1 Thursday, 26 February 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning. Madam Registrar, could you call the
7 case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, ma'am. All the accused are present.
11 Presentation as yesterday with the exception of Ms. Tapuskovic for the
12 Popovic Defence team.
13 So good morning to you, Mr. McCloskey. And good morning to you,
14 Mr. Pandurevic.
15 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Judge.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Fauveau, no, you can remain standing, it's
17 going to take very little time. You had your motion for the admission of
18 a number of documents from the bar table. It has been responded to in a
19 positive manner by the Prosecution and therefore we are hereby granting
20 your motion. Thank you.
21 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
22 WITNESS: VINKO PANDUREVIC [Resumed]
23 [Witness answered through interpreter]
24 Cross-examination by Mr. McCloskey [Continued]
25 Q. Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, everyone. Good
1 morning, General.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. Yesterday we ended with 65 ter 4236, which I don't think we need
4 to put up on the screen. We saw a reference in that March 2nd Zvornik
5 regular combat report to:
6 "At around 8.30 hours, columns of civilians and soldiers with
7 pack animals were noticed from Udrc and Rasevo towards Konjevic Polje.
8 The columns were hit with every available means."
9 I think we talked about that a bit. But now going on to
10 65 ter 4258, which is the daily combat report of the corps and to the
11 Main Staff. And if we can go down and it's in paragraph 1, the second
12 paragraph of the-- entitled, "The enemy." We see the same phrase going
13 up to the Main Staff, but it has left out the part about civilians. Were
14 you told by the corps not to shell civilians? Or fire upon civilians as
15 a result of this?
16 A. I don't know why the corps worded this document as they did.
17 This was a column moving from Tuzla
18 animals, and obviously, they were carrying the ammunition and weapons for
19 the forces deployed in the area of Konjevic Polje. And that was one of
20 the reasons why fire was opened. We never had an order to fire on
21 civilians. And it was quite clear that we were expected only to target
22 military facilities. And this column was a legitimate military target.
23 Q. My question was, General, we see that they've left out civilians
24 in their report. Did the corps tell you to stop firing at civilians?
25 A. As I said, they did not tell me either to shoot at civilians or
1 not to shoot at civilians. What we did here, we opened fire at this
2 particular column.
3 Q. Did they tell you not to put in your reports that you were firing
4 at civilians?
5 A. No. Since they didn't tell me either to open fire or not to open
6 fire, therefore, I was not told to put -- what to put in my report.
7 Q. Okay.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter 4243.
9 Q. And this is a daily combat report of a colleague of yours,
10 Lieutenant-Colonel Andric. It's dated 2 March. And he is describing the
11 situation as he is involved in these activities, and we see in
12 paragraph 2, as he is describing the movement of the forces that the
13 village of Gobalji has been burnt and tomorrow the plan is to do
14 Paljevine. So were you and Andric going down as -- after fighting the
15 Muslims, were you burning these villages?
16 A. No. Villages were not being burned along the axis of my action,
17 and by the way, I'm not familiar with the area where Mr. Andric was
18 carrying out actions. Paljevine is a feature and I think you can see it
19 in the map behind my back. It was on the axis of Andric's forces. As
20 for the other village of Gobalji
21 and that it had already been burned. Whether that happened during a
22 fighting or at some other time, I really don't know.
23 Q. So you were open to the reality that Andric's forces just burnt
24 that village?
25 A. I wasn't aware of that fact. It was an entirely different axis
1 of attack. We just even couldn't see each other.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to 65 ter 4259.
3 Q. This, again, is a Drina Corps report, the same day as Andric's
4 report. I want to direct your attention to paragraph number 2 of this
5 report of the Main Staff. Where it basically repeats what Andric has
6 said but instead of saying the village was burnt, it says:
7 "Part of the forces of the brigade liberated the village of
8 Gobalji at the frontline in the area of Cerska."
9 So now we see, as in your previous document, the editing going
10 on. Can we conclude that "liberated" in this particular document
11 actually means "burnt"?
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I thought I had solved it. You need to be patient
13 with us, Mr. McCloskey, and all the others, because we have lost the --
14 but I don't know what is happening, there's something happening now.
15 Something happening now. Okay. It seems to be working now. Did anyone
16 else experience the problem?
17 MR. HAYNES: Yes.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Have you solved it?
19 MR. HAYNES: Sort of. I seem to have a transcript but not where
20 I would expect to find it, but ...
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Can anyone assist Mr. Haynes, please. Anybody else
22 has the problem? Solved. Okay. My apologies to you, Mr. McCloskey, I
23 had to stop you. So you need to go back to page 4, lines 5, or 5 to 9.
24 That's where I stopped you. You had just read part of Exhibit 4259.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
1 Q. So General, we can conclude from looking at this Drina Corps
2 report that when the Drina Corps says that this village has been
3 liberated, it really means burnt; correct?
4 A. No, I cannot draw such a conclusion as you did. I know that
5 there was a lot of fighting along this axis. There was a battalion from
6 the Krajina Corps that between 15 and 20 soldiers died in the fighting.
7 Some villages and some houses could have been burnt as a result of
9 I know that on the slopes of Cerska, which was predominantly
10 Muslim, there were yet some Serbian villages. The village that was
11 mentioned later on in the secondary passage was the Serbian village, it
12 was not burnt at the time but it was deserted. We chose axis of our
13 attacks along the lines where the Serbian villages were situated because
14 it was easier for us to advance in that way.
15 Q. But you agree with me the Drina Corps has removed the term
16 "burnt" and replaced it with "liberated"?
17 A. They may have had a consultation with Andric and maybe his
18 statement referred to this part of the Serbian village that had been
19 burnt but I really don't know what actually transpired there.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter 4244.
21 Q. This is another report from your colleague Andric, dated
22 2 March 1993
23 to is near the bottom at the English. It's B/C/S page 1. And he points
24 out that -- and says:
25 "In the course of the day, special units of the 1st Birac Brigade
1 took and destroyed the village of Gobalji
2 of the main forces and the attack on Cerska. At the entry into the
3 village, our soldiers found weapons and other military equipment, as well
4 as food and cattle, which the enemy left behind when fleeing from our
5 forces. If the Zvornik Brigade continues the attack towards the
6 above-mentioned facilities, Udrc will not be a threat anymore to a single
8 So we can conclude from this that you and Andric are working on
9 the same operation in the similar vicinity; correct?
10 A. Well, if you look at the map behind me, you can see that Udrc is
11 a feature at high elevation and covered in wood. It is a dominant
12 feature. If we manage to capture it, we would have a tactical advantage.
13 Andric and I did act together as part 1 operation, however, we were not
14 close in combat. In his first part of the report, he said that he would
15 be compelled to withdraw into his zone unless the forces of the
16 Zvornik Brigade do not accelerate their actions.
17 Q. So the answer is yes?
18 A. Yes, we acted together in this operation, that's what I said.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to 65 ter 4245.
20 Q. This is March 4th, a couple of days later. This is a report from
21 you in your name. It appears to say, we are not sure, Major Pandurevic,
22 have you been promoted at this point or is ...
23 A. No, I was promoted on the 7th of January irrespective of any
24 combat operations.
25 Q. All right. Well, let's -- looking at this, it's on the front
1 page, and that the computer may be as good a view of this as the actual
2 document. It's a little bigger, in fact. What I call your attention to
3 is you describe the activities, and then you say under paragraph 1:
4 "Activity in the direction of Konjevic Polje, Duge Njive," and
5 some other villages, "and Glodi have been taken and facilities in Glodi
7 Now Glodi was a Muslim town with a mosque. Did your units burn
8 Glodi like it says here, the facilities in Glodi?
9 A. As far as I know, back in November or even October, the entire
10 area of Kamenica including Glodi was under the control of the Army of
11 Republika Srpska. However, on the 6th and 7th November, the whole area
12 including Bosansko Brdo fell and this village is located there. At the
13 time when I was there, I didn't see any mosque and I honestly don't know
14 which facilities they are referring to as being burnt. It might have
15 been houses but it might have been some fortifications for housing firing
17 Q. General, did you say you are not sure what "they" are referring
19 A. I'm not quite sure what you are referring to now. Maybe the
20 translation was ...
21 Q. The translation we got, General, is that after I asked you that
22 question, you said, "I'm not sure what facilities they are referring to."
23 But I can go on.
24 You wrote this report or you -- went out under your name;
1 A. Yes, but when you'll speak about facility in military terms, that
2 involves firing positions and cover. Whereas a house is a house. That's
3 how it is called. When it is called in military terms, it's a facility.
4 It could be a bunker, a shelter, and there were such facilities in
5 Glodjansko Brdo and Glodi.
6 Q. What did you burn in Glodi?
7 A. I'm tell you can that houses in Glodi were not burned. This
8 village was empty. You mentioned a mosque. I didn't see any mosque
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to the next document, 65 ter 4260.
11 Q. This again is the Drina Corps report to the Main Staff on the
12 same day and it we can see down it begins at page 1 in the B/C/S and it's
13 at the bottom of page 1 in the English, but then -- it's at the bottom of
14 page 1 in English. And it says:
15 "Parts of the Zvornik Brigade liberated Duge Njive and Glodi."
16 So again we see the term "burnt" left out. And my questions are the
17 same, did the Drina Corps tell you not to burn or did they tell you not
18 to say that you'd burned?
19 A. My answer is the same as to your previous question. My report
20 says that facilities were burnt. It doesn't say specifically the houses
21 or the village. Here it says liberated. When we launched an attack and
22 took some facilities, we used to call it liberations and that is what the
23 Muslims did as well. They said that they liberated Kravica and we said
24 that we -- they said that they liberated Kravica and we said that we
25 liberated Konjevic Polje. Even now if you walk through this village, you
1 can see that the houses had not been burned.
2 Q. So you didn't burn any houses in this operation ever?
3 A. Unless there was fire coming from certain fortified buildings
4 they might have been burned or set on fire by fire from weapons, and in
5 that context, I do not rule out the possibility of any house being
6 actually burned.
7 Q. Accidental burning, you are talking about.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to 65 ter 4247.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You have amended or -- my answer.
10 I didn't say accidently. In fighting, if you have a building or a
11 facility from which fire is coming, then you target it deliberately.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY:
13 Q. Of course. Okay. This is another report dated a few days later,
14 March 10th, 1993
15 hope. And this is in your name. And you talk about the -- what has been
16 happening in most of this. And we know you've had a chance to study
17 this. Well, I can ask you that. Have you had a chance to study this
18 document before I just handed it to you?
19 A. I had a CD or a DVD
20 read it, but not recently.
21 Q. Well, it says at the bottom -- you say at the bottom:
22 "We propose that houses should not be torched when taking control
23 of Konjevic Polje, but that they be inhabited by people from Tuzla
24 other areas."
25 A. Yes, that's what it says.
1 Q. What people from Tuzla
2 A. Well, the Serbs, Serbian refugees who wanted to leave Tuzla
3 Q. So we can --
4 A. All those who are already in Zvornik.
5 Q. So we can conclude from this that prior to your report, houses
6 were being torched and wasted?
7 A. I repeat that on my axis of action, they were not. But when I
8 emerged at these positions quoted here, I noticed that from the direction
9 of Cerska, there was smoke and there was burning, and that's why I made
10 this timely proposition to the corps command before we moved towards
11 Konjevic Polje to do this or, rather, not to do this, because there were
12 troops who followed from behind and did torch.
13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter is not quite sure about this
14 last part. Could Mr. Pandurevic repeat.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Pandurevic, we have an interpretation but
16 the interpreters are not quite sure they got it right. So I will read
17 out to you what we have here and if it's correct, please say so. If you
18 need to change it, please then go ahead.
19 "I repeat that on my axis of action, they were not. But when I
20 emerged at these positions quoted here, I noticed that from the direction
21 of Cerska, there was smoke and there was burning, and that's why I made
22 this timely proposition to the corps commander before we moved towards
23 Konjevic Polje to do this or, rather, not to do this because there were
24 troops who followed from behind and did torch."
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It wasn't troops that followed from
1 behind. It was the locals who used to live in that area. At the
2 entrance to Konjevic Polje, from the direction of Drinjaca, there were
3 several Serb houses before the war, and at that time they were burnt
4 down. And those locals, when they returned, they would be prone to
5 burning a few Muslim houses.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Haynes.
7 MR. HAYNES: I should say that's precisely the correction I was
8 advised should be made from my left.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY:
11 Q. So none of your troops did any burning, it was all Serb locals?
12 A. I didn't say no one. It could have happened that there were
13 soldiers whose villages used to be there before. But when the unit
14 passed through Konjevic Polje, I set up a police check-point at the
15 entrance to Konjevic Polje to prevent any of the locals from the Zvornik
16 municipality from coming into that area and to loot and take away some
17 property, that was the Bratunac municipality. And I know that some
18 people took a round-about way from the surrounding hills on tractors and
19 one person even got killed travelling that way. The houses remained
20 intact. One of my escorts once took an aerial cable because he said he
21 needed it for his TV set, and I said I'll hang you with that cable if you
22 try to take it from here. None of my men took anything.
23 Q. So then the previous references to -- that Andric made to burning
24 things and that you made to burning facilities which got left out of the
25 Drina Corps reports, we should just ignore that and we should put this
1 burning on local Serbs, is that what you are telling the Court?
2 A. Whether the soldiers are responsible under the command of an
3 officer, in this case Andric, or the responsibility lies on local Serbs,
4 I don't know. Maybe both are responsible. But one thing is true, both
5 things happened.
6 Q. But Vinko Pandurevic is not responsible?
7 A. That's not what I said, Mr. McCloskey. If fighting is going on
8 for some features, houses, buildings holding soldiers of the BH Army, and
9 if they are firing from these buildings at us, those are military
10 targets. We open fire at them, we throw grenades, we fire shells. And
11 then the building can be burnt down. However, if a soldier set something
12 on fire when the fighting is over and if I am aware of that, then it's my
13 responsibility. To that extent, I agree with you.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to a UN report now of the
15 same time-period, 13 -- 65 ter 4252, to get just a glimpse into what the
16 UN is reporting. And we don't have a translation of this so I think we
17 are going to need to look at the screen. Actually, we did get one. It
18 did come in in time. So it should be -- well, it's page 2 of the
19 English, but if we can stay with page 1 for a bit.
20 Q. We've seen these sorts of things. It's to the headquarters of
22 situation in various sectors. And the sector that I'm concerned about is
23 on page 2, and it's the Tuzla
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to that. Page 1 of the B/C/S. I
25 think we need to go back in the B/C/S. Page 1 in B/C/S, page 2 in
2 Q. And under the Tuzla
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: And perhaps, yeah, if you could blow that up for
4 the General so he can see that.
5 Q. The part I want to draw your attention to is -- it begins a few
6 lines down:
7 "The first report of an attack by the BSA on the village of
8 Konjevic Polje came through at 1124 hours. Shelling and reports of the
9 attack failed to disperse the hundreds of civilians that had surrounded
10 the BritBat party. At 1412 hours, OC B SQN 9/12 stated that he was
11 reconsidering his options and at 1424 hours requested that
12 Major Pandurevic (the local BSA commander at Zvornik) be urged to stop
13 the shelling as civilians were being caught in the fire. At 1450A hours,
14 one round landed killing 2 civilians and injuring three children under
15 the age of 6, two of which lost their legs. At 1530 hours, word was
16 received from BH C Kiseljak that the BSA was in the process of checking
17 fire. The request for a safe route out of BritBat was also being
19 "At 1545 hours, information came through that the Spartan was
20 being towed by the Foden and that the Sultan and the Land Rover were
21 about 300 metres apart and still surrounded by civilians. At 1619 hours,
22 the Foden received an indirect hit with shrapnel going through its
23 radiator. At 1642 hours, another round landed in the group of civilians
24 by the Foden, killing 10. No BritBat injuries. It was also decided at
25 this time to abandon the Foden and Spartan and move north towards
1 Zvornik. Because of the frequency change, at 1700 hours coms with C B
2 SQN were lost. It was assumed that the group was still moving.
3 "At 1905 hours, it was reported that OC B SQN was in conference
4 with the BiH. This was assumed to be the edge of what remains of the
5 Cerska pocket. Permission was granted to carry on and word has passed to
6 Major Pandurevic that the BritBat group would shortly be approaching the
7 BSA lines."
8 Do you recall this incident where this --
9 A. What is the date here?
10 Q. It's dated 13 March 1993
11 A. I don't remember these details. The artillery of the
12 Zvornik Brigade could not observe its own fire from the positions where
13 it was and we never fired randomly. We never did that. From what
14 direction this fire came and whether it came from the direction it says
15 here, I don't know, but I know this gentleman was interested in me
16 because he was supposed to come to Zvornik and come close to our
17 positions. And I remember one group of military observers, among them a
18 British officer, one Russian officer, and one other officer, Australian
19 or a Belorussian, I'm not sure. They went to that area and returned
20 awhile later.
21 And as for artillery fire by us at Konjevic Polje, it was never
22 random. We never fired without observing, and we were simply unable to
23 observe that location. So I'm not aware of these details.
24 Q. I would suggest to you this was not random artillery. This was
25 deliberately designed to drop these artillery rounds right on the crowd.
1 You can tell me nothing else about this?
2 A. No, it is not deliberately designed because how could I know
3 where people are in that broad space if I can't see that space and have
4 no information. On top of that, I was perfectly aware that military
5 observers were headed there. I wouldn't fire on them. Fire could have
6 come from some other direction by someone else who didn't know that the
7 military observers were headed there. And at that time I didn't receive
8 any protests from them.
9 Q. Okay. Who else could have been firing artillery at -- in the
10 direction of BritBat and the Muslim population in Konjevic Polje?
11 A. I don't know what kind of BritBat you are talking about. There
12 was no BritBat there that I know. However, fire was possible from Cerska
13 and from Kasaba directions. From both of these locations it is easier to
14 observe the area of Konjevic Polje than from Zvornik of because there a
15 mountain chain between -- between Zvornik and Konjevic Polje along the
16 Drinjaca River
17 Q. All right. Let's go on. You talked a bit in your direct
18 about --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Haynes.
20 MR. HAYNES: It might be significant, but I think the three
21 letters SQN are short for "squadron" not "son," and that may actually be
22 important as to what sort of size of force from the British army were in
23 Konjevic Polje.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: We can probably sort out those abbreviations.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY:
3 Q. Now, you spoke in direct about your dealings with
4 General Morillon. It was this time-period, as we know, March 1993. You
5 had mentioned, on page 30808, that:
6 "I was honoured to maintain contacts with a high-ranking
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, let me go to 65 ter 4250.
9 Q. We've highlighted the part I'm going to ask you about. It's on
10 page 2 of the English. And we can see that this is another report from
11 you on March 11th, it's the time-frame that I'm sure you will agree that
12 you were dealing with General Morillon and others. And you talk about
13 the situation. And then on line 9 you say:
14 "Due to the bigger presence of UNPROFOR, different humanitarian
15 organisations and other bitangi," which is translated as
16 "good-for-nothings," "we are requesting the corps command and the
17 RS Main Staff to appoint a competent person to solve the complex
18 conflicts in the area in order to avoid the commander of the brigade
19 appearing in front of the cameras."
20 So General, if we go back to the war, this is a fair description
21 of how you felt about UNPROFOR and its officers at the time, isn't it?
22 A. No. UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations are mentioned
23 separately here. I thought they had a mission, I thought they should be
24 working and I thought their work was of mutual benefit; but there were
25 various other individuals in groups that appeared for all sorts of
1 reasons, exerting pressure both on the command and the troops, and making
2 it impossible for us to do our job. That's why I wanted the corps
3 command to deal with this.
4 Q. So you are telling us that you are not referring to UNPROFOR and
5 humanitarian organisations as good-for-nothings?
6 A. No, no, not about them.
7 Q. "Due to the bigger presence of UNPROFOR and different
8 humanitarian organisations and other good-for-nothings ..."
9 A. Well, the person who wrote this could have made this grammatical
10 error, but that was not my thought. If one word applied to everyone,
11 they wouldn't be listed separately. That word would be applied to all of
13 Q. So somebody else did this. But you must take credit or
14 responsibility for the term "bitangi" coming out of your official reports
15 to your superiors; correct?
16 A. Yes, I'm responsible for the reports, especially if I was
17 directly involved in their drafting. If I said to the operations duty
18 officer what to write, using certain words and he put them in the way he
19 saw fit, then this report might have gone out in this shape if I hadn't
20 looked through it.
21 Q. Now, you heard when I asked Mr. Jevdjevic what happened to all
22 the mosques in this area, and when I asked him who destroyed them. Do
23 you remember what he said? I think he said idiots.
24 A. I don't remember if that's what he said. I agree.
25 Q. Who destroyed the mosques in these areas that you liberated
1 pursuant to this operation?
2 A. On the axis of action of the Zvornik Brigade the only mosque we
3 encountered was the one in Konjevic Polje and after the liberation of
4 Konjevic Polje, the mosque remained intact. It stood as before but
5 several days later, somebody destroyed it.
6 Q. Who?
7 A. I don't know.
8 Q. Your units helped move away the rubble, didn't they? You've seen
9 the document.
10 A. That rubble, the remnants of the mosque stood there for a year or
11 more, and I have seen documents showing that the corps commander or maybe
12 even the Chief of Staff, Colonel Skocajic, ordered the command of the
13 Zvornik Brigade, in brackets chief of engineering, to remove the rubble.
14 And I believe it must have been pursuant to a request from someone from
15 the government. Since that was not in my area, I tried to avoid that
16 duty and I asked them for fuel. And this tug of war with the fuel lasted
17 for a long time. But in any case, the rubble would have had to be
19 But my general position with regard to destruction of cultural
20 and historical and other property is that it's not civilised. But if we
21 want to be completely objective and realistic and we don't want to
22 justify this kind of thing with the eye-for-an-eye theory, we still have
23 to admit there was a cause-and-effect relationship in this destruction.
24 The best thing, however, would be if all the Serbs listed their churches
25 that were destroyed and all the Muslims listed their destroyed mosques
1 and they helped each other rebuild those, that would be the best possible
3 Q. What is the cause and the effect of the destruction of the
5 A. Well, the effect is bad. We can talk a lot about causes. People
6 are driven by all sorts of motives, and I believe that somebody who would
7 be driven to destroy that mosque, would be somebody who used to have a
8 house in that spot before that had been destroyed. And it's a frequent
9 occurrence in Bosnia
10 different intervals on the same foundations. It's not something to brag
12 Q. Do you suggest individual former residents as the main candidate
13 for the destruction of these stone or concrete-reinforced buildings?
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Haynes.
15 MR. HAYNES: Which mosques are we talking about? So far we've
16 heard about one. Are there any more than Mr. McCloskey specifically
17 wants to put to General Pandurevic?
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: We can talk about Konjevic Polje, but the General
20 and I know that the mosques in this area were destroyed and that's what
21 we've been talking about.
22 MR. HAYNES: What area, the whole of Bosnia?
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: The area of the operation of -- of Proboj. I can
24 go through the mosques but I don't want to spend the time.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we know exactly --
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think if we can stick with Konjevic Polje, I
2 think that's a good representative sample. And I don't think anyone is
3 going to suggest anything differently on what happened to the mosques in
4 all of Republika Srpska.
5 Q. So, General, are you suggesting former local residents as the
6 most likely candidate for destroying the Konjevic Polje mosque, for
8 A. I said that such people may have a motive to do that. However,
9 when I was leaving Konjevic Polje, the mosque was still standing. Who
10 destroyed it later, I really don't know.
11 Q. You've heard the news recently on the mosques in Banja Luka
12 the Republika Srpska taking responsibilities for that; one of those was a
13 UNESCO heritage site. Does that suggest to you that this might have been
14 an organised situation from the top that led to the destruction of the
15 Konjevic Polje mosque?
16 MR. HAYNES: I don't understand that question. What news are we
17 talking about and how is somebody who is in prison supposed to hear the
18 news and on what medium. Perhaps put a document to him.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: We don't know about this piece of news either. I
20 mean, we only know what we hear and see in this courtroom.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: If he doesn't know anything about it, he can't
22 answer the question, I agree.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: But you shouldn't put a question on a news item
24 that is not in the records. I mean, I follow -- at least I speak for
25 myself, but I've always been taught to follow the principle of quod non
1 est in actis, non est in mundo, whatever is not in the records, does not
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I have a good faith belief in the
4 event that I spoke of and it's directly responsive to him suggesting that
5 it's villagers doing it. But I will go on. There's enough bad news in
6 the news.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's move on. Let's move on.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY:
9 Q. So you don't know the news that I'm talking about either?
10 MR. HAYNES: You tell him he can't ask the question and he asks
11 it. I mean, it's disrespectful.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Proceed, Mr. McCloskey, please.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Let's go to 65 ter 4286. Excuse me, let
14 me cancel that. Let's go to 65 ter 4288.
15 Q. Now, this, we can see, is dated 24 February 1994, from the
16 Drina Corps, entitled "Removal of the remains of the destroyed mosque in
17 Konjevic Polje." Order. And it is to the Zvornik Brigade and it orders
18 you to:
19 "To use mechanical equipment of the engineering company of your
20 brigade to start immediately with of the removal of the remains of the
21 destroyed mosque in Konjevic Polje. The remains of the mosque are to be
22 dumped at the closest site for disposal of waste material."
23 So, is this the order that you were talking about earlier, that
24 your brigade got, you remember this?
25 A. Yes.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: And let's go to 65 ter 4289. And it's --
2 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment.
3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
4 JUDGE AGIUS: I am sorry for interrupting you, Mr. McCloskey, but
5 we have a technical problem. I was just trying to find out if it's only
6 temporary or whether it would be better to have the break now.
7 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's wait a little bit. Someone has got a mobile
9 in here and I just heard the beep of an SMS being just received. Was it
10 a watch?
11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Now, I think the problem is a little bit more
13 serious than we originally thought. It requires some time. So let's
14 have a break. 25 minutes. If it's not solved until then, of course
15 we'll let you know but the break is of 25 minutes.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.01 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 10.29 a.m.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, let's proceed.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY:
20 Q. General, we were at that point where we saw a document that the
21 Drina Corps was ordering you, your brigade, to go clean up the rubble
22 from the mosque. How was it that the Zvornik Brigade got tasked with a
23 mosque in Konjevic Polje, which as we know is closer to Bratunac?
24 A. Yes. At that time there was the 5th -- if the 5th Engineering
25 Battalion was in Konjevic Polje was there at the time, they would have
1 been given this task. However, the Drina Corps believed that the
2 Zvornik Brigade had more machinery at their disposal and for that reason
3 they assigned this task to them.
4 Q. And several months earlier, the Zvornik Brigade had actually
5 liberated Konjevic Polje; correct?
6 A. No, not a few months. Eleven months before.
7 Q. Fair enough. Now, as you know, we found three documents where
8 you were requesting fuel. Let me just go to the last one which is
9 65 ter 4291, which was dated 28 February. The other two were dated,
10 respectively, 24 February at 65 ter 4289, and 25 February, 65 ter 4290.
11 But let's just go to this last one to save some time at 4291. And it's
12 probably best just to leave it on the screen. You can see down at number
13 9 you are requesting:
14 "We are again requesting 300 hundred litres of petrol to remove
15 the remaining parts of the mosque."
16 So did you finally get that job done?
17 A. We tried to avoid doing this job and whenever someone from the
18 corps command asked to inquiry whether we had done it, we used fuel as an
19 excuse. I believe that ultimately all this debris was removed by the
20 engineering company of the Zvornik Brigade.
21 Q. All right. Now, let's get into 1995. There's been a lot of time
22 spent -- you have spent a lot of time being questioning and answering on
23 that so I don't expect to go through all of that in the kind of detail
24 they went through, I don't think that's necessary. But I do want to go
25 through a few things.
1 You recall what you said about Directive 7.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: And let's go to 65 ter 203, which is the
3 Drina Corps document dated 20 of March, 1995.
4 Q. Which, as you've already said, was the Drina Corps taking the
5 Directive 7 and adapting it to operations for the Drina Corps.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to page 6 in the English, and
7 page 3 in the B/C/S.
8 Q. And this is under the section entitled, "The tasks of the
9 Drina Corps," but as you've stated out, before the section on the tasks
10 of the units. And it's that now famous or infamous language I want to
11 ask you about.
12 "By planned and well thought-out combat operations create an
13 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
14 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
15 What does that mean to you?
16 A. During this trial, this has been extensively discussed and I
17 talked at length about this during my examination-in-chief. As I
18 understand it, the Srebrenica enclave was created because the
19 28th Division was not demilitarised and removed from the area, but
20 rather, by means of its combat deployment, managed to create this
21 completely isolated enclave in geographical and demographic sense.
22 What the author of this sentence had in mind I can only guess. I
23 already said that the main culprit for this grave situation that the
24 residents of the Zepa enclave had to suffer was the 28th Division, that
25 there was a rift between the political and military leaderships within
1 the zone itself, and that the VRS tried to deepen this rift in order to
2 defeat those who wanted to continue fighting, and for this enclave to
3 cease to be an enclave and that people could live there normally.
4 There's another type of combat activities that can be understood
5 to be implied in this sentence, and that is the so-called sabotage,
6 psychological and propaganda activities aimed at undermining the morale
7 of people, manpower of the enemy causing anxiety and insecurity and that
8 can be achieved through propaganda, media, leaflets, radio broadcasts,
9 et cetera.
10 Q. General, this says, "By planned and well thought-out combat
11 operations," and goes on. I won't repeat it. Is this targeting the
12 civilian populations of Srebrenica and Zepa?
13 A. If that was the idea, it would have been worded thus.
14 Q. So you don't take the words "create an unbearable situation of
15 total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the
16 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa." So you don't take the term for the
17 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa to involve the population?
18 A. The local population are civilians. There was an attempt from
19 inside to persuade or to make the political military leadership inside
20 Srebrenica to stop treating them as their prisoners.
21 Q. Can you answer my question?
22 A. I did.
23 Q. Do you read this as a target of the civilian population by the
25 A. This is now a new question. Taking the civilians by the Serbs as
1 a target, that's not it. It was possible to expose them to propaganda so
2 that they would act and exert influence on the authorities, military and
3 civilian. If the 28th Division had not been there, there wouldn't have
4 been any VRS units deployed around the enclave.
5 Q. So I take it you don't see anything wrong or illegal or
6 militarily inappropriate in this phrase?
7 A. Well, the sentence itself is phrased in such a way that it can
8 involve various connotations, primarily some that are contrary to the
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey, just for your better understanding
11 of what is going to happen. Next break will be at 11.50. 11.50. Thank
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. General, I'm not asking for an academic or professorial answer.
15 I need your military opinion as a General. And is there anything wrong
16 with this phrase, in your view?
17 A. Yes, there is, of course. I already said that.
18 Q. What?
19 A. This sentence that says -- I myself don't see any reason to
20 create unbearable conditions for the population in order to achieve a
21 military objective. Perhaps that was an indirect attempt to somehow
22 exert pressure or impact on the 28th Division. But I wouldn't like to go
23 back to that. This is not a precedent in wars. Things like this
24 happened before and after.
25 Q. So that -- I don't think I'll ask any more questions on that.
1 Now, let's go back to a document, 65 ter 2920. This is dated
2 25 April 1995
3 document involving "poturice." I do not want to get into that topic
4 again. But what I want to ask you about is the message, the specific
5 message that I have identified here. If we look at page 1 of the English
6 and the B/C/S, there's three particular segments I want to draw your
7 attention to. The first is right at the top:
8 "The moment has come when the issue of liberating the Serbian
9 lands from poturice will be finally resolved in this area by resolute and
10 successful action of our forces."
11 And we go down a little further in the paragraph:
12 "They," meaning the Muslims, "have given us a unique chance to
13 push them away from us for all time as they are asking for it and put
14 them under control in this area."
15 And we go down to the next paragraph:
16 "The adequate response of our forces meant that we realised that
17 there would be no peace and security in Semberija and Donje Podrinje
18 until the poturice were completely defeated and driven out of this area."
19 These three statements are similar in idea to what we saw in
20 Directive 7.
21 A. They are not similar at all.
22 Q. That by planned and well thought-out combat operations create
23 total insecurity, which was announcing the idea of directing operations
24 against the Muslims at this time-frame. Now we see, coming out of your
25 house, the idea that it is now time to defeat the Muslims, the poturice,
1 to]get them out of the area. These are similar ideas, aren't they?
2 A. These are not similar are ideas. If you look at the date when
3 this information was compiled, that was during the Operation Spreca.
4 Before that, truce had been signed that lasted for nearly 3 months; then
5 this was breached by the Muslim forces launching an offensive. We had to
6 respond to this offensive. I don't know how many of these truces were
7 agreed and then breached.
8 Therefore, if we understand that the objective of the Muslim
9 leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to create a unified Bosnia
11 themselves from that. We had no other choice. Nobody wanted to drive
12 Muslims from Bosnia
13 living there in this area and we will have to continue to live, but on
14 condition that everybody's rights are respected. This is the issue of
15 identity. Nothing more or less.
16 Q. So making life impossible for the civilians of Srebrenica and
17 Zepa is in no way related to the idea of liberating Serbian lands from
19 A. Muslims still live in Srebrenica to this date, so obviously that
20 was not the objective. The objective was to make them realise that there
21 was no life for them as long as the 28th Division was there, and living
22 in the enclave. If the 28th Division wasn't there, they would have been
23 living like everybody else in the area.
24 Q. So you think General Mladic would have allowed the Muslims to
25 stay living in Srebrenica?
1 A. Well, I don't know what he would have done, whether it was up to
2 him to decide or not. But I remember during the preparation for Dayton
3 negotiations aimed at ending the era in Bosnia, the Serbian proposal was
4 for all these enclaves, Srebrenica, Zepa and other, remain as they were,
5 where they were and to be given to the Muslims once the issue of division
6 of territories was on the table.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Let's go to 65 ter 4256.
8 Q. This is again another document involving "poturices," but I want
9 to ask you to take a look at -- it's page 2 in the English, it's right
10 near the end in the B/C/S, the second paragraph up. And it states:
11 "The task of the Zvornik Brigade is that in coordination with
12 other forces 'finish off' poturices at Zecija Kosa and Vitinica and crash
13 all poturices' illusions that they are going to stay there."
14 Now this is another document that you have acknowledged was yours
15 and these areas of - pardon the pronunciation - Zecija Kosa and Vitinica,
16 were they part of the Spreca operation.
17 A. You are pronouncing the names of these features perfectly.
18 Zecija Kosa is a mountain and -- as well as Visoko Glava. This is where
19 the frontline was and this is where fighting took place. This is where
20 we defeated their forces. It has nothing to do with residents of Teocak,
22 we were engaged in combat and this is information that speaks about
23 combat successes.
24 Q. So "all poturices" only means combat soldiers?
25 A. I said that this word was used and refer -- it was used to refer
1 to those who acted in the same way as, back in history, the Ottoman
2 empire did by forcing Christians to convert. All these who subscribe to
3 this very same idea during this war, that's how we called them. That
4 included Alija as well and he didn't hide it. He spoke about that and
5 wrote about that publicly.
6 Q. All right. Let's go on. On page 30809 of the transcript, you
7 said in regard to convoys:
8 "The brigade didn't have any powers to either allow or reject the
9 passage of convoys. The people who manned checkpoints were only to act
10 in compliance with the usual procedure upon receiving a notice that a
11 convoy was coming and to check the contents of what they were carrying."
12 So your brigade did follow the orders related to convoys and just
13 followed the orders? You didn't act on your own in any way?
14 A. Yes, and both if we were to let a convoy pass through or halt it,
15 depending on the order that we received and we would act accordingly.
16 Q. So that procedure was one by the Drina Corps and the Main Staff
17 with you following their orders?
18 A. Yes, that's how I understood that this chain went from the
19 Main Staff via a corps down to the brigades. Later on, we saw that that
20 was expanded to the state level when this coordinating body became
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Just one document on this point.
23 Exhibit 5D 00321.
24 Q. 4 April 1995
25 you could just go to page 2 in the B/C/S, page 2 of the English. Under
1 your name, several domestic goods were confiscated, shampoo, detergents,
2 towels. This was a vehicle with two persons in it. Cigarettes.
3 Sir, did you receive orders to confiscate that material from
4 these two people going to Srebrenica?
5 A. We certainly did because if we did this on our own, we wouldn't
6 have reported it. This is a report from us about what we did concerning
7 the order that we received.
8 Q. All right. Let's go on.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter number 107, which is a
10 familiar document that you have spoken about. I won't spend too much
11 time with it.
12 Q. This is the attack plan for Srebrenica, dated 2 July, by
13 General Zivanovic. If we could go to page 3 in the English, and page 2
14 in the B/C/S under paragraph 2. Paragraph number 2. And we see here
16 "The command of the Drina Corps pursuant to operations
17 Directive 7 and 7/1, and on the basis of the situation in the corps area
18 of responsibility, has the task of carrying out offensive activities with
19 free forces deep in the Drina Corps zone, as soon as possible, in order
20 to split apart the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, and reduce them to
21 their urban areas."
22 At the time what did you think that meant, "reduce them to their
23 urban areas"?
24 A. Firstly, I knew that they had to be divided, meaning that we had
25 to cut off any communication between Zepa and Srebrenica, between the
1 Zepa Brigade and the forces in Srebrenica.
2 Secondly, based on the agreement on militarisation, the borders
3 of the enclave were not clearly defined, and there were some disputes
4 between the signatories to the agreement. In my mind, the urban area
5 included the centre of the town and the surrounding settlements.
6 Q. So the surrounding settlements in the countryside that we've all
7 been to, you consider to be the urban area?
8 A. Look, speaking about an enclave, I stick to -- my understanding
9 was that the positions of the 28th Division should have been pushed to
10 the line that I mentioned. It was them who created the enclave, not the
11 people who lived in various locations and villages.
12 Q. You have been through that, I don't want to go through it again.
13 But I would like an answer to my question. You consider the countryside
14 and the villages around Srebrenica town to be part of the urban area;
16 A. Not hamlets or villages, but suburbs, and the tasks show which
17 line the units had to reach and this is much farther than the suburb
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the last three
20 names of the settlement.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: We need you to repeat the last three names of the
22 settlement, please, Mr. Pandurevic.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours. The line that
24 units participating in active operations throughout Srebrenica were to
25 reach were Alibegovac, Kak, Zivkovo Brdo and Rajine. These were the
1 features that are far away from the town itself.
2 Q. So what did they have to do with the urban area?
3 A. It wouldn't have been possible or purposeful from the military
4 tactical aspect to move the frontline of the VRS to the urban area of the
5 town. The positions would have been unviable. These positions that I
6 quoted give you a possibility of a effective defence and the possibility
7 to push the 28th Division out of the enclave.
8 Q. You don't think this order really meant urban area, you think it
9 meant the perimeter of the objectives that were laid out in the order?
10 A. Well, the author said reduce the enclaves to their urban areas,
11 and then he specified to which lines the units were to go. It's not the
12 same, those lines the units were supposed to take, and the urban area.
13 The urban area is not just the town. The urban area also includes
15 Q. Suburbs of Srebrenica?
16 A. Well, at the entrance to Srebrenica, before the Domavija hotel
17 there, is a village that practically continues into the town. You have
18 Potocari village which practically flows into Srebrenica.
19 Q. You are suggesting the urban area referred to in this document is
20 this area within the perimeter of the defined tasks?
21 A. I'm telling you which positions the VRS were supposed to take, to
22 reach. Anything outside that closer to Srebrenica town, would have been
23 the area where the 28th Division was active, and the population lived.
24 That is, as opposed to the urban area mentioned in paragraph 2 of this
25 order. You see, even the author of this text was not very precise.
1 Q. Well, it's the position of Prosecutor that the author of this
2 text knew exactly what he was doing. Let me ask you -- you don't agree
3 with that, but let me ask you -- the people, you were aware that there
4 were thousands of refugees living in the Srebrenica enclave both inside
5 the town and in the villages outside the town; correct?
6 A. I knew that people were living there. How many, I didn't know,
7 because I was not interested. I was not studying that area. But if we
8 applied that to the urban part of the town knowing what Srebrenica is
9 like, then all these people would have been driven out into the street
10 because there's only one main street and two cross streets. What would
11 have that been like?
12 Q. General, my question was, you knew that there were refugees
13 living in and around Srebrenica; correct?
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Haynes.
15 MR. HAYNES: Well, he answered it. Line 7.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey. I think he has.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: "I knew that people were living there." Of
18 course people were living there. I want to know about refugees. There's
19 a very big difference in this case.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
21 MR. HAYNES: Just because he doesn't give you the answer you
22 want, doesn't mean he hasn't answered it.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: I agree with that.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: You have to agree with that and we have too. On
25 the other hand, he has made it clear now that he is making a clear
1 distinction between people in general and refugees in particular, and he
2 is seeking a direct response from your client on that particular category
3 of people. So, Mr. Pandurevic, if you could answer the question, please.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can, Your Honour. Refugees are
5 also part of the population that lived there.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY:
7 Q. Yes, General, I didn't spend a day talking about 1993 just
8 because we had documents. Many of the refugees that were living in
9 Srebrenica in July 1995 were actually refugees from the area that we saw
10 on the map that used to be behind you; correct?
11 A. Yes, that's correct. I agree with you. I would even say the
12 same is true of the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the
13 frontlines varied and moved, the population on both or, rather, all three
14 warring sides moved back and forth, and Srebrenica is no exception.
15 Q. So you could anticipate, with the combat actions you engaged in
16 pursuant to this operation, that the Muslim populations would move away
17 from your forces into the town?
18 A. Even that could be anticipated and such things did happen. And
19 when the moment came to carry out a demilitarisation of that area and to
20 make Srebrenica an open town, meaning that all military installations,
21 moveable and immovable, should have been removed, making it a purely
22 civilian territory. If that had been done, that population would have
23 been left alone to live there to this day. However, the signatories of
24 the agreement did not honour the agreement and the resulting situation we
25 all know about.
1 Q. So when you say, "even that could be anticipated," did you
2 anticipate that happening at the time of the attack, that the Muslims
3 would move away into the town? You yourself?
4 A. Not that they would flee into the town. The civilian population
5 needed to be removed from the zone of combat operations. An agreement
6 between warring sides could have created special safe areas where the
7 population could have been removed for the duration of combat activities.
8 However, this does not happen in this war. The sides could not agree
9 about that. And my attempts were geared at temporarily removing the
10 population from the area for the duration of combat activities. They
11 pulled out together with their troops.
12 However, when the safe area was created, if the demilitarisation
13 had been created behind Serb lines, there would have been no military
14 units and all that population would have been able to live normally. The
15 frontline would have been facing only the 28th Corps. However, the
16 Muslim army didn't want it.
17 Q. So you acknowledge that it was part of your objective to remove
18 the civilian population from the area, but so that they could be safe and
19 that they could come back and live in harmony with their brothers and
21 A. Well, simply, you can use your deduction and try to reach that
22 conclusion based on my answers. I don't see how that can be done.
23 Q. Okay. Just I want to point out a couple of other things which I
24 think you will agree with me on. We should still be on that page 3 in
25 English, page 2 in the B/C/S. It goes down on paragraph 4 in the B/C/S
1 and at the end of it, after talking about improving the tactical
2 positions and providing certain trig points, that to create conditions
3 for the elimination of the enclaves. What did that mean?
4 A. Yes. This is -- actually follows up on my previous answer. To
5 improve a tactical position means the following: Almost a half of the
6 Drina Corps should be pulled out from this area and should be geared
7 towards the 2nd Corps. Reduce frontline, and jeopardize the 2nd Corps
8 militarily. It doesn't mean deploying forces around the enclaves and
9 using three or four brigades to keep the position. That's what improving
10 military position means. Elimination of enclaves does not mean
11 elimination of the population, it means eliminating the 28th Division
12 which made up the enclave basically. The safe area and the enclave is
13 not the same thing. And you can't find a provision in international law
14 where --
15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter is lost, I'm sorry, can we have
16 a repetition of this.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Pandurevic, the interpreters had a problem.
18 The last we have in the transcript is the following:
19 "... and you can't find a provision in international law where."
20 And you need to continue from there, please.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
22 It goes on to say, the international law of warfare, meaning the
23 regulations we applied, know terms safe area and open town, but not
25 MR. McCLOSKEY:
1 Q. Quick question. Do you think that between the 11th of July and
2 the 15th of July, that the VRS was following the international rule of
3 law that you've just mentioned, or can we agree that that was pretty much
4 put on the shelf for a few days?
5 A. I can only repeat your words when you said that an attack on the
6 enclave was a legitimate military target. A quick response to a quick
8 Q. So elimination of the enclaves doesn't mean elimination of the
9 enclaves. It means defeating the 28th Division.
10 A. What needed to be done was to demilitarise the area completely.
11 Q. General, I'm not asking what needed to be done. I'm just trying
12 to clarify your last answer. Let me try again. So you are saying
13 elimination of the enclaves means defeating the 28th Division?
14 A. Yes. Disarming and demilitarising the 28th Division.
15 Q. Okay. Let's go over to page 3 in the B/C/S, page 5 in the
16 English. After discussing various tasks of various units, it says:
17 "In case of the advantageous development of the situation, be in
18 readiness for an attack and pursuit of the enemy along the aforementioned
20 That particular line was meant for everyone involved in this
21 operation, I take it?
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Is that a question?
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, okay. Could you answer it, please,
25 Mr. Pandurevic.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't found in my text the
2 passage just read by Mr. McCloskey. Can I get a reference?
3 JUDGE AGIUS: In B/C/S, Mr. McCloskey said it's on page 5.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry, it's page 3, B/C/S; page 5, English.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Page 3 in B/C/S.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's under paragraph 5 but it's a long paragraph.
7 Q. It begins, the paragraph: "The first Milici Brigade has the task
8 of reaching the area of," da da da da da. And it's a new paragraph and
9 it says: "In case of advantageous development of the situation, be in
10 readiness for an attack and pursuit of the enemy along the aforementioned
12 Was that only referring to the Milici Brigade or was that --
13 should all units be ready to do that should the opportunity arise?
14 A. It's defined here as a task for the Milici Brigade but if we
15 interpret this in the context of some tactical standards and procedures,
16 then always when the opportunity arises in combat to pursue the enemy,
17 then you move from the phase of attack to the phase of pursuit. In this
18 case, it means pursuing military units, no one else.
19 Q. You heard the testimony about that mortar round that landed right
20 in the middle of the crowd that was gathered around the Dutch Battalion
21 base in Srebrenica. What do you know about that? Who fired that round
22 into that crowd?
23 A. I know about that shell just as much as I heard during the trial.
24 Q. Nothing more?
25 A. No.
1 Q. You also heard that as the Muslim population was moving along the
2 road in massive numbers from Srebrenica to Potocari, rounds were falling
3 on either side of the road. What do you know about that?
4 A. The same as in my previous answer about the shell.
5 Q. Okay. Let me go now to the meeting in Bratunac that you have
6 testified was on 11 July. I think you understand the Prosecution's
7 position is that that occurred on the 12th of July. And you likely
8 recall from your review of the Krstic case that General Krstic also said
9 this meeting occurred on the 11th of July; right?
10 A. I don't recall what Mr. Krstic said about that meeting, but in
11 the documents that you have shown us, I have seen testimony by a Dutch
12 officer, I believe it was Koster Edres [phoen], Mr. Petrusic had asked
13 him about that date and he was probably talking about the 11th.
14 Q. He was and I can ask you a bit about that a bit later. I just
15 wants to make sure that you've had a chance to review the material on
16 this topic and that as you sit here today you are absolutely sure that it
17 was on the 11th, not the 12th?
18 A. I attended a meeting at the Bratunac Brigade on the 11th of July
19 at 2200 hours.
20 Q. And was Mr. Jevdjevic there?
21 A. Yes, I saw Mr. Jevdjevic at one point. I don't know what
22 happened to him later.
23 Q. Did you have the fish dinner with him or know about the famous
24 fish dinner, Mr. Bajagic, I think, made. We are talking about the same
1 A. I don't know about that famous dinner. There was a simple
2 ordinary dinner, a short one after the meeting, and I was there. The
3 dinner was prepared and brought by Mr. Bajagic.
4 Q. And it was fish?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. What kind of fish?
7 A. I don't know much about fish, a river fish, a sea fish, but the
8 dish was called drunken carp. A carp prepared specially in wine, and I
9 know that the carp is a freshwater fish. That much I know.
10 Q. Was Mr. Beara at that dinner?
11 A. No. If it had been sea fish, maybe he would have attended, but
12 he did not attend the meeting.
13 Q. And Mr. Jevdjevic said that Mr. Furtula was in Bratunac that
14 night on the 11th. Do you agree with him?
15 A. I saw Furtula in Srebrenica, but as for the meeting in Bratunac,
16 I don't recall him being there so I can't say either yes or no.
17 Q. Let me show you a clip to see if this is the person you are
18 talking about, and it's from the trial video which I should know the
19 65 ter number by now, but. We are at 00:30:00:3.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 MR. McCLOSKEY:
22 Q. Does that person over General Mladic's left shoulder, is that the
23 guy you are talking about?
24 A. Yes. That's Mr. Radomir Furtula.
25 Q. And that's the same Furtula that was mentioned, as far as you
1 know, in the conversation between Colonel Beara and General Zivanovic on
2 the 15th of July?
3 A. Yes, I think that referred to him.
4 Q. And this meeting on 11th, I believe Mr. Jevdjevic described that
5 you had made comments about General Mladic's order to go to Zepa the next
6 day, that you spoke up a bit; is that correct?
7 A. Yes, among other things.
8 Q. And that trial video is 2047. All right.
9 And I just -- I will try to do this briefly, but I want to go
10 over some of the evidence of the date of that meeting. You have had a
11 chance to see the intercept that we discussed with Mr. Jevdjevic when he
12 was here that the Prosecution has said happened at 1850 hours, and that
13 Mr. Jevdjevic said, We are going to be at bottom now, extension 385, and
14 you can reach bottom via Zlatar 1. Okay. Do you remember that
16 A. I remember you questioned Mr. Jevdjevic about these intercepts.
17 Q. And you remember that he said that take place but it didn't take
18 place on the 12th, but that it took place one day earlier on the 11th?
19 A. Yes, I remember his testimony that he associated his activities,
20 these ones, with the 11th of July.
21 Q. Have you had a chance to review the intercepts to determine if
22 the date is as Mr. Jevdjevic said it, or as the Prosecution says it?
23 A. In the printed version of that intercept, the date 12th is
24 quoted, but I don't think there is a date in the notebook.
25 Q. But you have had a chance to look at the notebook version and see
1 the intercepts on either side of the notebook and what they are talking
2 about and see the date of the 13th in the notebook right before this
3 intercept; correct?
4 A. Well, it might be better for you to show me the notebook again
5 because I think there are no dates for a period of 7 to 8 days.
6 Q. And I should have said the date of the 13th was right after the
7 intercept in question, not before, if I misspoke.
8 Well, General, I don't think I'm going to take the time to go
9 through that. We went through with Mr. Jevdjevic and I don't think I'm
10 going to change your mind from those intercepts. But I did wanted to ask
11 you if you had a chance to review them.
12 JUDGE KWON: Could you just let me know the intercept number?
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: 65 ter 4262. And Your Honours, I can go over
14 that if you would like me to.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Up to you.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, exactly, same position here. It's up to you.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it's not even necessary, at the
18 end of the day. I can give you some other opinions.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey, have you heard what the witness
21 MR. McCLOSKEY:
22 Q. Excuse me for turning my back, General. Yes, and we'll have a
23 chance to go over your other opinions. I don't want to dwell on these
24 intercept, I think they speak for themselves, and I don't think we're
25 going to find agreement. I just wanted to give the General a chance to
1 change his mind and be open to the possibility that he is mistaken.
2 Which apparently you are not, right, General?
3 A. First of all, I don't understand cross-examination as a personal
4 communication between you and me. I understand it as something that is
5 supposed to be for the benefit of the Trial Chamber. I want to tell you
6 my own view.
7 We see in the notebook that the dates are missing for several
8 day. We have conversations, one after another, written in different
9 handwriting, meaning different persons wrote them down, and the question
10 logically arises in my mind, were all these intercepts recorded by one
11 device and one tape in sequence? Were they recorded on several devices
12 on several tapes and then several operators noted them down? Or maybe
13 one person recorded it and another noted it down. And perhaps the person
14 who recorded it in the first place did not record the frequency or the
16 I cannot agree with you that the contents of the conversation
17 alone can tell us the date. It can tell us about the activities and the
19 And one more thing. Although Jevdjevic is a better expert than I
20 am, the bearing is the same on the 15th and the 12th, and Jevdjevic was
21 certainly in Krivace on the 15th and he could have hardly been on the
22 same place on the 12th, and we have the same bearing for the 12th and the
23 15th, which is 135.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY:
25 Q. General, you've taken me into it. I'll --
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. McCloskey, the number you gave me is the number
2 of the note. Do you have the 65 ter number of that specific intercept
3 you are referring to.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, of course, Your Honour. I will go through
5 that intercept, but I also get you that reference, one second.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to the notebook, which is --
8 Q. General, for you it would be the ERN ending 7909 and it's page 5
9 in the English translation. And we see in the handwriting on the left
10 side, and this is 4087 --
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: 4087, Judge Kwon, for the -- independent of this.
12 Q. So if we look at these intercepts, we can see the intercept at
13 1850 hours. And we are in 65 ter 4262 for -- sorry about the confusion,
14 I don't know any way of doing this. And we can see that intercept and
15 that's the one between Major Jevdjevic and the switchboard.
16 Now, if we go back in time from 1850, General, the one before
17 that is at 1310, and it says:
18 "About five or six buses are coming down. They should be
19 refueled with 25 litres each until Han Pijesak."
20 That doesn't tell -- to me that doesn't tell me much, buses are
21 being fueled and going places. But let's look at the next one at 1250.
22 Someone is asking about Radomir, that doesn't tell us much. Then if we
23 go to 1205, there's a conversation and I think we can look at this and it
24 says at the end of the conversation --
25 JUDGE AGIUS: In the booklet that we have been provided with it's
1 the English translation page 4.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. And it says:
4 "Brane --
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I just want to make sure that the accused are
6 following? Do you have -- okay. Thank you.
7 Proceed, Mr. McCloskey.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY:
9 Q. "Brane said they are collecting trucks and buses to drive from
10 Srebrenica and they are going to load 300 in each."
11 Now, at 1205 on the 11th of July, Srebrenica hadn't even fallen
12 yet, so that can't have occurred on 11 July, agreed?
13 A. Yes, I agree with you that based on the contents of the
14 intercepts one can recognise events going on in the field, and since we
15 know the sequence of events shall then it's all right. However, we are
16 seeing here various entries in this notebook and I would like to repeat
17 what I said earlier. We don't know when these conversations were written
18 down from the tape. Maybe this was done on the 11th.
19 You have a typed version mentioning the word "bearing," whereas
20 in the handwritten version there's no mentioning of the bearing. Another
21 interesting thing, which switchboard is Jevdjevic talking to? If he
22 later on mentions Badem, Badem and Zlatar, surely the one in Vlasenica
23 can reach him via Zlatar if he is on Badem.
24 There's another possibility and that is that he is using an
25 antenna in Bratunac to establish a connection with Krivaca and then after
1 that he would use a switchboard. It doesn't mean that if Badem is an
2 intermediary, he has to be on Badem in Vlasenica. Maybe you should have
3 asked him; he is a much better expert in this particular area.
4 Q. And I would say it's a good idea to look to his testimony because
5 he acknowledges this conversation, as I said. Now, let's -- we are back
6 to page 5 in the English. 7909 ERN. Now, let's turn the page, go over
7 to page 6 in English. 12 e-court and 7910 in your book, General.
8 We get to the next handwritten intercept in the same colour ink
9 and it looks like the same hand, in my view, and this one is a few hours
10 later than the key Jevdjevic intercept which was at 1850. This one is
11 now at 2200 hours, and it says:
12 "Well, we are moving them, the motherfuckers. Up there at Brcko
13 they are dumping civilians, women and children and sending them to Tuzla
14 those who got their hands dirty are being sent to BN. There is a
15 procedure for them." Any idea what BN means?
16 A. Probably Bijeljina, but what they are talking about is wrong.
17 Nobody was driven to Brcko. These two heard something and they are now
18 weaving their own story. I prefer to look at the notebook because I can
19 see the colour of the ink better.
20 Q. Certainly, General.
21 A. [In English] Thank you.
22 Q. And as we are waiting for that, I think you'll agree with me that
23 women and children being sent to Tuzla
24 doesn't it, and that was not happening on the 11th?
25 A. [Interpretation] Yes, it wasn't happening on the 11th, but at the
1 meeting that took place on the 11th, as far as I remember, this issue was
3 Q. Now, let's keep going down the conversation. And we see it says:
4 "Well, it is, one group walked into a minefield over here and
5 about 20 of them snuffed it. But anyway, it is very well blocked.
6 Anyway, 12.000 registered to go. Did you watch the news? Did you see
7 the boss among the Bule down in Potocari?"
8 Now we know that there's no film of Potocari on the 11th.
9 Potocari was in the hands of the Dutch Battalion on the 11th. But on the
10 12th, there is lots of footage of General Mladic among the Muslim women.
11 So this conversation has to be referring to what happened on the 12th;
13 A. Yes, Mr. McCloskey. I'm not a malicious person. I fully agree
14 with you. This conversation reflects the events that took place on the
15 12th. But if you look, between the 5th and the 13th, there are only one,
16 two, three, four, five conversations recorded. When they were taken off
17 the tape and put on paper, that's a big question.
18 Q. Well, we can follow that conversation and get a little more
19 clarity. It says:
20 "This morning at 10 hours we took Potocari. This was their last
21 big stronghold. The UN contemplated declaring Potocari and the
22 surrounding villages a safe area but that also slipped from them. Now
23 the motherfuckers can declare whatever they want."
24 So this conversation, you will agree with me, is clearly
25 referring to 10.00, 12 July, the time that the VRS finally took Potocari;
2 A. Yes, but what is stated in this conversation does not correspond
3 exactly to what happened on the ground and what we heard during this
4 trial. We know that there was a meeting on the evening of the 11th where
5 these topics were discussed, and nobody took Potocari on the 12th.
6 Q. I'm not going to --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Nobody entered
8 Potocari on the 12th.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY:
10 Q. Nobody entered Potocari on the 12th?
11 A. No, didn't take Potocari on the 12th in military terms.
12 Q. Well, I don't think we need to go over all the rest of it, but if
13 you look at it, you'll see other conversations and then you'll see that
14 the time runs out, and the 13th of July is written right on the diagram.
15 But we'll leave that as it is, General. Just wanted to make sure that
16 you were fully aware of that and that you are not going to be making a
18 The reason that I asked these questions, General, is that because
19 it's the Prosecution's position that you're there on the 12th of July.
20 That this happened on the 12th of July, in the evening. And that was
21 after several hundred Muslim men had been separated from their families,
22 as you will recall the Bratunac Brigade MP that gave us a count. And you
23 recall the old Muslim man that was put in the school, at the engineering
24 school that night, the night of the 12th with hundreds of others and what
25 happened to him there, right down the street from where the meeting
2 So it's the Prosecution's position that General Mladic and
3 General Krstic had fully engaged an operation to separate and kill the
4 men, and that you were at that meeting with those Generals at the time
5 these events were going on. And it's true, isn't it, General, that the
6 reason you want to put this on 11th July is to stay out of Bratunac on
7 the 12th of July because of what was going on there?
8 A. Well, I'm telling you, I wasn't at the meeting in Bratunac on the
9 12th. I was there on the 11th. I attended the meeting on the 11th. You
10 persist in saying that it was the 12th, and you have no other argument.
11 And the events that we are talking about now, the separation, the
12 incarceration, and others things, I learned about in the course of these
14 And let me tell you one more thing, if Krstic was at Vijogor on
15 the night of the 12th, and checked the units, why would he call me during
16 the night at Bratunac to go via Vijogor while there were still pockets of
17 combatants of the 28th Division there? That would be equal to him giving
18 me two tasks at the same time.
19 Q. What date did Colonel Mirko Trivic, the commander of the 2nd
20 Romanija Brigade, say that this meeting occurred, testify in this court
21 with his handwritten diary?
22 A. Yes, I have seen his diary and he says that it was on the 12th;
23 however, there was no entry for the 7th and the 8th, and based on that
24 diary, he didn't exist. He was nowhere. Sometimes he uses the pronoun
25 "I" and sometimes he says, Pukovnik Trivic gave an order, that's the
1 third-person singular. It seems as if two different persons were writing
2 this diary. And he just squeezed this date, 12, between the lines on one
3 page. He didn't start a new page for a new date. And there are also
4 many other details that I find to be odd.
5 Q. General, I'll show you, he put the 12th right between the 11th
6 and the 13th, but let's get to the diary. Though, 1150, maybe I should
7 give the General the diary --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: It's up to you, the break will be in five minutes'
10 MR. McCLOSKEY:
11 Q. General, why don't you --
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I suppose you can cover a lot of ground in five
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: I can, Mr. President, with that encouragement.
15 And this is 65 ter 4309.
16 Q. And I would say, General, given your last comment we should start
17 on -- well, I have page 6 in the English, but it's where on his diary he
18 has got 0900 hours on 11 July. So you might flip through the dates and,
19 I'm sorry, I don't have a clear indication of where that is in the B/C/S.
20 That's my fault.
21 A. May I ask you something, Mr. McCloskey, something is not clear to
22 me. Has this diary been copied in a chronological order as he kept it?
23 Do these number indicate the exact order of pages in the original diary?
24 Q. As far as I recall, we photocopied it in the order that it was.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: But you will check that to make sure because, after
1 all, the witness and also his counsel have a right to know once they have
2 this question put.
3 MR. HAYNES: It might be a good time for the break. I'd also
4 like some confirmation to be made of what use Colonel Trivic made of his
5 diary when he gave evidence because there's a danger to mislead here.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: That I'm not going to comment about.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Colonel Trivic testified, he had the diary, he
8 was open for cross-examination, I have no doubt that this was done
9 correctly and I will double-check, of course, Mr. President, on that. I
10 think you can tell by the way it's written because the pages are
11 connected, but it's a little late for that but we'll look at it.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: The question has been put to you, so I think it's
13 your responsibility to make sure that what you are alleging, at least
14 what you think took place did in fact take place that way and then we can
15 proceed after that. As to the rest, I'm not going to comment. So let's
16 have the break now, it's time anyway. We will reconvene in 25 minutes
17 from now.
18 --- Recess taken at 11.48 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 12.20 p.m.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, let's continue. Did you check in the meantime
21 whether the photocopying of the diary respected the -- or favourably
22 reproduced the diary as it was in its original state?
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: We looked into that as best we could,
24 Mr. President, and it was done years ago. We found a reference to me
25 speaking to Judge Liu about the diary and saying that it was an old war
1 diary with loose pages falling out of it and that we gave it to him to
2 try to have it -- or that he gave it to us and we photocopied it. And
3 we'll find the dates when this happened and we'll make that more clear.
4 But as we've seen, can imagine, the original is one of those old
5 documents and there may have been pages falling out of it.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. Let's proceed.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY:
8 Q. And, General, we'll get to the diary, I'm sure you've had a
9 chance to study it, but I would like to just remind you of question and
10 answer of Mr. Trivic in his testimony by Mr. Haynes on page 11978 back on
11 23 May 2007
12 "Now, each of those people, General Krstic, Momir Nikolic and
13 Milenko Jevdjevic, describe a meeting which they say took place on the
14 11th of July at which you were present. Do you think they might be right
15 about the date and you might be wrong? "
16 And his answer was:
17 "In my notebook, in which I recorded some crucial activities of
18 mine, this is what it was and this is how it's written. If it happens to
19 be some different date, then that would mean that my whole records were
21 And so, Mr. Haynes, of course, continues cross and I'm sure
22 there's more issues in there, but just to help us. And of course this
23 diary is in evidence and let us go to it at 4309. And I will start,
24 General, let's just start from the beginning so we can go through it
25 slowly and we can point out some of the issues associated with it.
1 On what we have as the first page we see it written, "Former
2 Veteran's Day." And then it says, "From 15 July" -- try to let us get
3 caught up. This I have is page 1 in the English. It should be the first
4 page. Yes, that looks like the first page as well, in the B/C/S. Okay.
5 That's it.
6 And it gives some information and then it goes down and it's got
7 a 5 July and lots of information that -- that's page 3 in the B/C/S if --
8 we continue to see that 5 July. I'll turn the page in English and we see
9 a notation that says 1800 hours on 5 July, in the English.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honours, and everyone, as you know,
11 sometimes we will match the translation to the book when we know it's
12 important; we did not in this situation, I apologise. In terms of mirror
13 image that is.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Haynes.
15 MR. HAYNES: It's just a small thing. I hadn't spotted this
16 earlier but this document is in evidence at 2D 125. What is 4039 and why
17 has a new exhibit been produced?
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: 4309 has a complete English translation. The
19 first one didn't.
20 MR. HAYNES: Thank you.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY:
23 Q. So we see 1800 hours on 5 July on page 2 of the English, and now
24 I see that on the B/C/S. And at the bottom of the English we see
25 20 hours on 16 July, 1995
1 next page in English, page 3, and see a reference to Krivace village, Han
3 It goes down and we see a reference to General Krstic and a note
4 that says:
5 "The VRS VK has decided that the eastern parts of the RS must be
6 liberated from the Turks. The brilliant victory in Srebrenica is the
7 biggest boost to morale." And it goes on.
8 And then it gets down to 9 July, if we can find that on the
9 original, it may be more helpful. Yes, at the top of the page, unlike
10 the English translation, it starts 9 July. And it goes through tasks.
11 And if we could slowly flip through the B/C/S we will see - in
12 the English page 4 - it comes to 10 July. Page 4 in the English.
13 Probably need to flip another page in the B/C/S. And then we flip
14 another one, at the top of the page we see 10 July. And we see his -- in
15 English, his descriptions. Do we have the 10 July in the English?
16 That's page 4 in the English. You can see it on page 4, the bottom of
17 page 2, it starts there. And it starts off with:
18 "The decision to change the direction of attack of the
19 2nd Romanija Brigade." And it goes on and talks about various things
20 they are doing.
21 It's critical of the Zvornik Brigade at one point since the unit
22 to the right of the -- sorry, not critical, it says:
23 "Since the unit to the right of the 1st Zvornik Brigade failed to
24 successfully follow the advance of these two units, the units linked up
25 and the flanks secured and they stopped at the line reached."
1 Was that the Bratunac Brigade that he is referring to there,
3 A. My right neighbour was the Bratunac Brigade.
4 Q. Yes, I seem to recall you saying that they had a problem in the
5 attack on this date; is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And then as we continue, we go to page 6 in the English and we'll
8 come to July 11th written down in the original. We need to, I think --
9 yes, thank you. And there is July 11th. And if we could go to page 7 in
10 the English and I want to start with what is the last big paragraph
11 before we get to 12 July. He says:
12 "Since conditions were right to enter Srebrenica with the command
13 group, I entered Srebrenica at around 1700 hours with the Sokolac SO
14 president and the PKVMP. Colonel Andric was already in Srebrenica with
15 the hardware and cameraman. Around 1730 hour, General Mladic, Zivanovic,
16 and Krstic arrived in Srebrenica."
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's page 24 in the B/C/S.
18 Q. "I went to him and greeted him. I told him that it was
19 interesting that on this day two years ago (nearly at the same time) he
20 entered Trnovo with me - I was also the first one to greet him then and I
21 gave him the flag of the RS. He 'snapped' at me - 'Forget history, go to
22 the men and secure the town.'"
23 We saw something like that on the video, didn't we, General?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And then he says: "My conclusion was (unspoken). I DON'T KNOW
1 HOW TO DANCE, or better yet, I don't know how to PLAY AN INSTRUMENT, I
2 only know how to dance to someone else's tune."
3 Then he says: "I don't know how to cash in - to sell my
4 success." And then he says: "Units of the brigade remained at lines
5 reached, securing Srebrenica from the west. Regardless of everything, we
6 were happy and returned to the KM in Jasenova."
7 KM is command post?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. "People were surrendering, they were gathering in Potocari
10 village, but not the ABH - it fled to the hills."
11 Then on the same page in English, we have at 0900 hours, 12 July,
12 written down - and I won't go through all of this - it talks about:
13 "Down to the town. The town is full of soldiers. Looting of the
14 highest order."
15 "General Krstic came to the sector of Vijogor village. I asked
16 that the 1st Birac Brigade go to Jastrebaca."
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry, that's page 8 in the English. 28 in the
19 Q. "Krstic said: Well, go then. Do you want someone else do it for
20 you? I replied after I realised that he was not going to be principled
21 towards everyone (as he makes himself out to be) as he is towards me. 'I
22 REALLY AM AN INEPT COMMANDER.' (Thinking it was better to say nothing
23 and even make false reports than to be an honest playee in a 'game' for
24 human lives). This is the way to make a military career! I, however,
25 can't do it!
1 "Order: Remain at the line reached. The brigade commanders are
2 to come to the Drina Corps IKM in Bratunac by 2100 hours via Srebrenica
3 and Potocari (the Bratunac Brigade command post) General Mladic came at
4 2200 hours. After congratulations and greetings (despite the fact that
5 Vinko Pandurevic and I warned him that the soldiers should rest) he
6 ordered: By 0800 hours tomorrow" -- that should be General Krstic, I
7 think, in the original.
8 Does that look like General Krstic to you in the photocopy
9 original, General?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 "General Krstic must prepare a decision for the liberation of
13 Zepa! Standby on the morning of 14 July. Dead-line to liberate the Zepa
14 enclave - two days. We need to take advantage of this moment of
15 confusion, both of the international community and the enemy. In the
16 morning of 13 July, at 1000 hours, General Mladic will personally address
17 the soldiers in the Vijogor village sector at the line reached.
18 "Dinner in the barracks restaurant - the Bratunac Brigade
19 command. At around 2300 hours, I spoke to Brankica and agreed with the
20 command and her that she would head home to," some place, "Teo and her
21 parents in Kasindol. She should get in touch with the command in
22 Knezina. Return to the sector in Jasenova command post at around 0030
24 "Problems: War booty - organise for the needs of the brigade.
25 Looted goods (by individuals for themselves). How to evacuate?"
1 Then Wednesday, 13 July 1995, 1000 hours, Vijogor village.
2 "General Mladic addressed the soldiers - the task is clear -
3 liberate Zepa. He was received with unanimous approval of soldiers,
4 although after he left, there were individual complaints due to fatigue
5 and so on, but the main concern is how to evacuate the captured goods.
6 "I assigned tasks: Major Eric to go to Bratunac and bring three
7 buses to transport troops. The transport is to commence at 1750 hours
8 from the Jasenova sector. During this time, pull the troops out to
9 Jasenova sector and prepare for relocation to the Krestalica village
10 sector, Krivaca, Han Pijesak." Then there's a long section about
11 organising the transport.
12 General, do you have any specific comments you want to make on
13 this? And please be as specific as you can.
14 A. Well, I can only say looking at this diary, the way you showed it
15 here, that on page 2 in B/C/S, the date is the 15th of July, 1995. The
16 last three ERN -- the last three digits of the ERN number are 289, and
17 then --
18 MR. HAYNES: Before we go any further I'd just like to clarify
19 this. I've been looking at 2D 125 and P 4309 and I wonder if
20 Mr. McCloskey can confirm that the pages have been re-organised in P 4039
21 to appear to run chronologically?
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: I can take time out and check that.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: But it needs to be checked.
25 MR. HAYNES: I just have because this could be the most
1 misleading piece of cross-examination yet. In 2D 125 these pages are not
2 in chronological order.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Do we have a hard copy of or can we see it on the
4 screen while we wait. 2D 125.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, the General and I have hard copies
6 that have the mixed-up order. That's what I was given, that's what I
7 gave the General, that's what we are talking about. What is on the
8 computer, I will look into. I don't know, sometimes people may arrange
9 things, I don't know, but I will look into that and I will try to get to
10 the -- resolve as many issues as we can.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Haynes, can we proceed in the meantime and this
12 will be verified later or --
13 MR. HAYNES: I probably jumped in a bit early because I spotted
14 that Mr. Pandurevic was referring to the ERN numbers and he obviously
15 spotted that they were out of sync, as it were, and had probably picked
16 up the point himself.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. So, then, we can proceed and you
18 will carry out a more in-depth analysis of this issue and let us know.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, of course, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. So, let's proceed. I think at present,
21 as things stand, what has been put to the witness is not a source for any
22 confusion. At lease that's how I'm understanding it.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's correct. It is the -- the way that we
24 appear to have photocopied it and it starts with the 15th and jumps
25 around. So that's where we are.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's proceed. And if necessary, we'll come
2 to this in due course and, if necessary, also upon re-examination,
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm told that what is in e-court is the same.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know. I don't know. I've only got what I
6 can see now. Okay. It's the same.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's the same, so that is not another ghost to be
8 dealt with, please. And I know everyone is tired.
9 Q. Okay, General.
10 A. Well, if the first page is really the first, and it must be, this
11 cannot be a mistake, then automatically the second page begins with the
12 15th July. It's hardly possible for the sequence to be broken on the
13 second page.
14 Then if we look at the page with the last three digits of the ERN
15 number 836 in B/C/S, the entries on that page:
16 "The brilliant victory in Srebrenica is the greatest contribution
17 to morale."
18 And then we have paragraph 4:
19 "In the area of defence of the 1st Zvornik Brigade, the situation
20 is very complex."
21 So this could be somewhere on the 15th. And then we have the
22 previous page, 835, the date is the 16th of July. So there's total
23 confusion in dates. We don't have the 7th or the 8th. It begins with
24 the 9th July, and then these entries are written both in the first-person
25 singular and in the third-person singular. Part of the events is
1 reflected faithfully.
2 On the 10th, General Mladic did not turn up at 1530, as it says
3 on page 845. He came at noon
4 Then whether Mr. Trivic knew how to cash in on his success or
5 play to somebody's tune, we all know very well. Srebrenica is not his
6 area -- was not his area, but he showed up there to meet with Mladic and
7 demonstrate that he was successful in accomplishing his mission. Also
8 it's not clear to me how come that on the 13th, Mr. Trivic still has a
9 command post in Jasenova where his command post was when the attack began
10 on the 6th. And I can't understand why he issues the task on the 13th
11 that buses should go to fetch people from Jasenova because his troops
12 were ahead of my troops on that day at Vijogor.
13 I can only conclude that this diary was written after the event.
14 If you read further on, you will see that there are entries for the 26th
15 proceeding the 19th, et cetera, so the chronology is not observed. Also,
16 in addition to those people whom we know said the meeting took place on
17 the 11th, Colonel Andric also claims that is was on the 11th. And I
18 stand by what I said many times before, that I attended the meeting on
19 the 11th and that meeting was between the two meetings that Mladic had
20 with the UNPROFOR.
21 Q. Okay. Well, I think exhibit speaks for itself.
22 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. McCloskey, you were going to produce the
23 mirror-image translation?
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think that's a very good idea. And we are
25 working on it now and we will contact, if we can, Colonel Trivic and --
1 JUDGE KWON: I was wondering, in the original, how many pages
2 were there, and where the date has been changed in the middle of the
3 page. So we'll know that later on. Thank you.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now that we've clarified this, we will get to the
5 bottom of it and give you as much information, Your Honour, as we can,
6 and we'll let you know as soon as we have something. All right. Could
7 we go into private session briefly.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Could we go into private session for a short while,
10 [Private session]
11 Pages 32175-32180 redacted. Private session.
17 [Open session]
18 MR. McCLOSKEY:
19 Q. Setting that scene for the night of the 11th you really think
20 it's possible that yourself, Jevdjevic and Serb soldiers were amongst
21 that crowd on the night of the 11th?
22 A. Mr. McCloskey, on the 11th, I passed through Potocari, and I'm
23 fully entitled to claim that that was on the 11th, and I rely on -- when
24 I say that precisely on the presence of the crowd there. I was in a
25 vehicle painted in civilian colour and none of them knew that it was a
1 military vehicle. I hardly made my way through the crowd. At one point,
2 I became afraid that they might find out who in the car was and that they
3 would eat us alive, so to speak. I somehow managed to break through the
4 crowd, but I didn't dare go back the same route. If it had been in the
5 evening, there wouldn't be such a big crowd because lots of them had been
6 evacuated on the 10th and 11th.
7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are not sure about the dates.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Did you say the 10th or the 11th?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 11th.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: That's what I thought I heard. Thank you.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY:
12 Q. You understand there were still thousands of people in Potocari
13 the night of the 12th that hadn't been shipped out yet?
14 A. There probably were, but probably the number was twice as smaller
15 than the number on the 11th.
16 Q. How do you know?
17 A. Well, I've seen here that evacuation took two days.
18 Q. Nothing you saw at the time?
19 A. No, no. I didn't see anything at the time with respect to the
21 Q. And as you know, General Krstic said he came through Potocari on
22 the 11th as well, and that Lieutenant Koster, the Dutch officer testified
23 in that case, which you've acknowledged reading, and that he testified
24 they had a secure perimeter the night of the 11th and that no Serb
25 soldiers went through Potocari either way. You've read that testimony?
1 A. Yes, I have. And I disagree.
2 Q. All right. You are saying, though, that Mladic issued orders for
3 you and the other units to go to Zepa the next day; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. But instead of getting ready and readying your troops to go to
6 Zepa, you've now testified that you were moving slowly, almost sweeping
7 the terrain, I think, but you never got anywhere near Zepa, in fact you
8 barely got out of Srebrenica.
9 General, if you had been issued orders to go to Zepa by
10 General Mladic, you would have gone to Zepa, wouldn't you? You wouldn't
11 have fooled around or slowly moved in the direction as you've described
13 A. I didn't mention any direction of movement of the units. I only
14 said which route I took on the 11th. However, if an order is issued to
15 go to Zepa, he didn't tell us to take the Bratunac-Konjevic
16 Polje-Milici-Vlasenica road, but rather to carry out the search of
17 terrain on our move towards Zepa because that was necessary. There was
18 no other tactically justified route and that Srebrenica, Vijogor,
19 Derventa Milici, and onwards.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Go to 65 ter 117A in the English, and
21 in the B/C/S it's 117 B. 1177, sorry. I may have misspoke.
22 Q. Now, this should be a familiar intercept. It's just a synopsis
23 by the Bosnian interceptors. 0952 hours in the morning of 15 July:
24 "Colonel Beara was looking for General Zivanovic but he was not
25 there. He said he was to call him at extension 139."
1 Extension 139 was the extension for Dragan Nikolic at the
2 Zvornik Brigade, wasn't it, at the security office?
3 A. I don't know the extension numbers by heart. You have the
4 directory of the Zvornik Brigade, so we can check together.
5 Q. We do have it and that's what it says, if you'll take my word for
6 it. We've seen it here and we can get it out for tomorrow. But --
7 A. I believe you.
8 Q. So if this intercept is correct, that means Colonel Beara would
9 be expected to be at the Zvornik Brigade at about that time so he could
10 take a call from General Zivanovic; correct?
11 A. Yeah, makes sense, based on this conversation.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Let's go to 65 ter 1178A in the English
13 and 1178C in the B/C/S. And the Zvornik Brigade phone list is 65 ter 368
14 for anyone that wants to check up.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: B/C/S version is confidential so it will not be
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I've just handed the General the print-out
18 version of that.
19 Q. So if we see this conversation between General Zivanovic and
20 Colonel Ljubo Beara, let me go over it. According to the intercept
21 operators it should be Beara that says: [As read] "Hello, General, sir?"
22 Zivanovic says: "Hello, this is Zivanovic.
25 "No, that's postponed. He is laughing. It can't be postponed as
1 long as there are ..."
2 Beara: "Okay that, but that's new position, new day, new ..."
3 Zivanovic: ...
4 Beara: "Okay, then. Listen, bro. Yes. You know that day, I
5 informed the commander about it, Furtula didn't send Lukic's intervention
7 Now we've identified Furtula from the video of Srebrenica, right,
8 this is the same Furtula that we saw on the Srebrenica video, that you
9 say was at the dinner on what you say was the 11th?
10 A. Yes. He was the only Furtula that I knew.
11 Q. And the commander of the Visegrad Brigade at the time?
12 A. I think that at the time it was the Visegrad Gorazde Brigade and
13 then it merged into one brigade.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Haynes.
15 MR. HAYNES: I think the last question was a misstatement of the
16 evidence. If you look at page 40, lines 12 to 15. This -- the accused
17 never said that Furtula was at that meeting.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY:
20 Q. I may have mixed that up with Jevdjevic. Did you remember seeing
21 Furtula as Jevdjevic did?
22 A. No, I said that I wasn't sure if I saw Furtula because he left no
23 impression strong enough for me to remember that. I think that was
24 exactly what I told you before the last break.
25 Q. All right. Thank you for clarifying that.
1 Now, Lukic's intervention platoon, what is that? What do you
2 think that is, based on your knowledge of the people and places and
4 A. I don't think that Lukic had any intervention platoon. There was
5 an intervention company, though, from the Visegrad brigade, and another
6 man was the commander of that company, or maybe even platoon.
7 Q. What was the other man's name?
8 A. I think his name was Boban Indjic.
9 Q. And we recognise that name from other intercepts; correct?
10 A. Yes, I've seen it somewhere in the intercepts.
11 Q. And then Zivanovic says: "And Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic."
12 And Beara says: "Lukic is here with me, and his driver, and we
13 urged them on that."
14 So according to this, Lukic would have been with Beara at Zvornik
15 on the morning of 15 July; correct?
16 A. That's what the person Beara says here, and that is that Lukic
17 was with him.
18 Q. Zivanovic says: "Yes."
19 And Beara says: "And yesterday, Furtula sent one soldier without
20 an arm and another one that Lukic knows as a drunkard. Fuck him."
21 Zivanovic says: "Yes."
22 Beara says: "Instead of platoon."
23 Zivanovic says: "Oh dear."
24 Beara says: "Simply, he doesn't give a damn about the
25 commander's order. Well, now, that platoon has 60 men."
1 Who do you think the commander is in this context?
2 A. I don't know whether Beara had contacts with his commander. He
3 is probably referring to this man Furtula. From other documents we saw
4 that this unit was on its way but that a bus broke down and it was
6 Q. That's -- I agree with that but isn't the commander's order
7 here, wouldn't Beara's commander been Mladic?
8 A. Yes, yes. I was -- I was just thinking that this unit was from
9 the Visegrad Brigade and that this unit commander was Furtula.
10 Q. Okay. And then it goes on, Beara says: "Have him send at least
12 Zivanovic says: "Yes, yes."
13 Beara says: "Say again?"
14 Zivanovic: "To send them immediately."
15 Beara: "Yes."
16 And then Zivanovic says: "I can't order that anymore."
17 Now, this is 15 July, why does, do you believe, Zivanovic says
19 A. Because he was no longer commander of the corps. Formally
20 speaking he was, but actually he wasn't because he by that time still
21 hadn't handed over his duty.
22 Q. Okay. So it goes: [As read] "Uh-Huh."
23 Zivanovic: "385."
24 Beara: "385."
25 Zivanovic: ...
1 Beara: "385."
2 Zivanovic: "That's right."
3 Beara: "And that is, what telephone exchange is 385?"
4 Zivanovic says: "Zlatar and 385."
5 Now Zlatar and 358 is the way to reach General Krstic at Krivace
6 at the time, isn't it, or wherever the forward command was on the 15th?
7 A. No, this is extension number 385 was probably moved around
8 depending on the location. I think that at that time it was being used
9 by the commander of the Drina Corps. And, yes, at the time it was at the
10 Krivaca IKM.
11 Q. And the commander of the Drina Corps at the time was
12 General Krstic; correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And then Beara says: "Okay. Thank you."
15 Zivanovic: "And we should have a drink."
16 Beara: "Oh, yes, of course. Take care and give my regards."
17 Okay. That happened at 954 hours by the Muslim's watch. And
18 then if we could go to 65 ter 1179A and 1179B. We have another intercept
19 this time between Colonel Ljubo Beara and General Krstic.
20 A. I only have Beara, not Ljubo.
21 Q. Handing you the handwritten versions. There's many versions of
22 this particular intercept as you will recall. I've picked out one of
23 them. So this is just a few minutes later at 10.00. And we can see on
24 the version I'm looking at it starts:
25 "General, Furtula didn't carry out the boss's order. Listen, he
1 ordered him to lead out a tank, not a train."
2 Beara: "But I need 30 men just like it was ordered."
3 Krstic: "Take them from Tasic or Sladojevic. I can't pull
4 anybody out of here for you."
5 Now, if we go down the intercept a ways we see a reference to
6 Nastic and Blagojevic. Who in your view, General, is this reference
7 Tasic and Sladojevic, that's the Muslims not hearing it quite right,
8 isn't it?
9 A. I suppose that this was Nastic from Milici Brigade and --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Witness, please repeat the second name.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Could you repeat the second name, Mr. Pandurevic,
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the second name was
14 Blagojevic from the Bratunac Brigade.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY:
17 Q. And just to set the scene a little bit, at 10 a.m. in Zvornik on
18 the 15th of July, you will agree with me that all the Muslim men at
19 Orahovac have been shot and killed, and either just finished burying or
20 in the continuing process of the burial. All the men at the Petkovci
21 school having been shot and killed in the late night hours of the 14th
22 and early morning hours of the 15th are all dead, and in the process of
23 being buried on the plateau of the dam. And that there are many hundreds
24 of Muslim prisoners still alive at the Rocevic School and there are many,
25 many hundreds of prisoners alive at the school in Kula near Pilica and
1 hundreds alive at the cultural centre in Pilica; correct?
2 A. Yes, that was the fact established in the course of this trial.
3 Q. Where are you at 10.00 on the 15th of July?
4 A. Probably just about to leave or I was already on my way before
5 the column started, or I was in the process of forming a column to head
6 towards Zvornik.
7 Q. So when you say in the process of leaving, you had just met with
8 General Krstic that morning and you were getting ready to leave or
9 perhaps had already left?
10 A. I left the Krivace IKM before 10.00. At around 10:00 or a few
11 minutes thereafter, I left the area of Zepa, or, rather, Podzeplje.
12 Q. Let's see what subject matter Mr. Beara and Mr. Krstic are
13 talking about. I'll continue that, sorry for the break.
14 "But I don't have any here," Beara says. "I need them today and
15 I'll give them back tonight. Krle, you have to understand. I can't
16 explain it to you."
17 Krle is General Krstic; correct?
18 A. Probably, yes.
19 Q. What do you think Beara is looking for, based on your knowledge
20 of the case?
21 A. He probably needs what hasn't arrived in time from Mr. Furtula.
22 Q. What is that in your view?
23 A. Manpower.
24 Q. For what purpose?
25 A. Probably for the job that Beara was doing.
1 Q. Organising the murder of all the Muslim prisoners in the Zvornik
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Nikolic.
4 MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] This calls for speculation on the
5 part of witness. Furthermore, he said himself that he was not in contact
6 with Beara at the time.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: He is perfectly capable of answering the question
8 one way or another if he knows. So let's proceed with your answer,
9 Mr. Pandurevic. Yes, Mr. Bourgon.
10 MR. BOURGON: Mr. President, I'd like to support the objection
11 which was put forward by my colleague in the back. It's not that the
12 witness knows. The witness has said that these are things that were
13 established during the trial --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Let him answer the question, Mr. Bourgon.
15 MR. BOURGON: -- so it is speculation, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: It's not speculation at all. Let him answer the
18 MR. BOURGON: He knew nothing at the time. Thank you,
19 Mr. President.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: He has been here with us for more than two years
21 and he knows that no one is allowed to speculate, so he is in better
22 place than you can imagine to answer this question. Go ahead.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that the
24 issue here is that the men who had been sent from Visegrad failed to
25 arrive in time and that Beara couldn't finish the job that Mr. McCloskey
1 is talking about and that he needed at least 30 men for that. I learned
2 about all that during the trial, but all I can do now is to establish a
3 connection between the documents put forward to me by the Prosecution.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY:
5 Q. Okay. And after Beara says: "I can't explain it to you."
6 Krstic says: "It will disturb everything on his axis if I pull
7 them out, and a lot depends on him."
8 What do you think Krstic is talking about?
9 A. I don't know if Beara was looking for someone in particular. I
10 don't know if he was asking Krstic for someone in particular to pull out
11 someone from Zepa, but even before this I got the task to go with my unit
12 and fight with the 28th Division.
13 Q. And then Beara says: "I need 15 to 30 men with Boban Indjic. I
14 can't do anything."
15 So how does that fit in?
16 A. Well, it fits in because he was insisting, continuing to insist
17 that men be sent to him.
18 Q. And Krstic says: "Ljubo, this is not secure."
19 So, is this a radio relay line that is not secure?
20 A. What you have just given me does not coincide completely with
21 what you read so I can't see what kind of communication that was. And
22 since the conversation was from Krivace, it went through RRU2 and that
23 connection was not secure.
24 Q. Okay. And Beara responds to that: "I know. I know."
25 Krstic says: "I'll see what I can do, but it will disturb a lot.
1 Please, you have down there at Nastic and Blagojevic."
2 Remind us who Nastic and Blagojevic are?
3 A. He probably means the commander of the Bratunac Brigade.
4 Q. And Nastic?
5 A. Milomir Nastic was commander of the Milici Brigade at the time.
6 Q. And Beara says: "But I don't have any. If I did I wouldn't
7 still be asking for the third day."
8 Now, Colonel Beara has no command authority, does he, over
9 General Krstic? He is asking.
10 A. Yes, he is asking it from him to accomplish the task given him by
11 the boss. Maybe he couldn't communicate with the boss to check. If he
12 had been able to communicate with Mladic, Mladic would have dealt with it
13 in no time.
14 Q. Mladic would have had to give the order directly to the brigade
15 commanders or through Krstic for Beara to get them. Beara can't just go
16 and grab brigade assets because he is not a commander; correct?
17 A. He is not a commander, that's true. But you see that he is
18 looking for specific people that had been assigned to him, but for some
19 reason these people are not coming, and he continues to insist with
20 General Krstic that Krstic solve the problem for him. And Krstic is
21 telling him what to do. So Krstic is not issuing orders either to Nastic
22 or to Blagojevic. He is telling him to contact these men directly.
23 Q. Krstic goes on and says: "Check with Blagojevic. Take his red
25 Beara says: "They are not there. Only four of them are still
1 there. They took off. Fuck 'em, they are not there anymore."
2 Krstic says: "I'll see what I can do."
3 Now, I think we've noted and noticed that Krstic does not say,
4 Check with Vinko Pandurevic, does he?
5 A. Right.
6 Q. Krstic has just communicated with you and give you specific
7 instructions on what you will be doing going back to your brigade;
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. At the time of this conversation, Krstic would have been updated
11 on the operation that Beara was involved in?
12 A. You see from this conversation what information I had.
13 Q. At the time of your conversation on the morning of the 15th with
14 General Krstic, General Krstic would have been informed and aware of
15 Colonel Beara's murder operation, and the Drina Corps and the Main
16 Staff's and the Zvornik Brigade's and the Bratunac Brigade's joint
18 A. At the time I did not know what he knew. He didn't tell me
19 anything about this. Before this conversation, I had a meeting with him,
20 and then I left.
21 Q. But you will agree with me that General Krstic must have known
22 about the murder operation when you spoke with him?
23 A. Well, he probably knew something because he doesn't sound
24 surprised in his conversation with Beara. He is not asking Beara for any
25 explanation why he needed those men.
1 Q. So if General Krstic was aware that there were thousands of men
2 still alive in the Zvornik Brigade area that needed to be guarded, shot,
3 transported -- excuse me, guarded, transported, shot, and buried, at the
4 same time he is asking you to defend the lines and deal with the Muslim
5 column, you would have needed to have that information about those
6 prisoners in order to properly do your job; correct?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Would you have wanted to know, General?
9 A. How could I have wanted to know about something that I was
10 completely unaware of, because I was completely unaware of the fact that
11 these people existed, that there were prisoners.
12 Q. General, can you explain to me, explain to the Court why it was
13 that you would not have needed to know about the prisoners?
14 A. Well, you see that not for a moment does Krstic tell Beara to
15 contact the Zvornik Brigade. Whereas Beara is practically in the yard of
16 the Zvornik Brigade. And from all these documents in this trial, we
17 didn't see a document showing that such a task was given to the
18 Zvornik Brigade to accept these people, to guard these people or to
19 escort them anywhere. So it's probably the case that Krstic knew that
20 the whole thing was organised and that people were being expected from
21 Visegrad or I don't know where, to deal with this, and it had nothing to
22 do with the Zvornik Brigade.
23 Q. General, how is it that you did not need to know this? Please
24 answer my question.
25 A. I don't see a single tactical or military or combat reason why I
1 should need to know what someone else is doing completely unconnected
2 with combat activities or with the Zvornik Brigade.
3 Q. You will agree with me that each of the brigade -- excuse me,
4 each of the battalion commanders, the 4th Battalion in the area of the
5 Orahovac, Petkovci battalion deputy commander, the Rocevic commander,
6 Sreco Acimovic, the 1st Battalion, the Pilica Battalion security officer,
7 and the deputy commander who was in charge of at the time all had to deal
8 with these prisoners in one way or another from this trial. I'm not
9 asking you to consider anything more than what has come out in this trial
10 but we've seen them involved one way or another. The guys you rely on,
11 four key battalion commanders, had this dropped on their lap. How, sir,
12 could you not need to know this?
13 A. You know well from the past proceedings and your investigations
14 that you know very well where I was and what I was doing when these
15 activities started. You also know very well that Dragan Obrenovic never
16 told me that any of these commanders had issued any orders regarding
17 these prisoners of war. He told them at the time to single out men, to
18 set up ambushes and fight the 28th Division, so many troops expected they
19 could be sent to the Baljkovica or Crni Vrh. And if any one of them
20 asked to be guards by the school holding the prisoners at the time, and
21 nobody knew at the time that they would be shot, of course such guard
22 duty was preferable to combat.
23 However, none of these battalion commanders got any orders from
24 Obrenovic or Pandurevic.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I think it's a good time to break.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey. What is your estimate of the
2 time you still need for the conclusion of your cross?
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, we are -- if we don't get too hung
4 up tomorrow we might finish tomorrow. I've got three binders and I'm
5 down two, almost.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. All right I'm asking for planning reasons,
7 but also because it's for the first time I notice some signs of tiredness
8 with the witness. So we'll reconvene tomorrow morning at 9.00. Thank
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.
11 to be reconvened on Friday, the 27th day of
12 February, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.