1 Thursday, 6 July 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call
7 the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Good
9 morning to one and all. Case IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Having said this,
12 this is Thursday, the 6th of July, 2006. We're going to be working until
13 1.45 today.
14 Without further ado and wasting time, I'm going to give the floor
15 to the first of the Defence counsel who are going to start the
16 cross-examination. Who will it be? Counsel Alaburic or Nozica, which one
17 is it? Mrs. Alaburic?
18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. My
19 colleague Nozica will begin the cross-examination, but in order to protect
20 the interests of my client, I'd like to say the following: In today's
21 short working day we have to get through the cross-examination by four
22 Defence teams and must leave enough time to our colleague Mr. Scott for
23 additional questions. I know that the Bench might have more questions as
24 well, and then time is needed for the introduction of exhibits.
25 I'd just like to emphasise that this kind of stage management is
1 not the consequence of -- or any fault of the Defence team and is not the
2 result of the agreement reached.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Counsel Nozica, you have the
5 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
6 WITNESS: JOSIP MANOLIC [Resumed]
7 [Witness answered through interpreter]
8 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:
9 Q. Good morning, Mr. Manolic. My name is Senka Nozica, a lawyer from
10 Sarajevo, and I'm going to ask you questions today on behalf of the
11 Defence team of Mr. Bruno Stojic.
12 Yesterday, we had a little problem with the transcript and the
13 interpretation because we were too fast. We speak the same language, and
14 we understand each other, but would you please try and slow down.
15 A. Yes, please do so, Ms. Nozica.
16 Q. And I'd like to ask you to adhere to that.
17 In your testimony, several times so far you told us that you did
18 not agree with the policy waged at a given period of time by the Croatian
19 Republic, or Croatian state, on three points: The relationship towards
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, you did not agree with the functioning of -- or lack
21 of functioning of state -- by the rule of law, and you had some
22 inter-party disputes as to the way problems should be solved.
23 Yesterday, you told us something very important, and I would like
24 to confirm that, which will help us in our job - me too, you too - that
25 your disagreement in fact with the policy waged by Croatia towards
1 Herceg-Bosna or, rather, Bosnia in general and the policy waged by the
2 Croats in Bosnia in fact emerged at the point of time when the Republic of
3 Herceg-Bosna was established. Am I right in saying that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Can we, for the transcript, for the record, give a time frame for
6 that? When was that?
7 A. I think that in the transcripts you will find the dates that
8 Herceg-Bosna was established as a republic.
9 Q. I'm of course well aware of that, but I'd like to hear from you.
10 When do you think that was?
11 A. Well, I can't remember.
12 Q. Can you give us the month, perhaps, and the day, the month?
13 A. I think it was autumn, sometime in autumn. Perhaps the 9th or,
14 rather, perhaps September or October, I'm not quite sure.
15 Q. All right, thank you. I'd now like to go on to discuss the
16 transcripts that you have been referring to for three days now, and I'd
17 like to take a look at where you agree and disagree with some of the
18 positions put forward by the state council at the sessions they held. I
19 don't think we'll need to have the documents appear on the monitor, on our
20 screens again, except perhaps in some exceptions when I wish to refer to
21 certain paragraphs, but I'm going to rely on your very good memory, and
22 I'm sure you'll remember --
23 A. Don't overestimate my memory, please.
24 Q. Well, let me tell you, sir, yesterday after your presentation and
25 your testimony over the past three days, I value your memory very highly.
1 I have good reason to do so, and I'm sure you will remember all the things
2 I'm going to talk about, but let's start with the first session. The
3 first session was held on the 8th of June, 1991, let me remind you. It
4 was in fact the time when the president informed you about the results of
5 the conclusions of the Presidency of the SFRY, the Yugoslav state
6 Presidency, and that was still the time when Croatia was very much taken
7 up with how to settle accounts and with the remains of Yugoslavia, and so
8 on, and when Bosnia-Herzegovina was mentioned in that context only insofar
9 as that was important for Croatian policy.
10 A. I should like to emphasise that that was the period when the
11 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still existed, with all its legal
12 apparatus, the constitution, and other provisions. So we had to take care
13 and take into account all these elements not to come into conflict and not
14 to be accused of toppling that system.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly be asked to speak up,
16 please, or into the microphone. Thank you.
17 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Would you agree that you didn't actually discuss that item?
19 A. Yes, I agree.
20 Q. Let's go on to the next session, and that next session is the one
21 of the 26th session of the Supreme State Council, held on the 12th of
22 November, 1991, and here too we have a topic discussed under number 2 of
23 the agenda and that -- or it is Prosecution Exhibit, in fact, 00068 where
24 the deepening of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina was discussed once
25 again. The Serbs were holding a referendum at that time, and you did not
1 have any discussions with respect to that issue and those questions belong
2 to the time frame that you've just explained to us.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you. At a meeting of the 18th of November, 1991, and that
5 is Exhibit P 00080, under Miscellaneous, I think that it was an important
6 session because of issues related to Bosnia-Herzegovina. As I was saying,
7 under Others, or Miscellaneous, President Tudjman informed you about a
8 piece of information received according to which the Western Herzegovina
9 Travnik region would gain their declaration to set up a joint
10 Herceg-Bosna; do you remember that?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. As far as I was able to go through that, you never had any
13 dilemmas or questions with respect to what was discussed at the meeting.
14 A. Perhaps not at that session.
15 Q. Would you explain to me, when you say perhaps not at the meeting
16 or at the session certainly not, but why did you say just at the meeting
17 not? Did you have any queries otherwise?
18 A. The problem was discussed previously and afterwards as well,
19 whether in a broader circle or narrower circle of people.
20 Q. Yes, but regardless of this, everything that you discussed was not
21 as drastic for it to merit for you to intervene at the session in any way.
22 A. When you look at the way in which the meeting was chaired with the
23 president's authority, I don't think that was necessary, and I wouldn't
24 think that that would have been useful, to open up a debate of that kind,
25 although it was quite clear to one and all what the position was and what
1 the creation of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna created.
2 Q. You bring me to a dilemma now. Actually, I'm not able to draw the
3 proper conclusion about your testimony now. I'm in a quandary. Yesterday
4 you said and repeated today that with respect to Herceg-Bosna, regardless
5 of whether it was called a community or not or republic or not, your first
6 opposition there was to the policy when the Republic of Herceg-Bosna was
7 formed; is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So can I conclude that you weren't opposed to anything at that
10 point in time?
11 A. No. At that point in time during the session, and on the basis of
12 the transcripts, that is not evident. However, I remained firm in my
13 position that the formation of Herceg-Bosna was a question that had to
14 have some attributes of statehood which would then collide with the
15 existing Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 Q. Well, we're going discuss that after the autumn of 1993. We'll
17 get to that in due course, when you say you were opposed to what was going
18 on, but let me now remind you of something else and ask you whether you
19 attended the meeting of the 27th of December, 1991, and that was the
20 meeting attended by Mr. Kljuic.
21 And I'd like e-court, please, and Prosecution Exhibit P 00088 to
22 be placed on the screens, and I'd like to remind you it was a meeting, as
23 I say, attended by Mr. Kljuic. He came in to present his position, and
24 the other Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina came too, and there was
25 discussion there about the positions of Mr. Kljuic as opposed to the
1 positions presented by the others who attended. Do you remember?
2 A. Could you repeat the date of the session, please.
3 Q. The 27th of December, 1991.
4 A. I don't remember, but you have it in the transcripts whether I was
5 present or not, and I will believe you when you tell me and I'll believe
6 the transcript.
7 Q. We will show you the transcript, that's why we insisted upon it,
8 because for some sessions we do have a list of those present but for
9 others, unfortunately, we do not have a list of those who attended, so I
10 cannot establish that myself and that's why I'm asking you whether you
11 were there or not.
12 May we have the agenda on our screens, please. Scroll down a
13 little, please. Up. May we have page 2 on the screen now, please.
14 Can you see that and read it?
15 A. Yes, I can.
16 Q. The meeting was a very important political one and stood out, and
17 I'm sure you would have remembered it had you been present, but I have my
18 reasons for thinking that you weren't present. Mate Boban was present,
19 for example, Mr. Brkic, and a large number of Croats, as you said, from
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is the meeting at which Mr. Kljuic stood up
21 in opposition to certain positions presented by others.
22 A. According to the contents, and based on what I've read here, I
23 don't remember having attended that meeting.
24 Q. My question was asked because the Prosecutor, in the summary that
25 he provided us with about your testimony, said that you were at that
1 meeting on the 27th of December, 1991, and that you would confirm that,
2 confirm what happened at the meeting. You don't remember, but do you
3 exclude the possibility?
4 A. Well, I don't exclude the possibility of my having been there. I
5 would have to read the transcript quietly and concentrate on that very --
6 in order to answer the question.
7 Q. May I try and jog your memory? Do you remember the debate in
8 general when Mr. Kljuic was there and Mr. Kostroman was there and when the
9 other Croats were there and when the decisions were read out on the
10 establishment of the Community of Herceg-Bosna? Do you remember that at
12 A. Well, I think I remember a meeting of that kind attended by Kljuic
13 and the other people that you mentioned, but I can't claim that that was
14 that very session. I think there were a number of meetings that were held
15 to which Kljuic came.
16 Q. Now, for the transcript, I'd just like to underline that you leave
17 the possibility open that you might have been at the meeting; is that
19 A. Yes, that's right. Based on the contents and the participants, I
20 might have been.
21 Q. We don't have you taking the floor, being recorded as having taken
22 the floor at the meeting, so it's difficult to establish.
23 A. Well, yes, that's why I have my doubts whether I actually attended
24 or not.
25 Q. I would like to refer now to another meeting. Let's have a look
1 at the meeting of the 10th of March, 1992, and it is Prosecution Exhibit
2 000134, a meeting where you did not take part in the debate on the item of
3 the agenda, on the work of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and our links
4 with them. That was a meeting where my client is mentioned, and let me
5 remind you it is the meeting where Mate Boban provided information about
6 the procurement of the Golf cars.
7 Do you remember what Mr. Bruno Stojic did at that time? And we're
8 talking about the 10th of March, 1992. What positions he held and how he
9 was able to procure those Golf cars.
10 A. I did not know what posts the individuals mentioned occupied
11 except for Kljuic. I know he was president. Except for Brkic. I know
12 that he was to take over the office of president. I remember that.
13 However, the other positions and who held them, I really can't know. I
14 didn't enter into that.
15 Q. At that time, the material time referred to by Mr. Boban,
16 Mr. Bruno Stojic worked as assistant in the Ministry of the Internal
17 Affairs or, rather, deputy. I was not precise enough. He was deputy in
18 the Internal Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So it's not a Herzegovina
19 structure, it was a post in the official state. And since you, in
20 response to a question from the Prosecution, speculated and said that
21 those Golf cars were perhaps procured from the factory, I'm going to ask
22 you whether you would agree with me when I tell you that the position of
23 Mr. Bruno Stojic was such at that time that he was able to procure all
24 equipment for all the police stations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that, as
25 such, performing that function, that's how those Golf cars were procured.
1 A. I can't tell you that because I don't know which position he
2 occupied. The Ministry of the Interior, I know what that structure was.
3 I know that there were a number of assistant ministers. I don't know
4 whether Mr. Prlic -- Stojic -- yes, Stojic, I beg your pardon, was in that
5 particular department for procuring equipment or whether he was something
6 else. So I really can't answer the question. I don't know what post he
7 occupied, so I can't give you an affirmative answer or a negative answer,
8 but the fact is that at the session the figure bandied about was that of
9 150 Golf cars procured.
10 Q. Yes. I just want to say that you were commenting on something you
11 don't know about and that is that those Golfs were procured for the
12 requirements of the police of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that
13 that is how -- a certain number of those cars came to the area that they
14 were talking about, Mr. Boban mentioned. I just wanted to highlight that,
15 because you said something and speculated on something that you didn't
16 know directly.
17 A. I did know directly what was stated at the meeting, and Boban did
18 state the figure of 150 Golf cars as procured by that man, he said that at
19 that session. So I'm adhering to that text and you can stick to that too
20 and we'll explain the situation very easily if we do that. If you have
21 any other knowledge, that's another matter. I can't enter into anything
22 like that.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly be asked to slow down
24 for the benefit of one and all. Thank you.
25 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]
1 Q. You said that you thought that these were Golf cars that were
2 procured from the factory, so you were talking about something you didn't
3 know first-hand. That is why I'm asking you.
4 A. If we're dealing with 150 Golf cars, then the assumption must be
5 where did they come from? Where did those Golf cars come from? And that
6 is why I speculated and guessed, and as I knew that there was a Golf
7 factory in Sarajevo, I logically concluded that there could have been 150
8 new Golf cars coming from that factory.
9 Q. Thank you very much. Now I would like to turn to the session held
10 on the 3rd of November, 1992, which is Exhibit 00699. And this is a
11 session where Slavonski Brod -- no, I apologise, Bosanski Brod was
12 discussed. So it was on the 3rd of November, 1992. Do you remember that
14 A. Yes, I can, if this is indeed the session where we discussed the
15 withdrawal of Croatian army from the territory of Bosnian Posavina; and in
16 relation to that, we discussed the destruction of the bridge, the issue of
17 Brod, and so on.
18 Q. Yes, correct. And on the agenda there was an item, the report of
19 the state commission on Bosanski Brod. You were quite active in that
20 session, although I have to say that there were many -- that there were
21 not many sessions where you were not quite talkative.
22 A. Yes, as is my habit.
23 Q. You spoke quite a lot about demobilisation, about that issue. The
24 status of Croatian officials in the army was also discussed. Do you
25 remember that?
1 A. Yes. I think we need to stick to the text. I think the text is
2 more relevant than my memory.
3 Q. Other than this, there were no other topics discussed?
4 A. Then we're not thinking of the same session. The session where
5 the report was given about the withdrawal of our forces from Bosnian
7 Q. Yes, that's the same session.
8 A. The president of the commission, you said who was in that post,
9 who gave the report.
10 Q. Yes. Now, let's turn to the session held on the 27th of January,
11 1993, and this seems to be the most problematic one. This is Prosecution
12 Exhibit 01325.
13 On the first day of your testimony, in direct examination you
14 commented on some portions of this session, and then yesterday you said
15 that you did not attend it. Let me remind you. On the first day, that
16 was the 4th of July, transcript page 4433 until 4434, you said there that
17 you attended the session.
18 A. I think that is clear on the face of the minutes, because that
19 document states the -- those present.
20 Q. Mr. Karnavas asked you about that session yesterday because,
21 during that session, a letter of Mr. Prlic was read out. You said that
22 you did not attend that session. Let us now clarify. Did you attend or
24 A. Please show us the very beginning of the minutes. If it says that
25 I was there, then I definitely did attend.
1 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown the first
2 page of this minutes. So this is Exhibit P 01325.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 27th of January, 1993; correct?
4 Q. You'll see it on the screen and you can verify. Could we please
5 see the next page so that the witness can see the agenda.
6 A. My name is not mentioned on the first page.
7 Q. We don't know yet. We have two different accounts right now, one
8 saying that you attended and one saying that you didn't.
9 Can we see the agenda and a bit below the agenda so that the
10 witness can see it. I think that that's quite important. It's below the
11 Miscellaneous item or, rather, scroll down. Yes, this is good.
12 A. Based on the people mentioned in these minutes, I think that this
13 has more to do with operative issues than any political discussion of a
14 problem. Based on the list of attendees, I would say that those were
15 people from operative affairs; minister of the interior, his assistant,
16 and so on.
17 Q. When Mr. Karnavas ask you yesterday, you said, "I did not attend
18 that session." I want to clarify this.
19 A. That's what I'm saying now. Looking at the minutes, I would say
20 that I didn't attend that session.
21 Q. Yes. But on the first day, when examined by the Prosecutor, when
22 he asked you about the report that Mr. Susak received from Kordic and
23 Stojic, and when the Prosecutor referred you to the pages of these minutes
24 -- this is ERN number 01867580. 01867580. So when asked then, you said
25 that you knew about this. So how come you know about this? Is it because
1 you attended this session or not?
2 A. I can tell you that I did not attend that session, but if you read
3 me out the text of my evidence in chief, then I can perhaps clarify.
4 Q. Well, the text is before you, the upper portion.
5 Another text we're interested, ERN 01867583.
6 A. See here, when it comes --
7 Q. This portion. This portion. Would you please look at the first
8 paragraph. When asked by the Prosecutor in your first day of evidence,
9 you said that you knew about this. So how come you knew about this if you
10 didn't attend this session?
11 A. It was possible that I could have learned of this from other
12 sources. Therefore, I can't tell you now firmly whether I attended that
13 session or not, but most likely the minutes would have reflected had I
14 been present.
15 As to the problems presented by Gojko Susak, those problems were
16 in place for quite a long time in that area, Vitez, Gornji Vakuf, as the
17 lines moved. So it was possible that I could have learned about this from
18 other sources, other reports, just as the minutes reflect.
19 Q. Can we then conclude that you didn't attend this session but that
20 you learned of it from other sources?
21 A. Yes, I think we can conclude that, because I fully believe the
22 minutes in the portion where it lists the attendees. That was quite
23 carefully recorded.
24 Q. Mr. Manolic, yesterday and the day before that, both when asked by
25 Mr. Praljak and by my other colleagues, you said repeatedly that you could
1 testify only about what was stated in the transcripts, and on a number of
2 important issues you said that you had no other information. So based on
3 this, I can conclude that in addition to what you learned during these
4 sessions, you also had some other sources of information, especially when
5 it comes to this issue, to Mr. Susak. Did he inform you about the
6 contacts with people there Herceg-Bosna?
7 A. I can't give you a firm answer about that because there were very
8 many sources of information in different periods of time. Now we are
9 dealing with the events discussed at this session which most likely I did
10 not attend.
11 Q. Please understand me. Please don't feel offended.
12 A. No, I'm not offended at all.
13 Q. It is extremely important for me, extremely important, because my
14 client was mentioned here, and I have to insist on clarifying this issue.
15 I have to know whether you attended that session or not.
16 Did you receive the information at the session or via some other
18 A. This issue that is discussed here, I am familiar with that issue.
19 Now, whether I attended that session, or perhaps I was late arriving and
20 therefore my presence was not recorded, or I learned of this from other
21 sources, and there were a whole number of those sources, I don't know.
22 Q. You said to my colleague that you reviewed these transcripts
23 before coming here; correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. I don't remember that you provided a very clear answer as to how
1 come you had these transcripts available to you. Do you have them in your
2 personal archive?
3 A. I don't know if you're aware of the fact that these transcripts
4 circulate throughout Zagreb in quite large copies, so it's not difficult
5 to come by these transcripts.
6 Q. So it's not difficult, and you had them.
7 A. Yes, I had some. I can't say that I had all of them. And I had
8 some minutes. I also had my notes from sessions, party meetings,
9 definitely, yes.
10 Q. Did you discuss with the Prosecutor specifically the report from
11 this session that I'm referring to now? Did you discuss the reports sent
12 by Kordic and Stojic on the situation in Central Bosnia?
13 A. What was put to me here, and I think that we did put the text that
14 we are dealing with now -- I'm not quite sure, though, because a lot of
15 texts were put here. I'm not sure whether this was put to me by the
16 Prosecutor through his question.
17 Q. Mr. Manolic, I didn't ask you about what was going on here in the
18 courtroom. I asked you about your contact with the Prosecution before
19 arriving here.
20 A. No.
21 Q. Just a minute. We mustn't overlap. Did you ever discuss with the
22 Prosecution whether you knew that Susak received reports from Kordic and
23 Stojic about the situation in Central Bosnia?
24 A. No, not directly, except what one could learn through the
1 Q. I'm just saying this not because of your sake but because of the
2 sake of the transcript. In the last summary we received from the
3 Prosecution on the 28th of June, 1996, [as interpreted] that's precisely
4 what is stated there; namely that you would testify about contacts and
5 information that Susak received about the status or situation in Bosnia
6 from Kordic and Stojic. This is why I was greatly surprised to hear from
7 you yesterday that you did not attend the session at all. That's all I
8 have to say about this session.
9 A. Let us deal with the contents, with the subject matter. You are
10 focusing on the session alone.
11 As to the reporting by Kordic and others, this is something that
12 Susak received on a regular basis. So I can't focus on the text alone, on
13 the text here. And that was quite a routine procedure.
14 Q. How do you know that Susak received these reports?
15 A. Not this specific report; I just know that they reported to him.
16 Q. How come you know about that?
17 A. I know that because it was mentioned in many sessions, not just in
18 one session of the Defence and National Security Council. Not just in one
19 session, it was mentioned in almost all sessions when the topic of Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina was discussed.
21 Q. But now you just said that in this particular session -- I'm not
22 interested in general -- things in general. I'm interested in specific
23 things. You said that in this session, when specific names were mentioned
24 - Kordic, Stojic, Petkovic - you were not present. Can we put an end to
25 this discussion. I'm not asking you just about the session, I'm asking
1 you about the contents.
2 A. I'm interested in the contents, not just the date.
3 Q. I showed you the contents.
4 A. Based on the contents, yes, that's correct.
5 Q. All right. We can move to the next session. This is session
6 145 T -- Prosecution Exhibit 1452. This is 9th of February, 1993. Did
7 you attend this session?
8 A. Let me just see the date.
9 Q. The date is the 9th of February, 1993.
10 Could we see it in e-court, this exhibit. The first page is
11 01452. That's the first page.
12 A. Yes, I was present.
13 Q. Could we now look at page 3, please. ERN number -- or, rather, 3
14 in Croatian. ERN number 01867533. If we can scroll down, please, with
15 this portion beginning with, "As you know ..."
16 I will remind you that this is the 9th of February, 1993, quite an
17 important date. It deals with -- oh, yesterday, when speaking of supply
18 of weapons to the Bosnian army, you said that it was mostly smuggling
19 and that it couldn't have been a legal process. I will read this out
21 "As you are aware, I was called by the president of Iran several
22 days ago, Mr. Rafsanjani." These are the words of Mr. Tudjman. "And
23 yesterday evening I received a call from the president of Turkey, from
24 Washington, following the conversation with the US President Clinton.
25 Both of them appealed to us to enable the supply of weapons to Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina. I said to both of them that they should say to Izetbegovic
2 that he needs to prevent conflicts with the Croats and that we, on our
3 part, would do -- would do that, but that they need to prevent conflict
4 with Croats and they need to achieve agreement with Croats. In relation
5 to that, we have specific demands. Even the president of Turkey spoke of
6 them yesterday. But otherwise, two helicopters were delivered to them and
7 weaponry. I think that we must be firm about this request that
8 Izetbegovic give a public statement, that he sign what he actually
10 And we know what he rejected. We are referring to the 9th of
11 February, 1993. He refused to sign the Vance-Owen Plan; am I right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. "Because otherwise we would be making concessions to them and they
14 are continuing with their attacks against Croatian settlements and
15 Croatian units."
16 Please, can we turn to the next page.
17 A. I this that this is quite --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.
19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] It didn't say there we are
20 making concessions or, rather, there was a letter missing, and it meant
21 that we are letting it through, meaning the weapons.
22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. Correct. That's the
23 meaning, we are letting it through.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think we need to give comment
25 here. This is quite important. This has nothing to do with the weapons
1 going from Croatia. No. This were the weapons that were coming from
2 other sides and that needed to transit Croatia and to be let through into
4 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Manolic, you spent a lot of time talking about how Croatia was
6 under embargo, and if a country is under an embargo, then no weapons can
7 cross its territory. You called all of this smuggling, trafficking,
8 everything that showed -- that Mr. Kovacic showed to you. You said you
9 knew nothing about that, and I'm trying to show now to you that you were
10 officially present in that body for which you claimed operated legally the
11 whole time and that this body discussed the supply of weapons to
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina which, in a way, represented a violation of embargo, at
13 least in relation to Croatia.
14 A. Yes, but you have to understand who requested this from us. It
15 was the other countries, such as Iran and Turkey. They wanted us to let
16 this through.
17 Q. I don't have too much time - I apologise, Mr. Manolic - but the
18 violation of something, of a decision, a resolution, you can't violate
19 anything like that even if some international powers want you to do so, so
20 this is just an illustration of the fact that you discussed the matter.
21 And that's it. I know that you always have an additional explanation, but
22 this is an illustration. You have provided your additional explanation,
23 but it doesn't change anything.
24 So in February, 1993, two points are essential to note here: The
25 Croatian state is sending, or letting through across its territory,
1 weapons to the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You were deciding on that.
2 A. You don't have proof and evidence of that, that it was let
3 through. You only have proof and evidence in the transcript that Croatia
4 was asked to do that, whereas President Tudjman very resolutely stated,
5 "I want you to say that you're going to stop attacking."
6 Q. Mr. Manolic, I do have proof and evidence of that, and as far as
7 I'm concerned, that's important for me that you discussed the issue.
8 A. Yes, that is true. We did discuss the issue, but that still is
9 not proof and evidence that Croatia actually let the weapons through.
10 Q. Were you opposed to that happening at the meeting?
11 A. What happening? What do you mean?
12 Q. Well, the president is speaking here, and he is saying that. He's
13 saying how this is going to be done.
14 A. Please read the text, because what you're saying is your
15 interpretation of the text, whereas we have the text before us, we have
16 President Tudjman's words in front of us.
17 Q. Well, you read it out, then. I didn't interpret it, I was reading
19 A. Well, let me have it.
20 Q. 01867533. That is the number of the page. And the Exhibit number
21 0142 -- 01452. This is part 2. May we return to the first page. We're
22 -- that's it. Could we zoom in on that. Lower down, please.
23 You weren't looking at the text when I read it out a moment ago.
24 Do you want me to read it again and you can follow on the screen? Can I
25 do that?
1 A. Yes, but please proceed in a proper manner. "As you know, several
2 days ago the president of Iran -- prior to this the president of Iran
3 called me, and last night the president of Turkey called me from
4 Washington, after having talked to the president of the United States,
5 Clinton, both of them urging us to enable --" so they are urging us to
6 enable the supply of weapons to BH. "I told them both that they can tell
7 Izetbegovic to present the conflict with the Croats and that we, for our
8 part --" Well, what else did I say? That's precisely what I read out.
9 Q. I had to interrupt you. I really don't have time. I do
10 apologise, Mr. Manolic, but I can't go into an expert analysis of this
11 text. I have very little time and a lot to get through. So everything
12 you read out, I read out a moment ago, the very same thing.
13 A. Yes, but we are -- we don't agree over one point: You say that
14 Croatia accepted those weapons going through Croatian territory, and I
15 claim that that was not what happened, because you can't see that from the
16 president's text. He is making conditions. He is setting conditions to a
17 step that he might take. So if you have other information from which
18 you're able to conclude that, that's another matter, that the arms were
19 nevertheless let through and passed through.
20 Q. Mr. Manolic, all I'm saying is that you discussed the issue, and
21 you said yesterday that you knew nothing about that.
22 A. That's not true.
23 Q. You said precisely that.
24 A. I wasn't able to deny this text. Please. I couldn't have denied
25 it. There might be some misunderstanding, then, over that issue, what I
1 said yesterday.
2 Q. Now, apart from this case, in any other case did you mention the
3 letting through or sending of weapons to the BH army apart from in this
5 A. I don't think so, no. As far as the -- the text is concerned and
6 the sessions are concerned.
7 Q. Did you have any information that the Croatian state let through
8 and sent weapons to the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. No, because I'm a legalist. I stick to the law, and if something
10 -- if there is an embargo enforced by the international community on
11 something, then anything that is done apart from that is trafficking,
12 illegal, and smuggling.
13 Q. At this meeting you said not a word. You uttered not a word about
15 A. Well, why should I?
16 Q. Well, all right. That's an answer too, why should you. I'll
17 accept that, let's end there. I'm going to skip over a few now --
18 A. Now for the Judges -- I'd like to make this clear to the Judges at
19 this point. What was discussed here was the letting through or not
20 letting through of weapons. You have no evidence that the weapons were
21 allowed to pass through as illegal goods.
22 Q. Mr. Manolic, let me remind you that you said you can deal with
23 that with other witnesses. I'm not the only witness to address this
24 question. So let's leave it at that. You don't have to know anything,
25 neither do we have to clear everything with you.
1 Now, the meeting of the 2nd of July, 1993, is one you'll remember,
2 I'm sure; the one that discussed the newspaper articles and the conflict,
3 as you called it, with the president. It's the meeting where the
4 president read out the letter from the British Prime Minister. You'll
5 remember that, I'm sure.
6 Now, I have your contribution to the discussion, and in what you
7 said, you say that you're not going to give up on your position at all.
8 You're not going to waiver from that, but you deny that anybody came to
9 ask for Susak's replacement at that meeting; is that right?
10 A. Yes. But we're once again dealing with specific individuals and
11 specific requests, and I think that in this case it was an information
12 trick, a ruse, where they said that I, General Tus, and some other people
13 went to see the president, requesting that Mr. Susak be replaced.
14 Q. But you said you didn't do that.
15 A. We didn't do that and we denied that, but that foul play sort of
16 was still bandied about.
17 Q. Now, on the Croatian translation, 01866481, you specifically said
18 that you didn't ask anybody to be replaced.
19 A. Yes, that's right, but I did this somewhere else. In a public
20 interview, I asked -- I said that Susak should go.
21 Q. Now, as a man of the law, as a legalist, can you explain to me how
22 you asked that he should go in an interview whereas you say you failed to
23 request this at a forum that discussed this?
24 A. Well, that's my own up to me when I decide to say something,
25 whether I'm going to say that I disagree with something at a session or
1 whether I'm going to inform the public in another way.
2 Q. And you consider all that to be legal?
3 A. Yes, it's all legal, absolutely correct.
4 Q. So you don't raise problems where those problems are being
6 A. You keep saying I should have done it at the session. I maintain
7 that I should not have done it at the session. Why would I have to do it
8 at that session? That's up to me. I can decide and choose.
9 Q. All I'm asking is whether that's legal.
10 A. Yes, it is legal.
11 Q. All right. We've finished with that now, let's move on to another
12 area. And I'd like to note, having looked at all the transcripts we've
13 had, I've looked through them all, and this brings me to the last
14 transcript or the last session provided by the Prosecutor. The 4th of
15 March, 1994, is the date. That's the time I'm addressing. It's 8012, the
16 Prosecution Exhibit number, and you did not have anything -- you did not
17 oppose anything at this meeting. You did not oppose the matters
18 discussed. You made a few proposals but there was no confrontation on
19 your part, either with Mr. Tudjman or Mr. Susak; is that right?
20 A. I don't know how you came by that conclusion. I would have to ask
21 you to read through all the transcripts now, and then you can see that I
22 did stand up to those demands. I think that I did so in that particular
23 transcript as well, that there was a direct conflict and clash between
24 myself and the president on that particular issue.
25 Q. What issue?
1 A. The issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2 Q. In this transcript, if you want to see it, the one I mentioned, it
3 is the 4th of March -- is that the one we're talking, about 4th of March,
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. It speaks about a preliminary agreement on the creation of a
7 Croatian-Muslim Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 A. Yes, that's right. That's an important event, an important
9 matter, and you have my presentation there, which was quite lengthy.
10 Q. I'm going to leave it to the Judges to read through that
11 transcript. Unfortunately, I haven't got enough time, but I'll say how
12 you started off. "I think that the agreement was an ideal one from the
13 standpoints of Croatia's interests. In the first place, the interests of
14 the Croatian state because it will rid us and has rid us already, or freed
15 us already, and I think that the example given by Gojko shows this, that
16 had there not been an agreement, we would still have been under a
17 blockade." So does all, everything you said glorify the agreement?
18 Throughout that transcript there is not a single word you said during that
19 transcript which would lead us to conclude that you had a conflict or
20 clash either with Mr. Tudjman, the president, or with Mr. Susak either.
21 But as I say, let's move on to another topic. I'm sure that
22 everybody will read the transcripts carefully, and then we'll be able to
23 see which of the two of us is right.
24 Now, I'd like to go on, with the time that I have left before the
25 break, to discuss a topic that I consider very important, and that's your
2 Mr. Manolic, what was the object of your writing the book? Can
3 you tell us that.
4 A. How do you mean; for the public or personally?
5 Q. I'm talking about your book, and we have provided the interpreters
6 with the book. All three booths have it. We're going to deal with the
7 book, not too much, but it was printed, as I can see, in 1995. And is it,
8 in a way, a sort of political promotion for your own party or a political
9 invitation? Is that what you wanted to achieve with the book? Was that
10 the meaning and purpose of publishing the book?
11 A. No, I don't think so. Had that been my aim -- the aim of
12 publishing the book was in fact to see the difference between two policies
13 waged towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was the first point. And
14 secondly, to highlight some of the problems in Croatian politics which
15 clashed. So that was the object of that. Because in 1995, I don't know
16 whether we had had the elections already then, whether there were any
17 elections in 1995, but anyway, I wanted to round off the creation of the
18 community and concluding with 1995, when I considered that the Washington
19 Agreement had solved the problem as far as the way in which the situation
20 in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be solved.
21 Q. All right. May we have a look at page 14 of your book together
22 now, please.
23 A. Would you just differentiate between your comments and what I say.
24 Q. We'll do that, very quickly. If we take a look at page 14 of the
25 book. I'm going to read it out, you'll have the text and you can follow
1 so that you can see that I'm not interpreting. It is the -- they are the
2 final two sentences on that page. You have the book in front of you. It
3 is Prosecution Exhibit -- I apologise for not stating that beforehand
4 because I see it's not up on our screens yet. Can somebody be of
5 assistance? What Prosecution is it, the book, please? Some help, please.
6 MR. SCOTT: 09673.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me help you out. May I help you
8 out and tell you that this is a comment, not my own presentation.
9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Right. It is P 09673, exhibit, and page 14 of that exhibit. Yes,
11 I'm saying it's your comment. I said that too. Did you take part in
12 those comments?
13 A. No.
14 Q. You didn't take part at all?
15 A. The commentator, the presenter may -- worked on the basis of
16 political action thus far, on the basis of the interviews he had in front
17 of him. That's what the editor did, and they're contained in the book.
18 Q. But do you agree with his evaluations?
19 A. No, not with his evaluations, but as I see, each of these
20 interviews where I speak directly are ones that I authorised.
21 Q. Can we then say that it was the editor who said this, not you, "At
22 the parliamentary elections, to give the vote to him and his party, the
23 Croatian Independent Democrats would mean to vote for the humane, decent
24 Croatian option which stands in defence of Croatian national interests and
25 internationally recognised RH borders."
1 So the editor says that. You have nothing to do with that; can we
2 put it that way?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you agree with what I say?
5 A. Yes. But we must not reject either my aspirations and efforts to
6 introduce myself to the public as a political figure who advocated a
7 certain course and policy. Whether that would be used in one set of
8 elections or another set of elections was a minor problem.
9 Q. Yes. That's what I want to talk about, which course you advocated
10 and when, in what period of time.
11 Now, if we go to page 263 of the book, that would be your first
12 interview given after the time that you said that you did not agree with
13 the policies pursued by Croatia. It was on the 10th of September, 1993,
14 that the interview was granted to the journal Globus. No. Just a minute
15 I gave you the wrong page. The correct page is 256. The interview begins
16 on page 256. Yes, on our screens, please, 256.
17 That's an interview that you gave on the 10th of September, 1993.
18 That's important. And I'm sure you remember the interview. You have the
19 book to help you out.
20 You recognise that certain differences of view exist in the HDZ,
21 but as the reason you quote the following, and that is part of the text on
22 page 257. The middle of 257, you say: "When we address practical
23 matters, the implementation of HDZ policy, we can see that there are
24 serious difficulties, that it is difficult to reconcile with respect to
25 not advocating the functioning of a legal state against violence, against
1 smuggling, and a respect for constitutionality and the laws."
2 So we still don't see that you address your disagreement, your
3 official disagreement with Mr. Tudjman as far as policy was concerned, or
4 anybody else. You don't say that you don't agree with anybody else.
5 A. Well, who would this be against, then, targeted against? If I say
6 as a prominent politician, if I am criticising the policies waged which
7 are not geared to prevent crimes and offences from taking place, then it
8 was somebody who prevented that from happening, which means against the
9 person that waged the top-most state policy.
10 Q. You and I know that presidents of republics, of states, don't
11 arrest criminals. So let's stick to the text. In the text it says that
12 you are disputing these matters with Croatian policy. All I'm saying is
13 there's no mention of Bosnia there.
14 A. There is not, no.
15 Q. In that same interview you speak about camps, and that is on page
16 262 of your book. This is the third paragraph from the top, and it begins
17 thus: "This is one of the most difficult issues in the war. The camps,
18 unfortunately, are a consequence of war. I personally condemn them. I
19 condemn inhumane acts towards prisoners. Croatian politicians and
20 statesmen loudly condemn the existence of camps, as did the opposition and
21 clergy. However, all of this needs to be viewed in the context of war
22 events. The Croats found themselves in a terrible mental shock. Their
23 allies had become their enemies."
24 Is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And at this moment?
2 A. I still adhere to that.
3 Q. You still adhere to that. All right. Can we then turn to
4 something else that might be quite interesting, which is your interview
5 given on the 21st of January, 1994. This is the interview given to
7 A. Page?
8 Q. I think that the editor prepared the book in such a way so that
9 it's quite confusing for an average reader, because they didn't bring your
10 interviews in their entirety, they just brought certain sections of your
12 I'm now going to focus on page 266. The bottom portion. The last
13 paragraph, please.
14 This is the part where you say that Mr. Boban urged the Croats
15 from Bosnia to move out. Remember that?
16 A. Yes, I do, and it's stated here. I don't know what's unclear
17 about it.
18 Q. It's unclear when he sent this appeal to them. That's unclear to
19 me. When was that?
20 A. He had occasion to reply to me, because this was publicly
21 announced. So he had every opportunity to reply to me whether this was
22 true or not true.
23 Q. Mr. Manolic, I'm not here to defend Mr. Boban. Can you tell me
24 specifically, if you remember, when is it you said this on the radio
25 several times? So when did Mr. Boban do this? Give us the time frame.
1 You say you spoke of this for the first time on the 21st of January, 1994.
2 I'm asking you, very briefly, when did Boban send this appeal to them?
3 When was it; in 1994?
4 A. Definitely in 1994. It's quite possible in 1994, but I can't give
5 you a firm date nor do I have these appeals, these calls, and his
6 appearances on the radio and so on, but that can be established.
7 Q. Did I misunderstand you when you said during your first day of
8 evidence that Boban sent this appeal to people to move out following the
9 Graz Agreement between Boban and Milosevic?
10 A. Yes, during that period of time.
11 Q. Do you know when this agreement was reached?
12 A. Yes. I think that this was in May of 1992.
13 Q. All right. And then in 1994 you bring this up again. Don't you
14 think that an average reader, at least those who are familiar with events,
15 can conclude that you sat on a piece of information for two years?
16 A. No, that's not true. It's not that I sat on a piece of
17 information, but a policy and viewpoints are built over a number of years,
18 not in one day, and this is what I mentioned in this particular interview.
19 Q. I'm sorry, but I fail to understand. Mr. Manolic, this has
20 nothing to do with policies or policy.
21 A. What does it have to do with, then?
22 Q. You are trying to make it appear that you were a defender of the
23 sovereignty of the AVNOJ borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that you were
24 consistent on that line of thoughts throughout the period. So I'm asking
25 you, as a man who is putting up that image, how is it possible that you
1 who participated in the highest level bodies of Croatia announced a piece
2 of information two years later, whereas it was your duty and your
3 obligation, Mr. Manolic, to request that Croatia take a firm position on
4 that. Am I right?
5 A. No. You are not right. Just because this was my personal
6 judgement as to when I was going to announce a particular argument and
7 what I was going to present publicly. I was absolutely free in that
8 sense, in political terms.
9 Q. I'm trying to say that you abused that freedom because you went
10 along with Mr. Tudjman all the way up until there was a schism in your
11 relations and then it was only then when that conflict broke out that you
12 remembered all the things that should have been done while you were a
13 member and an official in various official bodies.
14 A. I don't think that you are correct. Let us analyse all of my
15 public statements given in -- given in public and at various sessions, and
16 you will see that I didn't bring this up only in 1994, no. I brought it
17 up much earlier. I firmly stood up against the policy which wanted to
18 change the AVNOJ borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I don't know whether the Bench has
20 the translation of this book. I hope that they will have it if this is
21 introduced into evidence. But if it doesn't, and we would cover all
22 interviews if I had sufficient time, it is my position that up until early
23 hour there are absolutely no specific examples other than certain hints,
24 other than certain hints --
25 JUDGE PRANDLER: What you have actually -- you first proposed when
1 you began your questioning, that you should slow down a bit, and also I
2 would like to ask the witness, Mr. Manolic, also not to interrupt
3 Ms. Nozica but to wait until the translation is being finished. I thank
4 both of you.
5 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours, especially
6 to you, but you are aware of the technical difficulties when we have,
7 especially when communicating in the same language. Occasionally it is
8 very difficult to stop this witness.
9 This witness spoke about the Graz agreement and this agreement is
10 becoming a bit of a legend here. Every witness seems to mention it, and
11 every witness seems to draw conclusions on the basis of that agreement,
12 and none of the witnesses who appeared here so far saw that agreement.
13 Since Mr. Manolic spoke quite a lot about this agreement, he said that
14 this was a key moment when two sides agreed on doing something, I would
15 like for us thus to see Exhibit 2D 00040. 00192 is the exhibit number,
16 page 0012. I apologise. Maybe I didn't give the right number. No, no,
17 no, it is correct.
18 Can we please see the document. Can it be pulled up on our
19 screens. Yes. We can move on. Next page, please. Next page. That's
20 it. Can we see it in Croatian, please. Next page, please. Next one,
21 please. Now zoom in, please. I'm going to be reading this. Yes,
22 precisely that's the portion I need. I want the interpreters to see this.
23 Q. So this is the text of the agreement, the agreement that you
24 mentioned concerning which you said that you hadn't seen it. I'm going to
25 put my question to you at the end.
1 It says here: "Given that it is our intention to resolve all
2 outstanding questions through agreement and in a peaceful way, including
3 the border between our two constituent elements, Croatian and Serbian
4 units in Bosnia-Herzegovina, representatives of Croatian and Serbian
5 national communities have decided that in relation to the working
6 demarcation map, there are the following specific differences:
7 "1. In the town of Mostar, the Serbian side believes that the
8 Neretva river is the border whereas the Croatian side believes that the
9 entire town of Mostar is within the Croatian component unit."
10 Can you, based on this, conclude that they agreed on anything?
11 A. I think that they agreed on what is stated here.
12 Q. And what did they say?
13 A. They said that in Mostar the Serbian side believed that the
14 Neretva was the border, whereas the Croatian side believed that the entire
15 town of Mostar was within the Croatian unit. So this is just a statement
16 on the state of agreement.
17 Q. Can we conclude logically, linguistically, that they are dealing
18 now with two interests, two opposing interests in item 1?
19 A. Definitely. It can be seen here that they have agreed that they
20 disagreed, and that means that they needed to continue their negotiations.
21 Q. So no agreement. Item 2: "South of Mostar the Croatian side
22 believes that the entire area which was drawn in 1939, that is to say the
23 borders of Banovina, is within the Croatian unit.
24 "The Serbian side believes that the border lies along the Neretva
25 River. The border between the Croatian and Serbian units."
1 A. Once again this is a statement. They state that they failed to
3 Q. All right. 3: "Both sides agree that when delineating borders
4 between these two units in the area of Kupres, Bosnian Posavina, Derventa,
5 Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Samac, Odzak, Orasje, Modrica, and Brcko, they
6 must take into account the compact nature of the terrain and the roads."
7 Did they agree on anything?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. On what, that they would take into account the compact nature of
10 the terrain and the roads?
11 A. Yes, but they also deviated from the ethnic principle. You can
12 see here that Boban lost it here when it came to his principle.
13 Q. Well, I wouldn't use that term, I'm a lady, after all. So if --
14 what you're saying is that this was to the detriment of Boban.
15 A. Yes, to the detriment of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 Q. All right. Let us move on to page 5. "Both sides are resolute
17 that --"
18 A. Can I see the text?
19 Q. I apologise. I'm looking at my text. "Both sides are resolute
20 --" Can we please see the previous page, the previous page. The witness
21 needs to see the previous page. I'm reading item 4. Yes.
22 "Both sides are resolved to comply with the principles adopted at
23 the Conference of European Community on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pursuant
24 to that, they have agreed that -- with the arbitration proceedings of
25 European Community, they will adhere to the agreed criteria on defining
1 national territory, both when it comes to problematic as well as to all
2 other areas."
3 I have no time to read the whole to text to you, but would you
4 call this an agreement? You say that this is the first time that you see
5 before you. Would you say that this agreement came up with any definite
6 solution between these two units?
7 A. Yes. Yes, it defines the differences, the differences they had in
8 their viewpoints, but it also accepted the arbitration, which was very
9 important for the agreement itself, which means that they decided that in
10 -- on issues where they disagreed, the arbitration would decide.
11 Q. Whose arbitration?
12 A. It doesn't say so here, but most likely some arbitration tribunal
13 of the international community.
14 Q. Mr. Manolic, it says here that they would abide by the principle
15 adopted at the conference organised by the European Community about Bosnia
16 and Herzegovina.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. This was in 1991 or in 1992. Mr. Manolic, were they still dealing
19 with the internal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina? The structure was
20 being discussed by various ethnic communities in the presence of the
21 international community.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Is it in your eyes illegitimate to discuss it in this way?
24 A. No. Not illegitimate at all. I think that every discussion,
25 every meeting is a positive step, but the consequences of such discussions
1 are another matter.
2 Q. This is July of 1992.
3 A. Yes, correct, July -- Yes, correct, May.
4 Q. Both you and I know that this was the period of time when Croats
5 and Muslims in Bosnia fought together against Serbs; is that correct?
6 A. Yes. But you should also draw a conclusion that this agreement
7 meant the end of this war between Croats and Muslims on one side and Serbs
8 on the other side.
9 Q. That's not the conclusion that I can reach based on this.
10 A. It's up to you.
11 Q. But I can also conclude what you have concluded, namely that this
12 is not an agreement. You took part in similar discussions, similar
13 negotiations, didn't you?
14 A. I think that nevertheless this was an agreement.
15 Q. Well, that's your position. And this is the main difference
16 between some of the viewpoints of yours that you presented here and
17 evidence that was adduced here. I have a suggestion here to put this
18 question to you, and I'll do it gladly: Do you know who or, rather, who
19 on the Serbian side liberated Mostar? Do you have any information on
21 A. No, I don't.
22 Q. I'm now referring to 1992. Who liberated Mostar?
23 A. You mean liberated from Serbs?
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. I think that it was the Croatian units.
1 Q. Croatian units?
2 A. Yes. I'm not entirely sure. Don't hold me to this, but this was
3 a detail which in operation -- operative matters could have been viewed in
4 different ways. It's a matter for top politicians.
5 Q. But you said that this was the agreement that meant the final end
6 to the conflicts with Serbs.
7 A. Yes, I think that this agreement meant the end of conflict between
8 Serbian forces and Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina, mind you.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Counsel -- Counsel Nozica, I've
11 been told that you've already used 90 [as interpreted] minutes. The
12 division of time means that you have -- should have had 56 minutes. So
13 would you please end quickly to give enough time for the other counsel.
14 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you for that warning. I just
15 want to say that the rest of the Defence counsel have told me how they're
16 going to use their time, and I told them that I would be cross-examining
17 until the first break. So I'm not taking anybody else's time. Yes, the
18 time mentioned was 70 minutes.
19 Q. I think that we stopped with the forces that liberated Mostar.
20 Which forces did you say? It says HVO, but which forces?
21 A. The HVO. But in this case it was the HVO.
22 Q. So if the transcript says HV, it should read HVO. We'll put that
24 And now our final topic. I'd like to say something with respect
25 to your interview in Globus on the 22nd of April, 1994.
1 A. Page, please.
2 Q. Yes, it's page 317. Yes. On that page, for the first time or,
3 rather, you did that before that on the 26th of March, 1994, in Novi List,
4 that paper, just so you see that we haven't skipped that over, but anyway,
5 on the 26th of April, 1994, in Novi List, at a point in time when your
6 replacement is called for, you nominate -- you say that President Tudjman
7 was the reason you did not agree.
8 A. No, because on the 22nd I had already been replaced.
9 Q. When I say the 26th of March you said this publicly, and I'll
10 remind you of that. You have the book before you. It is page 285.
11 A. The 6th of March, 1994. 26th.
12 Q. Yes. You name President Tudjman for the first time there as being
13 the person responsible. As the person who does not see eye-to-eye with
15 A. That wasn't the first time. That's my first point. And second
16 point, I name him personally because when he spoke before the club of
17 deputies, he stressed that he was taking over complete responsibility for
18 the policy waged towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was my reaction to
19 what he said.
20 Q. When was that Deputies Club held? Was it in October?
21 A. No. It was all in March, the end of March.
22 Q. So after that.
23 A. Yes, after that. In the crisis that ensued in parliament,
24 President Tudjman found it necessary to address the deputies because there
25 was me and other Lower House representatives.
1 Q. That's when he asked for your replacement?
2 A. Well, a day here or there, but certainly the reason why I was to
3 be replaced was addressed.
4 Q. So was that during your -- the time you left. But anyway, I'd
5 like to go to page 317, and that's the last thing I want to ask you about.
6 It was an interview in Globus on the 22nd of April, 1994, and that is
7 Exhibit -- we've already had the exhibit. It is the book. The page is
8 317, for everybody to be able to follow in the courtroom.
9 You address Karadjordjevo. Page 317 of your book. The lower
10 section of that page. The Exhibit number is P 09673, page 317.
11 It says here that: "The president never, not even to his closest
12 associates, said openly -" I hope the translators have the text - "of what
13 he agreed with Slobodan Milosevic except for intimating some of the talks
14 that were held. He said we couldn't tolerate that. During Tudjman's
15 first negotiations with Milosevic the first cracks appeared in the policy
16 of the Croatian Democratic Community."
17 And then at the end, you say that Tudjman and Milosevic had agreed
18 upon the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the toppling of the then
19 Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic.
20 In that same book of yours, which I have read very carefully, you
21 have an introductory address to the parliament on the 16th of April, 1991,
22 where you are in fact defending yourself from the attacks about the
23 arrangement to replace Prime Minister Markovic. You say that that was
24 never agreed upon. Here in court you said that Mr. Tudjman himself told
25 you personally, and Mr. Mesic, that he was in Karadjordjevo and that they
1 reached an agreement of principle about the division of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So you don't say that even in 1994 in these articles. You don't
5 say that.
6 A. Well, don't look for what I did not say, stick to the text and
7 what I did say.
8 Q. It says, "The president never told even his closest associates
9 openly what he discussed with Slobodan Milosevic and the agreements they
11 A. In detail.
12 Q. It said only in intimating what they discussed. Well, didn't that
13 refer to the agreement on Bosnia and doesn't it emerge that he did not
14 tell you that he had agreed upon what was to happen to Bosnia?
15 A. What he told us in principle was a discussion on Bosnia.
16 Q. Well, in 1994, President Tudjman was still alive when this book
17 came out.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And you said for the first time that they had reached an agreement
20 on Bosnia's division after President Tudjman's death.
21 A. That's not true.
22 Q. Well, tell me, then, where did -- when did you say it while he was
23 still alive?
24 A. I told him that personally.
25 Q. I'm saying you didn't actually say it until the president died.
1 A. Well, I'd having to go through the book, leaf through my book. I
2 know that I did speak of that before.
3 Q. I wrote everything you -- I read everything you wrote in the book
4 and you -- my conclusion is that you never ever said that while President
5 Tudjman was still alive.
6 A. That's what you claim.
7 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I'm trying to be quiet today
8 but I don't understand the disagreement. On the very passage that
9 counsel's referring to, it says at the end of that, "Tudjman and Milosevic
10 agreed on division of Bosnia and Herzegovina," and counsel says that was
11 never said before, but this book was published in 1995, at least five
12 years before President Tudjman died. So I don't understand the dilemma.
13 Thank you.
14 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I'm just saying that for the record
15 and for the Prosecutor. All I said was this: That the witness did not
16 say, state in this interview that Tudjman had told him that they had
17 reached an agreement. That's all I'm saying. Whereas here in court he
18 said that Tudjman told him personally and Mesic, and speculations about
19 Karadjordjevo were present before and after. So that's the only
20 distinction I'm making, and I think it's quite clear now.
21 A. I don't want this to remain unexplained. President Tudjman, upon
22 returning from Karadjordjevo, said, "We agreed in principle about the
23 problems between Serbia and Croatia, which partially will go to the debit
24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina." In principle. He didn't comment anything else,
25 and we didn't ask him anything else. Our only comment was what about
1 reality and reactions from third parties, or the third party, which meant
2 the Muslim.
3 Q. I'm talking about 1991. Were there talks of that kind amongst all
4 the parties?
5 A. No. It wasn't widespread.
6 Q. But it was -- it did exist. Do you know the talks about SDA
7 representatives with the Serb side before the referendum, the talks in
8 Belgrade between Mr. Filipovic, Professor Filipovic? Do you know they
9 talked in Belgrade?
10 A. Yes, I know about that, that that was an agreement between part of
11 the Muslims and the Serb side.
12 Q. What was that about?
13 A. Well, something was known about that but it was negligible at the
14 time, not important, because people like Filipovic and others weren't
15 important figures. They didn't have an important political position.
16 Q. Do you know that Professor Filipovic went there with acquiescence
17 from Mr. Izetbegovic?
18 A. No, I don't know that.
19 Q. Well, then let's not conclude about things we don't know about.
20 And finally, all I can do is repeat the question that I asked at
21 the beginning: Your disagreements with the policy you expressed through
22 the media, in the way in which we have seen, and you expressed them at the
23 sessions that took place. And just three more minutes, with the Court's
25 A. And in direct contacts.
1 Q. Yes, direct contacts from the point in time when the Republic of
2 Herceg-Bosna was established.
3 A. Already in 1991, at the first agreement in Karadjordjevo, and that
4 is the period when the Serb aggression was fairly strong already vis-a-vis
5 Croatia. And that is why this was not talked about broadly in public, the
6 problem between -- and the issue of President Tudjman's meeting with
7 Milosevic wasn't discussed widely at that time.
8 Q. Do you know what Republika Srpska is in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
9 Mr. Manolic? Does it have all the attributes of a state within a state in
10 the way in which you explained yesterday?
11 A. What period are we talking about? Are we talking about 1991 or
12 after the Washington Agreements, or after the Dayton Accords?
13 Q. Before Washington and during the time that the Republic of
14 Herceg-Bosna was established and after the Washington Agreements and after
15 the Dayton Accords and to this day too. Did it have all the attributes of
16 a state within a state? Did it have its constitution? Did it have its
17 powers and authorities? Did it have its flag, and does it have that
18 today? And is it today within the composition of that state, the state of
20 A. Yes, it is within the composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. As it stands with its constitution, its flag, and all the
22 attributes of statehood?
23 A. I can't tell you when that came into being, as of what date,
24 because at the beginning there was a lot of commotion going on.
25 Q. Was it recognised by the international community?
1 A. With the Washington and Dayton Accords, the international
2 community did recognise it, yes, that is true.
3 Q. That was my final question. I have no further questions for you.
4 Thank you, Mr. Manolic.
5 A. Thank you too.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
7 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, can I just have one minute to indicate,
8 as you mentioned yesterday, I do indeed request to have some time for
9 redirect, so I will appreciate if that will be accounted for in the
10 schedule. Thank you.
11 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise, but I'd
12 just like to note for the record that I am opposed to the admittance into
13 evidence of the record and transcript because the witness said he wasn't
14 sure he was there. I've just lost the number. The number -- just a
15 moment, please. 1325. It is Prosecutor Exhibit 01325. I'm opposed to
16 that because the witness did not confirm that he actually attended the
17 meeting. Thank you.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.
19 It is now 10.35. We're going to take a 20-minute break and
20 reconvene at 5 to 11.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Next Defence counsel, go ahead.
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.
25 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:
1 Q. Mr. Manolic, my name is Vesna Alaburic, attorney from Zagreb, and
2 I'm here as Defence counsel for Milivoj Petkovic.
3 Over the past seven years -- 17 years, I have always attended with
4 great pleasure and satisfaction your public statements, and I'm going to
5 ask you about your political fate after you left the HDZ and some topics
6 that I consider to be relevant for this case.
7 Just briefly, on the basis of Globus documents in which you
8 published a series of interviews, Davor Butkovic and a series of other
9 journalists always followed each of your reactions to the political events
10 that were taking place. Now, if you have negative answers to my questions
11 or you can't remember something, I am ready to show you the interviews,
12 but if we manage to reach an agreement, we won't waste time on presenting
13 the interviews.
14 You have explained to us so far that on the 20th of April, 1993 --
15 1994, I beg your pardon, in 1994, you were expelled from the HDZ, and you
16 said that on the 25th of April of that same year, 1994, you formed a new
17 political party of the Croatian Independent Democrats.
18 Now, from those statements of yours one could conclude that when
19 the new political party was -- that you worked to form a political party
20 when you were still officially a member of the HDZ.
21 A. Not correct organisationally speaking, but in the political sense
23 Q. Thank you. In the Globus magazine of the 4th of -- 1st of April,
24 1994, which is highlighted in your book in part, you in fact put forward
25 your political plans, made them public, which, if I'm allowed to summarise
1 your words, boils down to the following: With Mr. Stipe Mesic you were to
2 establish a new political party.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you expected that many HDZ members who were like-minded people
5 would join that new political party. That's what you expected, and you
6 thought that this would lead to a parliamentary crisis. You expected that
7 thereby you would provoke a new set of parliamentary elections, and you
8 had the support of the international public and the international
9 community. You also enjoyed great support from the opposition and let me
10 say the liberal public, if I can use that term. I hope we all understand
11 what we mean when we saw that. And you were very realistic in considering
12 that you could win power and authority in cooperation with the opposition
13 at that year -- in that year 1994. Would that basically be correct?
14 A. Yes. That is the object of every political party, to seize power,
15 to come into power.
16 Q. Right. The elections were parliamentary. The parliamentary
17 elections were held in Croatia in 1995, and your party at those elections
18 was defeated.
19 A. Yes, looking at Croatia as a whole.
20 Q. Yes. And judging by your public statements you were disillusioned
21 with the opposition in one way or another, and in 1996 you grew closer to
22 Franjo Tudjman again and the Croatian Democratic Union, the HDZ. Would
23 that be correct?
24 A. Well, it's correct in one aspect, that is to say that the question
25 of relations with Serbia hadn't been settled yet. Relations in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina had not been defined ultimately, and as a protagonist
2 of those relations and as a person helping to solve those relations, I
3 thought that I shouldn't come to loggerheads with President Tudjman but,
4 rather, that on things we agree upon we could continue to cooperate. And
5 the Washington Agreement found this common point. You can see that
6 through my reactions and President Tudjman's reactions in the transcripts.
7 Q. Yes. Washington was in 1994. We're now dealing with 1996 when
8 you grew closer to the HDZ again. Let me mention Globus of the 12th of
9 April, 1996, in which the editor-in-chief, Tonkovic at the time, and Davor
10 Butkovic, the journalist, writes about the negotiations between you and
11 Mr. Mesic with Tudjman, with President Tudjman, about cooperation.
12 Several months later, on the 12th of July, 1996, the same author writes
13 about the fact that the president of the country, Franjo Tudjman, and you
14 were negotiating about the reconstruction of the government.
15 Do you remember those newspaper articles? Do you want me to show
16 them to you or not?
17 A. No, that's not necessary.
18 Q. All right. Fine. Now, at that period in 1997, round about, you
19 made a number of favourable statements publicly about Franjo Tudjman,
20 evaluating his statehood qualities and moves thus far. And so on the 14th
21 of February, 1997, Globus published an article in which it was stated that
22 your former party colleague, Stipe Mesic, who had in the meantime joined
23 up with a third political party, criticised you for this open attachment
24 to President Tudjman and the HDZ, and your position at the time was that
25 the Republic of Croatia could only be led by the HDZ. That was your
1 position at the time. Do you remember that?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. On the 7th of November, 1997, in a long interview once again in
4 the Globus magazine, and I'm going to read out a portion of that interview
5 because it's not included in your book, in response to a question --
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise to the Court. This
7 will be an exhibit, so may we have it on e-court, and the number is 4D
8 00066. In the Croatian part of the text, that is to be found on page 2,
9 it is underlined, highlighted, and I'm going to read out that part of the
11 Q. Mr. Manolic, I am reading your own words.
12 A. Is that portion included in the book?
13 Q. No. Your words are as follows: "Tudjman is a very successful and
14 deserving politician. Let us be realistic. When over the past -- in 20
15 years history textbooks are written, they will naturally include the fact
16 that Dr. Franjo Tudjman was the first president of independent -- on an
17 independent Croatia and that it was under his leadership that Croatia won
18 the war and retained all its state territory and strengthened its
19 international status. The Herceg-Bosna project will be spoken of just as
20 one of the less important deviations in the dramatic events in these
22 Just a small pause there. It's difficult for me to read out the
23 following text. "That is the logic of history and the logic of politics,
24 and we must all be conscious of that."
25 Do you remember those words of yours?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Thank you. After that, among other things, in the Jaratarnji List
3 paper of the 28th of June, 1998, you said the following in a very --
4 rather long interview: "Croatia's future can only be resolved with
5 Tudjman now."
6 Do you remember that?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Unlike the praise you directed at the former Croatian
9 president, Franjo Tudjman, the Prosecutor of this Tribunal has a
10 dramatically different view of him. They consider him to be a criminal,
11 as somebody who founded a criminal group which perpetrated many organised
12 -- many acts of organised crime. Since you are somebody who cooperated
13 closely with the former Croatian president and since you were his friend,
14 would you please tell us whether he devised a criminal plan in a political
15 or a military plan against Bosnian Muslims or other people? Do you have
16 any such information about the former, the late Croatian president
17 devising such criminal plans?
18 A. I think that if creating a state within a state is considered a
19 criminal plan --
20 Q. We'll get to that. Please tell us if he devised such plans.
21 A. What do you mean "plans"?
22 Q. Do you know of him devising some plans - I was quite specific - of
23 political and military acts against Bosnian Muslims? Did you ever hear of
24 Franjo Tudjman devising such plans?
25 A. All his plans can be reduced to his entire political influence,
1 which is evidenced by these transcripts in its entirety, through all of
2 these transcripts taken together. This is a good reflection of his
4 Q. I'm just waiting for your answer to be recorded. Mr. Manolic, the
5 transcripts that we have today during these sessions, were they recorded
6 without the knowledge of President Tudjman?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Given your experience, both in police work and intelligence
9 services and in politics, given that you're a lawyer, did you ever come
10 across a situation where a president of a state is devising criminal plans
11 during the sessions, is publicly recording these sessions, transcribing
12 them, or do you think that that would be an unprecedented event in
14 A. I think that I answered a similar question yesterday; namely, that
15 President Tudjman, with his public appearances, or, rather, in all of his
16 public speeches, in all the sessions and so on, never referred directly
17 about him being in support of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18 Q. So can we conclude that you never attended a meeting nor did you
19 ever read anything about Franjo Tudjman devising any criminal plans?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. We'll get to that. We'll get to that. Now you are telling us
22 about a state within a state. You said to Ms. Nozica that your
23 disagreement with Croatian policy vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina was
24 expressed following the creation of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna,
25 which was in August of 1993. Therefore, I will remind you of the
1 interview you gave to the Danas magazine on the 12th of October, 1993. I
2 will refer you to the portions which omitted in your book.
3 I will now give your words in full, and I will attach this when
4 objecting to this book being tendered into evidence, because it doesn't
5 contain all of the interviews in their full form.
6 You said the following: "So far I don't know of any agreement
7 between Milosevic and Tudjman." And then you proceeded to say: "Would
8 that mean the abolishment of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna in its
9 present form?" Or, rather, that was the question. And then you answered
10 to that: "Would that be an abolishment or not, what is important for us
11 is that national interests are respected, national interests of all ethnic
12 communities residing within the territory of the state."
13 Then you give a reply, which is included in the book, but you
14 omitted the last sentence, and the last sentence reads: When speaking of
15 internal units within Bosnia and Herzegovina, you said as follows: "Is
16 this going to be in the form of a republic or some other kind of autonomy
17 is something that needs to be agreed upon, is something that should be
18 resolved through agreement."
19 Based on this, we can conclude that in October of 1993 you knew of
20 the existence of a Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. You believed that
21 it was completely irrelevant whether it was going to be a republic or
22 another form of autonomy, which is contrary to what you said to us today.
23 A. I don't think it is contrary. I don't think there is anything
24 contrary there. In the first portion you read out, and it needs to be
25 clear to everybody, you read out first the question of the journalist, and
1 the question is different from my reply.
2 Q. Yes. I stated quite clearly what is the question and what is an
4 A. No, you didn't. It wasn't clear even to me.
5 Q. The question was: "Would that mean an abolishment of the Croatian
6 Republic of Herceg-Bosna in its current form?" That was the question.
7 And to this you answered with another question: "Whether that's going to
8 be an abolishment or not, what is important for us is that national
9 interests be respected."
10 So for you it was irrelevant whether there was going to be
11 abolishment or not.
12 A. What I was trying to say, that the process of looking for solution
13 in Bosnia-Herzegovina was ongoing. That was the essence.
14 Q. Mr. Manolic, I would like to remind you of an interview published
15 in Globus on the 18th of June, 1993, which can also be found in your book,
16 but without the portion that I'm going to quote now. When asked whether
17 the policy in Bosnia is the main point of disagreement, in June of 1993
18 you said as follows: "I don't think that that's the main reason. The
19 main reason are our internal problems."
20 A. I think that you need to depict the entire context.
21 Q. Yes. The interviews need to be in their integral -- in their
22 entirety. I agree with you.
23 Now let us go back to our late president, Franjo Tudjman. You
24 said to us today that he was a realistic politician.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Would you agree that Franjo Tudjman took great -- or, rather,
2 devoted a lot of attention to the reactions of various international
3 institutions, to the reaction of the international community as a whole
4 when it came to Croatian policies within the territory of the former
6 A. Yes, and this is clear from all of the transcripts that that was
7 his attitude towards the international community. He believed that the
8 decisions of the international community had to be complied with because
9 that had a great impact on the further development of the situation.
10 Q. At the point in time when the international community took the
11 position that the former Yugoslavia could fall apart, could go through a
12 process of disassociation but that the former republics had to remain
13 within their AVNOJ borders, would you say that that position was a firm
14 axiom that Franjo Tudjman respected, that he believed that that position
15 needs to be complied with?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Would you say that Franjo Tudjman was the first one who supported
18 the international arbitration about the former Yugoslavia and the
19 involvement of the international community in the resolution of the
20 Yugoslav problem?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Was Franjo Tudjman among the first one who supported the idea of
23 the UN peacekeeping forces coming to the territory of the former
24 Yugoslavia, among other things, in order to assure peace?
25 A. Yes, that was the decision of the Security Council.
1 Q. But was that also the initiative that was launched in our area?
2 Was it our politicians who launched this solution?
3 A. Yes. But you have to be aware of the circumstances existing at
4 the time.
5 Q. I'm very well aware of them. Would you agree with me that Franjo
6 Tudjman was a person who wanted the peacekeeping forces to be deployed to
7 the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina? You spoke of this
8 in your interviews.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Knowing Mr. Tudjman both as a politician and as an historian, tell
11 us, would he have ever consented to creating and building a Croatian state
12 on the basis of something that could be considered a crime, or do you
13 think that, given the historical perspective, he would have believed this
14 to be impermissible?
15 A. I think that you need to be specific about the context based on
16 which you draw such conclusions. If the issue of the change of borders is
17 analysed, then we have to say that President Tudjman accepted the Badinter
18 Commission and its decisions that the borders so far have been transformed
19 into state borders. However, his talks with Milosevic disrupt that, go
20 against this.
21 Q. All right. Mr. Manolic, I have already taken up some time of my
22 colleagues, so let us see if we proceed quickly.
23 Now let us deal with Karadjordjevo and this infamous conversation
24 between Tudjman and Milosevic on the 25th of March, 1991. In the three
25 and a half days of your testimony so far, you gave us some very
1 contradictory evidence about this, as you did in your public statements.
2 A. In your view.
3 Q. Yes. And I'll explain my view. I'm sure that you will help us
4 clarify this, namely that they discussed the division within Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina, the internal division.
6 You said today to Ms. Nozica that in that meeting, as Franjo
7 Tudjman told you, Tudjman and Milosevic agreed on problems between Croatia
8 and Serbia which was partially going to be to the detriment of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina, and that not a single word was uttered about the division of
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
11 A. And what does it mean "to the detriment of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina"? What do you understand in that -- that that term means?
13 Q. On the 3rd of July, on pages 54 and 57 of transcript, you said
14 that Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic agreed in principle on division
15 of Bosnia. On the same day, on pages 77 to 79 of the transcript, you said
16 that the two of them reached an agreement on the division within Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina, inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, and you mentioned the word
18 "inside" or "within" at least three times. And then you added that,
19 unlike them, Alija Izetbegovic supported the idea of integral Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina. And this statement of yours was recorded on page 80 of the
21 transcript on the 3rd of July.
22 On the same day, on pages 94 and 97, and also on the 5th of July,
23 on pages 163 -- on page 163, you said to us as follows: That desires are
24 one thing and reality is something quite different, that Franjo Tudjman
25 did not want any changes of borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina because that
1 would not have been accepted by the international community.
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. And you confirmed that today. And then just another addition
4 about what you said to -- about Karadjordjevo. On the 5th of July, which
5 was recorded on page 25 of the transcript, when discussing that meeting in
6 Karadjordjevo, you said: "No. I didn't say that they had reached an
7 agreement on division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather that they were
8 discussing it. I don't know to what extent this nuance can be conveyed
9 through translation, but to reach an agreement is a finite verb, whereas
10 to discuss or to negotiate is something that implies that no agreement has
11 yet been reached. It's a continuing process."
12 So I will ask you this now: In November of 1991, they were
13 discussing the future of the former Yugoslavia; correct?
14 A. Where?
15 Q. In the then Yugoslavia. The presidents of six republics would
16 meet regularly.
17 A. Yes, the sessions of the Presidency of Yugoslavia and so on.
18 Q. In March of 1991, the political options were as follows: Serbia
19 and Montenegro supported the concept of the federation. Slovenia and
20 Croatia supported the confederation concept, and they proposed a certain
21 transition period, to last between five and ten years during which
22 internal division would be completed and all contentious issues resolved.
23 In June of 1991, a certain compromise was -- compromise solution
24 was presented by the presidents of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
25 Mr. Gligorov and Mr. Izetbegovic, who proposed an asymmetrical federation.
1 A. Yes, something similar to confederation.
2 Q. Yes. What they called an asymmetric federation, partially a
3 confederation, partially a federation.
4 A. Which was a modified proposal of Slovenia and Croatia.
5 Q. Correct. Would you agree with me that in March of 1991, when the
6 meeting in Karadjordjevo was held, the creation of independent states from
7 the republics of the former Yugoslavia was not an option, especially not
8 an option that Milosevic was ready to reach an agreement on with somebody.
9 A. I don't think that that was a fait accompli, because even before
10 these conversations in 1991, there was already a rebellion of Serbs in
11 Croatia, in 1990 and so on.
12 Q. Yes. We will get to the subject of these discussions, but
13 completely independent of that, I'm asking you now about the political
14 options. What else was discussed in the state at the time?
15 Let me repeat my question: I hope you will agree with me. In
16 March of 1991, they discussed the future of Yugoslavia, and the creation
17 of independent states from the former republics of Yugoslavia was not an
18 option on the table.
19 A. Occasionally it was discussed.
20 Q. Yes, but in principle it wasn't; correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. So the logical conclusion would be that in that same month, March
23 of 1991, they also discussed the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24 A. Yes, quite naturally.
25 Q. Yes, quite naturally. Would you agree with me that all of us -
1 almost all of us - considered Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a mini
2 Yugoslavia? Was that the general thesis?
3 A. No, not the general one, no. That was the position taken by some
4 politicians but not a general position.
5 Q. No, no, no. That was the concept that was supported back in the
6 socialist times, in colloquial terms, due to the fact that the population
7 was so mixed we believed Bosnia-Herzegovina to be a good example of mini
8 Yugoslavia. So would you say that if any changes of internal structure of
9 Yugoslavia were discussed, wouldn't you say that it was natural that they
10 also discussed the future of this mini Yugoslavia, which is precisely why
11 the topic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was very current at the time?
12 A. I think it was topical because of its composition.
13 Q. Yes, precisely.
14 A. Because the Serbs attacked. They wanted to join that part to
16 Q. Yes, precisely. We'll come to that. We'll come to who wanted
17 what. But the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a question that was opened
18 up, because of the composition or because it was Yugoslavia in miniature.
19 Now, would you agree with me that already at that time talks had
20 started about the internal set-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that there
21 were diametrically opposed views about that on the part of the individual
22 ethnic groups or constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 A. Yes, certainly. Everybody had his own view to protect their own
24 national interests, each ethnic group.
25 Q. Yes, precisely. Now, would you agree with me if I put it to you
1 -- well, the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina are not under dispute. We had
2 the Badinter Commission, the conclusions were made. So we're not dealing
3 with borders any more.
4 Now, would you agree with me when I say that the Serbs in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina strove to have Bosnia-Herzegovina remain within
6 Yugoslavia, and in case that did not happen, that they publicly let it be
7 known that the territory which they had pretensions on would be organised
8 as their own --
9 A. State.
10 Q. Well, state, province, region, whatever. Would you agree with me
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you agree with me that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina were in
14 favour of having Bosnia and Herzegovina not remain within Yugoslavia and
15 that they wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina to be organised as a complex state
16 according to the national criterion, so that each of the three constituent
17 peoples had a certain territory and region in which they would be the
18 majority population?
19 A. Yes. Correct.
20 Q. Would you also agree with me that you, in all of your public
21 statements, supported those positions of the Croatian people in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they -- you considered them to be rational and
24 A. Yes. Up until a certain point.
25 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me. Your Honour, I would like -- at this
1 point, Your Honour, these questions have to be more precise. When she
2 talks about "supported those positions of the Croatian people," which
3 positions, at which time, in what part of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Is it
4 Herceg-Bosna, is it some other group, is it the Posavina? This question
5 is far too broad for this witness to answer in a meaningful way. Time,
6 place, which agreement, what territory, please.
7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] The witness understood what I asked
8 him and he gave us an answer. Now, this question can only be unclear to
9 somebody who does not have full knowledge, and I apologise to Mr. Scott, I
10 don't wish to insult him, but for those of us coming from those regions we
11 know exactly what we're talking about. So the question was very specific
12 and we understood it.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I did warn you of the time, the
14 period we were talking about.
15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Yes. We were talking about Karadjordjevo, 1991, and we're
17 developing our thoughts along those lines. We'll come to Herceg-Bosna,
18 we'll come to the republic. I think somebody wanted to intervene behind
19 me. No? Fine, then let's proceed. And we agreed about the positions of
20 the Croats. Now all that remained was the Bosniaks or, rather, Muslims.
21 MR. SCOTT: [Previous translation continues] ... I object again.
22 I'm sorry, Mr. Manolic, please allow me to object. The position of the
23 Croats. There were many different positions of the Croats. There were
24 the Kljuic Croats, there's the Boban Croats, there's other Croats. You
25 can't just ask a question about "all the Croats agreed." With all
1 respect, it's not proper.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Manolic, when
3 you are answering the question, in your mind are you thinking of the
4 Croats in general or do you make distinctions between the different types
5 of Croats?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think we have to distinguish
7 between them, because it was one thing to look at the position of the main
8 Croatian force in Bosnia, which was the --
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Tell us what distinctions you
10 make. How do you distinguish between them?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I distinguish between them in the
12 following way: One portion were for Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue,
13 whereas others allowed for the possibility of seceding or, rather,
14 stepping down from that community. That would be a better expression.
15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Manolic, I'm not asking you now about an integral or not
17 integral Bosnia-Herzegovina because I consider that we have solved that
18 topic and dealt with it because we said that the borders cannot be
19 changed. Therefore, we're talking about the internal system and set-up.
20 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Your Honour.
21 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'll ask my question and things
22 will become much clearer, if I may.
23 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, for the record, I do not agree that that
24 issue has been resolved. I just want to make it very clear that we don't
25 consider that, and if that's counsel's position, I want to make it very
1 clear the Prosecution does not consider that to be resolved and does not
2 consider that to be the full scope and character of Mr. Manolic's
3 testimony. Thank you.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The Judges will consider
5 that matter. Please proceed.
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. The question remains for us to say which Croats we're talking
8 about in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian Democratic Union of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did it take part in the elections in Bosnia and
11 A. Yes, it did.
12 Q. And can you tell us, if you have that information as a former head
13 of the HDZ of the Republic of Croatia, how many or what percentage of the
14 Croat population in Bosnia-Herzegovina voted in favour of the HDZ?
15 A. I think -- well, I don't think you're being precise. If you're
16 looking at the referendum and the question posed at the referendum --
17 Q. No, we'll come to the referendum in due course.
18 A. Well, I don't know the exact percentage, but the vast majority, I
19 think it was about 80 per cent.
20 Q. Thank you. So the third largest ethnic group in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims, or the Bosniaks, would you agree with my
22 following position about that: That for a long time they tried to find a
23 compromise solution with respect to whether they were going to stay within
24 Yugoslavia or step down from Yugoslavia, and at the end of 1991, after the
25 international community had stipulated the conditions for the recognition
1 of individual republics as independent states, decided to ask for
2 recognition of their independence, that is to step down from Yugoslavia,
3 and as far as their internal system was concerned, what they wanted was a
4 unitary state which would function according to the principles of one man,
5 one vote, a commonly known principle.
6 A. No, I never said that.
7 Q. I'm asking you. I'm not saying you said it. I'm asking you, what
8 do you say no to of all that?
9 A. Not that they were for a unitary state. I think that they came to
10 represent the three constituent elements.
11 Q. But you told us in your testimony so far that the Muslims or,
12 rather, Alija Izetbegovic, advocated a unitary state and that throughout
13 that time in all the negotiations they in fact endeavoured to avoid any
14 territorial delineation and separation and wanted to have an integral
16 A. Perhaps that came to the fore in a certain period of time, but I
17 think that ultimately that position was not upheld.
18 Q. Well, that's right. It wasn't ultimately upheld.
19 A. Yes, but at certain points in time that was the position taken by
20 that group of Muslims.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, tell us, please, Mr. Manolic, in view of the fact
22 that you made public statements with respect to the plans made by the
23 international community about the former Yugoslavia, and
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina included, I assume that you were well-versed in this
25 matter. Tell us, please, who at those negotiations represented the
1 Croatian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance? Was it Mr. Mate
2 Boban, Mate Boban, was it Miro Lasic, or some other person from
4 A. It depended on the character of the conference. I don't know
5 which one you're referring to now. But in principle when we were having
6 international conferences and when it was case of the positions in the
7 Yugoslav state Presidency, which still existed at the time, then in that
8 case it was always Izetbegovic who represented the community, with a
9 Presidency member from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 Q. All right. Tell us, if you know, who on behalf of the Croats of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the Vance-Owen Plan, for instance, in January
13 A. In the name of whom?
14 Q. In the name of the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 A. I think it could only have been Boban. Boban was the only person
16 who could have signed.
17 Q. Who took part in the negotiations and then possibly signed certain
18 documents in the name of the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
19 A. I think that Karadzic could have been the only man to have been
20 able to do that. Or Koljevic perhaps.
21 Q. And at those negotiations did somebody represent the Muslims, the
22 Bosniaks? Who would that be?
23 A. Well, if they did, then it must have been either the minister
24 later on of foreign affairs, or it might have been Izetbegovic himself.
25 I'm not quite sure.
1 Q. All right. Fine. Now from your answer, am I to conclude that at
2 those negotiations and in those documents Mr. Alija Izetbegovic did not
3 represent Bosnia-Herzegovina but, rather, he represented the Muslims or,
4 rather, the Bosniaks within Bosnia-Herzegovina? Would that be right?
5 A. It's difficult to differentiate between that now. At that period
6 of time it was difficult to distinguish. He always represented the whole
7 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 Q. Yes, well that's not contentious. We're all in favour of an
9 integral Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have to intervene at this
11 point. The three Judges are looking at the clock. There are two more
12 Defence counsel who wish to conduct their cross-examination, and of course
13 the Prosecution would like to ask supplementary questions and so on. So
14 time is our concern. How much more time do you need?
15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Well, our agreement is as follows:
16 Mr. Ibrisimovic has waived his right to take up time, and with the Defence
17 counsel of Valentin Coric, my colleague, I decided that I would give ten
18 minutes of time before the break so that she could continue after the
19 break and then leave 15 or so minutes for the Prosecution's questions and
20 another ten minutes for general matters. And I would also like to suggest
21 that documents be tendered on Monday, because we're really under great
22 time constraints.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. So that means that
24 you would be finishing by 12.20; is that right?
25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, roughly.
1 Q. So now to go back to my question, Mr. Manolic. If a document,
2 Stoltenberg -- Stoltenberg's, Owen's, Vance-Owen's is signed by Karadzic,
3 Izetbegovic and Boban, the question is who does Mr. Izetbegovic represent?
4 Would you agree that he is signing in the name of the Bosniak people?
5 A. He was still president.
6 Q. That's something else. That was his position. But who was he
7 representing at those conferences?
8 A. The international negotiators --
9 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour -- Your Honour, wouldn't it be better to
10 look at the documents themselves and see how they're signed? And if
11 they're sign as President Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we know
12 without speculation how they're signed.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Ms. Alaburic. You were
14 referring to what document, what period, what date? Don't forget that
15 Mr. Izetbegovic was the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, he
16 was legally bound to sign all international documents.
17 Mr. Praljak, if it's really important, go ahead, but otherwise
18 you're taking up time.
19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Mr. Izetbegovic was never
20 the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was president of the Presidency,
21 and legally speaking, he had to take a Croat and a Serb to negotiations
22 with him from the Presidency, if everything was to be legal. He was one
23 of one of seven equal members. Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it comes to the same thing,
25 Praljak. It boils down to the same thing. He was president of a
1 Presidency, a collective body, and collective bodies never attended fully
2 in their -- in negotiations; you would have the president of the
3 Presidency appearing.
4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with respect to
5 Mr. Scott's comment and objection, I'd like to say the following: I did
6 not intend to question Witness Manolic with respect to the formal contents
7 of individual agreements and contracts signed by the representatives of
8 three national communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreements that I
9 have to date are contained in this book, and they do not contain
11 Now, I'm asking Mr. Manolic as an individual who made public
12 statements, which is borne out by his book, about certain agreements and
13 treaties signed as somebody who kept abreast of political events and took
14 part in meetings with Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and who knows full well that
15 at those international conferences individuals represent -- there were
16 people representing the three ethnic groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that
17 nobody represented Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. There is no dilemma
18 for me on that score, that Mr. Manolic is very well aware of that. So I
19 haven't prepared documents with the different signatures, but we'll
20 clarify that in due course.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but you must be specific. When
22 we're talking about an agreement or a document, the Vance-Owen document,
23 for instance, that the international representatives wanted to have a
24 certainty and guarantees, not for just one man's signature, such as
25 Izetbegovic's signature as president of the Presidency, but the signatures
1 of the conflicting parties and warring parties in that territory, because
2 only in that way could a solution be found. Because the conflict existed,
3 there was a conflict, that's quite clear. Otherwise, there wouldn't have
4 been any need for the representatives of those national groups, the Serbs,
5 Croats, and Muslims to sign any such documents.
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Yes, that's quite clear. They signed a document. The people who
8 signed the document were those who were discussing something, three
9 national groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina or ethnic groups discussing the
10 internal set-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am not questioning that the
11 documents that Alija Izetbegovic signed with, for example, the president
12 of the Croatian state, that Mr. Izetbegovic was signing as president of
13 the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is not being contested, but
14 I'm talking about something quite different now. I'm saying who is it who
15 articulates the position of the Bosniak people at international
16 conferences? Who is their porte-parole and who says what the Bosniaks
17 want in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. I think it was Silajdzic as the Muslim representative who also
19 took part at those conferences, and that he articulated their desires and
20 made requests, and he clashed with the other sides.
21 Q. What about anybody above him? Was he the number one man or was
22 there anybody above him?
23 A. Well, I can't say that. You would have to look at their statute
24 and their legal provisions who the number-one man was.
25 Q. And what was Silajdzic? What post did he hold and at what time?
1 A. Well, I think, as far as I remember, that he was one of the
2 leaders of the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina who went from one
3 position to another. At a point in time I think he was foreign
4 minister --
5 Q. Was he Alija Izetbegovic's boss?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Was Alija Izetbegovic his boss?
8 A. Well, those were their relationships. I don't want to enter into
9 that now. But constitutional hierarchy states who was whose boss.
10 Q. Tell me, who was the president of the SDA at that time, the Party
11 of Democratic Action, for instance?
12 A. I think that they rotated, that people changed. I couldn't tell
13 you exactly now who it was.
14 Q. Mr. Manolic, I'm sure you remember that, I'm sure you can tell us
16 A. But they were always under the influence of the number one figure
17 and personage, who was Izetbegovic.
18 Q. But listen, Silajdzic didn't attend meetings very often. Was it
19 then Izetbegovic who articulated the views of the Bosniak people?
20 A. I don't know which sessions you have in mind, but I remember that
21 Silajdzic participated both in some international conferences as well as
22 in contacts with Croatia.
23 Q. But you don't remember Alija Izetbegovic?
24 A. What do you mean I don't remember?
25 Q. Well, I'm asking you about him.
1 A. And I'm telling you. I told you that the main figure in that
2 entire hierarchy of Bosniak Muslims in BH was Alija Izetbegovic.
3 Q. All right. So we agree. Mr. Manolic, I would now like to
4 establish the extent of your knowledge as to whether the Croats of BH or,
5 rather, the leadership of Herceg-Bosna accepted the plans of the
6 international community or whether they obstructed these plans. Yesterday
7 you gave us very extensive answers to the questions of Mr. Prlic's lawyer
8 about Stoltenberg's plan. I know that in your interviews you publicly
9 presented your views on certain plans of the international community, so
10 with your permission I would like to cover with you briefly some of these
11 plans to see what was the position of the leadership of Herceg-Bosna.
12 First of all --
13 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, I was hoping -- I was hoping not to be on
14 my feet so much today. This witness has said since Monday that he was
15 only in -- throughout this entire period he was only in Bosnia perhaps
16 once, in Sarajevo in August, 1990. He has also said that he did not have
17 operational dealings with any of these people. Herceg-Bosna, if you will,
18 was not his beat. It was Mr. Susak's beat. It was his responsibility.
19 So if -- with all respect, with the greatest of respect for Ms. Alaburic,
20 if questions are going to be put to the witness about the specific
21 positions of Mr. Prlic, Mr. Boban, Mr. Praljak, Mr. Stojic, then at this
22 point, Your Honour, I have to ask for a specific foundation as to his
23 personal knowledge to be able to express a view on that, and that is
24 inconsistent with everything he has told us for the last three and a half
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Madam, if you lay
2 the foundations first, then he can discuss Mr. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, and
3 so on, but providing that he knows him and that he saw them before. If he
4 has never seen them before, then we are embarking on speculation.
5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Witness Manolic
6 testified almost exclusively about the fact of existence or non-existence
7 of joint criminal enterprise. The Prosecution brought Mr. Manolic here so
8 that he could confirm that there existed criminal plans of the Republic of
9 Croatia vis-a-vis Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniak people, and also that
10 the Republic of Croatia, via the leadership of Herceg-Bosna, implemented
11 those plans. In that context, I believe it to be very important to ask
12 how these Croats then treated the plans of the international community and
13 the efforts of the international community to find a peaceful resolution
14 to all problems. It is our position, and we have evidence that the Croats
15 in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the Croats of Croatia were extremely
16 cooperative in their cooperation with the international community, jointly
17 seeking solutions that would be acceptable to all three constituent
18 peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they were the first and sometimes
19 the only ones who signed all plans which certain representatives of the
20 international community offered, and we believe this to be one of the
21 elements going to prove that the joint criminal enterprise does not exist
22 and that the allegations contained in those counts of indictment, 15, 16,
23 and 17 are not true, and those are the ones referred to directly by the
24 Prosecution. We believe this to be directly linked to the responsibility
25 of all the accused in this trial.
1 Now, as to the issue of individual guilt, we'll get to that later.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please go ahead, Mr. Scott.
3 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, Mr. Manolic was brought here to address a
4 particular scope of evidence, and that was -- the -- what was happening in
5 Zagreb among the senior Croat leadership; Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Susak, Boban
6 when he came to Zagreb. This man never met Boban once in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or with Prlic or with Stojic. And I agree that limits
8 his testimony, but he wasn't offered for that reason. He met Mr. Prlic in
9 one meeting in Zagreb. I'm talking about their dealings in Herceg-Bosna
10 on the ground in dealing with these matters. This witness was brought to
11 The Hague by the Prosecution to deal with the issue of the leadership --
12 senior leadership in Zagreb, and that's what he's talked about
14 Secondly, as the second part of Ms. Alaburic's statement of her
15 position, I understand that's their position. They can call witnesses.
16 They can call evidence on that point. They can try to establish their
17 position, but not through this witness who has no personal knowledge. I
18 invite them to call their evidence, and it will be all subject to
19 cross-examination by the Prosecution when they call their case, but not
20 through this witness who was not involved in any of these things.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, just --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, Mr. Karnavas.
23 Mr. Scott, the Defence, via Ms. Alaburic, claims that you brought
24 this witness here so that he could support the thesis of the Prosecution
25 on joint criminal enterprise. I listened to you carefully. I checked the
1 transcript, and it seems that you are saying that you didn't bring this
2 witness for that purpose but, rather, so that he could explain what was
3 going on in Zagreb and whom he saw in Zagreb.
4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour --
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you explain to me, then,
6 what was your object in bringing this witness here? Because if you didn't
7 bring him here to give evidence about joint criminal enterprise, then it's
8 quite normal for the Prosecution -- for the Defence to cross-examine on
10 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, with the greatest respect, you
11 misinterpret and misstate the Prosecution's position. Yes, of course it's
12 our position. It wouldn't be in the indictment otherwise if we didn't
13 charge a joint criminal enterprise having various facets and involving
14 various people over various times at various levels. Part of that joint
15 criminal enterprise - part of it - is what happened in Zagreb. That is
16 what this witness came to talk about; what happened in Zagreb, how it was
17 directed from Zagreb, what the transcripts show, the meetings that he was
18 involved in, how it was directed from Zagreb by people like Susak and
19 Tudjman and others.
20 He was not brought -- and I think I know why I brought this
21 witness to The Hague -- he was not brought to talk about meetings that he
22 had with Stojic or Prlic or anyone in Grude or Mostar, or anyone else.
23 There's no issue that he did not have. No one has suggested -- in three
24 and a half days no one has suggested he had such meetings, and that's not
25 the reason he's offered.
1 Now, if Ms. Alaburic can establish personal knowledge, a
2 foundation for this witness to express a view over what each of these
3 individuals did during this time, then if she can establish that
4 foundation, I have no objections. I will sit down and I -- and she can
5 ask all the questions she wants if she establishes that this witness has
6 personal knowledge to talk about those things. Thank you.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may very briefly, and I did seek leave from
8 Ms. Alaburic. The gentleman has accused President Tudjman, Susak,
9 Bobetko, all of the accused of being criminals. He stated -- excuse me,
10 sir. Excuse me, sir. You can disrupt the Prosecution. I pointed to the
11 record specifically where he pointed to the third echelon. That was very
12 clear. That was very clear. So I think the questions that are being
13 posed by Ms. Alaburic --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, just a minute. We
15 need to clarify something. We seem to remember, but we didn't discuss
16 this among us, he never said at any point in time that Mr. Susak was a
17 criminal. He said that there had been crimes, but he didn't accuse either
18 Mr. Tudjman or Mr. Susak as criminals. Perhaps --
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] -- it is you who is creating
21 that link.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: [Previous translation continues] ... going to see
23 in the final brief of the Prosecution is this gentleman's testimony, where
24 he's saying that President Tudjman, along with Susak and others, were
25 trafficking guns and trafficking all sorts of other material, sending
1 troops over, financing troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all going into
2 the joint criminal enterprise. That's what this gentleman has said.
3 Now, I know he's got to go back to Croatia and face the people,
4 and perhaps that's why now he's trying to be on both sides of the fence,
5 but he can't claim on the one hand for the president of Croatia to be
6 financing troops and sending troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the
7 Defence minister to be engaged in trafficking of weapons, to be engaged in
8 those sorts of illegal activities with banks, and at the same time say,
9 well, I'm not accusing them. I think that's what we're going to find from
10 the Prosecution. That's their theory of the defence. And I think it's
11 perfectly legitimate for Ms. Alaburic to go into these areas.
12 Now he can't have it both ways; I don't know what's happening in
13 Bosnia but at the same time, when I'm being questioned by the Prosecution,
14 he testifies to this. Now today he was even telling us he doesn't know
15 who Izetbegovic was representing. This is pure confabulation. And I
16 think this is very relevant and I think Ms. Alaburic is at the point of
17 establishing that the gentleman is not being truthful and honest with the
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, all right. Ms. Alaburic.
20 Let me specify that you still have about 20 minutes left.
21 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Manolic, I assume I don't need to remind you that in your
23 interviews to Vecernji List on the 29th of May, 1993, you spoke of
24 Vance-Owen Plan, you commented on certain provisions from that plan.
25 Based on that, I conclude -- and I know that you are one of the most
1 responsible politicians in my country, so based on that I'm sure that you
2 read what you commented on. I assume that you were also familiar with
3 other plans of the international community. Prior to Vance-Owen Plan in
4 January of 1993, there were a number of plans, such as Cutileiro Plan from
5 March of 1992, there was a draft of the constitutional set-up of Bosnia
6 and Herzegovina from October of 1992, which was drafted by the
7 International Conference for the former Yugoslavia. There was also
8 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan from July of 1993. We spoke of it yesterday. And
9 then Washington Agreement, Dayton Accords, and so on. Are you familiar
10 with all of these plans?
11 A. If that wasn't the case, you wouldn't be putting that question to
12 me, but I stated my position in that interview, in various public
13 appearances, and it was recorded. So there is nothing disputed there.
14 Q. Nothing whatsoever. I hope we'll resolve this within a minute if
15 you are going to agree to what I'm putting to you.
16 In Cutileiro Plan in March of 1992, it was envisioned that
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina would comprise several constituent units on the ethnic
18 principle, and then a working plan was established to come up with a map.
19 The representatives of Croats accepted that plan. Agree with me?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. In October of 1992, the International Conference on the former
22 Yugoslavia came up with a constitutional set-up, a draft of it, based on
23 which BH was supposed to have seven to ten autonomous provinces, most of
24 which would have one of three ethnic groups as the majority one. Each
25 province would have its own legislative, executive and judicial power,
1 whereas the army would exist at the level of the central government. The
2 representatives of the Croatian people in BH accepted this constitutional
3 structure of BH. Do you agree with me?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. In January of 1993 Vance-Owen Plan --
6 A. You have to say, Who disagreed with the plan?
7 Q. Yes, we'll get to that. I'm now focusing on the Croats first to
8 see what was their attitude with respect to the international community's
9 plan. All right. Vance-Owen plan in 1993, Bosnia-Herzegovina comprises
10 ten autonomous provinces, each of them has its own legislative, executive
11 and judicial branch. The Croats would be a majority in three out of ten
12 provinces. Boban signed all of the documents in relation to Vance-Owen
13 Plan in January of 1993. Agree with me?
14 A. You have to say, you have to specify who disagreed with the plan.
15 Q. Karadzic disagreed with everything. Alija Izetbegovic signed a
16 portion. He didn't sign the maps. Later on, he changed his mind. As
17 Mr. Karnavas said, he would have one position in the morning and one
18 position in the afternoon.
19 Then we have Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, July, Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 comprising three constituent republics. Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 agreed to that plan immediately. In Geneva it was also accepted by Alija
22 Izetbegovic, but on the following day, he withdrew his consent to the plan
23 and asked for guarantees that the union of three constituent republics
24 would have all attributes of a state. However, representatives of all
25 three peoples, Boban, Karadzic, and Izetbegovic, continued negotiations on
1 maps. Agree?
2 A. What am I supposed to confirm here or reject? This was published.
3 These are the facts.
4 Q. Yes, the facts. Can we, based on this, conclude justifiably that
5 the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not obstruct a single plan of the
6 international community, a plan for peaceful resolution to the crisis in
8 A. You didn't phrase this question correctly. The Croats accepted
9 this division into provinces because they were awarded three provinces
10 which, in the national sense, satisfied the Croats because these three
11 provinces covered the geographic area where Croats resided.
12 Q. Thank you very much. I will now have to wrap up our discussion
13 here, Mr. Manolic, and there will be three questions which are not
14 individually related to each other.
15 Banovina Croatia. Yesterday, Mr. Kovacic gave you the
16 constitution of the Republic of Croatia where the Banovina is mentioned in
17 the preamble. Do you remember that, or do we need to put it before you on
18 the ELMO? You remember the preamble?
19 A. Yes. And there's nothing contentious there.
20 Q. No, nothing whatsoever. I want something else. The constitution
21 you had before you is not the constitution of 1990 but rather the
22 constitution of 2001. So it was the revised text which was changed at the
23 time when Stipe Mesic was in power, Ivica Racan, who was Prime Minister;
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. So under their leadership the constitution also contained a
2 provision on the Banovina of Croatia.
3 A. No. It's not contained in Croatian constitution.
4 Q. The constitution of the Republic of Croatia.
5 A. Well, the preamble is quite a different matter. So the preamble
6 was not amended. It remained the same. It was the Tudjman's preamble.
7 Q. Yes. Quite correct. If Stipe Mesic and Ivica Racan left it in
8 the constitution, would that mean a firm evidence that this was not an
9 expression of territorial claims but, rather, this was an evidence of the
10 continuity of Croatian statehood, as Mr. Kovacic said?
11 A. Yes, quite correct. That was the meaning of the preamble.
12 Q. Mr. Manolic, I will always remember you, and most of the Croatian
13 public will remember as you as a person who spoke up quite a lot against
14 the terrorism in the territory of Croatia. You spoke about looting,
15 destruction of public property. You supported the rule of law. Do you
16 remember that?
17 A. Yes, quite, but it has nothing do with what we're discussing here.
18 Q. Yes, it does, and I'll tell you why. Tell me this first, please,
19 though: Would you agree with me if those same events, let us call them
20 terrorist activities for the time being, took place on the territory of
21 the Republic of Croatia during the war, even towards the Croatian
22 population not only towards the Serbian population of the Croatian
23 Republic, would you agree with me that then those same evil acts towards
24 the Muslim and Bosniak population in Bosnia-Herzegovina would -- could be
25 grouped into the same set of problems and come under the heading of
1 terrorism on the part of criminal groups which in wartime are very
2 difficult to keep under control? So would you agree that what was
3 happening in Croatia and what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina were the
4 same thing?
5 A. I don't think so. It would be difficult to apply analogy there
6 which would be able to cover everything as a whole.
7 Q. Well, not as a whole, but basically.
8 A. Well, yes. Terrorism, crimes, that all comes under the same sort
9 of chapter whether it's international or whatever.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, I'll also remember you as an individual who spoke
11 very reasonably about the involvement of professionals in the army and the
12 police when you talked about the Serbs who were in the army the police on
13 the territory of the so-called Krajina region and when you strove for the
14 fact that their dismissal and involvement in the police and the military
15 should be treated as their professional involvement and that should not be
16 an impediment for their integration into the Croatian army and Croatian
17 police force. Do you remember those statements of yours?
18 A. I have to say now that I was president of the commission which
19 President Tudjman appointed to resolve problems of relationships between
20 the Serbs and Croats, and that is when I reached that conclusion that in
21 order to resolve Serbo-Croat relations, that that can only be done if
22 professionalism be accepted and if these people could be incorporated into
23 the structures of the Croatian state, because otherwise it would have been
24 impossible. And I think that I was quite clear on that score in
25 explaining why.
1 Q. Yes, you were quite clear, that's true.
2 I apologise to the interpreters for talking so quickly.
3 Yes, as I was saying, I think you were reasonable and that your
4 comments were well founded and very welcome, but as the Defence counsel of
5 a Croatian general at this point in time who was a professional officer
6 whichever way you look at it, he was an officer of the Yugoslav People's
7 Army to begin with, I have to ask you whether those positions of yours
8 hold true for professionals in the HVO, too, or do you consider that in
9 the Croatian Defence Council there were officers and soldiers who
10 professionally did their duty?
11 A. Yes, there were, but we can only talk about specific cases, not in
13 Q. Yes. Yes. Tell me, do you know General Milivoj Petkovic?
14 A. By sight.
15 Q. Right, by sight. Do you know that he was promoted when the social
16 democratic liberal powers that be were established in Croatia?
17 A. What did you say?
18 Q. That he was promoted.
19 A. I don't know about that.
20 Q. Now, tell me, do you know that the -- President Stipe Mesic, as
21 his personal envoy, sent him to the Sinj Alka celebration. For those of
22 you who don't know, it's a traditional event in a place in Croatia.
23 A. I didn't say that, whether he was sent, who sent him, whether he
24 was an envoy or what. I don't know.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Manolic.
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] And I thank the Court and cede the
2 floor to my colleague.
3 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Before I begin the
4 cross-examination, I would just like to tell Their Honours that my client
5 and I have agreed to divide up our time in such a way as a brief portion
6 of the time would be taken up by my cross-examination and I leave my
7 client to do the rest.
8 Cross-examination by Ms. Tomasegovic Tomic:
9 Q. Mr. Manolic --
10 A. Who are you representing then? Tell me.
11 Q. My name is Ms. Tomasegovic Tomic, I'm a lawyer from Zagreb, and I
12 represent Mr. Valentin Coric in this case.
13 A. A client whom I don't know.
14 Q. Thank you, without my having to ask you. So let's get going.
15 Mr. Manolic, tell us, please, if I understood you correctly, you told my
16 colleague Ms. Nozica today that you authorised all your interviews.
17 A. Yes. 99 per cent of them.
18 Q. Excellent. Tell me now, please, when they -- when authorising
19 your interviews you ever asked any portions to be reacted from them.
20 A. Well, that probably happened. It was my relationship towards the
21 journalist who conducted the interview, and that happens to everyone.
22 It's quite normal.
23 Q. All right. Then I'd like to ask you this: Dunja Ujevic, does the
24 name ring a bell?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Where do you know Ms. Ujevic from?
2 A. She did an interview with me.
3 Q. May we have Exhibit 5D 00478, please. 5D 00478 is the number of
4 the document, please. The name is Dunja Ujevic, for the transcript, for
5 the record. The page is 84, line 14. Her name is Dunja Ujevic.
6 Mr. Manolic, I'm going to read the text out to you.
7 A. It's a false text. Let me tell you that straight away. You're
8 taking me back to World War II.
9 Q. No.
10 A. It's a false text.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment. Mr. Manolic, you
12 can say that it is a lie, but allow the Defence counsel to present her
13 point of view and then you can say that it's all a lie.
14 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. The text reads as follows: "The former column journalist writer
16 Vecernji List Dunja Ujevic testified that Josip Manolic, at the time
17 president of the Chamber of Counties in the Croatian Sabor parliament
18 reacted when she asked him a question of the 200 civilians whom the
19 partisans had killed without a trial in Bjelovar.
20 "When in talking to Manolic I asked him that question, he lost
21 his nerve and he looked at me for a long time and then he got up from the
22 table and started shouting, "Guards, guards," stresses Dunja Ujevic. Then
23 he calmed down suddenly. He got out a small black comb from his pocket
24 and started coming his hair. After that, he said to my quite calmly they
25 were not civilians, they were quislings. He described the atmosphere --
1 or, rather, the atmosphere was described in that way by the journalist of
2 Vecernji List. After that, something happened that I had never
3 experienced either before or after in my entire career. In fact, when I
4 asked Mr. Manolic whether he wished to authorise the text, I couldn't have
5 believed in my wildest dreams that in authorising the text from talking to
6 him he -- he could redact my question and his answer, said an angry Dunja
8 And I'd like to ask you the following question: Mr. Manolic, is
9 it true and correct that you asked that a part of the text be expunged? I
10 don't -- it's not important which excerpt.
11 A. Dunja Ujevic would have to prove, first of all, what she's saying.
12 It says -- she says Mr. Manolic became angry. That's not true.
13 Mrs. Dunja Ujevic recorded the talk, so let her bring in the tape. Let's
14 have the tape and then we can see whether there was an interruption or
15 not. So she has no proof or evidence to say what she is doing. That is
16 false testimony. I did not want that portion probably to be included
17 because it was my interview, it wasn't the journalist's interview. I was
18 granting the interview and giving it.
19 Q. Yes. So we can agree that certain -- the interviews in your book
20 are your own interviews in conformity with your interpretation as to how
21 you interpret the interviews.
22 A. Yes, they are my interviews.
23 Q. Right. Let's continue. Just let me see if I'm going too fast.
24 Tell me this, Mr. Manolic, please: In your testimony so far, in your
25 presentation so far --
1 A. Just tell me where I said what.
2 Q. -- you said that the Croats from Banja Luka moved out following
3 appeals from Mr. Boban.
4 A. Yes, but you forgot another sentence before that, that under
5 pressure from the Serbian aggression and the appeal by Mr. Boban, that the
6 result was that they moved out of that area. So there were two components
7 whereas you just refer to one component, which is not the correct one.
8 Q. Tell me this now Mr. Manolic, please: Omarska, Manjaca, do those
9 names ring a bell? Do they mean anything to you? Do you have any
10 knowledge of those places, and why were they known?
11 A. They were known because of the crimes. They were known as being
12 camps, and one of my ministers from my government was there, who was taken
14 Q. Could you tell us who controlled those camps and who closed them?
15 A. I think that's general knowledge, it's generally known.
16 Q. Well, tell the Court for the transcript, for the record.
17 A. They were Karadzic's camps and prisons.
18 Q. Who was in them? Who were the inmates, who were the prisoners,
19 ethnically speaking?
20 A. Well, mostly they were Croats and Muslims. Mostly. There were
21 probably others too.
22 Q. All right. I hope you will agree with me when I say - just give
23 me a yes or no answer - that people were raped, tortured, killed in those
24 camps, abused in various ways. Is that true?
25 A. Yes, that is true, and we condemned it at that time and I see no
1 reason for bringing that up now.
2 Q. Let me this then, please, Mr. Manolic: As an individual, as a
3 human being, I think that it is more logical that the Croats and other
4 non-Serb population, not only the Croats but we're dealing with Croats
5 here, they're essential to us, they moved out of those areas because of
6 the pogrom they were exposed to.
7 A. Yes, I said that to begin with. The very fact that you left out.
8 I said that it was under the Serb aggression that they left the area and
9 moved out. The other problem arose with the appeal from Boban.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, this is not a
11 debate between you and Defence counsel. You are here to answer questions
12 for the Judges. So look at me. You're becoming a little excited and
13 that's not going to serve any purpose. Defence counsel asked you a
14 question about Omarska camp, so give your answer calmly to us.
15 Please proceed, Counsel.
16 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] I just have one more
17 question in that regard. Tell me, please, Mr. Manolic, do you consider
18 that the Croats should have stayed on and waited for them to shut them up
19 in camps or kill them, or was it more opportune for them to leave?
20 A. In wartime conditions, people say -- try and save their skins and
21 groups try and save their skins in different ways. Some people flee,
22 leave all their property, because you have to save your life.
23 Q. That's right, Mr. Manolic. Now let's move forward. In one of the
24 statements you made today during your testimony, you said that the late
25 President Tudjman replaced Mr. Boban on the eve of the Washington
1 Agreement because he was in favour of the war option previously. You also
2 said that on the side of Alija Izetbegovic there were also individuals who
3 advocated the war option, who were in favour of war and who had to be
4 replaced and dismissed. Is that true and correct?
5 A. Yes. You couldn't have a clash or conflict with people just
6 thinking one thing. You had to have two parties to a conflict. A
7 conflict always involves two or more sides. That's logical.
8 Q. All right. Tell me, then, please, Mr. Manolic, whether you know
9 who the people were who advocated the war option on Alija Izetbegovic's
11 A. I can't tell you that now. Perhaps I knew them at the time, but
12 I've quite forgotten them now. But I'm sure you will able to find them in
13 the different documents.
14 Q. And do you know whether he actually replaced any of those people,
15 any of those individuals who were in favour of war?
16 A. I know that there were changes, both in the party and in the
17 government structures, but what he did I really can't say, I don't know.
18 Q. All right. Fine. Let's move on. Tell me this, please,
19 Mr. Manolic, you also said during your testimony that Mr. Izetbegovic
20 uttered the well-known sentence when he said this is not our war and that
21 he was talking about the sending out of Bosniaks to the Yugoslav People's
22 Army at that point in time. Is that correct? Did I understand you
23 correctly and remember correctly?
24 A. Yes, quite correctly.
25 Q. Tell me, please, when did you read that statement of his, that
1 sentence as uttered by him?
2 A. Well, I think it was bandied about quite a lot.
3 Q. I'm not asking you that. Where did you read it exactly?
4 A. Well, I can't tell you that. There were hundreds of meetings,
5 lots of material, lots of erroneous, incorrect, sometimes truthful reports
6 and reporting. I really can't say where I first heard that.
7 Q. Then tell me this, please: Would you agree with me if I were to
8 put it to you that Mr. Kljuic was -- had better knowledge of the
9 circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina than you?
10 A. Yes, certainly, because he lived there, he lived in that
12 Q. Is it possible, then, that Mr. Kljuic had better knowledge of what
13 Mr. Izetbegovic actually said?
14 A. Yes, I allow for that possibility too. Now, what it was that he
15 knew and quoted is another matter.
16 Q. Mr. Kljuic -- and Your Honours, yesterday we had some polemics
17 over this, whether we could show the witness what Mr. Kljuic said. I
18 think that would be in order now, so I'm going to tell the witness that
19 Mr. Kljuic in his statement said that the dissatisfaction and revolt among
20 the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina was caused by the fact that
21 Mr. Izetbegovic said this is not our war at a point in time when the
22 Croats were being attacked, not only in the Republic of Croatia but there
23 were also attacks by the Serb aggressor in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the
24 Croatian people were revolted because of that because they thought
25 that the government in Sarajevo would not be able to protect and defend
1 them. Do you allow that that was the case?
2 A. I allow for the fact that they felt insecure, just as there was in
3 any armed conflict. Now, whether what Kljuic said was exactly correct, I
4 don't know. I think we could believe him. I think we could take his
5 statement to be truthful since he was in a position to know, both as a
6 member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a man who lived over
7 there all the time.
8 Q. Now, I'm going to ask you this, Mr. Manolic: Over the past few
9 days during your testimony we read or, rather, the Prosecutor read out
10 within the scope of 3112 document, records from the national Security
11 Council and Defence Council of the 2nd of July, '73 [as interpreted], he
12 read out a letter by John Major, British Prime Minister, to the foreign
14 During your testimony linked to that letter told us here that you
15 doubted its authenticity, and you explained why. Now, can you tell me
16 whether and when you doubted the authenticity of that letter?
17 A. No, there was no discussion about the letter later on at that
18 meeting, at that session, and I was allowed to have my doubts or I could
19 accept that it was an original authentic letter by the signatory.
20 Q. Now, I'd like to have shown Prosecution Exhibit number 503112.
21 ERN page 01866481. P 03112. I see it's a problem. P as in Peter.
22 Could we have ERN number 01866481. If possible, could we now zoom
23 on the last passage in that -- on that page. Yes, that's it.
24 This is an excerpt that you see in front of it, and it says:
25 "Fourthly ..." It's an excerpt which pertains to your comment on that
1 letter. It says: "Fourthly, there is an issue of this document. Without
2 that document it would have been clear to me the English policy and the
3 French policy in the territory of former Yugoslavia. But just so you
4 know, the English policy is drawing you and me into a third Yugoslavia,
5 and I don't wish to go to the third Yugoslavia. As long as I have this
6 understanding, that the English policy is taking this direction, then I
7 will be against this English policy."
8 Please tell me, Mr. Manolic, are these your words?
9 A. Yes, in their entirety.
10 Q. It seems to me, as I look at this text, that you are referring to
11 this letter and drawing some conclusions from it. Is that correct?
12 A. Yes. One could say so. However, you didn't read out everything.
13 You didn't read all the passage, so now you have me all perplexed whether
14 I was referring to that particular document, that letter right then, or
15 something completely unrelated to that.
16 I don't think it would be that difficult to read out all of the
17 passages where I speak of item 1, 2, 3 and 4.
18 Q. Yes, but only item 4 pertains to this particular letter. I can
19 show the entire text, but only this passage pertains to this document, and
20 that was the only document presented at that session, the document
21 pertaining to the English policy.
22 Now, my last question before my client takes over. Tell me,
23 please, at the time while you were chief of security services in the
24 Republic of Croatia, you told us that it was the office for the protection
25 of constitutional order within the presidential office, did your offices
1 also deal with the security in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Was it within
2 their scope of work, the state of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
3 A. No. At least not during my term.
4 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] I have no further
5 questions, Your Honour, but before my client takes over, could the
6 registry please show us document PD 00477 -- 5D 00477.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The registry has 20
8 minutes to prepare this document. I believe that that should be
9 sufficient time. We now have our break, and we will come back in 20
11 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. The
14 Prosecutor has told us he needs at least 20 minutes for redirect.
15 Mr. Coric, you have until 1.25.
16 THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
17 Cross-examination by the Accused Coric:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, I'm Valentin Coric, the accused. To
19 the last question put to you by Ms. Tomasegovic Tomic, you said that in
20 1992, which was during the time that you held the most responsible posts
21 in Croatia in this field, the Croatian security services did not work in
22 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That wasn't within their scope
23 of duties. The document that the Defence counsel put to you will prove
24 something else.
25 I'm not asking for your response, but would you please read out
1 the heading of that document.
2 A. I don't know what is in front of me, what you are implying about
3 this document.
4 Q. It says Ministry of -- Republic of Croatia Ministry of the
5 Interior, Service for Protection of Constitutional Order. The date is
6 15th of October, 1992, strictly confidential, reproduction prohibited, and
7 it says here: "Acting assistant minister of the interior of the Republic
8 of Croatia, Mr. Marijan Benko." Subject is, "The activity of the security
9 service of HOS and a group for the so-called quiet liquidation."
10 Is that what it says here?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Could we now see the last page, which is page 5, where, in
13 addition to the signature, we will see, where it says assistant minister,
14 Smiljan Reljic, and a signature. On the left side it says forwarded to
15 the head of the office for protection for ZUP of RH, Mr. Manolic, and then
16 minister of the interior of RH, Mr. Jarnjak, and then deputy minister of
17 the interior, Mr. Tomljenovic. The next person is assistant minister of
18 defence of the RH security and information service, Mr. Perkovic. Acting
19 assistant minister of the interior of the RH, Mr. Benko. And the last
20 item is SZUP, I and V department. Is that what it says there?
21 A. Yes, that's what it says there.
22 Q. My first question: Do you know those persons whose names I just
23 read out?
24 A. Yes, I think that I know all of them.
25 Q. At that time in 1992 and 1993, did you have occasional or frequent
1 meetings with these persons?
2 A. Very occasional, and with some of them I never met at all.
3 Q. Did you have occasional meetings with Mr. Josip Perkovic?
4 A. Very rarely. I would meet more often with the minister of the
5 interior, Jarnjak, and his assistant mentioned here, Mr. -- assistant --
6 Q. Was it Mr. Benko?
7 A. No, not Benko, rather his boss who was assistant minister, Reljic.
8 Q. Reljic. He was the head of SZUP?
9 A. Yes. Assistant minister.
10 Q. Assistant minister but the first man of SZUP in Croatia. Did you
11 ever have joint meetings with these people?
12 A. No, never joint meetings but we would have individual contact.
13 Q. Did these people send you reports on any specific questions?
14 A. Not all of them, but yes, they would send reports.
15 Q. I would now like to move from this document. We'll get back to it
16 a bit later.
17 In 1992, did you meet with any person working in the services, any
18 one's services, that is to say services of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian
19 Community of Herceg-Bosna, or Krajina from the territory of Herceg-Bosna
20 -- or, rather, from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
21 A. I can't remember now, but if you were to give me some names, I can
22 give you a better reply.
23 Q. No, I'm quite happy with your reply. Did you ever exchange
24 information between the services of two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 and Croatia?
1 A. I don't know at which level and in which form.
2 Q. At your level, the information reaching you.
3 A. You mean written information or verbal information? I don't think
4 that I exchanged any written information. If you have any evidence to the
5 contrary, then would you please present it to me.
6 Q. No. Since my time is limited, we need to be as specific as
7 possible. Based on this document, we could see that the first men of
8 SZUP, which is the service for protection of constitutional order,
9 provided to you the most important information.
10 A. The ones that reached him. He would provide it to me or directly
11 to the president, because he also had direct communication with the
13 Q. All right. We can conclude with this and we can move on to
14 something else. The HOS. The first day of your evidence you spoke about
15 the HOS as one of the most extreme formations of the Croatian Party of
16 Rights. Do you agree with that?
17 A. Yes. Should I elaborate for you?
18 Q. No, because I don't have the time. Otherwise, very gladly because
19 you know much more about this than I do and I would gladly know as much as
20 you do.
21 What was the name of the first -- the most top ranked person
22 within the HOS?
23 A. I think that it was Kraljevic, but I'm not sure.
24 Q. And who was the top HOS man in Croatia?
25 A. Paraga and then Cakalic.
1 Q. Was Blaz Kraljevic answerable to Paraga?
2 A. I wouldn't know that. I don't know about their internal
4 Q. Do you know perhaps whether Alija Izetbegovic at that time
5 accepted the HOS as a legal military formation within the armed forces of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina? When I say "the armed forces of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina," I am referring to the same structure that exists in Croatia;
8 the Ministry of Defence, police, and so on. There was a similar structure
9 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Was the HOS accepted there?
10 A. I can't tell you that with certainty, but I think that at that
11 time they looked favourably upon each other, favourably, but I have
12 nothing to corroborate this with.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 A. I can only elaborate on consequences.
15 Q. Do you know that the HOS commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina had the
16 rank of general?
17 A. I don't know who you have in mind.
18 Q. General Blaz Kraljevic.
19 A. I don't know that and I don't know who inducted him into general.
20 Q. That's precisely why I asked you. It was Alija Izetbegovic who
21 gave him that rank?
22 A. Yes, but those are their internal relations.
23 Q. Yes, yes, but you know that you and I don't know each other so we
24 can't speak of relations between you and me, we can only speak of
25 relations between other people.
1 Do you know that Blaz Kraljevic, in his cooperation with the BH
2 army and with Alija Izetbegovic considered the HVO an illegal military
3 formation at the time?
4 A. I can't confirm that with certainty what relations existed there.
5 All I know is the tragedy which took place in the end.
6 Q. We'll get to that, but please let me lead this cross-examination.
7 I hope that you know that the HOS was composed of soldiers of almost all
8 ethnicities; Muslims, Croats and Serbs. Do you agree with that?
9 A. I can't agree with that because I don't know that. By don't think
10 that there were Serbs within that structure. Maybe you know better than I
11 do, in which case I'm not going to take issue with that.
12 Q. I think that we had some evidence about that and when the time
13 comes we can adduce more evidence about this. Let us move on.
14 Do you know that Blaz Kraljevic, with the support of the BH army,
15 in 1992 prepared an ultimatum to the HVO about disbanding the HVO? This
16 was happening around June and this meeting was held in Mostar. Have you
17 heard of this?
18 A. No.
19 Q. And now I'd like to go back to the document. I'm going to read
20 only a portion of it even though the document is six pages long. So the
21 subject was the activity of the HOS security service and a group for a
22 so-called quiet liquidation. This is in reference to a letter number
23 such-and-such of the SIS.
24 A. The SIS of what, of Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina?
25 Q. There existed only the SIS of the HVO. Bosnia and Herzegovina did
1 not have the SIS. And this deals with the SIS of the Republic of Croatia.
2 This is why I asked you about some of the top people within this service.
3 I'm now reading the documents: "Through operative methods and the
4 means of SZUP we were unable to confirm the SIS information that at the
5 level of the HOS for Dalmatia a security service was supposed to be
6 established or, rather, a group for quiet liquidation."
7 A. Never heard of it.
8 Q. This is a document that you were supposed to receive. At least,
9 that's what it says there. This was a strictly confidential document.
10 Any reproduction was prohibited. That is to say it was available only to
11 the very few. As far as I know, we did not receive this document from the
12 Prosecution. This wasn't disclosed by them, no. We received it from the
13 MUP of Croatia, and this is where they can find it.
14 I will now continue reading the document: "However, such a
15 service or such a group, based on the reports of reliable sources of SZUP,
16 is active in the territory of Herzegovina and partially in the territory
17 of the Republic of Croatia, which in accordance with the HOS structure,
18 are subordinated to the War Staff of the HOS for Herzegovina from
19 Ljubusko. In addition, in the territory of Ploce --" I'm not going to
20 read this portion. Let me now abbreviate this.
21 The HOS security service responsible for Herzegovina and the
22 territory of Croatian municipalities subordinated to the War Staff for
23 Herzegovina was established in late February, 1992. It intensified its
24 activity starting in late April, from which time it became active from the
25 HOS barracks in Dretelj near Capljina. Within it are the military police
1 of the HOS and the secret service which are, and especially the latter
2 one, tasked with creating the so-called groups for quiet liquidation, or
3 silent liquidation. This is page 2.
4 I think that you had a similar situation in Croatia.
5 A. I don't know what you mean when you say "similar situation." The
6 fact is --
7 Q. Please.
8 A. Let me complete.
9 Q. Don't interrupt me. I'm examining you here. With all due respect
10 to your age and everything else.
11 So we had the following situation in Herzegovina, or in Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina: Namely, we had several armies, several security services,
13 several military police, several secret service. What I read out, does it
14 confirm --
15 A. You know that. Don't try to get me to talk about things that I am
16 not familiar with.
17 Q. We're analysing this document together now. First I am putting it
18 to you --
19 A. Well, but you are stating that there were several armies, several
20 security services, intelligence services. I don't know that.
21 Q. You don't want to know that. Had you listened to me carefully,
22 you would have known, but you are refusing to know this. This is stated
23 in a document that you refused, Mr. Manolic. You were supposed to read
24 this document and take certain steps based on this document. I'd like to
25 continue now.
1 The task of the secret police - this is referring to the HOS
2 secret police - is defined as counter-espionage, intelligence work in
3 relation to the leadership and units of the HVO and the Croatian Community
4 of Herceg-Bosna, uncovering of the fifth columnists, monitoring of
5 suspicious persons, and uncovering of hidden activists of the Serbian
6 Democratic Party by -- in addition to uncovering such persons, this
7 service was also tasked with organising their arrest, investigation, and
8 possible liquidation. The commander of the HOS secret police in Dretelj
9 was Mirsad Muminagic, known as Tadija, from Struge. I'm going to skip
10 over some text. He personally was subordinated to Blaz Kraljevic, HOS
11 commander, with whom he met regularly in the premises of the staff in
13 Now my comment. Mirsad Muminagic, judging by his name, to what
14 ethnic community does he belong? And he was the head of the HOS secret
16 A. Most likely he's a Muslim, but I don't see why you're asking me
17 that. I don't understand that.
18 Q. It is up to the Bench to assess this, not up to you. Now I'm
19 continuing with the reading of this report that was sent to you,
20 Mr. Manolic.
21 "The information of the SZUP in relation to the secret activity of
22 the HOS service indicates that its members committed at least 12
23 liquidations of persons of Serb ethnicity."
24 Then it goes on to discuss some persons. I don't want to reveal
25 their names, places of their execution, their bodily remains, corpses that
1 were burned, their positions and so on, and I'm skipping over to page 3.
2 Further on: "The abductions and liquidations were committed
3 pursuant to the order of Mirsad Muminagic, the commander of the secret
4 police. The executioners are persons currently unknown to the SZUP except
5 that they were members of the HOS. They would come from other places
6 especially in order to carry out these tasks. They would come from
7 Mostar, Stolac, and other places in order to reduce the possibility of
8 them being identified."
9 Now I would like to read the following passage, also on page 3:
10 "Following the death of Blaz Kraljevic, members of the HOS secret police
11 carried out an investigation of this event. They found witnesses,
12 questioned them, and took statements from them."
13 I'm now moving to page 4. "This activity was carried out under
14 the order of the so-called main inspector of the HOS, Mile Dedakovic aka
15 Jastreb, who temporarily took over the command of HOS in Herzegovina."
16 A. Please give me the year, at least the year.
17 Q. This is around September of 1992. Who is Dedakovic, Mile
18 Dedakovic, called Jastreb? We saw his position within the HOS. What was
19 he prior to that?
20 A. An officer of the JNA who sometime in September of 1991 crossed
21 over into Croatian army. At the time he was sent to the front in Vukovar
22 and there at the front he didn't conduct himself honourably, following
23 which he had a conflict, and we started, instituted proceedings against
24 him. There was a police investigation against him, and I think that after
25 that he went to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1 Q. "Mile Dedakovic called Jastreb took over temporary command over
2 HOS in Herzegovina. Dedakovic, based on the information gathered, issued
3 an order that Primorac Ivica, former vice-commander of HOS, be placed
4 under surveillance." Have you ever met Mr. Primorac?
5 A. I don't think so.
6 Q. Have you heard of him?
7 A. Perhaps I heard of him. I might have heard of him at certain
8 meetings, I might have come across him, but I don't know.
9 Q. To read on: "Stojic Bruno, the commissioner for defence of the
10 Herceg-Bosna community ..." as is said in the text here, and you met him,
11 he's sitting here?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And Valentin Coric, the commander of the military police
14 department of the HVO. They were also included on the list for
15 liquidation. I'm not going to read the text further although there are
16 other individuals as well. But to go back to the commander of the secret
17 police, Muminagic Mirsad, and I'm reading on: "In connection with the
18 above it is important to note that Muminagic Mirsad, according to
19 information gained by SZUP, joined HOS pursuant to instructions from
20 Dzemal Najetovic, the former officer of the security services of the
21 Yugoslav People's Army, who at the time was performing the function of
22 commander of the Territorial Defence unit of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the
23 Muslim one) in a place called Jasenica in Capljina municipality. We
24 identified Muminagic earlier on as an operative of the security service of
25 the Yugoslav army in Capljina."
1 And to read on and finish the text, page 4: "Among the members of
2 the HOS units in our territory, there are several individuals who have
3 already shown themselves to be the perpetrators of terrorist acts (mining
4 facilities and property, shoot-ups in apartments and others) and among
5 them could be a recruited possible members of groups for silent
7 That concludes my reading of that passage, and I now have a few
8 questions to ask you about that.
9 In interstate communication, for example in peacetime, as we are
10 now, if the service of a country were to receive a piece of information of
11 this kind, wouldn't it be logical that that information be sent out via
12 Interpol to the country whose citizens are mentioned?
13 A. Yes, in normal conditions, that would be normal procedure.
14 Q. Mr. Manolic, I have checked - and others are free to check this
15 out too - this information none of us received, none of us in the HVO
16 security service. Had we received it, we would have found it in some
17 archive. Can you believe that?
18 A. Well, I can believe that, but I think that the assistant defence
19 minister had intensive contacts with Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 Q. Who do you mean?
21 A. I mean Perkovic.
22 Q. Let me just remind you that at that time, 1992, I was the number
23 one man of SIS for a time and also commander of the military police, and
24 at this time I was head of the military police administration, and I never
25 received any report to that effect. Can you believe me if I tell you?
1 A. Well, I have to believe you, because you're the witness and I have
2 no other proof or evidence. But I think that the Court should be told who
3 and what HOS is, the H-O-S, that you're talking about, because I think
4 that the leaders of that -- of the HOS was in Zagreb, in Croatia, whereas
5 these were branches of it. And I'm hearing now for the first time that
6 Dedakovic was, for instance, in Bosnia-Herzegovina in HOS.
7 But the road traversed was this: When we completed the police
8 investigation of Dedakovic, because we had suspicions, well-founded
9 suspicions where he was concerned, I think that after that, when he left
10 prison, that he joined HOS, HOS Zagreb with Paraga and Djapic, and that it
11 was they who sent him to Bosnia-Herzegovina. So our service had to tackle
12 HOS, and I myself, and up to the present day the vestiges of HOS.
13 Q. Thank you very much, but you're taking up my time. I just have
14 two more questions, Your Honour. The first question is this: I did not
15 read out four or five names of men who were members of the Croatian army
16 who were involved in this operation, and since the document has now become
17 public to all of us, were those people prosecuted in Croatia?
18 A. Well, I don't know who you mean. If you give me the names, I'll
19 be able to tell you.
20 Q. Well, I'll read the names out, then. They are as follows --
21 A. We prosecuted Paraga and some people around Paraga.
22 Q. Would you just leave me enough time to read this out. In
23 preparing these activities, Milicevic Damir, commander of the HOS military
24 police, took part. He was a policeman in Capljina. Milicevic Stjepan,
25 commander of the Metkovici police.
1 A. I never heard of those names. I've never heard of them or the
2 proceedings. There were no legal proceedings initiated against them in
4 Q. That's what I wanted to ask you. My last question now,
5 Mr. Manolic.
6 Now, the story around this document shows and proves -- does it
7 show and prove what kind of criminal enterprise it was between the people
8 in Croatia and Herceg-Bosna for which we are being held accountable?
9 Would that be logical?
10 A. Well, during these proceedings, during the case and trial, you'll
11 be able to establish that. I told you that I cannot enter into that.
12 When you go to Bosnia-Herzegovina -- I don't know you personally. We
13 never had any personal contacts, and you occupied prominent positions in
14 that area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, don't involve me in things I
15 don't know about.
16 Q. Mr. Manolic, from what you've just said leads me to make one more
17 observation and ask a question. Listening to you over the past few days,
18 I cannot believe that you were so courageous us to make assessments and
19 evaluations about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croats in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina with so little knowledge, so I'm not surprised that you
21 don't know me at all. I was a lower ranking officer, but nevertheless I
22 was minister of the MUP of Herceg-Bosna, I was member of the Presidency of
23 the presidential council, I was minister in the government of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so I am astounded in noting that you are brave enough
25 to speak out on such -- such important questions, fateful to the Croats in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, without that knowledge.
2 Thank you. You needn't answer that question.
3 ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours, that
4 completes my cross-examination of this witness.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Just a short
6 question that I have following on from what's just been said and a number
7 of questions raised by Mr. Coric.
8 When you received the letter, what did you do? Did you put it in
9 a drawer or did you pass it on to the people that should have reacted and
10 apprehended those individuals?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The president was informed of that
12 letter. As can be seen, the letter was sent to all high personages who
13 were supposed to take steps; to everyone ranging from Mr. Reljic and all
14 the others mentioned here. Now, what they actually did, what action they
15 took, I don't know because I never received any feedback information about
16 that. But generally speaking, I think that the information was correct.
17 And this testimony of Benko's was objective and can be believed, is
19 Now, what I wanted to make clear to this Honourable Trial Chamber
20 is how HOS was organised. HOS was an ultra-Nazi organisation during that
21 period of time which stood up to and worked to topple the constitutional
22 order of the Republic of Croatia, and now we can see that it had strong
23 roots or tentacles in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. It was an organisation
24 that was of that nature. We in Croatia did not carry out any of the
25 liquidations he was talking about. What we did was to initiate legal
1 proceedings against the main people like Paraga. The court acquitted
2 Paraga to begin with as the organiser of these paramilitary operations,
3 but then the court, the Supreme Court, ruled that they were paramilitary
4 formations, HOS formations, belonging to a political party, which was
5 something that could not be tolerated. So until they joined up with the
6 regular units of the Croatian army, we considered them to be paramilitary
7 formations and then we acted accordingly towards them as illegal
8 formations and we took proceedings both in courts of law and through the
10 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes. I would like to have a follow-up question
11 to the President Antonetti about your obligations and tasks in your
12 office. Before the break we have listened to Ms. Tomasegovic Tomic, who
13 is the counsel for Valentin Coric, and she mentioned that you were the
14 chief of the secret services in Croatia. I do not find now this line, but
15 it was about ten minutes before we -- before our break. So my question is
16 in a way a follow-up question, that what were your real responsibilities
17 in your office? Did you -- did you have operational responsibilities and
18 tasks? Did you coordinate the secret services, or was it rather in a way
19 in the presidential office to -- to collect the information and give it to
20 the president, of course which also implied certain operational
21 activities? So I would like to ask you what were your area of
22 responsibilities in your office there. Thank you.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My remit or area of responsibility
24 was contained in the decision of the president to establish that office in
25 the first place. There was stipulated what my responsibilities were and
1 what the authorisations of the department were, to collect, supply, and
2 coordinate material and give it to the president of the republic. So
3 nothing took place without the president having been informed about it.
4 Or, if I considered that a certain piece of information was of no interest
5 or was foul play on somebody's part, then I didn't send it on to the
6 president. But in addition to that, we must also know that the president
7 had an advisor for national security, and that advisor for national
8 security also worked in that area, that is to say collecting and amassing
9 information, and if there was any need to intervene on the basis of the
10 knowledge and reports received, he could do that.
11 The services within the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the
12 protection of the state order, the SIS heads also collected information
13 and would send that information out to their ministers, who could react,
14 and this information was either sent on or not to the presidential office.
15 I don't know if that answers your question.
16 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
18 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
19 Re-examination by Mr. Scott:
20 Q. Mr. Manolic, a few follow-up questions following from the
21 cross-examination. I just want to start, and we probably won't have the
22 time to pull up all of these documents. I will read some excerpts from
23 them, some of them that were put to you by the Defence. They can be
24 translated to you. If it becomes absolutely necessary, we can pull some
25 of them up on the screen.
1 But counsel for Mr. Petkovic showed you an article, an interview
2 from Globus on the 7th of November, 1997. Let me just read to you the
3 very beginning of your answer given at that time, and then I'll have a
4 question for you about that. "I criticised Tudjman the most for his
5 policy towards the Republic Herceg-Bosna. I have been the biggest
6 opponent of the establishment of the Republic Herceg-Bosna in the HDZ at
7 the time and the time showed that, from a strategic point of view, I was
8 right and that was the biggest pleasure for me and my party, that time
9 verified us."
10 Now, sir, is that statement consistent with the criticisms and
11 differences that you had with Tudjman, Susak, and others that you have
12 told the Judges about these last three and a half days?
13 A. I think that that would be correct. I don't know see any
14 difference there. If there are any differences during the first day of my
15 testimony and later on in the cross-examination, well, we would have to
16 determine what was different so that we can explain, whether it was
17 through a memory lapse, intentional, unintentional. But I stand by the
18 text as a whole, and all the texts that I published here. I have no
19 dilemma on that score, no queries, quandaries.
20 Q. Sir, our time is limited so let me try to move forward fairly
21 quickly. Ongoing questions about Karadjordjevo. Let me ask you this,
22 sir: Is it correct to say that one can also get confirmation of the
23 existence in terms of the meeting by the conduct that takes place
24 following a meeting?
25 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, time -- time may be short, but I'm going
1 to ask that Mr. Scott not lead the witness during redirect examination.
2 And it calls for speculation.
3 MR. SCOTT: No, it does not call for any speculation. It's a
4 general proposition of human behaviour. Can one draw --
5 MR. KARNAVAS: It's beyond the scope of this gentleman's
6 expertise. He's not a psychiatrist or a psychologist.
7 MR. SCOTT: It has nothing to do with psychologists. This is a
8 question of human conduct and someone who has been a senior official,
9 attended many meetings, can talk about whether conduct following a meeting
10 tends to confirm what happened at that meeting.
11 Q. Can you answer my question, sir?
12 A. I don't know what to answer, but to repeat that I stand by my
13 previous statements. You just read out a statement that I don't have in
14 front of me right this minute, and I don't know how to phrase my position,
15 but if you were to put me -- put it on the screen for me, I'd be able to
16 give you my position right away.
17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... particular article you wrote
18 now. Let me restate my question, and I'm sorry, I know you're tired. Let
19 me repeat my question. Can you tell us, sir, in your experience is it
20 often the case that one can gain information about what happens at a
21 meeting by seeing and observing the conduct that takes place after such a
23 MR. KARNAVAS: I object to the form of the question. Now we're
24 talking -- who are we talking about in general? I think this is --
25 MR. SCOTT: Human behaviour.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: I think this is improper rebuttal testimony. He
2 had ample opportunity to ask what he observed after the meeting. That's
3 testimony, those would be facts, then it would be up to the Trial Chamber
4 to draw conclusions.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand Mr. Scott quite
7 clearly. Was it possible to confirm only which took place at an official
8 meeting, which was also recorded and transcripts, or was it possible to
9 obtain information elsewhere? Yes, certainly information was also
10 obtained elsewhere; in the corridors and other places.
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. Sir, you said one of the things that President Tudjman reported
13 when he came back from Karadjordjevo, that the topic of Kosovo was
14 discussed. And can you confirm to the Judges again that, after that
15 meeting, in fact Croatia stopped its radio broadcast into Kosovo?
16 A. I think that I said correctly that that programme was terminated
17 based on direct proposal of the president. And you can call Mr. Vrdoljak
18 here to testify. At the time he was the director of the Zagreb TV. But
19 the fact is that that programme was terminated, and I link it to the fact
20 that that was a concession to Milosevic in relation to Kosovo, because he
21 said that Kosovo was an internal problem of the state of Serbia. I think
22 that's quite clear.
23 Q. Now, you also said, and whatever the other disagreements might be,
24 that the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was at least discussed, if not
25 agreed, as reported by Franjo Tudjman. Can you confirm, sir, that what
1 you've told us, that following Karadjordjevo, President Tudjman set up a
2 group that was supposed to prepare maps and demarcations?
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, Mr. President, is this new testimony or is
4 this rebuttal?
5 MR. SCOTT: In response to the questions raised on
6 cross-examination, Your Honour. Specifically -- many counsel went on and
7 on about whether Karadjordjevo happened or not.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: This is improper rebuttal then, because the --
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, your redirect
10 questions have to be based on what was covered during cross-examination.
11 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So please tell us, on which
13 parts of cross-examination do you base this?
14 MR. SCOTT: Defence counsel have continued to question whether any
15 meeting at Karadjordjevo occurred, or what happened there, what the terms
16 of any agreement were. I'm coming back to respond specifically to those
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic. In theory, when
19 it comes to additional questions, to redirect, there is no right to
20 intervene. Please go ahead, Ms. Alaburic. And following that, we will
21 have to stop with these interventions because if you all keep rising,
22 there will be no time for the Prosecutor to complete their questions.
23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Our questions did pertain to
24 Karadjordjevo but the topic of the work of this commission doesn't relate
25 only to the meeting in Karadjordjevo, because before and after that at the
1 meetings between the presidents of all six republics of the former
2 Yugoslavia, they discussed the territorial delineations, and none of the
3 questions of Defence pertained to the work of these commissions which were
4 established in all republics of the former Yugoslavia.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would like to --
6 MR. SCOTT:
7 Q. Sir, let me repeat my question to you. Was it -- can you confirm
8 to the Judges again that following President Tudjman coming back from
9 Karadjordjevo, was a group established for the purpose of preparing maps
10 and demarcations of territory? That's really fairly -- if you don't know,
11 if you don't remember, but --
12 A. I think that the central issue that this Honourable Chamber has to
13 rule on is the role of President Tudjman in the partition of Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina. The agreement that he had with Milosevic is something that
15 he conveyed to us in principle. He told us in principle, we agreed that
16 the area in -- territory in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia
17 will be divided based on our agreement. The implementation and the
18 operations that ensued was a confirmation in principle of that agreement.
19 He delegated it to some people, to a group of people in Croatia, really
20 prominent people in Croatia, academician --
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The question that was put to you
22 required you to say whether, after he came back, a commission for maps was
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Academician Bilandzic, who was a
25 member of the commission, said that on the 10th of March, or perhaps 10th
1 of April, I'm not sure, he was called by President Tudjman, who told him,
2 "I'm hereby establishing a team of experts -" that's what he called it, a
3 team of experts - "comprising yourself -" and his name was -- rather,
4 there were another three men there as well, but all prominent, respectable
5 figures in Croatian politics; a current judge on the Constitutional Court,
6 a well-known lawyer was also a member of that commission. And no need for
7 me to go into detail, these are publicly known facts. So this was an
8 expert commission which was supposed to prepare the implementation of this
9 agreement in principle, to implement it with all the appropriate
10 documents. Then on the Serbian side Milosevic also established an expert
11 team which worked jointly on the implementation of this agreement in
12 principle with Milosevic.
13 This is all that I can tell you. This is what I eyewitnessed as a
14 protagonist in Croatian politics.
15 As for the other questions involving Herceg-Bosna and all the
16 other events, I think that you need to further discuss it with these
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott, the
19 witness has now answered your question about the commission.
20 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
21 Q. Sir, moving next to the -- very, very briefly to the Graz
22 Agreement. Can you just simply tell the Judges -- I just want, if you
23 know, if you can give us some final assistance on that, do you know
24 whether the international community immediately rejected the Graz
25 Agreement as a bilateral agreement inconsistent with the international
1 peace negotiations that were taking place at the time?
2 A. I think that --
3 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, you may caution me, I
4 apologise, but this is truly a leading question. Even though you banned
5 us from intervening, I couldn't refrain on this occasion.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Scott, if you phrase
7 it this way --
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think that this is a leading
9 question. I already spoke about this. I already gave my position on
10 this. It's just that Mr. Scott wants me to reiterate this. He believes
11 it to be significant.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] On redirect, you have to -- you
13 have to base it -- base your questions on what was asked during
14 cross-examination. You cannot bring in any other issues.
15 Mr. Scott, if you are putting this question. It has to rely on
16 what the witness said during cross-examination. Do you have any
17 reference? Can you point us to a specific portion?
18 MR. SCOTT: [Previous translation continues] ... I cannot take you
19 to a page in the transcript at this time. I have not had time to go back
20 to study the transcript and give you a page and line number, of course
21 not. If the Chamber does not recall Defence questions about the Graz
22 Agreement the last day and a half, then --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In that case, you have to
24 withdraw the question.
25 MR. SCOTT: All right. Am I to understand then, Your Honour, for
1 the future, that for redirect purposes, that we will need to cite the page
2 and line number of the transcript?
3 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm not suggesting that it be that rigid, but he
4 must say, You were asked a question by the Defence ... and at least to
5 show that it is in rebuttal not new information. If the gentleman forgot
6 to ask it before, you know --
7 MR. SCOTT: It's not. Your Honour, the question was put --
8 MR. KARNAVAS: If he wants to ask it again for the second time,
9 it's not rebuttal.
10 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, multiple Defence counsel, and I'm sorry,
11 I cannot go back to the transcript now and find all the references to the
12 Defence questioning about Graz, but I submit to you they were
13 considerable. And the implication was either it didn't occur or that what
14 happened there -- or that what happened there --
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. But, Mr. Scott, there
16 certainly had to be questions to which the witness gave answers that you
17 were not satisfied with, and this is why you noted this down that you
18 needed to cover this in redirect. So where does the problem lie? What
19 did you see that you objected to?
20 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I thought we had this witness here and,
21 based on all the questions that had been put to him about Graz, if he can
22 assist the Chamber further to clarify what happened after Graz, I thought
23 I would ask him. And to assist you, in the questions that were raised by
24 the Defence, a suggestion that it was either inconsistent or consistent
25 with other peace processes, I would ask the witness to assist.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. But before the Graz
2 Agreement -- or, rather, after the Graz Agreement, after the Graz
3 Agreement, based on what you saw yourself, can you tell us what happened
4 following that.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What happened following that was
6 that the armed conflict between Croats and Bosnian Serbs ended, that is to
7 say between Croats and Karadzic. That was the result of that agreement.
8 I personally didn't see the text of the agreement, but those were the
9 results, the consequences; that the armed conflict between the Croats and
10 Bosnian Serbs ended.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, just for -- just for the record, I
12 want to make sure that we're very clear, at least on the part of the
13 Defence. We maintain that there was no agreement. We've never objected
14 to there being a meeting. And there's extensive discussion on this. In
15 fact, Mr. Kljuic, who is the gentleman's friend, indicated that he didn't
16 believe that anything occurred as far as an agreement at this Graz
17 meeting, so we object to the characterisation as there being an
18 agreement. A meeting? Not a problem, we discussed that. Whether the
19 internationals agreed or disagreed, that's a separate issue. But I want
20 to make sure that we're clear that we at no time concede that there was an
21 agreement in Graz.
22 MR. SCOTT: Fine. I understand that position, Your Honour. And
23 just like my previous question, it is a fair -- it is fair for the Judges
24 to be informed -- if their dispute, as you've just heard, there is a no
25 agreement, but if there is conduct following a meeting that implies or
1 suggests that there was a meeting, then the Chamber should be aware of
3 MR. KARNAVAS: But that's for direct examination, not for
4 rebuttal, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're going at it again.
6 You're arguing again.
7 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Your Honour. My apology.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please settle down. In
9 principle, when there is an agreement, generally there tends to be a
10 document that is signed. If we don't have a signed document, then we can
11 say that it was only a meeting.
12 Mr. Manolic, following that meeting which was held, in your
13 judgement the consequence of that meeting was that the conflict between
14 Serbs and Croats ended; correct?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But the signed agreement or the
17 signed document didn't exist; correct?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not sure whether there existed a
19 signed document, I think, though, that there was a statement given.
20 Whether there was a heading saying "agreement" is something that is
21 disputed, but I think that it can be clarified through various
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, very briefly.
24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Mr. Manolic, following that
25 agreement, we liberated both the right and the left bank of Mostar for the
1 length of 30 kilometres in -- in June. So how can you say that the
2 conflict between Serbs and Croats stopped?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was the purpose of that
4 agreement, to end the conflict between Serbs and Croats in that area. And
5 this is what transpired later on. Maybe in June there still existed a
6 conflict, but not later on. There was no conflict with Karadzic later on.
7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] What about Bosanski Brod?
8 What about Posavina? Where did you live at the time I have to wonder.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, your objection was
11 Mr. Scott, have you concluded with this or not? Because we should
12 have ended five minutes ago and there is another trial which is scheduled
13 to begin after us.
14 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, I appreciate that and I will shorten
15 my questions. Unfortunately, for all the interventions, we haven't been
16 able to get very far, but that's the reality, I understand. Let me just
17 look, Your Honour. If I can ask two or three questions. If I can just
18 look at my outline, please.
19 Q. Sir, during your testimony yesterday, you said at one point in
20 answer to questions from the Defence, you used -- part of your answer was
21 that Tudjman engaged in a quote - and this was your phrase, it was at page
22 -- at least, as of yesterday. I know sometimes the page numbering
23 changes. Page 28, at line 13, you said Tudjman engaged in a "dual
24 policy." Now, can you explain to the Judges, when you say "dual policy"
25 what you mean.
1 A. The mere fact that he acknowledged or recognised the borders of
2 the republics which came to be after the break-up of Yugoslavia, he
3 acknowledged this publicly and then, on the other hand, he and Milosevic
4 established expert groups that were to partition that area. This is where
5 you see the gap, the contradiction between his words and his deeds.
6 Q. My final question: On the issue of provision, Croatia's provision
7 of arms or supplies to the Muslims, which again was repeatedly asked and
8 also reflected in a number of Defence exhibits, do you know, can you tell
9 the Chamber, do you know whether any of these arms were actually
10 delivered; and if so, where they were delivered?
11 A. I can't say whether it was delivered. However, the document that
12 was put to us shows that this materiel was there. Whether it was one
13 shipment or multiple shipments, that's irrelevant now. And I think that
14 that's the issue where the Defence makes strategic mistakes, because they
15 are drawing Croatia into new troubles which are troubles with embargo.
16 MR. MURPHY: With all due respect, the witness must be instructed
17 to respond to the question and leave it at that, please.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: And just this last response, for the record, shows
19 that the gentleman here is with his own personal agenda. His agenda is to
20 smear Mr. Tudjman and to smear everybody else.
21 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, that comment right there is
22 objectionable. Mr. Karnavas has no business getting up and slandering
23 this witness in front of this witness and accusing --
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. Mr. Manolic.
25 Mr. Manolic, the question was quite specific. The Prosecutor asked you
1 whether you knew whether the weapons were delivered; and if so, where. So
2 the question was quite specific.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know that. I don't know
4 whether it was delivered.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. So you don't know
6 that. You just said I saw a document which -- all right. The question
7 was directed to you personally, whether you knew about the shipment of
8 arms from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you say to that "I don't
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have no knowledge about the arms
11 being delivered. I can just state what was written in that document, that
12 was requested, and so on.
13 MR. SCOTT: Sir, just to follow up on that and one final
14 question: Can you tell the Judges, sir, were there areas in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, specifically talking about larger area,
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, were there areas outside the territory claimed by
17 Herceg-Bosna where Muslims and Croats fought together against the Serbs
18 throughout the war?
19 A. We have to be quite specific there. If you are referring to six
20 or, rather, three provinces, then yes, that area is quite well defined,
21 but in other periods of times and in other discussions the issue was quite
22 different, or the situation was quite different.
23 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. In the interests of time and
24 -- Mr. Manolic, I'll conclude there. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. Mr. Manolic, on
1 behalf of the Trial Chamber, I would like to thank you for coming here.
2 You've testified here for several days. This was no small feat for you.
3 It was quite a lengthy testimony. So I wish you a safe trip home. I will
4 now ask the usher to escort you out of the courtroom.
5 [The witness withdrew]
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now, very quickly. Mr. Scott,
7 as for our schedule for next week, if I understood you well, we have two
8 witnesses scheduled. One is supposed to testify on Monday and Tuesday and
9 the other one on Wednesday and Thursday. As for the first witness, you
10 foresaw that the examination-in-chief would last three and a half hours
11 and for the second witness five hours. Is that correct? Do you think
12 that you can comply with this assessment?
11 Your Honour, beyond that, the Prosecution will be making an
12 application and makes an oral at this time - we'll be providing this
13 material to the Defence today - to offer as 92 bis evidence the testimony
14 of Stipe Mesic from the Blaskic case, which is our view that the testimony
15 of Mr. Blaskic -- President Blaskic in the -- excuse me: President Mesic
16 in the Blaskic case -- it's late in the day -- is corroboration of the
17 testimony that the Court has received from Mr. Manolic and we will -- we
18 are by this, by what I'm saying now, applying that the Chamber receive
19 that evidence under Rule 92 bis, and we'll provide that to the Chamber
20 today. Thank you.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: I have two unrelated matters. So I am not going to
22 argue --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment. So there's this
24 oral request pursuant to Rule 92 bis and Mr. Mesic's testimony in the
25 Blaskic case. Now, Mr. Karnavas.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm not going to respond to that oral request, Your
2 Honour, but I have two oral requests myself. One is with respect to the
3 joint response --
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment. With respect to
5 the oral motion, the Defence will also state its views. So you must state
6 your position. Do you agree or not?
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, we oppose. We want Mr. Mesic here. We
8 believe Mr. Mesic should be subjected to proper cross-examination in open
9 public, in open -- in open. And we want -- and I should add that after he
10 testified, because first time he came he took part of the archive and
11 brought it here, then after he testified it was open, so we have more
12 material, more documents that were not available at the time he testified,
13 but --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Do I understand that on behalf
15 of the Defence you would like him to appear. And everybody agrees, do
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Absolutely. Now -- two other points. This joint
18 response with respect to the Prosecution's motion for judicial notice is
19 due today at 4.00. We have it prepared, but because we've been working
20 rather hard with this last witness, I would ask leave to file it on Monday
21 so I could double-check it and perhaps even make it a little bit tighter,
22 but we do have it but I would appreciate if we could have that to be --
23 And then the next --
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No problem.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: -- I'm making an oral application for the Trial
1 Chamber to provide me with OLAD's response to my request to have my client
2 use a computer. I know a decision with a dissent was issued. I never
3 received that memo. OLAD will not turn it over to me without a request
4 from the -- from the Chamber or without a decision from the Chamber, so I
5 would most -- I wish to file a leave for certification to appeal that,
6 Your Honour, that's why.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It is five minutes
8 past 2.00. I apologise to the interpreters for having kept them for this
9 additional work. I wish everyone a very good weekend and we reconvene on
10 Monday at 2.15.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.04 p.m.,
12 to be reconvened on Monday, the 10th day
13 of July, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.