1 Tuesday, 12 September 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. Case
8 number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Good
10 morning to all your present here in the court-room, the Prosecution, the
11 Defence, as well as the accused who are all with us. Today we are going
12 to hear a witness, but before we bring the witness in the court-room let
13 me say that tomorrow at the beginning of the hearing we'll let you know
14 how time will be divided, time left for the remainder of the
15 cross-examination of the witness we had yesterday, and we will also tell
16 you tomorrow how we think, how we believe that the witnesses for next week
17 should be organised, considering that we will have two witnesses
18 testifying under Rule 89(F) procedure. This is a procedure that has
19 already been used in the Krajisnik case, but that it is not of very common
20 use here at the Tribunal. The advantage of this procedure is that in the
21 interest of justice we can speed up the hearing of some witnesses, and
22 we'll let you know tomorrow what we've decided about the matter because
23 the Judges will have a meeting this afternoon to deal with this issue.
24 I'm going to ask the usher to bring the witness in and if it's all
25 right, then the Prosecutor -- the representatives of the US government
1 will sit behind Mr. Scott, if everybody agrees.
2 MR. SCOTT: That's fine, Your Honour. Thank you. I'll introduce,
3 Your Honour, when they come in, if it's agreeable to the Court, I'll
4 introduce the two representatives to the Court.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Just one brief matter, Mr. President, for
6 scheduling purposes, can I assume that yesterday's witness will be next
7 Monday? If it's -- if you know?
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, it should be the case,
9 unless the Prosecutor has difficulties with the matter, but I don't think
11 MR. SCOTT: Well, again, Your Honour, we've asked yesterday for
12 the Defence to provide us any additional information on cross-examination
13 for next week. If they can, that would be very helpful to us. Thank
15 [The witness entered court]
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Good morning, sir.
17 You are a witness called by the Prosecution to testify in this case, the
18 case of Prlic et al., but before I ask you to take the solemn declaration
19 I would ask you to stand up. Very well. Can you please give me your
20 first name, last name, and date of birth.
21 THE WITNESS: Peter Galbraith, born December 31st, 1950.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you please tell me what are
23 your current functions, occupation.
24 THE WITNESS: I am an author -- author, writer, and I have a small
25 consulting business.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, have you ever testified
2 before the Tribunal on the events that took place in various territories
3 of the former Yugoslavia? If that's the case, if you've already
4 testified, in what case have you testified?
5 THE WITNESS: I've testified in two cases, in the Milosevic case
6 and the Martic case.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you testified before other
8 domestic courts, to testify about those matters?
9 THE WITNESS: No, I have not.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would now like to ask you to
11 read the solemn declaration.
12 THE WITNESS: I solemnly swear that I will speak the truth, the
13 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You may be
16 Sir, let me give you some information before I give the floor to
17 the representative of the Prosecution. You are a Prosecution witness,
18 that's what I said earlier on. You will have to answer questions put to
19 you by the Prosecution within the framework of the direct examination.
20 The Prosecution envisages around four hours and a half for your direct
21 examination. Once the Prosecution has completed the direct examination,
22 the Defence that is represented by several Defence counsel, and each
23 counsel will ask you questions on the behalf of the accused and some of
24 the accused might ask you questions directly, but for the Defence we have
25 planned or we have scheduled 315 minutes. We have to do such counting
1 because we are pressed for time. The four Judges who are sitting before
2 you can at any time take the floor and put questions to you.
3 There is something a bit specific about your testimony because
4 your government requested a number of protective measures that are
5 provided for by the Rules. That's why we have here in the court-room two
6 representatives of your government who are sitting behind the Prosecutor,
7 and if the Prosecutor produces documents through -- as part of your
8 testimony, some of these documents will be filed under seal. In other
9 words, these documents will only be reviewed in private or closed session.
10 Another specificity of your testimony is that as part of the
11 cross-examination, that is common law, Anglo-Saxon procedure you're very
12 familiar with, as part of the cross-examination, the Defence will not be
13 able to ask you any question -- on any matter that has not been dealt with
14 by the Prosecution. And we will make sure this rule is complied with.
15 The representatives of your government may at any time, if they wish to do
16 so, tell us that they object to a question put to you by the Defence.
17 They can do so if they believe that Rule 70 has been infringed upon by the
18 question put to you by the Defence. If such a case arises, then the
19 Judges will have to rule.
20 Furthermore, I would like to ask you to respond very precisely to
21 the questions put to you, and if you encounter any difficulty please
22 inform us immediately and we'll rule on this. For technical reasons, we
23 have to take a break every one and a half hour, a 20-minute break in order
24 to change the tapes. We'll therefore have two breaks today, and we'll
25 complete our day's work today at quarter to 2.00. And tomorrow the
1 hearing will start at 2.15. You will have the entire morning. And on
2 Thursday, the hearing will start at 9.00. Thus, in any case your
3 testimony will be completed on Thursday at a quarter to 2.00.
4 Mr. Scott, can you please introduce the representatives of the
5 American government.
6 MR. SCOTT: Yes, good morning, Your Honour, Mr. President,
7 Your Honours. I would be pleased to introduce the two representatives
8 that are present in court this morning for the United States government.
9 Seated behind me are Ms. Karen Johnson and Ms. Susan Aleksander, both of
10 whom are lawyers for the United States State Department. Ms. Johnson is
11 here from Washington, DC, and Ms. Aleksander works at the US embassy here
12 in The Hague. Thank you.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. On behalf of all the
14 Judges, I'd like to say good morning to them, including Ms. Johnson, who
15 is from Washington.
16 Mr. Scott, you have the floor.
17 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 WITNESS: PETER GALBRAITH
19 Examination by Mr. Scott:
20 Q. Good morning, ambassador.
21 A. Good morning.
22 Q. Sir, we've gotten your full name and date of birth in answers to
23 questions from the President. Let me briefly touch on some of your
24 educational background and some of your professional and vocational
25 experiences. I understand, sir, that you received a bachelor's degree
1 from Harvard university in 1973?
2 A. I did.
3 Q. And you received a master's degree from Oxford university in 1975?
4 A. I did.
5 Q. And I understand you have a law degree from Georgetown university
6 which you received in 1990?
7 A. That's true.
8 Q. I also understand that from 1979 until approximately 1993 you were
9 a senior advisor to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
10 Is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can you tell us just in a few sentences the nature of that work,
13 the kind of things you were involved in.
14 A. For most of the period I was responsible for the committees -- one
15 of the committee's major pieces of legislation, the Foreign Relations
16 Authorisation Act, which funded the state department and related agencies.
17 I handled the near east and south Asia for the committee. And then for
18 1991 until I left on June 24th, 1993, I had a mandate to deal with the
19 difficult places in the world, and thus it was that I as a staffer for the
20 committee made four trips to the former Yugoslavia between 1991 -- in 1991
21 and 1992.
22 Q. All right. Let's come back to that in a few moments. Let me
23 proceed just a bit through your professional experiences, and then
24 obviously we'll come back more specifically to your professional
25 involvements in relation to the former Yugoslavia. After leaving the US
1 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you were then appointed ambassador --
2 in fact, the first United States ambassador to the Independent Republic of
3 Croatia, and you served in that capacity from approximately the 24th of
4 June, 1993, until the 3rd of January, 1998?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Following that, sir, is it correct that from approximately 1998 to
7 2003 you taught at the United States National War College?
8 A. That is correct, but with a -- about a 20-month [Realtime
9 transcript read in error "20-minute"] period in which I was seconded to
10 the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor in 2000 and
12 Q. Can you tell us what your involvement was in East Timor and any
13 positions you held there?
14 A. If I can note for the transcript I said a 20-month, not a
15 20-minute period. The -- I was the director for political,
16 constitutional, and electoral affairs for the United Nations which made we
17 responsible for, among other things, the political transition in east
18 Timor, and then in July 2000 an interim government was formed in east
19 Timor, with an eight-member cabinet, and so I was one of the cabinet
20 members with responsibility -- the formal title was first cabinet minister
21 for political affairs, which included the foreign affairs function. Later
22 an East Timorese was headed -- came on to be head of foreign affairs and
23 I -- my title became cabinet member for political affairs in Timor Sea --
24 which political affairs was the constitutional transition;, Timor Sea was
25 negotiations with Australia over oil and gas resources in the Timor Sea.
1 Q. And after this approximately 20-month period, then you returned to
2 teach again at the national war college for a time?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. And I understand, sir, that you have recently published a book
5 called -- titled "The End of Iraq."
6 A. That's right, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created
7 a War Without End.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel slow down. Thank you.
9 MR. SCOTT: My apologies, we're speaking a bit too fast.
10 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, if we can then go specifically to your time
11 as ambassador to the Republic of Croatia. Again, you served in that
12 capacity for approximately late June of 1993 and continued until the 3rd
13 of January, 1998. And I take it in that capacity you did -- not to make
14 it sound normal, but the types of duties that an ambassador in an embassy
15 would have in other embassies around the world, albeit in the former
16 Yugoslavia at the time?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Can you tell the Judges briefly some of the major projects or
19 aspects of what was happening at former Yugoslavia -- in the former
20 Yugoslavia at that time that you were most directly involved in?
21 A. Yes. When I arrived, of course I was the first US ambassador to
22 Croatia, although there was already an embassy there. But naturally, I
23 did the kinds of activities that one would undertake -- newly arriving in
24 a country and establishing diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial
25 level, meeting government officials, explaining US policy, travelling
1 around the country. But the major focus for the first ten months of my
2 tenure was on the Muslim-Croat war that was underway in Bosnia, and the --
3 a US effort to try to stop the atrocities that were taking place and
4 then -- and then the successful effort to bring that war to a conclusion
5 with the Washington Agreement, and I participated in the negotiations that
6 led to the Washington Agreement.
7 From -- in 1994 and 1995, in addition to all the issues that were
8 related to the implementation of the Washington Agreement and other issues
9 related to Bosnia, I also was very heavily involved in the Croatia peace
10 process as -- first, as one of the co-sponsors of negotiations that led to
11 a cease-fire between the Republic of Croatia and the Krajina Serbs. Then
12 as one of the authors of the so-called Z-4 peace process which was an
13 effort to find a peaceful solution to the Krajina problem with substantial
14 autonomy for the Serb-majority areas in Croatia, that failed with -- when
15 the issue was settled militarily in Operation Storm and then finally I was
16 the co-mediator of the Erdut peace agreement which was concluded on the
17 12th of November, 1995, that ended the war in Croatia by providing for the
18 peaceful reintegration of Serb-held eastern Slavonia into Croatia. And
19 then after that I served as the de facto chairman of the Article 11
20 commission of that agreement, which monitored the implementation of that
21 agreement and the other activity -- major activities were those that --
22 and participated in the Dayton Peace Treaty negotiations. And then
23 naturally a major focus was to help ensure Croatian compliance with the
24 conditions of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
25 Q. All right. Stepping back for one moment you mentioned a few
1 moments ago that before becoming ambassador you had travelled on official
2 business or mission, if you will, in the former Yugoslavia, on at least
3 four prior [microphone not activated]?
4 A. That's correct.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed.
6 MR. SCOTT:
7 Q. During your time on Senate Foreign Relations, did you write a
8 report titled "ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina"?
9 A. I did.
10 Q. And approximately when was that and generally what was that report
11 about, other than what's disclosed in the title of course?
12 A. It was in August of 1992. It was a response to -- a mission that
13 was undertaken in response to disclosures in the American and
14 international press about Serb-run concentration camps. And so we went
15 out to document that. And in the course of doing that and of interviewing
16 refugees who had come out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we -- we -- I
17 can't -- we discovered or reported on the camps but also a much larger
18 pattern of the ethnic cleansing, the systematic expulsion of Bosnian
19 Muslims and Croats by the Serbs from large areas of Bosnia and
21 Q. So in fact, ambassador, you had some extensive -- fairly extensive
22 dealings and background in the former Yugoslavia and the issues that were
23 developing -- had or were developing there prior to taking on your
24 position as ambassador. Is that correct?
25 A. I certainly had some background, yes.
1 Q. Now, going to your time after arriving -- taking up your post in
2 Zagreb, can we begin on this topic by -- let me ask you, who are your
3 principal contacts in the Croatian government during this -- for now let's
4 concentrate on the 1993/1994 time period.
5 A. Of course I had many contacts in the -- among the -- virtually all
6 the ministers in the Croatian government, military commanders,
7 parliamentarians, local officials. But the most important of these, of
8 course, was President Franjo Tudjman, whom I saw on a regular basis, and
9 the foreign minister, Mate Granic, and the defence minister, Gojko Susak.
10 Q. In these earlier years, these years from 1993 to the end of 1994,
11 did you meet with President Tudjman, would you say frequently?
12 A. Yes -- I would say quite frequently.
13 Q. Several times a week?
14 A. That would be -- that would be quite usual, and as things went
15 into crisis mode, as they often did, it could be several times a day.
16 Q. Now, before going forward with your dealings with those
17 individuals and others, let me just mention one other individual. During
18 your time as ambassador, did you ever meet an individual named Slobodan
20 A. So far as I recall, I met him once at Zagreb airport very
22 Q. Going back to President Tudjman, Susak and Granic, as you became
23 with these men, can you tell the Judges what you observed and learned
24 about President Tudjman's territorial aspirations, if any, concerning
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1 A. President Tudjman believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina would not
2 and should not continue as a sovereign, independent state, and that a
3 substantial part of Bosnian territory should become territory of the
4 Republic of Croatia.
5 Q. Did he ever explain to you the basis for these views or ...
6 A. Very often.
7 Q. Tell us about that.
8 A. Well, he had -- he had many theories. First, that the Bosnian --
9 Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims were not a real nation, that they were Croats
10 who spoke the Croatian language, who had converted to Islam, and therefore
11 they didn't have an authentic claim to a state. That of course was the
12 state of these -- of three nations that didn't want to be together, that
13 historically the territory of -- part of the territory of Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina had belonged to Croatia. He referred specifically and very
15 often to the 1939 agreement that established the Banovina of Croatia, that
16 included parts of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also
17 referred to the map of the NDH Croatia, fascist Croatia during the Second
18 World War which also included a large part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Q. Did President Tudjman ever show you maps or during your -- or --
20 and/or during meetings with him did you ever see maps of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which indicated how it might be divided?
22 A. Yes. He had a number of maps to show what might become part of
23 Croatia or how it might be divided between the -- a Croatian -- and
24 sometimes -- well, to show how it might be divided, yes.
25 Q. And can you tell the Judges what you recall about the
1 configuration of borders that he proposed which might have been different
2 over time or different models, but can you tell the Judges about that.
3 A. To be clear, he would -- he wouldn't show maps that would show
4 this territory as being formally annexed into Croatia, but the context
5 made it clear that this is what he thought should become part of Croatia.
6 But the -- the maps would certainly include the Herzegovina, Posavina,
7 often they followed very similar to the map of the Banovina of Croatia.
8 But also he had ideas about population transfers and that one map showed
9 Bosnia being divided right down the middle with -- therefore, Banja Luka
10 becoming part of the Croatian side and Tuzla part of the Serbian side. He
11 would talk approvingly of the idea population transfers. He often made
12 the point about Banja Luka, that although it was a Serbian city, it really
13 looked more to Zagreb than it did to Belgrade.
14 Q. Staying on maps and territory, did the topic of Mostar ever come
15 up in your conversations with President Tudjman?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. What did he say about that?
18 A. That it was a Croatian city in one -- well, that it was the
19 capital of -- of the Croatian republic, if there was going to be a
20 three-republic solution. That the Muslims had no real claim to Mostar.
21 Q. Can you tell the Judges a bit more when you were involved in --
22 with conversations or dealings with President Tudjman in connection with
23 various peace discussions, whether that was various cease-fires or the
24 Washington Agreement or Dayton, how these factors or how these views of
25 his in terms of territory would impact his thoughts and his efforts -- his
1 involvement with peace efforts.
2 A. President Tudjman was one of the easiest people in the world to
3 read. No matter how much he tried to -- might try to -- no matter how
4 much it might be good for Croatia for him to restrain his true agenda, it
5 almost always came through. So he would present these -- even when it was
6 clear that we were about to conclude an agreement on one set of terms and
7 with one map, it wouldn't stop him from -- even at the last minute when
8 there was absolutely no hope that anybody would accept any different
9 version and certainly not his version, which we all recognised as a -- as
10 reflecting his desire for Greater Croatia, he nonetheless would come
11 forward and say: Well, what about this map? And frankly that happened at
12 all stages in this process. It happened just after the Washington
13 Agreement was concluded. It happened after the Dayton Agreement was
14 concluded in the period between the conclusion of Dayton on the 21st of
15 November and its formal signing in the Elysez palace in December,
16 obviously a time when anybody else would have understood that the map was
17 not going to be changed.
18 Q. We focussed -- I focussed my questions to you and you focussed
19 your answers so far primarily on President Tudjman. Can you tell the
20 Judges whether in your experience Defence Minister Susak held similar
22 A. Similar but not identical. The first point about Susak is that he
23 was a loyal lieutenant of President Tudjman, which perhaps is one reason
24 why he was so effective. He would refer to him as the boss and if the
25 boss made a decision, he was going to carry that out. On the other hand,
1 he was going to go to the boss and to the president and bring a contrary
2 point of view. But my impression of him and I spent a lot of him with
3 him, is that Tudjman was an advocate, if you will, of a great Greater
4 Croatia, a Greater Croatia that included a lot of -- perhaps a --
5 certainly a lot of Muslim-majority territory, perhaps a lot of Bosnian
6 Muslims, whereas Susak I would describe as being in favour of a little
7 Greater Croatia, that really the area that he wanted to incorporate into
8 Croatia was Herzegovina, which of course was the part of Croatia where he
9 was from.
10 Q. Ambassador, I've been reminded that both of us, since we are both
11 native English speakers and tend to speak quickly one after the other, to
12 please give a bit of a pause for translation between our questions and
13 answers, and that's directed at me as much as it is to you.
14 In this regard, sir, in terms of these territorial issues, can you
15 explain to the Judges in this context what was the US diplomatic or
16 foreign policy strategy, if you will, in dealing with Tudjman and the
17 Tudjman government on these issues as it related to accomplishing peace in
18 the former Yugoslavia.
19 A. The United States believed that the borders of the internationally
20 recognised successor states of the former Yugoslavia could not and should
21 not be changed, that the -- that the only way to have peace was for
22 everybody to accept the borders of the states as they emerged in 1991,
23 that is the borders that were the borders of the republics in Yugoslavia.
24 That once you try to change any border, you were opening -- you were
25 creating -- opening a can of worms, that is to say creating a situation
1 that was likely to involve ever more demands for changes of borders and
2 produce more conflict. And this had a very direct application to Croatia.
3 From literally the day I presented my credentials until the conclusion
4 of the peace process and perhaps I should say until the day I left
5 Croatia, the -- our -- the US government message was very simple: We will
6 -- we support the territorial integrity of Croatia to the extent that
7 Croatia supports the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And
8 that if Croatia adopted a political approach that represented the
9 territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States would
10 use its diplomatic and other influence to bring about a political solution
11 to the problem in Croatia so that -- so that the occupied territories of
12 Croatia, that is the Serb-held territories, would be re-integrated into
14 Q. Was there any sense in which the US position was to put Tudjman to
15 a choice, what he could have or what he could not have?
16 A. Yes. The basic strategy was that Tudjman would have to choose
17 between a Croatia within its 1991 borders that included the Krajina region
18 and eastern Slavonia, Baranja, the city of Vukovar, that would be -- and
19 -- and also beyond the path to integration into western institutions, to
20 include eventually NATO and the European Union, that would be one choice.
21 The other would be to pursue the dream of a Greater Croatia by taking
22 territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina with no prospect that he would be
23 successful at that and no chance that the United States would ever grant
24 international recognition to that effort.
25 Q. I was going to put some questions to you about Tudjman's views
1 toward the Muslims and toward Bosnia, but in fact you've touched on most
2 of those -- or answered those questions primarily already.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I'd like to ask a
4 follow-up question because the ambassador has just been speaking about a
5 very important problem.
6 You've just said that when you presented your credentials to
7 President Tudjman, you set out your country's position in order to -- and
8 you said that there could be no modification of frontiers, of borders, as
9 they were in 1991. Is that what you said, that the 1991 borders should be
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was our -- that was our -- our position.
12 There was in the -- I suppose I should have a small addendum here. There
13 was some discussion in this period of possible corridors to the sea that
14 might have involved some territorial changes. But the basic point was,
15 first, that there would be absolutely no changes brought about by force
16 and without the consent of all the parties; and second, that as a
17 practical matter, you could not have changes in borders because once you
18 started down that path it would never end.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And your country's position was
20 shared, I assume, by the international community, that is to say the other
21 countries, the other states?
22 THE WITNESS: For the most part, that is correct. Certainly the
23 entire international community insisted that there could be no changes in
24 borders brought about by force; and if there were any changes, they could
25 only occur through the consent of all the parties. David Owen, the --
1 the -- one of the co-chairman of ICFY and who had responsibilities for
2 peace negotiations came up with a number of schemes that did involve
3 territorial changes of these international borders. And these schemes,
4 frankly, always made us very uncomfortable.
5 MR. SCOTT:
6 Q. Ambassador, for purposes of the record, could I get you to explain
7 further when you say references to ICFY, what that was?
8 A. It was the international conference for the former Yugoslavia, a
9 committee of European states and the United States. It was co-chaired by
10 a representative of the United Nations and by a representative of the
11 European Union. Cyrus Vance was the initial UN representative, later
12 Thorvald Stoltenberg and then the EU representative was Lord David Owen or
13 co-chairman I should say.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And my last question. Your
15 government's position was quite clear and despite that, President Tudjman
16 each time seemed to broach that question of a Greater Croatia again during
17 your negotiations or discussions and showed you maps, et cetera. So he
18 didn't seem to understand the position taken by the international
19 country -- by the international community and your own country vis-a-vis
20 Croatia or did he try to convince you and to convert you to his way of
21 thinking, along with the other countries?
22 THE WITNESS: He was totally convinced of the logic, the
23 historical justice, and the correctness of his position. And so he was
24 certain that he -- if he kept explaining it to others, me, the members of
25 congress, members of the Clinton administration, that we would eventually
1 understand the logic and this is why he kept at it no matter how strongly
2 we insisted that we were not going to agree to changes in borders.
3 MR. SCOTT:
4 Q. Perhaps just one additional question on terms of President
5 Tudjman's views toward Bosnia as a state. Did he ever describe its
6 existence and its borders as "unnatural"?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And in what sense?
9 A. Well, in the sense that Bosnia and Herzegovina had never existed
10 as an independent state, in the sense that the Muslims were not a nation,
11 that the Muslim nationality was a communist construct of the Tito Era,
12 that -- I think he believed that states ought to be ethnically homogenous
13 or close to it. He often spoke approvingly of the 1923 transfer of
14 population between Greece and Turkey, which I must say I found, you know,
15 rather odd as I often reminded him it wasn't as if things subsequently
16 worked out very well between Greece and Turkey in the intervening 70
17 years, but he kept coming back to that. He considered -- I think that --
18 basically, he was very much prejudiced against the Muslims as a people.
19 He also saw that -- he believed that there -- that the Balkans was the
20 fulcrum of three civilisations, western civilisation of which Croatia was
21 then the eastern frontier, the Orthodox civilisation stretching from
22 Serbia through Russia, and then an Islamic tip of the sword or spear as
23 represented by Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims.
24 Q. On the issue of population transfer or exchanges, during your
25 tenure as ambassador and in dealing with these issues did you ever hear or
1 come across a phenomenon which some might call either reverse ethnic
2 cleansing or self cleansing?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Tell us about that, please.
5 A. There were I think two places where we saw that. First, in Bosnia
6 where the -- where the Croatians had a basic strategic problem. The
7 census of 1991 showed that the Croat population of Bosnia was 17 per cent,
8 which of course made it by far the smallest of the three communities. And
9 they were located, among other places, in western Herzegovina which was
10 more or less purely Croat or -- Central Bosnia and in the Posavina region.
11 But in reality - and this -- Croatian officials including Susak would
12 often talk to me about - the Croatian population was smaller than 17 per
13 cent, maybe as small as 10 or 12 per cent. Why? Partly the result of
14 Croatian policies. Tudjman -- Croatia had a policy of granting Croatian
15 citizenship to any ethnic Croat who wanted it, and of course as compared
16 to Bosnia and Herzegovina in this period, Croatia was both -- much more
17 prosperous and much more peaceful. So not surprisingly, a lot of Croats
18 voted with their feet and moved to Croatia, reducing the Croat population
19 in Bosnia, and therefore weakening Croatia's claim to territory that it
20 wanted to hold. So there was an idea that you might actually move the
21 Croat population out of Central Bosnia or places in Central Bosnia where
22 they were a minority or surrounded by the Bosnian Muslims and relocate
23 them to Herzegovina, thus building up that population.
24 The other example of reverse ethnic cleansing was by the Serbs
25 where Milosevic encouraged the Serbs in the Krajina region to relocate to
1 Kosovo in order to build up the Serbian population there, and that was not
2 a very successful venture.
3 Q. Before moving forward, I'd like to ask you about some other senior
4 Croatian officials at the time. When you were having these conversations
5 and dealings with people like Tudjman, Susak, and others, did you ever
6 have any contact or meetings with senior Croatian officials which had
7 different views or opposing views to those of Tudjman and Susak?
8 A. Absolutely.
9 Q. Can you tell us about that.
10 A. First and probably most influential was Mate Granic, the foreign
11 minister who was and is an extremely decent human being. Before becoming
12 foreign minister, he had been responsible for refugees and humanitarian
13 affairs. Croatia had a terrifically good record of taking refugees. I
14 can't think of a country that may -- has taken -- took so many refugees
15 per capita and treated them reasonably well. Granic helped set that
16 policy. During the period of 19 -- the first six months of my tenure when
17 I was constantly raising the issue of HVO-run camps and the bad conditions
18 in them, the problem of humanitarian convoys, the problem of the shelling
19 of east Mostar, Granic was sympathetic. He sent foreign ministry
20 officials into Bosnia. He attempted to deal with the problem, so he was
21 very positive.
22 Two other officials I would mention, Josip Manolic and Stipe
23 Mesic, who broke with Tudjman around this period because of their
24 opposition to Tudjman's policies in Bosnia. They felt that -- that
25 Tudjman's policies were doing great damage to Croatia, that it was going
1 to lead to sanctions on Croatia, to international pariah status, and they
2 were right, it was heading in that direction. So they very much supported
3 the idea of a unitary -- a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina, that Croatia
4 should fully respect Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries, it
5 should stop its support for the HVO and for the Bosnian Croats, and bring
6 an end to the Muslim-Croat war. And frankly, one of the things that
7 helped enormously in our efforts to end the Muslim-Croat war was the fact
8 that there was not a lot of support among the Croatian public for either a
9 great Greater Croatia or a little Greater Croatia. There was on a popular
10 level a lot of sympathy for the Bosnian Bosniaks or the Bosnian Muslims, a
11 lot of sympathy for the people in east Mostar and in Sarajevo.
12 And I remember, as an example of this, most vividly attending the
13 liberal party conference, their annual conference and hearing the head of
14 the liberal party, Drazen Budisa say basically that if Croatia
15 continued -- if the Tudjman government continued its policies in Bosnia,
16 Croatia deserved international sanctions. Of course he was a politician,
17 he was saying it because there was a large segment of the Croatian people
18 who did not want these kinds of policies.
19 Q. Did --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, for the transcript at
21 line 18, page 21, you said about the six first months where you met
22 Mr. Mate Granic and in the transcript it says 19 but not the exact year.
23 So what year was it actually?
24 THE WITNESS: 1993.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
2 Q. Before we move on, going back to Mr. Mesic and Manolic, did they
3 come back to you about intervening with Tudjman in any particular way or
4 what position they hoped you would take?
5 A. Yes, I spoke to them on a number of occasions in late summer/early
6 autumn of 1993. They were extremely concerned about what Tudjman was
7 doing in Bosnia, and they said there's nothing -- basically they said:
8 There's very little we can do. You're the only person that he will listen
9 to you. You've got to do -- you know, bring -- do everything you can.
10 Bring all the pressure you can bring to bear to get Tudjman to -- to stop
11 his support of the HVO and to stop the Muslim-Croat war.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed.
13 MR. SCOTT:
14 Q. With all of this by way of -- well, more than an introduction,
15 we're very substantively into your evidence now.
16 MR. SCOTT: If I can ask that the witness be shown P09498.
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Can I follow-up on the last issue.
18 Would you tell the Bench something about Tudjman's reactions.
19 First, did you try to follow suit, did you try to influence Tudjman, and
20 what was his reaction?
21 THE WITNESS: Yes. I certainly tried to influence Tudjman. This
22 was the -- it was the substance of most of my interactions with Tudjman
23 and I delivered on behalf of my government very strong warnings about the
24 consequences of Croatia continuing these policies. Tudjman's reaction --
25 Tudjman's reactions were several. First, to -- sometimes he would argue
1 that, yes, these terrible things are taking place, but the otherwise is
2 doing it as well, the Muslims are doing the same things. And I would tell
3 him: That is no excuse for your behaviour. We are going to hold Croatia
4 accountable for what Croatia does and since Croatia supports the HVO, we
5 hold Croatia accountable for what the HVO does. And it is totally
6 irrelevant as to what the Bosnian Muslims are doing. So that was one set
7 of exchanges where he would respond by saying: Yes, but the other side is
8 doing the same thing.
9 The second response was that as he -- as he -- it began to filter
10 through to him just how serious we were and how perilous Croatia's
11 position was, he would then promise to take action to correct the abuses
12 that I was citing. And in fact, because he exercised very substantial
13 control over the HVO, the Croatian government did correct these abuses.
14 And eventually, we were able to bring the Muslim-Croat war to an end in
15 February of 1994. He -- I do not recall him denying in any way the facts
16 that I was presenting to him. So the reactions were either to say the
17 other side was doing it or to -- to basically say: Yes, I'll try to do
18 something about this -- well, also -- he would say you know, I -- it's a
19 terrible situation down there, they're out of control, often referred to
20 the HVO leadership as being out of control. But then he would say: Yes,
21 I'll do something about it, and then in fact he would do something about
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you very much.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You've just said that you've
25 informed Tudjman about a number of facts, of events, and that he told you
1 that the Muslims were doing exactly the same thing. Could you please be
2 more specific about this. What events, what facts, did you report to him
4 THE WITNESS: At this time I focussed on the following events.
5 First, the blockage by the HVO of humanitarian convoys, convoys carrying
6 humanitarian supplies to the government-controlled parts of Bosnia and
7 also to east Mostar. Second, the holding of Bosnian Muslims in inhumane
8 conditions in detention camps, and we pushed both to improve the
9 conditions in the detention camps and for the unconditional release of the
10 prisoners. Third issue was the shelling of east Mostar, a civilian area
11 which, you know, there were large numbers of civilian casualties as well
12 as the destruction of a culturally important area. And more generally,
13 our insistence that the Muslim-Croat war be ended and that there be a
14 peace agreement between these two communities. These were the matters
15 that I was bringing to his attention on a very regular basis.
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I may insist, you have told us that when you
17 put such complaints, as it were, to President Tudjman he never denied the
18 facts, he admitted that there were doubtful, unlawful detentions under
19 inhumane conditions and so forth?
20 THE WITNESS: That's right. He never said: Oh -- he never said:
21 Oh, the camps are fine. What are you talking about? He readily
22 acknowledged that the -- or he never challenged that -- my assertions
23 about the conditions in the camps, some of which were based on first-hand
24 reporting by embassy officers. He simply said -- well, I mean, he would
25 say: I'm not responsible, or the HVO leadership is not -- they're not
1 fully under my control, but I will try to do something about this.
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
3 MR. SCOTT:
4 Q. We were about to go I think to Exhibit P09498.
5 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, let me make the situation concerning
6 many of these documents very clear. The position of the provider, of the
7 United States government, is that they can be discussed and shown and used
8 in the court-room, but for purposes of, if you will, the record and
9 keeping them in the future and access to the hard-copy documents
10 themselves, they would be maintained by the registry under seal. However,
11 we need not go into private session now to deal with the documents orally
12 or to present them electronically. So with that in mind, if we could go,
13 please, to exhibit P09498.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I'm trying to
15 understand what you've just said. You said that the government of the
16 United States of America would like these documents to remain under seal.
17 These documents, in other words, will not be disclosed outside of this
18 court-room, but at the same time you are telling me that these documents
19 can be put to the witness because from what I understand they are not
20 being fed into the e-court system. But if we put the document to the
21 witness, then the document will become a public document because we'll ask
22 the witness, for example, to read the third paragraph of this telegram and
23 then the document becomes public. So I'd like things to be extremely
24 clear with regards to this document. I'd like have to a clear idea about
25 the position of the United States with -- as far as these documents are
2 MR. SCOTT: Let me say it again, Your Honour. The concern is that
3 the hard-copy document itself not be freely available to members of the
4 public. If a member of the public were to talk into the registry and say:
5 I would like to have a copy of that document and carry a physical hard
6 copy of that document out of the building, that would not be allowed. The
7 documents would be maintained by the registry under seal and they would
8 not be publicly available. That's the principal concern that the
9 government -- the United States government doesn't want the hard copy of
10 the documents floating about the world and potentially manipulated in some
12 However, the documents can be discussed in the court-room for the
13 purposes of this case and can be broadcast, but no one will be able to get
14 a copy of the document and take it somewhere. The difference between the
15 hard copy -- maintaining the hard copy under seal, versus the information
16 that the witness will discuss in the court-room.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. So you are telling me
18 that the document can be displayed with the e-court system and it can also
19 be seen and read from the outside of this court-room. Since our trial is
20 broadcast, if the document is displayed on a screen, let's imagine someone
21 living in a given country, country X, this person can then reproduce the
22 document or copy the document and then let's imagine that the document is
23 published in a newspaper, newspaper Y. Then we'll have a violation of the
24 protective measures you're asking for. So how can we prevent such a
25 thing? Because if the document is displayed on the screens --
1 MR. SCOTT: Well, I'm not sure how it would be done
2 electronically, Your Honour, unless someone had some sort of a
3 screen-capture capacity. I believe I've accurately stated the position,
4 and I will double-check with the representatives of the United States
5 government, if you'll give me a moment, please.
6 [Prosecution and US government counsel confer]
7 MR. SCOTT: I have accurately stated the United States position,
8 Your Honour. It is not the broadcast of the information, it is the
9 sealing of the hard-copy document in the record.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Then we'll proceed
11 that way, but I think I've stated that with the modern technology anybody
12 outside of this court-room can reproduce the document.
13 But proceed, please.
14 MR. SCOTT: If we can then look, please, at this document.
15 Q. If you have it in front of you, Ambassador, can you tell the
16 Judges what this document is.
17 A. Yes, it is a cable that I sent reporting on my presentation of
18 credentials to President Tudjman and the conversation that we had
19 subsequent to the presentation of credentials ceremony.
20 Q. And this was on the 28th of June, 1993?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Can you tell the Judges -- when a new ambassador normally presents
23 his credentials to the head of state or the appropriate senior official of
24 the host government, if you will, is that typically a bit of a formal
25 procedure one would not expect to get into perhaps a lengthy, substantive
1 discussion of policy?
2 A. Generally that's true. It is a formal ceremony with perhaps -- in
3 which the ambassador hands over his letter of credentials, makes a brief
4 statement on the desire for good relations with the country to which he
5 has now presented credentials. There is a response, and perhaps a brief
6 conversation that deals mostly with pleasantries.
7 Q. And what happened on your first meeting with President Tudjman?
8 A. We sat down and had an hour-long conversation on a variety of
9 substantive issues.
10 Q. Looking at the beginning, the summary and comment part of the
11 document, you report -- is this a cable that you drafted?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Or under your supervision?
14 A. Actually both. But a cable from me.
15 Q. And it says: "In an unexpectedly lengthy conversation following
16 by presentation of credentials this morning (June 28), President Tudjman
17 sought US support against what he described as an Owen proposal that
18 Croatia cede its own territory to facilitate a deal on Bosnia."
19 Now, there are various peace aspects of that. In the interests of
20 time, because as the President's explained our time is a bit limited, can
21 I then direct your attention, please, with the usher's assistance to the
22 second page. Halfway down the page there is a heading and it says: "And
23 a Muslim route to the sea?"
24 And then the cable goes on to say: "The second unacceptable
25 proposal that Owen was trying to force on Croatia, according to Tudjman,
1 was Muslim access to the Adriatic by ceding to them Croat-inhabited areas
2 of B-H and another part of Croatia proper." And then skipping a few lines
3 and then I'll ask you to comment on this. Skipping a few lines down it
4 goes on to say that: "Tudjman added that Owen was also proposing to give
5 the Muslims the east bank of the Neretva in Mostar and southward. Tudjman
6 said that he failed to see why Owen was now insisting in territorial
7 shifts unacceptable to the Croatian people and clearly against their
8 strategic interest."
9 Now, first of all, is that as you recall an accurate summary of
10 your conversation with President Tudjman at the time and what more can you
11 comment on his position?
12 A. It is an accurate summary of the conversation that I had with him,
13 and I think the cable speaks for itself.
14 Q. I asked you some minutes ago now about how Tudjman's territorial
15 views would enter into his views or actions taken in connection with
16 various peace agreements or peace efforts. Can you tell the Judges, is
17 this an example of that?
18 A. It is. There -- there are several points, I think, that are
19 interesting here. First he discusses -- he says he's opposed to any
20 territorial swap except possibly, if I could just look at the first -- at
21 the summary again.
22 Q. Yes.
23 MR. SCOTT: Can we go back to the first page, please.
24 THE WITNESS: Yeah, except possibly involving a part of the
25 Vojvodina and this is because for reasons that frankly I never understood
1 and I don't think were shared by hardly anybody else in Croatia, he was
2 almost always willing to consider giving up the Baranja region of Croatia
3 because it had not been part of the 1939 sphere or zone. This is the
4 north-east corner of Croatia, north of the -- of -- of Vukovar and
5 what's -- and eastern Slavonia. He -- he certainly did not want to give
6 the Serbs a corridor north of the Sava, as was being asked by Owen. And
7 as I said before, that kind of territorial concession was that -- that
8 Owen was pursuing, my view very much on his own initiative, was not one
9 that we were very sympathetic to.
10 The final point here of course is that he was also treating
11 territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina as if it were part of Croatia or at
12 least it was part of his responsibility in opposing giving -- having that
13 territory become part of a Muslim republic or Muslim entity within a
14 federal Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 Q. Directing --
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I --
17 MR. SCOTT: Yes.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm also struck by this aspect, and I wonder
19 whether you are also thinking of the first of the two sentences on page 2
20 that have been read out.
21 "Tudjman complains that he was asked to cede Croat-inhabited areas
22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
23 That's how I read this, as meaning he talks as if it was his
24 Croatia already and complains that he is asked not to keep it.
25 THE WITNESS: Precisely. He's not actually treating it any
1 differently than the territory of Croatia itself, and you have it exactly
2 right, that he is the leader, the president, of -- not only the Republic
3 of Croatia but the ultimate president of the -- responsible for the Croats
4 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and therefore he is being asked to cede territory
5 that belongs to the Croat nation.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Very briefly, following up, Your Honour, it appears
8 that Mr. Owen is coming to Tudjman, that's how I read it, that it's Owen's
9 proposal, not Tudjman's proposal. So it's Owen that's looking to Tudjman
10 as if Tudjman believes that the Croats over there need protection or what
11 have you.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, Mr. Praljak is on his
14 Why, Mr. Praljak, why are you on your feet?
15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Well, I want to put right a
16 mistake, Your Honour. It was said, Mr. Galbraith said -- spoke about the
17 corridor north of Sava. Now, north of Sava is Croatia, so I don't know
18 what corridor he had in mind there and I think we ought to clarify that
19 point because we all spoke of the corridor south of the Sava, which would
20 link Serb territories with Krajina, and I think that would be the correct
21 way of putting it. Thank you.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. So apparently there is a
23 problem in relation to geography. So what corridor are we talking about,
25 THE WITNESS: Well, let me be clear. The Defence counsel is
1 correct that this was a proposal from David Owen that Croatia concede to
2 the Bosnian Serbs territory of the Republic of Croatia itself that is
3 north of the Sava River so that there could be a corridor that would link
4 western -- sorry, eastern part of Bosnian Serb territory with the western
5 part of the Bosnian Serb territory, including of course Banja Luka. That
6 was David Owen's proposal, and it did involve a change in the
7 international borders. And Tudjman was asking for American support in
8 opposing David Owen's proposal.
9 He also asked for American support in opposing another David Owen
10 proposal that would have had the Republic of Croatia, that is the --
11 within the 1991 borders, concede some territory that would enable the -- a
12 Bosnian republic in the union of three republics to have -- and the
13 Bosnian Serbs for that matter to have direct access to the sea. In the
14 same conversation, he also made the point -- he also talked about David
15 Owen asking him to cede territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was east
16 of the Neretva, talking about it as if it was indistinguishable from the
17 territory of the republic -- that he, Tudjman, was considering it
18 indistinguishable from the territory of the Republic of Croatia.
19 Now, to be clear, Owen would have been asking him to be consider
20 territorial concessions about Croatia within its 1991 borders. He would
21 not have been asking Tudjman -- would not have been asking Tudjman as the
22 responsible party to actually make the concessions in Bosnia, but rather
23 to use his influence with the Bosnian Croats to make those concessions
24 But what's important about this cable is that Tudjman looks at it, because
25 I'm after all reporting Tudjman's position, Tudjman looks at it as if it
1 was indistinguishable from the territory of Croatia itself. And just to
2 repeat, we, the United States, did not want to see territorial
3 concessions -- changes in borders. We were not very supportive of this
4 approach of David Owen.
5 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 MR. SCOTT:
8 Q. On that very point, if I can ask that we please go to the fourth
9 page of the document under the heading "US-Croatian ties." Second
11 "I told Tudjman that the US supports Croatia's territorial
12 integrity and that the basis of a close by lateral relationship lay in
13 shared commitment to democracy, respect for human rights, and respect for
14 the territorial integrity of other sovereign states. I pointed out that
15 the discussion in the United States about sanctions on Croatia focussed on
16 Croatian activity in Bosnia contrary to these principles."
17 Sir, is that consistent with the strategy and position of the
18 United States that you've now mentioned several times this morning?
19 A. It is a very precise articulation of US policy which remained
20 absolutely constant throughout my tenure as US Ambassador to Croatia.
21 Q. And finishing with this document, if we can go to the last page
22 and the last paragraph. Is it correct, sir, that at the end of the
23 meeting in fact the word here "reiterated." You stated to Tudjman that
24 the United States did not favour alteration under duress of one party of
25 recognised international Bosnian parties."
1 A. That was the strongly held position of the United States. It was
2 a constant message -- a message that I was constantly delivering to
3 Tudjman in the -- in the strongest possible terms in the course of my
4 tenure as ambassador to Croatia.
5 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I see the time, and this may be a time
6 for a break.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. We'll have a 20-minute
8 break and we'll resume around ten to 11.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's ten to 11.00. Mr. Scott,
12 please continue.
13 MR. SCOTT: I'm going to go next to P09499 [Realtime transcript
14 read in error "P04099"].
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There seems to be a mistake with
16 the exhibit number.
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: 9499.
18 MR. SCOTT: 9499, a cable from the 6th of July, 1993. Yes.
20 Q. Sir, going on to this, is this a cable, a further cable, sent from
21 Zagreb while you were ambassador concerning your dealings with President
23 A. Yes, it is.
24 Q. All right. I'd like to direct your particular attention to
25 paragraph 4, as a starting point.
1 "Tudjman also downplayed his influence with the Bosnian Croats 'I
2 have some political influence, but on the ground it is a situation that
3 cannot be controlled.' He said that depending on the situation in a given
4 region, the Croats and Serbs either 'collaborate or fight each other.'"
5 In terms of President Tudjman's influence over the Croats, we will
6 deal with that extensively in the course of your testimony. Let me ask
7 you for now to direct your attention to the second part of that paragraph,
8 collaboration with the Serbs. What was your knowledge at the time,
9 information about the collaboration or cooperation between the Croats and
10 Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
11 A. There was military cooperation between the HVO and the Bosnian
12 Serb army, specifically it included circumstances in which the Serbs might
13 allow the HVO to pass through Croatian line -- sorry, the Serbs would
14 allow the HVO to pass through Serbian lines for the purpose of attacking
15 the Bosnian government, the army. It included the Serbs providing tanks
16 or artillery support for an HVO attack, and perhaps some that went the
17 other way as well.
18 Q. Did you ever hear the phrase during this time or was it said there
19 was something called "rent a tank?
20 A. Yes, the notion that for" a certain number of marks, at this point
21 I don't remember the price, you could rent a tank for a day and then you
22 would pay so much for each shell that was fired, and of course these would
23 be Serbian tanks that would be rented by the HVO.
24 Q. Going on to the second page and item number 5, paragraph number 5.
25 Again, on some of these matters, sir, I'm afraid we're going to have to
1 move rather quickly to finish your testimony in the allotted time, but if
2 you look in paragraph 5, are the notes that you have made here consistent
3 with what you have told us earlier this morning about Tudjman's views
4 about Muslims?
5 A. Yes, I think this illustrates his prejudice about the Bosnian
7 Q. For example halfway through the paragraph it says: "He pointed
8 out that Croats and Muslims share a language, but 'the Islamic religion
9 separates them.'"
10 A. Yes, and that reflected his view that the Muslims were Croats who
11 had chosen Islam.
12 Q. Directing your attention to paragraph 6, and I will ask --
13 probably spend a bit more on this paragraph. It says: "Tudjman
14 acknowledged the problems which the situation in BH or it say may BiH
15 creates for Croatia and said 'I don't know how it happened.' But, he
16 said, Croats are not conquering 'other'' territory, but 'land which for
17 centuries has belonged to Croats.'"
18 Can you comment on that?
19 A. It reflected his view that a -- a significant part of Bosnia was
20 historically Croat territory and even if there were places that were no
21 longer Croat inhabited, they were historically Croat and therefore could
22 not be ceded to the Bosnian Muslims or the government.
23 Q. Going to paragraph number 8, starting with the first part of it
24 before continuing.
25 "Tudjman, not denying that Croatian support for the HVO is a
2 Had you raised with him, even by this time, the relationship and
3 support between the Republic of Croatia and Herceg-Bosna and the HVO?
4 A. Absolutely. Our position was that Croatia supports, sponsors, and
5 directs the HVO and the Bosnian Croat political parties, including the --
6 or the -- it supports the HVO, it supports the so-called government at
7 Herceg-Bosna. It -- the -- it is the same -- was the same political
8 party, the HDZ. And therefore, we were holding Croatia responsible for
9 the actions of the HVO and of the Bosnian Croat authorities. And in this
10 paragraph, of course, Tudjman is not denying that that is true; he's
11 simply explaining it, namely that the Herzegovinians were -- provided
12 critical support to Croatia in its hour in need in 1991, he's explaining
13 that Herzegovina is part of the ancient kingdom of Croatia, that
14 Herzegovina is strategically important to Croatia, which is obvious if you
15 look at a map. It's of course no justification for Croatian territorial
16 ambitions there or Croatian control, but he's simply explaining why it's
17 important. And of course comes back, as he often does, to that 1939
18 agreement for the Banovina.
19 Q. And that's in his item -- reference 4?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. May I next ask the witness to be shown P03 --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we move on to another
23 exhibit, I'd like to go back to paragraph 4 where you said that Mr.
24 Tudjman told you that there was certain situations in which there was
25 cooperation -- or rather collaboration between Serbs and Croats and he
1 quoted two examples. For example, sometimes the HVO would cross Serb
2 lines to attack the Muslims, and then the other issue of the location --
3 tanks. Now, what you said that Mr. Tudjman told you, was that
4 corroborated by your own information? Did your own information bear that
6 THE WITNESS: Just to be clear, what I described to you about
7 the -- the HVO renting Serbian tanks, using -- using the Serb artillery to
8 support its military action to having transit through Serbian lines to
9 attack the government, these are not things that Tudjman told me. This is
10 based on information that -- that we had from -- on our own. What Tudjman
11 said in this conversation is simply what is reported here, which is that
12 the Croats and the Serbs in a given situation, either collaborate or fight
13 each other. He did not provide those details, but the Prosecutor had
14 asked me a separate question about the cooperation, and that's what I was
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but this collaboration
17 between the Serbs and Croats on the basis of what you knew, was that
18 decided at a political level, high-up political level, or was it decided
19 on the ground and were they agreements between the various military
20 offices that reached this agreement without the top-most political
21 authorities being aware of that? What would you say? It's rather an
22 extraordinary situation, isn't it?
23 THE WITNESS: Well, I cannot -- I cannot answer that question
24 definitively because I don't know at what level this cooperation was --
25 was authorised or took place. I can provide an informed speculation that
1 certainly it took place on the ground among different commanders, and that
2 the approval for that went some way up the chain of command. But at what
3 level it was granted, I couldn't tell you.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, yes.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, if I may just simply point out that
6 in light of the questions that were posed by the Prosecutor and your last
7 questions, now we are into the area of getting information or having
8 knowledge from sources. As I've indicated, it's a known -- it's very
9 well-known that the CIA was actively working out of the Croatian embassy
10 and that the -- the American embassy, that is, and the American embassy
11 was getting lots of information. We have representatives here from the
12 state department. I certainly want to know all about where did this
13 information come and I certainly would like to look at this information,
14 not that I don't take the gentleman at his word, but there may be
15 something in it that's exculpatory. And I raise this at this point in
16 time because if we will not be allowed to have access to that information
17 because of an objection by the American government, then I certainly would
18 ask that we stay away from these sorts of questions because it would be --
19 it would violate our clients' rights of confrontation.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 Ambassador, the sources you refer to, the Defence is putting
22 forward a hypothesis, they're putting forward their case. You can answer
23 or not answer, or you can say: They are the usual sources that an
24 ambassador has recourse to. I don't know. Answer one of those.
25 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, with all respect to the ambassador, my
1 understanding is -- my instructions from the United States government is
2 that under Rule 70 we would not be able to go behind as to sources of this
3 particular type of information.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: And in that event, Your Honour, I would ask that
6 the previous answers to the questions posed be -- I know we can't strike
7 it from the record, but at least be noted that they're not to be
8 considered because we are not allowed to cross-examine in these areas
9 based on the fact that we do not have access to these sources. And I
10 would also ask, Your Honour, for a cautionary instruction to the
11 Prosecution not to solicit information which would cause the witness to
12 say: Based on information that I received or based on knowledge I know,
13 of which he's unable to tell us where that information came from. I
14 understand the US policy, and I understand the predicament the gentleman
15 is in, but we also have certain protections.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We have recorded
17 what you've just said.
18 Mr. Scott, please proceed within the frameworks of Article 70, of
19 course -- Rule 70.
20 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
21 If we could next go, please, to Exhibit P03240. It's a rather
22 thick document. There's really only one reference in it. As soon as it's
23 available. The record of a presidential meeting in Zagreb on the same
24 day, the meeting between Ambassador Galbraith and Tudjman on the 6th of
25 July, 1993. And if I could ask for the usher's assistance to take us to
1 page 40.
2 Q. Sir, if I can direct your attention to the middle of that page,
3 the English-language version is being displayed on the left side. About
4 the middle of the page the remark is attributed to President Tudjman. It
5 appeared in New York in -- and then Susak intervenes and says: "In
6 Toronto, too."
7 And then Tudjman continues to speak: "At the Bosnian delegation.
8 I had requested through our people ... and this confirms what is written
9 there. Now the question is in what way we are going to present our policy
10 because they still have not, and America today also (said) that we have to
11 be careful and (Ambassador) Galbraith told me today that we have to be
12 careful about our actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also because Croatia
13 could come under sanctions for our assistance to the HVO. Hence, such a
14 policy towards Croatia is continuing."
15 And can you just tell us, sir, based on your meeting with Tudjman
16 on that same day, has the president accurately reported the US position?
17 A. Yes. In very brief, summary form -- but I would also underscore a
18 point here, which is that he -- he admits, as he did in the conversation
19 with me, or at least didn't deny, he admits that Croatia is providing
20 assistance to the HVO.
21 Q. So when Mr. Tudjman -- when President Tudjman was speaking --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, Mr. Scott.
23 Mr. Praljak was on his feet.
24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I think there was a
25 misinterpretation. It says: "Towards Bosnia and Herzegovina" not "in
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina." So policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina,
2 whereas in the translation it said "in Bosnia and Herzegovina." So it's
3 the relationship, it's towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thank you.
4 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, I think the translation is -- I
5 don't know -- I'm not sure what Mr. Praljak is referring to. What I
6 quoted was: "Careful about our actions," that is Croatian government's
7 actions, "in Bosnia and Herzegovina also because Croatia could come under
8 sanctions for our assistance to the HVO. Hence, such a policy towards
9 Croatia is continuing."
10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] May I read out the Croatian
12 "Galbraith, we have to take into consideration our actions towards
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina." "Prema" is the word used in Croatian.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, counsel Kovacic.
15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Just for the record, Your Honour,
16 what Mr. Praljak read out is the Croatian text of the records on page 40,
17 according to the Prosecution's numbers, which corresponds to the English
18 translation. So that must be the same number of pages. And it
19 says "prema Bosnia and Herzegovina," which means towards Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina, as Mr. Praljak said.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, in the Croatian text we do
22 indeed see the word "prema."
23 MR. SCOTT:
24 Q. Ambassador, going back to the point you were making a moment ago,
25 so we see here that when President Tudjman, Susak, and others are talking
1 about this, if you will, among themselves, there is no denial that Croatia
2 was assisting the HVO?
3 A. That is correct. After all, he's saying Croatia could come under
4 sanctions because of our assistance to the HVO, and that is entirely
5 consistent with the position that he adopted in the meeting with me that I
6 testified to in response to your earlier questions.
7 MR. SCOTT: If we can next go on to Exhibit P05090.
8 Q. Do you recall, sir, that on the 15th of September, 1993, you and
9 the ambassadors from Germany and Turkey were called to a meeting with
10 President Tudjman at the presidential offices?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And when you have a chance or if you've had a chance to look at
13 this transcript, is that a record of that meeting?
14 A. It is a record of that meeting. I might add, though, that it is a
15 record of a meeting mostly conducted in English that was translated into
16 Croatian -- well, Tudjman would have spoken in Croatian, but the
17 ambassadors all spoke in English, translated into Croatian, and
18 re-translated back into English. So the speech is probably not exactly
19 the same.
20 Q. Let me ask you, by the way, when you would have these meetings
21 with President Tudjman in his office, did you know you were being
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Looking to the second page of the document, page number 2 --
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a technical precision.
1 There was a transcriber who was next to you and recorded everything or did
2 you have a technical device?
3 THE WITNESS: There was a microphone on the table or someplace
4 else, if it was upstairs in his office.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So every time you knew that this
6 would be recorded. Is that it?
7 THE WITNESS: Well, of course you were never sure whether the
8 microphones were running or not in any given meeting, and I never asked:
9 Oh, is this being recorded? But I presumed that it was being recorded and
10 I operated on the assumption that it was being recorded. But I suppose to
11 be fully accurate, I didn't definitively know that it was being recorded
12 until the Croatian government began to release transcripts, because at no
13 point did any -- did any Croatian official tell me: Oh, it's being
14 recorded. But there were recording devices, and so I presumed that that
15 was the case.
16 MR. SCOTT:
17 Q. Now, in this transcript or this record of the meeting on the 15th
18 of September, 1993, President Tudjman says that he's describing to you
19 certain discussions that he's had, recent discussions, with Izetbegovic.
20 And again, if we can go to page 4 in the interest of time, looking to the
21 paragraph or to the portion which says: "The second reason for calling
22 you here is to inform you that we have signed this agreement which,
23 remains secret, but we will inform your governments. It deals with the
24 policy which should be conducted in BiH by both the Croatian and Muslim
25 sides. This comes as a priority bringing together the Bosnian Republic of
1 Croatia and the Bosnian Muslim Republic in order to enter into a
2 confederation with the Republic of Croatia."
3 Now, with that in mind, sir, can you tell us a bit about what this
4 meeting was about, what was happening here as you understood it.
5 A. Yes. The idea was that the essential point that came out of this
6 was an agreement to form a federation of the Bosnian Croats and the
7 Bosnian Muslims, the Bosniaks, which in turn would enter into a
8 confederation with Croatia.
9 Q. Going on to page 5, Tudjman continues on that page, he says:
10 "Mr. Izetbegovic also expressed one more thought. I think this agreement
11 as it is, is in accordance with the interests of Croatia and, I believe,
12 in line with the intentions of your government as well. This agreement
13 stems from a unified existence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
14 but bearing in mind that the Serbs practically separated from this union.
15 In relation to that, the Croatian and Muslim republics should take a
16 stance on this and position themselves for a confederation with Croatia.
17 Mr. Izetbegovic is of the opinion that if the Serbs withdraw, or even
18 without that, there may be the creation of an independent Bosnian Muslim
19 Republic. He says that in that case such a Bosnian Muslim Republic would
20 have international recognition of its borders. As acceptable as this may
21 be to him, this would also mean that it would be acceptable for the
22 Bosnian Croatian Republic to join in with Croatia."
23 What can you tell us about that?
24 A. It certainly reflected Tudjman's wish for what he hoped would
25 happen I think in a very stark way, namely that you would have a Bosnian
1 Croat republic with established borders, you would have a separate Muslim
2 republic, and then that Croat republic would join Croatia and become part
3 of Greater Croatia. And it also reflected his logic in how he was going
4 to get there, namely that the Serbs split-off and then you encouraged the
5 Muslims to form their own state. I did not think, based on anything that
6 I know, that this actually reflected the views of Izetbegovic, and so a
7 great deal of what was going on in this meeting was he was trying to
8 persuade the United States, Germany, obviously from Croatia's point of
9 view the two most important countries of bilateral relationships, and
10 Turkey, who he saw as being the most influential country with the Bosnian
11 Muslims to accept this kind of solution.
12 Q. Going to page 7, as soon as we have it, your intervention, Peter
14 "It seems to me there is some contradiction in the agreement as I
15 see it. From one side the possibility of a union of the Muslim and
16 Croatian Republics (BiH) has been discussed and on the other side its
17 confederation with Croatia."
18 Can you tell us more about what you saw as the contradiction and
19 what Tudjman was saying.
20 A. Yes. And I think, however, this sentence, it reflects the
21 problem -- the lack of clarity that comes from speaking in English,
22 translated into Croatian, and then back into English. So I will give you
23 the idea, but perhaps the words here are not exactly the words that I
24 said. And of course 13 years later I can't recall the exact words I would
25 have said. But I certainly know what I thought, and I would have
1 articulated what I thought, and that is there was an obvious contradiction
2 between something we saw as very positive and, in fact, became the basis
3 of the Washington Agreement, namely that you would have a -- a federation
4 between the Bosnian Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats on the one hand, and
5 on the other hand that perhaps the Croat -- there would be a Croat
6 republic which would then join Croatia. The reason I think these words
7 are imprecise is that -- is that we accepted the idea, and this was in the
8 Washington Agreement and in fact in the Dayton Agreement as well, that
9 the -- that the entities in Bosnia might have special relations with their
10 neighbouring countries. Now, we never used the word "confederation," but
11 we did go along with the concept of special relationships.
12 Q. Going -- finishing on this document, if we go to page 12, because
13 I asked you earlier about the -- about the question of Mostar ever came
14 up. And on the bottom of page 12, Ambassador Galbraith, you say: "What
15 would happen if the Muslim republic becomes an independent country that
16 includes Mostar?"
17 And on the next page, page 13, Tudjman says: "Mostar is the
18 capital of the Croatian republic (of BiH) that's not at stake here.
19 "Galbraith: Do the Muslims accept that?
20 "Tudjman: Yes, of course."
21 And was that Tudjman's continuing view of the position and role of
23 A. Yes, it was. And what he was -- you can see from this transcript
24 that I'm asking a series of, if you will, leading or skeptical questions
25 about this proposal to draw him out. But he -- what he basically is
1 saying that: Oh, there's no problem -- they're saying: Not only does all
2 of Mostar become part of the Croat republic, which it might eventually
3 join Croatia, but that the Bosnian government, the Bosniaks, accept that.
4 And as you might imagine I didn't actually believe that that was true.
5 Q. If we can next then go, please, to Exhibit P06412.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Just a point of clarification while we're doing --
7 while we're getting the next document. It's my understanding that this
8 entire conversation is within the context of: If the Serbs break away and
9 if the Muslims form their own republic, as opposed to: This is, you know,
10 part of -- there's a plan A plus plan B. This is my understanding of the
11 context. Am I right or --
12 MR. SCOTT: Why don't we wait until cross-examination for that.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: The whole point is, as we go along why don't we
14 make the record straight.
15 MR. SCOTT: Because I'm not going to use my time to ask your
16 questions, Mr. Karnavas. I think the ambassador has been very clear that
17 he himself knew very well what was happening here and he was drawing
18 Tudjman out to state what his true views were. And the witness has said
19 he was skeptical of what was really happening here. It was being
20 presented as an Izetbegovic proposal, and the witness said he was
21 skeptical of that. Now I'll ask the witness if I've properly understood
22 his position.
23 Q. Ambassador.
24 A. That is precisely right, and of course one of the reasons -- I was
25 drawing this out for two reasons. First, so that my German and Turkish
1 colleague would fully grasp what was going on here, and naturally we
2 talked about it afterwards. And the fact that I'd drawn it out was
3 some -- was information that then helped them see clearly through what
4 Tudjman was talking about. So that was one very important point. And
5 second, I was looking for information so that I could describe this
6 clearly back to the United States government so that they would grasp what
7 was going on here.
8 MR. SCOTT: If we could then go to P06412, transcript of a meeting
9 on the 4th of November, 1993. And if we can just only go -- again in the
10 interests of time, to page 7.
11 Q. These are continuing discussions. You will see and if anyone in
12 the court-room wants to skim through the transcript, continuing
13 discussions of some of these concepts between you and President Tudjman.
14 And if I can ask you to look at the bottom -- the last paragraph on page
15 7. Is it correct to say, sir, that you once again state the US position
16 on borders to President Tudjman?
17 A. Absolutely. And one of the things you have to understand is that
18 the reason I'm constantly doing this is because it is clear to me that
19 Tudjman is constantly -- it's -- it is the thing that is at the top of his
20 mind that he wishes to change these borders. And I wished to close the
21 door on that thought in every way I -- that is humanly possible. And
22 hence, the statement here: "The most solid basis for a solution for an
23 agreement between the individual parties lies in recognising the fact that
24 the present borders are international borders and there is no prospect
25 that they will ever be changed."
1 Q. Thank you. Ambassador, going now back to this concept, there was
2 an earlier reference in one of the earlier cables to the question of
3 Zagreb's or Tudjman's control over the HVO. And I said we would come back
4 to that. Can you tell us what your observations and experience was on
5 that topic, and that is to what extent did the Tudjman government control
6 Herceg-Bosna and the HVO?
7 A. In my judgement and based on my experience, President Tudjman was
8 de facto equally the president of the -- equally the president of the
9 Bosnian Croat political entity, as he was the president of Croatia, that
10 he was equally the commander-in-chief of the HVO as he was the
11 commander-in-chief of the HV.
12 Q. Can you give the Judges some of the -- some of your basis for
13 that, some of your experience, some of your conversations on which you
14 base that conclusion.
15 A. Well, let's take the -- sorry. Let's take the military command.
16 Croatia financed the HVO, paid salaries. The Croatian -- Croatia
17 appointed the generals and top officers of the HVO, and when it became
18 convenient to change them it was Croatia that changed them. Croatian --
19 Croatian -- this was economically part of Croatia. It was the same
20 political party which Tudjman headed in -- effectively in both countries,
21 the HDZ. What later during the presidential campaign in Croatia, there
22 were billboards in Bosnian Croat territory that referred to Tudjman as
23 "our president." The -- and of course Bosnian Croats voted in the
24 Croatia elections. When -- when we sought action, the address that we
25 went to was primarily Croatia, and it was when we went to the -- to
1 Zagreb, to Tudjman, to Susak, to Granic that we in fact got results and
2 often very prompt results.
3 Q. When you say that -- sorry, let me interrupt you there for
4 clarification. When you say you sought action, when you sought action or
5 results, where?
6 A. Sorry, when we sought action or results in Bosnia, in the Croat
7 part of Bosnia, when we wished to have humanitarian convoys, we wished the
8 HVO to stop blocking humanitarian convoys, when we wished to have
9 prisoners released, when we wished to get access to prison camps in
10 Bosnia, all of these things were things that we did through the government
11 in Zagreb and direct -- usually by me directly with Tudjman, Susak, or
13 Q. On this topic, can you tell the Judges what your observations were
14 about the level of knowledge or information displayed by Tudjman and Susak
15 and others as to what was happening in the Croat parts of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the ground, so to speak.
17 A. I think they knew what was going on in the Croat parts of Bosnia
18 extremely well, better than what they in fact knew what was in fact going
19 on in most parts of Croatia. And frankly, at this time they seemed to
20 care more about what was going on in the Croat parts of Bosnia than they
21 did about what was going on in the rest of Croatia.
22 Q. Can you share with the Judges any observations that you saw,
23 experiences, in terms of whether Susak had any relationship, dealings,
24 regular dealings, let me put it that way, with Boban. A. Oh, when I
25 talked to Susak, he would often talk about his relations with Boban and
1 their friendship and his -- his control or influence over Boban.
2 Q. In any of your conversations with Susak, do you recall any
3 instance in which he claimed to have control or influence over any
4 particular HV or HV commanders that were operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 at the time?
6 A. Yes. He asserted that he had control over Slobodan Praljak.
7 Q. Susak?
8 A. Yes, Susak asserted that -- that he had effective control over
10 Q. I won't go into that further at this moment, Mr. Ambassador, and
11 the Judges, because there will be a follow-up reflected in one of the
12 upcoming documents?
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I interject a question? We have been shown a
14 lot of - I will carefully say - normative texts that organised the -- that
15 Herceg-Bosna and the HZ HB. According to those texts, it would be the
16 president of that entity that names, for instance, generals. Have you
17 ever heard any reference to such documents. I now use the term
18 unconstitutionality. Was there ever a discussion that all this teleguided
19 action, as you describe it, from Zagreb was "anti-constitutional" in a
20 Herceg-Bosna perspective?
21 THE WITNESS: So far as I recall, not at all. In short, the -- in
22 short, Tudjman, Susak -- Tudjman and Susak, as best I can recall, never
23 suggested that there was some constitutional impediment to their control
24 over the Bosnian Croat political entity or over the HVO. Milosevic, by
25 contrast, used this as a smoke screen all the time. Oh, well, that's a
1 separate country. I don't control the Republika Srpska, I don't control
2 the Bosnian Serb army, that's something different. That, as best I can
3 recall, was never mentioned to me by Tudjman or Susak. They -- they
4 didn't go through that charade. They took responsibility for the Bosnian
5 Croat leadership and for the HVO. And I think it's important to
6 understand the reason why this was. They were looking for good relations
7 with the United States, and from the time of my arrival I think it's fair
8 to say that they felt that they -- that relations with the United States
9 were improving greatly, they felt, rightly, that I was sympathetic to
10 Croatia, that the Clinton administration was sympathetic to Croatia, and
11 that there was a partnership. So in the manner of what became an
12 increasingly close partnership, they weren't going to pretend about
13 structures that didn't matter to them; in other words, they were going to
14 be direct with their partners, perhaps in a way they would not have been
15 if they were dealing with less -- countries that they felt less close to.
16 And of course at that time they had no idea that their actions were going
17 to be being judged someday by a Tribunal like this one.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
19 MR. SCOTT:
20 Q. Sir, the views that you've expressed or the information or
21 knowledge that you've indicated in the past few minutes, did you consider
22 this was some knowledge uniquely known or held to you or what was the
23 status of this information or knowledge in the international diplomatic
24 community in Zagreb at the time?
25 A. I think every diplomat who, except the most oblivious, clearly
1 understood that Tudjman and Susak controlled Bosnian Croat political
2 entity, the HDZ in Bosnia, and the HVO.
3 Q. Would it be fair to say in that context, sir, that one might
4 consider it was no secret at all or what some might call an open secret?
5 A. It was an open secret, shading into no secret at all.
6 Q. Now, if I can turn to Mr. Boban. Do you recall when you first had
7 a meeting with Mr. Boban?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. And when was that, please?
10 A. It was in Split on July 20th, 1993, if I am right.
11 Q. And how did that meeting come about and can you just give us a
12 brief overview of what happened in that meeting, the nature of the
13 conversation, the dynamics, what happened.
14 A. The meeting took place in the Croatian naval base in Split. It
15 was at the -- I think it was set up at the request of Boban. And it began
16 I think around 5.00 in the evening and lasted two or three hours. It
17 began with a long litany of complaints by Boban against the Bosnian
18 government, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Bosniaks as a people.
19 And then I think a great deal of surprise on his part when I responded
20 very firmly about -- on the subject of HVO misconduct and atrocities,
21 including the holding of prisoners in inhumane conditions, the blocking of
22 humanitarian convoys, and the shelling of east Mostar. The -- he really
23 was very much taken aback. I think he was -- he had believed from the
24 statements that I had made about Croatia's territorial integrity, from a
25 visit I'd make to Vukovar, from my denunciation of Vukovar as a war crime,
1 that my sympathy and my government's sympathy for Croatia was unlimited.
2 And in fact, the denunciation of war crimes committed by the Serbs was
3 matched by denunciation war crimes committed by the HVO. He responded by
4 promising to correct some of these problems. In particular he said that
5 he would move to release prisoners. He didn't quite come out and say
6 that, but that was the implication. The next day he sent a message to my
7 office in Zagreb that in fact he was going to release prisoners and indeed
8 prisoners were released.
9 Q. Let's look, in fact, please, at the next Exhibit P09501. If we
10 could enlarge the first paragraph, please, a bit. Thank you very much.
11 If we can scroll down or scroll up, I guess, we can see the top part of
12 the document in the English part. Thank you very much.
13 Sir, is this a cable reporting your meeting with Boban on the 20th
14 of July, 1993?
15 A. Yes, it is. And it also reports some of the actions that followed
16 directly as a result of that meeting.
17 Q. You raise with him during this meeting such topics as UNHCR, the
18 humanitarian convoys, and as you indicated a moment ago, the holding of a
19 large number of Muslim men?
20 A. That's right.
21 Q. Did you raise to him -- did you raise during this conversation or
22 meeting that the state of Croatia possibly faced sanctions if the HVO did
23 not, if you will, clean up its act?
24 A. Yes, that was our position. We told Croatia that and I told him
1 Q. All right. As you indicated a moment ago, you give a -- you give
2 a report as to the beginning of the meeting, Boban's litany?
3 MR. SCOTT: If I can ask, please, that we go to the second page.
4 And the section that's titled "unimpeded access for humanitarian convoys."
5 Q. Was this an important issue to you and the US government at this
7 A. Hugely important.
8 Q. And what steps did you take to address it?
9 A. I raised the issue with the responsible Croatian -- well,
10 President Tudjman, with Defence Minister Susak, Foreign Minister Granic,
11 other officials, and with Boban. I also -- the US government made clear
12 that if humanitarian assistance did not go to the -- into the Bosniak
13 areas in Bosnia, that it would result in sanctions -- in US support for
14 sanctions on Croatia. It was a matter of the highest priority for my
15 government that humanitarian supplies go into Bosnia and that the
16 suffering that was caused by that war be mitigated to the greatest extent
17 possible. And it was utterly unacceptable that Croatia and an entity --
18 for which Croatia was directly responsible as for which Croatia was
19 funding should obstruct the flow of that humanitarian assistance.
20 Q. In the second paragraph under this heading is it accurately
21 reported, sir, that: "Ambassador Galbraith stated that denial of
22 assistance to women and children is a war crime"?
23 A. I certainly stated that in the strongest possible way.
24 Q. Going over to the next page, please, second paragraph -- the
25 paragraph starting: "Galbraith said ..."
1 I said we would probably come back to this -- this topic would
2 come up again. In this meeting, according this to this cable, it says one
3 of the things again was raised was in the middle of that paragraph
4 that: "Croat-Serb military collaboration must cease."
5 And was that the type of collaboration that you were describing
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Did you also raise the issue and continue to raise the issue about
9 the freedom of movement of international organisations such as the UN and
11 A. That was an issue that we raised constantly. We wanted the UN to
12 be able to carry out its mission and of course access for the ICRC was
13 essential in order to -- for humanitarian reasons, in order to, you know,
14 ensure that prisoners in camps were being treated properly.
15 Q. Did you raise with Boban during this meeting the fact that by this
16 time two Spanish officers had been killed in Mostar?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. What was Boban's response to that?
19 A. He blamed the Bosnian Muslims.
20 Q. The next heading is called -- is -- states: "Boban's agenda."
21 And toward the end of that paragraph, that first paragraph, can
22 you see that -- do you recall talking with Boban about the fact that they
23 wanted to move -- there was a desire to move a large number of Croats from
24 the Vares area?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Did Mr. Boban give you any details, if you recall, I know this is
2 years later, any details as to how it was that they would move this Croat
3 population from the Vares area?
4 A. I don't recall if we discussed the mechanics of how they might be
5 moved, but the point was that he wanted them moved from Vares to
6 Croat-controlled areas, presumably Herzegovina, to increase the Croat
7 population in Herzegovina. What was striking is that he did not ask for
8 help in protecting the Croat population of Vares. He did not ask the
9 United States to use its very considerable influence with the government
10 in Sarajevo, for example, to do anything that might benefit the population
11 in -- while they were still in Vares.
12 Q. On item H, on the next page, there are a number of lettered items
13 and there's letter H. And do you recall, sir, whether Boban then
14 committed to you in this meeting that he would release 6.000
15 detainees "unilaterally, except for 'criminals'"?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. SCOTT: And if we can go, because it immediately flows from
18 this, to Exhibit P09500.
19 Q. Is this a cable that was sent on the 21st of July, 1993?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And in fact, was there a subsequent conversation around this time
22 very close in time from Mr. Boban that in fact the release of prisoners
23 had been started?
24 A. That day he contacted -- or his office contacted the -- my office
25 in Zagreb to pass on a message that -- and I quote the message: "Today
1 began a release of prisoners held by the HVO in a determined process that
2 is continuing and will go on until all have been released."
3 Q. If I can next ask you to look at Exhibit P09697. While that's
4 coming up, Ambassador, you've indicated several times that one of the
5 senior Croatian officials that you had frequent dealings with and
6 apparently quite a bit of respect for was the foreign minister,
7 Dr. Granic. Is that correct?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. And I'm now showing you the attachment or the second page of
10 P09697, which is titled "an appeal." If you look at the bottom of the
11 document around exactly the same time, the 21st of July, 1993.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Does Dr. Granic's appeal relate, in fact, to the very issues that
14 you and the United States government were raising with the Government of
15 Croatia at this time?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And you will see on the cover -- the cover page, if you will, the
18 first page of Exhibit P09697, that apparently the head of Mr. Granic's
19 office, I assume his head of -- administrative aid or Chief of Staff was
20 passing this or sending this appeal on to Jadranko Prlic, HZ HB HVO
21 president. Do you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Let me next ask you to please look at Exhibit P03673. And can you
24 see, sir, if you can take a look at this, this is a -- it's
25 titled: "Statement regarding the response by the President Dr. Prlic to
1 the Republic of Croatia Deputy Prime Minister," who again is Dr. Granic,
2 "Mostar, 23 July 1993." Do you see that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, if you look through the document, can you see that again it
5 touches on such issues as humanitarian convoys and the detention and the
6 holding of Muslim men? Take your time if you want to skim through it.
7 It's a ...
8 A. The answer is yes.
9 Q. Ambassador, Mr. Ambassador, is this an example of -- of a
10 situation you described to us some minutes ago where issues would be
11 raised in Zagreb and you would -- you would see responses being made in
13 A. It is an example, although I think it's -- would be correct to say
14 that this method of communication from Granic to Prlic in the form of a
15 demarche was probably -- and then a response was for the benefit of the
16 United States because the way in which orders were transmitted was more
17 direct. But this was a document that Granic produced to show he was doing
18 something, which he genuinely was, and a response to the Granic demands.
19 Q. All right. Now, if we come back to some of the issues in more
20 detail that you've indicated -- you've mentioned several times already
21 today, the HVO detention camps, the humanitarian aid convoys, and the
22 siege and the shelling of east Mostar. Is it correct, sir, that as of
23 July of 1993 and thereafter you had raised all of these issues with
24 Tudjman, Susak, Granic, and other officials that you were dealing with at
25 the time?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Do you recall, sir, how soon after taking up your post in Zagreb
3 information came to your attention that the HVO was operating detention
4 camps that were holding a large number of Muslim men?
5 A. It was very soon after taking up my post. I presented my
6 credentials on the 28th of June, and I think we became aware of the
7 round-up of men and, incidentally, some women - it's not true that it was
8 just men - that took place a couple days later, I think on maybe the 30th
9 of June.
10 Q. During this phase of July, August, September 1993 approximately,
11 were you responsible for sending two fact-finding missions into
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina proper, Herzegovina specifically, and to certain
13 islands on the Croatian coast?
14 A. I was.
15 Q. And tell us about those two missions, why and what they found as
16 an overview.
17 A. Well, one of my thoughts was that if we gained access to the
18 prison camps, first the fact that they were being visited by the US
19 embassy would certainly lead -- would hopefully lead - and I thought very
20 likely lead - to improvements in the conditions in the camps. And I also
21 knew that the Croatian government, while it might be prepared to block,
22 delay, or obstruct visits by the ICRC and by the United Nations, would not
23 dare to block a visit by the United States, so that we simply had more
24 access than anybody else. So I wanted to get access to these camps. We
25 sought access. Granic and Susak promised that we would get access, and
1 indeed we did get access to the Heliodrom at Rodic, and I sent a team in
2 there. It was also my very regular practice to send officers to interview
3 refugees. This is actually something the US embassy had been doing from
4 the start of the conflict in Bosnia. And indeed, I might add that a
5 number of those testimonials have been submitted to this Tribunal.
6 The -- but in any event, so we sent -- I sent people to Obonjan
7 island and Gasinci refugee camp to interview people who had been in the
8 Croatian detention camps.
9 Q. Did you and the United States government continue to raise these
10 issues with the Tudjman government and indicate that actions were
11 expected -- corrections -- relief was expected or there could be
12 consequences for Croatia?
13 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour. [Interpretation] I apologise for
14 having to interrupt but I'd like to clarify a point. In the transcript on
15 page 63 when the witness mentioned Gasinci, line 12, I believe, and then
16 in line 13 it says Croatian detention camps, that's the phrase used. I
17 never heard the witness say that. Perhaps I didn't hear properly, but
18 they were refugee camps. Could you have that checked, please, because I
19 think I was listening to the English and I don't think the witness said
20 detention camps, as it says here referring to Croatian detention camps.
21 MR. SCOTT: I think we can clarify that perhaps.
22 THE WITNESS: What I had said was that I sent people to Obonjan
23 island and Gasinci refugee camp to interview people who had been in the
24 HVO-run detention camps.
25 MR. SCOTT:
1 Q. The question I just put to you before the intervention was, did
2 you and the United States government continue to raise these issues with
3 the Tudjman government and again indicate that there might very well be
4 sanctions or consequences for Croatia if the camp situation was not
6 A. We constantly raised these issues, and I constantly made the point
7 that we were -- that we would not judge Croatia on its commitments or what
8 it promised to do, but on the results on the ground in the Croat part --
9 Croat-controlled part of Bosnia.
10 Q. As part of what was happening with the camps, did you come to know
11 or have any information at the time that there was some programme or
12 arrangement by which the Muslim men would be released from the camps, the
13 HVO camps, if they would leave to a third country, leave Bosnia and go to
14 a third country?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And what can you -- do you recall -- looking at some of your
17 documents in a few moments, but do you recall anything more about how that
18 was done?
19 A. Well, this was reporting by some of the embassy officers who went
20 to the refugee camps. And they described a process by which men held in
21 these HVO camps were told that if they agreed to be re-settled in a third
22 country, they would then be released from the camp, the HVO detention
23 camp, and go to Croatia for a third-country re-settlement. And indeed a
24 very large number of the people, of the men in the camps, did sign these
25 forms, and then they were taken out of the camp, back to their original
1 home. They were given between a few minutes and a few hours to collect
2 their belongings, family members, and then taken to the border between
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, where they were met by the Croatian police
4 and escorted in this case to the Obonjan refugee camp.
5 Q. Can we turn momentarily to the question of humanitarian convoys,
6 and I guess at this point just to confirm again that this was an issue
7 that you and the United States government were raising with the Croatian
8 and Bosnian Croat officials throughout this period.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Also the -- sorry?
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just to clarify something. I
12 seem to think, Mr. Ambassador, that you asked for authorisation for the
13 people working for the embassy to be able to go to the Heliodrom. Now,
14 did you in fact send someone to Heliodrom, people cooperating with your
15 embassy, embassy staff, or whoever, or didn't they see those localities
16 except when they were in the camp?
17 THE WITNESS: They -- I sent embassy staff to the Heliodrom, and
18 they went into the Heliodrom and they filed a report on what they found in
19 the Heliodrom.
20 MR. SCOTT: We have a specific document reporting that,
21 Your Honour, that we're coming to.
22 Q. To touch on the other -- one of the other issues you've mentioned,
23 sir, were you also continuing to raise throughout this time issuing
24 concerning the siege and the shelling of east Mostar?
25 A. Yes. Sorry.
1 Q. Now, before we look at some of these additional documents that
2 we're going to get to, going back to the relationship between the HV and
3 the HVO, that is the Croatian army and the Herceg-Bosna army, had you
4 specifically raised with Tudjman and others by this point the issue of the
5 HV's involvement in Bosnia?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And by this time was this -- again, was this an issue uniquely
8 known and raised by you or was this something that was a matter that again
9 generally being discussed and raised by the international community?
10 A. It was generally known by the international community. I cannot
11 speak to how much my diplomatic colleagues may have raised it.
12 Q. Did you have any understanding at this time -- Mr. Praljak has
13 come up a couple of times in your testimony so far. As an example, did
14 you know what Mr. Praljak's position had been in the Croatian government
15 or army before coming to Herceg-Bosna?
16 A. Well, as I recall, he held a senior position and had been a
17 general in the Croatian army.
18 Q. Do you recall, sir, whether there was any discussion in the
19 international -- perhaps in the embassy or in the international community
20 at that time -- I don't -- I'm asking you, I don't know if it was said
21 literally or figuratively, that the HB and the HVO insignia patches were
22 attached with Velcro, could be changed one to the other?
23 A. We certainly discussed that in the embassy, and I think it was
24 literally true.
25 Q. I raise with you the knowledge of this issue in the international
1 community. Can I ask you, please, to be shown Exhibit P05047?
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just a question of information. I'm not sure I
3 know what Velcro stands for. I can imagine, but I'm -- I would like to
4 know exactly.
5 MR. SCOTT: I'm not sure if I should answer you or the witness
6 should answer you.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: [Microphone not activated].
8 MR. SCOTT: Perhaps the witness can answer.
9 THE WITNESS: For anybody, if you have small children you know, it
10 is the -- it is a sticky material that attaches two pieces of fabric
11 together. So children who no longer have to tie their shoelaces, they
12 have Velcro on their shoes, they fold over the flap, and it seals it, but
13 of course it can also be for patches that you can take off your patch and
14 change your patch.
15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. I now know it's also referred to in
16 my language, at least, as a strip-tease attachment.
17 MR. SCOTT:
18 Q. Sir, I was asking the usher to show you Exhibit P05047, and if we
19 could enlarge the English portion, please. Sir, do you recall generally
20 around this time, you may or may not recall this particular item, but that
21 again the issue of Croatia's -- the involvement of Croatia and its armed
22 forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and specifically in the conflict with the
23 Muslims was being raised in the international community, including the UN
24 Security Council?
25 A. Of course this was being raised by the international community, as
1 evidenced by this presidential statement of the Security Council. And the
2 United States as a permanent member of the Security Council would have
3 been one of the -- either the sponsors of supporters of this statement.
4 So this statement reflected the views of the -- views and concerns of the
5 United States government.
6 Q. And at the end of this -- this specifically talks about the camps,
7 among other issues, but I think in particular the camps. The last
8 paragraph, did that again make this connection or linkage of the Republic
9 of Croatia?
10 A. It is a statement that Croatia is responsible for what the Bosnian
11 Croats are doing.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, I think perhaps the gentleman should
13 look at the last paragraph again. I mean, it talks about a responsibility
14 to use influence. Now, how you get to responsible for actions, I think
15 it's a bit of a stretch. I understand the gentleman wishes to help the
16 Prosecution, but let's have some balance here.
17 MR. SCOTT: Well, I object to the attack on the witness,
18 Your Honour --
19 MR. KARNAVAS: There's no attack on the witness. I'm pointing the
21 MR. SCOTT: You said he's anxious to help the Prosecution --
22 THE WITNESS: Let me explain a statement like this, what this
23 means from translating from diplomatic language into plain English.
24 The -- when the Security Council calls on a government and says that it
25 has a responsibility to use its influence, this is, in fact, a -- with
1 a -- with a supposed foreign party and calls on that government to take
2 immediate steps to that end, this is an incredibly strong statement. If
3 the Security Council did not believe that -- that Croatia was responsible,
4 the statement would have been directed solely Bosnian Croat political
5 authorities, who after all ostensibly were from another country. It is
6 precisely because this kind of formulation reflects precisely the belief
7 of the United States government, but frankly a belief that was shared by
8 other members of the Security Council, that Croatia was responsible for
9 the conduct of the Bosnian Croats and that it was upon Croatia -- the
10 responsibility of Croatia to take immediate action.
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. Mr. Ambassador, there's one topic I want to raise with you
13 briefly. Did it come to your attention around this time - and if so, I'll
14 ask you how - that there was -- supposedly had been some letter from the
15 British Prime Minister John Major to the British official Hogg that was
16 circulating in the Tudjman -- Croatian presidential offices?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. How did that come to your attention?
19 A. As I recall, President Tudjman asked me to come up and see him and
20 showed me the letter.
21 Q. And did you see the letter?
22 A. I did see the letter.
23 Q. What was your conclusion upon looking at it?
24 A. It was an obvious forgery.
25 Q. And did you communicate that to President Tudjman?
1 A. I did.
2 Q. What were some of the reasons that made it obvious to you that it
3 was a false or forged document?
4 A. It was highly improbable that the British Prime Minister would
5 have written to a subordinate minister a letter outlining his views in
6 that way, and the views were -- were not plausible -- were not plausible
7 ones that the British Prime Minister likely would have had and certainly
8 not ones that he would have put down on paper.
9 Q. Do you recall whether they were also grammatical and other errors
10 in the English that was used?
11 A. If I saw the letter again, I would -- I suspect that was the case.
12 I don't recall now actually.
13 Q. All right.
14 A. But I -- it was very clear to me that it was a forgery for all
15 sorts of reasons.
16 Q. And you immediately in this meeting pointed that out to President
18 A. I did.
19 Q. If I can ask you to next go to -- excuse me. Exhibit P06251.
20 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, as I say that, I look at the clock.
21 I'm about to start a new document. I don't know if the Chamber wants to
22 take the break now or to go for a while longer.
23 [Trial Chamber confers].
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you wish. It's 20 minutes
25 past 12.00. We'll take our 20-minute break and re-convene in 20 minutes'
2 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott, you have
5 the floor until a quarter to 2.00.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 MR. SCOTT:
8 Q. We were about to go to P06251, please. Sir, this is a record of a
9 meeting at the presidential palace on the 29th of October, 1993. It
10 indicates that two of the persons present at the meeting were a Timothy E.
11 Wirth and apparently yourself, Mr. Galbraith. Can you tell the Judges who
12 Mr. Wirth was, what position he held, and why he was there?
13 A. He was the counselor for the state department, with responsibility
14 for global issues including refugee matters. He was a former senator from
15 Colorado and he was there to deal with the -- to look at the refugee
17 Q. Can I direct your attention, please, to page 6. The paragraph on
18 the page starting with the words "I spoke recently ..." I think the record
19 will show this is President Tudjman speaking. And the second -- sorry,
20 the third sentence beginning: "There are even some proposals to allow
21 that Serbian republic from Bosnia to join Serbia immediately, while only
22 the Muslim and Croat republics would remain in the union. This standpoint
23 is not acceptable for Croatia because Croats would be in the minority in
24 such a union, but we would be in favour of this (as printed). We are in
25 favour of the union being retained and of the Bosnian, Muslim, and
1 Croatian republics being bound together as firmly as possible within the
2 union. If the situation is already such that the Serbs would join Serbia,
3 to which Izetbegovic has agreed in his agreement with the Serbs, then the
4 Croat republic should join Croatia, but the Muslim republic should be
5 bound by a treaty on friendship, on a common defence, into a firmer
6 alliance with Croatia."
7 Now, can we stop there, sir, and, Mr. Ambassador, is this
8 essentially a continuation of the same types of conversations that we
9 looked at earlier with President Tudjman about how to reorganisation
11 A. Yes, it is, and what's important here is that he sees a new
12 influential American envoy and so he's hoping to make the case to
13 Counselor Wirth, and of course is also misrepresenting the position of the
14 ambassadors of Germany and France.
15 Q. And when you say that, you're making references to the opening
16 part of the paragraph: "I spoke recently with the ambassadors of Germany
17 and France."
18 A. Yeah, it seems no one in Europe believes any longer that the union
19 of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be maintained.
20 Q. And you knew that not to be the case?
21 A. Right.
22 Q. Can I ask you to continue over to page 10 where Mr. Wirth then
23 speaks. Several lines down Mr. Wirth says: "As Ambassador Zimmermann
24 said during his talks with you two weeks ago, we are still very concerned
25 about aid deliveries to refugees in Bosnia. We know that you are trying
1 to influence the HVO and you do have certain influence in other matters
2 and, as you know, this is very difficult, but we appreciate your efforts
3 and assume that we are doing everything" -- sorry. "We assure you that we
4 are doing everything in our power to assist in the efforts of the
5 international community to ensure aid. We hope that the aid will reach
6 its destination. However, unless there is a cessation of hostilities, we
7 will be unable to deliver the aid. I wouldn't be completely honest if I
8 didn't tell you that some circles in our administration are dissatisfied
9 with the activities of the HVO, that is, the stopping of aid, and some are
10 even saying that perhaps additional sanctions should be introduced to
11 exert more pressure on you so that you increase pressure on the HVO."
12 Now, a couple of questions. There's a reference here to
13 Ambassador Zimmermann. Can you tell us or at least remind us perhaps of
14 who Ambassador Zimmermann was at this time and what his role in these
15 matters was.
16 A. He was the Assistant Secretary of State for refugee and migration
17 issues, and therefore directly responsible for refugee issues, actually
18 reporting to the Secretary of State through counselor Wirth.
19 Q. And according it this record, in fact, Ambassador Zimmermann had
20 met with President Tudjman in the past approximately two weeks. Do you
21 recall that?
22 A. I was not in Zagreb when that meeting took place or it's also
23 possible, actually, that the meeting was not in Zagreb but someplace
25 Q. And, sir, is this a further example of in this instance of Mr.
1 Wirth being the messenger, that again if you don't take -- do everything
2 possible to correct the conduct of the HVO, there could be sanctions
3 against Croatia itself?
4 A. Yes, that was the message that he was delivering.
5 Q. Then changing topics from humanitarian aid to Stupni Do, in the
6 next paragraph it says: "Finally, I must mention that the United States
7 was truly shocked by the recent discovery, two days ago, and thus it would
8 be useful that you condemned it as soon as possible, bringing those
9 responsible" - next page - "to justice as soon as possible."
10 Did the atrocities and massacre committed at Stupni Do come to
11 your attention around this time?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And going on that same page, did you yourself raise and protest
14 what had happened at Stupni Do?
15 A. Yes, I did. I -- in fact, I had instructions to make a demarche
16 to Tudjman on the matter, and so I gave him a copy of the demarche, but
17 spoke to him about the impact that Stupni Do had had on the Clinton
18 administration, as well as the American public.
19 Q. And in your intervention on page 11, the second line of that --
20 the second sentence of that confirms, indeed, as you said, you had
21 delivered a copy of the demarche?
22 A. Yes.
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, I may have missed something. How do
24 we know this refers to Stupni Do?
25 MR. SCOTT: Well, for example, the second -- the sentence we just
1 read, Mr. Galbraith: "In connection with this, let me just add,
2 Mr. President, that I received instructions today to specifically raise
3 the issue of the massacre in Stupni Do."
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. Thank you.
5 MR. SCOTT:
6 Q. Going on over to page 12 then, again there's additional talk about
7 humanitarian convoys and the camps again -- no, I'm sorry, convoys -- no,
8 I was right the first time, camps and convoys. And then Tudjman starts
9 speaking and he says after referring to Mr. Wirth: "We were truly
10 appalled by what happened two days ago."
11 Do you see that on page 12?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you know whether -- was this the only time that you or the
14 United States government raised Stupni Do or was this something that was
15 at least around the end of October and into November 1993, this was
16 something that was raised as a very serious issue on a number of
18 A. Well, to deliver a demarche on the matter to the -- the head of
19 state and who is also de facto the head of government of the country to
20 which you're accredited is as strong an expression of concern as you can
21 have. But I'm also sure that I raised this with -- in discussions with
22 Granic and with Susak and with others in the course of my diplomatic
23 dealings with them.
24 Q. Perhaps it's a very basic point. It may be that most people in
25 the court-room know this, but I suppose for the record, purposes of the
1 record, in diplomatic terminology when something is called or described as
2 a demarche, what is that?
3 A. Well, a demarche is a message from a -- a formal message from one
4 government to another. It can be a communication of views or a set of
5 demands or warnings. And in this case this was certainly an -- a formal
6 expression of our great concern about Stupni Do, a statement that it was
7 unacceptable, and most certainly a warning of the consequences of this
8 kind of behaviour that they would have for Croatia. Basically, a demarche
9 is a series of talking points that would be presented orally, but the
10 normal practice, certainly my practice, then would be to hand over the
11 piece of paper so that the government would understand word for word what
12 the message that had been delivered.
13 Q. All right. Let me go back to page 11. With the assistance of the
14 usher, please. In your intervention, we can scroll down the page you
15 say: "People were shocked when they saw photographs of what happened.
16 This was obviously done by Bosnian Croats. We pointed out several times
17 that since you support the HVO we would hold you responsible for its
19 And my question to you is: During this conversation with
20 President Tudjman, was there any denial the allegation or your statement
21 that Stupni Do had been carried out by the Bosnian Croats?
22 A. So far as I recall, no. What Tudjman did say, which was
23 characteristic, was that the Bosnian -- that the Bosnian Muslims had done
24 something bad the previous week. But there was not a denial so far as I
25 recall of the Bosnian Croats having committed the massacre.
1 Q. And then continuing back -- we can go back to the bottom of page
2 12, carrying over to page 13, in fact Tudjman concludes this particular
3 topic, the bottom of that page: "I, the Croatian government, our deputy
4 minister, and the minister of foreign affairs, Granic, as stated here,
5 issued a statement about this that we condemn these crimes and demand that
6 the perpetrators be punished. We shall exert our full influence to
7 prevent such acts."
8 Do you recall whether the United States government, through you or
9 otherwise, if you recall, received any sort of follow-up information,
10 whether in fact any HVO officer or soldier had been punished or prosecuted
11 for the crime committed at Stupni Do?
12 A. At this stage, I do not recall definitively, but I do not believe
13 there was any prosecution for the crimes committed at Stupni Do.
14 Q. All right.
15 MR. SCOTT: If we can then turn to -- for the Ambassador and the
16 court-room, what we're going to do now is go through an additional
17 documents and cables, touching on a number of things that the Ambassador
18 has mentioned this morning. The first one if Exhibit P09502.
19 Q. Is this a cable, sir, dated the 5th of August, 1993?
20 A. It is.
21 Q. From the Zagreb embassy reporting to Washington?
22 A. It is.
23 Q. And you made reference earlier today to one of the missions you
24 had sent to the Croatian refugee camp where Muslim men who had been
25 released from the HVO camps had been sent and then were interviewed. And
1 in looking at this document, sir, can you tell the Judges, is this a cable
2 describing the work and the report of this mission?
3 A. That is right. It's a report -- a consolidated report of the
4 teams that -- of embassy officers, that's what the phrase EMBOFs means,
5 that went to Obonjan island July 24th, 25th, and also the team that
6 visited the refugee centre at Gasinci.
7 Q. The introduction and summary provides a fairly detailed summary,
8 as you know, of this seven -- perhaps seven- or eight-page report.
9 Looking at item number 2, paragraph number 2, under the heading
10 of: "Rounding up Muslims," do you see this line which: "Beginning on the
11 night of June 30, uniformed HVO troops and military police on the
12 Croatian-controlled west bank of the Neretva river in Mostar began
13 searching door to door for Muslim males."
14 Do you see that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Is this an example of the information that was being obtained from
17 the men who were being -- who had been interviewed in Croatia?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And in paragraph 5 on the next page there's quite a bit of
20 information in these documents, but again we won't have time to go through
21 every detail. On paragraph number 5 do you recall it being reported --
22 one of the things being reported was the practice of forced labour on the
23 Muslim prisoners?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Did you recall anything more about that or was this only reported
1 on this one occasion or is this something that was continuing to come to
2 your attention during this time period?
3 A. It was a continual feature of the way in which detainees were
4 abused in the Muslim-Croat war. But specifically these forced labour
5 parties occurred on a daily basis at the Heliodrom. They were deployed
6 often to the front lines where they were then exposed to fire from Bosnian
7 government troops who were -- and the front lines were very close. So it
8 exposed the prisoners to not only forced labour but great personal risk.
9 Q. There is also a report in paragraph 8 of not only what was
10 happening to the detained Muslim men but the families that were still in
11 Mostar. If you see that.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Reports about rapes and murders. If we can continue on over to
14 paragraph 11 on the next page.
15 The heading titled: "Third country re-settlement."
16 Do you see that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, if you look at this paragraph 11, sir, you get a fairly
19 detailed confirmation, I believe, of what you told the Judges earlier this
20 morning. Do you see that?
21 A. I do.
22 Q. Go ahead.
23 A. No, it -- to restate it is that the HVO authorities offered to
24 release prisoners who signed a request for assistance and retaining
25 re-settlementing to a third country. The reports we had that were about
1 half the men in the Heliodrom signed up and filled out a questionnaire
2 with the desired country of destination. On July 17, buses took the men
3 who had signed to Mostar, where they were ordered to collect their
4 families and report back. Some were given 30 minutes, others three hours
5 to gather their relatives. During the night of July 17/18, eight buses
6 transported over 800 people to the Obonjan refugee centre. The process
7 was repeated on July 20th, when 180 more went to the island. A second
8 convoy of ten buses took several hundred to the Gasinci centre on July
10 Then just to note the next paragraph is -- confirms what I said,
11 which is that the Croatian police were waiting at the border for the
12 convoys to arrive and escorted them.
13 Q. I think for purposes of concluding with this document, of course
14 unless some -- unless the Judges have questions, if we could go to
15 paragraph 28 on the next-to-last page. In the context of talking again
16 about labour work details, in that same paragraph it says: "They spent
17 the entire day building bunkers near the 'management building' for mortars
18 operated by soldiers in Croatian army (HV) uniforms. He said soldiers and
19 HVO uniforms were also at the airport, but they were some distance away
20 near the air strip. On the way back to the Heliodrom he said he saw a
21 tank with a Croatian army (HV) insignia."
22 Is that the kind of information that would be reported back to you
23 and to the embassy and others from time to time?
24 A. It is.
25 MR. SCOTT: If we could next go to Exhibit P09503.
1 Q. Just briefly, Ambassador, this is a cable dated the 6th of August,
2 1993, and by way of balance was information coming to the US embassy in
3 Zagreb from time to time about situations on which Croats were victims of
4 alleged misconduct or war -- what might be called war crimes?
5 A. Yes. We -- we devoted considerable effort to collecting
6 information about all war crimes that took place in Bosnia, and these
7 included Croat victims of Serbian aggression as well as Croat victims of
8 Bosnian government attacks in the Muslim-Croat war.
9 MR. SCOTT: Can I ask you next please to go to P09504.
10 Q. And, sir, is this a cable dated the 10th of August, 1993,
11 reporting on the second of the two missions that you described earlier
12 today, this one being to the Heliodrom facility itself?
13 A. Yes, it is.
14 Q. Was that mission sent by you or under your supervision?
15 A. It was sent by me.
16 Q. Bottom of the first page: "The commander, who never gave his
17 name, stated that there were some 1400 prisoners in the facility and that
18 at no time in the last month were there more than 2.000. He evaded
19 questions about how many people had passed through the facility during
20 that period and was unable to say how long the present group of detainees
21 would remain."
22 Do you recall who in the embassy was in particular most directly
23 involved, if you will, if he was maybe the senior member of the team or --
24 who reported this to you?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Can you please just give us that information?
2 A. It was Tom Mitnacht.
3 Q. This report reinforced the concerns which you've expressed today
4 about what was happening in the HVO camps?
5 A. It did.
6 Q. Going to the last page, which says: "Overall assessment."
7 Was one of the particular issues that was being raised during this
8 time was not only the fact of the camps and the conditions of the camps
9 but whether international organisations had been allowed access?
10 A. Yes, that was very important.
11 Q. And this report -- the second sentence on -- under "overall
12 assessment": The continued interference with ICRC visits is inexplicable
13 and intolerable and the camp leaders were so informed."
14 Ambassador, is this the sort of thing that following the receipt
15 of this information this is something that you would have raised again
16 with Tudjman, Susak, and others?
17 A. Yes, I certainly would have raised it with the senior officials in
18 the Croatian government. I'm sure I raised this with Mate -- this
19 specific issue with Mate Granic, and it would be part of the -- of the key
20 issues that I would raise with Tudjman and Susak, these kinds of concerns.
21 Q. Going to Exhibit then P09505, a cable dated the 24th of August,
22 1993. It's a short document, again talks about the delivery of a demarche
23 to President Tudjman on the morning of August 24th. Do you recall
24 anything more about the subject of this particular demarche or
1 A. Certainly the broad subject of the demarche was the HVO's conduct
2 in blocking humanitarian assistance and humanitarian access to the Bosniak
3 population in Mostar and -- and the -- and likely other issues, including
4 the shelling of east Mostar.
5 Q. Directing your -- I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt you.
6 Directing your attention to the last sentence. Is it correct, sir, that
7 you reported that: "The ambassador said that there was no excuse for
8 starving the Muslim civilian population, that two wrongs don't make a
9 right. President Tudjman agreed."
10 A. It is true that I said that and it is true that he agreed.
11 Q. Do you have any recollection, sir, this cable was sent on the 24th
12 of August. Do you have any recollection, sir, of the efforts to get
13 humanitarian convoys into the Mostar region as of the end of August 1993?
14 A. I -- following this cable -- sorry, following in demarche, convoys
15 then went into Mostar. I think it's very important to understand here
16 that -- first that this was a very tough warning to Tudjman that we
17 delivered, and he did not deny what was going on. He in fact asserted
18 responsibility in saying that he would use all of his influence to accept
19 such a reasonable appeal, the reasonable appeal being for the access of
20 humanitarian assistance. "I will do all that I can do." He -- although
21 he then of course tried to raise other issues. He readily agreed that
22 there was no excuse for the starving of the Muslim population, and
23 subsequently to this, very promptly he did take action.
24 MR. SCOTT: I think there's a question, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes, I would like to ask you, Mr. Galbraith,
1 about your very last sentence when he -- when you said and he quoted --
2 and I quote you that: "He readily agreed that there was no excuse for
3 starving the Muslim population and subsequent to this very probably he did
4 take action."
5 I wonder if you would be able to tell us a little bit more about
6 what happened after that, what your last sentence suggested. Thank you.
7 THE WITNESS: Within a few days, convoys did have access to east
8 Mostar and humanitarian supplies were delivered. I think it's an
9 important point that this was a case where our diplomatic interventions
10 produced results, and it is in that sense somewhat different from the
11 experience of the United Nations and also, frankly, the experience in
12 dealing with the Milosevic government where demarches and interventions
13 would fall on deaf ears, on denials, on promises to do something and then
14 nothing would happen. Here, actually, things did happen.
15 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you, sir.
16 MR. SCOTT:
17 Q. And if we can then in fact go on to Exhibit P09506, two days
18 later. Can you tell us, Ambassador, is this a cable from the US embassy
19 in Zagreb to -- excuse me, dated the 31st of August, 1993?
20 A. It is.
21 Q. Did you speak to Susak, the defence minister, the Croatian defence
22 minister, around this time about continuing concerns that you had?
23 A. Yes, I did.
24 Q. And is that basically reporting -- in part what this cable is
25 about, reporting your conversation with Susak?
1 A. Partly as well as a call I had from an individual in east Mostar,
2 which in turn led me to go see Susak and to demand that the HVO shelling
3 of east Mostar stop.
4 Q. Ambassador, the -- the Chamber has heard evidence concerning a
5 time when a Spanish Battalion force that accompanied a convoy into east
6 Mostar at this time was held or detained, if you will, or presented from
7 leaving east Mostar around this time, the end of August 1993. Now,
8 directing your attention to the second part of your report where it
9 says: "Also reported ..." I take it this information had come to your
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. "UN forces trapped in east Mostar would be permitted to leave as
13 soon as the officials of east Mostar were in radio contact with a
14 replacement force."
15 Do you see that?
16 A. Yes. This is what I had been told by a -- what I'm -- a UN
17 official who was in east Mostar.
18 Q. Now, going further down the page you also say that: "The
19 Ambassador raised the issue of the shelling of east Mostar with Defence
20 Minister Susak at a previously arranged lunch meeting."
21 And if you look at this, and I'll just ask you to tell the Judges,
22 what was Susak's response when you raised this issue with him?
23 A. He promised that -- Susak promised he would be immediately in
24 contact with HVO Commander Praljak to demand a stop to the shelling. He
25 then went on to complain about the lack of discipline in the HVO and the
1 inability to halt a range of abuses.
2 Q. Thank you. If we can go on to Exhibit P0950 --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] May I ask a follow-up question
4 at this point. In the telegram it says that Mr. Susak indicated that he
5 would contact Mr. Praljak in order to stop the bombing. Were you certain
6 that there was a link between Mr. Susak and Mr. Praljak and between
7 Mr. Praljak and the bombing?
8 THE WITNESS: Yes.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Mr. Praljak.
11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Although this is probably a
12 matter for cross-examination, I think that we clearly heard here from the
13 gentleman from Spanish Bat, that while they were detained there was
14 absolutely no shelling in Mostar whatsoever. Thank you.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, you could have put
16 that question during the cross-examination because you are interrupting
17 the examination-in-chief.
18 Yes, we have another question from the Bench.
19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, you mentioned during your
20 testimony the links that existed between Zagreb and the HVO in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in this same telegram I can see that it says: Mr.
22 Susak who is complaining about the lack of discipline among the HVO ranks.
23 Now, what are your comments, what do you think about that? Was it an
24 actual lack of discipline and the fact that the link between Zagreb and
25 the HVO was not at a high level or was that just an excuse on his part, if
1 you understand my meaning?
2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I certainly understand your question.
3 The -- his statement to me was about the lack of discipline of HVO
4 soldiers and perhaps more junior officers in terms of following the orders
5 that were being given from Zagreb through the -- through the HVO command
6 down to the field. That was what he was -- he was saying to me. His
7 statement at that lunch and at every other occasion where this issue came
8 up, but his statement at that lunch was that he had -- was that he would
9 demand a halt to the shelling and that he had the power to demand such a
10 halt because he was, in effect, not only the defence minister for the
11 Republic of Croatia, but also the defence minister in charge of the HVO.
12 And he never made any pretense that this was a separate entity, and I
13 think that's clear -- that certainly was clear to me in that interaction
14 and in every other interaction.
15 As to where the lack of discipline took place in the HVO, that was
16 much harder to pin down. On some occasions the suggestion was that it was
17 at the case of individual soldiers or junior commanders. In other cases,
18 the suggestion was that Praljak was undisciplined and not following
19 instructions and that they were angry with him.
20 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And a final question following
22 on from what we've just heard. In your relationships and meetings with
23 Mr. Susak, he told you that there were problems of discipline and you have
24 told us that Mr. Susak had two posts he occupied. He was defence
25 minister, but also the minister in charge of the HVO. So as an ambassador
1 yourself and somebody who's well-versed in administrative posts and
2 functions, didn't you perhaps ask him whether he was giving out his
3 instructions in written form or over the phone. Did you ever discuss that
4 because you spoke of the lack of discipline and he said he'd do what he
5 could, and then something happened or didn't happen. But do you know how
6 he sent out these instructions and what the information line between
7 Zagreb and Mostar was, how this was done?
8 THE WITNESS: Just to clarify my testimony, I said that -- of
9 course that he has the -- held the position -- the formal position of
10 defence minister of Croatia and therefore had responsibility as the top
11 civilian for the HV, the Croatian army. I also said that he had de facto
12 responsibility for the HVO, but of course he didn't have a formal
13 position. But in reality he was -- he functioned also as the defence
14 minister in charge of the HVO.
15 As to -- I don't -- I don't recall inquiring in great detail as to
16 how he transmitted his orders because frankly I didn't want to get into
17 that issue. It was, from my point of view, the best situation for him to
18 take responsibility and for me, therefore, to say: Either this happens or
19 there are consequences. We hold you responsible. I didn't want to raise
20 any -- go into any chain of command issues. He took responsibility. As
21 far as I was concerned, if the HVO continued with these atrocities, I
22 could hold Susak responsible, I could hold the Croatian government
23 responsible, and the United States government could act on that basis and
24 we were not interested in hearing all the excuses. Now, I believe -- he
25 was very close to the Bosnian Croat leadership, so I -- and I imagine that
1 he -- whatever orders were submitted -- were transmitted in writing, there
2 was also plenty of oral communication via telephone and in person. He
3 also went down to the Croat areas of Bosnia; he was in fact from there,
4 from Siroki Brijeg, and he was very proud of that area and often went
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. SCOTT: If we could then go on to Exhibit P09507.
8 Q. Mr. Ambassador, can you confirm that this is a cable from the US
9 embassy in Zagreb dated the 6th of September, yes?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. The letter or the cable, excuse me, largely perhaps speaks for
12 itself, but if you will want to confirm or elaborate on any of the points
13 you made. It's fair to say that throughout this period you were, again,
14 continuing on almost a daily basis to raise various issues with the
15 Croatian government?
16 A. That is correct. And I think you can see from these cables that
17 the tone of them which started out firm becomes even more insistent in
18 terms of the demands that we made. And we -- I did not use a lot of
19 diplomatic language. They were demands that we expected Zagreb to comply
20 with, and the reason that we made these demands on Zagreb is that we were
21 certain that they were responsible and that they could comply with our
23 Q. Just as -- by way of connection to one of the earlier documents,
24 on paragraph 3 you refer back to the mission that had been sent in a
25 document about some of the problems in the camps. Do you see that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. "Over a month ago we reported ..."
3 A. And you will note that I -- that it's pointed out in this cable
4 that I've repeatedly raised this issue in numerous meetings with Foreign
5 Minister Granic as well as with President Tudjman and -- and then I think
6 it's perhaps worth noting the fourth paragraph which is that: "As he has
7 in the past, Granic has promised further efforts of persuasion. We
8 believe he is sincere and his work has had some limited success; however,
9 we believe if the abuses are to end Croatia must take concrete actions
10 against the HVO."
11 Q. And in that regard, then, if we continue over to the next page and
12 specifically to item number 7. Do you see where it says that: "Granic
13 said that President Tudjman, with whom he spoke September 5, was sending a
14 formal letter to HVO leader Mate Boban September 6 to urge in the
15 strongest possible terms that the Bosnian Croats respect and comply with
16 international humanitarian law."
17 A. Yes. Yes, I see that.
18 Q. And again, at the paragraph -- at the end of paragraph 10 at the
19 bottom of that page you once again stress as you did before that you and
20 the US government expect results and not anything less than that?
21 A. That's right. Again, reflecting our belief that Croatia was fully
22 responsible for the actions of the HVO, and therefore capable of producing
23 results. And therefore, good intentions or letters or demarches or
24 persuasion or even public denunciations was not sufficient. The only
25 thing that mattered was the results.
1 Q. Now, in the paragraph 7 that we were looking at just a moment ago
2 says: "Tudjman is going to send a formal letter to Boban to urge
3 compliance with international humanitarian law."
4 Can I ask that you next be shown Exhibit P05104. If you can look
5 at that document, sir. You may or may not have seen this document at the
6 time. You can tell us whether you did or didn't, but can you see that in
7 fact a few days later, on the 15th of September, 1993, according to this
8 document in fact Mr. Boban did issue, as indicated would be requested by
9 President Tudjman, an order or instruction that the HVO forces comply with
10 international humanitarian law?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Going on to Exhibit P09508. Can you confirm, Mr. Ambassador, that
13 this is a cable from the US embassy in Zagreb dated the 10th of September,
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Did you receive from Croatian government officials around this
17 time, if you will, a progress report, admittedly that's my
18 characterisation, but a further report on what was to be done with the
20 A. I was receiving constant updates and this is -- this cable reports
21 on one of the more significant developments, which was that the HVO would
22 close all but three detention camps and that the remaining camps would be
23 open to daily visits by the ICRC and that Croatia would provide
24 humanitarian assistance which would also monitor the conditions of the
25 prisoners. Once again, a message on the camps delivered by the Croatian
1 foreign minister to me, the American ambassador in Croatia, effectively
2 taking -- demonstrating that his efforts had produced results, as we
3 requested, and noting that, you know, formally that Croatia was taking
4 additional responsibilities, including the monitoring of conditions.
5 Incidentally, so far as I recall, there was virtually no interaction on
6 the -- there was -- these -- the Bosnian Croat authorities were not
7 dealing with the embassy -- American embassy in Sarajevo or there. I
8 mean, all this was coming through Zagreb because this was where -- this
9 was where the Bosnian Croats looked, and of course this is where Croatia
10 took responsibility.
11 Q. I'm glad you raised that because actually I was going to ask you
12 that. We've focussed on the embassy in Zagreb and the dealings with the
13 Croatian government. Were you receiving any information during this time
14 from your colleague, the -- your -- the US ambassador that was situated in
15 Bosnia at Sarajevo on these similar issues or was all this being channeled
16 essentially through Zagreb?
17 A. Basically all this was being channeled through Zagreb. At that
18 time, however, Ambassador Jakovich was actually based in Vienna and he
19 only made periodic trips into Sarajevo because of the security situation.
20 Q. In item number 4 of this cable it says that: "In a meeting called
21 by foreign minister Mate Granic the Ambassador was told that there had
22 been a dramatic change in the situation in BH over the last few days and
23 Granic wanted us to be the first to know. He said that:
24 "The HVO had agreed to close all but three detention camps in BH,
25 the remaining three being Rodoc, Dretelj, and Capljina."
1 Do you see that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The Rodoc facility being the one also known as Heliodrom?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. There's also this comment that -- the third bullet, some would
6 call it, down: "Also reporting that the HVO had appointed," sometime
7 around this point in September 1993, "two high-level officials to oversee
8 the welfare of the detainees; he gave the name of Vlado Pogacic," I
9 believe it should be Pogarcic, "as one of the two."
10 Did you know anything about Mr. Pogarcic or is that name known to
12 A. It may have been, but it's not one that I now recall.
13 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I'm coming to the end of my examination
14 well within, I think, the time that was allotted to the Prosecution. Do
15 note that we have a few minutes left, but I would ask the Chamber's
16 indulgence since I think I'll only be a few more minutes. I would like
17 the opportunity to review my notes and conclude in the morning. But I am
18 well within the time that we promised we would take, if that's agreeable.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have five minutes left.
20 After us there's another Trial Chamber that is sitting in this same
21 court-room, so we have to conclude within five minutes. But of course,
22 you can continue tomorrow because you have four hours, 30 minutes, and the
23 registrar will do the arithmetic, and he is telling me that you have used
24 two hours and 34 minutes thus far.
25 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, I think we're very well within the
1 allotted time, and frankly I think we are very close. But it would be
2 helpful if I could just double-check and review my notes over the evening.
3 Thank you. Unless the Judges have additional questions, we can use the
4 time, I suppose.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] While you're consulting your
6 notes, I have a question that I'd like to ask the Ambassador.
7 You mentioned a moment ago the existence of your opposite number
8 in Sarajevo. Now, in order to understand what was happening on the
9 ground, unless it touches upon Rule 70, then you're not obliged to answer,
10 but did you have frequent contacts with him, either by telephone or in
11 written form, regarding the situation on the ground? Because we know that
12 the Muslims and the Croats had a common enemy, and those were the Serbs.
13 So I was just wondering whether you had any contacts with your opposite
14 number in Sarajevo.
15 THE WITNESS: Our embassies communicated very regularly by cable
16 would how -- which is how we shared information. Most of the reporting on
17 what was going on in Bosnia was generated -- came from the embassy in
18 Zagreb for a lot of reasons. It was very difficult for the ambassador to
19 Sarajevo to get there, and also much of the information could be collected
20 from the UNPROFOR mission or by our disaster assistance relief teams,
21 which operated out of the embassy in Zagreb and went all over Bosnia. But
22 certainly we shared in our discussions with top leaders.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for the answer.
24 It's time to close for the day. As I said a moment ago, we'll
25 continue the examination-in-chief tomorrow morning -- or rather, tomorrow
1 afternoon because the Judges have a plenary meeting in the morning. So
2 the meeting is adjourned until tomorrow.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of
5 September, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.