1 Thursday, 22 January 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good afternoon, Madam Registrar. Could you call
7 the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-05-88-T, The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. For the record everyone is present,
11 including the accused, except Mr. Ostojic, Mr. Haynes, and Mr. Bourgon.
12 Good afternoon to you, General.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I wish to welcome you again, once more.
15 Mr. Vanderpuye, could you conclude, please, your cross-examination.
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. And good afternoon to
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Good afternoon.
19 MR. VANDERPUYE: Good afternoon, Your Honours. And good
20 afternoon to my colleagues. And good afternoon to you, General.
21 WITNESS: SLOBODAN KOSOVAC [Resumed]
22 [Witness answered through interpretation]
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Vanderpuye: [Continued]
24 Q. And good afternoon to you, General.
25 A. Good afternoon.
1 Q. General, yesterday when we were -- before we concluded we spoke
2 about your expertise in assessing the functional responsibility of
3 various Main Staff members. In particular in respect of the
4 decision-making process regarding UNPROFOR and international humanitarian
5 convoys, do you have any specific expertise in terms of evaluating the
6 functional responsibility of the individuals that were involved in that
8 A. In this expert report, I provided just a summary. And since --
9 in studying all the materials available to me, I saw that in the process
10 of proposing and making decisions, General Miletic's name did not exist,
11 I made the summary very short. I started with that option, but I gave up
12 on it, and it did not finally enter my final expert report.
13 Q. I take it, then, that you don't have any familiarity with the
14 role that was played by Slavko Kralj in the process involved of convoy
16 A. No, not in the process because I did not analyse that
17 organisational unit separately. I knew of its existence. I knew what it
18 was intended for, what its purpose was, and who it was tied to. And when
19 I looked at all the aspects of the organisation, I saw that it went
20 beyond the topic of my research, and I decided not to dwell upon and go
21 into any greater detail.
22 Q. Okay. So just for the record the same would be true, therefore,
23 for Radoslav Pandzic, Milos Djurdjic, Milan Gvero, Zdravko Tolimir;
24 that's true, right?
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse.
1 MR. JOSSE: He needs to ask individually about those people,
2 particularly the accused, quite obviously.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: To be honest with you, I know, perhaps, it was your
4 intention to rise and make the submission, but he has already answered.
5 MR. JOSSE: I didn't hear that, but I accept it.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: It's not recorded though, but he said yes.
7 Do you confirm, General, that you answered "yes" to
8 Mr. Vanderpuye's question?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I confirm that I said "yes."
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE:
12 Q. Terms of General Miletic's role as chief of the Administration
13 for Operations and Training, you did evaluate that pursuant to the rules
14 and pursuant to his position in the establishment; isn't that right?
15 A. Humanitarian aid does not fall under the systemic organisation of
16 the organisation and functioning of the Main Staff of the Army of
17 Republika Srpska. I evaluated the position of the Administration for
18 Operations and Training, and General Miletic's position based on all the
19 relevant documents that were important and that regulated the functioning
20 of humanitarian aid. And based on my evaluation on that algorithm, I
21 arrived at a conclusion that I incorporated into my expert report.
22 Q. Well, you recognise and you can confirm that the position that
23 was occupied by General Miletic in 1995 as chief of the administration of
24 training -- operations and training was a significant and important one
25 within the Main Staff of the VRS?
1 A. In order to confirm your sentence, I have to be a bit more
2 precise than yourself. The position that was performed by
3 General Miletic as the chief of the Administration for Operations and
4 Training is a very important organisational unit in the staff of the
5 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
6 Q. In your report, you refer to the term "standing in," and you
7 define that for us as necessitating a written order; is that right?
8 A. Could you please direct me to where I mention this word "acting
9 on behalf of --" as far as I can remember, I used the word "standing in
10 for" and "replacing" or "deputising."
11 Q. Yes, I think we have a problem in terms of the translation, and
12 that's all. What I said was and my question was that you did talk about
13 the term "standing in" in your report.
14 A. Absolutely, yes. Yes.
15 Q. And in defining that during your testimony you indicated that it
16 required a written order; right?
17 A. Yes, I was very precise, and I said that "standing in for" is a
18 situation in the service which is regulated by the law, and if for this
19 situation to be functioning properly it requires an appropriate order,
20 and only then can it function. Without an order of that kind, this
21 "standing in" situation cannot exist.
22 Q. And the rules that you indicated that provide a commander with a
23 certain amount of flexibility in the implementation of its modality,
24 would that account for a situation where a person might stand in without
25 a written order?
1 A. Standing in for as a situation in service was not flexible and
2 did not allow much room for flexibility. In order for somebody to stand
3 in for somebody else, they had to meet certain criteria that such a
4 position required. Standing in for without an order to stand in for
5 would certainly not function because a large number of organisational
6 units that are tied to that organisational unit would not be duty-bound
7 to accept or carry out any order or any material document, anything that
8 arises from the rights and duties of that duty.
9 Q. In the process of reviewing the material that you used for
10 your -- your report, you did, obviously, review numerous documents where
11 General Miletic signed as standing in for the Chief of Staff.
12 A. I reviewed many documents bearing different signatures, and I
13 also reviewed documents that were signed by General Miletic who was
14 replacing the Chief of Staff; whereas, the document depicted the word
15 "stand in for," and then I established the relationship with -- between
16 how it was signed and the factual situation. And based on that, I
17 created certain relations.
18 Q. All right. And you referred to the fact that General Miletic
19 signed in the capacity of standing in for the Chief of Staff during your
20 testimony as a rather unfortunate way of signing his name?
21 A. This may be a translation problem, but I will be precise. I
22 never said that General Miletic signed any document standing in for the
23 Chief of Staff. Actually, the Main Staff of the Army Republika Srpska,
24 because he never stood in for him.
25 Q. Well, we are talking about two different things. One, you are
1 talking about the factual question of whether he stood in for him; in the
2 other sense we are talking about whether or not his name appears on any
3 document as standing in. What I am referring to is the latter. You did,
4 in fact, review documents where General Miletic's name appears as
5 standing in for the Chief of Staff; that's correct, right?
6 A. Yes. I saw such documents.
7 Q. And when you testified that it was an unfortunate way of signing
8 his name, and that's what you were referring to, the fact that it appears
9 on those documents in that way?
10 A. I saw this typed block signature, and I assumed if the document
11 was dispatched in this way with that block signature that the document
12 itself was signed, and if it, indeed, was -- and I never saw any document
13 with original signature. If it was signed then it is true what I stated
14 that this was a misfortunate situation and a way for him to devise the
15 best possible solution under the circumstances.
16 Q. In fact, you said that the reason why he signed that way was
17 because of a situation concerning the way General Milovanovic preferred
18 that he signed such documents; right?
19 A. Yes. I stated that this kind of signing documents in such an
20 awkward way is the consequence of the best solution devised by the two of
21 them, and I also bore in mind the strict -- the official statement by
22 General Manojlo who signed on behalf of General Miletic, and where it was
23 stated that he was a very consistent officer which means that he never
24 encroached his authorities, that he never violated any of his
25 authorities, that he never signed anything that he was not entitled to
2 MR. VANDERPUYE: Well, if we could, could I have, please, 65 ter
3 5D00753 in e-court, please. 723, thank you.
4 Q. What you have in front of you is a personnel assessment regarding
5 General Miletic.
6 MR. VANDERPUYE: And if we could go to page -- it should be 3 in
7 the English, and it may be the second page in the B/C/S.
8 Okay, well, we have the B/C/S in front. I think there has been a
9 mistake in terms of loading the document. I can read the English into
10 the record.
11 Q. What you have before you, General, is a descriptive assessment
12 and conclusion regarding General Miletic's performance. The period
13 covers 1990 to 1994. And it's a document that is signed by
14 Manojlo Milovanovic. It is also signed by General Miletic. And is dated
15 12th May, 1995. It reads as follows in the second paragraph:
16 "His relationship with colleagues, subordinates, and superiors,
17 is fair, moderate, and shows due respect --"
18 JUDGE AGIUS: We need to see the next page in English, please.
19 There is no page English, only the first page? Okay.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, that's what I understand, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead, Mr. Vanderpuye. And sorry for the
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. It reads in the second paragraph:
25 "His relationship with colleagues, subordinates, and superiors,
1 is fair, moderate, and shows due respect. Through his actions and
2 personal example he is a strong cohesive factor to where he lives and
3 works, and much credit goes to him for the unity and success of
4 activities of the Main Staff of the VRS and immediate subordinate
6 Immediately preceding it says at the bottom of the first
7 paragraph that:
8 "He especially stands out in the field of general analytics and
9 operations and strategy, and he makes all his draft decisions and
10 decisions on the basis of real facts without displaying emotions,
11 partiality, glossing over, and the like."
12 In the conclusion it reads that:
13 "He is a highly educated, competent, conscientious officer of
14 high moral qualities, who greatly contributes to the success of the VRS
15 in the battle-field through his diligent performance of his duty."
16 And he's given a grade of excellent.
17 General Miletic clearly knows the difference between standing in
18 and not standing in. That's fair to say.
19 A. There are a number of things that are relevant for this section
20 that you have read out to me. First of all, the translator, the
21 interpreter said that this was the personnel assessment. In fact, it is
22 the official assessment. And later on, the interpreter said that this
23 was a quality assessment. In fact, it is a personnel assessment that is
24 based as a -- it is used as a basis for promotion or transfer. And you
25 told me that General Miletic, apparently, is aware of the difference
1 between "replacing" and "standing in for."
2 The only segment in this assessment is the one that is on the
3 previous page that was written by General Miletic himself. All the rest
4 was actually written by General Manojlo Milovanovic.
5 Q. Certainly you're not suggesting that General Miletic doesn't know
6 the difference between "standing in" and "not standing in." I take it
7 that's not what you're saying.
8 A. Well, absolutely. I think that he knows the difference between
9 "standing in" and "replacing."
10 Q. Let me show you a different document.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Could I have 65 ter 4160, please, in e-court.
12 Q. This document that you have in front of you is from the Army of
13 Yugoslavia and General Staff. Its indicated -- its dated 21 February
14 2000 and indicates a title of minutes composed at the army of Yugoslavia
15 General Staff on 31 January 2000 regarding the official interview
16 conducted with Major General Radivoje, son of Mitar Miletic, in relation
17 to the ending of his professional military service.
18 In the English if we could go to the second page. I think if we
19 can go down a page in the B/C/S, I want to direct your attention to what
20 I am referring to. In the B/C/S version it is the next-to-last
21 paragraph, although there is not a space between them. And in the
22 English it's the second paragraph.
23 From the top of the page, it reads as follows:
24 "During the war I was on duty of the chief of operations and
25 training administration in the Army of Yugoslavia General Staff 30th
1 Personnel Centre, and for a certain period I was representing the deputy
2 chief of VRS Army of Republika Srpska Main Staff. I am used to work. It
3 is hard for me to receive salary and not to work."
4 Now, in respect of this particular paragraph, there is written in
5 the English "representing the deputy chief of the VRS." Do you read that
6 in the version that is written in your language?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Okay. Does that have a specific military meaning?
9 A. In this specific case it does have a very specific military
10 meaning. I don't know how General Nikolic missed that. He's a great
11 expert for human resources for personnel, and I don't know how that was
12 skipped by General Miletic himself. Because now we have a post that
13 never existed in the Main Staff of the VRS that is now mentioned here.
14 Q. All right. And in the transcript we have a reference at page 10,
15 line 11, where you refer to General Nikolic. Is that accurate, is that
16 what you meant to say, or is that a mistake?
17 A. Yes, the conversation was held by General Stamenko Nikolic as --
18 in his official capacity, he was highly regarded as an expert for
19 personnel issues in the army, and General Miletic was also present there.
20 And I said that I found it strange that it skipped past him, that they
21 missed the fact that the mention is made here of a post that never
22 existed in the Main Staff of the VRS.
23 Q. Well, what should the post be?
24 A. Well, the question is what post or what duty, because we could
25 not really see that. You could actually opt for anything. Let me tell
1 you what this duty should be precisely and how it should be described
3 Q. If General Miletic mentioned that he stood in for anybody, who
4 would that be?
5 A. In accordance with the rules, General Miletic could be designated
6 to stand in for any person who occupies a post with the same requirements
7 that he possesses, that he meets, and if you are hinting that he should
8 be standing in for the Chief of the Main Staff of the Army Republika
9 Srpska, which I don't think that he said, then the formulation, the
10 wording would be as follows. That would be the post.
11 In a certain period of time, I stood in for the Chief of Staff of
12 the staff of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
13 So this would be a precisely defined duty, and this is what I
14 said on my first day here, how this duty or this post is defined.
15 Q. In all of the documents that you reviewed in preparation for your
16 testimony and in preparation -- and in preparing your report, it's fair
17 to say that you didn't see General Miletic's name attached to any
18 document as standing in for anybody or any post other than Chief of Staff
19 of the staff of the Main Staff of Republika Srpska?
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, before you answer the question, please,
21 Ms. Fauveau.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, could we ask the
23 witness to please take off his headphones.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: General, could you remove your headphones, please.
25 Yes, we can proceed, Ms. Fauveau.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this document that we
2 have before us is in regard to all of the service of General Miletic
3 within the Army of the Republika Srpska. I am not saying that it was
4 possible or not possible, but we don't know. At some time, at some point
5 in time, he did represent the head of the Administration for Operations
6 and Training. It was possible that he did so in 1992 and 1993. And
7 surely, the witness never had an opportunity to look at documents
8 pertaining to 1992 and 1993. Nothing in this document indicates that
9 this period is 1995.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, thank you, Ms. Fauveau. I think that deserves
11 feedback from you, some remark.
12 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, Mr. President. My understanding is that it
13 was this witness's objective to determine the capacity in which
14 General Miletic signed certain documents as standing in for the Chief of
15 Staff. That is the thrust of his expert report. This is a document that
16 is clearly relevant to that subject matter in so far as it concerns
17 General Miletic's service during the period of time in question. It is
18 his retirement exit statement, as it were. And what he talks about is --
19 he says very specifically that "During the war --" he talks about his
20 service during the war.
21 This is a relevant and obviously salient issue with respect of
22 determining what his capacity was during the war which is what the
23 subject matter of his expert opinion and his testimony is about. I think
24 it's a reasonable question to put to the witness, particularly since the
25 witness has expertise in organisational structure of the VRS,
1 particularly the Main Staff, particularly the positions that
2 General Miletic has alleged in the indictment and in the documents to
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye, before I consult with my
5 colleagues, I think that your answer, your remark, your response, is not
6 exactly responsive to the point made by Ms. Fauveau. I think what
7 Ms. Fauveau pointed out was the following, essentially:
8 If you look at this particular paragraph, what is being stated
9 there spans over the entire period of the war. What she is objecting to
10 is you presenting this paragraph to the witness in conjunction or related
11 to the documents where he signed as standing in for the Chief of Staff.
12 In other words, what she is suggesting is that you should be fairer with
13 the witness and put to him also that this paragraph doesn't necessarily
14 refer to 1995 but to the entire period of the war.
15 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I think my question - and I don't
16 have it in front of me - was whether or not in all of the documents that
17 he had reviewed, whether he had ever come across General Miletic standing
18 in for anybody other than the Chief of Staff, because the question
19 related to whether or not this -- he specifically mentioned that this
20 post that is identified on this document doesn't exist. Never existed.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: But what Madam Fauveau is tell you is that it could
22 have been in 1992 or 1993 or 1994 that he could have stood in or
23 represented someone else rather than the Chief of Staff and that someone
24 else is being described erroneously according to the witness as deputy
25 chief of the Army of Republika Srpska. This is what she is suggesting.
1 MR. VANDERPUYE: I think that's a fair suggestion, but I don't
2 think that that relates to the characterization of the document. That is
3 something that the expert can clearly distinguish. If he's saying that
4 that post never existed in the Army of Republika Srpska ever during the
5 war, then clearly there is an error on this document --
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, then ask him what he understands when he
7 reads this document. Who - and you have already actually asked him - who
8 could have General Miletic represented or meant to say he represented in
9 this paragraph? And leave it at that. Let me consult with my colleagues
10 in the meantime.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Anyway, prevailing opinion here in addition is that
14 we proceed with the witness answering the question, and you can deal with
15 this matter yourself on further redirect. Thank you.
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. General, in respect of this document I had asked you whether you
18 had seen in the -- in all the documents that you reviewed, preparing to
19 testify and preparing your report, whether you had ever seen
20 General Miletic's signature as standing in for anyone besides the Chief
21 of Staff?
22 A. I was quite clear a little while ago that I never saw any
23 documents about standing in that were signed by him. I merely saw the
24 signature block. And since this document was disseminated, then I think
25 that he did stipulate that, but I think that I did see a document where
1 he is indicated as "standing in" for somebody, but he was never in Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina at all at that time. I can't now tell you what report
3 this is, give you the precise reference, but I think that it exists
4 somewhere, but I did not see any other documents indicating that he was
5 "standing in for."
6 Q. General, since you prepared your report, you've had an
7 opportunity to actually review a collection of documents that we have
8 concerning General Miletic. Let me just share with you a couple of the
9 things that we found. I will say that the collection of documents that
10 we have are by no means complete, but in the collection that we found, in
11 reviewing 587 documents attributed to General Miletic, 579 of those
12 documents were attributed to him as standing in for the Chief of Staff.
13 Those documents consisted of combat reports, they consisted of
14 documents relating to humanitarian aid convoys, and they consisted of
15 documents relating to UNPROFOR convoys. Of those documents, on three
16 occasions General Miletic signed, or it is attributed that General
17 Miletic is having signed, as chief of operations and training.
18 Of the documents that you reviewed in preparing your report, and
19 the documents that you reviewed in preparing your testimony, on how many
20 occasions did you see General Miletic's signature or signature block as
21 attributed to anything other than standing in for the Chief of Staff?
22 A. There is a whole period in my work on this expert report that I
23 devoted to trying to see, first of all, how the officers, primarily those
24 from the Main Staff of the Army Republika Srpska, signed those document
25 in order to be able to draw analogies. I then inspected some of the
1 documents that pertained to General Miletic. I analysed the factual
2 situation. I inspected the map, the file, in the personnel section which
3 indicates clearly when somebody is standing in for or is not standing in
4 for. I read the statement by General Manojlo, given by him, and on the
5 basis of all that, I reached the conclusion that this was merely a bad
6 way to sign a document. At the time when there was this replacement
7 going on, I realised that all the documents that I saw were reports or
8 notices. They are relatively urgent documents, and they have to be
9 signed without undue delay by the person who is actually replacing
10 another person. And I did not count the documents after that. I merely
11 or, rather, I focussed exclusively on the contents.
12 Q. First, let me qualify what I said before in respect of the number
13 of documents. That was just for 1995, 587 documents I referred to, that
14 was for the year 1995. But, in relation to what you've just said, it was
15 part of your objective, for lack of a better term, to determine whether,
16 in fact, General Miletic was functioning within the constraints of his
17 position by establishment or whether he was performing functions that
18 were outside that establishment; in other words, in the capacity of the
19 Chief of Staff? That was part of your objective; right?
20 A. Absolutely. You can read this in my report as well. When I
21 established, based on all the parameters, that it was indeed the case,
22 then I researched some other aspects, because this was not the only
23 aspect of my expert work. The most important issue, that was what I
24 relied on in order to establish that, was the link between the
25 regulations regulating replacement, the factual situation, the contents
1 of the regulations, and the position of his superior officer. His
2 superior officer, if he had seen any other document, save for this report
3 signed in this way, would have reacted differently because this would
4 have meant that he also had been removed from his position. Because if
5 somebody is standing in for him, then he cannot at the same time perform
6 his duty. He would have he been removed from his position, he would not
7 have been a commander, which means that he would have been chased out of
8 his position.
9 In any case, if Miletic had stood in for the Chief of Staff of
10 the Main Staff of the Army -- Republika Srpska Army, and that if the
11 commander still performed his duty, that would mean the Chief of Staff of
12 the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, General
13 Milovanovic Manojlo, had been removed from his duty, i.e., that he was no
14 longer performing his duties.
15 Q. It is relevant to determining the actual capacity in which
16 General Miletic discharged his functional responsibilities to look at the
17 capacity in which documents that are purportedly signed by him are
18 attributed to him, whether that be chief of the Administration for
19 Operations and Training or whether that be standing in for the Chief of
21 A. I absolutely agree with you. It would be relevant to see in what
22 capacity he signed the documents. When I say "he," I mean
23 General Miletic. And obviously, you would have to study all the
24 documents and situations and everything that happened. I can say that he
25 signed the document as the most senior officer in that place. The person
1 who wanted to avoid the report being sent to Banja Luka and then being
2 returned. It is very precise that in the capacity of the person that he
3 was replacing at the moment he signed the document, having established by
4 doing that he would not encroach his powers as replacing the superior
6 Q. Given that that would be a relevant line of inquiry, that is,
7 examining in what capacity these documents are attributed to him, whether
8 it's in his capacity as per his establishment post or whether it is
9 capacity as acting or standing in for the Chief of Staff, are you telling
10 us that you have no idea as you testify here today how many times you saw
11 in reviewing the documents General Miletic's name on a document that
12 didn't say "standing in for the Chief of Staff"? You have no
13 recollection of that? You can't estimate that for the Trial Chamber?
14 A. I did not manage to note the third question. The first question
15 was whether in his capacity as acting or standing in for the chief, he
16 could not do that because in the establishment, the Chief of Staff did
17 not have his deputy by establishment.
18 And then you asked me your second question: He could not sign as
19 standing in for the chief because he was never appointed to do stand in
20 for the chief.
21 And the third thing is something that we have already repeated
22 several times, and you skipped over that. In his capacity as the most
23 senior officer who at that moment in that place replaced the chief of
25 Q. All right. Maybe something got lost in translation, but I will
1 try again. Can you recall how many times in the documents that you
2 reviewed you saw General Miletic's name associated with the position
3 other than standing in for the Chief of Staff? Can you approximate that
5 A. No. I don't have that statistic. And from the point of view
6 from the expert report that I drafted and which had been given to me to
7 do, this statistics would be -- would not be important. The statistics
8 are important only to confirm some facts, and this is at least how I see
10 Q. Well, one of the facts you were trying to confirm was that he
11 wasn't actually standing in for the Chief of Staff; isn't that true?
12 A. Absolutely. And I confirmed this fact by research rather than by
13 statistics, and I believe that an expert report whose methodology is
14 based on that does not require facts.
15 Q. All right. In terms of evaluating the functional
16 responsibilities of General Miletic, did you do that, first of all?
17 A. Absolutely. And I also told you what criteria I used to carry
18 out the evaluation of his functional responsibilities. And I said from
19 the outset that I never used that criteria because I knew only too well
20 what I was doing and what was used in other works, and that functional
21 responsibility of General Miletic was evaluated based on the rule on the
22 powers of the corps commands, the rules on the powers of military
23 districts, and so on and so forth. I evaluated that and studied
24 functional responsibilities based on the functional responsibilities of
25 the rank that he was a member of, which was a Main Staff which is in the
1 same rank as a General Staff.
2 Q. And those functional responsibilities would not entitle him to
3 issue orders; correct?
4 A. Absolutely. His functional responsibilities would not allow him
5 to issue orders, especially not orders to commands, units, and
7 MR. VANDERPUYE: Can I have 65 ter 4158, please, in e-court.
8 Q. General, this is an order that is signed by General Miletic
9 standing in for the Chief of Staff. You could see on its face that it
10 says "order." It's from the Main Staff, it's directed to the command of
11 the airforce and anti-aircraft defence, as you can see.
12 And it says:
13 "Pursuant to the request for UNPROFOR command for urgent medical
14 evacuation on 24 August, 1995, in a helicopter..." In quotes it says
15 "seeking," "... aiming to regulate safe flying in the RS air-space, I
16 hereby order."
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Incidentally, before he answers, page 20, line 2,
18 that question should be an answer, and there should be the removal of the
19 question mark at the end, on line 4.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE:
21 Q. General, have you seen this document before?
22 A. I have not seen this document. Could it be scrolled up a little,
23 please? Very well. Now I can see the whole document.
24 Q. You can see that it's an order; right?
25 A. Absolutely.
1 MR. VANDERPUYE: Can we have 65 ter 4159, please, in e-court.
2 Q. This is another document. It says at the top "Main Staff --"
3 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Ms. Fauveau.
4 MS. FAVEAU: Your Honour, I have nothing against this line of
5 questioning, but it would perhaps be good --
6 MR. VANDERPUYE: Could I ask the witness to remove his
7 headphones, please.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you wish the witness to remove his headphones or
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, if my learned colleague
11 requests it.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: General, could you remove yours headphones, please,
13 and be patient with us. Thank you.
14 Yes, Ms. Fauveau.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I have nothing against this line of
16 questioning and these documents. There are surely a number of them, but
17 perhaps we should come back to the period covered by the indictment.
18 Certainly, we haven't explored or studied the functions of
19 General Miletic in October 1995, and the indictment only ends at the end
20 of August regarding General Miletic.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, thank you. Do you wish to comment?
22 MR. VANDERPUYE: No, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Let's proceed, unless my colleagues
24 wish me -- no. Okay. All right. We are fine with the question.
25 General, thank you.
1 Yes, let's proceed, please. If you could answer the question.
2 Or, rather, I think he -- the question hasn't been put as yet, only part
3 of it. You need to put the question again.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: Yes, that's right, Mr. President. Thank you.
5 Q. General, have you seen this document before?
6 A. No, I have not seen it.
7 Q. Now, this document is from the Main Staff, it has the number of
8 034-2818. 20th October 1995 is the date. And it says:
9 "To the command of the Drina Corps, 67th infantry platoon,
10 Main Staff headquarters administration and Main Staff traffic
11 administration ..."
12 And it concerns the cleaning up and sorting out of Srebrenica.
13 And it's written "Order."
14 You do see the word "order" written before you; right?
15 A. Yes, I can see that.
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: If we could go to the second page of both
18 Q. We can see that this document is also attributed to
19 General Miletic as standing in for the Chief of Staff. That's right,
20 isn't it?
21 A. In the second document something has to be corrected in the
22 translation. It is not the infantry platoon. PV stands for the
23 communications regiment. That's what it should read. It is correct that
24 both are orders; however, both orders were issued in compliance with the
25 rules and regulations as to how an officer is replaced, and these
1 regulations were valid, both valid at the time. These are two urgent
2 orders. One is about helicopters and the rescue operation, and we
3 commented upon this situation indirectly yesterday. And the second one
4 is about the clean-up operation.
5 At the moment when the orders were issued, they had to be signed
6 by the most senior officer, and I assume that the most senior officer at
7 the moment in the command post was General Miletic. If I had been there,
8 I would have signed the two orders. I would not put "standing in for,"
9 but I would still have signed the two of them.
10 Q. And why do you assume that the most senior officer at the command
11 post must have been General Miletic? How can you make that assumption
12 based on this document?
13 A. I don't make that conclusion only based on this document, but on
14 the entire context. I never look at a document in isolation but rather
15 in its context. Bearing in mind the evaluation of his superior officer
16 that he never acted in any other way, this was a good enough indicator
17 for me that at that moment in the main base -- in the base command post
18 there was nobody but General Miletic. And it can be seen from all the
19 other parts that he was not in the command post, only when he was in
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina discounting some other cases, for example, once
21 when he was assigned to go on a mission, the whole context and the whole
22 situation and the fact that these are documents that have nothing to do
23 with the use of any units, but, rather, humanitarian aid and assistance
24 extended to the population and the city. I believe that this was enough
25 to establish the context and that all this was in compliance with the
1 regulations and rule that were in effect in Republika Srpska at that
3 Q. Couldn't you just as easily conclude that he was standing in for
4 the Chief of Staff and that's why he issued the order?
5 A. The analogy which is now offered would have been detrimental for
6 the Army Republika Srpska. It would be disastrous. No single corps
7 command would allow for somebody to order him if he was not standing in
8 for the chief but only impersonating somebody who was standing in for the
9 chief. The Chief of Staff would not allow such a person to issue orders
10 and make decisions.
11 Knowing General Miletic and his professional career and having
12 read official evaluations offered by others, since we did not serve
13 together, I concluded that this is a huge difference. Basing your
14 analogy on humanitarian aid and saying that he also issued combat orders
15 would not make any sense.
16 MR. VANDERPUYE: Could I have 65 ter 4055, please, in e-court.
17 Q. General, what you have before you -- what you have before you is
18 a document that's dated 10 March 1995, and it concerns convoys. In
19 particular, in this document, if we go to page 2 of the B/C/S, you can
20 see that it's type-signed standing in for the Chief of Staff, Colonel
22 Now, if we go to the first page again of the B/C/S, the document
23 is dated 10th March, 1995. It is directed to the command of Drina Corps.
24 And in its first sentence it reads:
25 "Please be advised that we approved the weekly plan of
1 distribution of humanitarian assistance from Belgrade for Eastern Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina during the period from 11 March till 17 March 1995."
3 Now, in a previous document that was shown to you, I asked you
4 about what was the necessary of the Main Staff indicating an approval of
5 humanitarian aid that had already been approved? You said "It couldn't
6 hurt." Do you remember that?
7 A. My answer was more complex, you simplified it. But I can repeat
9 Q. I don't need you to repeat it. I just want to know if you
10 remember that part of your testimony.
11 A. Yes, I remember in a much more precise way than you used to jog
12 my memory.
13 Q. Okay. Now, in this particular document you can see that it says
14 that "We approved the weekly plan of distribution of humanitarian
15 assistance from Belgrade for Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina."
16 And then it says in the following sentence:
17 "We reduced the plan for the enclaves in number of vehicles and
18 the transport of fuel is not committed. Despite the information on
19 restrictions we submitted to the coordinating body for humanitarian aid.
20 We expect the UNHCR shall try to bring fuel into the enclaves which has
21 to be prevented."
22 You see that; right?
23 A. I do, yes.
24 Q. All right. Now, if we go to the bottom of the page in English,
25 and we go to the bottom of the page in the B/C/S, you look in the
1 paragraph in the B/C/S designated 16.03.95. In English you can see there
2 is a remark, and it indicates:
3 "Regarding medicine for Srebrenica approved for 14 March 1995, we
4 shall send to the command of the Drina Corps a separate list of medicine
5 once we coordinate."
6 Have you seen this document before?
7 A. Yes, I believe I have.
8 Q. And in this context is it appropriate for the Main Staff to
9 reduce the amount of the planned convoy or humanitarian aid for the
10 enclaves even though it's already been approved?
11 A. You saw the correspondence between the coordination body and the
12 Main Staff. If Main Staff as a professional organ in the sytem of the
13 functioning of humanitarian aid provided its position and view points as
14 to what humanitarian aid could be used in combat against the Army
15 Republika Srpska. And also the Main Staff by the way of the functioning
16 of the -- of humanitarian aid could also provide its proposals for
17 something to be reduced. When such a proposal for reduction was given,
18 it always informed, as you can see here, and the coordination body could
19 reject that proposal or adopt it. Hence, the research of the
20 relationship between the Main Staff and the coordination body is not
21 something that I did in detail, but as far as I could see, they did not
22 have many problems between themselves. They had other problems that
23 needed to be discussed, and they did indeed discuss them.
24 Q. You can see that this document, in particular, is type-signed by
25 Colonel Miletic; right?
1 A. I can see the typed block signature. As I can see, this was sent
2 by way of teleprinter.
3 MR. VANDERPUYE: Can I have 65 ter 4062, please, in e-court.
4 Q. General, this is a similar document. It is dated 30 June 1995.
5 It's from the Main Staff, Republika Srpska. It's directed to the command
6 of the Drina Corps. And it leads as follows, well, it reads and leads as
8 "Please be advised that we agree with realisation of
9 authorisation of the coordinating body for humanitarian aid to the
10 Republika Srpska," and it gives a number 1582-HCR-867, "related to the
11 weekly plan of the Belgrade UNHCR as follows."
12 And you can see under 4 July there is a remark. And it
13 indicates, "We did not approve one more truck within this convoy with
14 school supplies."
15 Now, is this consistent with your understanding of the Main Staff
16 role vis-a-vis the coordinating body for humanitarian aid?
17 A. I should research this part in detail because there is also
18 another part, and that is once bitten, twice shy. Personally when I look
19 at this whole thing, I don't see a reason for that; however, if you were
20 to study the context of what was done and how things were done, then one
21 could say that they overstepped their authorities, or one could say that
22 for some reason this was done. The elements do not suffice for me to
23 conclude what was done and why things were done the way they were.
24 Q. All right. You do see at the bottom of the document --
25 MR. VANDERPUYE: If we could just scroll down in the B/C/S
2 Q. [Previous translation continues]... that that is also
3 type-signed, General Radivoje Miletic standing in for the Chief of Staff?
4 A. Yes, both documents were sent by teleprinter. They are both
5 notices or notifications. And both documents carry the signature block
6 that we can see here.
7 Q. All right. And both documents actually restrict pre-approved
8 humanitarian aid, that's true too, isn't it?
9 A. Both documents are notifications indicating that the Main Staff
10 of the VRS and the coordination body are to have a coordination meeting
11 about restricting humanitarian aid.
12 Q. All right, General. I think the documents speak for themselves.
13 You did in your report cover the area of humanitarian aid; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. In respect of humanitarian aid, as concerns the enclaves, you did
16 evaluate what the humanitarian condition of the enclaves were between,
17 say, January and July of 1995, didn't you?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So it's fair to say in your evaluation of the humanitarian
20 condition of the enclaves during that period that you concluded - and
21 you'll correct me if I'm wrong - that there was no specific indication of
22 a deteriorating humanitarian condition; is that right?
23 A. I am not aware of stating this in such uncertain terms anywhere.
24 I made some comments about humanitarian aid in ten -- or, rather, eight
25 paragraphs, all told, and I made my conclusions on the basis of what I
1 had gone through. And since the topic was not something that was -- I
2 was to cover in my analysis, I never put this in, but I did state that I
3 found in some documents instances that humanitarian aid -- there were
4 abuses of humanitarian aid effort, and I indicated this was a big
5 problem, the abuse of humanitarian aid.
6 Q. Okay. So you never actually evaluated what the condition of what
7 the -- what the humanitarian condition was during the period of time that
8 you were actually considering what General Miletic's role was in the Main
9 Staff of the VRS?
10 A. Yes, I did not analyse this in detail. That's correct.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Can I show you 65 ter 4124.
12 Q. During your testimony, one of the things that you mentioned was
13 you -- was that people that were in the enclaves expressed their wish to
14 leave. Do you remember saying that?
15 A. Not in so many words. I merely stated on the basis of the
16 reports that I read from the UN Secretary-General and the documents that
17 I read originating from the Main Staff of the BH army, the reports from
18 the security organ of the 2nd Corps of the BH army, on the basis of the
19 reports -- of the commanders in Srebrenica and Zepa and on the basis of
20 the local leaders that there was always this tension present among the
21 population that they actually wanted to leave the enclave. I did not
22 have a personal view, and I could not form a personal view because I was
23 not there, so this was merely stating some facts that are based on what
24 I've just told you.
25 Q. Okay. This document is an UNPROFOR office of civil affairs
1 document. It's a weekly situation report covering the period of
2 26 February to 4 March 1995. What I'd like to do is to refer you to
3 page 5 of this document. Okay.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: And if we could go down the page to number 15.
5 Q. Number 15 reads "Srebrenica supplies." And it reads as follows:
6 "After the UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica literally ran out of
7 food (they consumed their last combat rations on 3 March) the BSA finally
8 agreed today after several prior refusals to law the troops resupply.
9 The BSA explaining that they have no objection to food deliveries, only
10 to fuel, continue to refuse delivery of fuel to Srebrenica, and they
11 continue to refuse medical supplies into the three enclaves."
12 Were you aware of these facts at the time you were drafting your
13 report or in preparation for drafting your report?
14 A. I have mentioned several times, Your Honours, that I never put in
15 anything that is based on just one document. And I never look at
16 documents in isolation. This is not in line with the methodology that I
17 decided to use in the drafting of my report. The report that I see in
18 front of me, I think I have seen it before. I read it in the context of
19 many other reports and in the context of the reports indicating that
20 humanitarian aid was used to reward and pay fighters in where
21 humanitarian aid was used to provide logistics support to the 28th
22 Division. And I decided that this area should be explored very
23 carefully, lest there should be any such manipulations based on excerpts
24 taken from -- out of the context.
25 Since General Miletic was not part of the system whereby
1 proposals were drafted and decisions were made in the area of
2 humanitarian aid, I ceased researching this area in detail. And I am
3 only saying that this should be viewed within its context.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: Can I have 65 ter 4125, please, in e-court.
5 Q. This is a cable that is directed to Annan, United Nations New
6 York. It is dated 22 March 1995, and I am going to refer you,
7 specifically, to paragraph number 3 of this document. It reads, in the
8 first sentence:
9 "UNHCR reports that they have managed to get medical supplies
10 into Gorazde and Srebrenica for the first time since November 1994."
11 Were you aware of that fact in the context of drafting your
12 report or preparing to testify? And I ask you this because you've talked
13 a lot about abuses that have occurred in the process, justification for
14 the restriction of fuel, and justification for the imposition of
15 restrictions as regards the inspection of convoys?
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Josse.
17 MR. JOSSE: I hope I'm not pedantic, but I think that my learned
18 friend should say "assertion" rather than "fact."
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think Mr. Josse is right.
20 Mr. Vanderpuye, you said, page 31, line 1: "Were you aware of
21 the fact ..."
22 MR. VANDERPUYE: Okay. Okay. Thank you.
23 Q. Were you aware of what was asserted in this document? I hope
24 that satisfies my colleague. Are you aware of what is reported in this
25 document at the time that you prepared your report to testify in this
1 case? And I ask you for reasons that I've indicated before and also to
2 the extent that you've said that there is no indication that you've come
3 across that -- supporting the notion that life was made unbearable for
4 the inhabitants of these enclaves?
5 A. First of all, I never found any justification, and I always
6 insisted that things should be looked at in their context, I constantly
7 insisted. And it is my position throughout this report that I am
8 studying facts and checking assertions. And on the basis of having
9 checked the assertions and obtaining the facts, I draw my conclusions.
10 If I were to say that each action was justified, and if I were unable to
11 support that with facts, I would not be a serious scholar. And, Your
12 Honours, I never did that. I never did any of the sort.
13 Q. My question is were you aware of what's asserted; that is, that
14 the UNHCR managed to get medical supplies into Gorazde and Srebrenica for
15 the first time since 1994 on or around 22nd March 1995 when this report
16 is dated?
17 A. Well, I was not aware of this assertion, of this claim. I never
18 saw it; I never read it.
19 MR. VANDERPUYE: If we could go to 65 ter 4126, please. This is
20 another cable. It's dated 18 April, 1995, addressed to Mr. Annan. If we
21 could go to page 2 of this document.
22 Q. At item number 4 it reads:
23 "The following additional information further clarifies the
25 A, it says:
1 "Srebrenica, has been using UNHCR stocks of diesel of which 38.4
2 cubic metres have been used so far. The battalion reduced consumption
3 rates some weeks ago to 3.5 cubic metres per day and has now cut
4 consumption to 1.5 cubic metres per day. Strict limitations have been
5 placed on the use of vehicles and generators. The operational effects
6 have resulted in a much reduced patrolling programme."
7 For Zepa under C it reads:
8 "There is no vehicle controlling in Zepa, and the company is
9 using wood for cooking and candles for light."
10 Were you aware of the existence of those circumstances in April
11 of 1995 as is reported in this document in the preparation of your report
12 or in preparation for your testimony?
13 A. I was not aware of this and for a very simple reason. For me to
14 be aware of the document and for me to be able to use a document in
15 drafting my expert report, the document had to have been translated.
16 Since my knowledge or, rather, lack of knowledge of English makes it
17 impossible for me to study documents that had not been translated.
18 In order to be able to form an opinion at the time or now, we
19 need to look at claims made by both sides, and then those facts and
20 claims have to be checked and then conclusions can be reached. Now, I am
21 faced with the plethora of claims made by one side, and I was able to
22 look at claims both about the abuse of humanitarian aid and the lack of
23 humanitarian aid. But since this was not a topic that I was researching,
24 I did not pay much attention to that.
25 Q. I think it's time for the break. I would appreciate it if we can
1 take it now, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Fine. We will have a 25-minute break.
3 Thank you.
4 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 4.14 p.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, how much longer?
7 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: How much longer?
9 MR. VANDERPUYE: I have about ten documents to go through with
10 the witness. They are similar to this document. I don't anticipate it
11 will be how much longer than how -- on average how long it's been going
12 with each of these documents.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed.
14 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 If I could have 65 ter 4130, please, in e-court.
16 Q. General, this is an UNPROFOR document. It's from the office of
17 civil affairs. It's a weekly situation report indicating the week of 8
18 through 15 May 1995, and it's dated 15 May 1995.
19 MR. VANDERPUYE: If we could go to page 4 of this document.
20 Q. Excuse me, under item 10 it reads as follows:
21 "Serbs allow some UNHCR convoys into the eastern enclaves of
22 Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica, but continue to deny UNPROFOR resupplies
23 creating critical conditions for the troops. The Serbs' contention is
24 that so long as they suffer under international sanctions, they will
25 impose the same predicament on Bosnian areas over which they have
2 Now, sir, this document and the other documents that I have shown
3 you from the UN, UNHCR, it's the Prosecution's position that these
4 documents show that Directive 7 is alive. It was not invalidated by
5 Directive 7/1, particularly in respect of making life unbearable and in
6 respect of accomplishing that through the restrictive use of permits.
7 Now, having looked at this and having had an opportunity to
8 consider the report as I've just read it to you, does this, in your
9 opinion -- does this, in your opinion, contradict what you said?
10 A. First of all, it is very important to note that this is not a
11 topic of Directive 7 or Directive 7/1. The scope of the directive can
12 only be seen on the basis of the tasks issued to the units. Humanitarian
13 aid was operational as was the supply of units and irritation of UNPROFOR
14 units. It was within the remit of the coordination body and the Main
15 Staff. And it is obvious that neither Directive 7 nor Directive 7/1 were
16 sent to the coordination body and to the Main Staff, and it did not
17 entail any tasks issued to them. And we can see here that there are
18 problems with supply lines for UNPROFOR, and we can see on the basis of a
19 number of assertions that UNPROFOR was operating outside of its mandate.
20 And by researching both topics, then one can get a full picture
21 and see what is cause and what is consequence. At any rate, we can see
22 this assertion here, but it needs to be checked.
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: If we could have 65 ter 4132 in e-court, please.
24 And if we could go to the bottom of the page in this document.
25 Q. This is another UNPROFOR document. It is dated 1st June 1995.
1 And at the bottom of this page you can see it reads:
2 "The most critical situation with the food is in Gorazde and
3 Zepa," and it says "UKRKOY," "... due to the blockade of these pockets by
4 the BSA, there is no opportunity to resupply."
5 Now, were you aware of this, what is represented in this
6 particular document at the time of drafting your report and -- well, let
7 me ask you that first. Were you aware of it?
8 A. Not this document. If it was translated and if it was in the
9 database of the translated documents, then I probably would have been
10 aware of it.
11 Q. What about the circumstances about which it speaks, that is, the
12 inability to resupply UNPROFOR troops?
13 A. I knew about this whole set of circumstances, and I knew of a
14 document indicating that immediately before that a large quantity of
15 humanitarian aid was given by way of logistics support to the
16 28th Division. So I knew about this assertion and about the facts that I
17 saw from a document originating from the local authority.
18 Q. Let me take you to 65 ter 4133. It's dated 4 June, 1995. And
19 it's also an UNPROFOR weekly situation report covering the period of 29
20 May through 4 June.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is not an
23 objection. I would just like to inform the Chamber about the fact that
24 the series of documents which is currently being presented to the witness
25 are documents which were disclosed to the Defence teams on the 30th [as
1 interpreted] of January of this year, so the witness can't have seen
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: 13th of January.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. It's what I thought you had said,
6 actually, but, yes.
7 MR. VANDERPUYE: If we could go to page 4 -- 5 of this document,
9 Q. Under item 14 it reads that:
10 "The food situation is at an unsatisfactorily level as well.
11 Serbs had reassured all the humanitarian agencies to continue their
12 normal activities. However, with the current security situation and the
13 lack of UNPROFOR escorts for convoys, UNHCR decided to suspend its
14 convoys. UNHCR has 370 tonnes of food at the airport. Since 3 June
15 UNPROFOR has been protecting UNHCR convoys to cart the food from the
16 airport to the city."
17 If we go down to item 17, we see "Situation in the Enclaves," and
18 it reads:
19 "Limited amounts of humanitarian assistance through convoys
20 reached Tuzla during the reporting period. All other enclaves did not
21 receive their scheduled supplies. Should the present state of affairs
22 persist, the enclaves which depend entirely on humanitarian assistance
23 will suffer tremendously."
24 Sir, it's the Prosecution's position that this is evidence of the
25 fact that Directive 7 was not invalidated. It is evidence of the fact
1 that the population in the enclaves was made to suffer unbearable
2 conditions of life. And it is the position of the Prosecution that that
3 was -- that was inflicted upon them by restrictive use of permits as is
4 indicated in Directive 7 and that that contradicts your explanation that
5 Directive 7/1 invalidated Directive 7.
6 A. Well, despite all my best efforts to understand this question, it
7 is a fact that this is not a fact. It's a claim. That's number 1.
8 Number 2. What I said at the time and what I am saying now, your
9 position that the directive is what it is, this is your position, and I
10 told you something that is well known throughout the world, what kind of
11 a document a directive is and to whom it is addressed as a document.
12 What is the task that is contained in a directive, and who is assigned
13 this task?
14 Any analogy stating that a directive is an executive document
15 cannot be justified by anything that I found in any of my analyses, and I
16 also never said that Directive 7/1 abolished Directive 7. I clearly
17 specified what paragraphs and what items -- what units. I maintain that
18 it is a delusion to say that the directive regulates the field of
19 humanitarian aid. There are appropriate documents enacted by the
20 Republika Srpska. There is a specific document issued by the army. And
21 this was regulated in a completely different manner.
22 In order to verify this, for instance, this report by UNPROFOR,
23 it would be a good idea to give me the whole of the report, and then we
24 could see whether the report deals with all the elements in an
25 appropriate manner, whether the report deals with the exchange of
1 intelligence, whether it deals with a number of other issues that were
2 their mission. I am not saying "yes," and I am not saying "no." I am
3 only saying that this has nothing to do with Directive number 7, and any
4 efforts to link any directive or any military order with what we see here
5 amounts to speculation, and this is inappropriate for any military.
6 Q. Thank you, for that, sir.
7 MR. VANDERPUYE: Just for the clarification of the record,
8 Mr. President, the document 4133 that I've just used with the expert was
9 disclosed on 23rd January, 2008. This next document, 4136, I'd like to
10 have in e-court as well, was also disclosed on 23rd January, 2008.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you for that information.
12 MR. VANDERPUYE:
13 Q. Now, this is another document, also a similar document. It
14 indicates in the top left corner, UNPROFOR communications. It is
15 addressed to Mr. Annan, and it is dated 14 June 1995. In the second
16 point -- second paragraph, if we could page down a little bit, it reads
17 as follows:
18 "None of the UNHCR convoys to the enclaves have received
19 clearances. The Srebrenica convoy has been cancelled. The Sarajevo
20 convoy has not left Zenica. The BSA are demanding a 50/50 share of the
21 aid to which UNHCR will not agree. The UNPF resupply convoys have
22 suffered a similar fate. The two convoys to Gorazde were blocked by the
23 BSA and have returned to Sarajevo. The convoy scheduled to depart from
24 Zagreb for Sarajevo has not yet received clearance.
25 Were you aware, as I've said before, during the drafting of your
1 report in preparation of your testimony of the circumstances that are
2 described in this particular passage?
3 A. I was aware of the context and the circumstances prevailing with
4 regard to Republika Srpska. And in Republika Srpska, I was aware of the
5 entire context that you have just spoken about. I was aware of the
6 overall context of the blockade of the entire state. I was aware of the
7 entire context of misuse. And I knew of the context that bans were
8 introduced, and the research will show that some bans were justified and
9 some were not. This is an entirely different topic, and this different
10 topic has to be over-viewed and analysed in detail rather than, by the
11 way, by extracting some segments and sentences from their context.
12 Initially, when I first started working, when I reviewing all the
13 elements before I moved on to the concrete part, I also analysed the
14 humanitarian aid that was delivered, oscillations, the causes and
15 consequences between the quantity of humanitarian aid and the number of
16 population, the quantity of help, the number of units, the frequency of
17 humanitarian aid and the number of units, the rotation of forces, and so
18 on and so forth. When I saw that this goes beyond my commission, I
19 dropped that part and this part remained as separated, but it serves as
20 the good basis of information pointing to the fact that this part
21 requires a lot of work and a lot of future research.
22 Q. All right.
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Let me show you 65 ter 4138. For the record,
24 this was also disclosed on 23rd January, 2008. This cable concerns daily
25 reporting. It is dated 20th June 1995. It's addressed to Mr. Annan.
1 Q. And on the second page of this document - if we could turn to
2 that please - at point five it indicates or reads as follows:
3 "Problems with convoys, both logistics, resupply, and UNHCR
4 continue in my parts of the UNPROFOR AOR. The 56 truck convoy bound for
5 the eastern enclaves arrived in Belgrade yesterday. However, the BSA has
6 cut the number of trucks from 56 to 23, has cut the amount of food by
7 50 per cent and the amount of fuel by 70 per cent, has rejected the
8 passage of two ambulances needed for UN troops, and has insisted that
9 those personnel travelling with the convoy to the enclaves must also
10 depart with it, though no one else may, in other words, preventing any
11 troop rotation or reinforcement."
12 It indicates:
13 "Attached is a summary of the material requested for the convoy
14 and the material approved by the BSA. A UNHCR convoy destined for
15 Gorazde and given approval by Pale has been stopped and is now held-up 15
16 kilometres short of the enclave."
17 And the last sentence of this paragraph will read as follows:
18 "UNMOs in Srebrenica and Gorazde have not been able to rotate for
19 more than 60 days. Repeated requests for their rotation have been
20 refused by the BSA."
21 In light of the other documents that I've shown you and in light
22 of the Prosecution's position as I've stated to you, it is the case that
23 this document also contradicts your assessment of the effect of
24 Directive 7/1?
25 A. Looking at this document that you have just shown and looking at
1 the whole collection that I've been provided with, I am very concerned
2 that not having seen anywhere that Mr. Kofi Annan was ever informed about
3 the misuse of humanitarian aid. You have never shown me a document.
4 While I was doing my research I found over 35 per cent, a clearly defined
5 procedure of the functioning of UNPROFOR with the army and the timely
6 notification of the rotation of the forces and the -- at that moment of
7 the number of -- the research documents that in 30 per cent of cases, the
8 notifications were belated.
9 The statement that this is a directly related to Directive number
10 7 at first was likely that the goal and the intention of the directive
11 was not well understood, that its functioning was not well understood, as
12 well, how it is implemented now. I see that this is not due to the lack
13 of understanding, but the claim that is not in consistency with any
14 military doctrine or any state in the world which has a serious military.
15 MR. VANDERPUYE: If I could have 65 ter 4054, please. Thank you.
16 For the record, this document was also disclosed on 14 March 2008. If we
17 could go to page 2 of this document, it is dated 7 July 1995. It is an
18 UN cable directed to Mr. Annan.
19 Q. From page 2 at point 4 it reads as follows, General:
20 "The first UNHCR convoy since 20 May arrived in Gorazde yesterday
21 with 78 metric tonnes of flour, beans, salt, and oil. An UNHCR convoy of
22 56 metric tonnes was also successful in gaining access to Zepa. The
23 UNPROFOR leave and rotation convoy to Gorazde stopped at Rogatica on the
24 grounds that its clearance was no longer valid, will try to re-enter --
25 will try to enter the pocket today. Another UNPROFOR convoy bound for
1 Srebrenica returned to Belgrade after having been obstructed by the BSA.
2 UNHCR was targeted twice yesterday and BH or convoy being escorted by
3 PakBat around Ribnica came under BSA artillery fire."
4 Now, were you aware of the circumstances involving he obstruction
5 of the rotation of UNPROFOR troops or convoys bound for the enclaves by
6 the BSA?
7 A. Could I please be shown the first page of the document? Thank
8 you. As I'm reading this document and as I'm reading these claims, I
9 can't escape the impression that although this is about UNPROFOR, it is
10 still beyond UNPROFOR. A very important statement that impacts my view
11 is the fact that a reference is here to the BCS, something that did not
12 exist, and that is the army of Bosnian Serbs. I knew that UNPROFOR knew
13 very precisely that it was VRS rather than the BSA. My impression is
14 that the document was drafted by somebody else.
15 Second of all, I can see here some very precise data, and that's
16 why I am taken by surprise. Not to see in this document that the
17 humanitarian aid and the logistics of the DutchBat provided logistical
18 support to the 28th Division. There is very precise document which you
19 have and on which the head of the local administration -- administration
20 in Srebrenica reported on.
21 I am not doubting any of this, however, the facts in these
22 documents and the claims in these documents I would check in a context, I
23 would put them in a context, and then, only then, would I be able and
24 would I be willing to provide my concrete conclusions.
25 Q. Is it your opinion, General, that the restriction of troop
1 rotations is an appropriate response to the violation of some convoy
2 regulation or rule? Is that your opinion, sir?
3 A. No, that is not my opinion. However, I can't say anything before
4 I see the whole. Only then would I be able to state that the restriction
5 was the only possible answer at a certain point in time. But even if
6 that was the case, even if this was the only possible answer, this was
7 something that the state bodies and the military were in charge of, and
8 it -- this has nothing to do with what you are saying, and you are saying
9 that this was done to Directive number 7 or Directive number 7/1.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Vanderpuye, I want to make sure in my mind that
11 we are understanding the same thing by "restriction of troop rotations,"
12 as we have it in the transcript. What do you mean by that, "restriction
13 of troop rotations"?
14 MR. VANDERPUYE: It relates to the UNMOs that were the subject of
15 the previous document, and it also relates to the obstruction of the
16 UNPROFOR convoys that had returned to Belgrade in this document.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay.
18 And is that the way you understood it, General, when you gave
19 your answer?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. And I understood things even
21 in a more complex manner. All the rotations and all the enforcements,
22 yes, absolutely in that way.
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: If I could have 65 ter 4142, please, in e-court.
24 Thank you.
25 Q. This document as you can see in the top right hand corner is
1 stamped "UNMO headquarters." It is a cable from UNMO headquarters
2 UNPROFOR Sarajevo to UNMO headquarters Zagreb, and it's dated 8 July,
3 1995. And under item number 1, if we can page down and make it easier
4 for everyone to see, it talks about the number and status of inhabitants,
5 and it regards the food situation in Srebrenica, status for food to the
6 civilian population. And it reads, under item 1:
7 "Total population, 42.000; item B, 85 per cent of those -- or 85
8 percent were refugees or displaced persons, 20 per cent being locals."
9 And it says: "Status Food." Under item 2, "UNHCR Stock:"
10 "The food stock in the UNHCR warehouse is almost zero. There is
11 not even sufficient stock to run the social kitchens to provide one meal
12 a day for the most vulnerable."
13 Under item B, that is, point 2:
14 "Estimated private stock on the average may last for not more
15 than a couple of days providing for one or at most two meals a day per
17 It says, under item C, "NGO stock, MSF, Medecins Sans
19 "The supplies of MSF are very limited and depending on the number
20 of the wounded from the ongoing shelling, this may last for an
21 approximated two to four weeks."
22 If we go to page 2 of this document, under item 3 -- remarks
23 under item 3, and item 3 deals with UNHCR planned deliveries of food. It
25 "If the UNHCR planned convoys (i.e. three convoys per week) were
1 implemented, this would have served barely about 65 per cent of the needs
2 of the entire population; however, with the present rate of delivery,
3 less than 25 per cent of the needs is being met."
4 Now, sir when you prepared your report and when you evaluated the
5 information in order to do that to testify, were you aware of this
7 A. I believe this is dated 8 July. If I am not mistaken, 8 July
8 1995. I have not seen this particular one. However, in the first
9 sentence, if we can go back to the previous page, please, I believe that
10 this is not the estimate of the population but the exact number of the
11 population. It says here the number and status of the population, the
12 total number, not the evaluation of the total number. If I am mistaken,
13 I apologise.
14 I was aware of this and such evaluations; however, I also knew
15 and I would like to compare the reports of the local administration whose
16 estimates were lower, but they provided higher numbers in order to obtain
17 more humanitarian aid, more higher quantity thereof. And I can see here
18 that when it comes to the number of the population, this comprises the
19 28th Division, which is a respectable force, but it does not fall under
20 the entitlement to humanitarian aid. And it comprises over 20 per cent
21 of the total figure, here.
22 I also know that in the interval after that, 600 combatants of
23 the 28th Division were engaged, and they were paid in flour and other
24 type of humanitarian aid. I know that some other types of humanitarian
25 aid were sent to this division, and I know that a few days later the
1 depots were broken in and a lot of humanitarian aid was stolen. And when
2 we put all the pieces of that puzzle together, then I can tell you
3 exactly what facts are credible. I could be able to tell you what the
4 cause and the consequences are.
5 As things stand now, I can say that I am aware of all this, but I
6 find it very unusual that no single report deals with the factual
7 situation as it was on the ground at that time.
8 Q. All right, General. Well, you have to view all of these things
9 in context, I guess, is that your point; is that right?
10 A. From the very beginning.
11 Q. And these UN documents, as I've put them to you, in fact put the
12 events on the ground in context.
13 A. Probably. If we look at them as a whole. If we look at the
14 causes and consequences and not in this way. If we only extract some
15 reports from them, some excerpts from them, and we do not provide the
16 view from the other side. If that's how we wish to proceed, then we do
17 not have a context.
18 Q. All right. And you're here to put the perspective of the other
19 side to the Trial Chamber; is that right? Is that how you view your
20 role, sir?
21 A. No. Unlike some other things that were prepared, in my documents
22 I -- or, rather, in my expert report I used documents produced by both
23 the warring parties, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Army
24 Republika Srpska. I also used documents produced by UNPROFOR that I was
25 privy to. I used databases and procedures as they were defined in the
1 Army of Republika Srpska and how they are defined in other militaries,
2 and in NATO members.
3 I provided the true causal and consequential relationship. And
4 if you look at my expert report, I put forth some claims that have never
5 been put forth so far which are not very professional, and they are very
6 problematic for the Army Republika Srpska. I looked at the situation in
7 their dynamics, because in combat actions, there are always two sides
9 Q. All right.
10 MR. VANDERPUYE: If we could 65 ter 4145, please, in e-court.
11 Q. This document is entitled "Information Notes," it is published by
12 the UNHCR. I should point out that a similar document was put to a
13 different witness by the Miletic Defence. And I want to show you, if I
14 could, page 19 of this document.
15 MR. VANDERPUYE: For the record, its dated July 1995. All right.
16 I think we have to go one more page, I'm sorry. I think 18, I guess -- I
17 mean, sorry, 20 I think. One more. Okay. Thank you.
18 Q. What this shows, General, is the food delivery targets and the
19 food delivery to the eastern enclaves. You can see at the top it says --
20 I'll read it to you. It says "Aid to Bosnian enclaves," and in
21 particular. I'd focus your attention to Srebrenica and Zepa. Those are
22 the two right columns.
23 In June of 1995 it indicates that 230 metric tonnes in four
24 convoys went to Srebrenica. And if we go down -- well, before I get to
25 that, it also shows 50 metric tonnes of aid went to Zepa in one convoy.
1 That's for the month of June. If we could go down to the bottom of the
2 page, please --
3 MR. VANDERPUYE: And if we could maybe blow up the right hand
4 corner, that would be -- a little bit more. That's great.
5 Q. And in the right hand corner - I'll read it to you - it says:
6 "Note: The June 1995 food delivery target for Bihac was 1.000
7 metric tonnes; Gorazde, 772 metric tonnes; Srebrenica, 678 metric tonnes;
8 and Zepa, 160 metric tonnes."
9 That was the target. As you can see from this document in June
10 1995 Srebrenica was 230 metric tonnes which is about a third of the
11 target. Zepa was 50 metric tonnes, about roughly the same, about a third
12 of the intended target. Where you can also see -- and I have to go to a
13 different page for this. But before I do, firstly, were you aware that
14 these targets were so wilfully not met, the intended aid targets were so
15 reduced from what was expected?
16 A. Initially, when I started working I followed humanitarian aid. I
17 studied Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. I had similar information and
18 data; however, when I learned from the local authorities how many
19 inhabitants there were in really -- and how many was planned for
20 humanitarian aid, then my diagrams assumed a total different character.
21 If the ratio -- I am sorry that I have not seen this document
22 before. If I could study this, then I would look at the plan; I would
23 look at the starting parameters for planning; I would look at the true
24 planning parameters. And then I believe that the graph representation
25 would look entirely different. I am aware of the problem. I know that
1 this has to be studied, but I know that the whole thing represented in
2 this unilateral way can only lead to confusion and a false impression.
3 MR. VANDERPUYE: If we could go to page 7, please, of this same
4 document. It should be an ERN ending 3198. All right. If we could go
5 down. That's perfect.
6 Q. On the left-hand side it reads:
7 "Humanitarian situation in the eastern enclaves.
8 "The situation in the eastern enclaves where only 17 per cent of
9 the overall monthly aid delivery target was met in June is also very
11 It talks about:
12 "No convoy could reach Gorazde last month as a result of
13 obstructions by the Bosnian Serbs. The food situation became critical as
14 household reserves dwindled due to the long interruption in aid
15 distribution. The local authorities had to resort to collecting wheat
16 grain from surrounding villages for distribution to vulnerable cases in
17 the town."
18 Further down in this document it talks about Zepa, and it says:
19 "Zepa also faced serious humanitarian access problems. There
20 were no convoys for a four-week period until one was able to reach the
21 enclave on 21 June.
22 "There is a dramatic humanitarian situation developing in
23 Srebrenica at the time of writing this report. The BSA initiated an
24 attack on the pocket on 8/9 July and captured 30 Dutch peacekeepers
25 there. On 10 July the UN warned the BSA to halt their advance or face
1 NATO retaliation."
2 Now, in terms of the humanitarian situation as described
3 concerning Zepa, Gorazde, and Srebrenica, were you aware of those -- of
4 what the fact -- what the report indicates here, the information that the
5 report contains at the time of drafting your report or in preparing to
6 testify in this case?
7 A. Yes, I was aware of this information. I studied this
8 information. And I particularly studied what is mentioned here under the
9 titles "Obstruction." I am surprised that this report does not show any
10 self-criticism. I am astounded that this report doesn't say in any
11 place -- or maybe it does, but you have given me just excerpts, that
12 there was obstruction in the request for humanitarian aid, in the
13 planning of humanitarian aid, in the fact that in the request for
14 humanitarian aid, one thing is represented and the situation on the
15 ground is entirely different.
16 If we were to analyse all this, then we would probably
17 redistribute this problem of obstruction in a different way, and I'm
18 afraid that we could find consequences in a different place, which would
19 not suit us at all.
20 Q. All right.
21 MR. VANDERPUYE: If I could show you 65 ter 4146, please. This
22 is a similar document, it's actually the same author. And if we could go
23 to, I think it's going to be page 21 in this document. It's ERN ending
25 Q. This is a very similar chart to what I showed you before except
1 that it includes the figures for July 1995. In respect of Srebrenica and
2 Zepa respectively, we have 88 metric tonnes of aid going in and two
3 convoys in Zepa 56.
4 If we go down to the bottom of this page, all the way down, you
5 can see in the note what the targets are. And in this case it indicates
6 that the Srebrenica -- the target for Srebrenica was 720 metric tonnes,
7 of which 88 were met, and in Zepa 168 metric tonnes of which 56 were met.
8 I take it, sir, that you weren't aware of this information either
9 at the time of either drafting your report or preparing to testify in
10 this case?
11 A. I did not have these reports at my disposal, and now I wouldn't
12 be in a position to claim that I didn't have them on the CD either, but
13 if they were among the documents, they were not translated, and I don't
14 know in what context. You are now pointing me to July 1995, if I am not
15 mistaken, which those tables refer to because the month of July 1995 --
16 well, I don't know what was the basis for the plans and needs presented
17 here by this institution, what -- who the aid was supposed to reach.
18 So the whole purpose of this document that pertains to July 1995
19 and the situation on the field, apart from the oscillations that are
20 presented here, well, I can't see any essential purpose of this.
21 Q. Okay. Let me direct you to another document.
22 MR. VANDERPUYE: This is 65 ter 4161.
23 Q. What you should have in front of you is a Drina Corps document.
24 It's addressed to Colonel Popovic as it reads in the English translation.
25 And it is a request indicated, delivery of requirements for the Ukraine
1 units deployed in Zepa.
2 Have you seen this document before, first of all?
3 A. No.
4 Q. And do you know who Colonel Popovic is or who Lieutenant-Colonel
5 Popovic is within the Drina Corps command?
6 A. No, I don't know who this refers to because I am not that
7 familiar with the persons who were in the Drina Corps, and that is why I
8 find it strange the way this document is drafted. I can't see the date.
9 I don't know what organ this pertains to, and I can't see the whole of
10 the document.
11 Q. In your expertise, is there any particular reason why a document
12 listing items concerning the delivering of requirements for Ukraine unit
13 in Zepa would be addressed to a security officer in the Drina Corps
15 A. Well, I can't see -- well, I didn't study this document, and I
16 can't see any particular rational reason except if the military police
17 units provided security or were present in the field. And then, in that
18 manner, this document was the basis for allowing a convoy through. I
19 can't see any other reasonable reason for that.
20 Q. Okay. And finally in respect of your analysis of
21 General Miletic's signature in the context of standing in for the Chief
22 of Staff, were you aware that General Miletic, at that time
23 Colonel Miletic, signed in signature block for the Chief of Staff as
24 early as 1993, standing in for the Chief of Staff as early as 1993?
25 A. As far as I know, but I don't want to be speaking off the top of
1 high head here. The chief of the administration, General Miletic, may
2 have been there from August 1993, the chief of the Administration for
3 Operations and Training. And in line -- if we look at the dynamics of
4 the operations that ensued and the position that General Miletic held,
5 the fact that he was at the basic command post, the fact that the
6 greatest fluctuation in combat is the flow of information, reports, and
7 other documents, auxiliary documents that I was talking about, this
8 figure does not come as a surprise.
9 And I think that one could expect even a greater number of
10 document. The frequency of information -- informations report,
11 notifications is huge. It's a vast number of documents when you have a
12 combat situation, so I expected this kind of figure. I didn't have it,
13 but I expected the figure to be something like this.
14 Q. All right. I have just one document I would like show you.
15 MR. VANDERPUYE: I am going to need the ELMO for this,
16 Mr. President. We will put this into e-court under 65 ter 4219.
17 If we could just go to the top of the page so we can see what we
18 are looking at here. All right.
19 Q. This is a Main Staff document. It has the date. It's above --
20 if we can move up to we can see it. It's dated 8th October, 1993. And
21 the number of the document is 17/231-517. And it's directed to the Drina
22 Corps command; that's right, isn't it, General?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Okay. And if we could just go to the next page. Okay. And we
25 can see from the signature here that this is standing in for the Chief of
1 Staff is, type-signed, Radivoje Miletic; right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. All right. That's all I wanted to establish. And you are aware,
4 of course, that these documents existed, these type-signed documents of
5 Colonel Miletic, General Miletic, right up through 1995 as standing in
6 for the Chief of Staff; right?
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could my colleague clarify his
9 position? Is he saying that General Miletic, who at the time was
10 Colonel Miletic, was the representative of the staff during this entire
11 period -- representative of the Chief of Staff, rather?
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
13 Thank you, Madam.
14 MR. VANDERPUYE: No, I am not saying that at all. I think my
15 question is very clear, that there are documents like that that exist
16 that go right from 1993 right up to 1995.
17 Q. You are aware of that, sir.
18 A. Looking at the document that you've now put in front of me, first
19 of all we can see clearly the context, and I will share it with you.
20 First of all you said "stand in for," and I say he never stood in for;
21 whereas, the fact that it's written here on this document, it's a
22 different matter.
23 Had he been standing in for all -- throughout this time it would
24 is been a world record in standing in for. And since you said that he
25 did not stand in for, and since you made documents in various ways, then
1 out of the ten orders to stand in for, there would be at least one valid
2 order to that effect, and we would be able to see it here.
3 The Chief of Staff himself stated that he had never been
4 prevented from performing his duties, so nobody could have stood in for
5 him. This document probably indicates the following: That at the point
6 in time when this information, this notice had to be sent out - because
7 this is the kind of document that we are talking about - that at the
8 basic command post General Miletic was the senior officer, at the time he
9 was a colonel, and as the most senior officer he signed this notice so
10 that it could be sent out lest they should wait for the Chief of Staff to
11 return from wherever he was.
12 So it is one of the consistent documents regulating the
13 replacement in an appropriate manner. The fact that the Chief of Staff,
14 General Manojlo, in May 1995 in his official personnel assessment clearly
15 indicated that he never did anything outside of what you are saying.
16 Q. All right. And in your estimation there is nothing unusual about
17 that document, and it does in fact say on it, that Colonel Miletic is
18 standing in for the Chief of Staff; right?
19 A. I've said this again, but since I have been cautioned I have to
20 explain it in a different may. In my opinion I am quite precise. When I
21 say in this case Colonel Miletic, later General Miletic, carried out the
22 standing in for, or, rather, replacing, carried out the replacing in line
23 with all the rules, in line with the position taken by his superior, in
24 line with the usual practice, and what I said in my report, I believe
25 that this signature block was a clumsy solution. That's the least I can
2 And who was responsible for this clumsy solution? It was as much
3 General Manojlo Milovanovic and Colonel Miletic who actually came up with
4 it. They shared the responsibility for that. But standing in for was
5 done exclusively in line with the regulations. The two orders that you
6 produced had to do with humanitarian aid and some emergency situations,
7 and it is strange that you're now showing them as something that is not
8 quite in line with the real situation of standing in for.
9 Q. General, my question is limited to the document, just the
10 document that is sitting right there next to you in your right hand. It
11 says "Standing in for the Chief of Staff." That's what it says; right?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And it's --
14 A. It is my --
15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... dated 1993, right?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. And it doesn't look strange to you or unusual to you in any
18 respect, does it?
19 A. When I look at the contents that you are skipping here, no, it
20 doesn't look strange at all. It looks to be extremely in line with the
21 rules, that he's acting in accordance with the rules.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you very much, General.
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President, I have no further
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Josse.
1 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, perhaps the witness should take off his
3 JUDGE AGIUS: General, once more you have to be patient with us.
4 MR. JOSSE: I rise now because we have an application to further
5 cross-examine the witness. Let me make it clear it will be Mr. Krgovic
6 who will carry that cross-examine out consistent with how we proceeded
8 There are two issues that we wish to address in that
9 cross-examination. The first is the New York Times article that was put
10 to the witness, P4201; and the second issue, relates to the ICRC
11 documents that were put to the witness, basically P4156 and P157.
12 Mr. Krgovic estimates that his further cross-examination would take 15 to
13 20 minutes. There are, I think, three or four documents on a list that
14 we have available for distribution.
15 We thought it fair to do this now before Madam Fauveau carries
16 out her re-examination of the witness. And it's our submission that
17 these are areas that we really could not have anticipated the Prosecution
18 asking the witness about, and we should be allowed to ask the witness
19 further questions in relation to those matters.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Do you wish to comment, Ms. Fauveau,
21 and Mr. Vanderpuye? Ms. Fauveau first. Do you object to further
22 cross-examination? No. Thank you.
23 Mr. Vanderpuye.
24 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, we take no position on
25 Mr. Josse's application --
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay --
2 MR. VANDERPUYE: Your Honour, however, I want to hear what he
3 cross-examines on, because if he opens a new door, I anticipate we will
4 make an application to address that.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
6 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Ms. Fauveau, I think can start with her
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Let's do it this way.
11 Mr. Krgovic, usually we ask for the questions beforehand, before
12 we decide, but having discussed very briefly I think we can trust in your
13 discretion and allow you to go ahead. Try to be as brief as possible,
15 And Madam Fauveau, how much your redirect -- depending, of
16 course, what is going to happen now. But how much do you anticipate.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if my colleague
18 requires 15 to 20 minutes, I will do my utmost to finish today.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Yes, Mr. Krgovic.
20 Thank you, Madam.
21 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon again, Mr. Kosovac.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon to you, Your
25 Q. Mr. Kosovac, the Prosecutor -- well, General, I'm sorry.
1 A. No problem.
2 Q. General, the Prosecutor showed you an article from the New York
3 Times written by a John Burns a journalist, dated the spring of 1993
4 which you characterized as a propaganda pamphlet. And in my opinion he
5 speaks bad words about Serbs and about General Gvero. Do you know that
6 this journalist John Burns is quite well known for having used the New
7 York Times in the spring of 1993 to launch a story about how two Serb
8 soldiers killed two Muslim twins and how these men were then sentenced to
9 death by the Muslim authorities, it was Hara [phoen] case. And then it
10 turned out that the twins were found to be alive at a later date. And
11 the New York Times, several years later, had to publish a denial of this
13 A. Yes, I am aware of this case. I wasn't aware of the fact that
14 this is the same journalist. And I know why in May 1995 this story was
15 published because it was there to cover up the responsibility of those
16 who were really responsible for what happened in Zepa when it was turned
17 into an enclave to cover up the false reporting and many other things and
18 to draw the attention of the world public to something that didn't really
19 exist. I did not do any research into the facts, but I know very well
20 what the key problem was in Eastern Bosnia in May 1995. And any other
21 attempt to derail, to destroy, to turn it into something else, is an
22 effort to coverup.
23 Q. You are referring to 1993?
24 A. Yes, 1993, I'm sorry. This is when this story was published, the
25 one that we see here.
1 Q. General, the Prosecutor asked you a series of questions about the
2 meetings between the Serb side and UNPROFOR representatives and the ICRC
3 representatives showing you, among other documents, a report from a
4 meeting where mention is made about General Gvero being in attendance.
5 Do you personally know that General Gvero did, in fact, attend this
6 meeting on the 16th of June? I am not talking about what you saw in the
7 document but what you know, yourself.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
9 MR. VANDERPUYE: First of all -- and this is completely outside
10 the scope of the cross-examination, and it doesn't call for an expert
12 JUDGE AGIUS: What's your comment to that?
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: How does this fit in with what Mr. Josse described
15 to us as going to be your further cross-examination?
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there is another
17 document of the ICRC which I would like to show to this witness which
18 indicates that up until --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Show the document and ask him the question, the
20 pertinent question. Let's --
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
22 6D320. Could we see the bottom half of this document, please.
23 Q. Mr. Kosovac, you see here, it's a request from the ICRC to the
24 state committee for cooperation with international organisations, the
25 coordination body.
1 A. Yes, I can see that.
2 Q. It's for the evacuation of the wounded. The date is the 16th of
3 July, 1995. It is precisely what the document was about, the document
4 that the Prosecutor asked you about. Is this the way in which the ICRC
5 is supposed to address the state committee? Is this the usual way to do
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, go finish your question, please.
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. In obtaining the approval for the evacuation of the wounded?
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Before you answer the question, please,
11 General, let's hear what -- it's all right. Okay. Thank you,
12 Mr. Vanderpuye.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer now?
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 A. Well, this document dove-tails with paragraphs 188 and 189 in my
17 expert report regarding humanitarian aid where I explain how the
18 humanitarian aid was set up and how those roots were set up and how all
19 this functioned. At the state level there was the committee, and it was
20 stipulated how it should go through the Main Staff, through the VRS, and
21 all the way down to the actual implementation. And this indicates that
22 it was addressed to the right body which was the state committee for the
23 cooperation with international organisations, the coordination body.
24 Q. General, sir, in your proofing session for this testimony, did
25 you have an opportunity to see what General Nicolai said in his evidence
1 on the 29th of November, 2008, at transcript page 18497 when he spoke
2 about this evacuation and all the people who were involved in this
3 evacuation? Because General Nicolai said here that it is not likely that
4 General Gvero was actually at the meeting that this document is talking
6 A. I did have an opportunity to look at the transcripts of
7 General Nicolai's evidence. It was [indiscernible] translated to me. I
8 had an opportunity to look at his interviews, his reports, and they
9 formed a very good basis for the conclusions that I reached about all --
10 this issue, and I don't have anything to add to this statement made by
11 General Nicolai.
12 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Kosovac. I don't have any further
13 questions for you.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Krgovic.
15 Madam Fauveau, if you prefer to have the break now -- we should
16 have a break in 17 minutes' time. But in other words you can start, and
17 then we can have the break. Or else, if you prefer, we can have the
18 break now and then you start and continue and finish. Whichever you
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think I might as
21 well start now and then have the break a bit later.
22 Re-examination by Ms. Fauveau:
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to submit to the
24 witness Exhibit 5D7723. It is the note of General Milovanovic to
25 General Miletic during the period of 31 December 1994.
1 Could we please see page 2 in B/C/S. And if we could see the
2 last paragraph please.
3 Q. In this last paragraph, we see that it addresses the fact that
4 General Miletic performed his duties and tasks in the framework of his
5 functional position. If General Miletic during that period, namely in
6 1993, was at a given point in time the representative of the Chief of the
7 Main Staff, should that fact have been written in this note, have
8 appeared in this note?
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, before you answer the question, please,
11 Mr. Vanderpuye.
12 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, that's a question that my
13 colleague had actually put to the witness on direct examination, and I
14 don't see any need to readdress it on redirect examination.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Fauveau.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] But it did he derives from the last
17 document that the Prosecutor submitted to the witness. I did not use
18 this document, nor did I use the last document used by the Prosecutor.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, thank you.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, we think the question is perfectly legitimate
22 based on the use of these documents.
23 So let's proceed with your answer, General, please.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could I please be shown
25 the previous page of this document? Very well.
1 Your Honours, the part that I am now going to comment can also be
2 seen in English. This is the lower part of the English text. It says
3 here "the duties and situation in the service in the relevant period."
4 This implies that whoever assesses an officer has to provide all the
5 situations in the service that were observed during the relevant assessed
7 It is well known, and I've said it already several times, that
8 standing in for somebody is a situation in service. If at any -- if in
9 any way General Miletic between 1990 and 1994, on the 31st of December,
10 1994, had stood in for the Chief of Staff in the staff of the Main Staff
11 of the Army of Republika Srpska, this should have been stated here. The
12 period would have to be stated and the fact that he was standing in for
14 In accordance with that, in the description on the next page, it
15 has to be stated how the duty was performed. The assessment of an
16 officer is precisely regulated by the rules of assessment. And skipping
17 any of the things is checked by the personnel organs, and the assessment
18 may be returned for review if they are not in compliance with this. My
19 final answer would be this: This assessment on its first page and on the
20 second page should show whether the -- the officer in question stood in
21 for anybody during any period of time and whether that person was a Chief
22 of Staff.
23 Q. I would now like to show you Exhibit P4133. And this is an
24 UNPROFOR report dated the 29th of May until the 4th of June, 1995. I
25 would need paragraph 14, page 5, please.
1 I shall read out to you the sentence I am interested in which is
2 in paragraph 14 which reads as follows:
3 "[In English] However, with the current security situation and
4 the lack of UNPROFOR escorts for convoys, UNHCR decided to suspend its
6 [Interpretation] Does this sentence suggest in any way that the
7 Republika Srpska authorities had refused the convoys to go through?
8 A. No. This sentence does not suggest any such thing in any of its
9 parts. In a somewhat milder way, it represents the factual situation.
10 Objectively, UNPROFOR had enough strength to accompany humanitarian aid,
11 and this was never a problem. And also UNPROFOR was often late with
12 notifying on the passage of humanitarian aid. And this is what you've
13 asked me.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
15 Exhibit P4136. This is an UNPROFOR document. Could I have paragraph 2,
16 please. This document is dated the 14th of June, 1995.
17 Q. In paragraph 2, right at the beginning of the paragraph, we read
18 that: "None of the UNHCR convoys to the enclaves have received
19 clearances." These are the convoys that were going towards the enclaves.
20 And we can see that the Srebrenica enclave convoy has been cancelled.
21 As far as this document is concerned, I would like now to show
22 you document 5D1429. This is a document that stems from the Main Staff.
23 The document is dated the 12th of June, 1995.
24 Since this document has not been translated, could you read out
25 the first paragraph to us, i.e., the first three sentences.
1 A. "We hereby inform you that we are in agreement with the approval
2 issued by the coordination body for humanitarian aid of Republika Srpska,
3 number 1351-HCR
4 weekly plan of the UNHC Belgrade according to the following, and then
5 Kotroman-Gorazde, Karakaj, Srebrenica," and thereafter it goes on.
6 Q. The first date we can see was the 31st of June, but I think
7 everybody will agree that this is not the 31st but the 13th of June. And
8 then after that we can read the names of the enclaves. Without any
9 translation, one can understand that on the 13th of June, in Gorazde,
10 Karakaj, and Srebrenica, Sremska Raca, Bijeljina, Srebrenica. 14th of
11 June, Karakaj, Srebrenica. 15th of June, Kotroman, Gorazde.
12 Having seen this document, what can you say about the accuracy of
13 this UN document; in other words, that not a single convoy was authorised
14 to get through to the enclaves?
15 A. Bearing in mind that the document indicates that no convoy was
16 approved or were late postponed, and this states the number of convoys
17 and the quantity, this document excludes the accuracy of the previous
18 document, i.e., the previous document is incorrect.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE: I would just ask if my colleague could show the
21 witness the communication from the Main Staff to the UNPROFOR
22 headquarters in Sarajevo with respect to the convoy, if she has it.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau.
24 MR. VANDERPUYE: The document is addressed to the Drina Corps and
25 not to UNPROFOR.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I don't have that document. If the
2 Prosecutor has this document, maybe he would like to give it to me during
3 the break.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: I don't have it, I didn't pose the question,
5 so ...
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Anyway, let's proceed, and then if we find it you
7 can make good.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now show the witness
9 document P4145. This is a press release on the UNHCR. I would like to
10 see page 21, please. The bottom of the page, the chart we can see at the
11 bottom of the page.
12 Q. This table shows the humanitarian aid that reads Srebrenica in
13 1995. The shaded colour from -- well, July and -- June and July 1995.
14 Save from the month of June, according to this diagram, what was the
15 situation like in March, April, and May in 1995? Was there a drop in the
16 humanitarian aid that reached the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia in 1994?
17 A. Looking at this diagram, one can conclude that the humanitarian
18 aid in eastern enclaves in May, April, May-February, and February are
19 above the average of the quantities of humanitarian aid which were
20 delivered, i.e., are very close to the peaks in the quantities of the
21 humanitarian aid ever delivered.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we possibly have our break
23 now, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, Madam. 25 minutes, thank you.
25 Do you think you will finish -- or if you need us to have a
1 shorter break, we will have a shorter break.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] That would be more prudent, but I
3 will do my best and make sure that we can finish today.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Do I hear objections if we have
5 20 minutes instead of 25? No. Okay. Thank you. So break of 20
6 minutes, please. Thank you.
7 --- Recess taken at 5.42 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 6.05 p.m.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
11 I would like to show Exhibit P4203 to the witness now, please.
12 This is a map which shows Sadjestvo operation, Exhibit 4203. Could we
13 show the bottom right-hand corner of this map, please. Can we see the
14 name of the person and the signature, which is not very legible.
15 Q. We all know that Operation Sadjestvo was mentioned in Directive 7
16 and 7/1. Here we see the name of Manojlo Milovanovic and his signature
17 below that. According to what you know about military matters, do you
18 think Mr. Milovanovic could have drafted this map -- this map without any
19 knowledge whatsoever of Directive 7 and 7/1?
20 A. Could I please be shown the top of the map, its title? Yes.
21 In practical terms, this map is the nucleolus of Directive 7/1.
22 It arises from Directive 7, and this map could not be drafted by anybody
23 who was not involved in the process from the beginning to end. Nobody
24 could propose it for approval, because whoever signed it in the lower
25 right-hand bottom had to explain to the commander the plan to the very
1 last detail. It could be done by nobody else but that very person.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
3 document P45, which is an order stemming from the Main Staff dated 13th
4 of July, 1995.
5 Q. My colleague suggested to you that it was on the 19th of January
6 on page 3304. The document 03 was a document that was a document
7 belonging to the Administration for Operations and Training. This
8 document bears number 03, and I would like to show you the second page of
9 this document now.
10 On this document we see the name of General Milan Gvero. Why
11 this -- why does this document not bear the name of General Miletic,
12 General Mladic? It bears the number 03.
13 A. The main and crucial thing about the -- where the document
14 belongs is not where the document is filed. Where the document is filed
15 means that it was entered in a protocol somewhere, and based on that,
16 this is where the original copy will be kept, and from there it will be
17 distributed. The belonging of a document can be seen from another number
18 and the signatory who signed it. And these are the two elements that
19 define a document.
20 This document is not a document that originated from the
21 Administration for Operations and Training. None of its elements point
22 that it might be.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we go back to page 1 of this
24 document, please. Could the witness be shown item 1 and 2.
25 Q. I would like you to look at items 1 and 2. Item 2 discusses a
1 population and equipment, and item 3 discusses the prisoners.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
3 document P4209. I'm sorry, it's P4208. I apologise.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Josse.
5 MR. JOSSE: For the avoidance of any doubt, we maintain our
6 position so far as providence of the document is concerned --
7 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
8 MR. JOSSE: The position we took yesterday when it was put by
9 Mr. Vanderpuye.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I shall respond to that. This
13 document was seised by the OTP on the premises of the Krajina 1st corps.
14 MR. JOSSE: My learned friend will not respond like that. She
15 will call evidence to that effect. She is not here to make statements
16 and give evidence. She is here to ask questions.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed. Let's proceed. He has just made
18 his position clear, you can make yours as well, and then we will proceed.
19 And then it's a question at the end of the day on what evidence we have.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I shall deal with this now. Could
21 you look at item 2, please. In English this will be on page 2.
22 Q. The last two lines speak about the treatment of prisoners and the
23 civilian population, the handling of prisoners and the handling of the
24 civilian population.
25 I understand that you are not an expert in terms of psychological
1 and moral support, but which body is in charge of the moral and
2 psychological support?
3 A. This document was shown to me yesterday, and yesterday we had a
4 lot of problems with it. By accident, the material stayed with me. I
5 looked at the document yesterday evening. I offered the Prosecutor to
6 return the document to them, and I made some very important notes about
7 the document which is very important.
8 The plan as such is an integral part and it has to exist, and
9 every officer has to know that. The plan was signed, it seems, by the
10 officers in charge of the sectors. As far as I can tell, this is
11 Colonel Sokanovic, but I am not sure. The plan was approved by the
12 commander, that's correct. I analysed that plan in detail, and I was
13 able to see that no single element in the document can provide a
14 guarantee that it belonged or was part of Sadjestvo 95.
15 Q. Sir, that was not my question. I would really like to be able to
16 finish. I would like you to answer my question: Which body is in charge
17 of moral and psychological support?
18 A. The sector for moral --
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you the
20 penultimate page of this document.
21 MR. JOSSE: Unsurprisingly, we would like the witness to finish
22 when he was saying when he was interrupted by my learned friend.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed, Mr. Josse.
24 Let's proceed, Madam Fauveau.
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown the
1 penultimate page of this document where we can see the signature.
2 Q. It seems that my colleague has a few issues about the provenance
3 and origin of this document. I would like to read out what Mr. Sokanovic
4 said during his interview which took place on the 21st of October, 2004,
5 regarding this particular document.
6 On page 76 of this interview --
7 MR. JOSSE: How is this admissible, Your Honour? How can the
8 witness deal with this? Both points, as I've said, if my learned friend
9 wants to try and get this through -- deal with the provenance, she needs
10 to deal with it properly, not through the back door with this witness.
11 The Court has already said that a statement made by a witness is not
12 evidence. Put in this manner, I am not being very --
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Leave it. We don't want any lessons on how we
14 should look at documents and their use during trial. I mean, we are
15 perfectly capable about deciding later on about weight that we should
16 give to each and every document that has been made use of.
17 MR. JOSSE: I understand. I object to the question.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.
19 Let's proceed.
20 Your question, have you finished it? Because I don't think you
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Not yet.
23 5D1428 on page 76. 76.
24 Q. You can see in the middle of the page, this is in English, but
25 the thing I am interested in is that the witness was -- or rather the
1 representative of the OTP showed the witness 0886-8764, which is the ERN
2 number of the document we seen a while ago.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we look at the bottom of the
4 document, please.
5 Q. Mr. Sokanovic what he said, the question was put too him:
6 "Do you recognise who signed on behalf of General Gvero at the
8 [In English] "And Mr. Sokanovic responded by: "I can by chance.
9 It's myself."
10 [Interpretation] I believe you have already said this, but I am
11 not quite sure. Does this make sense to you that Mr. Sokanovic actually
12 signed the document?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I would now like to show you document 5D1417. Before this
15 document is displayed, I would like to tell you that General Miletic was
16 purportedly the third man of the Republika Srpska Army. This is a
17 document dated the 19th of January, 30304. Since this document is not
18 translated, could you read out the first paragraph which starts with the
19 5th of February, 1995.
20 A. This is a document. The date is 5th February.
21 Q. That is quite right. Could you please read out the first
23 A. "On the 5th of February, 1995, at Sarajevo airport a meeting was
24 held of the joint central commission. The chair was the Chief of Staff
25 of the UNPROFOR command, General Brickman. The delegation of RS was
1 headed by Lieutenant-General Milan Gvero. The HVO delegation was headed
2 by Major General Budimir, and the Muslim delegation by the brigade
3 General Hadzihasanovic. The following decisions of the central joint
4 commission were passed, adopted, and signed. The following decisions
5 were passed, adopted, and signed.
6 Q. Before putting the question to you, I would like to show you
7 5D1418 which are those decisions taken by the central commission. Here
8 we can see in the title that this is a meeting which was held on the 5th
9 of February, 1995.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown the
11 second page, please, the bottom of the second page. Here we can see the
12 name "Gvero" right at the bottom.
13 Q. Since this was chaired by the chief of the UNPROFOR, he was not a
14 colonel. Why was it General Miletic? Do you have an explanation for
15 this? Do you have an explanation for us why General Miletic at the time
16 was a colonel. He was the third man in the Army of the Republika Srpska.
17 Why did he not attend this meeting which was chaired by the Chief of
18 Staff of the UNPROFOR?
19 A. I provided my explanation very precisely. General Miletic could
20 not be the third man in the Army Republika Srpska. If he had been, he
21 would have certainly been there, but there is no option that would allow
22 him to be there.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
24 Exhibit 5D1419. This is a document which stems from the Army of Bosnia
25 and Herzegovina, which is a report regarding the implementation of the
1 cessation of hostilities on the 1st of January 1995. In this document,
2 we see who attended this meeting, General Rose, who at the time was
3 commanding UNPROFOR. The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was represented
4 here by General Alihahovic [phoen], and we had General Smith tell us that
5 he was the second man in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was on
6 the 7th of November, 2007, on transcript page number 1763. The Army of
7 Republika Srpska was represented by General Tolimir and General Gvero.
8 Q. Why, at the time General Miletic as a colonel did not attend this
9 meeting? Do you have an explanation to give us?
10 A. I have an explanation. My explanation was provided very
11 precisely in the scheme entitled "Rank and Order." Neither by rank nor
12 by order could General Miletic attend this meeting. Because before him
13 by rank and by order, there was a huge number of generals and officers,
14 and one can see that only assistant commanders were present at this
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
17 Exhibit 5D1322. This is the agenda of Karadzic's secretary [as
18 interpreted] --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Diary, interpreter's note.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to have page 70 on the
21 screen in B/C/S and page 59 in English. The 1st of June, 1995, entry
22 which is precisely the period covered by the indictment. We can see here
23 that a meeting was convened, attended by Mr. Krajisnik,
24 Professor Koljevic, Prime Minister Kozic, Minister Buha Kalenic [phoen],
25 the Minister Ninkovic, General Mladic, General Tolimir, and General Gvero
1 were present.
2 Q. Can you tell us why General Miletic did not attend this kind of
4 A. This type of meeting held at the highest level, when the
5 president of state requires the presence of the highest state officials
6 and the highest military officers, there is no place for General Miletic.
7 He would not have any powers to act on anybody's behalf if he had been
8 present at such a meeting. You can see that only the top echelons of the
9 military were present at this meeting.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to show you 5D1514.
11 This is information stemming from the Main Staff dated the 31st of July,
12 1995. 5D1415.
13 Q. What I am interested in is this: Could we show the bottom of the
14 document before turning to page 2. Page 2, could we show the bottom of
15 page 2. This information has been put down on paper here by
16 General Gvero. I would like to return now to page 1 of this document.
17 At the end of the first paragraph, we can read as follows. I
18 shall read it out to you in English:
19 "[In English] The VRS Main Staff profoundly aware of the gravity
20 and complexity of the situation has adopted the decision to undertake all
21 measures by engaging the most senior officers of the Main Staff headed by
22 the commander, General Mladic, and his assistant and transferring units
23 from other sectors of the theater and in cooperation with the authorities
24 to halt and smash the Ustasha aggression, liberate the temporarily
25 occupied territory, and punish the aggressor."
1 [Interpretation] Do you agree with -- do you agree with what
2 General Gvero has written here; namely, that the commander and his
3 assistants are the highest ranking officers in the Main Staff?
4 A. Yes, I agree. The sentence confirms the scheme that I drafted,
5 the one about the rank and order.
6 Q. I would like to get back to this. You have seen two orders today
7 signed by General Miletic. One was dated August, and the other one was
8 dated October. In light of this information whereby we see that the
9 commander and his assistants left at the end of July, beginning of August
10 to -- left for Eastern Bosnia. The fact that they signed the orders, do
11 you think that this is quite normal? Western Bosnia.
12 A. I have already stated this, and let me repeat, based on the fact
13 that both orders required urgent response and that both orders relate to
14 humanitarian aid, and humanitarian aid and assistance to the population,
15 prove that General Miletic acted in accordance with the rules regarding
16 the signing of those two documents.
17 [Accused Milan Gvero withdrew]
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse.
19 MR. JOSSE: Well, our client needed to be skewed excused, Your
20 Honours. And he's specifically asked if the proceedings can stop.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: We can --
22 MR. JOSSE: I think he will only be a minute, actually.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, I know, I know. I think we can wait.
24 Madam Fauveau?
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, of course, Your Honour.
1 [Accused Milan Gvero entered the courtroom]
2 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Could you tell us, does the fact that the commander and
6 assistants of the commander were not present at the Main Staff, did that
7 have any impact on the fact in a General Miletic signed certain
9 A. Absolutely. This fact produces the obligation to sign documents
10 that the most senior officer present has the right to sign, but it is
11 very clearly specified what kind of documents we are talking about.
12 Q. My colleague read to you part of the statement of the witness
13 Kesorovic in the Blagojevic case, and to be fair, vis-a-vis
14 Mr. Kesorovic, I would like to correct some information that was
15 submitted to you by my colleague.
16 First of all, Mr. Kesorovic was in June 1995 a
17 lieutenant-colonel, as declared on the 9th of June, 2004, page 10623 of
18 the Blagojevic case. Then, he declared on page 10624:
19 "[In English] I was in the military police department of the
20 security administration of the sector for security and intelligence
21 affairs of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. The
22 headquarters of my department was in Banja Luka in the building of the
23 headquarters of the 1st Krajina Corps."
24 [Interpretation] Does the fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Kesorovic
25 was based in Banja Luka, could that have any impact on the way in which
1 he perceived various members of the Main Staff in Crna Rijeka -- Rijeka?
2 A. This fact in relation to the previous time casts a different
3 light. The first was based on the brief report, that was my view, that
4 the fact that he didn't know meant that he didn't have to explain. But
5 now, this fact may create an illusion on his part, because probably in
6 communication with the basic command post, it was well known that
7 General Miletic was there at most times and that created an illusion on
8 his part that this was a man around whom everything revolved.
9 And this assessment from Banja Luka, looking at the basic command
10 post, may be very apparently a delusion.
11 Q. I would like to read out to you what General Skrbic, the
12 assistant of the commander of the Main Staff for personnel administration
13 stated before this Trial Chamber in this case on the 18th of September,
14 2007, on page 15596 in French.
15 The Prosecutor asked the following question:
16 "Were you at the same level of command as Miletic, or did you
17 have the feeling, the impression that he was slightly above you or
18 beneath you within the ministry?"
19 I suppose he was referring to the Main Staff.
20 And his answer, the answer of General Skrbic was the following:
21 "He was beneath me in the hierarchy."
22 Do you agree with this statement made by General Skrbic?
23 A. I agree, and figure 14 proves this. This shows clearly where he
25 Q. Did General Skrbic who was the assistant of the commander of the
1 Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army, would he have known the various
2 levels of hierarchy within the army?
3 A. I had a similar post in the Army of Yugoslavia, and
4 General Krstic ex officio was responsible, and he knew that. And I know,
5 based on my personal knowledge, that he was very familiar with the chain
6 of command and hierarchy.
7 Q. Did you say General Krstic, I'm sorry.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: You have to repeat, General, because the
9 interpreters didn't hear you.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I held a similar post
11 in the Army of Yugoslavia, and the post that General Skrbic had in the
12 Army of Republika Srpska, he was very much familiar with all that, and he
13 was an expert in organisation.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Perchance, the name of General Krstic was mentioned. We know
16 that in July 1995 General Krstic was at the command -- forward command
17 post in Zepa. When he was at that forward command post in Zepa, was he
18 still the commander of the Drina Corps?
19 A. That was the forward command post of the Drina Corps. I think
20 that the first time when he went to the forward command post that he was
21 not the corps commander. I didn't write down the date.
22 Q. When he became commander of the corps, did the fact that he was
23 at the forward command post, did that mean that he could no longer
24 exercise the commander's duties?
25 A. The commander of any unit performs his duties from any location
1 within its area, which means that he performed the duty when he was at
2 the logistic forward -- logistic command post, when the unit was on the
3 move, when he was at the forward command post, he was the commander. He
4 performed the duties of a commander at all times.
5 Q. And did the situation of General Milovanovic who was at the
6 forward command post in Western Bosnia any different from that of General
8 A. It was not different in any aspect, and we can see that he
9 performed the duty of the Chief of Staff successfully. He was the Chief
10 of Staff at the forward command post, at the rear command post, while the
11 unit -- units were on the move. Anywhere within the territory of
12 Republika Srpska, he was the chief of the staff.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
14 Exhibit P3312.
15 Q. The report you already saw yesterday under P486, except for the
16 fact that this version has been translated into B/C/S.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And could we call up page 18 in
18 English and 19 in B/C/S, please. In B/C/S it's at the very bottom of the
19 page. I would like to see paragraphs 88 and 89, please.
20 Q. And I will read them out to you:
21 "[In English] Violations of the Geneva Conventions were
22 perpetrated by government sources when they refuse to allow the
23 evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica, thus attempting to
24 use them as a human shield. Civilians must be protected from what their
25 own, as well as enemy forces regard as military expedient.
1 "Serious allegations have been made against government forces
2 regarding their offensive of December to January 1993. The facts can
3 only be verified to an impartial investigation with the presence of
4 international observers."
5 [Interpretation] Do the events that are described in these two
6 paragraphs have any relation with the number of people who were in
7 Srebrenica during the spring of 1993, since we are dealing here with the
8 year 1993?
9 A. Yes. It is linked with the number and with the actions at the
10 time and actions taken after that time, and this is what I indicated at
11 several places in my expert report and repeated here. This is something
12 that I repeated once again when I indicated how causal relationships are
13 to be studied and established.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
15 Exhibit 5D1427. It is a directive of the president of the republic dated
16 the 6th of August, 1994.
17 Q. First of all, did you know that the president of the republic
18 issued other directives, directives that were not only military
20 A. I didn't know that. I didn't read them, but he did have a basis
21 to issue other directives.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we show page 2 of this
23 document to the witness, please.
24 Q. Since this document is not translated, would you please read out
25 item 4 of this document to us?
1 A. "The presidents of the municipal assemblies and of the executive
2 boards are obliged to comply with this directive immediately, and the
3 governments of the republic is obliged to directly follow, direct,
4 regularly inform about the implementation of the orders contained in this
6 Q. In light of this paragraph, did the president of the republic,
7 his ministers and advisors, have the authority to consult the presidents
8 of municipalities regarding the implementation of this directive?
9 A. The whole chain of information was set up in a special decree,
10 and it was set up how information was to flow to and from the presidents
11 of the municipal assemblies and the executive boards.
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
13 Document 6D324. I apologise, I am looking for the correct number.
14 Perhaps 6D324. Is it 6D324?
15 Q. We see here the directive of the president. Can you conclude on
16 the basis of this document whether they were directives that were already
17 adopted or were yet to be adopted?
18 A. The directive was dated the 6th of August, 1994, and this is
19 the -- 20-something August 1994, which means that this official note was
20 based on the actions taking in accordance with the directive -- or,
21 rather, the action was implementing the directive. And we can see that
22 the contents here went a little bit beyond their competence.
23 Q. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
25 General, we've made it, at least. On behalf of my colleagues, I
1 wish to thank you for having been patient with us, for having come over
2 and stayed for such a long time to give and finish your testimony. And
3 on behalf of everyone present here, I wish you a safe journey back home.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I wish you all success
5 in your work.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
7 Mr. Josse, now is your hour of the truth. What's the position?
8 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, the position is as follows. That we do
9 not propose to call General Kovacevic, that I can confirm. I think it
10 remains unlikely that we will wish to call any evidence. As a result of
11 the re-examination that we have just heard from -- of this witness, we
12 would like to contemplate whether we wish to add a witness to our list,
13 but clearly that's not going to happen in the near future.
14 And so I don't want to be in the least bit obstructive, but
15 realistically, General Pandurevic's case is going to be able to start on
16 Monday. There might be one thing we could do in the next six minutes,
17 and that is hear the argument as to whether we are entitled to make an
18 opening statement.
19 And if we could have -- if it was possible to have a ruling on
20 that in the next six minutes, then obviously that would -- well, that
21 would help me personally. And I am happy to go first on this, and if I
22 could just be given a moment, please.
23 The Chamber will clearly need to look at Rule 84 which governs
24 the making of opening statements. We have a number of arguments in the
25 alternative. The first is that the rule envisages the possibility of the
1 making of such a statement at the start of the case immediately after the
2 Prosecution opening. At that juncture, whether the Defence will call any
3 evidence is unknown, and it is of course possible that no evidence will
4 be called; yet in those circumstances the accused through his Counsel
5 will be entitled to an opening statement. And we ask why it is that an
6 accused who chooses to postpone his right to an opening statement to the
7 Defence stage of a case should be deprived of such a statement in those
9 Our second argument, perhaps more importantly, is as follows: We
10 contend -- we have actually presented evidence. Firstly, we have
11 presented a variety of exhibits through a large number of witnesses that
12 the Chamber has heard over the last two-and-a-half years, and above all
13 else we contend that we have presented a witness in the case of Djuro
14 Djukic [phoen], through his 92 quater statement. We of course recognise
15 that no decision has yet been made as to the admissibility of those
16 statements, but nonetheless that is undoubtedly the presentation of
18 Thirdly, my third alternative submission is really as follows:
19 To stop us making an opening statement would not just be unfair, but
20 particularly unfair bearing in mind we could have circumvented the
21 problem by, for example, calling a character witness. That witness would
22 have fulfilled any requirements that the rule might have. We've chosen
23 not to do that because we take the view that would simply be wasting
24 everyone's time, and we submit we shouldn't be deprived of making a
25 statement because of that.
1 And finally, and perhaps above all else, we really say that the
2 Prosecution objection is rather petty. The Gvero Defence have, save the
3 matters I've already alluded to, chosen to call little or no evidence.
4 We are not going to trouble the Court in terms of much time. We are
5 asking for no more than an hour, and I suspect it will take nearly three
6 quarters of an hour to present some arguments at this stage in relation
7 to our case. It isn't instead of a closing argument, it isn't instead of
8 a final brief, but it's primarily to address why we've chosen to call no
9 evidence. And in our submission, to deprive us of that opportunity at
10 this particular juncture would be unfair, and as I've already said,
11 rather petty, bearing in mind how little of the Court time we have
12 actually consumed.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Mr. McCloskey, very briefly, because
14 Mr. Josse took almost five minutes of the six that we had.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Well, I think he knows the reason you can start
16 off with an opening statement is that you can change your mind and not --
17 decide not to put on any evidence. Defence Counsel -- Defence do that
18 everyday. That's why the rule is that way. And I've seen it done many
19 times, where you start -- you tell what your case is and you decide not
20 to put on a case.
21 You wait until the end, the only thing you can do is argue your
22 case. He can't tell us anymore what his case is about. Now, on the
23 other hand I am curious to hear what his case is and what he's going to
24 say. If he could perhaps, in a minute, give us an outline of what he's
25 going to say, but if he's going to get up and say why his client is not
1 guilty, why they didn't put on a case, I mean, that's not what this is
2 about. If he wants to take a minute and give us a brief preview of the
3 coming attractions, I'm interested.
4 I haven't objected to anything yet.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you. Have you -- yes, Madam
7 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is a case which
8 involves a number of accused. I don't know what my colleague wishes to
9 talk about, but this could have an impact on the presentation of my case.
10 The only thing I would like to draw your attention on is what Gvero's
11 Defence lawyer has just said on line 3, page 25:
12 "[In English] We contend we have actually presented evidence."
13 [Interpretation] That is a matter to be addressed during our
14 closing arguments. To allow my colleague to discuss evidence that has
15 been shown and not entitle the other accused to do the same I believe
16 would be extremely unfair for the other accused. It is not a formal
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: And --
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] This is not a formal objection.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: And one last point, I am sure Counsel is aware
21 that there are other rules here that allow statements to be made and that
22 they can be afforded. So they are not completely shutdown from making a
23 statement, or at least someone from that case making a statement.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse and everyone else, for that matter,
2 Mr. McCloskey as well. We did discuss this amongst ourselves, this
3 morning, for example, and we are still undecided as to how to proceed.
4 So we are not handing out our decision today, but what I suggest is, as
5 an ex-Boy Scout, be prepared on Monday just in case we decide to
6 authorise you to go ahead with your address, with your statement.
7 MR. JOSSE: Well I --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: And then we will decide the issue first thing
9 Monday morning.
10 MR. JOSSE: I certainly will be prepared. Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Have a nice evening, and we will
12 continue Monday morning at 9.00.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
14 7.02 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the
15 26th day of January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.