Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 34917

 1                           Thursday, 10 June 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [Judgement]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 10.06 a.m.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning, everybody.  I apologise for starting

 6     five minutes or six minutes late, but we had a technical fault which we

 7     were trying to fix.  Unfortunately, we haven't fixed it, but we decided

 8     to start nonetheless.

 9             Today, we'll be a little bit more formal when it comes to

10     representation.  I will be asking you to identify exactly who is and who

11     isn't here.

12             For the record, all the accused are present.  I just want to make

13     sure that you are receiving interpretation in your own language or in a

14     language that you understand.

15             Yes, I see all the accused nodding, so let's proceed to

16     representation.

17             Prosecution, Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,

19     everyone.

20             My name is Peter McCloskey, for the Prosecution, and with me

21     today is Nelson Thayer, Kweku Vanderpuye, Janet Stewart, Jelena Plamenac,

22     Chris Mitchell, Caitlin Chittenden, Rupert Elderkin, Lada Soljan, and

23     Julian Nicholls, who for the life of me I couldn't figure out who he was.

24     Thank you.

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.

Page 34918

 1             Representation for Accused Popovic.

 2             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.

 4             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  For Mr. Popovic, Zoran Zivanovic, lead counsel;

 5     Ms. Mira Tapuskovic, co-counsel; Mr. Djordje Kalanj, legal assistant; and

 6     Ms. Leanne Andrecik [phoen], legal assistant.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

 8             Representation for Accused Beara.

 9             MR. OSTOJIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  My name is

10     John Ostojic here on behalf of Mr. Beara.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

12             Representation for Accused Nikolic.

13             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.  My

14     name is Jelena Nikolic, with me, Mr. Stephane Bourgon and

15     Ms. Caroline Bouchard-Lauzon, our legal assistant.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

17             Representation for Accused Borovcanin.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  Good morning Mr. President, Your Honours.  My name

19     is Christopher Gosnell.  I'm here on behalf of Mr. Borovcanin, and with

20     me are Tatjana Cmeric and William Byrne.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

22             Representation for Accused Miletic.

23             MS. FAUVEAU:  [Interpretation] Natacha Fauveau Ivanovic

24     representing General Miletic with Mr. Petrusic, Nenad.

25             JUDGE AGIUS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 34919

 1             [In English] Representation for Accused Gvero.

 2             MR. KRGOVIC:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning,

 3     everyone.  On behalf of General Gvero Defence, Dragan Krgovic, lead

 4     counsel; David Josse; Michelle Butler; and Ivan Zogovic.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  And finally representation for

 6     Accused Pandurevic.

 7             MR. HAYNES:  Myself, Peter Haynes, Mr. Simon Davis, and our case

 8     manager, Helen Kaker.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  I thank you.  So let's proceed.

10             The Trial Chamber is sitting today to delivery its judgement in

11     the case the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara,

12     Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, and

13     Vinko Pandurevic.

14             I shall now read a summary of the Trial Chamber's findings in

15     that judgement.  However, the authoritative account of those findings is

16     contained in the judgement, which will be made available after this

17     hearing.

18             At the outset, the Chamber wishes to express its gratitude to all

19     counsel, past and present, the Registry staff, the interpreters, court

20     reporters, and technicians, the security officers, and staff at the

21     United Nations Detention facility, the Trial Chamber's own staff, and all

22     others whose have contributed to the smooth and efficient conduct of this

23     trial.

24             Trial proceedings in this case commenced on the 21st of August,

25     2006, and concluded on 15th September 2009.  In that time, the

Page 34920

 1     Trial Chamber has heard or otherwise admitted evidence from

 2     315 witnesses.  A total of 34.915 transcript pages records what was heard

 3     in court.  There were 5.383 exhibits before the Trial Chamber, amounting

 4     to 87.392 pages.

 5             Over the course of a few days in July 1995, following the fall of

 6     Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian Muslim males were detained in deplorable

 7     conditions, transported to various remote locations, and summarily

 8     executed.  In parallel to these mass executions, Bosnian Muslim women,

 9     children, and the elderly were transferred out of this part of

10     Eastern Bosnia.  In the context of the war in the former Yugoslavia and

11     in the context of human history, these events are arrestive in their

12     scale and brutality.

13             The Trial Chamber wishes to emphasise that while the horrific

14     crimes committed in and around Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 form the

15     basis for this case, the trial is ultimately about seven men:

16     Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin,

17     Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, and Vinko Pandurevic.  The trial is about

18     these seven men and their alleged individual criminal responsibility.

19             The Trial Chamber will first list the charges brought against the

20     accused.  It will then provide a summary of the factual allegations that

21     underpin the crimes charged.  Next, it will examine the specific crimes

22     and the criminal responsibility for each accused.  Finally, it will

23     render its verdict.  I'll start with the accused.

24             The Prosecution alleges that two joint criminal enterprises

25     existed in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995.  One was a joint

Page 34921

 1     criminal enterprise to murder the able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men from

 2     Srebrenica, which I will be referring to as the JCE to murder, and the

 3     other was a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly remove the Bosnian

 4     Muslim population from Srebrenica and Zepa.  I will be referring to this

 5     joint criminal enterprise as the JCE to forcibly remove.

 6             By virtue of their acts and omissions, five of the accused, that

 7     is, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin,

 8     and Vinko Pandurevic, are alleged to be responsible for genocide under

 9     Count 1; conspiracy to commit genocide under Count 2; extermination,

10     being a crime against humanity in Count 3; murder, a crime against

11     humanity and a violation of the Laws or Customs of War in Counts 4 and 5

12     respectively; persecution, a crime against humanity in Count 6; inhumane

13     acts consisting of forcible transfer, a crime against humanity in

14     Count 7; and, finally, deportation, a crime against humanity under

15     Count 8.

16             All five accused are alleged to have been members of the JCE to

17     murder and the JCE to forcibly remove, and are charged under every form

18     of individual responsibility set out in Article 7(1) of our Statute.  In

19     addition, Ljubomir Borovcanin and Vinko Pandurevic are alleged to be

20     responsible pursuant to superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the

21     Statute.

22             By virtue of their acts and omissions, two of the accused,

23     Radivoje Miletic and Milan Gvero, are alleged to be responsible for

24     murder, a crime against humanity and a violation of the Laws or Customs

25     of War under counts 4 and 5 respectively; persecution, a crime against

Page 34922

 1     humanity under Count 6; inhumane acts consisting in forcible transfer, a

 2     crime against humanity under Count 7; and deportation, a crime against

 3     humanity under Count 8.  Radivoje Miletic and Milan Gvero are alleged to

 4     have been members of the JCE to forcibly remove and are charged under

 5     every form of individual responsibility set out in Article 7(1) of the

 6     Statute.

 7             I now turn to the Trial Chamber's findings in relation to the

 8     commission of the alleged crimes by the Bosnian Serb forces.

 9             I note at the outset that the judgement sets out the background

10     of the events alleged from 1992.  For the purpose of this summary,

11     however, the Trial Chamber will limit itself to events that took place

12     between March and September 1995.

13             In March 1995, Supreme Command Directive 7 was issued by

14     President Karadzic.  The directive set out the criminal plan for an

15     attack against protected United Nations safe areas aimed at forcing the

16     civilian populations of Srebrenica and Zepa to leave the enclaves.  It

17     tasked the Drina Corps to create "an unbearable situation of total

18     insecurity, with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants

19     of Srebrenica and Zepa."  It also detailed that "the planned and

20     unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits" should be undertaken so as

21     to limit the supply of material resources to the population and logistic

22     support of the United Nations Protection Force, which I will be referring

23     to as UNPROFOR.

24             In the implementation of this plan, from at least June of 1995,

25     the aid supply decreased significantly as a result of the Bosnian Serb

Page 34923

 1     Army restrictions, creating an increasingly dire humanitarian situation

 2     in Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves.  Henceforth, I will be referring to this

 3     Bosnian Serb Army as the VRS.

 4             On 6th July, the VRS started its military attack on the

 5     Srebrenica enclave, an operation known as Krivaja 95.  Several days of

 6     intense shelling followed, which Srebrenica town and the compounds and

 7     observation points of the Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR, which I shall be

 8     referring to as DutchBat, being amongst the targets.  On 11 July, the

 9     enclave, including the town of Srebrenica, fell.

10             As a result of the attack, from 10th July, thousands of

11     Bosnian Muslims started fleeing from Srebrenica town to the DutchBat

12     compound in Potocari, desperate for protection.  While mostly women,

13     children, and the elderly fled to Potocari, Bosnian Muslim men from

14     Srebrenica gathered in villages in the valleys of the Srebrenica enclave.

15     In the late evening, these men formed a column which set off in the

16     direction of Tuzla, which was in the territory held by the Army of

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I will be referring to this army as ABiH.  In

18     order to reach Tuzla, the column had to break through VRS-held positions.

19     The column consisted of about 10.000 to 15.000 individuals, mostly men,

20     and with both a civilian and a military component.

21             Meanwhile, three meetings took place between representatives from

22     the VRS and DutchBat at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac over 11th and

23     12th July.  So-called unofficial representatives of the Bosnian Muslim

24     population also attended the second and third meetings.  The parties

25     discussed the logistics of moving over 10.000 Bosnian Muslims from

Page 34924

 1     Potocari and its surroundings, and Mladic told the Bosnian Muslim

 2     representatives:

 3             "You can either survive or disappear.  For your survival, I

 4     demand that all your armed men surrender their weapons to the VRS."

 5             By the morning of 12th July, a decision had been taken to

 6     separate the Bosnian Muslim men in Potocari and execute them.  On that

 7     same day, the VRS dispatched approximately 50 buses to Potocari, where

 8     members of the Bosnian Serb forces, that is, VRS forces, Ministry of the

 9     Interior in Republika Srpska MUP forces, began separating men aged

10     15 to 65 from the women, children and the elderly, who were boarding the

11     buses.

12             Already on the verge of a humanitarian disaster, a night of utter

13     misery ensued at the DutchBat compound.  People were frightened, some

14     died.  Members of the Bosnian Serb forces took away men who did not

15     return, and women were heard screaming, Let me go, and, Please don't.

16     The transfer and separations continued throughout the next day.

17             Members of the Bosnian Serb forces confiscated and eventually

18     burnt the separated men's belongings, including passports and identity

19     papers, and detained the men at various houses in Potocari.  They were

20     given no food, hardly any water, and sanitary facilities were scarce.

21     Members of the Bosnian Serb forces transported the separated men towards

22     Bratunac.  The Bosnian Serb forces thwarted efforts by DutchBat soldiers

23     to escort the convoys and record the men's names.

24             On 13 July, there were several random killings of Bosnian Muslims

25     by members of the Bosnian Serb forces, including at the Luke School and

Page 34925

 1     in Potocari.  By the evening of 13 July, between 20.000 and 30.000

 2     Bosnian Muslims had been bussed out to ABiH-held territory, and no

 3     Bosnian Muslims remained in Potocari or Srebrenica.

 4             The Trial Chamber has found that this constituted forcible

 5     transfer, including by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, with respect to

 6     the civilian component of the column.

 7             Meanwhile, on 12th and 13th July, the VRS deployed several units

 8     along various routes in order to engage militarily and block the column

 9     of Bosnian Muslims that was moving from Srebrenica to Tuzla.  By this

10     point, the murder plan originally directed at the men in Potocari was

11     extended to Bosnian Muslim men who were captured or surrendered from the

12     column.  By 13th July, Bosnian Serb forces had detained approximately

13     6.000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the Bratunac area.  The prisoners were

14     forced to surrender their property, which included identity cards,

15     wallets, watches, and food.  They were kept in cramped conditions and

16     received some water, although hardly any food.  Members of the Bosnian

17     Serb forces did not ask or record names.  Some of the detained prisoners

18     became victims of opportunistic killings.

19             On 13th July, VRS Commander Ratko Mladic issued a telling order

20     prohibiting filming and photographing of prisoners, and preventing access

21     by "unauthorised" and "uninvited" entities.  At the same time, a series

22     of meetings were held over the 13th and 14th July between members of the

23     civilian authorities and VRS members, at which the logistics of the

24     killing and burial operations were the central objects.

25             On 13th July, the murder operation began in earnest.  Members of

Page 34926

 1     the Bosnian Serb forces shot and killed Bosnian Muslim prisoners on the

 2     banks of the Jadar River, at an area along a dirt road in Cerska Valley,

 3     the Bratunac Brigade headquarters, and Sandici Meadow, and in and around

 4     the Vuk Karadzic School in Bratunac town.

 5             On the same day, Bosnian Muslim prisoners who were captured or

 6     surrendered from the column close to Sandici Meadow were marched or

 7     transported to the nearby Kravica warehouse.  There, what appears to be a

 8     busload of prisoners were initially killed after a prisoner had grabbed a

 9     weapon, killing one member of the Bosnian Serb forces and wounding

10     others.  What followed this initial killing episode can only be described

11     as a massacre of the prisoners held in the warehouse.  Members of the

12     Bosnian Serb forces besieged the prisoners with gun-fire and grenades.

13     The assault upon the prisoners lasted through the night.  By the end, at

14     least 1.000 Bosnian Muslim men had been killed.  Excavators arrived on

15     14th and 15th of July to remove the bodies.

16             Further mass executions followed in Zvornik shortly after.  Over

17     13th to 17th July, the detained Bosnian Muslim men were taken by the

18     Bosnian Serb forces in buses and trucks from Bratunac to various places

19     of detention in Zvornik.  The men endured a brief but horrific period of

20     detention in various public buildings, mainly schools.  The facilities

21     were woefully inadequate.  The men were taunted along ethnic lines and

22     largely denied food and water.  An atmosphere of terror was maintained

23     through beatings and sporadic executions.  Their spirits broken, the

24     Bosnian Muslim men were taken for execution.  Some were blindfolded and

25     their hands were tied, and at one detention site they were given a final

Page 34927

 1     glass of water.  Then they were transported to nearby locations and shot.

 2     This scene played out at a field in Orahovac, a dam at Petkovci, a gravel

 3     pit in Kozluk, and a farm in Pilica.  In addition, hundreds were killed

 4     inside the Pilica Cultural Centre, an execution for which there are no

 5     known survivors.

 6             Loaders and excavators were either already at the sites at the

 7     time of the executions or arrived soon after to bury the dead in mass

 8     graves.  In the wake of these mass executions, the Bosnian Serb forces

 9     ordered a so-called mopping-up operation throughout the enclave, and

10     executions on a smaller scale continued in the Zvornik area between the

11     16th and the 27th of July, 1995.

12             The members of the column who had not surrendered or been

13     captured had continued to move towards ABiH territory.  By 15th July, the

14     column had reached the Zvornik Brigade's area of responsibility, and

15     heavy fighting took place.  However, on 16th and 17th July, a corridor

16     several hundred metres wide was opened in the defence lines of the

17     Bosnian Serb forces, allowing a significant part of the column to pass to

18     ABiH-held territory.  These Bosnian Muslim men escaped the murder

19     operation.

20             During September and October 1995, in an effort to conceal the

21     killings, the VRS, with the assistance of the civilian authorities,

22     carried out a large-scale operation in the areas of Zvornik and the

23     Bratunac Brigades, during which bodies of execution victims were moved

24     from their primary graves to secondary locations.

25             An extensive amount of forensic and demographic evidence was

Page 34928

 1     presented in this trial.  This evidence is analysed in detail in the

 2     judgement.  Based on this evidence, the Trial Chamber has found that at

 3     least 5.336 identified individuals were killed in the executions

 4     following the fall of Srebrenica.  However, noting that the evidence

 5     before it is not all-encompassing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that

 6     the number of identified individuals will rise.  The Trial Chamber,

 7     therefore, considers that the number of individuals killed in the

 8     executions following the fall of Srebrenica could well be as high as

 9     7.826.

10             The scale and nature of the murder operation, with the staggering

11     number of killings, the systematic and organised manner in which it was

12     carried out, the targeting and relentless pursuit of the victims, and the

13     plain intention apparent from the evidence to eliminate every Bosnian

14     Muslim man who was captured or surrendered, proves beyond reasonable

15     doubt that this was genocide.

16             As these events played out north of Srebrenica, the VRS also

17     maintained a military focus on the Zepa enclave.  The VRS initiated

18     discussions regarding the removal of the population of Zepa before

19     arriving militarily at the enclave.  Three rounds of negotiations took

20     place.  At each juncture, military force was the means used by the VRS to

21     compel concessions from the Bosnian Muslim population of Zepa.  As the

22     attacks continued, they intensified.

23             Further, news about the fate of the Bosnian Muslims from

24     Srebrenica began to circulate, adding to the panic of the population, and

25     loud-speakers broadcasted a message that there was no chance for the

Page 34929

 1     Bosnian Muslim population, as the area was controlled by Mladic.

 2     Ultimately, in the face of these impossible conditions, the population

 3     had no choice but to leave the enclave.  As one witness described, the

 4     choice was "to leave Zepa under very cruel and humiliating circumstances

 5     or to remain and then either be killed or be subjected to suffering."

 6             Most of the transportation of the civilians took place on

 7     26th July, and by the following day, the 27th, around 4.000 or

 8     5.000 Bosnian Muslim women, children, and elderly, and wounded were

 9     transported by bus out of Zepa.

10             As of 31st of July, when negotiations as to their fate appear to

11     have stopped, the Bosnian Muslim able-bodied men of Zepa, civilians and

12     military, fled in various directions, including across the Drina River to

13     Serbia.  These men also faced the same situation as the civilians, and

14     they had no choice but to escape the enclave.  While a so-called

15     agreement was signed to give a veneer of legitimacy to the movement of

16     the Bosnian Muslim population of Zepa, the Trial Chamber has found that

17     this constituted forcible transfer, including, by majority, Judge Kwon

18     dissenting, of the able-bodied men who fled to Serbia.

19             I now turn to the legal finding.

20             The Trial Chamber will now summarise its key -- the interpreters

21     on the English channel, I'm now receiving the Serbo-Croat translation.

22     If that could stop, it would help me immensely.

23             The Trial Chamber will now summarise its key legal findings.

24             The Trial Chamber has found that there was a joint criminal

25     enterprise to murder and a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly remove

Page 34930

 1     with several participants.  The Trial Chamber has found that

 2     opportunistic killings were committed in the course of the JCE to murder,

 3     and by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, in the course of the JCE to

 4     forcibly remove.  Further, it has found that some members of the JCE to

 5     murder had genocidal intent and, thus, genocide was committed.  It has

 6     also found that members of both JCEs had the requisite special intent for

 7     the crime of persecution.  It has also been established beyond reasonable

 8     doubt that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the

 9     civilian population.  This attack commenced with the issuance of

10     Directive 7 and had various components, including the strangulation of

11     the enclaves through the restriction of humanitarian supplies, the

12     gradual weakening and disabling of UNPROFOR, and a planned military

13     assault on the enclaves, and culminated in the removal of thousands of

14     people from Srebrenica and Zepa.

15             Therefore, applying the legal elements of the crimes charged in

16     the indictment to the facts found to be proven, the Trial Chamber has

17     found that the following crimes were committed by members of the

18     Bosnian Serb forces in various locations alleged in the indictment:

19     Genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; extermination, a crime against

20     humanity; murder, a crime against humanity and a violation of the Laws or

21     Customs of War; murder, cruel and inhumane treatment, terrorising

22     civilians, and forcible transfer as acts of persecution, a crime against

23     humanity; and, finally, forcible transfer as an inhumane act, a crime

24     against humanity.  The Trial Chamber finds that the elements of the crime

25     of deportation have not been established.

Page 34931

 1             I now turn to individual criminal responsibility of each of the

 2     accused, starting with Vujadin Popovic.

 3             Vujadin Popovic was the chief of security of the Drina Corps in

 4     1995, and he held the rank of lieutenant-colonel.  On 12th July, Popovic

 5     forecasted the planned separations, transfers, and killings in the

 6     enclave when speaking to Momir Nikolic prior to the third Hotel Fontana

 7     meeting.  He told Momir Nikolic that "All the balijas have to be killed,"

 8     and asked him to assist in the operation.  Popovic was present with the

 9     Bosnian Serb forces in Potocari on 12th July, and the Trial Chamber has

10     found that Popovic was aware of the large number of men among the

11     thousands of Bosnian Muslims gathered at Potocari on this day.  The

12     Trial Chamber has found that Popovic had knowledge of the operation to

13     capture men along the Konjevic Polje road on 13th of July.  That evening,

14     Popovic phoned Drago Nikolic to inform him that a large number of

15     prisoners would be brought from Bratunac to Zvornik in order to be

16     killed.  He asked Drago Nikolic to assist in this operation.

17             On 14 July, Beara, Popovic and Nikolic met at the

18     Standard Barracks, which was the Zvornik Brigade's headquarters in

19     Karakaj, to organise and co-ordinate the killing operation.  Following

20     this meeting, Popovic carried out the initial steps required to put the

21     plan in action when he accompanied a convoy of buses carrying

22     Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Bratunac to Grbavci School in Orahovac.

23     The Trial Chamber has found that later that day, Popovic was present at

24     the field in Orahovac as the executions took place.

25             On 15th July, Popovic was present at the Rocevic School,

Page 34932

 1     organising personnel and equipment to facilitate the detentions at the

 2     school as well as the executions which occurred later that day at a

 3     gravel pit near Kozluk.  Also on this day, Popovic gave the

 4     Zvornik Brigade duty officers instructions to not record any information

 5     concerning the Bosnian Muslim prisoners, nor should he speak about them

 6     over the radio.

 7             In the following days, that is, 16th of July, Popovic was present

 8     at yet another site, where prisoners were detained prior to execution.

 9     I'm referring to the Kula School in Pilica.  On this day, Popovic

10     requested the delivery of fuel from the Zvornik Brigade in relation to

11     the execution and burial of prisoners in Pilica.  Drazen Erdemovic, saw a

12     so-described lieutenant-colonel at Pilica several times on 16th July,

13     including at the Branjevo Military Farm execution site.  The

14     "lieutenant-colonel" was organising personnel to participate in the

15     executions.

16             For the reasons outlined in the judgement, the Trial Chamber is

17     satisfied that this so-called lieutenant-colonel was Popovic.

18             That evening, Popovic asked that a message be conveyed to "the

19     general" that he had "finished the job."  And the next day, 17th of July,

20     Popovic again told an unknown interlocutor, whom he referred to as "the

21     boss," that "that all gets an A."

22             For the reasons outlined in the judgement, the Trial Chamber is

23     satisfied that in both of these conversations, Popovic was referring to

24     the killing operation.

25             Later in July 1995, 10 wounded Bosnian Muslim men came to be held

Page 34933

 1     at the headquarters of the Zvornik Brigade.  Sometime after 23rd of July,

 2     these men were placed in Popovic's custody.  For the reasons outlined in

 3     the judgement, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Popovic either killed

 4     or facilitated the killing of these 10 wounded Bosnian Muslim men.

 5             The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that

 6     during these days, Popovic was fully engaged in the organisation of the

 7     killing operation being carried out in the Zvornik area.  For the reasons

 8     set out in the judgement, the Trial Chamber has found that Popovic was a

 9     member of the JCE to murder the Bosnian Muslim males of Srebrenica and

10     that he participated in the joint criminal enterprise with persecutory

11     intent.  The Trial Chamber has found that Popovic was not a member of the

12     JCE to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslim civilian population from the

13     enclaves.

14             Popovic was not a marginal participant in the JCE to murder.  He

15     knew of the plan from the time of its inception and was privy to each

16     development, from the discussions at Bratunac before the operation began,

17     to the capture of the Bosnian Muslim men from the column, to the

18     large-scale killings at Zvornik.  Popovic was entrenched in several

19     aspects of the operation, and he participated with resolve.  He was

20     ubiquitous in the Zvornik area, present at all but one of the major

21     killing sites.  Popovic knew that the intent was not just to kill those

22     who had fallen in the hands of the Bosnian Serb forces, but to kill as

23     many as possible, with the aim of destroying the group.  Popovic's

24     ensuing robust participation in all aspects of the plan demonstrates that

25     he not only knew of this intent to destroy, but also shared it.

Page 34934

 1             I'll now deal with Accused Beara.

 2             In July 1995, Ljubisa Beara was chief of security in the

 3     VRS Main Staff, and he held the rank of colonel:  He was the superior to

 4     Popovic and Nikolic, in the professional sense.

 5             On 13 July, Beara was present in Bratunac and was seen at a

 6     number of places where Bosnian Muslim men were detained.  Intercepted

 7     conversations from this day record Beara discussing Bosnian Muslim

 8     prisoners.  Although the record of one conversation indicates that Beara

 9     was looking to simply detain prisoners, the Trial Chamber is nevertheless

10     satisfied, for the reasons set out in the judgement, that the

11     conversation was deliberately misleading as to the fate that awaited

12     these Bosnian Muslim men.

13             Several witnesses testified that Beara was present in Bratunac

14     and took part in informal meetings held at the SDS offices held between

15     13th and 14th of July, 1995.  The evidence of these witnesses is analysed

16     in detail in the judgement.  The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Beara

17     participated in these meetings, the subject matter of which was the

18     logistics of the planned killing operation, including the location for

19     the killings and burial as well as transportation and equipment.

20             Beara's co-ordinating role in the murder operation continued

21     throughout 14th of July.  He sourced construction machinery, enlisted the

22     help of civilian authorities to assist with the burials, and inspected

23     possible detention and/or execution sites.  Beara was also present at the

24     Grbavci School and the Petkovci School on 14th of July, where prisoners

25     were detained prior to being executed.

Page 34935

 1             On 15th of July, Beara continued to enlist personnel to carry out

 2     the killing operation, and intercepted conversations record his thinly

 3     veiled attempts to solicit resources.  Beara told General Krstic that he

 4     had "3.500 parcels" that needed distributing and pressured him to assign

 5     troops for that purpose.  In another conversation, he discussed the

 6     killing operation in terms of conducting a "triage."

 7             On 16th of July, Beara was at Kula School in Pilica, where

 8     prisoners were being held prior to execution.

 9             As the most senior officer in the Security Branch, the

10     Trial Chamber is of the opinion that Beara had the clearest overall

11     picture of the massive scale and scope of the killing operation.  From

12     his presence in Bratunac on the night of the 13th to his personal visits

13     to the various detention and execution sites, and the significant

14     logistical charges he faced throughout, Beara had a very personal view of

15     the staggering number of victims destined for execution.  Steeped in this

16     knowledge, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that Beara effectively

17     became a driving force behind the murder enterprise.

18             For the reasons detailed in the judgement, the Trial Chamber has

19     found that Beara was a member of the JCE to murder the Bosnian Muslim

20     males from Srebrenica and that he participated in that JCE with

21     persecutory intent.  The Trial Chamber has found that Beara was not a

22     member of the JCE to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslim civilian

23     population from the enclaves.

24             Beara's vigorous efforts to organise locations and sites, recruit

25     personnel, secure equipment, and oversee executions all evidence his grim

Page 34936

 1     determination to kill as many as possible as quickly as possible.  His

 2     encounters with Miroslav Deronjic, on the night of the 13th of July,

 3     provide a chilling illustration of a mind set on destruction.  He

 4     announced an intent to "kill all" the detained men, and without pause to

 5     consider or comment upon the horrific nature of his so-called orders, he

 6     launched into a series of heated exchanges about the best location for

 7     this reprehensible undertaking.

 8             For these reasons, which are outlined in the judgement, the

 9     Trial Chamber is satisfied that at this time Beara was a man intent on

10     destroying a group by killing all the members of it within his reach.

11     Beyond all reasonable doubt, he harboured genocidal intent.

12             I'll deal with Drago Nikolic.

13             In July 1995, Drago Nikolic was the chief of security in the

14     Zvornik Brigade and held the rank of second lieutenant in the VRS.

15             On the evening of 13 July, Nikolic was informed by Popovic that

16     the able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica were to be brought

17     from Bratunac to Zvornik to be killed.  Popovic asked Nikolic to assist

18     in the murder operation, and Nikolic subsequently sought release from the

19     forward command post for this purpose.  The evidence shows that from that

20     moment, Nikolic became an active member of the JCE to murder the

21     Bosnian Muslim males from Srebrenica.

22             During the evening of 13 July 1995, Nikolic made preparations for

23     detaining the prisoners at Orahovac and was at Orahovac giving directions

24     to the Zvornik Brigade military police who had been released to him for

25     that purpose.  For much of the day on 14th of July, 1995, Nikolic was

Page 34937

 1     present at the Grbavci School in a co-ordinating role and gave directions

 2     at the Orahovac execution site.

 3             On 14 July, Nikolic ordered the 1st Battalion of the

 4     Zvornik Brigade to secure the prisoners at the Kula School in the

 5     awareness that they would be executed.  Nikolic was also present with

 6     Popovic near Petkovci School while prisoners were held there, most of

 7     whom were killed the next day.

 8             On 15th July, Nikolic, working closely with Beara and Popovic,

 9     was involved in organising the detention and execution of prisoners at

10     Rocevic School.  The evidence shows that Nikolic demonstrated a resolve

11     to carry out his assigned tasks in this murderous operation.  His

12     contribution to the JCE to murder can properly be described as persistent

13     and determined.

14             However, Nikolic's knowledge of the murder operation is of a

15     different nature from that of Beara and Popovic.  Nikolic was first

16     informed of the murder plan on the evening of 13th July.  On the evidence

17     before the Trial Chamber, the evidence he was given was sparse, and it

18     came at a time when the murder operation was already well underway.

19     Further, at that point, other than his general understanding that these

20     were prisoners taken as a result of the attack on and the fall of the

21     Srebrenica enclave, there was no evidence that he had information as to

22     the circumstances by which these men had ended up in VRS custody.

23             Thus, the Trial Chamber has found that on 13th July, when he

24     joined the common plan, Nikolic was aware of the plan to murder on a

25     large scale, but not of some of the key features of the operation which

Page 34938

 1     would evidence genocidal intent.  However, the Trial Chamber has further

 2     found that from his interactions with Popovic and Beara, and from his own

 3     observations at the school and execution site at Orahovac on 14 July,

 4     Nikolic soon became aware that this killing operation was being carried

 5     out with genocidal intent.

 6             Nonetheless, for the reasons set out in detail in the judgement,

 7     including the nature of Nikolic's acts and participation, as well as his

 8     personal circumstances and position, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied

 9     beyond reasonable doubt that he shared this genocidal intent.  In these

10     circumstances, the Trial Chamber has found that Nikolic participated in

11     the JCE to murder with persecutory intent, that he had knowledge of the

12     genocidal intent of others, and that he made a substantial contribution

13     to genocide.  The Trial Chamber has found that there is no evidence that

14     Nikolic participated in the JCE to forcibly remove or that he contributed

15     to it.

16             I now turn to Ljubomir Borovcanin.

17             During the time relevant to the indictment, Ljubomir Borovcanin

18     was deputy commander of the Special Police Brigade, which I will refer to

19     as SBP, of the MUP forces.  On 10th July 1995, Borovcanin was appointed

20     commander of a joint force of MUP units which was subordinated to the

21     Drina Corps and sent to Bratunac to participate in the Srebrenica

22     operation.  Borovcanin was present in Bratunac and Potocari between

23     11th and 13th of July, 1995, when the plan to forcibly remove culminated

24     in the actual forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim women, children,

25     and the elderly.

Page 34939

 1             The evidence does not demonstrate that Borovcanin was aware of

 2     the plan, nor of its incremental implementation, prior to his arrival in

 3     Bratunac.  On 12 July, however, with his presence in Potocari and what he

 4     witnessed there, the Trial Chamber has found by majority, Judge Kwon

 5     dissenting, that Borovcanin came to know that there was a forcible

 6     transfer of the civilian population of Srebrenica taking place.  The

 7     evidence is insufficient, however, to demonstrate that Borovcanin shared

 8     the intent to forcibly transfer, himself.  The Trial Chamber has found

 9     that Borovcanin was not a member of the JCE to forcibly remove.

10             However, on the 12th of July, Borovcanin left the Jahorina

11     recruits in Potocari under his subordinate commanders, Jevic and Mane,

12     with orders for them to participate in the process whereby the Bosnian

13     Muslim population was to be removed from the area and transported to ABiH

14     territory.  They continued to do so on 13th of July and were instrumental

15     in executing the physical forcible transfer.

16             While there is no evidence that Borovcanin shared the intent to

17     forcibly transfer or had the intent to discriminate, with his knowledge

18     of the intent of others, as found by the majority, including

19     discriminatory intent, Borovcanin's acts in ordering his men to

20     participate constituted a substantial contribution to the crime of

21     forcible transfer.

22             While Borovcanin was in Potocari, Bratunac, and on the

23     Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road, where the plan to murder the Bosnian Muslim

24     men was developed and put into place, the evidence is insufficient to

25     find that he had any knowledge of this plan or that he shared the intent

Page 34940

 1     to contribute to the common purpose of the joint criminal enterprise to

 2     murder.

 3             On 13th July, Borovcanin arrived at the Kravica warehouse, where

 4     over 1.000 Bosnian Muslim men were detained.  And outside, in front of

 5     the warehouse, he saw a number of dead bodies, what appeared to be a

 6     busload.  Borovcanin knew that his units were amongst the Bosnian Serb

 7     forces with custody and/or control of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners that

 8     day, and therefore had a duty to protect the remaining prisoners in the

 9     warehouse.  The first and only step Borovcanin took after seeing the

10     evidence of prisoner executions was to remove himself and his men from

11     the Kravica warehouse as quickly as he could.

12             Borovcanin had the means to protect the prisoners and knew that

13     it was probable that the prisoners would be killed.  Borovcanin's failure

14     to protect the Bosnian Muslim prisoners then still detained substantially

15     contributed to the full-scale execution which later took place at Kravica

16     warehouse.

17             The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that Borovcanin knew that the

18     prisoners at Kravica warehouse would probably be killed by members of the

19     Bosnian Serb forces there with discriminatory intent.

20             Further, Borovcanin was the superior of the SBP 2nd Sekovici

21     Detachment.  Having arrived at the Kravica warehouse shortly after the

22     murder of a busload of prisoners, he had knowledge which was sufficient

23     to put him on notice that his subordinates had committed the crime of

24     murder.  For the reasons detailed in the judgement, he failed to take the

25     necessary and reasonable measures required to punish his subordinates for

Page 34941

 1     the murders of the busload of Bosnian Muslim prisoners at Kravica

 2     warehouse.

 3             I now turn to Radivoje Miletic, who, in 1995, was the chief of

 4     administration for operations and training at the VRS Main Staff.

 5             A significant amount of time during the trial proceedings was

 6     devoted by the Prosecution and the Defence for Miletic to establish the

 7     nature and extent of his powers at the time relevant to the indictment.

 8     The Trial Chamber is convinced that from at least May to October 1995,

 9     Miletic, in addition to his regular responsibilities, took on certain

10     duties from the Chief of Staff, Manojlo Milovanovic.  However, the

11     Trial Chamber is not satisfied that Miletic was Deputy Chief of Staff of

12     the VRS Main Staff or was officially "standing in" for the Chief of

13     Staff.  Most importantly, though, the Trial Chamber has not assessed

14     Miletic's criminal responsibility on the basis of title or even assigned

15     or undertaken responsibilities, but rather on the basis of the factual

16     evidence of his acts and conduct which has been adduced before it.

17             Miletic drafted Directive 7, and whatever his level of input, in

18     terms of content or wording, he was intimately acquainted with its final

19     text, including the incriminatory parts.  As such, from the early stages

20     Miletic had full knowledge of the common criminal plan to force the

21     Bosnian Muslim populations from the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, and he

22     was instrumental in the plan being captured in writing for dissemination.

23     Through his central role in the drafting process of Directive 7 and of

24     Directive 7/1, Miletic contributed to the joint criminal enterprise to

25     forcibly remove.

Page 34942

 1             Miletic further played a role in the process for the approval of

 2     humanitarian convoys.  Through this, Miletic implemented the instructions

 3     of Directive 7 to incrementally and unobtrusively deprive the enclaves of

 4     humanitarian aid and UNPROFOR of supplies, with the purpose of creating

 5     an untenable situation for the population and strangling UNPROFOR.  By

 6     doing so, Miletic again contributed to the JCE to forcibly remove.

 7             Considering the scale and scope of the military attack on and the

 8     operations to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslims from the enclaves,

 9     co-ordination from the Main Staff level was essential.  Miletic, with his

10     in-depth knowledge of the strategies and goals of the VRS, was at the

11     center of this co-ordination.  Through the reports he received from

12     subordinate units and his direct contact with the forces in the field,

13     Miletic was fully attuned to all developments in the field and informed

14     on the progress of the operations.  Miletic forwarded the knowledge he

15     gained to Mladic and Karadzic, while at the same time he ensured the flow

16     of information from the Main Staff to subordinate units.

17             Milovanovic, the Chief of Staff and Miletic's direct superior,

18     captured the essence of Miletic's role at the Main Staff when he called

19     him "the soul of the Main Staff of the VRS" and the person "best informed

20     on the situation in various theatres of the war."

21             Miletic skillfully and efficiently used his unique position to

22     inform and advise and thereby enabled the decisions taken to successfully

23     implement the plan, resulting in the forced removal of thousands of

24     Bosnian Muslims from the enclaves.  Through these acts, Miletic

25     contributed to the JCE to forcibly remove.

Page 34943

 1             Considering all the individual acts and contributions

 2     cumulatively, the Trial Chamber concludes that Miletic made a significant

 3     contribution to the JCE to forcibly remove.  Miletic furthermore shared

 4     the common intent of the JCE.  In addition, he carried out his acts in

 5     furtherance of the plan to remove the Bosnian Muslims, with the specific

 6     intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds.  Based

 7     on Miletic's level of involvement and his in-depth knowledge and broad

 8     overview of the massive operation to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslims

 9     from Srebrenica, it was foreseeable to him that murder would be committed

10     in Potocari and that these murders would be committed with the specific

11     intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds.

12             Judge Kwon dissents on the foreseeability to Miletic of the

13     killings in Potocari.

14             I turn now to Milan Gvero.

15             In 1995, Milan Gvero was the assistant commander for morale,

16     legal and religious affairs of the VRS Main Staff and directly

17     subordinated to Mladic.  In this position, and as one of the most senior

18     officers in the VRS Main Staff, Gvero played an important role in VRS

19     operations, and this was no different for the operations in Srebrenica

20     and Zepa.  Through his knowledge of key documents from 1992, and his

21     involvement in the drafting of Directive 7, Gvero knew of the plan to

22     forcibly remove the populations from Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves from

23     its very inception and of the VRS's role in this plan.

24             Gvero had to be informed of major developments in the operations

25     so that he would be in a position to act if issues of morale arose or

Page 34944

 1     dissemination of information was necessary.  Accordingly, key documents

 2     were specifically addressed to him, such as:  Tolimir's telegram

 3     forwarding Karadzic's order to capture Srebrenica; Tolimir and Mladic's

 4     instructions regarding prisoners of war; and documents concerning the

 5     negotiations in Zepa.  The need for Gvero to be fully attuned was

 6     enhanced -- the need for Gvero to be fully attuned was enhanced by the

 7     fact that on occasion he was the most senior officer present at the

 8     Main Staff, in which case other assistant commanders reported to him and

 9     he could be called upon to intervene directly in ongoing military action.

10             During the Srebrenica and Zepa operations, Gvero carried out key

11     functions relating to external propaganda and interaction with

12     international organisations, with the aim to support the plan to forcibly

13     transfer the populations from the enclaves.

14             On 10th July 1995, after the VRS had launched its military

15     assault on the enclave, taken over United Nations observation points, and

16     moved to capture Srebrenica town, Gvero issued a statement to the media

17     concerning the attack on Srebrenica enclave, stating that the VRS

18     activities were directed at neutralising Muslim terrorists and not

19     against any civilians or UNPROFOR.  Though not criminal, as such, the

20     purpose of this blatantly false statement was less innocent.  Gvero made

21     this statement with the intention to mislead the international

22     authorities concerned with protecting the enclave, with a view to

23     delaying any action that could frustrate the VRS plans.

24             On 11th July, as part of the combined VRS efforts to stop the

25     NATO bombing on the VRS forces approaching Srebrenica town, Gvero adopted

Page 34945

 1     the same approach as the day before.  He falsely asserted to UNPROFOR's

 2     Chief of Staff, General Nicolai, that the VRS was merely responding to

 3     attacks, while knowing that the VRS had taken the town and that Bosnian

 4     Muslim men had fled to Potocari.  Gvero further threatened Nicolai by

 5     stating, in essence, that failure to stop the NATO bombing could result

 6     in serious consequences for UNPROFOR and the civilians in Potocari.

 7             The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Gvero issued this threat with

 8     the aim to halt NATO bombings so that the VRS could complete its plan to

 9     take over the Srebrenica enclave and forcibly remove its Bosnian Muslim

10     inhabitants.

11             Soon thereafter, Gvero warned the VRS personnel on the treatment

12     of UNPROFOR forces to avoid any action that could provoke a response and

13     interfere with the efforts to end the NATO bombing.

14             With regard to the Zepa operation, though Gvero was clearly

15     knowledgeable as to the illegal purpose of and developments in the Zepa

16     campaign, the Trial Chamber has no evidence to find that Gvero

17     contributed to it.

18             Based on these factors combined, and for the reasons detailed in

19     the judgement, the Trial Chamber has found that Gvero made a significant

20     contribution to the JCE to forcibly remove and shared the common intent.

21     Furthermore, Gvero acted with the specific intent to discriminate on

22     political, racial, or religious grounds.  However, considering the nature

23     of Gvero's acts and his level of involvement in the operation to forcibly

24     remove, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that it was foreseeable to him

25     that murder would be committed in Potocari.

Page 34946

 1             I now turn to the last of the accused, Vinko Pandurevic, who was

 2     commander of the Zvornik Brigade and held the rank of lieutenant-colonel

 3     in 1995.

 4             As commander of Tactical Group 1, Pandurevic was aware of the

 5     criminal objective described in Directive 7 and of the plan to forcibly

 6     remove the Bosnian Muslim populations from Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves.

 7     Pandurevic and Tactical Group 1 participated in the attack on Srebrenica

 8     on 6th July and entered Srebrenica town on 11th July.

 9             While the evidence is insufficient to conclude that Pandurevic

10     intended to carry out the common purpose of the JCE to forcibly remove,

11     the Trial Chamber has found that Pandurevic's participation in the

12     military attack and take-over of Srebrenica enclave substantially

13     contributed to the forcible transfer of the civilian population from

14     Srebrenica.  The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that by participating in

15     the attack on Srebrenica enclave, Pandurevic knew that he was assisting

16     in the commission of persecution.

17             With respect to Zepa, the Trial Chamber has found that Pandurevic

18     did not make a contribution, significant or substantial, to that forcible

19     transfer, nor did he share the intent to forcibly remove.

20             On 15th July, Pandurevic was ordered to return to the Zvornik

21     area of responsibility to block or crush the column and prevent the

22     column from joining up with the forces of the ABiH 2nd Corps.  Upon his

23     arrival to the Standard Barracks on 15th July, the Trial Chamber is

24     satisfied that Pandurevic was told by his Chief of Staff that pursuant to

25     Mladic's order, Beara and Popovic had brought a large number of prisoners

Page 34947

 1     from Bratunac to Zvornik, where they were executing them, and that there

 2     were enormous problems with the guarding, execution, and burial of

 3     prisoners.

 4             In the following days, Pandurevic received additional

 5     information, including about the detentions and executions and burials in

 6     Pilica, Petkovci, Rocevic, Orahovac, and Branjevo Military Farm.  By

 7     18th July, Pandurevic had information as to the overall scale of the

 8     murder operation.  However, there is no evidence to establish that

 9     Pandurevic shared the intent to commit the crimes that formed part of the

10     JCE to murder.  There is also no evidence that Pandurevic, himself,

11     participated or that he ordered, authorised, or otherwise approved the

12     participation of his subordinates in the murder operation.

13             In the period between 13th and 16th July, members of the

14     Zvornik Brigade participated in guarding the detained Bosnian Muslim

15     prisoners and in transporting the prisoners to execution sites in the

16     area of Zvornik.  The Trial Chamber is satisfied that members of the

17     Zvornik Brigade provided practical assistance that had a substantial

18     effect on the commission of the executions of the prisoners.

19             Upon his return to Standard Barracks at noon on 15th of July,

20     Pandurevic had reason to know that his subordinates had committed, were

21     committing, or were about to commit crimes in relation to the detention,

22     execution, and burial of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the area of

23     Zvornik.  As detailed in the judgement, the evidence before the

24     Trial Chamber shows that Pandurevic did not genuinely attempt to take any

25     measures within his material powers in order to prevent any further or

Page 34948

 1     continued participation of his subordinates in the murder operation.

 2             With respect to his duty to punish, however, in the unique and

 3     extraordinary circumstances Pandurevic faced, the Trial Chamber considers

 4     that Pandurevic's actions were such that he is not responsible for a

 5     failure to punish.

 6             On 16th July, Pandurevic opened a corridor to allow passage of

 7     the column through Zvornik Brigade territory to the territory held by the

 8     ABiH 2nd Corps.  This was contrary to the orders he had received from his

 9     superiors.  Thousands of men passed through this corridor.  After the

10     corridor was closed on 18th July, and during the subsequent few days,

11     elements of the Zvornik Brigade participated in searching the terrain for

12     ABiH soldiers.

13             Around 20th of July, 10 wounded Bosnian Muslim prisoners were

14     transferred from Zvornik Hospital to the clinic of the Zvornik Brigade.

15             On the 23rd of July, Pandurevic requested instructions from the

16     Drina Corps regarding the wounded Bosnian Muslim prisoners in his

17     custody.  The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Pandurevic was informed

18     that Popovic would come to take the wounded prisoners.  The Trial Chamber

19     is further satisfied that the wounded men were placed in Popovic custody

20     on the 23rd of July and that Popovic was responsible for their death.

21             Although the Trial Chamber has found that Pandurevic did not

22     possess the intent to murder the 10 wounded Bosnian Muslim prisoners, the

23     Trial Chamber has found by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, that

24     Pandurevic knew it was probable that the wounded prisoners would be

25     murdered once they were transferred into Popovic's custody.  By failing

Page 34949

 1     to intervene, Popovic [sic] failed to discharge his legal duty to protect

 2     the wounded prisoners, and therefore substantially contributed to the

 3     murder of these 10 men.

 4             I now come to the verdict.

 5             Will the Accused Vujadin Popovic please rise.

 6                           [The Accused Popovic stands up]

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  For all the reasons I have summarised, the

 8     Trial Chamber finds you, Vujadin Popovic, to be guilty pursuant to

 9     Article 7(1) of the Statute of the following counts:  Count 1, genocide;

10     Count 3, extermination as a crime against humanity; Count 5, murder as a

11     violation of the Laws or Customs of War; Count 6, persecution as a crime

12     against humanity.  In relation to the following counts against you, on

13     the basis of the principles relating to cumulative convictions, which we

14     explain in the judgement, the Trial Chamber does not enter a conviction

15     for Count 2, conspiracy to commit genocide, and Count 4, murder as a

16     crime against humanity.

17             You are found not guilty and therefore acquitted of the following

18     counts:  Count 7, inhumane acts consisting in forcible transfer, a crime

19     against humanity; and Count 8, deportation, a crime against humanity.

20             In the face of the grave nature of the crimes perpetrated and

21     your significant responsibility for them, the Trial Chamber considers

22     that the only appropriate sentence for you is life imprisonment, to which

23     you are hereby being sentenced.  You may sit down.

24                           [The Accused Popovic sits down]

25             Will the Accused Ljubisa Beara please rise.

Page 34950

 1                           [The Accused Beara stands up]

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  For all the reasons I have summarised, the

 3     Trial Chamber finds you, Ljubisa Beara, guilty pursuant to Article 7(1)

 4     of the Statute of the following counts:  Count 1, genocide; Count 3,

 5     extermination as a crime against humanity; Count 5, murder as a violation

 6     of the Laws and Customs of War; Count 6, persecution as a crime against

 7     humanity.

 8             In relation to the following counts against you, on the basis of

 9     the principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does

10     not enter a conviction under Count 2, conspiracy to commit genocide, and

11     Count 4, murder as a crime against humanity.

12             You are found not guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the

13     following counts:  Count 7, inhumane acts consisting in forcible

14     transfer, a crime against humanity; and Count 8, deportation, a crime

15     against humanity.

16             In the face of the grave nature of the crimes perpetrated, and

17     your central responsibility for them, the Trial Chamber considers that

18     the only appropriate sentence for you is life imprisonment, to which you

19     are hereby being sentenced.

20             You may sit down.

21                           [The Accused Beara sits down]

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Will the Accused Drago Nikolic please rise.

23                           [The Accused Nikolic stands up]

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  For all the reasons I have summarised, the

25     Trial Chamber finds you, Drago Nikolic, guilty pursuant to Article 7(1)

Page 34951

 1     of the Statute, through aiding and abetting of the following count:

 2     Count 1, genocide.

 3             You are found guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of

 4     the following counts:  Count 3, extermination as a crime against

 5     humanity; Count 5, murder, as a violation of the Laws or Customs of War;

 6     and Count 6, persecution, as a crime against humanity.

 7             In relation to the following count against you, on the basis of

 8     the principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does

 9     not enter a conviction for Count 4, which is murder, as a crime against

10     humanity.

11             You are found not guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the

12     following counts:  Count 2, conspiracy to commit genocide; Count 7,

13     inhumane acts consisting in forcible transfer, a crime against humanity;

14     and Count 8, deportation, being a crime against humanity.

15             The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence of

16     35 years imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already served

17     in detention.

18             You may sit down.

19                           [The Accused Nikolic sits down]

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Ljubomir Borovcanin, would you please rise.

21                           [The Accused Borovcanin stands up]

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  For all the reasons I have summarised, the

23     Trial Chamber finds you guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute,

24     through aiding and abetting of the following counts:  Count 3,

25     extermination, as a crime against humanity; Count 5, murder, as a

Page 34952

 1     violation of the Laws or Customs of War; Count 6, persecution, as a crime

 2     against humanity; and Count 7, by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting,

 3     inhumane acts, consisting in forcible transfer, being a crime against

 4     humanity.

 5             In relation to the following count against you, on the basis of

 6     the principles of cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does not

 7     enter a conviction pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute for Count 4,

 8     that is, murder, as a crime against humanity.

 9             The Trial Chamber also finds you guilty as a superior pursuant to

10     Article 7(3) of the Statute of the following counts:  Count 4, murder, as

11     a crime against humanity; and Count 5, murder, as a violation of the

12     Laws or Customs Of War.

13             You are found not guilty and therefore acquitted of the following

14     counts:  Count 1, genocide; Count 2, conspiracy to commit genocide; and

15     Count 8, deportation, a crime against humanity.

16             The crimes for which you stand convicted are of a very grave

17     nature.  However, as detailed in the judgement, the Trial Chamber

18     considers that the particular circumstances which you faced in relation

19     to the forcible transfer, and the nature of your criminal responsibility,

20     which with respect to murder and extermination is predicated on aiding

21     and abetting by omission and superior responsibility, diminishes the

22     gravity of your criminal conduct.  Having considered all these factors in

23     combination, the Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence

24     of 17 years imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already

25     served in detention.

Page 34953

 1             You may sit down.

 2                           [The Accused Borovcanin sits down]

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Radivoje Miletic, would you please rise.

 4                           [The Accused Miletic stands up]

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  For all the reasons I have already summarised, the

 6     Trial Chamber finds you, Radivoje Miletic, guilty pursuant to

 7     Article 7(1) of the Statute of the following counts:  Count 4, by

 8     majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, murder, as a crime against humanity;

 9     Count 6, persecution, as a crime against humanity; Count 7, inhumane acts

10     consisting in forcible transfer, a crime against humanity.

11             You are found not guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the

12     following counts:  Count 5, murder, as a violation of the Laws and

13     Customs of War; Count 8, deportation, a crime against humanity.

14             The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence of

15     19 years imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already served

16     in detention.

17             You may sit down.

18                           [The Accused Miletic sits down]

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Will the Accused Milan Gvero please rise.

20                           [The Accused Gvero stands up]

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  For all the reasons I have summarised, the

22     Trial Chamber finds you, Milan Gvero, guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of

23     the Statute of the following counts:  Count 6, persecution, as a crime

24     against humanity; Count 7, inhumane acts, being forcible transfer, a

25     crime against humanity.

Page 34954

 1             You are not found guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the

 2     following counts:  Count 4, murder, as a crime against humanity; Count 5,

 3     murder, as a violation of the Laws or Customs of War; Count 8,

 4     deportation, a crime against humanity.

 5             The Trial Chamber, having considered the extent and nature of

 6     your involvement, and mitigating factors set out at length in the

 7     judgement, hereby sentences you to a single sentence of five years

 8     imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already served in

 9     detention.

10             You may sit down.

11                           [The Accused Gvero sits down]

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  Will the Accused Vinko Pandurevic please rise.

13                           [The Accused Pandurevic stands up]

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  For all the reasons I have summarised, the

15     Trial Chamber finds you guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute,

16     through aiding and abetting, of the following counts:  Count 4, by

17     majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, murder, as a crime against humanity;

18     Count 5, by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, murder, as a violation of

19     the Laws or Customs of War; Count 6, persecution, a crime against

20     humanity; and Count 7, inhumane acts, being forcible transfer, a crime

21     against humanity.

22             The Trial Chamber also finds you guilty as a superior, pursuant

23     to Article 7(3) of the Statute, of the following counts:  Count 4,

24     murder, as a crime against humanity; and Count 5, murder, as a violation

25     of the Laws or Customs of War.

Page 34955

 1             You are found not guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the

 2     following counts:  Count 1, genocide; Count 2, conspiracy to commit

 3     genocide; Count 3, extermination, as a crime against humanity; and

 4     Count 8, deportation, a crime against humanity.

 5             The crimes for which you stand convicted are of a grave nature.

 6     However, as detailed in the judgement, in arriving at an appropriate

 7     sentence, the Trial Chamber has considered the limited nature of your

 8     involvement in the forcible transfer, the circumstances you faced upon

 9     your return to the Zvornik area, and the nature of your criminal

10     responsibility, which for murder is premised on aiding and abetting by

11     omission and superior responsibility.

12             Further, the Trial Chamber considers that there are several

13     mitigating factors to be taken into account in your sentence, most

14     significantly your act of opening the corridor for the passage of the

15     column.

16             Having considered all of the relevant circumstances, the

17     Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence of 13 years

18     imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already served in

19     detention.

20             You may sit down.

21                           [The Accused Pandurevic sits down]

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Judge Prost appends a separate opinion to the

23     judgement, and Judge Kwon appends dissenting and separate opinions to the

24     judgement.

25             The hearing is now adjourned.

Page 34956

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.33 a.m.

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