1 Tuesday, 17 October 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, can you call the

7 case, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honour. It's

9 IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11 I would like to greet all people present in the courtroom, the

12 representatives from the Prosecution, Defence counsel, and the accused.

13 An oral decision which amends a written decision, 16th of October,

14 2006. We handed down a written decision on the evidence presented through

15 Peter Hauenstein, the document P 3273, which had been presented by the

16 Defence of Mr. Coric. This document is still admitted, but it's a

17 document that has been admitted now under seal, because it's a document

18 that complies pursuant to Article 70 -- to Rule 70.

19 The Prosecution still has a short time to go, and I shall give

20 them the floor straight away.

21 I would also like to greet the witness.

22 MR. BOS: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 WITNESS: ANDREW WILLIAMS [Resumed]

24 Examination by Mr. Bos [Continued]

25 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Williams.

1 A. Good afternoon.

2 Q. Mr. Williams, yesterday evening when we left the court, you were

3 talking about Colonel Siljeg and General Petkovic and their relationship.

4 You told the Court that, according to the information that you had

5 obtained in the field, that Colonel Siljeg was the head of the operational

6 zone north-west Herzegovina and that his superior was Brigadier Petkovic,

7 who was the commander of the HVO. This is on transcript page 8518 of

8 yesterday's transcript. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes, that is correct.

10 Q. Now, I see you still have your exhibit bundle there. Could you

11 please look at Exhibit 1153. Mr. Williams, have you seen this document

12 before?

13 A. Yes, I have. I saw it on Sunday.

14 Q. What's the date of the document?

15 A. It's the 15th of January, 1993.

16 Q. And who is the author of the document?

17 A. Brigadier Petkovic.

18 Q. Focusing your attention on the first paragraph of the document, is

19 it fair to say that this document confirms what you said yesterday about

20 the relationship between General Petkovic and Colonel Siljeg?

21 A. Yes, it does.

22 Q. Could you then move to Exhibit 1292, please. Have you seen this

23 document before?

24 A. Yes. I saw it on Sunday.

25 Q. Who's the author of the document?

1 A. Brigadier Petkovic.

2 Q. And to whom is the document addressed?

3 A. To the commander of the Mostar south-eastern Herzegovina zone of

4 operations.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.

6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you. I only

7 wish to draw attention to the signature on this document, not the

8 typewritten name of the signatory but the signature itself. I suggest

9 that this signature be compared to other signatures by General Milivoj

10 Petkovic for the following reasons: On the 24th of January, Milivoj

11 Petkovic was attending negotiations in Geneva so he did not sign this

12 document. Thank you.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. But this signature

14 is on behalf of Mr. Petkovic, for Mr. Petkovic. The question which

15 remains is to know whether it's a head of staff, a second in command, an

16 officer. We'll have to see that later.

17 MR. BOS:

18 Q. Witness, could you just briefly just read the order and tell us

19 what the order is about?

20 A. It's a troop rotation order, reinforcement order, to send troops

21 from other units to relieve troops that are in position around Gornji

22 Vakuf.

23 Q. And where do these new troops come from?

24 A. Ljubuski, Grude, Siroki Brijeg, and Citluk.

25 Q. Let me now focus your attention to Exhibit 1311, which is in the

1 second bundle. Have you seen this document before?

2 A. Yes, I have, on Sunday.

3 Q. Again, who is the author of the document? Page 9.

4 A. Colonel Siljeg.

5 Q. And going back to the first page, what's the date of the document?

6 A. The 26th of January, 1993.

7 Q. And to whom is the document addressed?

8 A. The Presidency of the HVO of the Croatian Community of

9 Herceg-Bosna, government of the HVO HZ HB in Mostar, the defence

10 department in Mostar, and the Main Staff of the HVO in Mostar, and to his

11 own operation zone in Tomislavgrad.

12 Q. Now, there's just two small things that I want to point out in

13 this particular order. If you move to page 2 of the order, in the top

14 paragraph, line 5, and I'll read it out, it says the following:

15 "Carried out talk with Andabak on Brada's orders."

16 And then if you move to page number 8, somewhere in the middle,

17 second paragraph, bottom of the paragraph of the second paragraph, it

18 says:

19 "While writing the report, I was informed of the instructions

20 which Zrinko Tokic obtained from Brada and I shall follow them."

21 Now, Witness, do you know who Brada is?

22 A. I did used to know who Brada is. I cannot be specific or exactly

23 recall who Brada is now.

24 Q. So you're saying here that you recall the name Brada when you were

25 in Gornji Vakuf. You recall that this name came up.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But you can't remember who Brada is?

3 A. No. It's somebody of a higher rank than Colonel Siljeg.

4 Q. Thank you. Moving to another topic, Witness, can you say

5 something about the general manner in which the HVO attacked the area of

6 Gornji Vakuf?

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I apologise. I'm sorry.

8 There's just one thing I'd like to look at. I've got a document here, and

9 I notice a few things at times on this document.

10 On page 7 in the English version, Witness, it is mentioned that

11 the participation and involvement of UNPROFOR is considered at each

12 check-point. That said, the check-point -- these check-points will be

13 manned by mixed patrols.

14 As far as you remember, did you ever happen to be there at the

15 check-point when the HVO and ABiH were there together?

16 THE WITNESS: There were occasions at the start of cease-fires

17 where they would work together, and they even had representatives from

18 each of the side on the other side's mortar positions, such as to verify

19 that they weren't firing. However, it was sporadic, and it depended a lot

20 on the immediate situation, though sometimes we would go to collect the

21 people for these joint patrols and one side or the other would not join

22 in. But, yes, there were occasions when they did jointly patrol.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. But my question

24 concerned UNPROFOR. Why, for instance, did the BritBat not put some of

25 its men at these check-points at the same time as the HVO and ABiH?

1 Because this proposal had been put forward by Colonel Siljeg. What I

2 wanted to know is why BritBat did not take part in this kind of control.

3 According to me, this would have been beneficial in that you could

4 have controlled people going in, going out, and I would like to know why

5 UNPROFOR did not take part, together with the other two entities, did not

6 take part in controlling the roads.

7 THE WITNESS: Yes. I understand now, Your Honour. Yes, we did

8 actually take part in the joint patrols. In three specific areas, we had

9 had a check-point on each of the routes going into Gornji Vakuf where we

10 had a Warrior, infantry fighting vehicle, with a section of troops and a

11 representative from each of the two factions.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So at the entrance of Gornji

13 Vakuf you'd placed a tank at the spot where the two warring factions were,

14 the two warring parties.

15 THE WITNESS: There were three check-points; one on the southern

16 edge of Gornji Vakuf, one on the northern edge of Gornji Vakuf, and one

17 just up the road from our base. They were primarily there to reassure the

18 two factions and also to reassure the locals and also to keep the routes

19 open so we could keep the aid moving through.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. You have

21 answered my questions.

22 Mr. Bos, you may proceed.

23 MR. BOS:

24 Q. Witness, at the time you were there in Gornji Vakuf, did you ever

25 see how the HVO would attack areas in Gornji Vakuf?

1 A. The main method, when they were attacking the villages around

2 Gornji Vakuf, was to use mortars, heavy machine-guns and artillery and

3 tank fire to either get the civilian population in the village to leave,

4 in which case then the militia that -- the Muslim militia that were there

5 would leave because there would be nobody to protect; or the other way

6 around, to get the Muslim militia to leave, in which case the Muslim

7 population would leave because there was nobody to protect them.

8 Q. And when you say that they were using mortars and artillery to

9 attack, would they actually, as far as you could tell, aim at military

10 targets?

11 A. No. It was very random. They would just aim at a village or aim

12 at an area in the town and just fire into it.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You are answering a question

14 that has been put to you by the Prosecution. This has bothered me all

15 night. Yesterday, we saw a document which discussed the military police.

16 The military police had 10 people killed and over 60 people wounded, so

17 all in all, there were 80 casualties amongst the military police. These

18 were the people that suffered in combat, out of 430. In other words, 20

19 per cent of all these men were lost. You're talking about artillery fire

20 and you're -- the attack. This what happens in modern attacks. You start

21 using your weaponry and then the men are on the ground.

22 How can you explain this? Twenty per cent of the people working

23 for the military police were either wounded or killed. Does this mean

24 that around Gornji Vakuf or in Gornji Vakuf there were pockets there that

25 remained, and the infantry was confronted with a certain amount of

1 resistance? How can you explain this? If there are artillery shells

2 falling, how come the HVO suffered so many casualties?

3 THE WITNESS: The chosen method of using heavy weaponry to try to

4 get them to move out didn't work. In most of the villages, the people

5 stayed, so that necessitated them having to be cleared on foot, which

6 is -- urban warfare, even in a small village, heavily favours the

7 defender, and you would expect to take heavy casualties. Most commanders

8 will try, at all cost, to avoid engaging an enemy inside a built-up area

9 solely because of that -- the heavy casualty rate and also the heavy

10 expenditure of small-arms ammunition that clearing buildings uses.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for your answer, which

12 is helpful.

13 MR. BOS:

14 Q. Witness, could you look at Exhibit 1235, please. Looking at the

15 first page, what kind of document is this?

16 A. It's a Cheshire Regiment military information summary for the 20th

17 of January, 1993.

18 Q. Now, I'd like to focus your attention on page 3, and in particular

19 the top paragraph, and could you please read out the sentence which starts

20 with "In addition ..."

21 A. "In addition, a great deal of HVO artillery fire has proved

22 ineffective, falling mainly on Muslim residential areas and not close to

23 the main concentrations of Muslim fighters. In short, the HVO have met

24 with only partial success and have not managed to break into the town

25 itself."

1 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, is this exactly as you just testified,

2 when you said that HVO would fire artillery into villages without actually

3 aiming at military targets?

4 A. Yes, that's correct. Artillery and mortars are not a point

5 weapons; they're an indirect area-fire weapon. You shell an area as

6 opposed to a specific target.

7 Q. Witness, could you also look at Exhibit 1278. What kind of

8 document is this?

9 A. This is a Cheshire Regiment military information summary. It says

10 its dated the 23rd of November on that line and the 23rd of January on the

11 line above it.

12 Q. So, what would you think? Would this be a document of the 23rd of

13 November or 23rd of January? Just --

14 A. The 23rd of January.

15 Q. Very well. Going to page 2 of this document, under the

16 heading "Gornji Vakuf," and I'll read out the part which I'm particularly

17 interested in. It's a bit after the middle of the paragraph.

18 "The village of Bistrica, grid 0770, came under rocket attack from

19 an HVO BM21. The houses in the village were reported to be burning

20 fiercely. CO 1 Cheshire is keen to stress that this is most definitely

21 ethnic cleansing by Croats on a Muslim village."

22 Witness, did you actually, yourself, witness this particular

23 attack on Bistrica?

24 A. Yes. Bistrica was small village to the rear of our base,

25 approximately 400 yards away from the base. We saw the first Salvo of

1 rockets land on the hill in the woods behind the village, and then a

2 second Salvo was fired which landed on the village itself. It caused a

3 significant amount of damage. Most of the village was damaged, on fire.

4 There were bodies in the streets, and at one stage we had to go and shoot

5 the dogs because the dogs were eating the bodies.

6 Q. And the village of Bistrica, is it a Muslim village or a Croat

7 village?

8 A. It's a mixed village, but they live on separate sides of the

9 village.

10 Q. In which part of the village was it?

11 A. The majority of munitions fell onto the Muslim side.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, following on what

13 you've just said, I would like to understand. A while ago you said that

14 the HVO had suffered casualties because the artillery had not defeated the

15 combatting forces, and the HVO, therefore, entered the village which

16 caused casualties on both sides.

17 What I would like to know is this: When the HVO shelled a

18 village, where were the ABiH fighters? Were they inside the village,

19 inside the houses, in trenches, outside the village? Where are these

20 people? Because after the shelling, when the HVO then enters the village

21 and there is fighting in the village, where were the ABiH men at the time

22 the shells and mortars were falling?

23 THE WITNESS: Most of the villages were defended by TO, which are

24 a militia of -- not as high quality.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. They were defended

1 by the Territorial Defence. The members of the Territorial Defence, where

2 were these people in the village? Where were they, inside the houses,

3 outside the houses, in holes they had dug themselves, in cellars? Where

4 were these people?

5 THE WITNESS: They were in all of those, Your Honour, as they'd

6 constructed bunkers, fire trenches. Some of them were in their houses

7 because they were their houses, they lived there. So they were all over

8 the place within the village area itself.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So, let's take an 82-millimetre

10 mortar, which is in its right position, and a shell falls on the village.

11 Who does the HVO aim at, the houses, the people inside the houses, the

12 civilians, the members of the Territorial Defence? Who is targeted by the

13 shell that's about to fall on the house?

14 THE WITNESS: The village itself, Your Honour. With a mortar you

15 cannot fire at a specific point target. My profession in the British Army

16 was as a senior mortar fire controller. A mortar has a beaten zone and a

17 very, very good mortar team, who are well practised with up-to-date

18 equipment, can get a mortar round to land within 40 metres of what they're

19 trying to hit. That's why they tend -- when you see a mortar firing, they

20 fire an awful lot of ammunition. It's to create a beaten area.

21 Mortars against any -- particularly medium mortars, like

22 82-millimetre mortars, are not a very good weapon for using against

23 well-dug-in troops as they don't contain a lost explosive. They're mainly

24 a shrapnel weapon. And all you will succeed, in using them against

25 soldiers, is to slow them down, make them go to cover. But you'll be very

1 hard pushed to damage a constructed defence with a medium-calibre mortar.

2 Houses, they will -- depending on how the fuse is set, as you can

3 have a delayed fuse or an impact fuse, houses are not that much

4 protection, really, unless you're in a cellar, or something like that, as

5 a round may come through the roof and explode inside the building.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for having given me

7 these technical details.

8 MR. BOS:

9 Q. Witness, could you please look at Exhibit 1406. Could you tell us

10 what kind of document this is?

11 A. It's a Cheshire Regiment military information summary from the 3rd

12 of February, 1993.

13 Q. Could I focus your attention to page 3 of this document. Now, as

14 you can see on this page, there are casualty figures listed. Reading this

15 report, were these casualty figures that you reported in this report?

16 A. Yes, they are.

17 Q. And are these casualty figures from Gornji Vakuf?

18 A. Yes, they are.

19 Q. And could you please read out here in court -- well, let me first

20 ask you: How did you obtain these casualty figures?

21 A. We got them from the commanders of both sides while they were in

22 talks.

23 Q. And could you please read out the figures that have been reported

24 here, and maybe let's start with -- because the report makes a division

25 between military and civilian casualties and -- dead, so let's start with

1 the military dead.

2 A. On line 1, the HVO Croatian: Military dead, 40; civilian dead,

3 nil. For the armija and the Muslims: Military dead, 21; civilian dead

4 39. On the third line, for the HVO and Croats: Military wounded, 79;

5 civilian wounded, not known. For the armija and Muslim side, a total of

6 200 military and civilian wounded.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, finally, I would like you to look at Exhibit

8 1437. Have you seen this document before?

9 A. Yes. I saw it on Sunday.

10 Q. Who's the author of the document?

11 A. Brigadier General Milivoj Petkovic.

12 Q. Moving back to the front page, what's the date of the document?

13 A. It's the 8th of February, 1993.

14 Q. And what kind of document is this?

15 A. This is a situation report of what's going on at that particular

16 moment in time in Gornji Vakuf.

17 Q. Now, I would like to focus your attention on page 2 of this

18 document, and I'm interested in the middle paragraph, which says, "Report

19 from Prozor." Could you please read out the sentence that starts

20 with "Both sides ..." up to the end of the paragraph.

21 A. "Both sides are still taking prisoners, including women and

22 children. Prisoners are being exchanged. The talks are continuing but

23 the agreements are not being observed. Cease-fire orders have been

24 reissued. Our side has continued to burn down buildings - Uzricje,

25 Zdrimci, Dusa, Krupa. Both sides are retaliating in wilful acts of

1 individuals. There are also cases of mutilation."

2 Q. Witness, what's been reported here in this report from Petkovic,

3 is that what you experienced on the ground as well around this time?

4 A. Yes, it was.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I just ask, when you speak of mutilation

7 here, what do you refer to?

8 THE WITNESS: The mutilation of corpses, Your Honour. I

9 personally only saw one incident, and that was where some Croat civilians

10 had been killed, and then after they'd been killed, barbed wire had been

11 wrapped around their throats.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now, for the transcript, with

13 respect to this document in B/C/S, number 1437, it says that it was not

14 signed by General Petkovic, there is no signature; whereas I note that

15 there isn't a register number here. Usually all military documents have a

16 number. Here, we don't see a number. But the date is there, the 8th of

17 February, 1993.

18 Having said that, continue, Mr. Bos.

19 MR. BOS:

20 Q. Witness, do you recall whether the ABiH and the HVO, in one of

21 their cease-fire negotiations, decided to set up a joint commission?

22 A. Yes, it did.

23 Q. And can you explain the role of this joint commission? What did

24 it do?

25 A. The joint commission would be a member from each of the two

1 factions and a member from UNPROFOR, and they would go and visit outlying

2 areas and villages and catalogue the damage and the casualties.

3 Q. When was this joint commission set up?

4 A. At the end, when we had a stable cease-fire. I can't remember the

5 exact date, but it was at the end of the fighting. It was part of the

6 actual cease-fire.

7 Q. And did you participate in any of these joint commissions?

8 A. I did participate in two or three.

9 Q. And you said that they visited villages. How many villages were

10 visited in total; do you recall?

11 A. Every village in the area.

12 Q. And how long did it take this joint commission to visit these

13 villages?

14 A. It was several days.

15 Q. And so you said that you joined in one of these joint

16 commissions. What was your role when you would actually visit the

17 village? Could you explain a little bit how this would go in practice?

18 A. Our role was to basically make sure that the two representatives

19 from each side worked together and agreed on what had happened, and that

20 the report of the damage and the casualties was the same, that each side

21 had a copy that was the same.

22 Q. And so the report contained a report on the damage of what, in the

23 village, and ...

24 A. Damage to the houses; livestock; property; casualties, dead and

25 wounded; and missing people who had been taken as prisoners or had just up

1 and gone.

2 Q. Witness, could you look at Exhibit 1351, please. Have you seen

3 this document before?

4 A. Yes, I have, on Sunday.

5 Q. Who's the author of the document?

6 A. Colonel Siljeg.

7 Q. Moving back to the front page, to whom is this document addressed?

8 A. To the Presidency of the HVO Croatian Defence Council of the

9 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna in Mostar, the government of the HVO HZ

10 HB in Mostar, defence department of HVO HZ HB in Mostar, and the General

11 Staff of the HVO HZ HB in Mostar, and his own headquarters in

12 Tomislavgrad.

13 Q. And what kind of document is this?

14 A. This, again, is a situation report.

15 Q. And what's the date of this report?

16 A. The actual report is dated the 20-something of January, 1993, and

17 it refers to the situation as it was on the 28th of January, 1993.

18 Q. Now, Witness, there's a couple of questions I want to ask about

19 this document, and I first want you to have a look on page 2, and look at

20 the bottom of this page. I'll read out the sentence. It says: "Civilian

21 Franjo Djodjo from Prozor was also captured, of whom they allege to know

22 nothing. When we told him what that we know who captured him and that the

23 commander is from the ranks of the BH army, has family in Croatia and that

24 the Irish method would be very uncomfortable, they found Franjo Djodjo in

25 five minutes."

1 Now, what I'm particularly interested in here is this reference

2 to "the Irish method." Do you know what that means, "the Irish method"?

3 A. The Irish method refers to a particular type of punishment

4 shooting that the IRA used to carry out. It's called knee-capping, where

5 you would lie a victim on the floor, face down, and shoot them through the

6 back of the knee with a pistol.

7 Q. Witness, moving to page number 3, it starts here with, "... the

8 subcommission toward the villages per request and determine the situation

9 in those sectors which are enclosing the report of subcommission Gornji

10 Vakuf, 28 January 1993."

11 Now, what follows, would that be the type of report of a joint

12 commission that you've been just talking about?

13 A. Yes, it would.

14 Q. Now, as you can see, this particular report deals with the

15 villages of Uzricje, Dusa, Trnovaca, Lucani and Gornja Ricica. Do you

16 recall whether you were a member of this joint commission, visiting these

17 particular villages?

18 A. I cannot recall the actual villages I went to, but I would have

19 taken the third copy from the UNPROFOR person who had been to each of

20 these villages. Not only did each side have a copy, but we had a copy as

21 well.

22 Q. So each of these reports would have gone through your hands?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. Just staying on page number 3. The village of Uzricje, do

25 you recall whether you ever visited village of Uzricje?

1 A. I did visit the village of Uzricje. I did visit all of the

2 villages in the area several times.

3 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.

5 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry to interrupt, but the

6 witness mentioned that they received a copy of the minutes of these joint

7 commissions. Perhaps it would be good idea to ask the witness whether the

8 British Army ever handed over those documents to the OTP. As we can see,

9 this was not obtained from the British Army but from the Croatian

10 archives. So if the British were able to collect those documents, why did

11 they not hand them over to the Tribunal? Because, as you know, the

12 Croatian archives became completely accessible at the beginning of 2000,

13 whereas --

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. I'll ask the witness the

15 question.

16 You've just heard Defence counsel. To the best of your knowledge,

17 did the British Army hand over documents coming from these joint

18 commissions, to the best of your knowledge? Perhaps you don't know

19 anything about this.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. The reports were added on to the

21 daily report that I produced and appeared in the daily report, the

22 Cheshire Regiment military information summaries. As to what happened to

23 them after that, I do not know, Your Honour.

24 MR. BOS:

25 Q. Witness, let me just focus your attention again on page number 3,

1 on the bottom, under point number 4. It says - and this is talking about

2 Uzricje - "A total of 24 houses destroyed (22 torched 2 shelled)."

3 Now, what does this tell you when it says "22 torched, 2 shelled"?

4 A. It means that the village was actually taken. The troops moved

5 into the village and either the troops or -- the Croatians living in the

6 village or the troops and the Croatians combined burnt the houses to stop

7 the Muslims from coming back.

8 Q. By Uzricje, you're talking about Muslims. Do you know whether

9 Uzricje was a Muslim village or a Croat village?

10 A. Off the top of my head, I can't recall. But that was the thing

11 that happened on both sides.

12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. Witness, how do you know that the

13 purpose of the torching was to prevent Muslims from coming back?

14 THE WITNESS: Specific targeting. You could go into a village

15 that had been damaged and you could see. If it was a Croat village, the

16 Muslims houses had been damaged and the Croat houses were untouched; if it

17 was a Muslim village, then the Muslim houses were untouched and the Croat

18 houses had been damaged.

19 When they set fire to the houses, because of the situation, they

20 burnt completely; the roofs collapsed inwards and everything. So there

21 would be no way you're coming back.

22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In paragraph 4, I see there are

24 18 houses that were destroyed, 16 that were torched, and 2 that were

25 destroyed by the shelling. Now, that sentence, does that indicate that 16

1 houses were deliberately torched after the shelling, after the bombing?

2 THE WITNESS: In which particular sequence it happened I can't

3 say, Your Honour, but the ones that are torched are deliberately torched.

4 MR. BOS: Your Honours, I'm just looking, because I think you were

5 referring to the English page number 5, which relates to Dusa rather than

6 Uzricje. Just to clarify the record, what we were talking about before

7 was Uzricje and that your reference to paragraph 4 was regarding Dusa.

8 Q. But just to come back one more time to Uzricje and focus your

9 attention on page 4, on the top. Under point 5, it says, "Looted two

10 tractors and seven luxury cars."

11 Now, what did that mean to you when vehicles were looted from a

12 village? Did that mean anything to you?

13 A. It usually indicated that the people who had attacked the village

14 were from outside of the area.

15 Q. Very well. Let's move on, then, to the village --

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A moment ago, I mentioned the

19 sentence relating to the village of Dusa. Now, number 4, for the Dusa

20 village, we see 24 houses destroyed; it says 22 torched and 2 shelled,

21 destroyed with shells.

22 Now, what conclusion can one draw? The 22 houses, were they

23 torched? And 2 were bombed? Is that right.

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, that's correct. Twenty-two of the

25 houses, as it says, were torched. That means that they were deliberately

1 set on fire at close range. And two of them had been destroyed by shell

2 fire.

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise, but

4 perhaps this is the right moment to clarify something that was on page 19,

5 line 8. The witness said that there were situations where the houses were

6 set fire to by Croats who lived in those villages, that is to say, not the

7 members of the HVO. So could we clarify that point?

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness. You, yourself,

9 were you an eyewitness of Croatian houses being at the time fire to by

10 Croats themselves?

11 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour. This came up in the cease-fire

12 negotiations as to -- and with the joint commission as to who would have

13 actually done the damage. In some instances it was the HVO who'd done the

14 damage; in some instances it was the armija who'd done it; in some

15 instances it was the actual civilians who lived in the village themselves

16 who turned on their neighbours and did it.

17 MR. BOS:

18 Q. Witness, if I could just move your attention now to the village of

19 Dusa, starting on page 4. Let me focus your attention on page 5, under

20 number 3, which says the following: "Civilians were killed as a result of

21 a shelling," and it names a list of five names. Do you recognise any of

22 these names that are listed here?

23 A. I recognise, line 1, Babeheta Behio and the two children.

24 Q. What do you remember about this?

25 A. This particular incident was actually brought up several times in

1 the cease-fire negotiations. The house that they were in - and they were

2 either in a downstairs room or in the cellar, I think it was the cellar -

3 the house had been hit with an anti-tank round fired by a tank or fired by

4 an anti-tank gun. It had penetrated the wall, where the wall joins onto

5 the ground. It penetrated just above that and it killed them inside the

6 house.

7 Q. And did you actually see yourself the damage to that wall, or how

8 did you know about this?

9 A. It was -- again, like I said, it was brought up several times in

10 the cease-fire negotiations. Yes, I did see it. And there was also a

11 photograph of it.

12 Q. So you did see it yourself, with your own eyes, in Dusa at the

13 house?

14 A. Yes. Which village it was, I'm not exactly sure. But, yes, I did

15 see the house.

16 Q. And for you there was no doubt that looking at -- looking at the

17 damage, that this was damage caused by a fire from a tank?

18 A. Either a tank or an anti-tank gun. It had been hit by an

19 anti-tank round. The damage to the wall and how it had hit, it was

20 indicative that it was either a tank round or an anti-tank -- from a tank

21 or from an anti-tank gun.

22 Q. Well, these are both arms that could have direct fire; correct?

23 A. They are, yes. They are direct-fire weapon systems. You would

24 aim at a target through a sight.

25 Q. Could I just focus your attention on page 7 of this report.

1 Again, near the bottom, and I'll read out the sentence:

2 "Pavo Posavac, from the village of Dusa, allegedly fired from a

3 recoilless gun on the house of Enver Sljivo in which his wife and children

4 were killed (we did not have a recoilless gun there)."

5 What is a recoilless gun?

6 A. A recoilless gun is an anti-tank gun, as opposed to having a

7 proper breech block, like artillery or whatever. It has what is called a

8 venture on the back and there is a back blast-out as well as the round

9 going forward.

10 Q. And just going back to page number 5, under points 4 and 5, would

11 your comments be again the same as regards to Uzricje, as far as the

12 destruction of the houses is concerned and the looting of the vehicles

13 here?

14 A. In what way? The --

15 Q. Well, in the way -- when it says here that 16 were torched and two

16 houses were destroyed by shelling, that's, in fact, something you know

17 when you explained how these houses were torched, that that was in a

18 similar way.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Just one other thing on this document, which is starting at the

21 bottom of page 7, and I'll again read it out to you:

22 "Before the situation in Gornji Vakuf, Vlado Rajic abused and

23 decapitated an invalid. He was taken to Mostar, released, returned to

24 Gornji Vakuf, and contributed to such a situation."

25 Now, is this something that refers to the Vlado Rajic which we've

1 been discussing before, about the incident on the decapitation?

2 A. Yes. Yes, it is. This was a very serious bone of contention

3 between the two sides during the -- when we were trying to get them to

4 stop fighting, was the fact that this HVO soldier had not been prosecuted

5 and put in gaol. He had, in fact, been released and returned to Gornji

6 Vakuf to take part in the fighting.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, I find the words "and contributed to

8 such a situation" entirely unclear. Could, perhaps, the interpreters read

9 or could someone read the original and then the interpreter tell us what

10 it is supposed to be.

11 MR. BOS: I don't know if Your Honours want me to read the

12 original. I don't know how good my B/C/S is. I can give it a try. I

13 don't know if -- maybe we can ask one of the interpreters to look at the

14 screen.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A volunteer. We have one. Yes,

16 Ms. Nozica.

17 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I be of assistance.

18 In the original, it does not say "this situation, to such a situation," it

19 says "to this kind of situation, such a situation." That's the only

20 difference. Now, which situation is referred to we'll have to clear up in

21 due course.

22 MR. BOS:

23 Q. Witness, yesterday when we were discussing the military police,

24 you were referring to the village of Hrasnica, and maybe just --

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're moving on, are you?

1 Before you do that, I'd like to stay with the document, and let us take a

2 look at page 2, Witness, in English. Right at the top of page 2, where it

3 is stated that: "In the village of Bistrica, an HVO sniper killed two and

4 wounded two BH army soldiers. And from the Krc facility, an HVO sniper

5 wounded a BH army soldier in Gornji Vakuf."

6 Now, you, yourself, did you see in the field any HVO snipers?

7 THE WITNESS: I personally did not see any HVO snipers, Your

8 Honour, but they did have snipers. And I think this part of the document

9 is referring to the difficulties that both sides were having in getting

10 renegade elements of their forces under control. We would have a fairly

11 substantial cease-fire in position, but there were still renegade elements

12 who would still carry on fighting. And I think that's what he's referring

13 to there.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So, in fact, Colonel Siljeg, in

15 his report, in the following sentence, says that: "In our units there are

16 individuals who are obstructing the work of the commission working towards

17 a cease-fire."

18 Now, when you were part of the commission, because you attended

19 meetings, this type of event, was it brought to the attention of

20 UNPROFOR? And, if so, did you ask the responsible individuals what they

21 did to punish the HVO sniper? Did you ever ask for accountability? Did

22 you ask the military authorities how they dealt with the problem, what

23 they did about it? Because the Colonel says that there were two HVO

24 snipers who obstructed the cease-fire.

25 Now, my first question is: Did you know about these events; and

1 secondly, did you ask what was done about them?

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did know about the events, Your Honour. They

3 were brought to the attention of both factions at the meetings, and each

4 time they used to say, "Yes, we'll get it under control," but what they

5 actually did I'm not aware of, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 MR. BOS:

8 Q. Witness, yesterday you briefly discussed the village of Hrasnica

9 when we were talking about the military police. Did you ever visit this

10 village?

11 A. Yes, on numerous occasions.

12 Q. And were these visits both before and after?

13 A. Yes, they were.

14 Q. Now, can you briefly explain again to the Court what happened in

15 the village of Hrasnica.

16 A. Hrasnica was attacked on at least three occasions.

17 Q. Sorry to interrupt you. Hrasnica, is this a Muslim village or a

18 Croat village?

19 A. It's a Muslim village.

20 Q. Please continue.

21 A. It was attacked on at least three occasions. Each attack was

22 progressively worse than the attack before. The first time it was

23 attacked, the civilian population just ran away. The village was damaged

24 but still inhabitable, and the civilian population moved back. It was

25 then attacked a second time and this time it was burnt as well, but the

1 civilian population again moved back. So on the third time, it was

2 completely levelled. It was bulldozed, blown up, and booby-trapped with

3 mines.

4 It was a -- although it was a Muslim village, it was of tactical

5 importance to the HVO's battle plan for Gornji Vakuf in that it overlooked

6 the road from Gornji Vakuf to Bugojno. While that village was there, they

7 would not be able to secure the road. And also, it was the route where

8 armija fighters from Travnik and places -- such places were coming in on

9 foot to reinforce Gornji Vakuf.

10 Q. Witness, do you know what happened with the civilian population

11 from Hrasnica when they eventually had to move out of the village? Do you

12 know where they went?

13 A. I don't know exactly where they went, but they will have moved

14 further up towards Travnik and Novi Travnik and Bugojno, the main Muslim

15 areas up there.

16 Q. Could you have a look at Exhibit 1250, please. Could you tell us

17 what kind of document is this?

18 A. This is a Cheshire Regiment military information summary for the

19 21st of January, 1993.

20 Q. Could I focus your attention on page number 3. On the heading of

21 "Gornji Vakuf," maybe you could just read out -- read it for yourself and

22 tell us whether this was, in fact, a report on the attack on the village

23 of Hrasnica.

24 A. Yes, this was one of the attacks on Hrasnica.

25 Q. Now, you discussed this yesterday as well, but it says here

1 that "the HVO soldiers responsible were believed to be wearing blue

2 helmets and to be equipped with three BTR-40's." And then it says, as a

3 comment, "GV believe that these soldiers may have been from Herzegovinian

4 military police unit." That's what you testified yesterday as well, isn't

5 it?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And would you recall whether this would have been the first, the

8 second, or the third attack?

9 A. This will have been, looking at the date and who was involved in

10 it, will have been either the second or the third attack.

11 Q. Finally, Witness, there is one more village that I would like to

12 ask you questions about which is the village of Zdrimci. Do you know this

13 village?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. Did you visit the village?

16 A. On numerous occasions throughout the six months that I was there.

17 Q. Is it a Croat village, a Muslim village, or a mixed village?

18 A. I cannot recall exactly without checking as to which one it was.

19 Q. What can you say about the destruction of this village, when you

20 say that you visited this village?

21 A. It was, again, like all of the villages in the immediate vicinity.

22 It had suffered some damage.

23 Q. And do you remember whether Muslim houses or Croat houses were

24 damaged in this particular village?

25 A. To the best of my recollection, it was a mixed village that was

1 predominantly Croatian, and it was the Muslim houses that had been

2 destroyed.

3 Q. Now, how could you tell if you would visit a mixed village? If

4 some of the houses were destroyed and others weren't, how could you tell

5 that the Muslims houses were destroyed rather than the Croat houses?

6 A. The answer to this may sound bizarre, but the three ethnic groups

7 tended to build houses with a different shaped roof which then would

8 indicate which ethnic group lived in that house. So you could go into a

9 village and you could tell by looking at the houses, the roofs, whether

10 the houses that were intact were Croatian or Muslim or Serb.

11 Q. Witness, one last exhibit that I would like to ask you to look at,

12 which is exhibit --

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's the first time I hear about

14 this. Could you tell us what the rooftops looked like? What was their

15 shape?

16 THE WITNESS: I can't remember which group built the roof which

17 way, but some of them -- one side, it was like a pyramid-type shape with

18 just four triangles; the others were similar but with a flat roof. But

19 they tended to build the roof of a particular style, depending on which

20 ethnic group they belonged to. I don't know why they did that, really.

21 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, perhaps not to waste the time on the

22 cross. This is the whole story, and we agree this is the kind of rule.

23 But there's too many exceptions, and I guess the witness knows that. So

24 if you would ask him additional questions, to avoid that subject matter on

25 the cross, I think that would help a lot.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] According to Mr. Kovacic,

2 Defence counsel, what you are saying, in general terms, seems to be true,

3 but there might have been exceptions. What do you think of this?

4 THE WITNESS: There will have been exceptions caused primarily by

5 the movements of refugees. It was a general rule. It was correct the

6 majority of the time.

7 In addition, with the commission, the joint commissions, you

8 could -- the village -- when we checked the villages, the one ethnic group

9 had disappeared out of the village, which also confirmed that one

10 particular ethnic group in that village had gone.

11 MR. BOS:

12 Q. Just a follow-up question on this. I mean, if this joint

13 commission would visit a village and would report on these damaged houses,

14 would they only base their assessment on the type of roof, whether this

15 was a Muslim house or a Croat house, or also another aspects?

16 A. No. The joint commission logged all the damage in the village

17 irrespective of whose house had been damaged.

18 Q. Sorry, I'm not really understanding your answer here. Maybe my

19 question wasn't clear. How would the joint commission know whether a

20 house was a Muslim house or a Croat house?

21 A. When they were in the village, they would speak to the local

22 population in the village and ask them whether they were Croat -- well,

23 they knew most of the time whether they were Croat or Muslim, and try to

24 find out where the other part of the village had gone.

25 Q. Thank you. Witness, maybe one last exhibit, which is 1373. What

1 kind of document is this?

2 A. Again, this is a Cheshire Regiment military information summary

3 for the 31st of January, 1993.

4 Q. Now, if you move to page 2 of this report, what's been reported

5 here, would this be, again, part of a report from a joint commission?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And is it correct that, under A, a report has been given about --

8 [Static on English channel]

9 A. Yes. This is a report about the village of Zdrimci.

10 Q. And just to finish this off, maybe could you just read out what's

11 been said about the village of Zdrimci.

12 A. "This village was reported to be mixed but under HVO control.

13 There were approximately 100 Muslims, predominantly old people, women and

14 children, all of whom wished to leave. During the conflict, two Muslims

15 and three Croats were reported to have been killed, and six Muslims

16 wounded. 31 young Muslim males were currently reported to be detained; 19

17 were in a local prison and 12 were held at Prozor in order to be used for

18 a prison exchange. 33 Muslim houses were reported to have been destroyed

19 during the conflict."

20 MR. BOS: Thank you, Your Honours. This concludes my

21 examination-in-chief.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, you give me the

23 countdown and tell me how much the Prosecution has had yesterday and

24 today. The Defence teams will have the same amount of time.

25 Before we have a break in 20 minutes' time, I shall give the floor

1 to the first Defence counsel. Who is to take the floor first?

2 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the Prosecutor

3 referred to Pusic in a paragraph. He has not been accused of anything in

4 the indictment, so we cede our time to the other Defence teams.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Karnavas.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours.

7 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:

8 Q. Good afternoon, sir.

9 A. Good afternoon.

10 Q. You were questioned twice by the Prosecutor before; is that

11 correct? You've given two statements.

12 A. I've given one statement for this trial, and I gave an earlier

13 statement for a trial some years ago.

14 Q. Correct. And then you testified in Kordic as well.

15 A. Yes, I testified in that trial.

16 Q. And, of course, before coming here today, it would appear, at

17 least, that on Sunday, or maybe Saturday, or Saturday and Sunday, you met

18 with the gentleman there.

19 A. Yes, I met with the Prosecutor on Sunday.

20 Q. May I ask, just out of curiosity, how many hours did you meet with

21 him? Or was it --

22 A. I don't know what time we started, but we finished at about 3.00.

23 Q. Okay. And I take it at that point in time he showed you documents

24 you had never seen?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 Q. And did he let you read through the documents or did he point to

2 specific areas and told you that he would be asking you questions or

3 asking you to verify the contents of those portions?

4 A. He asked me for how -- the certain paragraphs of certain parts of

5 certain documents, how that fitted in with the situation in Gornji Vakuf

6 at the time.

7 Q. All right. I take it he also allowed you or gave you the

8 opportunity to read the entire document, perhaps?

9 A. No, I wasn't allowed to read the whole thing.

10 Q. No? Okay. Well, documents that were generated by, for instance,

11 the HVO, did you ask to look at the other documents to, perhaps, see

12 whether they may contain some information that would allow you to put the

13 matters into perspective, into a proper context?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Okay. Would you agree with me that, perhaps, some of those

16 documents would contain information that you were totally unaware of, in

17 spite of your position as an intelligence officer?

18 A. Yes, parts of those documents I would be unaware of.

19 Q. Now, speaking about your function, as I understand from the Kordic

20 trial, at the time that you were there, you were a colour sergeant?

21 A. I was a sergeant at the start of the tour and I got promoted

22 during the tour to colour sergeant.

23 Q. I'm from the United States and we have master sergeants, gunny

24 sergeants, you know. Is that just one rank up, sergeant, or is that the

25 top of the level?

1 A. No. A colour sergeant is one rank below a sergeant major.

2 Q. Okay. I'm familiar a little bit with the US Army, you know, and

3 normally sergeants are not in the business of intelligence. You would

4 have, perhaps, a warrant officer who's trained in that position. So if I

5 could ask, were you train as an intelligence officer?

6 A. Yes, I have been on intelligence courses and I was -- I did

7 intelligence gathering in East Tyrone, in Northern Ireland, and also in

8 South Armagh.

9 Q. Okay. And this was before your tour over here?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You had no prior experience in the former Yugoslavia?

12 A. No. We were the first unit to deploy --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. -- into Bosnia.

15 Q. Okay. And I take it that was your first -- your personal first

16 time exposed to that particular area.

17 A. Yes, it was.

18 Q. In other words, you hadn't gone to Dubrovnik at some point on

19 vacation.

20 A. No.

21 Q. Now, before coming into the situation, I take it that you were

22 briefed somewhat.

23 A. We were briefed a little. There was not much information really

24 known at a low level on the ground, what it was actually like on the

25 ground.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. We had reconnaissance teams, who deployed a few weeks before we

3 deployed, to gather some information. But their main task, really, was to

4 find somewhere for us to be accommodated.

5 Q. All right. Well, now, you've piqued my curiosity a little bit. I

6 know that there were, sort of, British special forces running around

7 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war. Are we talking about those

8 fellows or are we talking about just a unit that went there to look for

9 where you would be billeted, how to make sure that it's a proper and safe

10 area?

11 A. It was our reconnaissance teams, from inside our regiment.

12 Q. Okay. Now, you said you were briefed a little bit. When you say

13 "a little bit," you know, that's like asking "How long is a string?" So

14 how little is "a little bit"?

15 A. It was literally a couple of hours on the actual situation on the

16 ground.

17 Q. Okay. Well --

18 A. Primarily, at that stage, we hadn't deployed. Our mission was to

19 escort aid convoys. As far as we were concerned, the war was between the

20 Serbs on one side and the Muslims and Croats on the other and had nothing

21 to do with us.

22 Q. All right. But this little bit of training or little bit of

23 briefing that you got, was that primarily on the terrain itself?

24 A. Yes, ground training.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Ground.

2 Q. But with respect to, you know, the political situation, the

3 reasons why the situation was going on, was that part of the briefing or

4 was that something incidental?

5 A. Yes, that was part of the briefing.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. The army intelligence corps even produced a magazine

8 called "Threat" in which they -- it was probably about 20 pages long,

9 which was a brief history of Yugoslavia and the effect of the death of

10 Tito and how it just crumbled.

11 Q. Okay. All right. Well, Yugoslavia is a big place. You were now

12 in Bosnia and in particular one area. But with respect to that particular

13 area, how much briefing did you get?

14 A. Virtually none.

15 Q. Okay. That was what I was asking for, actually. Now, yesterday

16 you did enlighten us a little bit about the importance of that particular

17 area to both sides. Was that something that you came to find out once you

18 got there or is that something that you knew in advance?

19 A. It was something we came to find out once we got there.

20 Q. And, of course, you being a military man, in intelligence and in

21 your other experiences, you could look at the map and you could tell the

22 importance of controlling that particular area.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Were you also, at any point in time, given any information with

25 respect to Central Bosnia?

1 A. Very little. Again, when we initially deployed, I first went -- I

2 was in Vitez for one day, and then went down to Gornji Vakuf.

3 Q. Okay. Was that geopolitically or politically or militarily

4 important, that area, Central Bosnia?

5 A. Again, it was to do with routes. You need routes for the lorries.

6 Q. Well, you need routes for the lorries, but were there any, like,

7 ammunition depots or batteries that might have been important to one side

8 or the other?

9 A. As far as I can recall, there was some sort of arms factory

10 somewhere around the Travnik area, somewhere around there.

11 Q. And that might make that area rather significant to either side --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- right? Okay. Now, you got to the theatre at what point in

14 time? What was the exact month; do you recall?

15 A. November.

16 Q. November. Now, that --

17 A. Sorry, it was either late October or early November.

18 Q. Okay. Now, had some events occurred prior to your arrival in that

19 area?

20 A. There'd been some incidents in Prozor.

21 Q. Okay. What about a little bit before that?

22 A. I'm not aware of that.

23 Q. Okay. Well, there had been some fighting, had there not, between

24 the Croats and Muslims against the Serbs?

25 A. Oh, against the Serbs, yes. But, by and large, the front lines in

1 that area were static.

2 Q. You told us that a little bit yesterday. In fact, there was one

3 particular place that fell; right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And that was?

6 A. Jajce.

7 Q. And with the falling of Jajce, was there not a significant

8 movement of population?

9 A. Yes, there was.

10 Q. All right. Known as refugees; right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you happen to know the number?

13 A. I don't, I'm afraid. It was outside of my area.

14 Q. Well, did you ever learn of it?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Well, in intelligence, might that be an important number, for

17 instance? I'm not trying to put you on the spot, and I'll tell you why.

18 Yesterday, you told us a little bit about the TOs, Territorial Defences;

19 right? Militias, you called them, I believe. You were aware, obviously,

20 being in intelligence, that every male of a military age was, in effect,

21 mobilised?

22 A. Mm-hmm.

23 Q. Right? You're shaking your head. That means yes?

24 A. Yes, sorry.

25 Q. Okay. We have to make a record.

1 A. Sorry.

2 Q. Okay. And so that would make every male, irrespective of where he

3 is, subject -- whatever side, whatever ethnic or national make-up, subject

4 to recruitment; right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And so with this large number of refugees, might it have been

7 important for you, for instance, to learn how many able-bodied men were

8 there that had come from Jajce or other places that could be recruited by

9 either side?

10 A. We did have the figures of refugees. I just cannot recall what

11 they are.

12 Q. Okay. Well, I'm not talking about refugees now. You see, I

13 switched. I'm now talking about able-bodied men, because that's the count

14 that you would actually use, would you not, being in intelligence, as to

15 how many able-bodied soldiers there might be on one side or the other?

16 Right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. And would it be not -- also, you talked a little bit about

19 the TOs yesterday. You didn't go too much into it. But if I understand

20 the concept of a TO and you used the word "militia," we're talking about

21 home-grown [static on English channel]. They're there to locally protect

22 what is theirs and around themselves; correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. But now, with the influx of refugees and large numbers of

25 able-bodied men - and, incidentally, I'm sure you know the figure is --

1 the age bracket is, I think, 16 or 18 to 60 or 65 - now you're in a

2 situation where you would have a large number of able-bodied men who would

3 also be able to be used as a mobile unit; right?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. Okay. And, of course, if that large number of able-bodied men

6 happened to be Muslim - and, in fact, we have heard some testimony here

7 that there were large numbers of refugees with able-bodied men from that

8 area - that would now provide the ABiH with a rather significant increase

9 in its manpower; correct?

10 A. Yes, it would.

11 Q. All right. Now, you can imagine, can you not, in looking at that

12 map, I believe it was the President who was quite keen on showing us and

13 pointing out how the villages are mixed all over the place; right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Some villages are mixed and then you have other villages which are

16 basically homogenous. But, in essence, they're all over the place,

17 intermingled; right?

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

19 Q. And with the large number of Muslims coming now as refugees,

20 able-bodied men, would it not, in your opinion, as a military man, as a

21 career man, would that not cause some concern, some concern to the Croats?

22 A. It did cause some concern to the Croats.

23 Q. Okay. But when we say it did, that's a realistic feeling, is it

24 not?

25 A. Yes. They did actually -- they mentioned it several times.

1 Q. Right. But, I mean, they were not being irrational about it,

2 given the circumstances.

3 A. Yes, they would be being irrational about it, because nominally

4 they were allies.

5 Q. Okay. Well, hold on. Let's think about this slowly. They were

6 nominally allies. As I understand from your testimony in Kordic, you say

7 that, you know, they would have these cease-fires, they would break them,

8 back, on and on; right?

9 A. Yes, that's correct.

10 Q. So it was a sort of a forced marriage, as you will, forced by the

11 situation of what was happening from the Serbs, but they didn't trust each

12 other; right?

13 A. No, they didn't trust each other.

14 Q. And they did have problems with each other.

15 A. They did have problems; however, the two commanders of each side

16 locally within Gornji Vakuf did actually have quite a good relationship.

17 Q. They tried very hard. And you even told us today that there were

18 these renegade elements and, to use the terms that were used by the

19 Prosecutor yesterday which drew my objection, it would appear, at least

20 from your testimony today, that the commanders did not always have

21 effective command and control over their units; right?

22 A. That was prevalent right the way through. The commanders at all

23 levels could not control their men properly.

24 Q. So, in spite - in spite - their best efforts, their best

25 intentions, their willingness to work with each other and try to find some

1 common ground within this madness, this war, they were not able to control

2 individuals that had, you know, perhaps, their own agenda, whatever that

3 agenda may be; right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. Now, getting back to the irrationality, you know, given the

6 situation - and it would appear to me, the only thing that comes to my

7 mind is somewhat of a tinder box situation, you know - these large numbers

8 of able-bodied men coming in, that's not -- that would heighten the

9 anxiety of these people, would it -- of the Croats, would it not?

10 A. Yes, it would.

11 Q. Okay. Now, we talked about -- you talked about the significance

12 of this area, and it would seem to me that we can't talk about one side

13 without really thinking about the other side as well; right?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 Q. In other words, if it's relevant and important for the Croats to

16 control this area, we could equally say the same thing about the Muslims;

17 right?

18 A. That's perfectly true. Both sides knew the significance of it.

19 Q. And both sides were playing for the field; right?

20 A. In what way?

21 Q. Well, both sides wanted to control it in one way or the other.

22 A. I think the HVO wanted to actually take control of it for

23 themselves. The armija, on the other hand, just wanted it open as a

24 route --

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. -- and were prepared to let anybody use it.

2 Q. All right. Well, you know, you say that, and first I want to

3 remind you that on page 6056 in your Kordic testimony - this was on 2

4 August 1999 - you said something that cause my attention. It says that

5 you were -- you know -- well, you were asked a question, and it was:

6 "You found yourself confronted with a confusing and complex

7 situation militarily and ethnically and politically."

8 That was the question. It starts on line 18. And you say "Yes."

9 Would that be correct?

10 A. Yes, that was the correct.

11 Q. Okay. And from what we heard initially, you virtually were not

12 necessarily briefed, at least not comprehensively, in order to make sense

13 of this confusing, complex situation, militarily, ethnically and

14 politically; correct?

15 A. Right at the very beginning, that's correct.

16 Q. All right. Now, you were billeted in that area; right?

17 A. Yes, in a factory on the edge of the town.

18 Q. And might I ask whether you had Croats or Muslims as your

19 interpreters?

20 A. We, at the start, had both. Once the troubles broke out, we were

21 left with just two, two Muslim sisters, and a captain in the British Army

22 who could speak Serbo-Croat.

23 Q. Okay. Now, you say "we." That would be you as well.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So whenever you went there -- and that was your ears basically;

1 right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Because you didn't speak the language.

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. All right. Now, I noticed something, incidentally, in both of

6 your statements that you gave, that there's -- I don't want to say

7 "nothing" because that would be uncharitable. But there's virtually

8 nothing there with respect to what the Muslims were doing. In other

9 words, all the information that you are imparting is against the Serbs --

10 I mean, against the Croats. Now, would that be a fair characterisation?

11 A. At the start of our deployment, we were there -- our actual

12 mission was the route, to keep the route open, and we did not have

13 problems with the Muslims to keep the route open. When we did have

14 problems, it was the HVO.

15 Q. Okay. Apparently I didn't make myself clear. In reading your

16 statements, okay, it would appear -- and I have to say this with some

17 degree of regret, that it almost came out yesterday, no fault of your own,

18 that when the questions were being posed, it was all against what the

19 Croats were doing without anything coming from the other side; in other

20 words, as if the Muslims were not doing anything and they were strictly

21 being attacked by the Croats. Would one get that impression when reading

22 your two statements?

23 A. As I said to your last question, we were there to -- initially to

24 keep that route open, and the problems that we had in trying to keep it

25 open were caused, 9 times out of 10, by the HVO.

1 Q. All right. Let me go about it another way. You were questioned

2 by the Prosecutor on two occasions; correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. All right. Now, they were obviously seeking information from you,

5 you being on the ground; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And it would appear that if you wanted to be fair about it, or if

8 they wanted to be fair about it - and I can't vouch for that one way or

9 the other - but if they wanted to be fair and if you wanted to be fair,

10 you would be talking about both sides; right?

11 A. Right.

12 Q. Okay. Step by step, we're going to get there. I'm trying to help

13 you out here. Work with me.

14 Now, it would appear that if you're trying to -- if you're trying

15 to understand the situation, you can't understand it in the abstract;

16 right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. All right. And so if we're talking about a particular situation,

19 there's usually action and there's reaction; right?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. All right. And what I'm trying to say to you - and perhaps I'm

22 just being inarticulate because I'm tired - that when I read your

23 statements, it appears that you never say whatever the Muslims might have

24 been doing, or the ABiH; in other words, one would walk away with the

25 impression that the Croats were constantly on the offensive and the ABiH

1 was simply either on the defensive or doing nothing or incapable of doing

2 anything.

3 A. There's two things. First of all, like I said, we were there

4 primarily to keep the route open, and the problems that we had keeping the

5 route open were nearly always caused by the HVO. And secondly, the armija

6 did not attack Gornji Vakuf --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- the HVO did.

9 Q. All right. Well, we're going to talk about this.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: Right now I believe it's time for the break, Your

11 Honours, but I'll just touch on a few more issues and then -- because I

12 know I have limited time, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, could you tell me how

14 much time Mr. Karnavas has had so far?

15 It is now a quarter to 4.00. We shall have a 20-minute break and

16 resume at five minutes past 4.00.

17 --- Recess taken at 3.48 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 4.07 p.m.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, I've been told

20 that you've used up 25 minutes.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Twenty-two. I just have a few more minutes. I

22 could cross-examine the gentleman for hours, but I'll just cover the few

23 points.

24 Q. We left off when you said that it was the Croats that attacked

25 Gornji Vakuf. Now, in your previous testimony - and, again, this is on

1 page 6067, dated 2 August 1999, when you testified in Kordic - you said

2 that it was hard to put an exact time and date as to when it started,

3 because it was sporadically occurring at the time, that is, the fighting;

4 correct?

5 A. Yes. There were a series of clashes and it built up from there.

6 Q. Okay. And that was well before the 15th of January.

7 A. There'd been sporadic clashes in the previous year, even before

8 our deployment.

9 Q. Exactly. And those sporadic clashes, do you know who was

10 initiating each and every clash?

11 A. No, because at that particular time, the main effort was the route

12 itself, not what the warring factions were doing with each other.

13 Q. In other words, it might be the Muslims one time; it might be the

14 Croats another time. Tit for tat, that sort of thing.

15 A. There was evidence that a lot of it was tit for tat.

16 Q. Okay. And that had been ongoing before you got there, while you

17 were there, and then, of course, after the so-called ultimatum; right?

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

19 Q. All right. Now, I want to move to another area. The Prosecution

20 has spent quite a bit of time on that individual Vlatko Rajic who beheaded

21 the Muslim, and you told us that there was some concern that after he went

22 to Mostar he returned from there.

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Did you actually see that individual?

25 A. No, I didn't see the individual.

1 Q. Okay. But you were just told of that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All right. Now, did you, as an intelligence officer, ever make

4 any efforts to go to Mostar or to use your sources in Mostar to see

5 whether there had been any Prosecution of this individual; and, if so,

6 what might have been the result?

7 A. No, because it was completely outside of the British area.

8 Q. Okay. Yet it would appear, at least from your testimony, that

9 this is the sort of thing that keeps being mentioned all the time as a

10 significant event; right?

11 A. It was significant in that -- first of all, that it happened, and

12 then that situation calmed down, and then it was significant in that it

13 came up during the cease-fire talks.

14 Q. Okay. Well, at this point in time, perhaps I can hand you -- for

15 your convenience we could have the -- and we can either -- we can use the

16 e-court as well, but I just want to make sure we cover this.

17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I ask a question on this same Rajic issue.

18 You have said, sir, that the issue came up in cease-fire talks. On those

19 occasions, did the representatives of the HVO usually deny that Rajic had

20 returned? Was this contested?

21 THE WITNESS: No, it wasn't contested, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

23 MR. KARNAVAS:

24 Q. In fact, let me make sure that we get your testimony absolutely

25 clear, because yesterday you said it was neither confirmed, nor denied;

1 right?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Okay. Let me just -- I'm short of time. And you being in

4 intelligence, you know sometimes, when you're having these negotiations,

5 neither confirming or denying is a tactic or a ploy that is used, because

6 there is no sense in giving away your positions; correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. All right. So nothing nefarious. In other words, to make sure

9 that our Judges know, you were warning them: Your denial to answer this

10 question can and will be used later on, at least presumptively, as an

11 admission that this person wasn't prosecuted, is back in the field, and is

12 back doing harm. Right?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. There was no -- okay. Fine. Now, if we could look at document 1D

15 00943, a document that you haven't seen.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: And for the Court --

17 MR. BOS: The Prosecution did not receive a copy of this document.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: It should be in the e-court. And if I may, Your

19 Honour, this is a --

20 MR. BOS: We don't have it in e-court.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: It should be in e-court. If not, we will have to

22 give the gentleman -- we'll give an extra copy to the gentleman.

23 If we could look at that. Just by way of introduction, I had my

24 investigator check in Mostar, and we're going to go through several

25 documents, and what I will demonstrate, at least through these documents,

1 is that the gentleman was, indeed -- the prosecutor was, indeed, in

2 custody this entire time, and contrary to what was believed at the time

3 during these negotiations, and contrary to what the Prosecution would have

4 us believe.

5 Q. If you could look at the first document. It's dated 9 April

6 1993. Do you see that, sir?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Okay. And it says here that this is a decision, does it not?

9 A. Yes, it does.

10 Q. Okay. Now, if we could flip to the second page, because we don't

11 have much time, and I'm going to read from the first paragraph on the

12 second page, in the middle, where it says: "Namely, investigation against

13 the accused is under way due to the well-grounded suspicion that he

14 committed a criminal act from Article 36, paragraph 2, item 3, of the

15 Criminal Code of RBiH, and this criminal act is punishable with death

16 sentence. Therefore, based on Article 191, paragraph 1, of the Law on

17 Criminal Procedure, detention must be imposed on the accused. The

18 investigation has not been concluded due to objective reasons which the

19 first-instance court justifiably concluded and applied the law properly."

20 Does it not say that, sir?

21 A. Yes, it does.

22 Q. Okay. And the Court will have ample time to go through this.

23 Again, I apologise for not going step by step, but, of course, you're not

24 a lawyer either, are you?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Okay. Now, if we go to the next document, 1D 00944. If you look

2 at this, it's dated 21 February 1995. If we look on the fourth line, we

3 see the name Vlatko Rajic.

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. That would be the same Rajic, would it not? At least it would

6 appear.

7 A. Yes, it would.

8 Q. Okay. This is a decision, too, and if I may just read the first

9 part, it says under the decision: "The security measure of obligatory

10 psychiatric treatment and custody in a medical institution pronounced to

11 Vlatko Rajic," and it goes on about his son, and what have you. That

12 would be the same Vlatko Rajic, would it not?

13 A. Yes, it would.

14 Q. And then, again, I'm going to have to just skip through. It would

15 appear, if we look at this document, look at the second page, it would

16 appear that the whole issue is whether he, at this particular time, is

17 going to seek treatment while in custody or out of custody. And if we go

18 to the second paragraph on page 2, in the middle of it, it says -- I'll

19 just read the whole thing:

20 "Having considered the above listed, the court agrees with the

21 measure proposed by the expert neuropsychiatrist, who has given his expert

22 opinion about the personality of the accused after he talked to him, and

23 the opinion agrees, to a certain extent, with the report of the District

24 Prison in Mostar. Having in mind all the above stated, the court hold

25 justifiable the request of the accused that the security measure

1 pronounced to him be abolished and that he be pronounced security measure

2 of obligatory psychiatric treatment at liberty as of 1 March 1995 ..."

3 And it goes on, so on and so forth.

4 From here, would it not be fair to say that we can conclude that,

5 at least as of this particular period, he was still in custody?

6 A. Yes, you could conclude that.

7 Q. Okay. In other words, he could not be in two places at one time;

8 one in custody and at the other time in Gornji Vakuf, as was being touted

9 by the --

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at page 1 of

13 the decision, please.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Certainly, Your Honour. Certainly.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In paragraph 3

16 there, "Exposition," if we read the paragraphs, it would appear that on

17 the 26th of January, the person concerned underwent psychiatric treatment,

18 and perhaps he left after that, because psychiatric treatment is in a

19 medical institution, not a prison necessarily.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I don't -- well, I think we can -- I don't

21 see where -- well, let me put it to you this way, Your Honour, because

22 we're short of time: This individual has agreed to come and testify

23 before this Court, so we can hear from him and he can tell us whether he

24 was in -- I'm told by my investigator that he indicated that he was in --

25 in custody throughout this time. But we will bring this gentleman to put

1 this matter at rest.

2 And if we could look at the last document, 1D 00945.

3 Q. This appears to be a certificate, does it not, dated 28 February

4 1995?

5 A. Yes, it does.

6 Q. And, again, you being not a lawyer, there is no need to go into

7 it.

8 I know I'm short of time. If I can ask one or two questions more.

9 I notice when you gave evidence in the Kordic case, you, as a security

10 officer or in the security business, intelligence business, you were

11 placing emphasis that Siljeg was communicating with Split because the

12 number that was being used -- or on occasion he had used the fax machine

13 with that number; correct?

14 A. He'd made a number of faxes, and the number that he dialed had a

15 Split area code.

16 Q. Okay. But from that, it would appear that you had -- you were

17 intimating that he was communicating with folks in Split, were you not?

18 A. No. I just reported that he was --

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. -- it was a Split area code.

21 Q. Okay. But you're not claiming that he was -- because you were

22 asked where Split was and you said it was in Croatia, so one might get the

23 impression that you were trying to convey the impression that he was

24 actually communicating with authorities in Croatia.

25 A. No. It was -- it was -- he was using -- he was faxing to a number

1 and the number had the Split prefix.

2 Q. And I suspect you, being in intelligence, knew by then that in

3 Mostar there were several numbers with a Split prefix; correct?

4 A. Early on in that stage, we only knew certain numbers. We didn't

5 know all the numbers.

6 Q. Okay. But the question was: There were certain numbers in Mostar

7 with a Split prefix.

8 A. I wouldn't know.

9 Q. Okay. All right. Well, I'm terribly sorry that we don't have

10 time to have a more convivial discourse on all of these matters.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, that will do for now.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 Next.

14 MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Cross-examination by Mr. Murphy:

16 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Williams.

17 A. Good afternoon.

18 Q. My name is Peter Murphy. I'm one of the lawyers representing

19 Mr. Bruno Stojic.

20 Mr. Karnavas asked you a few questions about the briefing that you

21 received before taking up your deployment, and I think you responded that

22 it was very little.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. In fact, when you gave a statement to the Prosecutor, you

25 indicated that the briefing had been carried out by a person called Martin

1 Bell; is that right?

2 A. Martin Bell was a personal friend of Colonel Bob Stewart and at

3 that time was on leave, after having been injured in an incident in

4 Sarajevo, and he came and spoke to the officers and senior NCOs of the

5 regiment.

6 Q. And Colonel Bob Stewart was the commanding officer of the regiment

7 or that part of the regiment?

8 A. Colonel Bob Stewart commanded the 1st Battalion of the Cheshire

9 Regiment.

10 Q. And Martin Bell, in fact, is a television journalist, is he not?

11 A. He is a journalist for the BBC.

12 Q. And it was Mr. Bell who was brought in to give you a briefing.

13 A. No. He came of his own free will, as a favour to Colonel Stewart,

14 and spoke to, primarily, the officer and also some NCOs.

15 Q. All right. Now, are you acquainted with an officer, who then had

16 the rank of major, called Jacqueline Carter?

17 A. I am not.

18 Q. You don't remember that she was an officer who was also a doctor,

19 a medical doctor?

20 A. I think her surname might be different at that time.

21 Q. All right.

22 A. We did have a major, female.

23 Q. A female --

24 A. A female who was a doctor, but her last name wasn't Carter, I

25 don't think. So maybe she's married since.

1 Q. Do you know whether she was sometimes known by the name of Tracy?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All right. Now, I bring her up because I want to ask you a few

4 questions about the various documents you've been asked about,

5 particularly the information summaries and then the milinfo documents.

6 You testified yesterday that you were the person who would write the

7 material that went into the info summary; is that right?

8 A. I would right most of the material from the Gornji Vakuf area; not

9 all of it but most of it.

10 Q. And that information, or what you wrote, would then be passed up

11 the line to Vitez.

12 A. That's correct, where it would be absorbed into the milinfosums

13 that you've seen.

14 Q. Do you know a captain by the name of Robbie Boyd? Does that name

15 mean anything to you?

16 A. Captain Boyd was our company operations officer, as I recall, and

17 he was attached to us from the Royal Irish Regiment.

18 Q. Was Captain Boyd with you throughout the time that you were

19 deployed in Gornji Vakuf?

20 A. To the best of my knowledge, he was, yes.

21 Q. I mention him because when Lieutenant Colonel Carter, as she now

22 is, gave evidence to the Judges, she said that Captain Boyd was the one

23 who prepared the infosums and that you would do it on occasion.

24 A. No, that's not correct. Captain Boyd would compile the situation

25 report, the sitrep. I would compile the milinfosum.

1 Q. So, Lieutenant Colonel Carter was mistaken about that when she

2 said that, then.

3 A. She was mistaken. Yes.

4 Q. All right. Now, you said, in answer to Mr. Karnavas, that you

5 began the deployment as a sergeant. You were then promoted to colour

6 sergeant.

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. So you were a non-commissioned officer.

9 A. A senior non-commissioned officer, yes.

10 Q. A senior NCO, yes. And above you, there were -- in addition to

11 Captain Boyd, and I think this is the first time we've heard about him

12 this afternoon, there was also, as you've said, first of all, your

13 commander -- the commander of the unit or battalion -- I'm not sure what

14 his title is, but Major Rule at first and then Major Jones?

15 A. Yes. They were the officers commanding B Company.

16 Q. Officer commanding B Company. And then below those officers, you

17 had Captain Short, who spoke B/C/S.

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

19 Q. In fact, he was a military interpreter. That was his job, wasn't

20 it?

21 A. Yes, it was.

22 Q. And also a Captain Hughes, who you said was the liaison officer

23 with the HVO.

24 A. He was the liaison officer for B Company. He liaised with both

25 the HVO and the armija.

1 Q. Obviously, by definition, all the people that I've mentioned were

2 superior in rank to you.

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Now, as far as the actual negotiations with local commanders went,

5 if you were trying to achieve a cease-fire or to bring about a deal of

6 some kind, that would be done by the officer commanding Major Rule or

7 Major Jones; right?

8 A. Yes. On most occasions, yes, it was, and on some occasions, when

9 there were higher-ranking HVO or armija at the negotiations, we would have

10 higher-ranking people as well, as a sign of respect.

11 Q. Because, in general, it would be appropriate to have

12 communications with local officers conducted by officers of approximately

13 the same rank, wouldn't it?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 Q. And if the commanding officers were not involved, then, would most

16 of the negotiation be done by either Captain Hughes or by Captain Short?

17 A. Within the base itself, when we had the local commanders in, it

18 would be done by the OC, Major Rule or Major Jones, with probably at least

19 one of them present. Sometimes I was in there and interpreters, a clerk.

20 Not Major Clark. A clerk, clerk.

21 Q. But your role would be, essentially, to assist the officers in

22 conducting those meetings or negotiations, wouldn't it?

23 A. They would sometimes ask me to go and get bits of information out

24 of the files.

25 Q. So would it be right to say that quite a bit of the information

1 that would go into the reports that you wrote would, in fact, be relayed

2 to you by the officers who were conducting those meetings rather than

3 things that you, yourself, had observed.

4 A. Yes, it would be correct to say that. Some of it was gleaned from

5 the interpreters; some of it, I was present in the room when it was said

6 and wrote it down; and some of it, I wasn't present and it was relayed to

7 me afterwards.

8 Q. Because, in addition to your role as an intelligence officer, you

9 also had what I could call a more normal military position as a mortar

10 team leader?

11 A. Mortar fire controller.

12 Q. You are also a trained medic, aren't you?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I have to ask you this, something that we were told by Dr.

15 Carter. You don't play in the band as well, do you?

16 A. No. I understand where you're coming from on that.

17 Q. That was not too serious a question. One other thing. You

18 mentioned that, in assessing intelligence, you had a designation of its

19 credibility which went from A1 to F6.

20 A. Yes. You had A, B, C, D, E, F, and 1 to 6, so you could be A6 or

21 B3 or whatever, and it depended on how it correlated with other

22 information.

23 Q. Because, in relation to one report that was mentioned yesterday

24 concerning an information you got from a mercenary, it was said that there

25 was a question about the reliability of the information.

1 A. Yes. It was graded F6 because there was no way of actually

2 checking it. We didn't actually have any other source of information to

3 compare it against.

4 Q. Who would be -- within B Company, who would be responsible for

5 attaching the designation of reliability to a particular piece of

6 information?

7 A. Either myself or, later on, an assistant I had called Sergeant

8 Peter Dalton.

9 Q. So that would not be something that was done by one of the

10 commissioned officers?

11 A. No.

12 Q. All right.

13 A. Not at my level. Higher up in Vitez they would regrade it all.

14 Q. All right. Now, I wanted to ask you about one specific matter

15 that you mentioned yesterday. This was, for the record, on page 57 of the

16 transcript. You were asked some questions about the presence of certain

17 Muslim fighters you described as extremists, I think, within the 7th

18 Brigade. Do you remember that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

20 Q. And was it your testimony that there was some evidence that some

21 of these fighters within the 7th Brigade had come from foreign countries,

22 or not?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Because you were asked, I think, a specific question about the

25 presence of the fighters known as the Mujahedin, and you said that there

1 were no such people in your area. Do you remember that?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 MR. MURPHY: Perhaps, with the assistance of the court officer, we

4 could see a Prosecution exhibit in e-court. The number is 01210. 01210.

5 Q. Okay. Do you see that, Mr. Williams?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And this document appears to be -- is headed "Republic of Bosnia

8 and Herzegovina, the 3rd Corps in Zenica," dated 19 January 1993, and it's

9 headed, "Special Combat Report." Do you see that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And if you look at the -- if we can go briefly to the end of the

12 document, it's signed by somebody called Selmo Cikotic. Do you know who

13 that is?

14 A. Yes. He was the security officer for the 3rd Corps of the armija.

15 Q. Okay. Now if we could go back, then, to the previous page and

16 look at item number 3. It begins with the word "Requests." Do you see

17 that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. "That Lendo ..." -- do you know who that is?

20 A. I can recall the name but I can't recall exactly where he fitted

21 in.

22 Q. Would you accept that he was a commander within the armija?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "... provide someone to get to the village of Bistrica." We've

25 talked about that village, have we not?

1 A. Yes, we have.

2 Q. "... during the night and take over the command of the Infantry

3 Company from Novi Travnik, the Mujahedins, and the troops from Bistrica."

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. "These are then to be used to execute an attack along the route.

6 The check-point in the village Bistrica-Fran Kovac Kubu-Zvizde-Gornji

7 Vakuf, to link with the forces in the town and supply us with the materiel

8 and technical equipment located there." Do you see that?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Have you ever seen this document before today?

11 A. No, I haven't.

12 Q. So this was not one of the documents the Prosecution showed you on

13 Sunday, then.

14 A. No.

15 Q. Are you aware of the attack that was being referred to in this

16 document?

17 A. I remember the check-point that's referred to in that document

18 being attacked, yes.

19 Q. Okay.

20 MR. MURPHY: May we see another Prosecution exhibit, please. The

21 number is 01632. 01632.

22 Q. While that's coming up, you also testified yesterday at some

23 length about the military police, if you recall.

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 Q. And what their role had been.

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. And, if I have this correct, you testified that you could

3 recognise, or somebody could recognise, the military police because they

4 had blue helmets and drove around in blue vehicles. Is that correct?

5 A. It was correct some of the time. It's not strictly true. They

6 did not have blue vehicles all of the time. But if the vehicles were

7 blue, then they were military police.

8 Q. Can you give us a little more detail about that? What type of

9 vehicles were these that you were talking about?

10 A. BTR 50s which are old Soviet troop carriers. Occasionally, a

11 POV. A POV is a small armoured car with a gun platform on it, a

12 machine-gun platform, POV 3.

13 Q. So these were armoured vehicles?

14 A. Light armoured vehicles.

15 Q. Did they have any particular markings or insignia on them that you

16 recall?

17 A. No, I don't.

18 Q. Is this something that you saw personally or was it information

19 that was given to you by someone else?

20 A. Both.

21 Q. So you did actually see these vehicles.

22 A. I did see some military police, yes, and some vehicles.

23 Q. On more than one occasion?

24 A. No. I only ever actually saw them once, personally. But other

25 people saw them.

1 Q. What kind of distance away from the vehicle were you on the

2 occasion when you saw them?

3 A. Hundred and fifty yards, 200 yards.

4 Q. You don't recall any markings or insignia or whether there were

5 any at all.

6 A. I don't recall that at all, no.

7 Q. You're quite sure, are you, that the military police officers that

8 you are talking about were wearing blue helmets?

9 A. It's not to be confused with the UN powder blue. It's a darker

10 blue.

11 Q. Important distinction. So it was --

12 A. It was noticeably different. It was far darker.

13 Q. So it was a different shade of blue; is that right?

14 A. Far darker.

15 Q. Was it darker?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. All right. But there is no doubt in your mind that these people

18 were wearing these dark blue helmets.

19 A. Yes, some of them were.

20 Q. And that they were military police.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now that we have this document, I think, in front of you -- can

23 you see that on the screen, Mr. Williams?

24 A. Yes, I can.

25 Q. It's a report from the brigade Dr. Ante Starcevic in Gornji Vakuf,

1 dated the 9th of March, 1993; is that right?

2 A. Yes, it is.

3 Q. On the conflict between the army of BiH and HVO in Gornji Vakuf,

4 it says, under the word "Report."

5 A. Yes, it does.

6 Q. And if we could go to the next page of that, please. I want to go

7 to an item under letter D. If we could scroll down to the bottom there,

8 do you see a paragraph D, beginning "The future task of all units ..."?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. I mention this because, before I ask you a question about this,

11 you testified yesterday that it was your impression that the HVO military

12 police were mostly concerned to protect the Croat civilians and perhaps

13 not quite so much the Muslim civilians. Do you remember saying that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. This paragraph D says:

16 "The future task of all units, especially the Brigade Command with

17 all its services and military police as well as juridical organs, is not

18 only in defence of Croat population and areas. These tasks must be aimed

19 at suppressing all negative occurrences in this area."

20 And then it refers to robberies, and so on, and then the last

21 sentence says:

22 "Other tasks include the preservation of public peace and order,

23 protection of lives and the property of the citizens."

24 And then immediately below that, we can't see it, but just perhaps

25 on the next page, it's signed by the chief of the SIS, Mr. Kolak; is that

1 right?

2 A. Yes, it is.

3 MR. BOS: Just for the record, the date of this document, you

4 mentioned that for the record. I don't think it was mentioned.

5 MR. MURPHY: I'm sorry, I thought we mentioned it. I'm sorry if I

6 didn't. It's the 9th of March, 1993, at the top of page 1.

7 Q. In fact, Mr. Karnavas talked to you about the particular case of

8 Mr. Rajic who had murdered the young Muslim man. It was, in fact, the

9 military police who had arrested Mr. Rajic, wasn't it?

10 A. I presume so, yes. I don't know for definite who actually

11 arrested him.

12 Q. Okay.

13 MR. MURPHY: Well, in that case, could we look at another

14 document, number -- Prosecution Exhibit P 00768. If we could see that

15 briefly, please.

16 Q. Just while that's coming up, you did say that it was the HVO who

17 had insisted that Mr. Rajic be taken to Mostar; is that right?

18 A. The Muslim armija wanted him to go to Zenica, I believe --

19 Q. Right.

20 A. -- to stand trial.

21 Q. But the HVO said he should go to Mostar, as I understand it.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. All right. Now, can you see the document in front of you there,

24 sir?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Head "The Basic Court in Bugojno" and dated the 18th of November,

2 1992.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. "Record of Crime-Scene Investigation"; is that right?

5 A. Yes, it is.

6 Q. Then it begins -- I don't want to read the whole thing, but it

7 begins by saying that the record is being made by the investigating judge,

8 "following the discovery of the headless corpse of Salih Grizic outside

9 the house of Huso Guko." So this is the crime that we've been talking

10 about, isn't it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And at the beginning of the next paragraph there, it says

13 that "The armed forces military police informed us" - that would be the

14 court - "that the murder had taken place," and so on.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And then if you look at the bottom of that page, you see a

17 paragraph beginning, "The team immediately went to the scene of the

18 crime."

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. "The crime scene was secured by the members of the HVO military

21 police --"

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. "-- who claimed that the scene of the crime was not tampered with,"

24 and so on. It also says that Mr. Rajic, the accused, had been detained at

25 the Gornji Vakuf HVO military police prison; is that right?

1 A. Yes, it does.

2 Q. So, would you agree from that document, sir, it appears that the

3 investigation was carried out by the military police --?

4 A. Yes, it does.

5 Q. -- is that right?

6 MR. MURPHY: I'm sorry, Your Honour. May I just briefly inquire

7 how much time I have left? Can I just ask the court officer how much time

8 I have?

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, please, and Mr.

10 Coric.

11 THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] I would just like to make a

12 brief intervention. It's probably matter of the interpretation. The

13 military police detained Mr. Rajic, in detention, not put him in prison.

14 So those are two separate things. I think that was just a translation

15 question.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have had 22 minutes.

17 MR. MURPHY: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. Just one or two very, very brief things. Going back,

19 Mr. Williams, to the interview that you conducted with the mercenary,

20 which we talked about before, what was the name of that gentleman that you

21 interviewed, if you recall?

22 A. It was Iswelyn Llwellyn Thomas.

23 Q. Llwellyn Thomas?

24 A. Iswelyn Llwellyn Thomas.

25 Q. All right. Only if you're from Wales can you pronounce that

1 properly, I know.

2 Was there also another mercenary you were acquainted with, a

3 Mr. Rutter?

4 A. I personally knew Carl Rutter, Charles Rutter. He served in the

5 same company as me some years before. He's an ex-soldier from our

6 regiment. He fought in Bosnia, he fought in Mostar during the battle of

7 Mostar, and he actually -- on one occasion, there was a problem at a Croat

8 check-point and he appeared out of the bushes -- with one of our patrols,

9 and he appeared out of the bushes and said, "Hi'ya lads. What's the

10 problem?" And then he sorted it all out.

11 Q. I don't want to cut you off. It's just because of the time. I

12 just wanted to know if you were acquainted with Mr. Rutter. You know who

13 I mean by that.

14 A. Yes, I do. Yes.

15 Q. All right. And, finally, I just have to ask you: You recall

16 yesterday testifying about having come across some soldiers who appeared

17 to be members of the Croatian army.

18 A. In Split, yes.

19 Q. In Split -- from Split who said that they were going to a wedding.

20 A. Yes, that's correct. They'd been to a wedding.

21 Q. Or been to a wedding. And you commented that that must be the

22 wedding between Herceg-Bosna and Croatia. I think we all enjoyed that

23 line. Was that something that you came up with yourself, or did somebody

24 else come up with that one?

25 A. I misquoted there. I asked them what they were doing there, why

1 they were there, and they said for a wedding. Whether they'd been to a

2 wedding or were going to a wedding, I don't know.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. Yeah. I assumed that they were referring to Herceg-Bosna and

5 Croatia. They were heavily armed. They had all their weaponry with them,

6 all their equipment.

7 Q. During all the briefings that you received, did you ever receive

8 any briefings on the political structure of Herceg-Bosna at all?

9 A. Yes, but I can't remember it at all hardly. I know Mate Boban was

10 the head of it.

11 Q. Right.

12 MR. MURPHY: That's all I have, Your Honour. Thank you.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Next Defence counsel, please.

14 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence of

15 Mr. Praljak will have a total of an hour and 15 minutes time. You gave us

16 30 minutes. We received 30 minutes from my colleague Mr. Ibrisimovic and

17 about 15 minutes from Ms. Alaburic. I'm going to use up some of that

18 time, and then my client will be asking questions of a purely technical

19 and military nature.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, please.

21 Mr. Karnavas, how much time did Mr. Ibrisimovic give you?

22 MR. KARNAVAS: I didn't --

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Because Mr. Pusic is giving his

24 time to all and everyone. So if everybody is having his time, well, then,

25 we might still be here for weeks.

1 MR. KARNAVAS: I think we're moving along quite well, Your Honour.

2 Now, to answer your question specifically, I just borrowed it without

3 asking, and so -- but I would certainly -- I think that we can make some

4 allowances on this occasion.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. I'm sure Mr. Kovacic

6 will show us how flexible he is. You need an hour and quarter; is that

7 right?

8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] We need at least three or four

9 hours, but an hour and a quarter is what we were given and we will

10 endeavour to complete our cross-examination within that time. I'm

11 speaking on behalf of my client as well. Although, of course, we would

12 need more time because the witness knows a great deal. He was there for

13 six months. He could contribute a lot. But let's leave that for another

14 occasion.

15 Cross-examination by Mr. Kovacic:

16 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon. My name is Bozidar Kovacic. I'm

17 Defence counsel for Slobodan Praljak.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you're going to be using up

19 an hour and a quarter of an hour; 30 minutes which are your 30 minutes, 30

20 minutes which were given to you by Mr. Pusic, and 15 minutes which were

21 given to you by Ms. Alaburic. So that's an hour and 15 minutes all in

22 all.

23 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour. Yes. And we

24 will certainly respect that time limit.

25 Q. I'm going to ask you questions in Croatian. Since you'll be

1 answering in English, we have the interpreters and I'd like to ask you to

2 pause between question and answer to help them along.

3 Mr. Williams, you gave two statements to the Prosecution, one in

4 2005, in September, and another one in May, 1995, and you -- or, rather,

5 2005, and you also testified in the Kordic trial. Is it true that, in

6 neither of those statements, neither to the investigators nor your

7 testimony, did you mention General Praljak?

8 A. That's perfectly correct, yes.

9 Q. And if I may say, you never met him personally on any occasion.

10 Would that be right?

11 A. That's also correct, yes.

12 Q. Thank you. Mr. Williams, you have described to us, and you did so

13 in a number of places, an event. You mentioned one when the Croatians put

14 out the flag in the school in Gornji Vakuf and an incident broke out. You

15 know the flag incident that I'm referring to.

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. I'd like to ask you in that regard the following: Do you remember

18 other similar incidents in other towns in the territory where BritBat was

19 active? I mean similar in the sense of flags being hoisted by one side,

20 the other side taking them down, and then an incident breaking out.

21 A. Not that I can recall, no.

22 Q. If I might try and jog your memory. There was a very similar

23 incident in Travnik, for instance, which your unit covered, the area?

24 A. Yes, our unit did cover that area, but it wasn't within my little

25 bit of the area. Travnik was covered from Vitez, and so it wasn't -- I

1 was not concentrated on Travnik. I was concentrated on Gornji Vakuf.

2 Q. Very well. But bearing in mind the incident that you say you

3 remember, do you agree with me when I say that an incident like that

4 demonstrates the general mood and atmosphere that was prevalent in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, an atmosphere of tension, the wish for ethnic groups

6 to emancipate, and so on? Do you agree with that?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. And flags quite obviously - and you noted that very well - played

9 an important role as the symbol of each of these nations or ethnic

10 groups. Do you agree with me there?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. You do. Right. I'm sure you know Major Watters, Brian Watters.

13 Do you know him from your mission in Bosnia?

14 A. Yes. Major Watters was part of my regiment and I'd known him

15 since he was a senior lieutenant. He joint our regiment out in Bosnia

16 towards the end of the tour in the capacity, as I recall, of Battalion 2

17 IC, battalion second in command.

18 Q. That's right. He was also the deputy for Colonel Bob Stewart.

19 But he reached the rank of colonel himself, ultimately; is that correct?

20 A. I believe so. I left the army in 1998, and what their actual

21 ranks are now I'm not sure of.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] May we have on e-court document 3D

24 00461.

25 Q. To save time, Mr. Williams, I'm going to read out two excerpts

1 from the document that we will be seeing shortly on our screens. It is

2 Colonel Brian Watters' letter that he wrote to his father from

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. His father was also a soldier, and he was trying to

4 inform him and describe the situation to him. The exhibit was introduced

5 in the Kordic/Cerkez case. It was D57/1. That was the exhibit number.

6 I'm going to have it tendered here as well. I'll read it in the original,

7 in English. I apologise for my pronunciation. But I'm going to read two

8 excerpts. The first is at the very beginning. Have you got the document

9 on your screen? Yes, we have, actually. One is the third paragraph

10 marked by the side. He says the following:

11 "It is all too easy [In English] to apportion blame to a specific

12 faction prosecuting its particular military or political advantage. It is

13 convenient to identify the culprit and level the blame in his direction.

14 It is comfortable but too simplistic. There are no 'good guys and bad

15 guys' in this bitter civil war, there are only victims."

16 [Interpretation] And then later on in the letter, on page 3, the

17 first paragraph, the whole first paragraph, or rather, there's a big

18 paragraph to begin that says -- paragraph 2, beginning "Tonight, I

19 deployed ..." The second sentence:

20 [In English] There is a dispute between the Croats and Muslims

21 over the positioning of their respective flags. Two Muslims were shot

22 dead last night and one Croat earlier this evening. Those are, of course,

23 allies, but then again this is Bosnia."

24 [Interpretation] You were there for six months. You saw

25 everything going on there; you experienced the general atmosphere and

1 mood. Would you agree with these assessments made by Colonel Brian

2 Watters?

3 A. Yes, I would. Yes, I would.

4 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to move on to another area. Yesterday,

5 and in your previous statement to the investigators, especially the 1995

6 one, you said, in a way - and it was on page 3315 of the transcript and

7 page 37 of your testimony yesterday - you said that you believed that two

8 incidents caused greater tension among the two parties, the two sides,

9 which later resulted, in a way, in a direct conflict in Gornji Vakuf

10 between the HVO and the army, BH army. And these two incidents, you say,

11 were as follows: The first incident was the one in which the HVO soldier

12 decapitated a retarded Muslim invalid. We just mentioned that a while ago

13 today. And then the other one you mentioned was when HOS took over the

14 school and threw out the Muslims.

15 I have to say here that yesterday, in your testimony before the

16 Court, you said that the HVO took over the school, whereas in your

17 previous statement, paragraph 19 of the 2005 statement, you said that HOS

18 took over the school. Let's clear that point up. What is it, HOS or the

19 HVO?

20 A. The school did have HOS in it, and eventually it became used by

21 the HVO. As to which one took it off the Muslim -- stopped the Muslims

22 using it as well, I cannot answer definitely.

23 Q. Yes, but we agree that HOS took over the school first and then

24 later on, the HVO. One of the two expelled the Muslims from the school.

25 But at any rate, you did mention that particular incident, when HOS took

1 over the school, and the incident where the man's head was cut off, as

2 events which, without a doubt, caused increased tension. Is that correct?

3 Did I understand you correctly?

4 A. Yes. They were two of the incidents that helped to cause the

5 problem.

6 Q. Thank you. Now, two days into your testimony, and in the proofing

7 session with the Prosecutor on Sunday, when you go back to think about

8 those days, would you say that that was the right description of events,

9 that that was how things were?

10 A. There were other incidents as well; some that we were aware of;

11 others that we weren't aware of. But it was just a general increasing of

12 tension and distrust.

13 Q. Very well. Now, let's take a look at what others think about

14 that, some of your colleagues, too. You said that Company B Major

15 Alastair Rule was one of your superiors and he was your commander; right?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. He testified before this Tribunal in the Kordic/Cerkez trial, and

18 you testified there as well as a witness. Alastair Rule said on that

19 occasion that the conflict in Gornji Vakuf came about when a bomb that had

20 been planted exploded in the headquarters of the BH army, in a hotel in

21 Gornji Vakuf. That is in the Kordic judgement. For the record, that's

22 where it's to be found. Paragraph 561. For the benefit of the record and

23 the Trial Chamber, I'd like to read the sentence. Major Rule gave

24 evidence about the conflict, which was the start of the fighting in

25 Central Bosnia. He said:

1 "[In English] The fighting broke out in Gornji Vakuf on 11 January

2 sparked by a bomb which had been placed in a Muslim-owned hotel used as a

3 headquarters."

4 [Interpretation] Do you agree with your commander's opinion?

5 A. Yes, I do. That was one of the pivotal events that actually

6 started the actual conflict itself. The other incidents I referred to

7 were helping to increase the tension.

8 Q. Okay. The Cheshire Regiment commander while you were in Bosnia

9 was Colonel Robert Stewart; is that correct?

10 A. Bob Stewart.

11 Q. Bob Stewart, he was referred to.

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. You hold him in high esteem. I think he was a popular man, was he

14 not, Bob Stewart? You were shaking your head, but for the record, could

15 you give us an audible answer, please.

16 A. He was a very, very popular commander with the soldiers.

17 Q. Thank you. Colonel Bob Stewart, in his book -- after serving in

18 Bosnia, he published a book, which was very popular, I might add. It's

19 called "Broken Lives," the title of the book. And on page 205 of that

20 book --.

21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] And I'd like to ask the registrar to

22 place it on e-court. It is 3D 00462. They are two pages. The first page

23 just shows the title page and the second page is where the sentence is to

24 be located.

25 Q. On page 205, Bob Stewart says that the conflict arose in Gornji

1 Vakuf spontaneously, broke out spontaneously. Let me read the sentence.

2 It's been underlined. May we pan down a bit. Thank you.

3 "[In English] This flare-up just happened spontaneously, and we

4 never discovered its cause," [Interpretation] says Bob Stewart.

5 Did you hear Bob Stewart make that assessment earlier?

6 A. No, I didn't.

7 Q. [In English] Okay. [Interpretation] Bob Stewart, when, later on,

8 he testified in the Kordic-Cerkez trial, during the cross-examination, on

9 page 12364 of the transcript, said as follows -- he says the following --

10 I won't read the question. The answer is this:

11 "[In English] Well, I'll just actually qualify that given a second

12 to think about it. Maybe it was the Vance-Owen Plan that was the catalyst

13 for this fighting. I think I have actually said that somewhere.

14 Actually, in rethinking it through, the answer to your question was, No, I

15 don't know. But maybe it was this silly plan."

16 [Interpretation] So from the quotation in the book and what he

17 said before this Tribunal, we heard what he thinks about the causes of the

18 conflict, what Bob Stewart thinks about the causes of the conflict. Did

19 you hear of this position of his ever?

20 A. About the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, yes.

21 Q. Very well. Let's move on. The judgement in Kordic, paragraph

22 559, also quotes General Simpson, the high-ranking officer of the British

23 Army, who, in the judgement and according to the judgement, said the

24 following:

25 "After the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was made public, the situation

1 culminated, especially in Gornji Vakuf and in the Lasva River Valley. An

2 all-out conflict broke out between the HVO and the ABiH."

3 Do you agree with that assessment? Mr. Cordy-Simpson or General

4 Cordy-Simpson also says that the conflict broke out as a result of the

5 Vance-Owen Plan. Would you agree with that? Say you do or you don't or

6 you don't know.

7 A. Yes, I do agree with the general's assessment that the Vance-Owen

8 Peace Plan was the culminating point. There were put -- it was just part

9 of other incidents that were just creating more and more mistrust between

10 the two sides.

11 Q. Thank you. I'd like to quote another opinion, and it is, once

12 again, in the Kordic judgement, paragraph 564, which quotes a witness and

13 he is Brigadier -- HVO Brigadier Luka Sekerija is his name, and the

14 judgement quotes that the conflict broke out with an all-out attack by the

15 BH army against HVO positions on the 11th of January, 1993. And after

16 that, Luka Sekerija states - and this is interpreted in that paragraph 564

17 - that after the war, officers of the BH army told him that they had

18 received an order to expel the Croats from Gornji Vakuf, first of all, in

19 October, 1992, and he says that on page 18154 of the transcript, and then

20 again in January, 1993, because they considered that area to be the front

21 door entrance into Central Bosnia. That's what is said in the judgement,

22 and Sekerija said that on page 18222 of the transcript.

23 So, according to that witness quoted in the judgement, it is the

24 strategical value or position of Gornji Vakuf that is referred to. Do you

25 agree? And I think, judging by what you said a moment ago, that you would

1 agree, that it was of strategic importance for both armies, that Gornji

2 Vakuf was the key strategic point and therefore the key reason for the

3 conflict. Would that be right?

4 A. Yes. It was the fact that it straddled the routes.

5 Q. Thank you. Next we have another interesting document, and it is a

6 report by the ECMM, the European Monitoring Mission, of the 19th of

7 January.

8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] May we have it on our screens,

9 please. The document is P 01215. And I have to say the judgement in the

10 Kordic trial, in the same paragraph, 564 --

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute.

12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Is that under seal?

13 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] No, no, none of this is under seal.

14 Thank you. Thank you for your concern.

15 I do apologise. I'm not sure about P 1215, but it's quoted. It's

16 quoted in the Kordic judgement but only by date. So just to be on the

17 safe side, I'll ask for us to go into private session, because most of

18 these documents were, indeed, under seal. Perhaps this one is not, but

19 unfortunately I failed to check.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, please, can we move

21 into private session.

22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could we look at the last page of

23 this document, please.

24 [Private session]

25 (redacted)

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10

11 Pages 8600-8601 redacted. Private session.

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1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 [Open session]

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session, Your

9 Honour.

10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your

11 Honours.

12 Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

13 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. My name is Slobodan

14 Praljak. I am an accused. I will put some brief questions to you, and I

15 see that your responses are brief, so we will get through them the

16 material, I hope.

17 Do you know how many soldiers of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

18 defended Jajce together with the HVO?

19 A. As far as I'm aware, it was a brigade of each. It happened -- it

20 fell before we actually deployed, so it was something that had already

21 happened before we got there.

22 Q. Well, we shall see that the Jajce brigade of the army of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina arrived in the Gornji Vakuf area. Is this correct?

24 A. Yes, it was.

25 Q. You said twice that that brigade, or rather, the men in that

1 brigade numbered 50. Can you testify that a brigade, defending Jajce,

2 stationed in Gornji Vakuf, numbered only 50 men? And in what army can 50

3 men be called a brigade?

4 A. I was the part of the escort when the Jajce Brigade that were in

5 the Gornji Vakuf area were placed on coaches and taken out of the area,

6 and they numbered approximately 50 men, some families. And the whole lot

7 went into two coaches and a truck. There were no other Jajce Brigade

8 soldiers that we were asked to escort out of the area. And they came from

9 the villages of Voljevac, that area.

10 Q. So you are testifying that, after the conflict in Gornji Vakuf,

11 the Jajce Brigade, by agreement, had to leave that area, and you saw that

12 50 men left.

13 A. Yes, that's correct. That was the only group of Jajce Brigade

14 soldiers that we in B Company escorted out of the area.

15 Q. Thank you. But from that one cannot conclude that what you saw

16 were all the soldiers of the Jajce Brigade who had been stationed in

17 Gornji Vakuf; is that correct?

18 A. That is correct. But during the cease-fire negotiations, we were

19 asked to escort them out, and that was the only group that we escorted

20 out. If there were others, we had no knowledge of them. And nobody asked

21 us to escort them out.

22 Q. Thank you very much. I'm satisfied with that reply. What code

23 designation did the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina carry, the one that arrived

24 in Gornji Vakuf, after Jajce? What was their code designation?

25 A. I cannot recall. It would either -- I think, have been either the

1 304th or the 317th, I think.

2 Q. The reason I'm asking you, sir, is that your recollection around

3 the Tomislav Brigade, the Livno Brigade, the soldiers from Croatia, the

4 hospital, and so on and so forth, are very precise and very clear. As an

5 intelligence officer on the ground, you cannot tell me what code

6 destination the brigade from Bosnia-Herzegovina carried which arrived in

7 Gornji Vakuf? The answer is 305.

8 What was the code destination of the ABiH brigade from Gornji

9 Vakuf, the local brigade?

10 A. Again, I would refer back to the question earlier. I can't quite

11 remember. But I think it may have been either the 304th or the 317th.

12 But it definitely began with a 3.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we see 3D 00456,

15 please. While we will are waiting for the document to show up -- you can

16 zoom in. Yes.

17 Q. Please take a look at the document. You see here Gornji Vakuf,

18 Bugojno, Novi Travnik, Travnik, and Jajce. My question is the following:

19 When did the Serbs take Donji Vakuf; do you know?

20 A. As far as I can recall, it was taken sometime around the fall of

21 Jajce, but I'm not particularly certain on that. I know the front line in

22 that area was fairly static because I went up to it quite a few times.

23 But when it actually was taken I cannot say for definite.

24 Q. Witness, I must interrupt you. Please excuse me. My questions

25 are very simple, so in order to save time, and for that reason alone

1 because I do not wish to be impertinent, please sell me precisely: Do you

2 know when the Serbs took Donji Vakuf?

3 A. No, I don't.

4 Q. Thank you. As this happened in April, 1992, was all communication

5 between Bugojno and Jajce, Bugojno-Donji Vakuf-Jajce cut off? And I mean

6 all communication.

7 A. That I couldn't answer. Do you mean -- by "communication," do you

8 mean roads or do you mean telephones or radios or ...

9 Q. Roads, I'm referring to roads. So neither BritBat nor convoys nor

10 anyone could pass through. All road traffic towards Zenica, Tuzla,

11 Travnik went along two routes: Gornji Vakuf-Novi Travnik and the second

12 one was Gornji Vakuf-Bugojno-Novi Travnik. Is that correct?

13 A. It was at that time, yes. But by the time we got there, there was

14 just the route through Gornji Vakuf to Novi Travnik.

15 Q. So we can conclude that the fall of Jajce, you will agree with me,

16 as regards road communications, had no relevance as regards communications

17 or roads between Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Tuzla, Zenica, Visoko, and so on;

18 is that correct? Because it was cut off to the left of Travnik, in the

19 direction of Jajce.

20 A. When Jajce fell and the front line moved forward, it meant that

21 the Serb artillery could move forward, and our commander's, Colonel

22 Stewart's primary worry was that the Serb artillery, which was up on the

23 hill overlooking Travnik and Turbe --

24 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Yes. That is something we could talk

25 about, but it wasn't my question. How many refugees arrived from Donji

1 Vakuf to Gornji Vakuf, after the fall of Donji Vakuf?

2 A. That, I couldn't tell you now.

3 Q. Do you know how many soldiers of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

4 from Donji Vakuf were stationed in Gornji Vakuf after the Serbs took Donji

5 Vakuf?

6 A. This particular -- now I can't, no. I would have been able to

7 years ago.

8 Q. If, in Gornji Vakuf, according to the census of 1991, there were

9 8.600 Croats and 10.480 Muslims, if we add to that the refugees from Jajce

10 and the refugees from Donji Vakuf, how do you explain your claim that in

11 the conflict in January, 1993, the HVO was superior in numbers?

12 A. When the HVO brought up the reinforced brigades, they outnumbered,

13 and they also had the heavy weaponry which the armija did not have. They

14 had more -- they had tanks, artillery, heavy mortars. The armija had very

15 few things like -- battle-winning assets like that.

16 Q. Let's leave weapons to one side now. Sir, Witness, we're not

17 talking about artillery and mortars but manpower, and you have answered.

18 My next question: How long was the front line on the Livno

19 theatre towards the Serbs and --

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak has just addressed

21 an issue relating to refugees. I see he has quoted, line 18, page 85. So

22 this was a census of 1991. In Gornji Vakuf there were 8.600 Croats and

23 10.480 Muslims. According to you, do these figures represent the town or

24 the entire municipality? Because in the indictment, in 1971 [as

25 interpreted], the town had 10.000 inhabitants, 5.000 of which were located

1 in Gornji Vakuf. So what about the town of Gornji Vakuf? According to

2 you, how many inhabitants were there in Gornji Vakuf itself? I'm not

3 talking about the entire municipality here.

4 THE WITNESS: I cannot remember, Your Honour, so I cannot give a

5 definite answer on that, other than the population had expanded with the

6 influx of refugees, the vast majority of which were Muslims.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but you were there. You

8 were in Gornji Vakuf. According to you, this town had a thousand, 5.000,

9 10.000, 20.000 inhabitants? Do you have an idea? I'm just talking about

10 the town itself.

11 THE WITNESS: I no longer have an idea of the number, Your

12 Honour. It was only a small town.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

14 Mr. Praljak, proceed.

15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Sir, you're a soldier. Do you know how long the

17 Livno-Tomislavgrad-Prozor front line was held by the brigades from Livno

18 and Tomislavgrad against the Serbs?

19 A. No. These days I can't. I can show roughly where it is, where it

20 was on a map.

21 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Can you imagine a military situation where

22 Colonel Siljeg would withdraw the brigades assigned to guarding or keeping

23 a certain territory and send them to Vakuf? If he had brigades to spare,

24 would it have been logical to send them to Gornji Vakuf? Or would the

25 truth be that only small parts of those brigades were brought there?

1 A. As I replied yesterday, there were two brigades, reinforced

2 brigades, involved in the attack, and the reinforcements were sub-units

3 that had come from other brigades.

4 Q. You will agree that we saw this in General Petkovic's order, where

5 he sent 3 times 100 and 1 times 70 men. If 370 men arrived to replace

6 people, can we agree that it was so, or was it something else?

7 A. No. That is a troop rotation. They were there to relieve other

8 soldiers.

9 Q. Yes, but 370. Sir, on the map before you, can you mark the line

10 held against the Serbs? Where did it go? From Gornji Vakuf, where was

11 the line against the Serbs?

12 A. As I recall, it's something like that. Maybe that bit is a bit

13 further that way.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could you please show the

15 witness the map. Could you flip it down.

16 Your Honours, this map is 1:50.000. I have an identical map but

17 it's 1:25.000. So, if Your Honours wish to look, you may look at this

18 map, for your information. The only difference is that the defence lines

19 against the Serbs are not marked.

20 MR. BOS: Witness -- Your Honours, before we are going to deal

21 with this map, could Mr. Praljak tell us who made the markings on this

22 specific map so that we have that on the record, and the source.

23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The legend is already on the

24 map, and it was General Petkovic and I who made the markings, based on

25 documents, unfortunately in prison conditions, so it's not a professional

1 job. But red marks the HVO positions, green marks the ABiH positions, and

2 black marks the positions against the army of Republika Srpska.

3 MR. BOS: Your Honours, sorry, I would like to interrupt again.

4 If General Praljak says that this was based on documents, could he be a

5 bit more specific? Which documents were actually used in order to prepare

6 these markings on the map? We really need to know which specific

7 documents General Praljak is referring to. And also the time period is

8 important.

9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The time period is just

10 before the beginning of the conflict in Gornji Vakuf, and the documents

11 are the Prosecution documents we have all seen here: Colonel Siljeg's

12 reports, Mr. Cikotic's reports, and a gentleman I will quote soon, and --

13 MR. BOS: Sorry, I think we need to be more specific. If it's

14 just a report from Siljeg, could you please provide us with the exhibit

15 numbers?

16 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour. [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't

17 think the accused is bound to say precisely on the basis of what

18 documents. The witness can confirm or not.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, you have a map, which

20 is 1:25.000, in which General Praljak has positioned the HVO units in

21 green and the ABiH units -- the HVO is in red and the ABiH is in green.

22 In Gornji Vakuf, for instance, you can see that there were, all at once,

23 the ABiH and the HVO.

24 Now, in looking at this map, do you think this could match what

25 you, yourself, noticed?

1 THE WITNESS: It is roughly how I recall it, yes, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you don't

3 challenge the markings on this map.

4 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For instance, let's take

6 Bistrica, which is above Gornji Vakuf. You can see that there are HVO

7 positions there and a few ABiH positions. Would that be in line with the

8 perception you had of the situation?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. I gave an answer earlier, I

10 think, where I said that the town was split in half, or the village was

11 split in half, and you can see that on the map there.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Please proceed,

13 Mr. Praljak.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

15 Q. You said that the relay, which was overlooking the town, which was

16 a dominant elevation, I'm saying that it's to the right and then the next

17 elevation is to the right and then the next elevation towards Karamustapic

18 were all taken by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina before the outbreak of

19 the conflict. Please correct me. I will give you a pencil and you can

20 correct anything you disagree with. Alipasin Brijeg, elevation 748;

21 Zvista [phoen], elevation 733; elevation 762; elevation Grebline; 786,

22 Crni Vrh, so all of these elevations surrounding the town, before the

23 outbreak of the conflict, were under the control of the army of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, who had well-fortified dugouts. Did you know about

25 this or not?

1 A. Initially, at the very beginning, yes, as part of the defence of

2 the town, the armija occupied all the high ground to the south of it and

3 the features to the south-west and south-east that you mentioned.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, we, on the Bench, are

5 not military experts, but in looking at this map, we can see that the ABiH

6 is holding all the hilltops, whether they be to the left or to the right

7 of the map, all the high ground above the town. When you were there, had

8 you noticed that the ABiH was dominating the hilltops?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. As it became apparent that there

10 was going to be a battle, we watched the armija dig in positions, dig in

11 fire trenches, bunkers, and occupy the strategic ground around the

12 southern and south-west -- south-eastern part of the town.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And can you confirm that between

14 Gornji Vakuf and Podgrad, which is the top left on this map, you have the

15 armija and the HVO facing each other.

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

17 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Witness, can you tell me whether you ever toured the lines toward

19 the Serbs? And did you ever establish how many forces of the allies, the

20 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO, were holding what amount of

21 kilometres of the line? Did you ever look at this information, or did you

22 consider it unimportant?

23 A. On our initial deployment, we were more interested in where the

24 Serb front line was and how far away from our positions it was. Yes, I

25 did visit the Serb -- or the front line overlooking Serb positions from

1 armija and HVO positions. Once the situation within Gornji Vakuf itself

2 deteriorated, the Serb front line, as far as we were concerned, was an

3 irrelevance.

4 Q. Under these conditions, did the HVO abandon the battle lines

5 toward the Serbs? Did the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina do so?

6 A. In what? Do you mean to leave the front line to reinforce the

7 troops at Gornji Vakuf?

8 Q. Yes, that's what I mean.

9 A. As far as I remember, as I recall, the troops for the attack on

10 Gornji Vakuf were troops that were already not on front-line duties. None

11 of the -- as you -- as you well -- as you know, within the brigade, not

12 all of it is on the front line. It rotates and takes a turn. And it was

13 the ones who went on the front line who were part of this.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to have to take the

15 break now, but I would like to ask you to specify something. We spoke

16 about the village of Hrasnica in paragraph 67 of the indictment. Now,

17 looking at the map, I see that there are two places with that name; one

18 which was surrounded by BH forces and another one which is surrounded by

19 the HVO. Now, they say that there was an HVO attack on this place. What

20 was it?

21 THE WITNESS: The village to which it refers, Your Honour, is the

22 village of Zdrimci, at grid square 7064.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So it is at elevation 7064, is

24 that right, that feature?

25 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour. It's grid square 7064. If you

1 follow the numbers along the bottom of the map to get the 7-0, and then up

2 the side to get the 6-4, and where they intersect is where the village is.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. We're going to have to

4 take a break now. It's quarter to 6.00. We'll reconvene at five minutes

5 past 6.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 6.06 p.m.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

9 I have to say two things. The registrar has just told me that

10 Mr. Praljak and Mr. Kovacic have already used up 50 minutes, which means

11 that, in theory, you have 23 minutes left. But what we would like,

12 Mr. Praljak, is, based on your map, that you should indicate to us what

13 you wish to show. Do you wish to show that it wasn't the HVO that

14 attacked Gornji Vakuf but that it was the ABiH that attacked? What was it

15 you wish to demonstrate? Because otherwise we're going to spend a lot of

16 time looking at the positions of both sides. But what is the point you're

17 trying to make?

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I wish to show

19 precisely that it was the BH army which, throughout December, 1992, by

20 digging trenches and strong fortifications - and we'll show this through a

21 witness who will be testifying, Mr. Beese, or rather, who has testified -

22 placed the position of Gornji Vakuf and the HVO forces that were not

23 digging any trenches at all in a completely subordinate tactical and

24 strategic position, thereby, in December, 1992, starting a slow precise

25 military attack and preparations for a military attack, or rather, a

1 strong offensive in Gornji Vakuf. And through my questions and exhibits,

2 that is what I wish to demonstrate.

3 The HVO was just responding. And if you look at the map over

4 there, there was just one road which was -- which you could go through to

5 Bugojno, left of Pidris, a road that was completely -- that couldn't be

6 used in winter at all. And the witness can tell us and see whether that

7 was the only road that the HVO could use to link up with its forces in

8 Bugojno and Central Bosnia. You can take a look at the map.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Fine. So,

10 Mr. Praljak, you wish to show that, contrary to what the Prosecution

11 claims in the indictment, it wasn't the HVO which did the attacking but it

12 was the ABiH which, through its fortifications, placed the HVO in an

13 inferior position; and that, in reality, the conflict started from the BH

14 army and not the HVO. Is that right?

15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So my question -- now, this is a

17 great endeavour. You have 20 minutes to demonstrate it, but you'll have

18 an opportunity to go back to the question with other witnesses, perhaps.

19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Q. Witness, now, in talking to Zrinko Tokic, before the beginning of

21 the conflict in December, 1992 -- and Tokic was a congenial man. Now, at

22 meetings did you ever talk, and did he complain to you, of the strong

23 activities engaged in by the BH army and the trench-digging on all

24 dominant features around town? Were those meetings held? Did Zrinko

25 Tokic, indeed, complain to you about this?

1 A. Yes. Zrinko Tokic did complain with the armija digging trenches

2 around the villages and on the high ground, and when we were trying to

3 diffuse situations, part of the local cease-fire agreements were that the

4 positions should be filled in. But once you've dug a trench, it's very

5 easy to very quickly dig it out again, if you fill it in. So they -- once

6 they'd been dug, even though they were filled in, they could be very

7 quickly dug back out again.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] May we now go into private

10 session because of the documents I'm going to mention. I think they

11 were --

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Registrar.

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23 [Open session]

24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Witness --

1 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session, Your

2 Honour.

3 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

4 Q. As you were involved in intelligence work in your regiment, you

5 have before you an overview of HVO brigades from June 1993. I'm asking

6 you whether you knew how many mean the HVO had in total. On page 2, you

7 have an overview of the number of men and their ethnic make-up in June,

8 but this is without the units from Central Bosnia, because we were unable

9 to get the required information.

10 First of all, tell me, do you see this document?

11 A. Yes, I can see it.

12 Q. Up to number 12, without the main headquarters, the command of the

13 Posavina Operational Zone and the following brigades, do you know where

14 Operative Zone Posavina was?

15 A. I'm not sure because I can't remember where Posavina was. Looking

16 at the numbers, I believe one of those brigades may be the Ante Starcevic

17 Brigade, but I can't be definite on that. We tended to refer to HVO

18 brigades by their name, because they had names.

19 Q. Thank you. OZ Posavina fell to the Serbs in the autumn of 1992,

20 and all these brigades, from 101 to 115, ceased to exist. When this is

21 subtracted from 36.000, how many men, according to you, were there to the

22 south of Donji Vakuf? Please pay special attention to the 4th Brigade

23 under ordinal number 17.

24 A. I'm sorry, can you specify? When you say "south of Donji Vakuf,"

25 how far south?

1 Q. Livno, Tomislavgrad, Posusje, Grude, Mostar, and so on. How many

2 men did the HVO have there, according to your information?

3 A. According to our information, it was OP zone north-west

4 Herzegovina, commanded by Colonel Siljeg. It had, to the best of our

5 knowledge, the Gornji Vakuf Brigade, Prozor Brigade, Tomislavgrad, Livno,

6 and possibly another couple of brigades, and we worked on the assumption

7 that a brigade was between 1.500 and 2.000 strong.

8 Q. Thank you very much for this information. You met a group of

9 young soldiers who were tidy, well kept, in Rama, and in response to a

10 question from you they said they will came from the 4th Brigade. That was

11 the Stjepan Radic Brigade in Ljubuski. So I'm asking you the following:

12 Is it possible that you failed to take a look at these men whom you say

13 were from Split to see their patches or their flashes? The 4th Brigade of

14 the Croatian brigade in Split, what kind of insignia did they all have to

15 wear on their sleeve as they were a Guards Brigade, a professional brigade

16 of the Croatian army, and what kind of caps did they wear?

17 A. I cannot recall all of that. However, it was the soldiers

18 themselves who said that they came from the 4th Brigade in Split. They

19 were definitely -- looked more military than the HVO, and they did have

20 patches on them that indicated that they came from the HV.

21 I don't know whether I'm allowed to expand further on this because

22 it refers back to the trial that the other defending attorney mentioned

23 earlier. In that one, there was -- there was no denial --

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just tell us, what is the patch

25 of the HV?

1 THE WITNESS: Other than they have -- they wear a flash with HV on

2 it, I cannot recall what the -- the exact patches that they had on. They

3 did -- they were wearing badges of rank, which was quite unusual. Most of

4 the HVO didn't wear badges of rank.

5 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

6 Q. If I were to tell you that the members of the 4th Guards Brigade

7 from Split wore red berets and that on their sleeves they had to wear a

8 sign saying 4th Guards Brigade with a big lion, did the men you saw have

9 such patches?

10 A. Again, I can't remember, and they didn't have headdress on, but

11 they did have a distinctive patch, but I cannot remember what it was.

12 I was thinking while you were asking. Earlier on I was thinking

13 it was perhaps a tiger that I'd seen, but a lion looks like a tiger.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, a tiger and a lion.

15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] A tiger looks like me and a

16 lion looks like Petkovic.

17 THE WITNESS: Like I said, I cannot remember exactly the patch

18 other than they did have -- they weren't wearing any headdress. They had

19 all their equipment with them, and they said that they were from Split.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Well, you're saying that because they were young and tidy,

22 clean-shaven, that they were -- they belonged to Croatia while we who are

23 not so good-looking belonged to Herzegovina.

24 But please look at the Bruno Busic Regiment. The number of men in

25 June 1993, 331. That's the unit you referred to as a brigade. Did you

1 ever see more than a hundred men assembled in one place belonging to that

2 unit? And if you did, when and where was this?

3 A. I believe the largest amount of men that I ever saw from that unit

4 in one place at one time was approximately 20, and that was in

5 Gornji Vakuf, and I believe it was just as the cease-fire started to take

6 effect.

7 Q. Thank you. We can agree on that. I would like to read to you

8 something from the book entitled "The Cunning Strategy" of Sefer

9 Halilovic, the Chief of Staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 Page 152. He says: "In spite of this, in January 1993 during the Geneva

11 negotiations our army reached the impressive number of 261.500 fighters."

12 Did you have information about this numerous and powerful army of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of these Geneva negotiations, 261.500?

14 261.500.

15 A. Again, the exact size of the Armija Bosna I can't comment on. We

16 just used to use a rule of thumb measurement that a brigade was usually

17 between 1.500 and 2.000 men and work it out from that. So the brigades

18 that we knew of, because we didn't even know probably all of the brigades,

19 and we would have just put a ballpark figure on it of 1.500 to 2.000 per

20 brigade.

21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have only

22 two very brief questions now. Could these two photographs be placed on

23 the ELMO, please, and then I will have two more points to cover with this

24 witness.

25 Q. Do you know this area?

1 A. I can't positively identify it, but I think it may be

2 Gornji Vakuf, but I'm not sure.

3 Q. Would you agree that this is the village of Bistrica and that this

4 is the quarry we mentioned? I don't wanted to say who the witness was.

5 A. Yes, I think this may well be the village of Bistrica. And I

6 think in the bottom corner, in the middle, on the right-hand side just

7 above the tree-line, that may be the factory that the HVO had a

8 headquarters and the factory next to it is where we were. If it is

9 Bistrica.

10 Q. Could you please put a date and your signature on this photograph,

11 please.

12 A. [Marks].

13 Q. The 17th.

14 A. [Marks].

15 Q. Could we look at the next photograph, please.

16 Do you remember this street in Gornji Vakuf?

17 A. I think this may be the main crossroads. And I think just off the

18 left of the picture is where the bridge is, I think.

19 Q. If you turn left you go towards Novi Travnik. Isn't that right?

20 You can see that on the signpost as well.

21 A. According to the signpost, yes, it's correct.

22 Q. Could you please tell me whether if you look at the roofs on this

23 photograph does the left-hand side belong to Croats, the right-hand side

24 to Muslims, or vice versa? In this photograph, can you tell by the way

25 the roofs are built that one side of the street belongs to Croats? Was

1 this the demarcation line at the time the conflict broke out?

2 A. The -- as I said earlier, I can't remember which way round the

3 roofs were, who -- whose roof type belonged to whom. All the road

4 junctions, the major road junctions within Gornji Vakuf were points that

5 both sides were trying to gain control of.

6 Q. And my last question: Do you agree with me that in order to

7 establish the truth as to who set fire to whose house one would have to

8 conduct a much more extensive investigation, a much more detailed

9 investigation, not one where somebody who comes in good faith but without

10 sufficient information and jumps to conclusions? Could jumping to

11 conclusions lead one up the wrong trail, up the wrong track? Would you

12 agree with me?

13 A. Yes, especially in a confusing situation like that, which was why

14 we had the teams go out as part of the cease-fire to actually catalogue

15 village by village what had happened.

16 Q. Could you please sign this photograph. Thank you very much for

17 your exhaustive replies.

18 A. [Marks].

19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I

20 believe I have kept to my time limits.

21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could these last two

22 photographs we saw be numbered IC 53 and the last one IC 54 so that

23 tomorrow I can tender them. Thank you.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, the first photograph

25 which shows a view of Bistrica, the village you see in the distance from

1 the hilltop, that will be given number IC 53. And the second photograph,

2 which is taken inside Gornji Vakuf just before the junction in the

3 direction of Novi Travnik will have the exhibit number IC 54.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, they will be.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We have 15 minutes

6 left. Ms. Alaburic, you have 15 minutes.

7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

8 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:

9 Q. Mr. Williams, my name is Vesna Alaburic. I am the Defence counsel

10 appearing for General Milivoj Petkovic.

11 In your testimony yesterday, you told us -- these are the

12 documents I intend to refer to.

13 Yesterday, you told us you did not have an opportunity to meet

14 General Milivoj Petkovic, but that once or twice you were in places where

15 he was. Did I understand you correctly?

16 A. Yes, that's correct.

17 Q. You did not specify where you saw him or the date, and from this

18 one might draw the conclusion that you don't actually recall the time and

19 place where you saw General Petkovic. Would I be correct in drawing that

20 conclusion?

21 A. Yes, you would. I know I saw -- I know I have seen him. The

22 exact dates I have seen him, I don't know.

23 Q. In January, 1993, had General Petkovic been in the Gornji Vakuf

24 area, I assume this would have been recorded in one of the reports of the

25 British Army. Would that be correct?

1 A. It would have been, yes.

2 Q. Do you know a single report from January, 1993, mentioning that a

3 meeting or any kind of event in the Gornji Vakuf area was attended by

4 General Milivoj Petkovic?

5 A. I can't remember that specifically, the problem being that the

6 military information summary that I wrote for Gornji Vakuf was then sent

7 to Vitez and you then -- the ones you've got here are the battalion ones,

8 where they will have taken out bits and thought -- and said, "That's not

9 relevant, that's not relevant" and only stuck in the bits that they said

10 were relevant. So I cannot comment on that.

11 Q. Yes. Thank you. I'm satisfied with that reply that you know of

12 no reports dated January, 1993, mentioning General Petkovic being there.

13 Yesterday, you referred to a document which will be tendered by

14 the Prosecutor as P 01087. Please take a look at this document, and in

15 the bundle handed to you by the Prosecutor, you will find this document.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher also show us this

17 document in e-court. It's P 01087.

18 Q. This is an order issued on the 9th of January, 1993, by General

19 Petkovic, ordering the raising of combat readiness to the highest possible

20 level. Do you know to whom this order was delivered? Can you conclude

21 from the document before you who were the recipients of this order?

22 A. According to the distribution just above the signature block, it

23 was "Southeastern Herzegovina, Northwestern Herzegovina, and Central

24 Bosnia."

25 Q. Could one conclude, on the basis of this, that this order refers

1 equally to Tomislavgrad, Mostar, Gornji Vakuf, or any other municipality

2 covered by these operative zones?

3 A. Yes. In a normal order of things in an army, Brigadier Petkovic

4 would tell his next subordinate commanders down, which are the operation

5 zone commanders for those operations, and they in turn would then pass it

6 down to the brigade commanders, down the chain of command.

7 Q. Very well. Can we conclude further, on the basis of this, that

8 this is a general order, not motivated by or directed at the events in

9 Gornji Vakuf at that time?

10 A. I don't believe it's possible to comment on that from this order.

11 It's an order that has been sent to all operational zones to raise their

12 combat readiness. It doesn't give a reason why or what for.

13 Q. So we may conclude that this order has no direct connection with

14 events in Gornji Vakuf at that time. Would that be correct?

15 A. You could conclude that or, on the other side of the coin, you

16 could conclude that it does, because to stay at the highest possible level

17 in all units, you would not be able to do that for an extended period of

18 time.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could we also conclude that this

20 is something to do with what is happening in Geneva? If you look at what

21 is above the order.

22 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, Your Honour, you could conclude that.

23 You could conclude that they were mobilising, ready to impose the

24 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, or you could conclude that they were mobilising,

25 ready to resist the Muslims rejecting it and try to overrun their areas.

1 You can put any interpretation on it you want, other than it is linked to

2 Geneva and you would not be able to stay at that level for a long of time.

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I would now like to show the

4 witness P 01059.

5 Q. Mr. Williams, that document is in the set of documents handed to

6 you just a moment ago, the ones I provided. Again, it's an order issued

7 by General -- well, by Milivoj Petkovic. He was not a general at that

8 time. And it is linked to the conference in Geneva. As you can see, the

9 date is the 6th of January.

10 "In order to comply with the obligations that stem from the Geneva

11 Conference, I hereby order compliance with the cease-fire and also

12 suspension of combat activities."

13 Would that being correct?

14 A. Yes, it does.

15 Q. Thank you very much. May we conclude, then, that the document we

16 spoke a few minutes ago is not the only document issued with a view to

17 making sure there was a peaceful situation at the time of the Geneva

18 Conference?

19 A. Yes, you could draw that conclusion from it. It's obviously a

20 document that is ordering the HVO to, in British parlance, bunker down, to

21 stop offensive operations.

22 Q. I have to react to the words "stop offensive operations," because

23 that implies that something has started and is now being stopped. Is the

24 term "stop" used here or is the term used "comply with," which would mean

25 that there was no offensive activity and the order was that this should

1 remain the case, that the HVO should continue to behave in the same way?

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Look at item 1. What does it

3 say?

4 THE WITNESS: On what line, Your Honour? It says, "respect the

5 cease-fire and suspension of combat activities."

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the order you had item 1 and

7 item 2. What do you see? Is it item 1, "respect" -- it starts with

8 "respect."

9 THE WITNESS: Yes. It is "respect the cease-fire and suspension

10 of combat activities." So with an armed force, that would mean that

11 they're to stop where they are.

12 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may observe, the

13 English word "respect" is not the most felicitous translation of the

14 Croatian word "comply with" or "adhere to," so by your leave, I will read

15 out the first sentence to see how it will be interpreted.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. If you could read

17 out item 1 and the interpreters will translate it into English and into

18 French.

19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I quote: "Comply with the

20 cease-fire and cessation of offensive military activities."

21 Q. My colleagues --

22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. The English translation

23 was "cessation," and that would mean stopping. Maybe the translation is

24 disputable, but "cessation" means that you stop something which was going

25 on.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Ms. Alaburic, could

2 you read the sentence out in your own language again, and the interpreters

3 will be very careful and translate this again.

4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] "Comply with cessation of fire and

5 carrying out of offensive combat activities." So the word "interruption"

6 or "cessation" applies both to fire and to the carrying out of offensive

7 combat activities.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I think this makes matters

9 worse. It doesn't make any difference.

10 Mr. Praljak.

11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The interpreters will

12 correct me if I do not explain this correctly, but in the Croatian

13 language, a situation has been established and the word "comply with"

14 refers to constantly or continuously maintaining the existing situation.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes. The only verb here is "comply

16 with." You can comply with -- only with something that exists. The

17 situation that already exists should continue. That's the essence of this

18 order.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In B/C/S, we have noted your

20 interpretation, but I realise that in English and in French the meaning is

21 not quite the same. So we could perhaps ask CLSS to translate this for us

22 again. We have acknowledged that in your language, and Mr. Praljak

23 spelled this out, that means maintaining a situation as it stands. One

24 has the feeling in English that an offensive is being suspended.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in view of the fact

1 that we have only one minute left before 7.00 p.m., I think this order

2 will become quite clear to us when we look at other orders tomorrow

3 ordering the cease-fire, and then we shall see the distinction between

4 these terms. Thank you for today.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So tomorrow you

6 would like to take the floor again. So the question is: How much time do

7 you have left? Registrar, perhaps Ms. Alaburic has taken up 10 minutes at

8 the most. Nine minutes. Fine. So you will have six minutes tomorrow.

9 This is a very detailed account. So, in six minutes, could you perhaps

10 introduce your documents or --

11 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise, but I

12 have been given one hour. We gave 15 minutes of ours to General Praljak.

13 I have used nine minutes. I have 36 left.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm sorry. Yesterday, I

15 told you that you had an hour minus 15 minutes, which you gave to someone

16 else, so you have 45 minutes minus the time you've had already. So

17 tomorrow you still have a certain amount of time. And Mr. Coric and his

18 lawyer will have 30 minutes.

19 Witness, I'm sorry, you will have to stay here tonight and come

20 back tomorrow at a quarter past 2.00. But rest assured your testimony

21 will be finished tomorrow afternoon, because we shall be calling another

22 witness tomorrow afternoon.

23 So the hearing will begin at a quarter past 2.00 tomorrow.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.,

25 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day

1 of October, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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