1 Monday, 15 May 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.23 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call
6 the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, Your Honour. I'd
8 like to greet all and everyone. This is case number IT-04-74-T, the
9 Prosecutor versus Mr. Prlic et al.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are Monday, 15th of May,
11 2006. I'd like to greet all the people present in the courtroom. I don't
12 think you need to introduce yourselves because I think they are all the
13 same people present this afternoon.
14 We shall resume with witness testimonies this afternoon, but
15 before that, a few housekeeping matters I'd like to address.
16 First of all, time issues. I think we had an example of this last
17 week. The Judges have decided that when the hearing is due to finish at a
18 quarter to 2, we shall stop the person who is speaking at quarter to 2.
19 We cannot overstep our time for several reasons. As you know, there are a
20 lot of people working and helping this Chamber. There are security
21 guards, there are staff members working for the Trial Chamber, and the
22 interpreters. When we finish at quarter to 2, everybody must understand
23 that all these people have started working at 9.00 in the morning and
24 sometimes some of them have been there two hours before already, so we
25 cannot overstep our time and cannot go beyond quarter to 2. The lawyer
1 who has the floor at that time must keep an eye on the clock and that is
2 the reason why the clock is up there in the courtroom; so that everybody
3 can check the time.
4 And make sure that the questions fit into the appropriate time
5 frame. The Judges never like to cut a lawyer when he or her is speaking.
6 It's always a rather tricky question, but sometimes it is important that
7 people stick to the allotted time. There is also another issue of a
8 technical nature. Sometimes there is another hearing in the courtroom
9 afterwards and 30 minutes are required to change the videotapes or
10 audiotapes. So it is most important to finish the hearing at quarter to 2
11 so that the next hearing can start on time.
12 So I would ask all of you to be as disciplined as possible and
13 make sure, given these requirements, that the time you spent or the time
14 speaking is something which you clearly keep in check. We cannot go
15 beyond our allotted time and therefore it is most important to be -- to
16 keep this in check. This is something we wanted to share with you and we
17 wanted to inform you about the decision we have taken.
18 Now, as far as last week is concerned, the expert report by
19 Mr. Donia, the Trial Chamber has decided to admit this report into
21 Registrar, could you please give us a number for this expert
22 report. I think, if I remember correctly, the number should be P 9356. I
23 stand to be corrected.
24 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. This
25 report has been admitted under the exhibit number you have mentioned. [In
1 English] This report is admitted under the reference P 09536. Thank you.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
3 Secondly, because we ran out of time last week, I had to interrupt
4 Mr. Praljak who was putting his questions to the witness. I would like to
5 ask the Defence team - I think it's Mr. Jonjic - who was due to ask for
6 some of his exhibits or documents to be admitted into evidence. So he has
7 the floor right now.
8 MR. JONJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. On Friday,
9 because we didn't have enough time, I had to put off my request that the
10 following exhibits be tendered: 5D 01026, 5D 01046, and 5D 01050. Those
11 are the documents that were shown the witness, and if I may just say one
12 more sentence, this morning -- of course, it's too late now since the
13 Trial Chamber has taken its decision with respect to the report by Witness
14 expert Donia -- I had a request asking that those findings should not be
15 admitted into evidence and, if they are subsequently adopted, that when
16 the Trial Chamber comes to assess and appraise its value, they should bear
17 in mind that Dr. Donia demonstrated that he did not have the knowledge of
18 elementary facts. In addition, he said that he had no knowledge about how
19 the banovina of Croatia was first created and that he knew nothing about
20 the changes of the -- in the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 20th
21 century. He demonstrated that. Thank you.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, as far as the
23 tendering into evidence of these three documents is concerned, please.
24 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] These three documents are tendered
25 into evidence under following numbers: [In English] 5D 01026, 5D 01046,
1 5D 01050. Thank you, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as tendering into
3 evidence of the expert report is concerned, I would like to tell all and
4 everyone that if a report is tendered, this does not mean that the Trial
5 Chamber deems that this report does have a probative value or that the
6 exhibits have a probative value. All of this has to be checked out
7 against other information, namely other expert reports, other expert
8 evidence, and it is only at the end of the day that all of this will be
9 assessed by the Bench.
10 So you need not worry, it's not because the report is admitted
11 that everything is set in stone. As you know, there will be other experts
12 who will come to testify, other witnesses that will come and testify,
13 there will be your own witnesses that will come and testify, so what is
14 said today may change over time. So this is a golden rule which this
15 Trial Chamber applies and which other Trial Chambers also apply. So you
16 will have ample time to talk about the banovinas again, if you so wish
17 when other witness will come to testify and when your own expert witness
18 will come to testify. Mr. Jonjic, you have the floor.
19 MR. JONJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I omitted
20 to include one exhibit that was also shown to the witness. It is the
21 description of the SS Division members, and that was document number
22 5D 01041. So might that be tendered into evidence as well? Thank you.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. You're quite right. This
24 document got forgotten. Registrar, you have the floor.
25 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. This is a
1 Defence Exhibit which will be admitted under the following number: [In
2 English] 5D 01041. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are still talking about
4 expert reports. So the Prosecutor told us last week that as one of its
5 witnesses could not come and testify, the Prosecution was going to call an
6 expert witness earlier than expected. So the expert witness
7 Mr. Tomljanovich should come and testify on Wednesday and Thursday. And
8 this will be the examination-in-chief. The Defence counsel had -- the
9 Defence teams had asked us to postpone the testimony of this witness to
10 September. Mr. Sahota, who is here, did not have time but he was supposed
11 to get back to us and give us his point of view, and let us know whether
12 there were any confidentiality issues because this witness is an employee
13 of the Tribunal and works for the Office of the Prosecutor. Now the
14 question was raised whether during the examination-in-chief -- between the
15 examination-in-chief and the month of September the Prosecution could use
16 this time and prepare the witness for a number of answers he could give
17 and when questions were put to him by the Defence team. The Prosecution
18 did state that they would do nothing of the sort. In the meantime, we
19 have been told that this witness may be called to testify in September.
20 Mr. Sahota said he would let us know what his point of view was, and he's
21 had ample time and he's had all the weekend to think about it. So,
22 Mr. Sahota, what is your position on this, please?
23 MR. SAHOTA: Mr. President, Your Honours, I have spoken to my
24 colleagues on the Defence benches, and we agree that no objection will be
25 taken in principle to this witness dividing his testimony in two
1 installments. However, we would like the Court to consider issuing a
2 caution or warning to the witness before he retires, having given his
3 evidence-in-chief, asking him not to discuss his testimony in any form
4 with any other individual. Thank you.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Sahota. In
6 addition, we had one unanswered question which we didn't settle. Pursuant
7 to Rule 94 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, when an expert
8 report is actually recorded, the Defence as a general rule has one month
9 in which to state its position. Either the Defence accepts the reports or
10 if it wishes to cross-examine the witness, it can also challenge the
11 quality of the witness or the relevance of the report. Given that this
12 report has been recorded and given to the Registry on the 10th of May, the
13 Defence would have until the 10th of June to state its position, but as
14 one of the witnesses that was called to testify cannot come, the
15 Prosecution has had to put this witness testimony forward and therefore
16 the Defence has not had enough time to submit its filings. So this may
17 raise a particular issue. If the Defence can file their written
18 submission by the 15th of June, because a -- they will need 30 days. And
19 the Defence will also have ample time to prepare its cross-examination.
20 The Trial Chamber has accepted the fact that the cross-examination can
21 take place in September.
22 To sum up: The six Defence counsel will have the possibility or
23 you can address us your submissions pursuant to Rule 94 bis before the
24 15th of June, and in the meantime, on Wednesday, we can hear this witness
25 and it will be the direct examination of this witness and the Defence
1 counsel will have a few months to prepare the cross-examination of the
3 Does the Defence team have anything to say about this? If the
4 Defence team has nothing to say, I shall continue addressing the matter of
5 expert reports.
6 I shall give you the floor, Mr. Scott. Just let me finish and
7 I'll give you the floor.
8 I had drawn the attention of the Prosecution on the following
9 during the Status Conference: I had indicated that between the beginning
10 of the trial and the summer recess that we would have very little time,
11 and that it would be better to call only one witness, one expert witness.
12 The expert witness was in fact Mr. Donia, it so happens, and you couldn't
13 organise it any other way. You happen to be calling another expert
14 witness. Why not? But a third expert report has come in last week. So I
15 would like to ask the Prosecution the following question: Do you intend
16 to call this expert witness to testify on the 12th of July? This is a
17 tall task for the Defence team because it has to prepare the
18 cross-examination of the expert witness who is going to come to testify on
19 Wednesday, the Defence team has to prepare the cross-examination of all
20 other witnesses also, and if in addition there is a third expert witness
21 who is also coming to -- calling to testify, maybe this is a little bit
22 much. Is it really necessary to call this third expert witness before the
23 12th of July?
24 Mr. Scott, I think you wanted to take the floor. Perhaps you can
25 answer all of these questions.
1 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours, good
2 afternoon. Let me start with the last question: No, there is no
3 intention to call a third expert between now and the summer recess. It
4 was simply a matter of disclosure. So the Defence have plenty of time to
5 plan for the future, but there is no intention to call that witness prior
6 to the summer recess.
7 The other matter that I rose to my feet concerning a moment ago
8 was concerning Mr. Tomljanovich. Your Honour, I raised last week when
9 this issue came up whether the -- essentially, whether the Chamber would
10 entertain the notion of a rule in this particular set of circumstances by
11 which Mr. Tomljanovich would not be essentially, if you will, barred from
12 having communication with the Prosecution, or you might use the word
13 "sequestered," until such time as his cross-examination had begun,
14 because that, of course, is the normal time when, once Defence starts
15 putting questions to a witness, then the question arises, or the concern
16 arises that there should be no opportunity for the Prosecution to
17 influence the witness's potential answers once the cross-examination
18 begins. As I indicated last week, obviously cross-examination now won't
19 begin until sometime later, and there is no risk or prejudice that can
20 arise from the Prosecution attempting to influence the witness since the
21 cross-examination has not started yet. Having thought about this further
22 over the weekend, Your Honour, I think I must press the Chamber, with all
23 respect, to apply a rule in this case which would not in any way prevent
24 the Prosecution from having continuing contact with Mr. Tomljanovich
25 between the time that he finishes his direct examination and the time that
1 he begins his cross-examination. And from among other reasons are this,
2 Your Honour: Mr. Tomljanovich is a member of the Prosecution team. We
3 work with him on a number of items, on a given day on a week-to-week
4 basis. Some of these matters are so closely related I do not want to
5 raise the possibility of someone making an allegation that we've spoken to
6 him inappropriately on something that might be interpreted to be so
7 closely related to his testimony that someone is going to raise the
8 allegation that we have talked to him about his testimony. As Your
9 Honours can see from his expert report, he talks about many, many aspects
10 of the case, many dimensions of the case, and any number of which can
11 conceivably come up in the course of any set of daily discussions about
12 the case in general, about some other preparation of some other aspect of
13 the case, et cetera. So under these particular circumstances, Your
14 Honours, I would -- I don't think the Prosecution can go forward with
15 putting Mr. Tomljanovich on the witness stand unless we can have a ruling
16 and understanding that there will be no bar -- no caution, no bar, to the
17 Prosecution continuing to speak with -- and work with Mr. Tomljanovich,
18 because we work with him on a daily basis, until the cross-examination
19 actually begins, albeit in September or whenever, and, of course, at that
20 time, of course, no contact. But in the meantime -- in the interim time
21 period, Your Honour, I do not think it is workable and I think it raises
22 the opportunity for mischief, frankly, and allegations being made against
23 the Prosecution that something has been said that someone will
24 characterise as related to Mr. Tomljanovich's testimony. So I would ask
25 the Court -- I'm asking the Court for a ruling that that -- any such
1 caution or sequestration order not take affect until Mr. Tomljanovich's
2 cross-examination begins. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I shall give the floor to
4 Mr. Karnavas, but as far as this particular point is concerned, before
5 giving the floor to Mr. Karnavas, the Bench have discussed it. As far as
6 we are concerned, we don't see any impediment to this but we should
7 mention the fact that there is no question that you or Mr. Mundis discuss
8 with this expert witness who works with you on other topics, that you
9 discuss his report, and the answers he has provided to your questions
10 during his examination-in-chief. Of course, you can talk to him about the
11 weather and other cases and whatever; you name it. That, of course, you
12 can do. But there is no question of you telling him, "I have asked you
13 such and such a question. You have answered in such a way. During the
14 cross, you will have to provide a different answer." This would be a
15 contempt, of course, and nobody would even think of it. And I think all
16 attorneys and lawyers have understood it this way.
17 Mr. Karnavas, you would like to take the floor?
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, on this issue, and then I have other issues
19 that perhaps we can raise at -- later on but before the next witness comes
21 First, I'm sure that no one on the side of the Prosecution will
22 attempt to influence the witness as to what to say on cross-examination
23 and changing their statement. I take them at their bona fides. They are
24 professional, so I don't see that as a problem. The problem I do see,
25 however -- I'll slow down for the interpreters. The problem I do see,
1 however, is where Mr. Tomljanovich gives his direct examination, we have
2 other witnesses coming in, now Mr. Tomljanovich is used as a resource to
3 assist the Prosecution with respect to other witnesses. Of course, all
4 with a sense of tailoring, perhaps, their testimony to fit
5 Mr. Tomljanovich's direct examination, and there lies the problem. Now my
6 heart goes out to it these folks, but let's face it, this trial was
7 supposed to start in February. In fact, when I first got in the case, it
8 was last October. We just got this report last week. One might ask: Why
9 did it take them so long? I don't want to go into perhaps there were
10 reasons that they wanted to frustrate the Defence. I don't want to go
11 there, but the bottom line is we just received it. And I can tell you
12 right now, Your Honours, I am going to need five days, minimum, of
13 cross-examination. I'm going to be asking for that. This is the entire
14 Prosecution case with respect to Mr. Prlic. I desperately will need that
15 time and I desperately will need the time to go over that report because
16 Mr. Tomljanovich, unlike Mr. Donia, was pretty thorough in documenting his
17 positions, and so we will need to go through all of that. So I think that
18 the problem with Mr. Tomljanovich is that it was -- their tardiness in
19 bringing their report to us. Now they wish to put him on because they
20 need to fill a gap. Fine. If they want to hold off, that's fine too but
21 the bottom line is you can't put the Defence in a position where we might
22 be prejudiced.
23 One other thing with respect to expert witnesses, because I think
24 this is going to come up again. The last report --
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let me just interrupt you for a
1 few minutes. I would just like to finish off with Mr. Tomljanovich. For
2 the length of time you have asked for, we haven't discussed it yet and the
3 Bench hasn't discussed it yet but we would let you know how much time you
4 will have for your cross-examination. But you have just raised an issue
5 which I had not thought of. You are telling us that this expert witness
6 works together with the Prosecution and can also work with witnesses to
7 be. This is a real issue.
8 Mr. Scott, this expert witness, is he going to be working with you
9 in this case? In other words, to prepare other witnesses? Or is he going
10 to be disconnected until September from the -- from trial management and
11 he will be working on other things? Because if he is preparing the
12 testimonies to come, and preparing the next witness, then there can be a
13 certain degree of interference. I had understood you to say that this
14 expert witness was in broad terms working for the Prosecution but was not
15 specifically working on this case. If he's one of your close associates
16 who is helping you to prepare the case and the examination-in-chief, this
17 may raise an issue. Could you please fill us in on this, please.
18 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. That was largely the point that I
19 was in fact trying to make and perhaps not well enough, in explaining the
20 unworkability, the unworkability of having Mr. Tomljanovich separated from
21 the team during this period of time. Your Honour, in light of these
22 concerns that have been expressed and in light of these issues that have
23 been raised, we will not call Mr. Tomljanovich on Wednesday and we will
24 just delay his testimony to the future. That means, however, we will have
25 no witnesses this week on Wednesday and Thursday. Thank you.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Well, at least in an
2 adversarial system you are able to solve some problems. We will not hear
3 this witness on Wednesday. Unfortunately, you cannot call another
4 witness, can you?
5 MR. SCOTT: No, Your Honour, it's impossible for us to make other
6 arrangements that quickly, I'm afraid. We have worked very hard in the
7 last week to find witnesses who can come. I apologise for that.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Karnavas is now
9 satisfied. You may proceed.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: That gives me more time to make my record, Your
11 Honour. As I was talking about experts, just to finish on that point,
12 General Pringle's expert is dated -- he signed it on the 26th of March
13 2006. 26th March, 2006. We are into May right now, as I understand it.
14 The question is: Why didn't we get this report earlier? Now, the
15 Prosecution can say, well, maybe they weren't planning on calling him.
16 Nonetheless, the problem is if they have an expert, they know they are
17 going to use this expert, they have the report, it's a signed report by
18 the expert, why are they waiting until the last moment to give it to us?
19 It really poses a problem. It's a problem of fairness, it's a problem of
20 equality of arms. It is virtually impossible for us to be doing all of
21 these things at the same time; go through an expert's report, check all
22 the footnotes, check the resources. These are experts that we need
23 experts to look over the expert reports. That's how it's done.
24 So I just mention this for -- perhaps, you know, it was an
25 oversight, but -- perhaps this won't happen again, perhaps the Court may
1 wish to issue an order.
2 Next --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott, I think
4 fair play is no mean virtue. The Defence team is asking you how come that
5 a report dated the 26th of March was only recorded a few days ago. Is
6 there some administrative reason for this or was it just a lack of fair
8 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, it was just lack of -- lack of attention
9 to it, if you will, in the sense of inadvertence. It had not been
10 displayed earlier. I'm not sure why this is a basis of complaint at this
11 juncture. I've just indicated a few moments ago this witness will not be
12 called until sometime next fall. I cannot imagine any possible prejudice
13 to the accused. You know, believe it or not, the Prosecution is also
14 working very, very hard and has many issues to deal with on a day-to-day
15 basis. Mr. Pringle's report didn't go out earlier. We sent it out last
16 week, fully knowing - fully knowing - that he would not be coming for some
17 number of months. So I think the Defence has adequate time to prepare,
18 under the circumstances.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may just respond to that because I think
20 perhaps there is a different way of doing things --
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, please,
22 Mr. Karnavas. I think we've settled the issue. You have asked your
23 question. The Prosecution has answered your question. Let's move on to
24 another issue now, please. So which is the other issue you would like to
1 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. But I'm coming back to this particular
2 issue because in preparing for a Defence, Your Honour, you need to prepare
3 it completely, not in snippets. That's my point.
4 My next point was Mr. Donia. Obviously I'm highly disappointed
5 that the report is coming in, albeit you're going to be giving it some
6 weight at some other point of time, but I must express for the record
7 certain concerns: One, there was the issue that we were not allotted
8 sufficient time. This is an expert report. I can state on the record
9 with full responsibility that this particular Defence team, my team alone,
10 spent literally hundreds of hours preparing for Donia's cross-examination.
11 We were limited to about 3 and a half hours. I was wondering over the
12 weekend why am I preparing a case if I'm not going to be allowed to fully
13 challenge each and every word that the report has in it? So I had to gut
14 my cross-examination. It was very disjointed. I have here what I would
15 like to put on the record, or make part of the record, on an ex parte
16 basis, an outline of my cross-examination, ex parte in the sense that the
17 Prosecution should not be able to have my theory or -- of how I was going
18 to challenge Mr. Donia, since I wasn't allowed to cross-examine him on
19 several areas. I don't know how to go about it but that's something to
21 Secondly with respect to Mr. Donia, I thought it was
22 inappropriate, and I say this with all due respect but I cannot find any
23 other word to describe it, but I thought it was inappropriate for a member
24 of the Bench to comment to the witness that they found the report to be a
25 good report when in fact the witness was still being -- hadn't been fully
1 cross-examined by all the Defence. I can only assume that it was to
2 comfort the witness. After all, the witness was under attack by the
3 Defence for a day and a half, and so I think the comment was not meant in
4 any particular fashion; however, from the Defence standpoint, I can assure
5 that it generated a big deal --
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, sir.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, the witness
9 Mr. Donia came here to testify before this Trial Chamber, or rather, came
10 to this Tribunal to testify eight times already. He testified in eight
11 different trials. It's up to you to do what you wish. Of course you can
12 challenge his work, report or his competence. But as I've told you
13 previously, the fact that some expert report is tendered into evidence
14 doesn't mean that the Trial Chamber will fully rely on it. In addition to
15 that, you yourself have a chance to challenge that report in your
16 submissions. When other witnesses come, you will have a chance to point
17 out through these other witnesses precisely why in your view this report
18 was bad. You can bring in your own expert witnesses who will testify
19 differently. So please don't let this upset you, the fact that somebody
20 said that this was a good report. Don't confuse the quality of report and
21 quality work put in report and the probative value of a report. Please
22 don't let yourself be upset about it.
23 The second issue has to do with time. All of us would like to
24 have more time available to us, however we are all faced with temporal
25 limitations. We cannot give you an unlimited amount of time. When you
1 cross-examined this witness, you used up about an hour and a half in
2 dealing with questions which were perhaps interesting but, given that you
3 were aware of the lack of time, you could have abbreviated your
4 cross-examination. This is your strategy. This is your line of defence.
5 You chose not to abbreviate it. But as the trial goes on, you will have
6 an opportunity to challenge everything that this witness said. I'm
7 reminding you once again that we are not here to decide about the history
8 but, rather, to decide on relevant issues in this trial. Let me remind
9 you that in the Blaskic judgement, the testimony of Dr. Donia was
10 mentioned only in two footnotes, so please don't ignore this fact. You
11 may proceed.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, I'm not ignoring the fact and I'm
13 very cognizant and mindful of the special rules of evidence that we have
14 here. I am. But for me to challenge, I cannot challenge through other
15 witnesses if I don't have, for instance, the facilities or the means to
16 hire experts in my case. There is a presumption that somehow we are going
17 to be able to have these resources to challenge. And I raise this issue
18 with Donia because when it comes to other witnesses, such as Tomljanovich,
19 I dare say if strict limitations are placed, we are going to be faced with
20 a quandary here: Can we serve the interests of the Security Council and
21 the interests of justice in the same time? And I don't think that those
22 are irreconcilable at this point, if we have a strict time line. Now, I
23 had proposed that Donia not appear and his report not come in because I
24 thought he's not relevant to the case, but I was overruled on that. But
25 be that as it may, I take your point, Mr. President, but nonetheless, I do
1 have an outline I would like to make part of the record with respect to
2 Mr. Donia.
3 The next thing is some -- that I wanted to bring up are some
4 technical issues, just very briefly. There are some technical issues: No
5 access to -- remote access to LiveNote, no remote access to exhibits.
6 There is an issue with the 65 ter exhibits, 9.500 of them, technical
7 issues that impact us. I just raise that because I'm hoping that the
8 Trial Chamber will look into this, and of course, if we are fumbling on
9 this end, it's only because we are trying to work with everybody else in
10 resolving these issues. And I'm not blaming anyone, I'm just stating that
11 for the record.
12 Lastly, it goes to the next witness who is about to appear. I
13 wanted to raise a couple of issues. One, we received today some witness
14 information, a witness statement. It's not much, but nonetheless we
15 received it today. I'm not going to belabour the point. Normally I
16 would, but I'm not. There are two particular videos, that I'm aware of,
17 at least. One is an interview taken by my client. Obviously, I have no
18 objections to that entire interview coming in in its entirety, and if that
19 was the -- if that's the only thing that comes in, I certainly have
20 nothing to ask this witness. With respect to the other video, however,
21 it's a montage, it's snippets of interviews of various people, including
22 something taken out of context from my client. There is footage. There
23 is all this dramatic language involved. We don't have the full and
24 complete text of everyone who was interviewed. So, for instance, the late
25 President Tudjman, we don't have the full text. Or Boban or Susak or the
1 others. It's a montage, we believe -- or at least I believe, that there
2 is no probative value to this video. It's only prejudicial. There is
3 absolutely nothing from which you can draw from other than it's a
4 something that is for public audience, it has a particular point of view,
5 it's slanted, and it is certainly not evidence worthy of being in any
6 Tribunal anywhere in the world. Therefore, I would move at this point in
7 time that before the witness -- before we see this video, that the
8 Prosecution put forward questions in order to establish a foundation as to
9 why this video is worthy and then give us perhaps the opportunity to raise
10 this issue again, but I move that the video not be shown, that it not be
11 admitted, that it's inadmissible because it's more prejudicial than
12 probative, and that if that video doesn't in, then obviously I have no
13 real cross-examination at all to do. But if it does come in, then it puts
14 us again back into that time frame situation. I would have to go and
15 challenge virtually every sentence that this woman says on this video.
16 And also, it puts me at a great disadvantage because I don't have the full
17 transcript of the late President Tudjman or the late Susak or the late
18 Boban to see in what context they were speaking when they made those
19 remarks. In fact, we don't have a transcript at all of any of these
20 folks, and there are other -- two other or three other or five other
21 individuals that are questioned. We don't have transcripts for any one of
22 them. So based on those reasons, we are being prejudiced, it shouldn't
23 come in Your Honour, and we could save a lot of time by simply admitting
24 the one full interview of my client and we can thank the young lady -- or
25 the lady - I don't know how old she is - but we can thank her and she can
1 go on her business. Thank you.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, Mr. Kovacic. I
3 will give you the floor, but prior to that I would like to hear from
4 Mr. Scoot. Mr. Karnavas raised a problem here, and if I understood him
5 well, there are two videotapes that you intend to play. The Defence
6 believes that there could be problems regarding something contained on one
7 of the tapes because this is actually a montage, a videotape containing
8 several different clips, and certain things have been taken out of
9 context, because all of these clips were edited and then put together. So
10 what is your intention? Do you intend to first examine the witness and
11 then play the tape, or how do you intend to proceed regarding this?
12 I see that it's going to be you, Mr. Mundis. Please go ahead.
13 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. The Prosecution was
14 planning on laying a foundation, asking the witness precisely how it was
15 that she came about to produce this film. It's basically a documentary,
16 what we might call a documentary. She went, and she will explain to you
17 how she went and interviewed people and shot video contemporaneously in
18 the late autumn of 1993, how she had edited this together and produced
19 this television show which was then aired on a British television network.
20 We were planning on laying the foundation for that. It's not a lengthy
21 foundation, but it's a foundation nevertheless. We would then ask the
22 videotape be played.
23 The issues raised by my learned colleague Mr. Karnavas go to
24 weight and not to admissibility. That is, that the issues that he's put
25 forward before you go to, again, the issue what weight you might give to
1 that videotape. The items, the issues that he's raised concerning the
2 bias, if you will, of the witness, to use a shorthand term for what
3 Mr. Karnavas has described, that's clearly an issue for cross-examination.
4 The witness can be cross-examined on any bias that she may have had.
5 These are all issues, Your Honour, that can be addressed in
6 cross-examination. And again, just because something is contained in a
7 videotape doesn't mean that the Chamber will give it a great deal of
8 weight. It's contextual. It goes to providing the Trial Chamber at this
9 early stage in these proceedings with an overview. That's all it is,
10 Mr. President. It's a 50-minute, 45-minute long documentary that was
11 produced for British television.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President --
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, I was going to ask the question:
15 What's the relevance? And I guess I heard it: This is an overview. The
16 title of it is "A Greater Croatia." Now, if that's not a result-oriented,
17 you know, documentary, if you want to call it that, I don't know what is.
18 I can assure you that when my client was approached and signed a waiver,
19 he wasn't aware of the title of it, and that certainly wasn't the case,
20 and I agree with my learned colleague Mr. Mundis that just about anything
21 can come in and then we sort it out at the end, but here, I think one of
22 the fundamental principles of keeping certain evidence out is whether it's
23 more prejudicial than probative, and if it has no probative value -- and I
24 suggest, Your Honours, it has zero probative value, and it doesn't give
25 context, because when you see the video, it doesn't present a balanced
1 point of view, so what kind of context does it give? And if they are
2 going to lay a foundation through the witness, then I'd ask Your Honours
3 that before we even see the video, that I would be permitted to do what
4 they call a voir dire to pose questions to the witness specific to the
5 issue of foundation. Not into contents but strictly issues of foundation
6 and then you can make a determination as to whether the video should be
7 played or not. I'm confident that when you see the video, and even if
8 it's admitted, you're not going to give it any evidentiary value, or any
9 weight. I'm confident of that. But I'm saying that I don't think that we
10 should bringing in all this sort of inflammatory footage simply because
11 it's convenient or because somehow it fits the Prosecution's theory. It's
12 not a balanced documentary.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There are two sets of rules when
14 it comes to video material. One type of video material is the one that
15 can be introduced when the witness itself was a director or interviewed
16 the person, and then that witness is expected to say well on such-and-such
17 day, you taped this footage, or you interviewed this person, and this is
18 how it is confirmed. So that's one way that this can be done.
19 The other way is that sometimes video material is introduced into
20 evidence even though we don't have the director, cameraman, or the
21 journalist. However, this material is nevertheless relevant if it
22 pertains to an event covered by the indictment. This is why it is
23 relevant. As for its probative value, this is something that the Judges
24 will decide upon after hearing both sides. We will decide on the
25 probative value at the very end. In all trials, there are numerous video
1 tapes that are tendered into evidence, or photographs, and then at the
2 end, you will see that 5 per cent or less of them are actually relied
3 upon. They are only sometimes mentioned in the footnotes. And it is only
4 sometimes that they are relied upon.
5 Mr. Karnavas, you touched upon the relevant issues. First of all,
6 we haven't heard the witness, and second, we haven't seen the video
7 material, so how are the Judges supposed to know this in advance? In
8 addition to that, another judge would like to address you.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You are quite well aware of this, but it is
10 important, that this is a professional Bench and we do not have a jury.
11 So a jury might be impressed by seeing a video and are not able then to
12 take a critical distance, but I hope you trust that these professional
13 judges are able to look at the video and all the time think, "We'll see
14 what it's worth."
15 MR. KARNAVAS: That's precisely. If I had a jury, if it was in
16 front of a jury, I can see why they would want to sneak in something like
17 that to prejudice and inflame the passions of the jury. But we don't. We
18 have dispassionate judges. That's why I don't see why they would bring in
19 something that has no value. That's precisely my point. I am fully
20 confident of this Bench.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Kovacic.
22 MR. KOVACIC: Even though I agree with almost everything
23 Mr. Karnavas said, but I don't think that actually he represents the
24 entire Defence here, so I will also -- I would like to add two or three
25 minor issues here. If I may.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please go ahead.
2 MR. KOVACIC: [Microphone not activated]
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I apologise. Perhaps I cut you
6 MR. KOVACIC: It's working now? [Interpretation] It seems to be
7 working now. As for the expert witness Tomljanovich, I fully support
8 everything said by the Defence of Mr. Prlic. I don't think I need to add
9 anything there. However, in view of some questions raised by the
10 Honourable Trial Chamber, I would like to say this as I don't know whether
11 the Chamber is informed about this, based on the discussion.
12 I remember, on the basis of reading some witness statements,
13 witnesses who were called in and interviewed in this case. These were
14 witnesses who were called here as suspects, called here and examined by
15 the Prosecution, and Mr. Tomljanovich was present in a large number of
16 such examinations. Based on what I heard from suspects and witnesses -
17 and I think that this can be found in certain records that we received -
18 Mr. Tomljanovich occasionally took a very direct part in such
19 examinations. My question now is whether the role of Mr. Tomljanovich is
20 limited to what was portrayed here by the Prosecution or is
21 Mr. Tomljanovich so involved in the Prosecution work that it makes no
22 difference whether one of the prosecutors will come to testify here or
23 Mr. Tomljanovich himself. I'm not saying this is a completely identical
24 situation but it is a fact that it is very, very close and it would be as
25 though I proposed my co-counsel, Ms. Nika Pinter, as a witness here
1 because she's been so involved in this case that she's obviously an expert
2 here. And I don't think that I could do this in view of many formal,
3 legal limitations.
4 On the other hand, the Prosecution is proposing that one of their
5 own, a member of their team, be called here to testify. I think this goes
6 against some basic rules, safeguarding fairness of the trial.
7 But we don't need to go into this now because this witness is not
8 coming, after all, this week and perhaps we will be submitting our
9 position in writing.
10 As far as expert witness Tomljanovich is concerned, my formal
11 proposal is that he not be allowed to come here to testify as expert
12 witness and that, likewise, his expert report not be admitted into
17 (redacted) The witnesses
18 scheduled for the 22nd and 23rd. I'm not going to mention any names.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No names were shown in the
20 transcript. Was that what you wanted to intervene about, Mr. Mundis?
21 MR. MUNDIS: No, Mr. President, actually, I'm just wondering if we
22 need to be raising a number of administrative issues right now, given than
23 we will have some time later this week that's now available because
24 Mr. Tomljanovich will not be testifying, while at the same time we have a
25 witness whose -- who was expecting to start her testimony at 2.15 and --
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. Please go ahead,
2 Mr. Kovacic, but speed up, please.
3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Very briefly, Your Honours. Here in
4 the courtroom on Thursday last week, the Prosecution gave us a new
5 calendar. It caught us unprepared. We were unable to verify it. I
6 wasn't going to object about these witnesses coming one day before they
7 come, and today was the first day when I was able to object because today
8 was the first day that I was able to look at the calendar. So these
9 witnesses scheduled for Monday and Tuesday next week, 22nd and 23rd, are
10 not listed in the second table where we have more detailed information
11 about the witnesses coming before summer recess.
12 They were put on the list of viva voce witnesses, the annex that
13 came in with the pre-trial brief, but they were not put on the other
14 list. So a week before they are scheduled to come, we are being told that
15 these witnesses are coming and we were not expecting them before summer
16 recess. So this caught us unprepared.
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, by your leave, just
18 two sentences concerning the expert witness Tomljanovich. I believe that
19 the jurisprudence of this Court as well as the Court in Rwanda is telling
20 us that the person employed in the OTP cannot be considered a biased
21 witness a priori and should not be banned on the basis of that. However,
22 I think that there are plenty of cases showing that a person working for
23 the Prosecution and involved in the case can be viewed with -- more
24 thoroughly. I think that there is bias with this witness, and I agree
25 with what my colleagues before me said, both Mr. Karnavas and Mr. Kovacic.
1 I think that this witness is a biased witness and we should view him as
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. We are going to
4 discuss this among the Judges. We have two more issues to discuss but we
5 will go into private session first.
6 [Private session]
11 Pages 2030-2031 redacted. Private session.
5 [Open Session]
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We resume the hearing. Good
7 afternoon, Madam. You have been called to testify by the Prosecution.
8 Before you read the solemn declaration, I would like to ask you a number
9 of questions to -- for you to introduce yourself. Could you give us your
10 first name, last name, your date of birth and place of birth.
11 THE WITNESS: My name is Belinda Giles. My place of birth is
12 Paris, France. And your other question was? I'm sorry.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Your date of birth.
14 THE WITNESS: 9th of the 6th, 1958.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is your profession?
16 THE WITNESS: I am currently a student. I was a television
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam, have you testified before
19 on the events that took place in ex-Yugoslavia before an international
20 Tribunal or a national Tribunal or is this the first time you're
22 THE WITNESS: This is the first time I'm testifying.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Would you go ahead
24 and read the solemn declaration now, please.
25 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
1 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam. Please be
3 seated. As I said a moment ago, Madam, you're now going to be answering
4 questions put to you by the Prosecution, which is sitting to your right.
5 And this will be the first stage during the afternoon. And afterwards,
6 the Defence teams and the Defence counsel of the accused sitting to your
7 left will be asking you questions. There are quite a lot of them. A few
8 of them will be asking you questions on the basis of what we call in
9 common law the cross-examination, and you will be able to see that the
10 types of questions will be different than those asked you by the
11 Prosecution. The Judges sitting in front of you, the four judges opposite
12 you, can, if they deem necessary in the interests of justice, also ask you
14 If you have any difficulty of any kind, please let us know. We
15 are here to help you. If you don't understand the meaning of a question,
16 ask the question to be reformulated, asked again. And if you need some
17 time to think before you answer, please do so, so that we can hear your
18 testimony in the best possible conditions.
19 Once we have started the examination-in-chief, we will be working
20 for one and a half hours and then we'll take a break to give you a chance
21 to rest for about 20 minutes and then we'll reconvene and we will finish
22 today by 7 p.m.
23 Having said that, I'm going to turn to the Prosecution to give
24 them the floor. It is Mr. Mundis. You have the floor, sir.
25 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 WITNESS: BELINDA GILES
2 Examination by Mr. Mundis:
3 Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Giles.
4 A. Good afternoon.
5 Q. You answered in response to a question of the Presiding Judge that
6 you had formerly been a television producer. Can you please tell us what
7 that job entails.
8 A. In my case, I was an independent television producer, working for
9 my own company, and my job was to come up with ideas which I then sold to
10 broadcasters, in the U.K. primarily. And if they were interested in the
11 subjects that I proposed, these broadcasters would then give me money to
12 go and fund a project that I would then make which would then be broadcast
13 on the appropriate channel that had funded it.
14 Q. Can you tell us a little bit about the day-to-work work of a
15 television producer. What exactly do television producers do?
16 A. Well, television producers work -- I mean, particularly
17 independent television producers work across a variety of different tasks.
18 As I've just explained, it's -- there is a lot of development of new
19 ideas. Once an idea has been sold to a broadcaster, it's a matter of
20 putting the ideas that you have suggested into reality by researching the
21 project, then filming it, then editing it and preparing it for broadcast
22 on television.
23 Q. Ms. Giles, of these various constituent parts of the television
24 production business - that is filming, editing, preparing for broadcast,
25 researching - how much of that did you actually do?
1 A. Well, again, there are no hard and fast rules but I would normally
2 do everything, every part, or certainly have a major role in every part.
3 I might have a cameraman who would shoot the actual pictures but I would
4 almost invariably be there to direct the pictures and make sure that we
5 had got the right material that I needed. I would have an editor who
6 would actually technically put the material together but it would be me
7 who would be in charge of determining in what way those were put together,
8 the script; you know, all the details that ended up on the final -- on the
9 screen in the end.
10 Q. And who would conduct the interviews?
11 A. Again, it depends, but I would often conduct the interviews. It
12 depends in what circumstances you're working with. You can be working
13 with a well-known television presenter who would do the interviews, it can
14 be the director who can do the interviews; it just varies according to
16 Q. What type of training or education did you have to enter this
18 A. I started my career in television in the BBC. I was what's called
19 a graduate trainee, which means that I had a degree in history and I
20 applied to the BBC to join them on a graduate trainee programme for two
21 years. I started with 12 other people who had similar degrees, not only
22 in history but across the range of academic subjects, and I was trained on
23 the job as a researcher initially, then as an assistant producer, and then
24 I became a producer and a director.
25 Q. And how long did you remain at the BBC?
1 A. I was there from 1979 to 1986.
2 Q. And what did you begin doing in 1986?
3 A. I then became a freelance producer, working for various different
4 companies, and in 1988, I would say, I set up my own production company to
5 do my own projects.
6 Q. What was the name of your production company?
7 A. It was called Sole Purpose Productions.
8 Q. And how many persons were employed by Sole Purpose Productions?
9 A. Well, initially, it was just me, but by the end -- I closed the
10 company four years ago. By the end, we had about 50 people working.
11 Q. What are some of the projects or films that were produced by Sole
12 Purpose Productions?
13 A. We did a whole range of stuff across that time, from documentary
14 to historical things, to political, foreign affairs. I suppose if there
15 is one thing I particularly majored on was projects about the former
16 Yugoslavia. I did eight films in all about the former Yugoslavia.
17 Q. Why did you do so many films about the former Yugoslavia?
18 A. I became very interested in it, and I went there initially at the
19 beginning of the war to make a film about refugees, and I just became very
20 absorbed by the whole -- the politics, the war; everything. The people.
21 It was -- it became a passion for me.
22 Q. What -- what were these people, the first film that you've told us
23 about, refugees, who were these people and refugees from where or from
25 A. Well, I was asked by the BBC to make a film about the nature of
1 suffering and I made a film really based all over Bosnia and Croatia, not
2 in Serbia at that time, just about what the experience of leaving your
3 home, losing everything, was like. It wasn't a political film at all. It
4 was an emotional film about -- about what people were undergoing at that
5 very time. It was in late 1992, so it was sort of -- it was at the height
6 of the cleansing.
7 Q. When you say "cleansing," who was doing this cleansing?
8 A. At that point, it was the Serb cleansing.
9 Q. And who were the victims?
10 A. The victims, we had -- we featured a lot of Croatian victims. A
11 lot of Croatian victims. I would say probably a majority of Croatian
12 victims, actually, who had been cleansed out of Northern Bosnia and
13 Central Bosnia, and also Croats who had actually, you know, obviously had
14 to leave their own areas in Croatia. And there were also -- we featured
15 quite a lot of Muslim refugees who were at that time being cleansed out of
16 Central Bosnia.
17 Q. Ms. Giles, what was the second film that you made about the former
19 A. The second film was a film called "A Greater Croatia," which we
20 made for channel 4 television.
21 Q. Can you briefly tell us not about this film yet, because I'll come
22 back to that, but about the other six films you made about the former
24 A. I made two films about the International War Crimes Tribunal here.
25 One was about the first case, Dusko Tadic, about how he had become the
1 first person to stand trial at The Hague, the sort of judicial system that
2 had been set up to try him, and how he came to be the first defendant, and
3 his own background in Bosnia.
4 I then did another film about the -- after the Tadic trial,
5 examining the process and how it had been carried out.
6 I did a film about the Serbs and the nature of the Serbs called
7 "The Corridor." It was at a time when sort of the maps were yet again
8 being redrawn and it broadly focused on the route, it was a sort of road
9 movie, from Belgrade through to Knin.
10 And I did another film, again with a collaboration of the
11 International War Crimes Tribunal, following from day one the excavation
12 of the mass grave at Vukovar, which went from, as I say, day 1 through to
13 DNA identification in the morgue. That was a long film that won many
15 Q. Okay. Let's return now to the film, "A Greater Croatia." Can you
16 tell us how the idea for that film was formulated?
17 A. Well, in the first film that I have described, the one about
18 refugees, we had been to Herzegovina and I think we had also spent some
19 time in Zagreb. It was an area that we were, as I say, very interested in
20 by that time. And it was not me that came up with the idea. It was my
21 colleague, Paulette Farsides, who had a great -- who had been a journalist
22 out there, and she suggested that we look at what was going on in
23 Herzegovina as the mini-state of Herceg-Bosna was being set up. And we
24 sold this idea to channel 4, to look at the sort of complexity of whether
25 the mini-state that was being set up was really for the Croats of Bosnia
1 generally or whether it was for the Croats of Bosnia in Herzegovina, and
2 to look at that tension, and to look also at the fact that whilst the
3 Serbs were kind of being targeted as the people who were doing the real
4 really bad things in Yugoslavia, whether the Croats were getting away with
5 similar sorts of crimes whilst the world's media wasn't able to focus on
6 another element of this very complicated conflict. So we put this forward
7 to channel 4 as a proposal and they immediately went for it and asked us
8 to leave. I think we left within a week. As you can imagine, it was a
9 fast-breaking story. There was a lot going on at this period. So we went
10 out there pretty quickly to start filming.
11 Q. Can you tell us a little bit about the filming process for "A
12 Greater Croatia"? Where did you go? Whom did you interview?
13 A. We spent some time in Zagreb. We interviewed President Tudjman
14 and we interviewed Mr. Susak, who was then the defence minister. We also
15 interviewed some people. We interviewed, I remember, Bilandzic and Slaven
16 Letica, who were people who had been part of the sort of Tudjman
17 entourage, particularly, I think, Bilandzic, but had fallen out with him
18 and were quite revealing about the intentions of some elements of the
19 Croatian government, I think particularly President Tudjman.
20 We then travelled down to the region, to Herzegovina, and we
21 filmed all over the place but mostly in Capljina where we had been before
22 on the project, the previous project, and we had come to know the mayor
23 and so he gave us access to places that we wouldn't have had otherwise.
24 And shall I go on?
25 Q. Yes, please.
1 A. And we also went to Mostar. We went to both West Mostar and East
2 Mostar. I went to West Mostar under the auspices of the UN, in an
3 armoured convoy with the Spanish Battalion that were stationed there at
4 the time. And I went to -- sorry, I went to East Mostar in that way, and
5 I went to West Mostar in a -- just an ordinary van. We went two or three
6 times to film there, and -- yes, that's what we did.
7 Q. When did you first go to Herzegovina to produce this film?
8 A. Well, the exact date I'm not completely sure because it was around
9 the first or the second week of November of 1993. And I'm pretty sure
10 that the first time I went into Mostar itself was the day that the bridge
11 fell, because obviously there was a lot of talk about the bridge, and it
12 had already had -- did have quite a symbolic value, and I remember when we
13 arrived in Mostar, the news was already out the bridge has fallen, the
14 bridge has fallen, and it was a great shock to everybody, although there
15 were very few people on the streets, but I remember that, that it was a
16 great shock to everybody.
17 Q. And Ms. Giles, just for the record, when you refer to the bridge,
18 which bridge are you talking about?
19 A. I mean the old bridge, the old Ottoman bridge.
20 Q. How long did it take you to produce this film or create this film?
21 A. Again, I cannot be completely sure, but I think we were in the
22 region -- we also went to Sarajevo, and it was very complicated to go to
23 Sarajevo because we had to sort of fly out and fly in with the UN. I
24 think the whole thing, we were there for probably three weeks in all,
25 maybe a bit longer, maybe four weeks, and then we came home and we had to
1 put it together probably in another three weeks. So it was probably a
2 maximum of six to eight weeks, I would say.
3 Q. And Ms. Giles, when you say "we," who worked for you on this
5 A. There was me, I was the director, and then I had Paulette
6 Farsides, who I've already mentioned, who had had the idea for the
7 programme. I had a cameraman called David Bailey, and a local translator
8 who was from Zagreb, who was a colleague from Zagreb.
9 Q. And who did you interview, if anyone, during the time period you
10 were in Mostar?
11 A. I only interviewed Jadranko Prlic.
12 Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which this interview was
14 A. I can't be precise about it. I have a feeling that it was
15 arranged through the office of Mate Boban, who we had also interviewed in
16 Grude, but it may have been the other way around. It may have been that
17 we interviewed Mr. Prlic first and then Mr. Boban, I can't remember.
18 Q. Can you tell us a little bit about how that interview started?
19 A. I don't really remember how the interview started. I remember we
20 turned up and Mr. Prlic welcomed us. He was very easy. He wanted to do
21 the interview in English, which was helpful for me because it's always
22 easier interviewing someone in your own language. We turned up in his
23 office, and it was away from the front line, and I was very frightened by
24 being in Mostar at all. I can't really remember any other details.
25 Q. Can you tell us a little bit about the three- to four-week period
1 that you spent putting the film together, following the time you were in
3 A. I remember it being a very complicated -- it's a very complicated
4 story, as I'm sure you will understand, to convey to an audience in
5 Britain who were already extremely confused by Bosnian Croats, Bosnian
6 Serbs. All the details were very dense, and we were trying to make this
7 even more complicated story, where you have funny names like Herceg-Bosna
8 coming in, and Herzegovina. People had just got used to the idea of
9 Bosnia and Serbia and Croatia, and what was this new entity? And trying
10 to get that across and trying to explain the complexities of the story, as
11 I said already; the whole idea of the Croats of middle -- Central Bosnia
12 being sacrificed for the sort of interests of Herzegovina. I remember
13 having a lot of discussions about how we could actually put this across in
14 a way that was understandable to a lay audience, and structuring it so
15 that it had a kind of dynamic appeal that would interest an audience. It
16 was very difficult in what was really a very short time, because channel 4
17 wanted to get it out. It was a story that was happening then and there
18 and they didn't want it to become outdated.
19 Q. And Ms. Giles, who worked on this phase, that is the final
20 assembly and putting together of the movie?
21 A. It was me and my colleague, Paulette Farsides, who I've already
22 mentioned, and we had an editor - I cannot remember her name - but she, as
23 I think I've already explained, editors play a part in the editorial
24 process because their input is valuable but she is really in charge of the
25 technology to make sure the pictures and the sound work rather than the
1 sort of editorial structure. So the editorial structure was me and my
2 colleague and, of course, the editors at channel 4 who had the -- who we
3 were doing the work for, so they had their input as well at certain
5 Q. And do you recall approximately when "A Greater Croatia" aired on
6 channel 4?
7 A. I would say that it was before Christmas. I would say it was the
8 middle of December but I may be completely wrong. It may have been early
9 in January, but I think it was -- I think it was the end of December.
10 Q. And the year?
11 A. 1993.
12 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, at this point in time we would ask
13 that the film "A Greater Croatia" be played in court. It has been
14 previously marked, I believe, as P 07437. My case manager reminds me to
15 say this, it is in Sanction.
16 [Videotape played]
17 "On Dispatches tonight, the unreported story of the Bosnian war.
18 How the Croatian government has shared in the carve-up of Bosnia just as
19 it always intended, and how it's got away with it. Tonight, as the Croats
20 meet to talk peace with their former Muslim allies in Vienna, Dispatches
21 reveals the secret protocols that betrayed those same Muslims. That's
22 Dispatches: How the Croats have created a brand new country in Bosnia
23 just for themselves and how the West has turned a blind eye to a Greater
25 "Capljina, a town in Herceg-Bosna, a new country few people have
1 ever heard of but a country that's determined to put itself on the
2 European map. Herceg-Bosna is the mini-state that Croats have carved out
3 of what was once Bosnia and now Capljina's mayor, Pero Markovic, can look
4 forward to a brave new world.
5 "[Interpretation] In the future, I hope that together with the
6 world, with the help of the world, and all those who want to experience
7 life in a democracy, we are part of Europe and we want to be like them.
8 We must rebuild our lives. We want to educate ourselves. And we must get
9 ready to take our place in Europe, where we belong.
10 "[In English] Before Herceg-Bosna can take its place in Europe
11 towns like Capljina have a lot of work to do. Not just repairing the
12 damage caused by the Serb attack 18 months ago but also removing the
13 traces of a second, more chilling battle. Capljina seems to be getting
14 back to normal but scratch beneath the surface and everything has changed.
15 One in four of the town's population has left. They didn't choose to go.
16 Six months ago, Capljina was sealed off by the militia, street by street,
17 block by block, a quarter of the town's people were loaded into buses and
18 driven away. They were all Muslims. This was the final step in a
19 campaign of persecution which began when Muslim cafes and shops were
20 looted and destroyed. Herceg-Bosna has not emerged by accident. The
21 setting up of this state is the realisation of a long-term plan. Today
22 all the players in the Capljina football team are Croats. They play
23 beneath the Croatian chequerboard flag. The story of how the Serbs carved
24 out their chunk of Bosnia is well known. The Croats have now done the
25 same, but their game plan has been overlooked. Herceg-Bosna owes its
1 existence to one man - Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman. For him, the
2 making of a Croat state on Bosnian land has been a personal obsession, an
3 obsession which drove him to bang the final nail into Bosnia's coffin.
4 Tudjman has built this state on concentration camps, ethnic cleansing,
5 torture, starvation, all executed by his henchman, Mate Boban.
6 "The Croats were the smallest group in Bosnia, fewer than a fifth
7 of the population, but they've always dominated the barren landscape of
8 Herzegovina. Herzegovinians looked to the Croatian capital, Zagreb,
9 rather than Sarajevo, as their capital. This rocky terrain bred the
10 fascist Ustashas of World War II. To this day, Herzegovinians display a
11 virulent strain of Croatian nationalism. It's a philosophy of intolerance,
12 a lot of prejudice. They hate state as an institution. They hate texts.
13 They hate everything. They need only space and territory.
14 "After World War II poverty drove tens of thousands of Herzegovinians to
15 abandon this infertile land. In emigre communities abroad their nationalist
16 fervour only deepened. They dreamed of their region becoming part of
17 Croatia. It was a dream shared by Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. He
18 always believed that Croatia had an historic claim in Bosnia.
19 "[No interpretation]
20 "[In English] Tudjman's obsession with Croatian claims in Bosnia
21 runs deep. In 1991, he meets his arch enemy, Serbian president, Slobodan
22 Milosevic, for secret discussions. Even though Serbia is threatening to
23 invade Croatia, Tudjman is still happy to talk about their one common
24 interest, a carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two eye witnesses of this
25 meeting in Karadjordjevo can now reveal the real agenda.
1 "That was never… in the mass-media and no complete information about that
2 was ever given. Hence, they were secret talks. But the mass-media portrayed
3 them as being talks between Serbia and Croatia on unresolved problems
4 between the two states. Nothing more. Moreover, it was denied… the rumors
5 and stories going around and all the speculations that it was about Bosnia
6 were denied. It was denied.
7 "[In English] There were several maps on the table, I guess, and
8 the idea was more or less close to the recent ideas on Bosnia-Herzegovina,
9 that -- that means either to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten or 15
10 units or in three semi-independent states.
11 "Did the Muslims attend this meeting?
12 "No, absolutely. Absolutely no. [No interpretation]
13 "Tudjman has swept to power on a nationalist ticket but most of his
14 advisers opposed his ambitions in Bosnia. However, Tudjman is an autocrat
15 who listens only to the people who agree with him. He found unconditional
16 support elsewhere. Emigre Herzegovinians had poured money into Tudjman's
17 election campaign. They were confident he would promote their nationalist
18 ambitions not only in Croatia but also in Bosnia. The most prominent is
19 Gojko Susak. Until four years ago, Susak was a pizza parlour entrepreneur
20 in Toronto. Now he's the defence minister of Croatia.
21 "President had a view on Bosnia-Herzegovina long before we met.
22 He was very explicit, and that at the very first public speech when he
23 came to the US and Canada, that's when I first met him. His politics were
24 on known Bosnia-Herzegovina were defined. They do coincide with my view
25 of Bosnia-Herzegovina in many ways.
1 "There is a double game between the two. At personal level,
2 Mr. Susak is a kind of Tudjman's slave. He accepts every decision made by
3 Mr. Tudjman, so his non-existing personality at personal level, but in
4 political sense, Mr. Tudjman sometime or even at present time, very often
5 exhibits political -- Mr. Susak's political philosophy.
6 "But for the Croats of Sarajevo and the rest of Bosnia, Tudjman's
7 ambitions were dangerous. The Herzegovinans, who number only 200.000, had
8 always lived together, but 600.000 other Croats were scattered in mixed
9 communities throughout Bosnia. They couldn't easily be disentangled.
10 These Croats already had their own leadership in Sarajevo.
11 "[No interpretation]
12 "[In English] But unknown to Kljuic, the president of all Croats
13 was already preparing the ground for a division of Bosnia. Even as he
14 makes his first presidential visit to the Croats of Sarajevo, Tudjman is
15 secretly backing a small group of extremist Herzegovina politicians who
16 are plotting a separate Croat state in Bosnia. But he reveals nothing of
17 his true intentions to this audience.
18 "[No interpretation]
19 "[In English] Dispatches has obtained the signed secret protocol
20 produced by that group in November 1991. It confirms decisions reached
21 with Tudjman in Zagreb. It declares Croatian people within
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina must finally start a decisive and active policy, which
23 is supposed to lead us to our centuries' long dream: A common Croatian
24 state. They'll show Europe and the world which regions in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina are Croatian and where our future lies.
1 "The document lays out the real plan. First, a Croat province in
2 Bosnia is declared, next any Croat leaders who support a united Bosnia
3 must be removed. Within two months of the meeting, with Tudjman's
4 backing, the separatists force Kljuic to resign. Herzegovinan Mate Boban,
5 whose main claim to fame was a spell in jail for black marketeering, is
6 installed as the new leader. A plan is underway. Boban moves the Croat
7 power base to this factory in his home town of Grude in Herzegovina.
8 "This town with just two main streets and no town square takes the place
9 of sophisticated Sarajevo. The next stage is simple: Boban sets up a
10 separate Croat army in Bosnia, the HVO. March 1992, Croats vote with Muslims
11 for independence. The Serbs rebel and war breaks out. As the Serbs cut a
12 swathe through Bosnia, Croatia steps in to help the beleaguered state.
13 Tudjman signs a military alliance with Bosnian President Izetbegovic to
14 fight the Serbs. Tudjman knows that the mainly Muslim Bosnian government
15 has little choice but to rely on Croatia. This serves his purpose.
16 "[No interpretation]
17 "[In English] He thought that Muslims would join Croatia, that was
18 -- I mean, that was a second thought behind his political mind.
19 "Croats and Muslims link up to fight the Serbs. Many Muslims join
20 the HVO, which is better prepared than government forces.
21 "[No interpretation]
22 "[In English] But once the alliance has halted the Serb advance, Boban
23 moves to the next stage of the master plan. He declares that the Bosnian
24 government is dissolved and announces that the HVO has taken over in all
25 areas unoccupied by the Serbs. The strains in the alliance are obvious.
1 "Well, superficially they were working together as partners.
2 There was a coalition which had taken them through the referendum on
3 independence, and on the face of it, you thought that you were dealing
4 with the Croats and the Muslims versus the Serbs. It was not many weeks
5 before I realised that this was not a true coalition.
6 "[No interpretation]
7 "[In English] But to the HVO's supposed partner in the alliance,
8 the takeover seems far from temporary. Ivan Negovetic is a Croat who
9 enlisted not in the HVO but in the Bosnian government army.
10 "[No interpretation]
11 "[In English] To tighten its grip across Bosnia, the HVO has to
12 weaken its alliance partner. Dispatches has obtained official documents
13 which show the restrictions the HVO placed on the Bosnian army. In many
14 areas, supposedly under joint control, the HVO requisitions all industry,
15 power supplies, and transport. All consignments of weapons to the Bosnian
16 army need to pass through Croatia and Herzegovina. At each check-point,
17 some of the consignment is hived off and most of the weapons end up in HVO
18 hands. In Grude alone, 37 trucks of weapons intended for the defence of
19 Sarajevo are halted and plundered.
20 "[No interpretation]
21 "[In English] The alliance starts to collapse. In some areas
22 Bosnian forces are disarmed and expelled by the Croats. In others, they
23 fight back and push the HVO out.
24 "Serb aggression becomes a distant memory as Croats and Muslims
25 begin a scramble for territory. They fight each other with the bitterness
1 born of betrayal. Bosnia is dead.
2 "[No interpretation]
3 "[In English] Tudjman and Boban are already rewriting history.
4 They planned to seize power across Bosnia but the Bosnian army stopped
5 them. Now the official Croat line blames Muslims for destroying the
7 "[No interpretation]
8 "[In English] As the alliance crumbled, Western negotiators failed
9 to react to the Croat territorial ambitions. The Croats have taken care
10 to pose as the reasonable party in the Bosnian conflict.
11 "They were the weakest group because they are the smallest group
12 and I think they were quite clever politically to decide that by and large
13 they would go along with the negotiators. They would be the reasonable
14 party, that was in their interest to be that. And I think that was a
15 clever strategy.
16 "That strategy is about to pay dividends. Now the peace
17 negotiators are poised to give the Croats the green light for the final
18 dismantling of Bosnia.
19 "December 1992, Geneva. As the Vance-Owen peace plan is being
20 drafted, the Croats are tightening their grip throughout their planned
21 mini-state Herceg-Bosna. The plan divides Bosnia into ten provinces but
22 it appears to ignore Mate Boban's obvious territorial ambitions, ambitions
23 which the negotiators knew only too well.
24 "One was well aware that they had been pursuing their own agenda
25 way before the Vance-Owen plan was announced. That was, we were very
1 conscious of it. The Herceg-Bosna question was a constant issue between
2 President Izetbegovic and President Tudjman. So there was nothing --
3 there was no surprises by then. We were fully aware of what was their
4 private agenda.
5 "Even so, the Croats see the Vance-Owen peace plan as an
6 endorsement of their private agenda. Two of the provinces have a clear
7 Croat majority, the third is half Muslim. Boban claims this province for
8 himself. He insists that Vance-Owen has rewarded Croats with over a
9 quarter of Bosnia. He hurries to sign.
10 "[No interpretation]
11 "[In English] The Vance-Owen plan places the mixed city of Mostar
12 in a Croat province. The Croats have long coveted Mostar as their
13 capital. They use the peace plan as the green light for a takeover but
14 Vance-Owen also binds each province to protect ethnic minorities. The
15 Croats appear not to notice.
16 "[No interpretation]
17 "[In English] May the 9th, 1993, the Croats mount an all-out
18 assault in Mostar. The Bosnian forces resist.
19 "Have you always seen Mostar as the capital of Herceg-Bosna?
20 "Yes, all the time.
21 "Even though it was a majority Muslim?
22 "No, there are no majority in Mostar of any nation. Before the
23 war, the equal number of inhabitants were Muslims and Croats. Difference
24 was only few hundred.
25 "But still you saw it as the capital of the Croatian part of
2 "Yes, yes, it is.
4 "Because this republic must have a capital. Must have one centre.
5 Must have university. Must have other things which makes a republic a
6 republic. Our own civilisation, level with theatre, symphonic orchestra,
7 and so on.
8 "But that civilised capital does not include Muslims. All the
9 Muslims living on the west side are rounded up and forced across the river
10 to the devastated east side. A brutal siege begins. Civilians become a
11 weapon of war.
12 "[No interpretation]
13 "I saw a film where there was a night shot of people being driven
14 out of West Mostar into East Mostar by HVO troops.
15 "[No interpretation]
16 "[In English] For four months, the HVO blocks all relief convoys
17 to Muslim-held East Mostar, as the battle for the capital of Herceg-Bosna
18 grinds on, Boban continues to starve civilians there. He is still using
19 food as a weapon in his war.
20 "[No interpretation]
21 "[In English] Across the river, on the Croatian-held side of
22 Mostar, there is no shortage of food.
23 "Mostar don't have west bank, don't have east bank. Mostar is a
24 unique town and I don't recognise this division. It's temporary front
25 line but I'm an inhabitant of Mostar. Mostar is my native town and I
1 don't want to divide it.
2 "Other natives of West Mostar are busy sweeping away the last
3 traces of their neighbours. Dispatches found some photographs among the
5 "[No interpretation]
6 "[In English] The Croats steadily work their way through the order
7 of war pioneered by the Bosnian Serbs. In the Mostar region Muslim men of
8 fighting age are herded off to camps such as Dretelj. Many had fought in
9 the HVO.
10 "[No interpretation]
11 "[In English] On an island just off the Croatian mainland, victims
12 from Dretelj are still held under police guard. Dispatches filmed there
14 "It's important for you at the moment to go somewhere safe because
15 your refugee status has only been extended for one month.
16 "The government of Herceg-Bosna released these men only on
17 condition that they would be sent abroad by the United Nations. They have
18 left Bosnia forever.
19 "It's important that you secure your safety first and foremost.
20 "[No interpretation]
21 "[In English] Throughout the war against Bosnian government
22 forces, the regular Croatian army continues to pour into Bosnia to
23 reinforce the HVO. This Croatian soldier was photographed on the front
24 line of Mostar last June.
25 "[No interpretation]
1 "[In English] We have evidence of Croat army tanks in Ljubuski.
2 "[No interpretation]
3 "[In English] There is, and as I speak, a very substantial element
4 of the Croatian army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, very substantial. And I must
5 say I think it's an issue which the world ought to address more strongly.
6 They addressed it in terms of the Serbs in the spring of 1992, with very
7 considerable strength of purpose, but they have, to a great extent,
8 ignored it in the last six months as it's built up.
9 "President Tudjman's ambitions in Bosnia have been so ignored that
10 in the Croatian capital of Zagreb it's business as usual. Croatia's
11 backing of atrocities in Bosnia has gone unpunished. A senior diplomat
12 told Dispatches the Croats have got away with murder, literally. At a
13 European Community meeting in July ministers rejected sanctions.
14 "Certainly that has been the view of the European Community,
15 obviously influenced by the Federal Republic of German and other friends
16 of Croatia, like Austria in the United Nations, Hungary and others and the
17 United States. So the general feeling has been that it's better to make
18 representations to President Tudjman and to criticise and to argue rather
19 than to take action in terms of sanctions against Croatia.
20 "We need an appropriate international approach to the Balkans, and
21 until present time we have experienced many -- I mean many strange
22 international politicians, genuinely losers in their own countries, like
23 Lord Owen, Lord Carrington, lord that and that, and they were sent to this
24 part of the earth to play an irresponsible political games.
25 "One winner in these irresponsible political games has been Franjo
1 Tudjman. In July he abandoned any pretense of supporting a unified Bosnia
2 by calling openly for a carve-up. Peace negotiations are now based on a
3 union of republics or mini-states. Tudjman has satisfied his obsession.
4 Next on the agenda, the joining of this part of Bosnia with Croatia.
5 "[No interpretation]
6 "[In English] In Herceg-Bosna, in towns like Capljina, the new
7 state is taking shape. The few factories are getting back to work.
8 Children are getting used to a new curriculum, the same one taught in the
9 Croatian motherland.
10 But just outside Capljina, a convoy waits to collect the Croat
11 refugees driven out from Central Bosnia. For these people, Tudjman and
12 Boban's land grab has backfired. They come from outside Herceg-Bosna,
13 where the HVO is losing more and more territory to Bosnian government
14 forces. The Croats of Central Bosnia are now reduced to a few besieged
15 pockets, falling one by one. The latest is Vares, where 20.000 people
16 have fled. Mate Boban's only solution is to offer them a home in the
17 barren land of Herceg-Bosna.
18 "In Sarajevo, Croats face an uncertain future. 30.000 Croats live
19 here. It's still the largest Croat city in Bosnia but the Herceg-Bosna
20 government has abandoned them. Only the church is left to protect them.
21 The spiritual leader of all Croats in Bosnia, Archbishop Vinko Puljic,
22 refuses to leave his cathedral despite constant pressure to move to
24 "[No interpretation]
25 "[In English] Ivan Tomislav is a Croat citizen of Sarajevo. He
1 feels betrayed by Mate Boban and his fellow Herzegovinans in Grude.
2 "[No interpretation]
3 "[In English] For the Croats in Sarajevo, Mate Boban's invitation
4 to come and join other Croats in Herceg-Bosna is unacceptable.
5 "[No interpretation]
6 "[In English] This is a tragedy. And this tragedy could be
7 attributed to the leadership of Mr. Tudjman because he has made many wrong
8 decisions, and I mean he is simply, and his mentality is a mentality of a
9 genuine loser.
10 "[No interpretation]
11 "[In English] The choice now facing Bosnian Croats is stark. For
12 most it's Herceg-Bosna or nothing. Franjo Tudjman has carved out his
13 chunk of rock in Bosnia. He's fulfilled his personal obsession with no
14 international reprisals. But the price has been the betrayal of Bosnia
15 and the sacrifice of his own people."
16 MR. MUNDIS:
17 Q. Ms. Giles, I just have a couple of remaining questions concerning
18 the documentary that we just saw. Do you recall who was the narrator?
19 A. I can only remember her first name but she was someone -- I wrote
20 the script, she just read the script.
21 Q. That was my next question.
22 A. Right.
23 Q. Let me ask you this, because we did see in this piece an interview
24 with Mr. Prlic. Who conducted that interview?
25 A. I did.
1 Q. And was that the interview that you told us about prior to
2 watching the film?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Okay. When was the last time you have watched the tape of that
6 A. A long time. I can't put it in time.
7 Q. Okay. Let me ask you specifically about the Prlic interview tape.
8 When was the last time you saw the Prlic interview tape?
9 A. I saw that this morning.
10 Q. Okay.
11 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I would ask at this point in time that
12 we see part of the Prlic interview tape. In terms of time, I will -- we
13 will be tendering both of these tapes into evidence, but I don't believe
14 at this point, in light of some of the comments made by Mr. Karnavas
15 earlier, that we will need to watch the whole tape but I would like to
16 show her a couple of minutes.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: I would object. It's the entire tape or no part of
18 the tape. I think for completeness, this is for the public audience as
19 well. I think --
20 MR. MUNDIS: We'll play the tape, then. We'll play the tape.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: They have it. They should play it.
22 [Videotape played]
23 "Journalist: Okay, so if you just look at me. Could you tell me
24 first about what happened this week when you became Prime Minister? Why
25 did you become Prime Minister?
1 "Jadranko Prlic: You must ask those persons who choose me. Now
2 we have a new government of Herceg-Bosna with many new persons, and I
3 think that this new government will be very good and this government has
4 responsibility for all things in Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna. Now we
5 have all ministry in our government and I think we are able to do good
7 "Journalist: Before you were acting Prime Minister. Why have
8 you now changed to become Prime Minister?
9 "Jadranko Prlic: Before? Because we didn't be republic. We had
10 been Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna, as temporary organisation. Now
11 according to Geneva agreement, we created a Croatian Republic of
12 Herceg-Bosna, and I am the Prime Minister of this new government in new
13 structure of Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna, in future union of Republic
14 of BH.
15 "Journalist: And you've done that even though Geneva Agreement
16 hasn't gone ahead, it hasn't been signed by all three parties? You still
17 set up a government?
18 "Jadranko Prlic: But all three parties accepted principles, this
19 thing of principles, not border realign of -- excuse me, I made a mistake.
20 All three parties accepted principle of organisation of future BH.
21 "Journalist: You said when I asked you why you'd become Prime
22 Minister, that depends on the people who chose you. Who did choose you?
23 "Jadranko Prlic: Our parliament, parliament of Croatian Republic
24 of Herceg-Bosna and the president of Croatian Bosnia, according to law.
25 "Journalist: And are they representative? Who did they
1 represent, the Parliament? How were they elected?
2 "Jadranko Prlic: All municipalities of Croatian Republic
3 Herceg-Bosna, more than 30 municipalities in this parliament. This
4 parliament has 70 members.
5 "Journalist: And do they come from all over Bosnia?
6 "Jadranko Prlic: Not all over Bosnia. All parts of Bosnia in
7 which Croat lives.
8 "Journalist: So you have representatives from Central Bosnia and
9 from --
10 "Jadranko Prlic: From Central Bosnia, Northern Bosnia or Bosanska
11 Posavina, Middle Bosnia, Herzegovina and --
12 "Journalist: Where is the seat of government?
13 "Jadranko Prlic: Here in Mostar.
14 "Journalist: Could you tell me that like in a statement here,
15 Mostar is the seat of government, just it makes it easier.
16 "Jadranko Prlic: Mostar is the seat of government all the time.
17 "Journalist: And what is the division of responsibility between
18 Mostar and Grude? Is there --
19 "Jadranko Prlic: There is no Grude in any document of Croatian
20 Republic of Herceg-Bosna. In all documents Mostar is the capital of
22 "Journalist: And has that always been so?
23 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes.
24 "Journalist: Why are you not all united here working together in
25 Mostar? Why -- there seems to be two different administrations.
1 "Jadranko Prlic: No, we have only one administration, but we
2 have somebody, some ministries, all around Herceg-Bosna.
3 "Journalist: So the president lives in Grude and the Prime
4 Minister lives in Mostar.
5 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes. You may say it, it's true.
6 "Journalist: Why would that be?
7 "Jadranko Prlic: Because president lives in Grude. I live in
8 Mostar all my life.
9 "Journalist: One day, will the president come and live here, do
10 you think?
11 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes.
12 "Journalist: When do you think that will be?
13 "Jadranko Prlic: Officially president of Croatian Republic of
14 Herceg-Bosna, his seat is in Mostar, temporarily seated in Grude.
15 "Journalist: Have you always seen Mostar as the capital of
17 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes, all the time.
18 "Journalist: Even though it was a majority Muslim?
19 "Jadranko Prlic: No, there are no majority in Mostar, of any
20 nation. Before the war an equal number of inhabitants were Muslims and
21 Croats. Difference was only few hundred.
22 "Journalist: But still you saw it as the capital of the Croatian
23 part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes. Yes, it is.
25 "Journalist: Why?
1 "Jadranko Prlic: Because this republic must have a capital, must
2 have one centre, must have university, must have other things which makes
3 a republic as republic, around civilisation level, with theatre, with
4 symphonic orchestra, and so on.
5 "Journalist: Do you think the Muslims agreed with that at the
7 "Jadranko Prlic: I think so. At the beginning, yes, but after
8 that, when BH army became stronger and stronger, they choose their mind.
9 "Journalist: Sorry, they did what?
10 "Jadranko Prlic: They have choose their mind about it.
11 "Journalist: They changed their mind.
12 "Jadranko Prlic: They changed their mind.
13 "Journalist: And what happened? Tell me what happened when they
14 changed their mind.
15 "Jadranko Prlic: You know, as in other part of Croatian Community
16 Herceg-Bosna, in one year before, there were more than 120.000 of
17 refugees, of Muslim refugees, in this region. About 20.000 refugees in
18 Mostar, 15.000 refugees in Travnik, and so on. And it was a very easy to
19 manipulate with refugees. If you say to them you will stay in this flat,
20 you will have job, you will have everything, because those person lose
21 everything in their life, their old homes and so on. And it is very easy
22 to manipulate with this population. It is one of the main problem in
23 development, the process in BH, because almost all soldiers have been
24 taken from this population.
25 "Journalist: So can you tell me about how Mostar was saved from
1 Serbs? What happened here in Mostar to repel the Serbs?
2 "Jadranko Prlic: Liberated Mostar. It was more than one year
3 ago, HVO liberated Mostar, because in this period, only military troops in
4 Mostar was HVO. There was not BH army in this region. After
5 liberalisation, Muslims created BH army.
6 "Journalist: So did the Croats alone fight to --
7 "Jadranko Prlic: Not only Croats. Many Muslims fight in HVO.
8 "Journalist: As part of HVO, they were part --
9 "Jadranko Prlic: Not as part, member of HVO.
10 "Journalist: And let's say you empowered the Serbs and then
11 Mostar was at peace.
12 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes.
13 "Journalist: And then what happened?
14 "Jadranko Prlic: Refugees, changing of politics, of Muslims and
15 so on, is the real cause of conflict between Muslims and Croat in our
16 region, because you know, if Croats want to ethnic cleansing, or to win
17 Muslims, they might do at any moment, because we was much stronger than
18 Muslims. We didn't want it. After BH army became stronger and stronger,
19 they started fighting with Croats, and now we have result of this
21 "Journalist: Do you think you could have repelled the Serbs
22 without the Muslim soldiers in HVO?
23 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes, yes.
24 "Journalist: Without any Muslim soldiers.
25 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes, we were able to do it.
1 "Journalist: Why did you arm them? Why did you allow them to be
2 part of HVO?
3 "Jadranko Prlic: Because they want to be member of HVO. HVO in
4 this period was voluntary army.
5 "Journalist: So then you issued, as far as I understand, a
6 declaration that they -- that all BH army soldiers should hand over their
7 weapons on the 15th of April, is that right? Is that correct?
8 "Jadranko Prlic: Excuse me, I didn't understand it.
9 "Journalist: You said on the 15th of April that BH soldiers
10 should give their weapons back to HVO. Is that correct?
11 "Jadranko Prlic: I didn't understand you.
12 "[No interpretation].
13 "Jadranko Prlic: No, did nothing. It's not correct, no.
14 "Journalist: So what did happen?
15 "Jadranko Prlic: Nothing.
16 "Journalist: Why are you in this situation where you're fighting
17 now? You were in alliance with these soldiers, now you're fighting
18 against them. How did that happen?
19 "Jadranko Prlic: Muslim army want to occupy all Mostar. It's
20 only true. Because HVO had all, all town. Had everything in Croatian
21 Community Herceg-Bosna. There was not BH army in this period. After
22 that, Muslims became and create -- became creating new army, BH army, or
23 Muslims Army. In first period it was BH army, now it's only the name. In
24 reality, it is Muslims army.
25 "Journalist: So they started the fighting in Mostar against
2 "Jadranko Prlic: They started fighting in all Croatian Community
3 of Herceg-Bosna.
4 "Journalist: But in Mostar?
5 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes.
6 "Journalist: It was the Muslims who started the fighting.
7 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes. It's official statement.
8 "Journalist: And what did the HVO do when the fighting started?
9 "Jadranko Prlic: Defend. Start defend.
10 "Journalist: But why did you use Muslim troops if you didn't need
11 them at all? Because at the beginning you fought side by side, you fought
12 to defend your city.
13 "Jadranko Prlic: No, we didn't use Muslim troops. We have
14 Muslims in HVO. It was voluntary army and those Muslims want to be member
15 of HVO. They are no any Muslim troop.
16 "Journalist: So really you think the breakdown between Muslim and
17 Croat troops happened only because the Muslims became aggressive, not --
18 "Jadranko Prlic: You know, Muslims wanted to find new territory
19 for all Muslims. You know, many Muslims were pushed away from their
20 territory by Serbs, and Muslims tried to get new territory. It was very
21 hard task to do it against Serbs. It was easier to do with Croats. It's
22 the main reason for this conflict.
23 "Journalist: So what's happening now? You've got most of the
24 west bank is Croat. What's happening in the east bank? Can you describe
25 that to me?
1 "Jadranko Prlic: No, Mostar don't have west bank, don't have east
2 bank. Mostar is a unified town, and I don't recognise this division.
3 It's temporary front line. But I'm an inhabitant of Mostar. Mostar is my
4 native town. And I don't want to divide them -- to divide it.
5 "Journalist: So what do you think will happen? Because at the
6 moment you couldn't go to the east. I mean it is effectively a divided
7 town, isn't it?
8 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes.
9 "Journalist: So how --
10 "Jadranko Prlic: It is a temporary situation. I think that
11 inhabitants of Mostar, Croat, Muslims and Serb, will overcome the
12 situation in near future.
13 "Journalist: How?
14 "Jadranko Prlic: On political way.
15 "Journalist: So you will have a united town again? You will have
16 all the people on the east bank?
17 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes, we will have united town with all other
18 inhabitants; Croats, Muslims and Serbs.
19 "Journalist: On what terms? What terms? What --
20 "Jadranko Prlic: I'm not sure. But I really believe it.
21 "Journalist: And will you allow the BH army to have a part in
22 Mostar as well?
23 "Jadranko Prlic: No one army will have any part of Mostar. We
24 don't need any army.
25 "Journalist: Not even the HVO?
1 "Jadranko Prlic: No one army.
2 "Journalist: Can I ask you now about Central Bosnia, what is
3 happening in Central Bosnia at the moment?
4 "Jadranko Prlic: We have war in Central Bosnia between Croats and
5 Muslims. Muslims army succeeded to occupied many towns in Central Bosnia,
6 for instance, Travnik, Bugojno, Fojnica, in Northern Herzegovina Konjic
7 and Jablanica, and in those towns, there are no Croats in this moment
8 except [indiscernible]. Muslim finished ethnic cleansing of Croats in
9 this region of BH.
10 "Journalist: What is HVO doing at the moment for those areas?
11 "Jadranko Prlic: Defend -- defend one -- two enclaves, no. HVO
12 in this moment is in situation to defend three enclaves Middle Bosnia.
13 Zepce second, Kiseljak part of Fojnica and Kresevo, and Vitez, Busovaca,
14 part of Travnik and New Travnik.
15 "Journalist: How are they doing? How is the strategy proceeding?
16 Is it going well?
17 "Jadranko Prlic: It is going not so good because we are in war
18 but I think that we are able to defend this town, this municipality.
19 "Journalist: Is that where HVO is now concentrating its effort in
20 Central Bosnia?
21 "Jadranko Prlic: It's probably problem of military strategy. I
22 am not military man. I am just president of government.
23 "Journalist: It seems to me that it was a strategy that was --
24 that was almost bound to fail, to try and get the whole of Central
25 Bosnia. That it was too ambitious [indiscernible].
1 "Jadranko Prlic: No. We have only one ambition: To defend
2 Croats in all BH. We don't want all BH or great part of BH. We want only
3 one part of BH in which we have sovereignty in BH. And all other people
4 who live in this part has the same right as Croat any other region with
5 Serbian or Muslim majority.
6 "Journalist: Going back to Mostar again, if all Muslims have
7 rights here, why have so many Muslims left this part of Mostar?
8 "Jadranko Prlic: I think that more Croats leave Mostar than
9 Muslim. It's our evidence.
10 "Journalist: And also talking about the HVO policy, Croat policy
11 is to defend all Croats in Bosnia, the fact is that the people, the Croat
12 people of Central Bosnia are being, as you said cleansed down. Is that
13 not a rather unfortunate thing?
14 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes. It's very unfortunate thing, because we
15 didn't prepare for war with Muslims. We tried to establish good
16 cooperation with Muslims. You must know one thing: We gave
17 [indiscernible] to Muslim, all the war. We gave them our house and
18 anything else, refugees of Muslims. We constructed new road to Central
19 Bosnia, through the mountains. Through this road all refugees, all Muslim
20 refugees, went out from BH and all humanitarian aid now go through this
21 road. We didn't want to fight Muslims.
22 "Journalist: Were you in any way influenced by the peace plans?
23 I mean the peace plans have changed since the beginning. What did you
24 think, for instance, about Vance-Owen in the way that it treated Croats?
25 "Jadranko Prlic: I think it was very good plan for all three
1 sides in BH. I think that this plan was the best among all other plan.
2 "Journalist: Why?
3 "Jadranko Prlic: Because in this plan, BH will be state. Only
4 Croats now in BH want BH state. Serbs and Muslims don't want BH. Serbs
5 want Serbian Republic or Greater Serbia. Muslims want Muslim state. Only
6 Croats want BH as a state. And I think that Vance-Owen plan has a
7 guarantee to establish new state, decentralised state, and achieve all
8 nationality in BH.
9 "Journalist: Okay. So what do you think your policy, Croat
10 policy, in BH has really achieved for Croats? What do you think that you
11 have achieved for Croats?
12 "Jadranko Prlic: We achieved one thing: Croats became factor in
13 BH. We are not satisfied with the result of this war, but it's problem of
14 other three nations, not Croats. You must know that before the war, in
15 all population of BH, were only 17.6 Croats. Croats lives in many part of
16 BH, from the north to the south. We don't have so huge concentration of
17 Croat to establish some new state. We don't want Croat state in BH. It's
19 "Journalist: But the people of Central Bosnia, as we've seen,
20 from Vares and other places, are coming down, being made refugees. Do you
21 not think that in some way you are responsible for that fact, that people
22 -- that Croats are having to leave Central Bosnia? Do you not think you
23 put so much effort into this area of Herceg-Bosna, into Herzegovina, that
24 actually the people of Central Bosnia have been abandoned?
25 "Jadranko Prlic: Vares is one Croat enclave in Central Bosnia
1 with no communication with the main body of Croatian Republic of
2 Herceg-Bosna. Vares has only one very little [indiscernible] 1.000
3 soldiers. Front line between Croats and Muslims was about 60 kilometres.
4 When Muslims concentrated so huge troops, two corps, it was obvious that
5 Croats didn't have any chance to defend this town. It's the main reason
6 for fail of Vares.
7 "Journalist: Can we pause there for a minute.
8 "Okay. I want to change slightly to find out some more details
9 about things we were talking about at the beginning. Can you explain to
10 me -- you said you've now become Prime Minister, which I understand. Are
11 there any plans for elections in Herceg-Bosna?
12 "Jadranko Prlic: Excuse me?
13 "Journalist: Are there any plans to hold elections in
15 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes. We have plans for elections in
16 Herceg-Bosna but in this period, it is not -- it is not real. We must
17 wait the end of war. We must know which territory will be boundaries and
18 so on, and after that, it may be -- excuse me -- after that, we will be
19 able to organise election in Herceg-Bosna. Election in this period may be
20 manipulated and may be not real, real result, because as you know, now we
21 have more than 200.000 of refugees who are abroad.
22 "Journalist: When the war comes to an end, can you -- can you see
23 what sort of shape Herceg-Bosna will be where the territory will be, and
24 the boundaries?
25 "Jadranko Prlic: I think that politics negotiation will resolve
1 this problem and Croat will be accept all solution. As you know Croat
2 first accepted all plan from international community, and we are ready to
3 do the same if this plan will be satisfying for Croat as a minimum,
5 "Journalist: Did -- talking about plans, did the Vance-Owen plan
6 have any influence over Croat policy?
7 "Jadranko Prlic: As you know, Croat accepted this plan first, and
8 I think it was some kind naive of Croats. Really they believed in this
9 plan. But from the point of view of Muslims, it was only buying of time,
10 prepare for war against Croats. It's one of cause of this conflict in BH.
11 "Journalist: But in the Vance-Owen plan Croats got significantly
12 more than their 17 per cent, didn't they? Why was that?
13 "Jadranko Prlic: Croats didn't -- excuse me. Would you repeat
14 once again?
15 "Journalist: I just wondered what you thought about the fact that
16 in the Vance-Owen plan, Croats got nearly, I think, 25 per cent.
17 "Jadranko Prlic: Croats didn't get anything. Croats has it from
18 the previous period, and it is not the true. This part of BH will be only
19 provinces, and these provinces got all inhabitants, which lives in this
20 territory, but not Croats.
21 "Journalist: So it didn't have an influence in the provinces,
22 that you began to think that the provinces you'd been allocated under
23 Vance-Owen were Croat provinces which needed --
24 "Jadranko Prlic: These three provinces were with Croat majority.
25 It's only true, nothing else.
1 "Journalist: So no action was taken as a result of those
2 provinces being given officially through the Vance-Owen plan?
3 "Jadranko Prlic: No. We made a deal with Muslims to create new
4 government in provinces and we elected candidates, as proposal, but
5 Muslims didn't want to participate in this process. But you know that
6 Izetbegovic signed the declaration with Croats about future constitution
7 of these provinces. But as you know, Muslims didn't want to do it.
8 "Journalist: Can I ask you about the structure of HVO? What is
9 the HVO?
10 "Jadranko Prlic: HVO, HVO, is the name of our army, Croatian
11 Council of Defence. It is significant. We are Council of Defence, not of
12 attack. And it's true during all war.
13 "Journalist: What else does it do? Is it just involved in the
15 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes.
16 "Journalist: So it has no role in other part of the
18 "Jadranko Prlic: No. Role of HVO is the same as the role of any
19 army in any state in the world.
20 "Journalist: How is it financed? How do you pay for it?
21 "Jadranko Prlic: From our fiscal system. We have customs, we
22 have taxes, and so on, and we have enough money to finance the war.
23 "Journalist: Not from a local based system?
24 "Jadranko Prlic: Not from?
25 "Journalist: Locals; each unit being financed locally?
1 "Jadranko Prlic: You think municipal?
2 "Journalist: Yes.
3 "Jadranko Prlic: It's a part of all system, all financial
5 "Journalist: Does each municipality have a control over their bit
6 of the HVO?
7 "Jadranko Prlic: No. We have central organisation of that.
8 "Journalist: Where is that based? Where is the central
9 organisation of the army?
10 "Jadranko Prlic: Where is the headquarters?
11 "Journalist: Yes. Where is it based?
12 "Jadranko Prlic: Excuse me. In Citluk and Posusje.
13 "Journalist: I wondered about how much help the Croatian army has
14 given the HVO.
15 "Jadranko Prlic: They are no of any help from the Croatian army
16 from beginning of war except volunteers from Croat. You know that people
17 from this region have been first volunteers in the war in Croatia, and
18 after the beginning of war here, all of them came back to this region and
19 started to defend this region.
20 "Journalist: So there is nobody fighting here who is not from
21 this region?
22 "Jadranko Prlic: I think so.
23 "Journalist: So what was the significance of the alliance
24 announced between President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic, the
25 military alliance? What was the meaning of that alliance?
1 "Jadranko Prlic: The meaning as any alliance.
2 "Journalist: Can you explain that?
3 "Jadranko Prlic: No.
4 "Journalist: I think my last question at the moment is just can
5 you tell me why -- what you felt about the bridge coming down? The Sanski
6 Most, Stari Most, sorry.
7 "Jadranko Prlic: I think it is terrible, and I think that the old
8 bridge or Stari Most have been destroying more than one year and a half,
9 and this week is final date of this destroying. Now we are going to
10 [indiscernible] some activity for preparing documentation, planning,
11 projecting and so on, and start activity to reconstruct this old bridge
12 just after the end of there war.
13 "Journalist: Why did it need to be destroyed, then?
14 "Jadranko Prlic: I don't know. There are no any political and
15 military reason to destroy this bridge. But destroying of this bridge is
16 just to -- one evidence of the kind of this war, of dirty kind of this
17 war, of anything, as you know, about the character of this war.
18 "Journalist: It seems to me such a symbol of Mostar, being an
19 ethnically mixed city. Do you see it as being the end of that
20 possibility, that Muslims, Croats and Serbs can live together in Mostar?
21 "Jadranko Prlic: No, no. I believe in some kind of joint living.
22 We will live in the future in this region as neighbour. I believe good
24 "Journalist: Equal neighbours.
25 "Jadranko Prlic: Yes.
1 "Journalist: Even though this will be a Croat province and this
2 will a Croat capital, you will be equal neighbours.
3 "Jadranko Prlic: Equal. You may live in France as American
4 without any problems. Do you have any problem in Paris or in Bonn,
5 Amsterdam? No. You may live in this town. I think that all -- all
6 inhabitants of Mostar must live in this Mostar.
7 "Journalist: And they won't have any problems living here?
8 "Jadranko Prlic: No.
9 "Journalist: Finally, why -- can you just explain to me the
10 decision to reopen the cafes yesterday? It seems to be --
11 "Jadranko Prlic: I didn't know. It's a decision of municipal,
12 not central government.
13 "Journalist: So it's nothing to do with you?
14 "Jadranko Prlic: I think it is good cafe is open.
15 "Journalist: Why is it good?
16 "Jadranko Prlic: Because you may drink coffee.
17 "Journalist: Okay. Can we pause there? I just want to --"
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We shall also have a
19 break now. It is now 25 minutes to 6. We shall have a 20-minute break
20 and resume at five minutes to 6.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 5.35 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 5.58 p.m.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So we have resumed our hearing.
24 I've been informed about a personal problem regarding the witness. She
25 has a child and must fly back after the hearing today, after 7.00. So we
1 have an hour left. If we have not finished the examination-in-chief or
2 the cross-examination today, the witness will have to come back on another
3 day. I don't know where you stand, Mr. Mundis. Have you finished viewing
4 the film?
5 MR. MUNDIS: Yes, Mr. President. We have no further questions for
6 the witness.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So if you have no further
8 questions, the Defence team has one hour for its cross. The Prosecution
9 has had an hour and a half, so you are half an hour short, Mr. Karnavas.
10 I assume you are the person starting?
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, Mr. President. By agreement from -- well, it
12 would be nice in the future if we know if there is a problem with the
13 witness, so we could dispense with the formalities in the beginning.
14 Maybe I should use this microphone, Mr. President, so if I could
15 have just one second.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:
17 Q. Good afternoon.
18 A. Good afternoon.
19 Q. My name is Michael Karnavas, I represent Jadranko Prlic, the
20 gentleman that you interviewed. I'm going to try to hit some of the
21 general areas and hopefully my colleagues will have enough time to go into
22 more specifics.
23 First I want to talk to you a little bit about this production of
24 yours. You indicated -- you told us a little bit about your background
25 and you indicated that normally, when you're an independent producer, you
1 have to pitch the idea, right?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. And then I take it, in pitching the idea, you have a result in
4 mind before you even pitch it?
5 A. I think you have an idea of the story, of course, but with a fast
6 turn-around as I described - and a six weeks turn around for 40-minute
7 film is a very fast turn-around - you go relatively unprepared. You go
8 with what you have read in the newspapers and nothing else. You are not
9 able to research too much in advance so you pick things up as you go
11 Q. Precisely. Would it be fair to say that when you pitched the
12 idea, the idea that you pitched was Greater Croatia, the carving up of a
13 certain part of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be annexed to Croatia? Would that
14 be correct?
15 A. Correct, yes.
16 Q. Okay. So it would fair to say that it was with that in mind that
17 you went, later on, into the field in order to create this film?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. All right. Now, if we could step back, as I understood you, you
20 were under the impression at the time that this was a fast breaking story,
21 so to speak. Those were your terms, by the way.
22 A. Yes. It was happening. I mean, I have to say, looking at the
23 film, again, I had forgotten, I have to say, how much had already
24 happened, how far down the road it already was.
25 Q. Okay. Now, I'm going to stop you right there. So may I take that
1 as an admission, somehow, that after looking at the film now, you see that
2 part of your thesis was perhaps maybe wrong?
3 A. No, not at all. In fact, quite the reverse. I'd say looking at
4 the film reminded me of what a powerful story and how convincing it was.
5 Q. Especially when you take that footage and you zoom the camera into
6 the flag with the Catholic church in the background, because you want to
7 stress the point that here are these Croatian Catholics doing all these
8 things to the Muslims, right?
9 A. I think I made it quite clear in my first piece of evidence that I
10 wasn't arguing for, you know, the Muslims. I was arguing -- what the
11 point that the film was trying to make was that there was a mini-state
12 being carved out in Herzegovina in a very similar way to the way the Serbs
13 had -- were trying to carve out their mini-state in Serb Republic, so I
14 don't think that -- I don't like the idea that I was kind of special
15 pleading for the Muslims. That was not my role.
16 Q. And that wasn't what I was suggesting, that you were pleading for
17 one side or the other. What I am saying, however, is, and I put to you,
18 that you went there with a result in mind, and your result in your mind
19 was these Croats are -- from Croatia are, one, trying to establish a
20 Croatian state within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and secondly, the Croats from
21 the Herzegovina area of Bosnia-Herzegovina were abandoning and sacrificing
22 the Croats of Central Bosnia; correct?
23 A. It is correct. It wasn't a particular -- it's not a particularly
24 original argument. It was the first time it had been put together on
25 British television in that way but it was very well documented in the
1 press, which was how I had got hold of the story in the first place.
2 Q. All right. So you read the press, that gave you the idea, you
3 pitched the idea, off you went into the field.
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. Now, you indicated to us -- maybe I should slow down a little bit
6 because even though I didn't have my coffee, usually I tend to rush these
7 things. We speak the same language and the interpreters are going to yell
8 at us fairly soon.
9 A. Okay.
10 Q. Rightly so. So let's slow it down. So as I understand it, you
11 were a history major?
12 A. History and theology.
13 Q. History and theology. Is there a particular period? I mean
14 history is a big picture, you know.
15 A. I guess I did 19th century British history, 17th century European
16 history, and 13th century Anglo-Saxon history. I mean, no.
17 Q. So fair to say not much on the Balkans?
18 A. Not much on the Balkans.
19 Q. Okay. And I take it you didn't research, do any original research
20 other than, say, reading the newspapers in order to pitch this particular
22 A. We did have our document by that stage.
23 Q. Let me stop you here. Did you do any research, original research?
24 A. What would you count as original research?
25 Q. Okay. Maybe getting not just one document but getting more.
1 Maybe not just targeting one person or two people to interview but
2 targeting many.
3 A. Well, we had spoken to Lord Owen, who I think put his views pretty
4 firmly. We had spoken to journalists and politicians who were pretty
5 shocked and horrified by what was going on in Zagreb. We had a couple of
6 documents. We had -- I mean, you know, we -- we had enough evidence to
7 persuade channel 4 to let us make the programme, and they are renowned for
8 their journalistic, you know, acuity.
9 Q. Okay. Well, I wasn't aware of that, but let me ask you this: Did
10 you do any research to see what the Cutileiro Plan was?
11 A. I can't remember what the Cutileiro Plan was.
12 Q. Well, what about did you look at any other -- did you look at the
13 Vance-Owen Plan that was being proposed? Did you actually see it, study
15 A. We -- we did study it, yes.
16 Q. When you say "we," does that include you in that "we"?
17 A. Me and my colleague, Paulette Farsides, we studied it quite
18 thoroughly. It seemed to me to have an instrumental effect on the whole
19 -- what was going on, so it seemed necessary, yes.
20 Q. Can you tell us what plan came after that one, the Vance-Owen
21 Plan, do you recall?
22 A. I certainly don't at this stage.
23 Q. Do you recall seeing a plan that came after that, any original
25 A. Well, as I said, we went and did the film about "The Serbs in the
1 Corridor." I can't remember which plan was on the table. There were so
2 many different plans.
3 Q. Well, "The Serbs in the Corridor," that was much later, wasn't it?
4 A. That was '94, I think.
5 Q. That's much later. I mean, if you -- I mean, it stands to reason
6 if you do a documentary on '93 and you're doing something in 1994, it
7 stands to reason that what you saw in 1994 would not necessarily apply to
8 what you did for 1993, correct?
9 A. No, but I mean I accumulated a body of knowledge over my working
10 involvement with the region over four or five years, but it was ten years
11 ago and I have different things to think about.
12 Q. Okay. All right. Fair enough. Now, I look at number 11 in this
13 statement that apparently you signed today. It's a one-page page and two
14 paragraph statement. And from reading it, it would appear that you don't
15 have your notes.
16 A. No.
17 Q. Okay. So there is nothing that I can look at or the honourable
18 members of this Tribunal can look at to verify what exactly you're telling
19 us; in other words, what documents you saw, who you attempted to
20 interview, who you actually interviewed, who you included into your video,
21 who you excluded in your video. We don't have any of those notes, do we?
22 A. No, we don't, but I remember very clearly who we interviewed, and
23 they are all in the film. I cannot remember any that we kept out. I
24 mean, in fact, you know, we had the three main protagonists. I think the
25 lineup is -- I mean, I'm again rather kind of impressed.
1 Q. Okay. Well, all right. Forgive me for not being as satisfied as
2 you are, but we don't have your notes, that's the bottom line.
3 A. I don't know what these notes are that --
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. -- I would have. I mean, I'm not a print journalist. I'm a
6 television journalist.
7 Q. Very well.
8 A. We cannot transmit anything unless actually we've recorded it.
9 It's very difficult to include things like documents. They don't move,
10 they don't talk, so therefore, our blood, our meat for making television
11 programmes is the things that we record, and that's what you saw in the
12 film. That is testament enough to the work that we did, I think.
13 Q. I guess what I wanted to see is your research, Madam, because you
14 claim that you saw documents, and what I put to you is --
15 A. The documents that --
16 Q. Excuse me. I have no reason to believe you or to trust you when
17 you say "I don't have any notes now." Where can you verify what documents
18 of any of these previous agreements that you actually reviewed? If the
19 answer is, no, you don't have it, I'll take it, I'll move on.
20 A. Okay. Well, the documents I referred to are in the film, they are
21 actually filmed in the film and highlighted in the film. If you want to
22 review those, those are quite obvious.
23 Q. Notes -- do you have a notepad, a story board, something?
24 A. I have to say it would be nice if television were as programmed as
25 you think it is.
1 Q. So the answer is no. So the answer is no.
2 A. It didn't exist --
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. -- so I don't quite know what you're looking for. It never
5 existed. So this thing -- you know, you suggest that television
6 journalists go out with a story pad. We don't have the time for a story
7 that's happening so quickly in a war zone, where you're trying to piece
8 things together.
9 Q. I'm just looking at what you say here. These are your words, "I
10 have not been able to locate any of my notes."
11 A. Right.
12 Q. That's what I'm reading.
13 A. Okay.
14 Q. So I assume you had notes to lose. Now you're telling me you
15 never had any notes.
16 A. Well, the notes would have been, you know, How do we fly into
17 Sarajevo? How do we get from Split to -- logistical notes. I don't think
18 it's editorial notes that we are missing here.
19 Q. What about footage? We have the complete interview of Mr. Prlic.
20 Did you interview, Mate Boban?
21 A. We did. And he --
22 Q. Did you? Did you?
23 A. I did.
24 Q. Okay. And do we have all his footage?
25 A. The BBC, I believe, have that footage.
1 Q. Has that been turned over to the Prosecutor?
2 A. I don't know, but, I mean, if Mr. Prlic's interview is there, I
3 can only assume that Mr. Boban's interview is there.
4 Q. All right. And what about the -- did you interview President
6 A. I interviewed President Tudjman.
7 Q. And that's the clip that we saw?
8 A. There are various clips in the film, yes.
9 Q. Okay. But that's from your interview, not somebody else's
11 A. Not somebody else's interview.
12 Q. Okay. Where might that be, because I don't believe that we have
14 A. I don't know. I have to say I don't know, but it may be that the
15 BBC has that.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers please slow down and make
17 pauses between questions and answers.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Sorry, sorry, sorry.
19 Q. Okay. What about the other fellows that you interviewed?
20 Everybody in that film. Do you have any footage of any of those people
21 other than the one that we have for Mr. Prlic?
22 A. I don't personally have any of that stuff, I'm afraid, no.
23 Q. Is that because you sold it to -- or it's not part of your archive
24 any more?
25 A. It's not part of my archive any more.
1 Q. Okay. That was sold to the BBC?
2 A. No. It was -- you know, you cannot afford to keep all archive
3 rushes that you have.
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. So it was just destroyed, I'm afraid.
6 Q. Destroyed?
7 A. Well, I don't know what has happened to it. I gave it to channel
8 4, channel 4 will almost certainly have junked it after ten years after
9 transmission. It is of no use.
10 Q. So does that mean that that would go -- that would apply also for
11 President Tudjman and also Mate Boban?
12 A. Well, I believe that the fact that the -- Mr. Prlic's interview is
13 in the possession of the Court, means that it is quite likely that the BBC
14 also has Mate Boban's interview because I know they've used that in
15 another context. It's also quite likely that they have the Tudjman
16 interview for the same reasons, but I don't know.
17 Q. Okay. Were you ever asked to find out?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Okay. And but with the other footage you believe it must have
20 been junked.
21 A. I believe so.
22 Q. Okay. Now, I take it you shot quite a bit of footage. So what
23 remains is what we have right now, as far as you know.
24 A. As far as I know, yes.
25 Q. Okay. So we don't have an unedited version of the various shots
1 that you took, or the various interviews that you have.
2 A. No.
3 Q. Okay. And who chose the editing? You know, which snippets? And
4 I'm saying that because I noticed with Mr. Prlic you asked him
5 specifically to say, Could you say it on the record, Mostar is the
6 capital, because you're obviously looking for that one little punchline,
7 and so could you tell us who did the editing?
8 A. As I think I've already explained, it was my colleague and I who
9 chose the particular pieces that went in, and another colleague who
10 actually did the technical editing. So there is a distinction there, but
11 the editorial line, the pieces of interview that were chosen, were my
12 responsibility and my choice.
13 Q. Okay. And the people that you chose to interview, that list, who
14 came up with that list, if you know, if you remember?
15 A. I -- I mean, as I said, the film was made by myself and my
16 colleague, Paulette Farsides. It would have been a collaborative
17 enterprise. I cannot imagine how we actually came -- I mean, I cannot
18 remember how we actually came up with the final list, but I mean, they
19 were -- they were the kind of obvious people to interview, you know, the
20 president of the state, the president of the mini-state, the newly
21 appointed Prime Minister of the new state, and you know, political
22 advisers who had been at Karadjordjevo, Owen he was at the peace plan and
23 had a vision of that. I mean, it's kind of obvious where the list came
24 from. It was --
25 Q. So you didn't think it was necessary to interview anybody else.
1 That's a yes or no.
2 A. I'm trying to remember whether there was anybody else that we
3 wanted to interview.
4 Q. How about Izetbegovic? Did you ever ask him, you know, President
5 Izetbegovic, I want to interview you because I'm doing this film on
6 Greater Croatia. Perhaps you could share with us your ideas on what's
7 happening in all these negotiations you're doing? Did you ever --
8 A. No. We didn't want to have Izetbegovic. Actually, since you
9 mention it, I do remember that we interviewed -- I cannot remember his
11 Q. Not on the film?
12 A. He's not in the film. He's a senior Bosnian in the Sarajevan
14 Q. If you only had your notes, you see. That's why I'm asking for
15 those notes because maybe your notes would reveal --
16 A. But you have this notion of these notes that are kind of -- I can
17 see, you know, wonderfully laid out. It's not like that on the road. It
18 just ain't like that when you're in a war zone particularly.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, could you kindly
20 slow down, please.
21 MR. KARNAVAS:
22 Q. Yes, I understand, especially when you have a result in mind and
23 the focus. You have already written the story and now it's just a matter
24 of trying to present it.
25 A. No. I think if you look at the cast of characters, we did
1 interview -- he's called Ejup Ganic. That's who we interviewed in
3 Q. Okay. What was his position at the time?
4 A. I think he was Prime Minister at the time.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. The reason we really assembled the characters is, as I said at the
7 beginning, we were making a film about the Croats. We weren't making a
8 film about the Muslims and what was going on with them. That's why, if
9 you look at the film, actually there are very few Muslims in it. It's
10 about the Croats and what was happening to the Croats, both in terms of
11 what was happening in Herzegovina and what that was doing to the other
12 Croats in Bosnia, particularly in Central Bosnia.
13 Q. All right. Well, there were a lot of questions to Mr. Prlic
14 regarding the HVO. Do you recall that?
15 A. I've just seen them.
16 Q. There were a lot of questions as to why did you arm the Muslims?
17 Did you hear yourself ask that question?
18 A. Because that's what he told me he had done.
19 Q. Okay. Now -- Well, he, he himself personally?
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. Was that in the film that he said that he armed the Muslims?
22 A. Yeah, at the beginning, when the relationship broke down, the
23 Muslims and the Croats got together to defend Mostar and to defend that
25 Q. How much of that did you know before you went there?
1 A. I don't know. I can't remember.
2 Q. Do you know when the Patriotic League was formed? Or better yet,
3 who are the Patriotic League?
4 A. I have no idea.
5 Q. Okay. Do you know what kind of relationship the Muslims of that
6 area had with the HVO?
7 A. It was however long ago it was -- 13 years ago. I can't remember.
8 Q. All right. And, well, did you ever ask around who might have been
9 the commander of the Bosnian Muslims in that area to maybe interview him
10 and try to find out what the conflict was?
11 A. As far as I was aware, there were no Muslims in that area at that
12 time. They had been fully cleansed. I'd been in that area in -- earlier
13 in 1993 and I had met many Muslims then. There were no Muslims, as far as
14 I could see, in Herzegovina except a few very, very frightened refugees
15 living at the top of a school in Capljina.
16 Q. I want to make sure I heard this correctly. Your testimony today
17 is that in Herzegovina, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were few Muslims
18 living in that period when you took that film. That's your position?
19 A. As far as I was aware, it was certainly the Muslims I had met six
20 months earlier when I'd been in the area had all not -- were all not there
21 any more. They had been --
22 Q. This is in?
23 A. In Herzegovina.
24 Q. Herzegovina. It's a pretty large place.
25 A. It is a large place. I mean, there were Muslims on the east bank
1 of Mostar. I went to interview them, as you saw in the film.
2 Q. Was there any army there, any Muslim army there on the east side?
3 Yes, no, maybe.
4 A. There probably were but it was extremely dangerous and I wasn't
5 going to risk my life any more than I already was.
6 Q. But that wasn't the question, was it?
7 A. What?
8 Q. Whether it was dangerous or whether it was peaceful. I'm asking
9 you was there an army there of Muslims? If yes, did you interview them?
10 A. I don't know. I didn't see them.
11 Q. Okay. Did you ever ask the question, is there anybody here on
12 this side that I might be able to talk to in order to get sort of like a
13 -- how about a novel idea, a balanced picture?
14 A. We interviewed two soldiers who had fought with -- three soldiers,
15 actually, who are in the film who had fought with the HVO, who were
16 Muslims, and now were part of the Muslim army in Sarajevo. It was far too
17 dangerous to interview people on the front line at Mostar. It was the
18 most dangerous front line I think in the whole of the conflict.
19 Q. Okay. Now, you indicated that -- you had indicated to us that
20 this was a very complicated story. Those were your words. You know,
21 initially during your direct examination, when you were pitching the idea.
22 Do you recall saying that?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Okay. And you interviewed Kljuic.
25 A. Stjepan Kljuic, yes.
1 Q. Right. Now, did you ask him, by any chance, what his involvement
2 was in 1991 and 1992 in the party, in the HDZ party?
3 A. I can't remember.
4 Q. All right. Well, it's not in the film, so I guess whatever he
5 said probably was edited out, if he did say anything about that. Did he
6 by any chance share with you the positions that he expressed and others
7 expressed on the 27th of December, 1991?
8 A. I can't remember.
9 Q. Okay. Were you aware of any activities going on at that
10 particular time - I'm talking about the end of 1991, or even sort of the
11 middle of 1991 onwards - with respect to how the Croats of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina were trying to resolve the Croatian issue within this whole
13 conflict that was going on as a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia?
14 A. I can't remember.
15 Q. Okay. I'm just going to hit some high points so others can
16 question you.
17 Did you ever go to Central Bosnia to meet any of the folks over
18 there, whether they were the Muslims or the Croats?
19 A. I never went to Central Bosnia.
20 Q. Okay. So for me to ask you a bunch of questions about Central
21 Bosnia would be futile.
22 A. Pretty futile, yeah.
23 Q. Yet you had reached already the conclusion that these folks, the
24 Croats, at least, of Central Bosnia were being sacrificed for the creation
25 of a -- of Herceg-Bosna which was in Herzegovina.
1 A. I think the evidence, the testimony of Archbishop Puljic in
2 Sarajevo represents, you know, the -- the whole feeling of Croats in
3 Bosnia. You know, that -- one inevitably has to be expedient if you're
4 making these films. You're doing it on a very tight turnaround, on a very
5 tight budget. As I said, in a war zone you have to make decisions about
6 what you can and can't do. I think that Puljic said what we needed him to
7 say to back up our case.
8 Q. Okay. Now you said that he -- that Puljic had said that they were
9 trying to get him -- to convince him to leave Sarajevo.
10 You're shaking your head. I take it that's a yes.
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. Okay. Give the translators a break a little bit.
13 Now, what I'm wondering is, I looked at this film and I don't see
14 anywhere where where Puljic is saying that they are trying to convince him
15 to leave Sarajevo. I mean, it wasn't in the film. Maybe I missed it.
16 And I watched it several times.
17 A. I thought he said it in the film.
18 Q. Okay. Well, maybe -- I know that he was concerned that he wanted
19 all of Croatians of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be included in some sort of a
20 negotiated plan but I didn't get the impression that he directly said, and
21 His Honours have the video, that they were trying to move him out of
22 Sarajevo and have him come to Mostar.
23 A. I thought he said that quite clearly in the film, that he wasn't
24 going to leave his cathedral in Sarajevo because that's where he felt he
25 could represent the -- you know, all the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not
1 just the Herzegovinan Croats.
2 Q. Well, there is a difference between him not wanting to leave and
3 him being told or urged to leave there, don't you think? There is a
5 A. There is definitely a distinction but I really cannot remember at
6 this distance what he precisely said.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. I know that he went on record many times after. I wasn't the only
9 person he went on record to. He was -- he publicised his campaign
10 extremely fully. He was a staunch anti-Herceg-Bosna person.
11 Q. Okay. All right. As were many other Croats, right?
12 A. It seemed.
13 Q. Yeah, depends on where they were.
14 A. Sure.
15 Q. All right. And but did you -- I guess I keep coming back to this
16 idea - I'm trying to figure out - did you do any research to know what was
17 happening in 1991 and 1992 in the region; in Herceg-Bosna, Herzegovina,
18 Central Bosnia? Did you have a sense of what was really happening before
19 jumping into or fast forwarding to that particular period where you
20 thought this was a breaking story? I guess that's what I'm wondering.
21 A. Well, I'd been there, as I said, for quite a long time in the
22 spring of 1993. I know, you know, it had -- the conflict had antecedents
23 far beyond that. I think I had read extremely fully and thoroughly, not
24 only historical records but, you know, the material that was coming out
25 from '90, earlier onwards. I think I felt that I was fully abreast of all
1 the evidence in order to make that film. I needed to be. It was, as you
2 have repeated, a complicated story, and to extract the main story out of
3 it, you needed to be that well informed.
4 Q. All right. Well, you indicated on there that Dispatch was able to
5 obtain the signed, secret protocol.
6 A. M'hm.
7 Q. Then there was that -- sort of looked like History Channel a
8 little bit. Okay. Now --
9 A. History Channel wasn't invented then, I don't think, so maybe it
10 came afterwards.
11 Q. Maybe it was the result of the BBC's effort in covering the war.
12 A. Channel 4.
13 Q. But you say secret. This was not known to the public?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Until you revealed it. Take a stab; yes, no, maybe.
16 A. What do you mean by the public?
17 Q. You say secret. Secret means nobody knows about it other than the
18 people that were sitting around, making this sort of signed secret
19 protocol. This was '91, November 1991. So by 1993 you're saying you
20 obtained this.
21 A. Yes. We obtained it from some Croatian journalists.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. I don't think they had published it.
24 Q. Okay. But to your mind, this was a secret document?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Okay. Now, did you look at, by any chance, any other documents
2 that came after that? For instance, the establishment of the Croatian
3 Community of Herceg-Bosna, otherwise known as HZ HB?
4 A. I cannot remember.
5 Q. Okay. Did you ever try to figure out what was this Croatian
6 Community of Herceg-Bosna, the HZ HB?
7 A. Well, I think I tried to figure it out in the film. I think the
8 conclusion I came to is in the film.
9 Q. Okay. What is the difference between HZ HB and HR HB?
10 A. One is the Croatian Community and one is the Croatian Republic.
11 Q. Okay. All right. Now, could you tell me what the difference is
12 between the two of them?
13 A. No.
14 Q. All right. All right. Do you know when the HR HB was
15 established; the republic, that is?
16 A. I -- I probably knew at one point but not now.
17 Q. Okay. That would have been around August 28th, 1993. And in the
18 film, Mr. Prlic tries to describe to you as to -- that they have this new
19 government, right?
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. And you make the point or you ask him the question that he was
22 acting Prime Minister.
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. Okay. Would it surprise you if I were to tell you - and the
25 Prosecution can correct me if I'm wrong - that he was never an acting
1 Prime Minister?
2 A. Well, as you saw in the whole interview, there was a language
3 problem. But I think what I understood from Mr. Prlic was that he had
4 been acting Prime Minister and that he'd been promoted to being Prime
5 Minister, but maybe that was to do with the language problem. Mine as
6 much as his.
7 Q. Right. Well, you assume because somebody told you that he had
8 been an acting Prime Minister, he had been president of, you know, of the
9 government, you know, during -- when it was Croatian Community of
11 A. Right.
12 Q. And I take it you thought that he was actually an acting Prime
14 A. My impression is that he actually said that in the tape, but I
15 mean, I -- maybe I'm wrong.
16 Q. Well, did you make any different -- in your mind did you make a
17 distinction as to this -- this Croatian Community versus the Croatian
19 A. I can't remember.
20 Q. Okay. Now he says in -- he says during the interview, that he --
21 when it was a Croatian Community, that it was -- that it was temporary.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. And did you ever ask him -- or better yet, since we know the
24 answer is no, why didn't you ask him, What did you mean by "temporary"?
25 What exactly was this all about?
1 A. Well, again, if you looked at that tape as we just did, I think
2 the communication wasn't particularly strong between me and Mr. Prlic. I
3 think, with the benefit of hindsight, it would have been better if we had
4 done it in his language and we could have actually had a proper debate
5 going. As it was, I don't think there was much room to ask really
6 detailed questions about what was going on --
7 Q. All right.
8 A. -- because his English wasn't up to it.
9 Q. Yes, but were you in control of the interview, so -- I mean -- we
10 can't blame Mr. Prlic now.
11 A. I'm not blaming him at all. I'm saying with the benefit of
12 hindsight we could have got more information, probably, out of him if we
13 had conducted it in his language rather than mine.
14 Q. But suffice it to say he was open?
15 A. Absolutely.
16 Q. And you didn't have to cut through any red tape to see him?
17 A. No, absolutely not. He was very -- I remember him being very
18 helpful indeed.
19 Q. All right. He wasn't trying to steer you in the wrong direction
20 or hide anything?
21 A. Not at all.
22 Q. There were no, for instance, boundaries --
23 A. No.
24 Q. -- you know, to start with?
25 A. No, none whatsoever.
1 Q. And I take it -- I wasn't there so I wouldn't know, but I take it
2 there wasn't anything off the record, on the record?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Because it seems to me you're not the off-the-record type.
5 A. You're probably right.
6 Q. Okay. All right. Okay. Because we are running out of time and
7 hopefully we can conclude your cross-examination and have you home so you
8 won't have to come back, at this point in time, I'm going to yield the
9 floor to my colleagues, and I thank you very much. I hope I didn't press
10 you too much.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. The next Defence
12 counsel, please. We have half an hour left.
13 MR. MURPHY: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Murphy:
15 Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Giles. My name is Peter Murphy, I represent
16 Mr. Stojic. I just have a couple of questions for you. You said that you
17 wrote the script for this film.
18 A. I did.
19 Q. Did you write the script before or after visiting the area?
20 A. That would have been the final stage of the whole process. It
21 would have been done about the day of transmission, so it was after, well
22 after, visiting the area.
23 Q. When you approached channel 4 with the story, you clearly had in
24 mind that it was going to be about the setting up of a mini-state.
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. About what you called, I think, in the script the carve-up of part
2 of Bosnia.
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Would it be fair to say that once you had got channel 4 to agree
5 to that, that was going to be the story and that was going to stay the
7 A. I think channel 4's reputation as the sort of seat of best
8 journalism would not have allowed me to get away with that. If I'd gone
9 out there and found a very different story, I would have come back with a
10 very, very different story. As it was, I came back with the story I had.
11 And what I thought I had read about was in fact fully justified when I got
13 Q. You came back with the story you expected to come back with, isn't
14 that the case?
15 A. I can't remember at this stage. I think -- I think it was far
16 stronger than any of us had thought it would be.
17 Q. Of the film footage that we saw, was all of that shot by your
18 photographer, Mr. Baily?
19 A. No it wasn't. There was quite a lot of archive shots,
20 particularly of the fighting. And the shots in Dretelj were not shot by
21 me. Dretelj was closed by the time I got there, although when we went to
22 Badija and saw the refugees who were being shipped out to third countries,
23 that was all my footage.
24 Q. Maybe you can't help, but as a percentage, what amount of the
25 footage would you think was shot by Mr. Baily during your visit?
1 A. I would say between 85 and 95 per cent.
2 Q. Okay. And just one other thing: I was intrigued by one answer
3 you gave at page 82, line 13, for the record. You said that you wouldn't
4 want to interview President Izetbegovic. Is that because you didn't think
5 he would have anything to add to the story?
6 A. I can't remember, to be honest, why we didn't, but I think -- I
7 come back to this thing that it was really a Croat story and therefore, in
8 a way, his part, I mean, his part wasn't very major. It didn't seem to
10 Q. There was a scene where you showed him, I think, with President
11 Tudjman, signing --
12 A. Signing the agreement, yes.
13 Q. But despite that, you didn't think he would have anything to add
14 if you interviewed him?
15 A. No. The main story was really the Zagreb Herceg-Bosna
16 relationship, and that -- you know, we had President Tudjman, seemed to me
17 that we had some pretty heavy hitters. We didn't need Izetbegovic as
19 Q. Thank you very much, Ms. Giles.
20 MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
22 Mr. Kovacic, you have the floor.
23 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] With your permission, Your Honour,
24 I'm going to take up just five minutes, and my colleague has asked for
25 three minutes. Mr. Praljak has asked for three minutes.
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Kovacic:
2 Q. Madam, I'm the Defence counsel for the accused General Praljak
3 here, and I just have a few short questions for you. At the beginning of
4 your film and during your direct testimony you spoke about the country
5 Bosna, called Bosnia, and you visited Bosnia, you say; is that correct?
6 A. If you mean I was using a shorthand and not saying
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, yes, yes, that's what I referred to it as.
8 Q. And as you just said, that shorthand name was placed in the
9 footage which you showed to the British public; isn't that right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Madam, do you know what that country, Bosnia, was called before
12 the war, before that unfortunate war in 1992 and 1993 in
14 A. I believe it was called Yugoslavia.
15 Q. Do you really think that?
16 A. I can't remember.
17 Q. Did you ever hear of the fact that Yugoslavia was a federation
18 made up of six independent autonomous republics?
19 A. I did hear that.
20 Q. Did you ever hear about the fact that the Republic of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of those republics of the former federation?
22 A. I did hear that.
23 Q. And what was its name, do you know?
24 A. I can't remember.
25 Q. You don't know?
1 A. I can't remember.
2 Q. But you knew at the time?
3 A. I'm sure I did at the time. I was very immersed in the subject.
4 I'm not now.
5 Q. Do you know today what the country was called while you were
6 visiting in 1993 and 1994?
7 A. I've just said I can't remember.
8 Q. Did you know then, at the time?
9 A. I can't remember.
10 Q. Do you know what that country is called today?
11 A. No. I don't think I do.
12 Q. You don't, right.
13 There is part of the interview, a small portion of your
14 conversation with Lord Owen, and he mentions the presence of the Croatian
15 army, the army of the Republic of Croatia in Bosnia. I want to ask you
16 this: While you were working on this broadcast, this programme, did you
17 ever see yourself elements of the Croatian army in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. Yes. I remember very well, actually. In Siroki Brijeg we saw
19 quite a lot of tanks and I remember putting the question to Mr. Boban.
20 Q. And that was when?
21 A. In November, 1993, when we were there shooting the film we've just
23 Q. Madam, you gave the Prosecution a brief statement. I'm going to
24 read it out to you, just one of the things you say. It is paragraph 4 and
25 5. You said that you were in Mostar in November, 1993, and then the next
1 point, in point 5, you stated that you were there at the HVO press office
2 in West Mostar, and so on and so forth. And that you remember having met
3 there a colleague journalist, Ed Vulliamy.
4 A. I do remember that.
5 Q. And that was in November, 1993, was it?
6 A. Yes, it was.
7 Q. If I put it to you that Ed Vulliamy testified here just two or
8 three days ago and in his statement, for the record - I have to quote the
9 exact page - it was on the 9th of May, on page 10, line 15, of
10 Mr. Vulliamy's testimony, where he claims he was in Mostar on the 7th and
11 8th of September, 1993, that that was when he was in Mostar. And then on
12 page 17, line 23, up until page 18, line 4, Ed Vulliamy, Witness Vulliamy,
13 stated that he was there from September, 1993 -- or rather, from
14 September, 1993, until mid-February, 1994, he was not in Mostar. So
15 something is not quite correct there. Either you have made the mistake or
16 Mr. Vulliamy has made the mistake.
17 A. As I think I hope I've made clear in my testimony, this was all a
18 long time ago. I have left the subject of Bosnia-Herzegovina and indeed
19 the whole of former Yugoslavia behind. I have a new career. It may be
20 that I misremembered it, although I would question -- I -- I would like to
21 stick by my story that I remember him being in the HVO press office that
22 day when I went in.
23 Q. But if I put it to you that in the statement you gave to the
24 Prosecution on the 6th of April 2006, and the 15th of May 2006, that is to
25 say this morning, you were very definite. There were no reservations
1 there; you say in November, 1993.
2 A. I still -- I know when I was there. I was there in November,
3 1993. I remember Ed Vulliamy being there. If I've got that wrong, I
4 apologise. I'm not retracting it. I'm saying, however, that it was a
5 long time ago and that a lot of this has become very, very foggy in my
6 mind because I'm no longer intimately involved with any aspects of
7 anything to do with the former Yugoslavia.
8 Q. In the footage with Lord Owen and the conversation there with him,
9 it would emerge from what he said, from his statement -- or rather, an
10 introductory question first of all. Did you personally talk to Lord
11 Owen --
12 A. I did.
13 Q. -- in the film?
14 A. I did.
15 Q. You did, right. Now, in part of his statement, it would clearly
16 emerge that he says that the countries of Western Europe, and he even
17 enumerates them, he mentioned Austria and Germany, countries of the
18 European Community, and also America and the United Nations, had different
19 positions on the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or rather, the conflict
20 between the Croats and Muslims in BH. Did you follow up on that idea put
21 forward by him?
22 A. No, because that wasn't the subject of our documentary. The
23 subject, we were asking specifically about what was happening in
25 Q. So despite the fact -- to be quite clear, despite the fact that a
1 very qualified politician, Lord Owen, said that different countries and
2 international institutions have quite different opinions about these
3 events, you weren't interested in that and pursued the scenario that you
4 yourself thought to be relevant.
5 A. Well, I think it was clear what he was talking about in terms of
6 Germany and Austria. That seemed to be stories about the past, you know,
7 about the international community in the past. We were trying to deal
8 with what was the president -- the present, and what was happening
9 specifically in this -- this one area of the conflict. It seemed to me
10 that we needed to focus in order to make it understandable to a wider
12 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I have to go on with my questions but,
13 because of the brief time, I'm going to give up on that and just ask three
14 short questions.
15 Q. Madam, let's go back to Mostar. You said you were up at the front
16 line in East Mostar, and so on and so forth. Who gave you permits to move
17 around Mostar? It was a war zone, wasn't it?
18 A. In the west, it was the HVO. And in the east, I went in with the
19 UN Spanish Battalion, who were regularly patrolling that area.
20 Q. While you were in the west, before you crossed into the east part
21 of Mostar, did you ask for a permit to move around the territory?
22 A. I had UNPROFOR --
23 Q. You said you were up at the front line.
24 A. I had UNPROFOR accreditation.
25 Q. Yes, but once again, in the statement you gave this morning to the
1 Prosecution, and where you mention your colleague Mr. Vulliamy, you said
2 you were at the HVO press office. Didn't you go there to receive a
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Yes. So the HVO issued you a permit, did it?
6 A. Yes. I had a permit from the HVO. We did quite a lot of filming
7 with the HVO in a barracks actually.
8 Q. And what about when you were on the east side? The BH army, did
9 it insist upon you having a permit?
10 A. No. I -- I think I've already told your colleague I didn't meet
11 anybody from the BH army. I was travelling with UNPROFOR, and that's how
12 I gained access to that side of the river.
13 Q. Tell me, please, you encompassed in your material the story about
14 the old bridge. Did you happen to notice that the old bridge was
15 protected in a way, physically, by physical obstacles, tyres and things
16 like that, that had been protected from earlier on?
17 A. I didn't -- I didn't get to the river. I never went anywhere near
18 the river. It was much too dangerous on either side. I didn't go
19 anywhere near the river.
20 Q. How did you reach the eastern side, then?
21 A. Oh, because I had to come out and go all the way around and cross
22 right down further down the river, and nobody was crossing at that stage
23 except for, well, refugees, I think, were still crossing across the river
24 at night. There were certainly shots of that in the Jeremy Bowen
25 documentary. But I wasn't going to go anywhere near that. I don't take
1 those sorts of risks.
2 Q. So you know nothing about the old bridge from your own personal
4 A. I know that when it came down, people in Mostar were very shocked
5 and very upset, on both the east and the west.
6 Q. Just slowly, please, just a moment. What I'm asking you is this:
7 From your own -- what you personally saw, do you know anything about the
8 old bridge?
9 A. I personally saw a lot of people, on both the east and the west
10 side, being very upset when the bridge was finally destroyed and blown up.
11 Q. But you didn't see the bridge before that, yourself. You said
12 that a moment ago.
13 A. I said that the day I first went into Mostar was the day the
14 bridge was destroyed. So it wouldn't have been there for me to see, even
15 if I had been brave enough to go up to the river.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would have a few
18 more questions but unfortunately we have to leave time to my colleagues,
19 to be quite proper in our conduct, although there would be quite a few
20 relevant things that I'd like to raise, but never mind. [In English] I'm
21 sorry, I was asking for three minutes for Mr. Praljak before.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Three minutes for Mr. Praljak,
24 Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:
25 Q. Madam, just professional questions. When the film mentions the
1 meeting between Milosevic and Tudjman in Karadjordjevo, we see the footage
2 of the meeting of Milosevic and Tudjman. Is that footage from
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Are you sure about that?
6 A. Yes. I obtained it from the Croatian television station, and
7 Mr. Bilandzic, who was my witness to that event, told me that he
8 remembered that, that -- he verified it for me.
9 Q. Everybody says that there were no eye witnesses to that event.
10 Bilandzic said so himself, and everybody denied that any agreement was
11 reached there. Is that what you say in the film?
12 A. I think Bilandzic, Mr. Bilandzic, spoke very strongly for his --
13 on his own part. He had his own experience, and he was, as far as I
14 understood, a witness to it, and he wasn't -- and that's what he told us
15 in the film.
16 Q. Please, just answer my question. Bilandzic says that there were
17 no eye witnesses, yes or no? Is that heard in the film?
18 A. My recollection of the film - I've just seen it like you've just
19 seen it - is that he said that he was there and he knew what had gone on.
20 Q. Thank you. Then you go on to show refugees and say they were
21 refugees from Vares. The refugees that you filmed, were they from Vares
22 or not?
23 A. The shots of the people coming out of Vares were not my shots. I
24 think they came from BBC television.
25 Q. Thank you. Thank you. You talked to a man in East Mostar. Do
1 you know that that man was deputy commander of the 4th Corps of the army
2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, yes or no?
3 A. I didn't talk to any men in East Mostar. I only talked to the
4 lady who described her living conditions.
5 Q. The man in your film who says that they used bad equipment to
6 eavesdrop on the conversations of HVO soldiers and that man is the deputy
7 commander of the 4th Corps of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; did you know
9 A. I must have done at the time, but I didn't interview him in East
11 Q. Thank you.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have ten -- approximately
13 ten minutes left and then we have to stop.
14 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:
15 Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Giles. I'm Vesna Alaburic. I am defending
16 General Petkovic. I have two and a half minutes, so would you please give
17 me yes or no answers. If I understood you well, the intention, when
18 making this movie, the intention of yours, is to show that the Croats in
19 Central Bosnia were sacrificed for the interests of Herceg-Bosna. The
20 second one was that the Croats wanted to split Bosnia, and third was that
21 that split precisely was the death of Bosnia. Would you agree with such a
22 general description?
23 A. Are you asking me to agree with your description of the film or
24 your description of what was going on at the time?
25 Q. You told us today, and that's recorded on page 40 of the record,
1 that you wanted to explain the complex situation and that, I'm quoting,
2 "The Croats in Central Bosnia were sacrificed for the interests of
3 Herceg-Bosna." Everything else I said after that was a sort of quotation
4 of your words.
5 A. That is -- I agree that is what the film said.
6 Q. As for the death of Bosnia, I'm going to ask you this: Do you
7 know that Bosnia and Herzegovina has three constituent peoples, Bosniaks,
8 Muslims, Serbs and Croats, living there?
9 A. I did know that.
10 Q. Do you know that in early 1992, the Serbs created Republika
11 Srpska, thus setting aside their own territory into an independent
12 territorial entity?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Would you agree with the conclusion that, precisely by doing that,
15 the Serbs dealt a death blow to the state community of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
16 A. I think things started to unravel, didn't they, but when the final
17 death blow was launched, I wouldn't like to specify. I don't think I'm in
18 a position at this length of time from the events to specify that.
19 Q. Please tell us how come you concluded, in relation to the conflict
20 between Muslims and Croats, that it was that that dealt a death blow?
21 A. I think you can argue that once -- I think somebody says it in the
22 film, that so long as there was a federation, there was a chance for
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to have some chance. Once the federation
24 had broken down, that was really the end.
25 Q. I apologise, Mrs. Giles, I have to ask you this: Do you know at
1 all when the federation was created, the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2 When was that territorial entity created? Did you ever hear of Dayton?
3 Did you ever hear of the agreements concluded in 1995? We don't have any
4 more time for that now. Clearly some things got confused. I'm going to
5 put a very --
6 A. I don't think things got confused. I mean, of course, I've heard
7 of Dayton. Dayton happened well after the period that we are talking
8 about. We are talking about 1993 here. I don't know what the point is
9 that you're making except that you're trying to suggest that I didn't know
10 my facts. I can tell you that I did know my facts. I am unclear about
11 them now because, as I've said many times this afternoon, I have left this
12 subject behind. But I did know my facts at the time and the film speaks
13 for itself. I think the witnesses in the film do speak much louder than I
14 do. All I did was I put them on screen.
15 Q. Thank you very much. I think that everything is clear as regards
17 A very direct question to you: Today, on page 52 of today's
18 transcript, the words of the presenter on the film are recorded. You are
19 the author of the scenario. I'm quoting: "Franjo Tudjman in July of 1993
20 called for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be divided." Can you please tell us,
21 when did Franjo Tudjman do that and where? When did he ever call for
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina to be divided?
23 A. I don't remember.
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I'm going to
25 skip all my other remaining questions to yield the floor to my colleague.
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Jonjic:
2 Q. Thank you. Mrs. Giles, good evening. I am Tomislav Jonjic, and
3 I'll be putting two or three questions to you on behalf of my client,
4 Valentin Coric.
5 My questions concern the selection of the persons you interviewed.
6 Specifically, Dr. Bilandzic and Dr. Slaven Letica. Did you check the
7 claim of Dr. Bilandzic about Muslims not participating in the negotiations
8 in which the Croats and Serbs participated?
9 A. I can't remember.
10 Q. Are you familiar with the secret Muslim-Serb negotiations?
11 A. I can't remember.
12 Q. Do you know that Dr. Bilandzic, before 1990, was a member of the
13 Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia?
14 A. I did know that, yes.
15 Q. Do you know that in 1994, after the conversation with you,
16 Dr. Bilandzic was a diplomat of Franjo Tudjman; he was a special envoy in
17 the Croatian embassy in Belgrade?
18 A. I don't remember that.
19 Q. As for Dr. Letica, do you know that he offered himself to Slobodan
20 Milosevic as an advisor?
21 A. I didn't know that.
22 Q. Do you know that several years ago, Dr. Letica, in the last
23 parliamentary elections in Croatia, was on the ticket of a party which is
24 normally considered as a right-wing party and that today, he's one of the
25 most vocal supporters or defenders of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia?
1 A. No.
2 MR. JONJIC: [Interpretation] I thank you. I don't have further
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Sahota, we have a few split
5 seconds left.
6 MR. SAHOTA: [Previous translation continues] ...
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'd like to thank all Defence
8 counsel who did abide by the time allotted to them.
9 Mrs. Giles, I would like to thank you for having attended this
10 hearing on behalf of the Prosecution. We wish you a safe journey home.
11 And I would like the usher to escort you out of the courtroom.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So I'm now looking at the
14 Prosecution. The witness for tomorrow will be there tomorrow, Mr. Mundis?
15 MR. MUNDIS: Yes, Mr. President. The witness for tomorrow is here
16 in The Hague and will be ready to testify tomorrow.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] How much time will your
18 examination-in-chief last? I'm asking you this question to know how much
19 time the Defence team will need.
20 MR. MUNDIS: If I'm not mistaken, Mr. President, we initially had
21 said two and a half hours, and on the calendar we put down one and a half
22 hours. One of my colleagues is meeting with the witness or was proofing
23 the witness earlier this afternoon, and I haven't had any further
24 communication from my colleague, but I would expect that we would be
25 somewhere in the vicinity of two hours on direct examination.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Mundis. I'd like
2 to thank you all. We shall reconvene tomorrow. Our hearing will begin at
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 16th day of May,
6 2006, at 9.00 a.m.