1 Thursday, 2 November 2006

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14 [Open session]

15 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session,

16 Mr. President.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] While I read, the registrar can

18 fetch the witness.

19 Regarding the admission of evidence through the witness Muamer

20 Tokic. The Chamber will pronounce itself regarding the admissibility of

21 the evidence during the appearance of the witness on the 30th of October.

22 The Chamber admits 2D 00205 submitted by the Defence on the grounds that

23 it has certain probative value and a certain relevance. The Chamber

24 recalls that document P 01413 and P 01636 submitted by the Prosecution

25 were already admitted into evidence on the 27th of October, 2006.

1 [The witness entered court]

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Oral decision with respect to

3 the admission of documents concerning the testimony of Zijada Kurbegovic,

4 and the Chamber will render its decision with respect to the documents

5 submitted through this witness on the 26th of October.

6 The documents were submitted by the Prosecution and the Defence,

7 and they will admit them because they have probative value and relevance.

8 P 01027, 3D 00464 and 476.

9 The Chamber wishes to recall that the document P 07350 was already

10 admitted on the 30th of October.

11 We shall now continue the proceedings with a view to completing

12 the cross-examination of the witness.

13 WITNESS: FAHRUDIN AGIC [Resumed]

14 [Witness answered through interpreter]

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. In the transcript the

16 legal officer tells me that there was an error in line 7, page 3, it says

17 476 -- 3D 00476.

18 Mr. Praljak will complete his cross-examination, and I give him

19 the floor with satisfaction.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak: [Continued]

22 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Brigadier Agic. Let us continue

23 our work.

24 Could we see Exhibit P 00840. I think we can cover these

25 documents quite quickly and then we will have some comments to make.

1 Mr. Agic, it is a record by Colonel Miro Andric which he addressed

2 to me. It says on the document "for General Praljak."

3 A. I am unable to find it.

4 Q. Never mind. This is just my introduction. It will appear later

5 on, and you will be able to look at what it contains and what the aims

6 were at that time in that territory. P 00840.

7 You have the document now?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Will you quickly look at it. He was given an order to take over

10 the coordination and command with a view to achieving a Joint Command. He

11 was not the commander of the Joint Command but for the purpose of a Joint

12 Command of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO, and I will

13 read for you a part of this document.

14 "The first level of coordination has been achieved without

15 ignoring the agreement achieved. "It is a bit difficult to achieve

16 agreement because the armed forces of Bugojno are getting instructions

17 from Zenica which do not coincide with the agreement on Joint Command.

18 Also, the curfew has been introduced and joint patrolled by the military

19 police, and there is goodwill to implement this." He is referring to

20 Bugojno. "The coordination is showing positive progress, but the HVO of

21 Bugojno will be able to raise the level of alert required for an attack.

22 Agreement has been reached on the method and easier passage of convoys and

23 other vehicles towards Bugojno, Zenica, and Tuzla. There are certain

24 problems in Prozor which you are already familiar with. As for your

25 command regarding separation of opposing forces of the HVO and the armed

1 forces at Makljen, I wish to inform you that regarding the order for the

2 withdrawal of units from Ravno on the 24th of November, together with

3 Fahrudin Agic, he personally withdrew the 2nd Battalion from the Crni Vrh

4 and the quarter 1013 -- 1303."

5 Mr. Agic goes on to inform him that he has withdrawn his units

6 from the mentioned region, et cetera. However, he says: "According to my

7 order for the closure of catering institutions at 1500 hours, the HVO is

8 respecting the order whereas the armed forces of Gornji Vakuf will not

9 respect the order because Mr. Agic says that his superior command is in

10 Zenica, and when he receives an order from them he will carry it out."

11 Do you know that in those days because of the bad influence of

12 catering establishments we managed to impose a curfew in Bugojno,

13 Novi Travnik, but we didn't manage to achieve that in Gornji Vakuf. Is

14 that true?

15 A. First of all, I don't think that there was any need to introduce

16 your curfew, and as the commander of the Municipal Staff of Gornji Vakuf

17 did not have the authority to close civilian facilities, catering

18 facilities. They bothered me, too, but that was a problem for the

19 authorities in Gornji Vakuf. It wasn't a problem only in Gornji Vakuf.

20 Gornji Vakuf was not proclaimed a war zone for the command to be able to

21 regulate life and work in the municipality. There were civilian

22 authorities and police authorities, and it is their duty and competence to

23 close catering institutions.

24 Furthermore, Mr. Andric that you mention, we did discuss this

25 problem and in his report I see that he -- he seems to write in a tone of

1 a superior officer. General, you know that was the problem. It wasn't up

2 to Fahrudin Agic. Mr. Mato Andric did not have the competencies to issue

3 orders to the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Territorial

4 Defence.

5 Q. Mr. Agic, I didn't say that he did. This is about a coordination

6 of efforts. It functioned in Bugojno. It was simply an attempt to

7 address the problems, and one of those problems, a very major problem, I

8 hope you will agree with me, was the fact that people who were not on the

9 front lines and who took their weapons home with them without any control

10 would go to inns and bars and provoke a lot of trouble, the greatest

11 amount of trouble. I hope you will agree with me in saying that that was

12 one of the main causes of so many incidents and killings on both sides.

13 Would you agree with this part of my question?

14 A. Yes, I agree. But Mr. Andric, in the part of the report that you

15 have just read, in the first paragraph he says, "My order to close."

16 Neither he nor I could order such a thing. The part of the town that was

17 controlled and managed by the HVO, they dealt with it in that way. I did

18 not have the competence as commander of the territorial staff, nor could

19 the brigade commander. We had a lot of difficulty with the authorities.

20 I didn't like it either, General.

21 Q. Would you agree with me --

22 A. Will you let me please explain this first. Before this there was

23 a killing of an invalid in Gornji Vakuf, Rajic Pero Vlatko. I know him as

24 we were born in the same village. He slaughtered a man. Miro Andric

25 promised to deal with it, and that man reappeared in Gornji Vakuf shortly

1 after that.

2 Q. I'm not interrupting you to prevent you from telling us about

3 this, but this is a problem that the Court has already been informed about

4 this. That is why I interrupted you so that we wouldn't waste any more

5 time.

6 But never mind. The fact remains that in the opinion of

7 Mr. Andric and following my instructions more should have been done with

8 the civilian authorities. I understand that you were awaiting Zenica to

9 react, but in the meantime the problems increased. Would you agree?

10 A. I would.

11 Q. Could we look at the next exhibit now. Number 14. 3D 00510.

12 A. I apologise. I have 511. I don't have 510. I found 3D 00511. I

13 don't have 3D 510.

14 Q. Let's go back, then, please, to 3D 00506. 3D 00506 until we find

15 this other document. It's been found.

16 Let's go back then to 3D 00 -- it is another report by Mr. Andric,

17 a part of a lengthier report that he submitted. Have you got this report?

18 A. On the screen I have an order dated the 12th of January.

19 Q. No, the report. 3D 00506. 3D 00506. It's a report. It

20 says: "I have established contact with HVO commanders and of the

21 commanders of the BiH forces." He lists the names. He says: "The HVO in

22 Bugojno have immediately taken steps and have achieved good fortified

23 lines. The armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina," that is the armija,

24 "is showing interest in cooperation and are working on the fortification

25 of positions. The relations with Senad Dautovic have been established.

1 He's ready to cooperate and the agreement is being respected."

2 A. Could you move the document up?

3 Q. At the end he reproaches you and says: "Commander Fahrudin Agic

4 is not showing any interest in cooperation, and whenever any agreement is

5 reached -- both Dautovic and you are in the 3rd Corps. So according to

6 Mr. Andric's report cooperation is excellent with a part of the

7 leadership, but he says regarding you that you're endeavouring to avoid

8 implementing the decisions. And in the report it goes on to say that the

9 superiors should bring pressure to bear on Mr. Agic for him to show a

10 willingness to cooperate and to abide by agreements achieved.

11 Tell us, what were the misunderstandings between you and

12 Mr. Andric?

13 A. You keep implying that I was obstructive.

14 Q. Not I. I'm just reading the report. Would you please try and

15 explain this report which I and the HVO received from Andric?

16 A. General, you held a meeting on the 4th of November in

17 Gornji Vakuf, and after that meeting these measures were supposed to be

18 implemented -- to have been implemented; is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you were going to implement what you decided at the joint

21 commission. Within that framework, some of the check-points which were

22 uni-ethnic should have been disbanded, the Sebesic road and check-point

23 and the Makljen check-point was never disband, and you know that full

24 well, better than me?

25 Q. Not from Banac [as interpreted] but I thought Sebesic -- no, Cabanac

1 held that position. I don't know what commanded with him there, but he

2 did that separately. We followed orders and complied with what had been

3 agreed upon and signed, but I as the commander of the Municipal Staff

4 Bugojno Vakuf never received an order to be subordinated in completing my

5 assignments to the unit that was commanded by the HVO. And what it says

6 here is not right. You know that at that time we had another meeting up

7 there. We enhanced the line. You know that we connected it up, linked it

8 up, and I don't know where this observation comes from.

9 Q. Nor do I. I'm just reading it. Let's move on.

10 May I now have P 00112. P 001112 is the next document I'd like to

11 show the witness. And the date is the 12th of January, 1993. It is a

12 regular combat report of the operative zone of north-western Herzegovina,

13 and under A, information about the enemy, referring to the army of

14 Republika Srpska. And it says there that the possibility exists -- there

15 is the possibility that in the area of Gornji Vakuf, in the broader area

16 of Gornji Vakuf, the enemy, and in brackets, the Chetniks might have

17 opened fire because we noted an order from Banja Luka issued to the

18 commander at Kupres.

19 Is that what it says there? That is to say, the Serbs obviously

20 knew about the misunderstandings and tried to use it to their own benefit.

21 Do we agree there? Is that what it says? Were you certain at that time

22 that every shell -- or, rather, let me put it this way: Was Vakuf shelled

23 from Republika Srpska territory before?

24 A. Only in July. Once, when the town was shelled, 18 projectiles

25 fell on the town, in fact.

1 Q. First of all, I want at that ask you: Can Republika Srpska target

2 Vakuf? Was that possible?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Were you always certain when something was targeted, some

5 projectile except for mortars, which we knew couldn't go there, were you

6 certain that it was the HVO or could the shell have come from the army of

7 Republika Srpska?

8 A. Only in one case were we accused of being targeted at Pidris with

9 22 projectiles, and Mr. Andric was wounded on that occasion. I think that

10 that was on the 18th and 19th of January, and I'm sure you remember that.

11 And they opened fire with the 122-millimetre howitzers down there.

12 Q. All right. Thank you. May I have the next document, please. It

13 is number 14. Document 0 -- 3D 00510. 510. 3D 00510.

14 A. I haven't got that document in my files. Yes, I have it.

15 Q. Now, think what it says in the first sentence: "Peacefully," and

16 we're talking about the 12th of January, 1993, by peaceful means he is

17 issuing an order, Colonel Siljeg is issuing an order, "free our arrested

18 on" -- according to the principle of all for all. So the Gornji Vakuf

19 Brigade it is quite obvious that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has some

20 captured HVO members, and he says -- do we agree that -- that it says:

21 "Our men captured should be released by peaceful means on the principle

22 of all for all. Our forces should be held under control, not to engage in

23 provocations and not to provoke first. Follow the situation. As for the

24 Voljevac-Gornji Vakuf axis, you have forces from the village of Dobrosin.

25 Ensure that you have communications with them and regulate this engagement

1 if the need arises. We managed to obtain some intelligence information,

2 according to which the Chetniks were ordered to strike the Muslim village

3 with one weapon and the Croatian village with another to give the

4 impression that it was -- is the Croats that opened fire on the Muslims,

5 or vice versa the Muslims opened fire on the Croats."

6 Is that what it says there?

7 A. Yes, it does.

8 Q. May we now have the next document, P 001101, P 01101. Is it a

9 report?

10 A. Yes, it is. It is a report.

11 Q. Once again, Colonel Miroslav Andric, the date is the 12th of

12 January, 1993, and the report for the operative zone of North-west

13 Herzegovina.

14 We'll skip the fact that there were problems and complications

15 around Christmas. And it says: "The problems with the army are becoming

16 more complicated and culminating in Gornji Vakuf when Croatian

17 [indiscernible] have been taken out of and there is gradual deployment of

18 soldiers along with the BH army and that check-points were established in

19 town, around the town, and especially towards Prozor. Tensions have grown

20 and they have almost reached a climax. Explosive -- an explosive was

21 planted in the Radusa hotel, Gornji Vakuf, and business premises and shops

22 nearby were wrecked and looted."

23 And, furthermore, it goes on to say: "To the commander of the

24 Ante Starcevic Brigade instructions were issued to speak with Mr. Agic and

25 try to calm the situation down and separate the conflicting parties and

1 that they should undertake active defence," and that's been underlined,

2 active defence there. "We're also following the situation -- developments

3 in Bugojno where there are no clashes for the moment or any serious

4 tensions."

5 And it says: "The command of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina told

6 the HVO that no motor vehicles must be allowed passage in the Gornji Vakuf

7 area without previously gaining permission from them.

8 Now, what is correct in that report and what is not? Could you

9 tell us, please, just briefly, not to take up too much time?

10 A. None of that is correct. At the time, Siljeg with his units that

11 he brought in pursuant to an order of the 12th of January, he continued to

12 shell and attack the town.

13 Q. All right. Fine. That is your testimony.

14 May we have the next document, please, which is P 01110. It is a

15 letter from General Arif Pasalic to the command of the 3rd Corps to be

16 handed over by hand, Enver Hasanovic, to Enver Hasanovic personally, and

17 it says: "Pursuant to an order from President Izetbegovic," and it is

18 handwritten under 1: "A military political commission is to be

19 established immediately with two representatives of the ABiH and SDA party

20 at the highest level and send it to Gornji Vakuf.

21 "2. Colonel Siljeg and Andric, representatives of the HVO, are to

22 be contacted in Gornji Vakuf. Send me detailed information on the

23 situation in Gornji Vakuf."

24 And "4: Do have the patience while the situation in Gornji Vakuf

25 is calming down."

1 So that was an attempt made from the 4th Corps to do this together

2 with the 3rd Corps.

3 A. Commission had its first meeting on the 14th of November.

4 Q. Yes, that's right. I'm going to read you another document and

5 then I'll be asking you some questions.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, just a short question.

7 Could you clarify something. The document that General Praljak

8 has just shown you from Pasalic to the 4th Corps to Hadzihasanovic who is

9 the commander of the 3rd Corps, and under 3 Pasalic asks him to send him

10 detailed information on the situation in Gornji Vakuf.

11 Now, how come General Pasalic intervened here, intervened with the

12 3rd Corps? Have you got an explanation to give us? How was he able to do

13 that and why would he do that. Because usually the corps were on an equal

14 standing, and if somebody wanted to ask for a report from Hadzihasanovic

15 it would have been the Supreme Command, not his colleague from the 4th

16 Corps, for instance. So what explanation can you give us about that

17 because we have the impression that the 3rd Corps is somehow depending on

18 the 4th Corps and under the tutelage of the 4th Corps, if I can put it

19 that way?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in the preamble --

21 well, not the preamble but in the first line General Pasalic is referring

22 to an order from President Izetbegovic, so I can only assume that in

23 Jablanica he had a meeting with the president, and I think that President

24 Izetbegovic was on his way to Geneva at that time. So in order to

25 facilitate contacts, I think he issued this order to General Pasalic

1 telling him to contact General Enver Hadzihasanovic and to propose these

2 three points or four points. I have no other explanation.

3 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Would you agree with me if I say that we quite simply were not

5 able to establish cooperation and links with the 3rd Corps. Is that true,

6 that we used the good relations we had with the 4th Corps who, let it be

7 said in formal and legal terms at that time, was under the -- was

8 subordinated in Mostar to the HVO, or resubordinated, and that meant

9 nothing except that they should sit down and decide where they would go,

10 which lines they would go to, and that Pasalic would ask for ammunition

11 from the HVO.

12 So because of those relations that we had with the 4th Corps and

13 we did not have any relations like that with the 3rd Corps,

14 Mr. Izetbegovic used this method to make use of these good relations and

15 try to influence Hadzihasanovic to do the job as it should have been done?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly be asked to slow down

17 for the benefit of one and all. Thank you.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What do you think about what has

19 just been said, Witness? According to what Mr. Praljak has said, there

20 were difficulties with the 3rd Corps, contacts with the 3rd Corps, and so

21 the HVO had to go through the 4th Corps in order to wield influence on the

22 3rd Corps. Would you say that that was correct, not correct? What is

23 your opinion about that?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't see that there were

25 any difficulties intentionally. Perhaps there were communication

1 difficulties, but as far as I know General Hadzihasanovic had good

2 cooperation at that time with the commander of the operative zone of

3 Central Bosnia, that is to say General Blaskic.

4 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Very well. Let's move on may I have P 01114, please, the next

6 document. It is a collective piece of information with respect to

7 developments in Gornji Vakuf, Mostar, and Travnik. We'll just look at the

8 Gornji Vakuf paragraph. So may we zoom in on the Gornji Vakuf paragraph,

9 see what that says.

10 I have underlined the portions. It says from the commander of the

11 BH army there's a ban on the movement of HVO vehicles without their

12 permission. Because of knowledge about the possibility of large-scale

13 conflicts which was confirmed on several occasions during yesterday; the

14 day yesterday, there was gunfire at HVO positions in town and our units

15 retaliated and -- towards the BH army positions in the evening hours and

16 towards Gornji Vakuf.

17 Colonel Siljeg set out for Gornji Vakuf with 200 soldiers and two

18 tanks.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Might the English version be placed on the

20 screens for the interpreters. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Colonel Mandic Ilija had 50 soldiers. Colonel Andric was in

23 Prozor, and during the day yesterday the members of the HVO and

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina army were captured, about 15 members, who were

25 exchanged later but without any identity cards, documents, materiel and

1 technical equipment or vehicles. Yesterday afternoon five Ludvig Pavlovic

2 Unit soldiers were captured by the BH army of course.

3 Now, Brigadier --

4 A. I have a document 1141, and the contents of that document are

5 different.

6 Q. 0 -- P 01114, that should be the number of the document you should

7 be looking at. 1114.

8 A. It says here: "Since the Christmas holidays Colonel Andric."

9 Q. Well, yes, that's it. No, this is Akrips [as interpreted].

10 That's something different. In the middle. Do you see that it says that

11 Colonel Siljeg set out with 200 soldiers and two tanks and that Predrag

12 Mandic Ilija set out with 50 soldiers? You have that on your screen.

13 A. Well, why were the forces coming in at that time if you wished to

14 calm the situation down?

15 Q. Brigadier, tell me this: What was the plan of attack to take

16 Gornji Vakuf if it was only on the 13th that Siljeg arrived with 250

17 soldiers and two tanks? Were those sufficient forces? Was that a

18 preparation for an offensive, a plan to take control of Gornji Vakuf with

19 250 soldiers and two tanks, or is his explanation that the conflicts had

20 already begun, that they were gaining in intensity, and as a responsible

21 commander he was bringing in half a battalion roughly and two tanks

22 because he did not know what the intentions were of the opposite side or,

23 rather, of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Vakuf, especially because the

24 problems had reached a peak, and we'll see later on that there was trench

25 digging and so on and so forth.

1 So he comes in with 250 soldiers. That's what it says here. And

2 with 250 soldiers on the 13th you cannot - and the conflicts had already

3 begun - launch something which would be considered an attack to take

4 control of the town. Do you agree with me there on a military level?

5 A. No, I do not agree with you there, General, because Colonel Siljeg

6 up until that time in town had more than a thousand soldiers who were not

7 from that area, and we know that just prior to the new year or, rather,

8 after the new year a lot of soldiers arrived in Gornji Vakuf. Colonel

9 Siljeg, on the 11th, was informed of the situation in Gornji Vakuf in

10 order to write that on the 12th of January the town should -- control of

11 the town should be established.

12 Q. We'll come back to that order, and it was wrongly translated and

13 as you can see Judge Antonetti noted that. The units were placed on the

14 alert, but whether they would have gone ahead it says there no, not until

15 the order was given, and I think that is quite clear to you as a soldier,

16 and I'll try and explain it further to you. All the plans and all the

17 orders were compiled after D-Day in Normandy and then they waited for the

18 date when General Eisenhower with the united forces would see that the

19 order be given and carried out. That is the military explanation and I'm

20 sure you can agree with me there.

21 A. Well, yes, I can agree with that explanation. However, the order

22 given by Colonel Siljeg was being applied as of the early morning hours of

23 the 12th of January, and he didn't hide that from UNPROFOR. He came to

24 the UNPROFOR base on that day. In the evening we did everything we could

25 to stop this on the 12th of January. I said that we visited the lower

1 villages where it was claimed that the problem was that the communications

2 were made more difficult, but there was fear on -- only on the Bosniak

3 side at that time, and I state that with full responsibility.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I wanted to ask you a question

5 yesterday but we didn't have time for that. You were speaking of the

6 UNPROFOR force in Gornji Vakuf. There was BritBat. Now, you yourself, as

7 commander of the municipal Chief of Staff, did you have any relations with

8 the commander of UNPROFOR, the UNPROFOR force in Gornji Vakuf?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And who did you meet, as far as

11 you can remember?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I met with the commander of the

13 UNPROFOR base, Major Johnson, and on several other occasions I met with

14 Colonel Stewart. On -- he came to the base for the first time on the 13th

15 in the evening because his soldier had been killed at a crossroads.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And during these meetings with

17 these various members of the BritBat, did you tell them orally that in

18 your opinion the HVO was about to mobilise its forces in order to launch

19 an attack against the BiH? Did you tell them that?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They knew that better than I.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You say they knew,

22 but did you tell them as well?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That was the constant topic of

24 discussion at UNPROFOR headquarters when we met.

25 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

1 Q. Very well. Mr. Agic, I could agree with you that certain

2 estimates in the ABiH reports may be incorrect because of fear, but

3 Colonel Siljeg was an officer of the JNA, and not in a single document

4 that has been shown, and I will show more of them, no mention is made of

5 more soldiers. Do you think that in those reports, which are precise in

6 military terms, that somebody would put 200 soldiers plus 50, whereas in

7 fact there were 1.000? Is there a single document shown by the

8 Prosecution or that you may show that the soldier known as the HVO stated

9 somewhere which brigades these men came from, that they had sent 1.000

10 soldiers to Vakuf? Is there a single document, HVO document, to that

11 effect? And these documents, at least in terms of numbers and dates, are

12 correct because they were compiled by professional officers of the JNA.

13 Siljeg may have been whatever you like, but when it comes to the compiling

14 of reports, he was a major of the Yugoslav People's Army, an active-duty

15 soldier, who wrote precise instructions all his life. So can we agree in

16 that regard?

17 A. General, I don't know how Colonel Siljeg wrote his reports. I

18 know how he spoke and how he behaved when we were sitting together and

19 when all of us except him were trying to appease the situation. He used

20 the language of threats. He didn't stop even on the day when the

21 agreement was signed with the chairmanship of international factors. He

22 threatened. He said that he had so much power that had they come 24 hours

23 later there wouldn't have been any need to have a meeting. And this is --

24 the meaning is quite clear.

25 As for these 250 soldiers on the 13th or 12th who came with him,

1 he's simply reinforcing his troops for the attack. What did he need tanks

2 for when we didn't have any tanks? A tank can only be used as a gun in

3 Vakuf.

4 Q. Very well. Very well. We'll come back to these two tanks. It is

5 his military right to do so, because in his opinion the conflict has

6 started, and he believes that the other side is involved. But we'll come

7 back to that. Let's not go into what he said there.

8 I can ask you: Do you know that on the 18th in the evening I

9 ordered a cessation of hostilities, and I stopped HVO units from entering

10 Gornji Vakuf?

11 A. Why wasn't your order implemented in practice?

12 Q. My order was implemented. You will see on the basis of the

13 documents of the ABiH that HVO units at that point in time had the town

14 almost ready. They could have easily entered the town.

15 Do you know that on the 18th, following my order which was based

16 on my authority, that all offensive activity of the HVO was stopped?

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're talking about an order

18 that you issued on the 18th. Do you have that order to show it to the

19 witness? It's a written order or an oral order? If it is in writing,

20 then you must have it.

21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, witness will

22 come. I didn't have it. I wasn't entitled to sign orders in those days.

23 But on the 18th I issued an oral order, and I testified to that effect in

24 court here four years ago. I called Geneva through Minister Gojko Susak,

25 or Mate Boban, because General Petkovic, who was Chief of Staff, and he

1 was there at the time, that they should immediately on the 19th send an

2 official order on the cessation of military activities in Gornji Vakuf.

3 That the 19th the HVO must go to attend negotiations and respect the

4 cease-fire. Why it wasn't respected we'll see through the documents. I

5 just hope I'll have time to do that.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, you're telling us

7 that you issued an oral order on the 18th following instructions that you

8 had on the basis of the negotiations in Geneva. But if you issued an oral

9 order, I don't know to whom. It must have been to Colonel Siljeg. Then

10 he must have immediately passed on your order to his units.

11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. President,

12 on the 18th I issued an order that they mustn't move, and after that I

13 called to Geneva asking them to send a formal official order to Colonel

14 Siljeg on behalf of General Petkovic or Mate Boban.

15 So please don't misunderstand me. This order on my part was based

16 on my influence and authority and not on the formal position I held at the

17 time. There are some documents to corroborate this.

18 Can we now move on? Let me show you a document now. The number

19 is 19 3D 00487. 3D 00487. Do we have it?

20 A. We have 486 but not 487. We need 487. Ah, it's reached me now.

21 Q. It was issued on the 13th of January, and it says: "We also have

22 reports that 13 members of HVO units were wounded in conflicts with the

23 ABiH. During the day there was fierce -- a fierce conflict between HVO

24 units and the ABiH. Croat houses were burnt in Luzani, and the same were

25 expelled towards the positions held by our units."

1 You saw this document yesterday. Is it true?

2 A. Why didn't you say that on that day we had 15 dead, not to mention

3 the number of civilians?

4 Q. Now another document, 3D 00476, please. This has already been

5 admitted into evidence. 476. 3D 00476.

6 A. It's on the screen now.

7 Q. This document has been shown to Their Honours. It has a large

8 number of pages, and we will just note the following with respect to the

9 kind of battles we had around Gornji Vakuf and whether the HVO was

10 involved.

11 Let me ask you three questions. Here we have a list of

12 casualties, the dead and wounded, HVO soldiers in the conflict in

13 Gornji Vakuf in the period from the 12th of January to the 24th of

14 February, 1993. Now we have the list for each day, the 13th, the 14th,

15 and so on. And you will see that on the 20th of January when the

16 agreement was signed there were very high casualties. And when we add up

17 the dead and wounded, that was our job to do that, 276 is the total number

18 of -- 209 wounded, 46 killed soldiers, wounded civilians 7, and killed

19 civilians 14.

20 Do you see this list of the ITD sector of Ante Starcevic Brigade

21 from Gornji Vakuf?

22 A. I do see it, General, but I would like to ask Their Honours if we

23 could look at the list dated the 13th of January as evidence there were

24 units coming from outside.

25 Q. These were units of the HVO who, on the 12th, as Siljeg said, came

1 there. Those are the 250 men who came there. But my question is as

2 follows, the first question: Such a large number of casualties in the

3 fighting around Gornji Vakuf, was this due, (a), to the inability of the

4 commanders and a lack of professionalism, were they badly trained; (b),

5 was it because the conflicts were intensive; or was it, (c), because the

6 fortifications of the ABiH on positions and main features around the town

7 of Vakuf were exceptionally well-fortified and difficult to capture?

8 A. I will give you my answer. It is true that you were attacking and

9 that it is normal when someone is attacking to have very high losses. You

10 were not in town. You had the highest losses. Half of the dead HVO

11 soldiers were killed in town.

12 You said a moment ago that on the 18th you captured the relay

13 station. Please say now whether there was a single trench knee high

14 there, but you presented it as if it was a concrete fortification. In

15 fact, there was a repeater, a TV repeater there that was hit, and it fell

16 apart after three direct shots. You know how you captured it under very

17 heavy fighting.

18 But those are facilities, Your Honours, which are 50 metres behind

19 the buildings in Gornja Mahala in town. Outside that area, towards

20 Pidris, we didn't have a single soldier further away.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, the figure given by

22 General Praljak has where been discussed with other witnesses. Can you

23 hear me? Let me check. Are you hearing me?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Through the documents which

1 appear to be truthful that there were 40 killed, 207 wounded, plus

2 civilians, if we proceed from the hypothesis that the HVO was attacking,

3 they are attacking by shelling first. In all military manuals, we don't

4 start with artillery fire -- with infantry fire. First comes artillery

5 fire and later comes the clearing with the infantry.

6 How is it possible that in spite of the shelling there were so

7 many dead on the HVO side? You have just given an explanation that half

8 were killed in town. Was there chest-to-chest fighting in the town

9 itself, and if there were losses on the HVO side that means that you were

10 numerous, too, and that you were able to respond to that kind of an

11 attack. Could you give us some more details regarding the HVO losses?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the HVO was trying to

13 gain control of the town. It amassed its elite forces in town to take

14 control of the centre of the town where the military police was. During

15 the first few days the fighting was so fierce that the killed and wounded

16 were lying in the streets. The eight nitroglycerine rifles that General

17 Praljak ordered to be brought to Gornji Vakuf should have been new weapons

18 which were meant to help them capture the town because there was no other

19 way. So that materiel was regrouped as well.

20 I have to tell you that a tank was brought into the middle of town

21 too. The police building was targeted from a distance of 50 metres and

22 directly hit. However, it is not easy to capture a town.

23 As for the artillery you mention, Colonel Siljeg acted as proper

24 soldiers. He started with artillery, very -- a very fierce artillery

25 attack, but he didn't look at the results of his hits. When they gained

1 control of Krstic, they killed 26 soldiers there. Not a single soldier --

2 one soldier survived under the dead, and it was only when they were piled

3 on the truck that it was noticed that he was alive. Those trenches were

4 captured with tanks, anti-personnel carriers.

5 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

6 Q. You are now mentioning trenches, and you say that at the relay

7 station at Krc you will show us this place on the map. If there are not

8 shelters, and believe me that I did tour that fortification line and I

9 will have it filmed, it was so well fortified at Krc and elsewhere. These

10 are hills which are 50 metres away from the town as the crow flies.

11 The first question: Why did you dig such big trenches a month

12 before?

13 A. That is not true. You should have told Their Honours there were

14 trenches, but you should have said that Gornji Vakuf was reattacked in the

15 summer of 1993, and that is when those trenches were dug.

16 Q. That is what I want to hear. Colonel Siljeg and Andric, and as

17 testified by a British officer, and while I was there I insisted on not

18 digging trenches between -- behind the backs of the soldiers. The enemy

19 is at Radusa. No army will tolerate trenches being built on the hills

20 around town.

21 Another question: If the tanks reach the relay station, and they

22 did, could they hit house by house and destroy the Muslim part of

23 Gornji Vakuf, which is 70 per cent of the town? Wherever you fire from

24 with a cannon you can hit these with precision. Why wasn't that done?

25 A. General Praljak needs to explain to the Court why Colonel Siljeg,

1 in the afternoon of the 19th, brought in addition to a tank a lorry full

2 of explosives and fuel.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to intervene here. The

4 witness is asking questions himself instead of answering the questions

5 he's been asked, which is what he ought to be doing.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The tank had come to target Vrse.

7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Now, why would this be, as you say, at a distance of 50 metres

9 from the houses in the Muslim district? If somebody wishes to do this --

10 let me ask you this: You know what an open town means in the military

11 sense. According to your reports that we have here, Vakuf was about to

12 fall. First of all I asked you whether you knew who stopped the attack.

13 Now, in the military sense we should have -- you should have been called

14 and said let's get the civilians away. Don't hide behind civilians or

15 surrender. Now in that -- as MacArthur did in Manila. There is the

16 responsibility of the commander to hand over the town and to proclaim the

17 town an open town. This was not done because -- or, rather, I'm asking

18 you why wasn't that done, if it was the intention of the HVO to take

19 control of Gornji Vakuf, if that was a plan? Now which commander, when he

20 has Karamustafic, when he has Bokletera [phoen], when he has taken control

21 of positions above town which had been fortified in previous months, he

22 has the HVO behind, in the rear, which commander, if he had the intention

23 of taking control of the town, would not have made use of this? Either he

24 didn't have the intention or he was an idiot. What is it, of the two?

25 A. Well, that's a very broad question. You have asked me -- put

1 different theses to me. The tank was put there to target Vrse for one

2 reason. Because of the depression, it was not able to target them,

3 because of the houses were down below underneath the hill, and he was

4 targeting the lines and trenches behind the back. He was dangerous. He

5 was appointed by the commander of the armoured mechanised units, General.

6 Q. First of all, you say that in Vrse there were trenches that were

7 being dug. We're not going to wait to go into battle in an open space,

8 are we?

9 Q. All right. Very well. I'd just like to convince you --

10 A. General, you're asking me why were the trenches dug. I'll try and

11 explain this to the Trial Chamber. The HVO at Makljen always had

12 company-strength forces.

13 Q. Sir, I understand --

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, Mr. Praljak.

15 General, General Praljak said that before the 19th of January

16 fortified Gornji Vakuf by digging trenches. Now I understood it that your

17 answer to that was that that was done in June, not in January.

18 So my question is a simple one. In January, before the 19th, that

19 is, did the BiH fortify Gornji Vakuf by digging trenches on the hills, in

20 town, or wherever?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, up until the 12th of

22 January, not a single trench was dug, trenches dug facing the HVO forces

23 or any other side because there was no need for that, and that is why we

24 lost. In one day of fighting, we lost the relay station, and they came

25 to -- right up to the edge of town.

1 Isn't that right, Mr. General? Isn't that right, General?

2 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Yes, but Mr. Agic, I'm going to give instructions to dig those

4 trenches and I'll photograph them. They were fortifications of the first

5 order.

6 A. Well, in July they were.

7 Q. In July and January. And who dug them in after that?

8 A. Take a look at the UNPROFOR reports.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly ask to slow down, make

10 pauses between question and answer and not overlap. Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

12 Q. One of the main points of the agreement on a truce which was

13 signed is this: To withdraw the forces and to fill in the trenches, to

14 fill in the trenches. I'm not going to go back to that question.

15 May I have 3D 00368 as the next document now, please.

16 It is an order of the 15th of January once again. Once again, it

17 is Colonel Siljeg issuing an order. It says: "To accept the PGZ." It's

18 a mobile group for setting up obstacles, about 10 people, and engage it to

19 block the road from the village of Voljevac, and they are subordinated to

20 the Rama Brigade commander. Number 2, one platoon from the Rama Brigade

21 is to be directed as security to the village of Mackov if it hasn't

22 already been directed there. One platoon from the Rama Brigade should be

23 sent to the village of Dobrosin to secure the town of Dobrosin and

24 Voljevac 6 if it has not been sent there yet. 4, to eliminate the forces

25 of the BH army in summerhouses in the region of feature 1303 on the Crni

1 Vrh by artillery fire.

2 So according to that report, a group is sent to set up obstacles

3 and block the road and then it also says that the forces of the BH army at

4 that point in time were at Makljen, Crni Vrh, et cetera. Up at Crni Vrh.

5 Now, at that point in time, on the 12th of January, that is the

6 date we're talking about, did the units of the BH army on the 12th, 13th,

7 and 14th, were they at Crni Vrh at Makljen?

8 A. Crni Vrh and Makljen are not the same thing. We were never at

9 Makljen.

10 Q. What about Crni Vrh?

11 A. Do you know where this elevation 1303 is, feature 1303? It is the

12 first feature after village of Boljkovac.

13 Q. We'll show that on the map later on. But may I have the next

14 document, P 01152, please.

15 Forces are not sense to town in any of these [indiscernible].

16 This is done to deblock the town?

17 Q. All right. But this is what I'm saying. In the document,

18 document P 00152, in paragraph C, and the document is once again signed by

19 Siljeg, I believe -- no. It is signed by Milivoj Petkovic, although I

20 think it's Siljeg's report to the Main Staff. And it says how much

21 ammunition must be ensured for the HVO Brigade in Gornji Vakuf. The Ante

22 Starcevic Brigade, 5 boxes, 3 shells, 60-millimetre ones, and 300 shells

23 of 82 millimetres, et cetera, which means that this should be provided.

24 But the 15 cases of ammunition and the 600 shells, mortar shells, 300 of

25 one and 300 of another, 60 millimetres especially, which are

1 anti-infantry, which is something that could be used against the town. Is

2 that something we would use against a town?

3 A. Are you asking me?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. Well, it would be reinforcement depending on which unit it was

6 going to. I would like to -- I would rather comment on the paragraph

7 referring to the enemy where it says that there is concern because part of

8 the military police has gone on assignment to Gornji Vakuf. And it says

9 the Petar Kresimir IV Brigade. What brigade is that?

10 A. Well, that's not important.

11 Q. Well, if it's not a secret could you tell me, please, then?

12 A. It is not a secret, no. It is Livno.

13 Q. So, right, policemen from Livno to come to Gornji Vakuf if we wish

14 to calm the situation.

15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have to intervene

16 once again. My client would like to conduct a calm interview with the

17 witness but it is a fact that he's not answering questions.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Now, P 00141 is the next document I'd like to have shown, please.

20 P 01141.

21 And it is Mile Curcic who signed it, the chief. The date is the

22 15th of January, 1993, at 1130 hours, informing the Main Staff and so on

23 and so forth. He says the night and morning passed relatively quietly,

24 this is after a truce, with just sporadic fire, et cetera, et cetera.

25 And he goes on to say: "This morning Colonel Siljeg issued the

1 order to block the Voljevac-Dobrosin road so that the PZG can arrive to

2 reinforce Makljen and Dobrosin and not to use the artillery in built-up

3 areas without special permission, and outside built-up areas not to allow

4 any movements of the BH army towards Gornji Vakuf, or to take up positions

5 facing our forces."

6 So that's what it says. This morning -- "Early this morning

7 infantry fighting began again with the use of cannons by the ABiH army.

8 There was a regrouping of forces," et cetera, et cetera. Forces were

9 introduced from Konjic and Bugojno, fresh forces. And then it says:

10 Certain facilities in the town of Gornji Vakuf and Bistrica, Luzine, and

11 Hrvatske. Says: "We were not able to put out the fires and these

12 facilities are on fire, are aflame."

13 I asked you that yesterday. You said that according to you

14 nothing was on fire. There was nothing burning.

15 Now, 32, 33, 34.

16 Is any of this correct here, what it says?

17 A. Well, I don't know. This is what General Siljeg ordered. Now, as

18 far as the fact that on the 15th of January the army, the BH army, used

19 artillery to fire, I don't know. That's not true.

20 Q. Let's move on now. Document -- and the next document, I have it

21 here under number 33, but let me check the proper number. 3D 00439. And

22 it's BH army documentation.

23 This particular document that you're going to see on your screen

24 was signed by the commander of the 3rd Corps, Enver Hadzihasanovic, and it

25 is addressed to the 38th Brigade, the 312th Motorised Brigade, the

1 309th Mountain Brigade, and so on.

2 A. May I be provided with that document, please.

3 Q. It is 3D 00493. 493, yes. 3D 00493. That's the document. I

4 don't want to enumerate all the brigades. There are -- were 11 of them.

5 Eleven brigades were informed through this order. On -- and it is the

6 16th of January, the date. "On the basis of information gave during the

7 night and in the morning of the 17th, reinforcements from Kiseljak will be

8 dispatched to the HVO, and I hereby issue the following order." Under 1,

9 we'll skip 1 and move on to 2. "To prevent all attempts at carrying out

10 manoeuvre of forces and bringing in reinforcements which were attacking

11 Gornji Vakuf without our permission, engage in the following activities,"

12 blocking, et cetera.

13 And then it says: "In case of an armed attack, in case of an

14 armed attack by the HVO against our forces, we should launch a decisive

15 attack to break up the HVO forces and militarily defeat them, seize their

16 weapons and equipment and take control of the territory."

17 And then it goes on to say: "Act according to orders issued thus

18 far in that connection."

19 So before this particular order, there were other orders in that

20 connection.

21 May we have your comments to that text?

22 A. This is an order, and I think it is in order and it's properly

23 written.

24 Q. May we have 174, P 00174 as the next document.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, before you go on to

1 look at the following document, this particular document, the one we have

2 on our screens from the command of the 3rd Corps, I'm not getting the

3 interpretation, how are we to interpret it in military terms? Is it an

4 order which says prepare to retaliate in case of a attack, or may we

5 consider this to be an order that is telling the 308th, 312th, 306th and

6 your own brigade to attack?

7 So what would your analysis be in military terms, solely in

8 military terms? How do you understand the contents of that document?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The commander of the corps is

10 ordering the units here to be on the alert and to be ready to engage.

11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Yes, to launch an attack and to capture.

13 A. If they are themselves attacked.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's stay in military terms, on

15 a military level. It is a pity that we had -- did not have any military

16 experts in court before you.

17 But in military terms, purely military terms, when an army is

18 attacking, are there any preparatory actions, any meetings held, a plan, a

19 general plan of attack which is then concretised on the basis of documents

20 establishing that on such and such a day at such and such an hour the

21 attack started or is to start and so on?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. There is a whole procedure

23 that is put in place. It is called making a decision, setting out --

24 doing reconnaissance working and so on.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now, this procedure in your

1 country at the time, in 1993, was this the result of the old rules and

2 regulations governing the JNA?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not receiving the

4 interpretation.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let me repeat my question.

6 You've just said that there was procedure that was put in place, and my

7 question is this: I would like to know whether that procedure was

8 inherited from the rules and regulations that were in force during the

9 ex-JNA period.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the BH army, yes, that's right.

11 It did apply.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Therefore, if there was an ABiH

13 attack, would you normally find documents which would relate to that

14 procedure for attack? Would there be documents relating to that?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Procedure for attack must

16 exist of the superior commander, and everything issued must be complied

17 with.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I apologise.

19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, I would like to turn the

20 question and ask it a different way. You recognise this order from

21 General Hadzihasanovic, do you? That's right, is it? That's what it is;

22 do you agree?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, it is. I agree. Although

24 General Hadzihasanovic didn't sign it. This is not the general's

25 signature.

1 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well. Now, to the best of

2 your recollections, the attack, when it took place, that the general is

3 referring to in this order, did the attack take place or not? If it did

4 take place, then the preparative steps that President Antonetti mentioned,

5 were they put in place or not?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Hadzihasanovic -- rather,

7 this order is addressed to all units within Central Bosnia. This is not

8 an executive order. Units are placed in combat readiness and are told to

9 respond if they are attacked. By this order, General Hadzihasanovic is

10 endeavouring to prevent the manoeuvre of HVO forces which might possibly

11 have reached Gornji Vakuf.

12 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well.

13 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [No interpretation]

14 Q. [Interpretation] In the meantime, let me just read a part.

15 "Forces of the King Tomislav Brigade: 135 cannon; 120-millimetre

16 mortar, 20 pieces; VBRs 107, 36; 6 shells; VBR 107-millimetres, 12;

17 120-millimetre, 10," a total of 89 shells.

18 A. Could we check the numbers?

19 Q. [No interpretation]. P 01162, dated the 16th of January, 1993.

20 Not counting the T-55 tank from Makljen, Colonel Siljeg reports that he

21 used a total of 89 shells for the whole municipality. Is that what it

22 says here? And is this a minimum consumption of shells for the whole

23 municipality?

24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can we place it on the ELMO,

25 please. That is not the document. Can you put it on the ELMO, please.

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. Five pieces with a cannon on Svilici. Yes.

3 Q. In your statement, you said a thousand shells, but you will agree

4 that a professional officer could not speak erroneously about firing. He

5 says that he used, for the whole municipality, 89 shells, not counting the

6 155 tank which is at Makljen. That is far from Gornji Vakuf. Is that

7 what it says here?

8 A. He doesn't say that a single one fell on Gornji Vakuf.

9 Q. He says it was fired.

10 A. Here, not a single target was close to Vakuf. This was the

11 targeting around. Why was the 130 cannon fired at the village of Svilici?

12 Q. All I'm asking you is for you to testify.

13 A. It is not a correct report.

14 Q. It's not correct; fine.

15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Let's have the next

16 document.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In this document that you are

18 producing in support of thesis, in the paragraph B, "Our Forces," I read

19 the following sentence: "We are beginning intensive operations on the

20 enemy and the regrouping of forces of the ABiH."

21 This sentence can lead us to believe that, at 2000 hours, on the

22 16th of January, Colonel Siljeg is explaining that he's beginning an

23 attack.

24 General, do you see this sentence? How do you interpret it?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this report, in this document, I

1 can't find that sentence.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The sentence comes after the

3 small heading "Our Forces" and before the forces of the Kralj Tomislav

4 Brigade.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have document 1162 in

6 front of me.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. In your language, the

8 words are "Danas smo poculi."

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's not the document.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You don't have the right

11 document. P 1162. Do you see the small (b), "nasse snage"? Will you

12 read it, please, in your own language, the sentence beginning with the

13 word "Danas."

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Today we have started acting more

15 intensively on all movements and regrouping of enemy forces (ABiH)."

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What does that mean, in military

17 terms?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It means they intensified their

19 attack, introduced additional forces.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could Mr. Petkovic please

21 make a comment?

22 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would refer

23 to this sentence once again. "Today we have started to act more

24 intensively on all movements," and this refers to the forces of Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina and the regrouping of forces of the army of

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This means, if linked with the previous order by

2 Hadzihasanovic of the 16th, that some forces are being introduced to

3 Gornji Vakuf.

4 Now, please, Your Honour, will you look lower down, where it says

5 that Crni Vrh has been captured, and then the next sentence: "Enemy

6 forces" - I am addressing you, Mr. Agic - "Enemy forces who tried to make

7 a breakthrough towards the positions of our forces were fiercely shot at

8 and rejected. We had two dead from sniper fire, enemy sniper fire. Both

9 are reconnaissance members from the Rama Brigade."

10 I repeat that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is carrying out the

11 manoeuvre and regrouping of forces, and this sentence that says that enemy

12 forces tried to break through towards positions of our forces were

13 fiercely repulsed. And I link this to the report of the 16th by

14 Hadzihasanovic when he says, "Introduce more forces and carry out an

15 attack." That would be my comment.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, you have just heard

17 General Petkovic. He tells us, in military terms, that the ABiH was

18 regrouping and carrying out movements. To your knowledge, in this area,

19 on the 16th of January, were there movements by the ABiH? Were there

20 regroupings and reinforcements? Because, according to General Petkovic,

21 this is linked to the document that we just saw by General Hadzihasanovic,

22 telling you to mobilise yourselves if you are attacked.

23 What is written here, does it reflect the reality, or is it your

24 view that it don't correspond to the reality on the ground?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the order by General

1 Hadzihasanovic was not in this part of the territory. It couldn't be

2 respected in this part of the territory. I beg you to bear in mind.

3 Svilici is nowhere close to the line. This is a village of ten houses. I

4 don't know why it would be targeted if it is not for intimidation. Why

5 would five 130-millimetre shells be fired at it? This is the most

6 powerful cannon that we have. But we leave that to the person who fired

7 these shells.

8 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can we move on?

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is now time for the break.

10 The registrar tells me that you have already used 100 minutes, General.

11 Do not forget that after you there are 35 minutes for Ms. Nozica and also

12 35 minutes for Ms. Tomic at the back. So please make your own

13 calculations, because we have to adjourn at 7.00 p.m.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's a pity

15 that all the hundred documents prepared cannot be reviewed, because this

16 is an ideal opportunity. I think I'll be able to finish in another 15

17 minutes.

18 Have you given me some time?

19 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think as we still have

20 another one and a half hours until the next break and another hour

21 from 6.00 to 7.00, if he uses another hour after the break I think the

22 remaining two Defences will be able to complete their cross-examination in

23 the time left, because we are all keen to hear what General Praljak has to

24 say.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It is a quarter

1 to 4.00. We will have a 20-minute break and resume at five past.

2 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 4.06 p.m.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

5 I just have an announcement to make for the interpreters. They

6 have noted that we're all speaking much too fast and that they find it

7 very difficult to follow. So I myself will do my best and I hope all the

8 rest of you will do, too, to speak slower to facilitate the work of the

9 interpreters.

10 Having said that, Mr. Praljak.

11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Next document, please, and

12 it is number 3D 00531.

13 Q. Brigadier Agic, would you look at your screen. It will come up on

14 the screen. You needn't waste time looking through your folder. The

15 number is, and I repeat, 3D 00531. And here it is.

16 This came by Paket post, and it says Hadzihasanovic, the unit of

17 the 4th Corps, deployment of the unit of the 4th Corps, and he proposes

18 that it be sent out urgently, on the -- or, rather, that the unit

19 numbering the rank of a brigade be urgently dispatched from Jablanica to

20 the broader region of Makljen to launch an attack on HVO units in the area

21 of Makljen.

22 The axis for the bringing in of reinforcements and engagement of

23 forces pursuant to a decision by the brigade commander and he proposes

24 that it be the Neretvica Brigade. This is urgent. It says "this is

25 urgent" at the bottom in handwriting, at the bottom of the document.

1 Is this indeed a document which has the cryptoprotection, it's

2 encoded, and was sent out to the following addresses.

3 Now, is this a proper document? Is it correct?

4 A. I assume it is. I assume it is correct.

5 Q. Thank you. Next document, please. It is 3D 00531. 3D -- I

6 repeat -- ah. It's 3D 00499. 3D 004, et cetera.

7 It's rather faint. I have a better copy in my own hands. It

8 says: "Contact Lendo Refik." He has been granted permission to provide

9 artillery support. And the signature is that of Commander Enver

10 Hadzihasanovic.

11 Can you see that document?

12 A. I can't see the date. I'm just interested in the date.

13 Q. Could this document be placed on the ELMO.

14 The date is the 18th of January. To the 317th Brigade and Lendo.

15 You know who Refik Lendo is, I assume? Or, rather, do you know who Refik

16 Lendo is?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. So is Refik Lendo being asked to provide artillery support to the

19 forces of the 317th? And was the okay given?

20 A. Well, I said that there was no artillery of this kind in

21 Gornji Vakuf.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 May I have document 3D 00498, please.

24 Once again, it is a document signed by Enver Hadzihasanovic, the

25 commander. And it says -- or, rather, he repeats that the Neretvica

1 Brigade was asked to be dispatched to Makljen from the composition of the

2 4th Corps and that they would be informed -- receive timely information.

3 And this is sent to the 307th Motorised Brigade in Bugojno.

4 Now, why was Bugojno included in all this? We don't know at this

5 point in time, but is that what this document says?

6 A. Yes, that's what the document says, but I don't think that the

7 signature is Enver's, but I do think that the document is authentic.

8 Q. Thank you. Next document, please. My number is 47, but let me

9 find the other number. It is 3D 00496. The date is the 18th of January.

10 It is the command of the 3rd Corps. The year is 1993. It is signed by

11 Commander Enver Hadzihasanovic, and once again addressed to the 307th

12 Brigade in Bugojno.

13 And it says as follows: "You did a good job in posing an

14 ultimatum to the HVO, but take care and leave your large forces in Bugojno

15 both because of the Chetniks and because of the HVO, and set aside as many

16 troops as possible and advance to Gornji Vakuf. Also inform if you come

17 across resistance from the HVO, enter into an all-out open conflict and

18 tell us whether a sabotage reconnaissance detachment has been detached to

19 Bojska and Grnica or whether it is stationed there, and if it has indeed

20 set out, whether it has conjoined with the IG in the region of Jagnjid and

21 Drazev Doca. This assignment must be carried -- it is compulsory to carry

22 out this assignment."

23 Is that right?

24 A. Yes. Because on the 18th of January Gornji Vakuf was almost taken

25 control of, as was the territory around it. You didn't expect us to wait,

1 did you?

2 Q. No, I didn't expect you to wait, but I'm just going through the

3 documents.

4 And the next document now is P 01 --

5 JUDGE PRANDLER: Slowly, slowly.

6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Document 3D 00452. The

7 document is 3D 00452.

8 Q. Here, Mr. Arif Pasalic, the commander of the 4th Corps, is writing

9 to headquarters and staff of the ABiH to Sefer Halilovic in person. And

10 he says as follows: "On the 19th of January, 1993, along with the

11 presence of the EC with Mr. Petkovic, the commander of the Main Staff, an

12 agreement was reached and a proposal made for a cease-fire in

13 Gornji Vakuf."

14 First, the Main Staff of the HVO, Bruno Stojic, Petkovic Milivoj

15 and Pasalic Arif would issue an order on the cessation of hostilities in

16 Gornji Vakuf, and the order would be signed by the Main Staff HVO, Bruno

17 Stojic and Arif Pasalic, pursuant to your authorisation which would apply

18 to the conflicting parties. The representatives of the European Community

19 would be the mediators in this regard with us.

20 "To all units of the HVO and ABiH we would give assignments to

21 reduce tension, and we would send commissions numbering six members, three

22 from the HVO and three from the ABiH, to implement it and issue an order

23 to deblock the roads. We would like to have your opinion urgently."

24 Is this a valid, authentic document?

25 A. Yes, it coincides with the right date and the commission that

1 signed the truce, the cease-fire, in Gornji Vakuf on the 21st of January.

2 Q. But you agree that intensive work was under way at that time to

3 implement the cease-fire already on the 19th.

4 May I now have the next document, please. It is my number 66.

5 Otherwise, it is number 3D 00505. 3D 00505. 505. Page -- that's the

6 second page. May we have the first page of that document, please. Page

7 number 1, please.

8 It is Mostar, the 24th of January, that is to say five days after

9 the 19th. Once again, it is the 4th Corps command. The commander is the

10 same, Mr. Arif Pasalic, and he is issuing the following order. Under 1:

11 "Accept the unit DIO 004 into your own composition."

12 But I'd like to dwell on paragraph -- or point 6.

13 "During the fortification of the units, the battalion officer

14 should contact the commander of the Prozor battalion, Mr. Ruvic Salih, in

15 order to exchange intelligence information about the enemy and the

16 territory."

17 When it says "enemy" here, does that imply the HVO?

18 A. I don't know.

19 Q. We'll see from point 7. "Send reconnaissance groups in order to

20 carry out reconnaissance work along the axes at the Makljen feature where

21 working with the local units they should see the lie of the land, the

22 capacity of the axes, the deployment and numerical force of the HVO along

23 those axes as well as at the Makljen feature itself.

24 "8. After carrying detailed reconnaissance work, after evaluating

25 this, issue precise assignments to the units in order to carry out active

1 operations with the aim of inflicting losses on the enemy, taking over

2 combat equipment and taking control of the Makljen feature in order to

3 prevent fresh troops from coming in from Western Herzegovina to

4 Gornji Vakuf.

5 "The Makljen pass" --

6 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you. I'm sorry to interrupt you, General

7 Praljak, but I would like to ask a question, also from the witness,

8 because when you induced this order you mentioned that at that time, that

9 is -- I believe it is 24th of January, there was no combat activity in

10 that region. At the same time, in the chapeau, the preamble of this

11 order, you can see that, that it says that -- "to provide support to the

12 3rd Corps, 317th Mountain Brigade, currently fighting the HVO in

13 Gornji Vakuf." So I again repeat: "Currently fighting the HVO in Gornji

14 Vakuf."

15 Now, my question is: If it is put there in the chapeau that

16 "currently fighting the HVO," I would like to ask the witness, Brigadier

17 Agic, if it was indeed during that time fighting was going on or not, and

18 then of course it should shed light to the question if there was any

19 fighting activities around that region. Thank you.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I said yesterday that a

21 truce was signed on the 21st under the auspices of the international

22 community. However, none of the points in the cease-fire agreement were

23 adhered to and operations continued continuously.

24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'd just like

25 to read out the document to the end to -- so that we can see why the truce

1 wasn't respected. We can see that from the order, because Mr. Arif

2 Pasalic on the 19th is asking for it, and the commission was sent on

3 the 24th as well as the other documents on the sending of sabotage units,

4 a show who did not wish to see this cease-fire come into force. I don't

5 know why, but can we look at the next sentence.

6 "The Makljen pass should be held and you should entrench on the

7 same feature and, if possible, launch active operations with the aim of

8 having our forces enter Prozor."

9 So not only - although Makljen is at a distance from Vakuf, about

10 10 kilometres away - that they should reach Makljen and engage in active

11 operations enabling our forces, that is to say the ABiH forces, entering

12 Prozor. And it says: "This order comes into force immediately and must

13 be carried out immediately. And the Neretvica Brigade commander shall be

14 held responsible for that."

15 Q. I'm not questioning the clarity of the order. I'm only asking you

16 whether you have any comments to make with respect to the document and the

17 signature and so on.

18 A. I didn't see the signature. I don't have any reason to doubt its

19 authenticity, but you were going to go back in November to Prozor and you

20 didn't.

21 Q. May I have the next document, please. It is my document 75, but

22 otherwise document 3D 00371. 3D 00371 is the next document. 371. I

23 apologise. It is 3D 00371. That's the document.

24 Once again, it's the 28th of January, 1993, signed by Mr. Arif

25 Pasalic, commander of the 4th Corps. And I'd just like to ask us to focus

1 on the following. "In this connection," it says, "it is necessary to

2 prevent all arms transport -- transports, mines, explosions for the

3 purposes of the HVO." He is ordering that at all check-points controlled

4 by the ABiH army and the military police that there should be a stepped-up

5 control, a passage going that way, through the check-point. Equipment,

6 materiel, soldiers, and so on. And that same person is ordering that all

7 movement by HVO forces should also be prevented along with all the other

8 things he mentions.

9 Has that document been signed by Mr. Arif Pasalic?

10 A. Yes. It is a document of the 4th Corps. You probably used the

11 roads to transport materiel.

12 Q. But you signed the cease-fire.

13 A. Yes, it was, but you didn't abide by it. The army had to react.

14 We couldn't just wait, sit and wait.

15 Q. That is your opinion. The HVO -- I'll ask you that at the end.

16 But the HVO stopped in front of the town, as we have already said, but we

17 will clear that up with the other witnesses.

18 Now I could have another very important document, 3D 00501.

19 Will you please listen to it carefully. It is issued on the 20th

20 of January, 1993, the command of the 3rd Corps is sending to the Staff

21 Command in Bugojno, the 317th -- I am sorry, the 307th Mountain Brigade,

22 and it says, I'll read it slowly and carefully: "We appreciate your

23 thoughts and suggestions, but we draw your attention to the need to carry

24 out assignments in your zone of responsibility. Do not engage in

25 activities which are not within your terms of reference. Write your

1 reports in such a way that they reflect the combat situation rather than

2 being political lectures. In the conflict in all towns -- for the

3 conflicts in all towns of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, it is

4 premature even though such an option has been envisaged. Do your best to

5 do everything you can to assist Vakuf."

6 So let me say this one again. As it is too early for conflicts in

7 all the towns of Herceg-Bosna, even though such an option has also been

8 envisaged.

9 This is Zenica, the 20th of January, 1993, signed by Enver

10 Hadzihasanovic, and stamped.

11 Now, sir, tell me, please, who is it who is making political

12 statements in the army, and what kind of an option is this, the option of

13 attack and conflict in all towns of Herceg-Bosna which is still premature?

14 A. I'm afraid you'll have to ask the author of this request. I just

15 see corps commander. He didn't sign it. But it's authentic as it has the

16 stamp of the 3rd Corps.

17 Q. One more document and then I'll be done with this part of my

18 cross. Could we have now 3D 00500. 3D 00500.

19 Colonel Zeljko Siljeg, an extraordinary report dated the 20th of

20 January. "According to subsequently received report," he says, the first

21 paragraph, "in Gornji Vakuf it has been more or less peaceful. This

22 morning we started to break up enemy forces at Vrse. The enemy is

23 continuing to make a breakthrough from the region of Luzani-Grnica towards

24 Ricica, Hrasnica, and Bistrica which has been repulsed. However,

25 according to a subsequently received report, yesterday 26 wounded have

1 been brought to the hospital in Bugojno by 1400 hours, four from HVO

2 units, 12 from ABiH, and 10 Muslim civilians. Because overcrowding in the

3 hospital, they are requesting the evacuation of about 25 wounded.

4 Sir, was it true that the HVO medical corps, without any

5 reservations and without any exceptions, transported wounded of the HVO

6 and of ABiH to the HVO hospital in Bugojno?

7 A. I say with responsibility that you did not transport a single

8 wounded person with your means but the hospital was a joint hospital.

9 This was formed by the ABiH and the HVO. You're justifying your attacks

10 and exaggerating ours.

11 Q. Can I have the next document, 3D 00503. Dated the 23rd of

12 January, signed by Enver Hadzihasanovic on the next page.

13 He says in paragraph 2: "It is our view that there is a problem

14 in the organisation."

15 First page, please. Page 1, please. I'll refer to only two

16 points. "It is our assessment that there's a problem in the organisation

17 of the same, meaning the units of the ABiH, and their involvement in

18 combat activities. It is necessary correctly to assess one's own forces,

19 planned, use, order, and implement the idea to the end."

20 Number 3: "By issuing an order to all units, carry out active

21 combat activities, especially offensive ones."

22 This is to the command of the 317th Mountain Brigade in

23 Gornji Vakuf: "Active combat activities, especially offensive."

24 This was issued on the 23rd of January, after all the

25 cease-fires. In all the documents we have read, there's reference either

1 to attacks or sabotage groups or the Neretvica Brigade at Makljen or the

2 entry into Prozor or the like.

3 Paragraph 5 refers to the correct handing over of ammunition. And

4 on the last page it says -- can I have the last page? "We cannot send

5 units the way you imagine and wish due to other circumstances which you

6 are not aware of, and you will be told about them personally by Selmo

7 Cikotic. Your assignment, I repeat, is with available and additional

8 forces to urgently plan and organise defence and at the same time engage

9 in active operations for which you have already received instructions."

10 The post scriptum: "PS: From the 4th Corps of the ABiH the

11 following have been sent to you in Gornji Vakuf: 120.000 7.62-millimetre

12 bullets, 150 shells for an 82-millimetre mortar, 120 shells for -- I'm

13 sorry, 150 mines for the 82-millimetre mortar, and 120 shells for the

14 120-millimetre mortar. And today," on the 23rd of January, 1993, "we have

15 sent 50.000 rounds of 7.62 millimetre, 16 RPG shells, and 1 PAM."

16 It is an anti-aircraft cannon of 23 millimetres, if I remember

17 well.

18 Is this a valid report?

19 A. It's a PAM. It's 12.7, not 14.5.

20 Q. Yes, fine. I made a mistake. Next document, please.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

22 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Is the document correct, valid, authentic?

24 A. I think it is a valid document, but if I may comment on it.

25 Q. No. When did the mortars reach you and how?

1 A. You have noticed from this document that the army was not ready

2 for the beginning of the conflict in Gornji Vakuf. Everything that

3 arrived was in response to a reaction of the 3rd Corps. You just a moment

4 ago said that Vakuf was about to fall. Surely you didn't expect us to let

5 you enter the town?

6 Q. No, but on the 19th a cease-fire was signed, and from all the

7 documents that we have viewed up to now, Brigadier Agic --

8 A. It was signed on the 21st, not on the 19th.

9 Q. Let's go slowly, all right? The cease-fire was signed on

10 the 21st.

11 A. Yes. But on the 22nd you captured the last feature, Ali Pasa's

12 hill, and you put us in a position of a total encirclement. You know that

13 we couldn't send wounded to Bugojno without an UNPROFOR escort.

14 Q. I can understand that, but then how did you receive this?

15 A. This reached Priboj Boljkovac and then you know it was very

16 difficult to carry out these instructions. It took days for these -- for

17 this equipment to reach us.

18 JUDGE PRANDLER: I add my voice to that of our president. At the

19 beginning he emphasised that you should wait for each other to complete

20 your statements, and after when the interpretation is being finished then

21 you start again with your questions or with your answers.

22 Please kindly defer to this procedure and not to speak so fast.

23 Thank you.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, I want a point of

25 clarification.

1 General Praljak, through a series of documents, is showing that

2 the 3rd Corps is sending, in terms of logistics, mortars, artillery,

3 et cetera. So there are documents showing that as of the 21st of January,

4 weapons are being sent.

5 However, you have just said that Gornji Vakuf was rounded,

6 encircled, and my understand was that you were explaining that these

7 dispatches could not reach you because you were encircled. Could you tell

8 us whether during this period of time you were really encircled and that

9 you received nothing from the 3rd Corps?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Some of the equipment reached us

11 through mountain roads via the village of Vrse. When on the 22nd

12 Ali Pasa's hill was taken, all communication was interrupted with the

13 outside world.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So within Gornji Vakuf you did

15 not have the mentioned reinforcement -- reinforcements in materiel.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Nothing reached the town from what

17 was sent by the 1st Corps.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Here it says that shells arrived, not mortars, shells for mortars.

20 A. General, one cannot have 120-millimetre mortar. Where can I shoot

21 at with it? It's impossible. You took the relay station, the Partisan

22 cemetery. You were holding Zvizde, Grebine. The features that I have

23 mentioned, it's so nearby that you can recognise people. It's about 150

24 metres as the crows fly.

25 Q. But, Brigadier, that is the best evidence that you are presenting

1 to show that the HVO being in such a position did not want to take control

2 of Gornji Vakuf. Not a single soldier who was in such a position and who

3 at the beginning of the story aimed at taking control of Gornji Vakuf

4 would not have missed such a chance. You don't have to be a military

5 expert to know that.

6 From what you say -- tell me you don't agree. But from what you

7 are telling us, it is quite clear, but you can say, "I don't agree," my

8 question is: Is it clear from that, that -- the struggle, the combat

9 started in a different way and that the aim of the HVO was to deblock the

10 very poor position that it found itself in because of the trenches dug by

11 the ABiH so that the HVO had to make another road? Is that right?

12 A. No, you're not right.

13 Q. Very well. 3D 00502, please. I have just two more documents and

14 the map. I'll be through in a minute.

15 That is the document. Again, it is dated the 21st of February,

16 1993. The command of the 3rd -- of the 4th Corps. It is the Republic of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ABiH, state commission.

18 Esad Ramic, you will agree, was a member of the state commission

19 for the cease-fire between the HVO and the ABiH.

20 A. Yes. There's a document showing that. We saw it yesterday.

21 Q. And he says: "The commission worked in two parts today. One part

22 with European Community and UN observers or -- that is UNPROFOR. They

23 went to Pajic Polje so as to discuss with local commanders of the ABiH and

24 the HVO the assignments regarding the withdrawal of local units and the

25 filling in of trenches, the filling in of positions. They were given a

1 deadline for the completion of works, which was specified by a plan. The

2 other part of the commission went to the broader region of the village of

3 Bistrica to jointly check to make sure whether all the bunkers and

4 shelters and trenches had been filled in and units withdrawn because the

5 agreed deadline has passed."

6 And furthermore regarding Mr. Pasalic -- for Mr. Pasalic. "Today

7 at a meeting the deputy commander of the HVO Rama Brigade from Prozor

8 complained that last night there was a fierce attack by the ABiH from the

9 direction of the villages of Here, Scipe and others, and requested that

10 UNPROFOR and the European Community and the mixed commission go there to

11 that region. It is my view that the attack must be stopped and that the

12 men you have sent there should" -- will you move the text up, please --

13 "should work on the organisation of the defence and strengthening the

14 military organisation rather than attacking, because all operations in

15 Gornji Vakuf have been halted.

16 "Signed on behalf of the ABiH, a member of the commission, Esad

17 Ramic."

18 My question is: Is it clear from this that -- that it is a

19 question of implementing the truce, bringing units to Makljen, sending

20 sabotage units? And this is testified to by Esad Ramic, a member of the

21 commission for the cease-fire. Is that true?

22 A. I don't know about Prozor, whether this is true that on the 21st

23 immediately after the cessation of hostilities in Gornji Vakuf, it is

24 clear from the report from Bistrica.

25 Q. Does it say here that the most important thing is to fill in the

1 bunkers and trenches?

2 A. Colonel Siljeg at the commission meeting said he will not fill

3 them in. He will, rather, capture them. And that is when the problem

4 arose. The next morning he attacked Ali Pasa's hill.

5 Q. Very well. So you're saying that we have a situation with

6 Gornji Vakuf being surrounded. The HVO has cannon, artillery, mortars,

7 more than a thousand men coming from another region. You do not have any

8 artillery inside. You do not have anyone else coming from the outside.

9 You are surrounded. And just then the HVO demands a cease-fire. The

10 cease-fire is being signed, and the offensive operations by the army

11 continue.

12 Is this visible from all the documents that have been shown? Is

13 it as clear as clear can be?

14 A. You keep saying that I am not attacking you. Show me a single

15 feature that the army attacked and captured in this period of time.

16 Q. Mr. Agic, I never claimed that HVO or army BiH attacking. My

17 thesis is completely different. I will put it to you and you may agree

18 with it or you may say it is not true.

19 It follows as this: The fear that existed among army BiH after

20 Prozor because of possible incidents caused trenches to be dug on all

21 important elevations around the city of Vakuf. HVO insisted over one and

22 a half months at the end of 1992 for such a position -- that if such a

23 position was militarily untenable because HVO units and the part of the

24 town, smaller part which was Croatian, were put in such a position that it

25 was possible from your part to effect an attack at any time. For

1 instance, there were two lines Releg Krci [phoen], and the one on Radusa,

2 and for these reasons, for mutual fear, they engendered -- this fear

3 engendered tensions. And the conflict grew step by step; first some

4 shooting in the city, then unruly units on the part of the Croats, the

5 so-called HOS, although it was not under the command of Tokic. On your

6 part, Hanefija Prijic over which you had no command or control, who in

7 1993 killed three humanitarian workers from Italy. You had drunken

8 people, cafes which were open, and the conflict grew spontaneously because

9 of different options from the military point of view. You were afraid of

10 the HVO. HVO was afraid of you digging trenches. There was no plan to

11 this attack.

12 I did not say that you attacked, but can you agree or you may say

13 that my thesis is incorrect?

14 A. I would not comment. I will neither confirm or say otherwise.

15 There's no need for that. I don't believe that anything happened by

16 chance. Yesterday we read commands that you referred to that we were --

17 we had to become subordinated to the HVO in the Croatian provinces.

18 It is true that a number of incidents intensified the situation

19 and blame can be discussed.

20 Q. Yes, this is my basic thesis. It is said in the report of the

21 3rd Corps about the ultimatum. Their express position of the HVO as they

22 state, I can go back to document but I like the term, the filling in the

23 trenches and the return of units which do not hail from that period to go

24 home, and this is the only position. And when the cease-fire was signed,

25 exactly that is stated in the cease-fire agreement. Units to be sent home

1 and the trenches to be filled in. And we've heard that in testimony of

2 several witnesses. Is that true?

3 A. We did that after the 14th of February with great difficulties.

4 Q. 3D 00542, my last document. 3D 00542. It is a handwritten memo

5 signed by Mr. Jasmin Jaganjac.

6 My question: Do you know who Jasmin Jaganjac was? Say yes or no.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you know that at that point in time Mr. Jasmin Jaganjac was a

9 military advisor to the President Alija Izetbegovic?

10 A. If the 12th of February, 1992, is the correct date, then this may

11 not be so.

12 Q. This is exactly what we're going to refer to. It is clear that

13 this refers to 1993. From the content this is 1993. You will see from

14 the content of the letter that it refers to events in 1993. Let me read

15 it out to you.

16 "During today's contacts with General Praljak and General Cermak,

17 I agreed that a certain amount of equipment and materiel to be sent to

18 Pazaric, and I specify: 300.000 rounds, 200 pieces for RPG, and 20 pieces

19 of Maljutka.

20 "Materiel is symbolic, but passage has been ensured."

21 This was addressed from Zagreb to Mr. Alija Izetbegovic on that

22 date in 1993, the 20th of February.

23 "I gave to Mr. Praljak and Mr. Susak," Susak refers to the

24 Minister of Defence of Croatia, "your proposal of a statement that you

25 forwarded to Mr. Boban as a proposal."

1 Could you please scroll down.

2 "They believe that it's quite approximate, and they admitted that

3 they have not studied it sufficiently.

4 "In answering to my question whether they've given up HZ

5 Herceg-Bosna, General Praljak said that this no longer existed and that

6 there is a period of transition that will be necessary."

7 I will skip a part. I believe that we got stuck on item 5,

8 insignia.

9 "Praljak believes that this will not be a problem for -- apart

10 from the state flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina to have a provincial flag. If

11 any dispute were to arise, I will inform you tomorrow. Since General

12 Praljak is travelling to Herzegovina tomorrow and after that to Central

13 Bosnia, he asked me to relay to you that he wishes you to appoint one or

14 two highly regarded Muslim politicians who would together with him visit

15 Central Bosnia and try to influence in the direction of further diffusion

16 of tensions."

17 Later on, we cannot read it out, the letter refers to some ploys

18 and back-stabbing within the SDA and other political structures.

19 Therefore, is it clear here that on the 12th of February while

20 fighting is going on in Vakuf, I organised convoys of munitions for ABiH

21 towards Pazaric? Is it stated so here in this letter? Does it state

22 here?

23 A. This is too serious to be written in longhand.

24 Q. Does it say so?

25 A. Yes, it does say so here.

1 Q. May I repeat my question? In this period, whether Mr. Jasmin

2 Jaganjac was military advisor to President Alija Izetbegovic

3 A. Whether he was an officer of the Croatian army or HVO.

4 Q. Are you questioning me?

5 A. I know in April 1993, because there is photo of him, but I never

6 saw him before that time with President Izetbegovic.

7 Q. Mr. Agic, we are both officers. Your task is not to ask me

8 questions. I have the right to put questions to you.

9 My question to you is whether you know that Mr. Jasmin Jaganjac

10 was at that time personal military advisor to President Izetbegovic.

11 A. I don't know whether at that particular time he was personal

12 military advisor to President Izetbegovic.

13 Q. Does it state here that Praljak and Susak state and ask him to

14 relay to President Izetbegovic that by signing of the Vance-Owen Plan or

15 any other plan to be agreed upon by the side that there would be a

16 termination of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna? Does it state

17 here?

18 A. I commented. I could have written this myself.

19 Q. Does it state so?

20 A. Yes, in -- under item 3.

21 Q. Yes, under item 3. And the last exhibit concerning this, whether

22 you know that Mr. Jasmin Jaganjac was a Croatian army officer.

23 A. I heard talk about that.

24 Q. Do you know that we asked him that in his capacity of a Croatian

25 army officer to take over the command of the HVO in the city of Mostar in

1 May 1992? Do you know that?

2 A. I don't know that.

3 Q. Do you know that Mr. Jasmin Jaganjac is a Muslim?

4 A. I don't know. I have no reason to doubt that.

5 Q. Therefore, a Muslim, Jasmin Jaganjac, was brought to Mostar in May

6 1992 to become commander of the HVO. Do you know that or not?

7 A. I heard that he was in HVO in Mostar.

8 Q. May we see the map? It is an exhibit. You take a look at the

9 map. It's 3D 00543.

10 On the basis of all the reports that have been read out in this

11 courtroom, be it from the HVO or the army BiH, 3rd Corps, 4th Corps,

12 brigades, et cetera, et cetera, we prepared this map with a deployment of

13 forces on the 12th of January, 1991, and it was later on amended, those

14 serpentine forms, indicating where the Neretvica Brigade had to be

15 deployed and where different sabotage groups had to be infiltrated in the

16 rear all within the ranks of the HVO.

17 Mr. Brigadier, would you take a look at this map.

18 A. Is this the state of affairs on the 12th of January, 1993?

19 Q. Yes, that's correct. So 12th of January, 1993.

20 Blue lines denote the positions of the HVO, and green denotes the

21 positions controlled by the army BiH, and arrows indicate the further

22 developments, green and blue arrows.

23 My question would be: Next to Gornji Vakuf, elevation 128, then

24 Strmica 785, then the next elevation 785, in a row those above the main

25 road. My question is whether you controlled these positions from June

1 1992 from well-fortified positions.

2 A. Absolutely not.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, General, we have

4 to be more precise here. General Praljak is showing us a map with the

5 positions of the ABiH and of the HVO.

6 Now, do you agree with these positions, or are you saying that

7 they are not correct?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I indicate two

9 errors? This map is not true.

10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Could you indicate them?

12 A. Mr. Praljak, did you come to the Gornji Vakuf command

13 headquarters? Please answer this question.

14 Q. Probably in 1992.

15 A. At this period and the 15th or 20 -- 25th -- the 31st of January.

16 Q. No. I came on the night of the 15th and 16th of January to put a

17 stop to all this, but we will leave it be.

18 A. In a document HVO states that army of BiH took control of the

19 right bank of Vrbas at Batusa, then Branovaca [phoen] alongside the Vrbas

20 River, and those alleged positions are parallel. I must tell you that

21 this is the road that the HVO used and used to travel down to come command

22 headquarters which was adjacent to the UNPROFOR, and they controlled this

23 road all the time until the 4th of August, 1993.

24 Below Batusa in the northern direction there was no members of the

25 ABiH. They used this communication, this road, regularly, and we had to

1 use APCs of the UN to get there.

2 Q. But this -- it states here -- I'm asking you about Karamustafic.

3 A. We can start from here.

4 Q. Grebine, Zvizde, who controlled the elevations around the city?

5 A. Zvizde was controlled by the HVO continuously. We never held that

6 position, the ABiH. And you rolled barrels full of explosives from that

7 position.

8 Q. Until the August of 1993 we did not control this.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm looking at the map, the one

10 that General Praljak has just produced, and he's showing the positions of

11 both sides. We can see Gornji Vakuf and we can see Batusa.

12 Now, according to General Praljak, the HVO was deployed along that

13 area and the ABiH was between Gornji Vakuf and Batusa. They were also

14 deployed. And to the rear at elevation 733, Zvizde, you were also there

15 too. Now, is that true or is it false?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, outside of Sicaja

17 towards to Gornji Vakuf, to Krup, Franjkovac, north of the Batusa area,

18 there were no BH army members. They used the road to bring in supplies,

19 and that's where the Ante Starcevic Brigade command was throughout.

20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

21 Q. You're saying the right thing. You used the road from the Sicaja

22 pump, because at Karamustafic everything was blocked.

23 Now, there was a witness here and she testified under a pseudonym

24 and stated -- she's from a village around that area. She said that they

25 made a road of salvation. Now, this road of salvation went from Sicaja to

1 the village of Podgradje.

2 A. This road of salvation is the synonym for something else that was

3 going on.

4 Q. We had another road of salvation where 200.000 -- or thousands of

5 people passed through. This is from Sicaja to Podgradje.

6 Now, I'm asking you this: Why did the HVO on the basis of

7 testimony from a lady Bosniak Muslim witness had to devise this road of

8 salvation with allies like yourself? Why? And this is something that the

9 witness said.

10 A. The -- you made the road -- or route through Uzricje after you had

11 taken control of Uzricje and made a road for yourself, a path for

12 yourself, so that you could communicate unimpededly. But I'm saying that

13 the map does not reflect the situation as it was on the 12th of January or

14 throughout January and February.

15 The BiH army was never in Franjkovac. It was never north of

16 Batusa. You used that route to go to the headquarters, to come and go,

17 and that's where the headquarters worked throughout that time. That's

18 where they were. And I say that with full responsibility. Zvizde is a

19 feature to the right of the Vrbas, looking at it from Makljen, the Makljen

20 direction, right by the settlement at Odvode and another part of town

21 which I've forgotten what the name of was.

22 Mr. President, the ABiH army was never there, which means that's

23 map is not correct.

24 Q. I can assure you that the positions --

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, please. I have

1 another question.

2 We had witnesses here -- and I'd like to clear this point up.

3 Next to Gornji Vakuf there is the village of Dusa and [indiscernible].

4 General Praljak is saying that those two villages were, in a way,

5 surrounded by ABiH troops, because we can see the green line right round

6 this area. Now, is that true or not?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Uzricje was surrounded. There was

8 no need to surround Dusina because there were no soldiers there.

9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Unfortunately, the witnesses who were here challenged that and

11 said something quite different, but never mind.

12 You said that you were the commander of the town. You said that

13 expressly.

14 A. Yes, General, I was.

15 Q. But how do you know who was in the villages and what the situation

16 was like there?

17 A. Well, it's not thousands of square kilometres, this territory.

18 It's much smaller.

19 Q. But did you go with the 317th or did you move around or did you

20 stick to the town?

21 A. Well, I know the situation in the villages because part of the

22 people who survived came into town, and we had the problem of finding

23 accommodation and taking care of them.

24 Q. But did you tour the area with your own two feet?

25 A. I never left town.

1 Q. Thank you, sir. I'm very sorry that we haven't got more time, but

2 thank you, sir.

3 A. Thank you, too.

4 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I'd like to thank the Bench

5 as well.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Next Defence team.

7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Before the next Defence team takes

8 the floor, I have two corrections for the record. Perhaps we could put

9 that right straight away or shall we leave it until the end of the day?

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead.

11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] On page 3, line 16, you gave us the

12 exhibit number 3D 00476 and then the number was repeated 476 where it

13 should have said 3D 00475 and 3D 00476. That would be the correct record.

14 The next thing I'd like to put right is on page 12, line 20. It

15 says the 14th of November, and that was the statement from the witness.

16 It should have read the 14th of January, and we can see that from the

17 previous text where the witness says two days after that, and that was the

18 12th of January. So it follows that the correct date should be the 14th.

19 I have another correction to the interpretation, but we can go

20 into that tomorrow or, rather, next week. I won't take any of your time

21 up with that.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as page 3, line 16 is

23 concerned, it was 3D 00475. You're quite right. That was the right

24 number.

25 Next Defence team.

1 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

2 The time allotted to us by the Court for the cross-examination we shall be

3 sharing with my client. My client and I will be sharing that time.

4 Cross-examination by Ms. Tomasegovic Tomic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, before I begin, I'd just like to tell you

6 that you have the number of the documents on a slip by the side of the

7 document, but you needn't refer to the folder yet.

8 Tell me, please, sir -- and I'd like to follow on from what

9 General Petkovic was discussing with you, and he asked you about plan B.

10 You said that you had never heard of plan B because you were in charge of

11 Gornji Vakuf, if I understood you correctly. Is that right?

12 A. You mean what was mentioned in General Hadzihasanovic's order?

13 Q. No. Plan B, 1992, the month of September.

14 A. No. I never ever saw any document like that.

15 Q. Tell me, please, do you happen to remember whether in September

16 1992 the commander of the TO Staff in Prozor was Mr. Muharem Sabic?

17 A. Yes, he was.

18 Q. Now, may we have on e-court document P 00430. You have it in

19 front you.

20 We see at the top, while we're waiting for the document, that it

21 is the TO Staff. The date is the 1st of September, 1992. It's note a

22 view clear copy, but I think you will agree that it is the 1st of

23 September nonetheless. It is signed by Commander Muharem Sabic. The

24 title of the document is the plan of defence for Prozor municipality, and

25 I'd like to draw your attention to the last few paragraphs.

1 I'm going to read them out slowly. And it says here: "The first

2 option is plan Elif, which would be carried out in a coordinated action

3 with HVO units, formations, in accordance with document Alfa. The second

4 option is plan B, which would be carried out independently or in

5 coordinated action with the TO units in neighbouring municipalities

6 (Gornji Vakuf, Konjic, and Jablanica) in accordance with document Beta

7 herewith attached."

8 Now my question is as follows: In view of the first paragraph I

9 read out and the time period that we're discussing here, at that time the

10 HVO and the Territorial Defence or, rather, the BH army were allies, were

11 they not? Is that right? Fighting a joint aggressor of the --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, this leads me to a logical conclusion. I mean, you'll tell

14 me if I'm right. In view of the second paragraph, which considers the

15 possibility of the HVO and the Territorial Defence not being allies

16 anymore but adversaries, in view of the fact that they weren't included

17 together. Have I understood that correctly? That seems to me to be

18 logical.

19 A. This is the first time that I see this document. It was another

20 area, so I don't know about that, and I don't know whether you'll believe

21 me or not, but this is the first time that I'm hearing of these two plans.

22 Q. But now that you've read these documents -- this document in front

23 of you, would that be logical to you? If you say you don't know, we can

24 move on.

25 A. I don't wish to comment.

1 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to have on e-court the following document

2 and it is P 00687. You have it before you. And it is connected with the

3 previous document. So I'd just like to ask you -- or, rather, to read out

4 certain portions of the document. It is from the security and information

5 service, the SIS, of the Croatian Defence Council compiled in Prozor on

6 the 1st of November, 1992. It is a report on clashes between the HVO and

7 the ABiH in the Prozor area. And I'm going to read out paragraph 3, which

8 reads as follows:

9 "Based on a large number of statements taken from detained ABiH

10 members as well as documentation seized from the ABiH, we learn that a

11 plan for the neutralisation of the HVO in certain areas and establishment

12 of full ABiH command had been made and prepared in advance. ABiH TG-1,

13 Tactical Group 1, had two plans, the Alfa plan by which the ABiH units

14 would act in cooperation with the HVO units against the Serb forces, and

15 the better plan by which only ABiH units would act" -- I think it says

16 TG-1 there -- "in case of clashes with the internal enemy, and in this

17 case we know who that enemy is.

18 "According to a statement by Ekrem Ubijar, Official Note number

19 01-71/92, given on the occasion of a meeting with some ABiH unit

20 commanders from neighbouring areas, the following information was

21 provided.

22 "Mustafa Here cautioned those present that there would be clashes

23 between the HVO and ABiH units, and he issued tasks to them as well as the

24 axes of operations.

25 "In the Makljen area, in a place called Crni Vrh, there was

1 already a small unit from Prozor which was supposed to be a reconnaissance

2 unit and controlled the already existing HVO units in this part of

3 Makljen. It would meet the OS BH units from Voljevac and Boljkovac and

4 serve as their guide.

5 The units of the village of Pridvorci were attacked at HVO point

6 on Menjik ridge and take the village of Glibe. The members of the armed

7 forces of BH of the villages of Here, Kute, and Scipe, should take control

8 of the village of Jurici and ensure safe passage from these roads to

9 Prozor -- along those reads to Prozor and a breakthrough to the village of

10 Uzdol which is where the HVO forces were located. The members of the OSB

11 Kranjcici and parts of the village of Donji Vasti should neutralise" --

12 now, this is illegible and we can only see a few letters, "Rasim Pilav,

13 commander of a private unit, should enforce a blockade of the road in the

14 lower part of the municipality towards Prozor, i.e., control the main road

15 from Jablanica to Prozor and neutralise the Croatian part of Kranjcici

16 village, while the other Muslim villages would serve as reinforcement to

17 the town.

18 "In this plan were included units from the rest of Gornji Vakuf,

19 or more exactly the Green Beret units, under the command of a man called

20 Paraga, the OS BH Konjic units, and the OS BH Jablanica units were also in

21 this plan."

22 I'm skipping two paragraphs and moving on to a paragraph starting

23 with the words "units from the village -- from the direction of the

24 village of Boljkovac and Voljevac."

25 This is how it reads: "Units from the direction of the village of

1 Boljkovac and Voljevac have partially been successful in carrying out

2 their task, and in cooperation with the unit withdrawn from the front line

3 they took control of part of the Makljen area and killed an HVO member in

4 the area who was driving a tractor with firewood for the winter. They did

5 this from an ambush from the rear. And they pushed back the considerably

6 stronger HVO -- more numerical HVO forces from the area. A strong unit

7 from the direction of the village of Pridvorci broke up the Menjik point

8 held by the HVO, took control of the village of Glibe, where an HVO member

9 lost his life, and two others were captured, and they set fire to this

10 part of the village.

11 "Units from the direction of the village of Here took control of

12 the village of Jurici and set fire to some buildings followed by an

13 unsuccessful attempt to breakthrough to the village of Uzdol."

14 And now I'm just going to lead the last sentence which is the

15 first sentence of the last paragraph, where it says as follows: "Rasim

16 Pilav's private unit attempted a breakthrough in the direction of

17 Kranjcici but failed."

18 Now, why have I read out all this to you. Regardless of the fact

19 that you told me earlier on that you did not know of any plans, Alfa and

20 Beta, are any of these events or military operations or names I've read

21 from this document familiar to you for that period?

22 A. I'd first of all like to take a look at plans Alfa and Beta,

23 because when I say that I didn't see them nor was there any talk of this

24 plan with the armed forces, I say that with full responsibility. But I do

25 know of this event when Prozor was taken and when the first echelon of HVO

1 units reached Menjik and the army responded. We -- I think this is common

2 knowledge. We used Maljutkas to fire. We missed, and that's the truth of

3 it. The army had an order to do that, and some of the forces withdrew

4 from Prozor and we were told to take them in. But it doesn't say here

5 that the town had been attacked anywhere.

6 During this period, the 24th I went to Jablanica to attend a

7 meeting on that day. Prozor was on fire that day. There was looting.

8 People had been taken prisoner.

9 Q. Just a moment, please. Sir, if I need additional explanations

10 I'll ask you. All I was interested in -- or, rather, I know that you have

11 a lot to tell us, but this document doesn't cover the entire situation in

12 Prozor either before the events or after the events. All that I was

13 interested in was whether any of these events actually took place. Now,

14 why they took place, why they happened and so on?

15 A. The unit in Pridvorje was involved in the conflict in Prozor.

16 Otherwise, the rest of the developments of these events was not properly

17 described.

18 Q. Right. We'll move on, and this is my last area that I wish to ask

19 you about and it is this: Among other things, there was mention, if you

20 remember, of that special report by Mr. Cikotic where the Mujahedin are

21 mentioned, to remind you of that.

22 At the time you said in answer to a question from the Judge that

23 you were not aware of these Mujahedin because in those days in Central

24 Bosnia there were not a single -- there wasn't a single Mujahedin unit.

25 You don't know which Mujahedin this refers to, and the El Mujahid unit was

1 formed after that period. That is what you said.

2 A. Yes, that is so more or less.

3 Q. You were in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Corps. Will you

4 please -- you nodded your head when I asked you whether you were in the

5 zone of responsibility of the 3rd Corps.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Could we now have document P 01318.

8 You have it in your bundle. You have it in Croatian and in

9 English. The English first and then the Croatian.

10 A. Is it a military report?

11 Q. Yes, it is a military report of a brigade battalion for the

12 27th of January, 1993.

13 THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry, of the British Battalion,

14 interpreter's correction.

15 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Will you look at the second paragraph, please. As far as I know,

17 Travnik is about 30 kilometres from Gornji Vakuf. Is that right?

18 A. No, not 30. You asked me whether it was 30.

19 Q. Well, how far is it?

20 A. I don't know exactly, but it's much more. It is 32 kilometres to

21 Donji Vakuf, and then if you had to go to Bugojno 18, Novi Travnik

22 another 20, and then Travnik and Novi Travnik another 10 kilometres.

23 Q. So up to 50 kilometres. Would that be right? If I've added up

24 correctly.

25 Let us look at the second paragraph, now, which says: "Normally a

1 reliable source has provided additional information on the 7th Muslim

2 Brigade. He confirmed that this brigade is commanded from Zenica with

3 battalions deployed within the area of the 3rd Corps. A battalion from

4 the 7th Brigade is deployed on the front line in the Travnik area.

5 Members of the battalion consider themselves Mujahedin in every sense.

6 The majority of members are staunch practising Muslims recruited from the

7 local area. Although this particular battalion was instructed by two

8 Iranians, the source claims that the brigade has, at most, 100 to 150

9 foreign Mujahedin from Islamic countries."

10 Tell me, are you familiar with this?

11 A. You said that I said that there were no Mujahedin. I continue to

12 claim this. In Rostov and in the Gornji Vakuf area there were never

13 Mujahedin units. A platoon of soldiers in the Rostov hotel belonged to

14 the 7th Muslim brigade. How they declared themselves I don't know, but

15 they were part of the 7th Muslim Brigade. It was officially a brigade of

16 the 3rd Corps of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17 Q. Where is Rostov?

18 A. It is between Bugojno and Novi Travnik.

19 Q. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

20 Cross-examination by the Accused Coric:

21 Q. [Interpretation] Brigadier, I am Valentin Coric, and I have some

22 questions for you.

23 I would start with the 23rd of October, 1992. Yesterday you spoke

24 about that date when it was said that at the Karamustafic check-point a

25 unit of the military police was stopped that was heading towards Central

1 Bosnia or, rather, Jajce. Is that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You also said yesterday that you had an order from a senior

4 command not to allow this unit to pass to Central Bosnia.

5 A. Yes, because of the conflict in Novi Travnik.

6 Q. I will use the reports that have already been used here and some

7 which will be used in future. I won't quote -- I will just quote from

8 some of those documents.

9 When on the 23rd, and I wish to remind you that on that day there

10 was a conflict in Prozor, the military police reached the Karamustafic

11 check-point, and the commander was immediately told that they couldn't

12 pass. The order on passage was issued -- was it issued before the

13 military police reached the check-point?

14 A. Could you tell me, was it a mixed check-point?

15 Q. The check-point was manned exclusively by members of the BH army

16 police.

17 A. That is not true. You must learn that the check-point was

18 informed and that Tokic agreed that the unit shouldn't pass that evening,

19 and I said that I had received orders from General Hadzihasanovic not to

20 allow transports of -- and convoys of any kind to pass.

21 Q. Did you pass through that check-point?

22 A. I was disarmed at that check-point two days later.

23 Q. Were there any logs there?

24 A. Not logs, but four engineering hedgehogs as soldiers call them.

25 Q. What were they made of?

1 A. They were made of iron.

2 Q. I see. I have quite a different report.

3 A. I know, because I and Zrinko together formed that check-point.

4 Q. We'll come to that later. So there were tree-trunks, and behind

5 them were only members of the military police of the BH army. That is

6 something that we will see from the documents and that we have already

7 seen. Let me move on.

8 Talking about the military police in Gornji Vakuf, who was the

9 commander of the military police at the time?

10 A. I think it was Mico, Bandic Miro, and Slavan Kvestic [phoen], one

11 of the two.

12 Q. I'm talking about ABiH military police, not the HVO military

13 police. Who was the commander of the military police of the ABiH?

14 A. The commander of the police of the 317th Brigade was, I think,

15 Hadzijusufovic.

16 Q. Hadzijusufovic. Let us move on.

17 We are now moving on to January 1993. At the beginning of the

18 month the atmosphere was tense between the HVO and the BH army; is that

19 right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. At the beginning of the month the first incidents occurred; is

22 that right?

23 A. They continued through December but intensified in January.

24 Q. I'm talking about the incidents in January. For instance, the

25 motel was blown up in Gornji Vakuf; is that right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Who was based in the motel in Gornji Vakuf?

3 A. The civilian police was put up there and the reserve police of the

4 MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 A. The answer is no, but I have documents showing that the

6 Green Berets were put up there.

7 Q. There were no Green Berets in Gornji Vakuf. I don't have time,

8 but we'll come back to that.

9 Was Hanefija Piric, known as Paraga, in Gornji Vakuf at

10 the time?

11 A. Not Piric but Prijic.

12 Q. Yes. That evening when the motel was blown up, which housed only

13 ABiH forces, do you know that Paraga was in the motel that evening?

14 A. I don't know, but it was not only the army units. It -- the motel

15 was under the control of the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 Q. I am claiming that Paraga was there that evening, that he had a

17 unit there. What was his relationship with the military police?

18 A. I know we had some problems with him.

19 Q. That was not my question. What was his relationship with the

20 military police of the BH army in Gornji Vakuf?

21 A. He was a commander who was relieved of his duties.

22 Q. Who?

23 A. Prijic Paraga.

24 Q. Was he a member of the military police that evening when this

25 happened?

1 A. No.

2 Q. The documents will show otherwise, let us move on.

3 After this blowing up of the motel, who carried out an

4 investigation to establish what actually happened at the motel?

5 A. I think the investigation was conducted by the public security

6 station.

7 Q. That is what you believe? Is it -- was the military police of the

8 HVO allowed to participate in the investigation? Do you know this or not?

9 Was it allowed or not?

10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. Thank you. Do you know when this explosion occurred how many

12 people were wounded or killed as a result of the explosion?

13 A. I don't know.

14 Q. I am claiming that no one was killed or wounded.

15 A. I really don't know.

16 Q. Thank you. That is an answer too. Let us move on.

17 At the time you were one of the most responsible people in

18 Gornji Vakuf. What happened in Gornji Vakuf after this explosion at the

19 motel?

20 A. You must give me a date.

21 Q. Well, let's say what happened in the village of Bistrica? Do you

22 remember that three Croat civilians were killed, massacred? Do you

23 remember that?

24 A. Will you please give me the date?

25 Q. The beginning of January 1993. The first day after the motel it

1 explosion.

2 A. I don't remember the date.

3 Q. We have it in many documents. The day after the explosion.

4 A. Please give me a time, a framework.

5 Q. It's my mistake that I don't know the exact date.

6 A. It was before the 10th of January. I really don't know.

7 Q. Okay. Fine. And then something of great significance occurred in

8 my opinion. This is before the conflict.

9 Brigadier, so three civilians were killed and massacred. And one

10 day at a joint check-point, Pavlovica and Karamustafic, where at that

11 point in time the military police of the ABiH army and the military police

12 of the HVO were manning this check-point jointly, was it? Was that true?

13 A. Karamustafic, yes, but at Pavlovica, never.

14 Q. Thank you. So we'll talk only about Karamustafic. Members of the

15 military police were captured and detained of the HVO by the ABiH in

16 Gornji Vakuf. Do you remember that?

17 A. I do not.

18 Q. Now let me see if you remember the following that I'm going to ask

19 you about. Do you remember that members of the HVO in connection with

20 this - so that is the capture of the military police - detained several

21 members of the BH army at the beginning of January 1993? Do you remember

22 that?

23 A. I am really sorry that I'm unable to answer, because you are not

24 giving me a time frame.

25 Q. All this happened within a period of five days.

1 A. There were so many events in those days. I really can't remember

2 half of those things that you are referring to, minor or major events.

3 These events followed one another at great speed.

4 Q. I was in another state when this happened, but you were on the

5 spot and you are not aware of it. But never mind, I'll move on.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could there be pauses between questions and

7 answers, please.

8 THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. I won't let you give speeches here. Their Honours have given me a

10 fixed amount of time. I'm trying to throw light on certain events that

11 are important.

12 What happened was that the HVO detained several members of the BH

13 army. After the first incident, do you remember that these members of the

14 ABiH army were arrested and detained?

15 A. I don't remember either events.

16 Q. Then you don't remember the exchange either?

17 A. No, I don't. The police -- I was not always aware of what the

18 police were doing. They belonged to the 317th Brigade.

19 Q. In those days in Gornji Vakuf there was the MUP of Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. The military police of the BH army.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. The military police of the HVO.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. The civilian police of 150 men attached to the republic's MUP.

2 Did they have their own unit?

3 A. It didn't have so many men, but they didn't have so many men of

4 the republic MUP.

5 Q. And there were two Military Intelligence Services. Do you

6 remember that?

7 A. I know what happened on this side, but it was roughly the same on

8 the other side too.

9 Q. Do you agree with me that there were check-points set up by

10 military units in Gornji Vakuf?

11 A. That also existed.

12 Q. Can you confirm that it is the duty of the police to put up

13 check-points in town or in villages?

14 A. If they had reason to do so, yes.

15 Q. I will read from a document that has been shown here, so will you

16 just confirm or deny this. I'm going back to the month of October 1992.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Coric, we must have the

18 break now because we have been working for more than an hour and a half,

19 and we will resume at 6.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 5.42 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 6.03 p.m.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

23 Mr. Coric.

24 THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Brigadier, I'm going to read out to you a short excerpt from a

1 document P 00712. You don't have to follow it on the screen. I'm going

2 to read out the salient part.

3 I quote: "On the 24th of October, all units of ABiH are put into

4 a combat readiness at 0500 hours. They take positions around the city."

5 Gornji Vakuf is what is meant. "The trunk road through Gornji Vakuf at

6 the place of Karamustafic is blockaded as well as all other local roads.

7 Around 1800 hours an explosive device is thrown into a cafe owned by a

8 person of Croat ethnicity in the part of the city controlled by the

9 members of the ABiH, and after that armed conflict ensued. Street

10 fighting lasted for around one hour when commander of -- Chief of Staff of

11 the ABiH, Mr. Tokic, prohibited members of the HVO to open fire. After

12 street fighting, members of the HVO take control of all factories and put

13 them under their control."

14 Brigadier, do you remember these events?

15 A. I do remember these events. But the explosive device was not

16 thrown in my earlier -- this was the cafe of Mr. Kovacevic, aka Ota, but

17 it wasn't opened.

18 And with respect to the facilities, they were divided. I don't

19 know what could have been struggled over and captured.

20 Q. Thank you. I'm going to continue, and I will touch upon what I

21 deem to be the most important problem in Gornji Vakuf.

22 Incidents followed day in and day out. You said that half an

23 hour ago.

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 Q. In my opinion, you do not remember Mr. Paraga sufficiently. By

1 this I mean Prijic. It says here Piric. I'm going to quote from three or

2 two documents referring to that person. These are court documents.

3 The first document, and I'm going to refer to their number, and

4 I'm going to give you very short quotes. So document or excerpt from

5 P 00952, says "Gornji Vakuf."

6 "In the municipality of Gornji Vakuf there were no problems

7 before the position of the military police commander of the HBH [as

8 interpreted] before Mr. Piric, aka Paraga, was made commander. By his --

9 when he approached check-point at Pavlovica, Croats were disarmed, side

10 weapons, vehicles, and other effects, personal effects. And mostly no

11 receipts are given for such items which are seized.

12 "Three vehicles from Prozor were also seized which were at the

13 time in Gornji Vakuf. And to -- in order not to let this happen and

14 continue from HVO military police from Gornji Vakuf made sure to disarm

15 members of the ABiH which -- for which they did not have any licence to

16 carry arms." This is what it meant. "But receipts are issued to such

17 persons about personal effects or weapons seized. The Karamustafic

18 check-point on the road between Gornji Vakuf and Prozor is operational

19 only in day-time, and around 2000 hours both police forces would withdraw

20 from that check-point."

21 And you're going to be advised subsequently. And this was the

22 report sent to me by heads of military police in the relevant time.

23 Was the atmosphere like this as depicted in Gornji Vakuf?

24 A. Yes. We had problems with the functioning of this check-point,

25 Zrinko and I as well.

1 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to quote from another document which

2 refers to Mr. Paraga but also sheds light on another matter. It's

3 2D 0023. This is a report from a meeting of ECMMs, ABiH, and HVO. The

4 report says: "One of the representatives of the European Community stated

5 publicly that all new problems are created by the army of BiH. He was

6 embittered because planned visits of the Voljica village, Jagnjik, and

7 Osrijedak could not be visited in a planned manner, and this was

8 pre-empted by Paraga who said that the trenches would not be filled in,

9 that there would be no peace or cease-fire before six people of his were

10 released."

11 Do you remember this event concerning the power of Mr. Paraga who

12 could prevent people from UNPROFOR, ECMM, ABiH, et cetera?

13 A. These trenches were filled in eventually.

14 Q. I did not ask you about the filling in of the trenches.

15 THE INTERPRETER: The answer eluded the interpreter because

16 there's plenty of overlap, Your Honours.

17 THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. This is a report by a member of the ECMM at Gornji Vakuf. I'm not

19 going to refer to his name. He said that he was a witness at a meeting

20 and that the commander of the ABiH was familiar with him, and it was 31st

21 of May, 1993, and he said that the same person, Paraga, he intercepted

22 humanitarians from Italy, five persons, beyond Paljevica, in the woods,

23 out of whom three were killed by his subordinates on the spot and two

24 survivors reached the negotiations.

25 Do you remember this event?

1 A. Yes, I do, because the brigade military police accepted the

2 survivors. They conducted the investigation, and they -- and this Paraga

3 was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

4 Q. I would like to give you a [indiscernible], Mr. Bandic. What is

5 his present occupation?

6 A. He works in the department J in the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the

7 army of BiH. He is a security and intelligence officer.

8 Q. Thank you. He was -- he was in the HVO throughout the conflict;

9 is that correct?

10 A. During the conflict, yes, I believe so.

11 Q. You know that there was some 50 members of the military police of

12 the HVO. Do you know that?

13 A. Yes, I know.

14 Q. At the same time when Paraga was a member, and the others, they

15 were contemporaries of Miro Bandic, military police of the ABiH had 150

16 members?

17 A. There was a company -- that's incorrect. There was a company, 120

18 to 125 men.

19 Q. Thank you. I'm talking about police forces. Reserve MUP numbered

20 150; is that correct? I'm quoting from documents.

21 A. I believe that they had reserve force, but I don't believe that

22 this was the number.

23 Q. I did not invent that. I'm referring to a document. So you

24 don't -- you're not sure?

25 A. No.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Coric, your time is up.

2 Otherwise, Counsel Nozica won't have her 35 minutes.

3 THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Madam Nozica told me that I

4 may proceed for another eight minutes. Is this true? So I've got, by

5 your leave, another eight minutes. I was given that time by Ms. Nozica.

6 Q. So Paraga at the time would have command over some 300 people,

7 reserve, his men and military police; is that correct?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Where does Paraga hail from?

10 A. From the village of Jagnjik, municipality of Gornji Vakuf.

11 Q. What was his occupation before the war, is Paraga's?

12 A. I don't know whether he was employed at all.

13 Q. So he was a freelance artist, then. Who was commander of Paraga

14 while he was commander of the military police in Vakuf?

15 A. Commander of the brigade, and he removed him from this position.

16 Q. When?

17 A. I don't know when, but after the events that were connected with

18 him.

19 Q. When Selmo Cikotic was in Gornji Vakuf, who did Paraga respond to?

20 A. I'm -- with full responsibility, it wasn't Paraga.

21 Q. Then I have to resort back to my question who commanded the ABiH

22 in Gornji Vakuf. So a couple of concrete questions: Where did you in the

23 command of the 3rd Corps while Selmo Cikotic was in Gornji Vakuf; whether

24 you sent daily reports to the HQ of the 3rd Corps? Yes or no.

25 A. I don't understand the question. Did I send the reports through

1 Selmo?

2 Q. No, you didn't get me. Concentrate, please. While Selmo Cikotic

3 was in Gornji Vakuf, we couldn't ascertain which position he held. You

4 said he was a coordinator. You were the commander of the defence of the

5 town itself. So at that time, did you send daily reports to the 3rd Corps

6 in Zenica?

7 A. Every day.

8 Q. Every day. Did the commander of the brigades which covered the

9 rest of the municipality send reports to the 3rd Corps?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did the commander of the Jajacka [phoen] brigade or battalion at

12 that time, did he send reports there?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Then on the basis of which reports would Selmo Cikotic send his

15 daily reports?

16 A. As a member of the commission on the basis of his -- what he

17 learned to the commander.

18 Q. When was this?

19 A. He was in the Gornji Vakuf UNPROFOR HQ or base. He was every day

20 there.

21 Q. Wasn't he employed?

22 A. Well, he was there every day. He almost slept in Gornji Vakuf.

23 Q. I could not send any reports that you would send from -- from that

24 period. I found Selmo Cikotic's reports but not yours, which means that

25 Selmo Cikotic sent reports on behalf of all of you.

1 JUDGE PRANDLER: Now the French translation is over, I would like

2 to say the following: That yesterday afternoon when the question of

3 the -- of the pecking order came up, that is who was number one and two

4 and three in the chain of command, then of course we have discussed this

5 question quite -- right away. At that time I found a document but right

6 now I do not remember its number, which recalls a situation when there was

7 a negotiation convened by the UNPROFOR and with the participation of -- of

8 also the ECMM and the both sides from HVO and of course BH, et cetera,

9 armija. In that list it was clearly stated that on behalf of the armija

10 there were three persons there, and the number one listed was actually

11 Brigadier Agic, and number two was Cikotic, and number three now I do not

12 remember actually, but he was somebody from -- from their part. And of

13 course there are the names also for HVO and also the UN people, et cetera.

14 So therefore, I would suggest really to -- to close the issue that

15 who was in command in Gornji Vakuf, because at least, according to this UN

16 document, it was Brigadier Agic who was in command.

17 But I do not want to take your time, Mr. Coric, so please proceed.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment. There's another

19 question from the Bench.

20 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, I'd like to go back for a

21 moment to a problem that the accused Mr. Coric raised before the break,

22 so I'm sure you'll remember that, and it had to do with the prisoner

23 exchange.

24 Could you tell us, please, if on the 12th of January, and also

25 the 13th, 14th, or any of those dates, and I'm talking about 1993, of

1 course, whether there were any Muslims captured by the HVO and whether

2 there were any HVO soldiers captured by the ABiH and what the fate of

3 those individuals was. Were they exchanged? Were these prisoners

4 exchanged or not?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the standard practice

6 on a daily basis was that at the check-points, both check-points, persons

7 would be detained. They would be looted. Part of their property or their

8 property would be seized. That was done by both sides.

9 Now, in order to prevent the worst from happening and persons

10 disappearing, the police was very effective, and they enabled these

11 individuals to continue along the road they had taken by exchanging them,

12 which means that the people who happened to find themselves at

13 check-points, if their property had been seized, and if they reacted

14 quickly enough, people were released straight away, and they were able to

15 continue along their way.

16 So this wasn't the classical type of capture. It was just that

17 people were detained and mistreated. But the police was very efficient.

18 And I said that this happened on a daily basis, so I don't remember that

19 actual event. Because these were things that happened every day at one

20 check-point or another. People were prevented from continuing along their

21 route for a certain amount of time.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And the soldiers under your

23 command who manned these check-points, did they loot and seize property

24 from persons and, if so, did you take any steps to sanction this?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it wasn't the

1 policemen that seized property. The policemen did their job. I'm talking

2 about those people at the check-points who were individuals, individuals

3 who did this kind of thing, but they did this for purposes of looting.

4 Most of these individuals were apprehended on both sides.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So these check-points were not

6 under your authority. They were individuals who set up their own

7 check-points on a spontaneous basis in order to engage in looting along

8 the main roads.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Coric, try and bring your

11 questioning to an end because otherwise Counsel Nozica won't be able to do

12 her job.

13 THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. And I

14 thank the witness for his answers. I have finished.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Counsel Nozica.

16 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, and thank you

17 for being careful and mindful of my time.

18 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:

19 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Agic, I'm sure that you, too, are quite tired

20 by now, but we'll get through this very quickly. I haven't got many

21 questions to ask you.

22 Judge Antonetti just asked you something about these check-points,

23 and it's a very important point, and would you agree that the reason that

24 you gave in your testimony for some conflicts, or incidents shall we say,

25 that took place before January 1993, and in that light, may we take a look

1 at a document that the Prosecution -- that the Prosecution showed you. It

2 is document P 00643, and it is an order.

3 I haven't prepared these documents. I haven't got many documents,

4 but you will see it come up on the screen. It is a short order signed by

5 the commander Colonel Zeljko Siljeg on the 24th of October.

6 Here it is on our screens. 1992 is the year. And the Prosecutor

7 asked you to focus on the order for action, the title of this document.

8 And the first paragraph it says: "Place the town under your control.

9 Control the roads and be resolute in eliminating all attacks on HVO

10 units."

11 Now, let us look at the second paragraph of that order. "Maintain

12 contact with the HVO Eugen Kvaternik Brigade in Bugojno and the Rama HVO

13 Brigade in Prozor. Communicate amongst yourselves and, if possible,

14 jointly liberate the communication line between Vakuf and Prozor."

15 Does it not seem to you to be logical if this road was not blocked

16 why, then, would this order have been written and asked that this main

17 road, this main communication line leading from Bugojno to Vakuf be freed?

18 A. I don't know how you mean "blocked," how was it blocked.

19 Q. I am indicating the verb "osloboditi" meaning to liberate. Does

20 that not mean -- does that indicate that the road was blocked? Why else

21 would you have to liberate it, free it?

22 A. That's not true.

23 Q. Well, I'm not surprised by your answer, but I just wanted to draw

24 your attention to this portion of the document which will be important

25 when the Judges come to weigh up your answers.

1 We have another document -- or, rather, this document is the

2 24th of October, right?

3 A. After the fall of Prozor.

4 Q. But before the fall of Jajce, right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Yesterday you saw a piece of information compiled by Ante Prkacin,

7 and for the record I would like to say that it is document 3D 00484, which

8 talks about endeavours to reach Jajce by the HVO, because Jajce was in a

9 very difficult situation at the time.

10 Now, let's us take a look at P 00670 together.

11 A. Is it a report?

12 Q. The number of the document is P 00670.

13 A. I'm asking you, is it a report.

14 Q. It is not a report, no. In fact, it is the report you saw

15 yesterday. It's rather illegible. The date is blurred, although I'd say

16 that it was the 29th. But anyway, you have what it says in writing in the

17 upper right-hand corner, and there it clearly states the 29th of October,

18 1992, and we're talking about those roads, those communication lines.

19 So let's see what it is that you do not -- what it is that this

20 has created, and you say you don't agree with it. It says: "We have been

21 trying for 58 hours to have an armed HVO formation enter Jajce, from the

22 direction of Jajce, with 400 armed soldiers. For the moment, this group

23 was prevented twice by the Muslim forces from moving towards Jajce. This

24 morning I agreed that the representatives of the HVO and SDA should move

25 together with the HVO unit and the armed forces of the TO of BiH in order

1 to resolve the problems that have occurred and in order to ensure our

2 group free passage towards Jajce. You must do everything in your power to

3 resolve the misunderstandings with the Muslims in the area of Novi Travnik

4 and Fojnica and to wield your influence on the Muslims so that we can

5 ensure unimpeded passage towards Jajce."

6 And this was signed together by Slobodan Praljak and Bruno Stojic.

7 Now, in that first portion we see where this order was addressed

8 to, but it reflects the situation and people who feel themselves to be

9 responsible for the situation in Jajce and attempts for forces to reach

10 Jajce. Is that what the document does, it reflects that general

11 situation?

12 A. Yes, it does.

13 Q. Would you agree with me as well that from this document we can see

14 that everything should be deployed, the HVO and the SDA, that all

15 available resources should be used? Isn't that incompatible, to a certain

16 extent, the HVO and the SDA, but even that was attempted for units to be

17 able to reach Jajce, units which were of a joint composition, you'll agree

18 with me?

19 A. Prozor was a joint composition too.

20 Q. I know that you would like to say what you want to say, but would

21 you refrain from that and answer my questions.

22 I'm not talking about Prozor now. I'm not asking you about

23 Prozor, and you haven't come here to answer -- to tell us about the

24 situation in Prozor because you were never in Prozor.

25 Now, I'm asking you about these documents, documents which have to

1 do with your area of responsibility.

2 A. This specifically was not in Gornji Vakuf.

3 Q. And in Gornji Vakuf?

4 A. Before this period, yes, pursuant to an order from the 3rd Corps

5 commander and I complied with that order.

6 Q. I'm -- does this document show that after the 24th you said you

7 had forbidden passage, so up until the 29th, right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. On several occasions over the past two days you spoke about the

10 following, if I can put it this way, and please correct me if I'm wrong,

11 that Colonel Siljeg was the individual who made the problems and for

12 which -- because of whom the existing conflicts couldn't be resolved. Am

13 I right in saying that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You were shown today -- yes, I can see your answer. Yes.

16 You were shown a document today, and it is P 00840 -- let me

17 just -- may we have it placed on e-court. It is a report from Colonel

18 Miro Andric. I'm sure you will remember it. It is P 00840.

19 I'd like you to see it, because it is a document, as we can see,

20 it is dated the 1st of December, 1992. Now let us take a look at the last

21 paragraph on the second page. May we focus on the last two paragraphs on

22 the second page. Here we have them. Zoom down, please, or pan down. And

23 it says -- a little further up, please. Can we see the document a little

24 further up?

25 He says: "I hereby conclude that Mr. Agic does not wish to

1 implement what we have agreed upon. Because of everything related to the

2 relations and complying with orders given in the area of responsibility

3 set, the problems which surpass my competence and authority, the commander

4 of the armed forces of Gornji Vakuf, Mr. Fahrudin Agic, who, through his

5 promises and signatures, and he does not seem to stand by them, and

6 because he is bypassing the truth does not give us hope that relations

7 within Gornji Vakuf will be solved, or between Gornji Vakuf and Prozor

8 will be solved in a more adequate manner."

9 My question is: Did you know about this weariness expressed by

10 individuals in the HVO towards you?

11 A. Yes, I did.

12 Q. Right. You did.

13 Now may we take a look at another document which was shown to you

14 yesterday as well, and that is document P 01174. It is a document -- ah,

15 here it is. May we take a look at the first page. We can see that the

16 date is the 17th of January, 1993. And this document -- you can't see it

17 here, but please believe me when I tell you that that is so. It is signed

18 by Enver Hadzihasanovic, and we will be able to see that in due course.

19 May we pan down. But before we look at this, I'd like to return

20 to some things that need to be underscored. It says -- and you know what

21 this is about. You saw the document yesterday. Do you want to take a

22 look at it to refresh your memory?

23 May we continue?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. At the meeting, and it is before the bullet points down below, the

1 first sentence says: "At the meeting the view was presented," et cetera,

2 and what should be carried out was stated. "The HVO decision is a

3 temporary decision and based on reciprocity."

4 Is that right?

5 A. That's what it says.

6 Q. And the next bullet point says: "If, according -- there are any

7 changes in the final agreement in Geneva, the Croats will stand by them."

8 Can we conclude, Mr. Agic, from this that Mr. Enver Hadzihasanovic

9 at that point in time, and we're talking about the 17th of January, had

10 information of this kind about the act that you testified about, the

11 document you say you saw on the 14th which was entitled -- or, rather,

12 which was dated the 15th of January, 1993, about the establishment --

13 about establishment in the province?

14 A. I didn't see that.

15 Q. I asked whether it emerged from this that Mr. Enver Hadzihasanovic

16 in fact interpreted that document in that way when he wrote this.

17 A. Mr. Hadzihasanovic is sending a proposal from the UNPROFOR

18 commission to be assessed by the chief of the General Staff, General

19 Halilovic, and here it says the views were -- set views were presented at

20 the meeting, because they were defined in this way to UNPROFOR.

21 Q. That's all I asked you. They were defined in this manner, were

22 they?

23 Now, may we take a look at something else when we come to talk

24 about mutual distrust, the HVO towards you, and let's look at the

25 beginning -- the top of the second page.

1 We have here a sentence which we discussed the day before

2 yesterday. It says -- and this would be an HVO demand, request from the

3 previous page, "issuing orders and influencing the army can no longer be

4 done through Topcic, Agic, and Prijic."

5 And then a little lower down, pan down, please, Mr.

6 Hadzihasanovic -- ah, here we have it. That's right. Mr. Hadzihasanovic

7 is explaining this in his own words, and he said in part of the text which

8 refers to the influence wielded on the army, and we mean Topcic Abdulaha,

9 president of the SDA party for Gornji Vakuf, a deputy in the BH Assembly,

10 Fahrudin Agic, commander of the SSO OP Gornji Vakuf, and Hanefija Prijic,

11 Paraga, commanding the units of the military police. Is that what it

12 says?

13 A. Yes, that's what it says.

14 Q. So is this document a reflection in fact of the situation in which

15 individuals from the HVO during that critical time considered you to be an

16 individual who was not conducive to cooperation?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you tell me, please, whether there were any legal proceedings

19 taken against you or being taken against you for crimes committed during

20 this period, let's say from 1992 to 1993?

21 A. No.

22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] May we now move into private session

23 out of an abundance of caution. I think it would be a good idea to work

24 in private session for my next set of questions.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please do your

1 duty.

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7 [Open session]

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are in open session,

9 Mr. President.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For the few minutes left to us,

11 Mr. Mundis, have you any additional questions for this witness?

12 MR. MUNDIS: The Prosecution has no further questions for the

13 witness, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No? Can the Defence give me a

15 list of the documents they wish to tender into evidence?

16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have a list. It is

17 on the e-mail, but I've given instructions to my personnel to check -- to

18 double-check to avoid any errors, so I'd prefer to do that on Monday

19 because there were very many documents.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

21 Madam Nozica.

22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I may be

23 risking a repetition of some documents which the Prosecution has already

24 tendered, so let me say first document P 01174, P 00670, 2D 00223,

25 2D 00224, 2D 00225, 2D 00227.

1 I think those are all the documents that I wish to tender. Should

2 there be something else, I can provide the number on Monday.

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] We have 26 documents to tender, and

4 so as not to use your precious time, we have a list of those documents

5 which we should like to give to the usher, thank you, to save time.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis.

7 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 While we appreciate everyone's efforts to expedite the proceedings

9 with respect to procedural matters, I would ask that in the event the

10 procedure that Ms. Alaburic has adopted with respect to written listings

11 be made available to the Prosecution. We don't have copies of the list

12 that she's provided, so if in the future that could be done we would be

13 ever so grateful so that we can at least compare it with the transcript

14 and our records to indicate what exactly is being tendered.

15 Thank you.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do apologise to

17 colleague Mundis that it didn't occur to me. I really should have

18 prepared a copy for the Prosecution to be able to check our documents, and

19 I will have that list ready tomorrow.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The other Defence counsel.

21 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we are

22 tendering three documents: P 00430, P 00687, P 01318.

23 Thank you.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Chamber will

25 render an oral decision regarding the admission of these documents.

1 Before giving the floor to Mr. Mundis to tell us about next week,

2 General, I wish to thank you for coming at the request of the Prosecution

3 to testify in The Hague about the events that took place in Gornji Vakuf.

4 Thank you for contributing to the establishment of the truth. I wish you

5 a safe journey home. And I'm going to ask the usher to be kind enough to

6 escort you out of the courtroom.

7 [The witness withdrew]

8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have a copy for the

9 Prosecution, so we can deal with it straight away, and I will give it to

10 Mr. Mundis.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine.

12 Mr. Mundis, for next week.

13 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

14 The Prosecution has three witnesses scheduled for next week

15 pursuant to the schedule that was distributed yesterday. I'm not going to

16 identify any of those witnesses. We do have one viva voce witness and two

17 92 ter witnesses scheduled for next Thursday. I did alert the Trial

18 Chamber's legal officer to the fact that one of those -- we shouldn't have

19 any problems meeting the time frames on Thursday with respect to the two

20 witnesses that are scheduled to appear. If we did, however, run into any

21 problems, one of those witnesses would be available for the following

22 Monday, if need be, carrying over from the Thursday to the following

23 Monday.

24 So we have the three witnesses, a viva voce witness and then two

25 92 ter witnesses on Thursday, one week from today.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The viva voce

2 witness who is going to come on Monday, so we plan to work Monday,

3 Tuesday, Wednesday for him, and the two 92 ter witnesses for Thursday.

4 Therefore, on Monday we will indicate to the Defence how much time they

5 will have.

6 How much time have you planned for the viva voce witness,

7 Mr. Mundis? Is it the whole day on Monday?

8 MR. MUNDIS: One moment, please, Mr. President.

9 I believe the estimate that we've put down according to the

10 calendar is 4.5 hours. Of course, we're always endeavouring to reduce

11 that as much as possible, but I don't believe that we'll finish the

12 witness on Monday. We might carry over into a bit of Tuesday and then

13 there would be the remaining -- the majority of Tuesday's sitting time and

14 all day Wednesday for cross-examination.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I see. How many documents have

16 you planned to cover in those four and a half hours?

17 MR. MUNDIS: Just a moment, please, Mr. President.

18 At this point, Mr. President, the witness is linked to or we have

19 indicated 55 documents. Of course, once proofing is completed during the

20 course of the weekend, those numbers generally go down. So as of right

21 now, 55 documents are listed as being to be shown to the witness, but

22 hopefully that number will decline as well as our efforts to -- to move

23 along as quickly as possible.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Don't forget that on

25 Monday we will have at least 30 minutes devoted to oral comments regarding

1 the reduction of the time of the Prosecution for the presentation of its

2 case. That will take at least half an hour.

3 MR. MURPHY: Yes, Your Honour. That's what I wanted to refer to.

4 I just wanted to confirm, would the Trial Chamber's intention be that we

5 do that immediately at the beginning of the session on Monday?

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. At the beginning of

7 the session.

8 MR. MURPHY: Thank you.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Not Monday morning, Monday

10 afternoon.

11 Very well. So we will meet again on Monday for a hearing that

12 will begin at 2.15.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Monday, the 6th day

15 of November, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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