080904ED

Page 25207

1 truth. Please read it out aloud.

2 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

3 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Please make yourself comfortable. Do

5 I take it that you are going to testify in English?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. You are free to testify in any

8 other language which is translatable here should you feel so.

9 Mr. Ostojic is going first. You will be with us today and

10 tomorrow for sure. He didn't like it. Okay. So you can cut down your

11 direct, Mr. Vanderpuye will take my advice to do likewise, and we can

12 send him home today.

13 MR. OSTOJIC: Good afternoon. Mr. President, Your Honours. I'll

14 try to do my best. May I proceed?

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

16 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.

17 WITNESS: SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

18 Examination by Mr. Ostojic:

19 Q. Sir, as you know my name is John Ostojic, and I'm one of the

20 attorneys here for Mr. Ljubisa Beara. Can you please state your name for

21 the record?

22 A. Yes. My same Srdja Trifkovic. I'm also known to my

23 English-speaking friends as Serg.

24 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, we both speak the same language, and sometimes we

25 can overlap as both the person who is asking the questions and the person

Page 25208

1 who is providing the answers. We're going to try to take it slow today

2 even though we will make every effort to conclude with your testimony

3 today. Can you share with us briefly, where do you currently reside?

4 A. I currently reside in Highland Park, which is a north-shore

5 suburb of Chicago, Illinois.

6 Q. Can you tell us a little about your education? What's the

7 highest level of education that you've attained?

8 A. A PhD in European history at the university of Southampton in the

9 UK obtained in the summer of 1990.

10 Q. Sir, do you -- presently, do you -- are you employed anywhere?

11 A. Yes, as foreign affairs editor of the monthly magazine

12 "Chronicles Published By The Rockford Institute" in the city of Rockford

13 in Illinois.

14 Q. How long have you held that position?

15 A. For the past nine years.

16 Q. And prior to that, have you been gainfully employed?

17 A. Yes. Between 1996 and 1999, I was in academia, first at the

18 University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas, as a visiting professor for

19 one year; and at then at Rose Hill College in Aiken, South Carolina.

20 Q. Okay. Can you share with us what you did in 1992?

21 A. In the first half of 1992, I was completing my one year of

22 post-doctoral research at Stanford -- at the Hoover Institution at

23 Stanford University on a Title 8 grant from the department of state on US

24 policy in the Balkans during World War II. The second half of that year

25 I spent as Chief of Staff of his Royal Highness Crown Prince Alexander

Page 25209

1 Karadjordjevic based in London, England.

2 Q. And as his Chief of Staff, just briefly describe what your duties

3 and responsibilities were at that time.

4 A. That was a period when the monarchist sentiment in Serbia was on

5 the rise and when believing that the Crown could electrify a position to

6 Milosevic, a sentiment I wholeheartedly shared. I was keen to help him

7 assert himself as a possible factor who could meaningfully contribute to

8 the process of political change in Serbia.

9 Q. Now, Mr. Trifkovic, you and I know each other, and we've known

10 each other for quite some time, correct?

11 A. Longer than I care to remember.

12 Q. Fair enough. Can you tell me, also, have you testified before

13 the Tribunal in other cases or in any other case?

14 A. I was an expert witness in March of 2003 in the Stakic case.

15 Q. And what expertise did you provide for the Stakic case at that

16 time?

17 A. I provided a background of the Bosnian war in general and the

18 situation in the municipality of Prijedor in particular based not so much

19 on my personal observation of the circumstances but rather on the access

20 to secondary sources, materials, and statements.

21 Q. And you recognise, sir, although you were an expert witness in

22 that case that you're being called here in this case as a fact witness?

23 A. Indeed.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Please pause between questions and answers for

25 the sake of the interpreters. Thank you.

Page 25210

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Did you hear that?

2 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Both of you? Yes, please. If you could comply,

4 we'll appreciate that. Thank you.

5 MR. OSTOJIC:

6 Q. Sir, following your employment with Crown Prince Alexander in the

7 capacity as Chief of Staff, what, if anything, did you do in terms of

8 employment?

9 A. In the summer of 1993, it became obvious that contrary to my

10 hopes and expectations the crown prince was not going to move to Serbia

11 on a permanent basis, which I believe he should have done especially in

12 view of the ongoing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and I was not

13 willing to simply continue as basically a glorified administrator

14 preparing press releases and statements out of the London office, which I

15 believed to be somewhat meaningless.

16 So relying on my previous connections as correspondent for US

17 News and World Report in Belgrade and on my access that I had during the

18 period of my work for him, I decided to work as a freelance journalist,

19 and I had a contract with the Belgrade magazine called Duga, Rainbow, and

20 they also had regular slots in a number of English-speaking publications

21 including at that time also the leading bilingual newspaper of the

22 Serbian community in the United States, Sloboda, Liberty. And I was also

23 providing regular interviews to the electronic media in the UK having

24 spent six years as a radio journalist with the BBC world service in the

25 1980s. I had connections there, too, and I was regularly interviewed

Page 25211

1 especially when it came to presenting a Serbian point of view in the

2 ongoing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

3 Q. Share with us, if you will, if you ever had an opportunity to go

4 to Pale and meet with Radovan Karadzic.

5 A. Yes. The first such occasion was in my capacity as Crown Prince

6 Alexander's advisor, which was at the end of July of 1993 at the time of

7 the Igman and Bjelasnica operation, when I also brought in my car, a

8 consignment of humanitarian assistance and medicines sent by the crown

9 prince's wife Princess Catherine, and I also had a meeting at that time

10 with a number of political and military leaders in a purely ceremonial

11 capacity conveying the best wishes from the crown prince and delivering

12 the packages to the hospital, Koran [phoen] hospital at Pale.

13 Q. Were you ever asked to assist with any of the mainstream media

14 from Dr. Karadzic or people from Republika Srpska in connection with --

15 or based upon your experience as a journalist and being knowledgeable in

16 the Balkan area?

17 A. That initiative came later on. In September of 1993, my wife and

18 I were touring northern France, and we stopped in Geneva where at that

19 time one of the negotiating sessions was going on, and I was personally

20 acquainted with the late professor Nikola Koljevic somewhat more closely

21 than with the others from the Republika Srpska leadership. And it was

22 from him that the initiative came that I would be useful as a

23 spokesperson in some capacity because I think he had seen some of my

24 articles and my media appearances up to that time.

25 Q. And did you accept to attain such a position as a spokesman?

Page 25212

1 A. Well, the situation was somewhat delicate because accepting the

2 position of an official spokesman would have severely curtailed my

3 capacity to function as a freelance journalist and also to provide the

4 kind of analysis of the political background to the conflict in former

5 Yugoslavia that I wanted to continue doing as I deemed fit. I therefore

6 indicated to Professor Koljevic before he formalized the proposal to Dr.

7 Karadzic that I would accept an informal arrangement in which my ability

8 to continue with my other professional pursuits would not be hindered,

9 and which would also enable me to present and articulate positions and

10 analysis in accordance with my own understanding rather than in

11 accordance with anyone's formal instructions.

12 I also believed that in this way I could provide a more

13 comprehensive and more useful information to the media consumers in the

14 English-speaking world, especially since, to be perfectly frank with you,

15 I was also skeptical about the ability of people in Pale, the ability of

16 people in the Serbian lands in general, to present and articulate their

17 positions in a way that would be both readily understood by the western

18 media consumer and that would be presented in a convincing and coherent

19 manner.

20 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, what was your title, then, if any, at that time?

21 A. My title was the Balkan affairs analyst with close links to the

22 Bosnian Serbs. I was occasionally in the media presentation, actually

23 referred to as the representative or spokesman for the Bosnian Serbs,

24 which I always insisted on correcting because I did not want this

25 impression of a formal relationship to be created, not only because of

Page 25213

1 the fact that I wasn't receiving either instructions or payment from Pale

2 but also because I wanted to give them the ability to obtain plausible

3 deniability of my statements if they happened to be displeased with them

4 so that at all times I could both retain the status of an independent

5 analyst, and the leadership of the Republika Srpska could retain its

6 ability to distance themselves from my analysis as presented to the

7 media, which, by the way, did not happen.

8 Q. And we've seen -- or received from the Prosecution some media CDs

9 of you giving speeches to news outlets, and they referred to you as "the

10 unofficial Bosnian Serb spokesman." Would that be a fair way to say it?

11 A. No, because spokesman or spokesperson, again, whether official or

12 unofficial is the person who conveys clearly articulated formal

13 statements or positions of a given entity, which I was very careful to

14 emphasize that I was not in the position to do. But on the other hand,

15 journalists are in the habit of simplifying issues, and if the editor

16 says, give me the Bosnian Serb point of view, they will probably, you

17 know, fill the slot any which way they can even if such a designation

18 which corresponds to the needs of the editorial cycles may fit in neatly

19 with their requirements would not be accurate when it came to my actual

20 role.

21 Q. Okay. So let me stick, then, with the title that you provided

22 us, and that is as "the Balkan affairs analyst with close links to the

23 Bosnian Serbs." Did you hold that position for any length of time?

24 A. I did until, I believe, first week of September of 1995 when the

25 political leadership of the Republika Srpska decided to authorize

Page 25214

1 Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate on their behalf. I could not possibly

2 continue as someone presented as a person with close links or any links

3 with a political entity that was now hardly more than an offshoot of the

4 Milosevic Pale centre. In fact, I remember saying at one point that --

5 asking Milosevic to negotiate on behalf of the Republika Srpska was

6 tantamount to entrusting Count Dracula with a blood bank.

7 Q. Now, Mr. Trifkovic, if you could just give us an idea, and since

8 you started in approximately mid-to late September in the role as Balkan

9 affairs analyst with close links to the Bosnian Serbs, can you tell us in

10 that year how often you would meet with the Republika Srpska leadership

11 just so we can get a general sense of it?

12 A. I spent a week in late November of 1993 in Geneva at the

13 Palestine Nations where I tried to set up some kind of media management

14 for -- I obviously wasn't going to stay there, but I wanted to help them

15 out with the art of composing press releases and formal statements and

16 not relying on improvisation as they had been doing until that time. I

17 am afraid that I was successful in this endeavour to a very limited

18 extent. And after that, during 1994 I paid a total of four visits to the

19 Republika Srpska at times they coincided with my coming to Belgrade on

20 private business or vacations. One or two occasions in 1994 and one

21 occasion in 1995 were purpose-made trips because I simply wanted to find

22 out what was the view from Pale, so to say, at particularly sensitive

23 moments of the Bosnian crisis, such as the Gorazde crisis in 1994, the

24 aftermath of Ex-President Carter's visit in 1995, and ironically in the

25 summer of 1995 I visited Pale because I had already intended to be in

Page 25215

1 Belgrade as part of my summer break without ever suspecting that those

2 days in the month of July would subsequently prove to be critical in many

3 ways.

4 Q. And we'll come back to July 1995 a little later in your

5 examination, but just give us an idea. In 1995 other than July, were you

6 at Pale?

7 A. I was at Pale in late January of 1995. I remember leaving

8 Belgrade on Saint Sava's day that year, and I remember it vividly because

9 --

10 Q. Just tell us what day.

11 A. It was 27th of January. I was at Pale 28th and 9th, and I drove

12 back the following day, so probably on the 30th. And in March, I was

13 there just for one day, in March -- I don't remember the exact day.

14 Probably 22nd or 23rd or 24th of March.

15 Q. And help me with this: After your visit in Pale in July of 1995,

16 did you ever go back to Pale?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Where were you stationed during the time that you were the Balkan

19 affairs analyst?

20 A. I was dividing time between London and the United States. I was

21 at that time still pursuing research subsequent upon my post-doctoral

22 work at Stanford, and I was actually looking for employment in the United

23 States because having been frankly disillusioned with the way that the

24 Republika Srpska leadership, one might say, folded up by entrusting

25 Milosevic with the end game, I prepared the ground in the US for my

Page 25216

1 subsequent move to Houston in the summer of 1996.

2 Q. Are you familiar, as I'm sure you are being a historian, with

3 events that were generally considered the September 1993 action?

4 A. I am familiar in the capacity of, you know, someone who takes a

5 great deal of interest in these affairs, but I'm not familiar with them

6 on a firsthand basis. In other words, I have not discussed them with any

7 of the key participants or key players, and I certainly have not been

8 privy to any privileged information concerning their background.

9 Q. Well, just give us an idea of what it is from the information

10 that you have.

11 A. The Latin tensions between the political leadership of the

12 Republika Srpska and the military leadership had always been present to

13 some extent. The military leadership was composed to a large extent of

14 the former YPA officers who were viewed by the political leaders

15 belonging to the Serbian democratic party as people with a great deal of

16 ideological baggage in their tow. But my first awareness of these

17 tensions came, actually, during the very first visit to Pale during the

18 and Igman and Bjelasnica operation when I gathered from conversations

19 with other people such as one of the advisors to Dr. Karadzic, that he

20 viewed Karadzic, that operation as detrimental to what he believed was a

21 possible diplomatic political break-through and that he believed that by

22 acting without the clear approval from the civilian leadership, the

23 military was somehow undermining the political and diplomatic efforts of

24 the civilian leadership.

25 I, frankly, did not believe that this was substantively the case,

Page 25217

1 even if Dr. Karadzic believed it to be so. In fact, I was pretty certain

2 that no immediate political diplomatic break-through was on the horizon,

3 and as we had seen subsequent to the summer of 1993, in the fall of 1993,

4 the negotiations in Geneva under Stoltenberg and Owen, which had a

5 promising framework of the three entities that had the attributes of

6 sovereignty, collapsed, torpedoed by the United States just as the

7 previous Owen-Stoltenberg plan had been torpedoed in the spring of '93.

8 The second crisis, if you will, in the relations occurred in

9 September of 1993 with a protest by the war veterans, handicapped and

10 wounded soldiers, and the families of the fallen, and there were two

11 versions of what was going on. One was that of the political leadership,

12 which claimed that this was engineered by the military top brass as a

13 means of putting pressure on politicians and as a means of pointing out

14 the existence of Banja Luka as the alternative power centre to Pale;

15 while on the other hand, the view of the soldiers was that the Serbian

16 democratic party establishment, allegedly both corrupt and inept, was

17 manipulating the perfectly justified grievances of the veterans, the

18 wounded, the handicapped, and the widows and orphans, in order to

19 engineer a show-down with the military that would give them an excuse to

20 replace the top brass of the BSA. And either way, I frankly do not have

21 the information that would enable me even at this stage to pass the

22 verdict, whether it was one or the other or the mix of the two. But

23 either way, it certainly proved that not -- that something was rotten in

24 not the kingdom of Denmark but the Republika Srpska.

25 Q. Okay. Let me just follow up if you don't mind and clarify. You

Page 25218

1 said BSA. Just tell us what you mean by that.

2 A. I mean VRS, Vojska Republika Srpska or Bosnian Serb Army is the

3 usually shorthand used in...

4 Q. Fair enough. And then you also use the acronym YPA?

5 A. The Yugoslav People's Army or JNA.

6 Q. I just want to clarify that. Now, when, if at all, was the first

7 time that you heard the name of Ljubisa Beara?

8 A. The first time I heard the name of Ljubisa Beara was during the

9 week I spent in Geneva in late November of 1993, when during the long and

10 arduous negotiating sessions of which I was not -- to which I wasn't

11 privy and obviously was not invited, I spent a few hours in all with the

12 members of the Republika Srpska delegations security detail. Being both

13 a journalist and a historian, I was very interested in the views and

14 experiences of these young men who were all veterans of the early battles

15 in the summer of 1992 and who being, you know, mostly simple folk from

16 the grass roots of the Bosnian/Serb public at large were providing -- I

17 don't want to sound condescending about this, but it was the genuine vox

18 populi. It was something that one doesn't get in a raw form unless you

19 actually spend a long time in the Republika Srpska, which I wasn't able

20 to do.

21 And so just listening to them chatting among themselves, joking,

22 reminiscing, and commenting provided me with a fascinating insight into

23 the -- you know, the nitty-gritty of the perception of events on the

24 ground. And it was in this context that I heard them refer to Ljubisa

25 Beara's appointment as "bezbednjak," chief of security of the

Page 25219

1 Bosnian/Serb army, with displeasure and even indignation because they

2 believed that it simply meant that the old-school Tito-restrained former

3 YPA officers who had internalised the Yugo nostalgic -- who had internal

4 analysed the both Yugoslav rather than Serbian loyalty and the particular

5 brand of Titoist communist Yugoslav loyalty as their formative experience

6 in the period of their personal and professional development and that

7 therefore he wasn't someone that they would look upon with approval as

8 the chief of security of what they expected to be a new army for a new

9 Serbian state. Nevertheless --

10 Q. And just so -- sorry.

11 A. Sorry. At the same time, they referred with a degree of grudging

12 respect to what I understand was his successful arrest of some Croat

13 demonstrators who were guilty of killing a Macedonian conscript during

14 the demonstrations in Split in May of 199 -- oh dear, it would have been

15 May of 1991. But they specifically referred to the killing of two

16 volunteers belonging to the Serbian radical party in the region of

17 Dubrovnik as the proof that he doesn't like caucades [phoen] Serbian

18 nationalist berges [phoen] and beards, and I now quote from memory. He

19 can't stand caucades and beards, was a comment made at that time.

20 Q. And who were these individuals again? They were providing

21 security detail for who?

22 A. For the Serbian -- Bosnian Serb delegation. They were -- I have

23 to tell you the truth. I don't remember their names, but they were in

24 their late 20s, perhaps early 30s, and they were the veterans of the

25 early battles. I believe that most of them came from the special police

Page 25220

1 units rather than the military structures.

2 Q. Now, you mentioned, also, two instances, one with the Macedonian

3 conscript, and then you also mentioned a killing of Serbian radical party

4 volunteer. Do you know if that was the same incident or two separate

5 incidents?

6 A. These would be two separate incidents, and they were referred to

7 with a very different sentiment. The killing of two volunteers was

8 referred to as the proof of Beara's animosity to any display of Serbian

9 particularism within what was still at the time the JNA, but the

10 apprehension of Croat culprits for the killing of the Macedonian

11 conscript was mentioned, as I say, in the spirit of grudging respect as

12 the proof that the man is a pro.

13 Q. Now, help me with this: Since you were there and based on your

14 personal observations and experiences, were there any idealogical

15 differences between the civilian authorities, let's call them, in Pale

16 and Banja Luka and those who were former JNA either officers or members;

17 and then if you can, describe that for us.

18 A. Well, even at this distance of more than a decade, it is hard to

19 tell to what extent differences that acquired the guise of ideology were

20 rooted in the differences over personalities, the position in the power

21 structure, or even the accusations of corrupt dealings and outright

22 criminality which was occasionally levelled by the military leaders

23 against the civilian authorities and in particular against the SDS party

24 structure on the grounds. But suffice to say that I became aware of

25 these differences in fairly outspoken references by Dr. Karadzic to the

Page 25221

1 "commie bastards," "komunjare," and the Red Plague, which I do not recall

2 being referenced to any particular person but which I took to imply the

3 top brass, the, basically, top leadership of Bosnian/Serb army. The

4 constant spirit of this underlying animosity was based on the claim that

5 they had divided loyalties and that many of them were still on the

6 payroll of the Yugoslav Army, which at that time was no longer Yugoslav

7 People's Army but was -- became VJ and Milosevic himself, and that they

8 were playing a duplicitous game on the one hand accepting the primacy of

9 the political leadership but on the other still continuing to act as an

10 independent power centre in its own right.

11 On the other hand, the view from the military was that the

12 political leadership displayed a mix of political and diplomatic

13 inaptitude on one hand and the proclivity to corruption and even

14 criminality on the other; that the civilian leadership had failed to

15 proclaim the state of war in the entire territory of the Republika

16 Srpska; that it had failed to control the smuggling of fuel, cigarettes,

17 and even munitions and military hardware, either by the politically

18 connected individuals or through the state company, which even though was

19 supposedly serving the treasury of the Republika Srpska was still in the

20 end allegedly used by the various SDS bigwigs and well connected

21 individuals to line their pockets. But as I mentioned earlier, all of

22 these elements in the puzzle, I haven't been able to glean from any

23 first-hand sources but, rather, from fragmentary accounts and from

24 elements of, you know, press articles and public statements somewhat

25 reinforced by this remarkable level of almost vehement personal animosity

Page 25222

1 that I noticed in Dr. Karadzic on a number of occasions when it came to

2 the top brass of the Bosnian/Serb army collectively.

3 Q. And did this attitude, if you will, based on the observations

4 that you've made and had, did this attitude persist throughout the period

5 that you worked as a Balkan affairs analyst, meaning until September of

6 1995?

7 A. I would say that it was less pronounced in 1994 or maybe early

8 1995 than it was in the summer of 1995. In the summer of 1995 - that was

9 my final visit - I had two meetings with Dr. Karadzic, one with two

10 Serbian/American people --

11 Q. We'll get to that.

12 A. Yes. And at that time I actually became aware of rather strong

13 language used with reference to the events surrounding the assembly of

14 the Republika Srpska held at Sanski Most in mid-April. Even though

15 reference to what amounted to a coup was not something I heard from

16 Karadzic itself, I cannot exactly recall who made that particular

17 reference or who used that metaphor, but I believe it was an exaggeration

18 that the attempt by the military leaders at that assembly to obtain a

19 number of decisions from the politicians regarding the conduct of the

20 war, the organisation of both the production geared to supplying the

21 military, and the more even burden of the effort on different strata of

22 the population, that was certainly interpreted by the political leaders

23 as an attack on their own position and on -- certainly on their own

24 authority.

25 Q. And what time period are you speaking of?

Page 25223

1 A. Well, it was a two-day assembly of the Republika Srpska. I

2 believe it was April 15th and 16th of 1995.

3 Q. And where was it specifically?

4 A. At Sanski Most.

5 Q. And who was giving the speeches that led to this, as you put,

6 increased or almost vehement personal animosity that you were generally

7 discussing and this coup that you mentioned?

8 A. Obviously I wasn't there, but my understanding is that General

9 Mladic came up with a list of specific demands and that on behalf of the

10 SDS the party secretary Velibor Ostojic responded in vehement terms that

11 those demands were nothing short of an act of disobedience, disloyalty.

12 Q. And help me with this: Did it ever come other than the

13 conversations you shared with us with the security detail of the

14 political establishment at the Palace of Nations in Geneva, was there any

15 other opportunity that a discussion about Mr. Beara was undertaken in

16 your presence?

17 A. It was either during my January visit of 1995 or my March visit,

18 I can't remember which of the two, that vice-president Nikola Koljevic's

19 Chief of Staff, Zdravko Miovcic, referred to Beara as someone who doesn't

20 trust all these foreign Serbs who have gained access to the political

21 leaders. In addition to myself, he mentioned Jovan Zametica and Milos

22 Prica as, you know, the diaspora Serbs who simply by virtue of living in

23 the West or having lived in the West where one might say suspicious by

24 definition, that therefore, their loyalty was open to doubt, but Miovcic

25 added half-jokingly, but don't worry about it, he doesn't count for much

Page 25224

1 around here, meaning Pale.

2 Q. Just remind us of who Mr. Zametica was at that time?

3 A. He was advisor to Dr. Karadzic. I believe he was particularly

4 focused on foreign and diplomatic affairs.

5 Q. And the same with Mr. Mitrovic? What was his role?

6 A. No Miovcic. He was vice-president, Koljevic's Chief of Staff.

7 Q. Did you form an impression as to whether or not they were

8 speaking as a result of their position and their close ties with Mr.

9 Karadzic that perhaps those were his views as well?

10 A. Not necessarily, but nevertheless, I found it remarkable that

11 both at the level of, you know, simple but, you know, honest-to-God young

12 fellows who comprised the security detail of the political leaders and at

13 the upper echelon of their entourage, for instance, the Chief of Staff to

14 the vice-president, a fairly similar sentiment was expressed, and also

15 that if what Mr. Miovcic said was true about Beara's dislike of the fact

16 that all these diaspora Serbs are, you know, making themselves

17 conspicuous, that would imply that the security experts in the

18 Bosnian/Serb army took a somewhat dim view of the judgement of political

19 leaders themselves, because if they surround themselves by people who by

20 virtue of having lived abroad are of dubious loyalty, then obviously

21 their own judgements and their own loyalty, perhaps, could be open to

22 some doubt.

23 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, the transcript and I misspoke when I used the name

24 Mr. Miovcic, it's M-I-O-V-C-I-C, correct? Is that the way we would spell

25 it?

Page 25225

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. It's important just so we have it right. Thank you for

3 that. Now, have you ever heard of Karadzic referred to Beara --

4 A. No.

5 Q. -- at any time during any of your visits or the times that you

6 spent in Pale from 1993 to September 1995?

7 A. No. Let me reiterate. The only specific references to Beara by

8 name were the ones made by the security detail at the Palace of Nations

9 in Geneva in late November 1993 and the comment by Mr. Miovcic in either

10 late January or else mid-March of 1995.

11 Q. Share with me, if you will, are you familiar with the name of Bob

12 or Robert Djurdjevic?

13 A. Yes. He was a businessman based in Phoenix, Arizona, who had

14 previously lived in Canada and who was publishing a newsletter called

15 "Truth In Media."

16 Q. And do you remember seeing him at all in Pale in July of 1995?

17 A. Yes, I remember seeing him in a very brief encounter at the

18 office of Dr. Zametica. I don't think it was a particularly friendly

19 encounter because of -- there are two things. One of the two Serbian

20 Americans who came with me on that trip was Mrs. Slavica Ristic from

21 Phoenix, Arizona, who knew Bob Djurdjevic well. They lived in the same

22 city and even volunteered when he started his newsletter with the layout

23 and the data entry but who by that time had come to the conclusion that

24 he was, as she put it, a Milosevic man.

25 That opinion could have been justified some years later when I

Page 25226

1 came across a report in the English language edition of the Haaretz daily

2 newspaper in Israel that in the course of trial of General Sharon's son

3 for corruption, it was mentioned that he received a particular payment

4 from Belgrade, from the government of Serbia and Milosevic for stealing

5 power at that time, which was delivered by Bob Djurdjevic.

6 Q. Okay. Mr. Trifkovic, we will go into detail on your visit in

7 Pale, but I just wanted to cover with respect to Bob Djurdjevic whether

8 you knew him or not. Thank you for that.

9 Can you share with us where you were in early -- or in July 1995

10 prior to you arriving in Pale?

11 A. Yes. I was in Belgrade. I was also briefly in my in-laws'

12 cottage, mountain retreat on Mount Jelica near Cacak, and during my trip

13 to Pale with Mr. Premovic and Mrs. Ristic, I actually left my family in

14 the cottage because having visited Bosnian/Serb republic in the summer of

15 1993 they were not particularly keen to go, especially since it was the

16 time when military operations were underway. They deemed it wiser not to

17 join me on that trip, and I completely concurred.

18 Q. Why did you go?

19 A. Because at that time the Srebrenica military operation was in

20 full swing, and I generally wanted to hear what was their take on what

21 looked like an unexpected development. By the way, I had intended to go

22 even before the military operations started unfolding, but when I left,

23 which was July 12th, I was really keen to obtain the kind of firsthand

24 account of what was going on and what was the political leader's take on

25 future course of events so that upon my return to London, which was

Page 25227

1 scheduled for July 18th, 17th or 18th, I could address the media with

2 some degree of authority having been to Pale: Having spoken to the

3 political leaders, having considered the situation with analysts in

4 Belgrade, I can now tell you that this is what's going on.

5 Q. And did you provide such interviews or commentary to the news

6 media?

7 A. Well, yes, and one point on which the political leaders were

8 particularly insistent, Karadzic, Koljevic, and their advisors, was that

9 the failure of the United Nations to demilitarise the UN-protected zone

10 of Srebrenica had effectively compromised its status as the protected

11 zone and the military operation was made necessary by the failure of the

12 UN to act in the way that would prevent its further use as an armed camp

13 when raids are carried out against surrounding Serb villages on the one

14 hand and as a UN-protected zone when the Serbs threaten retaliation.

15 Q. Do you remember, sir, specifically how long you stayed in Pale in

16 July of 1995?

17 A. I stayed -- I stayed from the evening of the 12th until the early

18 morning of the 16th, so I was there the 13th, 14th, and 15th.

19 Q. And where did you go afterwards on the 16th?

20 A. On the 16th, I drove to Belgrade, and then either the following

21 day or the one after I flew to London. I really need to look at my old

22 passports to see the stamps in order to ascertain this.

23 Q. Now, I'd like to show you what we've identified or are going to

24 use as an exhibit in e-court, which is P2905.

25 MR. OSTOJIC: And just so the Court's aware, this is an excerpt

Page 25228

1 from an appointment calendar for Radovan Karadzic in July 1995. It was

2 used in the Milosevic trial, and although I understand now we do have

3 what purports to be the complete calendar, this one was used, I think it,

4 as my learned friend has told me, is almost if not identical to the one

5 that was recently seized, but we're using the one given to us by the OTP

6 previously?

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just to -- this is obviously an important

9 document. We did not purport we have the complete version of this diary,

10 but we did provide what we do have, that what we know we do have from the

11 recent seizure of that diary, and it matched what came out of the

12 Milosevic trial. So we have -- I think it's roughly the month of July

13 for the diary, but we did have the material that was included that came

14 out in the Milosevic trial, just so that's clear.

15 MR. OSTOJIC: And just so it's further clear, this is the

16 document from the Milosevic trial. We didn't go through -- since we were

17 only given the seizures from Radovan Karadzic only yesterday, this is the

18 one that was actually used in the Milosevic trial, so...

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, both of you. Please proceed.

20 MR. OSTOJIC:

21 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, you are looking at, obviously, as you've heard,

22 what purports to be an excerpt from an appointment calendar for Radovan

23 Karadzic for July. Specifically, I think it's the 13th and 14th of July,

24 1995. Do you see that on your screen?

25 A. Yes.

Page 25229

1 Q. There's an English version to the left, and do you have both

2 versions there?

3 A. Yes, except that I don't see the bottom of the handwritten

4 Serbians. Oh, there we are.

5 Q. Do you see your name depicted anywhere on that entry after the

6 13th of July, 1995?

7 A. Yes. Both the 13th with the two visitors from the US and on the

8 14th with Dr. Zametica.

9 Q. Okay. Well, let's take it one step at a time if you don't mind.

10 The entry which is at the top portion of this exhibit P2905, the 13th of

11 July, how many times is your name entered there? Do you see?

12 A. Just once under the 13th.

13 Q. And what time does it designate?

14 A. 1700 until 1840.

15 Q. There seems to be some hash marks or minus signs or plus signs to

16 the left of the names of some of the purported visitors with Dr.

17 Karadzic. Can you explain that to us?

18 A. Well, I don't know for fact, but it stands to reason that when

19 appointments are made a minus sign would be put next to the name, and if

20 the appointment is actually realized, then the cross or plus sign would

21 be completed. But if for whatever reason the appointment was not, then

22 -- or if it was rescheduled, then the minus would stay because the third

23 from top on July 14th Professor Karadzic and V, presumably Velibor

24 Ostojic, we have the minus sign and -- with the addition tomorrow. So I

25 would say that wherever you see the plus sign, that meeting had actually

Page 25230

1 taken place.

2 Q. And so what does it say with respect to you in the meeting that

3 you had with Dr. Karadzic?

4 A. Well, that --

5 Q. For the 13th. We're only talking about the 13th.

6 A. That's right. Originally, I seem to remember that we were

7 supposed to have at least a brief meeting with Dr. Karadzic on the

8 evening of the 12th because as I mentioned earlier, for the two visitors

9 from the United States it was a matter of something -- they wanted purely

10 formal and ceremonial reasons and especially as people who had also

11 provided a lot of humanitarian assistance and so on, but we were not able

12 to do so when we arrived on the evening of the 12th. So on the 13th, we

13 had a meeting during which Dr. Karadzic greeted and took pictures and

14 then gave a rather optimistic account of the likelihood for the, you

15 know, speedy political and diplomatic conclusion to the war because with

16 the fall of the eastern enclaves, we are probably going to enter the

17 period of intense diplomatic activity which, as he believed, would pave

18 the way for, you know, a peace on terms favourable to the Serb.

19 Q. To the best of your recollection, do you recall who was

20 maintaining the appointment book for Dr. Karadzic in July of 1995?

21 A. There was a secretary. I believe her name was Mira. I really

22 can't remember her last name. I may have been told it at some stage, but

23 --

24 Q. And just so we have a better understanding of the entries there,

25 to the right of the name in parentheses, do you know what that -- those

Page 25231

1 designations are?

2 A. Well, I would say that once the meeting is completed, she was

3 probably entering the actual times when it was held.

4 Q. And help us with your meeting and entry on the 13th of July,

5 1995. How long did that meeting last, first to the best of your

6 recollection, and then we'll compare to the entry.

7 A. Well, I wouldn't have been able to tell you from my recollection

8 what was the duration. I would have said more than an hour, less than

9 two, and this sounds about right.

10 Q. Does it just give the length of the meeting, or does it designate

11 the time that perhaps the people met with Dr. Karadzic?

12 A. I would say that this actually indicates the time when visitors

13 came and left.

14 Q. And what does it say for your entry on the 13th of July?

15 A. 1700 until 1840.

16 Q. Is that the only entry that bears your name on the 13th of July,

17 1995?

18 A. Yes. On the 13th, it is the only one.

19 Q. Let's move, then, on to the 14th of July. Do you see any entries

20 that bear your name?

21 A. Well, I do, but can you bring the handwritten page down? Yes.

22 We are -- there we are, second from bottom. Myself and Zametica, meaning

23 Dr. Jovan Zametica, 2305 until 0035 -- 25 to 1 a.m..

24 Q. Now, looking at this document, do you -- and we mentioned Mr.

25 Djordjevic. Do you see whether he met with Dr. Karadzic?

Page 25232

1 A. Yes. We see his name entered from 5 p.m. until quarter past 7.

2 Q. It's far for me. Does it say actually 5 p.m., or does it have

3 the military --

4 A. Actually, it has 1700. All designations are military style.

5 Q. Okay. Now, let me take you to the next document, and we'll come

6 back to this in short order, and I'd like you to now look at 2D531. And

7 it's a long document, but I'd like first for Mr. Trifkovic to see the

8 front page of it so he can become familiar with it.

9 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are kindly asked to slow down and

10 to pause between answer and question. Thank you very much.

11 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I will bear it in mind.

12 MR. OSTOJIC: I'm sorry.

13 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, this 2D531 exhibit is something the Prosecution

14 provided us during this case, and it seems to be a diary of sorts from

15 Bob Djurdjevic as indicated on the first page, and I think -- from my

16 understanding its his handwriting on the bottom right-hand corner where

17 he says not to open until after the YU war ends -- after three years

18 after the YU war ends. I want to go to a couple of entries in his diary

19 just to see whether it matches or not with the appointment book that we

20 were just looking at. So I would ask with respect to this diary that we

21 go to immediately to - and I think I have the right number here -

22 2D40-0508.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Are you contesting this?

24 MR. OSTOJIC:

25 Q. It's a doc ID --

Page 25233

1 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, because we could skip this if the

2 Prosecution does not contest the -- what would be the outcome of this

3 piece of part of the evidence? We can skip it if it's just for

4 confirmation of what is contained in the diary and the appointment book.

5 MR. OSTOJIC: It's not just that. It also goes to the

6 authenticity.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, okay, then -- but the way you described that

8 was as if it was just that. Okay. Go ahead. Go ahead.

9 MR. OSTOJIC: I was getting there, though. It's more than a...

10 Q. Do you see the entry before you, sir, that from this diary of Mr.

11 Djurdjevic that he says that he had a meeting with Radovan Karadzic and

12 the time that he notes that he had this meeting in Pale?

13 A. Yes, it would seem to fit the entry in the appointments book.

14 Q. Now, if we just go a couple of pages prior to that which is Doc

15 ID number 2D40-0504, which is the date that Bob Djurdjevic writes as the

16 when the meeting took place. And as you know, we looked at the diary

17 from the 14th when that meeting took place from 1700 hours on. He in his

18 diary, however, writes that it seems to have taken place on the 13th of

19 July, 1995. I'm not going to ask you if you remember what day that falls

20 on, but I will take you further back to Doc ID number 2D40-0491. If we

21 can just look at that entry. That also is July 13th, 1995, but it's a

22 Thursday, and it's actually the start of Bob Djurdjevic's trip from

23 Belgrade to Han Pijesak with a driver called Milos Tomovic. Now, with

24 respect to the dates is it fair to say, and I know you didn't read the

25 entire article, that the meeting that Bob Djurdjevic had, as did you,

Page 25234

1 with Radovan Karadzic actually occurred on the 14th of July, 1995?

2 A. I would say that we had two meetings. One was with the visitors

3 from the United States on the 13th, and the other was with Dr. Zametica

4 in attendance late at night on the 14th. I'm sorry, Mr. Ostojic. Are

5 you referring to my own meetings?

6 Q. I wasn't, and that's what I was looking at.

7 A. Oh, sorry.

8 Q. That's okay. I'm just looking to get some help to see the

9 authenticity of this document. Now, the 13th of July, 1995, we see from

10 Bob Djurdjevic's diary that he actually arrives in Pale on the 13th, and

11 he has no reference to meetings with Dr. Karadzic, but his only reference

12 is the next day, which he state is th 13th, which is an error, at least

13 according to the appointment book, correct?

14 A. Correct. The 14th was Friday, not the 13th.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Vanderpuye.

16 MR. VANDERPUYE: I object, obviously, to the form of question.

17 It's leading, and he suggested the answer to the witness.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: It had been better had you stood up earlier. It's

19 over. So let's -- but in future try to avoid leading questions, please.

20 MR. OSTOJIC: I will. Thank you.

21 Q. Now, do you -- I'm going to show you an entry that Mr. Djurdjevic

22 makes -- strike that. Let's go back to the appointment calendar of

23 P2905. I want you to walk us through some of this, and thank you for

24 your assistance on this, and once we get it up we'll be able to look at

25 it, I guess. I want to in particular focus on the 14th of July, 1995,

Page 25235

1 and the meetings that Dr. Karadzic seems to have had on that day. But

2 first I want to ask you this question: Do you know a person or did you

3 know a person by the name of Miroslav Deronjic?

4 A. No, I don't recall ever hearing his name or meeting him.

5 Q. And can you share with us, please, whether you can identify his

6 name as having purportedly had a meeting with Dr. Karadzic on the 14th of

7 July, 1995?

8 A. Well, yes, indeed. He figures on the list at 1100, 11 a.m., as

9 scheduled but actually held from 1240 until 1310. Sorry. Yes. It is

10 somewhat unclear. It looks like Deronjic himself had a meeting, 1240 to

11 1310, and then with the delegation from Srebrenica later that afternoon

12 from 1425 until 1825. This is potentially somewhat confusing, but I

13 presume that this is what it means because in the handwritten notes it

14 looks like the meeting was scheduled for 1100, that's the figure on the

15 left; that it was actually held between 1240 and 1310, that's the numbers

16 in parentheses above his last -- his first name; and then the subsequent

17 meeting with the delegation, since it is right next to his name,

18 presumably he was with that delegation from 1425 until 1825.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Vanderpuye.

20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I'm sorry. I object to this line

21 of questioning. It's clear that this witness doesn't have any personal

22 familiarity with this book. The book speaks for itself. Everyone can

23 read what it says, and this line of questioning is completely

24 inappropriate to pursue with this witness because all we're getting from

25 him is speculation.

Page 25236

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you wish to comment, Mr. Ostojic?

2 MR. OSTOJIC: I think we can determine as to whether or not the

3 book has any level of accuracy and authenticity because this witness was

4 a participant in several meetings, and he can confirm whether or not

5 approximately he met with Dr. Karadzic at that time. I think it's

6 likewise very important for this Court to know when Miroslav Deronjic met

7 with Karadzic at least according to the appointment book. It is indeed

8 relevant.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: What you haven't answered is the following: There

10 is the document itself, which purports to say that, but is the witness in

11 the position to confirm that indeed a meeting took place between Deronjic

12 and Karadzic on that day at a time or at any other time?

13 MR. OSTOJIC: By him describing his meeting and the hash marks --

14 JUDGE AGIUS: He can only confirm -- he can only confirm that he

15 himself had this meeting, but can he confirm -- yes, Mr. McCloskey.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we have a brief discussion without the

17 presence of the witness. This, again, is an important document.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Right. The witness needs to leave the courtroom

19 because the discussion will be in English, of course.

20 [The witness withdrew]

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, who wishes to go first?

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I apologise for interrupting Mr. Vanderpuye

23 on this, but this, again, goes back to -- perhaps folks don't know, but

24 Mr. Karadzic's secretary was interviewed about these pages and described

25 what these marks meant, and those statements are available. I believe

Page 25250

1 meeting would have been two weeks after the session of the Republika

2 Srpska assembly at Sanski Most on April 15th or 16th at which, as I know

3 from open sources and my own reading of many years later, General Gvero

4 was present and was at least implicitly one of those supporting the 25

5 points that represented -- at that time by Mladic that represented as

6 specific demands from the political leadership for the more effective

7 waging of the war.

8 Q. Do you know that the result of the work of the assembly was that

9 they made a recommendation for General Gvero to be pensioned off?

10 A. I'm not aware of General Gvero being singled out by himself. I

11 believe that shortly before the fall of the Krajina, and now we are

12 entering into an area where I don't have any firsthand experiences or

13 knowledge based on personal encounters, but I believe that it was shortly

14 before the fall of the Krajina in the first week of August that an

15 attempt was made to pension off a whole group of senior officers

16 including not only General Gvero but also General Mladic.

17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Trifkovic. No

18 further questions.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Mr. Haynes?

20 MR. SARAPA: No questions, thank you.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Vanderpuye.

22 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon to

23 you. Good afternoon to my colleagues.

24 Cross-examination by Mr. Vanderpuye:

25 Q. And good afternoon to you, Dr. Trifkovic. My name is Kweku

Page 25251

1 Vanderpuye. On behalf of the Prosecution, I'm going to put some

2 questions to you in relation to your direct examination and also in

3 relation to your cross-examination. So if there's anything that I ask

4 you that's not clear to you, please let me know and I'll try to rephrase

5 it in a way that we can better understand one another.

6 Now, you mentioned that you never met Colonel Beara.

7 A. I have no recollection of meeting him. I was present on a few

8 occasions in gatherings where several people were present, for instance,

9 in the area of Gorazde when there was a reception. I'm not aware of

10 meeting him, and I certainly have no memory of exchanging any words with

11 him.

12 Q. Okay. But you've -- you learned his name, and you heard him

13 spoken about in 1993, you mentioned, right?

14 A. Yes. The -- I remember him mentioned by name in November of 1993

15 and then again in early 1995 on the two occasions that I described.

16 Q. Okay. Now, you indicated that you had gone down to Pale from I

17 think it was Belgrade on the 12th of July, 1995, right?

18 A. That's right.

19 Q. Okay. And about what time did you arrive at Pale?

20 A. It was towards late afternoon, early evening. I would be

21 hard-pressed to give you more precise time than between 530 and 7 or so.

22 Q. All right. And for what purpose were you going?

23 A. I was spending the previous ten days in Serbia on -- as part of

24 the summer break and was going to visit, anyway, at some point in order

25 to learn the details of what was going on in the aftermath of the

Page 25252

1 Srebrenica operation which, of course, was very much in the news at that

2 time, although obviously not for the reasons that we are mostly concerned

3 these days. And the two friends of mine from the United States -

4 independently of each other, by the way - were also in Serbia, and it was

5 a sort of friendly favour that I took them along pay a visit which both

6 of them very earnestly wanted to make. But my primary interest was, to

7 put it colloquially, get the score on the what views from Pale were,

8 which I could then usefully employ in my own analysis, writings, and

9 media presentations.

10 Q. Okay. And the two friends you are talking about are Tom

11 Premovic?

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. And Slavica Ristic?

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. Okay.

16 MR. VANDERPUYE: If I could have 65 ter 3690 in e-court, please.

17 If we could just go down and blow up, that's probably okay.

18 Q. This is another entry from the appointment book of Dr. Karadzic,

19 and with respect to your name, you see it appears on -- below 12 July

20 1995. It's the second line following the date.

21 A. Right.

22 Q. Okay. Now, you see below that the name of Vukcic?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you know who that is?

25 A. No.

Page 25253

1 Q. Do you recognise any other names that you see on this particular

2 page, that is, under the 12th July date?

3 A. No.

4 Q. All right.

5 A. And by the way, let me add that this meeting was not actually

6 held.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Yeah. We were supposed to arrive somewhat earlier, and the

9 secretary informed me that the meeting was rescheduled for the following

10 day.

11 Q. All right. And when did you learn that the meeting had been

12 rescheduled for the following day?

13 A. Upon arrival at Pale.

14 Q. And do you recall the name of the secretary who told you that?

15 A. As I mentioned earlier, I believe her name was Mira, M-I-R-A, but

16 my visits were not frequent enough to establish any kind of rapport with

17 administrative support staff.

18 Q. And did you -- well, following the rescheduling of the meeting,

19 did you meet with anybody else on the 12th?

20 A. I'm sorry. The transcription says "were not frequent" -- all

21 right. Sorry. On the evening of the 12th, the only -- the only person I

22 recall meeting, or rather, persons were Dr. Koljevic's Chief of Staff

23 Zdravko Miovcic and Dr. Karadzic's advisor Dr. Zametica.

24 Q. Okay. And were these meetings -- were these meetings actually

25 scheduled beforehand or were they scheduled simply after --

Page 25254

1 A. No, I knew them privately, so to say. I -- they were not people

2 with whom you would need to formerly schedule a meeting. They were

3 people who I actually relied upon to give me informal behind-the-screens

4 briefing of what's going on.

5 Q. And with respect to the rescheduling the rescheduling of the

6 meeting that you had for the 12th, were you given an explanation as to

7 why the meeting had been cancelled?

8 A. That our arrival was later than had been anticipated and that,

9 therefore, his schedule for the evening was full.

10 Q. Okay. When did you make the appointment actually, initially?

11 A. When I called Dr. Zametica to say that we would be coming, and I

12 believe it was only done a day or two before we left Belgrade because I'm

13 pretty certain that I wasn't able to fix the dates until at most two days

14 before leaving.

15 Q. All right. The reason, as you can imagine, I'm asking is because

16 there's no time indicated for your planned meeting.

17 A. Well, the details are somewhat blurred after all these years, but

18 I believe that I would have been advised to give them a call once I

19 actually arrived.

20 Q. All right.

21 A. And in view of, you know, crossing the border and checkpoints and

22 so on, one couldn't be very precise about the timetables and schedules.

23 MR. OSTOJIC: Sorry. Can we have the B/C/S version of that

24 appointment calendar moved so we can see the full writing on the

25 right-hand side of that, please.

Page 25255

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Vanderpuye speak closer to his

2 microphone or more into the microphone. Thank you.

3 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'm sorry.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Is it good enough like that?

5 MR. OSTOJIC: If that's the best they can do. I'm just told that

6 in parentheses it has an indication of something, and maybe it might

7 assist us to have the witness inform us what it says.

8 THE WITNESS: Well, I think --

9 MR. OSTOJIC: Or if they have the original, they can share it.

10 THE WITNESS: I think it probably means for tomorrow because it

11 says "za se" [phoen] so it would be "za sutra."

12 MR. VANDERPUYE:

13 Q. Okay. Now, you'd mentioned that you'd met -- you'd had some

14 meetings after this particular meeting was cancelled, right? These are

15 private meetings?

16 A. As I say -- I wouldn't necessarily call it a meeting. It was a

17 private conversation that had more of a character of a social get-

18 together with, you know, snacks and drinks and informal off-the-record

19 chat about what's going on, who's doing what to whom, what's the mood,

20 what's -- it would be, as I say, the kind of friendly briefing that you

21 get from people you know personally rather than people who are

22 communicating with you on the basis of their function or the chain of

23 authority.

24 Q. Okay. And what is the nature of the informal conversations that

25 you had with Mr. Miovcic?

Page 25256

1 A. I don't have precise recollection, but I would probably guess

2 that it had to do with the unexpected or seemingly unexpected collapse of

3 the Defence of Srebrenica and the diplomatic implications and what is the

4 take at Pale on the significance of this event and on the presentation of

5 the issue which in -- at that time was primarily focused on -- in my

6 personal interest was also whether there would be the continuation of the

7 military activity in the direction of Gorazde, whether they would try to

8 wrap it up in one swoop, and also, what feedback, if any, were they

9 getting from the UN and from various other international powers that be.

10 But I can't give you more precise answer because I know this

11 would be the kind of conversation I would have with Zametica and Miovcic

12 with whom I had both a better personal rapport than with the officials

13 higher up and also with whom I was able to be more frank about my

14 disagreements or differences of opinion than would have been the case

15 with someone like Karadzic or even Koljevic.

16 Q. Well, seeing as you've discussed this matter with them, did you

17 get the sense with them at any point as to what direction this particular

18 operation was going?

19 A. I had a strong sense both then and the following day that they

20 were generally surprised that Srebrenica fell effectively without a fight

21 and that there was also some difficulty in getting the feedback from the

22 ground as to what was actually going on. I remember while I was with the

23 other two visitors at Karadzic's office the following day that on a

24 couple of occasions he actually was interrupted and tried to get the

25 connection through to someone at Han Pijesak, but one particular term I

Page 25257

1 remember used is that the line is down. So what I got from those two

2 gentlemen was the sense that they really didn't know what happened, that

3 after, you know, a long period of tenacious defence that Srebrenica just

4 fell.

5 Q. Well, did you discuss some of the concerns that would normally

6 arise in the situation like that, such as humanitarian concerns?

7 A. Absolutely, and --

8 Q. Okay. What did you discuss?

9 A. That it would be very important for the Serbian side to make sure

10 that nothing happens in the treatment of the civilians and, by the way,

11 the focus was primarily in our conversations with the civilians that

12 would be used in the way that during the different episodes earlier on

13 with Gorazde, with Bihac, and of course, Sarajevo itself that there was

14 immediate treatment of the Serbian side that was greatly detrimental to

15 the Serbian interests, which was at least to some extent, even though

16 possibly exaggerated, but at least to some extent based on real events.

17 I had the impression that they shared this assessment, and I also

18 have the impression that during the meeting the following day, Dr.

19 Karadzic was particularly insistent that he would issue orders that

20 nothing would happen to the civilians that could be used in the media

21 presentation as a tool against the Serbs.

22 Q. Well, why did you -- what gave you the impression that they

23 shared that particular concern?

24 A. Because I commented on, first of all, that I saw a number of

25 civilian buses, that as we drove down from the Drina River, from the

Page 25258

1 Serbian border towards Pale, I didn't see much in the way of traffic,

2 military or civilian, but there were certainly buses parked by the

3 roadside especially in the area where the road turns left towards

4 Bratunac from the main highway from Zvornik to Sokolac. And on that

5 first evening, which is the 12th, I have to emphasize that my own

6 knowledge or understanding of what was actually going on was sketchy in

7 the extreme. On the other hand, I again have to reiterate that even the

8 following evening, the 13th, Dr. Koljevic, the vice-president, expressed

9 intention to go and visit Srebrenica the following day, the 14th, which

10 would at least suggest that he, also, was not fully appraised of the fact

11 that the civilians had been removed or were being removed at that time.

12 MR. VANDERPUYE: All right. If I could, could I have 65 ter 2047

13 in e-court, please. 2048, I'm sorry. Page 58 through 61. 58 through 61

14 in the English. Page 43 in the B/C/S, please. All right. I don't see

15 it yet. Thank you.

16 Q. What you have in front of you now, sir, is a -- it's a broadcast

17 of an interview with Dr. Karadzic on 12 July 1995.

18 A. Mm-hm.

19 Q. In particular, the reason why I've put it up on the screen for

20 you to see, it relates to the information that Dr. Karadzic had on the

21 12th of July, and in particular it touches upon some of the concerns that

22 you raised with Mr. Miovcic in your meeting with him as regards the

23 humanitarian concerns following the fall of Srebrenica. If we could --

24 first of all, have you seen this document before?

25 A. No.

Page 25259

1 Q. Okay. Now, you can see on this page, that is, ERN 92454, that

2 Dr. Karadzic is saying: "Our army is enabling the establishing of our

3 civil authorities there because the Serbs were exiled from Srebrenica at

4 the beginning of the war." You see that, right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. Further on it says: "And there is now as affairs settle

7 down an activity of the refugees who want to leave." Before I go on, let

8 me ask you first: Did you have any of this information on the 12th

9 pursuant to your meeting with Mr. Zametica and Mr. Miovcic?

10 A. No, I did not.

11 Q. Did this particular issue come up at all?

12 A. It came in the general sense that it would be important for the

13 Serbian side to avoid any mistreatment or appearance of mistreatment of

14 the Muslims, not only as a matter of principle but also in order to

15 prevent the media treatment of any such incident in the way that would

16 magnify it and render it politically useful to the other side. In other

17 words, it was more a discussion in principle of an issue that was

18 presumably going to be on the agenda in view of the fact that there were

19 large numbers of people in Srebrenica. So it wasn't prompted by any

20 specific information I had. It was simply the discussion that presumably

21 I would have had if at that time either Bihac or Gorazde rather than

22 Srebrenica was on the agenda.

23 Q. All right. So your understanding from your conversations on the

24 12th which were followed up with Dr. Karadzic in a sense on the 13th was

25 that it was important at least from the point of view of the western

Page 25260

1 press that was there was the appearance that humanitarian treatment of

2 the refugees is being appropriately administered, right?

3 A. No. What I was not saying is that there should be the

4 appearance, but rather that such treatment should be substantively so in

5 order to avoid the media presentation of -- or rather, misrepresentation

6 of the appearance of mistreatment.

7 Q. Okay. Thank you for clarifying that. If we could go to the next

8 page, please. Now, if you go -- sorry, we also have to move forward in

9 the B/C/S. Now, if we could go all the way down to the bottom of the

10 page in the English. All right. I would say about the fifth line or

11 sixth maybe or seventh line from the bottom, you can see it says

12 "secondly". This is in response to a question put to Mr. Karadzic:

13 "Mr. President, what information do you have on the humanitarian

14 situation in this town?"

15 And I'll refer you to where it starts: "Secondly..." It says:

16 "Our commissaria for refugees as you can see rushed in to help. Everyone

17 can see that these people look well-fed and that there are no problems at

18 all. If you compared what happened in western Slavonia where the

19 Croatians were allegedly liberating with what has happened in Srebrenica

20 where the Serbs are doing the liberating, there is such a difference that

21 it is impossible to talk about war at all."

22 Now, first of all, I just want to ask you: Did you discuss

23 western Slavonia at all during your conversations with Mr. Zametica and

24 Mr. Miovcic?

25 A. I can't remember that I did. I can only tell you if we did what

Page 25261

1 I would have said about western Slavonia. I would have used it as one of

2 the arguments for my constant misgivings or unease that Milosevic had

3 some kind of deal with Tudjman and that the overall lay of the land

4 didn't look right to me. The way that western Slavonia fell, and as

5 indeed it happened with the Krajina on a grander scale in August,

6 reflected my constant suspicion that the powers that be in Belgrade were

7 striking deals that were detrimental to the western Serbs' position.

8 Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Karadzic at some point what his

9 consideration or concerns were about western Slavonia as they related to

10 Srebrenica?

11 A. No, I don't have any memory of that. I do remember, however,

12 that in the meeting on the 13th he stressed that the treatment of the

13 Muslim civilians in Srebrenica will be such as to put the Serbian side

14 beyond any reproach even by the non-benevolent media.

15 Q. And when you say non-benevolent media, what do you mean by that?

16 A. I would say that he would regard most of the western mainstream

17 media as not friendly to the Serbian side in their reporting or analysis.

18 Q. All right. And in fact, you yourself have referred to the

19 situation in western Slavonia on a number of occasions in interviews that

20 you gave, right?

21 A. I would need to look at those interviews. It's been a long

22 while, and I believe, yes, that I did make a number of observations about

23 it at the time, yes.

24 Q. All right. Well, in particular -- I don't think we have this in

25 e-court because it was just provided by Defence counsel last night, but

Page 25262

1 let me read it to you, and let me see if that refreshes your

2 recollection. This is an interview with BBC TV Newsnight live. It's

3 dated 28th May, 1995, and it's entitled: "UN Making Mockery Of Its Own

4 Resolutions." Interview with Dr. S. Trifkovic. Presenter: Peter Snow.

5 And in this interview, the question is put to you: "What is

6 going on? Have the Serbs now thrown all restraint to the wind?" In your

7 answer. You say: "If mockery is made of UN-protected zones, it is of

8 the UN's own making. They are not enforcing their own resolutions when

9 it is the Croats and the Muslims who are violating them. The Serbs are

10 fed up. They are feeling very irritated because only three weeks ago in

11 western Slavonia we had a slaughter of Serb civilians. We had a mass

12 exodus of Serb civilians, and the UN did nothing. They did not even

13 castigate the Croatians in the security counsel; ditto with the misuse of

14 the safe havens."

15 Is that essentially what Dr. Karadzic is referring to in this 12

16 July broadcast interview?

17 A. Well, first of all, let me emphasize that I did not either

18 receive inputs from Pale or seek them in my presentation of -- in fact,

19 the mood of the Serbs at that time was more than amply supplied by the

20 media from Serbia Proper or Republika Srpska. It was the early days of

21 the internet, but it was already possible at that time to have it at

22 one's fingertips, if you will, not video streaming but certainly written

23 reports. And my judgement on what happened in western Slavonia in the

24 first week of May of 1995 did not need to rely on Dr. Karadzic's

25 assessment. If the two coincide, it is probably because there was some

Page 25263

1 substance to such an impression, that, indeed, it was an attack in

2 violation of the UN rules, and that, indeed, it was both brutal and

3 indiscriminate when it came to the treatment of the Serb civilians.

4 Q. All right. Well, I want to talk about your independence as a --

5 I've forgotten the term that my colleague used but what I understand it

6 to be is an unofficial spokesperson for VRS, but we'll talk about that

7 separately. But let me equate you with a different news article, if I

8 could, and this is one from London news radio, and this one is dated

9 Monday, 17 July 1995. I don't think I gave you the time for the last

10 one, but I have the time for this one, and that's 2135. And it's

11 entitled: "Consequences Of Failure To Demilitarise. Live interview with

12 Srdja Trifkovic. Presenter: Paul Reynolds." And the question that he

13 puts to you, he says -- well, you finish the previous paragraph saying:

14 "These places have not been demilitarised." He says: "But is that an

15 excuse to have the Muslims of Srebrenica ethnically cleansed?" And in

16 your response, you say: "In the Balkans, one ethnic group does not trust

17 soldiers belonging to another ethnic group. In the hundreds of years of

18 civil and religious wars in the Balkans, this has been a regular feature.

19 Only two months ago we had a tragedy on a much greater scale in western

20 Slavonia, also nominally a UN-protected area, where the Croat army

21 attacked the Serbs, drove them out, and massacred hundreds of them.

22 There are 600.000 Serb refugees in both Serbia and the Serb republics of

23 Krajina and Bosnia."

24 Okay. Now, this is a separate interview, obviously, and it's

25 dated just about a week -- well, five days after the interview with

Page 25264

1 president Karadzic. Now, in relation to your statement there, were those

2 statements predicated upon your conversations with Dr. Karadzic or your

3 understanding of what Dr. Karadzic is referring to on the 12th of July?

4 A. Well, in fact, no. If you read my response to that particular

5 question, I'm actually making a factual statement that is amply supported

6 by the empirical evidence of the wars of Yugoslav succession, that,

7 indeed, the ethnic group that is faced with the sudden change of

8 authority in a given territory will do its best to depart the territory

9 because it does not trust, and I'm not either quantifying the degree of

10 unpleasantness of one group towards the other or trying to qualify in any

11 way that the Serbs behaved necessarily better or worse than the other two

12 sides. I'm simply stating a fact that has been a regular feature of

13 warfare in that part of the world for a very long time, that if, for

14 instance, the Croat troops come into the area of Neretva valley, the

15 Serbs from Mostar will run away to Trebinje or Nevesinje, or when the

16 Muslims overrun parts of central Bosnia, the Croats will be the ones who

17 sometimes even using Serbian territory will escape to Croatia proper, and

18 needless to say that the Muslims when the Serbian army advances will feel

19 more comfortable going to Tuzla or Zenica than staying put. It is, I

20 would say, more of a descriptive factual statement than analytical let

21 alone value judgement.

22 JUDGE KWON: What is the 65 ter number, Mr. Vanderpuye?

23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Judge Kwon, this doesn't have a 65 ter number as

24 yet because these were provided to me last night by Defence counsel. So

25 I'm only -- I'm not tendering the documents as it were, per se. I'm only

Page 25265

1 putting the questions to the witness, and if it becomes an issue then I

2 think I'll have to pursue the course to enter the documents into

3 evidence.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Judge Kwon.

6 Q. All right. In fact, in the interview that Dr. Karadzic gave on

7 12 July 1995, he says -- oh, it's only -- okay. Page 60 the English, and

8 that was 65 ter 2048. Let me just read it in the interim so that we can

9 move along. He says -- all right. It's there now. It's the third line

10 from the bottom on this screen. It's page 45 in the B/C/S, I understand.

11 "I would also like to remind the entire international community of a

12 particular hypocrisy. Whenever Muslim forces from these safe havens

13 advance through the Serb territory from Bihac" -- as you've just

14 mentioned -- "Tuzla, Sarajevo" -- as you also mentioned -- "and even from

15 Gorazde, the whole word applauds. But when the Serbs undertake

16 counteroffensives and neutralise their opponents, then the world starts

17 to wail and mourn Over the losses. You can see that the Muslim civilians

18 haven't lost anything, but the Muslim army has."

19 Now, did you have any information as concerns the Muslim

20 civilians when you spoke to Mr. Miovcic and Mr. Zametica on the 12th of

21 July?

22 A. Other than the agreement with the absolute necessity of acting in

23 the way that would be beyond reproach and other than the indication given

24 by Koljevic that he still believed that basically they were there on the

25 evening of the 13th, no. However, I was becoming aware that the

Page 25266

1 evacuation was underway or had already taken place at the tail end of my

2 stay, ironically more through listening to the BBC World Service than

3 being told firsthand by anyone over there.

4 Q. All right.

5 MR. VANDERPUYE: If I could have 2748, please, in e-court. All

6 right. Thank you.

7 Q. This is an urgent combat report. It's directed to the president

8 of the Republika Srpska, and it's dated 12 July 1995. Let me ask you

9 this: Have you ever seen a document like this before?

10 A. No, and in fact, this would be the kind of documents that I

11 normally wouldn't see or, indeed, expect to see.

12 Q. All right. If I could go to page 3 in the English. It's the

13 last bottom of paragraph A. 6(a), I'm sorry, and I believe it's page 3

14 in B/C/S. At the bottom of this paragraph, that is, where it says under

15 number 6, "In the DK zone of responsibility," Drina Corps zone of

16 responsibility. Paragraph A, "The enemy..." At the bottom of that

17 paragraph, you'll see it says: "The enemy has been attempting to

18 withdraw from the Srebrenica enclave with women and children in the

19 direction of Ravno Buljine and Konjevic Polje but ran into a mine field."

20 Go to the next page, and we look at B, "Situation In The Corps."

21 And I think it's the next page -- it's not. Okay. It's in the middle of

22 the paragraph in the B/C/S. At the bottom of that paragraph, that is

23 paragraph 6(b), it says: "On..." and then slashes, "... important axes,

24 parts of our units in the MUP have laid ambushes in order to destroy

25 Muslim extremists who have not surrendered and who are attempting to

Page 25267

1 break out of the enclave in the direction of Tuzla."

2 So my question to you is in respect of the information that is

3 contained in this report, did you have any discussions on the 12th, or

4 for that matter, on the 13th as regards these Muslim extremists who have

5 not surrendered and are attempting to break out of the enclave?

6 A. In order to answer this adequately, I have to emphasize that on

7 the 12th I drove with two visitors from Zvornik from Karakaj border

8 crossing to Pale on that very road, and at the checkpoint outside Zvornik

9 driving south we were warned of the possibility of small armed groups

10 crossing the road and that we were proceeding on our own responsibility.

11 We were not either told to take a detour or advised not to proceed.

12 We were also told that in case of any such movement, it is better

13 -- best to avoid contact or to make a U-turn, but certainly didn't look

14 like they were overtly concerned at the level of military activity was

15 such that it would make the trip risky.

16 So I have to admit that on the basis of what looked like a fairly

17 uneventful drive through the very area that -- of Konjevic Polje and the

18 vicinity of Bratunac and Tomorici and from there up to Vlasenici and so

19 on that I already arrived at Pale, maybe lulled into a false sense that

20 the military activity was practically over.

21 Q. All right.

22 A. But I was certainly not aware of -- in fact, the conversations at

23 Pale proceeded with the assumption that it's over, the enclave has

24 fallen. There was, you know -- I believe you know, imminent expectation

25 of the news of Zepa, but I wasn't aware at that time of any attempts by

Page 25268

1 the armed groups of a significant size and magnitude to break through.

2 Q. All right. So nobody at Pale when you had these conversations

3 within the circle of the Presidency actually discussed this particular

4 information with you --

5 A. No.

6 Q. -- at least not on that day?

7 A. The focus of the conversation both on the first day when I came

8 with the two visitors from the United States and on the second day late

9 in the evening when I was there accompanied by Dr. Zametica was on Dr.

10 Karadzic's view of the political diplomatic aftermath of Srebrenica's

11 fall. In other words, on the first day I heard what looked like, in my

12 opinion, excessively optimistic assessment, and on the second I really

13 hoped to have a more realistic conversation, but having encountered even,

14 you know, in -- in a more -- without the presence of the first-time

15 visitors, having encountered a similar outlook, I basically did not argue

16 the case because on a number of previous occasions, assessments that I

17 regarded as faulty or poorly based by Dr. Karadzic, I tried to enter into

18 some kind of analysis in terms of real politik and scenario-making, and I

19 never got very far with it. On the contrary, I could sense that the

20 discussions based on the non-acceptance of favourable assessments were

21 not welcome or encouraged.

22 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to the information that you received

23 concerning these small armed groups, did you receive that before you

24 crossed at Zvornik?

25 A. Well, no, but I think that it stood to reason to assume that in

Page 25269

1 such immediate aftermath of what at that time one assumed was a fairly

2 major military operation that it would be necessary to obtain the

3 information from the military on the ground about the possibility of the

4 road.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And that's why I mentioned this relaxed attitude of the Serbian

7 soldiers at the checkpoint exiting Zvornik because I didn't have any

8 specific information about the level of military activity, but I assumed

9 that it was possible that some was still in evidence.

10 Q. But in fact, somebody did tell you that you should be aware of --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- small arms groups?

13 A. Yes. That was the soldiers manning the checkpoint exiting

14 Zvornik in the direction of Konjevic Polje.

15 Q. Okay. So these are VRS soldiers, right?

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. Okay. And they had the information concerning these potential

18 extremists that are mentioned in this combat report?

19 A. Well, in retrospect I would say that their demeanour was more

20 relaxed and --

21 Q. Well, they're further away, too, right?

22 A. But I would say that, you know, in retrospect and with hindsight

23 I would not have made that drive. It was maybe their assessment or their

24 impression of the situation but certainly that we were told that, yeah,

25 we should exercise caution, but it was not presented in terms of, you

Page 25270

1 know, serious warning that there is some likelihood of encounters that

2 could be dangerous.

3 Q. Okay. Now, I think I may have forgotten to ask you, but you tell

4 me if I've repeated the question. I'm sure my colleague will tell me.

5 When you met with Mr. Zametica and Miovcic, did you meet with them alone,

6 or did you meet them, also, with Mr. Premovic and Mrs. Ristic?

7 A. I believe that Mrs. Ristic was tired and was not with us. Mr.

8 Premovic would have been with us at least part of the time, but it was --

9 I really can't be sure. But the conversation was certainly of the kind

10 that had more to do with background briefing of the overall mood of the

11 place rather than end, you know, outlook, hopes, expectations, rather

12 than any specific information that would preclude the desirability of a

13 third-party presence.

14 Q. All right. Did you meet with anybody else following your meeting

15 with Mr. Zametica and Mr. Miovcic --

16 A. I'm pretty certain --

17 Q. -- on the 12th of July?

18 A. No. No, I believe that was it. In fact, it was getting on,

19 anyway, and it had been a long day.

20 Q. All right. Now, you've indicated that you also met -- you met

21 with Mr. Karadzic on the 13th of July?

22 A. That was with the visitors from the States, yes. It was on the

23 13th in the afternoon.

24 Q. And this is when you described his upbeat monologue that he

25 delivered?

Page 25271

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you indicated, also, in relation to your contact with Mr.

3 Karadzic that you had some notes concerning these conversations that you

4 had between -- well, over the 13th and the 14th, right?

5 A. Yes. I don't think I had my laptop with me on that particular

6 occasion, but I would have entered then from scribblings, brief notes

7 made at the end of the day. However, with my laptop crashing I believe

8 in 1997 and the backup diskettes not covering some of these -- in fact,

9 it's a source of great regret to me personally. But to be perfectly

10 frank, I had the overall sense of deep frustration and misgivings, not

11 for the first time, after what was yet another encounter with the

12 inability of Dr. Karadzic to look at the predicament of the Republika

13 Srpska in the full complexity of the wider international situation, and I

14 make no qualms about that. I think that that meeting would have been yet

15 another occasion for such sense of frustration that the view from Pale

16 was rather narrow and based on wishful thinking rather than a

17 comprehensive analysis of the global diplomatic and political situation.

18 Q. All right. Now, you mentioned that you met with Mr. Karadzic on

19 the 13th for between one and two hours.

20 A. I believe from the diary it would appear that it was about an

21 hour and a half.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. And you met with him in the company of Mr. Premovic, Ms. Ristic,

25 right?

Page 25272

1 A. That's right.

2 Q. Was anybody else present during the course of this meeting?

3 A. I think that Mr. Zametica came in and out but was not present

4 throughout.

5 Q. Okay. And during the course of your meeting with Dr. Karadzic,

6 was he in contact with anybody else, any soldiers or --

7 A. Well, I remember him shouting a few times, give me connection,

8 what's up with the connection, "veze su u prekidu," who exactly he was

9 trying to contact, but I also got the sense that some lines were down.

10 Q. Okay. How did you get that sense? Did somebody say that

11 specifically?

12 A. He actually said something like [B/C/S spoken] or something like

13 that. Whether it referred to the film connection or some other form of

14 communication, I'm not sure, but I believe he was actually shouting this

15 to the secretary, so it must have been the film.

16 Q. All right. But -- okay. How many times did he shout this during

17 this hour and a half that you were with him?

18 A. I would say two or three times.

19 Q. Okay. And did he have access to any other telephones that were

20 there?

21 A. Yes. Occasionally, the phone would ring, and -- I wouldn't be

22 able to say how many times, but yes, our meeting was being interrupted,

23 and it wasn't a particularly structured meeting in that it was mostly his

24 resume of how he saw things to the visitors.

25 Q. Okay. You said that he seemed -- well, "buoyant" is, I think,

Page 25273

1 too strong a term, but optimistic?

2 A. Upbeat, optimistic. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. And was that because he felt as though -- well, tell us

4 why that was, what your understanding was of that.

5 A. This would really take us into the overall propensity of Dr.

6 Karadzic to look upon the situation of the Republika Srpska in a more

7 optimistic and more upbeat manner than was warranted by circumstances or

8 by the attitudes of the great powers. For instance, the hope or

9 expectation, even, that Russia would take a more strongly pro-Serbian

10 position had been a salient feature of his comments and remarks

11 throughout the -- I wouldn't say each and every time I came, but I would

12 say that the majority of times he would say something like, "Rusija se

13 budi," "Rusija progledava," Russia is waking up, Russia is coming to see

14 the light, an opinion I didn't share. I actually believed, and as we

15 know in retrospect, this is correct, that Yeltsin's Russia did not want

16 to confront the West over the Balkans at that time. Likewise, I think

17 that his hope or expectation that some kind of diplomatic deal or offer

18 was imminent is another salient feature of his comments in the winter of

19 1995 January after the visit of President Carter or, for that matter, in

20 the spring of 1994 after the Gorazde operation.

21 So all the time I had the increasing sense of frustration with

22 the inability to communicate my understanding of the problem of the

23 Bosnian/Serb position as seen from the other side of the Atlantic or from

24 London in the way that would be readily understood because ultimately I

25 realized that in a very deep cultural sense we did not speak the same

Page 25274

1 language.

2 Q. Well, speaking of language, what exactly did he say to you during

3 the course of this meeting? What exactly did he say in terms of his

4 position concerning the operation?

5 A. Because of my lack of precise notes, I can only give you the best

6 recollection I have of the meeting after 13 years, which is that he was

7 greatly optimistic that the outside world will realise from the success

8 of Serbian arms in Srebrenica that it is futile to expect the Serbs to

9 continue taking punishment and not getting the elements of a political

10 package that it can live with, and he expressed repeatedly his confidence

11 that in the near future as the result of this demonstration of Serbian

12 military might, there should be a political movement and diplomatic

13 movement that would actually wrap up the war.

14 I do remember -- and I'm sorry, before coming here I didn't call

15 Mrs. Ristic or Mr. Premovic to compare not notes but memories, but I do

16 remember his saying that the war is coming to a close. Now, with

17 hindsight we know it was but certainly not on the terms he had in mind.

18 Q. All right. I think this is probably a -- am I wrong about the

19 break time?

20 JUDGE AGIUS: No, you are right.

21 MR. VANDERPUYE: All right. So --

22 JUDGE AGIUS: We still have another 15 minutes for the break.

23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Very well, then. Thank you, Mr. President.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: However, that said, if you prefer to have it now,

25 we can have it now.

Page 25275

1 MR. VANDERPUYE: Now would be a good time, I think.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Right, we'll have a 25-minute break. Thank

3 you.

4 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Could I ask you, how much longer do you think you

6 require?

7 MR. VANDERPUYE: I think about -- well, half an hour, 40 minutes.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. And do you envisage --

9 MR. OSTOJIC: Not much, Mr. President.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. Then think about who is coming

11 tomorrow.

12 MR. OSTOJIC: We'll talk about that.

13 --- Recess taken at 5.29 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 5.57 p.m.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

16 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Trifkovic.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Could some microphones be turned off, please.

19 MR. VANDERPUYE: I was asking -- I'm sorry, Mr. President.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no. Just checking to accommodate the

21 interpreters. Is there anybody else with his microphone or her

22 microphone on apart from me, which I will switch off immediately now. Go

23 ahead.

24 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, when we left off I was asking you about your

Page 25276

1 meeting with Dr. Karadzic on the 13th of July, and I'd asked you

2 specifically what he had said regarding the operation in Srebrenica. Can

3 you tell us what, if anything, else he said during the course of that

4 meeting?

5 A. On the basis of my conversation with Dr. Zametica and Mr. Miovcic

6 the previous evening, I recall being curious about the military details

7 of what seemed to be rather sudden, unexpected, and swift fall of

8 Srebrenica on which he didn't really enlighten me. In fact, to be

9 perfectly honest I left Pale and the Republika Srpska on the 16th still

10 none the wiser as to what actually happened in terms of the military

11 aspect of the operation itself. Bearing in mind the tenacious fighting

12 in Bihac in the fall of 1994 or Gorazde in the spring of 1994 or

13 Srebrenica in 1993, I have to admit that the issue as to what actually

14 happened to make the fall of this enclave so swift and so unexpected, at

15 least my impression was that to them up in Pale it was unexpected, that I

16 still didn't get the answers to that particular question.

17 Q. No, I understand that, Mr. Trifkovic, and I appreciate your

18 response. But my question to you is specifically what it is that Dr.

19 Karadzic told you during the course of that meeting, and you understand

20 the distinction --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- between that and what your impressions of what he said are?

23 A. I have to confine myself to overall impressions because I don't

24 have the minutes, and after all this time the memories tend to acquire

25 the character of overall impressions rather than specific snippets or

Page 25277

1 quotes.

2 Q. I understand that, too, but as you recall, you did testify about

3 a conversation that you had which concerns Mr. Beara in 1993. I take it

4 you don't have notes of that conversation?

5 A. Well, no, but it was, nevertheless, to someone who had

6 encountered these grassroots soldiers from the ranks, if you will, for

7 the first time. It was a memorable experience because it was also the

8 first time that I sensed first-hand this latent mistrust bordering even

9 on animosity between the two traditions among the Bosnian Serbs. It

10 would be a characateur to describe as the partisan tradition versus the

11 Chetnik tradition, but it was certainly something of that spirit at work

12 there.

13 Q. Well, Mr. Trifkovic, at that period of time in particular, that

14 is, on the 13th of July, 1995, you were still functioning in some

15 respects in the capacity of dealing with the western media regarding

16 specifically the information that you came to acquire?

17 A. Well, when it comes to the attitude of the western media to the

18 issue of Srebrenica, I became aware of the question of what happened to

19 the military man or man of military age only after returning to London.

20 In fact, the theme of conversations that I had was solely the treatment

21 of civilians. The issue of the treatment of military prisoners didn't

22 even come up. But again, to give you a very precise answer, I didn't

23 find that particular visit useful when it came to articulating positions

24 in media interviews. I didn't find the optimistic scenario for the

25 future useful. I certainly wouldn't have condoned it or shared its

Page 25278

1 overall tone.

2 Q. Well, maybe I've misunderstood what you've said, but on your

3 direct examination I believe you said that you came down -- the reason

4 why you went to Pale was to get information about the specific goings on

5 as concerns the Srebrenica operation for the purpose of dealing with the

6 western press or the outside media. So my question to you is this.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. If that's the reason why you went there and you actually had an

9 appointment and spoke to the object, the purpose of your being there, you

10 spoke to the president of the Republika Srpska, and he spoke to you about

11 the specific incident that you were there to inquire about, but is it

12 your testimony that you have no recollection of what he told you on the

13 13th of July knowing --

14 A. No --

15 Q. -- knowing now in retrospect what transpired on the 13th of July?

16 A. No. My answer is that it wasn't particularly fruitful or useful

17 meeting from the point of view of having either a closer understanding of

18 what was going on on the ground or of getting an insight into the

19 political background and the realistic scenario for the end game from

20 which Srebrenica might lead.

21 So whereas it is, indeed, very much the purpose of my visit to

22 have a clear picture, from the meetings with Dr. Karadzic far from

23 getting clear picture, I get an upbeat story of the war entering its

24 finale on terms favourable to the Serbs and the absence of clear

25 description, even, of what actually happened to make Srebrenica fall

Page 25279

1 quickly and unexpectedly.

2 Q. Did you ask the question?

3 A. Yes, I did. Yes.

4 Q. Did you ask him what happened to the military that was in

5 Srebrenica --

6 A. Well, actually, the --

7 Q. -- that is, the Muslims?

8 A. The issue of what happened to the military had never arisen until

9 that moment, and I'll tell you why.

10 Q. I just want to know if you asked.

11 A. No, I didn't.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. It didn't occur to me because in all previous operations the

14 prisoners -- my understanding was that the prisoners were regarded as

15 valuable assets to be exchanged for one's own side, and I had no reason

16 to believe that this was an issue, and I didn't ask.

17 Q. I take it you asked about civilians?

18 A. Very much so because --

19 Q. And what did he tell you?

20 A. Well, I expressed the opinion that I already shared with Miovcic

21 and Zametica on the first evening, that it would be extremely important

22 to avoid any incidents or exercise that would be detrimental to what I

23 believed was very sensitive political situation of the Serbs at that

24 moment and that Dr. Karadzic gave me assurances on this point. In fact,

25 I believe that I was also given a press release in Serbian about these

Page 25280

1 assurances to translate into English in the absence of Dr. Zametica for

2 further distribution by the SRNA news agency.

3 Q. And what did this press release say?

4 A. If there is a record of the SRNA news agency releases for that

5 period, you might see the precise wording, but my memory is that it

6 contained specific guarantees that their safety would be -- that they

7 would be looked after and they have nothing to fear.

8 Q. All right. Now, I've asked you a lot of questions and a lot of

9 time as concerns about -- as concerns what Dr. Karadzic told you on the

10 13th. Is it your testimony that you have no specific recollection as to

11 what he spoke to you about or what he said, I should say, over that hour

12 and a half to two hours that you were with him on the 13th of July, 1995?

13 A. Well, first of all, it wasn't two. It was an hour and a half

14 during which time some interruptions due to phone calls and his attempts

15 to make them were taking place. Some of the time was taken up by social

16 niceties connected with the introduction of the two visitors, but I am

17 being perfectly frank with you when I say that what I recall of that

18 meeting is, first of all, a very long discourse on the end game which he

19 confidently expected to follow that would be favourable to the Serbian

20 point of view; and secondly, the agreement with my insistence that it is

21 both substantially and in terms of media relations extremely important to

22 avoid any incidents in the treatment of the civilian population that

23 would be reminiscent of the early stages of the war.

24 Q. And that's your best of your recollection?

25 A. It is, indeed.

Page 25281

1 Q. Now, you mentioned that you had you notes concerning these

2 meetings that you had with Dr. Karadzic on the 13th?

3 A. Particularly what I recall, and I don't know if the record of it

4 exists somewhere else, was a letter that I wrote to A.M. Rosenthal, the

5 former editor of the New York Times, by Dr. Karadzic in which he praised

6 his editorial published a few days previously and made some specific

7 suggestions about the renewal of direct contacts between the Clinton

8 administration and the Republika Srpska leadership. So this is the

9 closest I can get to some specifics of our conversation that were

10 contingent upon his overall favourable assessment of the situation, that

11 he felt so confident that in fact the situation is ripe for some kind of

12 diplomatic end game that he approached Rosenthal with a suggestion that

13 such -- that he explores the possibility of such contact.

14 Q. The notes that you referred to that were on your computer, you

15 say they were destroyed?

16 A. No, they were not destroyed. I had what they call a hard disk

17 crash --

18 Q. All right.

19 A. -- either in late 1996 or early 1997, and I had not been doing

20 backups in a timely manner at the time.

21 Q. Well, what did you do about it? Did you try to get your hard

22 drive fixed?

23 A. Yes, I did, but it was -- I was not able to recover anything,

24 which in fact is a source of great anguish to me personally, not that it

25 matters.

Page 25282

1 Q. I can imagine. Do you have that computer?

2 A. No. It's been discarded.

3 Q. It's been discarded?

4 A. Many years ago, yes.

5 Q. Did you keep any handwritten notes?

6 A. Well, no, because --

7 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Forget the computer because the

8 computer you will discard, for sure. It's the hard disk itself. Did you

9 keep the hard disk?

10 THE WITNESS: Well, no, because it would have meant dismantling

11 it. Once I was told by the Best Buy technician that it was a matter of a

12 basically catastrophic failure, the business of defragmentation - and I

13 don't know the technical jargon - was, as I again recall, beyond their

14 ability to take care of but might have been done at a considerable

15 expense by some expert company specializing in that kind of problem,

16 which I in hindsight regretfully decided not to do.

17 MR. VANDERPUYE:

18 Q. Sorry, you say that computer crashed in 1996?

19 A. In the winter of --

20 Q. Or 1997?

21 A. -- 1996, 1997. Yeah.

22 Q. All right. So you had it for a good year after the events in --

23 A. It was a brand new computer that I took with me to Serbia, but I

24 didn't take it with me to Pale. It was actually the first colour laptop

25 that I had.

Page 25283

1 Q. Did you produce any articles based on the information that you

2 had in that computer, the notes that you took?

3 A. Well, no, because I must emphasize, the meeting with Dr. Karadzic

4 was both disappointing in terms of his analysis and not particularly

5 informative in terms of the background to the specific military

6 circumstances surrounding the fall of Srebrenica. So on the basis of

7 that particular meeting, I did not write anything or publish anything.

8 Q. All right. But you did have contact with the press after that,

9 right?

10 A. Yes, I did, and in fact I don't think that my comments to the

11 press would have been much different if I had not gone to Pale at all in

12 July of 1995.

13 Q. In other words, they were not specific, but they were general

14 comments that you made?

15 A. Even if they refer to -- again, you have some advantage over me

16 because I haven't actually been revisiting my old interviews in awhile.

17 But suffice to say that the only point that I came with was the assurance

18 that the civilians would be treated well, and also, let me add the

19 reiteration of the insistence that military operation was necessitated by

20 the failure of the UN to demilitarise the enclave. But there was nothing

21 new about that. That had been the old theme early on in the spring of

22 1994 in connection with Gorazde.

23 Q. All right. Mr. Trifkovic, you met again with Dr. Karadzic on the

24 14th -- well, first, before I get to that, I'm sorry. On the 13th -- and

25 you'll correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you mentioned on the 13th

Page 25284

1 that he had mentioned something about Zepa?

2 A. I think it was taken more or less for granted. I have no

3 recollection whether Zepa had already fallen or was about to, but it was

4 pretty much taken for granted that it would.

5 Q. Well, let me ask, again, then: What did he say in respect of

6 Zepa on the 13th?

7 A. Again, I can only say that he said with Srebrenica and Zepa, we

8 have proven that the strength of our weaponry, our military prowess is

9 such that it can no longer be assumed that the Serbs will accept any

10 terms of final settlement that do not address their key interest. I

11 don't know even on what specific day Zepa fell, but I think with that he

12 assumed that it was going to happen as a matter of course.

13 Q. All right. You met with him on the 14th, right?

14 A. On the 14th. It was quite late at night. It was with Jovan

15 Zametica, and the specific purpose of that meeting as far as I was

16 concerned was to try and see if there was a more nuanced and a more

17 critical view or understanding of the overall political and diplomatic

18 situation than the one displayed the previous afternoon. In other words,

19 to be perfectly frank, whether he was playing to the gallery with

20 Serbian/American visitors who are prominent in their local community and

21 presenting the upbeat front for their benefit or whether it was indeed

22 what he believed, and it was indeed what he believed.

23 Q. Well, since you recall so specifically what he believed, can you

24 recall what he told you on the 14th?

25 A. I think that it is possible to recall the overall tone, flavour,

Page 25285

1 and "stimmung" is the German word, which maybe the best in English

2 equivalent would be -- yeah, the overall tone is good enough, without

3 recalling the specific quotes. He was saying that the war is coming to a

4 close, that the Serbian military success in Srebrenica will present the

5 world with the reality that can no longer be denied, and that after this

6 we can look forward to the diplomatic movement which will finally be

7 based upon the realisation that the Serbs cannot be defeated and that

8 they will not accept a settlement that does not address their key

9 concerns.

10 Yeah, I'm again quoting from memory of many years ago, but again,

11 what I found remarkable is that in a more private meeting, in a different

12 setting, just with his advisor Dr. Zametica in attendance, he essentially

13 repeated the same-old, same-old, which I found deeply flawed both in

14 terms of the rigor of analysis and in terms of the understanding of the

15 diplomatic facts of life.

16 Q. Well -- and forgive me for this, but I'm a bit puzzled. You're a

17 historian by profession, by training, right?

18 A. Right.

19 Q. You have a PhD --

20 A. Right.

21 Q. -- in history?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. An historian is a kind person who remembers dates, events, places

24 and things of that nature very well, right?

25 A. I --

Page 25286

1 Q. And can recall them?

2 A. I would argue that, in fact, it is far more important in the

3 study of history to remember the essential underlying intent of the key

4 participants rather than their verbatim quotes. We don't know exactly

5 word for word who said what to whom in July 1914, but we do know that the

6 underlying tendency was for Wilhelm in Germany to give Austria a blank

7 cheque to deal with Serbia as she deemed fit. And if you ask me how --

8 Q. Mr. Trifkovic, you are were in the middle an historic event

9 concerning the former Yugoslavia, full-out war, and you were there in the

10 midst of it with a note pad, with a computer, and for the specific

11 purpose of gaining access to information that would help you discharge

12 your obligations to the -- to the civilian authorities of the Republika

13 Srpska. That's why you're there, and you're a historian, and you're

14 telling this Court today that you have no recollection, specific

15 recollection of what Dr. Karadzic told you on two separate occasions on

16 the 13th and 14th of July, 1995, knowing fully well looking back what was

17 occurring on those days? You know that on the 13th of July, 1995, that

18 people were being killed?

19 A. I know now.

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. I didn't know then.

22 Q. Well, you knew that in 1996.

23 A. I have to remind you that I've tried to give a fairly detailed

24 and comprehensive answer about the essentials of that conversation, and

25 my inability to reproduce -- and my inability to reproduce verbatim

Page 25287

1 quotes is really based on my respect for occasion that we need to get --

2 to understand the character of that meeting rather than try to and

3 reproduce unreliably the specific, quote-unquote verbatim segments of it,

4 and in that respect I've done my best today.

5 Q. All right. I appreciate your concern for the integrity of these

6 proceedings and your respect for the Court as concerns the information

7 that you're providing and the accuracy that you wish to provide it in.

8 Now, you have written a number of articles in the past, right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And you've also testified at these -- at this particular Tribunal

11 in the past as well, right?

12 A. As an expert witness in the Stakic case five and a half years

13 ago.

14 Q. Now, do you recall writing an article in 1996 -- a 1996 article

15 called "The Hague Tribunal: Bad Justice and Worse Politics"?

16 A. Indeed, I do.

17 Q. And it is true that you wrote in that article that: "The

18 tradition, that is to say the International Court of Justice tradition

19 which is now being destroyed by a pseudolegal imposter, the Yugoslav war

20 crimes Tribunal, which was inserted deliberately into The Hague to

21 provide the pretender with a legal and cultural pedigree and at that same

22 time devalue the true legacy."

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. "It's as if Jimmy Swaggart set up shop in Rome, took a crash

25 course in Latin, and took to wearing a miter." Did you write that?

Page 25288

1 A. Yes, I did. Yes.

2 Q. You also wrote that: "This so-called Tribunal uses legal

3 language. It has jurists on its panels, and they are dressed in a

4 bizarre imitation of continental judicial attire." And you said that "It

5 has funds, lots of funds, but it's a fraud." Right?

6 A. It's been a few years, but certainly, the sentiment is right.

7 Q. Okay. Well, in fact, what you said on page 13790 of that

8 transcript, that is, in the Stakic case, is that -- yeah, that's a

9 verbatim section of the article published in June 1996, and you readily

10 admit that you have considerably modified your views of the Tribunal

11 since then. That was back in 2003.

12 A. Right. That's what I said, yes.

13 Q. And in fact, other than the comments about the judicial attire,

14 you still hold the view that the Tribunal is in fact a fraud, don't you?

15 A. I would say that this has to be somewhat qualified in -- on

16 several counts. First of all, I think that the Tribunal is an extremely

17 important forum for the presentation of the historical record. Secondly,

18 I believe that some of the decisions of the Tribunal, particularly in the

19 Haradinaj case and in the Oric case would only reinforce skepticism of

20 its modus operandi and its process, but at the same time that because of

21 the need to set the historical record straight as comprehensively and as

22 dispassionately as possible, I certainly respect it as the forum in which

23 the attempt to get a very complex story analysed in as comprehensive a

24 manner as possible is indeed here.

25 Q. All right. Well, you wrote -- I should say you said, rather, in

Page 25289

1 an interview with BBC, and this is 65 ter 3684. I don't think I enter it

2 into e-court. You'll let me know if you want to see it. All right. You

3 were asked this question, and this concerns -- well, let me give you the

4 date first.

5 A. 22nd of July.

6 Q. 22nd of July, 2008, and you were asked about the indictment of

7 Mr. Karadzic, and you were asked specifically, "Do you think the war

8 crimes were committed?" And your answer to that was: "The war crimes

9 were committed. Absolutely. What remains to be seen is to what extent

10 the war crimes committed by the Serbs will continue to be treated as

11 uniquely more substantial, more evil, and more massive than those

12 committed by the other two sides." Do you recall giving that answer to

13 that question?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. And you stand by it, don't you?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Okay. Because you think -- well, in your opinion, I should say,

18 this Tribunal is anti-Serb?

19 A. No. If you look at that quote, I said it remains to be seen.

20 Which means I'm --

21 Q. So you're optimistic?

22 A. I'm still giving this Tribunal the benefit of the doubt that

23 after two verdicts that, indeed, would reinforce the skepticism about its

24 nature and its underlying premises, the Haradinaj and Oric case, we may

25 as yet with the Karadzic case get a more dispassionate and more

Page 25290

1 evenhanded treatment than the one that, as I say, we've seen in those

2 cases.

3 Q. All right.

4 A. It would sound haughty and arrogant for me to say that I'm giving

5 the Court the benefit of the doubt, but hopes springs eternal.

6 Q. Well, do you think that that somehow makes it sound less haughty

7 or arrogant?

8 A. No, it is maybe a human touch that the lawyers will take as such.

9 Q. You have expressed the view that you expect Mr. Karadzic to be

10 convicted because the verdict has already been written, haven't you?

11 A. Well, the verdict I didn't say was written by the Court, but the

12 verdict but the media chorus and of the commentators on each and every

13 flickering screen and printed page in the world is not only written; it's

14 cast in stone.

15 Q. All right. And that's your view as you sit here testifying

16 before this Tribunal today, isn't it?

17 A. Yes, indeed, it is.

18 Q. You've also written several pieces with respect to your views

19 about Muslims, haven't you?

20 A. We have to draw the distinction between pieces about the Muslims

21 and pieces about the Islamic ideology. I would appreciate if you'd let

22 me know which of the two you particularly refer to.

23 Q. Well, I'm referring to Muslims. Let me refer you to 65 ter 3687.

24 This is an article that you wrote. It appears to be on the 24th of

25 November, 2003, and it's entitled: "Islam and Slavery: The Concealed

Page 25291

1 Truth. Excerpt from a lecture by Srdja Trifkovic." Xavier University of

2 Louisiana, New Orleans, 14th -- I'm sorry. This is 14th November, 2003.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. I don't know if we can go to page 6 on this one. I'm on page 6,

5 and I guess we'll get there. You see the paragraph which begins: "It is

6 richly ironic", right?

7 A. Mm-hm.

8 Q. What it says below that is it says: "The violent and inherently

9 discriminatory message of the Koran is a huge problem for all Muslims.

10 We cannot solve it for them, and we should not be asked to deem the

11 problem solved by pretending that the Koran is a pacifist tract." Right?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. And that's your view with respect to not only Islam but as to all

14 Muslims, right?

15 A. No. I don't see where you see the connection.

16 Q. I see the connection where you say "all Muslims."

17 A. It is the problem for all Muslims, and some Muslims resolve it by

18 choosing to reinterpret the Koran while others stick to the view that the

19 Koran is the unadulterated view of Allah, which is immutable for all time

20 and cannot be interpreted but must be taken literally. And there is a

21 great deal of distinction between saying that it is a problem for all

22 Muslims and further saying, which I'm not, that all Muslims regard the

23 Koran as literal -- in its literalist way, the way that, for instance,

24 the Muhabis do and the way that in which the Rema [phoen] of the chief

25 centres of learning ital alaskar [phoen] university do.

Page 25292

1 Q. Well, let's look a little bit further down on the page if we

2 could. Looks like it's just about the last sentence on that paragraph,

3 you say: "The West has yet to learn fully the lesson that my Balkan

4 ancestors were forced to learn six centuries ago, that Islam a collective

5 psychosis seeking to become global, and any attempt to compromise with

6 madness is to become part of the madness oneself." You wrote those

7 words, right?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. You believe that Islam is a collective psychosis, right?

10 A. Yes, I do, but without putting it in the context of the

11 literalistic interpretation, it wasn't conveyed. In other words, you are

12 taking this totally out of context.

13 Q. Am I?

14 A. If we say that in the discriminatory message of the Koran is a

15 huge problem and if we, then, say that Islam is a collective psychosis

16 without reference to the particular problem that the Koran presents with

17 its inherently discriminatory message, then it would be necessary to

18 explain whether this collective psychosis reference refers to each and

19 every Muslim believer or to those who take the Koranic message in its

20 literalist sense. This is where I think you have to look at it in the

21 totality of my piece and not in isolation.

22 Q. All right. Well, looking at it in that context, then, it would

23 make sense that people that are not Muslim should seek ways to defend

24 themselves, right, by disengaging from the world of Islam physically and

25 figuratively?

Page 25293

1 A. That --

2 Q. Does that make sense to you?

3 A. That disengagement is indeed something that I have long

4 advocated, which is vastly different from attempts to intervene in the

5 Muslim world and to "bring democracy to the Muslim world." In fact, I

6 think that from the civilisational point of view it is far more

7 productive, far more promising of a peaceful discourse to disengage than

8 to engage in the way that engagement has been practiced in Mesopotamia

9 and Afghanistan.

10 Q. All right. So that means it would make sense to separate from

11 somebody from the Islamic faith, right? Because that would be the most

12 practical solution to the problems that you've identified in Islam, isn't

13 it?

14 A. It would indeed be the best advisible strategy for the western

15 world to deal with the problem of Jihad, not by trying to bring

16 counter-Jihad to the heartlands of Islam but to, indeed, disengage in the

17 way that would preclude open-ended military commitments that are only

18 helping the Jihadists obtain new recruits for their cause.

19 Q. All right. In your article dated January 26, 2007, this is

20 called Dines Vedemi [phoen], and that was published in Chronicles

21 Magazine, you say -- 65 ter 3693 for the record. "It's never happened

22 before because" -- well, let me go back so I can put this in context.

23 "Now, think how amazing this is. Has it ever happened in this

24 country - I'm not talking about some totalitarian country, but America -

25 has it ever happened that a prominent intellectual called on leading

Page 25294

1 writers on a subject of major importance to stop writing what they are

2 writing because it would offend someone?" That's your question. You

3 answer it. "No, this is has never happened before. It has never

4 happened before because it is only in response to Mohammedinism that

5 westerners adopt the posture of preemptive surrender which Batjar calls

6 mental dhimmitude. Of all the social, ethnic, religious, political

7 movements in the world, only Islam has the ability to evoke this eagerly

8 cringing attitude. Only Islam has this faculty of inducing people to

9 surrender" --

10 THE INTERPRETER: We need to look at the original of the text on

11 the screen in order to be able to interpret it correctly into B/C/S.

12 Thank you. Because we don't see it on the transcript, either, because it

13 too fast. Thank you.

14 MR. VANDERPUYE:

15 Q. Okay. If we could go -- it's on the second page -- or third page

16 of this document, and reading from paragraph 8, it's the third paragraph

17 in that series. I'll start here where it says -- it's the third line

18 from bottom of the page on the screen: "Of all the social, ethnic,

19 religious, political movements in the world, only Islam has the ability

20 to evoke this eagerly cringing attitude. Only Islam has the faculty of

21 inducing people to surrender psychologically to it even before it has any

22 actual power over them."

23 You believe that, right?

24 A. Well, in fact, this is -- that's yours, quote, but I agree with

25 it, that in fact the self-censorship that the elite class of the western

Page 25295

1 world exercises when it comes to misogyny, violence, and the active

2 attempt to change the liberal nature of the western society in order to

3 accommodate the views and beliefs that are not shared by the overwhelming

4 majority of the host population is, indeed, unprecedented. I think that

5 the level of self-censorship witnessed in connection with Muhamed's

6 cartoons, for instance, or with the non-reporting of the dark side of

7 family violence among the Muslim diaspora in western Europe and so on

8 reflects this fundamental truth, that if there is any other social,

9 ethnic, religious, or political movement that is guilty of such

10 transgressions, for instance, deep southern evangelical Christianists, or

11 in terms of ideologies, members of either far left or far right

12 movements, the level of public indignation of the media class and of

13 disclosure and unmasking of the facts of the case would be far greater.

14 I think that it is not even particularly unique nowadays to complain of

15 this tendency to self-censorship. You will find it in articles by Stein

16 or by Robert Spencer, by -- in fact, it is beginning to come from both

17 the left and the right, that one does not help either the continuation of

18 the liberal character of the western society or the integration of the

19 Islamic community to gloss over the unpleasantness that is all too often

20 present. And yet, the media editors prefer not to dwell on it because

21 not only is it tricky; it can be physically dangerous as unfortunately

22 Vince - I said almost Vincent van Gogh - the documentaries van Gogh found

23 to his peril on the streets of Amsterdam not a million miles from here a

24 few years back.

25 Q. In your article, this one's dated 27th February, 2002. It's

Page 25296

1 called: "Islamic Terrorism In Italy: The shape Of Things To Come" by

2 you. That's 65 ter 3688. If we could go to the bottom of the page. Oh,

3 wait a minute. If we could go to page 3, please.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Microphone.

6 MR. VANDERPUYE: I'm sorry, Mr. President. If we could just go

7 to page 3.

8 Q. If we could -- all right. You see this paragraph that leads

9 "Britain leads the way"?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Now, in the paragraph you mention in the second sentence of the

12 second paragraph below it where it says "Islamic law" --

13 A. Mm-hm.

14 Q. -- in brackets. It says: "In Britain today where Islam controls

15 the inner cities..." Now, I'll grant you this article was written in

16 2002. Now, when you make this reference to inner cities and Islam

17 controlling inner cities, do you have any particular cities in mind?

18 A. Well, this is actually something that needs qualification. The

19 inner cities does not refer to areas not inhabited by Muslims, but on the

20 other hand, there are significant areas of some inner cities,

21 specifically Leeds, Bradford, Birmingham, Leicester, parts of east

22 London, parts of other industrial cities in the midlands, such as lower

23 Hampton and also in Yorkshire that, indeed, exist de facto communities

24 under their own Islamic-based rule. You will not find alcohol in any of

25 the shops, you will not find video stores that would offer material not

Page 25297

1 to the liking of the adherence of Mohammed's faith, and you will find

2 that there is a great deal of pressure on local people to conform to such

3 an extent that even young Britons of Pakistani origin are very keen to

4 leave such areas if they do not subscribe to the cultural assumptions and

5 the lifestyle prevalent in them. Again, to those of us who know

6 circumstances in Britain, this I think is neither particularly new nor,

7 indeed, remarkable.

8 Q. Well, Mr. Trifkovic, with all due respect, that's known in some

9 circles as commercialism. One does not sell what another will not buy,

10 and that's why you don't find these things in certain shops in all kinds

11 of places around the world.

12 A. At the same time, those who would try to test the market for

13 alternative products which are not offered would soon find his shop

14 window smashed and his physical security jeopardised, and that is --

15 Q. And that's what we call the mafia, and that exists all over the

16 world, too, Mr. Trifkovic.

17 A. No, not if it is not motivated by commercial interest but by

18 idealogical convictions of the perpetrators, which by the way is similar

19 to what is it happening in France where young girls who in similar

20 suburbs of eastern valieus [phoen] of Paris do not wear the head scarf,

21 risk getting something called the "smile," which is a knife slash that

22 goes from the angle of the lip to the lower earlobe. So no, it is not

23 the Mafia; it is fanaticism.

24 Q. Let me ask you this question. If we could go to page 5. You see

25 that paragraph that leads "Meanwhile across the channel..."

Page 25298

1 A. Mm-hm.

2 Q. You write in this paragraph: "In Germany, the highest Court in

3 the land ruled in January 2002 that Muslim butchers should be allowed to

4 slaughter animals according to Islamic practice by slitting their throats

5 and letting them bleed to death and without stunning them first in any

6 way. German law says animals cannot be slaughtered without first being

7 stunned, but the constitutional court has now overturned it. The head of

8 Germany's Islamic counsel Hassan Hosjogan [phoen] declared that this will

9 be an important step in the integration of Muslims in Germany." You then

10 write: "If and when the constitutional court allows a clitoridectomy for

11 Germany's Muslim girls, presumably another important step will be made,

12 but that integration will be complete only when Pakistanis in Britain,

13 Algerians in France, and Turks in Germany turn the host country into an

14 Islamic society by compelling it to adapt to their way of life."

15 You wrote that, right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And you believe it?

18 A. Believe what specifically?

19 Q. Well, you believe that the only way that a Muslim person can

20 integrate into a Christian society is by turning the Christian society

21 into one that is based on Islamic law, right?

22 A. I'm not saying it is the Islamic activists that are saying it,

23 that the only end product of their activism is the complete triumph of

24 Dar al-Islam over Dar al-Harb and if you doubt that this is indeed the

25 self-proclaimed objective of each and every Islamic activist in the

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1 world, given the sufficient time I would be more than happy to supply you

2 with ample quotes that settle the matter beyond any doubt. This is not

3 suggesting that all Pakistanis in Britain, Algerians in France, and Turks

4 in Germany are sharing such views. In fact, specifically for the Turks

5 in Germany I would say it is, indeed, a minority. But I'm suggesting and

6 I still stand behind this view that making legal exceptions and

7 exemptions for a religious group in order to accommodate its particular

8 demands only feeds appetites for further demands which are ultimately

9 unlimited in scope and nature.

10 Q. Well, thank you very much for that, Mr. Trifkovic. I do

11 appreciate your candor.

12 A. Thank you.

13 Q. I have no questions for you.

14 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye. Mr. Ostojic, do you

16 have any re-examination?

17 MR. OSTOJIC: I do not, Mr. President.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. That's -- do you have any questions?

19 Do you have?

20 Mr. Trifkovic, that means that we have come to the end of your

21 testimony. I was wrong in the beginning when I imagined you will be with

22 us again tomorrow, but I'm sure you are happier. On behalf of the Trial

23 Chamber, I wish to thank you for having come over, and on behalf of

24 everyone present here I also wish you a safe journey back home.

25 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.