? One of the criteria you see in here says "not those

15 from mixed marriages." That's justifiable in your view, right, Mr.

16 Alacov?

17 A. Well, the situation evidently showed that in the course of the

18 breaking up of Yugoslavia, that some people who hailed from mixed

19 marriages fell under the influence of their wives and other members of

20 their family. They left the armed forces, and they abandoned the

21 service, which they had sworn to protect, saying that they would

22 conscientiously perform their tasks. Instead, they were under the

23 influence of their family members and leaving the armed forces at the

24 very moment when they were needed the most. That was the starting point.

25 As well as based on the experience of others, this is normal.

Page 23577

1 When electing persons to sensitive positions, this also had to be borne

2 in mind. As far as I knew, this is something you find in each and every

3 army of the world. Some people cannot be trusted with certain functions

4 if they don't meet the other criteria. There's also a categorization of

5 officers in terms of category 1, 2 and 3, and you know exactly to what

6 level a certain officer can advance. It is not my fault that I would,

7 for example, fall in category 3. I shouldn't be angry by that -- because

8 of that. And as far as I know, such categories exist in foreign armies

9 as well.

10 Q. Okay. What category would somebody like General Miletic fall

11 into?

12 A. I don't know.

13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I object. I object. I really

14 don't see the purpose of this question. This is a witness testifying to

15 the character of another person. He didn't even talk about the Army of

16 Republika Srpska. We don't even know if he knows General Miletic. Maybe

17 it would be good to start -- for a start to know whether he knows General

18 Miletic.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Ms. Fauveau.

20 MR. VANDERPUYE: I think he has answered the question. I have no

21 further questions. Thank you, Mr. President.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Is there re-examination, Mr. Nikolic?

23 Yes, please go ahead.

24 MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, briefly.

25 Re-examination by Mr. Nikolic: