Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9733

1 Wednesday, 8 November 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call

7 the case, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. President. Case

9 number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would like to greet everyone

11 in the courtroom. I believe that Mr. Karnavas needs another seven minutes

12 which means that he will have had 90 minutes in total.

13 Mr. Karnavas, you have seven minutes, please go ahead.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, Your

15 Honours.

16 WITNESS: SAFET IDRIZOVIC [Resumed]

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas: [Continued]

19 Q. Good morning, sir. I'll try to do it in less. I want to show you

20 a document, sir, and I'll read it for you because we don't have the B/C/S

21 version. But if I can put it on the ELMO. And for the record, it's 1D

22 01048. This is a document from ECMM. It's dated 17 October, 1993.

23 Now, before I pose the question to you, I just want to recap.

24 Yesterday we talked a little bit about Cibo and his functions. Do you

25 recall that conversation?

Page 9734

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you recall us agreeing that Cibo was appointed by Izetbegovic

3 to be in charge of three municipalities, Jablanica, Konjic and Prozor; is

4 that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, here these are some minutes of a meeting it appears. And I'm

7 going to need Madam Usher to actually turn the second page because I want

8 to read a passage from it. This would be with respect to Mr. Cibo. This

9 is -- we'll be revisiting this document, Your Honours, at some other

10 point, so I don't want to go into the entire contents, but this was a

11 meeting where my client, Dr. Jadranko Prlic, attended along with Mate

12 Granic, the then Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia. You will

13 see that it was a very constructive meeting. And then it goes on on page

14 2 that there apparently had a meeting with Mr. Cibo, and I'm going to read

15 slowly what Mr. Cibo's position was and then pose a question to you.

16 Mr. Cibo stated that if -- well, I first have to go back up, I

17 guess.

18 "MI," that would be Mostar 1, "has met today Mr. Cibo Safet,

19 president of the War Presidency in Jablanica. He stressed that there

20 could be no possible political solution in this conflict without:

21 "1. Punishment of the aggressors who, according to him were the

22 Croats. He said here that in the eyes of the world community, Croatia is

23 not acclaimed as an aggressor country, and that this is one of the reasons

24 why the solution of this whole conflict is not getting anywhere.

25 "2. Negotiations between Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and all the

Page 9735

1 legitimate leaders of the nations of the world, Mr. Tudjman, Mr.

2 Milosevic, Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg are not legitimate leaders of any

3 state and therefore they are not able to negotiate about the future

4 presence of Bosnia. Nor is the UN for the same reasons.

5 "3. Realising the fact that no new state could be based on ethnic

6 principle."

7 Mr. Cibo goes on to say:

8 "Mr. Cibo stated that if these requirements could not be met, the

9 Muslims would be willing to fight until there was no single Muslim left in

10 the area of former Yugoslavia. He also said the Muslims were against

11 ethnic cleansing. He added that everybody would have to accept the fact

12 that there would never be a Greater Serbia, a Greater Croatia, nor a

13 Muslim State. As a consequence of this, people by the next count of

14 population would simply be listed as Bosnians and not as Muslims, Croats,

15 et cetera."

16 This was Mr. Cibo's stated position. Apparently, one would think

17 that this is also Mr. Alija Izetbegovic's position since that he was more

18 or less his Viceroy in that region back in 17 October, 1993.

19 Sir, would it not appear that Mr. Cibo is advocating a policy

20 wherein there would be no nations recognised, no constituent nations

21 recognised in Bosnia-Herzegovina as was recognised by the then existing

22 constitution?

23 A. Well, this is an extract from a text that I don't have in the

24 B/C/S. It's an extract, but I'm not familiar with the context. Cibo knew

25 that the statements weren't always appropriate, but I wouldn't agree with

Page 9736

1 you that he literally represented what Alija Izetbegovic was fighting for.

2 I don't believe that these are Alija Izetbegovic's positions.

3 As far as I am aware, given the extent of my contact with Alija

4 Izetbegovic, he was always for avoiding a conflict between the Muslims and

5 the Croats. That was his position. And he always asked us and beseeched

6 us not to do anything that would pose a threat to the relationship between

7 the Muslims and the Croats.

8 Why did they send Cibo into this area? Well, since we're short of

9 time, I can't go into all the details. There was only some things we

10 found out about after the war. There were some documents that surfaced

11 about how he arrived there. He was sent to the area of Jablanica and

12 Konjic because there was a parallel power structure in Jablanica

13 apparently and that was unacceptable because they thought that that meant

14 we had accepted HVO authority. However, there were rumours and --

15 according to which the head of the municipality of Konjic, I can't

16 remember his name, had already accepted the structure in Konjic, the HVO

17 structure in Konjic. That's why Cibo had apparently been sent down there.

18 But to be quite objective, I don't think we needed him at all.

19 Q. Well, Cibo was an extremist, was he not?

20 A. Well, he's difficult to describe him.

21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

22 A. Some of his statements, even the text you've just read out, point

23 to the fact that he was an extremist and other statements don't seem to be

24 the statements of an extremist, but it was difficult to cooperate with

25 him. He replaced all of us as soon as he arrived down there. He gathered

Page 9737

1 some people around him, and we knew that they weren't the sort of people

2 they should have been. When he arrived there, our situation became far

3 more complex because local people could no longer officially control the

4 situation in Jablanica. At the time, we lost control of many things.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 A. And I expect that you will later accuse me and some of my

7 colleagues of having done certain things up there.

8 Q. Okay. Sir --

9 A. That at the time we didn't have --

10 Q. Thank you very much. Undoubtedly Alija Izetbegovic knew exactly

11 what Cibo was up to though, didn't he, because he was being informed of

12 Cibo's activities? And I have no further questions.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's have the next

14 Defence team, please. Ms. Alaburic, how much time do you have at your

15 disposal? If we do the calculations --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.

17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. I have

18 an hour and a half. That's the amount of time you granted me. And I also

19 have the time given to me by my colleague Fahrudin Ibrisimovic, and I hope

20 that I'll have sufficient time to cover at least some of the subjects with

21 Mr. Idrizovic.

22 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:

23 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Idrizovic. My name is Ms.

24 Alaburic. I'm a lawyer from Zagreb. I represent Mr. Petkovic. I won't

25 be accusing you of anything, but I believe that as you have done so far,

Page 9738

1 you will assist us in understanding certain things a little better.

2 I'll take up from where Mr. Karnavas stopped. He was talking

3 about Mr. Cibo. And please have a look at a document in my bundle of

4 documents. 4D 00452. It's an order from Sefer Halilovic. 00 -- 4D

5 00452.

6 Mr. Idrizovic, it might be simpler to just look at the screen so

7 as not to waste time with the documents. This is an order from Mr. Sefer

8 Halilovic in which Safet Cibo is being assigned to the Mostar 4th Corps.

9 Please have a look at the following document now, 4D 00450.

10 While waiting for it to appear on the screen, I'll tell you what

11 this will document is. It's a letter from the SDA regional committee in

12 Herzegovina, and it says at the meeting of the central and executive --

13 and part of the Executive Board of the SDA, it was concluded that Mr.

14 Safet Cibo should be assigned to the regional committee of Herzegovina as

15 a full member.

16 Mr. Karnavas asked you about appointing Mr. Cibo as the president

17 of three municipalities, and now we have a document that concerns the army

18 and the SDA political party. These documents on the basis of which Mr.

19 Cibo had power in party and in the army and within the civilian bodies.

20 A. If you can remember, I answered this question yesterday although

21 no one asked me about it.

22 Q. Yes. So those are the three documents concerned. Thank you very

23 much.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In response to a question put to you by Mr. Karnavas, you said

Page 9739

1 that Mr. Cibo was a little difficult, that sometimes his positions or the

2 positions he expressed weren't the policies followed by Alija Izetbegovic.

3 Yesterday, you also said that you didn't really get on with him, and you

4 said that in the area of Jablanica and Konjic, someone else appeared with

5 Mr. Cibo or, rather, some other military formations arrived with Mr. Cibo.

6 Who did you have in mind?

7 A. Yes. At the time in Jablanica or somewhat later, it's not really

8 important when, first part of a unit came and then the entire unit came

9 from Igman in Sarajevo. The name was the special unit -- unit for special

10 purposes of the Supreme Command Staff. It was called Zuka's unit or

11 Zulfikar Alispago, known as Zuka, was its commander. Part of it first

12 arrived and then the entire unit came then. The silver fox unit came. It

13 consisted of 10 or 15 men, and then the Igman or Igman Wolves or Cedo's

14 Wolves also arrived. It was also a small unit from Igman. I can't really

15 little tell you what their status was. As far as we were concerned, the

16 status was non-existent, but I don't think those units were under the

17 effective control of the corps when they arrived there and later on to

18 avoid being asked other questions. The detachment for special purposes

19 within the Supreme Command Staff shows who should have been in charge of

20 it. The corps commander, the commander of the 4th Corps and later the 6th

21 Corps, well, the name shows that it wasn't part of the corps. As to which

22 formation it was a part of, I don't know. Don't ask me. Then I could

23 speculate that this isn't the right place to speculate.

24 Q. Very well. Let's draw a conclusion. Certain military units

25 arrived, and you are telling us that they weren't part of the regular

Page 9740

1 system of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were directly linked

2 to the Main Staff of the army.

3 A. Yes, that's what it says in the name.

4 Q. I won't ask you who was in charge or in command of those units,

5 but I'm interested in the following: What were the consequences of the

6 arrival of those units in the territory around Jablanica and Konjic? You

7 said that Cibo arrived and that units arrived and that corps's

8 dissatisfaction among the Croats and the Muslims. How di the Croats feel?

9 Do you know how they reacted, how the Croats reacted to the arrival of

10 those units in your area?

11 A. Well, no one felt good about it, not just the Croats. I don't

12 know how to put this. These people were young people. These men were

13 young men. They were well-armed, and they were -- they had Ray-Bans.

14 They were all arrogant. They'd been well fitted out. That's how it was.

15 Don't laugh. In one village, well, they wreaked havoc because they

16 married 20 young girls. The behaviour of General Daidza was similar. So

17 these men were -- well, that's how they were. I don't know how to

18 describe it. They weren't part of the structure or they weren't under

19 effective control of anyone else. Whether there was someone who wanted

20 things to function in this way, I don't know. All I can say is how things

21 worked in the field.

22 Q. Very well. Tell me, when those units arrived did the relationship

23 between the Croats and the Muslims deteriorate or improve or, rather, the

24 relationship between the HVO and the ABiH?

25 A. On the whole, the situation deteriorated throughout that period,

Page 9741

1 from April 1992 up until April 1993. The relationship continued to

2 deteriorate during that period.

3 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, that's quite enough. Let's move on to another

4 question.

5 Yesterday, in answer to a question from the Prosecution, you said

6 that in May and June, 1992, the Croats took all the major hills in the

7 southern and western part of the municipality of Jablanica, and you said

8 almost literally, that at that point the ABiH army had been established or

9 had the BiH army been established by then or had you been in a position --

10 rather, you said you had the ABiH army. You could have expelled them from

11 those positions but you weren't allowed to do so by the leadership. Do

12 you remember doing that -- saying that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. When Mr. Cibo arrived in the area of Jablanica and Konjic, was the

15 difficulty of removing the HVO from those hills removed?

16 A. No. When he arrived, the situation didn't change. I'm talking

17 about the hills taken by the HVO in 1992 or, rather, the elevations. They

18 weren't affected up until the conflict.

19 Q. So you said that nothing changed. But in what sense did something

20 change?

21 A. I haven't understood you exactly.

22 Q. You said that in that sense the relationship to the HVO didn't

23 change when Cibo arrived, but I believe that you wanted to say that in a

24 certain sense the relationship did change. So I want to know whether I've

25 understood you correctly?

Page 9742

1 A. Well, let me tell you what that was all about if you want me to

2 explain.

3 Q. Briefly, please.

4 A. Yes, I'll try. Until his arrival, our contacts with the HVO -- we

5 had contacts with the HVO. There were never any problems especially when

6 Marko Zelenika and I were there. There were really no problems and there

7 weren't any problems later on. We still maintained contact. But with his

8 arrival, our contacts ceased, not because we wanted them to cease, but

9 because he wanted to be the individual who would be the liaison officer or

10 contact with them. So that is why I said at the beginning that we weren't

11 able to exercise effective control of the area.

12 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, in answer Mr. Mr. Karnavas's question

13 about the statement by Mr. Cibo, about some sort of Bosnian unitarianism,

14 if I can simplify matters, this seemed to remind me of an answer you

15 said -- gave yesterday, to the effect that in December, 1992, you talked

16 to the president, Alija Izetbegovic, and asked him to answer questions

17 about cantonisation. And from the way in which you spoke about this, I

18 understood it that the BH army, on the territory of Jablanica, that is to

19 say in your own units, was in fact opposed to the cantonisation of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina which would be based on the national criteria or ethnic

21 criteria. Did I understand you correctly?

22 A. No, you didn't. We always said we're going to respect any

23 decision that the authorities take, that the authorities agree upon. Now,

24 since this was not agreed upon, cantonisation was the subject of

25 discussion, but it was not a fait accompli. It was not something that was

Page 9743

1 decided upon. Then we said, let politics do its work and once they reach

2 an agreement when -- we'll follow suit. We're not going to do anything

3 against that. We just wanted to have these agreements rounded off and

4 agreements actually reached. And the problem here was that the local

5 representatives of the HVO used this subject of discussion as something

6 that had already been agreed upon. So the cantonisation of Bosnia on

7 ethnic grounds was being discussed. Herzegovina belonged to the Croats

8 and they wanted to put it into effect. Now, we were opposed to this until

9 an actual agreement had been reached.

10 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, that's another subject again. Just slow down a

11 bit. And in this sense, we're interested in whether the BH army really

12 did implement this policy, but with regard to the military operations or

13 did individuals in the BH army have some of their own political goals?

14 And I'll remind you, in this regard, of a document that was

15 presented by the Prosecutor. It is P 00614, and it is the records from a

16 meeting of the Municipal Assembly of Jablanica held on -- or, rather, held

17 in December, 1992, and it was literally stated in point 2 of that document

18 of the records, relating to the political and security situation, that in

19 Jablanica, in the fifth section this is, and I'm going to quote: "We

20 should state loud and clear that the three ethnic groups, entities, which

21 are being imposed now, will not be accepted by the Muslim people."

22 A. I haven't got anything on my screen.

23 Q. I apologise. I gave the wrong number. It should be P 00624. 624

24 is the correct number. And it is, as I said, the minutes of the session

25 of the Municipal Assembly dated the 22nd of October, 1992, and point 2 was

Page 9744

1 devoted to the political and security situation in Jablanica municipality.

2 The Staff Commander of the armed forces of Jablanica at that time, and

3 this is in section 5, said that "we should state loud and clear that the

4 three ethnic communities will not be accepted by the Muslim people, and an

5 attempt to implement this, at all cost, would lead to a civil war."

6 Those words are very similar to what my colleague Mr. Karnavas

7 said when quoting Mr. Cibo, contained in the document of the European

8 Monitors, observers. Now, tell me, do you have any knowledge about this?

9 Did you know that many some of the representatives of the ABiH army would

10 be opposed to this internal division which would be based on national or

11 ethnic grounds?

12 A. Well, I don't -- I only have the beginning of this document. I

13 can't see the portion you're referring to.

14 Q. It is page 5.

15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: For us, too, it is not clear where the passage is

16 to be found because it's a rather voluminous document. If you could

17 indicate more precisely that would be very kind. Thank you.

18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I said that it was point 2 of the

19 minutes, the fifth section. In the B/C/S text, it is on page 5. But I

20 quoted the passage, so I don't think there's any need for us to spend time

21 on that now.

22 Q. My question is as follows: There were individuals in the BH army

23 who were opposed to --

24 MR. SCOTT: I apologise to counsel, but I must say I'm with Judge

25 Trechsel on this. I'd like to see. When the language is being put to the

Page 9745

1 witness, I would like to be able to see the particular language and the

2 context of it. If we could please be assisted.

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, but I -- as I said, it

4 is part of the minutes relating to point 2. In the minutes, it says

5 exactly what point 2 is about, and it is the fifth section. We have it on

6 our screens, and it begins with the following words, "Ako, if". And what

7 I quoted was the last part of that portion. "It should be stated large

8 and clear that the three ethnic groups are being imposed now will not be

9 accepted by the Muslim people and attempts to implement it at all costs

10 would lead to a civil war."

11 THE INTERPRETER: Or words to that effect because the interpreters

12 don't have it in English on their screens.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That has been extracted from the

14 context. Read out the previous passage where it says "Units of the --

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I have read everything, Mr. Idrizovic. Tell me, did you read the

17 book by Sefer Halilovic?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Could you tell us whether that -- from that book it emerges that

20 Mr. Sefer Halilovic was without a doubt opposed to the internal division

21 of Bosnia-Herzegovina which would be based on the national principle or

22 ethnic principle?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You agree?

25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly be asked to slow down

Page 9746

1 for the benefit of the interpreters and the Court. Thank you.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Do you agree that he was not the only member of the BH army who

4 held political views of that kind?

5 A. No. I think that while Sefer Halilovic was in command of the

6 army, that within its composition, there were 25 per cent of non-Muslims.

7 Q. I'm talking about the political --

8 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes. Thank you. I waited for the translation.

9 The interpreter is asking you please kindly slow down, and I only

10 interpret their words and request. Thank you.

11 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, my question was as follows: Can you agree with the

13 position taken that Sefer Halilovic was not the only member of the BH army

14 who was opposed to the internal division of Bosnia-Herzegovina based on

15 the national criteria?

16 A. That's right. He couldn't have been alone.

17 Q. Tell us whether you ever heard -- can you agree with me when I say

18 that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be interpreted as a civil war

19 because of the different views people had on the internal set-up of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

21 A. Well, if there's some people here --

22 Q. Just give me a yes or no answer?

23 A. It's difficult to give a yes or no answer to that question. I

24 think it is a religious war as well, that it was an aggression, that it is

25 a civil war, and there is no category of war that you could not apply to

Page 9747

1 this particular war.

2 Q. Yes. Thank you. I'd now like, Mr. Idrizovic, for us to take a

3 look at the documents of the BH army which relate to the conflicts. I'm

4 not going to begin with April, 1993, but with March, 1993. So would you

5 now please take a look. And in my set of documents, if you can find the

6 document, if not, we can focus on our screens. The document is 4D 00438.

7 A. What did you say, 4 --

8 Q. 438.

9 A. Yes, I have it.

10 Q. It is a document which is not very legible, and that's what it

11 says in the translation as well, but those who know the names of the

12 units, who are familiar with the names of the units, will be able to see

13 that it -- we're talking about 7th brigade, the Suad Alic Brigade from

14 Konjic, and a letter from the commander, Midhat Cerovac. It is dated the

15 23rd of March, 1993, in which it says the following: "We inform the 4th

16 Corps that the situation in the area of responsibility is as follows: 150

17 members of the HVO captured, the town blocked, life in the town paralysed.

18 We continue with the arrests."

19 Tell us, please, Mr. Idrizovic, perhaps we could just remind the

20 Court of your words when you said that the situation in Jablanica could

21 not be understood or followed unless we know about the events that took

22 place in a broader area, including the neighbouring municipalities of

23 Jablanica and Mostar and Konja. I meant to say Konjic.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Tell us, do you know about these events in Konjic? Were you

Page 9748

1 familiar with them?

2 A. No, I did not know about those events, and I think I said

3 yesterday or previously that all of us -- or what I want to say is this:

4 All those who say that they knew what was going on within the encirclement

5 are not telling the truth. We are under -- we were under such a siege.

6 We were under such a blockade and taken up with our own affairs that if

7 we're going to tell the truth as human beings then, objectively speaking,

8 we didn't know what was going on there. And I'm under oath here. I took

9 the solemn declaration. And I claim that I never knew that on the 23rd --

10 is that what it says, the 23rd of March, yes -- that 150 members of the

11 HVO were captured. I really didn't know about that.

12 Q. All right. Fine. Let's move on to the next document 4D 00081.

13 And it is a document from Mr. Arif Pasalic.

14 A. What did you say 4D --

15 Q. 4D 00081. It is a document from Mr. Arif Pasalic dated the 7th of

16 April, 1993, and it is addressed to the Municipal Staff for the defence of

17 Jablanica. You can see that in the lower portion. Can you see that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And in that order, among other things, the following is

20 stated: "Undertake all necessary measures and steps in the spirit of our

21 previous order to place the units under full combat readiness as was

22 ordered."

23 Can you see that order and point 1 of it? Can you explain to us,

24 what was the previous order to place units under full combat alert?

25 A. Well, I don't know what the previous order was. I assume you have

Page 9749

1 that previous order.

2 Q. Do you happen to remember what that previous order was so that you

3 could tell us what time it was issued?

4 A. I really don't want to speculate once again. I'm sure that you

5 have the order. You ought to have it because you found it like all the

6 other ones. It is the archives of the 4th Corps seized by the HVO in May,

7 1993, the 9th of May.

8 Q. Yes, but I'm not interested in hearing your explanations.

9 A. I wouldn't like to speculate. I don't want to say what this order

10 or the previous order was because it's been 15 years since that time after

11 all.

12 Q. Can you explain to us point 6 of the order? It says: "Protect

13 the secrecy of our own activities and pay due attention." Does that mean

14 planning some offensive activities?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Can you explain to us the call for combat -- or, rather, the

17 slogan at the end: "For a free Bosnia-Herzegovina until final victory."

18 That slogan that is in capital letters at the end of the text. Can you

19 tell us about that?

20 A. No, I really can't. Everybody wrote something at the end. That

21 comes under morale boosting and propaganda and things like that.

22 Q. All right. Let's move on to the next document then. Let's move

23 on to the next document and the number is 4D 00082. It is also an order

24 from Arif Pasalic dated the 14th of April, 1993, addressed to the

25 Municipal Staff of Jablanica among others. Is that right, Mr. Idrizovic?

Page 9750

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. Could you explain to us what this order is about? "You must not

3 allow members of the Spanish Battalion to leave Jablanica." What's all

4 that about? What was that about? And why did Mr. Arif Pasalic issue an

5 order to that effect, not to allow UNPROFOR to leave Jablanica?

6 A. Why? Well, I can't speak in his name and say why. The Spanish

7 Battalion was put up in the town of Jablanica. It was deployed in a

8 stadium on -- in an open space and there were rumours going round at that

9 time, and we're talking about the 14th of April because the conflicts in

10 the Neretvica river valley had already begun. In Doljani and Sovici, the

11 situation had reached a head and we, together with the representatives of

12 the Spanish battalion and the European Monitors, toured the area to see

13 what was happening and war was looming in the air.

14 Yes, I'll get to that. Just a moment. I'll get to that. I'm

15 speaks as slowly as possible for the people to be able to interpret

16 properly and to be recorded properly.

17 It was expected that if the Spanish Battalion or, rather, if the

18 HVO attacks Jablanica, the Spanish Battalion would try to pull out,

19 because faced with a situation of that kind, it could have been the

20 victim, too. And this actually happened at a certain point in time later

21 on. A shell actually did hit them and two members of the Spanish

22 Battalion were killed. So the intention was to have the Spanish Battalion

23 stay there to be a witness and if the HVO were to attack us, let them be

24 in the target area, too. Probably, that was it. I'm saying this. I'm

25 giving you my opinion.

Page 9751

1 Q. All right. Fine. So the answer, in fact, if I've understood you

2 correctly, is that you do not know what Mr. Arif Pasalic wanted to achieve

3 by issuing that order and why he gave the order.

4 A. I said that I didn't know but that that was what I assume.

5 Q. Let's move on to the next document, 4D 00453. This is a letter

6 from the HVO Brigade commander in Konjic, Mr. Zdravko Sagolj. It's very

7 brief. We can read through it.

8 "Konjic was attacked by forces that arrived from Bradina and

9 Igman. We are doing all we can to neutralise their action. They are

10 exerting much pressure from Jablanica on the area of Klis. We shall

11 attempt to do something in Jablanica, too, in order to engage those forces

12 (they have surrounded our forces in Doljani and Sovici) but we can't do

13 anything effectively ourselves alone. Start acting in accordance with the

14 prior agreement immediately. Zlatar and Boksevica have been surrounded

15 and cannot maintain their position. Hurry up. Inform Prozor. They say

16 they can't help us at all. They say they have no orders. In Konjic,

17 Celebici, and Radesine, up there, you should assess. Including Kiseljak

18 in the sector of Ivan Planina, engage forces with the artillery in Prozor

19 [as interpreted] until something is done concretely. Start moving while

20 we're still alive."

21 Mr. Idrizovic, were you familiar with the position in Prozor as

22 described in this letter?

23 A. No. This was on the 15th of April. Jablanica had already been

24 attacked. We were dealing with our own problems. I can't say what was

25 happening in Konjic. Konjic had been cut off for three or four days. We

Page 9752

1 didn't have any contact with Konjic, any communication with Konjic. What

2 Mr. Sagolj has written confirms what I have already said here yesterday or

3 the day before yesterday. Everyone was dealing with their own problems.

4 No one could help anyone.

5 You can see that Mr. Sagolj is asking for assistance. Nobody was

6 sending him any assistance. That was our situation. That was everyone's

7 situation.

8 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, I'd just like to correct something in the

9 transcript on page 19, line 19. Instead of the word "Prozor" it should

10 say "Konjic", since the letter I read concerns the area of Konjic.

11 Let's move on. Everyone was dealing with their own problems. Mr.

12 Idrizovic, if the HVO was planning to launch an attack in the direction of

13 Jablanica, and that would include the immediately neighbouring

14 municipality of Konjic, would it be possible that on the same day the HVO

15 in Konjic would prepare such a letter and you would draw a conclusion on

16 the basis of the letter that everyone was trying to save what they had in

17 the area under their control. Could you explain that very briefly though?

18 A. I haven't quite understood your question.

19 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, you said that everyone was dealing with their own

20 problems. This can be seen in this letter and that includes HVO units.

21 They were dealing with their own problems.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So it don't show that there was planned action and a joint action

24 hadn't been planned by all those forces. You can't say that.

25 A. Well, I said on a local level, people were dealing with their own

Page 9753

1 problems. Please don't ask me what happened -- about what happened in

2 Konjic. I really don't know nor could I have known. And no one from

3 Jablanica could have known what was happening in Konjic and vice versa.

4 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, we've now opened up two subjects. Let's try and

5 first deal with the subject I'm trying to clarify by putting these

6 questions to you and it concerns this statement of yours. If you yourself

7 have come to the conclusion that individual HVO units were exclusively

8 concerned with what was happening in their area, in their territory, and

9 if these things were happening on the 15th of April, the only logical

10 conclusion is that on the 15th of April, there was no planned HVO attack

11 in the area of Jablanica and Konjic. Would you agree with that

12 conclusion?

13 A. That's not what I said. All I said is that the situation was such

14 that we, at the local level, dealt just with our own problems. As to what

15 someone planned at a higher level, well, I know nothing about that. But

16 from Mr. Sagolj's letter -- on the basis of Mr. Sagolj's letter, you can

17 prove what I'm saying, that we were all dealing with our own problems and

18 that includes Mr. Sagolj.

19 Q. That's just what I wanted to show. Thank you for that answer

20 because I think it reflects the actual situation on the ground. With

21 regard to your answers that relate to not knowing anything about the

22 situation in Konjic, well, since you're a witness who is supposed to

23 explain to us the events in Jablanica and the surrounding places, I have

24 to put the following question to you. Is it possible to understand the

25 events in Jablanica and in the neighbouring places if you have no

Page 9754

1 knowledge of what was happening in Konjic? Try and be objective in your

2 answer.

3 A. Well, you've lived in Zagreb and you can't understand what I'm

4 saying. People who went through the war can understand me. These

5 gentlemen here know what it was like. You don't. We could only move

6 around within a diameter of 10 kilometres, that's all.

7 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, when I put my questions to you, I'm not assuming

8 that you were able to move around freely and that you had certain

9 knowledge. I'm asking you something simple. Is it possible to understand

10 the events in Jablanica if one is unaware of what was going on in the

11 neighbouring municipalities?

12 A. Yes, it's possible. We couldn't know what was happening

13 elsewhere.

14 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, I'm not asking you whether you could have known

15 anything about that. I understand you when you say that if you were

16 involved in combat, et cetera, you were only familiar with the situation

17 in your area. But my question is: Is it possible to understand the

18 events in one place, for example, Jablanica, without trying to explain the

19 events in the neighbouring municipalities?

20 A. Well, if you look back at the situation now, then you can see that

21 these events were linked up.

22 Q. And that's why I want to show you and the Judges documents that

23 also concern the neighbouring municipalities. This is an order to have a

24 better understanding of the events in Jablanica, Sovici, and Doljani, and

25 these places are referred to in the indictment. And this is why I would

Page 9755

1 now like to have a look at the following document, 4D 000 --

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, you know that we

3 rendered a decision in which we've said that the tu quoque defence was not

4 acceptable. If you want the witness to say that the ABiH was guilty of

5 committing atrocities, well, you can spend many hours doing this, but this

6 doesn't mean that we will be taking this into account in the judgement.

7 We're not judging the ABiH. We are judging the charges directed at some

8 of the accused. The ABiH isn't on trial here. We're not dealing with

9 what happened that Konjic. You can ask him whether he knows what happened

10 in Konjic and he'll say yes or no, and the Judges will be intelligent

11 enough to understand the answer. But don't spend minutes or hours on this

12 subject, given that the witness doesn't want to play your game.

13 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I have to answer that, and I have

14 to respond to that objection. I don't think it's appropriate objection,

15 because I'm not trying to point to crimes committed by the ABiH. My sole

16 purpose was to clarify offensive and defensive action in mid-April, 1993.

17 The reason for this is as follows: The question is --

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If that's your objective, ask

19 him whether the ABiH carried out an attack on the 14th of April, and I'll

20 say yes or no, and you can continue in that way. Deal with the substance.

21 The Defence keeps complaining about not having enough time. The

22 Judges have noted that you're not dealing with the crux of the matter.

23 You want to show that there were attacks or defensive action taken by the

24 ABiH. You have a former member of the military here. Ask the witness

25 whether the ABiH was involved in an attack in April. He'll say no,

Page 9756

1 perhaps, and then you can show him a document that contradicts him, et

2 cetera, et cetera. I'm not going to lecture you on how to proceed when

3 conducting your cross-examination, that's not my role. My role is to

4 avoid wasting time. When you use time intelligently, constructively, then

5 we can only approve this. But when we notice that you are following a

6 route that is not of much use, I must inform you of the fact.

7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I ask the witness

8 a direct question about whether there was an ABiH attack in April, 1993,

9 I'm quite certain that the witness would say no. And similarly, if I put

10 the same sort of question to an HVO officer about HVO attacks, this

11 witness -- or such an officer would also say no. So I believe that by

12 putting such direct questions, I can't obtain an appropriate answer from

13 the witness.

14 I'm sorry if you believe that I'm wasting my time. I don't share

15 that opinion, and I believe that in Jablanica and Sovici and Doljani

16 certain facts have been accepted from the Tuta and Stela case. These are

17 facts that we now have to refute at this stage, and these adjudicated

18 facts also say that the HVO planned an attack on Jablanica and that the

19 attack on Sovici and Doljani was part of the planned action. The events

20 in Sovici and Doljani were part of a planned action to expel the

21 population from that area, and my questions are being put to the witness

22 in order to prove that there was combat in the wide area of Jablanica and

23 Konjic, and these areas are linked up. Conflicts would spill over from

24 one area into the other. And I'm trying to show that certain military

25 activities had been planned or, rather, certain HVO military activities

Page 9757

1 had, as the purpose, the achievement of certain objectives, and this was

2 the result of ABiH action.

3 So things aren't quite simple when we are talking about who was

4 attacking and who was defending themselves.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're not a soldier, but

6 perhaps General Petkovic could have put a question to the witness as a

7 soldier. You know that when there's a military action, there are orders.

8 There are preparatory orders, there are orders that concern reports on

9 actions. There are debriefings. That's how things work in all armies

10 throughout the world.

11 If you're trying to show the ABiH was involved in a military

12 operation, the witness in front of you would have been immediately aware

13 of it. So use your questions and documents to go to the crux of the

14 matter.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, all I'm trying to say

16 is the following: It's an indisputable fact that the ABiH had more

17 territory under its control after the conflict with Croats than it had at

18 the beginning. And I'm sure we won't find a single document from the ABiH

19 in which we can see that an attack is being ordered. But now I'll ask my

20 client, Mr. Petkovic, to provide an explanation for the reason for which

21 such questions are being put.

22 Cross-examination by the Accused Petkovic:

23 Q. Your Honour, we talked about the arrival of Safet Cibo and his

24 arrival in the area of Konjic and Jablanica.

25 Witness, on the 23rd -- on the 20th of March, did Safet Cibo

Page 9758

1 become the chief of these municipalities.

2 A. Yes, yes. He was appointed halfway through the month.

3 Q. Have you seen documents of the commander of the brigade Suad Alic

4 who launched an attack in the area of Konjic as ordered by the 4th Corps

5 commander.

6 A. No, not prior to today.

7 Q. Not before today. Sir, you were link to the 4th Corps, yes or

8 no?

9 A. I haven't seen the report of Mr. Cerovac before today.

10 Q. Were you in contact with the 4th Corps?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Did you see in the document of the 23rd of March the stamp of the

13 4th Corps?

14 A. You're talking about this Cerovac documents?

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Was the deputy commander of the 4th Corps, who was known as Tetak,

18 in Jablanica at the time?

19 A. At the time of the attack, yes, on the 15th of April.

20 Q. So you know about that too?

21 A. Yes, of course.

22 Q. You've been shown an order dated the 4th of April, I think. From

23 the commander of the 4th Corps, it was also addressed to you. It was to

24 raise the level of combat readiness?

25 A. Yes.

Page 9759

1 Q. It refers to an earlier order that you weren't familiar with?

2 A. Yes, I was familiar with it. I didn't say I wasn't. All I said

3 is that, at this point in time, I couldn't remember. You'd have to show

4 it to me.

5 Q. That previous order, was it a link to the beginning of the

6 conflict in Konjic.

7 A. I don't know. If you have the order, show it to me.

8 Q. As far as you have told us, you established a chronology of the

9 events and I think that the orders of the 4th Corps are orders that you

10 have included in your chronology of events. Yes or no?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So now we have concluded that the link on raising the level of

13 combat orders concerns an earlier order about launching an offensive in

14 Konjic.

15 A. That's not what I said.

16 Q. You said that there could be a link.

17 A. This is a serious question. I can't talk about something I don't

18 have in front of me.

19 Q. Very well. Let's talk about the next order you were shown several

20 days afterwards. It's again the 4th Corps; is that correct?

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When you are talking about

22 documents, perhaps you could provide the number so that we can see it on

23 the screen, because the witness said that he couldn't see the document.

24 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we have the first

25 order from the corps? Date -- dated the 4th of April.

Page 9760

1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] The order dated the 7th of April,

3 4D 00081.

4 Q. Witness, can you see that order of the 7th of April? It was shown

5 to you previously.

6 A. Well, I'm -- I don't know what number you mean now. I'm looking

7 for it.

8 Q. You have it on your screens.

9 A. I see.

10 Q. You took a look at the first point of the order. "Undertake all

11 necessary measures and actions in the spirit of our previous order on

12 placing the units on full combat alert or full combat readiness as was

13 ordered." Now if we're dealing with the 7th of April here, this document

14 is the 7th of April, and on the 20th of March was the blockade and attack

15 on Konjic and 150 members of the HVO captured and the next day the arrests

16 and captures continue. You saw that document.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is that the logical link between that and this document?

19 A. I cannot say that.

20 Q. All right. You cannot say that. Now, the next document which my

21 attorney showed you, was the next order to raise combat readiness and it

22 is the 14th of April. That was the date.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. May I have a number, please, counsel, for that document?

25 A. I have the document.

Page 9761

1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] For the Bench and everybody else,

2 it is 4D 00082.

3 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Did you take a look at the order?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Tell me, please, if we go back to the 23rd of March, and here we

7 have the date as being the 14th of April, Arif Pasalic is still the

8 commander of the 4th Corps, yes or no?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. All the orders that we've seen are continuous orders following on

11 from each other, yes or no?

12 A. These orders, yes they are. They are orders from the corps

13 commander.

14 Q. Absolutely. So they all raise combat readiness in the area; is

15 that right? There's no letting up?

16 A. Yes, because the situation deteriorated from one day to the next.

17 Q. Thank you. Now, tell me this. You mentioned or, rather, we

18 mentioned the 23rd of March, the blockade of Konjic, the arrests that took

19 place, 150 members on the first day and I don't know how many HVO soldiers

20 on the second day. Now, do you know about Turje, Zabrdje, Zaslivlje,

21 those places?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. How far are they from Konjic?

24 A. Well, it's almost the suburb of Konjic.

25 Q. Do you know that the international observers and everybody else

Page 9762

1 who spent time in the area consider that to be a small Croatian enclave?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you know, sir, that in the broader area of the town of Konjic,

4 it was only this small portion, this small area where the Croats and up to

5 150 Croatian soldiers remained in an area not controlled by the BH army?

6 A. I know that Mr. Petkovic, but don't ask me about Konjic, please,

7 because the situation in Konjic was very -- well, I haven't got any

8 information about that. So don't ask me about Konjic.

9 Q. Sir, I just asked you something that you do know about. You have

10 already told me that a man nicknamed Tetak came to Jablanica, and as far

11 as I know, this man named Tetak was the deputy commander of the 4th Corps.

12 A. Yes, it was Sulejman Dudakovic.

13 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, could my counsel show us the order by Arif

14 Pasalic dated the 16th.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Arif Pasalic the 16th of -- it's 4D

16 00084.

17 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Witness, can you see this order of the 16th of April? First of

19 all, is it the command of the 4th Corps that issued this document?

20 A. Probably it is. Yes. Yes, yes it is.

21 Q. And it says the addressees, the Municipal Staff of Jablanica, the

22 command of that staff was who?

23 A. I was.

24 Q. You, right. So you were within the command of the 4th Corps and

25 every document thus far was addressed to you too?

Page 9763

1 A. Well, I don't know if every document, but most of the -- but

2 documents did arrive.

3 Q. The documents I showed you?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Let's read through this document. It says: "Pursuant to a piece

6 of information from the supreme defence staff of the armed forces of the

7 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation among the HVO forces in the

8 region of Neretvica is as follows:

9 "1. They are faced with a difficult situation. They are in a

10 difficult position because they do not have enough manpower. They demand

11 that their artillery from Risovac attack our positions north of the

12 Neretvica. The HVO informs that the ABiH forces have taken control of the

13 village of Vile probably Vrce."

14 A. Vrce wasn't taken control of and Vile doesn't exist in the area.

15 That's a mistake.

16 Q. Well, anyway, that they are moving in the direction of Kostajnica

17 and that they are ABiH forces.

18 Point 3: "HVO units expect assistance in the form of

19 reinforcements from Prozor from the north. And the HVO units in Kiseljak

20 have been ordered to help them out and move through Bradina, via Bradina.

21 The HVO from Neretvica will attempt to take control of the village of

22 Grebivca."

23 A. Yes, Grebivca.

24 Q. Yes. And then we can't see the rest of the text. But what we can

25 see at the bottom, it says "coordinate and unite."

Page 9764

1 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I can help you out,

2 I have this order which is handwritten, and it is fully legible.

3 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. We were referring to point 3. "HVO units accept reinforcement in

5 manpower coming from Prozor, from the northern side, and HVO units in

6 Kiseljak have been ordered to set out to assist them via Bradina." Is

7 that what it says?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. "The HVO from Neretvica will attempt to take control of the

10 village of Grevici, because via Grevici, and Kucani, the infantry can move

11 to assist them. That is an assumption. I hereby order, under 1, continue

12 combat operations in your areas of responsibility and do not allow the

13 arrival of new forces from the direction of Prozor. And I'd like to

14 mention that it is Prozor, the village of Kucani and the village of

15 Grebici as well as from the direction of Bradina." And number

16 2, "Dovetail and coordinate joint combat operations in order to carry out

17 successful operations and in order to break down the forces of the HVO."

18 Is that what it says in that point?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now 3: "This order must be acted upon immediately." And it

21 says, "Send to the addressees." Tell me the brigade locations. The 43rd

22 Brigade of the BH army, where was that?

23 A. Konjic.

24 Q. It was at Konjic. Where at Konjic?

25 A. It was turned towards the Serb aggressor over there, towards the

Page 9765

1 fighters of Bijelo and the Glavaticevo region mostly. I am not saying

2 that it didn't act the other side too.

3 Q. Do you know how many men held the front line towards the Serbs?

4 A. It was a long front line from Vrce, where the HVO held positions

5 and where the Serb forces had their own positions and then via Konjic,

6 Bijela, Borak, that area, and Gornja Neretva.

7 Q. Let's move on to the next brigade, the 44rd brigade of the army of

8 BH.

9 A. That is Jablanica.

10 Q. Jablanica is it. So this order was sent to your brigade at

11 Jablanica, that it should continue combat operations; is that right?

12 A. That's what it says here.

13 Q. All right. Now let's look at the 45th brigade. Where was that?

14 A. Neretvica.

15 Q. Neretvica. So that's Kostajnica?

16 A. Yes, the entire Neretvica river valley, it is the right bank of

17 Jablanica lake.

18 Q. Yes, I know that that's the municipality. I just asked for

19 specifications. Now to the military police, they are being included in

20 this as well.

21 A. The battalion of the military police was at the level of a corps,

22 of corps strength, so it had three companies, one was in Mostar, one was

23 in Jablanica and another one was in Konjic.

24 Q. Thank you. And the Municipal Staff of Konjic was the next

25 addressee. You were not at its head. And the Municipal Staff at

Page 9766

1 Jablanica, you were at the head of the Municipal Staff?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So on the 16th of April, sir, as the Municipal Staff of Jablanica

4 and your own brigade as well, the 40, what did you say, the 44th Brigade?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You received this order to dovetail your combat operations with

7 the forces of two brigades in the area of Konjic municipality. Is that

8 what it says in this order or not?

9 A. That's what it says. I can't say it doesn't when that's what is

10 written.

11 Q. Witness, you know Konjic and the area around Konjic better than

12 any of us here. Tell us, please, militarily speaking, how could the HVO

13 bringing in reinforcements help Konjic?

14 A. That would be very difficult.

15 Q. Very difficult. Now, if they wanted to assist, was it only

16 Prozor-Jablanica, from those municipalities?

17 A. Prozor Kiseljak is what is mentioned in the order.

18 Q. I'm asking you about the territory, the area that is more

19 southerly, the area of Prozor. That means -- and the Jablanica

20 municipality because it's Jablanica and Ostrozac; right?

21 A. Yes. Right.

22 Q. Now, tell me, please, the HVO Brigade, how many battalions did it

23 have?

24 A. As far as I know, Mijo Tomic was the third, that means three.

25 Q. Now, two battalions in the Konjic area?

Page 9767

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. How many brigades did the BH army have in Konjic?

3 A. Two brigades at the time.

4 Q. Right, two brigades. And the forces brought in by Cibo, you

5 mentioned that?

6 A. Yes. There were those forces as well.

7 Q. Tell me now, did the staff of the Supreme Command with Cibo, send

8 these troops to the Konjic-Jablanica area, and with the arrival of Cibo,

9 did combat operations start immediately against the HVO? My calculations

10 say that they started three days after Cibo arrived in the

11 Konjic-Jablanica area?

12 A. That's not correct. No combat operations started with the arrival

13 of Cibo, but the general situation deteriorated. The general political

14 situation deteriorated, if I can put it that way, but no combat operations

15 started with his arrival.

16 Q. Please, we just noted that on the territory of two municipalities

17 making up where the population is 70 per cent Muslim, Konjic and

18 Jablanica, the HVO has one brigade there. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, if that same area, the Konjic municipality and Jablanica, the

21 BH army has three brigades?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, in Jablanica itself, you told us that you had 2.500 soldiers.

24 Yes or no?

25 A. Yes, throughout the whole war. There were never that many

Page 9768

1 concentrated at any one time, but through the brigade, through the BH army

2 during the war, so many soldiers passed through it, but not at that time.

3 Q. Did you say that the HVO had 300 people in Jablanica?

4 A. The documents will tell you the exact figures and the HVO

5 information and report will tell you the exact figures and the deployment

6 of the people.

7 Q. Did you say that the HVO had 300 men? And in your written

8 statement, it says that we imprisoned 100 in Jablanica.

9 A. I'm not sure I'm following you. I didn't understand what you just

10 said.

11 Q. You said that the HVO had 300 soldiers in Jablanica. Now, in your

12 written statement given to the investigators, you mention that in town, in

13 the town of Jablanica, for preventive reasons, you incarcerated 100 people

14 at the beginning of the conflict.

15 A. You mean that we imprisoned a hundred people? That's not true.

16 Q. Well, you can read your statement once again.

17 A. All right, fine, but I never said that.

18 Q. Let's move on. Witness, I'm going to go back once again to the

19 23rd of March. And this Court and all of us here have to know that Safet

20 Cibo arrived before that and not long afterwards, not long afterwards, the

21 conflict broke out. Now, for you, those of you who were within the 4th

22 Corps chain of command, you do not know that on the 23rd of March the town

23 of Konjic was blocked? I'll repeat it again. The town of Konjic was

24 blocked. Somebody paralysed life in the town. Somebody arrested and took

25 prisoner 150 soldiers of the HVO, and somebody, the very next day,

Page 9769

1 continued with these arrests.

2 Tell me please, do you know about Musala?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you know about Celibici?

5 A. I do.

6 Q. Do you know about Tarcin?

7 A. I heard about it.

8 Q. Tell this Court whether they were prisons held by the BH army?

9 A. Celebici and Musala, as far as I know, at the beginning, were

10 joint prisons, joint prisons of the BH army and the HVO.

11 Q. I'm not asking you about these joint things. I'm asking you who

12 those prisons belonged to. Who had control of those prisons?

13 A. First of all, they were held by the HVO and the BH army together

14 and, probably after that, just by the BH army.

15 Q. My next question is this: You said that you could help Konjic.

16 Konjic could be helped out only from the area of Prozor, if you wanted to

17 help Konjic militarily, is that right?

18 A. Well, you could help it out on all sides but it depends on the

19 available forces. You could help Konjic from Fojnica as well and Kiseljak

20 as well.

21 Q. Fine. That's fine. Excellent.

22 A. If somebody has three brigades to send there, then they could do

23 that.

24 Q. Militarily speaking, I'm asking you, if the HVO wanted to and if

25 it decided to, could it, from the Konjic area, engage in fighting with the

Page 9770

1 BH army in order to help the HVO in Konjic?

2 A. I think that I said yesterday -- just a moment, please, I'm going

3 answer your question. The situation was such that at that point in time

4 nobody could help anybody. Not even God could help us down there any

5 more. The situation was that complicated that all of us fended for

6 ourselves. We did what we could to help ourselves. That's why I asked

7 you not to ask me anything about Konjic, because I don't know about that.

8 And I took the solemn declaration to tell the truth here and that's what

9 I'm going to do. I'm going to tell the truth.

10 I know nothing about the situation in Konjic, just as I know

11 nothing about the situation somewhere else. I heard stories going round,

12 but I don't want to speculate. All I want to say is what I know. So I

13 don't know anything about the situation in Konjic but I do know for sure

14 that the -- in Konjic, the Konjic Croats, the HVO could not have helped

15 them from any direction just as the BH army could not have helped us in

16 Jablanica, and that was the situation reflected further afield in the

17 whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everybody to had to fend for themselves and

18 look out for themselves.

19 Q. Witness, I have one question, one more question about Konjic. Is

20 there any military logics in the following, for anybody with two

21 battalions, and you've just said that nobody could help anybody from any

22 side, would it be logical for them to enter into conflict fighting two

23 brigades and against forces that were brought in by Safet Cibo? Would

24 that be logical from a military aspect?

25 A. Well, it's not logical, but let's be quite clear here. Safet Cibo

Page 9771

1 didn't bring in any respectable forces, any large forces. It was 3 to 400

2 men or one battalion strong.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, General Petkovic asked

4 you a question and it is an important one. So you must give us a clear

5 answer. General Petkovic, through his sequence of questions, is asking

6 you in military terms, the following: In that particular area,

7 Jablanica-Konjic, the HVO had a brigade strong. Forces were numbered a

8 brigade. Now, if the BH army -- ABiH had three brigades or, rather, it

9 did have three brigades. In your particular town, you had 2.500 soldiers,

10 whereas the HVO had approximately 300. So according to General Petkovic,

11 and the Chamber will check that out, 100 were preventively incarcerated.

12 Now, the question that you're being asked by General Petkovic and

13 that I am relaying to you is this: How come with that ratio of forces, it

14 would be possible for the HVO, numerically far lower than compared to the

15 number of forces the BH had, could launch an attack? So what answer could

16 you give in military terms to this -- to what General Petkovic is putting

17 to you? How come that the HVO who had so many less -- far less soldiers,

18 how could it have launched an attack against a far mightier ABiH army? So

19 that is what General Petkovic is asking you with his sequence of

20 questions.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand. Well, I'd first like

22 to correct something. The 44th Brigade never had 2.500 men. All I said

23 is that in the course of the war in Jablanica, and I was referring to the

24 Municipal Staff, the brigade, and the MUP, through these bodies 2 -- 2.500

25 men passed through all of these bodies, but the brigade never had 2.500

Page 9772

1 men at one point in time, but the war lasted for four years and there were

2 many men who passed through, who were killed, et cetera.

3 We haven't got time to go into all the military details now, but I

4 think that, naturally, the HVO couldn't have launched an attack where the

5 Herceg Stjepan Brigade was located, but I believe their strategy was to

6 wait and see. They were waiting for someone to come from the outside and

7 they'd be there to assist on the inside. That's what happened in

8 Jablanica when Sovici and Doljani were attacked. And later on, this

9 happened when there was an attack launched from the direction of Prozor

10 towards Slatina. And also, there was this attack in June on Boksevica, et

11 cetera.

12 So in order to describe these events to you, I'll tell you when

13 the HVO withdrew from Jablanica, when it moved its command, its troops,

14 its police. Most of the families of those who had gone to Doljani

15 remained in Jablanica. They believed that they would return down there in

16 two or three days' time and they would join up with their families again.

17 If they hadn't believed that this would happen -- if they hadn't believe

18 that this would happen, if they hadn't counted on assistance from the

19 outside, they certainly wouldn't have left their families in town and gone

20 to this village to shell this town. In fact, they shelled their own

21 families. I think that was the HVO plan. I'm assuming that that was the

22 case. As a soldier, that's what I would assume. But naturally, inside,

23 they didn't have the possibility of launching any military activity, any

24 attack.

25 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 9773

1 Q. My counsel showed you a Sagolj document and it says that forces

2 from Jablanica were attacking from Ostrozac in the direction of

3 Kostajnica. Was a brigade from Jablanica included in the attack on

4 Kostajnica and Falanovo Hill and other areas around Kostajnica?

5 A. A brigade from Jablanica and we're talking about the 15th and 16th

6 of April.

7 Q. And of the 13th too.

8 A. On the 13th of April, the Jablanica-Konjic road was blocked and

9 the Radesine sector, check-point was set up, and from the direction of the

10 Falanovo Hill, the Falan Hill, if you remember that part, it's in the

11 direction of Ostrozac, the road was kept under fire to block the road to

12 Konjic. On the 15th and 16th, we were using all of our forces to

13 establish lines in the direction of Doljani and Slatina. Unfortunately,

14 we didn't have those positions at the time. You know that.

15 Q. Witness, in your statement, you said that the HVO tried to do

16 something against the Serbs, but that you threatened them, and since they

17 were aware that they were in an inferior position, they gave up on that

18 idea. Did you say that or not?

19 A. I don't understand that.

20 Q. It's in your statement you gave to the Prosecution.

21 A. Could someone show that to me?

22 Q. We'll go back to that statement later.

23 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, a brief

24 comment with your leave. When reading the order dated the 16th of April,

25 I emphasised Prozor and Jablanica. We'll come across HVO activities in

Page 9774

1 Prozor on the 17th of April, on the 18th of April, and on the 19th of

2 April, during that period of time. (redacted), a Prosecution witness,

3 will also talk about this and we have shown this witness documents that

4 relate to places in the municipality of Prozor, and that's why I put a

5 question to the witness. If the HVO had to assist its forces or wanted to

6 assist its forces in Konjic, how could they have done so in military

7 terms? They would have had to leave from Prozor and then drive back the

8 armija in the first village and then in the second village and then reach

9 Kostajnica?

10 Q. Is that correct, sir?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Kostajnica is the nearest?

13 A. Yes, yes or, rather, it's the largest Croatian village and that's

14 where the brigade command was located later on.

15 Q. So that's the largest village. Witness, we have the documents and

16 the order shows that your brigade from Jablanica carried out military

17 activity in Kostajnica. That's in the Prozor municipality.

18 Tell me, in military terms, in order to stop your brigade, would

19 it have been logical to cut of your routes from -- between Konjic and

20 Jablanica, from Slatina-Ostrozac, so that you couldn't send forces into

21 the municipality of Konjic? I'm asking you whether it's logical --

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, General. Let's

23 go into private session.

24 [Private session]

25 (redacted)

Page 9775

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 [Open session]

12 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We're in open session, Mr.

13 President.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please continue.

15 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I repeat

16 the question?

17 Q. Witness, in military terms -- in military terms, would it be

18 logical, would it be justified if one wanted to prevent action of the

19 forces from Jablanica in the direction of Konjic, would it be logical to

20 take over the area between Jablanica and Konjic, to cut off access to

21 Konjic, yes or no?

22 A. Well, I can't say just yes or no. I'll answer your question but

23 not like that.

24 Q. I'm asking you whether this is military logic?

25 A. Well, you're claiming something you have no evidence for. The

Page 9776

1 44th Brigade from Jablanica never carried out military action in the

2 direction of Konjic, and a minute ago, we concluded that in the Neretvica

3 sector, if the whole -- the entire Herceg Stjepan brigade had been there

4 in the Neretvica, well, there was the 45th Brigade of the ABiH in

5 Neretvica. Why would they need assistance from Jablanica? There was no

6 need. And as far as your previous question is concerned, whether in

7 military terms it would be logical for someone from Prozor to go to

8 Kostajnica, well, naturally. That's not logical and that's not possible.

9 Q. Why is it not possible? I'm interested in that?

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have a break now because

11 it's 10.30 and we'll resume in 20 minutes' time.

12 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

13 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Petkovic.

15 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'll continue

16 because I think I'm running out of time. I think I've been granted an

17 hour and a half.

18 Q. Witness, I want to stop discussing the brigade from Jablanica, but

19 I have a document, a Defence document, 2D 00246. It's a Stojic Defence

20 document.

21 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] With your leave, I'd just like to

22 provide the Bench with some information. This document can be found in

23 the bundle of documents that belong to my colleague Ms. Senka Nozica. So

24 these documents concern the Stojic Defence.

25 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 9777

1 Q. Witness, you can see the document on the screen. Can you see the

2 document on the screen now?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is this a document from the 44th Brigade from Jablanica?

5 A. It should be.

6 Q. Is it dated the 14th of April, 1993?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. In the preamble, they mention the responsibility of the Neretvica

9 brigade, the problems in the municipality of Konjic and the zone of the

10 Neretvica brigade.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Is that Hakalovic's brigade?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That's on the right bank of the Neretva?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now you mentioned an order. Your commander said I hereby order.

17 Let's deal with Konjic first of all. Have a look at item 3 of this order

18 issued by your commander. I'll try and read it through.

19 Item 3: "The 2nd Battalion has the following task: Having

20 completed mobilisation, use 1 Company to take up positions" --

21 A. Could I see it on the screen? I can't follow it.

22 Q. Can you see item 3?

23 A. The 2nd Battalion.

24 Q. Yes. Item 3 says, "The task of the 2nd battalion is as follows."

25 Can you see it?

Page 9778

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "Upon completion of mobilisation, use the 1st Company to take up

3 positions. The defence at the following line: Glodnica, Ostrozac."

4 That's the last place in your municipality; is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Ostiste?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. That's a hamlet near Ostrozac?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You know about the hamlet. "Be prepared to carry out an attack on

11 the positions and units of the Croatian Defence Council."

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "Use the 2nd Company, having completed mobilisation, to take up

14 positions on Boksevica and be prepared to launch an attack." Is the

15 Boksevica mountain a mountain that divides the municipalities of Jablanica

16 and Konjic?

17 A. Yes, and Prozor, three municipalities.

18 Q. Three municipalities. It includes Prozor. Very well. The 2nd

19 Battalion of the 44th Brigade, when the brigade commander was carrying out

20 Pasalic's order, did it say that they should participate with the

21 Neretvica brigade under Hakalovic's command and that you should launch an

22 attack? Have a look at item 3. It says, "Be prepared to carry out an

23 attack on the positions and units of the HVO." Which is the -- in which

24 place was the HVO present closest to Ostrozac?

25 A. Radesine.

Page 9779

1 Q. Now that you have mentioned Radesine, tell the Court what happened

2 in Radesine. Not on that day, but three or four days later?

3 A. Perhaps more than that but, yes, I know what happened there more

4 or less. HVO members from Radesine blocked the Jablanica-Konjic road.

5 They blocked the M-17 main road, and it wasn't possible to link up

6 Jablanica and Konjic.

7 Q. What did your brigade do afterwards?

8 A. Our brigade didn't do anything. The -- our brigade wasn't

9 involved in combat activity in Radesine.

10 Q. And the ABiH from Konjic?

11 A. Yes. The ABiH from Konjic, yes.

12 Q. What did they do?

13 A. They took Radesine and the population. Well, I don't know what

14 they did to them but I know they attacked Radesine. They took the

15 population somewhere and they captured or arrested the soldiers, but the

16 44th Brigade from Jablanica didn't participate in that.

17 Q. Very well. But you have provided us with some information. We

18 will have a witness from the Spanish Battalion who will probably deal with

19 that.

20 A. That's no problem, but this is what I know.

21 Q. In item 3, did the 44th Brigade use one of its battalion to

22 cooperate with the Neretvica brigade and with Mr. Hakalovic, who was

23 involved in action against the HVO in that area? Yes or no?

24 A. That's what it says in the order.

25 Q. Is that what it says? You want the brigade commander?

Page 9780

1 A. Item 3, the 2nd Battalion task, is that what you're referring to?

2 Q. Yes, we've read it out twice.

3 A. How should I put this? These are positions to the east of the

4 municipality of Jablanica. There's the Recica mountain, Ostiste and

5 Ostrozac. Globica is the neighbouring village beyond the lake. And apart

6 from Radesine, there were no other units anywhere. They weren't really

7 facing the HVO or, rather, this position wasn't much exposed to the HVO.

8 It wasn't facing the HVO at that time. We had positions facing the Serbs

9 on that axis.

10 Q. Witness, I don't want to say that you shouldn't make me laugh, it

11 wouldn't be polite. I know where the positions facing the Serbs were, how

12 far away they were. In Enes Kovacevic's order, on the second page, "The

13 3rd Battalion co-operates with the Neretvica brigade in the Konjic area in

14 carrying out attack." That's what I asked you about. Did the brigade

15 participate in the attack on the HVO in the area of the municipality of

16 Konjic?

17 A. No.

18 Q. The commander says, yes.

19 A. In the area of the municipality of Konjic, in the area of the

20 Boksevica mountain, the brigade was involved in combat with the HVO but in

21 the area of the municipality of Jablanica.

22 Q. Just a moment, please. I'm not claiming that you entered deep

23 into the rear of the Konjic municipality, but with Hakalovic and his

24 brigade, the Neretvica, you pushed back the HVO in Kostajnica and that

25 general area.

Page 9781

1 A. Kostajnica, at this point in time, is at the foot of Boksevica.

2 Now, the fighting at Boksevica lasted with lesser or greater intensity for

3 a month.

4 Q. We'll come to that and we'll do that through a different witness,

5 but I'd like to show you another document now compiled on the 24th of

6 April. The number of the document is --

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. Just a

8 follow-up question. The document as presented to you, sir, shows that the

9 2nd Battalion was supposed to take up offensive positions. Now, the

10 preamble of this order indicates that the situation deteriorated, that

11 there was general HVO movement and preparations going on designed to

12 launch offensive operations against the BH army. So we see that the 44th

13 Brigade is using all its effectives and you answered General Petkovic's

14 question about that.

15 Can you take a look at point 12 of that order, please. What does

16 it say in point 12?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have it on my screen.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is page 2.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Points 12, it says: "Open fire only

20 when given orders by the brigade commander and in case of an attack

21 against the unit."

22 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the task was

23 given on the basis of this order to the 1st Battalion, the 3rd Battalion,

24 and the 4th battalion.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] To the best of your

Page 9782

1 recollections, was it the commander of the 44th Brigade that was supposed

2 to give the final order for the troops to open fire? What happened with

3 the 44th Brigade and your unit? How did you act?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At this period, we were just trying

5 to entrench and be prepared for an attack in the territory of the

6 municipality. Nowhere were the units of the 44th Brigade outside their

7 municipality, and nowhere did they launch into combat operations outside

8 the municipality's territory.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But this particular order, it

10 has -- also has to do with the 2nd Battalion, which was engaged in an

11 operation outside Jablanica. Now, my question is this: I can see point

12 10, where it is provided for the wounded and injured to be taken to the

13 war hospital in Jablanica and the mobilisation of vehicles. So this is

14 preparatory action that conforms to this order, but in point 12, it seems

15 that the order must first be issued by the commander. But maybe there's

16 some restrictions, and that's why I'd like to have your comments. It

17 seems that there are two situations. One is that the commander has

18 ultimately to give the order for the go-ahead, and in English it says "in

19 case the unit is attacked."

20 Now, how do you analyse point 12 in military terms?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, but could you tell me

22 the date of this document once again?

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is the 14th of April -- the

24 14th of April, 1993.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right. The 14th of April. That was

Page 9783

1 the day when we were totally cut off, and we expected an all-out attack

2 from all sides. And of course if somebody were to launch an attack, and

3 the possibility existed in the Boksevica area for that to happen, and in

4 Doljani, Sovici, et cetera.

5 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 May I be allowed to continue?

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would like to -- excuse me. I would like to

8 add two questions here. One refers to what you have said, that you said

9 that you prepared for an attack. Now, this can mean two things. It means

10 that you prepared to carry out an attack or you prepared to be able to

11 defend yourself against an attack from the other side. What was it that

12 you were referring to?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was referring to preparing for an

14 attack against us. We had already been attacked in Ostrozac. In

15 Ostrozac, on the 14th, there was a civilian fatality. That was a refugee

16 from Foca. So we were already in combat and had to defend ourselves. We

17 had to defend ourselves.

18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise for

19 interrupting in this military exchange --

20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: One more, please. Earlier on, during this

21 military subject, the importance of military forces were mentioned with

22 the result that there -- the ABiH largely outnumbered the HVO. Can you

23 say anything about the firepower of these two bodies of troops? How would

24 that compare? I believe it was a few hundred HVO or even less versus

25 2.000 ABiH. What was the firepower, the armament?

Page 9784

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Reverse proportionately. Our

2 numerical strength was as it was and they were 10 times stronger

3 technically, in technical terms. We didn't expect our local HVO to attack

4 us. They didn't have the power to do so, nor were we afraid of an attack

5 from our local HVO, nor were we afraid that the HVO from Jablanica would

6 attack us. They didn't have the power to do so. But on the hills around

7 Jablanica, a year before the war, heavy artillery weapons were positioned

8 there and they were turned towards Jablanica, 155-millimetre cannons,

9 205-millimetre howitzers or 203-millimetre cannon at Risovac, mortars,

10 tanks, and all the rest of it. Those are things that we could have just

11 dreamt of. And we were afraid. We weren't afraid that we'd be attacked

12 by the local HVO, but that the HVO from Western Herzegovina would attack

13 us which came -- which did take place. The battalion from Siroki Brijeg

14 attacked us, not the local HVO.

15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you very much. And excuse me, Ms.

16 Alaburic, if I have interrupted.

17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I interrupted you

18 first, Your Honour, so I apologise to you.

19 All I wanted to do was to follow on from a question that Judge

20 Antonetti asked with respect to point 12 of this document. So, Mr.

21 Idrizovic, would you clarify a point. Is it right to conclude that you

22 could open fire in two cases? The first case is if an order is received

23 from the brigade commander to open fire, and the second case would be when

24 the unit is attacked, and then you would have to open fire in order to

25 defend?

Page 9785

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, something like that.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Thank you, Witness. Now, if the artillery were to win a war,

5 nobody would need any infantry.

6 A. That's true, General, but that artillery of yours killed 35 of our

7 civilians, let alone the soldiers.

8 Q. We're not going to talk in that manner, discuss things in that

9 manner. We won't mention Livade, Doljani, and so on or anything else.

10 Now document 4D 00140 is the next one that I'd like to take a look

11 at.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, can we have a

13 calculation of the time used so far?

14 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Witness, while we're waiting for the document, you said that the

16 local HVO was not equal in force to you; is that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now you're going to see this unequitable position in the Konjic

19 municipality for just a month. It is the 23rd of March, and this is the

20 24th of April now. So it's the space of a month. Let's see what happens.

21 This is our department for refugees and displaced persons who sent out

22 this document to all these international organisations.

23 A. Can you give us a number, please?

24 Q. You have it on your screen. You have the document on the screen.

25 It is a list of villages in Konjic municipality inhabited by Croatians of

Page 9786

1 which some were burnt, looted, and Croats expelled.

2 On the 23rd of March, you blocked Konjic, you arrested 150

3 Croatians, and this date is one month later on the basis of an unequal

4 struggle. Do you know these villages, Trusina?

5 A. I told you not to take me to this area.

6 Q. Do you know what happened in Trusina on the --

7 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. The Prosecution has said a

8 number of times and maintains its position, that whether the Muslims

9 committed some crimes in some of these areas is not disputed, without

10 going into any particular one at this point in time. That's why I'm

11 always reluctant to get up and interrupt counsel or the accused when

12 they're asking reasonable questions. But now, as the president already

13 cautioned once today already, this is clearly offered for no purpose of no

14 other reason then to take us down into a relevant area and tu quoque and

15 into an area of the case that has nothing -- nothing is charged in Konjic.

16 What -- what we've seen here this morning, I think Mr. Petkovic has shown

17 us the military tactic of diversion. This is nothing to do with -- what

18 happened in Sovici and Doljani has nothing to do with what happened in

19 Konjic. Konjic is in the opposite direction. No one, neither the witness

20 nor the Prosecution has ever suggested that the threat from the HVO came

21 from Konjic. The threat from the HVO came from the north and to the west

22 and this all -- all this about Konjic has taken up 45 minutes, an hour,

23 and is completely irrelevant. I've not interrupted up until now. But now

24 we go further and further into it.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence of General

Page 9787

1 Petkovic is the last, not only in this courtroom, but generally who --

2 which would attempt to justify the crimes of one side by crimes committed

3 on the other. I consider that to be untenable from the legal point of

4 view and from the human point of view. The reason that we're showing this

5 list of villages is not to attempt to justify the alleged crimes committed

6 by the HVO with the alleged crimes committed by the BH army, it is a

7 different reason. We're discussing, in fact, the ratio of forces, the

8 balance of power between the HVO and the BH army. And I think that Judge

9 Trechsel's questions were very rightly posed in that regard. But we do

10 wish to prove that the BH army was far more powerful compared to the HVO

11 forces.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Petkovic, would you ask your

13 questions then about this balance of forces and on the basis of this

14 document. There are 23 villages, Croatian villages here. And we can see

15 that the Croatians were expelled, that the villages were looted, burnt and

16 so on. So ask your questions relevant to the document.

17 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Witness, from the 23rd of March and the blockade of the town of

19 Konjic until the 24th of April, I showed you 24 villages taken over by the

20 BH army in the Konjic municipality. Do you know about that or not?

21 A. Well, rumours were going round that certain crimes had been

22 committed.

23 Q. We're not talking about crimes here. Were the villages occupied?

24 A. I told you not to take me to other people's areas because then I

25 would have to speculate, and I'm not here to do that. The time that we're

Page 9788

1 discussing was far off, as far as we were concerned, and it didn't enter

2 our minds to look at what was happening in Neretvica because we had too

3 many of our own problems to contend with.

4 Q. Thank you for that answer, but I have another question. Was there

5 a united system of command? The 4th Corps, two brigades in Konjic, one

6 brigade in Jablanica. Yes or no?

7 A. Not only that but it was a broader establishment as well.

8 Q. Yes, but I'm asking about that and was Esad Ramic and Tetak at any

9 command post, forward command post there?

10 A. No, not during that period of time.

11 Q. But the observation that can be made is that the 43rd, 44th and

12 45th Brigade was commanded by Arif Pasalic; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And your TO Staff; is that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I

17 give the floor back to my Defence counsel.

18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, might I know how much

19 time we've used up, so that I can organise myself.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have between 10 and 12

21 minutes, but the registrar will confirm that in just a moment.

22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Does that include half

23 an hour from my learned friend Ibrisimovic, or is that just what's left of

24 my hour and a half?

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No. So it is with the half hour

Page 9789

1 of -- with Mr. Ibrisimovic's half hour you have 40 minutes.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Further Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Idrizovic, I'd like us to discuss the moment,

5 the events in Sovici and Doljani. And it has to do with a direct count in

6 the indictment. Can you tell us, to start off, when the fighting began --

7 when the HVO engaged in combat in Sovici and Doljani. Do you remember?

8 A. From the 13th, we did not have effective communication with Sovici

9 and Doljani. It was interrupted. All physical contacts were interrupted.

10 So we didn't have any proper communication at all for me to be able to

11 answer that question. We have seen a series of documents, and from the

12 Tuta and Stela trials, it is common knowledge when that began. So you

13 don't want me to speculate and do a lot of guesswork. It would be

14 counter-productive.

15 Q. So you don't remember the exact date and that is quite

16 understandable. Right. Now, you told us that the BH army units were in

17 Sovici and in Doljani; is that right?

18 A. Yes, that is right.

19 Q. You also told us -- that will suffice.

20 A. No, it's not sufficient. Let me say why, why they were there.

21 Q. You told us yesterday why they were established, and you also told

22 us yesterday that the exclusive assignment of those units in Sovici and

23 Doljani was in case of a conflict to evacuate the population towards

24 Jablanica; is that right? That's what you wanted to say?

25 A. Yes.

Page 9790

1 Q. May we now take a look at the document -- document 2D 00246 once

2 again, and I thank my learned friend Ms. Nozica for that document, and it

3 is in the Bruno Stojic set of documents for the Bench. And I'd like to

4 show point 5 to the witness, point 5 of that document.

5 In point 5 of this order the commander -- from Commander Kovacevic

6 it says as follows: "The 4th Battalion assignment immediately upon

7 completion of mobilisation, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoon should take up

8 its positions towards Risovac, and the 5th Platoon in the village of

9 Doljani and to be prepared for launching a defence, and until

10 reinforcements arrive to reinforce the positions with one platoon and an

11 armoured vehicle and not allow free passage in the direction of the

12 villages of Sovici and Doljani." [Risovac]

13 Q. Tell us, please, Mr. Idrizovic, whether from what we've just read

14 out of this portion from the 44th -- commander of the 44th Mountain

15 Brigade it would emerge that the BH army in Sovici and Doljani did have a

16 different assignment, not exclusively to evacuate the population towards

17 Jablanica?

18 A. Didn't have any other task in military terms.

19 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, does this order show that there was some other

20 task? I know you'll repeat what your position is, but just tell me: Does

21 this order show what I have said?

22 A. I have never seen this order before. This is the first time. I

23 don't think it tallies with what I said earlier on. While I was the

24 commander in command of the formation I have referred to, well, that was

25 their exclusive task. Their task was that in the case of a Croatian

Page 9791

1 attack the population should be evacuated. That's what these people in

2 Doljani did, and the people in Sovici surrendered and what happened to

3 them happened.

4 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, this order depicts the situation differently from

5 the way in which you depicted it when talking about the tasks of the ABiH

6 in the villages of Sovici and Doljani; is that correct?

7 A. Yes, it is.

8 Q. Very well. We can move on. Yesterday you told us that the

9 commander in Doljani prior to the attack, or just before the attack, if

10 I'm quoting you correctly, managed to evacuate all the inhabitants in

11 Jablanica; is that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. He managed to evacuate them all to Jablanica. You also said that

14 some of the population of Sovici also managed to evacuate to Jablanica?

15 A. A small number. There were more people serving in the military

16 rather than civilians.

17 Q. You don't consider people serving in the military as civilians?

18 A. No. Those are -- who were serving in the army managed to break

19 through to Jablanica.

20 Q. When you say those serving in the army, you mean members of the

21 ABiH?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. Very well. So the Sovici commander didn't accomplish his task to

24 evacuate the population. Did he engage in combat with the HVO or not?

25 A. Well, I think there are a lot of documents about this, and in the

Page 9792

1 Tuta and Stela case there were witnesses who have addressed the issue and

2 there will also be such witnesses in this case, I believe, who will be in

3 a better position to answer that question.

4 Q. Can I conclude that you had no information according to which the

5 ABiH mounted resistance of some kind in Sovici? You don't know whether

6 there was an armed conflict between two -- two armies?

7 A. Whenever there is an armed conflict people get killed. The HVO

8 reports show that the action was carried out brilliantly without any

9 losses.

10 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, we are discussing what you know. You are telling

11 me that you don't know anything about this, and I just want to conclude

12 with this issue saying that you don't know whether there was an armed

13 conflict in Sovici or not?

14 A. According to the documents that I had and the documents that you

15 have, and on the basis of the conversations with people up there, well,

16 naturally, there was a conflict. People were attacked, and when they were

17 attacked the commander surrendered and everything fell through.

18 Q. Did he surrender after having tried to resist or before? Do you

19 know that?

20 A. Well, on the basis of what I heard from people up there, well,

21 everyone saw things differently.

22 Q. Very well. Tell me, at that time in Sovici were there 50

23 inhabitants of Prozor who were living in Sovici after the conflict in

24 Prozor?

25 A. I don't know about that.

Page 9793

1 Q. Very well. Can you clarify something for us? Can you clarify

2 part of your testimony when you said that in fact there were two conflicts

3 and that the second conflict - and I'll quote to you - occurred after a

4 member of Tuta's units had been killed, and after that event there

5 were -- an even fiercer attack was launched. Can you tell us what you in

6 fact wanted to say?

7 A. You haven't quoted me correctly. That's not what I said.

8 Q. Well, then, can you clarify what you actually said.

9 A. When I said that, it was within the context of an order from

10 Mr. Petkovic or Praljak dated the 20th of February on the cessation of

11 hostilities. I said that that order hadn't been implemented but that on

12 the 24th - so not on the 22nd but on the 24th - a fierce attack was

13 launched; this attack continued. I don't know whether you understand how

14 war a waged. Probably not very well. But there was a fierce HVO attack

15 on that day, on the 24th, and on that occasion Tuta's deputy was killed,

16 and then revenge was taken in Sovici.

17 Q. That's what I in fact want us to clarify. Before Tuta's deputy

18 was killed, tell us what in fact happened in Sovici and Doljani. Had the

19 military operation been completed within one day?

20 A. No. How could it have been completed in a day? It continued for

21 one year. The fighting continued for one year.

22 Q. So --

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In order to understand your

24 answers correctly, when you mention Sovici and Doljani, are you talking

25 about what you know now in 2006; or are you answering these questions on

Page 9794

1 the basis of the knowledge that you had when you were in Jablanica in

2 April 1993; or are you telling us about this because you testified in the

3 Tuta and Stela case and you learned about many things there?

4 What I would like to know is when you answer a question in what

5 capacity are you answering the question? Are you answering the question

6 in the capacity of a former commander in Jablanica; or are you answering

7 the question in your capacity as a witness in the Tuta and Stela case; or

8 is it because in the meantime you have read a lot of material and you find

9 yourselves -- you find yourself able to tell us a lot now?

10 Yes, Mr. Scott.

11 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, before the witness answers Your Honour's

12 question, could I just add I object to this current persistence in this

13 line of questioning because counsel repeatedly says -- asks the witness

14 questions about this. The witness repeatedly says, "I wasn't there. I

15 don't -- don't ask me to speculate," and then turns around and continues

16 to insist that he speculate, and can't have it both ways. He can either

17 talk about Sovici and Doljani or he can't, but we're going in two

18 directions at once.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's because I noticed the

20 problem that I would like the witness to tell me in what capacity he's

21 answering certain questions, on what basis he's answering certain

22 questions.

23 Can you answer that question, Witness?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. A minute

25 ago I answered that question. I told counsel that there would be other

Page 9795

1 witnesses appearing who could testify about Sovici. I wasn't there at the

2 time, and I can't say anything about what I saw there because I didn't see

3 anything there. What I know about that place is hearsay information or I

4 read about it. So I told her that she should spoke to others about this,

5 not to me. So you're quite right.

6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm aware of the fact

7 that the witness wasn't in Sovici or Doljani and that is why I put my

8 question to him and asked him whether he had any direct information about

9 the events in Sovici and Doljani. We have received his answer.

10 As far as the objection raised by Mr. Scott, I'd like to draw your

11 attention to part of the transcript, page 46 of yesterday's hearing. The

12 witness said that after Tuta's deputy had been killed, his name was

13 Cikota, he mentioned the date and he said after this member had been

14 killed an even fiercer attack was launched and this was in order to take

15 revenge. This was on page 46. The word "revenge" was repeated today, and

16 I believe that it's my task to clarify what is at stake here, given the

17 nature of these answers. And to clarify the word "revenge" I'd like to

18 draw your attention to the fact that this is a term that is a key term

19 with regard to the adjudicated facts from the Tuta-Stela case.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Idrizovic, can you clarify

21 the following for me. Yes, it's true that you referred to vengeance. On

22 what basis? Did you read about this? Is this something you learned about

23 in the Tuta and Stela case, or is it because in April you learned about

24 this in Jablanica? So why did you spontaneously use the term "revenge"?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We found out about it in Jablanica

Page 9796

1 very rapidly, because among the four men killed there was the brother of a

2 member of the 44th Brigade command. Mustafa Skampo. There was an Skampo;

3 he was the brother of an officer of ours. And the people who came from

4 Sovici afterwards told us that this had happened, and this event was

5 described by Rados in his diary.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may, just for one second, Mr. President,

7 because I'm getting a little agitated by the Prosecution standing up and

8 saying that we're out of the scope.

9 If you look at the proofing chart, he tells us the paragraphs of

10 the indictment. Look at it very closely. He tells us that this witness

11 is going to be testifying about certain paragraphs concerning Jablanica

12 municipality, and he notes -- he notes paragraph 73, which is in -- which

13 includes the area which counsel now is questioning on. And I think it's

14 disingenuous for the Prosecution to stand up and saying we're going

15 outside the scope.

16 If the gentleman, if the gentleman doesn't know anything about

17 those two incidents, then I -- I suggest that everything that the

18 gentleman stated on direct examination be wiped off the record and not be

19 considered. They can't have it both ways. On direct he can talk about

20 it; on cross, when counsel go into it, we can't.

21 We go by the proofing chart. The proofing chart states the

22 paragraphs. They chose it. And so I think it's unfair for the

23 Prosecution to stand up and to make these speeches interrupting counsel.

24 It's highly unprofessional.

25 MR. SCOTT: Well, sorry, Your Honour, but I want to respond very

Page 9797

1 specifically, because it's -- the questions -- first of all, in terms of

2 the proofing chart, so-called, it referred to -- counsel just referred to

3 paragraph 73 of the amended indictment, and I would -- I would ask the

4 Chamber -- unfortunately I hate to take the time. But if you look

5 specifically at the indictment, since this allegation -- a very specific

6 allegation against the Prosecution has been made, if you look at

7 paragraph 73 of the indictment, it is the introductory paragraph about the

8 background of Sovici-Doljani and the make-up, the demographic make-up of

9 the municipality, number one.

10 Number two, in paragraph 76 of the amended indictment, it talks

11 about the events on the 15th through the 17th of April, 1993. In the

12 indictment at paragraph 76, it says the following: "A number of Bosnian

13 Muslim men attempted to defend the villages of Sovici-Doljani, but most

14 resistance was quickly overcome by late afternoon on 17 April 1993, when

15 the Bosnian Muslim commander surrendered."

16 That is the Prosecution case. It is not in dispute. We've never

17 said anything to the contrary. There was a period of armed resistance

18 early on the 17th of April. Our position is not to the contrary.

19 Thirdly, the questions that were put to this witness about Sovici

20 and Doljani yesterday were very specific as related to information that

21 had specifically come to his attention; for example, when refugees and

22 people who had escaped from the villages came into Jablanica and gave

23 reports.

24 So I object to Mr. Karnavas's characterisations and attack on the

25 Prosecution. It's not fair or accurate.

Page 9798

1 Thank you.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: He asks the witness to provide hearsay

3 information. The witness wasn't there. It was good enough for the

4 Prosecution to ask for hearsay information. Granted, hearsay can come in

5 in this Tribunal. Well, now we're trying to rebut some of the hearsay

6 information and I think that's what counsel is trying to do. If they

7 didn't want the gentleman to ask -- for the Defence to ask these

8 questions, they could have avoided asking him for the hearsay information

9 which he learned, because he wasn't an eyewitness. He wasn't there. And

10 I think that we're entitled to -- under the rules of evidence to present

11 alternative --

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

13 Ms. Alaburic, please continue.

14 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'd just like to

15 explain why this question is being put. One of the counsel of the

16 indictment, one of the items -- or, rather, one the paragraphs in the

17 indictment concerns the torching of Muslim houses in Sovici and Doljani.

18 The witness mentioned revenge being taken after Tuta's deputy had been

19 killed, and as a result I think that it is in our interest to clarify this

20 matter. I don't think that he spontaneously used the term "revenge,"

21 because whenever the witness referred to Cikota being killed he mentioned

22 "revenge."

23 But since I have not got enough time to clarify all these details,

24 I'll ask the witness the following. Can we have a look at two documents

25 that concern Sovici and Doljani. The first one is 4D 00447. It's a

Page 9799

1 report from the 44th Mountain Brigade command which says that a commission

2 composed of Sefer Halilovic, Milivoj Petkovic, and other ABiH

3 representatives and HVO representatives arrived in the area. But what I'm

4 most interested in is a sentence. It's the third paragraph in the middle

5 of the page.

6 "An unconditional evacuation of the civilian population from

7 Doljani and Sovici has been agreed on and it will take place tomorrow."

8 The word "an unconditional evacuation has been agreed on" is what

9 interests me.

10 Q. Were you present when ABiH representatives and HVO representatives

11 held discussions in Sovici and Doljani?

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is the number of the

13 document, because --

14 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] 4D 00447. It's in the middle of

15 the report.

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: There is no English translation, at least not in

17 my file.

18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I have to ask my case manager about

19 this who told me we had all the English translations. I do apologise.

20 My case manager has told me that unfortunately this -- the

21 translation of this document didn't reach us in time. This is why you

22 don't have it. And in order to assist the Judges to see the sentence that

23 I'm interested in, well, it's the 10th line on the screen, and it states

24 the following: "An unconditional evacuation of the civilian population

25 from Doljani and Sovici has been agreed on for tomorrow."

Page 9800

1 Q. Can you see that sentence, Mr. Idrizovic?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "Agreed" is the word I'm interested in. My question, and I'll

4 repeat it, is: Were you present when Halilovic and Petkovic tried to

5 agree on evacuating the population?

6 A. No.

7 Q. No. So you know absolutely nothing about that or do you have some

8 information and, if so, what are your sources?

9 A. I have no information about this.

10 Q. We can move on and have a look at the following document.

11 I'd just like to draw your attention to one more thing. In this

12 same document is the very next sentence as follows: "It was noted that

13 the same commission made up of representatives of two armies and the

14 international community moved in the direction of Konjic, set out in the

15 direction of Konjic."

16 A. Yes, I can see that.

17 Q. All right. We can move on. The next document is P 02203, and it

18 is a letter sent by Paket post from Mostar signed by General Milivoj

19 Petkovic, and it is a document in which the Greens are mentioned, Zeleni.

20 I assume you are aware of this document?

21 A. Yes, it's about five buses coming to Sovici and Doljani to

22 evacuate the population towards Jablanica.

23 Q. Now, the word "green" was used, and I'm going to ask you the

24 following in that regard. Do you agree that this was sent on the 5th of

25 May from Mostar?

Page 9801

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you agree that this Paket communication -- that it was sent to

3 Doljani by Paket communication?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And do you agree, in Doljani, according to what it says in the

6 upper right-hand corner, that it arrived on the 5th of May at 1130 hours?

7 A. Probably it's not very legible but I take it that it's correct.

8 Q. If from the report of the 44th Mountain Brigade of the BH army we

9 saw that a delegation of the two armies, on that particular day, set out

10 towards Konjic, would you agree with me that that same delegation or

11 commission, on the 5th of May, was in the Konjic area?

12 A. Well, it should have been. Mr. Petkovic is here. He knows

13 whether they were there or not.

14 Q. Right. Now, tell me, with this possibility of communicating when

15 General Petkovic was in Konjic, was it possible for him to send word to

16 his service in Mostar to ask this about the buses, send this question to

17 Doljani. Or rather, can a commander from Konjic tell his service in

18 Mostar to send out a letter to an HVO unit in Doljani?

19 A. Why not? He has his deputy, the Chief of Staff, or whatever his

20 name was who could do that in his name.

21 Q. Right. And when somebody in Mostar compiles a letter with this

22 wording, he writes the text independently, does he not? He words it

23 independently?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In other words, this was written by somebody in Mostar in view of

Page 9802

1 the fact that it was a letter sent from Mostar to Doljani; right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, since General Petkovic was in Konjic on that particular day,

4 General Petkovic himself was not the author of the text and wording

5 contained in this document?

6 A. Quite possibly.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Scott, please.

9 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me. That's pure speculation, Your Honour. We

10 don't know if Mr. Petkovic dictated the exact language to someone in

11 Mostar. We don't know if he did, but it's pure speculation to the

12 contrary.

13 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Well, I'm very pleased that my

14 learned colleague Mr. Scott reacted because I think the burden of proof is

15 on him and he can prove that General Petkovic from Fojnica dictated this

16 kind of text this language.

17 Q. And Mr. Idrizovic -- yes, I'd like to give you some time to expand

18 but I have very little time and I have more questions to ask you.

19 With respect to calming down the situation, calming the conflict

20 in Prozor, I'd like to comment some of your answers with respect to the

21 exhibits presented to you by the Prosecutor. And I'll be as brief as

22 possible, but let's start off with this.

23 Take a look at document P 02088, please. It is a joint statement

24 by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban, who met in Zagreb on the 24th of

25 April, 24th of April, in the presence of Lord David Owen and the Croatian

Page 9803

1 representative of Franjo Tudjman and others.

2 Tell us, please, Mr. Idrizovic, did you know that on the 24th of

3 April, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic was in Zagreb talking to the Croatian

4 representatives about mutual relations in an attempt to solve the problem

5 of the conflicts and how to organise Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did you know

6 about that?

7 A. Well, we knew about that, yes, because during the war in

8 Jablanica, we had television. We could watch television. We had CNN. We

9 had cable television. So we were able to watch different channels. We

10 were not uninformed as we were in other areas.

11 Q. Right. Fine. Now, let us take a look at point 2 of this joint

12 statement together. The end of point 2, in actual fact, where the

13 following is stated: "That the signatories of this mutual statement,

14 joint statement, order all military units of the BH army and HVO to

15 cease-fire immediately and all hostilities in all locations where those

16 military units are located and where they face each other."

17 Have you -- do you see that?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, tell me, was Mr. Alija Izetbegovic in a way the Supreme

20 Commander of the armed forces? I know that there was the collective

21 Presidency.

22 A. Yes, he probably was.

23 Q. Do you know whether Mate Boban was the Supreme Commander of the

24 armed forces of Herceg-Bosna?

25 A. Probably he was. If he was the president, then according to the

Page 9804

1 various documents, that would be so.

2 Q. Now let's take a look at the end of point 3 of the joint statement

3 where they take note, the highest representatives, if I can put it that

4 way, of the Croatian and Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina take note of

5 the following: That the BH army and the HVO are equally legal units and

6 the establishment of a Joint Command is indicated; is that right?

7 A. That's what it says.

8 Q. Now point 5 is the next one I'd like to take a look at. And at

9 line 3 it says, "The signatories of this joint statement conclude that the

10 responsibility for the conflicts are to be borne by both sides;" is that

11 right? That both sides bear the responsibility -- are to blame for the

12 conflicts; is that right? Is that what Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and Mate

13 Boban say, that the BH army and the HVO have equal responsibility for the

14 conflicts? Is that right?

15 A. Yes, that's what it says.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, let us take a look at another document, the

17 number of which is P 02091. It is an addendum, annex to this joint

18 statement, and it relates to the establishment of the commands of the BH

19 army and HVO. And in point 1 of that annex it says, "That the BH army and

20 the HVO will retain their separate identities and command establishment."

21 Is that right, Mr. Idrizovic?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And point 2 says, "That they will establish or form a Joint

24 Command which will be responsible for controlling the operations in

25 military districts;" is that right?

Page 9805

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you for those answers. Now would you tell us the following:

3 Do you know of the reactions in the BH army to this joint statement? What

4 were they? And to this annex.

5 A. Well, it was talked about, and we firmly wanted to have a Joint

6 Command for conflicts to cease, because to all intents and purposes at

7 that time, we were waging war on two sides, and -- well, the conflict was

8 completely nonsensical and led to the destruction, especially of us

9 Muslims, because we were surrounded from all sides.

10 Q. Thank you. Does that mean that the BH army, or at least the

11 members of the BH army whom you knew, that they completely supported and

12 endorsed these conclusions on the legality of the HVO and that the HVO was

13 a component part of the armed forces of BH?

14 A. Yes, of course. And there was a provision having the force of law

15 stating who made up the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We did not receive

16 any other kind of document to deny that, refute that.

17 Q. Thank you. Now let us take a look at three more orders on the

18 cessation of hostilities which were compiled on the basis of this joint

19 statement from President Izetbegovic and Boban. And I'd like to take a

20 look at the following document, P 02084. It is an order by Mr. Bruno

21 Stojic and Milivoj Petkovic on a cease-fire for all offensive operations

22 towards the BH army. The date is the 25th of April, 1993, isn't that

23 right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And it was issued on the basis of the joint statement. It was a

Page 9806

1 follow-up to that and an agreement on a cease-fire; is that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now let's see what happens next in the BH army. I had to select

4 the documents, so I'm sorry for not showing them all to you but may we

5 take a look at document 4D 00435 next, please, which is an order from the

6 commander of the 4th Corps, Mr. Arif Pasalic, which once again relates to

7 the previous joint agreement and orders a cessation to all offensive

8 operations.

9 Are you familiar with this document? Have you seen it before?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. May we now take a look at 4D 00436, which is another order by the

12 commander of the 4th Corps, Arif Pasalic. And he warns and states in

13 capital letters that a cease-fire take effect immediately. Have you seen

14 this order before?

15 A. I don't remember, but probably, yes. If it was sent out to me, if

16 I'm one of the addressees and the Municipal Staff is, then yes. I can't

17 see the whole order.

18 Q. Mr. Idrizovic --

19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. I think it is my duty to draw your

20 attention to the fact that here again we have no translation. So perhaps

21 if we could be assisted.

22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I really do

23 apologise. We handed in these documents or many documents to the CLSS,

24 and we also gave documents to a translation office in Zagreb, and we do

25 some translations ourself as well for shorter documents which we need. So

Page 9807

1 all I can do is apologise for those translations not being ready.

2 If you consider it necessary, I can just say that my question

3 referred to point 1. We can have that point translated.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You could read it. I understand your

5 difficulties. I was not complaining, but I think in all honesty, you must

6 know what we can read and what we cannot read. Otherwise, we cheat you.

7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, you're quite right, Your

8 Honours. I do apologise. That's why I'm going to read out point 1 of

9 this order, and we'll see what it says.

10 It is an order from Mr. Arif Pasalic as commander of the 4th Corps

11 in which he refers, among other things, to the previous order that we

12 discussed, and point 1 is says: "I hereby most emphatically caution you

13 that immediately," and that is written in capital letters, "unconditional

14 and complete cease-fire be effected vis-a-vis the HVO units, and in case

15 of provocation, act in the spirit of point 3 of the order," and the

16 numbers follow, "of the 26th of April, 1993."

17 Now, since the witness has said that he has probably seen this

18 document before, my next question to him was this. A repetition of an

19 order with these contents, does that mean that the BH army or, rather, the

20 units of the 4th Corps did not abide by the order issued by their

21 commanders of the 26th of April? Would that be the logical conclusion?

22 A. Unfortunately, nobody respected any orders, or this order, either

23 side, when it came to cease-fire orders.

24 Q. Thank you. Now, Mr. Idrizovic, I'd like to use the rest of our

25 time to what we call the Prozor case.

Page 9808

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. I'd like to hear

2 your answer in full. You said that nobody respected orders. Why was

3 that? Why was Pasalic's order not respected? That's what we're

4 interested in hearing.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, these orders either on the HVO

6 side or BH side were not put into practice. They were not adhered to in

7 practice on the ground, not the ones before or the ones later. Now, it's

8 difficult to -- for me to explain why. Quite simply, the fighting went on

9 without cessation, we did receive orders, but nobody respected them on

10 either side. Nobody carried out these orders. And this also says that or

11 testifies the fact that Mr. Pasalic really did want to see a cease-fire,

12 because he kept emphatically stating as much through these orders.

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Are you aware, sir, of any reactions against the

14 non-compliance? Normally, in military service, non-obedience to an order

15 is a rather serious offence. Were there any prosecutions of persons,

16 lower commanders, who disregarded these orders?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, no, on neither

18 side. They were armies which were -- had been established just a little

19 while ago and they were far from the kind of --

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] May I ask a follow-up question.

21 You have an order signed by Pasalic that was addressed to you which says

22 "cease-fire". Now, let's take a hypothetical. One of your soldiers

23 shoots at an HVO soldier. What did you do in such a case, or what would

24 you do? Would you close your eyes to it, or would you arrest the soldier

25 and send him up before a military tribunal?

Page 9809

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you're asking me, then my units,

2 the units under my command, were a long way away from this. They were in

3 town or around town. So this did not refer to where I was, and I don't

4 know whether on either side one of the subordinate -- subordinates were

5 held accountable for non-compliance with an order by his superior

6 officers.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have an order of the 26th of

8 April from Pasalic which says "cease-fire". Now, in your particular town,

9 on the 27th of April, was there still shooting going on and, if there was,

10 what did you as the responsible person do?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was not the responsible person at

12 that time. It was my commander, the commander of the 44th Brigade in

13 Jablanica who was responsible. He held the positions facing the HVO. I

14 did not have any contact in that sense. My units --

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I see that others are still

16 being blamed very often, but I'm talking about a hypothesis. The person

17 who opens fire is under your command. You arrest such a soldier. Do you

18 draft a report and forward it to the command of the 44th Brigade? Do you

19 forward a report to Mr. Pasalic saying that in compliance with his order

20 certain measures were taken against soldier X who opened fire? What would

21 you say about that? Would you have taken any measures against such a

22 soldier?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would have taken measures against

24 such a soldier if he'd been a member of mine. There were rules that were

25 in force. A commander could take measures immediately, or he could send

Page 9810

1 the individual concerned to the military prosecutor. But at the time,

2 this judicial system hadn't been established. The state was in complete

3 disarray. There was no efficient judicial system. There wasn't an

4 efficient prosecutor's office. I'm not saying nothing existed, but it

5 simply wasn't efficient.

6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, I believe that the beginning of your answer

8 provided to the question put to you by Judge Trechsel was very important,

9 and I believe it will help the Judges and everyone else in the court to

10 gain a better understanding of anything. With regard to measures taken

11 for violation of orders, you said that both armies were in fact -- or had

12 in fact only just been established, that they hadn't been fully

13 established, and you have also said that the system was in a state of

14 disarray, that the judiciary wasn't functioning during that period. So

15 could you just finish the answer you had started giving, please? Or

16 perhaps I should put a concrete question to you.

17 Given that there were two newly-established armies, they had been

18 in existence for perhaps about a year at that time, given that situation,

19 did that reflect on the discipline? Did that influence discipline, the

20 possibility of taking measures against soldiers when orders weren't

21 carried out? Did it have an influence on the way in which the army

22 functioned?

23 A. Naturally. General Petkovic, other professional soldiers know

24 that you need several years to have an efficient brigade structure. Our

25 brigades were formed on an ad hoc basis. The officers in those units

Page 9811

1 weren't up to the tasks that they had to carry out. They weren't up to

2 performing their duties that they should have been performing given their

3 establishment rank. So the system was quite different. People often

4 don't understand us when we discuss matters. We understand each other,

5 but others don't. The situation was difficult.

6 Let me just add this: Sovici and the commander over there often

7 mentioned in this case, it wasn't possible to replace him though. We knew

8 he was no good but if 80 per cent of the soldiers said if he's not the

9 commander, then we won't remain members of the army. And there's no way

10 if you're forcing someone to be a member of an army. How could you do

11 that? There was no state in existence. Everything was done on the basis

12 of patriotism. So the entire system was unstable.

13 It's difficult to understand us when we talk about these things.

14 It's difficult for the Judges to understand us.

15 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, I believe that I understand you. I hope I

16 understand you very well in fact.

17 Now, could you answer the following: You described the situation

18 that the ABiH was in, and I assume this was not only a situation that the

19 ABiH was in. I believe the HVO was in a similar situation; is that

20 correct?

21 A. More or less.

22 Q. Thank you. Before I move on to another subject, may I please be

23 informed about the amount of time I still have at my disposal?

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar. You have already

25 used up 111 minutes, and as you have 135 minutes, that means that you have

Page 9812

1 another 24 minutes left. So you should conclude by half past 12.00 so

2 that we can have the break.

3 Yes, Mr. Ibrisimovic.

4 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, to know how we'll

5 be working after the break, I retain my right to use the 15 minutes I

6 have, and I know that my colleague from the Coric Defence has 15 minutes.

7 I don't know what the position of Mr. Praljak is and I know Ms. Nozica has

8 to conduct her cross-examination, so I'd like some instructions about

9 that.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, Mr. Ibrisimovic

11 wants to keep 15 minutes of his time, which means that in theory, you have

12 another 10 minutes. So you should conclude in 10 minutes' time.

13 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, let's move on to the subject of Prozor. You have

15 discussed this subject in detail, in greater detail than Jablanica, I

16 would say.

17 First of all, could you please have a look at the following

18 document. Unfortunately, we don't have the translation, so we'll read out

19 part of it. The number is 4D 00420. It's a daily report from Tactical

20 Group 1 in Konjic. And on the 21st of October, 1992, it was forwarded to

21 Sefer Halilovic. And I'd like to draw your attention to the date. It's

22 the 21st of October. I'll summarise this report.

23 Item 1 states the following: "Prozor has requested assistance in

24 the form of units at the ready from neighbouring municipalities. The HVO

25 has taken the Makljen hill, the border between Gornji Vakuf and Prozor.

Page 9813

1 There is tension in the town, and the forces have been deployed in zones.

2 Jablanica has sent in a company to the border of Prozor. All the other

3 forces are at full combat readiness.

4 "2. A company from Travnik which was on Igman is quite exhausted

5 and has passed through here -- passed through here at 1900 hours.

6 Instructions were given that they should go to Prozor."

7 I'll skip the rest.

8 "3. At about 1600 hours, Prozor reported that a Military Police

9 Platoon and an armoured vehicle from Grude had been allowed to pass

10 through Prozor. Their intention is to reach Travnik. An order was issued

11 at 1620 hours to Gornji Vakuf that they should be stopped and returned to

12 where they had come from. No report has been sent in response."

13 I'll just mention item 4: "Roads from the south have been blocked

14 for all traffic from Jablanica and from the south. The convoy of arms

15 mentioned last night was stopped in Posusje. The total mobilisation was

16 ordered in Konjic and the lining up of all armed persons in the barracks

17 in Celebici was also ordered. Tomorrow we will be sending in two

18 companies as reinforcement to Jablanica. The HVO units in Konjic are

19 invisible."

20 And that's sufficient for my question. On the basis of this

21 document from the ABiH, can we conclude that individual army units were

22 sent in the direction of Prozor on the 21st of October, 1992? Can we come

23 to that conclusion?

24 A. Can I answer that question with regard to Jablanica?

25 Q. Is this what the document shows?

Page 9814

1 A. I can only speak about Jablanica. I'll answer your question.

2 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, let me just tell you something. I'm not asking you

3 about what really happened. At this point in time, I would only like to

4 analyse the document. So, please, tell me, was this something we can

5 conclude on the basis of the document?

6 A. Yes, on the basis of the document, we can come to that conclusion.

7 But this was never implemented. A company didn't leave for Jablanica and

8 that's why the commander was replaced and I in fact replaced him. That's

9 what I wanted to say. A unit wasn't sent in, but given the order, one

10 could come to that conclusion.

11 Q. Mr. Idrizovic, what you have just said is something that we will

12 deal by referring to the relevant documents. Could we now have a look at

13 the following document. We have a translation of this document. The

14 number is 4D 00426. Again, it's from the commander of the Tactical Group

15 in Konjic. It's a letter dated the 21st of October 1992, sent to

16 Jablanica at 1330 hours, forwarded to the commander of the -- the

17 commander of the Municipal Staff in Jablanica is asked to place all forces

18 at his disposal in a state of full combat readiness and one unit is

19 supposed to be sent in as assistance. Is that what you mentioned a minute

20 ago?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Let's move on to the next document 3D -- 4D 00 --

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Defence would like to show

24 that you sent troops to Prozor before the 24th of October. So, is the

25 answer yes or no?

Page 9815

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So the answer is no. What does

3 this document mean then? This document, dated 21st of October, 1330

4 hours, it was sent to Jablanica. So, to you, for certain. An this

5 document states that you should send in a unit, that you should send a

6 unit to Prozor. You didn't do this then. Have you seen this document or

7 not? Did you receive this document or not?

8 A. Yes, well, no, nothing was done. If I may explain this. This

9 shows that the army was unstable. A Tactical Group 1, with its

10 headquarters in Konjic, was intended to gather forces to raise the

11 blockade of Sarajevo. That was its purpose and here it was becoming

12 involved in something that wasn't really within the competence of command

13 of the Tactical Group. Zejnil Delalic, he wasn't to be in command of the

14 forces linked to Prozor or to other forces down there. But he got

15 involved in that. We didn't act in accordance with this order. The staff

16 didn't acted in accordance with this order and that's why the Staff

17 Commander was replaced.

18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Let's have a look at the document and we'll see why the municipal

20 defence staff in Jablanica didn't act in accordance with this order.

21 Let's have a look at document 4D 00419. Unfortunately, we don't have the

22 translation of this document either, and so I would like to have a look at

23 the second page of that document. I'll read out a small part of the

24 document to clarify something for the Judges.

25 A. Let me just see if this document has a head and a tail, a title

Page 9816

1 and a stamp.

2 Q. You have this document in my bundle of documents. The number is

3 4D 00419.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The document is on the screen.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found it.

6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation].

7 Q. I will read out part of it. "Our unit couldn't carry out the task

8 because of the concentration of the HVO forces, because of the level of

9 fortification and because it's well-equipped. It would suffer great

10 losses. And engaging the unit in this way would result in blocking the

11 routes and would make it impossible to evacuate the wounded and killed,

12 the wounded and refugees from Prozor. Engaging our units in the direction

13 towards Prozor opens up the possibility for the HVO forces to carry out an

14 attack on other axes in the direction of Risovac and Mostar."

15 I'll skip the rest.

16 Is this the explanation of the commander for the -- does this say

17 why he didn't act in accordance with the order to send in a unit to

18 Prozor?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Very well. Thank you. You said that the commander of the

21 municipal defence staff in Jablanica was replaced as a result. Now let's

22 have a look at document 4D 0 --

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Could I just for understanding. What do we have

24 to understand under the term of unit? It would be, in my experience, a

25 company, some 150 or so people, but what did he -- did it signify here?

Page 9817

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Something like a company, hundred to

2 hundred fifty men.

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation].

5 Q. Document 4D 00418. We have the translation of this document.

6 It's an order from the deputy chief of the Supreme Command Staff of the

7 armed forces. So we're talking about Sefer Halilovic's deputy, Mr. Jovan

8 Divjak. The order was issued on the 25th of October, 1992.

9 Item 1 says: "We hereby replace the command of the Municipal

10 Defence Staff in Jablanica, Mr. Salko Zeren, because he failed to carry

11 out an order to send unit to assist the Municipal Staff in Prozor. And

12 this justifies -- he justified his failure to carry out the attack by

13 referring to the order of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command

14 according to which action shouldn't be taken to contribute to worsening

15 the conflict."

16 Mr. Idrizovic, so this document shows the reasons for which the

17 commander was replaced?

18 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I

19 intervene? Item 1 states that Salko Zeren did not carry out the order,

20 operative number one, of the deputy of the chief of the Main Staff of the

21 Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina on sending part of the unit to assist the municipal defence

23 staff in Prozor. Who is the deputy chief of the Main Staff?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Jovan Divjak. It was Jovan Divjak

25 in Konjic at the time.

Page 9818

1 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] My colleague was saying something

3 so I wasn't really following the question and answer, but I wanted to ask

4 you a question about this orders on replacement. According to this

5 order --

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That will be your last question.

7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I've got such wonderful documents

8 and I'm really sorry I won't manage to show them all.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There will be other witnesses.

10 There will be other witnesses.

11 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that it's difficult to

12 cross-examine in this way, but I'll focus on one matter.

13 Q. Do you know that Mr. Jovo Divjak was detained because he had

14 allegedly provoked the conflict between the Muslims and Croats?

15 A. Yes, I know he was detained, but he wasn't the only one to

16 encourage such conflicts. And there was a series of arrests. And I at

17 least and others who worked with me are not clear about all of this. All

18 those who are were arrested, imprisoned were released. And there is some

19 speculation about that event. There was this attempt made in Parsovici in

20 the Neretvica valley and the commander of the 45th Mountain Brigade, but

21 what happened there, what they're trying to do, I really don't know. And

22 I don't have any documents or I've never seen any documents about that.

23 Q. In order to provide Mr. Idrizovic with relevant documents, could

24 we have a look at 4D 00439?

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I said that that was your last

Page 9819

1 question. It's 12.30. We will now have our technical break, and I will

2 ask the legal officer to calculate the time together with the registrar,

3 the time remaining for the other Defence teams, in light of the time that

4 has been granted by some Defence teams to others, and I'd also like to

5 point out that General Petkovic's Defence has now completed its

6 cross-examination.

7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you, Witness.

8 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I think that Mr. Scott wanted to

11 say something.

12 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I know time is precious, but I

13 understand it's highly unlikely that we'll finish the witness today in any

14 event unfortunately. And secondly, I'm also aware that at 1.45 we all

15 tend to disappear sometimes quite quickly, so I didn't want to wait until

16 the end -- end of the session. Just so that everyone is advised, and I'm

17 not going to mention any witness names, because obviously we have a

18 witness in the courtroom, tomorrow's first witness we'll be seeking

19 protective measures concerning a pseudonym and facial image distortion. I

20 won't go into the details now. I'm just putting everyone -- I'm just

21 advising everyone that the witness will be seeking those protective

22 measures.

23 Secondly, Your Honour, the first witness on Monday, again, I'm not

24 mentioning names, will be a 92 ter witness. I think that was previously

25 disclosed but I just want to be -- I want to make sure.

Page 9820

1 And also because of potentially tight schedule next week, the

2 second week set -- sorry, the second witness set for next week, it's quite

3 possible that we will be able to start that witness on Monday afternoon,

4 on Monday and not Tuesday. Just so that people wouldn't be surprised, we

5 may be able to start the second witness next week on Monday. Thank you.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you, Mr.

7 Scott. It's up to everybody to prepare then.

8 I asked the legal officer and the registrar to make the

9 calculations and on basis of that, Mr. Ibrisimovic has 15 minutes, the

10 Defence of Mr. Coric will also have 15 minutes and Mr. Stojic's Defence

11 has 15 minutes. No, I'm sorry, 30 minutes. And Mr. Praljak's Defence has

12 30 minutes as well. So three accused have 30 minutes and Mr. Ibrisimovic,

13 representing Mr. Pusic, has 15 minutes. Those are the calculations. That

14 would give us enough time to hear two more Defence counsel because we have

15 15 minutes for one and half an hour for another. That will take us up to

16 quarter to 2.00. So go ahead, please.

17 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I

18 think there has been some mistake because we had an initial 45 minutes of

19 which we gave 10 minutes to the Prlic team which means that we have 35

20 minutes left.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Since I know that you have a

22 brilliant capacity to synthesize things, I'm sure you will be able to get

23 through what you want in 30 minutes. Go ahead.

24 Cross-examination by Ms. Tomasegovic Tomic:

25 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 9821

1 Q. Since the Judges always criticise us for not being coordinated as

2 a Defence, during the break, we decided that I shall be starting off by

3 showing a document to this witness that Counsel Alaburic didn't have time

4 to show. It is 2D 00263, Mr. Stojic's document, and you have it in the

5 Stojic bundle.

6 Before it appears on e-court, let me tell you that it is a

7 document from the BH army, the 4th Corps command. The document is dated

8 the 25th of December, 1992, and we have the stamp of the Supreme Command

9 of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the bottom to

10 the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. In person it says, Mr. Sefer

11 Halilovic, that is. And it is re your dispatch number such-and-such of

12 the 23rd of December, 1992. May we take a look at page 2 so that we can

13 see it is signed by Mr. Arif Pasalic. And I'm going to start off by

14 reading the first paragraph, as soon as we get the second page on the

15 screens. Can you see the signature, Witness, Mr. Arif Pasalic's

16 signature.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Right. We can go back to page 1 now and take it in order with

19 paragraph 1. And it says the following, "On the 2nd of December, 1992, at

20 10.30 hours, members of the Neretvica Brigade, in a facility owned by

21 Zejnil Delalic, Mr. Jovo Divjak was arrested. The reason that the

22 above-mentioned measures were taken was that they were acting on the

23 assumption that he was linked to individuals who on the territory of

24 Konjic municipality had perpetrated a number of criminal acts and that Mr.

25 Divjak had participated in issuing orders having, as their aim, the

Page 9822

1 creation of hostilities and conflicts among the Muslim and Croatian people

2 in the area."

3 My only answer, and it stems from something that is obvious from

4 this text, and you were asked this by my colleague before the break,

5 whether you agree with me when I say that from this document it is clearly

6 evident that Mr. Divjak was arrested and procedure taken because of

7 creating conflicts between the Croatian and Muslim people.

8 A. That's what it says here but I can't confirm that because I think

9 that you, too, have in your possession a series of documents signed by Mr.

10 Divjak which speak to the contrary.

11 Q. Well, I assume that Mr. Arif Pasalic knows the situation better

12 than I do because he sign the document. So I don't want to comment on

13 that further. We've seen the document and I'll move on.

14 You've already said today, sir, and you said it yesterday, that

15 during 1992, within the composition of the BH armed forces, there was also

16 the Territorial Defence and the HVO and the MUP?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Since they were jointly in the -- in this composition, I assume

19 that they shared responsibilities, duties, or you tried to do that

20 wherever that was possible?

21 A. There were attempts to do that.

22 Q. Thank you, that will be sufficient.

23 Now may we have on e-court the following document. It is P 00385,

24 and you will have it in your bundle. You have the numbers at the side.

25 P 00385. While we're waiting for the document to appear, it is an order

Page 9823

1 from the military police administration. It is dated the 12th of August,

2 1992, and signed by the chief Valentin Coric. That is what it says in

3 printed letters, but his deputy signed it, but that's not important. I'd

4 like to read out the first paragraph once again which reads as follows:

5 "I hereby order that in the municipalities of Herzegovina,

6 controlled by the Croatian Defence Council, apart from the municipalities

7 of Mostar, Konjic, Jablanica, and Gornji Vakuf, that permission for

8 vehicles to move around and members of the TO BiH on the territory of the

9 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna should be issued by commanders of the

10 military police posts of the corresponding municipalities on the basis of

11 assessing the justifications for the travel permit."

12 From this document we can see, and I think that you'll agree with

13 me there, that the municipalities quote where the HVO municipalities did

14 not issue permits, the municipalities of Mostar, Konjic, Jablanica and

15 Gornji Vakuf are the ones mentioned. Now, the municipalities that I've

16 just read out, are they municipalities that were characteristic by the

17 fact that they had an ethnically-mixed population and some of them had a

18 majority Muslim population?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Would it then emerge from this that it is most probable that in

21 those municipalities that were inhabited or, rather, the person issuing

22 the permits assumed that permits of this kind in those municipalities

23 would be issued by the authorities which were in charge of the Territorial

24 Defence. And in this case, those would be the authorities or municipal

25 boards in which the representatives of the Muslims were in power. Am I

Page 9824

1 right?

2 A. No.

3 Q. I'm not right?

4 A. No, you're not.

5 Q. Who issued these permits then? Who took care about where people

6 were going, where there was a majority population -- Muslim population and

7 where there were check-points of the Territorial Defence? Who saw to

8 that?

9 A. If somebody was a recruit.

10 Q. Well, that's what I'm asking you about.

11 A. If somebody was a recruit and wanted to leave the area, leave the

12 territory, not because of the HVO check-points but because of the BH army

13 check-points, for one to be able to move around, for example, someone

14 might have spent 10 or 15 days on duty there and then had -- wanted to go

15 back on leave. Now, in order to ensure that our army check-points didn't

16 prevent such people from passing through them and ensuring that these

17 people were not deserters, only in that case.

18 Q. Well, that's what I wanted to ask you and hear from you although I

19 might not have been clear enough.

20 Now, my next question is as follows: In Jablanica in 1992, as far

21 as I was able to understand you at the same time, we had the existence of

22 the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was also the Territorial Defence in

23 existence with its own military police, and there was the military police

24 of the HVO; is that right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 9825

1 Q. Tell me now, please, how many members did this MUP have, the MUP

2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if you know, if not say so?

3 A. I think it had almost 200 members.

4 Q. Thank you. And what about the Territorial Defence, how many

5 members did it have?

6 A. Well, about one and a half thousand people.

7 Q. And the TO military police?

8 A. The military police had people from the corps. For example, 50 at

9 most from our municipality. The military police was established at the

10 level -- at corps level.

11 Q. Yes. And you said it had around 50 members?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, do you know how many members the HVO in Jablanica had headed

14 by Mr. Livaja?

15 A. About 30 men, unless I'm very much mistaken.

16 Q. No, you're not very much mistaken. That's right.

17 Now, tell me, please, do you know whether the HVO had their

18 military police or the Territorial Defence military police, whether they

19 had a crime department, or was that the MUP?

20 A. The MUP had a crime department. I can't really say. In different

21 periods of time --

22 JUDGE PRANDLER: I have already many times told you please, do not

23 kill the interpreters -- said kill all the lawyers but now we don't want

24 to kill the interpreters. So, please, kindly wait for each other to

25 finish and then to speak. Thank you.

Page 9826

1 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. You haven't answered me about the crime department that I asked

3 you.

4 A. At the beginning, I'm not quite sure that it existed within the

5 military police. It -- that kind of department existed within the MUP.

6 Later on -- well, no, I really can't say. I can't answer that question

7 because that formation was something I never liked very much, I mean the

8 military police. I never liked any military police. They were all of

9 very doubtful morals, and they engendered problems. So I kept a wide

10 breast of them -- wide berth of them.

11 Q. I'm going to show you a document later on and I'm going to remind

12 you of who the members of the military police were. Now, in answer to a

13 question from my colleague Ms. Alaburic, you mentioned Zuka's units and

14 then the Silver Foxes, or Srebrni Lisicit, then Cedo's units and the

15 Wolves, et cetera. What I'm interested in, first, before I go in to ask

16 you about any of these, is that the Green Berets turned up; is that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. At the head of these -- Hanefija Prijic, nicknamed Paraga, was he

19 at the head of those Green Berets?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Were these Green Berets just as problematic as all the others or

22 not?

23 A. Yes, they were.

24 Q. Do you know whether these same Green Berets already in June, 1992,

25 caused various incidents by shooting from automatic weapons in front of

Page 9827

1 the military police building, for instance? That happened on the 19th of

2 June 1992. Do you know about that incident?

3 A. Yes, that's quite possible.

4 Q. Tell me, please, Zuka's units, when they arrived, you told us on

5 several occasions that you testified in the Tuta and Stela trial, so I

6 took a look at what you said there, your testimony there. So I'd like to

7 refresh your memory, rather, ask you whether you remember that when you

8 testified there you said that Zuka's unit numbered about 400 men.

9 A. Yes. Well, I didn't know the exact figure, but when it was up to

10 full strength, they had about 350 to 400 men.

11 Q. I think that in that same statement of yours, apart from all the

12 problems that were raised today linked to them, it was also stated that

13 the members of that unit would evict Croats from their houses and flats

14 and that they would move into them, take up residence in those same

15 houses. That's what you said in Tuta and Stela, so I'm asking you now.

16 A. Yes. I said yesterday, I think.

17 Q. Just tell me whether you remember that that kind of thing

18 happened?

19 A. It probably did happen. Things like that probably did happen.

20 Q. That's enough for me. Thank you. Now tell me this: Do you

21 happen to know that these Zuka's unit -- units or unit, among other

22 things, evicted the HVO military police from their building. Do you know

23 about that incident?

24 A. No. I can't say that that did not happen, but I don't know about

25 it.

Page 9828

1 Q. When in Tuta and Stela you said that the Main Staff commanded

2 Zuka's unit and that they were more numerous and better armed than you,

3 better trained than you and better equipped than you, younger and stronger

4 than you --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- that you were not able to stand up to them, that you were no

7 match for them.

8 A. Well, I have to repeat. It was called a special detachment for

9 special assignments.

10 Q. You don't have to repeat. I apologise for interrupting, but just

11 tell me if my conclusion is the right one, that you were simply no match

12 for them?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. Fine. So apart from these Zuka's units, you also had another --

15 you also had problems with refugees from Jajce, from Prozor, from Eastern

16 Bosnia, Foca. You also mentioned that yesterday.

17 A. I didn't mention Jajce.

18 Q. Right, then, but Prozor in Eastern Bosnia.

19 A. Yes, from Eastern Herzegovina, from Eastern Bosnia, especially

20 from Foca. They came from all parts. And quite a lot from our own

21 refugees from Jablanica, from Doljani, Sovici, Slatina and Prozor. And

22 there were a total of over 10.000 refugees.

23 Q. Tell me, please, when you say that you had problems with them, did

24 that mean some armed incidents taking place as well?

25 A. Who with? I don't understand your question.

Page 9829

1 Q. Well, someone might get drunk and start shooting round town and

2 causing disturbances.

3 A. You mean of the refugees. Well, that was the general sort of

4 thing that happened. There was sporadic shooting. Well, everybody shot.

5 Daidza's men would shoot, our men would start shooting. Those were the

6 times.

7 Q. Let us now take a look at document P 00952, please. You have the

8 document, I think.

9 A. Could you repeat the number.

10 Q. P 00952 is the number. It is a document from the military police,

11 the traffic military police, dated the 24th of December, 1992, and it is a

12 report referring to Jablanica. We have a description of the different

13 incidents that took place and I'd like to read out the third paragraph.

14 Not the entire paragraph, but the beginning which reads as

15 follows: "Linked to the throwing of hand grenades at Croatian facilities,

16 pursuant to an order from Rasim Pilav, a caterer from Prozor, who is at

17 the moment to be found on the territory of Jablanica with another 40 to 60

18 individuals also from Prozor, they were responsible, who had recently

19 taken part in the fighting in Prozor." So tell me, did you hear of these

20 incidents?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And you've heard of Rasim Pilav, have you not?

23 A. I know the man well.

24 Q. Excellent. Let's move on. Tell me this now, please: I know that

25 everybody ran wild at the time and did a lot of shooting, and I just

Page 9830

1 happened to focus on the problems caused by the Muslim side because I know

2 that you'll be better informed about those incidents than some other

3 incidents. But when you -- and you have military education and training.

4 The army sets up a check-point, right, in times of war at a given

5 location? One of reasons for which a check-point is established -- I'm

6 just asking a hypothetical here, regardless of which army sets it up, is

7 to preserve law and order; is it not? And when I say this, I mean, the

8 movement of persons, weapons, armed persons and so on. Am I right in

9 saying that?

10 A. Well, partially. Check-points were erected in order to control

11 the entrance and exit of people and goods, not for public law and order.

12 Q. Yes, but that was a way of controlling public law and order.

13 A. In part, but not fully.

14 Q. May we have on e-court now the following document which is

15 P 01121. These are instructions from the military police administration.

16 It's been signed by the chief, Valentin Coric, but his deputy signed on

17 his behalf. It's dated the 13th of January, 1993. I don't want to read

18 through the entire document. Everyone can do that for themselves. But it

19 concerns the prohibition of carrying weapons -- for weapons. If they're

20 going to the battlefield or returning from the battlefield or, rather,

21 they can only have weapons on that occasion. So can this be checked at

22 check-points?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Concerned long-barrelled weapons. Can we now have a look at P

25 0195. P 01095.

Page 9831

1 Again, it's an order from Valentin Coric, signed in the same way,

2 dated the 11th of January, 1993, and it's prohibiting entry into the

3 territory of the HZ and HB, and this concerns all foreigners whose

4 intention is to join military units to engage in combat. And then they

5 say how this order will be implemented. I want to know whether

6 check-points could be used for such purposes too.

7 A. Yes. Why not?

8 Q. Excellent. Yesterday, you mentioned military obligation, work

9 obligation, and it was said that there were deserters who even disguised

10 themselves as women. I think that's how you said that they avoided their

11 military or work obligation. One way for any of the sides to control the

12 passage of individuals who were trying to avoid their military or work

13 obligation was to have controls at check-points. Was that correct -- is

14 that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. When mobilisation is being carried out or when all those who are

17 fit have to perform their military or work obligation, then I assume that

18 without authorisation from the relevant authorities, they may not leave

19 their place of residence.

20 A. Well, they shouldn't.

21 Q. So, it's necessary to issue such certificates and a check-point is

22 a place at which these people could be controlled, could be checked; is

23 that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you. I have one more question now with regard to the

Page 9832

1 incident at the Aleksin Han check-point. As far as I have understood, on

2 the basis of the documents -- you've read the documents. So have I. I

3 don't want to go through all of them now. But Risovac was under HVO

4 control. Aleksin Han, Ostrozac and Velacici was under the control of the

5 Territorial Defence or the ABiH?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So at the time of the incident, the Prosecution has shown you

8 documents about that. Aleksin Han was under the control of the

9 Territorial Defence or, rather, of the military police of the Territorial

10 Defence. They controlled that check-point.

11 A. I'm not sure whether it was the military police or not, but it was

12 under armija control.

13 Q. Very well. When those kidnapped soldiers got in contact from

14 Split, then I believe that a representative of the MUP from Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina went to collect them in Grude and the president of the

16 municipality.

17 A. Yes. They contacted them from Grude.

18 Q. Yes. Yes. I then assume that all the information about that

19 event was given by them to the individuals who went to pick them up, the

20 MUP; is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So did the BH MUP carry out an investigation into the event?

23 A. I couldn't answer that question.

24 Q. Should they have conducted an investigation?

25 A. Yes, probably.

Page 9833

1 Q. Very well. And tell me, in 1992 and right up to March, 1993,

2 regardless of all the incidents that we have mentioned and everything

3 else, you in Jablanica, your military police and the HVO military police,

4 tried to cooperate. You informed each other about incidents. You

5 exchanged information. You reported on incidents.

6 A. Yes. We were there together within 200 metres.

7 Q. Does that mean you did cooperate?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Tell me, do you know that in February and March there were even

10 joint controls over the HVO military police and the Territorial Defence

11 military police?

12 A. Yes. There were several attempts to establish joint patrols.

13 Q. I said in 1993. Could we now have the following document on the

14 screen: 5D 02007. It's a report on the work of the HVO military police

15 in Jablanica. The period is the 28th of February, 1993, up until the 3rd

16 of March, 1993. We can have a look at the next page. The title

17 is "Patrol service." Can you see the second page, sir? Second paragraph,

18 and it says that at the time that a curfew was introduced, and it says as

19 of 2100 hours, joint patrols have been carried out with members of the MUP

20 and the military police of the ABiH.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What it says in this document, is it correct?

23 A. Yes, it is.

24 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to go back to Prozor although Prozor

25 isn't your primary concern, but the Prosecution asked you about Prozor, so

Page 9834

1 I will too.

2 A. Try.

3 Q. I'll do my best. When you started testifying, on the first day of

4 your testimony, you said that refugees from Prozor started arriving even

5 before the conflict in Prozor broke out in October. There were women and

6 children who arrived there, and they came because they were afraid because

7 of the tense situation.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Are we talking about one month prior to the conflict, 10 days?

10 A. It was around the 20th. Yes, the 20th of October.

11 Q. My colleague Alaburic has shown you some documents today,

12 documents that relate to Prozor, and I would now like to ask you whether

13 you are aware of the Alfa and Beta plans, which were plans for the defence

14 of the municipality of Prozor?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Do you know who the commander of the Territorial Defence Staff in

17 Prozor was in 1992, in September and October, let's say?

18 A. Well --

19 Q. Was it Muharem Sabic?

20 A. Yes. Yes. I couldn't remember. That's right.

21 Q. I'll now show you two documents and then I'll ask you something

22 about those two documents.

23 Could we have the following on the screen, P 00430. You have it

24 too. It's a defence plan for the municipality of Prozor. The date is --

25 it can't be seen clearly but I think it's the 1st of September, 1992.

Page 9835

1 Let's have a look at the last two paragraphs which say the

2 following: The first plan is ELIF, which will be implemented in

3 cooperation with units from the HVO and in accordance with the attached

4 document Alfa. The second variant is plan BE which will be implemented on

5 independent basis or in cooperation with TO units from the neighbouring

6 municipalities, and in brackets we have Gornji Vakuf, Konjic and

7 Jablanica. And it also says: "In accordance with the attached document

8 Beta." It's been signed. This document has been signed by the commander

9 Muharem Sabic.

10 A. Yes, I can see that.

11 Q. I'm just waiting for the interpretation.

12 You can see Muharem Sabic's signature?

13 A. Yes, I can.

14 Q. Tell me, at the time that this document concerns there was no

15 conflict in Prozor?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. When you have a look at these two paragraphs that I've read out,

18 plan Alfa and plan Beta, as someone who knows about military matters, it's

19 obvious that the person who drafted this document referred to the Beta

20 plan, and he had in mind the situation in which the HVO would become his

21 opponents, whereas they had been his associates before.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can we now have a look at the following document: P 00687.

24 I apologise. Your last answer hasn't been recorded. I think you

25 said that this can be seen on the basis of the document?

Page 9836

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. This is a report from the security and information service. It

3 concerns a conflict between the HVO and the ABiH in the territory of

4 Prozor. It's dated the 1st of November, 1992.

5 We can have a look at the fourth paragraph. Can you please read

6 it to yourself so I don't have to read it out. Everybody has the

7 document. The fourth paragraph describes the plans Alfa and Beta. And

8 let's have a look at the third paragraph from below, and this paragraph

9 says units from other parts of Gornji Vakuf were included in this plan,

10 and it also says units of the armed forces of the ABiH in Jablanica.

11 Now have a look at page number 2. It's page 2 in English

12 translation, too, the last paragraph in the English translation. It's the

13 third paragraph in the Croatian version. It says the Private 2 unit of

14 Rasim Pilav is trying make a breakthrough towards Krancici but is not

15 succeeding in doing so.

16 And then three paragraphs lower down it mentions the miserable

17 fate of the action and then some fled towards Gracanica and others towards

18 Jablanica. That's what it says here.

19 When I mention the name Rasim Pilav, is that the person I

20 mentioned a while ago in connection to the disruption in Jablanica?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. With regard to the documents shown to you by my colleague

23 Alaburic, if you bear them in mind, and if you bear the documents that I

24 have just shown you in mind, in the action that the Territorial Defence of

25 Jablanica did not participate in, and this concerned the breakthrough

Page 9837

1 towards Prozor, was this action in fact the implementation of plan

2 Beta -- could it have been the implementation of that plan?

3 A. It's the first time I've heard about this plan, so I couldn't

4 answer that question. I've never heard about such plans.

5 Q. But you heard that someone from Jablanica was supposed to go with

6 a hundred or 150 men to Prozor before the 24th of October, according to

7 the documents; isn't that correct?

8 A. Well, that's what it says. It's in the documents.

9 Q. But you heard that this should have been done but wasn't done; is

10 that correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I

13 have no further questions. Thank you, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I'd like to

15 congratulate you because you did not overstep your time limit, and I'd

16 like to extend my congratulations to you for that.

17 Counsel Ibrisimovic, you have until a quarter to 2.00.

18 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. My

19 questions will relate to exclusively what the witness -- the answers the

20 witness gave to the Prosecutor. I won't go beyond that scope.

21 Cross-examination by Mr. Ibrisimovic:

22 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Idrizovic, I'd like to start off by asking

23 you the following: You told the Prosecutor that you became the

24 top-ranking officer at a certain period of time in Jablanica. When was

25 that? When did you become the top-ranking officer, the commander of the

Page 9838

1 Territorial Defence?

2 A. The 28th of October, 1992.

3 Q. How long did that go on for?

4 A. Until the 21st of January, 1993. Until the brigade was

5 established.

6 Q. And after the 21st of January, 1993?

7 A. After the 21st of January, 1993, I -- and I said this before; you

8 probably weren't following what I was saying. But anyway, I said that the

9 staff remained with 200 men, and their sole purpose was to provide

10 security for the facilities, and I told you the reasons for which the

11 brigade was established, and from the previous documents that were shown

12 here today it is evident what the command structure was like for the

13 4th Corps.

14 Q. And you remained the Staff Commander with those 200 men?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So you had your subordinates, and I assume that the 4th Corps was

17 above you; is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, these 200 men provided security for the most important

20 features in town; is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. As the Staff Commander, I claim that you were highly well-informed

23 about what was going on in Jablanica, and you said several times that your

24 knowledge was limited when it came to events in Konjic, Sovici, Doljani,

25 but you had to know what went on in your own house. Isn't that right?

Page 9839

1 A. Of course.

2 Q. I'm sure you had an officer who kept you informed about events

3 that they -- it held briefings with the president of the municipality, the

4 brigade commanders and so on.

5 A. Yes. We had that kind of thing going on when the conflict

6 started. Up until then that was less frequent.

7 Q. But anyway, you learnt of all the important events that were

8 happening in town, and you learnt of anything that might cause a problem,

9 become a problem in town.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And one of those problems was the Jablanica museum; right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Asked by my learned colleague, and you didn't say this during your

14 testimony, you said that the refugees were accommodated in the museum.

15 A. Yes, for a period of time.

16 Q. Croats and Muslims together?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was there a prison or a collection centre for prisoners of war?

19 A. Yes, there was something like that. The military police company,

20 first of all, of the 1st and of the 6th Corps, and then -- well, in fact

21 they were down there as far as the prisoners of war were concerned. They

22 were in charge of them.

23 Q. Tell us, please, were they prisoners of war and refugees together?

24 Because it's a rather large building.

25 A. Yes.

Page 9840

1 Q. Tell us where the prisoners of war were put up and where the

2 refugees were put up.

3 A. I'm not -- perhaps you won't believe me, but I entered that

4 facility only once during the four years of the war, and that was towards

5 the end of the year, the end of -- or, rather, the beginning of 1993.

6 Q. I asked you about it. You said you were well-informed.

7 A. Where who was put up, all I know is that the Croat refugees were

8 put up in this building that was a glass building, so you could see

9 inside. They were glass partitions, and you could see that the Croat

10 refugees, when you looked towards the entrance, they were to the left of

11 the building, which is where the trophy room was. What could you call it

12 now? Well, the museum exhibits.

13 Q. Can you tell us how far the museum is from your headquarters?

14 A. Well, about 4 to 500 metres.

15 Q. Jablanica is a small town. I assume that you pass by that way

16 many times?

17 A. I've already told you, the refugees from Stolac and Capljina were

18 put up in the hall on a raised -- on a raised level, in the cinema hall,

19 and in other buildings. So all the available buildings and premises were

20 used for that purpose, if you're talking about 1993. I'm not -- so 600

21 refugees were there. There was the military police and there was this

22 prison probably where the prisoners -- HVO prisoners of war were put up.

23 Q. Your headquarters was 45 metres away from the cinema; is that

24 right? 400 to 500 metres away from the cinema; right? And the Croat

25 refugees, where were they from?

Page 9841

1 A. They were from Doljani.

2 Q. Now, asked by my learned colleagues, you said that there were

3 perhaps a little more than 20 prisoners of war, something like that.

4 A. I really can't say what the exact number is.

5 Q. That was what your answer was.

6 A. Well, it might have been, but I'm not sure of the exact number. I

7 it wasn't my job to go there.

8 Q. Well, where do you get this number from, then, this information

9 from?

10 A. Well, millions of documents passed through my hands.

11 Q. Thank you. Now, it should be the military police who is in

12 charge, the military police of the 6th Corps that is in charge of the

13 prisoners of war, and this office for refugees should be in charge of the

14 other refugees in the camp.

15 A. Yes, that's right, from the beginning of the war.

16 Q. Were there any civilians among the prisoners of war in that

17 detention centre? Do you know anything about that?

18 A. What did you say, civilians among prisoner of war?

19 A. Well, I don't know, I never went in there. Don't ask me that. I

20 have no idea. I didn't like to go anywhere where people were being held

21 and incarcerated.

22 Q. Mr. President, I would like to show the witness on e-court

23 6D 00035, the following document. We have a hard copy for the Bench.

24 Would the usher like to come up and collect it and hand it to them,

25 please.

Page 9842

1 Can you see the document on your screen?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. The document is a military secret, strictly confidential,

4 battalion of the military police of the 4th Corps, Jablanica, the 5th of

5 August, 1993. The commander of the military police company was -- what

6 was his name?

7 A. Well, I'm not sure. I can't tell you. There were a lot of shifts

8 in that military police.

9 Q. So it says the military police battalion of the 6th corps and then

10 we have a list of names. What does it say here? Subject is the list of

11 persons -- you read it out, please. Read out what it says underneath the

12 heading.

13 A. Well, what do you want to say?

14 Q. I'm asking you to read it out, nothing more.

15 A. Well, I'm fully aware of this list.

16 Q. Would you read it out, what it says? What does it say? A list of

17 persons to be found in the SRZ Jablanica museum who were not members of

18 the HVO; is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. So we have a list of individuals from 1 to 87; is that right?

21 A. Well, I can't see on the screen. I can't see the last number on

22 the screen. Yes.

23 Q. I looked at the document. Among the 87 persons listed as

24 prisoners of war, who were detained, 55 individuals were women. Perhaps

25 you know some people from this list.

Page 9843

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I'm asking you now whether the department for refugees should have

3 been responsible for these people? I claim that these were people

4 detained in the Jablanica museum who were not refugees.

5 A. I didn't understand your question. What are you asking me?

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The question was a very precise

7 one. We have a document here, apparently refutable, which establishes

8 that in the town where you held the highest military post that 87 persons

9 were held, of which 55 were women. What explanation can you give us with

10 respect to the incarceration of these women? If they were refugees, why

11 were they not at liberty?

12 No, Mr. Scott, let the witness answer that.

13 MR. SCOTT: There's an error in the transcript, Your Honour, but

14 I'll come back to it.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The military police wasn't supposed

17 to deal with this. This wasn't part of their duties, and the people who

18 were from Doljani or who were brought from Doljani to the museum weren't

19 detainees. They hadn't been imprisoned. They had free access to other

20 town. Naturally, they moved around freely everywhere. As to how they

21 felt, well, that's a different matter. I don't think they felt good.

22 It's not necessary to point that out. If some wanted to go out, well,

23 that was up to them, but, this wasn't a facility they had been imprisoned

24 in. Living conditions were very difficult, as was the case for everyone

25 else. There's no doubt about that. So I'm surprised that the military

Page 9844

1 police battalion compiled such a list and dealt with civilians, because

2 there was a staff whose responsibility it was to take care of refugees.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, what the error in the

4 transcript.

5 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. There was either a

6 translation or perhaps a transcription error. But on page 110, and I

7 think it's left the live screen now, but at page 110 at line 9, at least

8 it's put into the record, the question was put by counsel. I looked at

9 the document, among the 87 persons listed as prisoners of war -- were

10 detained, 55 were detained, 55 individuals were women.

11 Your Honour, that's not what the document says. The top of the

12 document, which counsel referred the witness, says people who were not

13 members of the HVO. So I don't think it's a proper characterisation of

14 the document by counsel or at least it was mistranslated.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Ibrisimovic, you have

16 the floor.

17 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] That's why I wanted the witness

18 to read this out, but I'll read it out aloud so the interpreters can

19 follow. "It's a military police battalion, 6 Corps, military secret,

20 highly confidential. Subject, list of individuals who are in the SRZ."

21 This means the collection centre of prisoners of war. "The Jablanica

22 Muzej, but they were not members of the HVO. This shows that they were

23 civilians, and on the whole, the individuals concerned are women. I'm

24 saying that these people are detainees and not refugees."

25 I have one more question for the witness.

Page 9845

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Ibrisimovic, could you

2 clarify something. When you say "SRZ" in your language, this means centre

3 for war prisoners; is that correct?

4 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. It means collection centre

5 for prisoners of war.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, have you been

7 following this carefully.

8 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I have some other documentation.

9 If I have a chance, I'll come back to it in redirect. Thank you.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Ibrisimovic, very briefly

11 now.

12 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] I have one more question. We

13 received this document from the Prosecution. That's what I'd like to

14 point out. And since Mr. Scott has just asked about the museum in

15 Jablanica, I was just following up on that.

16 Q. In the course of your testimony, you said that you could speak

17 about events up to the 15th of April, 1993, but that there were other

18 people who were more capable of talking about the events after that date.

19 Have I understood you correctly?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is one of the reasons for that statement the fact that there is

22 this document on the events in Jablanica museum in the collection centre?

23 A. Well, look. The corps military police battalion, well no one had

24 anything to do with that battalion. None of us had anything to do with

25 that battalion. None of us had any control over the corps commander.

Page 9846

1 Q. I asked you a question. You said you were well-informed. I'll

2 now refer to a document Mr. Scott referred to P 09400. This is the

3 chronology. If something of this kind happened in Jablanica, it should be

4 included in the chronology, I believe.

5 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

6 have no further questions.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, my document concerns the period

8 up to the 15th of April. Have a look at the date on this document. You

9 shouldn't mix up pears and apples.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, unfortunately, as you can

11 see, there are another two Defence teams who haven't had time for their

12 cross-examination yet, which means that tomorrow, you will have to return

13 for the hearing that will start at 9.00. But rest assured, the Defence

14 teams have 30 minutes each, according to our calculations, so if the

15 Judges aren't too talkative, everything should be over for you by 10.00.

16 We will do everything we can to release you as soon as possible.

17 I invite everyone to return for the hearing that will start

18 tomorrow at 9.00. Thank you.

19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

20 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 9th day

21 of November, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.

22

23

24

25