1 Tuesday, 22 August 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the

7 case.

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Good afternoon. Case IT-04-74-T,

9 the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon to everyone.

11 I'm not going to ask anyone to introduce themselves because we have the

12 same people present as yesterday.

13 The Trial Chamber will issue a number of rulings today because,

14 as I announced yesterday, we had a working meeting this morning, and I'm

15 now in a position to issue a number of rulings, and this will be done

16 orally.

17 The first ruling has to do with the computer. We took note of

18 what was said yesterday by Mr. Praljak, and we also took note of the four

19 letters, the last being dated 16th of August, a letter addressed to OLAD

20 and related to that issue. We instructed the legal officer of the Chamber

21 to take -- to get in touch with OLAD very quickly in order to inform us if

22 it will be feasible for the computer to have bigger memory. As far as I

23 know, it should not cause any technical problems apparently, and the cost

24 is about a few euros, but there are a number of procedures that have to be

25 followed at the UN in order to purchase that and that might explain the

1 delay. In any case, we've asked the legal officer to get this information

2 as quickly as possible, and as soon as we get this information I'll let Mr.

3 Praljak know what's going on and what's going to happen. And I hope that

4 you will very quickly obtain what you're requesting, because this a

5 perfectly legitimate request.

6 Now, in relation to the documents mentioned by Mr. Murphy

7 yesterday, we believe that at the end of the cross-examination the

8 Prosecution, if it wishes to do so, will be able to tender a motion for the

9 -- to issue -- to file a motion for the admission of these documents. The

10 Defence will respond in line with our previous decision and then we'll rule

11 on whether these documents should be admitted or not. At this stage, the

12 Judges of the Chamber believe that the accused have not suffered any

13 prejudice because the Defence is still in a position to ask appropriate

14 questions to the witness based on documents that the Defence has received

15 for quite some time now.

16 We have another decision in relation to the exhibits in relation

17 to Witness Manolic. I'm going to read this decision out very slowly for

18 everybody to listen very carefully.

19 The Trial Chamber has to rule about the admission of exhibits

20 tendered by the parties as part of the testimony of Mr. Josip Manolic. The

21 Trial Chamber would like first to recall that in line with the decision of

22 the 13th of July on the admission of evidence, when a party only introduces

23 an excerpt of an exhibit during the hearing it should only request the

24 admission of this particular excerpt. The Chamber invites the party to

25 file in writing before the 30th of August the list of exhibits submitted to

1 the witness Manolic that the parties would like to see admitted. We would

2 like to recall that as far as the excerpts are concerned, the parties are

3 to provide the page numbers or the paragraph numbers of the relevant

4 exhibits.

5 Secondly, as for the admission of the exhibits in the testimony

6 of Mr. Josip Manolic, since this is -- this happened before the decision

7 rendered on the 13th of July, the Trial Chamber is ready to consider any

8 decision filed by the Prosecutor in case the Prosecutor wants to file --

9 want to tender the exhibits that were not submitted to the witness. This

10 motion should be filed before the 30th of August and should include the

11 necessary reasons provided for in the guidelines for the admission of

12 evidence.

13 The Defence will then have eight days to respond and to raise any

14 objections it might have for each of the exhibits tendered for these

15 exhibits to be admitted.

16 Last decision rendered orally today. This has to do with the

17 exhibits and the evidence in relation to Mr. Omer Hujdur. By oral ruling

18 rendered today, the Trial Chamber rules on the admissibility of evidence

19 related to the testimony of Omer Hujdur, who was heard on the 20th and 21st

20 of June, 2006.

21 The Trial Chamber has decided to admit the following exhibits

22 submitted by the Prosecution because of their probative value and their

23 relevance to a certain extent: P 01542, P 01564, P 01656, P 03020, P

24 03907, P 04247.

25 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber has decided to admit the following

1 exhibits tendered by the Defence because of their probative value and their

2 relevance: 2D 00055, 2D 00056, 3D 00046, 3D 00126, 3D 00131, 3D 00287, 3D

3 00289, 3D 00291, 3D 00292.

4 However, the Trial Chamber has decided not to admit the following

5 exhibits tendered by the Defence because considering their contents or,

6 rather, because the witness had no knowledge of their existence or their

7 contents. These are exhibits 3D 00123, 3D 00125, 3D 00136, 3D 00138, 3D

8 00284, 3D 00285, 3D 00290.

9 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber has decided not to admit the

10 following Defence exhibits because the Trial Chamber is not satisfied of

11 their -- about their authenticity or their contents: 2D 00154 -- no, there

12 is a mistake. 2D 00054, 3D 00048, 3D 00049, 3D 00050, 3D 00122, 3D 00136,

13 3D 00137.

14 Finally, the Trial Chamber has decided not to admit the following

15 exhibits submitted by the Defence because these exhibits had not been

16 presented or because it was not possible to present these exhibits to the

17 witness Hujdur during the hearing, these are exhibits 3D 00130, 3D 00286,

18 3D 00288.

19 Since the decision on the admission of evidence related to

20 Witness Hujdur has been issued today, in other words, after the decision on

21 the admission of evidence that was rendered on the 13th of July, 2006, the

22 Trial Chamber decides or rules that the same principles should apply to

23 this decision, the principles that were outlined in the decision on the 13

24 -- of the 13th of July, 2006. Therefore, in line with this decision, the

25 Trial Chamber makes it possible for the Prosecution to file a motion with

1 the Chamber if the Prosecution wishes to tender additional evidence,

2 evidence that was not submitted to Witness Hujdur, and such a motion should

3 be filed on the 30th of August, 2006 at the latest, and it should state the

4 appropriate reasons for its filing following the guidelines for the

5 admission of evidence. The Defence will have eight days to respond and to

6 make objections for each of the exhibits submitted and tendered through the

7 motion.

8 This is the end of these decisions. We are now going to move

9 into closed session.

10 [Private session]

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20 [Open session]

21 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We're in open session, Your

22 Honour.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We're in open

24 session. I'm now going to give the floor to the Defence counsel who will

25 proceed with the cross-examination of the witness. I don't know whose turn

1 is it?

2 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. On

3 the 65 ter chart we received, our client's name was not marked and we don't

4 have the names of these witnesses.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Mundis, what

6 can you say to that? What can you respond to Mr. Ibrisimovic?

7 MR. MUNDIS: I'm not -- in all honesty, Your Honour, I'm not sure

8 I understand Mr. Ibrisimovic's concern. Is it the fact that the 65 ter

9 chart did not mention his client's name and, therefore, he doesn't have any

10 questions?

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Ibrisimovic, can you

12 please clarify your position?

13 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] I think there was a

14 misinterpretation, Your Honour. When my learned friend disclosed the chart

15 for this witness, he left out the name of our client. As there was no

16 mention during the examination-in-chief of our client, I have no questions

17 for this witness.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Following the

19 counsel -- Mr. Karnavas was back on his feet. He sat back again and now

20 he's on his feet again.

21 WITNESS: CHRISTOPHER BEESE [Resumed]

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour, Mr. President and everyone

23 in court.

24 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:

25 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Beese. I want to go back to the one document

1 that was referenced earlier. I take it your position is you wish to be

2 going into private session when I make reference to that document, you

3 personally? I know the Court's ruling on that, but is your personal wish

4 to treat that document as something that we should not be talking about in

5 open court?

6 A. Yes, please.

7 Q. Okay. Now, I take it before coming here today, and perhaps even

8 overnight, you've had a chance to look over any documents to refresh your

9 memory, any that were generated by others or those generated by yourself?

10 A. They are available to me.

11 Q. That wasn't the question. The question was: Have you refreshed

12 your memory? I know they're available, because obviously you have them.

13 And if you generated them, obviously they would be in your possession. The

14 question is did you review them to refresh your memory?

15 A. No, I did not.

16 Q. Okay. Now, first I want to start with the mission itself, and

17 we'll start from there. As I understand it, you got involved with ECMM at

18 or about January 2nd, 1993; correct?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. And you remained in that motion until approximate July 21, 1993.

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. And you arrived in country or in theatre, as you put it,

23 somewhere, I believe, on the 8th of January.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And barring two -- two times that you -- that you were absent on

1 vacation, and I believe there might have been two weeks or 10 days at a

2 time, that entire period you were in country or in theatre; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. All right. The total amount of time that you spent in -- in the

5 mission, would that be six months?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, you indicated to us in being questioned by the Prosecutor

8 that the turnover was rather high in the ECMM mission.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And that was because some countries would -- would allow for

11 their observers or monitors to be there for as little as four months, and

12 in the UK's position was as long as two years, but it varied; right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Some monitors like yourself were new to the region; right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And it would be fair to say that those who were new to the region

17 and new to the conflict came with more or less a tabula rasa, a blank slate

18 other than what they might have read in the newspapers, in the press, or

19 perhaps a book they might have read in getting ready for the mission?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And that was pretty much your case as well?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I hope I'm not speaking too fast for the translators. I'll slow

24 down.

25 We speak the same language, so I need to slow down a little bit.

1 Now, in this particular case, you've told us that you were not a

2 student of the HDZ or the HVO. It's in your transcript. I can get it.

3 But in this particular case, it's fair to say that you knew little, very

4 little, of the former Yugoslavia itself; correct?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. You're not a history buff, and not history buff of this

7 particular region; right?

8 A. Not of this particular region.

9 Q. And you had not studied in any significant way the former

10 Yugoslavia, at least it's political set-up; correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Nor had you looked at its constitution prior to the break-up?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Or subsequent to the break-up?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. And as you well know, as Yugoslavia was breaking up and as these

17 new republics were being recognised, they were -- in doing so, they were

18 forming their own constitutions as legitimate states recognised by the UN;

19 correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And so again, prior to your arrival and even after your arrival,

22 you did not look at any of these or study these so at least you would be

23 familiar with the various constitutions of these republics?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. Now, in your particular case, fair to say, you only had to

1 concern yourself with one particular republic which eventually became a

2 state, and that was Bosnia and Herzegovina; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You knew -- you knew before coming in theatre that there -- there

5 was a war going on, or conflict?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You termed it as a civil war as you understood it then and as you

8 understand it today; right?

9 A. I -- I wouldn't hang myself on any particular definition. Yes,

10 conflict.

11 Q. Right. Yeah, but when you think of the greater picture of

12 Yugoslavia, now people are fighting inside, it's a civil war in a sense.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. We can quarrel about the legal terminology of a civil war, but --

15 all right.

16 And, of course, you must have been familiar that with the greater

17 context of the conflict going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was also a

18 conflict that had occurred or a war in the Republic of Croatia; correct?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. And to a large extent, that conflict by the time you arrived had

21 taken -- that is, the conflict with the Republic of Croatia, had taken a

22 different turn in the sense that it was no longer continually being

23 attacked by the former JNA or the JNA or whatever you want to call them?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. All right. And I take it, I take it from all of these answers

1 that you knew little, if any, of what would -- had been happening in Bosnia

2 and Herzegovina during the time when the JNA was attacking the Republic of

3 Croatia. And let me --

4 A. I accept that, yes.

5 Q. Yeah. And would it be fair to say that to what extent the JNA

6 had been using -- had been operating within the territory of Bosnia-

7 Herzegovina, you know, and using that as a staging ground to attack

8 Croatia, I take it you had little or no knowledge of as well?

9 A. Some knowledge of it.

10 Q. Some knowledge. Were you aware by any chance or did you ever

11 become aware of what the reaction was of the Croat people in Bosnia-

12 Herzegovina in relation to its government, that is the government of the

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and how it was reacting towards -- and how it was

14 responding towards the JNA vis-a-vis using -- the JNA using BiH territory

15 to attack Croatia? I know it's a long -- you understood what I meant?

16 A. The Croatian Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina established a

17 defence council to protect their interests and resisted passively, at

18 first, the JNA.

19 Q. Okay. Now, were you aware by any chance of efforts that the

20 Croatian -- the Croatians of Bosnia and Herzegovina pre-dating the

21 community in a sense, any efforts they had made in sounding the -- the

22 alarm, placing a clarion call as it will, to Izetbegovic and the government

23 in Sarajevo to do something, to arm itself, to protect itself, to gear up

24 for perhaps the winds of war blowing, you know, from north to south, you

25 know? Were you aware of any efforts that the Croats in Bosnia had made in

1 that fashion?

2 A. Not in detail, no.

3 Q. Okay. By the time that you arrived, by the time that you

4 arrived, ECMM had been out of country or out of theatre for some period of

5 time.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And I'm not quite sure on the date, maybe you can help us out.

8 When was it exactly that the ECMM returned to -- to the theatre? To

9 Bosnia, that is.

10 A. December 1992, I believe.

11 Q. Do you know whether it was beginning, middle or end of December?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Okay. And you spoke of Mr. Lane as being sort of the hands-on

14 and more or less the old-hand within the ECMM -- I guess it would be the

15 coordinating centre that you were operating on. Do you know when he

16 arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

17 A. In December.

18 Q. In December. Had he been there before the -- before that -- that

19 gap?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Okay. So in essence, by the time you had arrived, he had in

22 total of approximately one month in theatre. That was the total, the sum

23 total, of his experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an ECMM monitor; correct?

24 A. I believe so, though I can't be correct about his dates of

25 service.

1 Q. Okay. Do you know, and I'm not going to hold you to this and if

2 you don't know then say so, but do you know if he had served in any other

3 capacity in -- in theatre which would then -- which at least would say he

4 had some previous knowledge of what on earth was happening in Bosnia-

5 Herzegovina before he became an ECMM monitor?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Okay. You don't know or no, he did not have any?

8 A. I believe he had some experience in the Krajina --

9 Q. Uh-huh.

10 A. -- in the months before he entered Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 Q. Okay. Now, I want to talk a little bit about the orientation

12 that you received when you arrived, and as I understand it correctly, it

13 was from January 2nd you arrive, and you leave on the 8th. So we're

14 talking relatively five days of -- to be briefed.

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Now, was this a formal briefing or was this somewhat of a -- sort

17 of a casual briefing, people coming in and going out? Was there some sort

18 of a structured briefing, as it were?

19 A. There was a structured briefing carried out in the hotel in

20 Zagreb.

21 Q. I take it there was like a little room or a conference room where

22 people sat? Usually you get a little folder and maybe a pen and pad. Did

23 you get -- was that provided?

24 A. Slightly more -- slightly more advanced than that.

25 Q. All right. Slide show or --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Yeah. I guess the military loves these presentations with the

3 computers.

4 Well, the question is, I guess, in your briefing packet, can you

5 describe to us, can you describe to us what exactly did it contain that

6 would equip you in understanding who you were dealing with and what your

7 purpose was? In brief, if you recall.

8 A. The briefing focused principally on the front lines at the time

9 as they would seem to be between the parties in conflict. They dealt with

10 the issues, particularly where front lines were live, and we received

11 relatively little information but sufficient for us to understand that the

12 regions we were deploying to were on the whole stable, that is, within what

13 we understood then to be the federation between the Croats and the Muslims.

14 Q. Okay. In particular, did they by any chance provide you with a

15 list of the who's who in at least the very -- the region that you were

16 going to be dealing with?

17 A. I received that in Split when I deployed to the south.

18 Q. Okay. Okay. Well, before we get to Split, did they at least --

19 did -- was there any -- I don't want to say political, but sort of an

20 orientation on how the government itself functioned? In other words, from

21 the state and then on to the various communities or what have you. Did

22 they have a flowchart, an organisational chart so you could say okay this

23 is how politically it operates, and here is where the levels of power are.

24 Was there any sort of orientation on that?

25 A. I wasn't shown one.

1 Q. Okay. You were not shown one then and I take it when you got to

2 Split and eventually got to -- got in theatre, would it be fair to say you

3 weren't shown one there either?

4 A. Ray Lane explained to me when I arrived what the layout was, who

5 the principal personalities were that he was dealing with.

6 Q. Okay. Again, you know, and I don't mean to be a stickler about

7 this, I'm asking whether one was shown to you, because Lane is giving you

8 an oral -- a verbal presentation, and I'm interested in whether one was

9 down on paper that would -- at least we could check, not that I just --

10 well, actually, I do mistrust Lane. I don't know what he was saying to

11 you. I don't know whether it's accurate or not, but was there one that had

12 been compiled so as you would leave and the next person would come in,

13 there is some sort of an organisational history, an institutional history,

14 as it were, and as the situation changed and became -- because it was

15 rather fluid, one could trace, for instance, how things were changing

16 politically, structurally, legally, and what have you?

17 A. We, that is Ray and I, prepared those at the time. He was

18 drafting them and over the weeks we prepared them.

19 Q. And I take it we can find -- were those sent off as part of your

20 reporting system?

21 A. Not initially, no.

22 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Lane was there for a total of one month. Did he

23 by any chance give you an orientation on the government in Sarajevo, the

24 state -- at the state level, who was who?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Did you know -- did you know who was -- did you know who was the

2 number one person in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state?

3 A. Yes, Alija Izetbegovic.

4 Q. Okay. And -- and his -- and the title of his position was what?

5 A. Officially?

6 Q. Yes, officially if you recall?

7 A. Leader of the state.

8 Q. Leader -- well, if ask you who the leader is -- what is the top

9 person in the UK you're going to tell me --

10 A. He was the president --

11 Q. He was the president?

12 A. -- of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 Q. Okay. Do you know how this president -- how -- do you know below

14 him how the structure worked?

15 A. No.

16 Q. In other words -- let me just -- let me just help you out here.

17 If you look at the flowchart of -- because we're dealing with Europe, you

18 may have a president, you may have a Prime Minister. Sometimes the Prime

19 Minister is more -- has more powers than the president. It all depends on

20 the country. In Greece, it's the Prime Minister and not the president. In

21 France, it's the president and not the Prime Minister. Now, do you know

22 below the president what the structure was, the political structure?

23 A. No, and the principal reason for that is because in the area in

24 which we were operating to begin with, those authorities had little

25 influence.

1 Q. Okay. Well, when you arrived, you weren't -- were you aware of

2 that and as a result you decided there was no need to -- to learn of how

3 the system worked, or was that something that eventually you came to

4 realise, well, Sarajevo has nothing to do or has no influence here, there's

5 no need to worry about it? Which of the two?

6 A. Principally, the concern it start with was to observe what was

7 happening rather than necessarily to understand all of the background.

8 Q. All right.

9 A. But it became apparent relatively quickly that the Bosnia-

10 Herzegovina government's position in Sarajevo was isolated from the

11 remainder of the country.

12 Q. All right. Would it -- would it surprise you that first of all

13 he was the president but he was the president of a Presidency? Would that

14 surprise you to learn?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay. Do you know how this Presidency worked?

17 A. No.

18 Q. All right. Now, later on we're going to get to a document, but

19 what is interesting in the document, and you'll have to trust me for the

20 moment on it, is that Mr. Ganic is mentioned, and he's referred to in the

21 ECMM documents by ambassadors as the vice-president of -- of Bosnia-

22 Herzegovina.

23 A. They would have used that terminology, yes.

24 Q. Right. Now, would it surprise you, sir, would it surprise you to

25 learn that at the time there was no such position in the structure, the

1 political structure based on the constitution of a vice-president in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Would that surprise you?

3 A. No, but again our concern was not with what was what people

4 called themselves, referred themselves as or each other but what was

5 actually taking place in theatre.

6 Q. Yeah. I understand that, but I guess what I'm -- the point that

7 I'm trying to make is here you are in country, here you're trying to find

8 out who the interlocutors are, and you're trying to figure out, you know,

9 how you can possibly help in this rather chaotic situation, and you have

10 ambassadors in the ECMM referring to someone who is a member of the

11 Presidency, a mere member, and incidentally the Presidency worked --

12 Izetbegovic was the first among equals, that's all he was, but he's being

13 referred to as the vice-president. In other words, giving him more power,

14 at least the perception of power, due to him.

15 Do you find that somewhat -- do you think possibly that -- that

16 that might be a cause of concern? How is it that these people, that ECMM

17 is there, ambassadors, not just you, but others much higher than you, don't

18 even know the political structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet they're

19 jumping to conclusions?

20 A. I can understand why the misuse of terminology might aggrieve

21 some or cause confusion. For us, it was a question of reporting what was

22 happening rather than any label attached to any particular person.

23 Q. All right. And -- now, you had an opportunity to be in the

24 presence of Mr. Ganic, did you not?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And I suspect if ambassadors are referring to -- ambassadors from

2 ECMM are referring to him as -- in their documents, that is, as vice-

3 president in person, would they have referred to him as well as Mr. Vice-

4 president? Do you recall that?

5 A. I recall us only referring to him as Mr. Ganic.

6 Q. Okay. Did he ever represent himself to be vice-president?

7 A. I can't recall.

8 Q. And of course had he represented himself to be the vice-president

9 and had ECMM relied on that, that, of course, would be rather troubling

10 because in a sense he would be perpetrating a fraud; right?

11 A. I suggest we will be talking to him because we felt he could

12 deliver.

13 Q. That wasn't my question now, was it? Let me ask you -- tell you

14 again. If, in fact, Mr. Ganic was representing himself and leading

15 everyone else on to believe that he was indeed the vice-president, the

16 number two in the government, when in fact he was merely a member of the

17 Presidency, that representation would be a fraud. He would be committing a

18 fraud on the ECMM. It would be --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. It would be a misrepresentation; right? And in one instance, and

21 there's a document that I wanted to go through with you, it's very clear

22 that he says at a meeting that he -- he's there to represent the Muslims as

23 the representative of the Muslims. Is that how understood his position to

24 be, as to be a member of the Presidency of the vice-president or the deputy

25 or whatever you want to call him but there primarily for the Muslims?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You know, whereas there was one instance I think when Mr. Boras

3 was there, and he would be looked upon as someone for the Croats; correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And yesterday, there was a question, I believe it was by Ms.

6 Alaburic, where she had -- she had asked you about Mr. Izetbegovic and you

7 had, in fact, indicated that he was the representative of the Muslim people

8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.

9 A. It had become that way, yes.

10 Q. Yes. All right. And so it would -- it -- if you, as ECMM, would

11 view that, and quite naturally so, would it not also be -- be equal --

12 equally true and equally apparent, perhaps, to others such as the Croats in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina that Alija Izetbegovic was there first and foremost as a

14 Muslim representative or the representative of the Muslim people?

15 A. I can't really suggest how the Croatian Defence Council might

16 have seen him.

17 Q. Well, I'm talking about the average Croat. Here you as an ECMM

18 see him as the representative of the Muslim -- of the Muslims, okay? And

19 that's fine, because I think that's how he projected himself. Would not --

20 would that not also equally apply to others than yourself like -- such as

21 the Croats, the Croat counterparts?

22 A. The Croat counterparts were quite specific who they wished to

23 deal with and who they did not.

24 Q. I didn't ask who they wanted to deal with. I -- we're going to

25 go step-by-step on this one. Okay?

1 A. Sorry. Could you repeat the question then.

2 Q. The question is as follows: ECMM, and you being one of them, saw

3 Mr. Izetbegovic as being the Muslim representative, just as Mate Boban

4 being the representative for the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Radovan

5 Karadzic for the Serbs; correct?

6 A. Not quite as straightforward as that because Mr. Izetbegovic

7 would have liked it to be understood that he acted for a group of people

8 living in a particular part of Bosnia and that included, in my experience,

9 people likeMr. Boris, Colonel Siber, from a number of nations, so it wasn't

10 quite as simple as that.

11 Q. No, but of course what you're talk -- and I understand what he

12 would have liked to have wished to legitimise his position in the sense,

13 but needless to say even under those conditions he's wearing two hats, is

14 he not?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. And you would -- would you not expect at any negotiations

17 that Izetbegovic would be at, he would be first and foremost looking after

18 his people? I mean, he's not going to give away things that are going to

19 be hurtful to his people; right?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Okay. Now, do you know whether -- I want to -- before we go on,

22 just since we're on this topic and you mentioned what Mr. Izetbegovic would

23 have wished, and I'm going to refer to a document, 1D 00814, and I'm going

24 to -- this is from a book that has been used in this courtroom before, it's

25 a compilation of a variety of documents including a speech by Lord Owen. I

1 don't know if we have it on screen. It's a short passage I wish to read.

2 It's on page 214 of this particular book, a speech by Lord Owen. This is

3 at a ministerial level meeting of the steering committee of the

4 international conference on the former Yugoslavia, 16 December 1992. And

5 the passage I wish to read is on the third paragraph starting from the top

6 of the page it says - of page 2, page 2 of the document, I have to

7 apologise, we have these fancy new systems. Okay.

8 If we look at the third paragraph, it says: "One of our concerns

9 is that Bosnia and Herzegovina -- is that the Bosnian and Herzegovian

10 Government is sadly increasingly becoming representative only of the Muslim

11 population."

12 Now, this is Lord Owen, 16 December, 1992, prior to your arrival.

13 Now, if Mr. Owen, who was involved in these negotiations, has

14 this perception from his dealings with Mr. Izetbegovic and from all his

15 contacts and all his involvement which you would agree was at least at the

16 negotiating level much higher than yours, it would seem, would it not, that

17 Izetbegovic was indeed looking after the interests of his people more or

18 less much -- at least much more than those of the others and was not really

19 a representative of the government of BiH but of the Muslim people?

20 A. I can understand that, though I'm not really qualified to comment

21 on it.

22 Q. Okay. Then you could understand, could you not, and I mention

23 this only because you make a reference, and the Prosecution has brought

24 this up, I believe, but that there is a reference to this meeting at Citluk

25 that took place, there was a statement that was issued, where -- where the

1 Croats, the Croatian Community, Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina through their

2 -- their representatives, had indicated that they no longer viewed

3 Izetbegovic as the head of the state but, rather, as the head of the

4 Muslims; correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. And if we look at Mr. Owen's viewpoint in December, 1996,

7 in this -- this Citluk -- the minutes from the meeting, and by -- and we

8 can look at it very briefly. I'm trying to go through -- this one is on

9 May 5, 1993. So it wasn't until about six months late that's right Croats

10 finally came out and say that they don't view Mr. Izetbegovic -- and they

11 view actually his Presidency as illegal.

12 If we could look at document 1D 00817. And this would be on the

13 fourth page under paragraph eight. I'll just read it while it's being

14 pulled up on the screen to save time.

15 "Presentation and legitimacy of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic taking

16 position of the president of BiH Presidency is illegal. Croat people

17 consider Mr. Izetbegovic only as the official representative of the Muslims

18 in BiH. In the same way, BiH army may be legitimate only as the armed

19 forces of Muslim people."

20 In light of what we know from Mr. Owen's observations and in

21 light of what you've already told us based on your experience or what you

22 understood it would be that Mr. Izetbegovic was, in fact, the leader of the

23 Muslim people, one could understand that back in May, in light of all the

24 activities that were going on that the Croats would view Izetbegovic in

25 those terms, especially in dealing with him at the negotiating table;

1 correct?

2 A. They could express that view, yes.

3 Q. Okay. And that view would be understandable, would it not?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. Now, you indicated in -- I believe in your testimony that

6 you were not a student of the -- of HDZ or HVO -- of the HVO structure, and

7 I -- I take it you stand by that.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And by that I take it that what you mean is when you -- just as

10 you did not -- and were not provided with the structure at the government

11 level, at the state level, the same could be said at the local level in the

12 sense that you did not look at any particular legislation or any particular

13 material that might be available that would allow you to understand how the

14 HVO was structured; correct?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. And of course Mr. Lane, having been there before you, new some

17 thingsobviously he had -- he had been briefed, but suffice it to say, at

18 least when I read some of your statements, it would appear that your

19 understanding was during this period Mr. Prlic was the Prime Minister;

20 correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Would it surprise you if I were to tell you that in fact he was

23 not the Prime Minister?

24 A. Again, a label is a label. The situation was not quite as simple

25 as that, but I'll take your point.

1 Q. Okay. All right. Well, did you -- did you understand how this

2 community -- let me -- let me -- I'll ask it in a more open-ended fashion.

3 How did you understand this community to function, that is, it included

4 various municipalities, and how did the -- how were the municipalities

5 structured, and what was their relationship with Mr. Boban and perhaps Mr.

6 Prlic and anyone else within the system? What was your understanding of

7 it?

8 A. As was perhaps described yesterday, as representatives of a

9 national group.

10 Q. Okay. But were you aware that there was a Presidency and Mate

11 Boban was the president of a Presidency as opposed to just being the

12 president? Did you know that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. And if I were to ask you who were the members of the

15 Presidency, could you tell us?

16 A. Not officially, no.

17 Q. Okay. Would it surprise you to learn that primarily were -- the

18 presidents of the municipalities?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Okay. Do you know what the presidents of the municipalities,

21 what sorts of powers they had at the local level, both over civilian life

22 as well as over the military, if any?

23 A. We looked at it more in terms of influence.

24 Q. I understand that, but --

25 A. That's the ability to get things on or not.

1 Q. Okay. Well, we're going to get there, but you're going to ask

2 that -- if you could answer my question.

3 A. I have not seen a document that lays out their responsibilities.

4 Q. Okay. Did you ever ask for a document and not receive one?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Did you ever ask for an explanation and not receive one?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Would it be fair to say while you were working along with Lane

9 and others, the fact of the matter was that other than your understanding

10 of where you could look to for influence, for all intents and purposes, you

11 were -- you lacked an appreciation of -- at least at the local level of how

12 it operated and who was in charge?

13 A. I think our communications were very effective, and if the people

14 we had connections with felt that we were ill-advised or could have done it

15 better, they had the opportunity to advise us.

16 Q. All right. Now, that's the second time. I don't want to get --

17 I don't want to have to get into this too much because particularly Judge

18 Trechsel doesn't like it, but if you could just answer my question. The

19 answer is that you did not have an appreciation of the political leadership

20 at the municipal level, and it would be fair to also say that you did not

21 have an appreciation of what, if any, influence they may have had over the

22 military at the local level?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. But you do make a reference at least at one point in time, I can

25 find it, and it refers to General Petkovic, where in a sense he, at one

1 time, is issuing a particular order over the phone and the local leader

2 simply refuses; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. And refuses because he felt he could.

5 A. Perhaps.

6 Q. Well -- and in fact, General Petkovic tried and tried and

7 eventually succeeded, but in fact there was a clear indication, at least at

8 that level, the clear example where at least some folks at the local level

9 had control over both civilian and military matters; correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, one would think, one would think that at least -- oh, sorry.

12 Sorry, sorry. I'm trying my best. I think I'm doing fairly well today.

13 Now, one would think, one would think that at least after that

14 sort of incident an effort would be made to figure out how this structure

15 all works, but none was made; correct?

16 A. No, it's not as simple as that. Again, it comes back to some

17 fairly critical situations that needed some attention and resolution.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Our obligation was to do our best to reach satisfactory

20 conditions to develop any kind of dialogue.

21 Q. All right. I'm going to back up a little bit. We talked a

22 little bit about your orientation. Now I want to talk about, at least from

23 the military structure. Were you by any chance, being a military man, of

24 course, you might have been interested, but were you by any chance given

25 any instructions on the military doctrine that existed prior to the break-

1 up of the former Yugoslavia?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. So I take it you had not heard of what was known as the

4 All Peoples Defence?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Were you -- were you explained at all about how the Territorial

7 Defences operated within the All Peoples Defence?

8 A. Only from, yes, a national Yugoslav approach to its own defence

9 in preceding years.

10 Q. Okay. And -- well, could you explain -- do you recall what it

11 was or would you like me to refresh your memory? Either way.

12 A. It would be helpful for you to refresh my memory.

13 Q. Okay. Good. Or not good. I'll do so. Would it be, as I

14 understand it and we've heard it in court and we'll hear it again, you had

15 the JNA, but also at the very local level you had what is known as

16 Territorial Defences where, in the event Yugoslavia would be attacked from

17 the outside, at the local level there was a stockpile of weapons, there was

18 -- everybody was mobilised. There had been training, a 50-year

19 indoctrination. This was taught in schools. So at the very local level,

20 they would be able to organise themselves both politically and militarily,

21 and from there you would have this Territorial Defence working in

22 conjunction with the professional army, the JNA, to ward off any foreign

23 aggressors. And this was both men and women, ages 16 to 60. Were you

24 aware of that?

25 A. Yes, but you've said it much better than I could have done.

1 Q. Okay. All right. Now, so -- would it surprise you to learn that

2 this was done both at the republic level, that is various republics, but

3 also then even way down to the grassroots level so that when the war broke

4 out, when the civil war broke out, the communities were able at least to

5 organise themselves based on -- they were already self-organised, but some

6 may even have a stockpile of weapons from which to develop a Territorial

7 Defence to defend themselves? Were you aware of that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. I mentioned that because I -- you make one reference. You

10 muse to the fact that you could not understand why at times you had -- you

11 and the ECMM had a hard time finding out how the armija was structured and

12 who was at the top and who was going to -- who -- how it was structured and

13 what have you, and you muse that perhaps it was because they had to form

14 themselves overnight. Do you recall that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. And I can quote you if you wish, but basically that's what

17 you say.

18 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Karnavas.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm listening to the translation, but now I

21 would like only to say there is a question of detail, but you mentioned

22 that in the Yugoslav Peoples Army, all men and women from ages 16 to 60,

23 they were trained and to be ready for a kind of war or other situations. I

24 wonder if you took it from some sources which are really, I would say,

25 contained in these figures of 16 and 60, because I'm not aware of that.

1 Probably some of even the accused might -- might instruct you if you were

2 correct on those numbers.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.

4 JUDGE PRANDLER: Especially if we speak about also the women and

5 men and the younger, I would say, children or boys of the age of 16. So I

6 wonder if this -- I would say, this kind of statement could be either

7 confirmed or denied.

8 And I'm also taking the floor in order to give some respite for

9 you and Mr. Beese because it was a long diatribe that we have heard. So

10 thank you, Mr. Karnavas.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. Well, let me make sure that I'm clear.

12 I'm talking about the Territorial Defence, the TO. Secondly, the All

13 Peoples Defence was something that was taught at school. The age at the

14 time, the military age, in case of an emergency was 16 to 60, and during

15 the course of the proceedings we will be presenting evidence to establish

16 that. Of course, I'm glad you brought it up. Make a note of it and make

17 sure that I do establish that, and that's very important I'm glad you

18 mention it because -- and as we see in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina

19 during the war, that is a critical date or critical figure, 16 to 60,

20 because every man, at least, is viewed as a military combatant or capable

21 military combatant, and so that's -- that's the importance of that. But

22 thank you.

23 Q. Now, we were talking, I believe, about a -- you make a reference

24 that there were -- there was a -- you and others in the ECMM had a

25 difficult time trying to figure out who was in charge or where did the

1 powers lie with the armija, and you muse, and I quote: "Perhaps it was a

2 consequence of having formed a citizens army at such a short notice." I

3 mean, that was your understanding of it; right?

4 A. One of the possibilities, yes.

5 Q. One of the possibilities. And of course not knowing that there

6 was already -- well, maybe you knew and maybe you didn't give it much

7 thought, that the Territorial Defence actually at the very local level

8 presented itself as an opportunity for each community to self-organise;

9 correct?

10 A. Yes. Though some were evidently much more effective than others.

11 Q. All right. And that would have been the same with the Croats as

12 well?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. Now, do you know when the armija was formed?

15 A. No.

16 Q. We talked a little bit about the HDZ. We just barely mentioned

17 it, but the SDA that was the political party for the Muslims, was it not,

18 or the predominant political party for the Muslims; right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And were you aware whether at any point in time they had a

21 military wing?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Well, would it surprise you to learn that in fact at the very

24 outset they did? In fact, they formed what was known as the Patriotic

25 League and none other than Halilovic was one of the architects and

1 masterminds behind it as he takes credit in his own book? Were you aware

2 of that?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And I take it if you weren't aware of it, perhaps Mr. Lane wasn't

5 aware of it either since he didn't brief you on it. He might not have been

6 aware of it.

7 A. Possibly not.

8 Q. Okay. In that particular region that you were serving in your

9 area of responsibility, there was some sort of military -- military

10 industry at some point in time, was there not?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And do you know where exactly it was located?

13 A. In the Heliodrom south of Mostar, principally.

14 Q. Okay. Well, that was for the -- I believe it was for the -- if

15 my memory serves me correctly, for helicopters or what have you, but what

16 about in the Travnik area, that area up there?

17 A. There were munitions factories, I believe, across Bosnia-

18 Herzegovina.

19 Q. And was there any munitions factory around there?

20 A. There were a number.

21 Q. And did you as a military man ever try to find out what exactly

22 at least in your neck of the woods, your area of spot, what exactly, if

23 any, munitions were being manufactured, which might, of course, be a bone

24 of contention or -- or a prize to capture by one side or the other?

25 A. Different -- different communities, that is different towns had

1 factories that produced component parts. Therefore, it would have been of

2 interest to have more than one to assemble a particular weapon or munition,

3 perhaps, but I don't have specific details, no.

4 Q. Okay. And I take it you never visited these -- any of these

5 factories?

6 A. No.

7 Q. All right. Now, if we could -- I want to talk a little bit about

8 the assessment, the assessment process, before we move on a little bit, and

9 I'm going to recap, because this was mentioned a while -- when you first

10 testified, and some of us may have forgotten it. As I understand it, there

11 was the ECMM headquarters in Zagreb; correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And then there was a regional centre, or there were regional

14 centres, one being in Zenica; correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And then, of course, there were coordinating centres, one of them

17 being in Grude or --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. It was called the Grude, but actually you folks were situated in

20 Siroki Brijeg; right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What is the distance between Siroki Brijeg and Grude, if you

23 recall?

24 A. About 45 minutes drive. I can't --

25 Q. Okay. And would it be fair to say during that period of time the

1 road was rather clear? You could travel that road, Siroki Brijeg to Grude?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All right. And when you -- when you got there in country, as I

4 understand it, Grude is where Mate Boban was located.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. All right. Incidentally, when you first got into the country, in

7 theatre, I mean, my experience, having worked in these sort of

8 international missions, is that one of the first things you do is make up

9 some printing cards, calling cards, and then you arrange to go and see all

10 the local officials to let them know, you know, that you arrived, you know,

11 become acquainted and so on and so forth. Did Mr. Lane do that with you?

12 In other words, take you on the rounds in somewhat of a structured way, so

13 at least from the very beginning you would know who's who?

14 A. I was introduced to number of civic leaders in communities across

15 Southern Herzegovina, which was principally my area to begin with.

16 Q. Okay. Was this in some sort of a structured area, structured

17 format so you say, Okay, today we're going to meet the leaders of the HVO.

18 Tomorrow we're going to meet the leaders of the, you know, the Muslim

19 leaders or -- how was this done?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. And I take it you, in fact, did meet Mate Boban?

22 A. I did not.

23 Q. You did not. Well, you did -- you did participate at least in a

24 meeting in which he was -- he was present, and that would have been, I

25 believe, if my memory serves me correct, May 8th, 1993; correct?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. And that was the very first time that you met Mate Boban?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And from reading your testimony and other documents, it would

5 appear, it would appear that it was at that particular moment, upon seeing

6 the dynamics at that meeting, that you realised that Mate Boban was the

7 most important person or the most powerful person within the Croatian

8 Community; is that correct?

9 A. No.

10 Q. All right. So -- in other words, you knew that prior to -- prior

11 to that meeting?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay. And would it be fair to say, then, that if you had a

14 particular problem that you wanted resolved, that's the person that you

15 would go to? Maybe not first, but ultimately -- or perhaps even first if

16 it was urgent; right?

17 A. I would generally have approached Mate Boban through the regional

18 centre and not directly.

19 Q. Okay. In other words, you would have somebody much higher than

20 you approach him?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. But that wasn't the case with Mr. Prlic?

23 A. Mr. Prlic was happy to see us on many occasions. If he felt it

24 was inappropriate he would offer us an alternative.

25 Q. Okay. Are you suggesting that Mate Boban was not happy to see

1 you?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. But since you did mention Mr. Prlic and happiness at

4 seeing you, one would say, at least from I read, was that here was a

5 gentleman that was -- his door was always open to the ECMM?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In other words, he was accessible; right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And whether you believed him or didn't believe him, he always

10 indicated his willingness to assist?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And I don't want to get ahead of myself, but this point was

13 touched upon yesterday with the abduction of the Serbs. I believe the date

14 was February 6, 1993. There was a round made to the various individuals,

15 including Mr. Prlic and Mr. Boban, and as far as I understand, it was -- it

16 was mentioned by you that you thought that any -- that the representation

17 that they had made that they would conduct an investigation were hollow

18 words. Do you recall saying something to that effect?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. And it turns out that after what we saw yesterday from the

21 -- from the lawyer, from counsel for Mr. Coric and then Mr. Coric as well

22 at some point, it would appear that perhaps you had jumped the gun on that

23 one, at least, that they were not hollow words, that efforts were made to

24 investigate. Perhaps not to your satisfaction and of course not to your

25 knowledge, but would it be fair to say that at least on that instance,

1 efforts were made?

2 A. It was done. I can't say how much effort was involved.

3 Q. Well, as a military man having been in theatre where there's

4 action, you do appreciate the fact that it's -- they're working under

5 abnormal circumstances, were they not?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And by your own admission, you had indicated that on both sides,

8 on both sides there were elements that -- I don't want to use extreme

9 because that's a different issue, but there were elements that simply were

10 uncontrollable; correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And when you're dealing with those sorts of uncontrollable

13 elements, one has to be rather careful for their own safety, their own

14 life; right?

15 A. My understanding was that the people we're talking of in the

16 government of the HVO had the control and influence to be able to resolve

17 these issues.

18 Q. Okay. Well, that was your understanding. We saw efforts being

19 made, and we saw the ultimate report. Obviously it took longer than you or

20 anybody else would have wished, but you cannot sit here with any degree of

21 certainty and say that under those circumstances, one did not have to at

22 least tread lightly on certain matters irrespective of nationality or

23 ethnicity involved, because there were a lot of dangerous people, dangerous

24 and crazy people running around?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. Now, before we get -- I just want to go back now to what

2 we were talking about. We -- the structure. As I understood you, the

3 regional centre would assess and analyse whatever information they received

4 from the coordinating centres; correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And the coordinating centres would prepare a daily report based

7 on what they had learned from the teams; right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And it would be then the regional centres that would type up a

10 report and then send it to the headquarters; right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And then from the headquarters the ECMM --

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, please slow down.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. I thought I was going very slow.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're going too fast.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. I apologise to the interpreters.

17 Q. Okay. And -- and so it would be the -- the regional centres

18 would prepare these reports, send them to the headquarters -- to the

19 headquarter, and from the headquarter another report would be compiled, and

20 that would be to the ambassadors of the ECMM countries, including Mr. Vance

21 and Mr. Owen in Geneva.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now -- and so we could safely say that at least the end product

24 that was ultimately reached by -- or obtained from ECMM started at the very

25 grassroot level, from the team approach; correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. All right. So when Mr. Owen would look at something or Mr. Vance

3 would look at something from the ECMM, it would be based on what was seen,

4 observed, heard, analysed, and then compiled at the team level first, and

5 it would move up the chain; correct?

6 A. I'm sorry, I'm being slow to answer only to assist the Court.

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Now, here's what I'm interested in: I mean, you've talked

10 about assessment and analysis, but you didn't really tell us how was this

11 information assessed and analysed. Who were these people? What were their

12 training? What was the protocol? I've been thinking about this, reading

13 it, thinking, you know. And I guess here is a series of questions for

14 which -- for you to ponder on and perhaps give us a lengthy explanation:

15 Was there a set-up methodology, you know, a protocol? What sort of

16 criteria was used? Was there any quality control, any double-checking?

17 Was there any -- when the final assessment and analysis was performed, was

18 it done on a consensual basis? Was there a consensus reached, or was it by

19 one individual making that assessment, final assessment and analysis based

20 on the information that he had received, keeping in mind, at least from

21 what I understand from you, that that person would have been sitting

22 somewhere in an office typing a report from data as opposed to sensing,

23 feeling, seeing, hearing, or any empirical efforts? And my -- and finally,

24 what about dissenting opinions? Were any dissenting opinions ever put in

25 what happened to them if there were dissenting opinions so could you please

1 tell us from your understanding, and I mention that because - and I think

2 you're qualified to testify because you worked in the team at a

3 coordinating centre and at a regional centre.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So could you please tell us?

6 A. Starting at the grassroot level, each team or a team would

7 normally have two monitors. The two monitors would discuss what they had

8 seen and heard during the day and report that to the head of the

9 coordination centre. That in itself is not normally a complicated process.

10 The head of the coordinating centre would use a standard format

11 for reporting issued by the ECMM covering a number of headers such as any

12 economic issues, social issues, military issues, with space at the bottom

13 for a summary. The head of coordinating center, in my experience,

14 discussed his analysis with other senior monitors before submitting it.

15 In the regional centre, in my experience, the reports coming in

16 from the field would come in any time between 6.00 in the evening and 10.00

17 in the evening, and the process during the busy periods of putting those

18 together would continue until about midnight when there was discussion

19 between usually two to three senior members of the mission on the analysis.

20 In my case whilst in the regional centre, it would have been two

21 of three people who discussed the report before its submission. The head

22 of the regional centre, in my experience, Ambassador Jean-Pierre Thebault,

23 myself as deputy head of regional centre, and Mr. Remi Landry as chief

24 operations officer for the regional centre.

25 Q. Okay. Well, that being said, it would appear that -- at least I

1 can conclude that consensus was tried to be -- was reached before the final

2 report went from the regional centre to the headquarters; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And that would have been based on a discussion of data that was

5 provided to those analysts, if you will, who had not seen or heard anything

6 but were merely reading a report.

7 A. If there was any doubt there would be discussion, if possible,

8 with the coordination centre submitting its reports.

9 Q. Now, when you say if there was any doubt, does that mean that

10 they would call you up?

11 A. We could call them.

12 Q. You would call them. Well, how would you -- well, how would you

13 know that there was doubt? How would you know when to call?

14 A. For much of the period, the events that occurred were so

15 significant that the focus given them was total, and if -- if there was

16 conflict in one particular area, it would not have been a surprise to hear

17 there was conflict necessarily. The difficulty was understanding why it

18 was taking place then, there, and what that might mean.

19 Q. Okay. Now --

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please stop. It's time for the

21 break. It's a quarter to 4.00. We'll resume at five past 4.00.

22 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 4.06 p.m.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

25 MR. MURPHY: Mr. President, before we recommence would it be

1 convenient to indicate to us generally how much more time remains for

2 cross-examination for the Defence.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thanks to the registrar's hard

4 work, whom I would like to thank, I'd like to tell you that you've used 4

5 hours and 23 minutes and we said yet that you would be having 8 hours. So

6 theoretically you have 3 hours, 40 minutes left.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, we might need some more time, Your Honour.

8 Not much, but hopefully that's not a fixed period. Keep in mind that we're

9 having to go in and out of open court and what have you, so ... thank you.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic.

11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I might just be

12 allowed to add two words to what counsel said. You did tell us 8 hours

13 yesterday, that's quite true, but before that there was mention of two and

14 a half days. So when we divided up the time among the Defence teams, we

15 counted on having 10 hours. So that's where the problem arises. According

16 to the Prosecutor's schedule, it seems that it was -- they planned to begin

17 with a new witness tomorrow after half time, after the first half of the

18 day. So I'd like to join in what my colleagues said. If we could be

19 allowed two more hours tomorrow morning, because we're the last, Praljak

20 and myself, and we have quite a lot of questions to ask. Thank you.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. As far as I'm

22 concerned, I don't see any difficulty with that if the cross-examination is

23 using the time properly, but I'd like to mention that Mr. Karnavas asked

24 the witness questions about the -- how reporting was done and so on and so

25 forth. Now, that's an interesting topic generally, but one question and

1 one answer would suffice, but you spent quite a number of minutes

2 belabouring the point. So that's where you use your time. Although it is

3 all useful, we must justify the use of time. So on the question of whether

4 you're going to be able to use tomorrow, that will depend on the

5 Prosecution.

6 Mr. Mundis, you were on your feet because the witness envisaged

7 for tomorrow, can you tell us about that?

8 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity.

9 Very briefly, the fact of the matter is if the Prosecution indicates that

10 there are two witnesses on for a given day, as would be the case perhaps

11 with respect to tomorrow's schedule, that does not necessarily mean that

12 it's split in half, 50/50, in terms of the two witnesses that are scheduled

13 to appear.

14 We would also re-emphasise, from the Prosecution perspective, the

15 point Your Honour, the Presiding Judge, just made with respect to the

16 relevance. We have take and he decision not to object to a number of

17 irrelevant or what we would object to as irrelevant questions for the

18 simple reason that the Defence, as professionals, know the amount of time

19 they have, and we don't also want to be in a position of the Defence

20 saying, Well, if it weren't for the objections of the Prosecution, we would

21 have finished and we don't want to eat up a lot of time in terms of

22 objections. They know how much time they have. They know the relevant of

23 the questions in the line of questioning they want to put to the witness,

24 and it's up to the Defence to organise their work accordingly.

25 Similarly, if one of the Defence teams thinks that they need more

1 time, they can certainly address that with the cross-examining party in

2 terms of organising their work.

3 So our position would be, as Your Honour indicated, the

4 Prosecution used about five and a half hours with this witness on direct,

5 eight hours is certainly more than the Prosecution used, and to expand that

6 to 10 hours is not the best use of the Trial Chamber's time given the fact

7 that some of these questions are not necessarily relevant to the issues at

8 hand.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. But as far as your

10 witness is concerned, the one that you're going to call tomorrow, how much

11 time will you need for the examination-in-chief of tomorrow's witness?

12 MR. KOVACIC: If I may assist my colleague. In the chart, they

13 indicated 2.5 hours.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Two and a half hours. So since

15 it's a witness who was a victim, the Defence will have two and a half hours

16 as well, which means five hours for that next witness, which means that we

17 must begin the examination of that witness tomorrow, and that in turn means

18 that we have another hour and a half until the next break. After the break

19 we're going to have another one hour, roughly, so that leaves two and a

20 half hours. Then tomorrow almost three hours for the Defence. So roughly

21 speaking, the Defence will have another three hours tomorrow, plus two and

22 a half hours today, which makes it roughly five hours or, rather, between

23 five and five and a half hours.

24 So I think that you will be able to finish off within that time,

25 so that after the second break tomorrow we can start off with the next

1 witness.

2 Having said that, please continue, Counsel Karnavas, but I would

3 like to emphasise once again, try and get to the essential points. We are

4 professional Judges. We understand your line of questioning. We, too,

5 have many questions to ask the witness, but we are letting you ask yours,

6 and usually the Judges have half an hour of questions.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. I will endeavour to be

8 better. I'm going to go out of sequence at this point because you raised

9 the point that perhaps I took too much time in talking about the reporting

10 process, one that we believe is important because of all the documents that

11 the Prosecution wishes to introduce as if that they are true, accurate, and

12 complete because they have the seal of approval of the ECMM, an

13 organisation which the Prosecution believes should be trusted completely,

14 utterly, and faithfully.

15 Q. Sir, you were -- at some point you became aware of what is known

16 as the ultimatum of January 15th; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, you told us yesterday, and we're going to go into this more

19 in depth, but you told us yesterday that you, in fact, never saw this

20 ultimatum.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. And so -- but nonetheless, you understood that there was

23 an ultimatum and accordingly acted on it.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. All right. Now, here's where I have to lay some background

1 before I get to the documents. As I understand it, when you testified and

2 what I say in other written form, on January 15th, just by chance, you are

3 visiting the -- the head of the armija in Mostar, Mr. Pasalic; correct?

4 A. I was seeing the brigade commander, which was not Mr. Pasalic.

5 Q. Okay. The brigade commander. And it was at -- and you were with

6 Mr. Lane. This is on the 15th.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And at some point -- and that -- it was at that point in time

9 when they had indicated that there was some sort of an ultimatum.

10 A. Must be clear here. I wasn't with Mr. Lane on the first day when

11 he went. I went the second day.

12 Q. So Mr. Lane went on his own?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And do you know whether it was afternoon or morning?

15 A. I can't recall.

16 Q. But nonetheless as I understand it, that particular evening there

17 was a meeting at the regional centre and he went up to Split.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But when he went up to Split, he went up there armed with

20 information that was given to him by the Muslim commander with respect to

21 some sort of an ultimatum; correct?

22 A. I can't recall the details.

23 Q. Right. But as I understand your testimony, Mr. Lane spoke to you

24 about this when he came back from the meeting and -- and in fact, told you

25 words to the fact that -- not to expect too much cooperation or expect too

1 much from the Muslim army at this point in time because they seemed

2 somewhat agitated.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. Now, the following day, as I understand it, you were

5 summoned or called to meet with these individuals, to meet with the armija,

6 the Muslim commander; correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You had only been in country for about eight days, and it was at

9 that meeting that you saw Mr. Arif Pasalic, and I believe he was in an

10 alcoholic haze of some sort, and it was at that point that his deputy read

11 out a six-page document; correct?

12 A. Not Mr. Pasalic.

13 Q. Not Mr. Pasalic, his aide?

14 A. No, Mr. Pasalic was not present. I was meeting with a brigade

15 commander. He did appear to be worse for wear.

16 Q. Who?

17 A. The brigade commander.

18 Q. And it was at that point that you were briefed about this so-

19 called ultimatum and subsequently to the briefing, you contacted Mr. Lane;

20 correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And you were summoned by Mr. Lane to come to Split to give some

23 sort of a briefing to them?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, you were in Mostar at the time, correct, when you got this

1 briefing?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Which side of the river were you?

4 A. West bank.

5 Q. Okay. And that's where the headquarters of the army of BiH were

6 located?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. Where was Mr. Prlic's office at that point in time?

9 A. On the west bank.

10 Q. Okay. How far would you say by car driving or even by walking,

11 how long, how far of a distance was it?

12 A. Ten minutes or less.

13 Q. Okay. Now, upon hearing this information, recognising that it's

14 rather alarming in a sense, so alarming that you contact Mr. Lane in -- in

15 Split, you did not, in fact, make any efforts, you or the individual that

16 was with you, to go and speak with Mr. Prlic or somebody else, anybody, to

17 perhaps see whether indeed this ultimatum was true, accurate, and complete,

18 you know, what was the nature of it, at least to have some information from

19 the other side; right? No efforts were made.

20 A. Effort at that time would not have necessarily been the answer.

21 Q. That's not the question that I'm posing. We're going to talk

22 about that.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. You made no effort; right?

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. Now I'm going to have to go a little faster.

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Okay. So -- and to get ahead of myself based on what you just

4 indicated to me, it seems that you were jumping the gun. You believed what

5 you heard and, therefore, there was no need to talk to any Croat. Hell,

6 Croats were going to lie to you. You might as well just believe what you

7 heard and just go straight up to Split; right? I mean, that's what it

8 appears.

9 A. Absolutely not.

10 Q. Okay. Then please explain to you and explain to the Judges here

11 why you didn't take -- make any efforts whatsoever, by your own admission,

12 to at least hear the other side of the story to find out whether this

13 ultimatum was true, what was the content of it, and so on and so forth.

14 Please explain that to us?

15 A. I had not, at that stage, met Mr. Prlic. I was not fully briefed

16 on the chain of command that I should apply to. We had barely met the

17 armija people in Mostar. It was appropriate for me to pass it back to

18 people who had more experience, more understanding, and could address it at

19 the correct level.

20 Q. Okay. But if this was, in fact, such an emergency, okay, one

21 would think that you would want to get all your facts correctly, not just

22 you but ECMM. Did you by any chance ask Lane who might be the Croat

23 counterpart, an interlocutory -- an interlocutor that you could meet and at

24 least get some sort of a briefing with?

25 A. By regarding it to Ray Lane, he report it had to the ambassador,

1 and between them they had the choice as to what to do about it, and they

2 ultimately decided, determined, to go to Mostar to speak with Mr. Prlic.

3 Q. Okay. And when they got to -- when they got to Mostar was what

4 date?

5 A. Days later.

6 Q. A few days later. So obviously the ultimatum was not so imminent

7 that it required ECMM to act immediately. Because if you're waiting two or

8 three days and it's an imagine, it's not really an imagine, is it?

9 A. It was an important issue, not an emergency, but the deadline for

10 the ultimatum was the 20th.

11 Q. But needless to say, before heading up to -- when you went up to

12 Split, the purpose for you being summoned, because that wasn't by your own

13 decision, but the purpose was for you to give a briefing on what you had

14 heard; right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And it would appear, at least from my point of view -- I'm trying

17 to slow down but I'm pressed for time. There's no way I can cover

18 everything.

19 It appears to me that the higher-ups don't care what the other

20 side has to say. They don't want to have the facts. They just want to

21 hear from the one side. Might that be the case?

22 A. Absolutely not.

23 Q. Okay. And you of course never suggested well, maybe we should at

24 least look at this ultimatum and see what it might say; right? You never

25 asked that?

1 A. I can't recall quite what my thought processes were then, I'm

2 afraid.

3 Q. Okay. Now, you draw a conclusion at some point that when the

4 ambassador finally comes down and has a meeting with Mr. Prlic, you're not

5 present but you're told by Mr. Lane that harsh words were spoken and in a

6 sense, Mr. Prlic was instructed in no uncertain terms not to act on the --

7 on the ultimatum; correct?

8 A. As I understand it, yes.

9 Q. Yes. You weren't present but that's what you were told.

10 Hearsay, we call that here in this courtroom; right? You weren't there;

11 right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. All right. Now, I mean, you might believe Lane but we have no

14 reason to. But that's what you were told?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And that's what you recount?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you muse at some point, you speculate that perhaps the -- Mr.

19 Prlic or others, Mate Boban, whoever, acted and did not go forward with the

20 implementation of this -- of this so-called ultimatum based on the

21 intervention of ECMM. And I can reference -- I can --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You draw that conclusion; correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. You, on -- now, it would be fair to say, would it not, and

1 I'm not being critical so don't take this in any negative fashion, but

2 obviously given where you were at in the totem pole, which is way down at

3 the bottom, you were not privy to any papers or negotiations or discussions

4 that were being held at a higher level.

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Okay. And I take it you didn't see any exchanges of documents

7 between the parties?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. All right. Now, first, since we're on this topic, and let's look

10 at a document, and it's P 01215. This is a document that was generated by

11 the ECMM signed by Mr. Beaussou, dated January 19, 1993, subject:

12 Relations between Croat and Muslims visit to Mostar.

13 Have you seen this document, sir? Is it on our screen? Have you

14 seen this document, sir, before?

15 A. I can't see all of it, but -- but --

16 Q. Well, if you look at the first page just to see if you recognise

17 it as a document?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: Can everybody see it, because I can't see it on my

20 screen? Do you have an extra copy here? This is part of the problem with

21 -- here we go. We have an extra copy for the ELMO. If I could have the

22 kind assistance.

23 Q. All right. Now, if we could look at the first page, it says the

24 persons that were there, Mr. Jadranko Prlic -- okay. We have it on the

25 screen. I don't know which one we want to look at. I have my own.

1 All right. It says who attended, Mr. Prlic, Mr. Pasalic,

2 Petkovic. And if we look at the second page of this document, okay --

3 well, first -- I apologise. Let's stick with the first page, because

4 obviously I want you to look at it a little bit. Clearly we're talking

5 about this particular incident, this particular period of time; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. And if we look into -- and if we look at the -- at the

8 second page, it says here on paragraph B, I guess, it would be 3 (B):

9 "After some misunderstandings in an exchange of letters, copies attached

10 between government of Herceg-Bosna, Mr. Prlic, and the Presidency of BiH,

11 it is requested by Mr. Prlic to organise a meeting between Mr. Izetbegovic

12 and Mr. Boban as soon as possible in Split. Such a meeting seems inasmuch

13 necessary that there is really room for many clarifications, particularly

14 in the period of uncertainty created by the new Geneva prospects."

15 Do you see that?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. Now, if we go through this document and if you look at it,

18 you won't see anything in this document about any harsh words being spoken

19 to Mr. Prlic such as, Be careful because ECMM will do such-and-such.

20 Nothing of the sort, but, rather, it seems that was a meeting, views were

21 exchanged, there was a misunderstanding which we'll get to with the

22 letters, and -- and the parties now are trying to clarify. Isn't that a

23 fact?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, were you aware of this document back then?

1 A. No, I don't believe so.

2 Q. Okay. That might be helpful, would it not?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. All right. And I guess I'm asking you -- I was asked to

5 put -- to point out that Mr. Petkovic, chief of -- if we look at the

6 persons on the first page under 1, it says, "Mr. Petkovic, Chief of Staff,

7 HVO, who stepped into our meeting, Mr. Pasalic, without formal notice."

8 We can deal with this at some other point. Needless to say, what

9 we have an account by none other than Mr. Beaussou as to what happened;

10 correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, before I talk about -- perhaps it might be a good idea now

13 to look at the documents where he talks about the exchanging of

14 information. If we could look at P 01267.

15 Okay. Now, have you seen this document by any chance? This is a

16 document -- it's a letter to Mr. Prlic from Mr. Izetbegovic.

17 A. I have not seen it, no.

18 Q. Okay. And just to make sure that we're talking about the right

19 period, it says here: "The problems that have recently arisen among the

20 members of BH army and HVO are not small, but they are not unsolvable as

21 well." And it goes on --

22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, does this document have a date? We

23 do not see it and you have not mentioned it.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: Precisely. I'm going refer to another document

25 that would at least clue us into the date of this letter.

1 If we could look at document 1D 00818. And all I can tell you,

2 Your Honour, is at the very top it says "ECMM Danish delegation." This is

3 what I have at the time.

4 But if we could look at this other document, this is 1D 00818,

5 this is an agenda from minutes of a meeting that took place, and if we look

6 at the agenda, it says "Analysis of Mr. Izetbegovic's letter. Item 1: On

7 17 January, 1993, the president of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

8 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, sent an invitation to Jadranko Prlic wherein he

9 proposed talks in Sarajevo related to all contentious questions. The

10 invitation came after an agreement reached by telephone that Izetbegovic's

11 delegation should come to Mostar as soon as possible." From

12 the top, we can see that this was generated on the 18th of January, 1993.

13 I don't want to go in to this -- through the entire document, because the

14 Court and the Judges can read it at some point and we're going to be

15 introducing it, but were you aware that -- were you aware that this was

16 happening?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Okay. And on page 2, we see after the analysis of Mr.

19 Izetbegovic's invitation, the HVO HDZ decided unanimously to send the

20 following response. That's on page 2 of this document. Following the

21 telephone conversation of 16 January, 1995. So it would appear that on 16

22 January, prior to any intervention from ECMM, there is a conversation

23 between Mr. Prlic and Mr. Izetbegovic. "We were in expectation of the

24 announced arrival of your delegation to Mostar." Obviously Mr. Izetbegovic

25 made some promises. "Having in mind the existence of a new situation in

1 some municipalities of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (Gornji

2 Vakuf, Jablanica, Mostar and others) and your proposal to change the venue

3 for the meeting - under the existing circumstances, unfortunately we cannot

4 but interpret it as another of your numerous inconsistencies and

5 undetermined political moves." And it goes on.

6 Do you see that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And in fact, had you been in theatre and had you spoken to the

9 who's who in the Croatian Community, you would have heard, as undoubtedly

10 you did, that one of the complaints that they had with Mr. Izetbegovic was

11 that he often changed his mind, and he was rather inconsistent in keeping

12 promises; correct?

13 A. He could have been.

14 Q. All right. Well, you allude to that fact in one of the documents

15 that parties would sign up to agreements that never really intended to

16 comply with; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And that would go for the Muslims as well, would it not?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And that would go not just for military agreements or agreements

21 for cease-fire but also for peace agreements as well, would it not?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And as I understand it, when you made that comment, it was in

24 reference to negotiations that were ongoing with respect to solving the

25 difference -- the differences between the Muslims and the Croats at a very

1 high level, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan; correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. Now, from here, assuming that the minutes were correct,

4 these minutes from 18 January, and of course they were prepared well in

5 advance of -- of these proceedings, it would appear that almost immediately

6 there was some sort of communication to try to resolve this

7 misunderstanding that the occurred whereby the Croats had begun to initiate

8 what they believed was an agreement that had been reached at very high

9 levels with the assistance of the International Community; correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. Now, I want to move to another document that might help us

12 out and here is perhaps this might -- finally we'll get to the area that

13 Mr. President was mildly commenting on that perhaps I dwelled too much on,

14 the fact of the reporting process, but this goes to why we must look at the

15 documents in rather a very careful fashion and not just accept them.

16 If I could make -- if I could refer you to a document, P 01303.

17 I trust it's already in the system.

18 And if we look at this, if we look at this document, it's dated -

19 - it's dated 25 January, 1993. Do you see that, sir? And is this sort of

20 a document that you might recognise?

21 A. Yes, it is.

22 Q. Okay. If we flip to the second page, we will see that it says,

23 "Regards Beaussou," and this is a document -- well, why don't you tell us

24 from where to where is this statement going?

25 A. Could we go back to the top, please?

1 Q. Okay. If we could go to the first page, please, it says, "From

2 HRC Split" that would be the regional centre Split; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. To headquarters Zagreb; right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, if we look at the second page at the very top, number 4, he

7 says, "I went to this meeting to Mostar, especially to have a private

8 interview with Mr. Prlic, president of the government in the HVO, in order

9 to express our deep concern. He said he understood the problem and shared

10 our concern. As a matter of act," probably fact, "order was given on

11 Saturday to Colonel Siljeg to stop immediately any attack and obey the

12 orders."

13 Do you see that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. And -- now, based on this, if we look at the next

16 document, P 01319, first if we look at the first page, perhaps we can dwell

17 on it a little bit just at the very top to see what is it. It says "ECMM

18 operations section," and then you see a list of distribution. And towards

19 the middle of the page, it says "Daily monitoring activity, 25 January

20 1993." Who prepared this report, sir?

21 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm trying to save time, Your Honours. I

22 apologise, but I feel like I'm drowning, given the time limitations.

23 Q. Can we look at this? Now, you see the distribution; right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. And it would appear that it's going to the capitals or

1 it's going to the foreign ministries of those who are participating in this

2 ECMM process.

3 A. Not the document I'm looking at, no.

4 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Is this P 1309? P 01309. If we could put

5 this on the ELMO to save time. We could take off whatever is on there.

6 So if we could look at that. And do you recognise this sort of a

7 document?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Could you please explain to the Trial Chamber what is --

10 what is this document? Where does it come from? How is it generated?

11 A. I can't see at the moment where it's from.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please stop. This document is

13 under seal. We have to move into private session.

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5 [Open session]

6 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session, Your

7 Honour.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 Q. If we could look at 1D 00819. And while this is being looked --

10 we're getting it up, this is an HVO staff and BH army staff document. It's

11 an order dated 20 January 1993. If we look at the last page, it has Mr.

12 Petkovic -- General Petkovic's signature or name to it with a -- which is

13 signed and stamped along with Arif Pasalic's. And it would seem that if we

14 could look at this, is this not, sir -- have you seen this by any chance?

15 A. I can't recall, I'm afraid, without seeing more.

16 Q. If we could look at the rest of -- I don't know how to work this

17 thing. I could give you a private copy if you want to flip through. It

18 might help while we still have this on. We don't need this on the ELMO.

19 If you just -- if we could look at the rest of the document slowly. But

20 this is an order, is it not? At least it purports to be.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. And it's dated on the 20th of January, 1993?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. And it appears that an order has already been issued with

25 respect to the situation, sir, that's ongoing in Gornji Vakuf; correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. All right. So if we look at this now in conjunction with the

3 previous two documents, it's quite clear that the last -- the last document

4 that we looked at, the one that came from Zagreb and that was distributed

5 outwards is rather misleading, because here we have an order for the 20th

6 of January, and if you look at the first document that we looked at for Mr.

7 Beaussou, clearly it would appear now that his English is rather good,

8 because he says, "Order was given on Saturday." He's looking backwards.

9 So an order was given. But nowhere in the first document does he say that

10 Prlic gave the order. Here is an order signed by Petkovic and Pasalic;

11 correct?

12 A. Presumably General Petkovic would have received instructions from

13 higher.

14 Q. Okay. Now, having said that, you had indicated to us before that

15 you had not looked at and was not familiar with and was not a student of

16 the HVO; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you know who was the Supreme Commander for -- for the Croat --

19 for the HVO? The Supreme Commander.

20 A. Not with use of that terminology, no.

21 Q. Okay. Would it surprise you if I were to tell you that there's

22 actually legislation in place at that time, while you were there, that

23 would give you that precise answer, and if fact, there was legislation that

24 delineates rather quite clearly where the powers lie, who is responsible

25 for what? Would that surprise you?

1 A. I would be surprised, if we relied on those structures, that

2 there would have been loss of life that there later was. So I can't rely

3 upon a structure described.

4 Q. Okay. All right. I know you can't rely on it, but I guess what

5 I'm trying to do is get you to admit that you were in total ignorance of it

6 and the ignorance derives from your lack of interest or appreciation or

7 need to understand what the actual political structure was, because it

8 would seem to me, and correct me if I'm wrong, if I need to solve a

9 problem, I need to know exactly who to go to, and that structure might give

10 me the opportunity to know exactly who I need to address. Would you --

11 would that --

12 A. On the 15th of February, at the very time we were talking peace

13 with seep your officials in Mostar, Jablanica was shelled, Ahmici was

14 attacked, and so forth. It's quite difficult in those circumstances to

15 understand who is who, who is really in charge, and actually what the

16 agenda is.

17 Q. Okay. If I could look at -- I want show you another couple of

18 documents. If I can show you now, relative to these events because since

19 you're here I think it might be interesting to look at, and we -- we would

20 need to look at both the Croatian and -- do we have the Croatian one as

21 well? 1D 00820 is a document. It's an unofficial translation. I do have

22 the original or a copy of the original -- a copy of the original that I

23 could put on the ELMO to show so we have it at least on the record. And

24 keeping in mind that you and I can't read that, but I want to show the

25 condition that we have it in, which would account for why we say that there

1 is an illegible text to it. Yeah. And incidentally, just to -- I'm

2 reminded with the excitement of it all, Ahmici, there was nothing in Ahmici

3 in -- as you recall -- as you describing it in February but, rather, it was

4 much later, in April 19 -- April 16, 1993. But in any event --

5 A. I apologise for the inaccuracy, but the relevancy still stands.

6 Q. We're going to get to that. We're going to get to that. And I

7 would agree with you the situation was a tinder box especially around

8 January 15th, being correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And so keeping in mind keeping in mind it is a tinder box and the

11 situation is explosive. One would understand for instance if a

12 communication is relayed from Geneva that there is, in fact, an agreement

13 that you would want to at least prevent the situation from getting out of

14 control because Gornji Vakuf had already started prior to the 15th or the

15 13th, there was some clashes and what have you, you would expect, would you

16 not, for there to be some -- some initiative to be taken such as, perhaps,

17 the ultimatum that was -- that we call it whereby, in some areas, ABiH

18 troops are asked to subordinate themselves to the HVO and vice versa in

19 other areas. In other words, HVO to subordinate themselves to armija.

20 That's a solution that in order to deal with that explosive tinder box

21 situation; correct?

22 A. Well, given that you would understand my concern hearing that

23 there was an ultimatum that might give rise to conflict and that therefore

24 I should treat it very seriously.

25 Q. I understand.

1 A. Which I did.

2 Q. Yes. And of course at that time, you were operating without the

3 understanding and knowledge and appreciation that at least at a much higher

4 negotiating level, there was a belief and understanding that an agreement

5 had been reached between the Croats and the Muslims.

6 A. But perhaps it wasn't happening on the ground.

7 Q. I understand that. What I'm trying to get at is this: Everybody

8 is operating with a little bit of information, not all of it; right?

9 A. That's why we pass the information up.

10 Q. All right. Mr. Beese, let me go back. I'll eat up some of my

11 time on this one. You jumped the gun. You think it's necessary, you and

12 Lane, you go up to Split and then Mr. Beaussou gets involved. What I'm

13 suggesting also is that ultimatum that we call it was based on a belief

14 that an agreement had been reached by the two sides that Izetbegovic had

15 indeed agreed and for at least a change would stick by his word and that

16 there was an initiative taken by the HVO because the Gornji Vakuf issue had

17 started two or three days earlier and it appeared that it was going to get

18 out of control.

19 MR. MUNDIS: Objection, Mr. President. This question is

20 compound. There are a number of assertions in there.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: For instance, I would like to hear what the

22 assertion is. Which assertion?

23 MR. MUNDIS: "You jumped the gun." "You think it's necessary."

24 "You and Lane you go up" -- there's a number of components in here.

25 "Izetbegovic had indeed agreed and at least for a change would stick by his

1 word."

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, I have to confess

3 that I find it difficult to follow you, to follow your line of questioning.

4 What do you want to establish? Could you ask a more synthetic question

5 that would shed some light for the Judges on an element that you deem

6 important. That has to be your objective, because if we are confused, if

7 we are lost, then all your efforts are in vain. So could you please try to

8 be more synthetic.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. President. I apologise for

10 being rather convoluted. Let me go step-by-step.

11 Q. Mr. Beese, the situation in Gornji Vakuf had begun, or conflicts

12 had begun as early as January 16th; is that not a fact?

13 A. Thereabouts, yes.

14 Q. Okay. Could it be even earlier?

15 A. I can't recall.

16 Q. Okay. All right. So there was an ongoing crisis or an ongoing

17 situation that was potentially going to become out of control by January

18 15th; is that correct?

19 A. I suggest it began earlier in Prozor.

20 Q. Well, I know what you suggest, but nonetheless, at this period of

21 time it was -- the situation could have gotten out of control; right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. All right. Now, let's suppose that one is of the understanding

24 that an agreement has indeed been reached and Izetbegovic has indeed agreed

25 to or what was being proposed in Geneva. Would it not be reasonable to act

1 immediately on that in light of what you already told us of the situation,

2 in order to prevent further precipitation of a conflict or to contain the

3 conflict?

4 A. Yes, but one side giving instructions to the army of another is

5 not likely to be taken well unless there is sound preparation for it.

6 Q. Well, whether it's going to be taken well or not, that's a

7 different issue. The first issue is one might want to act immediately;

8 correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. And when you say it's not going to be taken lightly, I

11 take it the same could be said about the Croats that had to subordinate

12 themselves to the Muslim army. They weren't going to like it either;

13 right?

14 A. It's not a question of liking it. It's a question of whether the

15 planning and preparation makes it possible for a peaceful or cooperative

16 endeavour.

17 Q. Right. But would you expect that if the Muslims felt that way,

18 the Croats who also had to subordinate themselves to the Muslims would

19 equally feel that way as well; right?

20 A. To a degree, yes.

21 Q. Okay. So -- all right. So -- now if we could go back to this

22 document. It's signed by Mr. Boban. At least that's what it appears at

23 the bottom in the original. And this is dated January 20th. It says: "In

24 reference to your decision," and it makes reference to a decision, "and

25 after the discussion with the co-chairmen of the Geneva conference of

1 Bosnia Herzegovina, Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, I am ordering you to convene a

2 special meeting of the HVO HDZ -- HZ HB," I'm sorry, "during the day and

3 change item 5 in a way to set a deadline for implementation of the

4 decision," so on and so forth, we can't read it.

5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. I'm sorry to go back a little step

6 because I simply do not understand. You said -- or you asked the witness

7 to say what Muslims would feel --

8 MR. KARNAVAS: How, yeah.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: -- that had to subordinate themselves, that

10 Croats that had to subordinate themselves to the Muslims.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.

12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That's line -- now, that was a hypothetical or

13 what facts do you exactly refer to?

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, we have to look at the so-called ultimatum,

15 which the gentleman never looked at. If you look at the ultimatum, Your

16 Honour, you'll see that it's not a one-way street in implementing this --

17 what -- what was believed to have been reached as an agreement was that in

18 some areas, those would be controlled, for instance, by the Croats, in

19 order to have some kind of an organised military operation going because

20 you had still the Serbs that you had to worry about, the Muslim army would

21 subordinate itself to the -- to the Croatian. Vice versa in areas which

22 were under control of the Muslims, and you had HVO operating, the hope

23 officer -- the HVO would have to subordinate itself. We will get to that

24 document at some point. But since the gentleman hasn't looked at it, never

25 looked at it, never saw it, I'm trying to save time.

1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

2 MR. KARNAVAS:

3 Q. Now -- now, if we could go to the next document, because it might

4 help us, it might help us, it might help us to understand what -- what --

5 the missing text. The missing text -- if we could look at 1D 00821. And

6 in this decision -- this is dated January 20, 1993. So it appears, as was

7 instructed, as was ordered, a special session was convened and a decision

8 was taken.

9 We can look at the preamble which makes reference to what we

10 see above, and then it says the decision: "To change item 5 of the

11 decision number 01-1-32/93 dated 15 January 1993, setting up a deadline for

12 the implementation of that decision."

13 And then it goes on to say in number 2 that: "Instead of the

14 earlier deadline for subordination of units of army BiH, the command of the

15 HVO General Staff in provinces 3, 8 and 10; and subordinating the HVO units

16 to the army of BiH Command in provinces 1, 5 and 9" - Judge Trechsel, the

17 answer to your question, "which was in five days, a new deadline is

18 defined, and that is the end of the continued Geneva talks."

19 Do you see that, sir?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, were you aware of this at the time?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Okay. And so one might conclude that at least when looking at

24 all of these other documents, that your account is not quite as accurate

25 when you say or when you speculate that in fact it was Mr. Beaussou's

1 conversation or stern talking to Mr. Prlic as was -- as was related to but

2 Mr. Lane that precipitated the events in calming the ultimatum and not

3 going forward but rather there were letters of exchanges between

4 Izetbegovic and Mr. Prlic, there was a decision, there were instructions by

5 Mr. Boban based on his conversation with Lord Owen and Mr. Vance, and as a

6 consequence that's how it was really resolved. Would it not appear so,

7 sir?

8 A. I think my comments state that --

9 Q. No. Would it not appear so, sir? Just answer my question. You

10 can answer whatever question you want to answer.

11 A. The field of discussion and the documents made available to me

12 are not known to me. They represent a degree of discussion which we would

13 applaud now and then, but one's concern at the time was whether it was

14 going to be successful or not.

15 Q. I understand, sir, but right now, you're testifying in this

16 court, and you're trying to put my client in prison for the rest of his

17 life with your testimony. So that's why, right now, what I'm showing is

18 the rest of the story.

19 A. I can only comment on what I've said.

20 Q. Okay. But it would appear that at the time that you wrote your -

21 - that you -- you observed these events and later on wrote about them, you

22 do not have -- you didn't have the benefit of all this information nor was

23 it provided to you, was it?

24 A. I didn't have an enormous amount of information. I wasn't

25 commenting on the information I didn't have.

1 Q. Sir, the information that I'm giving -- showing you today shows a

2 rather different picture than the one you have concluded.

3 A. I don't agree.

4 Q. Okay. Very well. Now, I'm going -- I've used already about two

5 hours and 15 minutes. I'm going to speed up so I'm going to jump around a

6 little bit, but needless to say, at one point in time, you relay an

7 incident where you're asked by the government in Sarajevo, you and Mr.

8 Andersen, I believe, to go to Geneva to give a briefing; correct?

9 A. I was asked to go so that, if questioned, I could give my view on

10 facts as to whether they were correct or incorrect to the best of my

11 knowledge.

12 Q. All right. And you were invited to go there by Mr. Ganic, I take

13 it?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And if we look at the documents, Mr. Ganic is referred to by Mr.

16 Andersen as the vice-president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So you go up there,

17 and at some point you have and opportunity to meet with Lord Owen; correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, Lord Owen is a rather, you know, seasoned politician;

20 correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. He's held numerous positions, and during this period of time was

23 heavily engaged in and I might say use this term "hands on" in the

24 negotiating process; correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. All right. He certainly was at the top of the food chain and was

2 privy to information, conversations, briefings that you were not; correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You, on the other hand, knew what you knew from the field?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. And when you met Mr. Owen along with Mr. Andersen and it

7 was Mr. Andersen who was the lead -- taking the lead in this instance was

8 he was, after all, an ambassador; is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. At the ambassadorial level?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. He basically got what we would normally call the bum's rush, the

13 cold shoulder?

14 A. I prefer the cold shoulder.

15 Q. Okay. MR. KARNAVAS: If we could go into private session

16 for one second, Mr. President. I guess it's private.

17 [Private session]

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1 (redacted)

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6 [Open session]

7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We're back in open session, Mr.

8 President.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have five minutes to the

10 break.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

12 Q. Now, we were talking about differences of opinion, and we said

13 that you -- you had a fixed opinion that the Croats were the aggressors.

14 You also tell us at some point that you met a individual named Martin,

15 Martin the monitor, who turned out to be none other than -- who was and I'm

16 sure you recognised him at the time as Sir Martin Garrod; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, I take it, since he's a sir, it must mean something, that

19 he's pretty important.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was he at the time a major or a colonel or a general?

22 A. A general.

23 Q. A rather seasoned general at that; right?

24 A. A retired seasoned general.

25 Q. Been around, seen a lot, and you would agree with me that he's a

1 rather respectable individual, is he not?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. If we could look at document 1D 00815. Now, Sir Martin -- while

4 we're looking that up, Sir Martin Garrod came in at some latter point while

5 you were in your mission and stayed on afterwards?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. And from reading -- as I understand it, when you met him

8 he was rather interested in listening to whatever you had to say and was

9 pumping you for information.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. Because, after all, he was the new boy on the block, as it

12 were, and you were the old hand, and he wanted the benefit of your

13 understanding of the events; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And you were more than pleased to offer him, after all a general,

16 a retired general, and of course you were there for that particular reason;

17 correct?

18 A. I'm sorry, I was there for which reason?

19 Q. Well, you were there to monitor and pass on information.

20 A. Yes, but not necessarily to please a general because he was a

21 general.

22 Q. No, no, not to please a general. But you were more than pleased

23 to offer your insight.

24 A. It was important to do it. Pleasing doesn't come into it.

25 Q. Okay. All right. If we could look at -- it's page number 3 on

1 this particular document, or it's numbered 3, and if we look at paragraph

2 20. I'll start reading to save some time. It says, "Throughout the last

3 six months it has been evident that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina were

4 desperate for peace though not at any price. They continually stressed

5 that it was they who first signed up to the Vance-Owen Plan and to the

6 Stoltenberg Owen proposals at Geneva. They were consistently critical of

7 the west for 'not understanding them' and for branding them as aggressors,

8 while calling the Muslims, whom they looked upon as the aggressors, the

9 victims. Their morale was not high throughout this period, as they saw the

10 areas controlled by the Croats, particularly in Central Bosnia, gradually

11 diminishing as a result of success by the BiH army."

12 Now, here he seems to indicate that the Croats are desperate for

13 peace. This, incidentally, this document, is generated -- if we look at

14 the very first page. it says "18 April 1994". So it seems that he was

15 there longer than you, and he seems, at least in this little passage, to

16 have derived somewhat of a different opinion, that they were desperate for

17 peace.

18 A. I don't agree.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. He made those comments quite possibly because HVO resources were

21 stretched to the limit, exhausted, and they were indeed desperate for

22 peace.

23 Q. All right. Well, you indicate at one point that it was a land

24 grab both -- on all sides. They were trying to grab land. You make that

25 reference, do you not?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. Because it was quite obvious, as I understand it and as

3 you understood it at the time, that land was not going to be appropriated

4 at the negotiating table, but all parties had to more or less negotiate

5 based on what they had at the time; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So it would behoove not just the Croats but also the Muslims to

8 have as much land as possible, because if in the eventuality, as the way

9 the negotiations were proceeding, you would have a federation, you would

10 have regions; the more land, the bigger the regions within the greater

11 context of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Correct?

12 A. Whilst we might understand why they wished to do that, it doesn't

13 mean to say we condone it.

14 Q. I didn't ask you whether you condoned it. I'm asking you whether

15 that was in fact the case, because that would at least explain not just the

16 what the Croats were doing but also what the Muslims were also doing.

17 A. I'm sorry. I just wish to be clear with my answer.

18 Q. All right. So what is the answer to my question? Were not the

19 Muslims also seeking to have as much land as possible prior to -- or during

20 the negotiating sessions so that at least if there was a confederation, as

21 was being negotiated, they would control as much land as possible? Is that

22 not a fact?

23 A. Quite possibly, though I can't confirm that.

24 Q. Okay. Now, when you got into -- when you got to -- to Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina back in 1993, January 8, by that point an incident had occurred

1 much earlier in a place called Jajce; correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Jajce. Jajce. Now, ECMM was not there at the time.

4 A. ECMM observed the withdrawal from it but were not present in the

5 town.

6 Q. Okay. And you were told of those events, were you not?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. And what you were told was, at least -- both sides blamed

9 each other; correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And the Croats especially were rather upset because they felt

12 that their allies, the ones that they had helped and protected,

13 particularly in the Mostar area but in other areas as well, had let them

14 down, had abandoned that area, and as a result what you had was a

15 humanitarian crisis of about 30.000 refugees; correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And about 20.000 of those refugees ended up in areas -- in the

18 surrounding areas; right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And of course the question was what to do with all of these --

21 what to do with all of these refugees.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, for the -- for the Muslims, for Izetbegovic at least, is it

24 not a fair assumption to say that this incident of Jajce and not, say,

25 Gornji Vakuf in January 15, 1995, as the Prosecutor would have us believe,

1 is perhaps a key event in the conflict between the Muslims and the Croats?

2 A. It could be. I can't confirm that.

3 Q. Okay. Well, let's look at it this way: Alija Izetbegovic has a

4 humanitarian crisis in the sense of what to do with about 20.000 Muslims,

5 his people, in this area; right? That's one way of looking at it.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Another way of looking at it is it also presents a serendipitous

8 opportunity to fill in the ranks of the ABiH and also to have a rather

9 mobile force of Muslim fighters because among those 20.000 you had -- you

10 had also men of military age; correct?

11 A. Could be.

12 Q. All right. And of course if you are a Croat and a minority in

13 that area, you might feel somewhat uncomfortable at having all of these

14 refugees, especially military-aged fighters in this area; correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. All right. And of course we talked a little bit earlier -

17 MR. KARNAVAS: If I could have just a couple of minutes, Your Honour, just

18 to round off this line of questioning.

19 Q. This is why I went into the Territorial Defence, you see. The

20 Territorial Defence is -- at the local territory you would have a unit

21 available for defensive or offensive purposes, but now Alija Izetbegovic's

22 provided with the opportunity to have a mobile unit of Muslim fighters that

23 could go beyond and into areas for offensive purposes. And so if we look

24 at the greater context of it, is it not, sir, possible that the situation

25 in Jajce was a lot more significant and more important than perhaps the

1 ECMM understood it to be because of the humanitarian crisis, because they

2 provided the Muslims with a mobile army plus they increased whatever army

3 that they had, plus because of the land grab, keeping in mind when we come

4 back from the break I'm going to have a few questions on the negotiations

5 that had been ongoing which demonstrate that the regionalisation process

6 was already not just mere -- a mere thought but it was something that was

7 being negotiated.

8 So is it a fact, sir, is it possible that perhaps you and your

9 -- and others in ECMM simply did not understand the significance of Jajce?

10 A. It was an event that had happened. One was to see what the

11 outcome would be. It was not for me to foretell it at that time.

12 Q. Did you, sir, make any efforts to really understand -- one

13 question. One question. Did you make any efforts, sir, you or ECMM, or

14 did you get any briefing papers --

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Counsel Karnavas, you just

16 asked a question numbering several lines. He answered, but if you would

17 like to, you can take it up again after the break. We have to stop.

18 It's to twenty to 6.00, and we will reconvene at 6.00.

19 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.

20 --- On resuming at 6.00 p.m.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

22 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, if I may be heard just for one moment.

23 Mr. Karnavas has indicated that he proposes to continue his cross-

24 examination after the break that we've just had, and I understand that he

25 has many questions to put in his client's interests. I just feel, Your

1 Honour, that I should go on the record at this time as pointing out that

2 this witness testified about our client, Mr. Stojic, and it is necessary

3 for us also to cross-examine him at some length, and I thought that we had

4 made this clear to other counsel. But for the record, Ms. Nozica and I

5 have divided the labour of cross-examination between us. Because of cross-

6 examination by other counsel, what I have to do has been reduced probably

7 by about three-quarters, so I can be very brief. But our best estimate is

8 that we are going to require two hours of cross-examination approximately,

9 and I know that that, therefore, has consequences for Mr. Kovacic, and he

10 may also wish to go on the record at this time.

11 Thank you, Mr. President.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Kovacic, how

13 much time will you need?

14 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, after the questions

15 put by other Defence counsel to avoid repetition, I feel that we will need

16 up to two hours. I see no way of reducing this further in view of the

17 number of documents used with this witness, and especially bearing in mine

18 (redacted)

19 document, taking up four or five hours of testimony. This is basically the

20 written statement of the witness, and by tendering the document, the

21 Prosecutor has saved himself four or five hours of examination time.

22 However, it requires cross-examination.

23 If I may add, Your Honours, and it's quite reasonable for Your

24 Honours to be concerned about this, the Prosecutor has envisaged two and a

25 half hours for the next witness, which means that if the Prosecutor starts

1 at the end of the day tomorrow or doesn't start tomorrow, he will have the

2 whole day for that witness on the following day, Thursday. This witness is

3 a brief witness, and he has been scheduled to take two and a half hours.

4 So we ask Your Honours to grant us the two hours we need for this

5 witness, because we cannot cross-examine on this volume of documents in

6 less. Thank you, Your Honours.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may be heard. I need -- over the break while

8 others were relaxes I looked at my notes. I need five minutes to wrap it

9 up. I can understand Mr. Murphy's discontent, but I represent a client,

10 too, as he does, and so -- and I'm sure there are going to be times when

11 he's going to need more time and I'm just going to have to bite the bullet.

12 But be that as it may, just five minutes, Your Honour, that's all I need.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you will need

14 five minutes. The registrar told me earlier on that we've used up seven

15 hours and 44 minutes. So the Defence has used up seven hours and 44

16 minutes. This will go beyond the 10-hour mark. If I understand correctly,

17 you need five more minutes.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. That means that the

20 following counsel will have 45 minutes. So we can still make it. So

21 please round off your cross-examination quickly.

22 MR. KARNAVAS:

23 Q. Mr. Beese, if we could talk a little bit about the Vance-Owen

24 Peace Plan and your efforts on the ground, just very briefly.

25 When you came in theatre, you had no prior experience in

1 government; correct? In running a government.

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Okay. And part of your job over there, you were not responsible

4 for the -- for the safety of anyone in a sense, the local people? Well,

5 you were not there to protect them; right? You were there to monitor.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You were not responsible to make sure that they had running water

8 or electricity or that pensions were paid or taxes were collected to pay

9 for everyday life; correct?

10 A. I was there to report if they didn't have --

11 Q. I didn't ask you whether you were there to report it. Please

12 just answer the question. You weren't there -- when you were there, you

13 were not responsible to make sure that the electricity was running, the

14 water was running, the garbage was picked up, that normal life could go on?

15 A. Right.

16 Q. Others were; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, you indicated and you indicate that Mr. Prlic had a

19 different view than you did, right, on how to go about implementation?

20 Right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. All right. It was your understanding, as it was the

23 understanding of the ECMM, that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was going

24 forward, and in fact you indicated that you had been given instructions by

25 the ECMM to assist in the implementation; correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But other than being told go ahead, you weren't given a

3 blueprint; you weren't given any information, detailed information, on how

4 to go about implementing this peace plan; right?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Now, in your conversation with Mr. Prlic, he had indicated what

7 he thought was necessary; correct? At least how to proceed; right?

8 A. To a degree.

9 Q. To a degree. All right. And in fact, one of the things that he

10 asked you to do is to try to find the opposite interlocutor so he could

11 begin this process with perhaps you participating in it; correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And of course we've talked about - you've indicated on the record

14 - that finding the right, appropriate Muslim interlocutor was always a

15 problem because one -- correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, Mr. Prlic never presented to you a fait accompli; in other

18 words, a take-it-or-leave-it package, this is it, it's intractable, this is

19 what has to be implemented. But, rather, his approach was, "This is how I

20 think we should proceed. Bring me this interlocutor and let's talk."

21 Correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay. And I take it you would expect him, representing his

24 interest, he would try to present a package at least as a starting point

25 that would be as favourable as possible to the Croats, and you would expect

1 the Muslims to do the same; correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All right. So that's the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. We've covered

4 that briefly.

5 Just one last issue. I know it's going to be covered in great

6 detail, but since you mentioned my client with respect to this, I need to

7 ask you a question or two. The issue of the Mujahedin.

8 As I understand it from reading what has been -- what you have

9 written, you indicate that when you went to Zenica, you became aware of the

10 so-called Mujahedin.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And in fact nobody wanted to take credit of who they were under;

13 right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. But it was very clear that they were part of the ABiH.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And in fact, you indicate that you were rather cautious and

18 didn't want to go into too much -- you didn't want to explore too much as

19 to who they were, what they were doing, because of your own safety; right?

20 A. That was a consideration.

21 Q. Yes. And in fact, you discussed that. And at some point, as I

22 indicate -- as I understand it, you were afraid that you would be kidnapped

23 by these people, not by Croats but kidnapped by these Mujahedin types;

24 right?

25 A. It was a consideration, yes.

1 Q. Okay. But you were there to monitor, were you not?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And monitoring would require, would it not, for you to actually,

4 not just you but others, to actually go in and explore and to find out

5 whether in fact, you know, they were foreign fighters, Arab extremists

6 perhaps, Mujahedin, whatever you want to call them, and to report

7 accurately and completely as you were required to do; right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. But in this instance at least, for safety reasons, because after

10 all the Muslims were afraid of these foreign fighters, these Mujahedin, you

11 didn't make as many -- you didn't make the required efforts, perhaps, that

12 would have been necessary. So at least today you could say yes, there were

13 Mujahedin; this was the number; this is where they came from, and so on and

14 so forth. Correct?

15 A. Not quite. We had very few resources. We had very many leads to

16 follow up. It was only actually physically possible in 24 hours to follow

17 up a certain number of leads.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. There were people in the mission who did look closely at what

20 they did.

21 Q. All right. But nonetheless, in what you've written and in what

22 you've stated, you seem to downgrade and almost denigrate if not outright

23 dismiss what you had been hearing from the Croats, including Mr. Prlic,

24 that there were Mujahedin extremists out there and that they had been

25 committing crimes; correct? I mean, one gets that impression.

1 A. Not entirely. That they may have committed some crimes. All

2 parties may have committed some crimes at a certain level. That's quite

3 different from the shelling of communities and outright infantry attack.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. That was our priority.

6 Q. I'm sure Mr. Praljak is going to inform you about all of that.

7 Just finally one last question. If we could go into private

8 session, Your Honour, just for one second. I know it takes a second to get

9 in there.

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9 [Open session]

10 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are back in open session.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Oh, wait a moment. There's

12 another question from the Bench.

13 JUDGE PRANDLER: I apologise to Mr. Murphy, not allowing him to

14 speak, but I would like to share with you my preoccupation about the time

15 that's used now. We all recall that there was a decision by the Trial

16 Chamber, which was of course also accepted and confirmed by the Appeals

17 Chamber, about the time to be used by the Prosecution and also by the

18 distinguished team of Defence, and I would like to recall that this issue

19 was many times raised.

20 I am afraid, and I have to speak about it quite clearly but

21 emphatically, that now we are going to lose too much time if we are going -

22 - if that approach will be continued. I suggested to the President, the

23 Presiding Judge Antonetti, and he graciously agreed, that we have to look

24 into the ratio of the time used by the Prosecution and the Defence, and we

25 have to come back to this question soon, because we would like to go ahead

1 with a certain amount of diligence. At the same time, of course, give the

2 possibility to the Defence time to do its work, but at the same time we

3 have to be in conformity with the rules which we have established.

4 So this being said, I would like, of course, I would like to

5 thank you for listening to me and I would like to ask the Defence to

6 cooperate. Thank you.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.

8 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, Your Honours, if I could just for one

9 -- for one very brief moment. I've raised this issue with at least one of

10 the Defence teams. There could very well be a number of issues

11 particularly relating to the Mujahedin that the Prosecution would be

12 prepared to stipulate and agree to. Some of these issues that the Defence

13 are planning on cross-examining are not at issue necessarily in this case

14 in our position and are clearly going to be things that we would be

15 prepared to agree to, and I would perhaps rather than spending several

16 hours tomorrow on the Mujahedin again invite the Defence teams to put in

17 writing specific issues that they would propose, and Mr. Scott and I, with

18 our team, will sit down and see whether these are really issues that are

19 live issues in this case.

20 Clearly as this Trial Chamber is well aware, this institution has

21 indicted crimes committed by the Mujahedin, allegedly committed by the

22 Mujahedin. We're not disputing that there were crimes committed by the

23 Mujahedin. But what we need to see are some specific and concrete

24 proposals by the Defence as to things that they believe are relevant and we

25 are prepared to sit down and look at those issues to see if there's

1 agreement. We do not believe that several hours of cross-examination of

2 this witness or any other witness on the issue of crimes committed by the

3 Mujahedin are in the best interests of anyone involved in this case and

4 simply will result in prolonging this case. Many of these issues I don't

5 believe are going to actually be in dispute.

6 I would invite the Defence teams to seriously sit down with us

7 and propose things in writing in advance so that we can review them, and

8 this should be a way of eliminating a huge amount of time concerning the

9 issue of the Mujahedin.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Trial Chamber

11 hopes that the Defence counsel have heard Mr. Mundis's proposal. We invite

12 you to meet, because it's -- it would be a waste of time for you to ask --

13 to ask questions during cross-examination, whereas the Prosecution fully

14 agrees with your position.

15 You have about three-quarters of an hour left, Mr. Murphy.

16 Please proceed.

17 MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Your Honour. May I just check that we

18 are in public session? Okay.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, we are.

20 Cross-examination by Mr. Murphy:

21 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Beese.

22 A. Good afternoon.

23 Q. I just have a relatively few questions for you on behalf of Mr.

24 Bruno Stojic. I'm going to try to go slowly as I appreciate you have also

25 to enable the interpreters to catch up with us.

1 You gave evidence that you had a number of meetings with Mr.

2 Stojic.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And the purpose of these meetings was to facilitate your being

5 able to get to certain locations.

6 A. Yes, mostly.

7 Q. You understood that Mr. Stojic was the person that you had to go

8 to to get permission for certain activities.

9 A. To his office, yes.

10 Q. By the time you arrived in theatre, Herceg-Bosna was an

11 established reality, wasn't it?

12 A. I can't answer that.

13 Q. Well, let me rephrase that question then. The officials of

14 Herceg-Bosna were people with whom you had to deal in order to carry out

15 your functions.

16 A. The officials of the HVO rather than Herceg-Bosna.

17 Q. Well, were you -- were you aware of Herceg-Bosna?

18 A. Yes, as a concept.

19 Q. As a concept.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. How many -- on how many occasions total -- in total did you meet

22 with Mr. Stojic?

23 A. I believe about five.

24 Q. And after that, I understand it became more the practice for you

25 to meet with his deputy, Mr. Bozic.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And if you can answer this in a meaningful way, on the occasions

3 you met with Mr. Stojic, about how long would those meetings last?

4 A. Between 15 minutes, half an hour.

5 Q. Now, you gave evidence about a meeting that occurred on or about

6 the 18th of April, 1993. Do you remember that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And that was a meeting where Mr. Ganic was present?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And you recorded that at some point during that meeting, Mr.

11 Stojic gave -- gave something of what you call, I think, a tirade to Mr.

12 Ganic; is that right?

13 A. Yes. I was not in the room at the time when he arrived.

14 Q. But you understood that Mr. Stojic had expressed himself forcibly

15 to Mr. Ganic; is that right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. About what he saw as certain crimes or atrocities committed by

18 Muslims against Croat victims.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And it was your understanding that Mr. Stojic was angry about

21 that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. That's understandable, is it not?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In fact, sir, you during your army career served in Northern

1 Ireland, didn't you?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You were defending part of the United Kingdom against aggression

4 by various paramilitary groups?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. These groups committed atrocities against the civilian

7 population, didn't they?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And against police officers.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And despite the best effort of you and your troops, that happened

12 while you were in that theatre.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And I'm sure that made you feel angry, didn't it?

15 A. I can't recall if anger was the response, but it would have

16 disturbed me, yes.

17 Q. Disturbed.

18 A. Yes. Concerned me greatly.

19 Q. Yes. Well, really it would be less than human not to be

20 disturbed, wouldn't it?

21 A. Yes, indeed.

22 Q. Yes. And on other occasions also, you were aware that Mr. Stojic

23 expressed strong views about what he saw as wrongdoing on the part of

24 certain Muslim elements.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And because you were there as a monitor, there would be nothing

2 untoward about Mr. Stojic expressing that opinion to you. Isn't that

3 right?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. And now because this has been dealt with by other counsel, I

6 think I can come to it quite briefly. I think we've established over the

7 last few hours of cross-examination that there were occasions when Muslim

8 elements did commit atrocities against others.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And with the limited staff that you had, it wasn't possible nor

11 was it your function for you to investigate each of those things in detail.

12 A. We would have done our best to confirm whether or not they had

13 taken place and some responsibility, yes, but it was not possible to

14 permanently investigate; correct?

15 Q. Right. So you would gather information as best you could.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But clearly there was a lot that you were not able to investigate

18 yourself.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Nor were your colleagues.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I think, also, you testified that there were certain -- I think

23 the phrase that was used were "uncontrolled elements" of the HVO operating.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You gave evidence that it was not always easy to identify who

1 they were because their uniforms might not be in the best condition.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So we can accept that they also may have been involved in certain

4 illegal activities, can't we?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR. MURPHY: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may we go into

7 private session?

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, private session.

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2 [Open session]

3 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We're in open session, Mr.

4 President.

5 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:

6 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Beese --

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, in open session. Counsel

8 Nozica, I give you the floor.

9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Yes. I'm

10 trying to use every bit of time.

11 Q. My name is Senka Nozica. I'm going to ask you questions on

12 behalf of the Defence counsel of Bruno Stojic.

13 My colleague indicated or, rather, spoke about your report of the

14 20th of April, 1993. It is a report which has a Prosecution number. It is

15 01981. So while I'm asking the questions, might we have that document

16 placed on our screens. It is a report that you talked about, and you said

17 that Mr. Stojic, although you did see it, entered an attacked Mr. Ganic

18 over alleged information about matters that took place on the ground.

19 Is this the report? The date is the 21st of April. Just let me

20 check that. Because in translation it says the 20th of April. But, yes,

21 it's the 21st of April, 1993. That's it.

22 You've just said that things did happen in theatre, that you

23 investigated certain things, others not. Now, I'd like to indicate two

24 points on page 2 that I consider to be important. It's on the next page.

25 And it is at the bottom of page 2. That's the portion that I'd like to

1 base my question on. And it's the first portion. It says: "The regional

2 centre of Zenica is attempting to negotiate a local cease-fire agreement

3 since early on the 18th of April, 1993. Consecutive meetings with local

4 authorities took place in the municipality but first without result due to

5 the absence of a military commander from the HVO side."

6 Do you remember that report and that section where mention is

7 made of the military commander of the HVO?

8 A. I don't think I've seen this report, but I understand the

9 context.

10 Q. If you don't remember the report, then take a look at the next

11 paragraph, the last sentence there, because it refers to what you said

12 about the interrupted meeting.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. The initial meeting, et cetera. So that report addresses both

15 those events.

16 I'm now going to ask you or, rather, show you some documents

17 which relate to Mr. Stojic's reactions, and then we'll go back to the

18 matter of the absence of the HVO commander at the meeting. I'll probably

19 do that tomorrow morning in the time I have.

20 We're now going to look at a series of documents which will show

21 us what information Mr. Stojic had on that day about the situation on the

22 ground, and my question later on will be whether you know anything about

23 those events and whether you took note of them and what your conclusions

24 were and whether you consider that those events or, rather, the information

25 that Mr. Stojic received were of such a character that they could cause him

1 disquiet or anger.

2 We're not all the same. We're different personalities. You

3 quite obviously are a rational person. You probably find -- you're

4 probably not angry very often, but other people might be. Am I right when

5 I make that observation? Well, can we take a look --

6 A. It's not an easy one to answer, I'm afraid. I would hope to be

7 able to remain calm even if I was disturbed. I am sometimes angry.

8 Q. Yes. But nonetheless, in your -- in one's evaluation, one cannot

9 always stem from oneself, especially when assessing other people. Then in

10 addition to what we observe about them, we try to -- we have to understand

11 that we're not all the same. Am I right?

12 A. Indeed.

13 Q. May we now take a look at Defence Exhibit 2D 00099. I'm going to

14 try and save time. It's a short document. I'll tell you what it's about

15 straight away.

16 This is a document of the Croatian Defence Council. We haven't

17 got it on our screens yet. The command of the Central Bosnia operative

18 zone, the department for information. The date is the 16th of April, 1993.

19 And it's called "Statement For The Public".

20 Any problems with the document? No. We have it on the ELMO.

21 Thank you. We can read it out. It's a public announcement.

22 "After a series of terrorist actions in the area of Central

23 Bosnia, on April the 16th at 5.45 hours, Muslim forces committed a brutal

24 attack on the command of the operational sector of Central Bosnia with the

25 aim of destroying the command.

1 "The Croatian defence council returned the aggressors' fire."

2 The next document will be 2D 00097, please. I'm going to show

3 you this whole set of documents, and then I'll come back to my initial

4 questions, once again to try and save time.

5 It is the same operative zone, Central Bosnia. The report is an

6 extraordinary report dated the 18th of April, 1993. It is one page long,

7 signed by Mr. Tihomir Blaskic, and it says: "Extreme Muslim forces are

8 continuing their attack, the aim of which is to break down the HVO

9 completely and to expel the Croatian people from the Lasva River valley and

10 to cut off complete communication between Konjic, Jablanica, and Gornji

11 Vakuf."

12 I don't want to read it all. I'm sure the Trial Chamber will

13 look at all the reports carefully. I just want to show you the events in

14 sequence and the information that Mr. Stojic had. Just let us establish

15 whether -- rather, what information he received.

16 The next document is document 2D 00100. Once again, the Croatian

17 Defence Council. We're just waiting for the document to appear on our

18 screens. The commander of the Central Bosnian events in Vitez. Once again

19 it is the 18th of April, 1993, and it says: "At approximately 2400 hours

20 on the 17th of April, 1993, the Muslim Mujahedin forces are continuing

21 their ceaseless aggression in Central Bosnia with a dominant attack on

22 Busovaca, Vitez, and the Croatian territory of Zenica, and in other areas

23 are launching serious preparations to go into action."

24 Have you had a chance to look at those documents, that particular

25 one?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I would now like to show you two important documents. One has

3 already been tendered. The number is 2D 00021.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Sorry, I would like to make an intermediary

5 footnote observation. We much appreciate Defence teams letting us have the

6 documents they present, and some teams present them in a way that you have

7 a file, and they name a document and you find it. But others, and there

8 were two examples this time and this is one, you have a file where the

9 documents are in an order which does not merit that time -- that title, if

10 you allow. It is impossible to find the document because they are all up

11 and down, the figures, and then it is of no use at all because, as we do

12 not want to -- to slow down, things pass and we look at the ELMO and here

13 and there.

14 So in the future, it would be very helpful if that could be

15 improved. We appreciate the effort. We know it's a lot of the work, but

16 it is -- the work is more or less wasted if there is no order that helps us

17 find the documents. Thank you.

18 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was certain that we

19 had organised them in the order in which I'm calling them out. It's just

20 that I'm trying to save time. Well, those four documents are classed

21 together, but the problem is time. If I had enough time, I would wait for

22 the document to appear on e-court, on our screens, and then there would be

23 no problem. But I'll slow down a little bit. I have five more minutes,

24 and then I would complete this showing of documents.

25 So 2D 00021 is that document. We have that in front of us, and

1 it is an order, and we can see what it's about. It says: "The Republic of

2 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

3 1st Mostar Brigade." That is a document of the 19th of April, and you can

4 take a look at the last page of the document and you'll be able to see that

5 it is an order in fact from Mr. Hujdur, the commander of the 41st Motorised

6 Brigade.

7 We can go back to the first page now, please, and then we'll see

8 that this document is called "Order." "Order for Defence," as my colleague

9 showed a similar order yesterday. However, the order for defence, this one

10 has an addition, and I'd like us to take a look at that. The addition to

11 the order for defence, and that is 2D 00095, that is the document's number.

12 It has an annex. 2D 000 -- yes.

13 This is interesting. This is an "Order For Defence," as it's

14 called, and that is the additional portion, and it should be a list of

15 signals to be used or, in other words, they are signals, different coloured

16 signals, ribbons or bands, that are used in attacking or defending.

17 So along with the Order For Defence, it is interesting to take a

18 look at the central portion. Thank you. It says here: "The Command of

19 the 41st Motorised Brigade." The date is the same, the 19th of April, and

20 it says: "With the RAK-625 signal, begin with an all-out attack at all

21 places along the axes already set." We have three types like this, but it

22 is obvious that this order was an order for attack and not an order for

23 defence.

24 Now, my question is as follows: Having seen these documents and

25 the information, we're mostly speaking about information because this order

1 was issued the following day on the 19th of April, and if we look at all

2 the previous information that Mr. Stojic had, do you know that these events

3 actually took place? Did you investigate them? And do you think that it

4 was sufficient reason for the person receiving this kind of information to

5 be alarmed?

6 A. I can't comment on the final document you've shown, but the

7 earlier ones mentioning aggression, particularly in Central Bosnia, are

8 interesting, particularly when much of the activity and action taken by the

9 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was directly in response to military attack by

10 the HVO. For the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to react when pressed is

11 hardly surprising. And therefore, to say that it is aggression as if it

12 was blatant and initial aggression is misleading, and I would say that the

13 first few documents we saw were part of a propaganda exercise. I cannot

14 comment on the last one.

15 Q. The last document shows precisely that that was not propaganda,

16 Mr. Beese, and it seems of that very clearly. But I think that His Honour

17 is going to interrupt me, so thank you, and I'll continue tomorrow morning.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. It is five minutes

19 past 7.00. We'll close for the day and reconvene tomorrow at 2.15.

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day of

22 August, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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