Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27642

 1                           Wednesday, 7 May 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the

 6     case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours; good afternoon

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-74-T,

 9     the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11     Today is Wednesday, 7th of May.  Good afternoon to the Prosecution, to

12     the Defence counsel, to the accused, and to all the people assisting us

13     in our work.

14             For your information, Mr. Karnavas, you used one hour, 19

15     minutes, so you can add up, and you'll see how much time you have left.

16     Let's have the witness in.

17                           [The witness entered court]

18                           WITNESS:  MIOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.  We are

21     going to resume the examination-in-chief.  You have the floor.  You may

22     proceed, Mr. Karnavas.

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good afternoon, Your

24     Honours and everyone in and around the courtroom.

25                           Examination by Mr. Karnavas:  [Continued]

Page 27643

 1        Q.   And good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul.  Welcome back.  I trust you had a

 2     good evening.  Now, yesterday when we left off, I'd asked you a question

 3     about the concept of confederation, and it was at that point when you

 4     were just about to finish your answer when we had to stop for the day.

 5     We will discuss in great detail this concept, but with respect to the

 6     concept of confederation, did President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic

 7     ever sign any agreements concerning that?

 8        A.   President Tudjman, President Izetbegovic signed a mutual

 9     agreement on the confederation.  I believe that was on the 14th of

10     September, 1993.  The decision was taken that the agreement would be kept

11     secret in a way.  It was never made public.  Each of the presidents kept

12     a copy, and there was another one kept at the mission of the Republic of

13     Croatia at Geneva.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15        A.   Needless to say, I am well aware of the existence of that

16     agreement because I was involved in preparing it, and I actually

17     physically drafted it myself.

18        Q.   All right.  Now, we'll discuss that later on towards the end of

19     your testimony here today, but just to round off this topic, are you

20     aware whether President Izetbegovic ever signed any other agreements with

21     others that would impact or had anything to do with the agreement that

22     you've just indicated to us?

23        A.   Yes.  A mere two days later, President Izetbegovic signed an

24     agreement with Mr. Karadzic.  It was a similar agreement, but it wasn't

25     about a confederation.  It was about creating republics within the union.

Page 27644

 1     The most noteworthy feature of that agreement was this:  First of all,

 2     Izetbegovic took this step without ever mentioning it to the Croatian

 3     side, or at least not to President Tudjman.  Secondly, the substance of

 4     the agreement itself.  What is noteworthy is the fact that President

 5     Izetbegovic subscribed to the possibility that after two years the Serbs

 6     would be allowed to leave the union.  The possibility, in other words,

 7     for Bosnia and Herzegovina to break up.

 8        Q.   All right.  And we're going to get to that, as well, but I just

 9     want to make sure I'm crystal clear here and that the Judges understand

10     this.  What you're telling us is this:  That the second agreement between

11     Izetbegovic, two days later that is, and the Serbs called for the

12     possibility of an eventual carving up of Bosnia-Herzegovina two years

13     after that agreement; is that correct?

14        A.   That's correct.

15        Q.   Now, finally before we get into the documents, and when we do so

16     we'll be going through them rather quickly, but finally were you ever

17     present when Izetbegovic offered any other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina

18     to anyone else, because it would seem to me that based on this agreement

19     he's offering the Serbs a piece of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Did he ever

20     offer any other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to anyone else and, if so,

21     to whom?

22        A.   I was present in Geneva, I think, in the spring of 1993, just

23     before this when President Izetbegovic made a direct proposal to

24     President Tudjman for Western Herzegovina to be annexed by Croatia.

25        Q.   All right.

Page 27645

 1        A.   This was during a recess in the Geneva negotiations.  I was with

 2     President Tudjman, and we approached President Izetbegovic.  This was

 3     something that often happened during recesses in negotiations.

 4             At a meeting that had just taken place, there had been very

 5     unpleasant conversation where the Bosniak side with President Izetbegovic

 6     and the Serbs clashed.  I think it was purely human reasons that

 7     motivated or pushed Tudjman to approach Izetbegovic during that recess.

 8     I can't remember specifically who was with President Izetbegovic.  I do

 9     believe that Mr. Miles Raguz was also with him at the time.  They talked

10     and President Izetbegovic made a proposal in no uncertain terms about

11     what I just said, for Western Herzegovina to secede from Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina and join Croatia.  He wasn't specific about the precise

13     extent of the territory on offer.  Nonetheless, President Tudjman refused

14     to talk about this.

15             Later on after we'd left, at lunch the president continued to

16     talk about this.  My impression at the time was he had been somewhat

17     taken aback by this.  He nevertheless believed that regardless of

18     Izetbegovic's motives for that proposal this could never be an

19     appropriate solution for dealing with the crisis in Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina, nor indeed could it be a solution for the status of the

21     Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Some time later, perhaps a year or

22     more later, I brought this anecdote up with Minister Granic who at the

23     time was Croatia's Foreign Minister.  He then shared with me that he,

24     too, once had attended a meeting at which President Izetbegovic tabled a

25     similar proposal.  This other proposal that Minister Granic was now

Page 27646

 1     telling me about was even more specific in purely territorial terms.

 2     There was talk of specific municipalities that would make up this

 3     territory.  Nonetheless, at least based on what Granic told me at the

 4     time, Tudjman yet again refused to discuss any solutions of that nature.

 5        Q.   Okay.

 6             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  Mr. Zuzul, you have said that there

 7     were human reasons.  That at least is the translation, and I would be

 8     grateful if you could elaborate a bit.  Do you mean personal reasons

 9     or -- or what does it mean?  I do not understand.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, during that session, and of

11     course I'm telling you about this based on how I remember things to have

12     happened, I think there was quite a severe verbal attack launched, I

13     think, by Mr. Krajisnik against Mr. Izetbegovic.  Mr. Izetbegovic looked

14     hurt, if anything, by this sort of approach that took place as part of a

15     round of negotiations.  Other than that, there had been a number of

16     situations in which the Serb negotiators took a harsh or even vulgar

17     approach in how they accosted the other delegations.  This was one such

18     situation.  As to President Tudjman's humanly understandable motives for

19     approaching Izetbegovic thereafter, to be perfectly clear this is just my

20     own personal interpretation of those events.

21             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

22             MR. KARNAVAS:

23        Q.   Okay.  Now -- I'm told that maybe you should say in English what

24     "Lucki" means.  Lucki.  Well, the English translation obviously was --

25     may be incorrect.

Page 27647

 1        A.   [In English] I would also say it was human approach based on

 2     empathy.

 3        Q.   Empathy.  Okay.  So in other words, Izetbegovic had been

 4     attacked.  He's sitting there by himself.  Tudjman, being the statesman

 5     that he was and a human, went there to comfort another human just to --

 6     after that very difficult and vulgar attack by Krajisnik.  Is that

 7     basically what it was?

 8        A.   That would be my interpretation.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And it was during that -- that exchange, if you will, when

10     Izetbegovic offered Western Herzegovina and Tudjman rejected it.

11        A.   [Interpretation] Yes.  But the reaction didn't come immediately.

12     We started talking about a number of different things.  At one point, the

13     discussion settled on the need for a solution.  It was at this time that

14     President Izetbegovic said as follows -- well, I don't think I can quote

15     him with any degree of accuracy, but he made a proposal for Western

16     Herzegovina to secede and join Croatia.

17        Q.   All right.  And just one -- I guess let's stay with this for one

18     second.  Did -- was there any counter-proposal by President Tudjman and

19     say, "Well, I don't need Western Herzegovina.  How about just giving me

20     Neum, and I'll give you that water port that you're looking for," you

21     know, that deep port?

22        A.   At that time, no proposals were being made by President Tudjman

23     apart from a crystal clear reply to the effect that this was in no way an

24     acceptable solution.

25        Q.   All right.  Now, we're going to go through some documents.  I'm

Page 27648

 1     going to ask you to keep your answers rather short, and then I'll direct

 2     you if I need more amplification.  We have quite a few, so we're going to

 3     go at a rather rapid clip, but nonetheless I think the information you've

 4     provided thus far lays a good foundation for -- for that process. With

 5     you, there should be some binders, unless they took them away.  Are they

 6     are?

 7        A.   [In English] Yes, they are here.

 8        Q.   And if you could to binder number 1, and if you could look at the

 9     first document, which is 1D 02039.

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  And incidentally, Your Honours, this is the

11     constitution of the Republic of Croatia.  We've seen it before.  In fact,

12     we saw it with the very first witness.  I mention this because this is a

13     document that is well known to everyone around the court in light of our

14     conversation yesterday, that is.

15        Q.   Now, let me preface my question by saying we had a witness by the

16     name of Donia that came here.  He's an historian who worked for the

17     Prosecution.  And in his report -- in his testimony he made references in

18     respect to the Banovina and quoted others or cited others to support his

19     thesis that President Tudjman had aspirations of re-establishing the

20     Banovina Hrvatska boundaries, and both in his report and his testimony he

21     made reference to the constitution.  In the preamble, that is.

22             So now I want to go -- I want you to look at this document, 1D

23     02039, page 1, towards the second to last bullet where it says:  "In the

24     establishment of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939 by which Croatian state

25     identity was restored in the Kingdom Of Yugoslavia."

Page 27649

 1             Now, if you could please comment on the preamble recognising

 2     that, one, you did not draft the constitution but you have been a member

 3     of the government and you are from Croatia.  You should be aware of the

 4     constitution.  Can you comment on that and you knew President Tudjman as

 5     well?

 6        A.   [Interpretation] Of course I do believe I'm in a position to

 7     comment on that.  I think I'm sufficiently familiar with Croatia's

 8     constitution both as a citizen and as an official.  I declare

 9     categorically that this interpretation has nothing to do with what is

10     actually contained in the preamble to the Croatian constitution.

11        Q.   Why is that?

12        A.   Anyone who reads this page without necessarily possessing

13     appropriate legal skills and knowledge must understand that what this is

14     about is the continuity of Croatia's right to sovereignty and not

15     Croatia's right to territory.  Were this about territory and not about

16     sovereignty, this would be entirely absurd.  In that case, having read

17     the whole thing, Croatia's territory would be somewhere between 10 per

18     cent of its present territory and perhaps 200 per cent of its present

19     territory.  It would probably be spilling over into Austria, Hungary,

20     Italy, Slovenia, and perhaps even the Catholic church.

21             If I may just be allowed to furnish an additional explanation as

22     to the importance of the Banovina of Croatia in determining the historic

23     continuity of the Croats' right to statehood.  As is well known from

24     history, and that is something that we see mentioned here again, there is

25     a reference to 1918 and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

Page 27650

 1     After the end of World War I and based on the principle of

 2     self-determination as defined by Woodrow Wilson, President of the United

 3     States, the Croats -- or, rather, Croatia's representatives at the

 4     Versailles Conference opted to unite with the Serbs and the Slovenes,

 5     thereby constituting the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.  They

 6     did, however, keep their sovereignty and their own parliament.  This went

 7     on until 1928, when Croat delegates were assassinated in the Yugoslav

 8     Assembly.

 9             In 1929, the then King of Yugoslavia imposed a constitution on

10     the Croats, defining Yugoslavia as an absolutist monarchy, thereby

11     abolishing any form of sovereignty of the Croatian people.  That is why

12     it is so exceptionally important for the idea of continuity as well as

13     its legal foundations that in 1939 following an agreement between the

14     Croatian and Serbian prime ministers, Cvetkovic and Macek, there was a

15     decision by the King to establish the Banovina of Croatia.  In

16     territorial terms, this never came to fruition simply because the Second

17     World War started soon after.  This was, however, of the essence to

18     Croatia because this gave Croatia back its right to sovereignty, and then

19     documents followed in 1943, 1945, and this period spanned all the way to

20     the 1974 constitution.  It is not my intention to pass myself off as a

21     constitutional legal expert.  I am, however, convinced that this is the

22     only correct interpretation of the preamble.

23        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Well, perhaps you might be able to assist

24     us in -- in more concrete ways given that explanation, of course, but in

25     a different context.

Page 27651

 1             We had another witness here, John Kenneth Galbraith's son, the

 2     famous economist.  His son came in.  He happened to be the ambassador to

 3     Croatia from the United States, Peter Galbraith, and he testified, and he

 4     testified that President Tudjman had territorial aspirations and that he

 5     believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would not and should not continue as a

 6     sovereign independent state and that a substantial part of Bosnian

 7     territory should become the territory of the Republic of Croatia.  He

 8     indicated that he formed those opinions having met with him on a frequent

 9     basis, sometimes even several times a day.  He talked about Tudjman being

10     prejudiced against the Muslim people, and he also indicated at one point,

11     he mentioned the fact as further -- as further basis for list supposition

12     that Croatia had a policy of granting Croatian citizens to any ethnic

13     Croat who wanted it, and of course as compared to Bosnia-Herzegovina in

14     this period, you know, that would have been one other way of establishing

15     his territorial ambitions.

16             And I'm quoting -- or this is part from the testimony, Your

17     Honours, for the record.  The gentleman testified in open court on

18     September 12, 2006, and passages to basically what I was referring to are

19     from pages 6435, 36, 6427-28, and 6453-54.  First let me ask you this,

20     sir:  Did you know Peter Galbraith?

21        A.   Yes, I do.

22        Q.   And yesterday incidentally, just let me touch on this, you talked

23     about a Contact Group, and as I understand it in the context in which you

24     put it, the Contact Group was established as a result of the failure of

25     the Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg Plans which were UN-EU coordinated

Page 27652

 1     efforts; is that correct?

 2        A.   That was certainly my impression.  I think that is correct.

 3        Q.   You indicated that one of the members of the Contact Groups was

 4     the United States, and my first question is Peter Galbraith, being the

 5     American ambassador to Croatia, was he the representative of the United

 6     States during those negotiations, the Contact Group, to your knowledge?

 7        A.   No, he was not the representative of the United States in that

 8     Contact Group, not the most active representative of the United States.

 9     There was one who was specially nominated for that position by

10     President Clinton, and that was Ambassador Charles Redman.

11        Q.   All right.  And again, how well did you know Peter Galbraith?

12        A.   Quite well, I'd say.

13        Q.   All right.  Now, he indicates that President Tudjman did not want

14     Bosnia and Herzegovina to exist.  Is that statement correct in your

15     opinion?

16        A.   In my opinion, this is an incorrect statement.

17        Q.   And what about his statement that he wanted to re-establish the

18     borders more or less based on the Banovina?

19        A.   Again, I think this is another incorrect statement.

20        Q.   Now, he talked about this policy.  Policy, and I mention that

21     word, and I underscore it because in some ways, in some circles, in

22     some -- under some circumstances it could give sort of a nefarious

23     notion.  Let me ask you this being familiar with the Croatian

24     constitution:  Are Croats all over the world, wherever they may be born,

25     do they have the possibility, based on the Croatian constitution, to have

Page 27653

 1     a Croatian passport?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Also, do the Croats around the world, wherever it may be, do they

 4     have the possibility, based on the Croatian constitution, to serve on the

 5     Croatian parliament?  I believe it's called Sabor.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   And in fact, if I'm not mistaken, are there some seats that are

 8     specifically allocated to those Croats because historically speaking

 9     there have been Croatian communities throughout the world that have been

10     organised in order to take care of their particular needs?

11        A.   Correct.  And if I may add to that, because very often it seems

12     to me that this is misinterpreted.  Although there is a number of states

13     across the world that allow their citizens who live abroad and work there

14     to participate in the parliamentary life of their respective states,

15     Croatia has had a number of reasons to allow its citizens that privilege,

16     because when the citizens' will was exercised after the democratic

17     elections and when the free Republic of Croatia was established, which

18     was then internationally recognised, one could not and dared not ignore

19     the fact that there was approximately the same number of Croats residing

20     within the territory of Croatia proper as those residing outside of the

21     territory of Croatia.

22             Why was it that this fact should not have been ignored?  A number

23     of them had left for economic reasons, but a large number of those Croats

24     had left for political reasons during the time of Communism, and they

25     could not even spend holidays in Croatia or visit their family members.

Page 27654

 1     They were not allowed to do so.  In other words, when those Croats were

 2     given an opportunity to participate in the political life of Croatia,

 3     this meant that the injustice was corrected, at least to a certain

 4     extent, the injustice that they themselves were not guilty of.  They were

 5     not to be blamed for that injustice.  A provision was introduced that

 6     exists in a number of democratic states when this was done.

 7        Q.   Okay.  I think that --

 8        A.   Likewise -- if I may.

 9        Q.   Okay.

10        A.   I believe that this is very important because your question

11     contained one part that was relative to the possibility of holding a

12     Croatian passport.  Maybe you would like me to comment on that.

13        Q.   Very briefly.

14        A.   It is true that a large number or a majority of Croats who reside

15     in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina also have Croatian citizenship

16     and hold Croatian passport because this is provided for by the law --

17     laws of both Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  However,

18     based on my knowledge and my information, I believe that I can say that

19     the other state with a number of citizens holding a Croatian passport is

20     the United States of America, and if we followed Ambassador Galbraith's

21     logic, would that mean that Croatia also had aspirations towards the

22     territory of the United States of America?  What I'm saying is this is

23     just an absurd claim.  These are two things that have nothing whatsoever

24     to do with each other.  The right to a passport cannot be interpreted by

25     saying that one nation has territorial aspirations towards the territory

Page 27655

 1     of another nation.

 2        Q.   All right.  Thank you for that.  Now, we're going to move on to

 3     the next document, 1D 02910, and this is a -- a presidential transcript.

 4     We've seen it before.  It has a D number, Your Honours, because there

 5     were some pages that were added.  We translated 12 pages, so that would

 6     have been the extent of -- this was P 00037.  So the 12 added pages would

 7     have been the addition to burdening everyone around the court with

 8     additional reading.

 9             Now, if I may, Your Honours, read from the -- the Prosecution's

10     exhibit list and their 65 ter description of this particular document.

11     It will be my vehicle for the next series of questions.

12             If you have that, sir.  Based on -- this is what the Prosecution

13     says:  "This transcript shows that Franjo Tudjman had clear territorial

14     ambitions toward Bosnia.  The transcript also discusses the deal made

15     between the Serbs and the Croats in Karadjordjevo to divide Bosnia," and

16     their reference is to page 2, 5 to 8, and 38 to 39?  First -- first of

17     all, let me ask you do.  You have the document with you?

18        A.   Yes, I do.  I have it in front of me.

19        Q.   Now, this was a presidential transcript that comes from the 7th

20     session of the Supreme State Council, 8 June 1991.  First of all, were

21     you present?

22        A.   No, I wasn't present because at that moment I was not politically

23     active at all.

24        Q.   Have you had an opportunity to -- to go through this presidential

25     transcript?

Page 27656

 1        A.   Yes, I have.

 2        Q.   Now --

 3             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  Just -- just a --

 4             MR. KARNAVAS:  Technical.

 5             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Oh, okay.  A correction in the transcript.  I

 6     think it has just disappeared now.  The number of the document is not

 7     correctly stated.  There is an 8 too much, and it might later make it

 8     difficult to find it.

 9             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.  It's 1D 02910.

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  That's correct.  Thank you.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  All right.  And this was Prosecution document P

12     00037.  The only exception is that we've added or translated, I should

13     say, pages 76 to 83, Your Honours, and pages 96 to 100, and you will be

14     able to notice that quite easily if you look at those pages.  They're not

15     numbered, but actually you'll see "Unofficial translation" is at the

16     right top part of the page.

17        Q.   In any event, with that, if we could turn to page 2 just very

18     quickly.  I want to focus your attention where it says:  "About the sixth

19     meeting of the presidents of the republic."  Okay?  And then you see:

20     "As you can conclude from the release, certain progress has been made in

21     the talks held so far and that Serbia, which means Montenegro, as well,

22     accepted the basic principle of the establishment of an alliance of

23     sovereign republics."  And then it goes on.  You also see Izetbegovic's

24     name at the bottom of the page.

25             First of all, if you could help us out a little bit in context

Page 27657

 1     because I've noted this is June 8, 1991.  What is happening in and around

 2     Yugoslavia at that period?  And I'm going to ask you to, like, either

 3     speak a little faster and shorter so we can go through this material. And

 4     I apologise to the translators if they're going to have to labour a

 5     little bit more.

 6        A.   At that moment there were almost panic attempts to find a

 7     solution to the break-up of Yugoslavia.  It was absolutely clear that

 8     Yugoslavia could not continue existing in the form that it existed up to

 9     then.  The collective Presidency stopped functioning.  All the republics

10     had their own governments and their own presidents, and in an attempt to

11     find a solution the presidents met on a regular basis, and this is

12     obviously a meeting that took place after the sixth meeting of the of

13     presidents.  The international community at that point in time was not

14     showing very much interest in what was happening in Yugoslavia, in -- it

15     did express, however, its position and stated that Yugoslavia should

16     continue existing in one way or another, in one form or another.

17             Two western-most republics of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia and

18     Croatia, which I dare say were certainly most developed in economic terms

19     and also had managed to develop the most democratic relationships within

20     their respective societies, proposed a model of confederal organisation

21     of Yugoslavia.  They did not advocate the break-up of Yugoslavia but,

22     rather, Yugoslavia as a confederation similar to -- to a certain extent

23     to the European Commission or Benelux at its very beginnings.

24             This proposal was drafted by a commission -- a joint commission

25     of Slovenia and Croatia upon the proposal of President Tudjman.  The

Page 27658

 1     representatives of Serbia and Montenegro rejected that proposal.  They

 2     did not even want to talk about it and tabled a completely different

 3     proposal for the survival of Yugoslavia.  According to that proposal,

 4     Yugoslavia would have been even more unitarian that it was according to

 5     the previous constitution of 1974, and it was absolutely clear that it

 6     would be dominated by the Republic of Serbia and Belgrade.

 7             The key issue was the position of the president of Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic, and the president Macedonia, Mr. Gligorov.

 9     The two of them found it very hard to reach any conclusions or make any

10     decisions.  However, when they finally presented their positions, then

11     their positions were much closer to the position of Belgrade and Serbia.

12             Mr. Izetbegovic at one point stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina

13     would be willing and ready to stay with the Rump Yugoslavia.  After that

14     and only after that Croatia and Slovenia took steps which would lead to

15     their dissolution and secession from Yugoslavia.  At that moment the --

16     there was something that was very much ignored by the international

17     community but it became very clear already at that point in time that the

18     situation in Yugoslavia would end up in war because the Yugoslav Army was

19     ready for an intervention.  At the beginning of 1991, which is now very

20     clear, they had already prepared themselves for a military takeover.

21             On the other hand, everybody was clear that Serbia was getting

22     ready for war.  The slogan which became a chapter in one of the

23     internationally recognised books which read "If we don't know how to

24     work, at least we know how to fight," became a -- something that was used

25     by a lot of politicians in Serbia.  When you read those things today,

Page 27659

 1     then you can see that the predictions of the CIA and other analytical

 2     services were that the break-up of Yugoslavia would happen in a war and

 3     that this war would be a bloodbath, but at that point in time and -- the

 4     international community ignored all that.  This, I believe, would give

 5     you a general framework within which this discussion took place.

 6        Q.   All right.  Now, during those discussions, were there discussions

 7     being held to carve up any particular republic, because there are some

 8     references here to Karadjordjevo, and that's part of the Prosecution's

 9     thesis, that there was a meeting between Tudjman and -- and Milosevic,

10     and at this meeting they had divided to -- they had decided to divide

11     Bosnia.

12        A.   In this document, I did not find any report about any meetings in

13     Karadjordjevo.  I may have omitted this reference, but I don't think it's

14     there.

15        Q.   All right.  Well, let me just go through one passage, and this

16     would be on page 38.  We don't have time to go through this entire

17     document.  It would take hours.  But just one -- to focus you on this one

18     page, page 38.  It says:  "The president:  All right.  Let's wrap up this

19     item.  First of all, regarding this proposal, I said there, and the

20     minutes will reflect this, that this proposal by Izetbegovic and Gligorov

21     is actually an attempt to preserve and somewhat bolster the 1974

22     constitution, basically, that is, Serbia accepted it, but giving it its

23     own interpretation in regards to the creating of an effective democratic

24     federation, and they are sure not to change their position in this

25     regard.  Therefore, the solution lies in what was said there, in the --

Page 27660

 1     in the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if -- and if we achieve

 2     that, then we can possibly look for a basis for an alliance of sovereign

 3     republics and states.

 4              "I think we shall achieve it because this is -- this is equally

 5     in the interests of Serbia and Croatia.  While the Muslim component has

 6     no other exit than to accept the solution, although it will -- it will

 7     not be easy to find the solution, but essentially that is it."

 8             And then he talks about the next couple -- the next paragraph he

 9     talks about the European Community, and then the following paragraph ends

10     with:

11             "Therefore, the question arises whether such a community is at

12     all possible having in mind the economic and other relations in the

13     eastern part of Yugoslavia."

14             Now, if we just looked at this segment in the -- you know, this

15     is just one page out of 163 pages, one might get the impression that what

16     Tudjman is actually suggesting, that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be carved

17     up among at least Serbia and Croatia.  Did you get that impression from

18     reading this document?

19        A.   My impression was that he was just telling about the conversation

20     that he was reporting about, and the conversation took place among the

21     six presidents, and I don't think that this was about any proposals

22     because it transpires from the entire transcript that no such proposal

23     was ever discussed.  There was discussion about completely different

24     things, and the thing that was discussed was whether there should be a

25     confederation of all the republics, meaning the six republics that

Page 27661

 1     existed at the moment.

 2        Q.   All right.

 3        A.   For example, he is saying, and I have a Croatian version in front

 4     of me, on page 9052 of the Croatian text where President Tudjman says

 5     explicitly:  "We can start from the position that Croatia may find its

 6     own interest in preserving a union of sovereign states."  And then we

 7     come to the guiding thought in my own interpretation of his whole

 8     state -- statesman behaviour.  He says:  "In this way we should achieve a

 9     peaceful separation."  And he goes on to say:  "A peaceful solution of

10     the Croat-Serb issue on the Croatian territory and the whole -- and the

11     territory as a whole," which means that within the context of the

12     situation that prevailed at the time.

13        Q.   Okay.  Now, in quoting -- and there should be page numbers.

14             MR. KARNAVAS:  The first page number, Your Honour, was page 43.

15     I'm just as alarmed as you are because I want to make a clear record, and

16     I know you need to follow.

17             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  We don't have -- it.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the Honourable Judge, please.

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour, I think that -- you should have, Your

20     Honour, page 43 of 163.

21             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I have page 9, and the next one is page 38, 39,

22     40.  Okay.  So 34 does not figure in this document.

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  All right.

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  You have it?  Oh, this is a discrimination

25     against my person, I note because my colleague seems to have it.  So I

Page 27662

 1     will think of the steps that have to be taken.  Thank you.

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, we apologise.  We do massive amounts of

 3     copying and printing, and I'll blame it on technology, but --

 4             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Your apology's accepted.

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  This was translated by the Prosecution, Your

 6     Honour.  I'm not suggesting -- I'm not suggesting that the Prosecutor --

 7     I'm just merely mentioning this -- that this is part of their --

 8     everybody seems --

 9             MR. SCOTT:  As the Court knows it's always the Prosecution's

10     fault.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  -- everybody seems to be so touchy around here.

12             MR. SCOTT:  [Microphone not activated]

13             MR. KARNAVAS:  What I meant to say was this portion was

14     translated by the Prosecutor.  We translated other pages.  Therefore they

15     should not have been missing but obviously it was our fault in copying

16     it.  So the Prosecutor should just relax a little bit.

17             MR. SCOTT:  [Microphone not activated]

18             MR. KARNAVAS:

19        Q.   Now, you quoted -- you quoted from another page --

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One second.  Mr. Witness, I

21     take this opportunity to ask a question linked to what we're talking

22     about.  We have a presidential transcript that relates to the 7th session

23     of the Supreme Council of the state of the Republic of Croatia held on

24     the 8th of 1991.  Several months ago the Defence challenged those

25     presidential transcripts.  You seem to be somebody who may have taken

Page 27663

 1     part in one of those meetings, so maybe you will be in a position to

 2     solve of some of the problems that we've been faced with.  My first

 3     question is as follows:  Did you personally take part in the Supreme

 4     State Council meetings?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  No, Your Honour.  Participate

 6     in this meeting.  I only read the transcript.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Maybe not this one, but did you

 8     take part in other meetings?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I participated in a number of

10     them, but once I was appointed in 1992.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  In 1992.  When you

12     took part in those meetings with President Tudjman, was there somebody

13     who was charged with recording everything that was said by all the

14     participants to these meetings?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, yes.  At meetings of this

16     kind there was somebody.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Who was it, a secretary, an

18     employee, somebody specialised?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These meetings were recorded, and

20     then notes or minutes or transcripts were taken, and as far as I know

21     there were a few professional typists, ladies, who did that.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  You have

23     by your answers given authenticity to those transcripts.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Honourable Judge --

25             MR. KARNAVAS:  At some point today hopefully we'll get to a

Page 27664

 1     transcript where Mr. Zuzul is mentioned.  There is an exchange which we

 2     will see he did not participate in.  So authenticity is one thing,

 3     accuracy is another, and we'll get to that at some point.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  But I believe the witness

 5     wanted to say something else.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It indeed happened in the way

 7     Mr. Karnavas described.  As I am reading these transcripts, and this is

 8     my first opportunity to read them carefully, I have been able to convince

 9     myself that they contain errors, misidentification of person,

10     misinterpretation of their words.  And since I know the conditions under

11     which the recordings were made were far, far from ideal, I'm not

12     surprised to see those errors, but it is my personal impression that

13     every transcript has to be checked and re-checked because of those

14     errors, and I'm going to be able to give you my own example to illustrate

15     one of the errors that are contained in one of those transcripts.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.  Judge Trechsel, did we solve your problem?

18     Okay.  Thank you.  And we apologise again.  And it was no fault of the

19     Prosecution's, so they shouldn't -- I just want to make sure that there's

20     not shifting the blame on anyone.

21        Q.   Now, I noticed that earlier that one of your answers, you used

22     the word "unitarian," and -- and I see that on page -- one of the pages

23     that we translated which would have been -- it should be page 46, 47, 48,

24     49 -- I mean, 96, 97, 98, 99, I believe right around there.  It says

25     here:  "Therefore it is necessary that we cooperate until all

Page 27665

 1     possibilities are exhausted and that we create both in principle and

 2     personally the best possible relations because that is in our interest,

 3     interest of the army and of individuals, but of course we will not be

 4     silent about -- we will not be silent about such cases.  We will present

 5     them as an existence of those elements and dogmatic Communist and

 6     unitarian Greater Serbia as they do exist in society not only within the

 7     army but also in all state -- in all strata of the society as well as

 8     extremists among us which hinder achieving a political solution."

 9             If you could -- I just want to dwell a little bit on this

10     unitarian Greater Serbia.  What is meant by that, because we've heard the

11     term "unitary government."  Now we have a variation of that word,

12     "unitarian."  What was your understanding of that in the context of which

13     we're speaking of, because it might assist us.

14        A.   Well, for all of us who group up in Yugoslavia the meaning of the

15     term "unitary" was something that we knew from our everyday lives.  It

16     was not something that was learned from constitutional practice, because

17     the more the federal state became unitary or unitaristic the less rights

18     were enjoyed by the republics.  Yugoslavia's history is the history of

19     defining unitary versus federal system.

20             In this particular paragraph that you've just quoted, President

21     Tudjman, in my opinion, is referring to something that had already

22     happened in Serbia by that time.  While Yugoslavia existed, in 1974

23     constitution there was the federal system, but Serbia had two autonomous

24     provinces under this constitution, Vojvodina and Kosovo.

25             At the time when this is being discussed, Serbia had already

Page 27666

 1     rescinded the right to the autonomy in both those districts, especially

 2     in Kosovo, and from that time until the recent time when Kosovo declared

 3     its independence as a state and was recognised as such this was the

 4     period when there was the Kosovo crisis, and President Tudjman and all

 5     the other participants were quite familiar with this crisis.  So he is

 6     talking about this unitary Serbia, Serbia that is rescinding all rights

 7     to autonomy and urges the creation of a Yugoslavia that would, it is

 8     quite clear, be set up not on the federal principles, not on confederal

 9     principles, but on unitary principles.  It would be in Serbia's way.  I

10     think that's what this paragraphs actually all about.

11        Q.   All right.  We're going to move on to this next document because

12     we're running a little bit behind.  So if we could go to 1D 00894.  This

13     is from "Balkan Odyssey."  This is a document that we've seen before.  In

14     fact we've seen these pages, again no additional reading for anyone

15     around the court.  No surprise.  But I want to point out one thing and

16     have you comment on it.

17             On chapter 2 Lord Owen in his book says, bottom of the first --

18     of the second paragraph on the first page:  "The Netherlands had the EC

19     Presidency from the outbreak of the war in July until December 1991, and

20     in consequence of my visit to The Hague, I discovered that on 13 July

21     1991, when the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were

22     just eighteen days old, the Dutch government had suggested to the other

23     EC members states that the option of agreed changes to some of the

24     internal borders between the Yugoslavian republic might be explored."

25             Now, I ask you to think about this only because the issue of

Page 27667

 1     changing of the borders have come up.  From your experiences were you

 2     aware of any of the international negotiators exploring possibilities,

 3     that is initiating, because I think that's the word, initiating

 4     possibilities of changing of borders?  And I mention this because of the

 5     Prosecution's theory of joint criminal enterprise that Croatia was

 6     initiating this process of changing borders?

 7             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I'm sorry to intervene.  I'm

 8     waiting for my microphone.  Thank you very much.

 9             Your Honour, I'm mindful that the Chamber, or at least some

10     members of the Chamber, do not like many interventions from counsel, and

11     I've been quiet all day for the most part I think with one exception, but

12     I am going to object and continue to object.  There is no reason on this

13     basis; that is, there is no reason for Mr. Karnavas to make speeches in

14     connection with his questions and characterise them as this is what the

15     Prosecution says.  This is the Prosecution's theory of the case.  It is a

16     form of coaching, Your Honour.  It's the key words to the witness to say

17     this is what the Prosecution says, so I'm telling you now this is what

18     you, the witness, are supposed to disagree with.  Mr. Karnavas can simply

19     ask non-leading questions to the witness.  Were you in such a meeting at

20     this day?  Tell us what happened.  Did you talk to Izetbegovic about this

21     subject?  What did he say?  Were you at this meeting or not?  No, I

22     wasn't.  But there is no reason for constant speeches or

23     characterisations of this is what the Prosecution says, so now I'm

24     telling you, Mr. Witness, I want you, I'm expecting you to say the

25     opposite.  It's a form of coaching.  We object to it.

Page 27668

 1             While I'm on my feet, while I'm on my feet, number two, number

 2     two, I want to make the record clear, and I'll say why, in terms of the

 3     transcripts, in the last transcript, the presidential transcript that we

 4     were looking at, and this is not directed at Mr. Karnavas or the Defence

 5     at all, but I just want the record to be clear on something because I

 6     know statements have been made in the Croatian press, statements have

 7     been made in the Croatian media that the Prosecution, for example, used

 8     only -- offered bits and pieces or excerpts of the presidential

 9     transcripts that the Prosecution tendered into evidence.  As the Chamber

10     knows, that's not the case.  The Prosecution's position was we tendered

11     the entire transcript, top to bottom, with the exception of a very few

12     where they were long transcripts and it was very clear to any reader that

13     the last 80 pages had absolutely nothing to do with anything at issue in

14     this case, whether to enter into a free trade agreement with China, I

15     don't think we needed 80 pages on that.  With those kind of exceptions,

16     we tendered every single page of every single transcript, and so when the

17     Croatian media writes its article tomorrow about the hearing today that

18     says, well, Mr. Karnavas had to add other excerpts because the

19     Prosecution had not played fairly, I just want it to be clear, the

20     Prosecution offered the entire transcripts, and it was the Chamber that

21     only decided to accept bits and pieces.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, with regard to the media,

23     that's not the Trial Chamber's problem.  We're not going to issue our

24     judgement based on some press cuttings.  That's one thing.  That's your

25     problem, not ours.

Page 27669

 1             However, with regard to the objection you've just raised.

 2     Mr. Karnavas, I believe that the objection is in part justified.

 3     Initially you should have asked the witness whether he had any knowledge

 4     of possible changes within the internal borders, and he could have said

 5     yes, no, and then you could have asked him to look at what Lord Owen said

 6     in his book.  Based on that, he would have said, yes, indeed.  Then third

 7     step, you can say, "The Prosecution in its indictment claims this and

 8     that.  Do you agree or not?"  Otherwise, you should have preempt or you

 9     lead the witness.

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well, Mr. President, but I do want to take

11     exception to the Prosecution's characterisation that I'm coaching the

12     witness.  First of all, we had a narrative.  We had a narrative where we

13     talked about changing of borders or swapping.  We had a narrative where

14     it was Izetbegovic that offered part of Herzegovina.  We had a narrative

15     where it was Izetbegovic that signed an agreement to allow half of Bosnia

16     to be carved away, so it's not as if I'm coaching the witness, but I

17     take -- I take your observations and I will modify my -- my technique.

18        Q.   Concerning this, sir, do you have any knowledge with respect to

19     international negotiators proposing the possibility at least that they

20     should explore the alteration of the borders within Yugoslavia made up --

21     that separated the republics?

22        A.   I know that the option of peaceful changing of the borders was

23     mentioned in several international documents.  Lord Owen writes about

24     that at several places in his book.  This is one of those places.  In the

25     first stage of the work of the conference for the former Yugoslavia, that

Page 27670

 1     was always on the table as an option, so voluntary changing of the

 2     borders in accordance with the mutual agreement.  After all, the case

 3     that I described yesterday was initiated by the representatives of the

 4     international community, possible territory swaps between Croatia and

 5     Serbia.  So I am aware of the fact that there was such thinking, and I

 6     know that it was mentioned in several international documents.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Now we move to the next document and that

 8     would be 1D 00893.  I think we've seen this document as well.  So without

 9     adding too much commentary, I do want to point out that this was a

10     document that is familiar to everyone here.

11             Now, if we can look at this.  This is the European Community

12     conference.  We have a draft convention.  It mentions Lord Carrington,

13     and there's a treaty proposal.  I will ask you to first focus on Article

14     1 where it talks about new relations between the republics, and under

15     1(c) common state of equal republics for those republics which wish to

16     remain in a common state.  Under (f), recognition of the independence

17     within the existing borders unless otherwise agreed.

18             I then want you to focus on page 16, the section called special

19     status, which says in addition areas in which persons belonging to a

20     national or ethnic group form a majority shall enjoy a special status of

21     autonomy, and it talks about the right to use national emblems,

22     educational system, et cetera.  First of all, are you familiar with this

23     document?

24        A.   Yes, I am familiar with it.

25        Q.   All right.  And to your knowledge this is what was being

Page 27671

 1     discussed at the time?

 2        A.   That was the framework for the debate and for the thinking in the

 3     period between 1991 and the London conference which took place in 1992,

 4     because this was, in fact, the only official document produced by the

 5     international community.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Now, we see from the very -- the preamble, we see that

 7     this is November -- 1 -- we see it was November 1991.  What is happening

 8     in Croatia at that point in time?

 9        A.   Immediately before this, on the 8th of October, Croatia made its

10     decision to become independent, and in the international sphere Croatia

11     was trying to achieve international recognition based, among other

12     things, on this document as a state within its borders, and soon after

13     this document was produced Croatia was indeed recognised, first

14     unofficially by Germany.  The recognition was then postponed until

15     mid-January 1992.  This was when the European states followed the

16     Vatican, the Holy See, and recognised Croatia within its existing

17     borders.  Internally in Croatia at the time the war escalated.  The

18     Yugoslav army attacked from several sides, and as I said yesterday, large

19     areas of Croatia were occupied and Croatia was for all intents and

20     purposes cut in two.

21        Q.   All right.  Now, if we go to the next document, P 00089.  It's a

22     Prosecution document.  We've seen this before.  It's been talked about

23     quite a bit by various witnesses, and it's been referenced, in fact, by

24     some in their works.  This is 27 December 1991.  You more or less told us

25     politically what is happening and physically what is happening in

Page 27672

 1     Croatia.  First let me begin by asking have you read this presidential

 2     transcript?

 3        A.   Yes, I have.

 4        Q.   Were you present --

 5             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry, could you --

 6             MR. KARNAVAS:  P 00089.

 7             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  The number is clear.  In which folder is it?  We

 8     have five.

 9             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, all these documents are in a chronological

10     order, so if you -- the number.  So it would be -- you would need to go

11     to the next binder.  So number 1, number 2 --

12             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Number 2.

13             MR. KARNAVAS:  Yep.  We have it that way.  If I do go out of

14     order, I'll make sure to give everybody the heads-up.  I only have three

15     binders.  That's why, so ...

16        Q.   Anyway, while we're looking for those, just some preliminary

17     questions.  Were you present during this discussion?

18        A.   No, I was not.

19        Q.   Okay.  Now, just to touch on a couple of points.  First let me

20     ask you:  Given your position and your involvement in the various events,

21     do you feel competent that you might be able to discuss certain contents

22     in this document?

23        A.   I think yes.  I think I can.  I think I can give you some

24     elements regarding the interpretation of this document, and quite by

25     coincidence after I read this document now for the first time, perhaps I

Page 27673

 1     can provide some additional information that might shed light on the

 2     circumstances, the time when this was going on.

 3        Q.   All right.  Well --

 4             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, excuse me again --

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, in light of what was just said, I'm

 7     going to object to this kind of just simply tell us your interpretation

 8     of the document, the document the witness has no personal knowledge of.

 9     He was not present at the meeting.  He's told us that.  And, you know,

10     this is what Mr. Karnavas -- a word Mr. Karnavas himself likes to use.

11     This is just spin.  I've got a witness here from the Tudjman government,

12     and I'm going to ask him to give his spin on this material, and that's

13     all it is.  I have no objection if -- if he asks about a specific

14     question about something that may have a technical meaning, something --

15     a moment ago he said something, what would "unitary" mean.  I didn't

16     object to that.  I think probably that's something the witness might be

17     able to assist us with.  But to simply take a presidential transcript of

18     a meeting where the witness was not involved, he wasn't even in

19     government at that time to my knowledge - this is December 1991 - and

20     just simply put it before the witness, "Witness, what do you think about

21     this?  What's your spin on this?"  And that's all this is.  That's all it

22     is.  Objection, Your Honour.

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.  I've heard the objection loud and clear,

24     and may I respond.  I'll be measured.

25             The Prosecutor brought in Donia, someone who got a degree in the

Page 27674

 1     United States on 19th century intellectual Muslims in Sarajevo, had a

 2     career in banking -- or in financing.  Twenty-some years later, writes a

 3     book with very few footnotes and then becomes a "Prosecution expert,"

 4     reads this, cites it.  Ribicic, Constitutional Judge in Slovenia, writes

 5     a book supposedly analysing the laws, the basis of Herceg-Bosna, does a

 6     constitutional analysis, and if you look at the portions and you look at

 7     the transcript, and by the way I did look at it before coming here today,

 8     but if you look at it - I'm afraid I didn't bring it in because of time -

 9     you will see that I referenced the part where he gets to say, "Once I

10     read this particular transcript, I changed my opinion."  And then if you

11     recall, there was a heated exchange where even you, Judge Trechsel,

12     intervene at one point because I said, well, what about all these other

13     transcripts.  You know, and he said, well, he didn't read them, and of

14     course my position at that point was that his report should be stricken

15     from the record because obviously that report was written when he only

16     looked at one particular transcript and not the others, at which point as

17     I recall, Judge Trechsel, you indicated well, you know, he could spend

18     his lifetime reading all this stuff or that could be supplemented, but be

19     that as it may, be that as it may, the point that I'm trying to make is

20     this:  When the Prosecution wants to have somebody who wasn't present and

21     take one sliver out of a presidential transcript, and I dare say he

22     wasn't quite correct when he said earlier that he's tendered everything.

23     He's only translated portions, translated portions, so tendering is one

24     thing.  Translating is another, so if you only have two or three passages

25     of 160 pages or whatever, he has it.

Page 27675

 1             But be that as it may, he brings in outsiders, not participants,

 2     to comment, to opine, and then he uses that as the foundation in

 3     establishing the joint criminal enterprise, and the first time I bring in

 4     someone who is aware of the events, and had Mr. Scott listened because he

 5     got a little excited there and was ready for his objection, but he didn't

 6     listen to the end of Mr. Zuzul's answer, which was having read that, he's

 7     able to comment on certain things.  So he got a little excited, didn't

 8     listen to the whole answer, and now here we are wasting valuable time.

 9     But I want to point that out.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  We are right.  We are

11     losing and wasting time.  You're both right.  You know, Mr. Karnavas, you

12     should, in order to avoid this objection because you are an experienced

13     professional and you know how to do it, initially you should have told

14     the witness:  "During the proofing session, we both looked at this

15     document, P 89, 160 pages long, and we mentioned this and that page.

16     Expert Donia in his report said this and that.  Could you, Witness,

17     enlighten the Trial Chamber on specific points," because then the

18     Prosecutor would not have anything to object to.

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  If I may add a point.  It strikes me that you

21     are comparing witnesses, your witness here --

22             MR. KARNAVAS:  Right.

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  -- to experts brought by the Prosecution, and I

24     don't think that is really quite equitable.  An expert is asked to give

25     opinions on matters.  A witness is asked to speak about facts that he has

Page 27676

 1     witnessed, and the question you put to your witness, in my view, is

 2     totally a question for an expert.  Now, your witness has not been

 3     presented as an expert.  We do not have any credentials like we have for

 4     an expert, and I think there's a little problem here.

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, let me respond to that because I beg to

 6     differ with you significantly.  Ribicic read law.  That's what he did.

 7     Now, what makes him an expert to take a presidential transcript and to

 8     say based on this he's making a constitutional analysis?  And just

 9     because we call somebody an expert doesn't make him an expert.  Donia

10     worked for the Prosecution, and I dare say in my 25 years of working in

11     this business, I'm entitled to ask a layperson to provide expert

12     testimony if they're capable of doing that.  So I've asked -- that was --

13     that was a foundational question.  Having read it, is he able to comment

14     on it?  He is an expert in a sense even though a fact witness in some

15     ways because he spent time over there.  He was with President Tudjman.

16     He knew the events.  He represented the government.  You're shaking your

17     head, but that's the fact.

18             Now, what I would do -- what I would ask -- what I would ask,

19     Judge Trechsel, is that -- that you begin registering your objections on

20     the record because it seems to me that at this point, at this point, it

21     is curtailing my defence.  Not only am I limited in time, now I'm being

22     limited in scope, as well, and I don't think I agree with your analysis,

23     but if that's the case I would like a clear record exactly, and give

24     me -- give me the scope.  Tell me how you want me to do it, so maybe I

25     make submissions for an interlocutory appeal, but at this point I must

Page 27677

 1     say, with your interpretation I wholly disagree, especially when we say

 2     that we're practising before professional Judges, especially because of

 3     that, and we can't have it both ways, but I dare say that the gentleman

 4     can comment because he was there and he knows the circumstances, and if I

 5     was allowed to ask those questions that I wanted to ask, you would see.

 6             Now, how much weight you give to that, that's a different story,

 7     but I think I have -- I was laying the predicate that would allow me to

 8     ask those questions because I wasn't asking him for an expert opinion.

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Well, you have challenged me, and I will give

10     you an answer.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.

12             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm not making an objection.  I'm just recalling

13     that we have witnesses, according to the Rules of Procedure, and we have

14     experts, and it is news to me that -- that they are the same and that you

15     can switch and take the expert as a witness and the witness as an expert

16     if it pleases you.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour --

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  But maybe I'm wrong on this.

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour, let me just -- I don't want to have a

20     philosophical or legal debate, but let's just say hypothetically

21     speaking, hypothetically speaking I brought in as a fact witness a

22     general.  Now, by virtue of his position, by virtue of his knowledge, by

23     virtue of his experience, is not that general able, capable, willing, if

24     I asked the question, to answer technical questions regarding military

25     matters that are outside what he has observed?  Of course.  Do I need to

Page 27678

 1     qualify him as an expert?  Of course not.  If it's relevant I should be

 2     able to ask that question.  Now, it shouldn't be -- I shouldn't be trying

 3     to sabotage the Prosecution, but I could certainly ask him technical

 4     questions.  It comes within that.

 5             Let's just say that I have a regular witness, and I'm asking him

 6     if he can identify somebody's voice like you have these recordings.  If I

 7     can lay the foundation that that individual does recognise the person's

 8     voice because he's heard it a hundred times on the telephone, in a sense

 9     that person is giving expert testimony because he's capable of

10     identifying the voice.  So that's how you can.

11             I'm not bringing this gentleman in as an expert nor was my

12     questioning eliciting expert testimony.  I was asking him to opine on

13     what he was able to glean from reading this, and had -- had we been

14     allowed, he would have been able -- he's indicated that after reading

15     this he has some personal experience of which he can discuss certain

16     matters.  That's not an expert.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break, yes,

18     Mr. Scott.

19             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I've been patient and

20     hopefully this will give Mr. Karnavas a chance to take a breath.  I fully

21     agree with what Judge Trechsel said and that was in my notes, and

22     Judge Trechsel you beat me to it and good for you for that. This is

23     now -- this is now -- the witness is now being tendered as an expert.

24     That's the difference between the witnesses -- the Prosecution witnesses

25     that Mr. Karnavas cites and this witness.  And I might add in light of

Page 27679

 1     the issues that were raised yesterday, we can add now to the deficiencies

 2     the lack of an expert report.  We don't have a statement.  We don't have

 3     an adequate summary.  We don't have notice of an expert.  We don't have

 4     an expert report.  So we just got a free-ranging witness here, a member

 5     of the Tudjman government, who can just come in and give his views about

 6     anything that Mr. Karnavas wants to ask him about.

 7             Now, that is not appropriate.  You cannot simply, with all due

 8     respect to this Chamber, all of whom I have great respect for, you cannot

 9     appeal every time to say it's professional Judges as if that means there

10     are no rules.  Yes, you are professional Judges.  There are still Rules

11     of Procedure and rules of evidence that should be followed and just to

12     say it's professional Judges, no holds barred, everything is fair, you

13     can do whatever you want, is not correct.  These are -- further these are

14     not technical matters.

15             I added a moment ago -- I asked a moment -- I made the comment a

16     moment ago:  If someone says it was a term of art and a witness could

17     say, "Well, I'm a general and I happen to know that when that term is

18     used this is what it means."  These are not technical matters.  These are

19     clearly political matters, political matters of the most direct kind.

20     I'm going to give you my political interpretation on these events, and

21     I've never -- I wasn't at the meeting, I've never seen this before, but

22     now that I've read it I'm going to give you my political interpretation

23     of events and that's all we're getting, Your Honour, and I we do object

24     and I'm going to continue to object to this kind of testimony.

25             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well Your Honour -- Your Honour --

Page 27680

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment.  Let me give my own

 2     opinion.  First of all, I do not agree with what Mr. Scott has just said.

 3     We are here with a witness who was a Minister of Foreign Affairs in

 4     Croatia, who was the representative of Croatia in international

 5     negotiations, who also participated in the work related to the Vance-Owen

 6     Plan.

 7             The Defence counsel is examining the witness on issues related to

 8     borders, to meetings between Tudjman and other individuals with regard to

 9     these geopolitical problems.  Without the witness being an expert but in

10     his field of foreign affairs, he's no doubt an expert because if you have

11     a minister of foreign affairs who would not be able to address issues of

12     foreign affairs, where are the experts, then?  And I do remind you that

13     the Trial Chamber is made up of two former ambassadors among the Judges,

14     and I believe that the Defence are entitled to ask questions of the

15     witness.

16             The only residual issue that may remain is to make sure that the

17     questions as they are asked are not leading because we're dealing here

18     with a common law procedure.  So as the chief examiner, he should not put

19     leading questions.  So that would be a cause for objections by the

20     Prosecution.  But, I mean, if he asked questions that could challenge the

21     case of the Prosecutor, that's another matter.  There should not be

22     automatically objections if the Prosecution's case is being challenged.

23     We have just spent about half an hour on procedural matters whereas I and

24     I believe my colleagues, too, are interested in the substance of the

25     case.

Page 27681

 1             We are going to break for 20 minutes, and we shall resume

 2     thereafter.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 3.50 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 4.12 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

 6     Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.

 7             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.

 8        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, if you could turn to page 27 of this particular

 9     document.  We're still on P 00089, 27 December 1991, and I'm going to

10     read a portion here, and I'm going ask you if you're able to comment on

11     it.  It says here "the president," so that would be President Tudjman.

12     I'm going to go to the bottom of the page first.  It says, "There are

13     numerous indicators that, you see, that America would gladly accept

14     Serbia in the policing role against the Muslims to forestall the

15     establishment of a Muslim state in Europe."

16             Now, throughout those years that you were involved in the various

17     positions that you held, was that ever a concern, that is, that they

18     might be -- that the US or other countries, Western countries, were

19     reluctant to see the establishment of a Muslim state in Europe?  And that

20     would be, of course, part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21        A.   That was certainly what President Tudjman had in mind.  He

22     believed there was concern both in America and in some of Europe's

23     countries about the possibility to establish a pure Muslim state in

24     Europe.

25        Q.   Okay.  At this point in time, 27 December 1991, had Croatia

Page 27682

 1     recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence?  This is December 27,

 2     1991.  Or I should put -- I should rephrase it.  Had Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina opted for independence at that point in time?

 4        A.   I believe they were preparing for independence, but no

 5     international recognition had been granted by this time.  I'm certain

 6     about that.

 7        Q.   Now, further down -- in the next page, page 28, I'm just going to

 8     hit this rather quickly, certain passages, it says, "Izetbegovic, even

 9     Stipe may recall," and I suspect that he's talking about Stipe Mesic,

10     "once openly said that he would favour a solution whereby Slovenia would

11     go.  Croatia would have somewhat more, and Bosnia would be more closely

12     associated with Serbia.  The establishment of borders, will we set up

13     border crossings between Croatia and Herzegovina so that a Croat from

14     Herzegovina may not go to his own Croatia or Croat from here may not go

15     there?  Shall we set up customs office?  Shall we set up customs?  Shall

16     we make it so that one has to, as the government has already issued and

17     rightly so, an order that petrol may be sold and so on?  Shall we --

18     shall we a currency in the end," as written, "all this together?  These

19     are the problems that arise in everyday administrative and legislative

20     sense, which establish new relationships which would be unbearable among

21     according to this view, not only for Croatia in view of the shape of its

22     borders but also for the Croatian part of the Herzegovina and Bosnian

23     territory.

24              "In addition, if Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain whole,

25     what are Croatia's prospects there?"

Page 27683

 1             If we go down to the -- to the next paragraph.  "During the talks

 2     under these circumstances, we supported the position of preserving a

 3     sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina precisely because the Greater Serbia

 4     policy raised the issue of Serbian areas in Croatia.

 5              "Therefore, in such circumstances, it would have been

 6     politically unwise for us to raise the issue of demarcation of borders in

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina otherwise.  However, if you recall as early as

 8     1989, we said in our delegation the historic HDZ declaration" I'm sorry,

 9     "the historic HDZ declaration that we were for a sovereign Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina unless its existence came into question because in that case,

11     in view of the interests of the Croatian people, we have to raise the

12     issue of Croatian borders."

13             First of all, let me ask you this:  By this point this time were

14     you a member of -- of HDZ?  We're talking December.

15        A.   I became a member in October that year, but I was just an

16     ordinary member.

17        Q.   And how much, if any, of Croatia's territory had been occupied or

18     was under attack at that point in time?

19        A.   At that point in time virtually a third of Croatia's territory

20     had been occupied already.  Vukovar had fallen.  Eastern Slavonia was

21     under occupation, and on the 10th of September the siege of Dubrovnik and

22     attacks on the town began.  Dubrovnik was now under siege, and at this

23     time was being subjected to heavy gunfire.

24        Q.   In light of your background, experience, and knowledge, are you

25     able to decipher, if you would, where on page 28 President Tudjman says:

Page 27684

 1     "Izetbegovic, even Stipe may recall, once openly said that he would

 2     favour a solution whereby Slovenia would go, Croatia would have somewhat

 3     more and Bosnia would be more closely associated with Serbia"?

 4        A.   Yes, indeed.  That's what I was talking about earlier on.  There

 5     were clear indicia as far as a solution for the former Yugoslavia was

 6     concerned.  The Muslim leadership had certain inclinations in favour of

 7     Serbia, and I think Izetbegovic didn't hold that back.  I think he said

 8     as much even when the attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina were first being

 9     launched.  Even prior to this there were villages in Dubrovnik's

10     hinterland, in Eastern Herzegovina that had already been attacked by the

11     JNA already and had been destroyed in their entirety.

12        Q.   What kind of army did Croatia have at the time?

13        A.   Croatia had already managed to set up a proper army.  We

14     established defence lines and put a stop to any further advances by the

15     JNA.  However, at the time it was still unable to defend its territory in

16     its entirety.  I think I did spend a great deal of time discussing that

17     yesterday.  Now, however, just before the turn of the year in 1992, the

18     greatest danger was the Dubrovnik situation and the possibility that

19     Dubrovnik might fall, as well as the entire area.  Not just the area

20     around Dubrovnik but, rather, the city of Dubrovnik itself as well.

21        Q.   All right.  Let me -- let me just walk you step by step on this

22     now.  At this point in time, is the -- are the JNA forces in Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina, and, if so, where are they?

24        A.   There is no doubt that they were there.  I don't think anybody

25     had asked them by this time to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina officially.

Page 27685

 1     I think didn't that happened until sometime later, but it's quite certain

 2     that there were JNA units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It is quite certain

 3     that they were launching attacks on the republic of Croatia from there.

 4     I mentioned several times the area around Dubrovnik and the forces that

 5     were arriving from Herzegovina, from Montenegro.  These JNA forces were

 6     attacking Dubrovnik, but there were attacks like that going on in the

 7     Posavina area, as well, and just north of Knin.  There were several areas

 8     in which the JNA were carrying out attacks from Bosnian territory.

 9        Q.   All right.  And yesterday you told us that you had joined the

10     army.  At that point in time, where -- were you in the army or working

11     for the department of defence?

12        A.   I was partly in the Croatian army at the time.

13        Q.   Okay.  And were you stationed in anyplace in particular?

14        A.   We were stationed in Zagreb, but it was precisely around this

15     time that I and my colleagues travelled south to Dubrovnik, our intention

16     being to reach Dubrovnik.  However, that wasn't possible.  Perhaps a

17     month and a half before this, I had been to the Opuzen area.  I said that

18     I might have some additional explanations that might shed light on the

19     background of this meeting.

20        Q.   Let me -- let me just lead you step by step because before we get

21     there, I just want to make sure that I'm crystal clear.  It's December

22     1991.  Croatia has declared its independence.  Croatia is under attack by

23     the JNA.  The JNA is staging attacks using Bosnian -- from the Bosnia and

24     Herzegovinian territory, and as I understand yesterday from your

25     testimony, Bosnia and Herzegovina did nothing to stop it.  Perhaps it

Page 27686

 1     could not do anything.  Let me ask you this question based on this

 2     background:  What -- let me make sure I phrase it in a way that it can be

 3     answered in a non-leading fashion.  Were there discussions with respect

 4     to Bosnia and Herzegovina's viability as a state and, if so, can you

 5     please tell us?  And we're talking about historically that period in time

 6     because we know that Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet declared its

 7     independence, but at that point.

 8        A.   There probably were, but in the context of defending Croatia

 9     there was no one to raise this with in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a

10     serious issue.

11        Q.   All right.

12        A.   I will try to be more specific.  I'm talking about the leaders of

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14        Q.   All right.  Okay.  And did -- as far as you know, and I'm asking

15     you -- maybe you didn't know back at the time, that is back in December,

16     but thereafter did you ever learn, given your experience and the

17     positions that you held, what Izetbegovic's position was at that point in

18     time?  Did you ever come out and expressly say, "We are for independence.

19     We are against Yugoslavia.  We want this or that"?  Was there ever some

20     sort of a public expression which we could look at and identifiably know

21     exactly where that man, given his position and his responsibility, stood

22     at at the time?

23        A.   His position as to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not

24     entirely clear.  He said he had a preference for Belgrade's solution.  As

25     far as war was concerned, his position unfortunately was clear.  He said

Page 27687

 1     this wasn't their war and that he had no desire to interfere.  If we try

 2     to interpret this, and we look at transcript one, the Croatian

 3     representatives, he talks about his own meeting with General Kadijevic,

 4     Mr. Kljuic's specifically.  His conviction is not only that the army

 5     would not attack Bosnia and Herzegovina but, rather, that the army would

 6     be allowing political parties to take control in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 7     We know now that this was quite gullible as a line of reasoning since the

 8     war had already begun, a war true and proper.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Now, to make sure that we fully understand, who is

10     Mr. Kadijevic?

11        A.   Mr. Kadijevic was at the time the defence minister of a

12     disintegrating Yugoslavia.

13        Q.   All right.  And when you say "army," which army are we talking

14     about?

15        A.   [In English] Yugoslav People's Army, JNA.

16        Q.   All right.  Just to make sure I'm crystal clear, because I'm just

17     a little confused here, at this period of time we see an exchange between

18     Tudjman and Kljuic.  Of course we all knew because Kljuic was here that

19     at the time he was president of the HDZ.  And what exactly is Kljuic

20     saying to Tudjman so we are -- and be as precise as you can so we can

21     understand that.

22        A.   [Interpretation] The transcript is quite long.  We see Kljuic as

23     president of Bosnia and Herzegovina's HDZ, and we realise that he had

24     just talked to General Kadijevic.  Tudjman asked him an explicit

25     question; namely, whether he had talked to Izetbegovic and Karadzic, who

Page 27688

 1     were then the political leaders of the other two ethnicities in Bosnia

 2     and Herzegovina.  It appeared clear that he had not talked to them.  He,

 3     much like Izetbegovic, still believed, at least that's how it comes

 4     across to me, that the JNA could be part of a solution and not one of the

 5     sources of crisis.  Apart from Kljuic, there was a large delegation of

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina's Croats attending this meeting.

 7        Q.   I just want to make sure.  I don't want to get into the whole

 8     debate, but this issue here is very important.  Kljuic is under

 9     discussion with Kadijevic, and -- because you said that they were

10     somewhat naive or gullible, gullible, I believe the word was, I think

11     that's the part that we want to be crystal clear, because we know in

12     context that Croatia is being attacked from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

13     now we have the highest Croat representative, and he's saying words, at

14     least if I understand you, that they think that they can do business with

15     the JNA, that is, Sarajevo government.  So could you please tell us what

16     is it that is being said in that, because you understand the events

17     better than we do.

18        A.   That is precisely what I was about to point out.  On the one

19     hand, we have Mr. Kljuic; and on the other, Mr. Kljuic who is saying just

20     what I've been telling you about.  That's my impression, and I think

21     you've just summed it up.  That was his conviction.  He said he still

22     believed that an agreement could be reached, even an agreement with the

23     Yugoslav Army.  On the other hand, there were a group of Croats from

24     Bosnia and Herzegovina on their way to see President Tudjman, the

25     president of Croatia, with their own proposals, a whole list of those, in

Page 27689

 1     fact, that were strikingly different from what Kljuic was suggesting at

 2     the time.

 3        Q.   All right.  Now, in this transcript we see the name of Mate

 4     Boban.  At that point in time, did you know him?

 5        A.   Yes, I did.  I had known him for quite some time before the war

 6     erupted.  I can't say I knew him well.  He was older than me.  I grew up

 7     in a small town call Imotski, however, and Mr. Boban worked there.  He

 8     was the manager of one of the major companies based in the area.  It was

 9     called Napredak.  That was when I made his acquaintance.  During the war,

10     however, just before the developments that I have now been discussing, I

11     had been directly in touch with Mr. Boban.

12        Q.   All right.  Now, I believe you wanted to say something earlier,

13     and I cut you off of a little bit --

14             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Yes, Mr. Karnavas.  I apologise for interrupting

15     you, but since we have been dealing with the document here, with the

16     minutes of this meeting under the chairmanship of the President Franjo

17     Tudjman, I would like to take this opportunity, not tomorrow when the

18     Judges are supposed to ask questions, to ask the witness about a

19     particular point since we are here at the document and you have

20     already -- I mean, Mr. Karnavas, you have already asked several questions

21     about the document, pages 28, I believe, and others.  And now I would

22     like to address myself to the -- to page 31, 31, of this very document,

23     that is the document 00089, I believe.  And 31, you -- concerning the

24     future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are interesting remarks.  Let me

25     quote or -- it's a long quotation.

Page 27690

 1             President Tudjman said:  "In other words, the sovereignty of

 2     Bosnia in the present circumstances from the Croatian standpoint is such

 3     that not only do we not have to advocate it, we must not even raise the

 4     issue openly.  However, why not accept this offer of demarcation -- " the

 5     demarcation which would have demarcated into three parts Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina, and of course it would offered, as we recall, we spoke about

 7     it this morning, and I continue now with the quotation.  "However, why

 8     not accept this offer of demarcation when it is in the interest of the

 9     Croatian people, the Croatian people here in this republic, and the

10     Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because I do not see a single

11     reason, a single serious reason, against it.  Moreover, in the talks I --

12     that I personally conducted with Izetbegovic and Milosevic, in addition

13     one of our people in Bosnia drafted a proposal for demarcation, whereby

14     the Croatian areas and those that you have included in this community of

15     Herceg-Bosna and in the community of Croatian Posavina, in the event of

16     demarcation, Croatia wouldn't get not only those two communities, Croatia

17     would not only get those two communities but also for geopolitical

18     reasons Cazinska and Bihacka Krajina, which would satisfy almost ideally

19     the Croatian national interests, not only present but also for the future

20     and then from the remaining areas."  End of the quotation.

21             And now my question is to Mr. Zuzul.  If -- how would you in a

22     way view this excerpt of the transcript as far as the position, of course

23     it was in late 1991, position of President Tudjman concerning the future

24     of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I thank you, Your

Page 27691

 1     Honour.  May I say this isn't just because I was part of Tudjman's

 2     cabinet, which I was.  It is because I wished to tell the truth, the

 3     truth that I saw and the way I saw it.  I want to tell you how I think

 4     about this when I think about it.  I think one thing that this transcript

 5     shows is one of the principles -- or, rather, all of the principles that

 6     Tudjman was applying whenever he thought about the future.  The first

 7     thing being protecting Croatia's borders, the second thing being

 8     protecting the rights of the Croatian people -- the rights of the

 9     Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the third thing being

10     putting a stop to the war.

11             When he discusses this, what he actually means is a division

12     within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this is what I was trying to point out

13     having read the transcript:  Tudjman is facing a proposal made by a

14     delegation of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The proposal was

15     formulated as a set of 19 issues or items.  If you look at item 27 -- or,

16     rather, page 27, that Tudjman was not familiar with those conclusions.

17     He did, however, show respect to this group of Croats who came to see

18     him, and I can comment why, if you like.  And he responds as to why he

19     believed that the only solution acceptable, and this is earlier on before

20     the negotiations, was a demarcation within the borders of Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina.

22             Regardless of the fact that President Tudjman at the time knew

23     that such a response was not likely to satisfy everyone since there were

24     people around who really believed that some parts of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina's territory should be annexed by Croatia, since some people

Page 27692

 1     sincerely believed at the time that this was the only direction that this

 2     moment in history could possibly take, nevertheless we have those

 3     opinions on the one hand and President Tudjman's opinions in his capacity

 4     as president on the other, and I think the distinction between the two is

 5     perfectly clear.

 6             If I may just add something based on my own knowledge of the

 7     situation and something specific about Mr. Boban.  It is due to a sheer

 8     coincidence that I know about the following:  Not long before this

 9     President Tudjman had first been in touch with Mr. Boban in a way that

10     illustrated the totality of what was going on at the time.  I can testify

11     to this based on my own direct experience.

12             I was part of the Croatian army, as I have pointed out already,

13     and we were headed for Dubrovnik, I along with several of my other

14     colleagues, university lecturers.  We were trying to contribute to the

15     defence effort.  We reached Opuzen and realised that the situation was

16     bordering on sheer panic.  The Croatian army, which was only in the

17     process of being organised, was simply unable to defend the area.  They

18     were short on manpower and equipment.  We spoke to the command there, and

19     someone raised the following issue:  What about the Croats from

20     Herzegovina?  It was a well-known fact that many of those had volunteered

21     to the Croatian army in order to defend Croatia.

22             Among our group, representatives of the Croatian army from

23     Zagreb, there was also Mr. Marinko Boban.  In Croatia, his reputation is

24     due to the fact that he is the father of probably the most famous

25     Croatian football player ever, Zvonimir Boban.  A little indiscretion, if

Page 27693

 1     I may.  I was travelling with Marinko Boban in a car that his son had

 2     received as a gift from his own football club, FC Milan.  That's what the

 3     times were like.  There is nothing else I can say.  We were trying to set

 4     up some sort of defence.  At one point in time, someone at the table had

 5     raised the following issue:  Maybe Boban would be able to help.  Maybe he

 6     could make available some volunteers.  He might give us a hand.  The

 7     person they meant was Mato Boban, who had by this time had been appointed

 8     to lead the Croats in Herzegovina -- or, rather, that part of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina.  We made a call to President Tudjman.  Following our

10     conversation, I understood that he knew about Mate Boban but that they

11     had never met.

12             Just to be specific about the time line, I'm talking about late

13     October, possibly early November.  So this is just under two months

14     before the Zagreb meeting.  Nevertheless, President Tudjman agreed that

15     Mr. Marinko Boban should travel to Herzegovina, of which he, too, was a

16     native, and that he should talk to his relative Mate Boban and ask him if

17     he could help with defending Dubrovnik.

18             Marinko Boban returned the same night late - it was well past

19     midnight - to inform us that Mate Boban had made a promise to secure an

20     entire battalion of volunteers who would be prepared to defend and attack

21     the JNA in Herzegovina.  Those volunteers were Croats, but they were

22     Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Marinko Boban later told me and

23     President Tudjman that this really occurred, that this materialised.

24     Several days later, a group of Croat volunteers from Herzegovina crossed

25     to Eastern Herzegovina, Dubrovnik's hinterland, and this was possibly one

Page 27694

 1     of the key factors in the defence of Dubrovnik and the eventual success

 2     in defending the city.

 3             I'm talking about telling the truth as I saw it.  Why did I deem

 4     it important to point out this very fact and to address this particular

 5     meeting?  President Tudjman knows that he not only enjoys the political

 6     support of the Croats from Herzegovina.  He also knows that he needs them

 7     in order to do something that constituted one of the most important

 8     strategic goals at the time, which was to defend Dubrovnik.  He pays his

 9     respect to them at that meeting.  He values their presence.  It wasn't a

10     matter of agreeing or disagreeing with what they were actually saying.

11     He knew that they were the only ones at the time capable of carrying this

12     extra burden of defence.

13             I don't know whether between the episode that I've just described

14     and the meeting there was any actual communication between President

15     Tudjman and Mr. Boban.  I simply don't know.  I do, however, believe,

16     Your Honours, that if we place this against that sort of a background

17     then reading the entire transcript is cast in an entirely different

18     light.  These proposals are being made but not by President Tudjman.

19     He's discussing these proposals.  He's discussing these proposals with

20     people that he respects, with people who are members of the same

21     political party.  They respected him in political terms.  That was one of

22     the reasons.  But if you ask me, I'll say this quite openly, he realised

23     at the time how important these people were and how crucial they were to

24     his ability to obtain his own political goals and in terms of helping

25     Croatia's defence as a whole.

Page 27695

 1             I'm sorry if I'm trailing off here into some sort of

 2     interpretation rather than telling you what you expected me to say, but I

 3     do believe that this is something that casts a truly different light on

 4     the transcript itself.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You provide very long answers.

 6     They should be shorter.

 7              I use the opportunity from my colleague's question, and this

 8     will not be taken out of your time, Mr. Karnavas, rest assured.  I use

 9     this opportunity to raise an issue that seems to me extremely relevant,

10     and your very words raised -- focused my attention on this issue.  I see

11     that there was this meeting between Tudjman and the delegation of

12     Herceg-Bosna, and under item 1 it is stated that:  "The Community of

13     Herceg-Bosna is going to give its full support to the recognition and the

14     final establishment of the Republic of Croatia."  That's item 1.

15             But based on this, since you were very close to President

16     Tudjman, you held very high functions indeed, I'd like to know the

17     following:  Why did the Republic of Croatia fail to recognise officially

18     at one point in time the Republic of Herceg-Bosna?  And I'm raising this

19     issue based on the recent model where you had various countries that

20     recognised Kosovo.  Why is it that back then Croatia did not want to or

21     was not able to officially recognise the Republic of Herceg-Bosna?  Could

22     you answer this question?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you meant the

24     Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and sometimes this term was used to imply the

25     organisation of Croats, as far as I know Croatia never seriously thought

Page 27696

 1     about recognising this as an independent republic.  As far as Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina is concerned, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a

 3     sovereign state, Croatia was the first state, if I'm not mistaken, that

 4     recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina at the moment when Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina sought the recognition.  I'm again speaking off the cuff.  At

 6     that moment Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet sought recognition either

 7     from Croatia or the international community.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are telling us that at

 9     no point in time did Croatia envision to recognise the Republic of

10     Herceg-Bosna, that it was never a concern of the then leaders of Croatia

11     and that you never heard this possibility being mentioned.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard a reference being made to a

13     possibility of the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina and separation of

14     different parts of Bosnia according to different models.  I heard that at

15     various international negotiations because reference was made to that,

16     but the unilateral recognition by Croatia of the organisation of Croats

17     in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that appeared under different

18     names, one of them being Herceg-Bosna, I never attended any such meeting

19     that a reference was made to that, and I don't know that such a

20     possibility was ever seriously considered by the Croatian leadership.

21             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Zuzul, I would like -- following up on the

22     question that my colleague Prandler has asked, I would like to take you

23     back to this Presidential transcript and to page 34 at the top.  I think

24     it would simply not be fair if I did not give you the opportunity

25     expressly to comment on this.  Here, Mr. Tudjman is quoted in the first

Page 27697

 1     paragraph as saying this:  "It seems to me, therefore, that just as we

 2     have taken advantage of this historic moment to establish an independent

 3     internationally recognised Croatia, I believe that it is time that we

 4     take the opportunity to gather the Croatian people inside the widest

 5     possible borders."

 6             I wonder how this is to be understood in your view.

 7             MR. KARNAVAS:  Judge Trechsel, before he answers the question,

 8     because you skipped a page, I think, and I was going to ask because it

 9     should follow -- it should have followed Judge Prandler's quotation to

10     read also page 33 because I think you cannot fully answer

11     Judge Prandler's question without reading the top paragraph of 40 -- of

12     33.  And then with that, then we can go on to 34 because it's sequential.

13     So if that's okay, otherwise I'll go back.  But I think without page 33,

14     I'm afraid we're cherry-picking at this point.

15             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  If you want to read it, read it.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, here's the part.

17             It says:  "And create," this is picking up where Judge Prandler

18     left off, the continuity of the thought.  It is:  "And to create a

19     statement, therefore, out of the remaining part around Sarajevo where

20     mostly Muslims and some Catholic Croats would stay which would resemble a

21     small historical land of Bosnia.  It would therefore be a buffer zone in

22     the demarcation of Serbia in Croatia, and in such conditions, it would

23     have to rely on Croatia to a large extent.  That would also satisfy

24     international actors who are now surely seriously counting, as you

25     mentioned, on Serb policing for that Muslim element, Islamic element, in

Page 27698

 1     Yugoslavia whose intention is to establish with the help of Tehran and

 2     Tripoli an Islamic state in Europe."

 3              That's the part that I wanted in, in keeping that we talked

 4     earlier about what he had mentioned about the policing of Muslims, the

 5     US -- the Americans' position.  And so with that in mind, I think

 6     that's -- that puts context into what -- because it seems to me there is

 7     some connection to all of this.  But I don't want to lead the witness.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The way I experienced this

 9     transcript and the overall discussion that transpires from it was that

10     Tudjman primarily responded to the proposals that were presented to him

11     in a very concrete form immediately prior to that.  In the 19 items he

12     speaks about various variants.  One of them is the cantonisation; the

13     other is republics.  All sorts of things are mentioned because at that

14     moment all the options are on the table.  As far as the international

15     community was concerned, there was also an option to divide

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina because the documents that we saw before had already

17     been known.  In that context, Tudjman presents his discussion and from

18     time to time he presents his own personal views according to which the

19     Western world does not want an independent Muslim state or that, in one

20     way or another, the Western world wanted to have a buffer zone.  I would

21     call this considerations rather than proposals.

22             As for the paragraph that the Honourable Judge pointed to, one

23     can see here that he makes a clear distinction between the

24     internationally recognised Croatia, which means that he speaks with a

25     certain degree, if you allow me my own interpretation, a degree of pride

Page 27699

 1     because he knew that very soon after that Croatia would be recognised.

 2     He speaks in one way about the international borders, and he speaks in

 3     another way which doesn't lend itself to an easy interpretation about the

 4     Croatian territory or the Croatian interest, territory, or the territory

 5     where Croats lived, and he primarily implies 30 -- or the 28

 6     municipalities.

 7             It seems to me that one can see the difference very clearly,

 8     especially within the context of the previous question.  He does consider

 9     certain possibilities and options, but he leaves room for future

10     decisions and reactions.  And there are also areas where he's very firm

11     and categorical, one of them being the borders of Croatia.  I think that

12     Tudjman could not be as categorical and as proud at the moment about the

13     recognition, the upcoming recognition of Croatia, if he had thought at

14     the time that the international borders of Croatia would change.  Tudjman

15     was not naive.  That's at least what we thought of him.  And if he had

16     thought in that way he would have appeared naive.  On the one hand he

17     speaks about the recognised borders and the recognition of Croatia, and

18     on the other hand he speaks about different ways to solve the situation

19     in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the different options for that.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Mr. Karnavas.

21             MR. KARNAVAS:  Any other questions?  Otherwise, we'll go on to

22     the next document.  And I think from now on where we -- where there's a

23     need I think it's perfectly acceptable, and in fact the best thing is for

24     the Trial Chamber to ask their questions as we go through this.

25        Q.   The next one is P 00130.  This is another so-called presidential

Page 27700

 1     transcript.  And just to save a little time we can see this is 3 March

 2     1992, and we can see from the very first page that your name is on -- is

 3     on as one of the -- somebody that was present at the meeting.  P 00130.

 4     Do you have it?

 5        A.   [In English] Yeah.

 6        Q.   All right.  Now, because I don't want to lose too much time on

 7     this one, have you had an opportunity to read this -- this particular

 8     transcript?

 9        A.   [Interpretation] Yes.

10        Q.   And the one part that I want to focus on just very briefly before

11     I ask you for any other things that you may wish to point out, on page

12     65, at the second paragraph, it says:  "I think that this is a big

13     problem that should be resolved urgently, namely the problem of

14     communication.  The Croatian War Navy, the Sixth Operational Zone, and

15     especially in the context of the problem of Herzegovina."

16             Now, this is several months after the previous transcript that we

17     saw.  Can you tell us how the situation had changed if at all in Croatia

18     vis-a-vis the JNA and the aggression that we spoke about yesterday?

19        A.   At that moment the overall situation had changed to a certain

20     extent.  Croatia was a recognised state and UNPROFOR zones had already

21     been established in certain parts of Croatia or their establishment was

22     under way, so there was no military danger in Croatia.  The situation was

23     frozen, in military terms, at that point.  However, there was still a

24     direct threat in the area around Dubrovnik.  Even after the recognition

25     of Croatia, the UNPROFOR mandate never extended to the area around

Page 27701

 1     Dubrovnik and south of Dubrovnik.

 2             We're talking about, me and others, which was the main purpose of

 3     this meeting, was in relation to the general problems of the army.  I and

 4     the others who were with me had all just come back from a visit to the

 5     territory around Dubrovnik, and we spoke about the problems faced by the

 6     defence there, one of the problems being communication between the

 7     different branches the Croatian army, more concretely between the navy

 8     and land army, and the impossibility of formal communication with the

 9     units.  I better say -- I don't know whether I can call them units in

10     formal terms, but with the volunteers in Herceg-Bosna from the territory

11     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those that I referred to a while ago.  And

12     this is what this particular sentence refers to as well as the rest of my

13     presentation.  I would like to add to that the group that I was with was

14     dealing with the psychological and information activities; i.e., problems

15     in communication with the different parts of the military were an

16     integral part of our everyday work.

17        Q.   You're going to have to slow down a little bit now.  Now we might

18     be going a little bit too fast, but is there anything else on this

19     transcript?  Otherwise we'll move on to the next document.  I only

20     mention that because you were present.

21        A.   As for the context in which this happened, I believe that a lot

22     has already been said about that.

23        Q.   All right.  Now, if we go to the next document, 1 -- it's P

24     00131, and the Prosecution says that this particular document is relevant

25     because this transcript records discussions by the senior Croatian

Page 27702

 1     military command and shows Croatian logistical assistance of both arms

 2     and military units to the Bosnian Croats.  And there's a reference to

 3     page 27, and we can see that on that particular page there are references

 4     to sector Dubrovnik.  Now, before we get into the specifics of this, if

 5     we just look at the very first page we'll see that you were present at

 6     this meeting.  This is the following day from the previous transcript, 4

 7     March 1992, and all sorts of other individuals are present, as well,

 8     including an individual by the name of Daidza, and perhaps you could

 9     begin by telling us did you know this person, who was and what position

10     he held?  Just very briefly.

11        A.   I met Mr. Daidza during one of my visits to the southern front.

12     I don't know whether this was immediately prior to this event.  At the

13     moment when I met him, he was the commander of a unit which mostly

14     consisted of Muslim volunteers.  At the moment when we met them, they

15     were in training in Croatia.  If I'm not mistaken, this was somewhere

16     near Makarska.  Maybe in Backa Polje, but I'm not a hundred percent sure.

17     But I know for a fact that he was the commander of that unit of Muslim

18     volunteers who fought together with the Croatian volunteers against the

19     J -- the Yugoslav Army.

20        Q.   Okay.  I'm going to have to ask you to slow down a little bit,

21     but you say Muslim volunteers.  Would they be Muslim volunteers from

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina, or are they Muslim volunteers from Croatia?

23        A.   From Bosnia and Herzegovina.  From Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24        Q.   Now, you also mentioned the word "training."  I take it that you

25     meant military training.

Page 27703

 1        A.   Yes.  I believe that this was primarily military training.

 2        Q.   All right.  And just prior to that you had pointed to what has

 3     been previously marked as 3D 03171.  That's the map itself.  And you had

 4     pointed towards the area of Dubrovnik.  At this -- so I want to focus

 5     your attention, and perhaps you might be able to comment.  On page 25 of

 6     this transcript where you say -- when Daidza says:  "I was assigned a

 7     task to arrange the valley of the Neretva River together with the other

 8     commanders because it was our very last defence line.  I would like to

 9     give a brief statement."  And then he gives a statement, and then on page

10     27, at the very last sentence there is a reference from a Luka --

11        A.   Djanko.

12        Q.   -- Djanko, thank you, where he talks about the zone of

13     responsibility of Dubrovnik sector covers only the short preliminary

14     territory of the municipalities of Dubrovnik, Metkovic, Ploce -- I always

15     have problems with this one.

16        A.   Vrgorac.

17        Q.   Vrgorac in Western Herzegovina.  And then it goes on:  "It is

18     specific about of few elements, Neum and Herzegovina cut it off and it is

19     shallow for the Defence.  The Dubrovnik municipality is encircled and

20     facing subjective problems in commanding, and I will say a few words.

21     "There are actions in Herzegovina without written orders issued by the

22     staff, and I'm already there with two of my brigades.  Croatian people of

23     Herzegovina are incapable to defend the line from Mostar to Popovo Polje,

24     and I think that they have approximately 22.000 barrels of artillery

25     which is enough.  I'm going to say a few words," and then there's a

Page 27704

 1     further discussion.  Now just so I'm clear, do these reflect what you

 2     were saying yesterday with respect to Neum and the difficulties of

 3     covering the entire Croatian -- southern Croatian territory?

 4        A.   Yes.  This is a very specific illustration of my own words.  I

 5     can provide you an example and give you an episode.  The first time I met

 6     Mr. Djanko down there he was the commander of the Croatian army in the

 7     area but not of the navy.  According to some information, Yugoslav tanks

 8     were moving towards Opuzen -- or, rather, towards the line on the Neretva

 9     River.  At the moment when we arrived, he was considering the possibility

10     of blowing up a bridge on the river Bistrina in the area.  However, when

11     we looked at a map we could see that this would not make any strategic

12     sense, because if he blew up that bridge, he would have prevented their

13     passage through the narrow territory of Croatia.  But they could proceed

14     and went on moving to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15             What I'm trying say is this:  It was absolutely clear that it was

16     absolutely impossible to defend that territory unless the defence of the

17     part of the territory in Herzegovina was involved in that overall

18     defence, because it was from that particular area that all the attacks

19     came from.

20        Q.   All right.  Okay.  Thank you.  We're going to move on to the next

21     three documents.  I will try to cover them in succession, so I'll just

22     point out some relevant passages and then ask you to comment on them if

23     that's okay with the Trial Chamber just to save some time, because they

24     relate more or less to the same matter.  So we'll be looking first at P

25     00205.  This is from the Security Council.  It's 15 May 1992.  Before we

Page 27705

 1     go to the document, is Croatia at this point in time sending troops into

 2     Bosnia and Herzegovina to attack the Sarajevo government?

 3        A.   Of course not.

 4        Q.   Have they sent in troops at this point in time to attack the

 5     Muslim people?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And you just told us just previously that in fact there

 8     were Muslim volunteers who were being trained in Croatia, assisting

 9     Croatia in its defence against the JNA which was launching attacks from

10     the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina onto Croatia; is that correct?

11        A.   Correct.

12        Q.   Right.  Now, if we look at this Security Council Resolution, and

13     if we go to the second page under item number 2, it says:  "Welcomes the

14     effort -- the efforts undertaken by the European Community in the

15     framework -- framework of the discussions on constitutional arrangements

16     for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the auspices of the conference of

17     Yugoslavia; urges that the discussion be resumed without delay; and urges

18     the three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate actively

19     and constructively in these discussions."  And it goes on and on?  First

20     question is:  Were you aware of -- of these activities?  There was --

21     there were undergoing discussions concerning the constitutional

22     arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23        A.   I was aware of that.

24        Q.   Okay.  And at any point in time -- this is a foundational

25     question for future questions.  At any point in time, were you involved

Page 27706

 1     in any sorts of activities, negotiations, discussions, drafting of -- of

 2     agreements or what have you, that were based in part -- were due to

 3     the -- the discussions on the constitutional arrangements of Bosnia and

 4     Herzegovina?

 5        A.   Most certainly over the entire period of time, on several

 6     occasions.  At this point in time, I was in a certain way involved in

 7     negotiations and talks.

 8        Q.   All right.  Now let's look at point number 3.  It demands that

 9     all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including

10     the units of the Yugoslav People's Army, JNA, as well as elements of the

11     Croatian army cease immediately and that Bosnia and Herzegovina

12     neighbours take swift action to end such an interference and respect the

13     territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina."  First question, to your

14     knowledge were there elements of the Croatian army on the territory of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina and, if so, where would they have been located at that

16     point in time in light of the circumstances and the activities that

17     you've already discussed thus far?

18        A.   I don't have any concrete information about that, but I believe

19     that there were elements of the Croatian army on the territories of

20     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I don't have any reason to doubt this report,

21     but it is also absolutely clear from the overall situation that at that

22     moment they were fighting exclusively against the JNA, which was at the

23     time in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is also confirmed

24     by this particular Resolution.

25        Q.   All right.  Now, we're going to get other Resolutions, but if you

Page 27707

 1     could just help us out a little bit because yesterday we talked about the

 2     UN and their lack of effort to send combat troops to defend the

 3     territorial integrity and the lives of Croatians as a result of the

 4     aggressive actions taken by the JNA.

 5             Assuming, assuming, and you told us that you were in that area

 6     and you know it very well, so we have the foundation for that.  You were

 7     in the military, so we have the foundation for that, as well, so let's

 8     assume that those elements of the Croatian army had withdrawn from that

 9     area around Dubrovnik and further up by Neum and what have you, and let's

10     assume for the sake of our hypothetical, but we will see later on that in

11     fact that was the case, that the JNA did not withdraw from that

12     territory, what would have happened to the southern part of Croatia?

13        A.   Yesterday I said that at that time there already was enough

14     compelling information to the effect that it was the plan of the Serbian

15     army, because the Yugoslav army at that time was completely controlled by

16     the Serbian leadership, to establish the border along the Neretva River.

17     It is my impression that had it not been for the volunteers from

18     Herzegovina, Croats, and the volunteers of Muslim ethnicity who fought

19     side by side with them, again I have to say this is my personal

20     impression, and the assistance they received from the Croatian army, and

21     the elements of the Croatian army, that they would not have been able to

22     achieve this goal militarily.

23             Now, as for the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as for the course

24     that the peace talks would take, this is something that we can only guess

25     and speculate, but it is a fact that all the peace talks about Bosnia and

Page 27708

 1     Herzegovina had as their starting point the fact that the Serb side was

 2     in control of certain territory, and at times they side-stepped the issue

 3     as to how Serbs actually got to hold this territory.

 4        Q.   All right.  Let me just move on for the sake of -- there's a

 5     point number 4.  We've seen this before where it talks about -- it says:

 6     "Demands that those units of the Yugoslavia People's army and elements of

 7     the Croatian army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina must either be withdrawn

 8     or be subject to the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina or

 9     be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective

10     international monitoring, and request the Secretary-General to consider

11     without delay to what international assistance could be provided in this

12     connection.  First, let me ask you this starting with the latter part of

13     this segment.  What if any assistance, what international assistance, was

14     provided at this point in time in that particular area?

15        A.   Primarily monitoring it seems to me.

16        Q.   Okay.  Were the monitors in a position to fight back the JNA

17     should they continue with their attacks on Croatia?

18        A.   I think that they did not have this kind of mandate at that time.

19     I'm sure that they didn't have it at that time.  They didn't have the

20     forces to do it either.  And we know, I think from the judgements

21     rendered by this Tribunal, that even when they had the forces they were

22     not in a position to intervene and to prevent some major humanitarian

23     catastrophes.

24        Q.   Now, the next two documents are dated --

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A follow-up question if I may

Page 27709

 1     on the document we've just been reviewing.  It is document 205 if I'm not

 2     mistaken.  Is this the right document, Mr. Karnavas?

 3             MR. KARNAVAS:  Correct, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the Resolution, on page 2 in

 5     the English version, item 4, it is demanded that the Croatian army units

 6     in Bosnia be withdrawn.  It is something we've discussed for hours, for

 7     dozens, maybe hundreds of hours.  To your knowledge, sir, were there

 8     units of the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that at that time there

10     were elements of the Croatian army in some areas of Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina.  Now, as to how one can define those elements, it's a

12     different issue, but they all fought side by side with all those who were

13     trying to defend themselves against the Yugoslav army and the Serbian

14     aggression as I have already said.  We in the Republic of Croatia, for

15     instance, welcomed this resolution.  At that time, I was in the Foreign

16     Ministry.

17             Why did we welcome it?  Because this resolution offers two

18     options.  One, for the Yugoslav army to withdraw from Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina.  At that time, there was still some optimism among the

20     international institutions, and some hoped that this could actually come

21     to pass.  In that case, the question of any elements of Croatian army

22     remaining there would become immaterial.  They would have nothing to do.

23     But if that did not happen, the Resolution goes on in paragraph 4 as it

24     continues offering another option for those forces to be placed under the

25     authority of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Your Honour, I

Page 27710

 1     can vouch that at that time we were already in contact with Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina with the aim of operationalising the conclusions stemming

 3     from this Resolution.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I was only referring to the

 5     month of May 1992.  For the rest, we'll see later.  Thank you very much.

 6     Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.

 7             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   Now, the next two documents are May 1992, and again, they sort of

 9     touch upon the same issues that we've discussed, and if we look on

10     page -- page 2 of P 00232, sort of in the middle of the page it says:

11     "Deeply concern also at the developments in Croatia, including persistent

12     cease-fire violations and the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians

13     and at the obstruction of and lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR in other

14     parts of Croatia."  If you could assist us a little bit.  What are they

15     talking about when they say the continued expulsion of non-Serb

16     civilians?  Are we talking about in Croatia?  What part?  What are they

17     talking about?

18        A.   They're talking about the events in so-called UNPROFOR zones.

19     Those were parts of Croatia that had been occupied by Serbs where the

20     so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina had been set up.  The international

21     forces arrived in the areas, yet despite that, the expulsion of non-Serbs

22     continued in that zone and in other zones, and when they're talking about

23     the lack of cooperation, it is obvious that at that time what happened

24     was that the self-proclaimed authorities in those occupied forces were

25     refusing to cooperate with UNPROFOR.

Page 27711

 1        Q.   Well, were those self-proclaimed authorities being assisted by

 2     any particular armed force, or were they just capable on their own to

 3     conduct those expulsions?

 4        A.   Right from the beginning, they received direct support and

 5     assistance from the Yugoslav People's Army.  They received weapons from

 6     them.  The command structure was for the most part taken over from the

 7     Yugoslav army.  One of the commanders in the area in -- in the Knin area

 8     was Ratko Mladic before he moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina, so it is no

 9     secret that it was a mix of self-proclaimed leaders who advocated the

10     idea of Greater Serbia and the Yugoslav army, which in the meantime had

11     dropped every pretense of the effort to save Yugoslavia.  They merely

12     occupied Croatia, and soon they moved to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina

13     too.

14        Q.   And again before I -- before I ask my next question concerning

15     this particular document, can you tell us at this point in time how much

16     of the -- of Croatian territory is occupied?  It might be relevant

17     because sometimes in this courtroom we tend to forget the percentage of

18     the country and the devastation that Croatia underwent.

19        A.   Well, I don't want to pretend to be an expert.  From what I've

20     read and from the documents that I received in my diplomatic career, the

21     international documents, the percentage of the territory was between 25

22     at the lower end, but the figure that was quoted most often was 30 per

23     cent of the Croatian territory.  That would be one-third of the overall

24     territory of Croatia that was occupied at that time.

25        Q.   Okay.  And we see now in this -- in paragraph 2 -- I mean on page

Page 27712

 1     3, item 2, I'm sorry, page 3 item 2 it says:  "Demands that any elements

 2     of the Croatian army still present in Bosnia-Herzegovina act in

 3     accordance with paragraph 4 of Resolution 752 very quickly."  Had the

 4     situation say, just in the southern part of Croatia, where we talked

 5     about earlier, had that changed in the 15 days between the document that

 6     we saw earlier, that is P 0025 and this one P 00232, had the situation

 7     changed on the ground at all?

 8        A.   No.  The situation did not change, but in the meantime the

 9     diplomatic activities between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were

10     stepped up, and they would soon result in the signing of the agreement

11     that would fully meet the demands of the UN Security Council.

12             MR. KARNAVAS:  I'm told that there's a wrong number in the

13     transcript.  It should be P 00205.

14             THE WITNESS:  This is P 00232.

15             MR. KARNAVAS:  Yes.  For the record, for the transcript, I

16     probably misspoke and that's why it was written down.  I was referring to

17     earlier.

18        Q.   Okay.  Now when we get to this document P 00233, which is the

19     last document in this series, it's dated the same date, and you told us

20     that the JNA has not left at least the areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina

21     where they're attacking Croatia.

22             Now, if we look at -- I just wanted to point a couple of things

23     out again.  So we can take a reality check over here, or do a reality

24     check.  In paragraph 10:  "As regards the withdrawal of elements of

25     Croatian army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, information currently

Page 27713

 1     available in New York suggests that no such withdrawal has occurred.

 2     UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of Croatian army personnel in

 3     uniforms operating within and as part of military formations in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Croatian authorities have consistently taken the

 5     position that the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina have left the

 6     Croatian army and are not subject to its authority.  International

 7     observers do not, however, doubt that the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 8     are under the control of the Croatian military --"

 9        A.   [In English] To the portion.

10        Q.   To the portion -- I'm sorry, the portion I can't read.  "The

11     portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Croatian

12     military and it's whether -- whether belonging to the local territorial

13     defence, to paramilitary groups, or to the Croatian army.  It is unclear

14     in the circumstances how their withdrawal or disbandment as required by

15     the council can be achieved."  We spoke of Mr. Daidza.  Was Daidza under

16     the -- to your knowledge, that is - if you can answer the question; if

17     not, we won't bother - but was he under the control of the Croatian

18     military or the Croatian authorities or the Croatian army?

19        A.   I couldn't give you an answer to that question.  I think it was

20     quite clear to me who Daidza and his volunteers were fighting, but as to

21     under whose control he was, I couldn't really venture an opinion.

22        Q.   Okay.

23        A.   But Mr. Daidza was from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That is a

24     notorious fact.  Everybody knew that, myself included.  He was from some

25     place in Central Bosnia, if I'm not mistaken.

Page 27714

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A general question, Witness.

 2     At the time you no doubt read the Resolutions of the Security Council, I

 3     suppose.  Your department within the ministry kept close scrutiny of

 4     anything that was written at the time.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Surely.  At that time, I was

 6     at the Foreign Ministry at the time.  We were familiar with those

 7     Resolutions, and we were trying to take steps in accordance with those

 8     Resolutions.  Now I'm talking about the Foreign Ministry.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you know, those Resolutions

10     result from different information coming from the international forces

11     present on the ground, from other sources, and so on and so forth.  In

12     your position, in your capacity, did you observe at any time major

13     mistakes in the Resolutions when certain facts were mentioned?  Do you

14     have specific cases in mind where you could say that what was written

15     down was obviously wrong, inaccurate, based on unreliable information?

16     Do you have in mind one or two examples that you could give us from the

17     top of your head?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. President, I can't now

19     think of any Resolutions or reports of the UN Secretary-General such as

20     this one where I spotted some major errors.  If there were any such

21     cases, we reacted while the Resolutions were in the process of being

22     drafted.  At times, it appeared that the idea behind the Resolutions was

23     to establish some kind of a balanced approach towards -- where all sides

24     would be treated in the same way, and to us who knew what the situation

25     was like on the ground, they did not seem an accurate reflection of that.

Page 27715

 1     I can tell you that because I had direct relations, good relations, with

 2     a number of international representatives.  I would sometimes bring that

 3     up.  At times, I would officially put -- make an official protest, but

 4     most often I would receive the following reply:  They were there to

 5     establish facts and not to judge what is going on, who is to blame and

 6     who is not.  It seemed to us that this approach was not always

 7     productive, but that may have been just our impression because, after

 8     all, I was there to represent the Republic of Croatia, and I allow the

 9     possibility that I was subjective in my approach.  But I couldn't really

10     say that I noticed any major glaring errors in those documents.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break --

12             MR. KARNAVAS:  If I could, just one last point on this document,

13     and we'll take our break.

14        Q.   Sticking with the same document, because this is 233, because you

15     mentioned Mladic, and I think it might be relevant here.  If we look at

16     paragraph number 5 on page 2, it says:  "The bulk of JNA personnel who

17     were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were citizens of that republic

18     and were not, therefore, covered by the Belgrade authorities' decision of

19     4 May to withdraw JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Most of them appeared to

20     have joined the army of the so-called Serbian Republic of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Others have joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia

22     and Herzegovina" -- I can't read that next word -- "which is under --

23     which is under the political control of the Presidency of that republic.

24     Others may have joined various irregular forces operating there."  Now,

25     you said earlier -- you talked earlier about General Mladic, who was in

Page 27716

 1     Croatia at one point, JNA officer.  Now, can you explain a little bit

 2     about what is being said in paragraph 5, why it might be significant

 3     about the JNA personnel?

 4        A.   In an effort to report objectively, I was talking about it a

 5     moment ago, it is my interpretation that the Secretary-General in this

 6     report as it is worded, that the members of the Yugoslav army from Bosnia

 7     and Herzegovina have now joined the newly formed armies.  In actual fact,

 8     nothing changed.  Those were the same troops.  They retained their

 9     equipment; I think the equipment is actually mentioned somewhere in this

10     report by the UN Secretary-General, and they had the same command

11     structure.  And unfortunately time would tell.  I think this is the first

12     time that General Mladic is actually referred to in a document

13     originating from the United Nations, but as time went by we went on to

14     see under whose command he operated and what he actually did.  So this

15     was just pretense.  The same troops remained there under the same

16     command.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you.  That's it, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We'll take a

19     20-minute break.

20                           --- Recess taken at 5.40 p.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 6.03 p.m.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you may proceed.

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. President.

24        Q.   Okay.

25             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm sorry, Mr. Karnavas, to stop you, but before

Page 27717

 1     we break I didn't want to take your time.  I only would like to have a

 2     question from Mr. Zuzul, and it is about a clarification.  During the

 3     very last minutes of -- of the witness, you spoke and he spoke about some

 4     of the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, and I believe

 5     it was page 74, lines 1 and 2, that -- that Mr. Zuzul you mentioned that,

 6     and I quote:  "I was there to represent Croatia," et cetera.  And now my

 7     question of clarification is the following:  According to -- to your -- I

 8     mean the summary of what we have received, there is not very much clearly

 9     stated, if you will, also posted in New York or only in Geneva.  This

10     morning you -- I mean, previously you mentioned that you were posted in

11     Geneva as the permanent representative of Croatia to Geneva.  Now, I

12     gathered from your last statement that -- that if you were also in New

13     York as representing Croatia as a permanent representative or only as a

14     member of delegation, et cetera.  So my question is to clarify if you

15     were permanently in Geneva or sometimes you participated at the

16     General Assembly sessions in New York or at the meetings of the Security

17     Council.  Thank you.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  When the

19     Resolutions were passed, I was with the foreign ministry.  I was, in

20     actual fact, assistant minister.  I had started dealing with the

21     negotiations already.  I had not yet been appointed ambassador.  Soon

22     after this, I became deputy foreign minister.  You talked about the

23     position of ambassador to the UN in Geneva.  I was appointed on the 1st

24     of February, 1993, to that particular position.  However, even while

25     working as assistant and deputy foreign minister in Geneva, I was a

Page 27718

 1     regular member of our delegations in New York, as well, and I was quite

 2     involved in the work of our delegations, and I took part in discussing

 3     all the Resolutions on the Croatian side, needless to say.

 4             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Thank you very much.

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Judge Prandler.

 6        Q.   And I wanted to point out something on page 74, line 24, because

 7     it was translated as -- in an effort for those folks to be objective, and

 8     I believe my colleague tells me that you used the word "Pokusaj," if I'm

 9     pronouncing that correctly.  Could you please tell us whether that means

10     "effort" or "attempt," because it may be a slight variation.  It may be

11     slightly nuance, but just to have a more accurate -- what did you exactly

12     mean when you were asked the question about the reports?  Were they

13     making an effort, or were they attempting?  I don't want to put words in

14     your mouth, but I'm told that you actually used the word.  We don't have

15     a Croatian transcript.  So if you could think back?

16        A.   [In English] I would say that they were making efforts.

17        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Now, if we could go to the next document, and

18     we're probably going to move through the next couple of documents rather

19     quickly so we can get some more substantive areas.  The next one is a P

20     document for Prosecution, P 00263.  This is a presidential transcript.

21     Now, this is dated 15 June 1992, and of course the Prosecution in its

22     exhibit list indicated that the relevant pages for them are 66 to 67 and

23     that this transcript shows army of Republic of Croatia units being sent

24     into Bosnia and setting up check-points there.

25             Now, if I could direct you to that page, page 67, it also shows,

Page 27719

 1     by the way, that you were present.  I don't know if you recall being

 2     present, but in any event, the first page shows that you were present.

 3     Page 67, as I understand it, you had an opportunity to read not just the

 4     English version but also to make some comparisons with the Croatian

 5     version, and it might be of some significance, I don't know, we'll leave

 6     it up to the Trial Chamber, but could you look at that, the very last

 7     paragraph where it starts:  "The numbers of theft and larceny cases has

 8     also increased."  Did you notice anything missing, any words missing in

 9     that?

10        A.   That's true, I was at this meeting.  Naturally having read the

11     transcripts it came back to me.  It has been 16 years since, after all.

12     However, when I read both English and the Croatian versions, I noticed

13     that the English is missing a word which in this case might change the

14     overall meaning.  In the English it's page 67.  In the Croatian -- I

15     don't know exactly how the pages were marked, but I think it's 714.

16     Anyway, the word "return" is missing.  Therefore, if we try to translate

17     this paragraph over here there is a word missing, the word "return,"

18     which can be translated into English -- well, I am certainly no expert,

19     but to the extent that I can tell, it could be translated in two ways

20     perhaps, "withdrawal," which is I think the word that most people would

21     have used in this case, or "return," which is another possibility.  If

22     you add that word to the paragraph, no matter if you actually opt for the

23     word "withdrawal" or the word "return," I think this changes the meaning

24     entirely, and the paragraph shows that those elements of the Croatian

25     army that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina were now returning home and

Page 27720

 1     while withdrawing were perpetrating certain crimes.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And with respect to the -- to the issue of check-points --

 3     well, perhaps you could read the paragraph itself, which is only a few

 4     lines.

 5        A.   [In English] Excuse me, the same paragraph.

 6        Q.   Yeah.  And you can read it in Croatian.  It can be translated or

 7     you can read it in English, however you feel more comfortable.  Croatian

 8     is the original language of the transcript, so ...

 9        A.   Maybe I'll read it in Croatian so maybe we'll get new translation

10     then.

11        Q.   All right.

12        A.   [Interpretation] "Cases of theft and larceny have been on the

13     increase.  The movable property, too, has been stolen, and in the last

14     cases at local check-points machines and equipment has been moved over

15     from Herceg-Bosna where units and individuals who were involved over

16     there along various front lines while returning to Croatia have been

17     hauling in as war booty tractors, and all other kinds of agricultural

18     machinery, et cetera.  "However," and that's the next paragraph,

19     "However, we have set up very effective check-points here, and I can now

20     say that we have been particularly effective at putting a stop to this

21     kind of practice."

22        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Can you, being there, and now that we have the

23     context and having read it and spotted the error, can you tell us when

24     they say "we have set up check-points here," what are they talking about?

25     What kind of check-points, and what does "here" mean in this context?

Page 27721

 1        A.   I can't tell you exactly where the check-points were.  I simply

 2     don't know.  However, looking at the overall context, I think these are

 3     check-points in Croatia itself.

 4        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Let's go on --

 5             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Just for the record, Mr. Karnavas, wouldn't it

 6     be good to mention that it is Mate Lausic who is speaking here?  It's not

 7     Boban.  It's not the witness.

 8             MR. KARNAVAS:  Right.  Right.  I should apologise.  I should have

 9     done that.  I'm just getting a little tired but --

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Of course.  We all are.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  -- you're absolutely correct.

12        Q.   All right.  And now just for the record, who is that individual

13     so we know?

14        A.   I think at this time he was the commander of the military police

15     of the Croatian army.

16        Q.   Okay.  All right.  Now, if we go on to the next -- next document,

17     P 00336.  This is a presidential transcript dated 21 July 19 --

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  We have to change the folders.

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  Sorry.

20        Q.   21 July 1992, and first context.  At this point in history, what

21     is happening in Croatia?  Has the JNA withdrawn?  Have the attacks

22     stopped, or is it -- and has the territory up to 30 per cent, as you've

23     indicated, does Croatia have total control over its territory within its

24     internationally recognised borders?

25        A.   There were no considerable changes in Croatia at this time.

Page 27722

 1     Large tracts of Croatian territory were still under occupation.  There

 2     was nothing much going on in terms of warfare, as far as I know, since

 3     all of those were by now UNPROFOR-controlled areas.  However, there

 4     wasn't anything in particular moving in a good, positive direction

 5     either.  Nevertheless, relations were changing between Croatia and Bosnia

 6     and HerzegovinaBosnia and Herzegovina had by this time been

 7     internationally recognised.  It had been recognised by Croatia as well.

 8             In the context of this story, one thing that strikes me as worth

 9     mentioning is that at a referendum before Bosnia and Herzegovina was

10     established, there were only Bosniaks and Croats participating.  The

11     Serbs refused to be involved.  President Tudjman issued a public call on

12     Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to go to that referendum and to vote in

13     favour of an independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Soon after

14     the proclamation, Croatia recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We started

15     with diplomatic consultations immediately.  This document is in relation

16     to the first major meeting following the recognition.  However, in the

17     context of the Resolutions that I have been talking about, there is one

18     thing that I would like to note.  Sometime in mid-June President Tudjman

19     and President Izetbegovic issued a joint statement.  I was with President

20     Tudjman when we prepared the statement.  Among other things, the

21     statement also dealt with issues mentioned in the Secretary-General's

22     letter as well as in the Resolutions of the Security Council.  Croatia

23     wanted to act on those documents immediately.  So this gives you the

24     general background.  There was a lot of diplomatic activity going on.

25     This meeting was agreed and eventually held between the leaders of the

Page 27723

 1     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leaders of the Republic of

 2     Croatia in Zagreb.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now -- thank you.  Let me walk you step by step, but I'm

 4     happy that you put that into context because let me use this to segue

 5     into my next question.  The Prosecution in the 62 ter description in

 6     describing this particular presidential transcript, and I'll use a word

 7     that they attribute to me that is "spin", this is what the Prosecution

 8     says:  That this transcript --

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, as I objected earlier this afternoon,

10     I'm also going to object again to this now.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well.

12             MR. SCOTT:  There's no point in putting these preparatory

13     comments and criticisms.  He can ask the question.  If he can point him

14     to the page and say -- if -- assuming it's otherwise a fair question,

15     there's no reason for these other preparatory remarks.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  I am entitled -- I am entitled -- this is the

17     Defence, Mr. President.  I am defending allegations.  The allegation --

18     the spin by the Prosecutor who wasn't there at the time is suggesting

19     that -- that Tudjman is -- presses the Bosnian president.  The gentleman

20     is particularly familiar.  That's their spin.  He's going to comment.

21             MR. SCOTT:  This is further coaching of the witness, Your Honour.

22             MR. KARNAVAS:  How is it coaching of the witness?

23             MR. SCOTT:  Because I'm now telling you what the Prosecution

24     position is, so you can be sure to disagree with that.  That's your queue

25     to disagree.

Page 27724

 1             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honours.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  This is objectionable.

 3             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honours.

 4             MR. SCOTT:  Just ask the question.

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honours, let's take a reality check.  I met

 6     with the witness.  I went through the documents.  If I wanted to coach

 7     him, I would have coached him back then.

 8             MR. SCOTT:  Maybe you did.

 9             MR. KARNAVAS:  This is absolutely ridiculous, and this Prosecutor

10     has met with every single witness, gone through the documents, and we've

11     seen them testify.  So I'm -- they allege a joint criminal enterprise.

12     They allege that Tudjman is pressing the Bosnian president, entering into

13     a particular agreement, which is the very next document.  That's their

14     spin.  I'm entitled to -- I'm entitled to point that out because the

15     gentleman can comment.  To suggest that I'm suggesting is utterly and

16     patently ridiculous, and I'm being generous at this point.

17             MR. SCOTT:  Well, I do suggest it, and also, Your Honour, I ask

18     the Chamber and not just Judge Antonetti.  I ask all the Chamber in

19     fairness.  Remember back during the Prosecution case and when the

20     Prosecution put on its witnesses.  I didn't say, and I'm telling you,

21     Mr. Witness, what the Prosecution case is, and this is the answer I want

22     you to give, and if you look at paragraph so-and-so of our indictment,

23     this is the Prosecution's theory.  I didn't preface my questions, and the

24     Prosecution counsel didn't in that way.  You ask a witness to come in.

25     You put questions to the witness.  You don't argue your case.  You don't

Page 27725

 1     say, I'm telling -- I'm putting your spin on it.  You ask questions.

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:  It's called burden of proof, Your Honour, burden

 3     of proof.  They are alleging.  They have the power.  They draft that

 4     indictment the way they want it.  They decided to put the spin on this

 5     particular presidential transcript in order to get it in.  That's their

 6     interpretation.  I'm not inventing anything.  That's their invention.

 7     They got to proof that.  I'm attacking.  I'm defending.  That's -- so if

 8     he thinks that's the case --

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, the Judges are

10     thinking about how to speed up trials, and the both of you have just

11     illustrated the need for Judges to intervene at times.

12             Mr. Karnavas, you want to highlight one point.  Very well.  In

13     order to do so, you tell the witness, "Look at this transcript.  There is

14     this particular sentence."  He can say yes.  He can say no.  He can say,

15     "I don't know."  Thereafter, afterwards you say, "well, it appears in the

16     indictment that this is being alleged," and then we can move forward.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well, Mr. President, but it's not in the

18     indictment.  It's in their description of the evidence, but very well.

19     And I understand that the description is not evidence, and you'll see a

20     motion that I filed where I objected to these characterisations.  That's

21     parted of this -- my whole attack on the Prosecution case, that in trying

22     to get in evidence they've had to put certain descriptions as to what

23     they believe the evidence shows.  So that's part and parcel.  And then

24     when I objected to that, they came back and they said, "No.  Our -- our

25     characterisations are part of the evidence."  But I take your point.  Let

Page 27726

 1     me move on.  Let's go straight to the document.  Okay.  Let's everyone

 2     calm down a little bit.

 3        Q.   21st of July, 1992, there's a discussion, and I just want to

 4     focus you very briefly because we're going to go on to the next document.

 5     On page 59, we have Dr. Franjo Tudjman, who is the president, and there

 6     he's -- he says, and I quote:  "Mr. President Izetbegovic, our time is

 7     limited, so can we finish with this part of the discussion as the base --

 8     as the presumption for further interstate conversations, that both

 9     delegations agree that the status of the Croatian people in

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised on the basis of three constitutive

11     units of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and second, that the defence forces of

12     the Croatian Defence Council are considered to be an integral part of the

13     defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they are to be

14     represented in the command, the Joint Command of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

15             Now, can you tell us given the position that you held and your

16     involvement, can you tell us exactly why is President Izetbegovic

17     pursuing this sort of policy, if you will, with President Izetbegovic at

18     the time -- I mean, President Tudjman, why is he pursuing this with

19     President Izetbegovic?

20        A.   I attended this meeting.  I think it was a very important

21     meeting.  I think it clearly illustrates the principles that President

22     Tudjman applied when he was thinking about Bosnia and Herzegovina as well

23     as when acting in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He accepts

24     President Izetbegovic as the president of a sovereign neighbouring

25     country recognised by Croatia.  He is here expressing his concern about

Page 27727

 1     the position of the Croats there, the Croats as a constituent nation in

 2     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He's here tabling a proposal that was anyway

 3     based on the proposal put forward by the international community, and I'm

 4     referring to Cutileiro's plan to the effect that the Croats within Bosnia

 5     and Herzegovina should be on an equal footing with all the other ethnic

 6     groups there.  He also goes on to propose that the Croatian armed forces

 7     in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be placed under a Joint Command to be

 8     exercised by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina so that they might be

 9     better able to defend themselves from aggression.

10             I think this very paragraph does a great job illustrating

11     President Tudjman's position at the time.  Not just at the time.  This

12     moment is when it was actually formulated, but what I've been trying to

13     say yesterday and today is this:  My impression from the very beginning

14     of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and onward was that Mr. Tudjman's

15     policies were defined by these three principles, and all three can easily

16     and to great advantage be seen in these sentences contained in the

17     proposal.

18        Q.   Okay.  And just before we get down to the next document, did

19     President Tudjman --

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for counsel, please.

21             MR. KARNAVAS:

22        Q.   Did President Tudjman intend to subordinate, to subordinate, the

23     Croatians and the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HVO, under

24     whatever army existed for the Sarajevo government, or when he says

25     "integral part," did he have some other intention?

Page 27728

 1        A.   No.  He wanted both for the Croats to enjoy an appropriate

 2     position in Bosnia and Herzegovina's government and its institutions

 3     including the BH army command and for the Croatian defence forces to

 4     become and integral and indivisible part of the BH army forces [as

 5     interpreted].  I think it is impossible to view these two issues

 6     separately.  He wanted them to effectively become one and the same army,

 7     but he also wanted to have a Croat involved in the command structure.

 8        Q.   Okay.  I'm told that it was the defence forces, not the BH army

 9     forces.  Is that what you meant?  Because my disadvantage is I don't

10     understand Croatian, and my colleague here is pointing out at page 85,

11     line 18.  So if you could look at that and please tell us again, because

12     we're talking -- there are some nuances here, and I just want to make

13     sure because I can see the Prosecution busily writing away for the

14     cross-examination.  I certainly don't want to give him any ammunition as

15     a result of something lost in translation.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters note, it was interpreted as

17     defence forces.

18             MR. KARNAVAS:

19        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the next document.  We're told -- we'll move

20     on.  It's okay now.  We'll move on.  P 0 --

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I ask a question,

22     Mr. President?  As I'm unable to monitor both my words and the

23     interpretation at the same time, and I have noticed some errors, and

24     given the fact that between my testimony today, my testimony tomorrow,

25     and my next testimony months will have gone by, I have to apologise for

Page 27729

 1     my ignorance, but may I please be granted a chance to inspect a

 2     transcript of my evidence and all the other documents, especially in view

 3     of the fact that I'm perfectly aware that I'm not allowed to contact the

 4     Defence, the OTP, or the Tribunal?  Is this something that is doable, and

 5     is my request a logical one?  I do apologise, but this just brought the

 6     issue to mind.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Transcripts are public and they

 8     normally can be accessed by everyone.  So by the time you return in July,

 9     you will have ample time through the internet to access the transcripts

10     of today's hearing.  No problem at all.  Unless the system breaks down.

11     You never know.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

13             MR. KARNAVAS:

14        Q.   If we could get to the next document, P 00339, because this is

15     connected to our previous document.  P 00339.  It's dated July 21, 1992,

16     and we could see that there's a title to it.  "Agreement on friendship

17     and cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the

18     Republic of Croatia."  Now again just to make sure that we're clear, that

19     everybody is crystal clear, by this point Croatia has recognised Bosnia's

20     independence; is that correct?

21        A.   Correct.

22        Q.   Within those internationally recognised borders?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   Okay.  Now, we don't have that much time to dwell on this, nor do

25     we need to, but if we could go to paragraph number 8.  Paragraph number

Page 27730

 1     8.  And I will go through it step by step.  "In consideration of the

 2     continuing aggression of the Serbian and Montenegrin military forces

 3     against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also largely against

 4     the republic of Croatia from the contiguous areas of the Republic of

 5     Bosnia and Herzegovina, the President of the Presidency of the Republic

 6     of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of Croatia

 7     call upon the international community, and in particular the United

 8     Nations, the European Community, and the United States of America, to

 9     take real and efficient steps to vigorously stop the aggression against

10     their States, to prevent further loss of human life, persecution and

11     expulsion of their citizens and the destruction of property."

12             Let's pause right here.  By this point when this was drafted,

13     when they say "in consideration of the continuing aggression," was the

14     aggression continuing in a manner in which it's stated in this paragraph?

15        A.   Definitely.

16        Q.   All right.  And I know that we talked about this a little bit.

17     They're asking the United Nations, European Union, and the United States

18     of America to take real and efficient steps to vigorously stop the

19     aggression.  I mentioned this before.  Let me ask it again.  By -- by the

20     date of this agreement, July 21, or thereafter did the United States send

21     in combat troops to protect the territorial integrity of Croatia and/or

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina against the JNA or whoever was the aggressor at

23     the time?

24        A.   No.  At that point in time, nobody ever considered the sending of

25     troops that would fight the Yugoslav People's Army, and if I may comment

Page 27731

 1     upon this paragraph, because I directly participated in the drafting of

 2     all this, this is a direct annotation on behalf of both presidents to the

 3     United States of America because President Clinton had become president,

 4     and even before that President Tudjman had sent him a letter expressing

 5     his belief that without direct involvement on the part of the United

 6     States of America, the crisis would not be solved, and that is why we put

 7     this in the agreement between the two presidents.  Both agreed with that.

 8             And if I may add a comment to that with regard to this document

 9     for which I believe that it is extremely important.  Not that there was

10     no pressure from one side to another, but, rather, we negotiated about --

11     about all this, and I don't really know what we're to use.  We measured

12     our words carefully the whole day, not just paragraphs but words,

13     especially Mr. Trnka on the Bosniak side and I and the others on the

14     Croatian side, and this is really a good example of our joint work.  The

15     presidents signed the document that had been prepared by the respective

16     delegations that comprised representatives of both states.  In other

17     words, this document was prepared in a very, very serious manner.

18        Q.   All right.  With that in mind, let's go on to the next part of

19     paragraph 8.  "With this objective in mind, both States will sustain

20     their -- will sustain their past successful cooperation and continuous

21     coordination of the defensive activities in" -- I underscore "in" -- "the

22     contiguous zones of the two States."

23             Question number one is this an accurate statement?  That is, was

24     there past successful cooperation between these two folks with respect to

25     activities in the contiguous zones?

Page 27732

 1        A.   The successful cooperation implied any attempt to prevent the

 2     Yugoslav People's Army from achieving their overall strategic goals, and

 3     I mean by that preventing them from establishing new borders or taking up

 4     the area all the way down to the Neretva River.

 5        Q.   All right.  Let's go on.  "Aware of the fact that both States are

 6     threatened, unless aggression against them is urgently stopped by further

 7     destruction and annihilation of their state entity and integrity, the two

 8     states will, should the efforts of the international community remain

 9     ineffective, take all necessary steps in order to establish broader

10     cooperation in the military sphere and coordinate military operations in

11     order to definitely --" I think this might be "repel the danger

12     threatening them."

13             So was this an accurate --

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Okay.  Now, with respect to broader cooperation in military -- in

16     the military sphere and coordinate military operations, since you were

17     part of the negotiating process, can you tell us at least at that stage

18     what was envisaged?  I know we have the presidential transcripts, and we

19     can probably glean from that conversation, but you being a participant,

20     can you help us out here?

21        A.   What this meant at the moment was every possible form of

22     cooperation between the Croatian army and the army of Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina.  And I'm not referring to the Croats in Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina but the Croatian army.  There were even talks, and the

25     paragraph leaves the possibility open, although not explicitly, about

Page 27733

 1     joint military actions whenever those were needed.

 2        Q.   All right.  And then just finally on paragraph 9 very quickly, it

 3     says that there was an agreement to have a protocol on the establishment

 4     of diplomatic relations between the two states at embassy level signed

 5     immediately.  Did that occur?

 6        A.   [In English] Yes.

 7        Q.   All right.  Now, let's move on to the next document.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is an interesting document

 9     for me, a document that was discussed with other witnesses before, and of

10     course I am going to seize the opportunity to ask this question to

11     somebody who took part in the generation of the document.  The previous

12     document on the presidential transcript, and let me note that the meeting

13     lasted 10 hours and 15 minutes, we have proof that the document was

14     produced right after the meeting and that the witness participated in the

15     production of the document. Here is my question:  This document is signed

16     by both presidents.  It is an agreement of friendship and cooperation

17     between the two republics.  For your country, was this document

18     distributed?  Was it published in the Official Gazette of your republic?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document was made public on the

20     same day, or maybe the following day.  I'm not sure -- sure, and I'm not

21     an expert either to tell you whether this type of agreement should have

22     been published in the Official Gazette, whether it falls under that

23     category.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine.  I had another question.

25     This is an international agreement.  According to your law, unfortunately

Page 27734

 1     I didn't have the time to check it myself, but was this document due to

 2     be ratified by the parliament, or was it up to the president to commit

 3     his country to an international agreement without necessity to -- for the

 4     document to be ratified?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that for this document no

 6     ratification was necessary.  In my view, under the then-prevailing

 7     constitution the president of the republic could have signed this

 8     agreement without this document being ratified by the parliament.  I

 9     believe that under the current constitution of the Republic of Croatia,

10     this type of agreement could have -- could be signed even by the Minister

11     of Foreign Affairs, which for that matter is the case in other states as

12     well.  But I believe that given his constitutional competencies, the

13     president could sign such a document today.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Several revolutions of the

15     Security Council are referred to in this document, particularly the one

16     on the 13th of July, 1992.  Did you officially send this document to New

17     York for information so that the international community be informed?

18     And in the next document - Mr. Karnavas was maybe about to talk about

19     this document - another Resolution is mentioned.  So did you send that

20     document to the international community so that everybody could be made

21     aware that from now on the HVO army was opposed to the army of Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina as provided for in paragraph number 6 of the document?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We informed the international

24     community about this document on the following day.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] These were all my questions.

Page 27735

 1             Mr. Karnavas.

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Now if we could turn

 3     to --

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Hold on a second.  Mr. Praljak

 5     is on his feet.  I don't know why.

 6             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Well, then, very well.

 7     If --

 8             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, let me just go on.

 9        Q.   The next document is 1D 02295.  Okay.  Okay.  I will --

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.

11             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, your words

12     have been translated into Croatian as the document saying that the HVO

13     would be opposed to the BiH army.  That's how it has been translated into

14     Croatian.  Can this please be taken into account?

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's not what I said.  There

16     has been an error in the interpretation.  What I said is that the HVO

17     army, according to the document, was an integral part of the army of

18     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That's what I said.  So I'm calling upon the

19     interpreters to be very vigilant because on several occasions we've seen

20     the importance or the significance of -- of nuances such as a comma or

21     full stop.  So, please, if you note any problems or misinterpretation,

22     please don't hesitate to let us know for -- in everybody's interests.

23             MR. STEWART:  May I point out that exactly the same error appears

24     in the English transcript, so what Your Honour has just said will

25     constitute a correction of that as well.

Page 27736

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well indeed, because when

 2     I speak I don't necessarily check the transcript in English.  I look at

 3     you rather than -- than at the screen.  I'd rather look at the Defence

 4     counsel than at my screen.  Mr. Karnavas, you have the floor.

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  [Overlapping speakers] Thank you.  First, I have

 6     to thank General Praljak for that correction, and that's an important

 7     one, and we thank him very much.  And we thank that he insisted on making

 8     that correction.  The dangers of circumstantial evidence sometimes, of

 9     jumping to conclusions.

10        Q.   1D 02295.  That's the next document.  It's dated 6 August 1992,

11     obviously some time after the agreement we've seen, and it says here at

12     the very top:  "I have come to the territory of the Republic of Croatia

13     at the decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina."  And if we look at the bottom, we're talking about Fikret

15     Abdic.  Do you know who this person is?

16        A.   Yes, I knew Mr. Abdic.

17        Q.   All right.  And we'll hear more about him through other

18     witnesses.  Now, if you go further down, I don't want to -- he does

19     indicate:  "My task is to organise activities which are at this moment of

20     particular importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina."

21             Skipping the next sentence and going down it says:  "In view of

22     the recently signed interstate agreement, we consider Croatia to be the

23     right place to set up a number of activities which are of consequence for

24     both republics.  With your consent, we intend to establish a Main Staff

25     for providing support to Bosnia and Herzegovina with its headquarters in

Page 27737

 1     Rijeka and several regions -- regional staffs in different locations in

 2     Croatia."

 3             And then if we go to the very last paragraph, first sentence:

 4     "We kindly ask that you adopt a decision legalising the work of our Main

 5     Staff and regional staff in the Republic of Croatia, the locations of

 6     which will be determined by mutual agreement."  My first question is when

 7     he's talking about the recently interstate agreement, were there any

 8     other agreements other than the one that we just saw that presumably, if

 9     we are to believe some, Alija Izetbegovic was pressed to sign?  Were

10     there any other agreements, or is this the agreement that Mr. Abdic is

11     referring to?

12        A.   I think that Mr. Abdic was referring to the agreement that we had

13     just looked at and discussed, because this letter is only a logical part

14     of the implementation of this agreement.  He may even be referring to one

15     of the earlier agreements, the one that was signed in June that I have

16     mentioned, but I would rather be inclined to say that it -- it is

17     referring to the last agreement we discussed.

18        Q.   All right.  And when he's talking about setting up a Main Staff,

19     with the intent to establish a Main Staff, what did you -- if you can

20     tell us, what do you think he means by that?  What is he asking?  Are we

21     talking about the military or civilian sector?  What are we talking

22     about?

23        A.   My interpretation would be that this primarily applies to the

24     military and logistical centre.  As you can see in the map,

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina has a border only with Serbia from which aggression

Page 27738

 1     came from, and the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina for that matter

 2     was occupied by the Serbs.  So the only the connection of Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina with the rest the world goes through the Republic of Croatia,

 4     and that's why all the numerous refugees and all the supplies went

 5     through the Republic of Croatia, and I'm talking about the humanitarian

 6     aid, medical aid, food, and clothes.  All those things went through the

 7     Republic of Croatia.  Unfortunately, the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia

 8     and Herzegovina were exposed to an unjust decision on the part of the

 9     international community.

10             And I would like to apologise to the Honourable Judge and correct

11     myself.  A decision or an embargo on the import of arms had been imposed

12     on the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Both the

13     republics were not -- were poorly armed, and they were facing a very

14     well-armed enemy, which was the Yugoslav People's Army.  Bearing that in

15     mine, everybody has to be clear and understand that they resorted to

16     various means to arm themselves.  I wouldn't be able to testify about the

17     ways and means, the arms reached the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

18     because I'm not well-informed about that.  But whoever who looks at the

19     map will understand how it went.  A lot has been written about that.  My

20     understanding is that a large part of the international community was

21     actually aware of the fact that they had issued a very unjust decision,

22     and by issuing that decision they had prevented the state from arming

23     itself and defending itself.  A large part of the international community

24     turned a blind eye, I would say, when it came to the supply and transport

25     of both weapons as well as all the other different military equipment

Page 27739

 1     through the territory of Republic of Croatia into the territory of Bosnia

 2     and Herzegovina.

 3             If you will allow me another comment, I would like to say that

 4     the Republic of Croatia really had wanted to annex part of the territory

 5     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then it would not have made much sense to

 6     issue a decision to the effect of helping it to arm itself, and I'm sure

 7     that it did help in every possible way.

 8        Q.   All right.  And tomorrow we'll see some documents to that effect.

 9     All right.  Now, if we could go through the next document, P 0386, P

10     00386.  We see that this is 13 July.  This is a week after Mr. Abdic made

11     that request.  This is Resolution 771, and --

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, how much time,

13     please, has been used by Mr. Karnavas?

14             MR. KARNAVAS:

15        Q.   Okay.  If you look at this document and you look at the next

16     document, which is P 387, and we look at the other one -- the other

17     document that follows that, the other P document, P 00406, if we can just

18     spend a few seconds looking at them.  They're all from the UN.  The first

19     one, 386, is 13th of August, the second one is 13th of August, and the

20     third one is 25th of August.  If I can just ask you very briefly, had the

21     situation changed on the ground, that is, had the -- had the JNA or

22     the -- or elements of it, had it left the -- the territories of Bosnia

23     and Herzegovina, and had the danger ceased to exist, concerning Croatia,

24     that is?

25        A.   Nothing major changed in Croatia, and as for Bosnia and

Page 27740

 1     Herzegovina, it became more and more evident that the Yugoslav People's

 2     Army gradually occupied territories and violated all international rules.

 3     In one of the items of this Resolution, makes an explicit reference to

 4     ethnic cleansing.  Where is that?  I think it's item 2, which mentions

 5     the operations of the Serbian army in the territory of Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina at that moment.

 7        Q.   You're referring to which document, but there are three

 8     documents.

 9        A.   Document 386.

10        Q.   Okay.  All right.  But say, for instance, in the other document

11     where they're talking about, for instance, 406, you'll see under page 3,

12     paragraph number 3:  "Demands further that those units of the Yugoslav

13     People's Army and elements of the Croatian army now in Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina must either be withdrawn or be subject to the authority of

15     the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

16             Okay.  Now if we pause a little bit at this, it seems to me from

17     your previous answer that the Yugoslav People's Army is still there.

18     Would it be fair to say the elements of the Croatian army remained --

19     seemed to be in -- within Bosnia and Herzegovina?

20        A.   If I may explain.  This is a -- a Resolution of the

21     General Assembly, which differs from the Resolution of the Security

22     Council.  It differs because it doesn't have an executive force and also

23     by the way it was passed.  It took a longer time to prepare this

24     Resolution, and it always does then for the Resolutions of the Security

25     Council.  If that wasn't the case, then it would be a totally superfluous

Page 27741

 1     to mention the Croatian forces because the agreement that deals with this

 2     issue evokes the already-signed Resolutions, which means that the

 3     conditions of the Resolutions had been met.

 4             I can tell you that I'm aware of this Resolution.  When the

 5     diplomacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an initiative to issue this

 6     Resolution Croatia provided its full support to this initiative.  I

 7     personally took the text of the proposal of the Resolution to President

 8     Tudjman, and he authorise I had me to instruct our diplomats to give

 9     their full support to the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina when

10     this Resolution was being passed.  As you know, it takes 100 -- over 180

11     States or over half a majority of the Assembly of the United Nations pass

12     a Resolution.  This Resolution was more political than executive in

13     nature, but as far as the diplomacies of the Republic of Croatia and

14     Bosnia and Herzegovina were concerned, this meant that this was an

15     implementation of our friendship agreement, and we in Croatia fully

16     supported the passing of this Resolution.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Okay.  Well, I see our time is up for the day,

18     Mr. President.  I don't want to keep anyone here any longer.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you've used three

20     minutes -- three hours, sorry, and 45 minutes.  So you'll have one hour

21     and 15 minutes left tomorrow.  Now, what about tomorrow?  I'm turning to

22     the other Defence counsel.  Will you cross-examine this witness?  If you

23     wish to cross-examine this witness, you'll have two hours and 30 minutes.

24     Mrs. Alaburic, is --

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  I believe that

Page 27742

 1     it would be very good to use Mr. Zuzul's time, because Mr. Zuzul knows a

 2     lot about topics that are very relevant for us.  I do intend to put

 3     several questions to Mr. Zuzul.  I have half an hour at my disposal, and

 4     I've asked the Defence teams of Mr. Pusic and Mr. Stojic to give me their

 5     time if I find this to be necessary and of benefit to the Trial Chamber,

 6     and I'm also going to talk to the other Defence teams if they're not

 7     interested in cross-examining to give me their times.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So you will

 9     cross-examine this witness during an hour and a half.  Mrs. Nozica.

10             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  For the

11     time being I do not intend to -- to examine the witness.  In any case, we

12     will decide by tomorrow, and if we do not intend to examine we will give

13     our time to Mrs. Alaburic.

14             MR. KOVACIC:  Your Honours, we expect not to have any questions.

15     Perhaps Mr. Praljak will have one or two very short, but it is still

16     under consideration.  More probably not than yes, but if, we are talking

17     really about couple of minutes.

18             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as things

19     stand now, we are not going to have any questions.  We will make our

20     final decision tomorrow.  And as Mrs. Nozica has already told you, in

21     that case we will give our time to Mrs. Alaburic.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Anyway, tomorrow we will

23     conclude at 6.30 at the latest.  Judges may need some time to ask

24     questions as well.  If there isn't enough time left, you know that the

25     hearing will resume on the 18th of July.  Witness, the 18th of July is a

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 1     Friday.  The Prosecutor will have five hours to cross-examine you.  Of

 2     course there have been administrative issues, objections, and so on, and

 3     it appears that we won't have enough time to finish everything on Friday.

 4     We may have to continue on Monday morning.  Therefore, you will have to

 5     stay over during the weekend between the 18th of July and the 20th.  I

 6     hope this is not going to cause any difficulty for you since, in

 7     particular, weekends in The Hague are pretty pleasant when the weather's

 8     nice.  So please make the necessary arrangements to be at the disposal of

 9     the Chamber on Friday, the 18th of July, and most probably on the

10     following Monday because after the Prosecutor's cross-examination, there

11     will most probably be redirect.  So we need to schedule for two days and

12     not just one, just for your prior information.  I know July is still far

13     away, but I just wanted to give you that information so that you can make

14     arrangements.

15             Now, you may have planned some holidays in July.  I don't know.

16     It may not be very convenient for you, but it is impossible to do

17     otherwise.  The Prosecutor was not in a position to start his

18     cross-examination this week.  This is obvious.  This is all I wanted to

19     say at this stage.  We will resume the hearing tomorrow at 2.15 in the

20     afternoon.  Let me reiterate the recommendations I gave you yesterday.

21     No communication with anyone while you're still under oath.  Thank you.

22     See you tomorrow.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day

25                           of May, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.