1 Monday, 9 October 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, can you call the

7 case, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honour. It's

9 case IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are Monday, the 9th of

11 October, 2006. I would like to greet all the people present in the

12 courtroom, the representatives from the Prosecution, the Defence counsel,

13 and the accused, as well as all the staff members in the courtroom.

14 We shall finish Mr. Kljuic's testimony today, who I would like to

15 greet also. We have planned to hear Mr. Karnavas for 10 minutes so that

16 he can complete his cross-examination. We will then hear Ms. Nozica and

17 Mr. Murphy, who will have an hour and a half between them, and the other

18 Defence counsel will share between them the hour and a half that's left.

19 I would like to state that we must finish at 7.00 today.

20 Mr. Karnavas, you have the floor.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Good afternoon, Mr. President; good afternoon, Your

22 Honours. After careful consideration, having read the record, and seeing

23 that this gentleman is rather difficult to cross-examine under any

24 circumstances, 10 minutes would not be enough for me to accomplish what I

25 wanted to accomplish. Having said that, the points that I wanted to cover

1 can be covered through other witnesses so, therefore, we would not be

2 prejudiced. In light of that, I would yield my time to whoever needs it,

3 and again thank you.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Karnavas.

5 Mrs. Nozica, you have the floor.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, counsel.

7 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

8 WITNESS: STJEPAN KLJUIC [Resumed]

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:

11 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Kljuic.

12 A. Good afternoon.

13 Q. I'm going to be asking you questions on behalf of the Defence of

14 Mr. Bruno Stojic. When it comes to the councils for certain areas, and I

15 think you know what I'm talking about, the HDZ discussed this for the

16 first time at a Presidency meeting on the 16th of April, 1991.

17 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] May I have Exhibit P 00034, please.

18 Q. Mr. Kljuic, these are mostly documents that you've already seen,

19 but we're just going to focus on the councils for the individual areas.

20 It is a Presidency meeting dated the 6th of April, 1991, as we've already

21 said. We have it here. We can assert that that's on page 1.

22 May we have page 3.28 in the Croatian version and page 3 also in

23 the English version. We're going to look at point 2.8, just to remind

24 you, and it says:

25 "According to professional capabilities and affairs which are

1 being conducted, the protagonists for the individual assignments are

2 determined for the individual areas, and it is their duty to rally a team

3 of professional people for the best possible functioning of the party in

4 all fields and to submit a report to the Presidency with a brief programme

5 of work as follows."

6 And here we can see the names. Mr. Mate Boban was in charge of

7 communal affairs; Mr. Ivo -- Iko Stanic was for legal affairs; Vitomir

8 Lukic for culture; Jerko Doko for defence and the police, and so on and so

9 forth. You were in charge of public information together with Ivan

10 Markesic and Smiljko Sagolj. We see that a defence council is formed for

11 defence and the police which will later be called Security Council; am I

12 right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. We also see that the criterion was, for the selection of

15 individuals, their professional capabilities and the types of affairs the

16 individual did; is that right?

17 A. Yes, for the most part.

18 Q. According to this list, we can see that you adhered to that

19 principle.

20 A. As far as that was possible and as far as we were able to find

21 people who were willing to engage.

22 Q. Yes. Now, the organisation of the councils you dealt with at the

23 Presidency meetings, and one of them was on the 10th of July, 1991.

24 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] May I have Exhibit P 000341, please.

25 The number was P 0003 -- or, rather, 41. We still don't seem to have the

1 document on our screens. I apologise. It was a Presidency meeting of the

2 Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 10th of

3 July, 1991. The number is P 00041. It says "341". P 00041. I think we

4 have it now. Yes.

5 Q. Those are excerpts from the minutes of the Presidency meeting held

6 on the 10th of July. Now, it is on page 2.2 of the Croatian version, and

7 in English it is page 3. Can we pan down? Yes. Point 2 says:

8 "In order to improve the quality of the work at the level of the

9 HDZ BiH, councils were set up for individual areas. This is necessary in

10 the municipal boards as well and in the municipal board of the HDZ."

11 Then we have the council for the economy. We have a different

12 person here if we compare it to the previous document; isn't that right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. We have the security chamber or council. It used to be called the

15 police and security council. Then we have the legal advisory council, the

16 council for culture and education, and the council for health and social

17 welfare.

18 Now, the main point here is, and I think you've already confirmed

19 that, for the first time at this meeting of the Presidency held on the

20 10th of July, 1991, we have this term "security council" that appears for

21 the first time; is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, could you just look at what it says above point 2. In the

24 Croatian version, it's on the same page; in English, it is on the

25 following page. 008518890 is the page number. And it says there:

1 "The taking over of power and authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina

2 is a process that still has not been completed for well-known reasons, but

3 work on this must be accelerated at all levels. The takeover of power in

4 BH has not yet been fully completed for well-known reasons," et cetera.

5 Now, was one of the reasons for that, for the fact that you in the

6 HDZ were establishing these councils in the first place, was precisely

7 because power and authority had still not been established after the

8 elections?

9 A. The reasons are very complicated why power and authority was not

10 properly established, but it was quite natural that the party which, at

11 that period in time, won 95 per cent of the votes of the Croatian people

12 at the elections had to take into account and take care of some very

13 simple interests - social, health, cultural, economic conditions, and so

14 on and so forth, with a view to the situation in the former Yugoslavia,

15 and of course the security issue.

16 So this was a move on our part by which we wished to compensate

17 for the inertia of the state apparatus, that is to say, to keep us well

18 informed and be in a situation where we could dictate certain solutions in

19 the field, and mostly especially where the Croats were in the majority.

20 Q. Yes. I assume that this security council was established because

21 of the complex situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina during that period.

22 A. Well, yes, in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, but -- and in Croatia

23 because you had the first incidents that took place at Lake Plitvice and

24 then the sabotage in Borovo Selo where Croatian policemen were killed.

25 But there was general tension, very high tension. There was a lot of

1 propaganda. Milosevic had control of the television and the media. He

2 had the army and the police. So that we had to react and prepare for that

3 situation. And if you were better organised, then you were better

4 prepared and better able to deal with the situation. Of course, all this

5 depended on the geographical and political position of the individual

6 regions as well.

7 Q. Now, the HDZ board, at its meeting of the 6th of August, did it

8 also deal with these councils and, in fact, supported the conclusion made

9 by the Presidency to appoint the councils of the 10th of July?

10 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] And may I have Exhibit P 00047 now,

11 please. Yes, we have it here in front of us. Let's just see whether it

12 is the minutes. May we look at page 5.14 in the Croatian version, and it

13 is page ERN number 00337302 in the English version. Also point 14. I'm

14 sure you'll be able to find it.

15 Q. Now, as we're looking at the Croatian version first of all, I'd

16 like to draw your attention to point 14. It says:

17 "The Main Board of the BH HDZ confirms the resolutions of the BH

18 HDZ Presidency of the 10th of July, 1991, about the appointment of

19 councils and persons in charge, respectively."

20 And we have the same composition of the councils. And then:

21 "It is important to mention that the persons in charge must

22 immediately," as it says, "submit the lists of persons whom they propose

23 for council members to the secretariat of the BH HDZ."

24 We can conclude on that basis, Mr. Kljuic, can we not, that the

25 members of the council still had not been appointed; right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, as to the councils for individual areas or departments, that

3 was dealt with on the 26th of August at the Presidency meetings; 1991, of

4 course.

5 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] May I have the next exhibit, P 00052

6 now, please.

7 Q. We can see the first page, and on that first page it says the

8 following - and this is something that is frequently mentioned at the

9 meetings that you presided over - that Mr. Ante Beljo was present. Can

10 you tell us who Mr. Ante Beljo as at the point in time?

11 A. Ante Beljo was the general secretary of the Croatian Democratic

12 Community of the Croatian Republic, who came to Bosnia often to hold

13 consultations and sometimes following directives. And he was rather close

14 to us because he was born in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So in Zagreb they

15 probably put him in charge of being this liaison between our two parties.

16 Q. Can we take a look at something we're interested in now which

17 relates to the councils, which is to be found on page 2.4 in the Croatian

18 and page 2 of the English version as well. The ERN number is 00860077.

19 So it's the following page of the English version, point 4. Next page.

20 And it says:

21 "On behalf of the HDZ BH Presidency, the following are appointed

22 to the councils."

23 And now for the first time we see who made up the councils. We're

24 interested in the security council now. That's what I'd like to focus

25 on. There's your name; there's Mate Boban, Branko Kvesic. What was

1 Branko Kvesic at that point in time?

2 A. Branko Kvesic was the Assistant Minister for the Interior and the

3 head of the department which was once known as UDBA, U-D-B-A, or rather

4 the security service, which was a very important segment in the Ministry

5 of the Interior.

6 Q. As far as I know, Mr. Jerko Doko was the Defence Minister; is that

7 right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And the rest of the people there all had some sort of relationship

10 with defence and dealt with defence and security, which is what the

11 security council did.

12 A. They were the representatives of regions. Filipovic was from

13 Samac; this other man, Bozo Rajic, was from another place, and so on. So

14 we included people who held these regional positions and covered all of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You had a representative of Herzegovina, Posavina,

16 and people working in the state administration, such as Jerko Doko and

17 myself, because I was also a member of the state council for security, ex

18 officio.

19 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now we come to the conclusions from the

20 HDZ BH Security Council meeting held on the 18th of September, 1991.

21 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] May I have the next document. It is

22 P 00058. The first page of that document, both in English and in B/C/S.

23 Yes, there is it is. We have page 1. Can we just pan down, yes, so that

24 we can see the whole of the first page. Thank you.

25 Q. Here we see that the Security Council co-opted Bruno Stojic; is

1 that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And as you testified, he was the Assistant Minister of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

5 A. Yes. The Assistant to the Minister of the Interior Affairs, and

6 he was in charge of the financial department and logistics.

7 Q. Yes. For material resources.

8 A. Yes, that's right.

9 Q. So he was elected after the multi-party elections to occupy that

10 post. He was elected by the government of the Republic of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

12 A. No, he wasn't in the electoral process, but he was appointed on

13 behalf of the HDZ which, among other things, in dividing up power -- in

14 the power division, was given that function. And then recommendations

15 came in, we held consultations, and he was appointed assistant minister

16 for the interior with the departments that you mentioned a moment ago.

17 Q. Was that position the reason that he was appointed to this body?

18 A. Absolutely.

19 Q. At this session, the security council changed its name to the

20 Crisis Staff; is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you remember whether any other sessions of this Crisis Staff

23 were held, attended by Bruno Stojic and that you attended, too?

24 A. I couldn't say whether a session was held but the Crisis Staff

25 functioned in Sarajevo because all the deputies in power were members of

1 the Crisis Staff. Jerko Doko, myself and many others, Brana Kvesic, we

2 communicated with each other on a daily basis.

3 You must be familiar with the time period that we are referring to

4 now. There was a war in Croatia or an aggression had been launched

5 against Croatia, a full-scale war. In Bosnia, non-Serbs were being

6 expelled from the territory. There were many refugees that had to be

7 taken care of, assisted. The Crisis Staff received relevant information

8 and then we tried to intervene with the JNA. For example, we'd receive

9 news that Croats had been expelled from a village in the vicinity of

10 Prijedor. We then had to check that information. We visited our police

11 force. Sometimes we went to see the federal police as well. We then

12 contacted Kadijevic, the Minister of Defence. The Crisis Staff had the

13 task of trying to assist those who were at risk at that time.

14 Q. So I can draw the conclusion that there was unofficial contact

15 that took place frequently. Because of the dynamics of the events, you

16 tried to solve the problems. You'd communicate with the members that you

17 managed to contact; am I correct?

18 A. Yes. And sometimes the members, without the president himself,

19 tried to resolve certain problems.

20 Q. In the course of your examination-in-chief, you already testified,

21 as stated in this document, that it was the duty of the Crisis Staff to

22 remain in charge of the entire system of --

23 JUDGE PRANDLER: I ask you again many times before that please

24 kindly slow down, both of you, Ms. Nozica and also Mr. Kljuic. If I may

25 ask you to speak a bit more slowly and to stop when one of you asks a

1 question or answering a question. Thank you.

2 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I do apologise, Your

3 Honour. I'll try to bear that in mind.

4 Q. In the course of the examination-in-chief, you said that it was

5 the duty of the Crisis Staff to control the entire defence system for the

6 Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was their duty to obtain

7 weapons, and this is what this document, in fact, states under item 1,

8 paragraph 3, of the conclusion. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes. That was our desire. As to whether we were successful, I

10 couldn't say because the task was too immense for people who were, in

11 fact, amateurs.

12 Q. As far as you know, at that point in time had the Muslims started

13 being armed through the Patriotic League and the Green Berets, and had

14 they started to organise them? Just a minute. Could you wait for the

15 interpretation, please.

16 A. May I? I'm not sure that it was organised in the way that they

17 say today and that people are now asking for pensions on that basis. But

18 that people were spontaneously armed well, there is no doubt about that.

19 Everyone was arming themselves. And I must say that the main sources for

20 weapons were local; that is to say, there were Serbian paramilitary

21 formations and individuals from the JNA who were involved in trafficking

22 weapons and selling weapons.

23 Q. Could we continue to discuss what you know about the Patriotic

24 League and the Green Berets. Were these units organised, and was the

25 public aware of that? Did you know about that in 1991?

1 A. Well, not in the way that they say now, but there were groups that

2 were interlinked, that were organised, that were preparing themselves for

3 the defence of the homeland. That was visible and you could see that in

4 Sarajevo when the aggression was launched. Had such youths not existed,

5 Sarajevo would probably have fallen. It wouldn't have been able to resist

6 for 320 days to the siege.

7 Q. When we're talking about the Patriotic League and the Green

8 Berets, then we're talking about a Muslim organisation, about SDA military

9 units.

10 A. Yes, but I have to say that among those groups that defended

11 Sarajevo, well, there were people of various ethnic groups. First of all,

12 I should have to tell you something about certain social categories that

13 were represented. They were all poor people, and there were some pre-war

14 delinquents who participated in the defence of the homeland, while Marxist

15 intellectuals and others just waited to see what would happen. These

16 young people had some very positive qualities. Later there were certain

17 problems, certain deviations, but that was the problem of the system, it

18 wasn't a problem with the youth. These young people from Sarajevo often

19 defended the town. In spite of the fact that they were so poorly

20 equipped, I think they should be given credit for this.

21 Q. We do agree that at that very beginning there were people who had

22 been organised by the police. There were people who, as you say, had

23 organised themselves, but in addition there were also people who had

24 already become members of the Patriotic League Bosna and the Green

25 Berets. Is that correct?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Were you perhaps familiar with a meeting of Muslim representatives

3 from Bosnia and Herzegovina or, rather, from the entire territory of the

4 former Yugoslavia, a meeting that was held in the home of the police in

5 Sarajevo on the 10th of June, 1991? And at this meeting a council for

6 national defence was established which functioned under the SDA.

7 A. I wasn't aware of that, but the Serbs had a Crisis Staff under the

8 SDS and we had formed a Crisis Staff, so naturally the Muslims would do

9 the same. That was to be expected.

10 Q. So you are now telling me that at this time each people, under the

11 parties that represented them, tried to organise themselves and prepare

12 themselves for the war that was imminent.

13 A. I hope that you remember that at the time the JNA changed its

14 image. It was no longer the people's army, it was the Serbs' army. And

15 it went a step further. Under Veljko Kadijevic, it was no longer a

16 communist and socialist force; it ended up being a Chetnik army. At the

17 time, terrible war crimes were being committed in Croatia, as well as in

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina. So it was quite natural that the Ministry of

19 Defence of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, was in control of the

20 situation. So the people organised themselves as they could and

21 everything was secret. So it was done on a national and religious basis,

22 too.

23 Q. At the Presidency sessions, did you discuss these matters with

24 other members? Did you discuss the arming of the citizens of Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina, citizens of all three ethnic groups? Because there was the

1 threat of Serbia and Montenegro launching an aggression.

2 A. Well, I have to say that at that time Bosnia and Herzegovina felt

3 very tense. There was a lot of tension, because the communist government,

4 immediately prior to the first democratic elections, handed over the

5 weapons of the Territorial Defence to the JNA. That was because of the

6 judges. Josip Broz established a system of military formations that

7 included the JNA, which was the regular military force composed of

8 professional soldiers, but there was another system, that of the

9 Territorial Defence. It was a sort of William Tell force. The people

10 were armed and this force existed in order to conduct a guerrilla war.

11 Q. I apologise, Mr. Kljuic. I think the Trial Chamber has already

12 heard much about the system of Territorial Defence from other witnesses.

13 I think they know what the Territorial Defence was.

14 But when the JNA took over these weapons from the Territorial

15 Defence, didn't Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, who was the President of the

16 Presidency, object to this at the time?

17 A. No, you're not right. The weapons were handed over before the

18 first democratic elections were held. The socialist government, the

19 Presidency, allowed this, not the new democratically elected government.

20 We arrived once the weapons had already been handed over, once they had

21 already taken these weapons.

22 Q. When you arrived, as you put it, were there any official reactions

23 on the part of Mr. Izetbegovic? Because those weapons were, in a certain

24 sense, still in Bosnia-Herzegovina; would you agree?

25 A. Yes, the weapons were in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they were under

1 the control of the JNA and the Serbian forces. Later, generals, such as

2 General Zelac in Banja Luka, distributed these to the citizens in

3 Krajina. Izetbegovic did not publicly object because he believed that the

4 JNA would not attack Bosnia and Herzegovina, would not launch an

5 aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. But there were people who

6 mentioned this issue.

7 But you must also be aware of the fact that the media was under

8 the control of the communists. That was not just the case in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian communists had also handed over the

10 weapons to the JNA, and the only communists in the former Yugoslavia who

11 hadn't handed over their weapons were the Slovenians, because they were

12 primarily Slovenians and then there were Yugoslavs and members of the

13 international community. But in our country, to be a Yugoslav was more

14 important than to be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least that

15 was the opinion of those in top positions.

16 Q. I want to go back to a certain subject and link it to your answer,

17 according to which Mr. Izetbegovic didn't publicly protest. You can't say

18 that when the newly elected democratic government was appointed they were

19 not in a position to react in public.

20 A. Well, the Minister of Defence, Jerko Doko, did react, but it was

21 all to no avail. That's quite irrelevant.

22 Q. Is that irrelevant or is that the SDA's -- the SDA party's

23 attitude to the war that was imminent? That wasn't the case for the HDZ,

24 because you're talking about Jerko Doko. Is that something that would be

25 important when it comes to this difference in reactions?

1 A. Well, yes. The Croats -- national consciousness among the Croats

2 was more developed. They could hardly wait to leave Yugoslavia. Whereas

3 in the case of the Muslims, whom we call Bosniaks now, this consciousness

4 was not that developed. On the other hand, there were many Muslim

5 citizens, not only from Bosnia and Herzegovina but also from Sandzak and

6 from Montenegro, who were members of the JNA or the police force, the

7 secret services and all other bodies that were loyal to the regime. They

8 would need a lot of time. It was only once they started killing them it

9 would take them a lot of time to realise that the JNA was not a people's

10 army. And then the resistance movement among the Muslims began

11 developing, began to strengthen. And they were the greatest victims in

12 the aggression.

13 Q. When you said that the Territorial Defence handed over its weapons

14 to the JNA before the democratic elections, do you remember a few months

15 prior to that event what the situation was like?

16 A. Well, we had our elections in October and November; Croatia in

17 May. So this was even before the elections in Croatia. I am referring to

18 the year 1990.

19 Q. Very well. My information was somewhat different. We were

20 discussing the Patriotic League. I'd like to know now, today, you have

21 any information, according to which such units had been formed in Banja

22 Luka, in Trebinje. And were the people who were members of the Patriotic

23 League in Mostar, Konjic, Zenica? This is the territory where the Serbian

24 party was predominant; am I right?

25 A. Well, yes. No one formed military formations in a territory where

1 they were in the minority. The Serbs didn't do that in Travnik either,

2 although there were 19 per cent Serbs there. Everyone obtained weapons

3 illegally, and Belgrade did this in docile. I'll explain it later.

4 They formed such units where they were in the majority and where

5 they had a certain amount of security, where they could act in secrecy.

6 Belgrade had to have an alibi in order to launch an aggression. So they

7 spread propaganda and claimed that the Croats and Muslims had armed

8 themselves. And if you have a look at the print from the year 1990 or

9 1991, if you have a look at Ekspres Politika, Nin, they write that the

10 Serbs were under threat because the Ustasha have armed themselves; how the

11 counter-intelligence service in Yugoslavia deliberately sold ordinary

12 weapons, pistols and rifles, so that the Croats and the Muslims could give

13 the impression that they had armed themselves. And this was a handicap

14 because some people really believed that they had armed themselves.

15 Then in Croatia the situation was different. They could import

16 weapons from the West. That wasn't the case in Bosnia. So there wasn't a

17 sufficient amount of weapons, and the state couldn't defend the citizens

18 because, according to the law, we could only strengthen the police force.

19 I must say, the professional police force was the most capable

20 force. Later there were divisions in the police force and the Serbs went

21 their own way. But the legally appointed authorities, the legally

22 appointed government, we tried to mobilise about 30 or 40.000 reserve

23 policemen, and they received weapons because the police had weapons in

24 their warehouse. And the then Minister of the Interior, on the 31st of

25 March, 1992, disbanded the reserve police force ostensibly because there

1 wasn't enough money to finance it.

2 Q. Just a moment, Mr. Kljuic.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think there's been a

4 mistake on page 16, line 17. It said "90 per cent" Serbs when the witness

5 was referring to the number of Serbs in Travnik, but the witness said "19

6 per cent". So that is a big difference and we have to put that right.

7 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Well, thank you for mentioning the police, because you were

9 thinking of the structure in which Mr. Bruno Stojic worked, is that right,

10 during that period of time?

11 A. Yes, Bruno Stojic was an economist. He had no political and I

12 don't think he had any military influence in the military. He was the

13 quartermaster. He procured vehicles.

14 Q. It was MTS.

15 A. Yes, he procured weapons, too.

16 Q. Yes. That's what you're saying was distributed in a professional

17 way and in a fairly proper way. That's what you said a moment ago.

18 A. Well, the police was multi-ethnic. It was proportionate, the

19 ratio was proportionate to the population make-up. And that was important

20 because, with dozens of thousands of weapons that all the citizens had,

21 the aggression would have been a little -- would have been even worse,

22 especially since the professional policemen were reduced in number. We

23 had a situation where people who had come to defend Bosnia took up arms

24 and knew nothing about weapons, especially when the new complicated

25 weapons came into play. And so there were a lot of casualties. People

1 were not well-trained and well-versed in these matters.

2 Q. Yes. I am looking at the transcript, so I'm following what you're

3 saying and looking at the transcript.

4 Well, I don't see why you're avoiding an answer to the question.

5 Was it the same police, or, rather, the Ministry of the Interior of the

6 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which Mr. Bruno Stojic worked at the

7 time? Is it the same ministry? You're talking about the police force

8 that was a professional police force.

9 A. Yes, yes. He was one of the assistant ministers, yes.

10 Q. Thank you. That's what I wanted to hear. Now, I'm not going to

11 show you the last document from this series of documents relating to the

12 security council, but I am going to remind you that at a meeting of the

13 16th of January, 1992, the security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was

14 discussed again. It was on the agenda. And it was stated again that the

15 Crisis Staffs of the BH at all levels must work immediately and urgently

16 in the sphere of defence preparation.

17 Now, you've said that this was a complex process and that you

18 couldn't expect to have satisfactory results during such a short period of

19 time. Then it was logical that this was an ongoing task that had to be

20 done and that the Presidency referred to and took care of. Is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to move on to another area. I'd just

23 like to remind you that during your testimony earlier on, in response to a

24 question from Judge Antonetti on the 27th of June, 2006, when you were

25 asked why you did not convene an HDZ party convention at the end of 1991

1 and at the beginning of 1992, you were asked to explain your position.

2 And this is on pages 3922 and 3 of the transcript. You said, your answer

3 was, that you couldn't convene a convention because of the siege of

4 Sarajevo at the time, because communication from Sarajevo was made very

5 much more difficult. Am I right?

6 A. Yes. But there was no need for me to call a regular convention.

7 Q. Just a moment. I'd like to ask you to focus on what I'm asking

8 you and to focus on the siege of Sarajevo at the blockade.

9 A. Yes. But let me just say that there was no need, because, on the

10 23rd and 24th of March, 1991, I did have a convention in Mostar but

11 because of different political situations and obstruction within the HDZ,

12 it said, of my right wing, on the part of the right wing people, it was

13 necessary to say what our aim was. But I wasn't able to do that because

14 of the situation that Sarajevo was facing and also because those overruled

15 at the convention in Mostar didn't want to go forward because they knew

16 they wouldn't win.

17 Q. Mr. Kljuic, you've explained that to us in detail. I'd just like

18 to remind you of the portion of your testimony where you referred to the

19 blockade, the siege of Sarajevo, which was still in force -- which was in

20 force at the time and which meant that Sarajevo could not communicate with

21 the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 Now, during that period of time, or, let's say, from April 1992

23 onwards, did the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Presidency

24 itself, did they have any control? Were they able to communicate with the

25 rest of the territory which was not occupied at that time by the Serb

1 army?

2 A. Well, as far as communication is concerned, that was possible with

3 individual areas. It was made more difficult, of course, but -- and of

4 course, there were isolated territories where you couldn't communicate and

5 others which refused to follow the orders of the central government or

6 adhere to the central government.

7 Q. Well, faced in a situation like that with Sarajevo under siege,

8 was it possible for the government or Presidency - and did they, in fact,

9 do anything - to assist in the defence of Mostar, to defend it from the

10 Serb army in May, 1990? Were they technically able to do so? And do you

11 know whether they did anything?

12 A. Apart from moral support, we could do nothing at that time. Not

13 only support to Mostar but to Tuzla or Gorazde or Bihac either. And faced

14 with a situation like that, people had to look to themselves and organise

15 themselves. And, of course, with that self-organisation, the question was

16 were they loyal to the regular powers or not? The Serb areas refused to

17 pledge allegiance to the central government. They were not loyal to it.

18 Q. Mr. Kljuic, we'll deal with that later on. During my

19 cross-examination, we'll deal with the question of loyalty to the legal

20 powers that be and the legal government. But for the moment I'd like to

21 dwell on what you analysed and said a moment ago and told the Trial

22 Chamber, in fact, in explaining the situation with the Presidency and

23 government at that time.

24 Now, do you happen to remember that there were some government

25 meetings that were held in Zagreb, Bosnia-Herzegovinian government

1 meetings were held in Zagreb, because it was technically easier than it

2 was to hold them in Sarajevo?

3 A. Well, I have to say for the benefit of the Trial Chamber that

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced two ills; one was the aggression and the

5 other was treachery within the people in power. Because you have to know

6 that people fled from the Presidency and government.

7 Q. Do you mean from all three ethnic groups, Mr. Kljuic?

8 A. Yes. Five Muslim ministers with the vice premier left the

9 government, stepped down from the government. The Serbs did, too,

10 although not all of them. The Vice Premier Simovic stayed on for a

11 certain time, but the Minister of Justice stayed on in Sarajevo throughout

12 the war.

13 Q. Yes. Thank you. If I seem to be a little nervous, it's because

14 my -- I have time constraints, so that's why I'm trying to move on.

15 Do you know, for example, that some SDA meetings were held during

16 that period of time in Zagreb, for instance?

17 A. I don't know that. But that they had strong headquarters or staff

18 in Zagreb, I know that.

19 Q. That the SDA had a strong headquarters in Zagreb; what do you mean

20 by that? Or staff.

21 A. Well, they had people dealing with logistics, with the economy,

22 and so on, and they were in Zagreb.

23 Q. Can we say that that was throughout the period during the war?

24 And what about the logistics base in Split?

25 A. Perhaps most of it was in Vienna, for example, and so on and so

1 forth. Of course there was a theory according to which you couldn't --

2 people thought that you couldn't help Bosnia-Herzegovina from Sarajevo,

3 that you had to go outside. But then the people who said that, who were

4 putting out that kind of slogan, were people who had already left BH.

5 Q. Yes, I agree with you. In Vienna we had the main logistics base

6 when it came to a question of money, but I'm interested in Croatia,

7 myself. I would like to look at Croatia. So you can focus on that. So

8 can you tell me whether you know that both in Split and Zagreb there were

9 strong logistics bases of the BH army, precisely the BH army?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, during 1992 and the beginning of

12 1993, for instance, on behalf of the government - and I'm talking about

13 1992 and the beginning of 1993, as I said - that on behalf of the

14 government and the Presidency of the BH, key decisions were taken by the

15 representatives of the Bosniak people. Would that be right?

16 A. Well, I cannot agree with that. But that they were the most

17 numerous, that is right, that is correct. Now, I don't know what

18 decisions you have in mind. Decisions of principle, which were taken by

19 the Presidency, was taken by consensus of the people who remained in

20 Sarajevo. Now, as far as the government is concerned, those prime

21 ministers would go. They left Sarajevo. They would very often act

22 against the government. There was a prime minister that had fled and

23 worked against Bosnia-Herzegovina, its interests.

24 Q. I'm thinking of the main decisions, the key decisions, in fact,

25 that the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina depended, the positions taken with

1 respect to the peace agreements, for example, and the decisions of

2 interest to all three ethnic groups, in fact. Because you, several times

3 yourself, said that Mr. Izetbegovic -- and Mr. Izetbegovic during his

4 lifetime said many times that you strove for a multi-national,

5 multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6 Now, those decisions, which were key decisions for those citizens

7 of Bosnia-Herzegovina of multi-ethnicity and linked to the agreements and

8 contacts with the international community, so on and so forth, positions

9 taken when people went to attend those conferences, were they taken at the

10 level of the entire Presidency or were they taken within the frameworks of

11 a very small number of people who were politically linked to Mr. Alija

12 Izetbegovic?

13 A. Well, I have to say that the referendum for independence, in order

14 to gain independence and become a member of the United Nations, were

15 decisions which we took jointly. I took part in the process myself.

16 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I am referring to the period after the recognition of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I said specifically from April onwards up until

18 the time you were active in the Presidency. And when was that?

19 A. The 10th of October, 1992, and then from the 4th of November,

20 1993, again until the 15th of October, 1996.

21 Q. Well, let's take that entire period. What would your appraisal

22 be?

23 A. I have to say, first of all, that I was not a member of those

24 delegations and that's for two reasons; one was that Mr. Izetbegovic did

25 not like me; and secondly, that Tudjman didn't want to receive the Bosnian

1 delegation if I was there, regardless of the fact that I was the

2 legitimate representative of the Croatian people.

3 Q. Why didn't Izetbegovic like you?

4 A. Well, they all said that they were in favour of a multi-ethnic

5 bourgeois Bosnia-Herzegovina. I said that I was in favour of a

6 multi-national one with citizens rights in order to represent citizens

7 interests. And I have remained along that course to the present day.

8 Now, why Bosnia's no longer a multi-national community, a multi-ethnic

9 community which we fought for, as the communists like to say, there are

10 subjective factors and objective factors to explain that.

11 Q. All right. I'm not trying to appear naive in any way, but if Mr.

12 Izetbegovic fought for a multi-ethnic --

13 A. Well, I'm not sure. I never said that. He did declare himself in

14 favour of that. However, he allowed Haris Silajdzic to introduce a

15 delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the United Nations with four

16 Muslims. And I said, "Gentlemen, I would have found at least one Serb,"

17 even if he was a main Serb and this blind Croat and made him a member of

18 that. So because of my views in the Presidency I encountered a great deal

19 of problems, and they sold me out.

20 When they went to the London conference, they took a clerk with

21 them; he would later on become a political personage but was never elected

22 anywhere. But they didn't take me on behalf of the Croats. Why? Because

23 all those staff members and clerks would nod their heads throughout the

24 whole aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ivo, my neighbour, didn't take me

25 with the delegation because I was a true fighter for a multi-ethnic

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, the fact that I did not succeed is no fault of

2 my own.

3 Q. All right. Very well. But I wanted to show you an opinion that

4 Lord Owen had at the time, or, rather, Lord Owen's opinion at that time,

5 and you seem to confirm that, too.

6 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] So may we look at 2D 00191. That's

7 the next exhibit, please.

8 Q. Let me just tell you it's an excerpt from the Balkan Odyssey by

9 Lord Owen, the presiding person over the international conference on

10 Yugoslavia. I'm sure you met him a number of times yourself and I'm sure

11 you read the book.

12 A. My answer is yes to both questions?

13 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] May we look at page 85 in the

14 Croatian version now, please, and page 52 of the English version. 52,

15 please, Balkan Odyssey. I have underlined the portion of the text that

16 I'm going to read out, and I gave the interpreters a copy.

17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that they do not have a

18 copy at this moment.

19 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] The exhibit number is 2D 00191.

20 Q. So the --

21 A. Yes, we have that.

22 Q. I'm going to read out the portion that is underlined:

23 "When the Croat Mile Akmadzic was appointed Prime Minister of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina --"

25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters have received a copy of the

1 translation. Thank you.

2 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I'm going to read it slowly.

4 "When the Croat Mile Akmadzic was appointed Prime Minister of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he made a real effort to revive the collective

6 leadership of the Presidency. He went back to live in Sarajevo and used

7 his previous experience as pre-war secretary to the Presidency to try to

8 restore the authority of the Muslim-Croat coalition that had won the

9 referendum on independence which the Serbs boycotted.

10 "But by the end of 1992, it was becoming clear to all that he

11 would fail and that power had gone to a small group of Muslim ministers

12 appointed by President Izetbegovic and their nominee as vice-president,

13 Ejup Ganic. The collective presidency, as a democratic body with

14 meaningful representation from the constituent nations, was, by the autumn

15 of 1993, no longer a reality. The real decisions were made elsewhere. We

16 were, in effect, dealing with a Muslim government for a predominantly

17 Muslim population."

18 Can we have your comments to this?

19 A. First of all, Lord Owen is not a proper witness. He was not

20 objective. And secondly, the result that Izetbegovic had taken over power

21 was not only his desire but he received great support from Zagreb.

22 What I mean to say is this: I was supposed to be the president of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 19th of December, 1992, pursuant to the

24 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then there was a secret agreement

25 by which I was eliminated from the Presidency. And in the name of the

1 Croats, a man was brought in who had never taken part at the elections,

2 and that was because of this secret agreement between Izetbegovic and

3 Tudjman.

4 Q. Just a minute, please. Were you familiar with that secret

5 agreement?

6 A. A friend of mine from Zagreb, a member of the Croatian leadership,

7 Slavko Degoricija, informed me through a woman in Rijeka that something

8 was being prepared against me, but the woman couldn't tell me what. But

9 the agreement found itself to be justified, was justified, in a sense,

10 because Izetbegovic, in attempt to be the president of the Presidency, on

11 the 19th of December, 1992, rejected the constitution of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina.

13 Please let me finish. President Tudjman was aware of the fact.

14 So in January 1993 - and at the time I was just an ordinary citizen of

15 Sarajevo - at a meeting in Zagreb he told me, he said, "Mr. Izetbegovic,

16 you're familiar with the constitution of your country. You're not the

17 president of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You're the president of the Muslims

18 and as such you are welcome."

19 So for all those who tried to topple Bosnia-Herzegovina, including

20 Milosevic and others, what was important is that the constitution of

21 Bosnia and Herzegovina had been rejected.

22 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I don't want to go into the reasons for these issues

23 at the moment, but it is true, you can't deny this, that whatever Mr.

24 Tudjman wanted, Mr. Izetbegovic eliminated you from the Presidency.

25 A. Well, naturally. It wasn't Tudjman. Tudjman asked Izetbegovic to

1 do something that he couldn't do himself. He acted pro domo sua. He

2 wanted to -- but, in fact, he betrayed the constitution of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina.

4 It was only in autumn, 1993, as mentioned in Owen's book, it was

5 only then, when the legally elected leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina had

6 been completely eliminated, it was only then, at the insistence of the

7 international community, that he would come to see me and we would again

8 establish a multi-national body. However, the Presidency no longer had

9 power. Individuals had power. There were negotiations with the Muslim

10 side at all times. And if a Croat or a Serb appeared as the seventh dwarf

11 in those delegations, none would ask him about anything. As soon as no

12 one asked me for my opinion I didn't participate in such matters.

13 Q. Very well. Nonetheless, you were a member of the Presidency until

14 1996, and now that you've mentioned this, I would like to know, since you

15 said Muslims sometimes participated in negotiations, does this confirm

16 that Mr. Izetbegovic, or someone who sent him to the negotiations, after

17 1993, after your return, did he always represent the Bosniaks and Muslims?

18 A. Well, no. They took this into account so they had Lazovic and

19 Komsic as the representatives of the Serbs and the Croats. But whenever

20 there was a summit or negotiations, for example, Washington or Dayton, the

21 Presidency would establish a framework for the political issues that

22 should be addressed, issues that should represent the minimum interests of

23 Bosnia and Herzegovina. As to whether they protected these interests and

24 interpreted them as such, I don't know. I didn't participate.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. I would like you, Mr. Kljuic, to

1 clarify something in your previous answer. You refer to "he" and you say

2 "he betrayed," that is on line 3, page 28. "He betrayed the constitution

3 of Bosnia and Herzegovina," and later on you say, "He would come to see me

4 and we would again establish a multi-national body." That would be line 7

5 and 8. Who is "he"?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "He" is President Izetbegovic, but

7 what follows is not something that I said. That's not correct.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

10 Q. I'd now like to move on to the subject of the ABiH. We're talking

11 about 1992.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. Before we move

13 on to the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I'd like to clarify something

14 you said a minute ago; that there was an agreement between Tudjman and

15 Izetbegovic in order for you to be eliminated from the Presidency,

16 because, according to what you said, you should have been the president of

17 the Presidency. Why did Tudjman eliminate you as being president of the

18 Presidency, a Croat, when you could have been an advantage for him? What

19 was, in fact, at stake when you were eliminated?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, yes, according to the

21 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, seven members of the Presidency are

22 full equal, and the president of the Presidency is primus inter pares, the

23 first among equals. According to the constitution, one individual can be

24 the president of the Presidency for two years at most. There are

25 elections every year, so there can be -- he can have two terms of office.

1 Mr. Izetbegovic was elected in 1990, and his mandate ended on the 19th of

2 December, 1992. That was the ultimate deadline. At the time of

3 communism, the order of rotation for the president of the Presidency had

4 been established. First there would be a Serb, then a Muslim or Bosniak,

5 and then a Croat. So I was next in line to be the president of the

6 Presidency.

7 Your Honour, you have claimed that President Tudjman would have

8 found it advantageous to have me in such a position. That's my position,

9 too. However, he decided not to take advantage of having me in such an

10 advantageous position.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In your opinion, why did he take

12 such a decision?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I was a favourite of us for a

14 certain period of time. But as I am an individual who was not susceptible

15 to suggestions, I always followed my own line. And I also noticed that in

16 Zagreb and in Belgrade they had no love for Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor

17 did they understand Bosnia and Herzegovina. And then thirdly, as a

18 legally elected Croatian member of the Presidency, I obtained half a

19 million votes and not a single Croat had obtained that many votes before

20 me or after I had left. But in that capacity, I believe that the defence

21 of a multi-national and secular Bosnia-Herzegovina was my historical task.

22 When certain policy changes had been carried out in Zagreb, I was

23 removed. I would say that perhaps Mr. Tudjman wanted me to be politically

24 removed but he didn't want me to be killed. There were others who

25 threatened to do that.

1 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Mr. Kljuic, we have to go back to that situation. Did Mr.

3 Izetbegovic remove you?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You assume that this was done following suggestions made by Mr.

6 Tudjman?

7 A. Yes. But Mr. Izetbegovic removed me from the Presidency. That's

8 quite clear.

9 Q. When you left the Presidency, when the term of office expired --

10 A. My term of office did not expire.

11 Q. Please let me finish. When Mr. Izetbegovic's first term of office

12 expired, was there anyone else, who was not a Bosniak, who could have been

13 the president of the Presidency? Did he remove you because Tudjman had

14 requested that, or was it so that he could hold on to power? He did hold

15 on to power, didn't he?

16 A. Yes, absolutely. The Presidency was changing in legal terms.

17 That happened when the Serbian representatives left the Presidency, Mrs.

18 Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic.

19 Q. That was in April, 1992?

20 A. Others were appointed on the basis of votes; that was quite

21 legitimate. But I was removed, they brought in someone else who didn't

22 participate in the elections.

23 Q. Was he a Croat?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. If a Croatian member of the Presidency should have become

1 president of Presidency and you had been removed for political reasons,

2 then why didn't this person become the president? Why did Mr. Izetbegovic

3 hold on to power until the very end?

4 A. Well, Mr. Izetbegovic didn't remove me in order to appoint a new

5 individual. He removed me in order to hold on to power.

6 Q. Very well. I think we have clarified this issue now. Before the

7 break, let us just move on to another series of interesting questions that

8 relate to the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9 In your opinion, did the Presidency at that time have control over

10 the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

11 A. When we assumed power, it was just before the celebration of the

12 day of the army of Yugoslavia, and since each republic had its own

13 celebrations, the leadership of the army in Bosnia and Herzegovina had

14 already been marginalised at the time. As weapons were being taken from

15 the Territorial Defence, at the same time Veljko Kadijevic reorganised

16 army areas.

17 Q. But, Mr. Kljuic, I really have very limited time. I don't want to

18 be impolite. I'm referring to the period April, 1992, just before the

19 events of April. I'm referring to your participation in the Presidency.

20 A. We had no control over the army.

21 Q. I'm referring to the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not to the JNA.

22 A. It was formed from the Territorial Defence.

23 Q. So perhaps there was a misunderstanding. I'm asking you whether

24 you had any control over the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did the

25 Presidency have such control? Did they listen to you?

1 A. Absolutely.

2 Q. Absolutely. Very well. Have you heard about a meeting in Zenica

3 in August, 1993? I know you weren't there at the time.

4 A. No, I wasn't there and I've heard nothing about it.

5 Q. Very well. Later, when you became a member of the Presidency

6 towards the end of 1993 again, did you have the opportunity of hearing

7 about the attitudes of the army brass with regard to the Presidency and

8 the government?

9 A. Yes, but when I returned - how to point this out - the Presidency

10 no longer had control over the finance sector and the army. We had very

11 little information. There was no weapons. There was no food.

12 Q. When was this?

13 A. After I had returned in 1993, in autumn.

14 Q. From 1993 onwards?

15 A. Control of the army had been taken over, and over the police. The

16 Presidency was powerless. And I should also point out that the members of

17 the Presidency weren't really interested in these matters.

18 Q. Power had been taken over -- power had been taken over over the

19 army and the police. From whom? By whom?

20 A. Izetbegovic.

21 Q. Let's have a look at 2D 00187, conclusions from the meeting in

22 Zenica. I believe that you will find this interesting. Have a look at

23 some of these conclusions that also concern the period during which you

24 were in the Presidency. We'll have a look at the first page for a

25 moment. Have a look at the first page. Item 2, these are conclusions:

1 "The goals of our army's struggle remain: The struggle for a

2 State of Bosnia-Herzegovina which shall remain unified and within its

3 recognised borders."

4 We're talking about the 21st and 22nd of August, 1993.

5 Have a look at item 3:

6 "The war for territory will continue. Even if there is peace

7 along the lines of the Geneva Agreement, the continuation of the war will

8 be against both ..."

9 And then could we have a look at the following page in English and

10 in Croatian:

11 "... will be against both forms of Fascism, the

12 Serbian-Montenegrin one and the Ustasha one, whether taken separately or

13 together."

14 Let's have a look at another conclusion on page 3, page 3 in the

15 English version and in the Croatian version. Item 11, it says:

16 "The civilian and military authorities during this period of time,

17 when fighting was ongoing, were not acting in accordance with the main

18 principles of armed combat. The civilian powers only partly engaged in

19 war, which resulted in not acting in a functional, moral, and logistical

20 way."

21 It's not important how this continues. Let's have a look at 3:

22 "In all corps, use offensive operations in skirmishes and combats

23 more than previously. Sabotage and reconnaissance operations are to

24 acquire a mass character focusing on the enemy's shallow and deep rear."

25 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness the last

1 page in English and in Croatian.

2 Q. The document was signed by the deputy commander of the Main Staff

3 of the armed forces, Sefer Halilovic. The top brass who participated at

4 this meeting first accused the civilian authorities for not having helped

5 them arm themselves. Given the document we have just seen, is this a

6 conclusion that can be drawn?

7 A. Well, yes, I think so. They were unhappy because they hadn't been

8 provided with the finance that they needed by local communes.

9 Q. We'll come to that later on. But may we just take a look at

10 something that's very important for you and your activities in the

11 Presidency, the discussion by Mr. Sefer Halilovic at the meeting in Zenica

12 on the 21st and 22nd of August, 1993. And that is Exhibit 2D 00186. It

13 is the transcript of this meeting, the consultations held. It is page 21

14 in the Croatian version and 20 in the English. And I have underlined for

15 Their Honours and the interpreters the portion I wish to read out. I

16 think they have that. I'll be reading slowly. It is on page 21. I think

17 they have -- we have the page. And I'd like to focus on the middle of the

18 page downwards. I'm going to start and read:

19 "I have to say here I'm sorry that there are no members of the

20 Presidency here so that I don't end up talking about them behind their

21 backs. The state has neither purchased for us nor obtained for us even

22 the minimum of weapons and ammunition, not even when the routes were open,

23 completely open. In the first five months, Sule ..."

24 I assume you know who "Sule" is, the Sule referred to. It was Mr.

25 Sulejman Vranje, we can see from the transcript.

1 "... you could get through without any major fuss, without any

2 problems, and then in the following five months you could get through with

3 some certification. Some would say yes, some no, but some got through.

4 Well, then it was blocked and there was no way at all. There's no way at

5 all now. Thus the state did not obtain anything for us, even when it was

6 possible, because they were privatising public property and public

7 resources. It was privatisation, pure and simple.

8 "After 13 victims in Sarajevo, from my close family members, I no

9 longer have any intention of not telling anyone in this state what I think

10 of them, even if it costs me my life that very second, costs me my life

11 that instance. I have no private interest in anyone, but I have an

12 interest in the survival of the state and the people. We have the

13 privatisation of resources. Some very exclusive groups of people are

14 occupied with that and we don't get any benefit from that. We're left

15 with the question of how and by what methods we can acquire booty, how and

16 in what way we can get large installations into operation for the special

17 purpose industry. How to take Vitez and how to take Zunovnica, because

18 for our army, they are two strategic features, with Vitez, the military

19 industry system of our state comes full circle. Then it is complete.

20 Then we have the complete chain in our hands."

21 I'm going to stop there for a moment. Mr. Kljuic, who were you

22 taking -- who was Vitez being taken from? Where was it? Serbia?

23 Croatia?

24 A. It was in Bosnia-Herzegovina where Croatian power and authority

25 was exercised during the aggression.

1 Q. We can continue now. Thank you.

2 "In Zunovnica we get to what is super urgent, to what is ready, to

3 what could be used immediately. The raw materials, the TNT is there.

4 There is gunpowder. There are weapons and ammunition. And with Vitez, we

5 integrate the entire special purpose production system. If the question

6 would be: Now your house is on fire. Do you put out the house fire or

7 take Vitez? I would go for Vitez first. With Vitez we integrate the

8 entire special purpose production."

9 Now, the weapons via the Green Berets and Patriotic League and so

10 on, can you tell us when that was? 1993? On the last page is Sefer

11 Halilovic's contribution. It is page 22 of the Croatian and 21 in the

12 English. I'd just like to read out one important sentence. So page 22

13 for the Croatian and 21 for the English. I'll read it out. It's in the

14 lower section, towards the end. It says:

15 "I must tell you that Bakir Alispahic and Sule and this group of

16 people, I'm certain, armed the Sarajevo region, the Eastern Bosnia region

17 in the pre-war period, as a member of the Patriotic League. We moved

18 about that, fled, hid, made arrests."

19 So we see there -- and Vitez is going to be very important,

20 because after the break I'm going to ask you about what you said at the

21 Presidency meeting in referring to Vitez and your opposition to taking

22 control of Vitez.

23 But from what we've just read out, can we see from that that, in

24 actual fact, the main person in command was criticising the authorities

25 for the lack of weapons, and, on the other hand, stating an intention to

1 continue, regardless -- to continue the war regardless of whether a peace

2 treaty would be signed or not. And was that the general mood that

3 prevailed at the time, to the best of your knowledge?

4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honours, I am going to object. This, once again,

5 hasn't been a question but a speech. Is the question to the witness, has

6 she read it correctly out loud to him, or does he have any knowledge other

7 than what's been read to him in this document?

8 The witness has already said he was not involved in the government

9 during this time period, from October of 1992 until November of 1993. He

10 specifically was not in this meeting. So we spent the last 10 or 15

11 minutes doing a long reading by counsel. Does this witness have any

12 personal knowledge, beyond pure speculation, as to what this meeting means

13 or what was said or what the policy of these people were? There is no

14 foundation whatsoever, except if he wants to say -- if she wants to say,

15 "Did I read this correctly?" Then I suppose all of us in the courtroom

16 who have followed along can say, "Yes, you read it correctly." Other than

17 that, there's no knowledge.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Nozica, the witness, in the

19 month of August, was not part of the Presidency again. This meeting was

20 held on the 21st and 22nd of August. You quoted a part of the text in

21 which Sefer Halilovic seemed to be criticising the political figures who

22 had not made available to the ABiH army all the resources that were

23 necessary. He talks about privatisation, and seems to imply that some

24 political personalities may have had a personal interest in this and may

25 not have only considered the interest of the state.

1 The witness was not a member of the Presidency at that time, so

2 what do you want to ask him about? You want to ask him about a meeting

3 which he did not attend? He certainly had no knowledge at the time of

4 Halilovic's discourse. So what is the point you want to make here?

5 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Halilovic at this

6 meeting presented his views about the work of the Presidency before the

7 beginning of the conflict and right up to that particular month of

8 August. Now, since the witness, until the end of 1992, was in the

9 Presidency, then the question was whether it was clear to him that the

10 army, BH army, held such positions. Because the army here is assessing a

11 longer period, not just the last eight months but a longer period of

12 time. So I'm asking him whether he was aware of that while he was in the

13 Presidency and whether he knew about it when he returned to the

14 Presidency.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I was not aware of that. I did

16 not know about it, because the army had become transformed since its

17 inception up until the period that Halilovic is referring to. And I have

18 to say that I contributed to having Halilovic become commander, because at

19 that time we had top-ranking officers who were Serbs and Croats; they were

20 loyal to Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm talking about Jovo Divjak and Stjepan

21 Siber. And we had a third officer, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, an Italian, who

22 was a very capable officer but who did not suit the functionaries of the

23 SDA.

24 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

25 Q. What does that mean?

1 A. Well, he was an individual who did not carry his religious

2 feelings on his sleeve. On the other hand, Halilovic, at the beginning,

3 was Izetbegovic's favourite. Later on, he was openly hostile to him. But

4 Halilovic was a low-ranking officer, and in 1991 he was still a captain.

5 He obtained the rank of major just a few months later. So he threw him

6 out and carried on with his communist rhetorics, and said that Zagreb and

7 Belgrade were the same vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina, which wasn't true at

8 all. Croatia received half a million Muslims. It took in others, too.

9 It helped them, sent them further on into the world. On the other hand,

10 Mr. Izetbegovic took his family to Brac, the island of Brac, and did not

11 take them to Gornji Milanovac, for example. And that's the best answer to

12 those people who still say today that Zagreb and Belgrade were equated,

13 that they were equally hostile to Bosnia-Herzegovina. We fought against

14 that, but there you have it. You see the captain of a Yugoslav People's

15 Army speaking in that way.

16 On the other hand, perhaps this was something that was not known

17 to the public, but the Croats were the bad guys in the Muslim place and

18 the Muslims were the good guys. But it was standard practice for people

19 walking around.

20 Today, when we looked at some papers, we find that Mr. Tudjman

21 wasn't the sole individual to blame for the conflict with the Muslims and

22 Izetbegovic. Just as Izetbegovic said once that you need two to go to

23 war; then you need two for everything.

24 And in writing my book quite recently, "The Betrayal of Bosnia," I

25 came upon an agreement between Mr. Izetbegovic and Boban, which was signed

1 in front of Lord Owen, saying that the Bosnian republic would have an exit

2 to the Adriatic Sea, and apart from that, that it would have a guaranteed

3 status of a naval -- of a maritime force.

4 Now, had we shown that -- gone public with that document, people

5 wouldn't have fought, because people who were sincerely anti-fascist and

6 were against the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina is today a

7 subservient class in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'm honoured to be a member

8 of that class.

9 Q. Thank you. I think it's time to take a break. After the break, I

10 have some more questions in that area. But you mentioned Brac, which you

11 said was where Mr. Izetbegovic's family was.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. But you can put him

13 the question a bit later because it's already 10 to 4.00. We shall have a

14 break now and resume at 10 minutes past 4.00.

15 --- Recess taken at 3.48 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 4.11 p.m.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Nozica, you have the floor.

18 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'd just

19 like to inform you that during the break I did some calculations, and I

20 have 10 minutes from my own cross-examination, and from Mr. Coric, I have

21 got 15, so I'll complete my cross-examination within that 25 minutes.

22 Q. Mr. Kljuic, when you spoke about Brac and Milanovac, could you

23 explain to Their Honours where Brac is and where Mr. Izetbegovic's family

24 was?

25 A. Brac is in the Republic of Croatia, and Gornji Milanovac and Donji

1 Milanovac are in Serbia.

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, I think you have answered -- you have

3 started to answer while Ms. Nozica was still asking questions. At least I

4 was confused. I didn't know who was speaking. I'm sorry.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Brac, where Mr. Izetbegovic's family

6 was, is in the Republic of Croatia, whereas Gornji and Donji Milanovac are

7 towns in Serbia.

8 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Thank you. Now, at the Presidency meeting, and I'm referring to

10 the second half time, the end of 1993, that is, did you indicate the bad

11 move of attacking Vitez? And from the transcript, with the consultations

12 held with the BH army already in August, 1993, that it was the planned

13 target of the BH army. Do you remember that you discussed that issue?

14 A. Of course. There were a number of times when I pointed this out,

15 and I legitimately defended, because I would never have accepted sitting

16 in a body which would legally attack areas inhabited by Croats. And when

17 two Franciscan Friars were killed in Fojnica, then, at Izetbegovic's

18 request, I went there to quell the hostilities. And I didn't know why

19 Vitezit was so important to them, because I'm not a military expert, but

20 the fact remains that the fighting went on quite intensely over there.

21 And we, as the Presidency members, received information from the military

22 structures of the BH army alone, and they said that those were the best

23 guys, whereas those over there were not.

24 But I would say this quite openly to Izetbegovic. I said that if

25 there were to be a war between the Croats and Muslims, Bosniaks at the

1 time, were it to grow into an all-out war between these two ethnic groups,

2 it would be highly detrimental to both but it would be worse to the State

3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let us take a look at what you did actually say at the

5 Presidency meeting held on the 29th of December, 1993. And it is Exhibit

6 2D 00189. We see here -- well, the whole first page in Croatian. First

7 tell us whether you remember the meeting.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Only the title has been translated into English, of that first

10 page, that is.

11 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Now, on e-court may we have the page

12 of which the number is 10/3, both in English and in the B/C/S. 10/3. It

13 is 2D 04/0140. That's right. And can we have the corresponding page in

14 English? In English, it is 2D 040143. That's it.

15 Q. I'm going to read it from the beginning. It begins -- Mr. Ganic,

16 who was the Presidency member; Mr. Komsic was also a Presidency member.

17 Is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Then we have you and Mr. Izetbegovic speaking. So this is what

20 Ganic says:

21 "At UNPROFOR, there are those who care about these conflicts.

22 Don't forget that. Some foreign powers that care got involved there."

23 And they are referring to Vitez throughout. Then Komsic says:

24 "If people surrender their weapons, and if those who want to leave

25 abroad do, then there are no problems."

1 Izetbegovic says to that:

2 "There is one thing there, that we don't get the factory in our

3 possession."

4 And then we come to the important point that you say, Kljuic says:

5 "And our army cares about that. That is why we're not going to

6 Foca but to Vitez instead. We are not kids either."

7 Now, you clearly stated your position. Let's just tell Their

8 Honours what Foca was at that period and why you reacted the way you did.

9 What was the importance of Foca?

10 A. Well, I have to tell you that it gives me great moral satisfaction

11 to read this after so many years, because certain individuals from Zagreb

12 and Herzegovina proclaimed me to be a traitor of the Croatian people who

13 stayed in Sarajevo. They said that there were no Croats in Sarajevo. But

14 all this is symbolic, expressed in symbols. Muslims were the most

15 numerous in Foca, and in a way that was the symbol. This town was the

16 symbol of trade, ability, and different types of skills. But, you see,

17 the army, the BH army, was going to Vitez, not Foca, which meant this is

18 the consequence of a process. And I have to tell you that the conflict

19 between the Muslims and Croats is the most tragic portion of Bosnian

20 history.

21 When that conflict took place, at that point in time Milosevic and

22 Karadzic questioned all military action on the eastern front and enabled

23 the Muslims to be stronger on the western front, because they thought that

24 if they took Travnik, Bugojno, Vitez and Fojnica, they won't ask for

25 Grude, Foca, et cetera, Visegrad, and so on. So that was a terrible

1 situation, and of course -- and perhaps the leadership, the military

2 leadership, under the influence of Izetbegovic, thought that Travnik would

3 be more important; Travnik, Bugojno, Fojnica, more important than Grude,

4 Medzic [phoen] and Visegrad.

5 However, when I said what I did, I expressed my disagreement. I

6 said, "We're not children. We know what this would mean." And tried to

7 prevent an escalation in the war with the Croats, because that would have

8 been detrimental not only to the Croats, who, conditionally speaking,

9 stayed on in territory where the Muslims were the majority, but Croats as

10 a state-forming nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also for the Bosniak

11 people, because it was the only link in the chain, that link which set up

12 resistance to Serbian fascism.

13 Q. I just want to go back to this for a minute. This is, in fact,

14 why I asked you whether the Patriot League was formed, for example, in the

15 territory of Foca from the beginning of 1991. Was there any information,

16 according to which the Muslim leadership - that's what it was called at

17 the time - preferred certain territories to others, although they kept, in

18 fact, claiming that they were for a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina?

19 A. Well, that's not how I would interpret this. The Muslim people

20 did resist Serbian fascism, but such operations were the product or the

21 result of a situation. You must know that a lot of JNA officers joined

22 the ABiH. They had been indoctrinated by the idea that Croats were

23 Ustashas. And this could be seen with Halilovic. Zagreb and Belgrade

24 were the same enemy. Initially they only mentioned Zagreb but then they

25 added Belgrade.

1 Q. But, Mr. Kljuic, my time is short, so -- my question wasn't about

2 the Muslim people. I'm referring to what was the product of the political

3 and military leadership. It didn't concern the Muslim people.

4 A. Well, my personal misfortune and misfortune of the Croatian and

5 Bosnian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina was that President Izetbegovic and

6 President Tudjman didn't like each other. They didn't tolerate each

7 other, and the result was that two ethnic groups suffered.

8 Secondly, there were public manifestations. There were a number

9 of secret agreements, some of which we are unaware of. Some have been

10 transcribed; some haven't. But since I knew both of them, I had close

11 personal contact with both of them, and in the end neither of them had

12 much fondness for me, but since I did know them, they enjoyed betraying

13 people. In fact, they betrayed their own people.

14 Q. Very well. I admit that what you are saying is quite interesting,

15 but I'm running out of time, so let's go back to this Presidency session.

16 Do you remember having intervened at this Presidency session with

17 regard to the ties between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Islam countries?

18 And you tried to inform the Presidency of contacts with Egypt. It's the

19 same document, 2D 00189, page 4/3, both in the English and in the Croatian

20 version. 4/3. That's the same document.

21 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] We have the English version. Can we

22 have the Croatian version? It starts at the top. Mr. Kljuic is

23 speaking. It's the same page. Yes, that's the one.

24 Q. I'll now read it out. You say: "Can I express my own opinion?"

25 And do you agree that you're addressing Mr. Izetbegovic?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "Are you going to express support for Egypt as one of our pillars

3 in the Islamic world? I have made a suggestion, and in my assessment, in

4 the case of Turkey, everything is fine. As far as Egypt is concerned, we

5 should subsequently submit a request to the ministry. In other words, we

6 should not issue an order. We should talk perhaps even to the Minister of

7 Foreign Affairs to put the emphasis on Egypt, because I feel that Egypt

8 could assist us significantly in a political sense."

9 And this is what Mr. Izetbegovic said in reply:

10 "I believe that Egypt could help us. However, what is at stake is

11 how much influence it has in the Muslim and in the Western world. At the

12 moment, Saudi Arabia has the most influence in the Western world. Given

13 the financial situation, Egypt is an economically dependent country. If

14 someone in the West is independent here, well, all this depends on Saudi

15 Arabia because of oil, because of the sacred grounds there, and because of

16 the fact that their revenue amounts to $200 billion over there. So Saudi

17 Arabia is a country whose voice is most heard over there, and they are

18 listened to the most. A few months ago they curtailed British government

19 action, and they threatened they were going to put an end to important

20 acquisitions, et cetera. Egypt cannot act in this way. I'm not sure that

21 Egypt is a very influential country. As far as influence in the Muslim

22 world itself goes, as far as its influence in the Muslim world itself

23 goes, Egypt is not the country that has the most influence either. It's

24 not because of the peace problems it has with Israel, et cetera. It is

25 not the most influential country. There are two countries there which

1 have a lot of influence; Saudi Arabia on the one hand, Iran on the other,

2 for certain countries that are more rigid, and Pakistan, a country which

3 has balanced politics. Contacts should be established with Egypt."

4 You continue to insist on Egypt. That's consistent with the

5 policies you have mentioned here before the Chamber. And my question is

6 now as follows:

7 When this was happening on the 20th of December, 1993, were there

8 any citizens of Serbian or Croatian nationality who were still in Sarajevo

9 and who would have believed this to be in their own interest? They would

10 have believed that close contact should be established with Saudi Arabia,

11 Pakistan, and Iran, rather than with countries such as Turkey and Egypt,

12 which are the countries that you preferred.

13 A. Well, naturally they wouldn't have advocated such a position at

14 the time, nor would they have advocated -- nor would they advocate such a

15 position today. I'm a politically mature individual, and because of

16 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the UN, and because of

17 Egypt's influence in the intellectual world in Muslim countries and in

18 Turkey, because Turkey is a secular country, well, because of these

19 factors, we believe that we should establish relationships with them, if

20 relationships were to be established with anyone. I didn't want to use

21 religion to introduce Shia Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, et cetera.

22 But finally, when the situation was very dangerous for our

23 country, five Presidency members in Bosnia and Herzegovina issued reports

24 of their own against the instrumentalisation of religion in the army,

25 against using religion in the army. I was the chief of the delegation of

1 the Presidency of Serbs and Croats. We were received by Anthony Lake, the

2 Chief of the Security of the USA. We were being prepared for the Dayton

3 Agreement. And we discussed these matters - this was in 1995 - the

4 condition sine qua non for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a secular state, so

5 Turkey was to be a model for us. Turkey, out of all the Muslim countries,

6 was a model. However, religion was instrumentalised by all three sides in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the results of the most recent elections

8 demonstrate this. When we would talk about the Croats, we can see the

9 role that the church played in its tragedies, et cetera.

10 So in a multinational country, you have a fourth confession. You

11 have the Jewish faith. The Jews are not numerous but they have much

12 influence in Sarajevo. So in that country, where you have four

13 monotheistic religions, the only way to survive is to have a secular

14 state. However, no one was in favour of a secular state, because for the

15 sake of elections, for the sake of one's political future, religion can

16 play a vital role.

17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kljuic. I regret not having had sufficient time to

18 discuss a subject that has often been brought up in the course of your

19 testimony, that of an indivisible Bosnia and Herzegovina. I had some

20 questions about that. I also didn't have time to ask you about the most

21 recent elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But I have now completed my

22 cross-examination. Thank you very much. And I will now give the floor to

23 my colleagues. Thank you very much.

24 A. Thank you.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Counsel.

1 Now for the next Defence team. Who will be taking the floor on

2 behalf of Mr. Praljak?

3 MR. KOVACIC: Mr. Praljak will be asking the questions. Thank

4 you.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, please put

6 technical questions to this witness.

7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I

8 will restrict myself to technical questions.

9 Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kljuic, I can't talk to you in general terms;

11 I'm not allowed to do so. And given the fact that we have limited time,

12 and since you're one of the crucial witnesses in this case, if I ask you

13 about certain documents, can you tell me very briefly whether you are

14 familiar with the document or not so that we can move on quickly. This is

15 only because time is limited.

16 A. We both share the same desire.

17 Q. Thank you very much. I'd like to go back to the agreement between

18 Boban and Karadzic of the 6th of May, 1992.

19 Can we see 3D 000430. That's the agreement in question. Can we

20 read through item 5 of the agreement. I'll just read out item 5.

21 "By this agreement we no longer have reasons to curtail the

22 conference of the European Union on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both parties want

23 the conference to continue urgently."

24 That's item 5. Is that correct, Mr. Kljuic?

25 A. I don't know. I'm not familiar with the contents of the document.

1 Q. You have it here.

2 A. I must say that Mate Boban didn't have the power to negotiate with

3 the Serbs. He was only one of 44 representatives of mine in the

4 parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 Q. Mr. Kljuic, look, I understand what you're saying, but I don't

6 have enough time. Please just have a look at the item and say whether

7 that's what it actually says. We've already discussed what Mate Boban's

8 role was. Is item 5 what I said it was?

9 A. You read it out correctly.

10 Q. Thank you. Do you know the name "Franjo Boras"?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Franjo Boras was a member of the Presidency of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was a Croat. Is that correct?

14 A. He was legally elected.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you know that in his book, "The Bosnian and

16 Herzegovinian Chaos," in 1996 -- 3D 00446 is the number of this document.

17 Could we please have it on the screen.

18 In that book of his, he described how Cutileiro and Lord

19 Carrington asked them and him personally to go and talk to the Serbs.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can we see page 244. Can we

21 see the following page, please, and then everything will be in order. The

22 following page, please. These are the titles of the book.

23 Q. He says, towards the end of our conversation with the Croatian

24 delegation, Lord Carrington said the following:

25 "Mr. Boras, if you don't reach an agreement, we'll let you kill

1 each other and then we will impose our own solution on you."

2 Mr. Boras answered:

3 "Lord Carrington, how should we agree on anything, and with whom?

4 The Serbian aggressor has everything at his disposal. He has all the

5 military equipment of the JNA. You can hear the noise of the mortars and

6 large guns from the surrounding hills. When we talk to them, it falls on

7 deaf ears. The representatives of the Muslim people are passive. They

8 don't do anything to defend Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they are still

9 hoping that the Yugoslav People's Army will provide assistance."

10 And then two lines below, towards the end of the conversation:

11 "Cutileiro informed us that all three delegations should reach an

12 agreement about the territorial boundaries of the three constitutive units

13 within Bosnia and Herzegovina without the presence of the international

14 community."

15 And then it says:

16 "With regard to the conclusions in Sarajevo, on the 6th of May,

17 1992, a meeting was held in Grac between the Croatian and Serbian

18 delegations. The Croatian delegation was headed by Mate Boban. Vlado

19 Santic and I were also members of the delegation."

20 So, according to Mr. Boras, a legally elected member of the

21 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was also a member of that

22 delegation, and they had discussions there. Is that what it says in the

23 book?

24 A. I don't know. I didn't read the book.

25 Q. But you have it here in front of you.

1 A. Let me assist you. Wait a minute. Franjo Boras had been legally

2 elected, but he didn't have the power to negotiate without consulting the

3 president of his party. He didn't have the power to negotiate with the

4 Serbian side. On the other hand, at that time it was only Milosevic who

5 had acted against us in Croatia and in Bosnia. And Franjo Boras had also

6 taken an oath, according to which he would protect the territorial

7 integrity and the freedom of a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. By

8 negotiating with them, he violated the oath he had taken.

9 Q. Witness, I just want to see or to establish what has been written

10 in this book. I like you and there are many things that we could agree

11 on. But could we just agree on what Franjo Boras wrote down?

12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could we move

13 into private session, very briefly, please. Thank you.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Why do you want to go into

15 private session?

16 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Because there is something

17 that I would like to say that I believe should not be said in open

18 session. It has to do with Franjo Boras.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Registrar,

20 please.

21 [Private session]

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 [Open session]

9 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We're in open session, Mr.

10 President.

11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

12 Q. I'd like to clarify something with regard to the consequences of

13 the meeting in Grac. Josip Manolic, a witness, testified before this

14 Chamber that, after the meeting in Grac, hostilities between the Croats

15 and Muslims -- sorry, Serbs ceased.

16 Please have a look at the map you have in front of you. My

17 question is as follows: After the 6th of May and the so-called agreement

18 on division, did the following events take place:

19 First of all, in Bosnian Posavina, from May until June, did the

20 army of Republika Srpska, after intensive fighting with the HVO, take over

21 Derventa, Modrica, and Bosanski Samac? You can see that on the map. You

22 can see the lines of attack of the Serbian army on Bosnian Posavina. Did

23 this take place in 1992, from May to October, up until Bosanski Brod fell?

24 A. Yes, that's correct. But can't you see how absurd that agreement

25 is?

1 Q. Well, this is what I'm discussing, this is what I'm talking

2 about. Did you know that the army of Republika Srpska launched an attack

3 on Livno on the 23rd of -- from the 23rd to the 25th of May, 1992? They

4 wanted to break through Livno and get to Split.

5 A. Yes, I know about that. I don't know the details, but I remember

6 the operation.

7 Q. Thank you very much. Do you know that after that meeting, the

8 Republika Srpska army broke through to the Neretva River, took the

9 municipality of Stolac, most of the municipality of Capljina, and the

10 eastern part of Mostar?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you know that in mid-June, 1992, HVO forces, with some

13 assistance from the ABiH that wasn't fully fledged at the time, liberated

14 Stolac, Capljina, et cetera, those territories?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Do you know that Jajce fell after heavy combat on the

17 29th of September, 1992, and the army of Republika Srpska drove back the

18 forces of the HVO and the ABiH and took the town and municipality of

19 Jajce?

20 A. Yes, but there was no heavy fighting, unfortunately.

21 Q. Very well. We'll discuss that later. Do you know that during

22 1993, continuously with varying intensity, there were artillery attacks by

23 the Serb army on the Mostar-Stolac area?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. That the army of Republika Srpska attacked the municipalities of

1 Tomislavgrad, Livno, Tomislavgrad and Bugojno?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. That the army of Serbia attacked Orasje, Posavina?

4 A. On a daily basis, yes.

5 Q. And the HVO units -- and the HVO units were defending

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo, Bihac, Usora, Zepce, Vares, Gradacac,

7 Brcko, Tuzla, those areas. Do you know about that?

8 A. Of course.

9 Q. Thank you. Now, on the map we see 11 HVO brigades and one HVO

10 battalion which were established and were located outside what we later

11 referred to as the provinces of -- provinces 3, 8, and 10, which were in

12 provinces 1, 5, and 9, in actual fact. Are you aware of that? Do you

13 know about those brigades?

14 A. Yes. You were referring to the provinces according to the

15 Vance-Owen Plan.

16 Q. Yes. Now, would you agree with me that all those 11 brigades and

17 the HVO battalion that was there, that they were established and that they

18 fought on the territory which was outside what is mentioned here as the

19 banovina of Croatia within Bosnia-Herzegovina? Take a look at the map,

20 please.

21 A. I helped one of the Defence counsel explain what "banovina" meant

22 last time. Banovina is not fact; it is fiction. On the other hand,

23 everything you say is quite correct as far as the fighting was concerned,

24 that the Croats made their contribution to the defence of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. (redacted) If, after

1 his agreement, everything went counter to it.

2 And the second point is that we in the Presidency reached a

3 decision to form armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which meant that all

4 those defending Bosnia-Herzegovina - and that was the greatest problem I

5 personally faced - was how to incorporate the HVO and the BH army and HOS

6 at that point in time.

7 Now, the problem arose with the behaviour of the different

8 commanders. Now, this contribution by Croatia to the defence of BH was

9 very important and indubitable. It was much more than just being an

10 active defence. It was helping logistics in the different regions of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, logistical support for Gradacac and Tuzla, for

12 example, where the commander of the 2nd BH army corps was located and that

13 was Zeljko Knez; and the town of Gradacac, Mejacevic.

14 So you're just pointing out the positive features which we can

15 accept. However, the conflicts arose on an interpersonal level, political

16 level, outside the system and the institutions.

17 Q. Mr. Kljuic, there's no doubt about that. We're not challenging

18 that at all.

19 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] I think that there's a mistake

20 in the transcript. In line 13 of that same page, it wasn't the

21 contribution of Croatia but the Croatian people. That's what the witness

22 said.

23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Kljuic, it's just because of the time constraints that I can't

25 enter into those -- into a debate of that kind and we can't go into the

1 details. Otherwise, rest assured that I'd be happy to clear up the

2 interpersonal relations and how many commanders of the BH army had

3 previously been in the Yugoslav army during the aggression against

4 Croatia. There are a lot of details of that kind.

5 But I'd like to ask you to restrict yourself to certain facts,

6 that there were 11 brigades fighting for Bosnia-Herzegovina outside areas

7 which we, here, conditionally refer to as "banovina"; is that right?

8 Would that be right?

9 A. Yes.

10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] May we move on to the next

11 exhibit. 3D 00431 is the number.

12 Q. Now, while we're waiting for the document, look at the red lines

13 on the map, please. After the fall of Jajce, was it the intention of the

14 army of Republika Srpska to break through to Sarajevo?

15 A. Well, they kept laying siege to Sarajevo but they weren't very

16 good soldiers and didn't succeed in taking control of Sarajevo.

17 Q. I don't mind about Sarajevo. That's not the point. But to try

18 and break through the corridor up to Jajce and Travan. Now, look at the

19 Bosanska-Posavina corridor on the map now, please.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Yes, I will slow down. Yes,

21 yes, yes.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Just for the record, Your Honour, it may be good to

23 identify the map with a number, and it would also be good, when Mr.

24 Praljak -- General Praljak is referring to the map and lines, to sort of

25 have the witness exactly point to the particular map so we can get it on

1 the record.

2 MR. SCOTT: And in a similar fashion, Your Honour, it would also

3 be helpful if specific dates were used. We're generally skipping around

4 continually from 1990 to 1994 and 1995. Could we also have Mr. Praljak

5 give the specific dates of the questions he puts to the witness.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, bear that in mind,

7 please.

8 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The exact dates of the

9 individual operations, and I state them, I give the months and dates:

10 Jajce, Posavina, Livno, all this is in 1992. And you have that

11 enumerated, the exact dates when what happened after the meeting in Grac.

12 Q. Now, sir, point to the corridor that the Serbs were defending on

13 the map, please.

14 A. Well, I can get up and show you. This was the corridor which

15 linked Banja Luka to Belgrade.

16 Q. Thank you. I have finished with the map. But would you now take

17 a look --

18 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour.

19 [Interpretation] May we have a number assigned to the map, an IC

20 number, so that we can refer to it.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Registrar, a number,

22 please, for the map.

23 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit IC 47, Your Honours.

24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I've been told, Mr. Kljuic, that your answer wasn't included, your

1 answer to my question, whether the army of Republika Srpska wanted after

2 fall --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down and repeat

4 what he's saying. It's impossible to translate at this speed.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that they weren't very good

6 soldiers and you had to have a bit of -- some high morals and so on,

7 enthusiasm, and so on.

8 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Kljuic, again we would like to ask you - and

9 the interpreters further ask you - to slow down and wait until Mr. Praljak

10 finishes with his question, and only after please kindly respond to it.

11 Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do apologise. It is

13 not my intention to speak fast. I'll do my best to slow down.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Now, take a look at what -- something else you have in front of

16 you. I have a video about the events in Polog where you were yourself.

17 Is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. In Polog, near Mostar, towards Siroki Brijeg, the Croatian people

20 stopped a Yugoslav People's Army tank column; is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 MR. SCOTT: Can we get a date, please?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the 7th to the 9th of May,

24 1991.

25 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

1 Q. That's what I was just going to say, but thank you for giving me

2 the date.

3 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic arrived and you yourself arrived. Now, is

4 it true that the Croatian people met you with acclamation? There was

5 great applause when you arrived with Mr. Izetbegovic.

6 A. I arrived on the 7th, in the morning, and Izetbegovic arrived in

7 the afternoon of the 9th, and we were greeted, although among those

8 present there were those who wanted incidents to break out.

9 Q. Yes, that's quite true. But on the footage you saw, you were

10 welcomed with acclamation and applause; is that right?

11 A. Absolutely so, yes.

12 Q. And then, at Izetbegovic's request, this tank brigade was left to

13 move toward Kupres, was allowed to move toward Kupres.

14 A. It was 72 hours of a great deal of trial and tribulation on my

15 side. I was arrested together with General Jerko Doko, the minister, by

16 General Andzelic, whose son in Sarajevo was propagating brotherhood and

17 unity.

18 Furthermore, President Tudjman and the late Cardinal Kuharic, the

19 famous cardinal, also made recommendations that they be let through. I

20 consulted them because I was faced with a difficult situation.

21 Now, can you imagine that for the first time after World War II,

22 in socialist Yugoslavia, a column of 168 tanks in full military combat was

23 stopped? We have to look at the period we're talking about. In Croatia

24 only two incidents had broken out at that time. The aggression had not

25 escalated to Croatia yet. And there were many of those both in the field

1 and in Zagreb who thought perhaps that it was better that the war, the

2 terrible war, begin there.

3 And I have to tell you, not only because of my own capabilities

4 and for my own sake but because of some of the people that helped me

5 there, and one of them was Slobodan Bozic - I always like to emphasise

6 that - and another point is this: Colonel Pantelic, the commander of the

7 Mostar corps -- it was a very difficult time. For 72 hours I didn't sleep

8 at all. There were provocations all the time. And I said, "Colonel

9 Bogdan," I think was his name, "you and I are faced with a very difficult

10 situation here, but we can only pull out of it if you don't fire, if you

11 don't shoot, and I'll do all the rest."

12 So you had all this force coming from Belgrade, from where General

13 Spirkovski was the commander of the 1st Army zone, giving directives that

14 the army must go through at 1400 hours. How could it pass across all the

15 people? So the Croatian people did, indeed, do that. It was a symbol of

16 resistance. It was the first time in communist Europe that a squadron of

17 that kind of the 4th Conventional Army was stopped. That was the first

18 example of anything like that, any military might being stopped like that

19 by the people in the world.

20 Q. Yes, I completely agree with you there. I'm not challenging that

21 at all. But can we just note that that tank brigade, with that many

22 tanks, later took part on the 9th and 10th of April, 1992, in fact, in the

23 attack on Kupres, and one month later in the attack on Livno, that I

24 mentioned, with the aim of moving to Split; is that correct?

25 A. It is correct. Let me say I wasn't happy that they marched on

1 Kupres.

2 Q. No. For goodness sake, nobody is claiming that. Thank you for

3 your answer.

4 A. But we prevented the massacre from the 7th to the 9th which had

5 been envisaged for Polog.

6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Might the witness Mr. Kljuic

7 be shown Exhibit 3D 00432 now, please.

8 Q. Mr. Kljuic, it is the attack by the Krajina Serbs on the village

9 of Unista, which is on Bosnian-Herzegovinian state territory. You are

10 going to look at an aerial map.

11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] No, this is Ravno. That's

12 not the right one. 43 -- 3D 0043 -- no, I don't seem to have the number.

13 I seem to have mislaid it.

14 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] It's the second page. The same

15 document, next page.

16 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] No, I can't find that.

17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can have it placed on the

18 ELMO. Here we have it.

19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Yes. Could we look and see

20 the whole map.

21 Q. All I'm asking you is this: Do you know that on the 10th of May,

22 1991, the Krajina Serbs, under the command of Mile Martic, occupied the

23 village of Unista, BH state territory, and expelled the Croats; is that

24 correct?

25 A. Yes, and we arrested Martic.

1 Q. Thank you. I don't have time to enter into a debate now, but you

2 know that I would gladly discuss the response made by the authorities on

3 an aggression like this. Would that be the beginning of war in any

4 country?

5 A. General, please. Then I'll ask you: How is it possible from the

6 territory of the Republic of Croatia to attack Bosnia-Herzegovina? And

7 you'll remain without an answer, you won't be able to answer. So don't

8 ask me to answer that, that Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a state, should protect

9 part of the territory being attacked by a paramilitary formation from

10 another state when that particular state does not want to prevent that

11 paramilitary formation from acting in another state.

12 Q. Mr. Kljuic, you're absolutely right. The Serbs occupied part of

13 the territory of the Republic of Croatia and Croatia was not able to

14 prevent that from happening. So I completely agree with you on that

15 score.

16 Now, all I'm asking you is this: An occupation of part of state

17 territory in every country would be -- would denote the beginning of a war

18 against that country.

19 A. Well, yes, it would, but Croatia was unable to prevent it and

20 defend it.

21 Q. I'm talking about interpretation, not what actually happened. I'm

22 only talking about what the interpretation theoretically was, what the

23 political structures theoretically thought, whether they took this to be

24 the start of an aggression.

25 A. No, they did not.

1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] May we have 3D 00432 now,

2 please. 3D 00432.

3 Q. Mr. Kljuic, it's the same question. Ravno, we're referring to

4 Ravno, and my question is a simple one. Did the Serbs, the army of

5 Republika Srpska in fact, attack the village of Ravno on the 15th of

6 September, 1991 and on the 6th of October, 1991, and expel and kill the

7 Croatian population?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] May we now have the

11 following document: Exhibit 3D 00445.

12 Q. Their Honours have received a complete translation of the Islamic

13 declaration written by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. Is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Have you read the Islamic declaration?

16 A. Many times.

17 Q. Then there's no need for me to ask you whether the political

18 message from the Islamic declaration is a secular civic

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the Muslims to be 50 per cent, and then to move to

20 an Islamic republic.

21 A. It's a theoretical book, a theoretical work. It could be called a

22 utopian work, like Saint Simon or John Locke, and so on, along those

23 lines, because no mention is made of any names in it or states in it. But

24 it is a theoretical possibility and discussed on a theoretical level, of

25 how the Muslim would act in a state in which they were in the majority,

1 what their conduct in such a state would be.

2 Q. At the time of the first parliamentarian elections in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the Islamic declaration printed in over 200.000

4 copies and distributed to the Muslim population, mostly to members of the

5 SDA?

6 A. That's all correct. But this text can't be understood by the

7 majority of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, I have to

8 point out that at the time no one objected, not even the communists who

9 were in power, nor other entities in Yugoslavia. No one took it very

10 seriously. It had been printed and it was reprinted on a number of

11 occasions.

12 Q. I understand you completely. Many books throughout history

13 weren't taken very seriously, although they were precursors of certain

14 events. However, there were 200.000 copies that were printed and these

15 copies were distributed to the population. And they were distributed

16 primarily to members of the SDA; is that correct?

17 A. Well, yes, since they had so many copies, they had to distribute

18 copies to members of the SDA. I think that even communist Muslims read

19 the book.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we now see 3D 00 --

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, as far as the

22 Islamic declaration is concerned, it's a voluminous document. Which

23 paragraph or page are you interested in? Which page or paragraph would

24 you like to have admitted into evidence, since we're not going to admit

25 the entire book into evidence?

1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I've singled

2 out the pages that I would like to be admitted into evidence, and in my

3 opening speech, we had the translated versions. These pages we have in

4 the Croatian version and in the English version. You've been provided

5 with the entire bundle. The translation was obtained from Washington,

6 from the Washington Library, and the parts that are to be entered into

7 evidence concern number 16. There are other numbers I could find later

8 on.

9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we'll do this

10 subsequently, although we believe that the entire book should be admitted

11 into evidence given the context, and the pages that are of particular

12 interest should be marked.

13 While we're waiting for the document to appear on the screen, on

14 page 52, lines 21 to 23, the name of a witness from the Naletilic case was

15 mentioned. Later we had a private session when this was done, so this

16 should be dealt with.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.

18 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kljuic, the book, "The

20 Islamic Declaration," have you read the entire book from cover to cover?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

22 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we now see 3D 00447 on

23 the screen.

24 Q. This is the text of the oath taken by members of the Patriotic

25 League. My question is as follows: Was the Patriotic League established

1 on the 17th of April or around the 17th of April, 1991?

2 A. Well, a minute ago I said I couldn't answer that question. This

3 was done illegally, and you know that in the territory of the former

4 Yugoslavia, when war is ended, then everyone tries to prove that they were

5 active two years prior to the event and they request a certain pension on

6 the basis of their activities. I don't know the exact date of its

7 formation.

8 Q. Thank you very much. Do you know what sort of oath members of the

9 Patriotic League would take?

10 A. No.

11 Q. I'll show you the text of this oath. It's based on a book written

12 by Nihad Halilbegovic, the facts on the Patriotic League in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 1994. On page 17 we have the relevant

14 section:

15 "I swear by Allah Jelleshanuhu that I shall always and at all

16 times and in every place defend all interests of the Muslim people," et

17 cetera.

18 They then wanted to amend the oath, but unfortunately many

19 documents have remained that refer to this text. I have certain other

20 documents.

21 Is it correct to say that the Patriotic League, which was the

22 organisation at the time, addressed itself to the Muslim population and

23 they had to swear by Allah?

24 A. Well, when you're referring to God, I don't think anything is

25 unnatural there. Everyone could say, "may God help." How could we put

1 this differently, invert this formulation? Is there some other people in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina that thought they would be defending the interests of

3 some other people? That's quite natural. But there's nothing illegal

4 here. Everyone defended their own interests at the beginning, initially.

5 Fortunately, initially, the Croats and Muslims had common interests.

6 Later, things developed differently. I regret the fact.

7 But this text, the text of this oath, well, I'm not sure this is

8 how it read. Do you know why? Because most of the people who joined the

9 Patriotic League came from JNA units and they were atheists.

10 Q. Mr. Kljuic, all your explanations, on the whole, are correct;

11 however, I'm saying that the text of the oath is as it reads here,

12 according to this book written by a Muslim; is that correct?

13 A. Well, no. I can also see what is written here. It's correct.

14 Q. Very well. I can also confirm that in the HVO it doesn't say we

15 swear by God, et cetera, but it always says that we will defend the

16 Croatian people and other peoples. But we'll discuss that at greater

17 length later on. I'll move on now.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can we now see 3D 00420.

19 Q. This document has been shown before this Court by Counsel Nika

20 Pinter. It says that on the 27th of May, 1992, a decision was taken on

21 forming Territorial Defence units. This decision was signed by Alija

22 Izetbegovic, as can be seen on the third page, page 3. We've already seen

23 the document; it's already been shown. Have a look at the first page, and

24 could you tell us whether this is correct?

25 A. I haven't seen the first page. Whose session is it?

1 Q. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the

2 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 A. I can't see the first page.

4 Q. Let's go back to the first page.

5 A. Can we see who attended the session?

6 Q. It was signed by Mr. Izetbegovic.

7 A. I can't remember this document. And these are the names of people

8 from one ethnic group, with the exception of one person.

9 Q. Yes. The witness said that Mate Sarlija was a Muslim. When we

10 read this out, we have the name Nijaz Batlak. But when you read out all

11 these names, is there a single Croatian name you can find?

12 A. Not on the first page.

13 Q. Let's see the second page. Have a look at page 2.

14 A. When I look at the names, not a single one, unless someone felt he

15 was a Croat by nationality, and I'm not aware of that.

16 Q. Let's see page 1.

17 A. But this was just a Presidency memorandum. It's not a Presidency

18 document.

19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Let's have a look at page 3,

20 please. Page 3, please.

21 Q. Is this Mr. Izetbegovic's signature? And is this the relevant

22 stamp, which is not very visible?

23 A. I assume so.

24 Q. And we have the protocol number there?

25 A. Yes.

1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think there's a

2 slight error in the transcript. It doesn't fully reflect the witness's

3 answer. Page 69, line 3. The witness said that it is Izetbegovic's

4 private document. He said something like that.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely. I was never

6 familiar with this, and I wouldn't have signed it either.

7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] You believe this is Izetbegovic's

8 private document?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, he signed it, and we have a

10 state stamp and it says, "Memorandum of the Presidency." But these

11 decisions weren't the subject of a discussion at any Presidency session

12 that I attended.

13 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Please, could you put the

14 chart on the ELMO.

15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: While you are looking at it, may I ask a question

16 with regard to this list. To some extent at least, but I cannot identify

17 it completely, it refers to different localities. It seems to be

18 geographically based in some way. And I wonder whether the localities

19 with a Croat majority are included in this, or whether this only covers

20 troops that are assigned or created in places with a Muslim majority;

21 Livno, the municipalities along the Croatian border, for instance. Tuzla.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the accused, please.

23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Everywhere, apart from the

24 territory that was under the control of the Serbs. The other parts of

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to this text, was under Muslims and one

1 Serb. There wasn't a single Croat. This is what the witness has

2 testified.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Stop, please. I said that's

4 what this document says. However, the document isn't valid. It doesn't

5 reflect the actual situation on the ground. At the time --

6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Mr. Kljuic, please.

8 A. This piece of paper is not a valid document.

9 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I know that your role in the Presidency has perhaps

10 been omitted, but this piece of paper is, in fact, a decision signed by

11 Mr. Izetbegovic in his capacity as the President of the Presidency. He

12 issues an order. This document is a valid one. Although you don't

13 believe that this document should be valid, that's a different matter. It

14 doesn't reflect the situation in accordance with the constitution of

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that case, I understand you fully.

16 Q. No, you don't understand me. This document is not real. It was

17 perhaps drafted, compiled. But when independence was obtained, since

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina had a Territorial Defence force but the Serbs had

19 taken the weapons and supplies away, well, the Territorial Defence

20 remained in place. And I have to mention the names of the individuals who

21 were active in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Territorial Defence. Later on,

22 these were local functionaries. There was an institution in the

23 Presidency building.

24 Q. Mr. Kljuic, please assist me. I'd like to discuss matters with

25 you at length, but the Chamber hasn't given me enough time or limits me to

1 technical questions.

2 A. But I want to assist you.

3 Q. Please just tell me whether you are familiar with this document or

4 not.

5 A. I'm not familiar with this document.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. It's not a valid document, because at that time there was an

8 official Territorial Defence force of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the

9 command of the Ministry of Defence. That was also composed of generals.

10 There was Siber and Divjak, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, and many others. And

11 this shows that these percentages are here simply not correct.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may intervene at this point. First, there was

13 a question by Judge Trechsel which has not been answered, and I think it

14 deserves to be answered. Unfortunately, Mr. Kljuic decided to start

15 answering questions which weren't posed to him. So would I ask him to

16 just please -- perhaps the question can be posed again so General Praljak

17 could answer that question for the record.

18 Secondly, the word "valid" is being used. I'm wondering whether

19 it's "valid" versus "legal". Is this a legal document, or is it a legal

20 document or a legal decision versus valid? And I think perhaps Mr. Kljuic

21 is thinking that this is not a legal -- that the document is not legal or

22 that the decision is not legal, which would mean that the president - and

23 that's his signature with the seal - would have created an illegal

24 document; in other words, acting outside his constitutional powers.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kljuic, you said that the

1 document was not valid. What does this mean exactly? Does it mean that

2 the document doesn't reflect the actual situation on the ground, or this

3 document that is signed by Mr. Izetbegovic is in some way illegal? Please

4 be more precise.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Both. There was a Territorial

6 Defence force and its structure was quite different from the structure

7 mentioned here. It was a legal body.

8 And secondly, the president of the Presidency, or the presiding

9 individual, the chairman of the Presidency, let's say, not the president

10 of the Presidency, couldn't appoint individuals to subordinate military

11 positions. The commander of the Territorial Defence had that role.

12 So this shows that this is an illegal document. And the fact that

13 it says "Memorandum from the Presidency" and it bears the Presidency

14 stamp, well, this is an abuse of his power.

15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

16 Q. This is what I'm trying to demonstrate, too, Mr. Kljuic.

17 A. That's what I confirmed. You said that this was the only

18 document.

19 Q. No. I just asked you whether you were familiar with this

20 document, whether it had been signed by Alija Izetbegovic and whether what

21 it says is, in fact, what it says.

22 A. Well, I can't check the protocol. Who knows whether that protocol

23 number is the right number.

24 Q. Thank you. Now have a look at the ELMO.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: No, no. My question now comes, and only as a

1 footnote. This is a document the witness says he has never seen. He has

2 no relation to it. So I think if the Prosecution were to present it, the

3 valid lawyers of the Defence would immediately jump up and say, "This is

4 not admissible." And I wonder whether the same should not apply the other

5 way around. Oh, they are jumping now.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm jumping. The gentleman is saying -- if I --

7 the gentleman is saying as follows: That President Izetbegovic was acting

8 outside his constitutional powers at the time that he created this

9 document, and he's making these appointments. And what it shows is that

10 you have a double-faced policy; one that is open, where he is acting

11 within his constitutional powers as the president of the Presidency, and

12 here where he surreptitiously is acting on his own because he happens to

13 be the president of the Presidency. And I think that's what the gentleman

14 is trying to say; that this is an illegal document per se; in other words

15 -- and so de facto you can see Izetbegovic acting now outside his

16 constitutional powers. And this is while he -- and this gentleman here,

17 at the same time when this document was generated, was a member of the

18 Presidency, which begs the question: If he's a member of the Presidency,

19 how dare the president of the Presidency surreptitiously make these

20 nominations? And I think that's the point that General Praljak is making.

21 And to tie it in with your very valid question was: Are these

22 locations simply controlled by Muslim majorities or other places? And I

23 think that's why your question, on which I insisted on getting an answer,

24 would be most important, because from there we could see, perhaps for one

25 moment, where the president of the Presidency, Mr. Izetbegovic, is going

1 with this surreptitious document, which is, you know, outside the

2 constitution -- his constitutional powers. And I think that's what the

3 gentleman is trying to say, so -- I'm just trying to assist.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I did not --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: -- I did not doubt what the witness has said. I

7 understood it exactly the way you have repeated it. That was not the

8 issue. The issue was to the document, but I said it was a footnote. The

9 question that General Praljak has not answered, I will put it more

10 precisely.

11 Could you please, in this list, point out the nominations of -- or

12 the creation of troops which are destined to be engaged in Grude and

13 Livno? Well, Mr. Petkovic may answer if he knows better.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] No, he doesn't know better,

15 but -- no. That refers to the majority Muslim population. He did not do

16 this for Grude where it was the Croatians who were in the majority but

17 just for the areas which he considered were inhabited by a majority Muslim

18 population.

19 I'd now like to ask page 3 of that document to be placed on the

20 ELMO, because part of the document was not photocopied, it was left out.

21 So I'd like to show Mr. Kljuic, because there's an additional text written

22 in Izetbegovic's hand.

23 JUDGE PRANDLER: I listened to the French translation until now,

24 and now I would like to ask a question before Mr. Scott will have,

25 finally, his say.

1 My question is the following: That Mr. Kljuic, a few minutes ago,

2 mentioned this document and he said that it was a memorandum, and my

3 question is that -- I ask mainly those who are -- who are using the Croat

4 or -- Croat, Serbian or Bosnian language, that when we see here in the

5 preamble of that paper or document it says that -- actually, it says the

6 name of the Presidency, in English, "Issues the following decision"; in

7 Croatian, "Donosi odluku o formiranju jedinica teritorijalne obrane."

8 So now my question is if it is really a decision, as it was

9 translated into English, or a memorandum, as it was said -- it was

10 mentioned by Mr. Kljuic. So that is my question to Mr. Praljak or those

11 who would like to answer the question.

12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Decision.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] It's a decision. He

15 decides. He is deciding. The decision is final, clear, and precise.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your permission,

17 just two words of explanation for the term "memorandum."

18 As the witness used it, it is the usual way for using this concept

19 which denotes a piece of paper which, in the upper left-hand corner, has

20 the person who has issued it. It says it's a document of the Presidency

21 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or whatever. That's what we mean by "memorandum".

22 That letterhead, in fact. It's an empty piece of paper with that

23 letterhead, a blank piece of paper with the letterhead.

24 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] To avoid all misunderstanding, it

25 would be "header" in the English, "header". And we refer to "header" or

1 "letterhead" as "memorandum" in our language, as the official paper, note

2 paper used by an institution for writing whatever it has to write.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

4 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. Several points to be made.

5 First, to follow up on Judge Trechsel's comments a few minutes

6 ago. I couldn't agree more. That's, frankly, been happening all

7 afternoon. The witness has been shown a series of documents that the

8 witness has no personal knowledge of. I haven't objected because, in the

9 past, that seems to be sometimes a separate procedure and I just didn't

10 want to be on my feet. But I think it's been happening all afternoon. We

11 have put documents in front of the witness the witness has no knowledge

12 of.

13 Secondly, I don't think counsel should stand up and characterise

14 the witness's testimony. It's not up to counsel to get up and say, "I

15 think this is what the witness is saying." Those remarks are better saved

16 for closing argument.

17 Number 3, it's also not up to Mr. Praljak or Mr. Petkovic or any

18 of the accused to stand up from their chair and give evidence. If they

19 want to give evidence in this case, they can take the witness stand right

20 here and I'll be happy to cross-examine them. It is not up to them to

21 give evidence in this case from their chairs. And that's what's been

22 happening again this afternoon, as it has before.

23 Number four, I don't understand the relevance of any of this.

24 We've spend all -- most of the afternoon on irrelevant matters. I don't

25 understand the relevance of this last 25 minutes or so. How is any of

1 this a defence to the expulsion of Muslim civilians in Mostar in June 1993

2 and thereafter? I don't understand the relevance of any of this.

3 And finally, Your Honour, I would like to inquire about time. I

4 don't know how the Defence allocated time among themselves. Mr. Praljak

5 has now been going at least for 50 minutes. I would like time for

6 redirect, and I do not know what how much time is left for the Defence

7 combined. Thank you.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Nozica.

9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I consider that it is logical for the

10 Prosecutor at this point in time to have got up on his feet to intervene

11 and to explain the opinions of Mr. Trechsel. However, I have to say, not

12 because he mentioned me but because I think it is a matter of principle,

13 what Judge Prandler has just said, on page 1 here it says on this document

14 that it was the Presidency who -- when I saw the first page; I don't see

15 it now. That it was in May 1992 that this was compiled by the

16 Presidency. Mr. Stjepan Kljuic at that time was a member of the

17 Presidency, and he had to have attended this meeting or the following

18 meeting when the minutes were adopted. So Mr. Kljuic should have known

19 about this document. And there is no better suited person, better placed

20 person, to tell us whether this document was adopted at the Presidency

21 meeting or not.

22 Your Honours, just finally, I'd like to add one more sentence and

23 that is this: That the examination conducted this afternoon was done with

24 the best knowledge of the indictment, so I'm surprised at the Prosecutor's

25 remarks.

1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may we go back to page

2 1. The header of the document clearly states who issued the document, and

3 those are indisputable facts. I don't want to respond to what the

4 Prosecutor has just said because I'm taking up my client's time. But I

5 think, in light of all this, that is quite obvious.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

7 Mr. Kljuic, we've spent a lot of time on this document. This

8 document is entitled, "Decision on the Creation of Units for Territorial

9 Defence." The stamp and the signature there indicate that it is the

10 president of the Presidency who has signed this document.

11 In the preamble of the document, which is based on article 41

12 which has to do with those texts governing the armed forces, in the

13 preamble, a reference is made to a meeting which was held on the 27th of

14 May. That said, this document is dated the 27th of May. So we can

15 reasonably conclude that the Presidency met on the 27th of May, and the

16 president of the Presidency has signed this decision.

17 Were you there? Did you attend the Presidency meeting? It's

18 either a "yes" or a "no" answer.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was in Sarajevo. There was

20 nowhere else that I could have been but at the Presidency meeting, because

21 during the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina I lived in the Presidency

22 building. So I was in the building itself, on the premises. However, I

23 do not remember that I was --

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Do you remember a

25 meeting during which Mr. Izetbegovic had said that territorial units

1 needed to be created, as can be read in this decision? Do you remember

2 this at all, or not?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, in looking at the list of

4 those appointed, many of them were heads of certain groups which defended,

5 more or less successfully, the country. Now, they had to be incorporated

6 into the system.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, it's a non-response to your direct

8 question. Your direct question was extremely precise and it deserves to

9 be answered by the witness.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, indeed. As a rule,

11 my questions are usually pretty accurate. So my question runs as

12 follows: Did you hear about, or did you hear anything about at one point

13 in time, at the level of the Presidency, that the Territorial Defence

14 units needed to be set up, as can be seen here? And these had to be

15 deployed in Zenica, Sarajevo, and so on and so forth.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We did our best to establish such

17 units, but I would never have agreed to these names, nor was I at the

18 meeting when this was put forward, if it was put forward at the meeting.

19 Perhaps it was written outside the meeting, outside the session.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, in that case, a last

21 question. You have answered my question, but I want this to be on the

22 record. Did the president of the Presidency have the authority to decide

23 on the creation of Territorial Defence units? I think you said no; I

24 think you said that that was not part of his duties. So what is your

25 definitive answer?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My definitive answer is this: That

2 we had a Territorial Defence which was active from the first day of the

3 aggression, and that for the appointment of the lower-ranking commanders,

4 it was the Main Staff of the Territorial Defence that was responsible, not

5 the presiding officer of the Presidency.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. And who at the time

7 was head of the Territorial Defence Main Staff, if you remember?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do remember. First of all,

9 there was a gentleman, a JNA colonel, his name was Efendic. Izetbegovic

10 wasn't very fond of him, and then he replaced him later on and brought in

11 Sefer Halilovic, and then he replaced Sefer Halilovic as well, ultimately.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The document,

13 perhaps a number of people have overlooked this, but I don't think so, the

14 Minister of Defence, according to the last paragraph, has played a

15 particular role who needs to organise the command structure of the units.

16 Who was Minister of Defence at the time, if you remember?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Jerko Doko.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And was he a Croat or a Muslim?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He was a Croat.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And you don't remember whether

21 Mr. Jerko Doko talked to you about his duties, the fact that he needed to

22 set these units up?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I do remember. We were

24 together every day. It was wartime. We would be in the same building the

25 whole day. All these guys who had patriotic feelings but did not have the

1 education, and some of them before the war were even delinquents, they had

2 to be established into a system of some kind, a territorial defence. And

3 they needed help and assistance. And it was, in fact, how the BH army was

4 formed.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we have the break - after

6 the break we'll only have one hour - this was the last question put by Mr.

7 Scott: Mr. Praljak, what is the relevance of all of this? Because what

8 is it you want to establish on the basis of this document?

9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The foundation of the

10 indictment is the joint criminal enterprise, which is based on premises,

11 the premises that the Croatian leadership and these six men sitting here

12 in 1992 and in 1993 as well, as well as in 1994, worked exclusively to

13 separate a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that the Muslims were those who

14 were in favour of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina; that we were

15 separatists, and that our philosophical thought was to look at war and the

16 fate of the Croatian people, how we viewed this, and that caused all the

17 evils and crimes that took place on that territory from that point in time

18 onwards.

19 Now, since the documents which I am presenting here quite

20 obviously show, together with the maps and the brigades and the facts of

21 how Mr. Izetbegovic behaved, the Patriotic League behaved and the

22 territorial units behaved, the number of Croats - and there were zero on

23 this list, zero Croats on this list - that that fact in the indictment has

24 nothing to do with the truth as it stands. And showing documents of this

25 kind leads to nervousness and anxiety on the part of the Prosecutor,

1 because none of the groundwork of the indictment which they wish to impose

2 can, in my deep conviction, be proved with these documents.

3 So I feel that these documents are relevant for the Court. They

4 show the development of events on a long-term basis, from day to day over

5 a longer period of time, how the situation deteriorated, how the war came

6 about, and then how, as a consequence of that war, as a consequence of the

7 impossibility of controlling people within that war, arrive at the facts

8 that we're discussing.

9 That is why I believe, Your Honours, that what I'm saying is

10 grounded in the indictment itself.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you're saying that, as far as

12 you're concerned, this document is relevant because there is a connection

13 with your defence strategy.

14 It is now nearly a quarter to 6.00. The registrar has just told

15 me that a name has to be deleted on the record, so we can only resume at

16 ten past 6.00. It has to be redacted.

17 --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 6.14 p.m.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have another 45 minutes.

20 Mr. Scott, how much time would you need for your re-examination?

21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I would have liked to have

22 something like approximately 20 minutes, but I'll settle for whatever the

23 Chamber can give me.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Kovacic.

25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'd like to inform you

1 that my client has one hour and 15 minutes; 30 minutes were granted to him

2 by the accused Petkovic and 50 minutes by the accused Coric. That amounts

3 to an hour and a quarter. He has taken up 45 minutes so far, according to

4 the registrar, so he has another half an hour.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, you have another

6 half an hour, and then the remaining 15 minutes will be granted to Mr.

7 Scott. So please don't waste any time.

8 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. Mr. Kljuic, please have a look at the document on the ELMO. You

10 can see that, in addition to the document on the Territorial Defence,

11 there is something that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic wrote; you can see the

12 handwritten text. Can you recognise that?

13 A. Yes, I can.

14 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions about that.

15 My next question concerns the arming of the army of Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina from the HVO from Croatia. Do you know that throughout the

17 war weapons arrived from Croatia for the HVO and for the army of Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina?

19 A. It didn't arrive in Sarajevo for the HVO, not sufficiently. But

20 everything else concerned agreements that were not institutional

21 agreements. The SDA officials and Croatians, both high-ranking and

22 low-ranking Croatians participated in this.

23 Q. Thank you. I have a series of documents that I would like you to

24 have a look at. Do you know who General Cermak was?

25 A. Yes, I know. He was a quartermaster in the Croatian army for a

1 certain period of time.

2 Q. Thank you. Do you know that General Zagorac had that role, too?

3 A. That was after Cermak.

4 Q. That's correct.

5 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Please, can you show

6 document 3D 00439.

7 Q. Witness, could you have a look at the date, the 7th of April. It

8 says the 7th of April, 1993, and it says:

9 "Permission to pass freely. The Main Staff of the HVO has

10 approved a free pass, supplies being provided on the axis

11 Grude-Srebrenica."

12 And then it mentions three drivers, three Muslims. Is that what

13 it says?

14 A. Yes. There was also an escort, also Muslims.

15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can we see 3D 00008. Could

16 you enlarge the document, please.

17 Q. Zagreb, the 6th of March, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic

18 of Croatia. An order is concerned through the Grude logistics base. A

19 certain amount of materiel and equipment has to be provided for Gradacac

20 and Visoko. The drivers are all Muslims. It's addressed to the units --

21 it's for the units of the ABiH; is that correct?

22 A. There is a Stipo Blazevic who is a Croat. One of the drivers is a

23 Croat. But apart from that, everything that you have said is correct.

24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we see 3D 0009.

25 Q. That's the document. The Republic of Croatia, the Ministry of

1 Defence. The 26th of March, 1993. Order for issuing materiel through the

2 Grude logistics base. Seta Sajub from Sarajevo will take over the

3 equipment, and apart from Franjo Juric to escort the convoy, all the

4 others are Muslims. Do you know who Seta was?

5 A. What's his name?

6 Q. Sajub is his name, I think.

7 A. No. I know a Seta who the ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

8 Ljubljana.

9 Q. Later on. The 26th of March is the date, and this document states

10 that, through the logistics base of Grude in Croatia, arms are being

11 provided to the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that what it says?

12 A. That's what it says.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can we see 3D 00010.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have one very brief question

16 that I'd like to put to you. I'm not going to take up a lot of Mr.

17 Praljak's time.

18 We have evidence that shows that the Republic of Croatia provided

19 the ABiH with weapons in March, April, et cetera. The political

20 authorities or those who lived in Sarajevo at the time, were they aware

21 that, regardless of the conflict between the HVO and the ABiH, Croatia was

22 delivering weapons to the ABiH? Was this something that they knew, or is

23 this something that you just discovered now?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Even when I wasn't a member of

25 the Presidency, at the time I knew that, as far as Tuzla and Gradacac are

1 concerned, weapons were delivered. This was done somewhat on a private

2 basis and for strategic reasons. And I knew that Bosanska Krajina,

3 including Bihac, was helped by Croatia.

4 This can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, they wanted to help

5 the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina; but, secondly, if Bihac fell, the

6 defence forces of Croatia would find themselves in a very difficult

7 position.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I add a question?

9 Mr. Kljuic, have you seen any of these documents that have just

10 been shown to you before? Have you seen these documents? Can you

11 identify the documents? Can you say whether they are genuine, whether

12 they are what they purport to be?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All this took place outside of

14 institutions. It concerned bilateral relationships between Mr. Tudjman

15 and Izetbegovic with lower-level individuals. As to whether Croatia

16 really delivered weapons selectively or not, I can't say. But I can

17 confirm, on the basis of my own experience, that when I visited the free

18 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I also visited areas such as Tuzla,

19 Vares, Gradacac; I was in the vicinity of Brcko, et cetera. And at that

20 time, the high-ranking officials informed me of the fact that, in spite of

21 all the misunderstandings, weapons did arrive or materiel did arrive in

22 some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I'd just like to point out

24 that the Court will be provided with thousands of such documents later on,

25 not only a couple.

1 Q. Mr. Kljuic, if weapons from Croatia didn't get delivered to Bosnia

2 and Herzegovina, how did the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina manage to open

3 fire? Were weapons produced? How was it possible for weapons to arrive

4 in any other way?

5 A. The question is very interesting, but since I'm also a victim of

6 the relationships in force at the time, I'd like to put another question

7 to you. How is it that you entered into a conflict when such friendly

8 relationships existed? The greatest victim of that conflict are the

9 Croats who remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina and primarily those who

10 remained in large cities.

11 If we had been asked for our opinion, such a conflict would never

12 have broken out. However, later on, when certain other countries got

13 involved - and you know whom Izetbegovic counted on - agreements were

14 reached -- an agreement was reached that was well known, an agreement

15 between Zagreb and Sarajevo. According to that agreement, assistance from

16 Islamic countries would be delivered to Croatia, and on the basis of some

17 sort of agreement, they would divide it. The Muslims received the larger

18 part. However, this was all done privately. This was done outside of our

19 institutions by bypassing institutions.

20 I believe that they weren't able to neutralise the conflict

21 between the Muslims and Croats until the Americans said stop, and then

22 that's when the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established.

23 That was on the 18th of March, 1994. That's the happiest day in my life.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kljuic. I would now like to go through some other

25 facts, but how the war broke out is something that will be discussed for

1 years.

2 Have a look at this document dated the 26th of March, 1993. It

3 says the 30th here, the 30th.

4 "Seta from Sarajevo takes over delivery, and as far as the convoy

5 escort is concerned, all those who made up the convoy were Muslims -- all

6 those who made up the escort were Muslims."

7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I have another seven or

8 eight documents that will be submitted to the Chamber. Let's skip this

9 part now. It's no longer necessary to dwell on it.

10 Q. Can you see this document? And do you recognise it?

11 A. Yes, I can see it. There's nothing that I can recognise here, but

12 I can see the names of the drivers. I can see the sort of materiel that

13 was delivered and I have no reason to doubt it, since I know that this was

14 the main source of weapons, in addition to the source represented by the

15 weapons that our units obtained when fighting the aggressor; or, in

16 certain cases, they bought weapons in some other way.

17 I have to say this because of the Judges: Bosnia-Herzegovina was

18 a mini-Casablanca at the time. Everyone would come to sell weapons

19 there. Certain soldiers from the international forces sold weapons. You

20 know there were Ukrainians and Russians in Bosnia-Herzegovina, et cetera,

21 et cetera. And since this was big business, that's how it functioned.

22 Q. Thank you very much. Could we please scroll up. Have a look at

23 the top of the document. We can see that it says, "The Republic of

24 Croatia, Ministry of Defence." And can we see the signature and the stamp

25 at the bottom. Could we scroll down now. Can we see the bottom of the

1 document?

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Which number? What's the number

3 of the document?

4 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Number 10, at the end.

5 Q. Mr. Zagorac, an advisor for the Ministry of Defence of the

6 Republic of Croatia. Is that what it says?

7 A. Yes, it does.

8 Q. Thank you. There are two other matters I'd like to address. Do

9 you know about what is known as a historical agreement which Muhamed

10 Filipovic represented on behalf of the Muslims? It was in Belgrade on the

11 2nd of August, 1991. Muhamed Filipovic, Radovan Karadzic. The date, the

12 2nd of August, 1991. Are you familiar with this historical agreement?

13 A. I'm not only aware of it but I managed obstruct it. This was an

14 act of betrayal of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because if such an historical

15 agreement had been implemented, then only the Croats would not have been

16 concerned by the agreement. They would have been the aggressors, et

17 cetera, et cetera.

18 However, when rejecting this agreement, I wouldn't have of much

19 influence, in spite of the fact that I'm eloquent. I wouldn't have

20 managed to have obstructed the agreement unless Mr. Izetbegovic had been

21 against the agreement. And that is why I'm surprised. Why were Croatian

22 policies against Izetbegovic at the time? Why was there such animosity?

23 Let's be clear. You understand this, but I'm saying this for the

24 sake of the Chamber. If Izetbegovic had accepted the agreement, the Serbs

25 had the tanks and officers. If Izetbegovic had accepted this and if he

1 had persuaded the Muslims, the Serbs would have mobilised 300.000 Muslims

2 who would have crossed over or who would have gone to the west. They

3 wouldn't have lingered on the Karlobag-Virovitica line. They would have

4 gone as far as Rijeka probably. And that's a historical fact. And

5 paradoxically, they came to a conflict between the Croats and Muslims

6 later on because of this.

7 Q. I know you want to explain everything to us, but let's see 3D

8 00281 on the screen, please. Can you just tell me whether this agreement

9 existed; whether what it states is what I have said; yes or no?

10 A. Well, no, I can't answer the question like that, you know. Let me

11 just say this: Belgrade tried to establish this agreement through Dobrica

12 Cosic, and they wanted this agreement with the SDA. When this didn't

13 function, they opted for a minority party. They brought in Zulfikarpasic,

14 who was one of the candidates for the Presidency in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

15 and he obtained the least number of votes. He was number 42.

16 Zulfikarpasic then went to Belgium.

17 Q. Mr. Kljuic, please, I'm talking about the text of the agreement

18 that you can see before you. Was this text signed by Muhamed Filipovic

19 and Radovan Karadzic in Belgrade?

20 A. Yes, it was.

21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Let's see 3D 00433. It's a

22 transcript of the programme shown on the federal television of Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina. The academic Muharem Filipovic was a guest. His photograph

24 has been presented to the Chamber. We can't have a look at it now.

25 Q. But I'm drawing your attention to what's been underlined. I'll

1 read it out:

2 "As far as Bosnia is concerned, from the point of view concerning

3 the Bosnian interests, concerning the interests of my people, we had to

4 avoid war as matter of priority."

5 He's talking about Bosnian people and about avoiding war.

6 "That's why we were negotiating. I didn't invent this, neither

7 did I negotiate to please myself, but the late Alija Izetbegovic shared my

8 opinion, and therefore he gave me and Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic the right to

9 negotiate."

10 Muhamed Filipovic said this on this programme. Have you seen

11 this?

12 A. Well, now I'll tell you how things actually happened. Mr.

13 Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic did go to Belgrade, but they informed

14 Mr. Izetbegovic about the fact at the same time. I know about that. Just

15 a minute.

16 Q. I don't have enough time.

17 A. Well, this is important. It will help you. Look, Izetbegovic

18 didn't accept this, but being a practical politician, he let them go there

19 to see how the Muslims would react. The Muslim politicians were against

20 this, and that's why this historical agreement failed. But if it had

21 succeeded --

22 Q. Well, we've heard about that already, sir. But the fact remains

23 that the agreement was attempted and we cannot discuss the perceptions and

24 consequences this had on the Croatian people.

25 A. Tragic.

1 Q. Yes, tragic. Thank you. Tragic. Quite right.

2 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Now, may we have this other

3 document placed on the ELMO. It's an agreement -- the joint declaration

4 signed by Momir Bulatovic, Alija Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic and

5 Slobodan Milosevic. The agreement or joint declaration was signed -- on

6 the last page it says when. Let's look at the date. It's 1993 anyway.

7 1993, and the month is September.

8 Q. May we look at point 1 on the first page in the Croatian text.

9 The Judges have the text in English. Let us look at point 1, and I'll

10 read it out.

11 "To do everything in our power for all hostilities to cease

12 immediately and military conflicts between the forces of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the forces of the Bosnian Serbs, pursuant an

14 agreement of the 30th of July, 1993, that they cease immediately and by

15 the 11th of September, 1993, at the latest, at exactly 1200 hours, and so

16 establish a direct link or hot-line between military commanders in all

17 areas."

18 Is that what it says there, sir?

19 A. Yes, it is, but I'm not aware of this document.

20 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the document was added

21 to your list subsequently. I can see that you're looking for the

22 document.

23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] May we have the next page

24 placed on the ELMO. Point number 5.

25 Q. And I'm reading the document:

1 "To establish a working group for special issues related to

2 territorial delineation and separation between the two republics in the

3 future union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the areas of Brcko,

4 Bosanska Krajina, the Neretva river valley, Eastern Bosnia, and Mount

5 Ozren, and also" - and I emphasise this - "to include the natural right of

6 the two republics to have an exit to the sea, or approach to the sea."

7 Is that what it says there, sir?

8 A. Yes, it does say what you've just read out.

9 Q. Thank you. So it doesn't say where this access to the sea will

10 be.

11 A. But there was a Boban-Izetbegovic agreement as well which

12 determines where this access to the sea will be.

13 Q. Please try and understand me.

14 A. But you want me to accept a document that I am seeing for the

15 first time. And when I want to help you and say where the access to the

16 sea will be, you don't want to let me do that. There was a separate

17 agreement between Izetbegovic and Boban.

18 Q. We'll come to that in due course. I would be very happy to be

19 able to discuss this for five days.

20 A. No, I wouldn't be that happy because it's going through all the

21 troubles and tribulations that I went through. All I want to say is to

22 tell the truth.

23 Q. In this document, and I'm going to show you the last page in

24 English, does it say what I read out?

25 A. I believe you. I'm just saying that I haven't seen this before.

1 I don't know. I'm not aware about this document. This is the first time

2 that I see it.

3 Q. That answer is quite all right. It satisfies me.

4 A. Well, good.

5 Q. Now, let's see the last page in English with the signatories. Do

6 you recognise the handwriting of Alija Izetbegovic and his signature?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: A question, just to make absolutely sure. This

10 document provides to be signed also by Momir Bulatovic and by Slobodan

11 Milosevic, and these two have not signed; is that correct?

12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Momir Bulatovic and Slobodan

13 Milosevic did not sign the document. It was signed by Radovan Karadzic,

14 Alija Izetbegovic, David Owen, and Thorvald Stoltenberg.

15 Q. Now, do you know that at that point in time, that is to say,

16 during the summer months of 1993, an open, all-out offensive, Neretva '93

17 of the BH army towards areas inhabited by Croats where they were in the

18 majority, with the aim of having access to the sea, as Sefer Halilovic

19 publicly declared? Do you know about that? Were you aware of that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you. Now, tell me this, please: Do you know that, from the

22 end of 1992 with the influx of the Mujahedin, and throughout 1993, the

23 Muslim units, most of them, when they were being established and when they

24 were going into battle would shout "Allahu Akbar"?

25 A. The instrumentalisation of religion in the army was a fateful

1 thing for the army. But I have to tell you that all those Afro-Asian

2 cadres who had arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not welcome for the citizens

3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, came in through Croatia and also the logistics

4 centres that you mentioned as having sent weapons to, all of them. None

5 of them went through via Milosevic's side.

6 Q. Yes, correct, as well as weapons. But do you know that everyone,

7 every single person, went via Croatia with permits from 250 humanitarian

8 organisations registered in Croatia?

9 A. Now the question arises as to who allowed that many humanitarian

10 organisations to be registered? Every country must control the work of

11 foreigners, and I think that Croatia knew at the time what those people

12 were doing, who later came to us and did what they did to us in Bosnia.

13 Q. Mr. Kljuic, a serious country, with a third of its territory

14 occupied, with half a million Muslim refugees, with half a million or

15 300.000 Croatian refugees, with a new authority in power, with a new

16 system, and the fact that any refusal to recognise any humanitarian

17 organisation in Croatia would lead to revolt from the whole world saying

18 that the Croats did not wish to allow humanitarian organisations to exist,

19 tell me, please, was it possible to say that they would forbid the

20 establishment of humanitarian organisations for assistance to

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Was that possible at all? Could they have been

22 prohibited?

23 A. They could not have been prohibited but they could have been

24 brought down to a reasonable number.

25 Q. Now, tell me this, and it's my last question: Slavko Degoricija,

1 who, through some of woman, sent you information what Franjo Tudjman

2 wanted to do with you, what was he in the Croatian government?

3 A. He was in the first Croatian government, and he was the

4 reconstruction minister, which was an important post in view of the fact

5 that Croatia was an occupied country in part, that it had been destroyed,

6 that an end of the war was expected and reconstruction and development

7 follow.

8 Q. All right. Now, at that point during the war, the minister for

9 reconstruction and development, you will agree with me, is a completely

10 unimportant person in the government.

11 A. Well, as a personage and as and friend, I saw him as being someone

12 very important, especially as he cautioned me through this woman. Now, as

13 for his activities within the government, he was to leave it very soon.

14 Q. Thank you. Now --

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, that was your last

16 question. That's what you said. You're not going to be asking more

17 questions. And in addition, it's now a quarter to 7.00.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I would like to tell the

19 witness the following:

20 Q. Slavko Degoricija, he wasn't an advisor to President Tudjman or

21 minister in any of the important ministries. How, then, could you have

22 believed that this man was informing you, through a woman, of President

23 Tudjman's intentions towards you? Could that have been just speculation

24 or something that had no written traces anywhere?

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just answer that question and

1 that will be it.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that's very complicated,

3 because my head was on the line both in Sarajevo and in other places. I

4 was in danger. Now, later on, they eliminated me and brought in somebody

5 else who later left Bosnia-Herzegovina, just like the prime minister that

6 you mentioned earlier on.

7 In the conflict between Izetbegovic and Tudjman -- and the people

8 down there in Herzegovina listened to Zagreb because -- and I see in the

9 context that Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into three republics, that in

10 Sarajevo there were no Croats. That's what was being said.

11 Q. Into two republics, sir.

12 A. And this man Boban even said that the only people who stayed on

13 were traitors.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Over to you.

15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Thank you, Witness.

17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I just take a

18 minutes of your time. The three documents that we saw on the ELMO, 3D

19 numbers, we have them for future tendering into evidence. I would just

20 like to mention the numbers, that they are 3D 00449, the first table of

21 the Territorial Defence; the next is 3D 00450 and it is the decision with

22 the handwritten passage by Alija Izetbegovic, the TO decision; and 3D

23 00451, that was the joint declaration, the last document we saw. Thank

24 you.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll deal with the tendering of

1 documents tomorrow.

2 Mr. Scott, it's your re-examination now.

3 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

4 Re-examination by Mr. Scott:

5 Q. Mr. Kljuic, we only have a few minutes. I will be very, very

6 appreciative if you would try to keep your answers brief.

7 MR. SCOTT: I would like the witness to please be shown Exhibit P

8 0060.

9 Q. Sir, this is a -- you were asked several times about the policy of

10 Izetbegovic and the Sarajevo government, about developments in the former

11 Yugoslavia during this time, and about the alleged statement - and I say

12 "alleged statement" because I think you addressed this in your earlier

13 testimony, but we don't have time to get into this this afternoon - but in

14 the alleged statement by Mr. Izetbegovic that this is "not our war."

15 Can I ask you, please, to look at paragraph number 5 of this

16 document, on the second page.

17 Is it correct, sir, in the interests of time, if the record --

18 A. [In English] Just one moment, please. Please change me Croat.

19 MR. SCOTT: Yes. If we could enlarge paragraph 5, please. I

20 don't think we have the right reference.

21 THE WITNESS: [In English] Okay. The right side. Okay.

22 MR. SCOTT:

23 Q. Sir, is it correct, in this record of this meeting of the HDZ BiH

24 Presidency that both you and Mr. Kostroman signed, that a decision was

25 taken at this meeting, as reflected here; that is, to endorse the decision

1 of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina of neutrality of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina?

3 A. [Interpretation] Yes. That was the only possibility, that we

4 don't take part actively in the aggression against Croatia and to paralyse

5 Serbia and the JNA on the other hand, because it says here that Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina mustn't be a training ground for attacks on the other side.

7 Q. As of October of 1991, that was the official policy of the HDZ

8 BiH. Is that correct, sir?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Now, you've been asked various questions about why

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina would allow the JNA to conduct operations against

12 Croatia on its territory. Can you tell the Judges, very briefly, Mr.

13 Kljuic, did anybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time have the

14 ability to prevent the JNA from operating anywhere in the former

15 Yugoslavia, be it Croatia or Bosnia, if they chose to?

16 A. No. The Yugoslav People's Army, according to the regulations of

17 the time, had the right to conduct exercises, and by -- and the troop

18 movement would always take place under the guise of exercises and

19 training. On the other hand, Croatia did not have the possibility of

20 preventing on its territory any JNA movement and shooting.

21 I had a verbal duel with the then minister of defence who, at a

22 meeting in Zagreb, once said, "Why are you shooting at us," claiming that

23 there was shooting coming from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which

24 was true, but it was the Chetniks of the JNA doing the shooting. And I

25 said, "Well, why don't you stop this Mirkovci place?" It's a Chetnik

1 village near Osijek, 17 kilometres from Osijek, on the territory of

2 Croatia.

3 So the defence system of Croatia and the citizens defending

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina could not stand up physically to the aggression and to

5 the Yugoslav People's Army.

6 Q. Let me ask you, sir, by some point in 1991, was approximately

7 one-third of the territory of the Republic of Croatia occupied by the JNA

8 or Serb military forces?

9 A. Yes, the Yugoslav People's Army and Serb insurgents.

10 Q. Is it correct, sir, that President Tudjman had no greater ability

11 than President Izetbegovic of Bosnia to prevent the JNA from doing what it

12 wanted to do?

13 A. He could not, no, because, as you saw earlier, the Croatian

14 communists as well as the Bosnian and Herzegovinian communists betrayed

15 their homeland and handed over the weapons of the Territorial Defence.

16 MR. SCOTT: Let me very briefly ask you, please, to next be shown

17 Exhibit P 00116. And if I can direct and have the usher's assistance,

18 please, to move as quickly as possible to what would be page 4 of the

19 English version. I'm not sure -- I'm afraid I'm not sure in the B/C/S

20 version, but maybe also page 4. Yes, thank you. If I could have you

21 enlarge the paragraph on both pages that says: "The assessment of the

22 work and role of the party ..."

23 Q. Sir, do you see the language where it says:

24 "The attitude of the Croatian representatives in the BH Assembly,

25 especially when the issue of the referendum was being decided, is a direct

1 result of the absence of a clear political stance."

2 Very quickly, sir, can you tell us, when it's described here, "the

3 Croatian representatives in the BH Assembly," who is being referred to?

4 And how do these people get to be the representatives in the BH Assembly?

5 A. We had representatives on two bases. We had 44 representatives of

6 the HDZ out of the 240 which the BH parliament had, the number of seats it

7 had. Now, all our representatives, with the exception of one, were in

8 favour of having a referendum on independence.

9 Q. Let me stop you there, sir, in the interests of time. These 44

10 representatives to the BH Assembly, were they, all of these

11 representatives, elected or did they result from the 1999 -- 1990, excuse

12 me, democratic election?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14 Q. And so, in fact, these democratically-elected Croats had favoured

15 -- voted in the Assembly in favour of the original language of the

16 referendum, as opposed to the Livno alternative language; is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You made several references during your testimony to Mr. Miro

19 Lasic, and at one point when you were here before you were not given the

20 opportunity to explain something further about the fact that he came to be

21 involved in the Cutileiro talks and also then became a member of the

22 Presidency in your place, if you will.

23 Did you consider Mr. Lasic -- number one, I want to give you the

24 opportunity to say whatever else you want to say about that before we

25 finish; and number two, in that answer, if you could tell us, did you

1 consider Mr. Lasic to be a moderate in the HDZ?

2 A. In the first stage, until he replaced me, he was relatively

3 moderate, but he was a man who was -- which all regimes could use. But he

4 was not prone to violence. He was an intellectual, a member of the civic

5 class, and so on.

6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Mr. Scott. I would like to have

7 precision.

8 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: In the answer to a question you have put before.

10 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It says, "the Croatian representatives." Are

12 these representatives from the Republic of Croatia?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. They're citizens of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which were ethnic Croats --

15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- because in parliament you had

17 Muslims, Croats, atheists, Serbs, social democrats, reformists, liberals.

18 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Q. And was it the same Mr. Lasic who later left the government of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the time that you re-entered the Presidency?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you have any recollection of, in fact, when all of the

23 remaining senior Bosnian Croats had withdrawn from the central government

24 prior to the time when you returned, if they had withdrawn --

25 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm going to object to the form of the question.

1 It assumes a fact not in evidence. He's used the word "withdrawn." I

2 want to point out that the Prosecution is not testifying. To use his own

3 words, he can take the stand and I'll cross-examine him.

4 MR. SCOTT: I'll rephrase the question.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. Thank you.

6 MR. SCOTT:

7 Q. Are you aware, do you have any knowledge, Mr. Kljuic, about senior

8 members -- Bosnian Croat members of the government withdrawing from the

9 government; and if so, when?

10 A. Some fled straight away when the aggression started, and they

11 spent five months out of Bosnia. Of course, there were Serbs, Croats, and

12 Bosniaks there, but I'm referring to the Croats now. And they stayed on

13 in Zagreb until we replaced them.

14 Now, as far as the critical situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is

15 concerned, the critical period, which was the autumn of 1992 and 1993 as

16 well, so when they replaced me and brought in Miro Akmadzic as premier,

17 who replaced Jure Pelivan and Mr. Lasic came into the Presidency at

18 Izetbegovic's support unlawful, there in Zagreb "[Realtime transcript

19 read 'in Greater Serbia'] there were two levers that they pulled so that

20 the Presidency at one point in time was left without a single Croat in

21 it.

22 Of course, the Contact Group and the people who wanted to see an

23 end to the conflict in Bosnia recommended first that the Presidency be

24 rehabilitated as the foremost political body in the country. And Mr.

25 Izetbegovic and the people that stayed on in the War Presidency, there was

1 an empty Muslim seat, the seat of Fikret Abdic, and they brought in, by

2 regular procedure, the third-placed person from the elections, Mr.

3 Durakovic. I, as the first person, because I was the sole victor in the

4 elections, I returned to the Presidency. And since Mr. Boras gave up on

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, the third man in the second place was Ivo

6 Komsic, who, at the elections, gained that right.

7 So, for the first time, the state was rehabilitated with its most

8 important body, and it was to try and mitigate the effects of the previous

9 policy that had been waged.

10 Q. Mr. Kljuic, very quickly, back on line 7 of page 103, the

11 transcript says "in Greater Serbia." I believe that your testimony was

12 there was in Zagreb, two levers being pulled; is that correct?

13 A. Yes. Yes.

14 Q. And when you say just now, you mentioned Mr. Komsic, can you tell

15 the Judges, please, was Mr. Komsic a Bosnian Croat?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Finally, sir --.

18 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, with the Court's indulgence, one more

19 minute.

20 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I appreciate your testimony. I don't mean to put you

21 on the spot, but in light of the questions -- some of the questions that

22 Mr. Praljak asked you, I must ask you about the fighting around

23 Tomislavgrad, Livno, Bugojno, between Serb forces and the forces of the

24 HVO. Do you have any recollection of the dates when that fighting

25 occurred?

1 A. The fighting occurred in several cycles. The first cycle was the

2 autumn of 1992, and then when the HVO managed to defend most of the

3 territory, in 1993 there were attempts to use the vacuum in the defence of

4 Croatian territories, of course, with a tendency towards moving towards

5 Split or to cut off the Croatian population.

6 Q. In light of this fighting, sir -- let me go specifically, excuse

7 me. My last question to you will be: In reference to, for example, the

8 fighting around Stolac, Capljina, Mostar in the period May to June, 1992,

9 do you have any information as to how long the actual fighting occurred

10 and how many casualties were suffered on the Serb side?

11 A. Well, the Serbs did not supply any information even via the Red

12 Cross. That could only be seen and established on the basis of images

13 from Bijeljina, towns that were Serbian at the time, or Banja Luka.

14 Suddenly you would see 30 obituaries and the citizens would say, "Where

15 are these people? How come they died?" There wasn't a flu epidemic or

16 something. So these were people coming in from -- to the Mostar

17 battlefront from other areas and they died. There were a great many

18 casualties, great many fatalities. But there was a lot of brutality later

19 on, because General Perisic, who was the commander of those forces, was

20 well known -- well, he was the equivalent of Ratko Mladic. There was no

21 difference. This one was at liberty; the other one wasn't at liberty.

22 That's the only difference.

23 So it was a brutal time and this -- the survival of the HVO was

24 important, because at Grahovo and Glamoc they had to break through a whole

25 fortress set up by a professional Serb army. But they were great

1 optimists and never believed that it would fall, so they did not set up a

2 second and third defence line. And when the first line fell, they went as

3 far as they could go on foot and in vehicles on that day.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kljuic.

5 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, there are other matters that I would

6 like to be able to clarify and pursue, but in the interest of time, I will

7 stop there. Thank you.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, you have just completed

9 your testimony in The Hague. I'd like to thank you on behalf of the Bench

10 for having come here today to testify on request of the Prosecution.

11 As you know, we are going to be hearing another witness tomorrow.

12 We'll see you at 9.00 tomorrow.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 10th day of

15 October, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.

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