1 Tuesday, 3 April 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call
7 the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
9 IT-04-74-T, the Prosecution versus Prlic et al. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Today on Tuesday, the 3rd of April, 2007, I'd like to greet
12 everyone present in the courtroom, the Prosecution, Defence counsel, the
13 accused, the Ambassador, and everyone else.
14 The Trial Chamber now has an oral decision to render that concerns
15 the Prosecution motion to have admitted into evidence Mr. Prlic's written
17 The Trial Chamber has decided that the motion must be filed
18 confidentially, and secondly, subject to agreement among the parties, we
19 plan to have a hearing on Thursday at 10.00 in the morning as the
20 courtroom will be available at that time. This will be at the end of the
21 witnesses examination. We will then have an hour's a break at noon so
22 that everyone can have lunch, and we will then continue with our hearing
23 so that the accused may have the opportunity to take the floor, as this is
24 what they had requested.
25 So this is what we would suggest to the parties concerned.
1 I have also been informed that the Prosecution would like to add
2 certain annexes to the conference held in Geneva. Mr. Scott, there's
3 something you wanted to say. The document concerned is 9852.
4 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Mr. President. Good afternoon to you,
5 Mr. President, and to Your Honours, and to everyone in the courtroom.
6 Yes, Your Honour. I provided notice to counsel and to the Chamber
7 this morning that, in looking at the documents last night, I had been
8 under the impression and I think again it was just -- admittedly with this
9 much paper in the case it's sometimes difficult to keep it all straight,
10 our Exhibit P 00116 that we used yesterday contained the full set of
11 materials containing the Vance-Owen Peace Plan proposals as presented to
12 the parties in early January 1993. When we ended the day yesterday and as
13 I looked further at the documents last night, I noticed that it didn't --
14 it was not in fact the entire set of documents, whereas what has now been
15 marked as P 09852, which is nothing more than a complete copy of UN
16 Security Council document S/25050, which is available on the UN's web
17 site, is a complete record of the proposals as they existed at that time,
18 and I would ask for the Court's leave to work with that document in lieu
19 of or in addition to the document we used yesterday.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I don't believe
21 there will be any objections from the Defence.
22 Mr. Karnavas.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: I don't believe so, Your Honour. At least not from
24 Prlic, and I think I can speak for the rest of the Defence teams.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott, please
1 continue with your examination-in-chief now.
2 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I do appreciate counsel's
3 accommodation on that.
4 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]
5 Examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]
6 Q. Sir, I'd like to pick up where we left off yesterday and back up
7 just a little bit because we were at a bit of a disadvantage with some of
8 the documentation yesterday afternoon.
9 MR. SCOTT: I might also note, Your Honour, I meant to say that in
10 terms of the diary, it appears that all the pages were in fact in the
11 various bundles, but in some of the bundles they had been -- they had been
12 misplaced. They were not in the right order, and I hope that's all been
13 corrected at this point, and I apologise to both the Ambassador and to the
14 Court and others for any confusion that was caused. I hope we'll do
15 better today.
16 I would ask that the usher please provide the witness with a copy
17 of the exhibit we were just talking about, which is P 09852. I think that
18 will be all right, usher. I think he'll be able to follow through all
20 Q. Ambassador, this is the -- as you just heard me explain to the
21 Court, this is a -- I believe, and we submit, the full packet of
22 Vance-Owen Peace Plan propose -- material as it was presented to the three
23 principal parties, the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, on approximately --
24 between the 2nd and the 4th of January, 1993.
25 Just to orient everyone in the courtroom because it is a rather
1 fairly important document, can you just look at that document enough to
2 say that you do recognise that as the set of Vance-Owen materials at that
4 A. Yes, Mr. Scott. This is the materials at that time, but it is not
5 the final form of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.
6 Q. Correct.
7 A. Which, as everybody knows, I believe, was altered,
8 understandably - that's what negotiations are all about - was altered
9 after the initial presentation in early January.
10 Q. Thank you very much. And in fact, yes, indeed later this
11 afternoon we will hopefully come to the version as it existed and was
12 approved by at least two of the parties at the end of March 1993.
13 The document sets out and those in the courtroom can look at it, a
14 bit of history. This is actually the Secretary-General of the United
15 Nations passing on his report about these developments to the Security
16 Council on the 6th of January, 1993. There's a brief history of the talks
17 and what was involved, the working groups, and how the process had worked
18 up until to that point in time.
19 Let me ask you to go to the pages -- the actual pages in this
20 document are numbered in the upper part of the document, on the top part
21 of each page, pages 1 through -- I believe the last page is 30 -- 36. So
22 it's fairly easy to work with, I hope.
23 Can I ask you to go to page 11 of the overall document, which is
24 Annex III, the opening statement of Lord Owen.
25 In the second paragraph, sir, of the Annex III it says: "As to
1 the maps which you should now all have in front of you, there are 10
2 suggested provinces. We have ought to arbitrate on many conflicting
3 claims and we have been very conscious of the need to follow the criteria
4 that we established on 27 October. Boundaries of provinces to be drawn so
5 as to constitute areas as geographically coherent as possible, taking into
6 account ethnic, geographical (i.e., natural features such as rivers),
7 historical, communications ... economic viability and other relevant
9 And Lord Owen goes on to say: "We have had to choose between
10 conflicting claims and we cannot stress enough how vital it is that
11 everyone accepts that there cannot be agreement without compromise,
12 sometimes painful compromise."
13 In looking -- before we go to the map, we just touch it -- briefly
14 on -- because it will be shown on the map I wanted to ask you again, among
15 the proposed provinces at that time, did the Sarajevo province -- the city
16 of Sarajevo and the province of Sarajevo stand in a different posture or
17 was it proposed that it be handled differently than some of the other
18 proposed provinces?
19 A. Yes, it was.
20 Q. And, briefly, how so?
21 A. The province of Sarajevo which comprised the city and the
22 surrounding areas was to have a more structured tripartite consensual rule
23 as between the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Bosnian Serbs.
24 Q. And is it fair to say that it was -- it was to be less identified
25 and none of the -- as I understand what you have told me, what others have
1 told me, none of the provinces were to be ethnic as such but that the
2 Sarajevo province even less so?
3 A. Correct. If I might expand on that briefly.
4 Q. Please.
5 A. The essence of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in all of its parts, the
6 map, the constitutional principles, the military arrangements and later
7 the suggestions for an interim government, the essence of the plan was
8 multi-ethnicity, decentralisation, consensual decision-making and
9 democracy. And actually, you can see that if you look -- if one were to
10 look at the population of the 10 provinces. To begin with, four of them
11 had no ethnic majority whatsoever, and then the overall picture was as
12 follows: 36 per cent of the entire Bosnian Serb population of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina was outside the Bosnian Serb majority provinces, 36 per
14 cent. 30 per cent of the Bosnian Muslim population resided outside the
15 Muslim majority provinces, and 29 per cent of the Bosnian Croat population
16 of the country resided outside the Bosnian Croat majority provinces, and
17 that was done consciously to emphasise the multi-ethnic aspect along with
18 the other features that Lord Owen mentioned in his remarks, the geography,
19 et cetera. So I think that makes it clear that the multi-ethnic aspect
20 was -- was a dissideratum of the peace plan.
21 Q. Thank you very much. And with that if we could turn to the copy
22 of the map as it is laid out in these materials or contained in these
23 materials on page 19 of the exhibit. And, Your Honour, for the next --
24 for some time this afternoon we're going to be working with a number of
25 maps and I -- it may get to be a bit -- well, I don't want to say
1 confusing, but we may be going from one map to another and hope everyone
2 will bear with us in doing that. It may be that anyone in the courtroom
3 to look at a larger map, it is -- this same map is map 11 in the
4 Prosecution's book of maps, which is Exhibit P 09276, map 11, the
5 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 2 January 1993, and page 12 of that exhibit in
6 e-court. I simply give people the choice of using the larger coloured map
7 or the smaller map that's in the materials itself on page 19.
8 MR. SCOTT: There is a third map, Your Honour, and this is the map
9 that will we had given notice over the weekend that we would be using, and
10 it is a map, and I'll ask the Ambassador to confirm. If the Ambassador
11 could also be provided if he doesn't have one now, Exhibit P 09841. And
12 if the usher doesn't have one, we have an extra one here.
13 Q. Sir, if you'll look at the map, this additional map that has just
14 been placed in front of you, Exhibit P 09841. Can you just confirm for
15 the record this is a map in fact that you had provided me over this past
16 weekend; is that correct?
17 A. Yes. This is the final Vance-Owen map. The UN version is the
18 January map. This was the map developed, and it was the map after March
19 25, when the Bosnian Muslim government approved it and signed it.
20 Q. All right. For current purposes, I'm not going to look at the
21 differences so much of the January happen map and the March map, but we
22 will come to that in the course of the afternoon. But because of the
23 additional information on this map, can you just confirm that what Exhibit
24 P 09841 does is to impose the Vance-Owen proposed provincial borders onto
25 a demographic map of Bosnia-Herzegovina based upon the 1991 census?
1 A. Yes, but I would not use the word "impose." They were not imposed
2 on the parties. They were developed by the parties in conversations with
3 the negotiators.
4 Q. I appreciate that. I probably -- when I said "imposed," I should
5 say the borders overlaid on the map, just physically on the map itself as
6 opposed to imposed on the parties. The borders have been laid over, if
7 you will, the demographic map; is that correct?
8 A. Yes, it is.
9 MR. SCOTT: Likewise, Your Honour, I'll just mention for purposes
10 of the record and again to assist anyone in the courtroom, in the
11 Prosecution's book of maps, P 09276, map number 9, page 10 in e-court, is
12 a map showing the ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again, simply
13 another version that the Prosecution submits is basically consistent with
14 the map we're looking at now, but if anyone in the courtroom wants to use
15 one or the other, they might be able to do that.
16 Q. Sir, when you look at map -- the map that has now been marked --
17 which you provided me, as Exhibit P 09841, do you see that the proposed 8
18 and 10 include or encompass a substantial amount of Muslim majority areas
19 or, to put it the other way around, includes a substantial amount of
20 territory where the Croats were neither a majority or a plurality?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. When you -- then next refer you and the courtroom --
23 MR. SCOTT: The witness will need be provided with the book, the
24 booklet of maps, please. The usher can provide just one more map that's
25 only in this book at the moment. Map 7. Sorry, it's map number --
1 it's -- excuse me, map number 6. It's page 7 in e-court. Excuse me.
2 Your Honour, in the book -- Your Honours, in the book of maps, map
3 6 is the map in the Prosecution's book of exhibits, maps that are -- has
4 the -- both the Banovina overlay on the map of parts of Croatia and
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina and also on -- showing the borders of the Croatian
6 Community of Herceg-Bosna.
7 Q. Now, Ambassador, I've now put a number of maps in front of you,
8 and let me ask you this: When you compared the maps in the Vance-Owen
9 Plan in January, the book -- the map that is on page 19 of the materials,
10 and you compare that map to the map 6 that I've just put in front of you,
11 can you tell us what relationship or correspondence you see between
12 Vance-Owen provinces 8 and 10 and the claimed borders of the Croatian
13 Community of Herceg-Bosna and the part of the 1939 Banovina extending into
14 Western Bosnia and Herzegovina?
15 A. Well, it's clear what one compares the map, the Banovina map,
16 that's your map number 6 in your book, and the map in the UN document,
17 which has the Vance-Owen Plan, the original map, that they are basically
18 the same.
19 Q. And with all this -- with all these maps and that information in
20 front of us now, and perhaps a bit fresher than when we finished
21 yesterday, based on all that, can you remind the Judges what was then the
22 reaction to the Bosnian Croat party to the Vance-Owen proposals as
23 presented in January 1993?
24 A. They were enthusiastic, particularly about the map, but about the
25 entire plan. They signed all three parts of the package, the map, the
1 constitutional principles, and the military arrangements at once. They
2 signed with alacrity.
3 Q. Can you give us from your experience at the time and being closely
4 involved in this process of your analysis or assessment of the reasons
5 that they agreed so quickly to this map both as expressed to you and based
6 upon what you knew about the process?
7 A. Well, they were pleased with the map, which was generous to the
8 Bosnian Croat community. We thought it was fair, but it was also
9 generous. The constitutional principles they did not like any more than
10 the Bosnian Serbs liked them, and the military arrangements they were
11 already violating, but they signed in the secure knowledge that the
12 Bosnian Serbs and to a lesser degree the Bosnian Muslims would not agree
13 with the package, and therefore they were able to get a free ride. They
14 were free riders, so to speak, to use the economic expression, on -- on
15 the situation, and they were in -- in a secure position.
16 Q. Let me turn to a different aspect of the proposals as they existed
17 in January, that is the topic of separation of forces. Can I ask you, in
18 looking back at the document for a moment -- we're looking away from the
19 maps for the moment so it's not as urgent for people to have those in
20 front of them at the moment but if you go back to Exhibit P 09852, the
21 packet of Vance-Owen material for January 1993, can I please direct your
22 attention to page 17, again numbered page 17 at the top, paragraph number
23 8. You mentioned this, I believe, yesterday, but to bring us into the
24 next topic, is it correct that one of the 10 fundamental or constitutional
25 principles was number 8: "Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be progressively
1 demilitarised under United Nations/European Community supervision"?
2 A. Yes, that was -- you're correct, and it was a very important
4 Q. Can I ask you please now to go to page 20 of the document of Annex
5 number IV. But it's on page 20.
6 A. Excuse me.
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. My page 20 says Annex number VI.
9 Q. I think you're right. I think you're absolutely right. Let me
10 just double-check. Yes, that's correct. Sorry.
11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, during this break it
12 might be good if my learned friend could repeat the number of the document
13 because there is an error in the transcript and it would be good to have
14 it on record. It will be important so as not to waste time later on.
15 MR. SCOTT: Exhibit P 09852, I believe.
16 Q. And you are absolutely correct. It is Annex VI on page 20.
17 This is called agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And
18 again on that page and I'm going to take you through a series of
19 references until we get to some particular language that I have questions,
20 but just so everyone in the courtroom can follow for process, if I can ask
21 you to look at paragraph number 4 toward the bottom of that page.
22 "Arrangements on the separation of forces as set out in Annex IV to the
23 present agreement." So then we need to turn to Annex IV to this
24 agreement. It should be on page -- well, actually, before we do that,
25 sorry, sorry, because there's another related topic that I want to
1 indicate. If you go to page 22 first, which is Annex I. Don't worry so
2 much about the annex numbers for the moment but just the page number, page
3 22. And if I can direct your attention again to Annex I, cessation of
4 hostilities, and we're not going to read the entire page, but as you scan
5 down the page you'll see that in the third -- roughly the third paragraph
6 overall on the page a cease-fire must be put in place and remain
7 effective. This is to be implemented 72 hours from the time of signature
8 of the agreement. It talks about monitoring by UN protection force, ECMM.
9 It says the separation of forces is to be achieved, et cetera.
10 On the next page, again reference to such things as establish the
11 demarcation line, move in United Nations Protection Forces to establish
12 security. Down below on the page again separations of forces. Second
13 item, area of separation to be agreed.
14 Do you see all that, and is that again, as you recall, the basic
15 concepts that were being offered or proposed at the time?
16 A. Yes. This concerned the immediate end of hostilities.
17 Q. Yes. Now, with that in mind, more specifically then if we can go
18 to it, page 30, specifically separation of forces. Annex IV. Again under
19 steps such things as an absolute cease-fire. Next, temporary freezing of
20 the military situation, pending agreement on the return of forces to
21 designated provinces.
22 "No forward deployments or offensive action."
23 Control measures some examples, monitoring of front lines,
24 establishing lines on which forces may be located. Staged withdrawal of
25 forces culminating with their location to designated provinces.
1 And again is that part of the process, the proposal as you
2 understood it at the time?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Let me, with that background in mind, then, take you back to Lord
5 Owen's opening statement on page 11 overall. And his -- his statement
6 starts on page 11 but then continues over to page 12 and 13. If I can ask
7 you to look please at the bottom of page 12 the paragraph starting with
8 the words "Separation of the armed forces." Might I just ask you, sir,
9 rather than myself reading it, could you just read that paragraph out
11 A. Yes. It reads and I quote: "Separation of the armed forces
12 throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to be negotiated in the light
13 of the boundaries of the new provinces. It is envisaged that there will
14 be no military forces in Sarajevo province. Bosnian Serb forces might
15 withdraw to provinces 2, 4, and 6. Bosnian Croat forces could be deployed
16 in province 3, and the remaining forces would hopefully reach agreement as
17 to their deployment in provinces 1, 5, 8, 9, and 10. Under our
18 constitutional principles, number 8, Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be
19 progressively demilitarised."
20 Q. Now, sir, the various passage that I've just referred to you and
21 to the courtroom and this statement by Lord Owen, can you confirm to the
22 Chamber for purposes of other questions this afternoon, are those the
23 entire provisions or a sampling of the entire provisions, because we saw
24 that we didn't read every item on every page, of what the Vance-Owen
25 proposals as of early January proposed in this regard?
1 A. Yes, that is correct, as of -- as of the January proposal.
2 Q. Now, if we look at the map, and whichever one of the Vance-Owen
3 proposals at the time, whichever one people want to use but using the one
4 at page 19 and referring back to Lord Owen's opening statement, he's
5 saying that the Bosnian Serb forces might withdraw to provinces 2, 4, and
6 6. People can see where those roughly are. Bosnian Croat forces could be
7 deployed in province 3. There's province 3 up in the upper right area of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is that -- does that correspond roughly to the
10 A. Yes, that is the Posavina province.
11 Q. And that the remaining forces would hopefully reach agreement as
12 to their deployment in provinces 1, 5, 8, 9, and 10. Basically meaning
13 all that was subject to further agreement among the parties.
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. And finally before leaving this document, just to put the time
16 factor into further context, can I ask you to look at page 4 of the
17 document. In the bottom half of that page, sir, in the section that's
18 headed "Plenary Session on the 4th of January, 1993," refers then to a
19 Plenary Session on the 4th of January, and then if I can direct your
20 attention to paragraph 20, lower on the page. Is it correct that then,
21 that at the end of the 4th of January the conference or the proceedings
22 were recessed until the 10th of January?
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. And is that fact consistent with what actually happened?
25 A. I'd have to consult my diary to see whether it's completely
1 consistent, but I suspect it was.
2 Q. All right. And in fact on that regard if we can go back then to
3 some of your diary entries, and if I can ask you to look, please, at
4 Exhibit P 01038, which is in binder 1. These are the diary excerpts or
5 diary items that we were looking at yesterday. It should be in one of
6 the --
7 A. Excuse me, sir, what is that number?
8 Q. Yes. 1038.
9 A. Thank you.
10 Q. If I can ask you to turn to your entries on the -- for the 10th of
11 January, 1993, which according to your -- to the document we were just
12 looking at would have been the next day that meetings were held after a
13 period of recess. And if I can direct your attention in particular, again
14 using the numbers that we were using yesterday, and I appreciate again
15 they are sometimes not the easiest thing to fine, but if you can find
16 4287, please, once you have found the 10th of January. 4287 which --
17 A. Yes. Yes, I have located it.
18 Q. Thank you very much. And for those using e-court, it's at page 35
19 of e-court. Excuse me, page 42. My apology. Page 42.
20 Sorry, let me catch up with you, Ambassador. Thank you. Sorry.
21 Sir, can you tell us then what commenced again or what were you
22 doing according to these minutes or notes on the 10th of January, 1993?
23 A. The meeting on the 10th of January was a rolling series of
24 negotiations with the parties. The page that you've referred to was with
25 Mate Boban and both -- and Akmadzic. The meeting lasted from 7.25 p.m.
1 until 8.00 p.m. in the evening, and we discussed with them their view of
2 where things stood.
3 Q. All right. And I don't -- because we need to move forward in
4 time, and I think we may have touched -- we may have gotten about this far
5 yesterday before stopping, but on this page does Boban -- do you have a
6 note for Boban saying, "I believe the Muslims don't want a map at all. We
7 must insist on constitutional text that Muslims accept map"?
8 A. Mm-hmm.
9 Q. And what was your understanding of the meaning of "much insist in
10 constitutional text"?
11 A. Mate Boban knew very well that the Bosnian Muslims wanted a
12 centralised state with very small administrative units. If that's the
13 case, the opstina map would suffice. You could just have counties and you
14 wouldn't need any map at all. You don't, for example, have a map of New
15 York State in the United States. That was the Muslim objective. There
16 was no -- never any doubt of that. So that's what Mate Boban meant when
17 he said the Muslims don't want a map at all.
18 Q. Then if you turn -- I believe it should be, hopefully, the next
19 page, 4297, using again the numbers, and for a meeting on the 12th of
20 January, 1993.
21 On the top left -- on the left side of the page, of course, in
22 your journal, again, as we saw yesterday, we're basically looking at two
23 pages, your journal opened using two pages. At the left side at the top,
24 does this indicate a meeting on the 12th of January? You've written the
25 notations, Mate Boban, Mile Akmadzic, General Petkovic.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Going to the right side of the page, about halfway down, do you
3 see a section -- about the middle of the page some comments attributed to
4 Mate Boban?
5 A. I'm afraid I don't. We're not on the same page.
6 Q. Well, I'm sorry for that. Page 4297.
7 A. Sorry.
8 MR. MURPHY: Did you mean 4297 or 87.
9 MR. SCOTT: This particular document is 4297.
10 MR. MURPHY: The -- 97. All right. Thank you.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I have 4297. Yes, a comment by Boban.
12 MR. SCOTT:
13 Q. Could you read that, please?
14 A. "You will have great difficulties with Muslims on both the
15 principles and the map. Give significance to what I say. Do not be
16 caught off guard by the Muslims."
17 Q. And -- I'm sorry, I'm not sure we're still on the same page. Page
18 4297, your meeting on the 12th of January. Yes, I see where you were.
19 Thank you very much. You're on the left side. Could I ask you to go
20 across to the right side of the page?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. About the middle.
23 A. Mm-hmm.
24 Q. And other comments attributed to Mr. Boban, and can you read that,
1 A. "We're running out of goodwill. We want to consult with you. We
2 want a solution. We'll be waiting. Our people are worried, are losing
3 patience with the Muslims. Tell Izzie," that is President Izetbegovic,
4 "Tell Izzie that either Akmadzic remains as president of the government of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the government will cease to exist." That's a
6 quote, "Will cease to exist."
7 Q. Sorry, go ahead.
8 A. "The Muslims in Sarajevo are trying to replace him," and then I
9 put in parentheses my own comment, "Ganic?" Telling myself that perhaps
10 they were trying to put Ejub Ganic in the place of Akmadzic.
11 Q. And just to pick up from yesterday when it makes reference here to
12 being Akmadzic being president of the government, he was the Prime
13 Minister at that time? He was in that position at the time?
14 A. Yes, he was Prime Minister.
15 Q. All right. Now, up above that you said a moment ago -- let me
16 just give -- let me just ask you to look at that again. You said, "We'll
17 be waiting." Does it say "We'll be writing you? We'll be writing --"
18 A. Oh, excuse me. Yes, we'll be writing you. I beg your pardon.
19 Q. And above that says, "We're running out of goodwill"?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. What was your sense, Ambassador, and the sense of Lord Owen and
22 Secretary Vance at this time as to the continued postures or patience of
23 the various parties as you approached the middle of January 1993?
24 A. The Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic, Koljevic, Krajisnik, and all of them
25 were the most demanding, the least cooperative, and of course, in terms of
1 military activities, they were doing the most damage, particularly to
2 Sarajevo. The Bosnian Muslims were hanging on by their fingernails and
3 hoping for the best. The Bosnian Croats were in the best position of the
4 three parties, because they were organised already in Croatia, and they
5 had a strong military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both strong and
6 well-led, and they were anxious to get on with their business.
7 Q. And what -- when Boban says, "Are losing patience with Muslims,"
8 what did you take from that?
9 A. Well, they were nominal allies. After all, they were together in
10 fighting the Serbs. But as we knew, and as Mate told us right
11 here, "We're losing patience with the Muslims." We know they were anxious
12 to clear the Muslims out of their -- you know, of what they considered
13 their national homeland, Herceg-Bosna, and this occurred in January.
14 Everybody was aware of what happened in Prozor two months earlier. So
15 that -- we interpreted that that meant that if the Muslims didn't shape up
16 and sign on board that there would be more displacement of Muslim people.
17 Q. Before we leave this diary entry, again for the 12th of January,
18 can I ask you to go back to the left side of the page, and above the
19 portion you read a few minutes ago, the other statement attributed to
20 Boban where he says, "You'll have great difficulties," but above that,
21 could you read your entry immediately above that section starting with the
22 word "earlier"?
23 A. This is a summary. It doesn't have the exact words of Akmadzic
24 because you will note it is in parentheses.
25 Q. All right.
1 A. But I summarise the situation, and I write, and I quote:
2 "Earlier, just before -- just before Boban arrived, Akmadzic told us
3 Muslims had no legitimate complaints, and the map was generous to them.
4 For example, Vares, a Croat town forever, was given to the Muslims."
5 Q. And what did you think about that statement? Was there anything
6 about that statement that you thought was, well, noteworthy enough to put
7 in your diary? With an asterisk.
8 A. Well, in some respects it was accurate. Vares was a holy town to
9 the Serbs [sic]. It was the site of the oldest Roman Catholic bishopric
10 in the area. President Tudjman showed us that clearly and so it was a
11 very sensitive city, and it was put into a Muslim majority province. So I
12 think that's what he was pointing out, and that was the essence of his
14 Q. All right. It may be worth if people -- if, Ambassador, you still
15 have the packet of Vance-Owen materials next to you, Exhibit P 09852.
16 MR. SCOTT: The packet of documents, Your Honours, we were looking
17 at a few minutes ago. It may be worth looking back at the map on page 19
18 of those materials?
19 MR. KARNAVAS: It might be worth correcting the record. He
20 indicated this was a holy town to the Serbs.
21 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, I didn't hear you.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: You indicated that Vares was a holy town to the
23 Serbs. The Serbs are Orthodox.
24 THE WITNESS: Did I say that?
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, I believe that you misspoke, and I just --
1 THE WITNESS: Oh, I beg your pardon.
2 MR. SCOTT: On line 14.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Line 14 to the --
4 THE WITNESS: No, of course it's Croats.
5 MR. SCOTT: I appreciate counsel catching that. Thank you.
6 THE WITNESS: Page -- I'm sorry. I can't believe I said it, but
7 if the -- it the monitor shows it, I believe the monitor.
8 MR. SCOTT:
9 Q. Can I ask you then in looking back at -- at the map on page 19,
10 does that indeed show that as of January 1993, and again the copy is not
11 ideal, that's why the map and the book -- book of maps may be better for
12 some things, but nonetheless, do you see that as of January 1993 Vares,
13 the municipality of Vares, which is just immediately above or, if you
14 will, say, north of the Sarajevo municipality, that was included in
15 proposed province number 9?
16 A. I don't have it in front of me, but I'm sure you're correct. It
17 was --
18 Q. I think it's also in the map -- out of the materials, the
19 Vance-Owen materials on your right, I think you can also see --
20 A. But it doesn't show Vares. What is the Vance-Owen map in this
21 document of yours?
22 Q. I'll be right with you.
23 A. Could you --
24 Q. Number 11, it's map number 11, and, for e-court, page 12 of
25 Exhibit 09276.
1 A. Map number 11. Yes. I'm sorry to take the time of the Court.
2 The Vares is indeed in province number 9, which was a Muslim majority
4 Q. If I can then next ask you to turn to Exhibit P 01158 in your set
5 of materials. I believe it will be in binder number 1, which hopefully
6 someone -- I think the same one you're in.
7 A. Yes, I've found it.
8 Q. Thank you. Sir, this is a record, you will see, of a meeting with
9 President Tudjman in Zagreb, and if you look on the first page it will
10 indicate that apparently at about 1550 hours or 10 minutes to 4.00 that
11 day on the 15th of January, 1993, President Franjo Tudjman welcome the
12 co-chairmen Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, Ambassador Ahtisaari, President
13 Izetbegovic, Boban, and his delegation to a meeting at the presidential
14 offices; is that correct?
15 A. Are you asking me?
16 Q. Yes?
17 A. Well, I wasn't there so I'm just reading the document.
18 Q. This particular meeting, you did not accompany Mr. Vance and Lord
20 A. No I was in Geneva chairing -- chairing the conference.
21 Q. Let me ask you just simply then to -- I'm going to ask you to look
22 at page 48, ask you to go to page 48 of the transcript, please.
23 A. Yes, I have it.
24 Q. On page 48, and I'm going to have to read a couple of pages to you
25 in order to put the next sets of questions to you about this. Izetbegovic
1 is speaking at this point on page 48. Izetbegovic says: "I will just
2 take the floor once more and I won't take it again. I would say I agree
3 with President Tudjman that this discussion should be finished. But I
4 think it is necessary to resolve a misunderstanding here because I think
5 it may be at the core of the fighting that has now happened in Gornji
6 Vakuf, a misunderstanding, perhaps a misinterpretation of these documents.
7 "So, for my part, with this I will finish this conversation, for
8 my part. I don't think this conversation should go on, except for this
9 item, which I think should be clarified.
10 "It's about the interpretation of a paragraph from the documents
11 put forward by Messrs. Vance and Owen.
12 "So it's about the interpretation, about comprehending or
13 understanding one of the items put forward in these documents.
14 "Mr. Boban said he understood from these papers that the armies,
15 that is -- excuse me, that each army should withdraw to their territories.
16 That's not how I understood the papers and I don't know whether this was
17 the intention of these documents, because I do not see that they define
18 who has what territories, whose armies these are, you know. So I am
19 afraid what is now going on in Gornji Vakuf may have been caused by a
20 misunderstanding of this item of these agreements."
21 Going on to the next page: "I am not sure I understood Mr. Boban
22 correctly, but he seems to have understood say now that the Bosnia army
23 should withdraw from the region, from the Travnik province now, and the
24 HVO should take it over completely. I do not understand these papers like
1 Tudjman says: "How else will have you the Serbs withdraw and
3 Izetbegovic: "Of course I'm only saying that this is not what
4 these papers say now or when this moment starts. Of course there will be
5 such moves but it has to be defined. I do not think this has been defined
6 in the papers yet nor has the movement for it been set. I'm afraid that
7 such a reading of these papers or this provision and Mr. Boban that such a
8 reading may have caused the clashes in Gornji Vakuf. Perhaps he wants the
9 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina to withdraw from there now, but since it is
10 not doing so then it should be driven out.
11 "Boban: "No, that's not how things are set up."
12 Izetbegovic: "I think because you, Mate, said it a few moments
13 ago, hasn't withdrawn [as read] been foreseen?"
14 Boban: "I said you should tell your people that provinces 10 and
15 13," 13 may be an error but that's what the transcript says, but "10 and
16 13 have been agreed on between the Croats and the Muslims and there won't
17 be any problems for you to do it, like I did on TV when I appealed for
18 peace, brotherhood, cooperation, co-existence between the Muslims and the
19 Croats and for bridging the gap at all costs. You do it and there will be
21 Izetbegovic: "I don't think this was foreseen in any of these
22 proposals. It was not foreseen that the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
23 should leave either the Travnik province or Mostar. That's not how I
24 understood these papers. I am not sure that's what is written there."
25 "It seems to me, I'm sorry, Mate, that this is how you understood
1 it and that's not how you understood it ..."
2 Boban: That's how I understood it."
3 It goes on. Tudjman talks again. Susak talks a bit. And if I
4 can direct in the interests of time to page 52, toward of end of this
5 conversation, of course anyone can read any more -- the entire record is
6 in the transcript. Anyone can refer to any additional parts of it they
8 David Owen on page 52. You find that. And Owen says at the end,
9 toward the end of the meeting: "I think this has been a very useful
10 discussion although we have not reached any definite conclusions. I
11 think the one and only real way to reach any solution is by discussing
12 these issues.
13 "With regard to individual provinces, I said while explaining the
14 system that the Serbian military forces would withdraw to the provinces of
15 Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and Eastern Herzegovina.
16 "I did not make any suggestions about the others, but I think I
17 mentioned that this was an issue for the BH army and the HVO to discuss
19 Now, before I put a broader question to you, what Lord Owen says
20 there at the end, does he provide an accurate summary of what the
21 Vance-Owen proposals were as of the middle of January 1993?
22 A. Yes. They were the proposals in the UN document that you read
23 just a moment ago.
24 Q. And so when you read -- the part that I have read to you, sir,
25 that I've pointed out to you starting at page 48, can you comment on
1 whether you agree or disagree with the position and assessment stated by
2 President Izetbegovic?
3 A. Yes. In this connection Izetbegovic is correct and Mate Boban has
4 it wrong.
5 Q. Had there been any part of the Vance-Owen proposal as it existed
6 as of mid-January that would require any ABiH forces to relocate from
7 provinces 8 or 10?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Can I ask you please to go to Exhibit P 01155. And, sir, this is
10 a document titled "Decision," dated the 15th of January, 1993, signed
11 by -- or over the name of, at least, Jadranko Prlic. Stamped. And I'll
12 just ask you, please, to look at the document itself and, in particular,
13 in the first paragraph it says: "In line with the agreements which were
14 reached and signed at the International Conference on the former
15 Yugoslavia ... The HVO of the HZ HB, the Croatian Community of
16 Herceg-Bosna, reached a decision at a special meeting in Mostar on the
17 15th of January 1993," that is that day.
18 "Decision." And point number 1: "All units of the BH army
19 currently in regions 3, 8, and 10 which were proclaimed Croatian in the
20 Geneva agreements are subordinate to the command of the main headquarters
21 of the HVO armed forces."
22 Do you see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Going down to paragraph number 5: "The decision shall be
25 implemented within five days starting from today, 15th of January, 1993,"
1 making that presumably the 20th of January. Would that be correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. 6: "This decision shall be implemented by the head of the defence
4 department of the HVO of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna."
5 My question to you, is sir, a couple of questions. The document
6 itself starts out with the words, "In line with the agreements reached and
7 signed at the international conference ..." Were there any agreements
8 that had been signed by all the parties, and was there any agreement in
9 fact as of the 15th [Realtime transcript read in error "23rd"] of January,
11 A. The agreement as of January 15th you have already read to the
12 Court. We have all looked at it. There is nothing in it that would
13 permit this statement that the decision is in line. It's contrary to the
14 agreement, in fact.
15 Q. Before passing on to some other documents, if I can ask you to
16 look at number 3, it says: "Units of the Kiseljak and Kresevo HVOs whose
17 municipalities are in region 7, remain under the command of the main
18 headquarters of the HVO ... until a final agreement has been reached on
19 the status of region 7."
20 Now, can you provide any insight or information to the Chamber
21 on -- in all of what is stated here in this decision by Mr. Prlic on the
22 15th of January, why was an exception being made for the HVO units in the
23 Kiseljak region?
24 A. Well, Kiseljak and Kresevo, as we can see from your map of the
25 Vance-Owen Plan and province 7 are in the province we call Sarajevo
1 province, and as we've discussed earlier, separate arrangements,
2 political, military, administrative, were made for the Sarajevo province,
3 essentially providing for consensus of all three parties on all aspects of
4 the organisation of the province, that is to say political, economic, and
6 Q. Well, excuse me.
7 MR. SCOTT: I've been -- I've been -- it's been pointed out to me
8 that on line 12 of page 27 there's an error. It should say there were in
9 fact any agreements by the 15th of January, and for some reason the
10 transcript says the 23rd of January. If we could correct that, please.
11 And the witness has it correct when he goes on to say the
12 agreement as of January 15th.
13 Q. Going further from that interruption, sir, but let me ask you this
14 in connection again with paragraph number 3 and Kiseljak and what you have
15 you just said about Sarajevo. Were there terms or conditions or
16 agreements to the Sarajevo province any more firm or final or agreed to as
17 they were as to provinces 8 and 10?
18 A. Well, the -- excuse me. The Sarajevo province was understandably
19 in many respects the most sensitive province. It was the capital of the
20 country. It was being besieged by the Serbs. We know that. And it was
21 to be the capital of the future unified sovereign state so that separate
22 arrangements were envisaged for the Sarajevo province.
23 Q. Although they had not been finalised as of the 15th of January; is
24 that correct? But still there was no agreement. There was still no
25 Vance-Owen agreement?
1 A. Correct. The Serbs had not signed onto anything.
2 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I was going to refer to the similar or
3 related orders on the 15th of January signed by Mr. Stojic, Exhibit P
4 01140, and then in turn by Mr. Petkovic, P 01156, but I believe the
5 Chamber has seen those before and, in the interest of time, I'm not going
6 to go into them now unless the Chamber wishes to.
7 Q. Could I ask you to next look at, then, Exhibit P 01150. Sir, this
8 is a document that purports to be -- that sets out an order that was
9 given, allegedly given, by a man named Bozo Rajic on the 16th of January,
10 1993. Do you recall who Mr. Rajic -- what his position he held at that
12 A. He was defence minister, as I recollect.
13 Q. And defence minister of what entity?
14 A. Of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 Q. And do you recall whether Mr. Rajic was a Muslim or a Croat or
17 A. He was a -- I believe he was a Croat.
18 Q. And do you see that in his order, paragraph 1, are specific in
19 particular as to provinces 3, 8, and 10, that he was indicating that again
20 the -- essentially the ABiH should be subordinated to the HVO in those
22 A. Yes, I see it.
23 Q. And let me ask you then to next turn to 11 -- Exhibit P 01168.
24 I'll just show you a couple of documents before I ask some questions about
25 them. Exhibit P 01168 appears to be an order dated the same day, the 16th
1 of January, 1993, in which the commander of the army of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ABiH, Mr. Halilovic, and the -- the main paragraph
3 being paragraph number 1 under his order essentially directs the ABiH not
4 to in fact subordinate themselves to the control of the HVO HZ HB; is that
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Above that, when Mr. Halilovic gives the reasoning for his order
8 the -- in the text above the line where it says "Command," it says:
9 "Regarding the facts that the talks in Geneva had not been finished yet
10 and all sides in talks have not signed the documents offered, we consider
11 the above-mentioned decisions directly endanger further mutual fight
12 against the aggressor."
13 Was General Halilovic's analysis accurate that, in fact, there
14 were no -- there was no agreement as of that time?
15 A. Yes, he's accurate. May I add something?
16 Q. Please.
17 A. But even if the agreements were complete, that is to say if the
18 Vance-Owen Plan of -- as of January 15 had been signed by all three
19 parties in all of its parts, the actions taken by the HVO would have been
20 illegal and contrary to the agreement because there was nothing in the
21 agreement that -- that said what -- what the HVO was claiming.
22 Q. Very well. Can I next ask you to look at Exhibit P 01267. And do
23 you see that this is a letter Mr. Izetbegovic to Jadranko Prlic, president
24 of the HVO, and does it stated -- is it stated again in the first
25 paragraph, excuse me, second sentence: "Until final agreement about the
1 future constitution about Bosnia-Herzegovina is reached in Geneva, our
2 opinion is that all unilateral acts should be avoided by all parties,
3 including your decision on subordination of the B and H army/HVO units in
4 certain provinces".
5 And again, can I simply ask you what President Izetbegovic says
6 here, is that consistent with what the Vance-Owen -- is his position
7 supported by the Vance-Owen proposals as they existed at the time?
8 A. Yes. What President Izetbegovic says is in conformity with the
9 Vance-Owen Plan.
10 Q. Let me ask you to look next at Exhibit P 01263. And this appears
11 to be a response by Mr. Prlic to the letter of Mr. Izetbegovic that we
12 were just looking at. I might just give you a moment, please, for you to
13 look at the letter, and perhaps others in the courtroom, to see what the
14 letter is. Perhaps you can just look up at any point that you're --
15 you're sufficiently familiar with it. Yes.
16 A. Yes. Well, the president of the HVO of Herceg-Bosna, Dr. Prlic,
17 takes issue, strong issue, with the position stated earlier by Izetbegovic
18 and General Halilovic, namely that their Vance-Owen Plan does not call for
19 the unilateral subordination of the BH army to the HVO in the three named
20 provinces, and he restates the Bosnian Croat position, and he's incorrect,
21 that it's just not the fact. It's an assertion, but he is incorrect.
22 Q. And just to look at one specific sentence, in fact the last
23 sentence of Dr. Prlic's letter, "you already know this is in accordance
24 with the Geneva documents." And as you just answered this, was these
25 positions set out by Dr. Prlic at this time in fact in accordance with the
1 Geneva documents?
2 A. No. The opposite was the case. It was totally not in accordance
3 with the Geneva documents.
4 Q. Can I ask you next to look at Exhibit P 01192. And I'll ask you
5 to look at that for a moment. It says it's a decision dated the 18th of
6 January, 1993, by Jadran Topic, who was the president of the Mostar
7 municipal HVO.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. In the body of his -- the first "I" section of his decision again
10 it says: "In accordance with the Geneva accords and the introduction of
11 civilian power, all appointments in economic and public organisations and
12 institutions in Mostar municipality made by the commanders of the BH army
13 units and all legal effects (contracts, decisions ...)" and so on, "of
14 these appointments shall be rendered invalid on the day this decision
15 comes into effect," which it says on item 3 is the 18th of January, 1993.
16 Now once again, sir, to your knowledge as a close and active
17 participant in the Vance-Owen process, was there anything in the
18 Vance-Owen process and as it existed in mid-January which was consistent
19 with the action taken by Mr. Topic?
20 A. No, nothing. We have the Vance-Owen Plan in front of us, and if
21 one wanted to read the entire plan you could see that there is nothing in
22 the plan that would lead to this kind of a statement. This statement and
23 the previous ones violate both the letter and the spirit of the Vance-Owen
25 Q. Can I ask you, please, next to go to Exhibit P 01343. And just to
1 finish up this particular series of documents. Is this a decision by
2 President Izetbegovic to essentially invalidate the order that had been
3 issued by Bozo Rajic that we look at a few minutes ago about the
4 subordination of the ABiH units to the HVO?
5 A. Yes, this is it. And he -- President Izetbegovic also had a note,
6 I don't have did in front of me, but about the same time declaring null
7 and void the -- another document that was issued by the defence minister.
8 Or am I -- am I referring -- thinking of the same document perhaps.
9 Q. I'm not sure, sir, Ambassador, at the moment?
10 A. I think we've seen so many documents that all make the same point,
11 but they came from various chains --
12 Q. Yes?
13 A. -- in the Bosnian Croat command. So excuse me for --
14 Q. You're right?
15 A. -- confusing --
16 Q. You're right and as we had said earlier we didn't look at them
17 all. In the chain of command there were orders -- similar orders issued
18 by Mr. Stojic and Mr. Petkovic, but I think the Chamber had seen those
19 before and so simply I didn't dwell on them at this juncture.
20 If I could ask you then to move forward to the 20th of January,
21 the document we just looked at, the decision by Mr. -- President
22 Izetbegovic being on the 19th of January. Could I ask you to look in your
23 diary, Exhibit P 01038? And your entries for the --
24 A. Excuse me, what is that number?
25 Q. Yes. 1038. It should be in the first binder, and we're
1 looking -- the date of the entry will be the 20th of January. And in
2 particular -- I think the first entry that you'll actually be looking at
3 will be 43 --
4 A. No, sorry.
5 Q. That's all right. If you can find 4315. If you have 43 --
6 A. Yes, I have 4315.
7 Q. Thank you very much. And looking at this page, can you just
8 remind us and put in context then what -- basically what was continuing?
9 What were you doing, you and Secretary Vance and Lord Owen doing around
10 the 20th of January, 1993?
11 A. Well, January 20 was a very important, very busy, and very
12 frustrating day because of the documents that you've introduced in the
13 Court, this unilateral Bosnian Croat decision to subordinate the Bosnian
14 army to the HVO in the provinces that they called their provinces, and all
15 this back and forth, and you've read it, the letters between Izetbegovic
16 and Prlic's letter, all of that. The co-chairmen decided to bring all the
17 parties together to see if they could resolve this, because while this was
18 going on, there was pretty heavy fighting. The HVO was -- was clearing
19 out Muslim civilians from these areas, and the situation was worsening so
20 that the co-chairmen, Secretary Vance and Lord Owen, urgently brought
21 everybody together on January 20 in Sarajevo.
22 Q. Can I ask you to then look specifically -- excuse me one moment.
23 Well, it's still on the 20th, but I'm afraid for -- if I can ask you to go
24 back several -- couple of pages to 4312. My apology for that, but it's --
25 if you just flip back a couple of pages to the page number 4312.
1 A. I have it.
2 Q. All right. Again on the left-hand side of your journal as laid
3 open here about -- on the bottom of the half. Page there are some
4 notations for -- attributed to AK. Who is that?
5 A. Akmadzic.
6 Q. And what do you write in your diary on that lower part of the
8 A. Well, I should introduce by saying that this -- this meeting was
9 extremely contentious, and at times degenerated into a shouting match, the
10 arguments between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims. It was
11 quite an experience. We all remembered it, because coincidentally it was
12 the day that President Clinton was being sworn in. January 20th is an
13 important date for the Americans, and so it stuck in our minds because
14 this -- this extremely hostile meeting.
15 Akmadzic had with him written notes. He had a prepared statement
16 that he took out of his pocket, and he said, "We, our Croat people, were
17 attacked bit Muslim troops. The HVO defence was a legal one. We asked
18 for an order from the defence minister, i.e., that armed forces should
19 withdraw to provinces per Geneva. We want to start implementing what we
20 have signed. We have no interest in continuing this war. We want a
21 cease-fire and a just peace. If not possible in all of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, then where we are a majority. If we agree here, we
23 are ready to issue an order for a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.
24 We are ready for a cease-fire and to make a public statement, but we --
25 but not ready to agree what was agreed in Geneva. All we want is that the
1 Muslim side accept the documents from Geneva completely." That's a quote.
2 "All we want is that the must side accept the documents from Geneva
3 completely, or at least in part but we would like them to agree on
4 provincial structures so we can implement the Geneva peace plan."
5 Q. Then your next entry there is Boras?
6 A. Boras was a senior Croat leader.
7 Q. And what is said there?
8 A. It says: "The HVO has offered the other side," that is the army
9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that's in quotes the other side, the army of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that at Gornji Vakuf both sides should withdraw and
11 the security of people would be in the hands of a mixed police force."
12 Q. Then could you please then -- Izetbegovic is IZ, Izetbegovic, and
13 does he make a response?
14 A. Yes. He says: "Won't go into reasons for the conflict, but the
15 defence minister's order a unilateral act was the cause," meaning was the
16 cause of the fighting. "Was opposed by the army of BiH to be withdrawn."
17 The act -- meaning the act -- the statement by the Defence minister was to
18 be withdrawn. The words are "act to be withdrawn."
19 Q. All right. Let me direct your attention -- we're coming up on the
20 time for the break. Let me direct your attention across the page, and
21 toward the end of that particular part of the conversation, does Lord Owen
22 make an intervention?
23 A. Before or after?
24 Q. After. Across the page, on the right side of your journal, do you
25 see an entry for DLO?
1 A. Oh, yes. I see it now. Speaking personal -- well, Owen, was
2 agreeing with Izetbegovic and he says, "Speaking personally, I think the
3 defend minister's statement was premature. That proves the defects in
4 your government structure. If the defence minister, not the Presidency
5 but the army's CIC is no -- there was no HVO member in the Presidency.
6 Let the defence minister's instruction lie and not be implemented until
7 further discussions have taken place."
8 Q. And what was Akmadzic's response?
9 A. Akmadzic responds: "It will so lie."
10 Q. And Haris Silajdzic is the man you identified yesterday, and what
11 does he add then to the conversation?
12 A. Silajdzic was the number two on the Bosnian Muslim side, and he
13 said: "The cause of the problem is those who understand the provinces as
14 national space. The Muslims were massacred in Prozor two months ago. We
15 have the names of those criminals who did it. The same thing will -- some
16 same thing is happening or will happen in Gornji Vakuf," et cetera, et
17 cetera. And Owen says: "Okay. No withdrawal," meaning no subordination
18 of the Bosnian government army to the HVO.
19 Q. UN to monitor.
20 A. UN to monitor.
21 Q. And just to finish on this.
22 MR. SCOTT: And then, Your Honour, I suggest that we could take a
24 Q. But on that day and if I can direct you back to -- one moment,
25 please. Actually, if you'd turn down a couple of pages until you get to
1 page 4315. Again still on the 20th.
2 A. Mm-hmm.
3 Q. On the bottom right side of that page did you note any comments,
4 your personal comments, about that particular meeting?
5 A. Yes. The meeting ended at 4.05 p.m. You can see I draw a line
6 under it with a cross which is my fashion, and then I write "comment,"
7 which is my comment on what has gone before, and it reads: "Extremely
8 revealing meeting. Hostility level very high. Also invective.
9 Muslim-Croat alliance, cooperation, collaboration, next to non-existent.
10 Government and Presidency -- fig leaf, tiny and transparent." And then I
11 characterise the individual behaviour. If you would like me to read it, I
13 Q. Sure, we'll finish with that.
14 A. "Izetbegovic was composed, worried, in charge. Haris Silajdzic
15 unhelpful, delusional, lying. Pejanovic role playing, pretending to be
16 the honest broker. Akmadzic rigid, nervous, reading Boban's script.
17 Boras smooth and pseudo-conciliatory. Lasic tough, hates the Muslims."
18 And I made a note, a marginal note on the side where, if I may, I can read
19 that. It's three words.
20 Q. Go ahead.
21 A. I wrote in Russian because it was January 20th, I mentioned
22 President Clinton was being inaugurated, I wrote: "Clinton, be careful.
23 Clinton [B/C/S spoken]. Clinton, be careful." Because it was a
24 well-known fact that Clinton was going to be more interventionist in the
25 Yugoslav portfolio than the previous administration, and so I was
1 preparing to warn the administration that they were -- that they needed to
2 be careful.
3 Q. Thank you, Ambassador?
4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I think that's time for the break.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's time to have our break now.
6 We'll resume in 20 minutes' time.
7 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 4.08 p.m.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, please continue.
10 MR. SCOTT:
11 Q. Sir, if I can direct you to -- I don't think we're going to have
12 too many additional diary entries, but if I can ask you to go to Exhibit P
13 01275, 1275, another instalment, I think, of your diaries.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. If you find your entry for the -- your entries for the 23rd of
16 January, 1993. In particular I believe it's page 4331.
17 A. Mm-hmm.
18 Q. Already. If you have that, on the left side of the, again, page
19 of your journal you have summit meeting of the five delegations. Are we
20 on the same page?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. All right. Across from that -- well, did you just briefly set the
23 scene for us as to what was happening, what this meeting was?
24 A. Well, this was a very important, a major meeting. We've -- the
25 last session before the break here in the court you have gone through the
1 situation from the 15th to the 20th, the heavy fighting, the letters
2 between the Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, the unilateral order issued by
3 the defence minister, the -- President Izetbegovic's declaring it illegal
4 and that sort of thing, ending with the shouting match between Akmadzic
5 and Izetbegovic on January 20, that meeting that I -- that we just
6 finished with.
7 So given the inconclusive, not to say negative result of the
8 January 20 meeting between the three parties, we decided to bring in
9 formally the delegations, then the chiefs, from Croatia, from the Republic
10 of Croatia, and from the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
11 comprised Serbia and Montenegro, and they were all present and you can see
12 the delegations were headed the Bosnian Muslims, Izetbegovic; the Serb
13 Karadzic; Mate Boban in the chair for the Bosnian Croats, because
14 President Tudjman, since he had a delegation from Croatia, was there with
15 Susak, Radic, General Tus, who was the commander in chief of the armed
16 forces of the Republic of Croatia, an airman, General Tus, formally --
17 before Croatia declared independence he had been the commander of the air
18 force of the Yugoslav republic before he went to Croatia. And then for
19 the federal republic, you see Cosic, Milosevic. Dobrica Cosic was the
20 president of Yugoslavia at the time. Milosevic was the President of
21 Serbia at that time, so down the list.
22 Q. All right. Let me ask you again partly because of the limitations
23 of time, to go across the -- directly across the page, the right side, and
24 you make -- there are three items there, 1, 2, 3 attributed I believe to
25 Izetbegovic. Can you just read those Izetbegovic re: map. Read those
1 three items.
2 A. Yes, Izetbegovic says read the map we have five objections one we
3 cannot agree that the regions where ethnic cleansing took place could even
4 be temporarily under the control of the cleansers. It does not matter
5 that demilitarisation helps.
6 "2. Also, while the conference goes on, and I quote, he said the
7 aggression continues and is even intensifying." Sarajevo, Mostar,
8 Yugoslav artillery bombardment.
9 "3. Impossible to talk peace while the aggression continues."
10 Q. Is it fair to say that even by the 23rd of January then there
11 was -- there was no agreement -- among other things there was still no
12 agreement on the map?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And finally on this particular meeting if I can ask you to turn a
15 few pages down, about three or four pages further into the journal until
16 you find page 4334. Still on the 23rd of January. You begin a series of
17 minutes --
18 A. Mm-hmm.
19 Q. -- then at three -- 330, I believe. Further down that page you
20 have an item referenced it appears to be Izetbegovic. "Izetbegovic
21 questions whole exercise and says if it's ethnicity he'll quit." What was
22 that about?
23 A. Well, this was a subsidiary meeting to the large meeting, and
24 Martti Ahtissari was in the chair, as I've indicated, and he raised the
25 matter of province number and the border with 3 -- with 9 and 10.
1 Karadzic asks for more, meaning more land. Boban says he's satisfied with
2 the border as drawn, and that was no surprise since indeed we knew that
3 the Bosnian Croats were pleased with the map. Izetbegovic questions the
4 whole exercise and says if it's ethnicity he'll quit. It meant he'll
5 leave the talks if the ethnic principle becomes emphasised in the
6 provincial structure because, as I mentioned earlier it was not in the
7 provincial structure. It never was, actually. I gave you the figures of
8 the population of the three parties, roughly a third for all of them but
9 they were outside their provinces, et cetera, et cetera. So this was
10 always very much on the Muslim mind, because both the Bosnian Serbs and
11 the Bosnian Croats were emphasising the ethnic aspect.
12 Q. Very well. I think we have to go forward to another exhibit,
13 please. If I could ask you to turn to Exhibit P 01338. Just finishing up
14 on January, a couple of items. 1338. And indeed, Ambassador, this may
15 have been the additional document that -- that you were thinking of before
16 the break. I don't know if it is, but it might be.
17 This is a letter written from General Halilovic, dated the 28th of
18 January, 1993, to the head of the defence department of the Croatian
19 Community of Herceg-Bosna.
20 Can I just ask you to look at the second paragraph of his letter.
21 Read that to yourself. I'll just ask you a question or two about that.
22 A. Yes, I've read it.
23 Q. All right. Ambassador, similar to some of the questions I've
24 asked you earlier this afternoon about other exchanges of views or
25 correspondence between various parties, can you tell us in this particular
1 instance do you agree with or is General Halilovic's assessment or
2 analysis correct at least in this particular situation?
3 A. Yes, he's correct in what he states.
4 Q. And could I ask you next to go to Exhibit P 01329. One moment,
5 please. Actually, if you'll go to 1 -- excuse me a moment. Sorry. It's
6 1329. And can you just confirm, by the end of January 1993 whether in
7 fact a cease-fire was obtained in connection with the fighting that had
8 then broken out in January, and do you recall generally a cease-fire being
9 agreed by President Izetbegovic and Mate Boban around this time?
10 A. Well, it was agreed but it was never put into effect.
11 Q. All right. Also, can I ask you next to turn to Exhibit 1363.
12 That is P 01363. And can you tell us during this time, sir, were you and
13 Secretary Vance and Lord Owen and others continuing to try to negotiate
14 and bring the parties to agreement?
15 A. Yes. The negotiations indeed were more intense in January and
16 particularly in this period because of the fighting around Gornji Vakuf
17 and in Central Bosnia in general.
18 Q. All right. And if we look at Exhibit 1363, can you just tell us
19 what that is and what that indicates in terms of any further progress that
20 you had been able to accomplish by that time?
21 A. Well, the principal achievement that's set forth in that document
22 which, as you can see, is essentially the constitutional framework which
23 we've seen quite a lot of earlier --
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. -- the three sides agreed. It was signed by Izetbegovic,
1 Karadzic, and Mate Boban. So we had full agreement for the first time on
2 the constitutional principles.
3 Q. Earlier -- in an earlier version we saw that there had been 10
4 principles, and I note now there are only nine. Can you explain how that
5 came about?
6 A. Oh, one -- two were combined into one.
7 Q. Let me next ask you to go to P 01285. And, sir, I'd just like you
8 to read the first two paragraphs, number 1 and number 2 of this document,
9 which is an UNPROFOR -- it says "Subject special assessment, Croat
10 intentions for provinces 3, 8 and 10," dated the 24th of January, 1993.
11 And if you could again please read paragraphs 1 and 2.
12 A. Do you want me to lead them aloud or to myself.
13 Q. Read them aloud.
14 A. Paragraph 1: "Since the Geneva talks in early January, tensions
15 are steadily increased between elements of both the Croat HVO and the
16 principally Muslim army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) in Central and Southern
17 BH. Discord between their elements seems to occur," I can't quite see
18 that last word, "seems to surface," excuse me. "Discord between them
19 seems to surface every time the pressure from Bosnian Serb forces lulls
20 and is significantly related to ethnic perceptions of the peace plan."
21 Paragraph 2: "The tensions seem to be more severe in areas where
22 there is no clear majority of either ethnic group in a particular opstina.
23 This does not prevent areas like Prozor (majority Croat) or Jablanica
24 (majority Muslim) from experiencing the effects of ethnic turmoil. Over
25 the past week, the political and military leaders of the Croatian
1 Community of Herceg-Bosna have begun to implement their 'understanding' of
2 the proposed settlement for the conflict in BH. This premature and
3 imperfect grab for control of provinces 3, 8, and 10 has resulted in
4 extremely high tensions in these and adjoining areas, and heavy fighting
5 between Muslim and Croat units in and around Gornji Vakuf."
6 Q. And, sir, my question to you again is: As one of the architects
7 of the Vance-Owen Plan and what you saw happening at the time, would you
8 agree or disagree with the assessment stated in this UNPROFOR report?
9 A. It's precisely correct in every point.
10 Q. Can you tell us, sir, is it correct that the negotiations
11 continued on into February and toward the latter part of March 1993?
12 A. Well, they continued until May 1993, so, yes, they certainly
13 continued in February and March, yes.
14 Q. All right. And we are going to come momentarily to the -- in
15 fact, we are there now, to the 25th of March, 1993, and was there
16 substantial further progress made or accomplished as of the 25th or 26th
17 of March, 1993?
18 A. Yes. March 25 was an important date because following the
19 revisions to the plan during January, February, and March, on March 25
20 Izetbegovic signed all three sections of the plan on behalf of the Bosnian
21 government. That is to say he agreed with the map, which had been altered
22 since January. He agreed to the military arrangements, and he agreed to
23 the constitutional principles.
24 Q. So, finally, is it correct to say that you then had the signatures
25 or agreement of two of the three parties to the various parts of the
1 Vance-Owen package?
2 A. That is correct. I should also add, however, that Izetbegovic's
3 agreement and signature was heavily qualified and conditioned.
4 Q. Can you give the Chamber some sense of that? Qualified or
5 conditioned in what ways?
6 A. Oh, they were the usual Izetbegovic style, complaining about this
7 or that and if the aggressor does this, we'll do that. It was no
9 Q. I think we will have -- I think some of his correspondence or
10 conditions or statements in the documents that --
11 A. They are in the documents. You can read the conditions.
12 Q. All right. You said a moment ago that there had been -- by the
13 end of March there had been changes in the map. Can you briefly -- I
14 don't know how many, but perhaps the most significant changes you recall
15 in the map at that time?
16 A. Yes, there was one significant change, and that was, if I may
17 draw, your attention --
18 Q. Actually -- sorry, Ambassador, if I can interrupt you for a
19 second. My apology. If I can ask you to look a be if you still have
20 available to you Exhibit P 09841 which was your map of the regions on
21 the -- I think I see it probably on the bottom of everything this. The
22 one we were looking at earlier today.
23 A. You've given me a lot of paper, Counsel.
24 Q. I have. I have a habit of doing that.
25 A. So I notice.
1 Q. If you have in front of you, and I see that you do, P 09841, can
2 you indicate for the Judges on that map any significant changes that had
3 been made to the map by the end of March?
4 A. Yes, the one significant change is in the upper right-hand corner
5 of the map between provinces 3 and 4 and 5. You will recall that the
6 original Vance-Owen map of January did not have that finger that goes
7 in -- of green that -- can I point it out somehow?
8 Q. Not unless we put to be the ELMO?
9 A. Never mind.
10 Q. Yes, we can put it on the ELMO. Either way.
11 A. What the new map did was give the Muslims access to the Sava
12 River, thereby breaking the Serb corridor.
13 Q. You may be able to indicate for us now, if the technology works
15 A. Ah, yes. There it is. That's the new area. The Serb corridor
16 was the most sensitive military area as far as General Mladic and the
17 Serbs were concerned because it connected Belgrade to Banja Luka, and the
18 original map had already broken the corridor by province 3, a Croat
19 majority province. But the Bosnian Muslims were concerned about
20 Croat-Serb collusion, so they wanted their own break in the corridor, and
21 that's the area I coloured in, which gave them access to the Sava River.
22 Q. All right. And before we move off of this exhibit and then we'll
23 ask that the document as marked be given an IC number, but before we do
24 that can I ask you about one other change to the map and looking at the
25 map? If you look at province number 7, and that's the Sarajevo province;
1 is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Is it correct, sir, that by the end of March 1993, Vares, Visoko,
4 Breza, and part of Kakanj had been moved out of the Muslim province number
5 9 and placed instead in Sarajevo province 7?
6 A. Yes. They were taken because of Bosnian Croat concerns, as I've
7 indicated earlier when I misspoke and said Serb, you'll recall I mentioned
8 that the Bosnian Croats had a deep and abiding affection for Vares because
9 of the bishopric. So it was moved by us from a Muslim majority province
10 to the Sarajevo province, which, as I mentioned earlier, required
11 consensus on all decisions.
12 Q. Very well.
13 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, could we have a -- when a print of this
14 marked version of this can be made it's based on P 09841 but if a new
15 exhibit an IC number can be given to that, please.
16 THE WITNESS: Would you like me to mark it --
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A number, please.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be received in e-court as
19 IC 521.
20 THE WITNESS: Sort of -- that's roughly the ...
21 MR. SCOTT:
22 Q. I see for the record you've marked over red that encompasses the
23 area we talked about, Vares, and some parts of Kakanj that you've marked
24 on the map?
25 A. Yes it's an approximate marking, you understand. I'm not a
2 Q. Very well. If we've done, if we've accomplished all that, please
3 can I then ask you to go to Exhibit P 01398 [Realtime transcript read in
4 error "03198"].
5 A. Mm-hmm. Yes, I have it.
6 Q. I'll just represent for the record, sir, and perhaps you can just
7 confirm, this is a packet of Security Council official records covering
8 certain materials for January, February, March 1993, and if I can ask you
9 to turn in that document until you get to what would be using the pages
10 that are actually on the document. Although they're not all continuous,
11 but if you get to page 276 from the bottom of the page. Let me know when
12 you have that, please.
13 A. Yes, I have it now.
14 Q. On page 276 the document, the Security Council document S/25479
15 begins and continues then on for some pages, and can you confirm for the
16 Judges that what is set out as document -- UN document S/25479 is a set of
17 the Vance-Owen proposals or plan as it existed on the 26th of March as
18 signed by Izetbegovic and also agreed by Mate Boban?
19 A. Did you mean S/25479 or 76?
20 Q. 79, please. On page 2 -- on page 276 on the right side of the
22 A. Ah, yes. I see it. Excuse me. Yes, that is the document. You
23 note its date, dated 26 March 1993. That is one day after President
24 Izetbegovic signed the complete Vance-Owen Plan.
25 Q. All right. Now, sir, because of the time I'm going to -- we're
1 going to begin to press forward a bit harder because we're going to need
2 to conclude before too much longer. Can I ask -- yes, Your Honour?
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me Mr. Scott.
4 MR. SCOTT: Yes.
5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The record speaks of a document number 03198.
6 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. That's the exhibit number.
7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It's not 1398?
8 MR. SCOTT: Yes, 01398.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ah-huh. But it says 003 and something. So one
10 goes looking for something that one doesn't have. I'm sorry.
11 MR. SCOTT: I apologise, Your Honour. I was not -- frankly I'm
12 not paying that much attention to the monitor I didn't see that, but
13 you're absolutely right. That is the exhibit -- the proper Exhibit number
14 for the record is P 01398.
15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
16 MR. SCOTT: Sorry for that.
17 Q. In that packet, starting at page 276, is the UN document, again
18 for the record, S, as in Susan, /25479?
19 A. Yes, I have.
20 Q. Sir, can I ask you for the purposes that -- this afternoon, can I
21 ask you to go to page 280, page 280, and section that is titled E
22 withdrawal of forces.
23 A. Yes. This is the text of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.
24 Q. And once again can you just read that section out loud, please.
25 A. Yes. It reads: "Sarajevo Province shall be immediately
1 demilitarised. All Serb forces shall withdraw into Provinces 2, 4 and 6;
2 HVO (Croatian Defence Council) forces into Province 3; Bosnian army forces
3 into Province 1. Both Bosnian army and HVO forces shall be deployed in
4 Provinces 5, 8, 9 and 10 under arrangements agreed between them. The
5 process of demilitarisation shall apply to it all forces in all these nine
6 provinces, and shall be carried out under the supervision of UNPROFOR and
7 in accordance with the detailed arrangements and timetables in the
8 Agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or as negotiated in the
9 Mixed Military Working Group."
10 Q. And, sir, can you just simply confirm for us that that is indeed
11 everything that the Vance-Owen Plan as of the end of March 1993 as agreed
12 by Izetbegovic, is that everything it says about the withdrawal of forces
13 in provinces 5, 8, 9 and 10?
14 A. Yes. That is everything that the Vance-Owen Plan explicitly said,
15 and it so remained through May. It was never changed thereafter.
16 Q. All right. Let me just ask you to briefly look at a joint
17 statement which is marked as Exhibit P 01738. And --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And can you just confirm for us that it was essentially a
20 statement or a declaration made by President Izetbegovic and President
21 Franjo Tudjman essentially confirming the agreement that we've been
22 talking about in the last few minutes and extending their hopes, et
23 cetera, in support for moving forward with the agreement?
24 A. Yes. Yes.
25 Q. Now, let's me turn -- ask you to look next to 1792, P 01792. And
1 did you come to know, you and Secretary Vance and Lord Owen, come to know
2 around this time that subsequent to the signature of the Vance-Owen Plan
3 by President Izetbegovic or around the 26th, the 25th the 26th of March
4 1993 that the Bosnian Croats then proposed that a further statement be
5 signed by President Izetbegovic?
6 A. We were aware of that, and we were also aware that Izetbegovic
7 never signed it. He did not agree with it.
8 Q. And if I can ask you to look at the document which again is P
9 01792. Can you again confirm to us that as far as you know
10 President Izetbegovic never signed this statement proposed by Mate Boban?
11 A. I'm certain he never signed it. Because in addition, extremely
12 heavy fighting and ethnic cleansing by the HVO began in April.
13 Q. In that connection, can I next ask you to go to P 01798. Sir,
14 this is a record of an HVO meeting on the 3rd of April, 1993, and again I
15 just want to point some passages to you and ask for your reaction to them.
16 You will see as you turn to the -- if you go to page 2 of the
17 minutes toward the bottom of that page there's a paragraph that stays:
18 "Until the republic is fully demilitarised." Do you see that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. At the end of that it says the statement was signed by Mr. Mate
21 Boban and its integral text reads as follows," and then does it
22 essentially and if you need if you'd like or if you've had a chance before
23 to compare the text that set out in the minutes to the joint statement
24 proposed by Mr. Boban that we were just looking at, Exhibit P 01792, did
25 the minutes essentially set out that joint statement?
1 A. I haven't compared them, but I would assume, and I think pretty
2 safely, that it -- being -- it was a document, that it would quote the
3 earlier Bosnian Croat document accurately, the one that Izetbegovic never
5 Q. All right. Very well. And there will be -- if anyone chooses to
6 compare them in the courtroom there will be the opportunity to do so.
7 Again, paragraph number 3 of both the joint statement that we
8 looked at a moment ago, the proposed -- the proposed joint statement which
9 was never joint, and paragraph number 3 on page 2 again talks about the
10 armed forces of the ABiH in regions number 3, 8 and 10 being put under the
11 control of the Main Staff of the HVO. Do you see that? Paragraph number
13 A. On page 2?
14 Q. I'm sorry. Page 3, if I misspoke.
15 A. Oh, sorry. Yes, I see it. Paragraph 3.
16 Q. And do you see again in both the joint statement and in the text
17 of the minutes the date being -- the date being called for was 15 April
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. If I can direct your attention further down the page. After item
21 number 6: "The HVO HZ HB hopes that because of the enormous importance of
22 the statement Mr. Alija Izetbegovic will sign this document because it is
23 yet further evidence of a desire for peace, which everybody wants."
24 And then finally the next two paragraph -- last paragraph on page
25 3 and the first paragraph on page 4. Perhaps you could read those two
1 paragraphs for us?
2 A. The last two paragraphs?
3 Q. Yes, the last paragraph on the bottom of page 3 and the first
4 paragraph on the top of page 4.
5 A. The last paragraph at the bottom of page 3 reads: "At this
6 meeting, the HVO HZ HB adopted the position that if the aforementioned
7 statement is not signed by the leaders of the Muslim delegations in
8 provinces numbers 3, 8, and 10, then the basic premise in the peace plan
9 which states that all ethnic armed forces have to withdraw to their
10 domicile provinces should apply."
11 The next paragraph reads: "If the joint statement is not
12 implemented, the appropriate military and other authorities of the HVO HZ
13 HB shall implement this provision of the Basic Document of the peace plan
14 in regions number 3, 8, and 10. At the same time, the HVO HZ HB will
15 respect the jurisdiction of the authorities in the provinces predominantly
16 populated by the two other peoples."
17 And before I ask you a couple of questions about that, can I ask
18 you to first go to Exhibit P 09519. It should be at the back of the
19 bundle you're in I'm told. P 09519.
20 A. Yes, I have it.
21 Q. Sir, this is an article that was published in the newspaper
22 Slobodna Dalmacija on the 4th of April, 1993, and I would just like you
23 again to look at it long enough to see does this article essentially then
24 set out basically the same information as was set out in the minutes of
25 the HVO meeting and again encompassing in part the draft joint statement
1 that Mr. Izetbegovic never signed?
2 A. Yes, a quick perusal reveals that this is a description of the
4 Q. And the beginning of the article, just to put this in context
5 says: "'Mostar at its session on Saturday the Croatian Defence Council of
6 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna reviewed the documents of the peace
7 plan which was signed by the representatives of the Croatian and the
8 Muslim people in BH,' announced the press department of the Croatian
9 Community of Herceg-Bosna." So that was something like a press release, I
10 take it, press statement?
11 A. I would think so.
12 Q. Now, on this point, sir, can you just tell us again the course of
13 action outlined in the HVO minutes, including the paragraph that you read
14 out loud to us a couple of moments ago, did the Vance-Owen Peace Plan at
15 any time contemplate unilateral efforts to enforce that plan without
17 A. No. Nothing like that was ever contemplated or written in the
18 Vance-Owen Peace Plan. We have read appendix section E, which set forth
19 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan very clearly, and there is nothing about the --
20 this kind of action in it.
21 Q. And can you just tell the Judges briefly as we're coming to the
22 final set of questions here, did you and Secretary Vance and Lord Owen,
23 did you become aware around mid-April 1993, in fact, a major armed
24 conflict then broke out between the Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia
25 and Herzegovina?
1 A. Yes, we did, and it was widely known throughout the world. The
2 press covered it extensively. Television pictures were shown on CNN, BBC,
3 particularly concerning the HVO depredations in Central Bosnia, and it
4 reached the United Nations, which issued statements and -- condemning the
5 Bosnian Croat action.
6 Q. If I can ask you to go to Exhibit P 01983. And this is a UN
7 document, and can you just simply confirm that this records for UN
8 purposes a statement that was made by President Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban
9 on the 18th of April following the outbreak of that conflict?
10 A. Yes. This was the, I must say, typical protestations of peaceful
11 intent signed by the parties.
12 Q. Why do you say you must say typical protestations?
13 A. Because we would see over and over again, particularly Mate Boban
14 and the Bosnian Croats, declaring their fielty to Bosnia-Herzegovina,
15 their love of peace, their willingness to live in multi-ethnic societies,
16 but the action, of the HVO, the army on the ground, belied those
18 Q. Ambassador, could I ask you next please to go to P 02059.
19 A. I have it.
20 Q. This is again a record of a meeting at President Tudjman's offices
21 in Zagreb on the 24th of April, 1993. Again on the first page we have
22 President Tudjman welcoming various people to the meeting, including a
23 delegation -- well, delegations led by Lord Owen, Mr. Izetbegovic, and
24 Mate Boban. And can I ask you to turn to page 11, please, of that
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And starting at page 11, Izetbegovic after a comment by Franjo
3 Tudjman, and then he essentially gives the floor to Mr. Izetbegovic and
4 says and then -- and then Mr. Boban will have the floor. Alija
5 Izetbegovic says: "Ladies and gentlemen, I agree with President Tudjman.
6 This is obviously a political issue. For me it presents itself in the
7 following way: Do Croatia, the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian
8 Defence Council want the Vance-Owen Plan honestly and fully by the spirit
9 and by the letter? I said by the spirit and by the letter.
10 "My impression is that they do not. I'll explain why. As it is
11 known we signed this plan with a lot of hesitations, reservations, and
12 difficulties. It was very difficult for us to decide to put our sit on
13 that plan."
14 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, with great respect, this has absolutely
15 no probative value whatsoever for Mr. Scott to be reading statements said
16 to express the thoughts of Mr. Izetbegovic and is probably going to ask
17 the witness to somehow confirm it. I don't think there's been any showing
18 the witness was at this meeting and it's really completely improper.
19 MR. SCOTT:
20 Q. Well, Ambassador, can you confirm your presence at this meeting
21 with Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen?
22 A. I don't think Mr. Vance was there, was he?
23 Q. He may not have been. My apology. He was referring -- I was
24 looking at the reference to Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen. If you would like to
25 check your diary?
1 A. I would have to check my diary.
2 Q. In light of the question that's been raised, please do.
3 MR. MURPHY: My objection is far broader than that. It is to the
4 witness being asked to listen while Mr. Scott reads what the -- the
5 thoughts of Mr. Izetbegovic, as if they were evidence in this case and had
6 some probative value.
7 MR. SCOTT: Well Your Honour, my intention was to do what I have
8 done previously yesterday and today, and this is a man who knows the
9 course of these negotiations, knows the Vance-Owen Plan I suspect
10 certainly better than anyone in this room, and can give his views on
11 whether it was properly being applied and implemented at this time or not
12 as he has been doing throughout his testimony.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Trial Chamber
14 will rule, but Mr. Praljak is on his feet.
15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I'd just like to remind
16 you --
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, only if it concerns
19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] This concerns procedure
21 When there was a protected witness, a High Representative of the
22 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna here and he was to be asked about
23 refugees, and he was far more involved with the Croatian people than
24 Ambassador is and he knew far more about other people's thoughts, then the
25 Judges told me that I couldn't put such questions to the witness, that
1 this was beyond the scope of the witness's knowledge from Vares. The
2 subject matter we are dealing with here is far broader. No one is
3 reacting, so I would like to inform of the fact that I feel confused by
4 this since the accused and the Defence are not being treated in an
5 identical manner.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ambassador, in order for the
7 Judges to be quite clear about the objection, the Prosecution has shown
8 you this document, 2059. It concerns a meeting that was attended by Lord
9 Owen, Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Izetbegovic, and Mr. Mate Boban. The meeting
10 started at 2055 hours. Were you yourself present at that meeting?
11 THE WITNESS: I do not recall, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm putting this question to you
13 because the Prosecution, on page 11 of the minutes of this meeting,
14 referred to what Mr. Izetbegovic said, and, if you were present, the
15 Prosecutor can ask you whether what we can see on paper was actually said
16 or not, but you have just told us you're not sure whether you were present
17 at the meeting.
18 MR. SCOTT: Could I ask the --
19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Sorry, I have --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Judge Trechsel, please.
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes, it's on.
22 Mr. Okun, I have your diary in front of me. It is page, I think,
23 4543, and you account the whole day, and then there is 7.20 to 8.30 p.m.,
24 dinner with Tudjman and others, and then it does not go on. The next page
25 is 9 -- oh, yes. Then it is 9.00 p.m. to 11.10 p.m. Croatia/BH meeting,
1 and there you seem to have been present.
2 THE WITNESS: Well, in answer to your question, Judge Antonetti,
3 and I apologise for not recalling directly whether I was present at this
4 meeting in 1993, but I thank the Judge, I was present.
5 MR. SCOTT: I believe it's in -- in e-court. If people care to,
6 and it may not be necessity point, but if people care to in Exhibit --
7 which diary is this?
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott, the
9 witness was there, so you may ask your questions because he may or may not
10 remember. We, the Judges, don't know what he will say, but since he was
11 there, you may continue and ask your questions.
12 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. I believe I left off approximately on page 12 at the second --
14 well, the third paragraph, I suppose, beginning on that page that says:
15 "Our impression." I'm not sure exactly, to be honest, and the transcript
16 has moved on, but let's start there.
17 "Our impression is that the HVO and the Republic of Croatia do not
18 want the Vance-Owen Plan as it stands.
19 "First of all, we accepted this plan because we thought that
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina could not contain some exclusively ethnic and
21 national territories, because it is a mixed country.
22 "Its basic problem is that it is an ethnically mixed country.
23 "Judging by the HVO actions, they understood this plan in a
24 completely different manner. Despite the fact that under the mediation of
25 Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen, we have signed a document, an agreement, whose
1 first item explicitly says that the provinces are not national territories
2 of any one of the peoples, who cannot lay claim to it only for themselves.
3 If we have signed this ...
4 "The second item of our agreement says that the symbols of Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina will be respected and will also be displayed in the
6 Travnik and Mostar provinces.
7 "In other words, Herceg-Bosna as a state entity, as a type of
8 state entity, could not exist after the signing of the Vance-Owen Plan.
9 "During talks with Mr. Owen, I heard several times that this was
10 only a temporary solution until the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
11 solved, that Herceg-Bosna was a temporary solution until some other
12 solution was found. In our opinion the Vance-Owen Plan offered a
13 permanent solution. However, after that Herceg-Bosna began to assert
14 itself even more and impose itself by force. The Mostar and Travnik
15 provinces were called Croatian provinces. The conflict in Travnik began
16 when one morning all of Travnik was decorated with Croatian flags. So we
17 have nothing against the Croatian flag, but the flag of Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina should also have been displayed. So by signing the Vance-Owen
19 Plan as we thought" -- excuse me -- "we thought we had finally solved the
20 issue of the equality of the Croatian and Muslim peoples in these
21 provinces which are now under the control of the HVO and the Bosnian army.
22 "Instead, throughout the territory of Herceg-Bosna, the Muslim
23 people continued to be disempowered. We expected that power-sharing would
24 be the first thing of the Vance-Owen Plan that would be implemented in
25 accordance with the envisaged ratios.
1 "When people from Herzegovina asked us what our motives were to
2 sign the Vance-Owen Plan, we told them, please, this is a way for you to
3 finally participate in government because for a long time the Muslim
4 people, some people in Herzegovina, in Mostar, in some places around
5 Travnik, had not participated in government.
6 "The conflict erupted because only Croatian authority began to be
7 implemented in the Mostar and Travnik provinces."
8 Ambassador, I'm going to stop there. As I've asked you at other
9 times this afternoon, again as an architect of the Vance-Owen Plan and
10 what you observed and the interpretations and the implementation, the
11 attempted implementation of this plan, what is your reaction to
12 President Izetbegovic's comments?
13 MR. KARNAVAS: I think at this point, Your Honour, I will object.
14 First of all, there's no foundation as to what Izetbegovic is saying that
15 this gentleman knows directly from being on the ground. The fact that he
16 was present when this was said doesn't mean that it's absolutely so. In
17 other words, he cannot offer this -- you know, this is hearsay, obviously,
18 today. We don't have Mr. Izetbegovic. Had he been here or if he was here
19 with us, we could cross-examine him. So it is a violation of our right of
20 confrontation, number one.
21 Number two, the gentleman does not know firsthand of these facts.
22 The fact that he was told of these facts doesn't actually mean that these
23 events as they're being described by Mr. Izetbegovic actually occurred as
24 they're being described. I think the document speaks for itself. I think
25 now to ask this gentleman whether he can vouch for, vouch for the
1 authenticity and the reliability and the truthfulness for what
2 Mr. Izetbegovic is saying is a bit of a stretch.
3 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, my reaction is to that, number one,
4 whether Mr. Izetbegovic is available or not is completely beside the
5 point. It has -- has absolutely no bearing on this question at all.
6 There are all sorts of documents and records that come in before the
7 Chamber where the author or speaker is not before the Chamber. That has
8 no significance whatsoever.
9 Secondly, what I've asked the Ambassador to do as to those
10 portions of what I've just read where Mr. Izetbegovic talks about the
11 implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan, about power sharing, about mixed
12 governments, about them not being national provinces, my question to him
13 is whether that -- those statements, those characterisations of the
14 Vance-Owen Plan are proper, and he -- no one more than Mr. -- Ambassador
15 Okun can confirm that.
16 THE WITNESS: May I answer?
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I -- may I just add a point? Maybe it would
18 be helpful for the Defence if they looked at the journal, at the diary of
19 the witness where in essence the text that Mr. Scott has read out finds an
20 echo which -- which is, I think, at least prima facie evidence that the
21 witness actually heard Mr. Izetbegovic, and he certainly has a view of
22 whether what he heard there translates the spirit, the idea of the VOPP or
23 not. It calls for his view on what he heard and noted. I do not
24 understand why it should not be -- okay.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: If -- if we're asking the gentleman to now opine on
1 whether Mr. Izetbegovic, his understanding of the VOPP, is correct, then
2 obviously as being one of the architects he can say yes or he can say no
3 or whatever. If that is the narrow nature of if. If on the other hand he
4 is being asked because there was a long list of reading that occurred, if
5 he is asked to opine and authenticate and vouch for those events that's
6 where I draw the line.
7 Now, if the question was rephrase and narrowed, I don't have an
8 objection and I concur with you.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: So we are in harmony. This is a rare moment.
10 Let's cherish it.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Judge Trechsel. Indeed.
13 Q. Sir I think you know -- Ambassador I think you know the
14 outstanding question. If you can answer that please?
15 A. Yes, I can answer the question and I thank the Judge for calling
16 attention to my journal entry which was contemporaneous. It was written
17 as Izetbegovic was speaking on April 24th, 1993.
18 This is what he said. It's in the diary. As the Judge said, it's
19 echoed in the diary. That's point one.
20 Point two is that the description of the plan given by President
21 Izetbegovic is correct.
22 Q. Thank you, Ambassador. Sir, I have one final exhibit for you to
23 look at and then one or two final questions, and then we will be concluded
24 with this part of your examination. Could I ask you to look at Exhibit P
25 02078. 2078.
1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] While --
2 MR. SCOTT: 2078.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.
4 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] While this is being done, I
5 don't know how the Prosecutor has not noticed this. In the joint
6 statement, it says in the preamble of this document that the gentleman did
7 attend this meeting.
8 MR. SCOTT:
9 Q. Do you have the exhibit, sir, 2078? Do you have the exhibit?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. All right. And, sir, do you recall that around this time there
12 were further -- after, again, the break -- the breakout of the -- of a
13 major conflict when the Croats, the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
14 mid-April 1993, there were -- there was an additional meeting or series of
15 meetings in Zagreb, and I think if you look at this page the people are
16 listed including yourself on the top part. Do you see that?
17 A. Mm-hmm. I see it.
18 Q. Could you tell us briefly about that meeting, the outcome?
19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Please, Your Honours. We
20 can't base our questions on the statement, there was a large conflict
21 between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina? We don't know what area we are talking about. Was
23 there a conflict between the HVO and anybody else at that particular point
24 in time?
25 MR. SCOTT: If Mr. Praljak would take the time to look at the text
1 of the document itself, it's quite clear that President Tudjman and
2 President Izetbegovic and the others knew what they were -- apparently
3 knew what they were talking about when they talk about in paragraph 3 and
4 following about the violations of humanitarian law and the crimes
5 committed by all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1993. So contrary
6 to Mr. Praljak, apparently Mr. Tudjman and others knew what they were
7 talking about.
8 Q. Sir, can you tell us about this meeting that occurred on around
9 the 24th of April, 1993?
10 A. I would prefer to compare it with my diary entry of that date.
11 Q. If you're able to do that, if you have it available. If you know
12 which -- just a moment and I see if I can find it.
13 A. My diary is 2.000 pages long. I don't have it at my fingertips.
14 Q. I will try to assist you if you tell me which -- it's in e-court?
15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Honourable Judge.
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I know. I pressed the button. Yes. Now it
17 should work.
18 It is the pages preceding 4545. It must be 45 --
19 MR. SCOTT: For the record, Exhibit P 01772. If we can go in
20 e-court to page 60 of that document in e-court. I believe you'll have it
21 and the Ambassador will be able to look at it either on the screen or if
22 he has it.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that General Petkovic
24 wanted to intervene.
25 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you very
1 much. I would like to remind everybody that the transcript that was read
2 out to the witness was actually a conversation that was held on that
3 evening in Zagreb and that the Ambassador attended it, and the conclusion
4 does not arise from a different meeting. These conclusions arise from
5 those conversations. The transcript was the conversation which took place
6 in Zagreb. I attended it and the Ambassador did, and after that
7 conversation a joint statement was issued. We're not talking about two
8 different documents or two different meetings. We are talking about just
9 one meeting and this is the statement that arises from that meeting which
10 has a military annex that we signed. This meeting happened on the 24th in
11 the evening, and we're not talking about two different meetings. The
12 meeting took place on the 24th. The transcript says what was said at the
13 meeting and the conclusion -- conclusions are summarised in the statement.
14 I was there and the gentleman was there.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for this
17 MR. SCOTT: Apparently there is no dispute about it and
18 Mr. Petkovic has also authenticated the document, which the Prosecution
19 appreciates, his assistance.
20 Q. So, sir, if you have your diary in front of you?
21 A. I don't.
22 Q. On the screen. If you look on the screen we can pull up the
23 relevant page and if you want to look at it for a moment. I don't know
24 that it's apparently in dispute now that, once again, various of the
25 accused have confirmed the existence and the statement issued as the
1 result of the meeting?
2 A. Yes, I remember this meeting. It was a very emotional meeting.
3 It was heated. It was understandably very argumentative meeting because
4 the fighting was continuing and indeed was escalating between the HVO and
5 government army, and you can see in my diary written at the time, and I
6 noted the times, at 10- or 15-minute intervals, I note on the left in
7 parentheses at one point Mr. Izetbegovic speaking excitedly, Mate Boban
8 interrupting, Izetbegovic still it excited, accusingly, et cetera. It was
9 a very, very disputatious meeting, and it was called, that is to say the
10 purpose of it, the reason we wanted to bring Tudjman, President Tudjman,
11 and Izetbegovic together was to see if it was possible in the presence of
12 President Tudjman to end this escalating violence, because it wasn't
13 enough that Mate Boban would give his agreement even if he kept it,
14 because we needed in many of the matters concerning the Bosnian Croats,
15 the person who was in charge was President Tudjman.
16 Q. And was the statement that the joint statement that is marked as
17 Exhibit P 02078, to your recollection, issued or publicised as a result at
18 the conclusion of this meeting?
19 A. I don't know the exact degree to which it was publicized in the
20 Muslim or Croatian press, but it was issued and it was not obeyed.
21 Q. And finally sir on the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, signing -- perhaps
22 was the peace plan ever fully agreed? Did the parties ever agree and was
23 there ever any final agreement and implementation of the Vance-Owen Peace
25 A. No. We're now at the end of April. This was also a difficult
1 period because the Bosnian Serbs were continuing their attacks at a
2 much -- at a much reduced level, which is what allowed the HVO to start
3 the ethnic cleansing again in Central Bosnia, but the Bosnian Serbs,
4 Karadzic, Koljevic, Krajisnik, continued to be completely recalcitrant
5 vis-a-vis the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.
6 Lord Owen and I met just about this time, at the end of April, in
7 Belgrade with President Milosevic who called Karadzic to come to the
8 meeting. Karadzic was not there when it started, and the discussion of
9 Milosevic and Karadzic and Lord Owen and myself concerned the effort, very
10 strong effort on our part, to get Karadzic to agree. He was recalcitrant.
11 He made various false statements, as was his want. Secretary Vance was
12 then in New York attending to other business, and at one point during this
13 meeting it was asked that we call Secretary Vance to get his view directly
14 on a certain point that I had made, and we did so. We called Secretary
15 Vance. He came on the line. He spoke to Milosevic and us and Karadzic,
16 and he agreed with what I had said, but you can see the intensity of the
17 meeting, of the effort to bring the Serbs on board by this fact.
18 Well, Milosevic, incidentally, whether honestly or not, one never
19 knew with Milosevic, was arguing in favour of Bosnian Serb adherence to
20 the Vance-Owen Plan. In any case, the meeting ended in inconclusively.
21 But a few days later the Greek Foreign Minister called us in Geneva and
22 said he would like to convene a large meeting of foreign ministers, our
23 group, others as well, in Athens to pressure Karadzic and the Bosnian
24 Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. That meeting took place on May
25 2, 1993. I was there, of course, and it was a long day, but Karadzic had
1 already decided that he would sign with one condition. So Karadzic did
2 sign all three parts of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan on May 2nd, 1993, in
3 Athens in our presence.
4 Champagne was handed out afterwards. A celebratory luncheon was
5 held, but the delegates who were not involved, who had not dealt with
6 Radovan Karadzic, did not pay much attention to the fact that his one
7 condition on signing the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was that it had to be
8 approved by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, that his approval was not final.
9 And so two weeks later, the Bosnian Serb Assembly met and rejected the
10 plan, and that was the end of it.
11 Q. Ambassador, I want to thank you for coming to The Hague once again
12 and giving your evidence. I want to thank you also for the service that
13 you performed during this time in 1992 and 1993, and wish you a continued
14 good stay here in The Hague. Thank you.
15 A. Thank you.
16 MR. SCOTT: No further questions, Your Honour.
17 Questioned by the Court:
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ambassador, just a brief
19 question from you as a result of the intervention by General Petkovic. In
20 the last document, which is a joint statement, you were there. Your name
21 appears on the document. As far as I could understand, the meeting
22 started in the evening at 20.55. Then there were statements by the
23 parties. We heard what President Izetbegovic said because the Prosecutor
24 has read it out loud to us. It seems on the basis of this document that
25 the -- the participants in the meeting had been given that text. There
1 was a break at 23.10 for an hour, and then the meeting continued at 10
2 minutes after midnight, and the document was signed 45 minutes after
3 the -- after midnight, and the meeting ended 10 minutes before 1.00, and
4 as far as I could understand from General Petkovic, this document was the
5 result of the meeting at which you had discussed the wording of this
7 Is that the fact? Is this what you remember about this meeting?
8 According to the documents that we have before us, it seems as a result of
9 the meeting that there was a joint stating by the three signatories,
10 Mr. Boban, Mr. Izetbegovic, and it was signed in the presence of
11 President Tudjman, who was there as a witness. In reality, this is a
12 joint statement by Mr. Boban and Mr. Izetbegovic in the presence of
13 President Tudjman. Is this how you remember this meeting to have taken
14 place? Is this, what I have just said, a good reflection of the course of
15 the meeting?
16 A. Yes, Your Honour, it is. The statement, and you correctly pointed
17 out the break in the meeting, the statement was not drafted or co-drafted
18 by us. It was essentially President Tudjman's chair, the meeting of Boban
19 and Izetbegovic, and it was the three of those gentlemen who developed the
20 statement, and it was precisely in that break period that you alluded to.
21 So General Petkovic is correct. This is what emerged from the
22 meeting of Boban, Izetbegovic, with President Tudjman, and there was a --
23 that was the small meeting within the larger meeting, as you surmised.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: As we are speak -- as we are speaking about this,
1 may I refer to your diary page 4548. That is the final page on the text
2 and perhaps it can be put on the e-court. It's just actually three pages
3 down. There you -- you also write down these moments in time.
4 A. Excuse me, Your Honour, I don't have that.
5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: No, it's coming up.
6 A. Oh, sorry.
7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: On the left side. And you see now on this break
8 you comment a drafting exercise, useless. Did you write that before the
9 next entry or would you like to comment on this?
10 A. Well, we were at the same table, so there was drafting with us,
11 but it was -- with us at the table it didn't work. It -- they got a
12 statement of the -- of the three, because you see afterwards at midnight,
13 and the arguing is continuing, but at the same time they -- President
14 Tudjman got them to agree to a statement.
15 At this point, as Judge Antonetti pointed out, it was close to
16 1.00 a.m. in the morning, and people were -- were ready to sign a
17 statement to go home.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I understand you correctly, at 11 -- at 12.15
19 you were still of the opinion that this would never work out, and then,
20 after all, somehow it did.
21 A. It did.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
23 A. President Tudjman was a very persuasive man.
24 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Sir, I would like to go back to the
25 place and the role played by President Tudjman in these negotiations. In
1 the transcript of this meeting that took place on the 25th of April, he
2 signed as a witness to this agreement between Mr. Boban and President
3 Izetbegovic. Yesterday, you told us that he was not the head of the
4 Croatian delegation of the Croats from Bosnia. Today in the transcript,
5 on page 68, line 15, you have told us that President Tudjman was in charge
6 of the Bosnian Croats and all the while you were answering President
7 Antonetti's question you kept repeating that he chaired that meeting.
8 My question to you is this: You attended that meeting. Would you
9 say that during those negotiations and during this conflict the effective
10 role of President Tudjman had somehow evolved and turned into something
11 else? What was his role? What was his position?
12 A. President Tudjman was president of the Republic of Croatia, a
13 recognised state, a member of the United Nations, a man with whom we had
14 close relations, Secretary Vance and I, because we had worked closely with
15 him already in 1991 during the Serb attack on Croatia. At the same time,
16 he was the dominant figure as far as the Bosnian Croats were concerned.
17 He had no formal title in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but there was no doubt who
18 gave the orders to Mate Boban.
19 You may recall at a meeting we discussed yesterday, Judge,
20 President Tudjman at one point says, and Boban is sitting there, I think,
21 about the extension of the term by Alija Izetbegovic as president,
22 remember in December 1992 he was supposed to turn over the Presidency on a
23 rotational basis to a Bosnian Croat member of the Bosnian Presidency, and
24 President Tudjman says, "Well, you know, Boban objected," words to that
25 effect, "they should have done it, but I told Boban it was okay." "I
1 recommended to Boban," I believe, was his word, and it was okay. And of
2 course Boban agreed. So it wasn't just a question of whether
3 President Tudjman needed or had any formal position in the Bosnian
4 governmental structure. He did not. But as the president of Croatia, he
5 was the ruler of the Bosnian Croats.
6 Have I answered your question?
7 JUDGE MINDUA: Yes, indeed. Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's 5.30, and we'll now have
9 our 20-minute break. We'll then start with the cross-examination.
10 --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 5.57 p.m.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll now resume, and I will
13 give the floor to the Defence team that will be starting first.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Good afternoon,
15 Your Honours.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:
17 Q. Good afternoon, Ambassador. We haven't formally met. My name is
18 Michael Karnavas, and I'm an attorney from the United States. With my
19 co-counsel here, Suzana Tomanovic, we represent Dr. Jadranko Prlic.
20 Now, you've indicated to us today -- I'm going to pick up from
21 where you left off, you said you had close relations with Dr. Tudjman;
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And I take it that was because at least initially when Mr. Vance
25 got involved, I believe that you were with him, that was in order to solve
1 the situation in Croatia because Croatia had been attacked by the JNA.
2 A. Yes. We began in October 1991.
3 Q. And yesterday and today you made a point of telling us in no
4 uncertain terms that it was Dr. Tudjman that actually was the head of the
5 Bosnian Croats. If not an official title, but basically he was the
6 godfather. He did everything, gave the orders, and everybody obeyed
7 pretty much. That's what you told us, right?
8 A. He was the de facto head. I would not say that he was responsible
9 for every jot and tittle of Bosnian Croat behaviour. No leader is. But
10 he was the final word on the major decisions.
11 Q. All right. Now, I mention that because at least one question
12 that's begged to be answered is: Why bother with Mate Boban? Why bother
13 with any Croat from Bosnia? Why not just go straight to Tudjman? You had
14 these close relations. He gave the orders. He could snap his fingers and
15 make things done. He could sign. Why just -- why not just cut the
16 middleman out and go directly with Mr. Tudjman?
17 A. Well, that's not the way the world works. Mr. Boban had a title.
18 Mile Akmadzic was the Prime Minister of the country. Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina was a recognised sovereign, independent country within
20 internationally recognised borders, and so we dealt with the recognised
22 Q. Okay. All right. But you could recognise -- you could deal with
23 the recognised authorities openly, but you could have had a sort of a
24 two-track approach. Openly embrace Mate Boban and privately just deal
25 with Tudjman and have him -- and cut your deal with Tudjman. Why not do
1 it that way? If -- if assuming that you are correct that Tudjman was the
2 alpha and omega for the Croats both in Croatia and for the Croats in
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
4 A. Well, the reason quite simply is that's not the way Secretary
5 Vance and I work. We don't do something in public and something else
7 Q. All right. Now, you've testified three times before in this
8 Tribunal, and frankly I've looked at all of these -- these transcripts
9 very carefully, and you weren't asked the question directly, but obviously
10 you were talking about the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At no time -- at
11 no time did you say in your testimony that it was Tudjman that actually
12 was calling all the shots the way you emphasised it today and yesterday.
13 A. There's a very simple reason for that.
14 Q. You would agree with me that you never mentioned --
15 A. No, I don't agree with that, but I'm going to answer your
17 Q. Okay. Go for it.
18 A. The three times that I testified before, I was testifying always
19 against Serbs. In one case, President Milosevic. The other case was
20 Mr. Krajisnik, the Bosnian Serb number two. And the other case were the
21 JNA officers responsible for the atrocity at Vukovar. So the focus was
22 exclusively, almost exclusively on Serb and Bosnian Serb activity. It
23 would have been extraneous to drag President Tudjman into it.
24 Q. Okay. Well, in the Krajisnik case, as I understand, one of the
25 reasons Krajisnik was indicted and was convicted and was involved in this
1 whole picture of Bosnia-Herzegovina had to do with his involvement in --
2 in the government, in the RS government at the time, or the
3 pseudo-government I believe as you pointed out -- put it yesterday, and at
4 least in part the questions that were being posed to you by the
5 Prosecution and by the Defence dealt with negotiations, right?
6 A. Negotiations can whom?
7 Q. With Krajisnik.
8 A. To a degree. Krajisnik was generally not present at our
9 negotiations, and that came out if you recheck the transcript. I was
10 asked that question and, of course, it was confirmed in my diary that we
11 saw Karadzic, Dr. Karadzic, and Koljevic, both of whom speak good English.
12 Q. Right.
13 A. Much more frequently than we saw Mr. Krajisnik, who tended to
14 remain more as, so to speak, the inside Bosnia.
15 Q. Right. But the -- I guess my line of questioning is that with --
16 the context in which you testified it in the Krajisnik case had to do with
17 peace negotiations, whether it was -- whether it was Krajisnik or
18 Karadzic, you were being asked questions about the various parties.
19 A. Yes, of course.
20 Q. Okay. And we saw yesterday and today you touched a little bit on
21 the Serbs. You told us a little bit about Milosevic. You told us about
22 Karadzic. And just by curiosity when I look at your testimony, there's
23 nothing about you claiming that Tudjman was in fact representing the
24 Croats. I'm just making that observation. Okay? Would you agree with me
25 at least if we went through --
1 A. If that's the case --
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. -- that means I was not asked the question.
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. I answer the questions --
6 Q. All right?
7 A. -- counsel, that are asked to me. I don't go off on -- I hope I
8 don't go off on excursions to waste the Court's time.
9 Q. All right. Now, I looked at your -- at your diary as well, and I
10 didn't see any notations in your diary you make comments, because in your
11 diary you make comments based on meetings, based on observations. There's
12 nothing in your diary where you say that Tudjman is in fact the
13 representative of the Croat people for -- in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 Would you agree with me that there's nothing in the 2.000 pages of diaries
15 where you come out and say that?
16 A. No, I do not agree with you at all, and indeed the diaries -- you
17 have misdescribed the diaries.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. Because -- if I may continue?
20 Q. Go ahead.
21 A. We've mentioned this before, a very important meeting with
22 President Tudjman, Mate Boban there where they discussed a very important
23 question which we've discussed before, but you've asked so I must answer,
24 concerning the continuation in the Presidency after December 1992 of
25 Izetbegovic when the Presidency should have rotated to a Bosnian Croat and
1 President Tudjman says, "I recommended," which I put in quotes in the
2 diary you'll recall, I hope.
3 Q. I recall that.
4 A. And that's perfectly evident. We all smiled when he said that.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. Everybody knew what that meant.
7 Q. "Everybody knew what that meant." Huh. Well, I don't see it in
8 your diary what everybody knew what that meant.
9 A. Well, let me continue then.
10 Q. Hold on, hold on. Let me -- first of all, it's not in your diary;
11 second of all, you -- right now we don't have Tudjman over here to tell us
12 anything, but you're interpreting a smile or a word, recommend, as if he
13 was the one that was able to order Boban. Now, why wouldn't he say if he
14 was that powerful as you -- as you claim he is, why didn't he just say, I
15 ordered Boban to do it?
16 A. Because he's a courteous gentleman.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. And it's in my diary and he continued to say, and it's -- you can
19 read the diary entry. He continued to say and he did it, you know.
20 Q. Very well yesterday I recall you saying I'm moving fast and I
21 apologise for asking rapid questions because it's only -- I need four days
22 with you, to be honest, and we don't have that time. But I'll slow down a
23 little bit for the interpreters.
24 But yesterday you indicated that occasionally Boban would say,
25 Well, I need to clear it up with -- check with Tudjman. At least you made
1 one reference at least at one time Boban said that he had to get clearance
2 or he had to check it Tudjman. Do you recall saying that yesterday? In
3 other words, that it was so obvious that Boban was getting his marching
4 orders from Tudjman that when he was being asked, his response
5 occasionally, or at least on an important issues would be I have to -- I
6 have to talk to Tudjman.
7 A. Well, that -- that was Boban's attitude.
8 Q. Okay. Now, again maybe I'm a stickler for precision, but I don't
9 see anything in your diary that reflects that.
10 A. Mr. Karnavas.
11 Q. I'm just asking you a question, is it in there or not?
12 A. I'm really surprised at these questions --
13 Q. Don't be.
14 A. -- because we've spent several hours here going over meetings in
15 Zagreb with President Tudjman in the chair. We have the pentagonal
16 meetings in Geneva with President Tudjman there, and President Tudjman was
17 indeed the man that had to be consulted. The last word was his.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. Now, as I said, and I try to say it again briefly, of course he
20 was not consulted on every individual point because he had a country to
21 run, namely Croatia, which was still being occupied by the Yugoslav army.
22 So he did not spend as much time, you know, full time on -- on the Bosnian
24 Q. Okay. Well, I put to you, sir, that that's an incorrect
25 observation on your part, and perhaps he was being consulted because, yes,
1 he was an influential leader, but also at times, and I think we're going
2 to we might get a chance to see it, if not through you, through other
3 witnesses, that the internationals sought his assistance and he was acting
4 as an interlocutor if you may -- if you may call it that, a more
5 intermediary trying to cobble up or get the two parties to agree, at least
6 the two parties, Izetbegovic and Boban. So I take -- I take exception to
7 your characterisation. What do you have to say about that?
8 A. Simply you're incorrect.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. You've drawn an incorrect inference.
11 Q. All right.
12 A. And I should also call to your attention that the regular Croatian
13 army was also in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was no dispute about that. So
14 that President Tudjman, who is a professional military man, a very
15 distinguished general, a partisan fighter with the Partisans during World
16 War II took a -- as you might expect took an interest in the activities of
17 his own army.
18 Q. All right. Now, sir, was Croatia hosting any refugees from Bosnia
19 and Herzegovina?
20 A. Yes, a large number.
21 Q. By any chance, were any of those Muslim?
22 A. Certainly.
23 Q. Was aid going from Croatia to the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. Well.
25 Q. Yes or no?
1 A. Excuse me. Allow me to answer.
2 Q. Okay. You can go with a yes and or no and then explain if you
4 A. The assistance that went through Croatia, I stress the
5 word, "through," was very important for the Bosnian Muslims because, as we
6 all know, Bosnia-Herzegovina is entirely surrounded by Serbia, then called
7 Yugoslavia, and by the Republic of Croatia. So in order to get to the
8 Muslims, one had to either go through those countries or overfly them, and
9 indeed a great deal of aid id go to the Bosnian Muslim particularly, most
10 of it supplied by Arab countries from the Gulf through Croatia.
11 Q. All right. So -- so what you're telling us is if Croatia wanted
12 to they could have closed the borders, not allow any aid to go to the
14 A. Mm-hmm.
15 Q. Not allow any weapons to go to the Muslims and, of course, not
16 allow any refugees, any Muslim refugees to come from Bosnia to Croatia.
17 Had -- I mean, if that had been --
18 A. In theory they could have done that.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. The international community, however, would have been outraged and
21 taken action if they did that.
22 Q. Okay. You mean they would have been outraged if they had
23 prevented weapons to be shipped to the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina so that
24 it could then be used, turned around and be used to kill Croats? That
25 would have been outrage about that?
1 A. No, the outrage would be of course denying domicile, temporary
2 domicile to the refugees. Croatia was a signatory to the refugee
3 convention, and so they had an international legal obligation to take in
4 the refugees. That's point one. And the second point was that the
5 Croatian government did stop occasionally shipments aimed -- designed to
6 go to the Bosnian government. I recall very well one time --
7 Q. Sir, I'm going to have to cut you off here. You've made your
8 point we have to move on here I don't mean to be rude. It's just I have
9 very limited time.
10 A. Fine. I understand. I'm sorry.
11 Q. That's all right.
12 A. I apologise.
13 Q. There was an embargo as far as arms were concerned, was there not?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Okay. But that embargo wasn't really being observed?
16 A. It was not observed.
17 Q. Yeah. In countries such as the United States, for instance, they
18 might have had a two-track policy, openly saying we want the embargo but
19 then turning a blind eye and we saw that for -- Galbraith was over here,
20 John -- the Galbraith's son was here. He was the ambassador to Croatia at
21 the time, Peter Galbraith. He was here and he told us that at one point
22 Tudjman was approached by the Iranians to have weapons shipped through
23 Croatia. He went to the Americans and they basically said we won't, you
24 know, don't -- we won't object or we won't do anything about it. So that
25 embargo was not being observed by the Americans as well.
1 A. By some elements of the Americans.
2 Q. Okay. All right. Now, yesterday again I'm just hitting spots to,
3 you know, just major points today and tomorrow maybe we'll slow down and
4 go through some of your diary, but the Karadjordjevo thing, it's
5 interesting. I looked at your -- I looked at your diary. I didn't see
6 anywhere where you or Mr. Cyrus Vance ever mentioned anything about
7 Karadjordjevo to Tudjman directly, or to Milosevic for that matter, to say
8 hey, what is this agreement about? Why do you want to carve up
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Or was that out of politeness that you chose not to
10 confront him?
11 A. Well, first of all, the Karadjordjevo meeting occurred itself
12 before we were involved. So did the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement of August
13 1939 occur before we were involved.
14 Q. The answer is, it's not in there.
15 A. But.
16 Q. It's not in your notebooks.
17 A. But -- but on many occasions we raised the -- the problems
18 involved with carving up Bosnia.
19 Q. Sir, I'm asking you concretely. Is there anywhere in your
20 2.000-page diary where you make a notation where Cyrus Vance, who was
21 there on behalf of the United Nations, along with you, or -- or David Lord
22 Owen who is there on behalf of the EU, is there anywhere in your diary
23 where you confront Tudjman and say, What about this Karadjordjevo? Or you
24 confront Milosevic? Or you confront both of them when they're together?
25 Is there any inkling in that diary of yours?
1 A. I would have to consult the diary.
2 Q. What if I were to tell you that I read all of your diary, not once
3 but twice, and it's a long one, and there's no mention in there?
4 A. Well, if you say it, I hear you saying it.
5 Q. And there's nothing, incidentally, about Graz either. One would
6 think that you negotiators would talk to the man, Mr. Tudjman, who, you
7 know, you've designated him as being the most powerful Croat. With your
8 close relations, did you ever contact him directly to ask him what is this
9 Graz agreement about and for him to put a stop with Mate Boban and
10 Karadzic? Because I don't see anything in your notebook, by the way, in
11 your notes reflecting that.
12 A. I don't want to go on at length, but the way negotiators work is
13 to deal with the parties, to derive their positions from what they tell
14 you or the documents they give you. You know, it's not a research
15 operation or blah, blah unless we need important information --
16 Q. Okay. All right. Fair enough.
17 A. -- because we were dealing directly with the issues.
18 Q. Now, on this Karadjordjevo thing, yesterday you indicated that
19 this was widely publicised or this was publicised.
20 A. It was in the press.
21 Q. It was in the press. And -- but this was before your time, before
22 Mr. Vance's time, but you yourself or Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen or anybody
23 else in your -- in your entourage never met with anybody who actually
24 witnessed this Karadjordjevo meeting. I mean, other than Milosevic and
25 Karadzic and Tudjman, and we know that you -- they weren't spoken to about
2 A. Well, they were the principals at this meeting, and we were
3 dealing with them on a regular basis.
4 Q. I understand. But --
5 A. So we didn't need to ask -- to take their attendance like
6 schoolchildren, were you present at class that day?
7 Q. I know but --
8 A. Because we were talking to them, Mr. -- counsel.
9 Q. My question is this though I mean everybody seems to know what
10 happened in Karadjordjevo. They all seem to know the content, the
11 agreement, but nobody was there?
12 A. Mm-hmm.
13 Q. And nobody bothered to ask the two folks that supposedly made this
14 agreement like, Hey, what's this agreement about. And my question is:
15 Did you or anybody else ever meet anybody who was present that could at
16 least tell us this was what was agreed upon at Karadjordjevo, other than
17 what we read in the press?
18 A. No, I did not.
19 Q. Okay. Now, interesting and I take it -- sticking with this issue,
20 I noticed that you were questioned once about Mr. Zimmermann who was the
21 ambassador, the last ambassador to the -- to Yugoslavia; right?
22 A. Mm-hmm.
23 Q. And this has to do with the '92 agreement, I believe it was March,
24 was it, March 18th, that -- that Izetbegovic signed and then he withdrew
25 his sit. This is the Cutileiro Plan.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You recall that. And of course that's undisputed that he signed
3 or -- and then he withdrew his signature, but there was some publications,
4 it was widely publicised that it was Warren Zimmermann, none other than
5 the American Ambassador, who actually had talked Izetbegovic -- or had
6 talked him into withdrawing his signature. Do you recall that little
7 exchange? In fact you say that was in the press, but it's unverifiable.
8 A. May I answer?
9 Q. Go ahead.
10 A. Not only is it unverifiable, it was formally denied by Ambassador
12 Q. When you had a conversation with him.
13 A. No, he wrote a book.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. You may read it in his book.
16 Q. Well, I mean --
17 A. Well, he wrote the book. There's a document. You can read it.
18 Q. Okay. Well, unfortunately he's not with us. But, of course, a
19 wink is as good as a nod. He could have said, for instance, I don't think
20 it's a good idea for you to go along with this. I'm not suggesting that's
21 the case, but what I am suggesting here, what I am suggesting, the point I
22 want to make is that we really can't always trust what we read in the
23 press. Okay? That's the point that I'm trying to make because we can't
24 cherry pick and say, Well, we just read in the press about Karadjordjevo.
25 No proof what actually transpired, but here with Zimmermann, because we
1 know him, we love him, he's one of us, obviously we must -- we must accept
3 Graz. Let me go with Graz. Did you ever, sir, see a signed
4 agreement, I mean with Boban's signature, agreeing to this Graz agreement?
5 Yes, no, I don't recall.
6 A. I don't recall.
7 Q. Would it surprise you, sir, that Boban also publicly denied the
8 Graz agreement?
9 A. It wouldn't surprise me.
10 Q. Okay. And we'd have to take Boban's word for it.
11 A. I suppose so.
12 Q. Okay. All right. Now, a couple of things. And I apologise for
13 the rapid clip, you know. We're under a lot of pressure here with the
14 time. And I don't mean to cut you off or be disrespectful. I don't want
15 you to walk away thinking the Defence is disrespectful.
16 A. I understand. You're very fair.
17 Q. Now, you gave a statement not too long ago before coming here. I
18 believe it was this young lady that came to New York to see you or
19 Washington, one of the two places. New York. And there in your
20 statement, paragraph 5, you say and I'm just going to read part of it,
21 it's not -- nothing --
22 A. Sir, I have it with me. May I look at it?
23 Q. You may. You may. It's paragraph 5. Paragraph 5. You can read
24 along. It's just a short piece.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours, I don't believe I have this in
1 e-court. I don't know if Your Honours have it, if the Prosecutor provided
2 it to you. If it wasn't, I apologise. I could probably put this on the
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, read it out. We
5 have trust in you.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.
7 Q. Paragraph 5 it says: "During this period the war aims, the war
8 aims, policies and military activities of the three sides were, in the
9 main, consistently applied. The war aims of the Bosnian Muslim government
10 were: The creation of a unitary, centralised state of all its citizens,
11 in the knowledge that such a state would have a Muslim plurality and with
12 the expectation that this plurality would become a majority as the Muslim
13 birth rate was considerably higher than that of the Croats and Serbs."
14 That was your statement. You're shaking your head. Does that
15 mean yes?
16 A. I'm agreeing with you.
17 Q. Okay. All right.
18 A. You have read it accurately.
19 Q. Thank you. I get a little nervous when I'm up here because my
20 reading isn't as good as it should be. Now -- good. It seems here that
21 you're telling us slightly more than what you told us yesterday, perhaps
22 because you weren't asked, but here you're telling us not only is this a
23 unitary, in other words, one person, one vote, but the ultimate goal of
24 the Muslims which were a constituent element of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was
25 eventually to be able to have a majority, and if you have a one person one
1 vote, they rule over the other two constituent peoples.
2 A. Not necessarily.
3 Q. Not necessarily, but that could also -- but you can't exclude that
4 possibility either?
5 A. It would be a possibility. It would be a distant possibility
6 because it would assume that hundreds of thousands of people would all
7 vote in unison.
8 Q. Right.
9 A. And that rarely happens.
10 Q. I understand that. But if you are a 17.2 or 3 per cent of the
11 population, obviously this unitary approach to a government --
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. -- would be of some concern to you.
14 A. No question.
15 Q. Okay. In fact, we see that in Iraq. When they drafted the new
16 constitution I believe it was the Shiite that wanted one person, one vote;
17 60 per cent, they win every time. They can appoint all the posts.
18 But here in Bosnia, which was sort of a microcosm of Yugoslavia in
19 a sense, it was multi-ethnic, you had three constituent peoples, Muslim,
20 Croat, and the Serbs; right?
21 A. Well, in Yugoslavia you had many more than --
22 Q. Many more, yeah.
23 A. In Bosnia but those were overwhelmingly the three.
24 Q. But you had others as well?
25 A. Yes of course.
1 Q. But by and large and we need to make a distinction here, as you
2 well know, between a constituent peoples and, say, a national minority.
3 You're shaking your head again. We've got to make the record.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And would it be fair to say -- would it be fair to say that all
6 three sides were cognisant of this?
7 A. Cognisant of the fact that they were each a constituent people?
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. All right. And at least with respect to the Croats, they wanted
11 equal share in governance along with the Muslims and the Serbs.
12 A. I would not say they wanted an equal share in all cases. They
13 wanted certainly a respectable share, but equal is a mathematical term and
14 it wouldn't be safe to apply that to every Croat action.
15 Q. Okay. All right. Okay. Now, I look at -- I've looked at some of
16 these agreements, and we're going to go through some of them starting with
17 Cutileiro, and at no time do I -- do I see anything but the Croats asking
18 to have their rights within, within a state government of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Decentralised but nonetheless within
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would that be correct?
21 A. No, that would not be correct.
22 Q. All right.
23 A. Because you have not mentioned the creation of Herceg-Bosna.
24 Q. We're going to get to that.
25 A. Excuse me, but you asked a question and I think I have to answer
2 Q. All right. Okay. Well, Herceg-Bosna, I'll ask -- I'll jump ahead
3 of schedule. Do you see any document in Herceg-Bosna that does not have
4 on top Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. Well, I can't vouch for that. I haven't seen every document --
6 Q. All right?
7 A. -- issued by Herceg-Bosna, but it would not be.
8 Q. Okay?
9 A. It would not be unusual --
10 Q. All right. Did you by?
11 A. -- to have a piece of paper that across the top said Republic of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina. I can cite you an example for you, if you wish.
13 Q. Let me just go step-by-step. Now, I know you're not a -- you're
14 not a lawyer and you were involved in -- in the big picture issues, but
15 did you by any chance, you or your staff, I don't know whether you had a
16 staff, it's not mentioned in your notes, but did you or any of your staff
17 ever look at any of the legislation that was put in place by Herceg-Bosna
18 to see what exactly is this Herceg-Bosna?
19 A. We had very good lawyers attached to the delegation.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. We had a --
22 Q. And are there --
23 A. We had a have, very active staff. There were military advisors --
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. -- And lawyers from the United Nations and other --
1 Q. Okay.
2 A. -- Entities.
3 Q. Okay?
4 A. So they did the looking.
5 Q. Okay. But did you actually ever sit down and read, for instance,
6 the statutory decision that established Herceg-Bosna?
7 A. I probably did at some point.
8 Q. Okay. And I don't want to go into -- too deep into this subject
9 because I don't have the time, but is it fair to say that when the JNA
10 attacked Croatia it's quite well known and we've heard testimony here that
11 the JNA was staging the attack, some of the attacks against Croatia on
12 territory belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina? Were you aware of that?
13 A. That was not the main thrust of the JNA attacks. The Eastern
14 Slavonia came right from Serbia.
15 Q. I didn't ask whether it was the main, but nonetheless it was being
16 used. There's a point that I'm trying to get to.
17 A. It could have been a staging ground, yes.
18 Q. Are you aware that prior to the JNA moving -- moving towards B and
19 H, that the Croats were asking the central government, such as it was at
20 the time, to ready itself against this impending threat? Were you aware
21 of that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay. You must have heard the reaction from the Croats when --
24 and they often quote Izetbegovic who said this is not our war in reaction
25 to what happened in -- in Ravno; correct?
1 A. In where?
2 Q. Ravno.
3 A. Ravno.
4 Q. Okay. Were you aware of that? Ravno was razed basically by the
5 JNA in BiH, and Izetbegovic, and he might have been misquoted but
6 nonetheless it's out there in the public domain that "this is not our war"
7 because at the time Izetbegovic is on the fence. He's waiting to see, is
8 Croatia going to win or Serbia going to win or Yugoslavia going to win.
9 So at that point in time he's not taking a position but the Croats are
10 looking at the president of the Presidency and they're starting to wonder,
11 who is this person and how can he protect our vital national interests if
12 that's his position? Were you aware of that?
13 A. Well, we did -- yes, we dealt a lot with President Izetbegovic,
14 and his style was not precise at any point. He tended to wander off onto
15 extraneous issues, and he -- he was a bright man. He spoke English like
16 President Tudjman, but his -- his style of discussion and action was --
17 was somewhat ...
18 Q. Lacking?
19 A. Well, I don't -- the word that comes to mind is dreamy, but I
20 don't want to --
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. -- denigrate him. But it was rather loose and imprecise.
23 Q. All right. Now, he was the head of the SDA was he not?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. The SDA was the predominant Muslim party at the time in
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. All right. At this time while he's holding this, he's being the
4 president of the Presidency and promoting himself as the president of this
5 government, of BiH, actually. He's actually really the head of the Muslim
6 party which had an agenda, did it not? And you told us what the agenda
7 was earlier.
8 A. Yes. And I've also said that he acted on behalf of the Muslims
9 the way Mile Akmadzic, who was also in the government, acted on behalf of
10 the Croats.
11 Q. All right. But at some point for all intents and purposes and I
12 think we had a small snippet in one of your notes today, and I think this
13 was an observation that you made, I could be wrong, that, you know, that
14 there is no real central government. It's a fig leaf or something like
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. So for all intents and purposes -- I'm sorry to the interpreters.
18 For all intents and purposes we have no central government, and what you
19 have in Bosnia-Herzegovina are three groups of people that are -- that
20 have organised themselves and a civil war going on.
21 A. That's not quite right. We had a central government that was
22 recognised, and if you give me 30 seconds, I would call your attention to
23 paragraph 11 of my statement, and I'd like just to read three or four
24 lines because that answer your question.
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. Paragraph 11. "Because of the" -- I'm reading from my statement.
2 Paragraph 11. "Because of the military conflict, the Bosnian government
3 in Sarajevo laboured under extremely onerous conditions: Sarajevo was
4 besieged by the Bosnian Serb army and subjected to daily shelling; the
5 Bosnian Serb army controlled approximately 70 per cent of the territory of
6 BiH. Therefore, the powers as well as the activities of the government
7 were severely limited." I think that answer your question.
8 Q. If you would read the rest of it because I think it helps round
9 this topic up.
10 A. Fine, I'm happy to read it. "It was clear to the negotiators
11 during the lengthy negotiations that President Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, and
12 Akmadzic were representing the government officially, while Izetbegovic
13 and Silajdzic were mainly representing Bosnian Muslim interests and
14 Akmadzic was mainly representing Bosnian Croat interests."
15 Q. All right. And I think that's -- pretty much is the case; right?
16 A. Yes, indeed.
17 Q. Okay. Now, there had been some complaints, had there not been, by
18 the Croats that actually they were being disenfranchised at the Presidency
19 or at the state level?
20 A. There is only that one about the rotation of the Presidency.
21 Q. Well, I --
22 A. If I could finish, please.
23 Q. Go ahead. I'm sorry.
24 A. And President Tudjman dealt with that and we dealt with it here.
25 They had their own community. You see here they created the community of
1 Herceg-Bosna and as far as the Bosnian Croats, that was the government.
2 That was their government and it was it the government, just the way the
3 Bosnian Serbs felt and said, "We have Republika Srpska; Dr. Radovan
4 Karadzic is our president."
5 Q. Right. And in -- for all intents and purposes you had Izetbegovic
6 with his community, and he's wearing two hats. One, he is the president
7 of -- for the Muslims, by the Muslims, of the Muslims, and at the same
8 time he's going around pretending to be the president of the entire
10 A. He wasn't pretending to be the president. He was the president,
11 and he spoke -- excuse me.
12 Q. Okay. Okay.
13 A. He made very clear in his imprecise way on many occasions
14 discussing the economy, for example, food supplies, refugees. We weren't
15 always talking about the fighting.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. And he made clear and indicated and indeed was the representative
18 of -- of all of the people.
19 Q. Okay. Well, let me -- let me just throw this out at you: Did you
20 by any chance examine this concept called the Presidency? We don't have
21 it in the States. When we think of the president we think of the
22 commander-in-chief, the chief, the top executive who is going to run
23 everything. But he was the president of the Presidency. Were you aware
24 that he only had one vote and he was basically first among equals but
25 that's all he was? Were you aware of that?
1 A. I had read the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the last one
2 that was extant. The Presidency consisted of nine people, three Serbs,
3 three Muslims, three Croats, with one additional person who represented
4 the group called "others," sometimes Yugoslavs. They used the term
5 interchangeably. And you see by that it's self-evident this was the
6 tie-breaking -- expected to be the tie-breaking votes.
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. And the Presidency was to rotate among the three parties.
9 Q. Right. Now the -- the others -- the person filling that other
10 seat, that was Mr. Ganic, was it not?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And he's a Muslim, is he not?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. But he was representing himself to be a Yugoslav, which at some
15 point Yugoslavia ceased to exist so he could not have been a Yugoslav. He
16 would have been one of the three -- one of the three constituent peoples.
17 Anyway, were you aware that the president cannot make decisions on his
18 own? In other words, it is the Presidency that makes the decisions? They
19 have to vote on it. So in other words, he cannot act independently on his
21 A. Mm-hmm. In peacetime that probably would have been the case, but
22 this -- there was an armed conflict occurring at this time, and naturally
23 in a situation like that people assume positions and powers that one would
24 not find in peacetime.
25 Q. Okay. But?
1 A. You can see that in the United States today, and the United States
2 has -- a highly developed --
3 Q. Right?
4 A. -- country.
5 Q. But -- I'm getting notes from my colleague that I should be in the
6 constitution, and I think that's self-evident; right?
7 A. I have a copy.
8 Q. No. But what I'm saying is that assuming that you are correct,
9 the powers that he would have taken on himself, those powers would have
10 been -- the constitution would have allowed Izetbegovic to take on those
11 powers; right?
12 A. Well, it was -- it was expected in -- as in any country that there
13 would be consultations and --
14 Q. Yeah, but sir, what I'm saying is this: You have a constitution.
15 Usually the contusion provides for emergency situations. If, however,
16 there is an emergency situation and the -- and the president decides to
17 take power unto himself in disregard of the constitution, that's an
18 unconstitutional act, is it not?
19 A. It would be if it were a clear case, as you describe it.
20 Q. Yeah. And naturally others would not appreciate that
21 unconstitutional act.
22 A. Well, if -- if it were unconstitutional.
23 Q. Okay?
24 A. -- they might object to it.
25 Q. Okay. And I don't want to debate the point at this point because
1 we'll deal with this with other witnesses.
2 Cutileiro. According to you, this is from your notebooks, on 18
3 April 1992, I believe you folks are in Lisbon, this is on page 113 of
4 Exhibit 159. I'll just read it real quickly. You have a note that says
5 that Cutileiro says, "It's absurd to blame BH exclusively on Serbs.
6 Responsibility of all parties. Can be seen in -- at firsthand in
7 tripartite talks."
8 Then this goes on -- then in your notes you say apparently what
9 Cutileiro said, "Izetbegovic is 'a liar', very untrustworthy. Always go
10 back -- always goes back as to what he has to agree to."
11 Now, do you recall writing that down?
12 A. If you have it in my handwriting in front of you, I wrote it down.
13 Q. Okay. Now, Cutileiro, he was a distinguished individual, was he
15 A. A Portuguese diplomat, yes.
16 Q. Well, okay, you can be a Portuguese diplomat and still be
17 distinguished; right?
18 A. Oh, yes. He was a former ambassador.
19 Q. All right. And did you have many dealings with him?
20 A. Yes, frequently.
21 Q. Okay. You indicated that he also wrote a book that you read.
22 A. Mm-hmm.
23 Q. Okay. Now here he's calling Izetbegovic a liar back in 18 April,
24 1992, and I take it that has to do something with the -- the agreement
25 that -- that Izetbegovic had signed and then had reneged and had pulled
1 off his signature; correct?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. That irritated quite a few people.
4 A. I'm sure it did.
5 Q. Now, for instance -- and I mean this is a hypothetical, of course,
6 but had he kept the signature, no telling what might have happened,
7 because the signature is on 18 March 1992. The Serbs had signed on, the
8 Croats had signed on, and certainly this statement of principles did not
9 call for the carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, no telling whether the war
10 could have stopped there at that point in time; right?
11 A. Excuse me, it did call for the carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina into
12 three sub-entities, a Muslim, a Croat, and a Serb. That was the essence
13 of the Cutileiro Plan.
14 Q. Was did within the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
15 A. You mean within the territory of Bosnia?
16 Q. Within -- yeah.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. It didn't call for three distinct countries?
19 THE INTERPRETER: Please make pauses between questions and
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Sorry.
22 Q. Now perhaps we can just look at it real quickly. It's on map 10,
23 Your Honours. Please. All right. Now, if we can all look at map 10.
24 This is the map that was provided by the Prosecution. I believe it's
25 Exhibit P 9276. It's multicoloured, and -- and so this is what the
1 Cutileiro Plan called for; right?
2 A. This is a notional map. I must tell you that.
3 Q. I understand that.
4 A. There was no definitive map ever developed by Cutileiro.
5 Q. Right. But if you look at -- but this is -- you say it's a
6 notional map. This is the Prosecution's map that they prepared. This is
7 from March 1992, okay, but basically if we look at Cutileiro and we look
8 at the plan carefully, it guarantees the rights of all the constituent
9 peoples; right?
10 A. I wouldn't say the map guarantees rights; a map only draws lines
11 on the earth.
12 Q. I understand, but -- well, we don't see three distinct states, as
13 you put it, number one. From the map it's self-evident.
14 A. But that's precisely the point.
15 Q. But -- but if you look at the statement of principles itself, it
16 never called for these states to be independent of the state; correct?
17 A. The -- the Bosnian Serbs spoke about the --
18 Q. Sir, I'm going to focus you on the statement itself. You were
19 very good with the Prosecutor.
20 A. Which statement are you referring to?
21 Q. The statement of principles, the March 18 statement of principles
22 for the new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Perhaps we
23 can just look at 1D 0398. This is the -- in essence what Izetbegovic
24 signed and withdrew his signature from. I think you called it the
25 Sarajevo agreement in --
1 A. Could I see it?
2 Q. It should be -- it was provided to you. Perhaps we can have the
3 usher help us out here. But you may have it as well in front of you but
4 it's buried among all those our documents, and I apologise. This is --
5 A. Yes, I have it in front of me.
6 Q. Okay. Now, have you looked at this before? Have you seen this?
7 A. A long time ago.
8 Q. Yes. Now, I don't want to belabour the point, but it talks
9 about -- we can see in the -- that the editor -- editor's note says that
10 it was subsequently repudiated by the Bosnian Presidency, the signature
11 you verified, others verified, so there's no -- there's no dispute that
12 Izetbegovic first signed and then withdrew his signature, but this lays
13 out basically the vision as was seen -- and by the way, Cutileiro, was he
14 speaking for himself or was he speaking on behalf of an institution?
15 A. He was working for Lord Carrington. His function was a
16 sub-function of the conference on Yugoslavia that Lord Carrington shared
17 when the fighting began in March in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lord Carrington
18 asked Ambassador Cutileiro to --
19 Q. Right.
20 A. To do just that as a sub-unit of his conference. So, yes, he was
21 working for Lord Carrington and the conference on Yugoslavia and the EC.
22 Q. Exactly. That's the whole point. Okay. So he carried some
23 weight. I mean, he wasn't just somebody who was there volunteering?
24 A. Oh, no, this was an official negotiation.
25 Q. All right. If we look at this, it says, just on the first
1 paragraph, which is independence, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a state
2 composed of three constituent units based on national principles and
3 taking account economic, geographic, and other criteria.
4 A. May I comment?
5 Q. Go ahead and comment.
6 A. I'll be brief. That illustrates the point I made to you earlier.
7 There were to be three states within a state composed of three constituent
8 units, a Bosnian Serb state, a Bosnian Croat state, a Bosnian Muslim
9 state, based on the national principles. In other words, ethnicity and
10 religion were to be the decisive factors. They were to be the foundation
11 of the state. It states that clearly.
12 Q. Okay. If you go on, and we don't have time, but the Judges are
13 jurists and can read the document and we will -- obviously we will bring
14 others to comment on it as well, but wasn't one of the missions that
15 Cutileiro had was to make sure that all the constituent peoples were --
16 their rights were protected within the state called Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. Well, indeed, just as we had that responsibilities. So Ambassador
18 Cutileiro --
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. -- would have had that as well.
21 Q. Now, it doesn't call for ethnic cleansing, in other words, or
22 movement of population. It doesn't call for that.
23 A. Transfer or ethnic cleansing is not mentioned.
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. Nor would I expects it to be.
1 Q. Nor -- nor was it envisaged, was it?
2 A. That I don't know. I was not active in March 1993.
3 Q. Well, sir, obviously --
4 A. Pardon me, March 1992.
5 Q. You can't -- you can't -- seriously, you can't tell us that
6 Mr. Cutileiro, Ambassador Cutileiro and others would have envisaged or
7 would have expected or would have condoned any movement of population or
8 any ethnic cleansing be it direct or indirect in drafting such a plan they
9 were promoting in order to bring peace to this very volatile situation?
10 You're not stating that, are you?
11 A. Your are asking me to speculate.
12 Q. Okay. You can't answer that question. Very well. All right.
13 A. Because even if -- if I may finish the sentence.
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. Because even if that was not in the mind of Ambassador Cutileiro,
16 it could have been, as you asked me, in the minds of others. I don't
18 Q. Okay. Now, that was a criticism also, as I understand it, of the
19 Vance-Owen Plan. I'm not suggesting that there were others. There were
20 some folks in the media who wanted to distance themselves or wanted to
21 make sure that the Vance-Owen Plan did not succeed, and they were openly
22 saying in the press that it would promote ethnic cleansing or movement
23 of -- of populations.
24 A. No, there was heavy criticism in the Vance-Owen Plan but that was
25 not one of them. The criticisms that were false, the false criticisms of
1 the Vance-Owen Plan were basically that it legitimised ethnic lensing that
2 had already taken place.
3 Q. All right?
4 A. And that it rewarded aggression, quote unquote. It rewarded
6 Q. Those, those --
7 A. Those were the main criticisms.
8 Q. But those --
9 A. And they were not correct.
10 Q. Exactly. Exactly. But going back -- one last point going back to
11 Cutileiro -- and incidentally who came up with this nominal map, if you
13 A. I don't know.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. I can tell you I spoke with Cutileiro on numerous occasions about
16 the map and indeed I spoke with his legal advisor, Mr. Henri Darwin on
17 precisely this point. And they both confirmed to me that there was no
18 definitive map. There was a map, perhaps, but nothing definitive.
19 Q. All right. But somebody must have sat down and prepared this?
20 A. I don't know.
21 Q. Okay. If we could just look at it just very quickly.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, that's map 10, Your Honours.
23 Q. And if you could just briefly comment does this look like the
24 Banovina to you, as you had described it? Because if I look at it, it
25 certainly doesn't reflect the Banovina, and this is something that the
1 Croats signed.
2 A. Well, if you look at it, you see in the north, in the Posavina at
3 the top of where the border is Croatia, Posavina, Bosanski Brod, Odzak
4 [phoen], Bosanski Samac, and Orasje, those were Croat areas and Croat and
5 the bottom area, Herzegovina --
6 Q. It doesn't look like Banovina, does --
7 A. It does. It does. It certainly does to me.
8 Q. Okay. Very well.
9 A. It's don't like the ban convenient it certainly does to me?
10 Q. Very well?
11 A. Not completely the banovina.
12 Q. Nothing in your conversation with Mr. Cutileiro to suggest that it
13 was the Croats that drafted this, came up with this -- that came up with
14 this map?
15 A. No, it was never agreed, as I've said a few times. Forgive me for
16 repeating it. There was no definitive map.
17 Q. Right. Right.
18 A. There was never a definitive map of the Cutileiro.
19 Q. But the but the Croats signed this, did they not?
20 A. I don't know did they.
21 Q. Okay. Well. Very well.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, let me -- well, maybe I can ask a
23 couple more questions on this.
24 Q. Incidentally, preceding, just to make sure that we understand one
25 point, preceding this, the Cutileiro Plan there was a European Community
1 conference and there was a draft convention, and I have here a treaty
2 provision for the convention of 4 November 1991. This would be 1D 00893.
3 Were you familiar with that?
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, sir. Could you help us out here?
6 Q. You have it in your bundle but ti might be easier or quicker.
7 A. Thank you.
8 Q. We wish to thank the ushers for helping us out. Now, did you see
9 this document at all?
10 A. Yes, I'm aware of it.
11 Q. Are you -- is there a problem, if The Prosecution are saying they
12 didn't get it? Okay. We apologise to the Prosecution. We were told
13 that maybe the -- maybe the gentleman gave it -- gave both copies to the
14 witness. But this has been introduced before.
15 But have you seen this before, sir?
16 A. I would have seen it in November 1991.
17 Q. And in essence, you know, prior to Cutileiro the EC was trying to
18 figure out an arrangement on how these republics could become independent.
19 A. I've already referred you to the conference on Yugoslavia chaired
20 by Lord Carrington which began in July 1991 and continued until August
21 1992. It dealt with the entire country, that is the six republics, and
22 it -- the goal was to either allow them to stay together or to separate
23 peacefully if that was what they wished. That was Lord Carrington's goal.
24 All six republics attended the meetings, and not this document but the one
25 of October 18th is the definitive document. It's the treaty that
1 Carrington laid down called, Arrangements for a Peaceful Settlement. You
2 can get it on the UN document, October 18, 1991.
3 Q. Okay. Thank you.
4 A. And this is a gloss on that document.
5 Q. Okay. But the point I wanted to make and I want to focus our
6 Trial Bench to is that it was well thought out as to what rights, what
7 human rights --
8 A. Mm-hmm.
9 Q. -- would be available or mandatory for the citizens of each
10 republic, be they a national minority or a constituent peoples; right?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Okay. And it's fair to say that Cutileiro then, in drafting the
13 Cutileiro Plan, would have had that in mind and would have been cognisant
14 of those principles in crafting an agreement; correct?
15 A. Up to a point, because the situation in Bosnia, which was what
16 Cutileiro was dealing with, the situation in Bosnia was entirely peaceful
17 in November 1991, but by November 1992 there was a war on in Bosnia. So
18 it was -- it was no longer the same situation.
19 Q. But what I'm talking about are the principles, the human rights
20 principles, making -- you know, that's what I'm talking about.
21 A. Well, the general principles on the -- if one looks at them, I see
22 here human rights, following human rights the right to life, the right not
23 to be subjected to torture, the right not to be subjected to slavery.
24 Yes, of course he would not favour torture.
25 Q. And I guess we'll leave with this last question, and that is that
1 these principles never shifted, these human rights principles never
2 shifted irrespective of whether when the drafting began or when the
3 principles were set out it was peacetime and now you have war in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the principles were the same. We're talking about
5 human rights principles.
6 A. The principles remain the same. The observance might be
8 Q. I agree. Okay, we'll have to pick this up tomorrow when we're
9 both fresher. Thank you very, very much, and I know it's very taxing to
10 be here answering questions at this place.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours, thank you. See you tomorrow.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you,
13 Mr. Karnavas. We shall resume tomorrow at 2.15.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,
15 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 4th day
16 of April, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.