1 Tuesday, 25 September 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
7 IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Jadranko Prlic et al.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, and I greet
9 all of the people in the courtroom, Mr. Scott, all of the Defence
10 counsels, the accused, and everyone else in this room, as well as those
11 who are not in the courtroom.
12 We shall pursue now our work, pursue the cross-examination; but
13 before we do, I know that Mr. Murphy and Mr. Karnavas would like to take
14 the floor on a number of topics.
15 Mr. Karnavas, you have the floor.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,
17 Mr. President. Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning, everyone in and
18 around the court. I left yesterday the courtroom rather depressed, to say
19 the least, and the reason for that was I was rather disappointed in being
20 overly energetic in responding to Judge Trechsel's shaking of his head and
21 trying cutting me off while I was trying to make my argument in response
22 to the Prosecution's objection. I was upset at my own behaviour because
23 it through me off, but it is something that occurs over and over again,
24 and justice has to be seen to be done, not just to be done.
25 Over the past 17 months, there have been instances where it would
1 appear, at least to those watching this trial and to the accused that at
2 least one member of the Trial Bench seems to be rather energetic in
3 expressing his feelings and yesterday was one example. I was in the
4 process of responding to an objection. The objection was a rightful
5 objection. The Prosecution was exercising his rights, and it dealt with
6 the issue of relevance.
7 The issue of relevance, of course, was raised by myself and others
8 in our objection, and I raised it again at the commencement of the
9 proceedings yesterday morning. The Trial Chamber -- that if we went into
10 a certain area, we would be opening up a Pandora's box. And after 17
11 months of testimony, the Judges should know what is and is not relevant
12 before even hearing the testimony; and then, as far as weight goes, they
13 can determine that at the end of the trial.
14 Be that as it may, I felt that I was in my proper rights in
15 defending Dr. Prlic to respond to the objection. I sat there. I listened
16 to Mr. Scott. He was able to say what he had to say. There were no
17 gesticulations from the Bench. He was allowed to say his piece, and then
18 I proceeded and, of course, I was cut off. And one of the reasons was,
19 was point out by Judge Trechsel, that the gentleman was a historian and
20 not a lawyer and I was asking for legal questions.
21 So, I went back home and I thought about this a little bit,
22 because yesterday, in the heat of the moment, I wasn't thinking as quickly
23 as I should have been. But I should have point out, Where was Judge
24 Trechsel, for instance, when we had Mr. Tomljanovich, another historian
25 from Yale? Where was he to stop Mr. Tomljanovich from giving opinions on
1 the law. Where was he to say something to Mr. Tomljanovich about going
2 into areas of political science and other areas, which clearly he wasn't
3 qualified? Tomljanovich was allowed to go into areas which were outside
4 of history. He talked about the law repeatedly. He commented about the
5 structures of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna and the Croatian
6 Republic of Herceg-Bosna. And, of course, the Trial Chamber in that
7 instance allowed the Defence to challenge the gentleman on his credentials
8 and to challenge them vigorously, which is the right thing to do.
9 So, in other words, you can either cut him off at the pass and say
10 you will not go into those areas or give the Defence an opportunity to
11 respond. In that instance, I saw no response from the Bench. I mention
12 this because, if you're sitting on this aisle of the court, the perception
13 is when it's a Prosecution witness, there is no reaction; but if the
14 Defence begins, as I did yesterday, in challenging the gentleman's
15 knowledge about matters which he had commented and had reached opinions
16 on, given his report, then, in the middle of my making a record without
17 being heard and I'm trying to respond to an objection, going to relevancy,
18 at that point, there is a prejudgement, and I think it's unfair.
19 Now, as I've noted in the past, we've had other incidents.
20 Yesterday, for instance, when Mr. -- just to give a couple of examples.
21 Yesterday, when the issue came up that was raised by Mr. Kovacic with
22 regard to the archives, we had the Prosecutor stand up. He made a
23 reference to the Library of Congress, and it seemed at the same time Judge
24 Trechsel had the Library of Congress in mind as well. Fair enough. You
25 could see Judge Trechsel mouthing "library of Congress" before Mr. Scott
1 mentioned it. It was harmless, but what is the perception?
2 Two or three weeks ago, there was a witness and the question was
3 posed: What did the prisoners have to eat? The mike was on in a rather
4 cynical tone, and I underline that, there was a comment by Judge Trechsel,
5 if anything. My client picked it up. I said nothing. I looked at Judge
6 Trechsel. I didn't say anything at the time, but my client brought it my
7 attention and said, "Aren't you going to react." My comment was, "How can
8 I possibly react? What can I possibly say?" And then he said, "Well,
9 how am I getting a fair trial if these are the sort of comments made from
10 the Bench."
11 It may be a perfectly natural reaction under the circumstances or
12 with the knowledge we have of the case; but if we're talking about the
13 perception of justice, you know, then I think we all need to be a little
14 bit more mindful and a little more careful. Whether justice will be done
15 at the end of the trial, that's somebody else's -- we'll see. I don't
16 know. Now, we do have options on the Defence side, as does the
17 Prosecution. We also know that the Bench is awfully divided and has been
18 divided for quite some time. Virtually all decisions, major decisions,
19 seem to be split decisions, and we all know which way they go and who's
20 voting on them. It's rather apparent.
21 But I am concerned. I'm trying to do my job. I'm trying to do it
22 properly. I don't like having to raise my voice against the Judge, but I
23 don't think it is fair. I don't know it is proper for the Judge to sit
24 there and basically bob their head, when it's the Prosecution talking; but
25 when it's the Defence, gesticulating, saying no, because that's the
1 appearance. And it gives the appearance to the accused that perhaps some
2 members of the Bench are less open-minded than should be. I'm not
3 suggesting that is the case. I don't know, but I am rather concerned.
4 I'm very concerned; and perhaps, when we cool down a little bit,
5 it may be good to have another session, maybe have a 65 ter hearing in
6 private, but something has to be cleared up. I don't think it is
7 appropriate for members of the Bench to be making comments while the mike
8 is on and others can hear them, where they're voicing opinions. I don't
9 think it's proper to be cutting off the Defence in the middle of
10 responding to an objection, especially when there seems to be a double
11 standard. You could certainly cut off Tomljanovich, but you chose not to
12 do. None of the Bench did. You allow allowed him. You gave him free
14 When it comes to this gentleman, all of a sudden we need to be
15 protective of him, because if the Prosecution says, "All we need is a
16 date. It fits our little theory," therefore, okay, fine. It's all
17 relevant. We already know about it. It seems to me that it's a rather
18 cynical approach to take to say, "We don't know whether it's relevant or
19 not. We're going to hear it." But when the Defence tries to demonstrate
20 through proper cross-examination why it is not relevant, to cut the
21 Defence off, so there is no record. That is my point.
22 That is why I think that what happened yesterday was unfair. And
23 I know that I'm taking a risk by bringing this to the Trial Chamber's
24 attention, but my client is looking at me and is asking me, "What is going
25 on." And I have to explain to him every day not to worry, that this Trial
1 Bench is going to look at all the facts objectively. And while there may
2 be some facial expressions or there may be some slips of the tongue, at
3 the end of the day, they're going to be fair.
4 But I must insist that we need, all of us, to be very mindful that
5 justice has to be seen, not just done. And that's -- I bring it to the
6 Court's attention, and I invite the Court to set a date so we can have a
7 mini hearing on this issue, but I think it would be good to clear the air.
8 That's all I have for now.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. A few brief comments
10 on what you have just said. A witness has testified upon the request of
11 the Prosecution in order to answer questions relating to the facts or the
12 events that took place in the former Yugoslavia during the period covered
13 by the indictment, as well as following the period covered by the
14 indictment. And yesterday, at some point, a legal question was raised,
15 and my colleague, who, of course, will also take the floor if he wishes
16 to, mentioned the fact that the witness is not a jurist, a legal expert,
17 and it was, therefore, difficult for him to address legal questions since
18 he is not trained to do so. That is what was said on that topic.
19 I was not of the same opinion. I feel that a historian should
20 generally have some legal knowledge. Nonetheless, I recognise that the
21 transitional provisions of the Washington Agreement are so complex that it
22 is not surprising that the witness was not aware of them. So that was the
23 debate that took place yesterday on the topic of history and law.
24 The second issue raised, well, it would seem that some time ago
25 the context of Dretelj, the issue of the food given to the prisoners was
1 raised, the issue of what the prisoners ate, and an element was mentioned
2 that had already been mentioned in the context of other depositions. As
3 far as I remember, some had indicated that the food was the same for the
4 soldiers and the detainees. So what was said really didn't have any
5 impact, any consequences.
6 Now, as to the way in which justice is perceived, we all realise
7 that the relevance and the probative value really have nothing to do with
8 that. The ruling will be handed down based on the documents, the
9 evidence, and the answers given to the questions, in light of the evidence
10 submitted by the Defence when the time comes. So no one today is in a
11 position to say that such and such a Judge feels a certain way on a
12 certain issue. Things keep changing, and what seems like truth today may
13 not be truth tomorrow. Elements -- new elements can change things, so we
14 should not draw any conclusions at this point.
15 The accused will be judged in the long run at the end, based on
16 all of the elements that we have before us. For the time being, there are
17 elements that are being discussed, and the final conclusion and ruling
18 will only be adopted at the very end. So anyone who might feel that
19 decisions have already been taken or are being taken, that minds are being
20 made up, would be very much in the wrong.
21 And that's all that I have to say about the issues that have been
22 raised. I don't know whether my colleague would like to take the floor.
23 I will give him the floor.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I will not try to address all the points counsel
25 has saw fit to raise, but address two issues. One is the shaking of my
1 head. Mr. Karnavas, I am not a poker player and I have not been born with
2 a poker face, and I seem not to have really learned it. I remember at one
3 point Ms. Nozica, and perhaps also Ms. Alaburic, certainly one of them
4 stated that they liked to see an echo on my face of what they were
5 bringing forward because it let them know where they were. I am not
6 reacting consciously. I will try withhold any mimic reaction to what I'm
8 But for one, when I was shaking my head, I was not stopping you,
9 Mr. Karnavas, and that was not my intention at that point of stopping you.
10 And if I disagree with something that you say, that doesn't mean that I am
11 prejudiced on the issue of this trial alone. It is not reduced to what
12 you say, Mr. Karnavas.
13 On the other hand, as far as the position of the witness is
14 concerned, what my objection still is - and we'll perhaps come back to
15 that - it's not so much that the witness is trained as a historian rather
16 than as a lawyer. It is a fact that the task assigned on the witness was
17 a merely anthological task. That means he was asked to state what a
18 historian today observes on the period after the Washington Agreement, and
19 he was not asked to pass any value judgement on whether that was something
20 that was wrong or unlawful or whatever.
21 Now, the word "unlawful" does appear at one point, and I will have
22 already leave of the President at the beginning of his continued
23 interrogation to invite him to make clear what he means and where he gets
24 that from. As you have noted, I was surprised. I haven't given it the
25 weight as you have given it, which of course is your right, but I think
1 there might have been a misunderstanding. I think that's all to say.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, if I may briefly respond as far as the value
3 judgement. If you look at the second report, which was the thrust of my
4 cross-examination, it's full of value judgements. That's the problem.
5 That's number one. And, number two, I understand what the task was;
6 however, you cannot look at historical events in the abstract and in a
7 vacuum. You have to put them in perspective.
8 In my opinion, what the Prosecution is attempting to do is have
9 the Trial Chamber draw certain conclusions. Now, they're entitled to have
10 the Trial Chamber draw those conclusions, but what we're suggesting is:
11 Please don't draw those conclusions until you hear all of the evidence
12 in -- and all the historical facts perspective. And they can't bring in a
13 witness and say: Well, this was my very limited task and don't go outside
14 if, for instance, in trying to accomplish that task, one would be expected
15 to look at other matters and to be aware of other facts.
16 That was the whole point that I was trying to make yesterday, and
17 that's why I believe we disagree on how far cross-examination should be.
18 I don't believe that this is relevant testimony. You believe it is or
19 maybe that it is. And the only way we're going to find out is the
20 Prosecution is entitled to ask their questions. I didn't interrupt during
21 their direct, but I'm entitled to go and then bring out other matters and,
22 because, as I indicated, I'm being forced now to go into 1996, 1997, 1998,
23 all the way to 2007 with respect to this, because the Prosecution
24 yesterday, if I understood him correctly, their theory now is that the
25 joint criminal enterprise that they believe existed continued to exist all
1 the way at least until 1999, 2000, and maybe even today.
2 That's their theory, which means I have to defend against that.
3 If I don't have to defend against it, then there's no need to hear any
4 testimony after the cut-off date of the indictment. It's plain and simple
5 to me as a lawyer; but if we're going to go into that period and if that's
6 going to be the argument, because I think the Prosecution's argument is
7 grounded in that it was so embedded, this joint criminal enterprise was so
8 embedded, that these -- these Croats just could not get along and can't
9 get along and they're just persisting, well, if that's the case, fine,
10 they can argue that. And I'm saying: Look at other historical facts.
11 And if you're going to be looking at the Washington Agreement or
12 if you're going to be looking at the Dayton Agreement, do so in context.
13 What did they call for? What happened afterwards? What was going on in
14 country? What was possible at the time? What were the internationals
15 doing and still doing? Just think. I just invite the Trial Chamber to
16 think back of the reunification of Germany, just as an example. In
17 peacetime where Germany at that time was a powerhouse, their economy was
18 the best in Europe, and think about all the problems it had. That's what
19 we're talking about in a middle of a war in forming the Federation, and
20 we're talking something like that multiplied by a hundred times after the
21 war with respect to Dayton.
22 So that's what I'm trying to do. I'm trying to give you the facts
23 through cross-examination, because at the end I'm going to be arguing, at
24 the end of this gentleman's testimony, that you should disregard
25 everything; otherwise, we will turn this trial into a seminar on
1 post-construction Bosnia.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] My colleague would like to take
3 the floor and then Mr. Scott will have the floor.
4 JUDGE PRANDLER: I have to speak up as well because the issues
5 which had been taken up by Mr. Karnavas are very important ones, and we
6 have to think about them and we have to give our own answer and really to
7 take into account whatever he said. I, as for one, I am very much always
8 watching Mr. Karnavas in a way with an approach that is very positive as
9 far as his work is concerned. I am fully aware of his talented way of
10 representing his client. I am fully aware of his knowledge; and also, as
11 far as we know he's, president of the body of the council of the Defence.
12 Now, I believe that that is why he has always a particular way of
13 responsibility and important task to represent his client and to speak in
14 this Chamber according to his achievements. By the way, I also used to
15 read his articles and whatever he has written about the Defence issues in
16 the Tribunal.
17 On the other hand, I have also some problem that he is having a
18 kind of leitmotif, a major push, a major line, according to which he
19 always tries to prove that this trial is not fair, and I cannot accept
20 this leitmotif. I cannot accept this approach. I really believe that we
21 have to come to terms and have to understand each other, but, of course,
22 we all know the important issues which are at hand.
23 We all know that it is the basic task of the Bench to be
24 independent, to be neutral, to listen to both the Prosecution and to the
25 Defence, and to be really as objective as possible, as humanly as
1 possible, by studying the issues at hand and then to make it's, I mean the
2 Bench's, proper conclusions and decision. At the same time, I really
3 believe that it will be not fair to characterize the work of the Chamber
4 as not being fair in its approach towards the Defence, towards the client,
5 their clients, to the accused, et cetera. And that is why I would like to
6 speak up and to say that I continue to be on the side of the Bench which
7 really would like to have a fair trial.
8 It is our intention to do that and, therefore, we are asking the
9 Defence, and especially I would like to ask Mr. Karnavas, not to be
10 carried away by their own convictions, not to be carried away by their own
11 oratory sometimes, but really to see that this Bench is constructed in a
12 way which really give rise to the best hope of this Trial Chamber to
13 achieve a judgement which is fair and fairly based.
14 It is what I would like to say and I would not like to go into the
15 details as far as the present witness's qualifications or what he has
16 written and what he -- what he knows. I know something also about Dayton
17 and Washington Agreement because, during that time in the 1990s, I was
18 working in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on the legal issues of the
19 Balkan crisis and Bosnia-Herzegovina; therefore, I may claim that I know
20 something about it.
21 At the same time, I do not say and I do not claim that I know
22 everything, and that is why I am, in the future as well, would like to
23 study everything which is at our hands which is before us. I can pledge
24 my full, I would say, attempt, not only attempt, but my approach, which is
25 to be that we have to reach the conclusions which are fair and just. It
1 is what I would like to say.
2 Thank you.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you have the floor.
4 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours. Good morning
5 to all of you, and good morning to all those in and around the courtroom.
6 Your Honours, I want to make a few, hopefully, brief comments in
7 response to some things that have been said this morning, and I want it to
8 be measured because I start off by saying, of course, the Defence has the
9 right to make a record about concerns that they may have about the conduct
10 of the trial and the rights of the accused. I understand that and that
11 certainly has, of course, its legitimate place in the courtroom, and I
12 start my comments with that.
13 I also want to start my comments by saying I'm torn whether not to
14 say anything at all because part of my instinct is not to belabour this
15 and let's just get on with business. However, the problem is, Your
16 Honour, as Mr. Karnavas has so often said, the parties have to make their
17 record; and for better, for worse, some years from now, some Appeals
18 Chamber or somebody else may be reading this record and it is important
19 that the record be balanced. And if the Prosecution does not at least
20 occasionally state its position, then we have a record in which it's only
21 a statement of the Defence grievances over and over and over again, and
22 not one that, in our judgement, reflects a fair state of the record as a
24 While I recognise the right of the Defence, including
25 Mr. Karnavas, to state his positions, I think the way that it has been
1 done repeatedly and they way it was done yesterday and again even this
2 morning, albeit, albeit in a softer tone, the substance was no different.
3 My concern is that this -- these theatrics, these positions are for the
4 purpose of intimidating the Court, threatening the Court, having a
5 chilling effect on the Court and the way it conducts its business. It's
6 further to push the Chamber. It would be perceived by some outside the
7 courtroom, and I guess what you see in the courtroom depends on where you
8 sit, both inside the courtroom and outside. And I won't belabour that
9 further, except to say that what Mr. Karnavas has said is his particular
10 perspective and not necessarily the perspective of all the observers of
11 these proceedings.
12 It is unfair to push the Chamber into, with the greatest respect
13 for Judge Prandler, to make him feel the need to on the one hand, of
14 course, express his concerns about some of Mr. Karnavas's conduct, but at
15 the same time, of course, appraise him: He's a very good lawyer, he's the
16 president of the ADC, et cetera, et cetera. It shouldn't be necessary to
17 say that, and I'm confident, but, on the other hand, I'm confident that
18 Judge Prandler has the same high regard for the lawyers on the Prosecution
19 team opinion.
20 The fact that, by his comments, Mr. Karnavas would press the
21 Chamber and press Judge Prandler, by one example, to feel the need to then
22 praise Mr. Karnavas in a conduct -- in a situation which I do not believe
23 deserved praise is unfair, unfair to the Prosecution, unfair to the
24 proceedings as a whole.
25 I also think it's terribly presumptuous, terribly presumptuous,
1 for counsel to comment on the internal workings of the Chamber and whether
2 there's a split among the Judges or whether there's a differences and to
3 comment on that. Now, unless Mr. Karnavas has some inside track or inside
4 source on how the Chamber conducts its business, I think that's
5 inappropriate and entirely presumptuous to make those comments, and they
6 shouldn't be made.
7 Now, turning to what happened with the witness, as I said
8 yesterday, Your Honour, the witness was tasked by the Prosecution to
9 answer a particular question, as Judge Trechsel has pointed out. Now, If
10 Mr. Karnavas has problems with that, which he may, he can direct that to
11 me, he can direct that to the Prosecution, he can direct that to the
12 Prosecution, and attack me and attack the work that was done. But it's
13 not fair, in my view, in my respectful submission, to attack the witness,
14 when the witness did what he was asked to do, a point that both the
15 witness and I both repeatedly attempted to make yesterday.
16 The issue, the only issue that the witness, once again, to
17 belabour it one more time, was to research the existence -- the continuing
18 existence and operation of Herceg-Bosna. Good or bad, right or wrong,
19 justified or not, did it continue to exist and operate after Dayton and
20 Washington? I think the answer is clearly: Yes, it did. It doesn't even
21 appear to be disputed anymore. Maybe it was disputed at one pint, but now
22 we're not disputing that but the answer is to try to justify it. That is
23 the moving target that I talked about yesterday.
24 I think it was -- I think the witness was treated unfairly
25 yesterday. I hope he won't be treated unfairly today, and, Your Honour, I
1 end my comments there.
2 Thank you.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Murphy.
4 MR. MURPHY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. I had
5 not, in fact, intended to speak now. It was a misunderstanding. I had
6 asked for some time at the end of the day rather than at the beginning,
7 but I think it may perhaps be in everyone's interest for someone to
8 intervene who's not involved in the immediate heat of what happened
9 yesterday. And I -- let me just say this on the issue of the witness.
10 The Prosecution says: "Well, it's not proper to cross-examine this witness
11 outside the bounds of what the limited task he was asked to do." But,
12 Your Honour, I -- I don't think it's any secret that the Prosecution's
13 intention in having this witness testify is going to be, at the end of the
14 day, to suggest to the Trial Chamber that what was going on after Dayton
15 was, in some sense, illegal and a continuation of the joint criminal
17 If that was not the intention, why have we taken two days to have
18 this testimony at all? It would be completely irrelevant. And if that's
19 the case, then for the Prosecution to say: "Well, you can't cross-examine
20 the witness to see what the transitional arrangements were under
21 Washington or under Dayton" is completely misconceived, because if you're
22 going to ask: "Did Herceg-Bosna continue and what was it doing after a
23 certain point," it has to be relevant to say: "Well, was there any role
24 that it was foreseen Herceg-Bosna was going to fulfil?" I mean, what was
25 the -- why was it continuing? What was its role, if any, in the
1 post-Dayton world?
2 And for a witness to come and represent himself to be an expert on
3 the Balkan -- on Balkan history and the Balkan history of the former
4 Yugoslavia and to say: "Well, I don't know these things. I didn't bother
5 reading the Dayton Accord. I can't remember what it says," Your Honour,
6 it's a matter which affects the weight of his testimony. And that will be
7 a matter that the Trial Chamber will consider, one way or the other. But
8 for Mr. Scott to say that "Well, you can't get into that and expose this
9 weakness in the evidence," in my respectful submission, is completely
11 And I will respectfully submit that Mr. Karnavas was completely
12 entitled to cross-examine. And, Your Honour, I don't think it would be
13 constructive for me to comment on any broader issues, so I'll leave it at
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Murphy.
16 We are going to have the witness brought in.
17 Mr. Usher, please bring him in.
18 So I think that Mr. Karnavas still has another 45 minutes.
19 [The witness entered court]
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, Mr. Karnavas,
21 because I believe that Judge Trechsel had a follow-up question.
22 Good morning, sir. Can you hear the -- me as I'm being
23 translated? Judge Trechsel has a question for you.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Miller, you have stated, I believe yesterday,
25 that your report was an objective description of developments, yet
1 Mr. Karnavas has pointed out that you speak of illegal structures in your
2 second report. Can you explain to the Chamber how that gets into your
4 THE WITNESS: As I also explained, my report is based on research
5 accomplished by other organizations. The term "illegal" was drawn from
6 the ICG report on reunifying Mostar. I -- one of the jobs of a scholar is
7 to evaluate the evidence, to evaluate the materials he is using in
8 preparing such a report. In that ICG report on reunifying Mostar, the
9 argument is convincingly made that the authorities in Mostar, the Croatian
10 authority, had systematically avoided implementation of agreements that
11 they had entered into with the other parties in Bosnia under international
12 guidance, and, therefore, the word "illegal" seemed to me to be
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Does that not cast a slightly different light on
15 your report, in that you seem to endorse this finding by the institute and
16 make a description which is not a mere description but which is tainted by
17 such a value judgement? You not just observe whether Herceg-Bosna
18 continues to exist, but without perhaps so saying so very expressly, but
19 betraying your attitude, you at the same time say that it unlawfully
20 continues to exist. Is that the correct interpretation of your report?
21 THE WITNESS: I don't actually think that it betrays my bias, and
22 I don't think that it betrays the bias of the ICG report that I'm relying
23 on. I think that it shows -- I think that the ICG demonstrated that the
24 Croatian authorities in Herceg-Bosna had avoided implementation of
25 agreements. You know, when --
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Miller, I am not talking of bias. One can be
2 neutral and pass a value judgement. That does not exclude each other.
3 But the issue is whether one makes a pure neutral description such as a
4 camera would, and even there it's, of course, a bit doubtful whether it is
5 entirely neutral, or whether in describing a situation one also says
6 something about its value, more particularly, its lawfulness.
7 THE WITNESS: I actually don't personally view a comment on
8 lawfulness or legality a value judgement. A value judgement would be if I
9 were to say, for instance, "Those lousy Croats in Mostar persisted in
10 illegal behaviour." To me, that's a value judgement and I don't believe I
11 entered into that sort of language in this report. However, I guess
12 perhaps I would just say I disagree with your characterization, but I
13 respect your position.
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, I think we have a semantic problem to some
15 extent here, because we may have a cooler -- a cooler conception of value
16 judgement. But thank you. That is -- that answers my question.
17 Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas, but I don't think you have anything to
18 object to this way of questioning.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: No, that was wonderful, Judge Trechsel.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It shows you that you are -- you have a tendency
21 to prematurely misjudge our minds, and I would invite you to be careful
22 and take the lesson.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: I agree. I will take my own medicine. I want to
24 thank Judge Prandler for his comments. I don't agree entirely with the
25 Prosecution, but I am very mindful of our task at hand.
1 WITNESS: NICHOLAS J. MILLER [Resumed]
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas: [Continued]
3 Q. Picking up on what Judge Trechsel indicated, first, let's begin
4 with a definition. What do you define as value judgement? Because I have
5 a couple of questions on this. Give me a definition.
6 A. I guess I understand a value judgement to be a judgement -- I
7 mean, it's almost self-evident, isn't it. A value judgement would be a
8 judgement based on my own values of another person's or institution's
10 Q. Okay. All right. And then picking up again from what was said in
11 your response to Judge Trechsel's question, you said that you read certain
12 reports, the research of a scholar. You sort of underscored that, the
13 scholar part. That. The research you did is you went on the internet and
14 pulled up some reports and you read them, right? That's the extent of
15 your research? It's a yes or no.
16 A. Well, sometimes we questions aren't yes or no. I mean, I suppose
17 technically, yes, that's what I did.
18 Q. Okay. So technically that's what you did. And I take it when you
19 were surfing the net technically what you did is you discriminated - I'm
20 using that word in a nonperjorative fashion - but you discriminated as
21 what you would download, look at, read, analyse, versus what you would not
22 download, look, research, read, analyse, and synthesise into your report.
23 Would that be correct?
24 A. Absolutely, we always discriminate based on our own knowledge of
25 the sources and our understanding of the situation.
1 Q. That would be one form of a value judgement?
2 A. Was that a question?
3 Q. Well, wasn't that an inflection at the end of my statement?
4 A. I thought you --
5 Q. No. Anyway. I'll move on. I'll move on.
6 A. No. I don't think that's actually a value judgement.
7 Q. Okay. All right. Now, you said that you looked at those reports;
8 and based on their evidence, does that mean that you read their footnotes,
9 or does that mean that you actually went beyond the footnotes and actually
10 looked at the sources that these organizations used in citing and in
11 basing their own conclusions?
12 That's an easy one.
13 A. I noted the sources they used. I did not go back and re-read the
15 Q. Okay. So you read the footnotes and said: "Well, I guess if
16 they're citing this newspaper, it must be correct; or if they're citing
17 this report, it must be correct." There was no need for you to actually
18 look at any original sources, as a scholar, but, rather, you read the
19 report, you glanced at the footnote, and it was: "Okay. I think this
20 report has value and I'm going to incorporate it into my little report."
21 Basically, that's how it went, right?
22 A. That's not only how it went; that's what scholars do all the time.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. We accept -- for instance, you were showing Steven Burg and Paul
25 Shoup's book the other day. We accept people based on their work. We
1 accept their current work based on the reputation of their previous work.
2 We do that because it's impossible to go back and actually examine every
3 source that's been used over the decades in the case of historians.
4 Q. All right.
5 A. The process is one in which we all build on each other's work.
6 People's work is judged by other people other scholars over time in the
7 form of reviews, articles, critiques. So we develop an opinion. We
8 develop a position on the value of a particular scholarly and other work.
9 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Now, yesterday - I don't want to belabour the
10 point - but yesterday you did indicate that -- when I pushed you a little
11 bit, you said, "I did what I was asked to do." This is on page 116, line
12 11: "I did what I was asked to do which is provide a short, direct report
13 on the nature or persistence," or the nonpersistence I suppose, "of the
14 government of Herceg-Bosna, and I did so as I was asked on the basis of
15 open-source materials, knowing that I was not going to be able to afford
16 or to be supported in going -- in going on-site research and ..."
17 And so my question is at this point in time: Are you saying, in
18 your answer here, that the Prosecution declined requests on your part to
19 actually look at original source material or to go on site and maybe
20 perhaps meet with some of the players in situ?
21 A. I did not make a request. That's my assumption that it would not
22 have been supported because the question itself was very basic and
24 Q. All right. But you, being the historian, the expert, being asked
25 to provide an answer to these questions, did you not think perhaps it is
1 necessary for you to tell the client, that is, the Office of the
2 Prosecution, what you, the expert, might want to look at, might need to
3 look at in order to give a full, fair, complete, unbiased opinion?
4 A. I did not --
5 Q. All right --
6 A. -- excuse me, because the differences between writing a report
7 that essentially states the obvious, that obvious has not really been
8 contested here, or doing years and years of work --
9 Q. Okay --
10 A. -- as a scholar --
11 Q. All right --
12 A. -- that would result in something like a book-length manuscript,
13 which I didn't as necessary.
14 Q. Okay. Well, let me -- Before we get to your report, because we
15 are going to pick up on that, I just want to finish up a little bit on
16 what we were talking about yesterday, and that is the transitional
17 process. My first question is: Would transfer of responsibilities to the
18 New Federation Institution parallel -- was there a parallel process from
19 Herceg-Bosna in institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
20 accordance with the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
21 If you don't know the answer, say you don't know.
22 A. I'm reading the question. It's long and is a little bit
23 complicated. As was the case yesterday, I have not memorised the Dayton
24 Agreement and I cannot tell you precisely, but I can make an informed
1 Q. Okay. Well, I'm not interested in an informed guess.
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. I'm asking you because we believe that that should have been part
4 of your work; albeit, you weren't asked directly by the Prosecutor.
5 Incidentally, before embarking on your task, did you look at the
7 A. I did look at the indictment, yes.
8 Q. Read it?
9 A. Yes, I did read it.
10 Q. Saw who was indicted?
11 A. Yes, I did.
12 Q. Okay. All right. So you kind of understood from reading the
13 indictment, and one does not need to be a legal scholar. Somebody with a
14 Ph.D. from University of Indiana would be able to read it and know more or
15 less the theory of the Prosecution case?
16 A. If I say that actually I'm not clear on the theory of the
17 Prosecution case in this case, would that make me less than intelligent?
18 I mean, I'm not a legal -- I am not a legal scholar. I did read the
19 indictment, and I didn't consider it my business, really, to understand
20 the direction. I was asked to do something and I did it.
21 Q. Okay. But why read the indictment if you didn't have to?
22 A. Because I was curious.
23 Q. You were curious.
24 A. I had time to kill.
25 Q. All right.
1 A. Perhaps that's true.
2 Q. All right. Then I take it, in performing your task here, you must
3 have looked at the various implementation agreements, such as Geneva,
4 Bonn, Rome, Sarajevo. These were all these agreements that took place
5 between 1995 and 1996. Did you look at any of those, again all of them
6 being available on the OHR, that's the Office of the High Representative
7 web site? Did you look at that?
8 A. I have looked at most of those agreements in the same sense I have
9 read the Dayton Peace Accords, but I did not memorise them and I did not
10 consider them to be important in the preparation of this report.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. So the answer is: Specifically, in this case, I did not look at
14 Q. You did not look at them as you were preparing for this report?
15 Because I'm not asking you about memorising so you can tell us what's in
16 them. As you can see, I'm not going through those documents, but I want
17 to know whether you consulted those sources because they happen to be open
18 sources available to the public. Did you look at them in preparation for
19 your report?
20 A. Like I said, I did not look at them specifically in preparation
21 for this report.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now -- so -- and I take it if I were to ask you
23 questions as: Have you read any of the expertise of the World Bank or the
24 IMF in trying to build the economic system of the Federation of BiH, the
25 answer to that would be "no" as well?
1 A. Over time, I've read some of it, but I did not read it in
2 preparation of this report.
3 Q. Okay. Well, who organized and who was responsible for the health
4 care, for instance, in the Federation? You haven't read that?
5 A. No.
6 Q. How many pension funds existed at the moment of the signing of the
7 agreement of the Federation? That would have been 1994.
8 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, enough is enough. This is -- haven't we
9 done enough since yesterday?
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Your honour, this is my time. It is my time, Your
12 MR. SCOTT: This is nothing more at this point than badgering the
13 witness and I think out of mean-spiritedness. The witness has said
14 repeatedly since yesterday that he did not need to nor did he look at the
15 specific sources for this specific purposes, and to ask this witness in
16 this context: "Do you know how many pension funds existed in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina at a particular time," is irrelevant. It is completely
18 irrelevant and is calculated only for the purpose of continuing to harass
19 the witness.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, it may be relevant. It may be
21 relevant --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. It may be relevant if
24 we're trying to discern, you know, the transitional process, and that's
25 what I'm trying to do. Now, I can move on; but as the Prosecutor so
1 eloquently pointed out, we need a record. And if I can quote him, you
2 know, I'm entitled to make my record as well as he is, so I'm making my
3 record. For instance, which enterprises provided electricity? That might
4 be relevant at some point. How many intelligence organs or institutions
5 existed at the signing of the Federation? How many existed at the signing
6 of Dayton? How many existed thereafter?
7 MR. SCOTT: That may or may not be the case, Your Honour. But at
8 this point, everyone in the courtroom must know, I hope, that it's unfair
9 to ask those questions to this witness.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on. If the Prosecutor is stating that he
11 does not know, I'll move on.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas. Mr. Karnavas, we
13 don't want to waste time --
14 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on --
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] -- but also for the sake of the
16 Defence, you wish to put questions and you know that the witness is going
17 to say, "I don't know." So can you gather all these questions into one
18 single question, and he'll be able to tell you: "I'm unable to answer,"
19 because he doesn't know about pension funds. And if you ask about power
20 generating agencies after Dayton, he won't know. He doesn't know how
21 officials are being paid. So I understood that you wished to develop your
22 case, and to do so you wanted to put it on record. That's why you put the
23 questions. Am I wrong or not about this approach of yours?
24 MR. KARNAVAS: You're -- well, you're not wrong, but there's a
25 little bit more to that, Mr. President, because the -- with all due
1 respect to what some -- some folks feel in this courtroom, I do think that
2 the report is latent with value judgements that the gentleman made, which
3 go to the line of the questioning.
4 But in any event, I'll move on. I just have a couple of questions
5 on that. I get your point and I'll move on, Mr. President. Two very
6 quick questions.
7 Q. Did the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina have a budget for 1994 with
8 all expenditure military police courts and education? Do you know that?
9 A. I do not.
10 Q. Okay. Did Herceg-Bosna have a budget for 1994 with military
11 police education expenditure? This is in 1994, so we're talking around
12 Washington Agreement time?
13 A. I don't know.
14 Q. Okay. Do you know what positions Dr. Jadranko Prlic held as a
15 result of the Washington Agreement?
16 MR. SCOTT: Object to relevance, Your Honour. Again, I have no
17 idea how this relates to whether Herceg-Bosna continued to exist or not,
18 which again is the only question that was put to this witness. What
19 positions Mr. Prlic held after this has no relevance to the question put
20 to the -- the task put to the witness.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, if I --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a moment. I'm going to
23 answer your intervention, Mr. Scott. You surprise me somewhat, because in
24 the documents that you had prepared in your binders, I can find the
25 presidential minutes. Obviously, Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Prlic speak about
1 the post-Washington period. These are documents provided by the
2 Prosecution and the Defence knew about it. It is, therefore, only normal,
3 maybe, that Mr. Karnavas should ask the witness whether he knows
4 Mr. Prlic's position as to the outcome of the Washington Agreement.
5 I'm somewhat surprised because this is to be found in the
6 documents. There is one of them in which we see Mr. Prlic and Mr. Tudjman
7 speaking about this very subject. So is the witness aware of this or not,
8 I don't know.
9 So please go ahead, Mr. Karnavas, with your question.
10 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, my apology for interrupting. Just to be
11 clear, I'm not going to belabour it. I understand what the Court said.
12 And it's certainly fair, absolutely fair, for Mr. Karnavas to ask about
13 any document that specifically mentions Mr. Prlic's involvement such, for
14 example, as the presidential transcripts, but I think the record will be
15 very, very clear that I didn't ask about Mr. Prlic's positions or roles in
16 terms of government after this time, nor do I think any of the documents
17 get into that. But having said that, I want to make the record clear, but
18 I understand your ruling.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, and it will become
20 imminently clear to Mr. Scott where I'm going with this.
21 Q. Did you know his positions?
22 A. I know that he served as prime minister or premier in the
23 government of Herceg-Bosna. I believe he went on to serve as foreign
24 minister of the Bosnian government.
25 Q. Okay. Now, I'm asking you about the signing of the Washington
1 Agreement, the formation of the Federation, pre-Dayton. Okay? So do you
2 know what positions he held within the government - and I'm just using
3 that term as we understand it - in BiH and any positions within the
4 Federation in BiH as a result of the Washington Agreements? Do you know?
5 It's a yes, no, I can take a wild guess.
6 A. It's a no.
7 Q. Okay. Now, let me go on to your report, the same report we were
8 looking at yesterday. You indicate on page 1, at the very end: "Some of
9 the ..."
10 MR. KARNAVAS: This is the very last sentence, Your Honours.
11 Q. You say: "Some of the more moderate Croats were dispatched to the
12 Federation and state government, while many of the many more radical
13 elements remained in place in Herceg-Bosna," and you cite some report
14 which we know you looked at but didn't go into the basis of how they
15 formulated those conclusions.
16 Now, first of all, let's look at that. Who are the more moderate
17 Bosnian Croats at this time that you're referring to, if you know; and if
18 you don't know, just tell us, I don't know?
19 A. I'm thinking of people like Kresimir Zubak, but I also believe
20 that Prlic was dispatched or went to Sarajevo.
21 Q. Okay. Well, that word "dispatch." Thank you. Who dispatched
23 A. Who dispatched him?
24 Q. Yeah.
25 A. The authorities in Herceg-Bosna.
1 Q. Which authorities in Herceg-Bosna? So are you suggesting that
2 somebody in Herceg-Bosna said: "Okay. Prlic, now, you're going to be a
3 member of the Government of the Federation and of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
4 while we hard-liners sit behind here in Mostar." Is that how -- how is it
5 that you understand this? Because you, after all, are the historian and,
6 we're talking about historical facts. And it would appear to me that
7 there's some value judgements here, one of which I like because you're
8 calling my client, you know, a moderate.
9 A. I would concede that there's a value judgement there.
10 Q. Okay. But ask me, where did you get this, where you say
11 "dispatched"? If the answer is "I don't know," we can move on. Save
12 yourself some time.
13 A. As I've said before, I accept the expertise of the people who
14 prepared these reports --
15 Q. Okay. Thank you.
16 A. You're welcome.
17 Q. Then you go on to say: "Meetings of HDZ and local cantonal
18 governors," et cetera, "serve as a real government of Herceg-Bosna where
19 business is transacted."
20 Now, I would assume that -- that for this particular comment, you
21 must have looked at how the cantonal structures are vis-a-vis the
22 Federation and what powers actually the cantonal governors had, right, or
24 A. I'll just repeat what I've said before --
25 Q. Very well. Very well. We can save on that.
1 A. But the answer wasn't I don't know. The answer was that I accept
2 the expertise of the sources I used.
3 Q. Sir, I'm asking you concretely: And what if the source is wrong?
4 What if? I know, as academics, we have to accept what other academics
5 say; but from where I come from, at least, most academics a lot of times
6 don't agree, especially historians, you know, and reasonable historians
7 can reasonably disagree. So what if? And there's no footnote to this, by
8 the way, there's a footnote following that, but I assume -- I'm going to
9 take a wild guess that this is probably part and parcel of the same
10 source. But what if they're wrong?
11 You were asked to prepare a report. You didn't look what they
12 were basing this on. You've already admitted to that. What if they're
13 wrong? Then the answer would be: I don't know, would it not?
14 A. If they're wrong, the answer would be that I used poor judgement
15 in accepting the verdicts of this report.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. However, it sounds to me like you actually have been agreeing with
18 the verdicts of this report.
19 Q. Let's go on to page 3, you say: "Croat leaders went further, even
20 discouraging Croatian refugees and displaced persons from returning to
21 areas now under the control of other ethnic groups." There's a footnote
22 9. Now, who are these Croat leaders? Name them in particular who were
23 discouraging. And I would like to know, when you name a person, I want to
24 know concrete facts, where you read it, not the report, but actual facts,
25 because we know you haven't looked at the sources.
1 So you're stating this, or is it the same answer: I've accepted
2 what was in the report?
3 A. It is the same answer.
4 Q. Okay. Then you go on to say, the next paragraph, there are no
5 footnotes, you say: "International organizations and other experts
6 identified four sources of strengths and intransigence of Herceg-Bosna."
7 First question: Is this a value judgement? Because earlier you
8 want us to believe that you're just telling us the facts. Here it appears
9 to be some sort of a value judgement, that there were intransigence. So,
10 who are the international organizations? Do we know them? Because
11 there's no footnote here?
12 A. This is a concluding paragraph --
13 Q. Okay.
14 A. -- excuse me. The value judgement, such as it is, is the value
15 judgement of others. I'm simply reporting my conclusion.
16 Q. Okay. And who are the other experts, other experts identified?
17 So, if I want to go see these other experts, because maybe I want to
18 challenge them as to this or maybe I want to have a discourse with them,
19 maybe I want to be enlightened by them, who are these experts? Because
20 they're unnamed here. Is it the same answer: It's a conclusion?
21 A. When I say "international organizations and other experts," I'm
22 simply concluding the past -- the section of the report. I'm referring to
23 the people that I've cited, people and organizations that I've cited.
24 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now we go on to HDZ and Ante Jelavic. That
25 section that starts on page 4. Now we're talking about HDZ. Now -- now
1 here you say: "HDZ," in the first paragraph, "the HDZ split into two
2 factions which divided along approximately the following lines: One
3 headed by Ante Jelavic, Jadranko Prlic, and others, which continued to
4 emphasise Herzegovinian interests, and second headed by Kresimir Zubak,
5 which argued that they HDZ should consider the interests of Croats
6 throughout Bosnia."
7 Now, my first question is this: Is this a value judgement?
8 A. I wouldn't call that a value judgement.
9 Q. All right. And where is it, based on what, because I don't see
10 any information here, based on what are you saying that Jadranko Prlic was
11 continuing to emphasise Herzegovinian interest? And before you answer
12 that question, particularly, if you have not even bothered, you didn't
13 even have the intellectual curiosity to find out what, if any, positions
14 he held in the Federation and in the government of BiH at the time, based
15 on what do you make this statement?
16 A. This entire report is based on readily available second-source
17 material. That will always be my answer.
18 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, later on, you say that - I'm going to
19 skip ahead a little bit - on page 5, you talk about a speech that Jelavic
20 gave on March -- on 3 March 2001, and then you go on the following
21 paragraph of -- you begin by stating: "While this rather convoluted
22 formulation gave the appearance that HDZ still planned to work within the
23 framework of Dayton, the party felt strongly that the election laws put
24 Croats in Bosnia at the mercy of non-Croats."
25 Now, is this a value judgement or no?
1 A. I don't see it as a value judgement.
2 Q. All right. You're just stating the facts? It's yes or no.
3 A. I'm giving an interpretation.
4 Q. Giving an interpretation. Okay. Fair enough. Based on secondary
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. No more than that?
8 A. Right.
9 Q. All right. Now, do you know what was happening in Bosnia at the
10 time and what exactly Mr. Jelavic was pursuing with respect to the rights
11 of the Croatian nation within Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you know what was
12 the main gripe that he had and other Croats had within Bosnia-Herzegovina?
13 A. The High Representative had moved to eliminate parties that he
14 defined as nationalistic or extreme from political life in Bosnia, I
16 Q. Well, that comes afterwards. Isn't it a fact that the Croats felt
17 that they were disenfranchised, and that they in essence -- and I mean
18 disenfranchised in the sense that by being part of the Federation, because
19 of their numbers, that their national constitual rights were being
20 jeopardized; isn't that the main thrust of this?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Isn't it a fact that that discussion is going on even today as the
23 international community is attempting to find a solution to Bosnia and
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. All right. And by the way, have you by any chance looked at the
2 report for the Peace Implementation Council, that's Paris, France,
3 December 14, 2005? It was authored by an R. Bruce Hitchner. He's from
4 Tufts, Tufts University, and he is a member of the Secretariat of the
5 Constitutional Working Group?
6 A. No, I have not.
7 Q. Okay. So I take it you're not following what's going on?
8 A. Currently, no.
9 Q. Okay. All right. Would it surprise you if I were to tell you
10 that the very same issues that the parties were discussing, in 1991, 1992,
11 1993, and onwards, are still being discussed today with certain -- with
12 one -- with the Serbs, for instance, wanting to maintain the RS, the
13 Bosniaks wanting more or less a unitary government, and the Croats trying
14 to find a middle solution?
15 A. It would not surprise me.
16 Q. Okay. So, in this statement that this gentleman makes, this
17 professor - he's a professor as well as you are - for the Croats whose
18 demographic position in Bosnia is increasingly weak, the situation is no
19 less difficult, as they must somehow, in the absence of their own entity,
20 support a state government but is genuinely decentralised but at the same
21 time functional and efficient. Isn't that, in essence, what Mr. Jelavic
22 was pursuing at the time, or are you not able to answer that question?
23 A. I would say that it's what he said he was pursuing, at the very
25 Q. Okay. Now, let's look at your first report. I don't know how
1 much time I have left, but just very quickly, I just want to look at this
2 first report. Again, when I look at it, I thought Mr. Murphy, who was
3 also a professor here, was rather generous, when he said he would have
4 given it a B minus, or you he would have given it a B minus. I would have
5 given this a D plus to a graduate student, maybe a C to a freshman, but no
6 more than that. This, again, this entire report is basically you having
7 read certain newspaper articles and drawing some conclusions, correct?
8 A. You could put it that way I suppose.
9 Q. All right. And I'm not going to go into the specifics, where you
10 are lumping everybody as Yugoslav and what have you, but I do want to
11 point out one thing. Let me get to this first. You indicate, at one
12 page, you talk about the Graz negotiations; do you recall that?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 Q. Okay. And, of course, somewhere in the paper, you do mention --
15 you do cite Burg and Shoup, right?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. Now, what is interesting is, because if we go on page 11 of your
18 report, you say, at the bottom, right after footnote 33: "Speculation in
19 Danas, the independent Croatian news weekly, could not compete with the
20 concrete fact that Mate Boban and Radovan Karadzic actually negotiated as
21 though the Croats did not exist in May 1992, one month into the war in
22 Graz. The Graz negotiations resulted in the framework for these
23 negotiations ..."
24 And then you go on, and then you cite -- you say on the Graz
25 negotiations, see so-and-so. That's the extent of your research on Graz,
2 A. It's the extent of my specific research on Graz for this paper,
4 Q. All right. Now, reading Shoup, and you say that this is a source
5 that you use --
6 A. Mm-hmm --
7 Q. -- and you mention earlier -- on page 9, you mention a gentleman
8 by the name of Adil Zulfikarpasic. I think anybody learning the language
9 could pronounce that name because it has everything you need to know on
10 pronunciation in B/C/S. You know who this gentleman is, right?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. You know he has a foundation in an extensive library or archive in
14 A. I wouldn't have been able to be that specific but I believe you.
15 Q. Okay. Now, you quote him in November 1991. Now, in Shoup, on
16 pages -- it starts with around 70 to 71, there's a long and drawn-out
17 passage with respect to this gentleman with the SDS leadership going in
18 August -- in July and August 1991, to Belgrade and trying to reach some
19 sort of a secret negotiated deal where Shoup describes it.
20 He says: "In effect, what began in 1991 as an effort to create a
21 Greater Serbia by the Serbs in Croatia would then in this MBO," that's the
22 party for this gentleman, "scenario be transformed into a greater
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina," because earlier he's saying that, in a sense, the
24 plan described Bosnia-Herzegovina not only as a republic but a state,
25 "with a unitary government without regionalisation or cantonisation. All
1 three provisions were absent in the Serb's draft," of course they're
2 talking about.
3 This called for autonomy, but it also called for, if the Serbs of
4 Krajina left, they would also be part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, hence the
5 Greater Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Now, I take it you take Mr. Shoup at his word, because that's what
7 you indicated, one scholar must take another scholar at their word, that
8 this actually was happening?
9 A. I have no reason to doubted it.
10 Q. He then goes on to say on page 73: "During the talks, on July 17,
11 Adil Zulfikarpasic met with Milosevic in Belgrade. According to
12 Zulfikarpasic's account, Milosevic threw his support behind the agreement.
13 Upon his return to Sarajevo from the United States, Izetbegovic also
14 visited Belgrade and conferred with Milosevic. Leaks of the conversation
15 between Zulfikarpasic and Milosevic sent public opinion in Bosnian against
16 the projected union in the prelude of the 'Belgrade initiative' came to
17 naught. "
18 And then it goes on to talk about what was reported in Borba and
19 so on and so forth and a reaction from Mr. Kljuic, who obviously was not
20 terribly pleased to hear about all this that was happening behind his back
21 while he was in the government.
22 Now, I take it again - and we'll bring this in through our case at
23 some point - but, again, I mention all this because you indicated that one
24 must take another scholar at their word. Tell me, you being the
25 historian, was it not a fact that predating this statement by
1 Zulfikarpasic, in November 1991, he along with Izetbegovic were courting
2 Milosevic in order to stay in Yugoslavia, having secret negotiations. Was
3 this not the case?
4 A. I accept that description, yeah.
5 Q. Okay. And was there any reason why you did not bring out that,
6 for balance sake, at least to say, there were secret negotiations from
7 everybody on all sides and then cite Shoup, as you have, rather than to
8 cite Zulfikarpasic to say that, in page 9, that a war would cause heavy
9 casualties. Of course, that's a no-brainer. Everybody knows that. But
10 why not say this very same gentleman, who was that concerned, was at the
11 same time secretly negotiating with the Serbs? Why not put that in?
12 A. I could have put that in.
13 Q. All right.
14 A. It doesn't bother me to acknowledge that it could have been put in
15 now, but I included the Zulfikarpasic quote because he specifically notes
16 that a war would likely be a battle for destruction of one nation and
17 clearing. So he was probably trying to avoid this outcome in his
18 negotiations. I take it for granted that in most cites, that's what was
19 going on.
20 Q. All right. And he's negotiating with Milosevic, "the prince of
21 darkness of the Balkans."
22 A. Yes, he is, and I agree with your value judgement as well.
23 Q. Okay. Well, I mean, this is how he's been characterized. Whether
24 he is or not, I don't know. But at this point in time everybody, says
25 he's "the prince of darkness." So here we have Izetbegovic and this
1 gentleman negotiating.
2 Now, let me ask you this: Being a historian, knowing how the
3 Croats felt, not just in Croatia, but also the Croats in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, how do you think, or could you give us your expertise,
5 how would they have reacted to that sort of a secret deal?
6 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, just by point of
7 clarification, is Mr. Karnavas suggesting that all Croats in Bosnia were
8 one single mono-lithic group and that all Croats in Bosnia were to
9 responded in the same way?
10 MR. KARNAVAS: First of all, I said Bosnia and Herzegovina, that's
11 first and foremost, and perhaps the gentleman would realise that there are
12 two components to that country: Bosnia and Herzegovina. And I'm
13 asking --
14 MR. SCOTT: My objection remains the same. All Croats in Bosnia
15 and Herzegovina have one mono-lithic response and position on these
17 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll rephrase. I'll go back. I'll go back.
18 Q. Were there any Croats in the government at the time back in 1991
19 in the Bosnia-Herzegovina government? And I'm saying "government" in the
20 American sense, you know, like not just the prime ministerial and his
21 cabinets, but were there Croats? Let me break it down any even further.
22 Were there Croats in constituent nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if you
24 A. According to Yugoslav constitutional law --
25 Q. You say "Yugoslav" --
1 A. -- since we are talking about -- I mean, are we talking about
2 before or after the war began?
3 Q. I'm talking about before the war began?
4 A. Before the war had begun, in November of 1991 in Bosnia, the war
5 had not yet begun. Croats were considered a constituent nation in
6 Yugoslavia and in Bosnia.
7 Q. In Bosnia, that's what I'm talking about. In Bosnia, itself, did
8 Bosnia have a constitution as a republic?
9 A. Yes. It had a republican constitution.
10 THE ACCUSED PRLIC: [Interpretation] In transcript, it is missing
11 a word of the gentleman. He said that Croats were considered people in
12 Yugoslavia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not in the transcript. I
13 just want to react on. Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: I need the help of my client, as you can see.
15 Thank you, Mr. Prlic.
16 Q. Now -- all right. Now, how would the Croatian -- those who were
17 in the government at the time in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats, how would
18 they have reacted to this secret negotiation? And if the reaction would
19 have been benign, why have secret negotiations? Why not invite them in,
20 since they're part of it -- since they are also a constituent nation? We
21 more or less know where the Serbs are going. The Serbs in Bosnia want to
22 be part of Yugoslavia. That's not a problem. So what do you think the
23 reaction would have been?
24 MR. SCOTT: Again, Your Honour, I object to the relevance of this
25 question. The first report was put -- the two questions that were
1 addressed in the first report were quite clearly stated yesterday, and
2 that was whether there were certain common features or practices about the
3 conflicts, such as the mass displacement of people, ethnic violence, et
4 cetera. And the second part, second question in the first report was to
5 what extent that information was widely reported and known. And whether
6 there were secret negotiations between the Muslims and with somebody else
7 on a particular occasion, I don't see that has any relevance to the two
8 questions the witness was asked to address.
9 So we're once more into a situation where it's a free for all. It
10 is an absolute free for all. There are no borders, there are no limits,
11 there are no rules in the courtroom. It's just whatever Mr. Karnavas
12 wants to talk about.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honour, the topic is thinking about war
14 in Bosnia. That's the topic that starts on page 8. Now, as I said, we
15 have to put it into perspective. The problem with Mr. Scott, and I don't
16 know where he's learned his trial skills from, but he can't just put a
17 witness on direct and not expect the witness to be crossed. He can't open
18 the door and as soon as I try to go in shut it.
19 MR. SCOTT: I expect him to be crossed on what he was asked to do
20 and on the conclusions that he has reached, which he has clearly stated.
21 I do not expect him -- I've been practicing law at least as long as
22 Mr. Karnavas and at least as long as Mr. Karnavas --
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Well --
24 MR. SCOTT: -- excuse me, Your Honour, I will finish my statement,
25 and that is that I expect the witness to be crossed appropriately. And
1 the Chamber will note for the last 17 months I have rarely objected on
2 cross-examination. I've given broad range. Only when I think it is, in
3 fact, inappropriate and it's gone outside the scope are those times that
4 I've objected, and this is one of those times.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] With regard to the objection,
6 the issue is as follows: Mr. Karnavas is asking the witness what or how
7 would the Croats have reacted had they learned that there were secret
8 negotiations going on in Belgrade between Milosevic and others, for
9 example, Zulfikarpasic. We find this on page 9 of the report. That
10 indicates that a Muslim political leader granted an interview in 1991, and
11 so on and so forth.
12 Hence, it would be interesting to know whether the Croats in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina -- or had they learned of that, how would they have
14 reacted. The witness may or may not know.
15 So, Witness, what can you answer to the witness put by
16 Mr. Karnavas?
17 THE WITNESS: I'm quite certain that they would have been upset,
18 but I cannot give an yes or no answer to that question.
19 MR. KARNAVAS:
20 Q. I wasn't asking for an yes or no. This is where it's an
21 open-ended question because it was outside the scope of direct examination
22 in a sense, and that's why I wanted to give you full range, full depth and
23 breadth to that answer. So can you expand on that, in particular
24 because -- I want to address a little bit the Prosecution with this
25 question. On page 6 you talk: "Yugoslavs," whoever they were, Yugoslavs,
1 "were prepared for war in mid-1991, and the war they expected was an
2 ethnic one."
3 It's a wide-range statement. I assume that residents, citizens,
4 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, irrespective of their creed or faith or
5 nationality, are Yugoslavs, in a sense, because we still had Yugoslavia,
6 that you're saying that they were preparing and expecting for war.
7 So if they're there, if Izetbegovic is with Milosevic in July and
8 August, secretly negotiating on carving up parts of Yugoslavia and what
9 have you with these secret deals, would Izetbegovic and others know that
10 this was likely to exacerbate the situation, cause fear and instability
11 among the Croat population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the point they may
12 think it might be necessary for them to self-organize themselves?
13 A. Is this a wide-ranging question again?
14 Q. This is a wide-ranging question. You go for it.
15 A. Thank you. I suspect that the Croats in Bosnia could be expected
16 to be upset upon hearing about such negotiations, but the historical
17 context here - sorry, I'm talking too fast - but the historical context
18 here is also important. Izetbegovic was undoubtedly negotiating with
19 Milosevic because he understood that the Tudjman government had embraced a
20 longer-term Croatian approach to Bosnia. The Croats had historically
21 longed to incorporate significant parts of Bosnia into a Croatian state.
22 Whether this is legitimate or not is not my problem.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. But this is present. This is something that all Yugoslavs had, -
25 and they were Yugoslavs before the war began.
1 Q. I understand that --
2 A. -- I'm wondering about the tone of these remarks about my use of
3 that term. And Yugoslavs, as a rule, understood that, you know, that the
4 Croatian government had passed it, had done it.
5 Q. Pop quiz.
6 A. Pop quiz.
7 Q. Did Izetbegovic ever offer Herzegovina, for instance, to Tudjman?
8 A. Yes or no?
9 Q. That's a yes or no.
10 A. I seriously doubt it.
11 Q. You seriously doubt it?
12 A. I do, but I don't know.
13 Q. You never heard of any offers made by Izetbegovic at any point in
14 time to Tudjman that he can have Herzegovina?
15 A. I'm not aware of that, no.
16 Q. Fair enough.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, apparently you've
18 run out of time; and as it is time for the break, please finish up quickly
19 with one last question.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. And I had it at the tip of my tongue.
21 Give me a moment, Mr. President.
22 Q. Now, you were talking about Tudjman, and you were talking about
23 Izetbegovic having to go, like Oliver Twist sort of, to Milosevic, you
24 know, with tin cup in hand, asking for protection. In essence, that's
25 what you're saying.
1 A. No.
2 Q. That's how I read it.
3 A. Okay.
4 Q. But let me ask you this: Was the war waging on at this point in
5 Croatia? Had it started there?
6 A. At the point that Izetbegovic spoke with Milosevic?
7 Q. Yeah. We're talking about July, August 1991 when these secret
8 negotiations are going on, had the JNA attacked?
9 A. It had begun.
10 Q. It had begun. Okay. And that's about the time, too, when these
11 secret negotiations are going on and then Ravno is attacked, and
12 Izetbegovic comes out and says: "This is not our war." This was the
13 message to the residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which undoubtedly, as you
14 must know, being a historian from a very fine university with a Ph.D.,
15 that the Croats took this to mean that this particular president is not
16 looking at our best interests?
17 A. As a historian who has studied these questions deeper into the
18 past than this trial is going into, I can tell you that it would be my
19 highly educated guess that the Croats of Herzegovina were perfectly happy
20 with that formulation.
21 Q. You mean with Croatia being attacked, Izetbegovic saying: "This
22 is not our war," to a response to an attack on a Croatian village by the
23 JNA, while the JNA is staging its attack against Bosnia-Herzegovina --
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I may have misunderstood,
25 Mr. Karnavas, but it seems that at page 45, line 5, the witness says that,
1 as a historian who has studied these questions deeply, more than this
2 Court will do so, are you doubting that the Judges would look into it as
3 closely as you would? I may have misunderstood.
4 THE WITNESS: No, I'm sorry. I would hope you would. But as I
5 understand it, this trial is not -- is not about the historic Croatian
6 attitude towards Herzegovina. I'm sure it's relevant. I meant no
7 disrespect, but I've been getting a lot of comments in a relatively
8 distasteful tone about my education, and so I thought I would just go
9 ahead --
10 MR. KARNAVAS:
11 Q. Be flip.
12 A. -- and be flip right back to you, yes.
13 Q. All right. Fair enough. Let me break it down to you, sir. It's
14 July/August 1991. By your own historical expertise, you indicated that
15 Croatia has been attacked by the JNA. I mentioned Ravno, because as you
16 might know or should know, Ravno was in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it was
17 attacked. You might also know that, at or about this time, the JNA was
18 staging their attack against Croatia on the territories of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. At that point in time, Izetbegovic is the president
20 of the Presidency; but for all intents and purposes, he's acting like he
21 is the president, not just first among equals, but above everyone else.
22 At the same time, Izetbegovic is negotiating, either directly or through
23 his proxies, with the Milosevic regime.
24 And my question to you, sir, is very simple, okay: Would that --
25 given the circumstances at that point in time, is it surprising that the
1 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, realising what is happening and realising
2 that after the attack on Ravno, Izetbegovic's best response is: "This is
3 not our war" - and some have interpreted this mean that he's just going to
4 sit on the fence - is it any surprise that the Croats felt insecure in
5 their so-called leader, and as a result decided to self-manage in a sense
6 and to begin to self-protect themselves? Is that -- is there any
8 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I object to a couple of things. To the
9 form of the question, it's a question that goes for, I don't know, some 20
10 lines of transcript. I'm not sure exactly what the question to the
11 witness is at this point, number one. Number two, just so the record is
12 clear, I think it would be more appropriate if Mr. Karnavas said the
13 "alleged statement" by Izetbegovic, because there's other evidence before
14 the Trial Chamber that that statement was never made. So it would be
15 correct to say the "alleged statement" by Mr. Izetbegovic.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: I've never heard anybody disputing that statement,
17 that's number one; and number two, while the question is rather long, you
18 will note, Your Honours, that it's based on fact. It is based on evidence
19 that has come before this Tribunal, and it's only at the very end where
20 the question comes into play. All else is sort of the facts that have
21 come through this court and are part of the evidence.
22 Q. Now, Mr. Witness, can you answer that question?
23 A. Of course.
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. Every --
1 Q. No, go ahead --
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So please answer.
3 THE WITNESS: I would be happy to. I think that everybody in
4 Bosnia had darn good reason to feel insecure at this point. I think
5 Izetbegovic, if he actually made that comment, was making it out of a
6 sense of profound insecurity, and I would not blame the concretes of
7 Herzegovina for feeling insecure at this point either. It's a general
8 phenomenon in Yugoslavia and its constituent parts at this time.
9 MR. KARNAVAS: Unfortunately, I'm out of time, and we need to take
10 a break.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is time to take the break, so
12 we will now have a break for 20 minutes.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So the Defence, Mr. Kovacic.
16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I'm going to table a request, in
17 view of your earlier guide-line, to allow my client Mr. Praljak to ask the
18 witness questions directly, because I think that, in this specific case,
19 it meets both conditions laid down in your ruling; that is to say, he has
20 specific knowledge on the subject and directly participated in the events
21 that the witness in the first part of his report addresses, and he sets
22 out facts from which he draws conclusions. And along with this, one
23 should bear in mind that, according to our position, expert testimony of
24 this witness is not strictly historical. It oversteps the frameworks of
25 historical expertise because it includes politicology as well and
1 sociology, the sociology of society and enters into other fields of
2 science and scholarly endeavour.
3 I'd like to remind the court that Mr. Praljak, General Praljak was
4 an active participant in the process of democratization in society at the
5 end of the 1980s and beginning of 1990s, and they are topics which the
6 expert witness touches upon in establishing certain facts that he sets out
7 from. He studied sociology and philosophy and, therefore, is qualified,
8 and he dealt with theory and practice and the literature as well and
9 gained a knowledge of those subjects.
10 And, in that sense, I think he meets both the criteria set out by
11 you, and I, therefore, request that you allow General Praljak to ask his
12 own questions.
13 Thank you.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, we would -- the Prosecution would object
16 to Mr. Praljak's participation. This is -- to accept this kind of a
17 showing as justifying his participation is a further illustration, with
18 deep respect, that the limitations the Chamber has placed in
19 implementation are meaningless, because there hasn't been -- I don't think
20 there's been a topic yet on anything that the Chamber hasn't somehow
21 viewed that he -- that it was relevant for Mr. Praljak to address it.
22 So if that's the case, the limitations that the Chamber has
23 implemented are meaningless. But, in any event, the Prosecution objects.
24 This is material which all the other Defence counsel, Mr. Karnavas
25 certainly demonstrated his ability to go through this material, and this
1 is the classic kind of information material that any Defence counsel would
2 be expected to go through, and we would object to Mr. Praljak's direct
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic, the Trial Chamber
5 would like to ask you on what issues, on what points Mr. Praljak would
6 like to ask the questions himself, on what elements with regard to which
7 his knowledge of sociology, for example, would be useful? What topics
8 would he address?
9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there's a whole series
10 of topics. Now, viewed realistically, Mr. Praljak won't be able to get
11 through all those topics; but, for instance, he deals with Konrad Lorenz's
12 well-known book "The So-called Evil." Now the witness ought to know this
13 book and this literature, which directly enters into his conclusions with
14 respect to his analysis and report, the first expert report which is
15 titled: "The characteristics and patterns of the Balkan conflict as
16 widely known and reported by the latter part of 1992."
17 What I want to say is this: That part of the report by the
18 witness, and yesterday we received certain explanations about this, is
19 based on an assessment of certain sources quoted by the expert witness,
20 upon which he relies in explaining the general characteristics and
21 patterns of behaviour in the Balkan conflict, as is the title of his
23 Now, it is our thesis that those weren't the sole factors, that's
24 the first point; and, secondly, that it is open to discussion how far the
25 press at the time that the witness relies upon viewed them correctly,
1 because you needed a certain amount of knowledge beforehand in order to be
2 able to view and understand the factors. And Praljak was involved in that
3 process, the process before the conflict; that is to say, the
4 democraticisation of society in 1989, when as single party system was
5 abolished, and when suddenly, on the arena, we had new political forces
6 appearing which were not organized, of course, although they existed.
7 Now, he lived through this. He knew exactly what was happening.
8 He knew what elements played a part and influenced events which later
9 brought about direct conflict, or rather, the decisions on the part of
10 Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army to participate.
11 Now, if you want to hear more in greater detail, General Praljak
12 will be anticipate to go into this. I can do that myself, but I think
13 that he will do it better, and we divided up the subjects that way. I
14 prepared the second part of the report; that is, the time after the
15 Washington Agreements and Dayton Agreements. So he would deal with the
16 first part of the report.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last question, Mr. Kovacic.
18 We have two reports before us, one of which relates to the period before
19 the events in 1991 and 1992 for the most part, and the second report deals
20 with what happened after the Washington Agreement. After the Washington
21 Agreement, General Praljak no longer played any role, since upon returning
22 to Croatia in November 1993, he apparently no longer played a role.
23 On the other hand, with regard to his role prior to that, you say
24 that he played a role in the process of democratization; in other words,
25 everything that occurred before 1993.
1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours -- or, Your Honour, you
2 noted that very rightly. Now, in this second expert report, that is to
3 say, events after Dayton, Mr. Praljak has not prepared any questions on
4 that part of the report. I will be doing that part. But as my colleague
5 has covered that, I don't want to go into those matters and I would rather
6 leave time, more time, to General Praljak.
7 But everything in 1990 and 1991, which is what the witness
8 begins with, his first chapter until June 1991, he lays down some premises
9 as to the context of why events developed as they did subsequently. It
10 was in that area that Praljak took an active part. That is the time when
11 the parties began to be formed. That is the time when democratic pound
12 [as interpreted] authority began to be established, and Praljak really was
13 involved in all those events fully. He devoted all his energy and time
14 into that process, and nobody knows about these events better than he.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic, he played a role in
16 Croatia or in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] In Croatia in 1989, 1990, and 1991,
18 in Croatia, and this entire story or presentation by the expert witness
19 begins, as you yourselves were able to see, with that period. And he says
20 that certain general characteristics and patterns of the Balkan conflict
21 began to become manifest, according to what the expert witness says, in
22 those first events in Croatia. And so the first chapter takes us up to
23 June 1991. So that's the basic thesis laid down by the expert witness,
24 and then those same patterns, ethnic persecution, and so on and so forth,
25 were reflected in Bosnia.
1 And by the sake token, any reasonable man, if we were to look at
2 the positions in Bosnia in 1991, should have known that this was the
3 template for what happened in Croatia. And it is our thesis that General
4 Praljak can explain this to you, that he himself devoted his full time and
5 energy and knowledge and participated precisely in the creation of these
6 new conditions, the aim of which was to democratize society. And this
7 democratization was opposed by certain forces, and that's what brought
8 about the war ultimately.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I interrupted you. You wanted
10 to still add something? What more did you wish to say?
11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I just wanted to say and to round
12 off with the last sentence. Those are the circumstances. Those are the
13 precise circumstances which the witness selectively addresses. He selects
14 these various circumstances to put forward his thesis, and his main source
15 was several newspapers. Quite obviously, this didn't take place in a
16 sterile environment. Everything that took place needs the knowledge of
17 society, and we know it was a multitude of factors which were at play here
18 and which we should take into consideration far more facts, put them on
19 the table in order to assess the reality.
20 Praljak took part personally in this process, and let me also add
21 that he really does have specific knowledge, not only formal education and
22 having studied sociology and philosophy, but he has general social
23 knowledge. And I must repeat, the analysis, the report, and the knowledge
24 of the author, at the least he needs is historical knowledge, because a
25 lot of these things are politicological information and sociology of
1 society. That's what makes this analysis or report the kind of material
2 that we can address, and I think that that's why we must show that,
3 presented in this way, it merits questions in the way I have described.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, the Judges have debated
6 the point and allow Mr. Praljak to ask questions solely with regard to the
7 period that goes up to April 1992, where it starts with the war in
8 Croatia, and not regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, so solely with regard to
9 the events in Croatia in 1990, 1991, up to April 1992 because Mr. Praljak
10 was at the time in Croatia. So that is to be the scope of our leave to
11 Mr. Praljak.
12 So, Mr. Praljak, you have the floor. And with regard to time,
13 Mr. Praljak has 30 minutes, is that right, Mr. Kovacic?
14 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I think that he was given some time
15 from some of the other Defence teams. I was doing other business, so
16 he'll tell you himself.
17 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your
18 Honours. I have been given ten or 15 minutes from the -- from
19 Mrs. Alaburic. I will adhere to your instructions. I didn't intend to
20 deal with the part that Mr. Karnavas has already dealt with, but I'm going
21 to deal with facts, facts on the basis of which value judgements are being
23 Cross-examination by Accused Praljak:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness. Good morning, Doctor.
25 A. Good morning.
1 Q. Tell me, to start off, which historical evaluation is not a value
2 judgement? Is there any historical judgement which is not, in fact, a
3 value judgement?
4 A. Well, I think that we're, once again, I guess getting into
5 definitions of value judgement. But for me, a value judgement is a
6 judgement that I make when I apply my values to you and your situation,
7 and probably avoid a reckoning with the facts. I think, though, you know,
8 any historical evaluation is going to be an interpretation, and I suppose
9 it would be open to the accusation that value judgements are involved.
10 We historians argue and debate the merits of various
11 interpretations all the time, and sometimes I think we would conclude that
12 more or less value judgement is involved.
13 Q. Well, we'll skip over that. You say you read the paper Danas, the
14 Croatian journal, and the Hrvatski Tjednik, the other journal. Now, can
15 you tell me, please, whether you read the Vecernji List, Vjesnik, Slobodna
16 Dalmacija, Rijecki Novi List, Osijecki Glasnik, Glas Slavonije? Have you
17 read those papers? Did you read those papers in Croatia?
18 A. In my professional life, I have read Vecernji List I have I have
19 read Slobodna Delmacija. I have occasionally read Glas Slavonije. I did
20 not read the newspapers in the preparation of this report.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, of the weeklies, Globus, Nedjeljna Dalmacija, and
22 Hrvatsko Slovo, did you read those weeklies in preparation for this trial?
23 Did you use that as a source?
24 A. [Previous translation continues] ... [Realtime transcript read in
25 error "No"].
1 Q. Now, at the time that you read Danas, do you know the circulation
2 that it was published in?
3 A. I would just like to say that I didn't say "no" to that previous
4 question. I don't know if I made a noise or something, but I did look at
5 Globus, but I didn't use it in the report. So, okay.
6 No. I couldn't tell you the circulation numbers for Danas.
7 Q. Can you tell me the name of a single newspaper [as interpreted]
8 who worked in the weekly Danas who was not a prominent member of the
9 League of Communists beforehand -- a single journalist or newspaperman who
10 cooperated and wrote for Danas who had not been a prominent member of the
11 League of Communists of Croatia for many years beforehand? Can you quote
12 me a single name?
13 A. No, I can't.
14 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Praljak, sorry. I really do not see the
15 relevance of your question. Of course, we know that in that time in
16 Yugoslavia, like in all other former communist countries, there had been
17 communists in everywhere. So, frankly, I do not know what is the
18 relevance of your question. You had already raised this question before,
19 beforehand, but I do not think it is a question which should be asked from
20 the witness. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Judge Prandler,
22 the relevance of the question is the following: The communists were
23 still, and particularly around the newspaper Danas - I can't go into that
24 today - but they still supported the thesis that Yugoslavia was tenable,
25 and, therefore, their reports were -- quite lacked objectivity or were so
1 far away from objectivity that they supported an idea that was
2 disintegrating and falling apart. So that's why I'm asking him whether
3 these journalists were members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
4 beforehand, or did they belong to the particularistic nationalists.
5 I asked about that but the gentleman didn't know. I think the
6 question is a relevant one.
7 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes, Mr. Praljak. I understand your arguments.
8 On the other hand, if I'm not mistaken, and if I do recall, you have
9 written your doctorate thesis at the university about the Marxist ethics.
10 So in this case, is it so -- Marxist ethics. So, I believe that this
11 issue of always speaking about former and other communist cities, frankly,
12 it is not within the scope of the indictment. It is not within the scope
13 of the reports, what the gentleman has written.
14 So, therefore, I do insist that you are asking questions which are
15 related to the report. The Chamber decided that your questions should be
16 in a way to be put on the two parts of the report, that is, before June
17 1991 and the beginning of the war in Croatia, and nothing else.
18 Thank you.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
20 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, if I could join Judge Prandler's
21 objection. The Prosecution makes the same objection to the relevance.
22 This question when asked, and again I'm looking at the first report, when
23 asked which of the conclusions, which of the conclusions in the first
24 report with the fact that some of the writers were communist have any
25 impact, how would that change? How does that draw into question the
1 conclusions reached by this witness, and there's one example only, just
2 one example. On page 7, for example, at the top, he makes reference, as
3 we discussed on Monday, to the killing of -- the killing of civilians that
4 they were forced to walk for a minefield in October 1991, that were forced
5 by Serb -- Serb forces to do that.
6 Now, is Mr. Praljak saying that because there could have been some
7 of the people who wrote some of these things were communist that that
8 event didn't take place? So what is it exactly? How is this exactly
9 relevant to the question of -- to the questions, to the conclusions
10 reached by this witness? I don't see any relevance whatsoever.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, please go on. By
12 asking this question, did you want to imply that the journalists of Danas,
13 according to you, were members of the communist party and, hence, were in
14 favour of maintaining Yugoslavia? Well, if so you've said it, now please
15 move on.
16 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Your Honours,
17 all I want to do is to ask one thing, and that's why I quoted all the
18 papers or a large number of them. Did the witness objectively, which is
19 the duty of a historian, write about this? He writes about the sources.
20 I didn't mean to denigrate the people in Danas, but I just wanted to show
21 that the witness in his selection kept one side, regardless -- I didn't
22 want to go into whether they were objective or not. I just wanted to
23 demonstrate that his sources were not diverse but just one-sided sources.
24 So that's what I wanted to show.
25 Q. Now, sir, you deal with the Balkans; and before this trial, I
1 wrote a book and I'm going to go through the history of Yugoslavia
2 briefly. Tell me, please, between 150 and 200.000 Croats, were they
3 killed in Blajburg in Slovenia after World War II and along the Roads of
4 the Cross? Do you know about this?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. Do you also know that after this war, in free Slovenia, 410 graves
7 were found, 298 mass graves, 87 pits, 15 anti-tank trenches, six mines,
8 and four anti-aircraft shelters, in which mostly the Croats who were
9 killed and withdrew in face of the Allied forces were buried there?
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Praljak, would you be so kind to explain to
11 us how this relates to this first report?
12 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Judge Trechsel,
13 the witness states quite clearly in his report that the whole problem of a
14 multi-national society in Yugoslavia begins -- began with Tito's death,
15 and that that Yugoslavia, a good Yugoslavia, which we can deduce from his
16 reform, were toppled by national particularism. So everything was all
17 right and hunky-dory up until then, he says. The League of Communists was
18 a wonderful organization; and because Tito did not provide an heir, just
19 as if it were perhaps the Habsburg Monarchy, or whatever, and because some
20 bad nationalists wished to break up the Yugoslavia, as it existed, the
21 following evil ensued.
22 So I want to show through my questions on the basis of which
23 Yugoslavia was formed, what was the essence of the communist regime, and
24 what evils it lived within it by quoting figures. I was just quoting
25 figures here to demonstrate that, from the very beginning, it was prison,
1 and that there were desire for democracy throughout and that no
2 particularistic nationalism toppled the country, but that it was toppled
3 as a dictatorship. So I would like to quote a few more examples, if that
4 is all right.
5 JUDGE PRANDLER: In my view, it is not all right. Please proceed
6 with the relevant chapters of the report.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, the Trial Chamber
8 has already taken a unanimous decision, requesting that you focus on the
9 period from 1990 to April 1992 and events in Croatia. In your previous
10 questions, you've raised other issues. My colleague feels that it is not
11 relevant. Personally, I would have been interested in hearing your
12 questions, but I will agree with the other Judges, respect their opinion.
13 I imagine that you will be able to ask these questions through
14 other witnesses, since they seem important to you. This witness has only
15 talked about 1990, 1991, and 1992, so please limit your questions to that
16 period; otherwise, the scope will be entirely different. It is certainly
17 of interest as well; but with regard to this witness, it may seem less
19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --
20 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do
21 apologise, but I don't know how we're to understand the thesis, it is a
22 thesis, that the Yugoslav elite -- on page 2 of the gentleman's report,
23 that the Yugoslav elite stood behind the particularistic type of
24 nationalism that had always existed side by side with the Yugoslav idea.
25 So in what way - and I'm talking to historian dealing with the
1 Balkans - can we start up the decision at a time when the country is
2 disintegrating. It is the disintegration of a society which -- and they
3 were led throughout a period of 30 years.
4 Q. Explain to me, please, sir, why did Yugoslavia disintegrate,
5 because of particularist nationalisms, is that what you're saying?
6 A. I have a question before I answer -- never mind. It disintegrated
7 because it was led by a dictator from 1944 to 1980, who approached the
8 country as a series of people all possessing nationalisms that needed to
9 be crushed in order for stability to be maintained. Nothing in my report
10 ever intimated that I thought Tito was a good person; but when he died,
11 there was nobody in a position to continue those repressive policies.
12 His enforced Yugoslavism - I'm trying to be as clear as possible
13 here - his enforced Yugoslavism failed to be sustained thereafter; and,
14 instead, these words particularist nationalisms are not mine. That's not
15 to say I'm distancing myself from them. That's not my choice of words.
16 But the those particularist nationalisms filled the vacuum. I have no
17 value judgement on this. The dictator, nationalisms, neither sides evokes
18 any feeling in me. I think it was -- the nationalisms themselves
19 increased in-- they were more vital. They became more aggressive and
20 ultimately more violent, thanks to the fact that they had been actively
21 repressed after 1944.
22 I hope that answers your question, but I would be happy to go on.
23 Q. Thank you. In part, it does. What about the desire for freedom,
24 for liberty, for democracy? What about the American Declaration of
25 Independence and the right enshrined in that declaration which you believe
1 in and advocate? What about the rights of nations? Did the USSR fall
2 apart because of nationalisms? Did the whole system crumble because of
3 nationalism, or was it because of the desire for freedom, liberty,
4 democracy, the rights of nations and so on and so forth, as set out in the
5 American Declaration of Independence?
6 A. We could debate the nature of the Declaration of Independence and
7 our Constitution for a long, long time, but I don't believe that the
8 rights of nations are enumerated in those documents. I think the rights
9 as citizens as individual are, but that's just me. I think the Soviet
10 Union and Yugoslavia fell apart for basically the same reason, and that is
11 that they were or had been dictatorships. They couldn't sustain
13 Third point, I think that very often nationalism is, in fact, an
14 expression for a desire of freedom. But I think, unfortunately, that it,
15 ultimately, very often lapses into a desire for freedom in a sort of
16 zero-sum gain, where one nation's freedom means another's lack of freedom.
17 In a case of a country like Yugoslavia, where territories were I think
18 factually nationally mixed to a great degree, one man's expression of
19 nationalism is going to be another man's expression of oppression in the
21 Q. I'd like to ask the following now: Referring to Yugoslavia, was
22 the full name of the country, the Socialist Federative Republic of
23 Yugoslavia? Is that correct?
24 A. I believe so.
25 Q. Therefore, I won't go into legal issues, but are you aware that
1 nowhere in Yugoslavia, except for Brezhnev's Doctrine, is the principle of
2 the right of nations to self-determination, going as far as secession
3 limited -- that was Lenin's principle, guaranteeing the right of nations
4 to self-determination going as far as secession?
5 A. I'm aware that that right is in the 1974 Constitution of
6 Yugoslavia. The reference to the Brezhnev Doctrine is lost on me.
7 Nonetheless, the right to the self-determination of nations, as opposed to
8 republics, is a complicated issue; and since no nation inhabited only a
9 single republic and alone, this is not quite as simple in practice as it
10 is in constitutional form.
11 Q. When referring to republics and nations, can you quote the first
12 three sentences of the socialist constitution of -- the Constitution of
13 the Socialist Republic of Croatia? What did the first three sentences
14 say? Or if you cannot recall, do they say the following: "The Croatian
15 state is the national state of the Croatian nation. Croatia is the
16 country of the Serbs and the other nationalities living in it."
17 Are these the opening sentences, the first sentences, of that
19 A. I have not memorised them, but that does sound like -- I know that
20 there's a distinction between the socialist versus the constitution that
21 came into effect in 1991, and that sounds to me to be an accurate
22 rendition. I accept your word on that.
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. Is -- are you serious, Mr. Praljak?
24 "The Croatian state is a national state of the Croatian nation. Croatia
25 is the country of the Serbs and the other nationalities"?
1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I said it correctly. I'm
2 sure of what I'm saying because it's something I have dealt with for 40
3 years. "Croatia is the state -- is a state. Croatian is the national
4 state of the Croatian people. Croatia is the state of the Serbs and other
5 nations and nationalities living in it." That's what the first three
6 sentences of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia say.
7 The reason I'm saying it is that the witness, in his report, says
8 that by changes of the constitution when Croatia gained independence, the
9 Serbs became second-class citizens.
10 Q. In what sense, in what way, Witness, do you say that the Serbs
11 became second-class citizens?
12 A. I can't remember the precise language that was used, and I would
13 readily admit that the difference between the constitutions would seem
14 kind of arcane and inscrutable to outsiders, that the language that was
15 used in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, after Franjo Tudjman
16 came to power, clearly offended the Serbian population of Croatia, even if
17 to an outsider it's difficult to understand why. And I do not remember
18 the precise language, but I'm -- well ...
19 Q. If you don't know what it said exactly, how can you assert that
20 something can offend someone?
21 Please look in my bundle of documents and look at document number
22 3D01085. 3D01085. That is a document published by the Croatian
23 parliament on the 8th of September, 1991, breaking off state links with
24 the -- with Yugoslavia after the expiry of the moratorium that had been
25 imposed after the Brioni Declaration and after the Serb air force bombed
1 the building of the cabinet and Presidency of the Republic of Croatia, the
2 so-called Banski Dvori. Are you aware that that happened then?
3 A. Yes, I am.
4 Q. Please read point 5 or paragraph 5: "The Republic of Croatia, as
5 a sovereign and independent state, by guaranteeing and safe-guarding
6 fundamental human rights and the human rights of national minorities,
7 guaranteed explicitly in the United Nations Universal Declaration, the
8 Helsinki Summit Final Act, OSCE documents," and so on and so forth.
9 Who can be offended by such a position if they wish to be a
10 citizen of a state?
11 A. Well, you're asking me to speak for the Serbian population of
12 Croatia, but I can tell you what offended them, the fact -- no --
13 Q. No.
14 A. Oh, I thought you were telling me to stop. They were offended by
15 the fact that Serbs weren't explicitly listed, and they were offended by
16 the fact they were designated a national minority. Me, that wouldn't
17 cause me to rebel; but, I suppose, in historical Croatian conditions, that
18 was considered a dangerous precedent by Serbs.
19 Q. Can you tell me whether you have read the memorandum of the Serb
20 Academy of Arts and Sciences?
21 A. I have read it through and through, and I've written about it and
22 yes, I have.
23 Q. Is that a clear political standpoint of the Serbian intellectual
24 elite to the effect that they want all Serbs, regardless of republican
25 borders, to live in a single state? Is that clearly stated there, either
1 explicitly or implicitly?
2 A. It's implicit in the document; it is not stated explicitly.
3 Q. And, within the scope of this, did Milosevic conduct his entire
4 policy in such a way that he suspended the Constitution of the Socialist
5 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia by abolishing two provinces: Kosovo and
6 Vojvodina, doing this on his own and without consulting the other
8 A. I'm going to read your comment here. In 1988 and 1989, he did, in
9 fact, suspend the constitution of -- or, excuse me, he did change the
10 constitutional status of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and the -- he did impose a
11 leadership in Montenegro that was friendly to him. I'm not sure I would
12 go so far as to say this was done with the sort of authority of the
13 memorandum which actually had no authority.
14 Q. Tell me one more thing. Within the framework of this kind of
15 national project with Milosevic at its head, did the Yugoslav People's
16 Army, a few years before the war, reorganise itself in such a way as to
17 safeguard the borders of a Greater Serbia Karlovac-Ogulin-Virovitica line
18 in Croatia, that line, that axis, in Croatia? Do you know anything about
20 A. I know that that line has a deeper history in Serbian politics,
21 and I take the word of scholars who are better-informed on these issues
22 that the Yugoslav People's Army did, in fact, reposition its units to
23 defend a Serbian state. And by "line," I'm referring to that
24 Karlovac-Ogulin-Virovitica line.
25 Q. Please look at 3D01086, 3D01086: Pursuant to requests by the
1 Badinter Commission that before recognition, the republics have to conduct
2 a referendum as to whether their citizens want a state, on the 29th of
3 April and on the 19th -- proposed and on the 19th of May, 1991, there was
4 a referendum held at which there were two possible questions: One, the
5 Republic of Croatia, as a sovereign and independent state, guaranteeing
6 the cultural autonomy, as well as all rights to the Serbs, so the Serbs
7 are mentioned here, and other nationalities in Croatia may join an
8 alliance of sovereign states with other republics; and second, the
9 Republic of Croatia remains a part of Yugoslavia as a single federal
11 Are you aware that these two questions were put at the referendum
12 pursuant to the request of the Badinter Commission?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Sir, if there are no deeper reasons of conquest on the territories
15 of Slovenia and Croatia within the project of a Greater Serbia, who can be
16 offended by a question formulated in this way and why would they be
17 offended by it?
18 A. You know, once again, I can't speak for Serbs. I mean, I guess I
19 can understand historically their reluctance to trust the Croatian
20 government. Croatia had a 20th century history of a series of events in
21 which they mistreated the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia. I'm sure the
22 independent state of Croatia is familiar to us all. So I think anything
23 that didn't explicitly guarantee the rights of Serbs, as such, was going
24 to be taken, let me put it this way, could potentially be taken as
25 inflammatory and could be used in a propagandistic sense by more extremist
1 Serbs in Croatia. No value judgement intended.
2 Q. Unfortunately, I cannot -- but anyway. To what extent did Chetnik
3 crimes against Croats and Muslims in World War II in Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina -- do you know how many Muslims and Croats were killed by
5 Chetniks in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in World War II? Because
6 you've mentioned the guilt of Pavelic's state. What about Nedic's state
7 and Draza Mihajlovic's Chetniks? Both were criminals. But what was the
8 ratio of crimes? What was the proportion?
9 A. I don't know the ratio of crimes. I'm inferring from this that
10 I'm being asked to compare relative guilt or merits of the two peoples in
11 the Second World War and after, and I just simply can't. But from the
12 Serbian perspective, Croatia was a dangerous place. If the Croatian
13 perspective was that Serbs were dangerous and being unified with a
14 Serbian-dominated state was dangerous, I would understand that as well.
15 But I don't know the numbers, and I know that they're heavily disputed.
16 Q. Very well. We will have other witness to deal with this
17 information. Are you aware from your research that the independent state
18 of Croatia and the fascist regime of Ante Pavelic have been criminalised
19 to a far greater extent than Nedic's fascist regime, which was in power in
20 Serbia and committed the same crimes and the Chetniks of Draza Mihajlovic?
21 Have you reached that conclusion in your research?
22 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] And, Prosecutor, I'm
23 referring to fear.
24 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I tried not to interrupt and I suppose
25 Mr. Praljak can waste his time any way he wishes, but, again, I thought
1 the Chamber's instructions was to address the period 1990 to 1992.
2 JUDGE PRANDLER: Actually, I would like to say the same, that we
3 have already asked Mr. Praljak to speak about that particular period of
4 time. I could also go into terrible details which happened during the
5 Second World War. Hungarian's killed a number of people, but our
6 neighbors killed a lot of Hungarians. And after this, frankly, it doesn't
7 make too much sense now to repeat all those things.
8 Actually, Mr. Praljak, you have already asked about these
9 questions during the last 17 months at least five or six times. So please
10 understand, we do not want to prevent you to ask questions, but we have
11 actually given to you rather clear instructions that you have to reflect
12 about those parts of the report which are there before you and those two
13 parts which you would like to ask -- which we would like you to ask
14 questions. Please kindly accept this ruling.
15 Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I accept this, Your Honour,
17 but the witness started speaking about the fear of the Serbs.
18 Q. Please look at 3D01081, and we'll move on quickly. Please look at
19 the document. It's an assessment of war damages in Croatia. Did you in
20 any way deal with the available sources as to the extent of war damage in
21 Croatia because of the aggression by the JNA and the rebel Serbs in
23 A. No, I did not.
24 Q. You did not.
25 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Their Honours may keep this
1 document if they wish. Calculations may differ.
2 Q. But would you agree that in total the damage can amount to $252
4 A. I'm afraid I have absolutely to idea.
5 Q. Please look at document 3D01076. Are you aware that on the
6 current territory of Republika Srpska --
7 MR. KOVACIC: If I may assist the witness, it is a separate book
8 by the bundle.
9 THE WITNESS: I found that as well.
10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Are you aware that on the present-day territory of Republika
12 Srpska about 700 Catholic churches or church buildings have been
13 destroyed, yes or no?
14 A. I'm unaware of that particular number. I'm aware of massive
15 destruction of religious institutions and churches and parishes throughout
16 the region.
17 Q. Are you aware that within the borders of present-day Republika
18 Srpska, more than 200.000 Croats have been expelled who have never been
19 able to return?
20 A. Again, I'm not aware of particular numbers, but I'm aware of the
21 phenomenon and I don't dispute the enormity of it.
22 Q. Look at 3D01074. Are you aware that only in those 11
23 municipalities I dealt with in Republika Srpska in the course of 1991 and
24 1992 and also part of 1993, 840 Croats were killed? Are you aware of this
25 piece of information?
1 A. I'm not. Of course, I'm aware that Croats were killed in the
2 Republika Srpska, but the precise number I wouldn't have known.
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Praljak, again, could you tie this to the
4 witness's report in some way? I do not quite see the relevance of the
5 question and the relation,-- except that it's the tu quoque argument that
6 we often hear.
7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] No, no, Your Honours. No,
8 no. I have distanced myself a hundred times from that. This is a witness
9 who is a historian, and Your Honours who are lawyers. Not for a moment
10 did I think that everyone who has committed a crime should not be tried.
11 We are speaking about cause and effect here. It's about who started the
12 chaos, who did the killing, who did the destruction, and what the
13 repercussions were in society. It's impossible to understand --
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Praljak, I did not read the report as being a
15 report which tries to find out who started the war. That was not my
16 reading of this text.
17 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, please look at
18 the report. Nowhere is the word "aggression" mentioned at all. There are
19 three sides mentioned here without beginning and without end. Three sides
20 committing crimes, yes, that's true. But here there is -- it says:
21 "Tudjman's government tried to take Knin as an SDS stronghold in order to
22 prevent the referendum."
23 Q. Witness, please, when and with what did Tudjman's government want
24 to take Knin?
25 A. [Previous translation continues]... with men who had guns. I
1 honestly don't know. Knin was part of the Republic of Croatia. They were
2 trying to --
3 Q. How can the police of the Republic of Croatia sending two
4 helicopters to retake a police station taken by rebels and JNA planes on
5 the territory of the Republic of Croatia force these helicopters to turn
6 back, which is a coup d'etat, and you say quite coolly that Tudjman's
7 government tried to take Knin as an SDS stronghold. Knin was full of
8 logs. It had been taken by rebels in the then-still socialist state,
9 which was a regular state, a regular republic.
10 Explain that to the Judges. That's why I'm putting these
11 questions, or if you have --
12 A. That was a long comment. I would be happy to give you a shorter
13 answer. You know, it's a matter of perspective, obviously, that the SDS
14 and its leadership had, in fact --
15 Q. Well, the Judges won't let me speak about perspective, so don't
16 you talk about perspective either. If I can talk about perspective, then
17 we'll talk about psycho-analysis and socio-psychopathology, and sociology,
18 but that is not our historical task. Your historical task here is to
19 establish whether Knin, the police station in Knin, was in Croatia and
20 whether it had been occupied by rebels headed by Milan Martic?
21 A. It was in Croatia, it had been occupied by rebels, I agree with
22 that formulation, and it was retaken or the attempt was made to retake it
23 by the Croatian government. And I don't actually see how that differs
24 from what I said in my report, but be that as it may.
25 Q. But where, where in your report does it say the rebels had taken,
1 in a regular republic part of a federal state the rebels, had taken a
2 police station? What country in the world would not send its regular
3 policemen to take it back within the constitutional order? But where do
4 you say this? Let's move on.
5 On the same page, page 3, you say that the taking of police
6 station in Pakrac, and you say here "by Serb rebels" and so on. And you
7 say that in Pakrac the Serbs accounted for 38 per cent of the population,
8 30 per cent was accounted for by the Croats, and 21 per cent was made up
9 of Yugoslavs. We can put that on the ELMO, but I will read it.
10 According to the census of 1991 in Pakrac, there were 27.509
11 inhabitants and the ratio of Serbs and Croats corresponds to what you say,
12 but there were 71 -- 718 Czechs, 273 Hungarians, there were Slovaks, there
13 were 860 Italians, 330 -- 46 Yugoslavs.
14 So how can you say that there were 21 per cent Yugoslavs, that's
15 my first question; and secondly, what happened to the Hungarians, Slovaks,
16 and Italians after the Serbs occupied Pakrac?
17 A. I was quoting a source which I considered and still consider to be
18 reliable, and I'm afraid I have no idea what happened to those poor people
19 who were caught in the middle of an argument that was not theirs.
20 Q. Now, the attack on Vukovar, can that be played and can we see what
21 that looked like.
22 THE WITNESS: Do I need to do something? Sorry.
23 [Videotape played]
24 "Under fire, civilians were still coming out of their cellars.
25 It seems that not all the Croatian soldiers had surrendered. The federal
1 army and Serbian irregulars were dealing with them.
2 "The Serbs were celebrating in the streets that they had fought
3 for. The aftermath of battle lay everywhere and, inevitably, there were
4 charges of atrocities impossible to confirm on the ground. The regular
5 army has acted with restraint, and it was the army this afternoon which
6 secured the former Croatian police station and moved to the hospital next
7 to it. There hundreds of casualties are waiting for evacuation.
8 Vukovar's ordeal is still not over.
9 "Martin Bell, BBC news, Vukovar."
10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. Now, sir, the attack on Vukovar, was it an aggression, yes or no?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, after the 1.800 fighters of the Croatian army who fought
14 there in those units, were there a hundred Serbs according to your
15 information or not?
16 A. I don't know.
17 Q. From that town, were 10.000 people taken away to camps in Serbia?
18 A. I'm afraid I don't know precise numbers about -- on these two
20 Q. How many bodies who have still not be found are still sought and
21 looked for by the Republic of Croatia of people who disappeared from
22 Vukovar? Is it in the hundreds, the thousands, or what, after all the
23 peace conferences and humanistic declarations made those bodies are still
24 being searched for?
25 A. I don't know what the numbers are of people who are still missing
1 from Vukovar. I imagine it's a very high number.
2 Q. Is it true and correct that in the town of Osijek more than 700
3 civilians were killed when the Serbian artillery fired, to the best of
4 your information?
5 A. I don't know.
6 Q. In Slav -- in the Slavonia subregion, Bosnian artillery, from the
7 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, didn't they kill more than 500 civilians
8 and a large number of children within that number?
9 A. I would not be surprised, but I do not know specifically.
10 Q. The UNPA zones that were set up in Croatia, four of them, under
11 the protectorate of the United Nations, while it was under UN control,
12 according to your information, were more than 600 Croatian civilians
14 A. You know, I don't know and I'm not going to know specific numbers
15 about any of these cases. I must as well specify that right now. I don't
16 doubt your numbers; I just don't know that they're accurate.
17 Q. Now, to wind up with exercise in simulation, 3d01077 is the next
18 piece of exhibit. Now, France, I have interpolated where Croatia would be
19 and I put the population of France and its surface area there; and then on
20 the second page, I do this for Croatia. I put it in place of Croatia;
21 then on page 3, the attack by the Yugoslav Army forces from the Republic
22 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic of
23 Serbia. You can look through that, then we have occupied territory.
24 Is it true that a third of Croatia was occupied in 1991, 1992,
25 1993, et cetera?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, we all know the figures for the displaced persons and
3 refugees in the Republic of Croatia; and if I translated that in terms of
4 the population of France, would you agree that Croatia, in the course of
5 1991 and the beginning of 1992, had 800.000 and more than that displaced
6 persons and refugees from Croatia and from Bosnia-Herzegovina? You could
7 see that in the Mazowiecki reports and so on; is that right?
8 A. I'm having a little bit of trouble following the question. I'm
9 not sure what,"if I translated that in terms of the population of France"
10 means, but I think I agree with what you said.
11 Q. If we look at the number of Croats, 4.200.000, for that period of
12 time, I tried to depict this as happening in France, which means that
13 Frenchmen expelled from France would be 2.800.000, the ratio, displaced
14 persons two and a half million killed, 151.000 wounded, 351.000, those who
15 died for unknown reasons 10.000, and so on. So I calculated the ratio.
16 Now, you can skip a page and look at 1992 to see what happened
17 after the Serb invasion, what was left of Bosnia-Herzegovina where the BH
18 army and the HVO where together, that was the white part, and the rest of
19 France which we superimposed on Croatia the territory of Croatia.
20 Now, the in view of the fact that you dealt with Karadjordjevo,
21 tell me this, please, from France, this kind of France, or you can read
22 that as Croatia, you can divide Croatia from Bosnia-Herzegovina along the
23 Karlovac-Karlobad-Ogulin line, how does that correspond with the agreement
24 made in Karadjordjevo between Tudjman and Milosevic, the alleged agreement
25 about the carving up of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They allegedly reached some
1 agreement on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I'm not clear on this
2 in view of the clearly declared Serb aspirations. Where could the borders
3 of such a state be?
4 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I object to not being able to
5 understand the question. I have no idea what the witness has been asked.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, be more specific in
7 your question because we're somewhat lost. Please rephrase the question.
8 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Sir, if it was the Serbian desire and they had taken over a third
10 of Croatian territory to have the Karlobag border line, et cetera, then
11 where would that state border on any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
12 would belong to Croatia, according to alleged agreement between Tudjman
13 and Milosevic? I don't know if I've made my question any clearer now.
14 Well, you needn't answer that. It will be self-evident from the
15 maps we're going to show, but now let's look at the last map, registered
16 and recorded displaced persons in France. And after this, we have the
17 displaced persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the same ratio, and we're
18 dealing with 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996.
19 Now could you tell me the following. Is it correct that Croatia,
20 in 1990 and 1991, A, was it attacked? Is that correct? Was Croatia
21 attacked? That's my first point and question?
22 A. I have to admit, I'm confused, too. But if I'm taking that
23 question in isolation, I would argue that there are two ways of looking -
24 I'm sorry, I won't use the P word, the perspective word - but I think
25 there are two ways of looking at what happened in Croatia in 1991.
1 It, obviously, objectively seceded from Yugoslavia and then the
2 Yugoslav Army, in fact, did attack it, but I'm still a little confused
3 about the relationship to the simulations we have here.
4 Q. Very well. We can forget simulation for the moment. But you're
5 denying the right. According to the constitution, the right exists of a
6 federal unit, pursuant to the constitution which was in existence on the
7 Lenin principle, has the right to self-determination to the level of
8 secession. So do you deny the republic the right that it cannot secede
9 from a country that it no longer wishes to belong to? Is that your
10 thesis? Is that what you want to say?
11 So if it wishes to secede and separate it, then somebody else has
12 the right to attack it. Is that what you're saying? Do you agree with
14 A. I neither deny nor advocate any of it. I have no horse in this
15 race. I try to describe it in a rational way and sometimes I can't even
16 do that, but, simply, I am not denying or advocating a thing. I try to
18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Very well.
19 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Praljak, I'm really sorry. This is the third
20 time I have to ask you to try to concentrate on the report, and here you
21 have the report before you and everybody has it. And here you are
22 concentrating to the period of time, which is in that report, in the
23 chapter, and I quote, "from June 1991 to April 1992, war in Croatia." And
24 it starts at page 3, and it goes on actually until page 8. And at page 8,
25 you will find a new chapter to start, Thinking about war in Bosnia.
1 Now, we have heard, again, a number of crimes about -- a number of
2 crimes, about the number of those who were killed, et cetera. It is very
3 regrettable, but I would like you to really concentrate on pages 3 and 8,
4 and to tell us and to tell the witness or ask the witness about it, if you
5 disagree with his findings in this chapter.
6 And it is what we are talking about. It is a cross-examination of
7 the witness about his report and reports. So, again, I would like to
8 plead with you that we have already heard, during the last couple of
9 months, a number of times, a great number of times, about the same very
10 regrettable facts. And we do not want to in a way to close our eyes
11 before those facts; but, on the other hand, we do have here a witness who
12 wrote a particular report. He should be asked about his report and not to
13 recapitulate everything which we have already heard about the war in
14 Croatia and in other places.
15 And really believe me that it is a counter-productive if you are
16 doing this, I have to tell you frankly. Sometimes too much is worse than
17 something not so much but very well-based and in a way very to the point.
18 But what you are doing is overkill and figuratively speaking, and I ask
19 you to restrain yourself on that very issue.
20 Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Thank you, Judge Prandler, but I cannot agree with that. I'm just asking
23 the following question. On page 4 the witness says: "Borovo Selo was a
24 Serbian village, while Borovo Naselje was mostly Croatian."
25 Q. Was that Croatian territory or Serb territory as a whole, Witness,
1 Mr. Historian?
2 A. It was on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.
3 Q. So it wasn't Serbian. It was a village in which the majority
4 population was Croatian and Serbian. So the precision of the historian's
5 declaration --
6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I just
7 wanted to say three things and ask three things: Was Croatia attacked?
8 Did Croatia change its political system? And at that point in time, was
9 Croatia creating its own state? Did it take in 800.000 refugees? How
10 many wounded did it have? And what was the situation in the rest of the
11 country where the whole infrastructure was destroyed, and I'm comparing
12 data for you to gain a picture of what was happening.
13 Of course, I cannot speak of Konrad Lorenz and the production of
14 "Evil" and all the rest of it, and what kind of control was possible.
15 Quite simply, we have to have historical comparisons, and here we have a
16 historian who is able to do that. I don't have any more questions on that
18 Q. Just confirm this for me, did Croatia move from a dictatorship, as
19 you say, to a democracy, and was it creating a state of its own, which it
20 did not previously in that form, and was it attacked by an all-out
21 aggression with the army putting it into place?
22 A. It was doing the first two things you mentioned; and on the third
23 I suppose, there are nuances that I would dispute with you, but there's no
24 question that war was the result. And, in fact, the point of my report is
25 that everybody knew it, and everybody knew what the nature of that
1 conflict was.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, Mr. Praljak. Well,
3 you've used up already 45 minutes. You had 30 minutes initially, with
4 another 15 minutes coming from Mr. Petkovic. We'll now have a break, so
5 please finish with your last question.
6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I've already
7 asked my last question. I just want to say that when I was one of the
8 leaders of the rebellion against the authorities at the time, that is to
9 say, in the 1960s, I took part in the democratic transformation of
10 society, and I have a lot of knowledge about facts, about society,
11 language, culture, everything that makes up a nation. And every war is
12 forged in peace when basic prerequisites are denied, the prerequisites of
13 ethnicity and something we call nation, nationality, or ethnicity.
14 So we won't be able to get at the cause of this war, because then
15 afterwards it appears that everybody attacked everybody else, that
16 everybody was offended and insulted, now which nation was pilfered, how
17 many people were killed, civilians incarcerated, and so on and so forth;
18 and then somebody seems to be insulted or offended because he wasn't set
19 apart or was set apart by a constitution. We have to deal with all those
20 matters here.
21 Thank you, Your Honours.
22 Q. Thank you, Doctor.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We're going to have
24 a 20-minute break.
25 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now, we've done an estimate of
3 the time. Ms. Alaburic had given 15 minutes to Mr. Praljak, therefore,
4 the Petkovic Defence will have 15 minutes. I can't remember what happened
5 to Mr. Stojic.
6 Mr. Murphy, did you give us your time estimate or not? I have
8 MR. MURPHY: I think I'll be just five or ten minutes.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
10 Ms. Alaburic, you have the floor.
11 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:
12 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon. Good afternoon to
13 all my colleagues in the courtroom. If I need a little time, and I think
14 I will need only five to ten minutes to complete what I intended to talk
15 about with this witness, my colleague Mr. Murphy will give me the time I
16 need, so I ask Your Honours to bear this in mind.
17 Q. Dr. Miller, I will speak to you exclusively about your first
18 expert report, and I wish to put a few questions to you, which I believe
19 might assist Their Honours in issuing a decision as to whether this expert
20 report should be admitted into the evidence as relevant to our case.
21 So to begin with, can we agree on the aim of your report. If I
22 understood it correctly, you wish to show that there were generally known
23 characteristics of the conflict on the former -- on the territory of the
24 former Yugoslavia, which was an ethnic conflict, and that violence against
25 civilians belonging to a different ethnic group was in a certain way an
1 integral part of the conflict? Did I understand this correctly?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. In other words, you wished to show that, on the territory of the
4 former Yugoslavia, everybody knew what the nature of the conflicts were
5 which took place in the early 1990s. Is that correct?
6 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, just since the Prosecution is
7 the one that set the questions, I just wanted to be clear that he was not
8 asked to show something. He was asked to investigate a question and
9 whether or not what the nature of the conflict was. He was not given a
10 mission to show anything in particular.
11 THE WITNESS: And I --
12 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] If I may respond to my learned
13 friend. I wasn't now referring to the task given to the witness by the
14 Prosecutor, but what follows from the witness's expert report and what
15 some 15 or 20 minutes ago the witness said. He wished to show that
16 everybody knew what the nature of the conflicts was.
17 Q. Dr. Miller, can we come back to my question now.
18 In your expert report, did you wish to show that everybody on the
19 territory of the former Yugoslavia was aware of the nature of the
21 A. I would only refine that slightly to say that I don't think
22 everybody in the former Yugoslavia would have known the nature of the
23 conflict, but any literate, engaged adult would understand the nature of
24 the conflict. I don't know if you were using the term" everybody" in its
25 more specific meaning or not.
1 Q. Dr. Miller, what were the sources on the basis of which you could
2 conclude whether someone understood the nature of the conflict or not?
3 A. This was a question that's rather wide open, but I could think of
4 only one way to approach it. I couldn't go back and interview people at
5 the time. Interviewing people today about what they knew in 1991 or 1992
6 would be a hopeless task, that's why memoirs are such unreliable sources.
7 The only way I could approach the question really, in my view, is
8 by looking at the press at the time. I simply don't know another way to
9 do it. I don't -- I mean, the bottom line is I don't really know if we
10 can absolutely conclude anything. I think that we can extrapolate from my
11 report and from the conclusions in the report. I think it's reliable. I
12 think it's the best that can be done to come to some type of -- slow down.
14 Q. Please, sorry. If I might go back to my question, if you based
15 yourself primarily or exclusively on the press, you cannot tell us whether
16 or how people understood the nature of the conflict. What you can tell us
17 about is how the conflict was presented in the press; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Very well. You told us that you based your expert report on the
20 writings of the political weeklies, Danas and Vreme; is this correct?
21 A. I used also some Western, well, that is American press, and I
22 looked, you know, I did look at other weeklies, but I didn't use them.
23 And the reason I chose not to use them was that they tended to present an
24 even more violent picture of what was happening in Yugoslavia. And there
25 is, I would say, at this point evidence that much of the press, in its
1 most extreme formulations, was inventive, that a lot of the press
2 coverage, especially the most extreme coverage, was occasionally
3 unreliable. So, yes, I relied on Danas and Vreme for the Yugoslav press
4 for --
5 Q. Excuse me. Excuse me for interrupting you, but I have little time
6 at my disposal, which is why I would like your answers to be shorter. Can
7 we agree on the following: The American press or any other foreign press
8 would not be relevant if we wanted to know what was widely known, what was
9 common knowledge in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia?
10 A. I would agree that it would not be as critical.
11 Q. Very well. You told us, yesterday, that you used the weeklies,
12 Danas and Vreme, and that you also read Nin, and you mentioned the
13 Hrvatski Tjednik. With respect to the Hrvatski Tjednik, as I come from
14 Croatia and I think I know the Croatian media rather well, especially in
15 the early 1990s, but quite honestly I have no idea what weekly that is.
16 So could you explain that to us, please.
17 A. Absolutely. I was actually hoping that I would have an occasion
18 to do so. I don't actually, when I said that yesterday, I thought that I
19 was right; but when I went home last night, or back to my hotel room, I
20 realise I'm not actually sure of what the name of the Tudjman regime
21 sponsored weekly was, and I readily admit that I could have the name
23 Q. Very well. I also don't know what weekly you mean, so I won't
24 enumerate all the ones that existed at the time. Can we then conclude
25 that you based your conclusions on Danas and Vreme, these two weeklies?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Can you tell us whether you read those weeklies in 1990 to 1992 or
4 A. Both.
5 Q. Can you tell us where in the early 1990s you read these weeklies
6 and when?
7 A. In 1991 and early 1992, I lived in the San Francisco Bay area and
8 I made a weekly trip to a newsstand in Berkeley, where I bought them, and
9 I still have many of them sitting in my box at work. Also, I can add that
10 at some points, during that time, I was in Indiana, at Indiana University,
11 which subscribed to both of them and more.
12 Q. In the 1990s, what other newspapers or journals from Serbia and
13 Croatia did you read, if any?
14 A. I read Nin. I read Interview from Serbia as long as it came out.
15 I read -- I did not read many newspapers, at least not regularly. I read
16 Duga, also from Belgrade. For a short time there was -- well, actually,
17 I'm not sure if it was a short time or not, but for a short time, I read
18 articles from something -- I believe it was called Hrvatski Vojnik, again,
19 not necessarily a mainstream journal. I -- I'm sure there were others. I
20 was able to get Glas Slavonije, oddly enough, at that Berkeley newsstand,
21 so occasionally I bought it as well.
22 Q. When you were preparing this expert report we are now discussing,
23 did you rely on your reading back then, or did you re-read these weeklies
24 we are talking about?
25 A. I re-read them.
1 Q. Can you explain to us based on what did you conclude that Vreme
2 and Danas are representative weeklies, representative of public opinion in
3 Croatia and Serbia?
4 A. Actually, I don't think that I would conclude that they were
5 representative of public opinion in Croatia and Serbia. I would conclude,
6 rather - and I think this is the general consensus, at least in the United
7 States. Obviously, there is probably an inherent bias there - I would
8 conclude that they were the most reliable. I purposely did not include
9 journals, news magazines, that were considered to - I'm trying to find the
10 proper word for this - that might have glorified the violence, let's say.
11 I was not looking for the most extreme examples. It would have
12 made my case probably more convincing.
13 Q. Without going into the correctness of your conclusion and whether
14 I agree with it or not, Dr. Miller, I wish to clarify the following point.
15 You might consider these weeklies to be the most reliable; but if it was
16 your task to show what was generally known, then you should have relied on
17 media which were representative, or rather, the media read by the greatest
18 percentage of the population. Can you agree with me on that?
19 A. I can agree with you on that, I mean, in a sense. I can agree
20 with you, and I have read that media. I guess it's ironic that I chose
21 not to include that media because I thought that the picture that it drew
22 was unreliable. It would have contributed to my own conclusion if I had
23 included it, and so perhaps I should have.
24 But the picture that we find in Danas and Vreme, insofar as, you
25 know, the nature of the violence, the nature of the wars, is more moderate
1 than the picture we would find in most of those other journals. That's a
2 general conclusion based on, for the most part, reading I did during the
4 Q. Were you aware that Vreme has such a small circulation that,
5 without the assistance of foreign donors, it would not have survived on
6 the market?
7 A. I am aware of that.
8 Q. Are you aware that Danas, in the early 1990s, had such a small
9 circulation that that was one of the main reasons why in the autumn of
10 1992 it stopped publication?
11 A. I'm aware that that's one of the reasons.
12 Q. Tell me, Dr. Miller, have you ever heard that, on the territory of
13 the former Yugoslavia, about 10 per cent of the population reads no
14 newspapers at all --
15 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Interpreter's correction: or
16 any newspapers.
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. -- that only 10 per cent of the population actually reads
19 newspapers or gets information by electronic means?
20 A. I would not have heard that, but I would believe it.
21 Q. I will repeat my question. I would like to thank my friend who
22 told me my question was not correctly recorded. I said that 10 per cent
23 of the population reads newspapers; whereas, 90 per cent of the population
24 receives information exclusively from the electronic media; although, I
25 assume that you understood my question and that your answer remains the
2 A. Yes, I did, and yes, it does.
3 Q. Dr. Miller, you understood my question. You speak Serbian,
4 Croatian, Bosniak, whatever you wish to call it?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. That's why you're able to read this press in the original; is that
8 A. I'm certainly able to read this press in the original. In the
9 preparation of this report, I had to access Vreme, for the most part, in
10 English translation. Originally, of course, I did read it in the Serbian.
11 Q. Tell me, Dr. Miller, can we agree that, in the early 1990s, we
12 cannot refer to the territory of the former Yugoslavia as a kind of
13 unified market. It would be more proper to speak of the Serbian,
14 Croatian, or Bosnian-Herzegovinian market; and when I refer to "market,"
15 I'm referring to it, of course, from the media aspect?
16 A. I would agree.
17 Q. Could we then agree that something that might be widely known on
18 the Serbian media market might be completely unknown on the Croatian media
20 A. Well, I would agree intellectually, but my report actually doesn't
21 discriminate between Serbs and Croats. The evidence is drawn from both,
22 and the treatments of the war on both sides were essentially the same.
23 Q. I was not trying to imply anything. I just wanted to use my
24 question as a basis for the following: Dr. Miller, did you investigate
25 how many inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina reads the weeklies, Vreme
1 and Danas?
2 A. Mm-hmm. No, I did not.
3 Q. May we agree that based on the writings of the Belgrade weekly,
4 Vreme, and the Zagreb weekly, Danas, we cannot speak of what was widely
5 known on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
6 A. You know, generally I suppose that's --
7 Q. Could you just be very brief in your reply, please. Do we agree
8 or not?
9 A. I can't be very brief. I can be quite brief. Okay. I'm sorry.
10 But I think we all know that Bosnia had all three populations. I mean, I
11 spent time in Sarajevo, and I know that; whereas, Vreme might not have
12 been read in Zagreb and Danas might not have been read in Belgrade. I
13 actually think and I would -- I think that they were both read in Sarajevo
14 by the respective populations. It was a divided market.
15 Q. Dr. Miller, when I'm asking you this, I don't have in mind just
16 some dozen people who in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Sarajevo might have read
17 weeklies from the territory of the whole of the former Yugoslavia. Maybe
18 more than a dozen, but anyway. We're talking about something that is
19 generally known and accepted now, that is, the broad population, the
20 population at large.
21 So, if you told me -- if you said to me that you don't know
22 whether and to what extent Danas and Vreme were sold on the market of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, then my logical next question would be: Would it be
24 correct to conclude that Vreme and Danas cannot be a basis for drawing
25 conclusions about something that was general knowledge on the territory of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I'm not talking about some dozen intellectuals in
2 Sarajevo. I'm talking about the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
4 A. I feel comfortable extrapolating from a broader reading. I told
5 you already that I excluded the writings of other journals that were
6 probably more widely read, I guess that was a mistake, which tell the same
7 story, essentially. Obviously, I could find differences. But strictly
8 speaking about those two journals, I suppose we cannot conclude that
9 everybody in Bosnia-Herzegovina read them. That would obviously be
11 Q. Dr. Miller, we're not discussing whether everybody read them. Of
12 course not. Everybody did. That is not being challenged. What we're
13 talking about is this: Do you have any proof and evidence that anyone
14 read Vreme or Danas at that time, at the beginning of the 1990s in
16 A. I have no proof that anybody read them.
17 Q. Very well. Now, Dr. Miller, would you agree with me when I say
18 that your expert report, based on the writings of the Belgrade weekly,
19 Vreme, and the Zagreb weekly, Danas, cannot be a reliable indicator about
20 what was generally known, for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the
21 beginning of the 1990s? Just briefly, please, yes or no.
22 A. I think it can. I think it can because I read more widely, and
23 this is a boiled-down version of wider reading.
24 Q. Dr. Miller, I'm not asking you whether you have any knowledge and
25 whether you could tell us what was generally known in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
1 and I don't doubt that you do have such knowledge. What I'm asking you is
2 exclusively with regard to your expert report, which is based as you,
3 yourself, said on those two weeklies.
4 So, based on those two weeklies, can the report be a reliable
5 indicator of what was common knowledge in Bosnia-Herzegovina or generally
6 known in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 and 1992?
7 I'm sure you find it difficult to answer that question, but please
8 try and be frank and honest in answering it.
9 A. I think it's as reliable as anything could be. I think
10 determining what public opinion or what knowledge was in 1991 is very
11 difficult. I think the conclusions in my report are drawn from a broader
12 reading than just Danas and Vreme, and that it's probably the best we
13 could do in determining what was common knowledge at the time.
14 Q. Tell me, please, Dr. Miller, in your first expert report or the
15 first part of your report, did you want to tell us the characteristics and
16 patterns of the conflict on the basis of your own opinion, and that you
17 weren't that interested in what was generally known in -- on individual
18 markets of the former Yugoslavia?
19 A. I don't think I understand the question. In the first part of the
20 conflict -- first part of my report ...
21 Q. In the first report, because we have two reports, so the first
22 report, since you base yourself on the American press, the European press,
23 sources you don't mention here, but you make certain conclusions. And on
24 the basis of all that, one could conclude that you, in fact, provided your
25 own vision of the nature of the conflict and that you were less interested
1 or dealt less with what was generally known. And we interested in what
2 was generally known in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 A. I don't actually think my opinion is present here, and I did my
4 best to show what I think was generally known.
5 Q. Very well. Now, my last question from this set of questions. If
6 you wanted to show us what was generally known on the territory of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, why did you not analyse a single publication printed
8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Sarajevo had a very rich publications activity
9 compared to Belgrade -- which could be compared to the output in Belgrade
10 and Zagreb?
11 A. I could have, but I wasn't actually asked to focus on what was
12 generally known in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, I understand the nature
13 of the case, but that's not what I was asked. I was asked what was
14 generally known on the territory, in general, the former Yugoslavia.
15 Q. And my final question: So you're saying that you didn't deal with
16 what was generally known on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that
18 A. Not in particular.
19 Q. Thank you. I now have one more question for you, Dr. Miller, and
20 it's this: Let's assume that the characteristics and patterns of the
21 conflict, as being an ethnic conflict and everything that you state in
22 your first report is correct, let's assume that.
23 Now, do you consider that it would be logical to expect that the
24 government, which decides to establish an army, establishes an army made
25 up of the members of its own nation, own ethnic group; in other words, not
1 to set up a multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional army?
2 A. I would expect that.
3 Q. Dr. Miller, are you aware that, in Herceg-Bosna, the HVO or the
4 government or the authorities, whatever you like to call these structures
5 that were in charge of that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they formed
6 an army that was called the HVO, which was composed of both Croats and
7 Muslims and Serbs and members of other nations and nationalities,
8 including those who declared themselves as undeclared; and that certain
9 parts of Herceg-Bosna, especially around Mostar, there were more Muslims
10 than there were Croats in some brigades? Did you ever hear of that? Were
11 you aware of that?
12 A. I was aware of that. I was aware that, early in the war, the
13 ethnic composition of various armies was more complicated than it became
14 later on. That doesn't surprise me to hear you explain that clearly.
15 Q. And were you also aware of the fact that this national ethnic
16 composition within the HVO existed until mid-1993, and I'm not going to
17 burden you with an event that took place on the 30th of June, 1993, which
18 is well-known to Their Honours.
19 Do you know and were you aware that this multi-national HVO
20 remained that way until mid-1993?
21 A. I wouldn't have been able to say precisely until when it went --
22 lasted, but I'll accept your word.
23 Q. Dr. Miller, could we agree, you and I, that if the HVO was indeed
24 established on a multi-ethnic basis, that the power and authority that
25 created such an army, that established such an army, did not have the
1 intention, nor did it expect, that it would ever go to war with the
2 Muslims or the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Would that be a logical
4 A. I simply can't --
5 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, that calls for pure speculation on the
6 part of the witness.
7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't consider that
8 it is pure speculation. I consider that it is a logical conclusion on the
9 basis of the premises made by Dr. Miller in his first expert report that
10 we're discussing at present, because if the ethnic conflict was the basic
11 characteristic and if, as the witness said, we could have expected
12 violence against the members of an opposite ethnic group, then it would be
13 logical to conclude this thing about the army. And I'd like to give the
14 witness a chance to answer my question.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please answer.
16 THE WITNESS: I'm going to read the question again.
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. I'll repeat it for you, or you can read it, whichever you like.
19 A. I'll read it. It's fine. Thank you.
20 Again, I have no idea. I could not read the minds of the
21 leadership of the HVO. I don't think that question actually calls for a
22 logical conclusion. It's too speculative for me.
23 Q. If it is speculative, as you say, then thank you, Dr. Miller.
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have completed my
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please go ahead.
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would like to add a question that just follows
3 the last question of Ms. Alaburic.
4 Yesterday, we have discussed at some length about a statement you
5 made that the HVO was not prepared to join a unitarian army of the BiH and
6 it has been shown that there would, in fact, be two armies, so that was
7 very natural. Now, is it correct that, according to the agreements, there
8 ought to have been one joint army for the Federation? That an army of the
9 Federation ought to have been forged of Croat and Bosniak soldiers?
10 THE WITNESS: Do you mean after the Washington Agreement?
11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes.
12 THE WITNESS: I assume so. But if this is another yes or no
13 question, I cannot say precisely.
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Have you found any evidence in your research that
15 this actually happened?
16 THE WITNESS: That the armies unified and became one?
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Of the Federation?
18 THE WITNESS: I have not.
19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Okay. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Murphy, please go ahead --
21 just a moment.
22 Mr. Petkovic, you have the floor.
23 Cross-examination by the Accused Petkovic:
24 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just have
25 one question to ask, perhaps it's technical, perhaps not, depending on how
1 much the witness knows, if I might be able to pose it.
2 Does the witness know that the army of the Federation was composed
3 of two components and that that was provided for by law: One component
4 was the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other component was the HVO,
5 and that that's how the organized units existed. The HVO represented the
6 first Croatian unity according to the law that was passed after all the
7 agreements, that the army of the Federation had two components.
8 Q. That's what I'm asking you, and that's what it says in the law:
9 One component was the army and the other component was the HVO.
10 A. With that sort of clarity, I did not know that.
11 Q. Now, the document shown you by the Prosecutor yesterday, did you
12 see the relationship in the distribution of forces and resources, or
13 rather, resources that they received from other countries, the United
14 States and other western countries, that of the 287 tanks, the army was
15 given 100-odd and the rest went to the HVO.
16 So who was in charge of this distribution? The Americans were,
17 General Warner and all the others. Did you know that?
18 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I'm waiting for my microphone
19 to come on.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
21 MR. SCOTT: I'm waiting on the microphone, Your Honour. Sorry.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, please go ahead.
23 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I just object to Mr. Petkovic's reference
24 to the document. The Prosecution wasn't allowed to use the document, and
25 I don't think it's appropriate for the Defence to use the same document;
1 although, I'd be happy to use it if everyone's in agreement on that. But
2 it's either in for all sides or it's not in for any side.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: The part of the document that was objected to was
4 the one portion of it which was quite obvious to the Trial Chamber that
5 there was no signature to, there was no date to it. There were other
6 documents attached to it, but I think the question the way it was posed is
7 a -- is quite appropriate, because it refers to a particular document,
8 that obviously there were some figures to it. And I think it's quite
10 But in any event, the essence of the question itself is a question
11 that should be put to this witness. Was he aware of that? Who was
12 distributing? Because this is a follow-up, Judge Trechsel, on your
13 question, and so I think it's very relevant.
14 MR. SCOTT: My --
15 MR. KARNAVAS: And I don't see why the Prosecutor is objecting.
16 What is he afraid of?
17 MR. SCOTT: Let's be fair, Mr. Karnavas. I'm certainly not afraid
18 of the evidence. I do believe in fair play. I believe, if one side is
19 not allowed to use an exhibit, the other side shouldn't be able to use it
20 either. I pointed out, at the time, that the document was a whole
21 document --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you say that you were
23 not allowed to use the exhibit. Which exhibit are you referring to?
24 MR. SCOTT: Well, the one that Mr. Praljak -- excuse me,
25 Mr. Petkovic is just referring to. I think it was 10267, I believe.
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I think I can assist --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers switch on their microphones
3 when speaking, please.
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would like to --
5 [Overlapping Speakers]
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] The Presiding Judge asked a
7 question connected with the document and the number of tanks was mentioned
8 and other weapons.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would like to interfere here because I made the
10 observation that this document had no signature, et cetera. That referred
11 to the 18-page document. There were annexes to this document to which I
12 have not referred. I must say I was even somewhat surprised that the
13 Prosecution did not continue with these other documents, but it was not my
14 task to do it or to insight that. So I think there is no unfairness if
15 Mr. Petkovic is asking the question he is asking.
16 MR. SCOTT: Well, just --
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: There must have been a misunderstanding.
18 MR. SCOTT: There may have been, Your Honour, as I took pains to
19 point out to the Chamber yesterday. The document was received in exactly
20 the form -- it was in a sense one document at the time the Prosecution
21 received it. It was combined. All these documents were combined. And
22 since it was presented as one collective document, that's exactly the form
23 it was found in the files of the archive, I understood Your Honours to say
24 that none of the documents -- since it was one document, if it was a
25 question about a part of the document, the entire document could not be
1 used. That was my understanding.
2 But I'll be happy to come back, perhaps, to other parts of it if
3 given the opportunity.
4 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, just one other
5 question, with your permission, please. The army of the Federation was
6 not established pursuant to this document. This is a report. The army of
7 the Federation has a law and regulations, according to which it was
8 established, and that document is still in existence. It still exists in
9 the archive of the Federation and in the army of the Federation. And I
10 claim and I am saying that a document exists, brought in the level of the
11 Federation, which says that the army of the Federation has two
12 components: The army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence
14 That document does exist at Federation level. It can be found
15 today in the Defence Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm not speaking off
16 the top of my head. This is just a report, which somebody wrote, but I'd
17 like to refer you to that. The document is titled, "The basic premises of
18 establishment or ratio of forces," something like that, but I'll do my
19 best to find it. So the document does exist. It does exist. It refers
20 to the establishment of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan army, and it did have two
22 So there were two components of the army of the Federation, and
23 Mr. Sotka was the commander of the Croatian component within the army of
24 the Federation. So we have a document at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 which we can bring in. Now, this is a document that somebody used for
1 some facts and figures and sent out to someone. Well, we can't see who
2 compiled it, who signed it. It was an intelligence matter anyway, quite
3 obviously. But there's a real document, stating that the army of the
4 Federation has two components: The army and the HVO, and that's when
5 there was a uniform, united BH army.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, you've heard what
7 Mr. Petkovic has just said. According to him, based not on this document
8 but on another official text, the army of the Federation was made up of
9 two components: The HVO and the ABiH. What do you think of that
11 THE WITNESS: I have no reason to dispute it, once again.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Murphy, you have the floor.
13 MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Murphy:
15 Q. Dr. Miller, my name is Peter Murphy. I am one of the counsel
16 representing Bruno Stojic. I would like to ask you about an answer you
17 gave to my colleague, Ms. Alaburic, a few moments ago.
18 MR. MURPHY: For the record it's page 85, line 21 of the
20 Q. You said that you were not looking for the most extreme examples
21 and you said, and I'm going to quote: "It would have made my case
22 probably more convincing."
23 When you use the phrase "made my case more convincing," would you
24 explain to the Trial Chamber what case you were referring to?
25 A. Well, my paper obviously, I hope. It's taken for granted that it
1 has a thesis. The thesis is that the characteristics that I've described
2 were widely known, and that's my case. I mean, that's what I mean when I
3 say "my case." My thesis would have been easier to demonstrate. But part
4 of my job is to evaluate the validity of evidence. And something that I
5 think is commonly known about the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav medias is
6 that much of it systematically exaggerated events on the ground.
7 Q. Well, the reason for my question was simply that, at an earlier
8 time in Ms. Alaburic's cross-examination, she asked a question, and
9 Mr. Scott interrupted to emphasise that you were not asked to reach any
10 particular conclusion, but to investigate certain matters. I suggest to
11 you, based on your answer, that, in fact, your report was driven towards a
12 predetermined conclusion?
13 A. No, I disagree completely. I'm asked to write a report. I have a
14 conclusion. I write a report, it has a conclusion, it has a thesis. It
15 could -- so I was not asked to produce any particular conclusion, and it
16 was not a predisposition, at least not insofar as I did -- I mean,,
17 obviously, I experienced the 1990s, and so I had a fair idea what to
18 expect, but I disagree with that formulation completely.
19 Q. All right. I just wanted to ask you about one further thing
20 relating to Herceg-Bosna. This is really about your second report on the
21 continuation of Herceg-Bosna. You're aware, of course, that the Croatian
22 community of Herceg-Bosna was set up or proclaimed in November of 1991; is
23 that right?
24 A. Mm-hmm.
25 Q. Is that a yes?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And that was before the international community recognised
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state; is that also correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Within the same broad time-frame, the Bosnian Serbs also
6 established certain structures, political structures, that, in due course,
7 transmuted into Republika Srpska; is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now when the -- as a result of the Dayton Peace Accords, Republika
10 Srpska then became a constituent of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did it not?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. But you would agree with me that during the -- certainly during
13 the war, the international community made much the same criticism of
14 Republika Srpska that it did of Herceg-Bosna?
15 A. Yes, I would.
16 Q. In other words, that it was an essentially illegal state which
17 was -- had been implanted on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That
18 was the basic criticism, wasn't it?
19 A. I -- I suppose we could parse words, but sure.
20 Q. But what's happened today through historical circumstances is that
21 Republika Srpska has, in a sense, been legitimatised through the Dayton
22 Peace Accords?
23 A. I would agree.
24 Q. Now, since Dayton, would you also agree that there has been
25 considerable dissatisfaction with the political structure of Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina on the part of all three constituent peoples?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And, in fact, on more than occasion, the Office of the High
4 Representative has had to make alterations to the constitution to try to
5 keep everyone happy?
6 A. I would accept that, although I could not specify the alterations.
7 Q. Well, we don't need to be specific. Is it also within your
8 knowledge that, even today, there is considerable political pressure among
9 all three peoples to make fundamental changes to the Dayton structure?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And would you also not -- would you also agree with me that, in a
12 democratic society, the Bosnian Croats, together with the other peoples,
13 have a right to lobby politically for the changes they would like to see?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And so, when you refer in your report to, I think you used the
16 word, intransigence on part of certain Bosnian Croats, would you also
17 agree, to be fair, that that could also be seen as simply a resolute
18 determination to try to get the changes that they want, to have those
19 changes brought about, through the political process?
20 A. I suppose that's a possible interpretation, yeah.
21 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, I have nothing further. Thank you very
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you have
24 re-examination? If you only need a quarter of an hour, we could finish
25 today with this witness.
1 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I think that I would be more than a
2 quarter of an hour -- [Microphone not activated]
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
4 MR. SCOTT: -- in fact, I'm just now, in light of the discussion
5 about the documents, I'm just now re-reading that one set of documents.
6 So, in light of the fact that I'll need more than 15 minutes, I would ask
7 to conduct the re-direct tomorrow morning.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Am I to understand that he is now moving to re-open
9 the direct examination; and if so, could we have concrete answer to that
11 MR. SCOTT: I don't know, Your Honour, because, again, I'm just
12 looking back at these documents, which I had understood, perhaps, in
13 error, had been excluded, and I would like an opportunity to review those
14 otherwise conduct re-direct in an appropriate manner. This coming down to
15 the last five or ten minutes and being rushed, which has happened to the
16 Prosecution repeatedly, is not appropriate. We have the time, the witness
17 is scheduled, and I would ask to conduct my re-direct tomorrow morning,
19 MR. KARNAVAS: We have no objections to him asking for the time to
20 prepare, if he's not prepared to continue right now. But if he does
21 decide to re-open, and if the Trial Chamber does invite him to go ahead
22 and re-open, obviously, we are entitled to cross-examination, at least to
23 that portion, and I am sure Mr. Scott will agree with me on that.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. It is quite clear in my
25 mind, Mr. Scott, that tomorrow you will ask questions, additional
1 questions, that are related to the questions that came up during the
3 The re-examination is not supposed to -- it's not the same as the
4 examination-in-chief. It is re-examination, additional questions.
5 Witness, unfortunately, I thought perhaps you might be able to go
6 home today, but you will have to come back tomorrow morning. The hearing
7 will begin tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m.; and in principle, it should be
8 fairly brief.
9 So I would invite all of you to come back tomorrow morning at 9.00
11 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, before we adjourn, since we have a few
12 minutes left, and so that I don't take any time, because I know Your
13 Honour has a plenary meeting to go to tomorrow morning, I'm not sure how
14 long it will last. Your Honour, tomorrow morning will be my last
15 appearance in any court as an advocate after some 35 years. Obviously,
16 that's a subject of very mixed emotions for me today.
17 I would like to say what a privilege it's been to practice at this
18 Tribunal, and, particularly, in front of this distinguished Trial Chamber,
19 and in the company of such distinguished and abled colleagues. Your
20 Honour, I would also like to extend my best wishes to the accused, and to
21 say, in particular, what a privilege it has been that my last case should
22 have been to represent Mr. Bruno Stojic.
23 Your Honour, I thank you for your courtesy towards me and your
24 attention through this long process.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Murphy.
1 On behalf of my colleagues and Judge Mindua, who is not here today, as he
2 is in the Dragomir Milosevic case today, I've said this before, but, of
3 course, we wish you all the best. All of our wishes for great success in
4 your new career, career as a judge. That is an extremely difficult one as
5 we experience on a daily basis. But I know that thanks to your
6 extraordinary qualities that you have shown in your 35 years as a lawyer,
7 you will have no difficulty in fulfilling this very noble mission as a
8 judge. And, in the future, we will be very happy to meet with you again
9 in other contexts. At any rate, please be assured of all our best wishes
10 for this new part of your career.
11 So the time has come and we meet again tomorrow morning at 9.00.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.35 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 26th day of
14 September, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.