080616ED

Page 29324

1 the court.

2 Examination by Mr. Karnavas:

3 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Akmadzic.

4 A. Good afternoon.

5 Q. All right. First I'm going to go through your background rather

6 quickly. Unless there is any objections I'm going to be leading the

7 witness to his background. As I understand it, you told us already that

8 you were born in 1939, correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And after graduating high school in 1965, I believe you graduated

11 from the Sarajevo university in English, German and Latin languages; is

12 that correct?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. From approximately 1964 to 1978 you were working for, I believe,

15 it was a large company Energoinvest as a translator primarily responsible

16 for international matters?

17 A. As a translator, yes, in international matters.

18 Q. And then in 1978, as I understand it, you began working for the

19 Presidency of the then Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And as I understand it, you were an advisor on international

22 protocol; is that right?

23 A. That's right.

24 Q. In 1982, you joined the organising committee for the 14th winter

25 Olympic games that were held in Sarajevo; is that right?

Page 29325

1 A. Right.

2 Q. I take it you worked there up until the games and I believe the

3 games were in 1984 so that would have been for a couple of years;

4 correct?

5 A. That's right, until somewhere in mid-1984.

6 Q. And then in 1984, I believe you returned back to the Presidency

7 where you were -- you headed the international protocol sector until

8 about the beginning of 1990?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Then around February 1991 as I understand it, you were elected to

11 the office of the general secretary of the Presidency of the Socialist

12 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

13 A. Let me try to be a little more specific. It was in mid-1990 that

14 I was working with the office of the president of the Presidency and then

15 in February 1991, I was appointed secretary general of the Presidency.

16 Q. Okay. And you held that position, as I understand it, up until

17 the time when you were elected prime minister of what became the republic

18 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that would have been around November 10, 1992;

19 correct, when you were elected prime minister?

20 A. That's right.

21 Q. And you held that position until about the end of -- sometime

22 towards the middle or end of August 1993; is that right?

23 A. That's right, almost until the very end of August.

24 Q. Okay. And we're going to go into some of that in greater detail,

25 but -- and let me just go back a little bit. As I understand it, in --

Page 29326

1 in November 14th, 1992, you were elected one of the vice-presidents of

2 the HDZ-BiH, that would have been -- correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So in other words, while you were holding that position within

5 the Presidency, you also had a particular position within the HDZ which

6 was a political party?

7 A. Yes, for a while.

8 Q. All right. The microphones pick up very well so you don't need

9 to shout, you know. And I understand you might be nervous so a little

10 water may help you calm down a little bit.

11 Then, as I understand it, at some point in -- I believe it was

12 December 10, 1993, you became a member of the presidential consul of the

13 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna; is that correct?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Then in early, I believe 1995, you were elected vice-president of

16 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna?

17 A. Yes, the government of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

18 Q. That would have been before, before the Dayton Peace Accords?

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. Okay. Well let's go back a little bit now that I've covered in

21 rather general ways your background. At first I want to go into your

22 position of being secretary -- general secretary of the Presidency. For

23 those of us who are not aware of that position, could you please explain

24 a little bit what this position entailed?

25 A. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised seven members

Page 29327

1 and the secretary general who was appointed by the Presidency directly.

2 This is a high-ranking administrative position and it is in charge of the

3 general functioning of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina within

4 the Presidency and outside the Presidency, as far as administrative

5 aspects of its work were concerned, this is a position that carries some

6 responsibility but is not of a political nature such as the positions

7 occupied by the members of the Presidency and this position does not call

8 for an appointment -- does not call for an election.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, I'm going to ask you to slow down a

10 little bit because everything is being translated and at this pace, I'm

11 afraid that they may not be able to keep up by the end of the afternoon

12 so if you could show down just a little bit, okay?

13 Now -- okay, good. Now, in your position as the general

14 secretary, did you have the authority or the power to vote along with the

15 presidents of the Presidency -- or the members of the Presidency?

16 A. I didn't have the power to vote, but I had the power to speak.

17 Q. All right. And as I understand it, and correct me if I am wrong,

18 with respect to -- the minutes of the meetings were being taken; correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And was your position such that you would have been responsible

21 in part for those minutes or was somebody else responsible for it?

22 A. Minutes were taken by someone else. I would go through them and

23 at the next meeting of the Presidency, I would grant my approval.

24 Q. All right. Now you say you would grant your approval and how

25 would that approval be granted?

Page 29328

1 A. I would just go through them and when I realised that I could go

2 to a Presidency meeting then under the regulations at the next meeting of

3 the Presidency would approve and adopt the minutes or perhaps amend them.

4 Q. All right. Well, did the -- did the minutes themselves, once

5 they were approved, did they require to be signed by anyone in order to

6 demonstrate that they had been indeed looked at, reviewed, and approved?

7 A. The minutes were signed by the president and the secretary

8 general.

9 Q. So that would have been you when you held that position?

10 A. That's right.

11 Q. Now, with respect to this Presidency, we heard a little bit about

12 it but again, since you were one of the, for lack a better term, one of

13 the insiders, could you please explain to us how did this Presidency

14 function? What were the responsibilities of this Presidency and its

15 members?

16 A. As I said before, the Presidency comprised seven members elected

17 directly by the people. Once the Presidency had been established after

18 its first meeting, the president would be appointed. The president is

19 equal to the other members of the Presidency except for one thing, he

20 chairs the meetings and schedules the meetings of the Presidency and he

21 also signs any decisions taken by the Presidency.

22 Q. And we've heard this term before but I want to see whether you

23 can verify it. Is this known or -- yeah, is this known as a collective

24 body?

25 A. Yes, the Presidency is a collective head of state primarily of

Page 29329

1 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina when it was still part

2 Yugoslavia and then also of the sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 Q. All right.

4 A. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 Q. I know there was a president of the Presidency, was there a

6 position such as the vice-president of the Presidency?

7 A. There was no such thing as the vice-president of the Presidency

8 but when the president was abroad, somebody would always be appointed to

9 stand in for him.

10 Q. Okay. With respect to the military, was it the president who was

11 the commander in chief or was it this collective body?

12 A. The collective body, the Presidency as a whole, was the supreme

13 commander of the armed forces.

14 Q. All right. Now, let's leave the Presidency for a second and go

15 to the government itself because we know that you served as prime

16 minister. If you could tell always little bit, just very briefly, about

17 the relationships between, say, the Presidency and the government itself?

18 And when we speak of government, perhaps I should ask you first to

19 explain what is meant by government by your system or the system back

20 then?

21 A. The government was one of the state bodies, one of the three

22 state bodies. There was the Presidency, the head state firstly;

23 secondly, the assembly as the legislative body and then the government as

24 the executive body. I'm talking about Bosnia and Herzegovina. The

25 legislative body of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that comprised presidents,

Page 29330

1 the vice-presidents and it also had a secretary.

2 Q. All right. Now going back to my earlier question as far as the

3 relation between the Presidency and the government, how did they interact

4 with one subordinate to the other, could you help us out here a little

5 bit?

6 A. Under the constitution and the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

7 each of those bodies had their own powers and areas which they were in

8 charge. Both of these bodies were bodies of the executive, the

9 Presidency was the head of state and the government ran -- governed

10 states in as far as any elements were concerned in relation to which it

11 was bound to so under the law that applied.

12 Q. As I understand it, the government now had different various

13 ministries one of which was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; is that

14 correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. As I understand it, prior to you becoming prime minister and even

17 thereafter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was Haris Silajdzic; is that

18 correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, if you could briefly explain to us the relationship between

21 the ministry and, say, the prime minister and the president -- president

22 of the Presidency. To whom would the minister be responsible and

23 accountable to?

24 A. The minister was responsible to the government and the prime

25 minister and the president of the Presidency is one of the members of

Page 29331

1 this collective body, the head of state. When invited by the Presidency,

2 his minister can also submit a report however answering any other

3 questions but as a matter of principle it goes through the prime

4 minister.

5 Q. Now, while you were there, not speaking prior to your being the

6 prime minister, could you please explain to the Trial Chamber how often

7 Mr. Silajdzic reported to you on his activity and we're going to talk a

8 little bit approximate it but if you could just tell us briefly about

9 that relationship?

10 A. Mr. Silajdzic, as foreign minister, spends a lot of time abroad.

11 He did not submit any reports to the prime minister or indeed the

12 government or indeed the Presidency. He only spoke to me once. He

13 wanted to talk about his time abroad, and I warned him on that occasion

14 that in the future, he should not travel abroad without obtaining

15 approval previously from the government or indeed without so to speak a

16 platform in terms of what he would be discussing there.

17 On his return to the country, he should inform me first and then

18 we would see together whether this was something for the government or

19 the Presidency to deal with. However, he failed to follow suit. He did

20 not comply with this decision of mine.

21 Q. All right. Well just to make sure that I understand it, because

22 I'm familiar with my system back in the States with the Secretary of

23 State, that's what we call the minister of foreign affairs, normally that

24 position is not a policy position; in other words, the minister would not

25 be designing and executing a particular policy of his or her own but

Page 29332

1 rather it would be the government's or the executive, whatever is the

2 executive authority would be setting the foreign policy with the minister

3 merely executing it or implementing it.

4 In that system of yours, could you please explain to us what was

5 the authority of the foreign minister to be going around having trips,

6 never reporting and God knows doing what during those trips while he was

7 outside the country?

8 A. Foreign minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the time it

9 became an independent state, well, that is the time when actually Bosnia

10 and Herzegovina had started to have foreign minister. Before that, this

11 post was called something else. He is on an equal footing with other

12 members of the government. He is not elected, an elected official, he is

13 appointed at the recommendation of the president by the assembly. And

14 since during the war the assembly could not be in session and he had

15 already been appointed, he was confirmed, he was reappointed by the

16 Presidency at my recommendation and the recommendation of the prime

17 minister. When the foreign minister is abroad in accordance with the law

18 on foreign affairs and in accordance with the discussions held with the

19 prime minister, the president and the platform of the government, he is

20 duty-bound to represent Bosnia and Herzegovina wherever it is that he

21 actually has to represent it.

22 Q. All right. Now, let me just sort of fast-forward all the way to

23 the end of our discussion and then we'll go back and sort of fill in the

24 pieces. From your CV, you were, from February 1991 until the -- until

25 August 1993, a member of -- working with the Presidency and thereafter

Page 29333

1 the prime minister and you would have been a member of the War Presidency

2 at the time. Can you please tell us, summarize for us, during that

3 period and even thereafter to your knowledge how was the Presidency

4 functioning as an institution considering that it did have -- you did

5 have a constitution and you had rules and regulations on how it was

6 supposed to function and the responsibilities and authorities each member

7 including the president of the Presidency.

8 A. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established on the

9 20th of December, 1990 that's when it was constituted. That's when the

10 president of the Presidency was elected, that was done at the first

11 session and the term of office was one year. That's when the rules

12 procedure of the first Presidency were also adopted and in accordance

13 with the rules of procedure, the term of office of the president of the

14 Presidency was one year; but after the expiry of this one year term of

15 office, it could be extended by another year, but that was the maximum

16 extension.

17 The -- there was another criterion that was applied in Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina and that was the following: The post of the president of the

19 Presidency, the president of the assembly and the prime minister of the

20 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina were subject to rotation. In other

21 words, officials from the three constituent peoples were to be appointed

22 to those posts according to a system of rotation. The Presidency of

23 Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 20th of December, 1990, until the 20th of

24 December, 1991, functioned fully within the legislative framework in

25 place in accordance with the constitution and in accordance with the

Page 29334

1 rules of procedure of the Presidency.

2 At the first session, the presidents of -- or chairman of various

3 bodies of the Presidency were also appointed in addition to the president

4 of the Presidency. One of those bodies was in charge of defence issues.

5 It was headed ex officio by the president of the Presidency and the name

6 of this body was the defence council.

7 There was another body for the protection of the constitutional

8 order and a member of the Presidency was in charge of that body. The

9 third key body was the commission, the personnel commission in charge of

10 appointments within Bosnia and Herzegovina to various posts, in

11 particular, within the Presidency itself.

12 So these were the three key bodies. There were two other bodies

13 that were also within the purview of the Presidency such as the body that

14 was -- that dealt with decorations and awards and another one that dealt

15 with complaints, pardons, and there were perhaps some other working

16 bodies that I cannot remember now.

17 Each of those working bodies was headed by a member of the

18 Presidency or somebody else from the Presidency staff but they could also

19 come from other state institutions.

20 Q. All right. Now --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

22 MR. KARNAVAS:

23 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, you indicated that up until one point, it was fully

24 functioning in accordance with the rules of procedure. Did there come a

25 time when it stopped functioning in a proper fashion and if so, to your

Page 29335

1 understanding, what were the reasons?

2 A. Apart from this aspect of the functioning of the Presidency which

3 was fully in accordance with the law, there was another stage in the

4 lifespan of the Presidency that we could describe as the prewar stage

5 because at that time, the Presidency was often in session, in constant

6 session, up until the 20th of December, 1992, and then the war broke out

7 and the Serb members of the Presidency left the Presidency. And then on

8 the 20th of December, 1992, the president of the Presidency,

9 Alija Izetbegovic, did not accept the constitutional provision and the

10 provision of the rules of procedure and refused to hand over his office

11 to another member of the Presidency that would thus become the president

12 and in accordance with the rotation principle, it was to be a Croat.

13 This disrupted the work of the Presidency. Instead of the Serb

14 members of the Presidency who had left the Presidency, now there were

15 other representatives of the Serb people who had not, however, been

16 elected. They had not won the election.

17 Q. Let me stop you here and let's go through the documents and let's

18 see if we can amplify on that.

19 If the usher could give him the documents, the first binder would

20 be fine and I will be referring to 1D 01408. We're going to go rather

21 quickly with some of these documents. This is a decision -- this is in

22 binder 1 for everybody, 1D 01408 it's 10 November 1992, we see a

23 decision, that's to elect you as prime minister; is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Go to the next document, 1D 02873, 2873. That would be in binder

Page 29336

1 3. We've seen this before, Your Honours, with the previous witness but

2 that would be the very next document for you, sir. All your documents

3 are in order so 1D 02873. We see here this is dated 2 August 1993, I'm

4 fast forwarding and this is a letter which apparently you signed where

5 you indicated that you and other members, Franjo Boras and Mr. Lasic

6 were -- had decided not to take part in the work on the Presidency until

7 the offensive operation of the Muslim army against the Croat population

8 stopped. Do you recall that?

9 A. I remember this document. I signed it together with

10 Mr. Franjo Boras and with Mr. Miro Lasic who were members of the

11 Presidency and at that time, I was not a member of the Presidency. That

12 was the 2nd of August, 1993, I was an official of the Presidency.

13 Q. All right. You were the prime minister at the time, were you

14 not?

15 A. Yes, I was. I was the prime minister and a member of the

16 Presidency in my capacity as the prime minister ex officio, in other

17 words.

18 Q. Right. And that's because there was a War Presidency at the

19 time; is that correct?

20 A. Yes. At that time, and I failed to mention that in my previous

21 answers, there was this War Presidency which increased by three more

22 members the president of the government or the prime minister, the

23 speaker of the assembly, and the commander of the Territorial Defence of

24 Bosnia and Herzegovina which existed at that time so ex officio as the

25 prime minister, I became a member of the War Presidency.

Page 29337

1 Q. Now, this letter, we don't need to spend too much time on it, but

2 were you resigning with this letter?

3 A. No. This letter was not tantamount to resignation, but it was a

4 warning to the Presidency that it should act in accordance with the law

5 pass decisions in accordance with the law and that as the supreme

6 commander of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina it should take

7 measures to put a stop to the fighting. In this case, it was the Croat

8 people that was being attacked.

9 Q. All right. And then if we look at the next document, which is 1D

10 02673, we see that -- and this is dated -- 2673, this is in binder 3,

11 Your Honours. This is dated 27 August 1993, and we see that the

12 president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, is relieving you of your

13 duties; is that correct?

14 A. Yes, I was relieved from my duty as the prime minister and

15 automatically I was no longer a member of the Presidency and the

16 explanation as given here was because of the withdrawal of the Croatian

17 Democratic Union members from the state organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina

18 but in accordance with the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

19 president can be replaced in two ways. The first way is for him to

20 resign and the other one is for him to be held responsible for something

21 and then the appropriate procedure must be followed and proceedings must

22 be instituted.

23 Q. To your understanding, were appropriate proceedings followed in

24 this case?

25 A. No. This was done in contravention of the law and the rules that

Page 29338

1 applied in the Presidency and in the state as a whole.

2 Q. Before we go any further, could you explain to us your

3 relationship with Mr. Izetbegovic?

4 A. I welcomed Mr. Izetbegovic to the Presidency after the 1990

5 elections. I acquainted him with the situation in the Presidency and

6 with the manner in which the previous Presidency functioned.

7 Mr. Izetbegovic heard me and we had -- we were on good terms. We were

8 friends for a good portion of the time that we spent working together.

9 The president of the Presidency, Mr. Izetbegovic, after the war broke

10 out, embarked on something that we could call a parallel policy. He

11 would sometimes make decisions with the core of his associates who were

12 not actually members of the Presidency. I disagreed with this practice

13 and so did many others.

14 Q. Okay. Thank you. If we could look at now document 2D 00191, 2D

15 00191. This would be in binder 4, Your Honours. Again, I apologise for

16 not putting them in the order for everyone but ...

17 This is the very next document for you, sir, the very next

18 document. Just --

19 A. Mm-hm. Mm-hm.

20 Q. You can't go wrong.

21 Now, this is from the Balkan Odyssey by David Owen, and I'm going

22 to read an excerpt from it from page 52 and I want you to comment on it.

23 It's towards the middle of the page, Your Honours, and it says, and this

24 is what Lord Owen writes:

25 "When the Croat Mile Akmadzic was appointed as prime minister of

Page 29339

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, he made a real effort to revive the collective

2 leadership of the Presidency. He went back to live in Sarajevo and used

3 his previous experience as pre-war secretary to the Presidency to try to

4 restore the authority of the Muslim-Croat coalition that had won the

5 referendum on independence which the Serbs boycotted. But by the end of

6 1992, it was becoming clear to all that he would fail and that power had

7 gone to a small group of Muslim ministers appointed by

8 President Izetbegovic and their nominee as vice-president, Ejup Ganic.

9 The collective Presidency as a democratic body with meaningful

10 representation from the three constituent nations was by the autumn of

11 1993 no longer a reality. The real decisions were made elsewhere. We

12 were in effect dealing with a Muslim government for a predominantly

13 Muslim population."

14 That's what Lord Owen wrote in his book concerning his experience

15 in dealing with the negotiations at the time. Would you agree with

16 Lord Owen?

17 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, just for the record I want to

18 make an objection to this form of questioning. This is nothing more than

19 a leading questioning disguised as reading the statement of someone who's

20 not in the courtroom. This exact same evidence could have been elicited

21 from the witness by non-leading questions: What were you doing at the

22 time? How did you find the functioning of the president? What were you

23 doing? Did you try to -- in a non-leading way, what you were you doing

24 to revive the work of the president, et cetera, et cetera. All of this

25 could have been properly elicited by non-leading questions which is the

Page 29340

1 proper method of proceeding on direct examination. Putting this text to

2 him and asking him whether he agrees with it is nothing more than a

3 rather somewhat clever way of asking a leading question. And the

4 Prosecution objects to it.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Two points. One this is the exact technique that

6 Mr. Stringer uses. In fact, I was rather amazed that he was able to get

7 away with it so I'm trying it; and I kind of like it.

8 Secondly, I did ask the predicate, if you go back to my previous

9 question, you had the witness, Mr. Akmadzic, recount how there was a

10 parallel or two-track approach, and he talked about Izetbegovic making

11 decisions with his close associates some of whom were not there. So in

12 the sense, the gentleman has already provided from his own experience the

13 answer.

14 Now we have Lord Owen validating it. I see nothing wrong with

15 that, and I don't think that I should be prevented from even asking

16 further questions concerning what Lord Owen has written about. So that

17 would be my response to the Prosecution on that one, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a moment, please. You

19 both are right. But if you want to be efficient, what happens? In

20 answer to a non-leading question, the witness said that he had been

21 removed from his position as prime minister. He explained the reasons

22 why that happened. Lord Owen wrote a book and confirms what has been

23 said.

24 Mr. Karnavas could have said, well, let me submit this document

25 to you towards the middle of the page, there is a passage, could you read

Page 29341

1 it and tell me whether it corresponds or not to what you said earlier and

2 he would have said that's exactly what I said.

3 So objections based on common law principles, why not but if you

4 want to be efficient, it is better to go to the bottom of the matter.

5 Mr. Stringer is not here today. He used the same technique once. Very

6 well.

7 Mr. Scott, you may say whatever you want but Lord Owen's book

8 seems to confirm what the witness said. If you want the Defence to spend

9 hours asking the witness whether he heard about Lord Owen, he would have

10 said yes. Do you know whether he wrote a book or not? The result would

11 be the same anyway.

12 Mr. Scott.

13 MR. SCOTT: Just to clarify, to the extent that Mr. -- I wasn't

14 necessarily in the courtroom and haven't been in the courtroom of course

15 at all times when Mr. Stringer has examined witnesses but my

16 understanding is that the -- any reference to Mr. Stringer using such a

17 method that was done during cross-examination and leading questions or

18 proper on what is bona fide as opposed to artificial cross-examination,

19 number one. It's a dramatically different rule in procedure and practice

20 as Mr. Karnavas knows under the common law system.

21 Secondly, Your Honour, with great respect to the time pressures

22 of this institution, not everything can be governed by efficiency. We

23 would have no other rules. There are rules that have to be followed,

24 yes, it would be proper -- it would be more efficient to put leading

25 questions to every witness; as a matter of fact, it would be more

Page 29342

1 efficient to do away with the witnesses and just let the lawyers talk,

2 but that's not our system. There are rules to be followed and we cannot

3 constantly appeal what's more efficient. Because if it's more efficient,

4 let's do away with everything, we don't need witnesses, we'll bring

5 books, we'll take turns reading from Lord Owen's book and we'll read that

6 and we don't need -- that's the most efficient of all so with great

7 respect to Mr. Karnavas, and to the Chamber, a constant appeals to

8 efficiency do not answer the questions of principle and the rule of law

9 in this institution or elsewhere and my objection stands, and we could

10 have proceeded a way that this could have been elicited by non-leading.

11 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honours, the Petkovic Defence would

12 wish to support Mr. Karnavas on this matter and we clearly have, although

13 this is clearly Mr. Karnavas's witness, we clearly have a direct vested

14 interest because such ground rules and practices are going to be

15 established in the course of Mr. Karnavas's case are likely to apply by

16 the same token throughout the Defence case. What we note is that

17 although Mr. Karnavas picked Mr. Stringer's examination as the example

18 today and studiously avoided any issue between himself and Mr. Scott

19 which we welcome and applaud, in fact, the technique was adopted

20 consistently throughout the Prosecution case because I recall, and I

21 wasn't even here at the very beginning of the trial; but I recall

22 numerous occasions particularly when a United Nations document and other

23 documents of that nature were put to witnesses and the witness was asked

24 after having quite a long passage put to him, is that consistent with

25 your recollection? Fundamentally that is absolutely no different at all

Page 29343

1 whether it's a passage from a book and so on and there was some objection

2 at times we did think it was carried to extremes but that technique was

3 adopted consistently throughout and what sauce for the goose is sauce or

4 all the ganders on this side of the court, Your Honours, and Mr. Karnavas

5 should be allowed to put questions in precisely that form.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm going to ask my colleagues

7 what they think of it.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber has

10 deliberated and states that at this stage of the examination in chief,

11 the counsel, based on documents or books is allowed to show references to

12 a witness by referring to the document and ask questions based on that.

13 Of course as to the probative value, the Trial Chamber will assess it in

14 the light of the types of questions raised.

15 Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. If we go on to the next

17 document -- I apologise.

18 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, you didn't answer. You owe us an answer, a

19 complete one.

20 A. First of all, affirmative. What Lord Owen said, this was true

21 although this was a compliment that he paid me, I would like to provide

22 another explanation. Lord Owen got this impression based on the

23 negotiations that we had at the international peace conference of the

24 former Yugoslavia, but he was not a member of the Presidency and he

25 doesn't quite know what went on inside the Presidency but it's precisely

Page 29344

1 what Lord Owen said.

2 Mr. Izetbegovic specifically at this time in 1993 once his term

3 had expired and he stopped being president of the Presidency in a legal

4 sense, also under the rules of procedure, he in some way assumed the

5 function of head of state. He took decisions independently or within a

6 very small circle of people. He acted very much like this at the

7 international level and during international negotiations.

8 Q. If we go on to the next document, and it's 1D 00942. This would

9 be in binder 1, Your Honours. You will see that this is a platform for

10 the activities of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and this, if

11 we look at page 2, it says, it's 26 June 1992. Do you recognise this

12 document, sir?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, this says this is the document -- this is the platform for

15 the activities. And for those of us who don't understand or don't know

16 what a platform is, can you please tell us, what was this supposed to be?

17 A. This document was supposed to show and to specify how

18 negotiations should be held internationally, how Bosnia and Herzegovina's

19 interests should be promoted. And also, how the Presidency should be

20 informed about this and how decisions should be taken of the Presidency

21 of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an institution and so is the country itself.

22 It represents all of its peoples, three constituent ones, specifically.

23 One of the representatives represented the remaining population that

24 didn't fall under the one those three ethnic groups. We called them

25 minorities, ethnic minorities or maybe those who refused to declare their

Page 29345

1 nationality.

2 All those who went to negotiate on behalf of the Presidency had

3 to operate in keeping with the constitution and the Presidency's

4 platform.

5 Q. Now, if we look at under number one: What kind of Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina? And if we look at the second part of this paragraph, I'll

7 read it, it says:

8 "The internal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a

9 multi-national and multi-religious community, is based on regional and

10 local self-rule which recognises economic, cultural, historical, and

11 ethnic criteria. Local and regional self-rule cannot be in opposition to

12 the principles of territorial integrity and the unform functioning of

13 government in the whole of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

14 My question to you, sir, is: To your understanding what is this

15 platform, this part of the platform, what is it talking about? How can

16 we interpret this or understand this, I should say?

17 A. There are two ways of looking at this, if you ask me. The first

18 is the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the head of state is

19 operating as a collective head of state and performs the function of the

20 head of state and it also applies to other central bodies of the state.

21 However, there is one thing that we mustn't forget, that is the interests

22 declared here in terms of local self-government and government

23 specifically in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

24 Q. All right. Now, let's go on to the next document.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a follow-up question so

Page 29346

1 that we don't have to go back to this document later on.

2 Witness, I was going to call you Mr. Prime Minister on account of

3 your previous position. It appears from the platform that there's a very

4 clear reference to local institutions, to local and regional self-rule.

5 From what I can read, it seems that local and regional self-rule would be

6 competent for economic, cultural, and ethnical criteria. This is a

7 document that was created on the 26th of June, 1992 at the Presidency of

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina. When reading it, as far as you can see, don't

9 you think that it shows that some kind of regional self-rule is

10 acknowledged?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Bosnia and Herzegovina, at various

12 stages of its existence, had different kinds of local self-government.

13 The smallest unit was the local commune. A rung up the latter from that

14 was the municipality. Municipalities could join forces in order to form

15 associations of municipalities. This was based on a number of criteria

16 and some of them are noted here. However, what we did not find noted

17 here were communication criteria, geographic criteria and other criteria

18 as well.

19 Municipalities grouped together like that would normally be

20 called an association municipalities.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You seem to say that in

22 history, there had been associations of municipalities already. Do you

23 have a specific historic reference to that?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm talking about back in the

25 socialist times and then after then; however, back in socialism, these

Page 29347

1 were called districts, counties.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] My last question: When

3 municipalities met in Grude, it may be that the defence teams will go

4 back to this question, but when they met in Grude, in order to create the

5 Croatian Council which is later to become the Croatian Republic of

6 Herceg-Bosna, is this the framework in which municipalities were going to

7 gather and create a structure of the type that we have with the Croatian

8 community?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think so. I'm not 100 per cent

10 certain, but I think what you're asking me about, Mr. President, is in

11 reference to the war, the community that was established during the war.

12 This decision invokes the provisions specified here. Nonetheless, its

13 primary purpose, if my understanding is correct, was not just linking up

14 but also creating the right conditions to defend Bosnia and Herzegovina,

15 its sovereignty.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

17 Please proceed, Mr. Karnavas.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

19 Q. Now, if we go to the next document, P 00743, that's in binder 4,

20 Your Honour, P 00743, that's the next document, we see this is dated 14

21 December 1992, these are minutes from the HDZ 2nd General Convention and

22 you already told us that it was at 14 December when you were elected one

23 of the vice-presidents and we can see that in this document. If you look

24 on page 6, Your Honours, the pages are on the bottom right-hand corner we

25 see your name.

Page 29348

1 More importantly, I just wish to point out to the Court's

2 attention, perhaps you can comment that at this particular gathering, you

3 spoke and at least we have some minutes, this would be on page 5, Your

4 Honours, under number 13, we see your name, Mile Akmadzic, BiH prime

5 minister is proud to be is part of the Croatian nation, it says

6 "naciona," and then it says, "He asks for support to BiH government from

7 HDZ."

8 Sir, did they accurately recount what you had indicated that you

9 were asking HDZ to support the BiH government? And this is back in 14

10 December 1992? Was that your attitude at the time?

11 A. At the time or just before I had been appointed prime minister, I

12 sought the support of the Croatian democratic community of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina for the government for the Presidency for the functioning of

14 the state institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina but the HDZ was one of

15 the three winning parties in the elections along with the SDA and the

16 SDS.

17 As a member that party, as a member of that ethnic group, I meant

18 to seek their support for the functioning of a government that I then

19 left.

20 Q. All right. Now, if we go to the next document and that's 1D

21 02892 that's the very next document in the binder that's in binder 3,

22 Your Honours. 1D 02892, if you could look at it, sir, it's dated 28

23 January 1993. If we look at the second page, we see your name as the

24 president of the government, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25 I wish to direct everyone's attention to the very last paragraph

Page 29349

1 of this document on page 1 and you state here, this is an address that

2 you made to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, this is a letter.

3 Now, do you recall sending this letter, sir?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. All right. Now, in this letter, you say at the last paragraph on

6 the first page, "On the other hand, the representatives of the Muslim

7 people in BH do not yet have a understandable policy and insist on a

8 unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina that is impossible."

9 What do you mean by that, "a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina"?

10 A. When I was appointed prime minister, the government platform said

11 that Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be decentralised state, only as such

12 could it go on existing, only as such could Bosnia and Herzegovina be

13 possible. Any other kind of Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to be

14 based on a unitary organisation if its constituent peoples did not get

15 the respect they deserved, the country itself would have been impossible

16 to preserve. Something had to be done to keep this from happening. I

17 sent this letter to the Islamic conference, the secretary general in

18 person. I knew that Mr. Izetbegovic enjoyed a great deal of respect in

19 those circles, and that was why I sought their support.

20 Q. Okay. But when you say unitary organisation, just so we

21 understand, if you could just answer my question: What did you mean by

22 that? What's a "unitary organisation"?

23 A. Unitary means without extensive local self-government, without

24 state-run principles that we talked about then within the Vance-Owen Plan

25 and other plans on how Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organised. I'm

Page 29350

1 talking about a regional approach where there would be regions, provinces

2 or whatever we choose to call them and those would be established and

3 based on all the criteria that were being negotiated.

4 Q. All right. And in fact, if we go to page 2, in the middle of the

5 third line you say, "The Croatian people seek an independent BH

6 consisting of a number of provinces with a high degree democracy,

7 equality for all three peoples ..." that's what you're just telling us;

8 is that correct?

9 A. Absolutely. Absolutely. This is the position that we advocated

10 and this never changed throughout the war or throughout all the rounds of

11 international negotiations.

12 Q. And we see later on in the third paragraph in the middle of it,

13 you say:

14 "In the same sense, we ask you to positively influence the Muslim

15 leadership in BH to cooperate closer with the leadership of the Croatian

16 people in BH and with the Republic of Croatia which is our common dear

17 ally and is threatened by the same aggressor."

18 A. Yes, this was a time of war. We Croats did not walk out in the

19 Presidency, two Serb members of the Presidency as I said who had been

20 legally appointed did walk out. The Croat members of the Presidency and

21 me as the prime minister and a member of the War Presidency remained in

22 our positions. We were adamant that there should be international

23 recognition for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that would reflect

24 interests of all of its three peoples not just the Muslim and the Serb

25 peoples but the Croat peoples but also the Serbs regardless of the fact

Page 29351

1 that this was an act of aggression. We asked the Islamic conference the

2 following intervention by Mr. Izetbegovic to accept these negotiations

3 and to accept any agreement reached.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, this Islamic

5 conference, did it send you a reply to that letter of January 1993? Did

6 you receive an answer or not?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I never got a response.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Another question, Witness. We have seen the

9 platform of the War Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina a short while

10 ago, and I wonder whether you could elaborate a bit on the relationship

11 between what you say here about the Muslim intentions and what is said in

12 the war platform which clearly does refer to self-government?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Self-government was defined quite

14 vaguely in the platform. We adopted the platform, nonetheless; however,

15 if you look at this document you have international negotiations and the

16 situation which dictated that we be as specific as possible, we had to be

17 specific about our desires. All of our three peoples wanted to be

18 specific about what sort a country we wanted and though international

19 negotiations at the time, we reached a conclusion at least we Croats did

20 and I don't think any of the other groups were far from our conclusions

21 that the best way to organise Bosnia and Herzegovina would be in terms of

22 provinces or on the basis of provinces. As soon as the 4th January 1993

23 we had signed all the constitutional principles for organising Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina. There were nine such principles. One of those principles

25 were the provinces and now we were adamant, and we explicitly sought that

Page 29352

1 the principles that were signed and accepted by all the three peoples,

2 the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims that those principles now be

3 implemented in the way that --

4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last part of

5 the witness's answer.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: You may need to repeat the last part your answer,

7 sir. You need to slow down a little bit.

8 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes, if I may say the same request, which was

9 the last line mentioned by Mr. Karnavas that -- that I would like to ask

10 the witness to slow down and really to save the interpreters in a way

11 that they should follow you and be so kind to make pauses between your

12 answers and the -- I believe that it would be very useful. Thank you.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My apologies.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: May I continue? Okay.

15 Q. Now, the next document I just put in here just to highlight some

16 of the problems that might have come your way. This is 1D 02859, 1D

17 02859, this is a letter that is addressed to you. This is in binder 3,

18 Your Honours.

19 You may -- I'm told that there's a possibility that you may not

20 have it, 2589. If that's the case, I will skip it and go on to the next.

21 You don't have it? We do have copies, I'm told. Perhaps -- make

22 sure that the Prosecution has one too. Okay. Do you have the document,

23 1D 02859, sir?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. We see that it's addressed to you, sir. If we look at the third

Page 29353

1 page, we see that it's by a Dr. Josip Goluza. Did you know this

2 gentleman?

3 A. [No interpretation]

4 Q. I'm not getting an interpretation.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, if you look at -- who was this individual?

7 A. This individual was an assistant minister. He was in charge of

8 economic relations. He was also in charge of the functioning of pressure

9 groups.

10 Q. Okay. Now if we look at number 2, I'm just going to highlight a

11 couple of points. Now as I understand, it's translated that he was in

12 charge of the functioning of pressure groups. That's what has been

13 translated. Is that what you meant "pressure groups" or are you speaking

14 of logistic centres?

15 A. Logistics centres.

16 Q. Now, if you just relax, sir, I will point you to the document.

17 Just relax a little bit. If you look at paragraph 2, it says:

18 "Humanitarian aid arriving from abroad from various donors is

19 under no control. Logistic centres which are currently in the process of

20 establishment, should restore order especially in the control of and

21 distribution of humanitarian aid."

22 If we go to paragraph 3, it says:

23 "Donors of humanitarian aid both in the country and abroad are

24 known in most cases, however, donations of financial assistance are

25 unknown. The government has opened 12 accounts around Europe to which

Page 29354

1 financial means should be paid. I claim with full responsibility that

2 these funds are not on those accounts, except for $440.000 US dollars

3 sent to the office of the government of the republic of BiH in Zagreb by

4 selling goods ..." and it goes on.

5 Sir, I guess my question is were you aware of these problems and

6 why do we have these problems and perhaps you could tell us when -- when

7 was this sent to you or to your office?

8 A. This was actually handed over to me when I travelled to Zagreb

9 once. I submitted this to the government because I had been involved in

10 negotiations all the time for this to be decided. This is a result of

11 work that was parallel with the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12 Logistics centres were opened, aid continued to arrive. This wasn't

13 fully state-controlled.

14 Q. I'm just going to stop you. Why was there such chaos when you

15 look at this document, it's very clear that money is disappearing, goods

16 are not being controlled. Who is at fault? Why are these problems

17 occurring? And this is while you're the prime minister of the

18 government.

19 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I wanted to give

20 Mr. Karnavas a fair chance to ask follow-up questions so I stayed in my

21 seat, but I would still like to get the answer to the question of

22 approximate date or time because again the Chamber knows it makes a

23 dramatic deference as to when we are talking about. I do note that in

24 paragraph 3 of the letter, it makes reference to the president of the

25 government at that time being Mr. Pelivan and I believe that Mr. Pelivan

Page 29355

1 stopped being the prime minister or president of the government sometime

2 in October 1992. If that assists the witness or the Chamber but perhaps

3 Mr. Karnavas could ask additional questions on the time of this or date

4 of this letter. Thank you.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: It hadn't escaped me.

6 Q. You were prime minister, as you indicated, from November 10th,

7 1992 to approximately the end of August 1993. Do you know about when

8 this was sent to your office?

9 A. This letter was sent to my office early 1993. I was prime

10 minister and there was this one report that I think is about the period

11 of Mr. Jure Pelivan.

12 Q. All right. We'll go on to the next document, 1D 02869. That's

13 in binder 3, Your Honours. 1D 02869. That's the very next document.

14 It's dated 17 July 1993, we're moving forward but staying with you, this

15 is a letter or a statement and a meeting of prime ministers of the

16 Central European Initiative in Budapest on 17 July 1993. Do you

17 recognise this document, sir?

18 A. Yes, this is my document.

19 Q. Okay. And what was the event, very briefly?

20 A. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a member of the Central European

21 Initiative, it's a group of about ten countries from central Europe and

22 the Balkans for the most part. They were holding a meeting with prime

23 ministers and foreign ministers involved. This was at Budapest around

24 this time, the 17th of July, 1993.

25 Q. All right. Now, if you go to page 3, we look at the first -- the

Page 29356

1 paragraph in the middle of the page. Towards the latter part of that

2 paragraph, you state:

3 "It is possible for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a decentralised

4 state made up of several constituent units with a free flow of people,

5 goods and capital over its entire territory."

6 Was that your position then as you were stating it?

7 A. That was precisely my position and that's the position that I

8 presented at the Central European Initiative. I sought their support and

9 I received their support in principle. Other prime ministers presented

10 such views. This meeting was attended by Mr. Silajdzic too, the foreign

11 minister. He, himself, agreed with this view.

12 Q. All right. Now, as I understand it, you participated in several

13 of the peace initiatives; is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Of all the peace initiatives that you were involved in and you

16 were aware of, which of the ones -- which of all of them did you find

17 most acceptable for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18 A. Since I was on good terms with Mr. Izetbegovic, regardless of the

19 fact that I opposed his term of office as the president after the 20th of

20 December, 1992, I told him and that was the position that I presented in

21 various international forums that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state of

22 three constituent peoples with equal status, a state that is not Serbian,

23 not Croat, not Muslim, but a state that belongs to all those ethnic

24 communities, it was a Serb, Muslim and Croat state, could continue to

25 exist as a decentralised state and that the best kind of system for it

Page 29357

1 was the system that was reached at the Geneva negotiations held under the

2 auspices of the International Conference For the Former Yugoslavia.

3 The co-chairmen of the steering committee were Cyrus Vance as a

4 representative of the United Nations and Lord Owen as a representatives

5 of the European Union or community.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. We'll take a break, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have the break now and

8 resume at ten past 4.00.

9 --- Recess taken at 3.48 p.m.

10 --- On resuming at 4.14 p.m.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you may proceed.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 Q. Sir, if we could go on to the next document, 1D 02884. That

14 would be in binder number 3, Your Honours. Do you have it, sir?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And it's dated July 20th, 1993. You can see that on the second

17 page, there is a stamp and your name and the signature. Is that your

18 signature, sir?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And apparently this seems to be a letter to the editor where you

21 are explaining that -- that you felt compelled, I guess, to explain

22 certain issues that were being reported at the time. Do you stand behind

23 what you indicated in this particular letter, sir?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. All right. Now, on page 2, very quickly, I don't have time to go

Page 29358

1 through the entire letter, but on page 2 at the second to last paragraph,

2 penultimate, I guess if you want to use the farcy word, "Bosnian

3 government opposes sanctions against Croatia, sanctions on Croatia would

4 be a deathnell for Bosnia."

5 Now, you say Bosnian government opposes sanctions against

6 Croatia." Can you explain that, sir, because at the time, you were the

7 prime minister as I understand it?

8 A. Yes, I was the prime minister. Sanctions would not have been

9 good for Bosnia and Herzegovina since Bosnia and Herzegovina shares about

10 two-fourths of its borders with Croatia and regardless of their

11 conflicts, its political and economic and human ties with Croatia were

12 very strong. To impose sanctions on Croatia would in fact reflect on

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina too. It would have repercussions, it would be

14 tantamount to imposing sanctions on Bosnia and Herzegovina and that was

15 not in its interest, definitely.

16 Q. All right. Now, just let me touch on another issue. We've heard

17 testimony here and we've seen documents --

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have the document here on

19 the screen. On page 2, first paragraph, this is what you seem to say,

20 sir, you claim that the incidents or the clashes that oppose the two

21 armies seem to be the result of the international community's implicit

22 support for Serb genocide against Bosnian Muslims. Could you tell us

23 what you meant by that? By reading that sentence, I'm under the

24 impression that the state of war in your country would be due to the

25 Serbs who were committing a genocide against the Muslims. Am I right in

Page 29359

1 saying that or is your interpretation different from what I just said?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At any rate, the war in my country

3 was the result of an aggression by Serbia and the army of Yugoslavia,

4 Yugoslav people's army and of Montenegro on Bosnia Herzegovina. The

5 Presidency --

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When you mention clashes

7 between the two armies, do you mean the HVO and the BiH army?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, in this case I'm talking about

9 the HVO and the BH army but this conflict was the result of the

10 aggression that I mentioned and even before this conflict, the thing that

11 we discussed at the Presidency and the government actually came about,

12 the aggression in particular in eastern Bosnia where there was no HVO for

13 all intents and purposes.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

15 JUDGE PRANDLER: Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas, I would like to have a

16 follow-up question. The witness just mentioned that -- and I quote from

17 the very last paragraph there:

18 "We discussed at the Presidency and the government and actually

19 came about that the aggression in particular in eastern Bosnia where

20 there was no HVO ..." et cetera.

21 Now my question is the following very briefly, that this July

22 20th letter which you sent to the New York Times, was it in a way agreed

23 upon by the War Presidency and did you discuss this kind of statements of

24 political nature, of course, very important to us with the Presidency or

25 with President Izetbegovic? So it is my question if you have held a

Page 29360

1 position formulated in a way jointly with the War Presidency. Thank you.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Presidency of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina in its full composition defined the war in Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina.

5 The war was defined as follows: The war in Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina is the result of an aggression on the part of what was

7 Serbian Montenegro at that time or rather that was the federal republic

8 of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav People's Army which still existed or rather

9 at the beginning it still existed at this time it did not exist anymore

10 and the internal paramilitary forces organized by the Serbian Democratic

11 Party and by the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This aggression

12 was aimed at Bosnia and Herzegovina and there were cases of genocide in

13 eastern Bosnia, that's what we were saying at the time and there was

14 aggression throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This

15 aggression indirectly led to the conflict between the Croatian Defence

16 Council and the BH army because the areas that Croats and Muslims were

17 left with were reduced, in particular, in Central Bosnia and in

18 Herzegovina where the Muslim people started to move from Jajce towards

19 Central Bosnia and towards southern Herzegovina, the Neretva River area.

20 Given this imbalance in the ethnic composition, the shifts in the

21 ethnic composition first we saw those sporadic clashes which then

22 escalated into large-scale conflict but we never used the term "war" to

23 describe them.

24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I have two technical questions. The first one

25 refers to the fact that this is a government document where normally one

Page 29361

1 takes all the pains to write them properly. And it appears to me that

2 the date on top of the letter has been amended, that it was typed "1992"

3 and someone then by hand changed the 2 to a 3.

4 Now, can you comment on this?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was just a typo. I made this

6 correction by hand because on the 20th of July, 1992 I was not the prime

7 minister at all.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You were not the prime minister but you signed

9 as -- or you used at least the letterhead -- the letterhead of the prime

10 minister and made the letter appear as the letter of the prime minister?

11 MR. KARNAVAS: No, Your Honour, he indicated that he corrected it

12 to 1993 --

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Because on July 20, 1992 he was not -- yes.

14 That is -- yeah.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: If you look at the second page, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I see.

17 MR. KARNAVAS: And then there is a letter attached to it that

18 says July 20, 1993 by Mr. V. Miles Ragus as well.

19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I just wanted to make it clear. The second

20 question is was this letter printed? Did it appear in the New York

21 Times?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, we didn't receive

23 New York Times on a regular basis, so I can't really tell you that. I

24 hope it was published but I cannot confirm that.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: And later on, you never tried to find out? I

Page 29362

1 mean you must have had personnel and there are search machines, at least

2 later on. I can imagine that you had other business to worry about. I'm

3 just curious.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, in late August 1993,

5 I was removed from office. The Muslim element in the Bosnian authorities

6 took over control of everything. I found it difficult to obtain my own

7 personnel file.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Okay. Thank you.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] While we're still talking about

10 this document, on the 23rd of July, the diplomat who is a member of your

11 permanent mission in New York addresses your letter to the New York

12 Times. Since your letter was not directly sent to the New York Times, it

13 first went via your embassy. If it went via your embassy, your embassy

14 mentions that you're one of the Croatian members of the Presidency which

15 means that it is your country that is involved, not only you as a Croat

16 because the representation of your country officially sends this letter

17 to the New York Times. Am I right in saying that? Am I right in drawing

18 that conclusion?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You are indeed right, Your Honour.

20 The permanent mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina in New York had its

21 permanent representative or ambassador who was a Muslim, Mr. Sacirbey.

22 There was some other personnel too, people who worked in the embassy

23 including Mr. Miles Raguz. He was an American born in Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina and he escorted me at all times while I was in New York. And

25 I asked him to forward this letter on my behalf and that's what he did.

Page 29363

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. Perhaps we'll get back to some of the

3 content on that letter later on but let's move on to the next document,

4 1D 02906, 2906, this is the very next document.

5 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Mr. President, I was again waiting to see

6 if there would be further questions on the document. Before we pass on

7 to the next document, I only observe for Judge Prandler's benefit and

8 Judge Prandler can decide, of course, for himself whether he wants to

9 persist in his question but there was no answer to the question about

10 whether the letter was produced jointly with other members of the

11 Presidency. I can certainly come back to it in cross-examination but

12 Judge Prandler, I don't believe you received an answer.

13 JUDGE PRANDLER: Actually, I confirmed the situation but since my

14 question was followed by my fellow Judge's questions, I didn't wish to

15 have something, a kind of follow-up on my question itself, but that is

16 indeed an important issue if the War Presidency knew about the letter

17 itself and it is not only about this letter frankly, but my question is

18 in general, if there was a kind of day-to-day coordination and

19 cooperation between the War Presidency and of course the prime minister's

20 office, that is the witness's office involved on those questions of

21 importance.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately not. There was no

23 daily coordination. It was very difficult to live in Sarajevo. That was

24 the first problem. There was another problem. I, and some other

25 Presidency members, were constantly involved in peace talks about Bosnia

Page 29364

1 and Herzegovina. We travelled to Zagreb, to Geneva, to Brussels, to New

2 York, to Washington, and to all other major centres where various talks

3 were being held. So it was impossible to have this kind of

4 communication. That is why we, the Croats, proposed that the Presidency,

5 in accordance with the regulation in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

6 should leave Sarajevo and move to a place where it could work despite the

7 war and there was a proposal for it to move to Livno because there were

8 secure premises there that existed from the time of the Yugoslav People's

9 Army. Mr. Izetbegovic rejected this proposal and he rejected the

10 proposal to have a corridor linking Sarajevo with the rest of the world

11 or the rest of the state although Sarajevo was completely besieged, it

12 was under siege.

13 We travelled to the airport in armoured personnel carriers, UN

14 vehicles, and then we would leave on humanitarian relief flights. My

15 deputy, Hakija Turajlic a Muslim, was killed en route from the airport to

16 Sarajevo having seen off the foreign minister, the Turkish foreign

17 minister. He was killed in the armoured vehicle.

18 Your Honours, for the better part of the war, we in Sarajevo did

19 not have any electricity. We didn't have water. We didn't have any food

20 or heating. We couldn't leave our homes. And in general, the living

21 conditions were harsh. People would bury their children in front of

22 their own houses.

23 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you. Continue, Mr. Karnavas.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. I have another follow-up question on

25 that but first just because you did mention this individual, your

Page 29365

1 deputy --

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment.

3 Witness, you are very upset. Would you like us to have a short

4 break?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it's not necessary. I think we

6 can move on.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

8 MR. KARNAVAS:

9 Q. Just to -- and I hate to go back to this issue about your deputy

10 because you indicated that he was killed in the armoured vehicle. This

11 was Hakija Turajlic. He was actually pulled out of the vehicle even

12 though he was under UN protection, the UN in a sense allowed the

13 gentleman to be killed. They didn't protect him as they should have,

14 isn't that a fact?

15 A. He was killed in front of the UN, that was UNPROFOR, an armed

16 force. They were forced to open the vehicle, and I think that he was

17 killed inside the vehicle but as they looked on. I was not in Sarajevo

18 at the time. He stood in for me. Had I been in Sarajevo, perhaps I

19 would have been the one to see off the Turkish foreign minister.

20 Q. Who was it, to your knowledge, that killed the gentleman?

21 A. I never did find out. It was at the checkpoint located between

22 the airport and the city of Sarajevo. It was manned by the Serb army,

23 and that's where he was killed.

24 Q. All right. Now, going back to His Honour's question and because

25 this is a rather important point, were you, being a member of the War

Page 29366

1 Presidency, also being the prime minister at the time, were you required

2 to get permission from the Presidency itself in order to submit letters

3 such as you did to the editor of the New York Times?

4 A. No, you have to look at this letter as an interview, and I did

5 not require the permission of the Presidency for an interview because as

6 the prime minister, I indeed did not require such a permission. I

7 couldn't give an interview to the New York Times and that's why I sent

8 this letter to them.

9 Q. All right. Let me stop you again. Mr. Izetbegovic who was the

10 president of the Presidency, do you know whether he held meetings, made

11 statements, wrote articles or letters, in the same way; in other words,

12 without getting permission of the Presidency itself?

13 A. Yes, he communicated with the public in political sense and also

14 in public relations sense. So this should be construed as a PR exercise,

15 this was not a political statement before the United Nations where you

16 would have to get the positions of the others, this was my personal view

17 and Mr. Izetbegovic himself at major international meetings presented his

18 own views as the head of state. He did not speak as the president of the

19 Presidency and in fact his term of office as the president of the

20 Presidency had already expired at that time.

21 Q. All right. Now, very quickly, I just want to address the next

22 three documents. 1D 02906. This is in binder 3, Your Honours. That's

23 the very next document. This is a -- it's titled "Ministry of inter-

24 republic cooperation and international relations." And if we look at the

25 second page, it says Mostar, November 18, 1993. Sir, do you recognise

Page 29367

1 this document?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. All right. And just in covering your background we spoke at some

4 point that you were a member of the government of the Croatian Republic

5 of Herceg-Bosna. As I understand it, and we'll see a document coming up

6 with it, you at one point were appointed as minister for interrelations;

7 is that correct? Interrelations cooperation and international relations?

8 A. Yes, that's right.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, you have misspoken but they have

10 taken you verbally. You are speaking of interrelations cooperation and

11 it should be interregional, I think.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: Inter-republic, inter-republic cooperation, yes.

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You have it on line 13 and -- well then I

14 have --

15 MR. KARNAVAS: I apologise.

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That's okay.

17 Q. What is this document, if you recall?

18 A. After the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was established in

19 accordance or rather in the course of international negotiations, in

20 accordance with the so-called Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, the Croatian

21 republic of Herceg-Bosna was set up and it had its ministries. One of

22 the ministries was the ministry for inter-republic cooperation which

23 means the cooperation between the three republics in Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina and the second part was international relations. What it

25 means was international negotiations.

Page 29368

1 This document for all intents and purposes is a programme for the

2 work of this ministry within the government. As you can see, this is a

3 ministry for inter-republic cooperation, it is not a foreign ministry and

4 this means that the -- this shows that the Croatian Republic of

5 Herceg-Bosna was not a state, it was a republic within a sovereign state

6 and in accordance with this plan that was being negotiated at the

7 international level it was supposed to be one of the three constituent

8 units of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you. And if we look at the next document, 1D 01958.

10 1D 01958. That was -- that's in binder 1, Your Honours. You will see

11 that at the very top, we have a number which is 115, at the bottom is --

12 you see number 1, and I am told, Your Honours, that this should be a

13 translation correction on the document it just should be "ministry for

14 inter-republican cooperation" as opposed "to the ministry." Sir, do you

15 recognise this document?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. And it would appear and I have a good-faith basis for this but it

18 would appear that this is part of a larger document. Do you recall when

19 it would have been generated?

20 A. It was generated at the time when this ministry existed and

21 operated and at the time when it submitted reports on its work. This

22 government, like any other government, required its bodies to submit

23 reports on their work in order to be able to ascertain that they were

24 working in accordance with the rules and regulations.

25 Q. Thank you. If we go to the next document, 1D 02871 and I

Page 29369

1 apologise, this is in binder 3, Your Honours. I apologise for moving

2 quickly but we have a lot of documents to go through. This is more of a

3 housekeeping matter. 1D 02871.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, I still have to come back to the

5 previous document.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Could you give the date, please.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: That was the problem. I asked for the date and it

9 would have been ...

10 Q. Do you know what year? We know that in 1993 -- we know in 1993

11 that you would have been appointed as the minister for inter-republic

12 relation; is that correct?

13 A. I don't have the date here, and I can't be certain but I think

14 this document was drafted sometime early in 1994.

15 Q. All right. And if you go to the next document, 1D 02871. And we

16 see that this is dated 16 February 1994 and we see that there is a

17 decision to proclaim members to the presidential consul. If we look at

18 number 9, we see your name and of course number 6, we see

19 Dr. Jadranko Prlic.

20 Very quickly, even though we'll get to it later on, could you

21 please tell us what was the presidential council of the Croatian republic

22 of Herceg-Bosna?

23 A. The presidential council has two stages, one was during

24 Mate Boban and the other after his departure. When the presidential

25 council took over the function of the collective president of the

Page 29370

1 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. In this specific case, this was the

2 first time it was established in this composition and there was a total

3 of two, one was to follow.

4 Q. All right. Now, we're going to go to another set of documents,

5 again dealing with you primarily with the period you were engaged in some

6 of the negotiations. If you just take it easy, it's the very next

7 document, 1D 02308. It's in binder 1, Your Honours. If you just look

8 through that document. Okay. Here it's dated 2 February 1993 and it's

9 to the permanent mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You

10 see your name at the bottom of it; is that correct? It notes that you

11 were to attend --

12 A. Yes, I see it.

13 Q. It says that you will be attending a session of the Security

14 Council of which the political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina will

15 be discussed.

16 Did you go to New York, sir?

17 A. I did.

18 Q. All right. Now, if we look at the next document ...

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please. I'm sorry,

20 Mr. Karnavas, because I have just discovered that the Security Council, a

21 meeting was scheduled at which the prime minister -- to which the prime

22 minister is going to go and part of the delegation, well, we have

23 Mate Boban.

24 Sir, I mean I've just seen this for the first time by reading

25 this document, everything is so complicated that you learn new things

Page 29371

1 every day. So there was a meeting of the Security Council and you were

2 the prime minister. As such, you must have been present, but was

3 Mr. Mate Boban part of the delegation for Bosnia and Herzegovina? Was he

4 seated next to you or not?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I didn't go to the

6 Security Council meeting that I was supposed to go to. There were talks

7 at the Security Council building, international talks. Also under the

8 aegis of the international conference.

9 Mr. Boban was then recognised as the head of the delegation of

10 one of the three parties to these negotiations. Three parties were

11 recognised, the Muslim, the Croat and the Serb. The delegations, the

12 respective delegations were headed by Mate Boban, Radovan Karadzic, and

13 Alija Izetbegovic. It was often the case that Izetbegovic was treated

14 and seen as the delegation of the government, whereas in actual fact, he

15 was this on behalf of one of the constituent people of B and H. However,

16 it was I who was supposed to give a speech at the Security Council but I

17 didn't because that decision was challenged.

18 I never got a specific response as to why this happened. I think

19 eventually it was Mr. Silajdzic who took the floor as foreign minister.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you were not able to take

21 the floor?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right, I wasn't. However, I

23 had a chance to see the secretary general of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, who

24 received me in the presence of Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance. There was an

25 official meeting in the UN building itself I tabled my views and the

Page 29372

1 position of my government and my peoples about the way that Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina should be organised in the future. Mr. Boutros-Ghali had a

3 lot of understanding for this. He even wrote about this in his book

4 entitled, "The US-UN Saga."

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, thank you.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Hopefully we'll ask some questions that will shed

7 some more light on this trip. If we look at the next document, 1D 02891.

8 This is the very next document for you, sir, and it says itinerary, Prime

9 Minister H.E. Mile Akmadzic, that's you; correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And this was your itinerary for February 5, 1993 and we can see

12 for yourselves that you were to meet with various individuals; correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Were you there meeting with them as a member of the Croat

15 delegation or were you there as a member of the -- as the Prime Minister

16 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by virtue of your position, a member of the

17 War Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18 A. I would say both. In this specific case, it's difficult to

19 distinguish because these are representatives of the countries that were

20 members of the Security Council.

21 Q. Okay. But I guess I'm asking you specifically, were you there as

22 the prime minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina because -- or are you there

23 as a Croat representing the Croatian interests or the Croatian peoples of

24 Bosnia and Herzegovina or both?

25 A. I would say both. Neither can be ruled out.

Page 29373

1 Q. All right. And then of course along with this document we also

2 see your itinerary for February 10, 1993 where you are to meet with

3 various ambassadors.

4 If we go on to the next document, 1D 02890.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, I don't know

6 whether you were going to deal with this. Since I don't know, I'm

7 asking. In this document, we see your itinerary for meetings. I see

8 that you were even to meet the ambassador for France, the one for China,

9 the ambassador for Russia, all the permanent members. But more

10 interesting is the first page. It seems that you are together with

11 Mate Boban.

12 Look at the first page. So did Mr. Mate Boban accompany you

13 throughout these visits?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Why not?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were two reasons. The first

17 being Mate Boban was not there in any sort of formal capacity that would

18 allow him to talk to their ambassadors. The other reason being he had

19 led the talks by this time. This was an interval between the two rounds

20 of talks. This was a period of several days during which the talks were

21 not continuing and we were now waiting for the talks to resume.

22 Mate Boban flew back to Europe for further talks, and I think he saw

23 someone in Germany about this. That was at least what he told me at the

24 time.

25 MR. KARNAVAS:

Page 29374

1 Q. Now, when you say that in between talks, you're speaking of the

2 negotiations that were ongoing with Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen.

3 A. Precisely.

4 Q. All right. If we go on to the next document now, 1D 02890, this

5 seems to be a press release and this would be in binder 3, Your Honours.

6 It's dated February 8, 1993. It lists the various -- it more or less

7 lists what you were up to, what you were doing.

8 If we look at the third to the last paragraph, you say that, "In

9 his capacity as a member of the Croatian delegation from the Republic of

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Akmadzic stated that the Croats have accepted

11 the Vance-Owen Plan as a painful compromise that all three parties should

12 accept and as the only realistic hope for ending the bloodshed."

13 Was that a correct statement, sir?

14 A. Yes, this is in reference to the 8th of February which is when I

15 was received by Boutros-Ghali.

16 Q. All right. If we look at the next document, 1D 02888, which is a

17 Security Council report or letter -- I'm sorry, it's a letter to. This

18 is in binder 3, Your Honours. 1D 02888, it's the very next document,

19 sir.

20 You see that this is a letter being delivered, it's your letter

21 being delivered by Mr. Sacirbey who was the permanent representative of

22 Bosnia Herzegovina at the time in New York and if we look at the next

23 page.

24 And you say in paragraph 2:

25 "The Bosnian Croat side is also a part of the government of the

Page 29375

1 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian government cannot be

2 identified solely with Bosnian Muslims."

3 You go on to say, "When considering the issue of internal

4 political settlement of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must

5 recognise three different constituencies..."

6 Then at the very last paragraph, you say, "It is misleading and

7 unfair to Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the Bosnian government

8 side, in your reports, refers exclusively to Bosnian Muslims."

9 Now, could you explain that so we understand that a little bit?

10 A. First of all, we were facing a great amount of difficulty -- we

11 still are, in fact. In order to be able to say that Bosna is just not

12 Bosna, Bosna is Bosnia and Herzegovina. Or is it a good idea to say

13 Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Muslims because you also have

14 Herzegovina there.

15 Secondly, the international community, in a manner of speaking,

16 for most of the negotiations, accepted Izetbegovic as the president of

17 the Presidency of all the three ethnic groups and as such, someone who

18 was a legitimate representative at those negotiations regardless of the

19 fact that there was a decision by the Presidency that whenever we talked

20 to a foreign country, we should appoint a delegation to speak on behalf

21 of all ethnic groups and whenever there were talks about the internal

22 organisational model for Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the

23 presence of the co-chairman of the international peace conference or

24 indeed anybody else, the talks should be between the three peoples

25 because the state belongs to them and they all have equal rights.

Page 29376

1 In a way, I'm here expressing my displeasure. I seek and I plead

2 that the Croat representatives who still are -- who have every intention

3 of remaining in the government of -- in the Presidency of Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina should get the same treatment as the Muslim representatives.

5 I'm not here referring to the Serb representatives because they left the

6 Presidency and the government, those who had been elected.

7 Q. Let me interrupt you here because we're going to see more

8 documents that may clarify this issue as well.

9 Now, if we look at the next document, Your Honour, this is sort

10 of dove tails the previous document, it's 1D 02889 in here this would be

11 the official letters that were sent that refer to the earlier document

12 and that's your signature; correct? In the next document, the one that

13 I'm just showing you 1D 02889?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now look at the next document after that, 1D 02848, 2848. That's

16 binder number 3, Your Honours. We see this letter is dated February 24

17 if we look at the second page, we see your name. Is that your signature,

18 sir?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And this is directed to Senator Biden who at the time was the

21 chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee of the US senate foreign

22 affairs committee, a well-known senator.

23 Here you seem to be sending him letter and I'm going to read

24 parts of it. Towards the last part of the first sentence you say:

25 "I wish to advise you that Mr. Silajdzic's testimony as a whole

Page 29377

1 did not represent fully the position of the government of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina."

3 You then go on to say:

4 "The position was established in its November programme by

5 consensus in the government and the Presidency functioning as parliament

6 as set forth in this programme, the government fully supports the

7 international conference on the former Yugoslavia though co-chairman of

8 the steering committee, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance and Lord David Owen and their

9 pursuit of the negotiated solution to the crisis in Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina. We seek to achieve a just peace through this process. In

11 our view, a just peace includes one, the return of all refugees and

12 displaced persons who wish to return to their homes; two, the

13 establishment of an international criminal Tribunal to try those accused

14 of war crimes. Three, non-recognition of changes achieved by aggression

15 including ethnic cleansing; and four, payment of reparations to those who

16 were damaged as a result of the war."

17 You go on to say:

18 "The government has also determined that Bosnia and Herzegovina

19 can be politically arranged as a decentralised state. The proposals

20 concerning establishment of provinces are an acceptable solution if not

21 based only on ethnic principles, but rather on a combination of ethnic,

22 geographic, historic, economic, and other principles developed through

23 negotiations. Our programme includes full equality for the three peoples

24 of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, as recognised by

25 the constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Page 29378

1 I'm going to skip a little bit. Then if you look at the middle

2 of the second paragraph in the second page, it says, "I therefore ask you

3 to keep in mind that the testimony of Mr. Silajdzic on the current stage

4 of the Vance-Owen talks and on the national history of Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina is representative of the views of some Muslim members of the

6 government and not of the government as a whole."

7 Then the following paragraph, just the last sentence because we

8 can read it later on, you say:

9 "Like Mr. Silajdzic, Mr. Izetbegovic does not speak for the

10 Presidency as a whole with respect to the current stage of the Vance-Owen

11 talks but only as one Muslim member of the Presidency."

12 Now, Mr. Akmadzic, can you please explain to us what exactly are

13 you trying to explain to Senator Biden in this letter? And please keep

14 it brief because I have some other documents that relate to this.

15 A. Much the same as in this letter. At the meeting with all the

16 countries in the Security Council, I was adamant that international

17 tribunal for war crimes should be established. Mr. Silajdzic went to the

18 talks and he saw Mr. Biden without having notified me. I myself was in

19 New York which was also when I wrote this letter. In a political sense

20 and in terms of protocol, this was unfair and not done by the book.

21 Thirdly, I received a report from Mr. Silajdzic's talks. They

22 called these testimonies, actually, Mr. Silajdzic's testimony in

23 Washington. His testimony didn't tally with our joint positions, nor

24 indeed did it tally with the platform adopted by the Presidency of Bosnia

25 and Herzegovina.

Page 29379

1 What I wanted to achieve by this was to draw Senator Biden's

2 attention to the fact that the political circumstances in Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina were what they were, which is what I wrote here. I asked for

4 all the three parties, all the three peoples in B and H to be guaranteed

5 equal rights.

6 Q. Let me stop you there. At this point in the negotiations, is

7 Silajdzic and Izetbegovic on board with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan or are

8 they pursuing another course?

9 A. It was precisely at this time in New York in the UN building that

10 we were discussing the Vance-Owen Plan. Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Karadzic

11 are still in Geneva early in January. As I say, they signed the

12 principles there and they, in principle, agreed to the military, the

13 terms of the military agreement too. What remained was to determine the

14 borders of the provinces and to set up an interim government which is

15 like a transitional government. We were still very much negotiating at

16 this time.

17 Nonetheless, Mr. Izetbegovic did everything he could to postpone

18 the adoption of this agreement which he was eventually forced to adopt

19 but he never complied with it.

20 Q. Let me stop you there. With respect to Mr. Silajdzic, what was

21 it that when he testified before the subcommittee that you found to be

22 not to be in keeping with the position that was being -- that was the

23 position of the Presidency or the War Presidency?

24 A. Well, based on the report that I received, it was clear that he

25 was not willing to agree to the negotiations plan. He was still sticking

Page 29380

1 to a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina. This unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina

2 meant what he and Mr. Izetbegovic normally referred to as one man, one

3 vote. Given that kind of situation, the Muslim majority would be able to

4 outvote both the Serbs and the Croats. This is one of the reasons, to

5 begin with, that Yugoslavia broke up.

6 Q. All right. Let's look at now the next document which is 1D

7 02847. 1D 02847.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Mr. Karnavas, this is one sentence

9 that I would like the witness to comment on, it is on page 61 lines 16 to

10 18 where you said, sir, "Mr. Izetbegovic did everything he could to

11 postpone the adoption of this agreement," and I think we're talking of

12 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan which he was eventually forced to accept, I

13 think, but never complied with it.

14 What did you mean that he was forced to accept or adopt?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't mean that in a physical

16 way, this was the course that the negotiations took. He eventually

17 accepted this agreement and we signed it on the 25th March in New York

18 but then again he stated his conditions. He accepted the plan, but he

19 stated a number of conditions. Despite this, he never allowed to

20 eventually see this plan implemented.

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Sir, I suppose you are aware of and conversant

22 with the distinction between signature of an international treaty and

23 ratification. Am I correct in assuming that this is very, very obvious

24 to you?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed.

Page 29381

1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm not surprised. I'm sorry for asking such a

2 silly question but it's the style of this interrogation. I learn it from

3 the parties.

4 Now, the next question is: Did Izetbegovic ever ratify -- the

5 Muslim side in any way ratify the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's difficult to talk about the

7 textbook style ratification which is something done by parliament. There

8 was no parliament at the time. Nevertheless, as far as the Presidency

9 was concerned, the Vance-Owen Plan was seen and accepted as one of the

10 possible solutions to the internal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11 The third party, the Serb party back in New York refused to sign

12 the plan. They were all right with the principles, they were all right

13 with the provinces, as far as I remember, but they weren't all right with

14 the interim government.

15 Despite this, and when I say "pressure" I mean pressure exerted

16 by the international community, they signed the plan as a whole in Athens

17 on the 2nd of May, 1993, again the condition being that their parliament

18 should okay this. Their parliament met in Pale several days later, this

19 is a town near Sarajevo. Based on our information at the time, the

20 parliament refused saying that only a referendum could decide an issue

21 such as this.

22 We asked that the Croats and the Muslims continue to pursue this

23 plan regardless of any or no involvement by the third party to the extent

24 possible. Despite this, the plan was never truly implemented.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I must insist a bit. I don't know whether you

Page 29382

1 are a lawyer -- I am, of course.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Please -- with this being a bit -- splitting

4 hairs, perhaps. You said "it was never complied with," but a previous

5 question would be whether legally Izetbegovic was bound by the plan,

6 whether he was under a legal -- in your view, under a legal obligation to

7 comply.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to try and explain this to

9 you, Your Honours. At the solemn ceremony to mark the signing of the

10 agreement in the UN building in New York, all three parties were

11 represented. The Croat side signed everything. The Muslim side signed

12 everything and submitted a paper to the co-chairman, the paper dealt for

13 the most part with the third side, the Serb side, where they sought some

14 military elements to be met, but I am not an expert for that.

15 As I said, the Serb side refused to sign the plan at that time

16 but earlier, as I have already indicated, they did sign the principles in

17 Geneva.

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you very much. Excuse me, please,

19 Mr. Karnavas.

20 MR. KARNAVAS:

21 Q. Yeah, let me continue with this, Mr. Akmadzic. You indicated at

22 one point -- sir, just relax for a second. Don't worry about the

23 documents, have a sip of water.

24 You indicated at one point Karadzic signed in Athens but then

25 took the matter before the Republika Srpska parliament and it was voted

Page 29383

1 down; correct? That's what you indicated to us earlier.

2 A. I testify on the basis of the reports that I received.

3 Unfortunately, I was not in Athens myself but this is not controversial

4 at all.

5 Q. No, earlier today just a few moments ago you told us that one of

6 the -- that Karadzic, though he signed it, they then took the matter

7 before the parliament in Pale, I believe it was, at the time where it

8 went to vote; correct?

9 A. [No interpretation]

10 Q. Now, at that point in time for the three territories for the

11 non-Republika Srpska territories that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

12 it's a fact that there was no assembly, correct, because we had a War

13 Presidency.

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 Q. And we heard testimony and correct me if I am wrong, that the War

16 Presidency in a sense took on powers that the assembly had.

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Okay. So based on His Honour's question, it would appear that if

19 the president of the Presidency signed on behalf of Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina, I suspect, then it would have to be at some point approved

21 by the Presidency itself.

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. All right. Now, do you recall whether the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,

24 any one them, ever went before the Presidency in order -- was it ever

25 tabled for the Presidency to consider?

Page 29384

1 A. I don't recall it having been tabled in its entirety the way it

2 had been agreed upon.

3 Q. Now, getting back -- during the peace negotiations because you

4 were involved and we've heard testimony before, but can you tell us

5 whether the negotiators, when we were dealing with three different

6 nations, the Croat nation, the Muslim nation, the Serb nation, all Bosnia

7 and Herzegovina, who were their counter parts. We have Vance and we have

8 Owen and who are they looking to to negotiate an agreement between the

9 three nations?

10 A. Those were the representatives of the three peoples. In Geneva

11 we had three rooms, one if one, there was Izetbegovic --

12 Q. Okay. Okay. Tell me -- okay, go ahead. Go ahead.

13 A. The second was Karadzic and the third was Boban. Since there was

14 no agreement about names of the three sides and then Lord Owen and Vance,

15 or Lord Owen and Stoltenberg decided to deal with it in this manner, to

16 have representatives of three peoples and three names.

17 Q. All right. Now, we're going to get to this and we will see

18 documentation but it appears from your letter here that when it comes to

19 Izetbegovic, he's being looked at as the representative of Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina and not of the Muslim nation or of the Muslim people. Is

21 that one of the things that you're complaining about?

22 A. Yes, absolutely.

23 Q. All right. Now, and we'll get to some more -- we'll look at this

24 again. But if you look at the next document, 1D 02847 and this is a

25 statement sent out by Senator Biden, well-known to -- that's in binder 3,

Page 29385

1 Your Honours, well-known to those of us from the United States, a rather

2 loquacious senator and we see here from the very first paragraph, he

3 says:

4 "One week ago, the European affairs subcommittee held a day-long

5 hearing on the subject of American policy in Bosnia. In the course of

6 that day, the subcommittee met with the foreign minister of Bosnia,

7 Dr. Harris Silajdzic, partly in private and partly in a public meeting."

8 Let's stop right here. At this point in time, were you in the

9 United States for Senator Biden to have met with you, you being the prime

10 minister, Silajdzic being a member of your government?

11 A. I was in New York. The negotiations were underway. And Senator

12 Biden was in a position to know that I was in New York, and that I was

13 the prime minister.

14 Q. Did you know, did you ever hear from Mr. Silajdzic, Dr. Silajdzic

15 what exactly he spoke with Senator Biden privately, were you privy to

16 that, did Mr. Silajdzic ever brief the Presidency, the War Presidency or

17 you as the prime minister?

18 A. No, he did not notify me, but I received reports about the talks,

19 some kind of a transcript in shorthand; and I heard that Mr. Silajdzic

20 had deep and sentimental relations with or in the office of Senator Biden

21 but I cannot indeed confirm that this was the fact.

22 Q. You're talking about his secretary?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. Now we go on to the third paragraph, you say:

25 "Yesterday, I received a letter from the prime minister of Bosnia

Page 29386

1 Mr. Mile Akmadzic who is a Bosnian Croatian member of the Bosnian

2 Presidency. The essence of Mr. Akmadzic's letter, which I will make a

3 part of the record of last Thursday's proceedings was to affirm that

4 neither President Izetbegovic nor Foreign Minister Silajdzic is

5 authorised to speak for the Presidency of Bosnia."

6 That was the letter that we just saw; correct? Mr. Akmadzic, you

7 know, if --

8 A. Yes, if they're talking not as part of the platform.

9 Q. All right. Now, it goes on to say, "It is impossible to discern

10 all that may lie behind such a letter." In other words, he's questioning

11 what is the motive.

12 "But it is not difficult to discern one possible effect, which is

13 to undermine the credibility of the very government of which Mr. Akmadzic

14 is a part and to enhance the perception that the Bosnian people, the

15 Bosnian problem is a three-way civil war among equally culpable and

16 hopelessly divided factions rather than a Milosevic-sponsored war of

17 aggression against a nation-state recognised by the United Nations.

18 Now, is that what you were trying to do undermine the credibility

19 of the very government of which you were a member of or was it the other

20 way around in other words was it Silajdzic is what you were arguing

21 about?

22 A. I think that Senator Biden --

23 [Technical difficulty]

24 MR. SCOTT: If the interpreter can tell me when she is ready, so

25 I can ...

Page 29387

1 Your Honour, I object to the form of the questions. This is all

2 leading. Okay, tell me when you are ready, please. It's been going on

3 for sometime but I'm going -- finally I'm going to object to it. It is

4 all argumentative and leading.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.

6 MR. KARNAVAS:

7 Q. Now, Mr. Akmadzic, was the purpose of your letter to undermine

8 the credibility of the government and to enhance some sort of a

9 perception of a three-way civil war, was that the purpose of your letter?

10 MR. SCOTT: Object to leading, Your Honour. That's what I just

11 objected to.

12 Mr. Karnavas is testifying.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll --

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, you're prompting the

15 witness, Mr. Karnavas.

16 MR. KARNAVAS:

17 Q. We see, Senator Biden's response. Could you please comment on

18 this response and feel free to comment about the credibility of the

19 response and the gentleman's understanding of your letter.

20 MR. SCOTT: Can we also instruct the witness --

21 MR. KARNAVAS: No I'm instructing him, it's an open-ended

22 question. I'm doing the same technique that Mr. Scott did now obviously

23 this testimony is hurting him, but this is the same technique that he's

24 used.

25 MR. SCOTT: First of all, Your Honour, it's not at all the same

Page 29388

1 technique that I've used and if I've used it I've use it on

2 cross-examination not opening -- not direct and -- just to be clear, this

3 isn't hurting me at all or the Prosecution case at all, it's all simply

4 entertaining, but it takes us nowhere.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Karnavas. At

6 the beginning on line 3 of page 69, you said well you can see the reply

7 of Senator Biden, can you make a comment. Please let the witness reply

8 and that will be enough.

9 Witness, go ahead.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, we've seen my letter. Under

11 oath, I confirm once again that my objective and the objective of my

12 associates was to bolster the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

13 not to undermine it in any way. The government was undermined by those

14 who took for themselves the functions that they did not have. It was

15 undermined by Mr. Izetbegovic who did not relinquish his office as the

16 president of the Presidency to a Croat representative as he was bound to

17 by the law, and in the letter or indeed anywhere else, I never mentioned

18 that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a civil war.

19 Throughout the negotiations, I said that it was an aggression and

20 in my testimony, I presented the view of the Presidency not my own view

21 and I also testified that this aggression engender the conflict between

22 Muslims and Croats. Senator Biden obviously did not understand that and

23 he did not talk to me. He didn't even summon me to talk to me.

24 Q. All right. Now, I won't go on anymore about this letter but

25 let's look at 1D 02849, it's in binder 3 and along with that, Your

Page 29389

1 Honours, you may want to get ready for 2851, which is the next document.

2 Sir, if you could look at 2849, 1D 02849, we see now it's

3 February 28, 1993 and this is a letter to Senator Biden by you, if you

4 look at page 2 where you try to explain to him the purpose of your

5 letter, obviously having seen his statement titled "A question concerning

6 the Bosnian government."

7 We look at paragraph number 2, you say: "The purpose of my

8 letter was to advise you about the position of the government of the

9 republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to the Vance-Owen Peace

10 talks which is often confused with the position of the Muslim part of the

11 government?"

12 Sir, let's stop here. At that point in time, what was the

13 position of the Muslim part of the government concerning the Vance-Owen

14 Peace Plan?

15 A. I spoke about that. It was the position of the Muslim government

16 not only vis-a-vis the Vance-Owen Plan but in general, that Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina should be a united state and what it actually meant was a

18 unitary state, this latter term being a somewhat harsher political term

19 than the one they actually used.

20 Q. If you look at the last part of this paragraph, you say:

21 "While the government as a whole supports Vance-Owen peace

22 process, there is no single position of the government on the current

23 stage of the Vance-Owen talks. Each of the three negotiating parties has

24 its own position on the proposal as it currently stands."

25 Was that a true statement, sir?

Page 29390

1 A. It is a true statement because the government and the Presidency

2 consisted of three peoples that could not reach a full agreement.

3 Q. Then if you go on to the next paragraph, you say:

4 "I also advised you that the mandate of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic as

5 President of the Presidency had expired. This is to demonstrate the

6 immediate need for the international community to assist, not only in

7 protecting Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity

8 but also in assuring that the country is governed in accordance with its

9 democratic and constitutional principles."

10 Do you stand by this statement, sir?

11 A. Yes, I stand by that statement.

12 Q. And before we take the break because I see we are about time for

13 it if we look at 1D 02581 [sic], the following in your binder and 3 also

14 for the Judges, this is March 1, 1993, we see that you have forwarded

15 this letter on to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who is The Secretary-General so

16 at least he would know what you are communicating with Mr. Biden;

17 correct?

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Sorry, a correction in the transcript, page 4 --

19 as I see it, line 14, it's not 2518 [sic] but --

20 MR. KARNAVAS: 2851, I stand corrected.

21 Q. If we look at 2850, the very last document, it seems that you

22 address also Al Gore who is vice-president of the United States?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. And I don't want to lead you because we're going to get a

25 reaction but can you tell us why was it was necessary for you to write a

Page 29394

1 recognise this, first of all?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. Okay. And it would appear that there are a list of names of

4 individuals who are to represent Bosnia and Herzegovina; is that correct?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Am I correct in assuming that they are not ambassadors per se,

7 but nonetheless, they are going to be engaging in -- for lack of a better

8 term -- diplomatic relations on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina; is that

9 correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, if we look at the names, are these not names that are

12 predominantly Muslim?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. All right. So, if we --

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, it's a little

16 leading, isn't it?

17 MR. KARNAVAS: It is leading but I'm trying to save some time but

18 if it's obvious. Okay. I'll go down, let's look at Germany, I admit, I

19 was caught out. I guess I get a yellow card.

20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Maybe I can loosen that by asking a question. I

21 see here Ministry of the Interior and if one looks at the contents, it

22 would rather be something for the ministry of foreign affairs, and I

23 wonder whether "Ministarstvo Poslova" is correctly translated with

24 interior affairs. I think Ms. Tomanovic was shaking her head.

25 MR. KARNAVAS:

Page 29395

1 Q. Sir, if you look at the B/C/S version, it says -- where it says

2 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, could you please -- could you please

3 look at the title. Which ministry is this coming from?

4 A. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

5 Q. Okay. So it should be -- thank you, Judge Trechsel. So if you

6 look at Germany, is that -- from what nation is this individual from?

7 A. I think he is a Muslim but I can't be certain.

8 Q. What about France?

9 A. A Muslim.

10 Q. What about Belgium and the European Community?

11 A. A Muslim -- a Muslim. A Muslim, yes.

12 Q. Great Britain?

13 A. Also Muslim.

14 Q. And Russia and other countries --

15 A. A Muslim. A Muslim. A Muslim. A Muslim.

16 Q. What about Tunisia and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation?

17 A. A Muslim.

18 Q. Let me stop you there. Why would it be necessary to send

19 somebody to be a representatives of the PLO keeping in mind now this is

20 1992, I believe?

21 A. I think in Tunisia there were many refugees, PLO, they even had

22 their own representatives there once upon a time, and then it was a

23 convenient idea Bosnia and Herzegovina to be in charge of Tunisia and the

24 PLO at the same time.

25 JUDGE PRANDLER: May I help you out, Mr. Karnavas, saying that

Page 29396

1 the PLO has been recognised by a number of countries before 1990 and also

2 mainly of course by the former socialist countries but other countries as

3 well, so that is why I believe that the decision was taken. I think of

4 course what the witness said that in certain countries there would be a

5 number of refugees and that is why it was a additionally necessity to do

6 so. Thank you.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: And I also thought at that point in time in

8 history, I believe, Yasser Arafat had moved his headquarters over to

9 Tunisia and that was the answer that I was hoping to get. I didn't want

10 to lead, so now I'm giving the evidence as my learned colleague is

11 informing me.

12 Q. Then we go into what about for United Arab Emirates?

13 A. Not a Muslim.

14 Q. Then we have Iran and Islamic republics?

15 A. Muslim.

16 Q. And I think we get the gist of this.

17 If you were to look at some of the other names, can you tell us

18 how many approximately of these names do not appear to be Muslim names?

19 A. I haven't actually calculated this, but I believe it would be a

20 very low percentage.

21 Q. Now we see that there is a list on page 2 where it says:

22 "The following persons have been appointed personal

23 representatives of the President of the Presidency of the Republic of

24 Bosnia and Herzegovina." And we see US, Sacirbey; Germany, Suliak;

25 Austria, Urban; Turkey, Silayci and then Malaysia, we have Ceric.

Page 29397

1 First of all, why was it necessary for the President of the

2 Presidency to have personal representatives?

3 A. Only he knows. There was no political need for this. Mostly

4 these are his friends.

5 Q. All right. Okay. Sounds good enough. If we go further down, it

6 says, "The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina authorised" in the same page, page 2, "authorised the

8 following persons to collect humanitarian aid on behalf of the Republic

9 of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Was this a decision that was made by the

10 Presidency or is this a personal decision made by the President of the

11 Presidency, if you know?

12 A. I don't, but I never came across a Presidency decision like that.

13 Q. All right. Was the president of the Presidency authorised to

14 make such authorisation, in other words, to make such appointments to

15 these individuals to act on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina without

16 getting either authorisation or clearance or without consulting at least

17 other members of the Presidency?

18 A. Under the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and under the

19 rules governing the work of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he

20 would not have the power to do that.

21 Q. All right. Do you know being a member of the War Presidency at

22 the time and the prime minister, do you know how much aid was collected

23 from these various countries? In other words, was there some sort of an

24 accounting so there would be a transparent process as to how much money

25 was actually collected from Saudi Arabia or the united Arab Emirates or

Page 29398

1 India?

2 A. I don't know and it's very difficult to get this sort of

3 information. I don't think there is any information available. Each of

4 the countries perhaps have some information, but I'm not sure about that

5 either.

6 Q. Do you know of this aid collected, of this aid collected,

7 assuming aid was collected, we don't know whether Saudi Arabia would have

8 allowed some of its petrol dollars to make its way to Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina, but of this aid collected, how much of it went to the

10 municipalities especially those municipalities where non-Muslims or

11 predominantly non-Muslims were residing?

12 A. Virtually nothing. There was an agreement at the beginning with

13 the government of the Presidency that humanitarian aid should be

14 distributed in three parts. This worked for a while, it's very difficult

15 to distribute in three parts in ideal shares, this worked for a time and

16 then it didn't work anymore. I know there was petrol and all sorts of

17 different -- and then Bosnia and Herzegovina survived based on this and

18 Sarajevo in particular --

19 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last part of

20 the witness's answer because he trailed off. Thank you.

21 MR. KARNAVAS:

22 Q. You need to slow down, Mr. Akmadzic, you need to slow down; and

23 we didn't get the last part of your answer and every word you say is

24 important.

25 A. I can't talk about the shipments that arrived from those

Page 29399

1 countries, but I know that the aid was substantial and that's what made

2 it possible for Bosnia and Herzegovina to get by, to survive.

3 Q. All right. Now, let's go to the next document, 1D 024 --

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, perhaps it's also interesting to

5 look at the next page where it says "The president of the government of

6 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina authorise the persons to collect

7 humanitarian aid." Was that a decision, Witness, that you have taken,

8 Mr. Akmadzic?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The date here is the 21st of June,

10 1992. I wasn't prime minister at the time.

11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. Any other comment on the fact that

12 you say the president was not competent to do that. Would the president

13 of the government have been competent?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not he either. When I was

15 prime minister, as I was no economist myself, I put my deputy in charge

16 of economic matters. The deputy that I mentioned when I was telling you

17 about how he was killed on the way back from the airport but he didn't do

18 it.

19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. Okay.

21 Q. And if we go on to the next document, 1D 02431, sticking with the

22 same theme that we've been with. Binder number 2, Your Honours, for you,

23 but that's the next document for you, Mr. Akmadzic. We see here this is

24 dated 16 October 1992 signed by Alija Izetbegovic and it says:

25 "In accordance with the agreement on friendship and cooperation

Page 29400

1 between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the following

2 persons are appointed to the commission for coordinating military

3 activities on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

4 Of those three names, are any of them -- well, of what

5 nationality are they? Put it that way.

6 A. All Muslims, based on their names. One of these might be

7 non-declared or declared as a Yugoslav but just by looking at their

8 names, I would normally assume that all these persons are Muslims.

9 Q. Forgive me for asking this question but can we assume that there

10 was no credible, reliable competent Croat to have filled any of those

11 positions at the time?

12 A. When it came to appointments, I must tell the Trial Chamber that

13 I talked to Alija Izetbegovic about this. I warned him that appointments

14 to various positions of Muslims alone in the judiciary in diplomacy in

15 situations such as this one and then he said, we'll think about this at

16 some later stage and things will remain what they are for the time being.

17 Q. I need you to slow down because this is important testimony, and

18 I can't lead you but I'm going to look at this answer and it would appear

19 to me that Izetbegovic was making appointments of a particular nation and

20 then he was telling you that later on at some point they would deal with

21 that issue. Is that what you're telling us?

22 A. That's right. Specifically I'm talking about Muslims. Most of

23 the appointment were appointments of Muslims. I then cautioned him for

24 warned him about this and he said, "Now is not the time to keep in mind

25 the equality between the peoples. This is something that we'll be

Page 29401

1 considering at a later stage."

2 Q. All right. Now, if we look at the next document, 1D 02870.

3 That's in binder 3, Your Honours. 1D 02870. If we look at that, this

4 document. Here again we see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and we see a

5 list of names, do we not, sir?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And in looking at these names, if you could look through the

8 document itself because there is some -- there's several pages to this

9 document including, as I understand it, there is one titled "Some

10 examples of nepotism in the diplomatic consular network of the Republic

11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Do you see that, sir?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, can you comment on this document and can you tell us of the

14 diplomatic corps, the foreign ministry was -- it is supposed to be

15 representing the official policy of the Presidency of Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina as opposed to the president of the Presidency or his party,

17 the SDA -

18 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Your Honour, but when is it going to stop? I

19 mean it's just constant commentary and argument by Mr. Karnavas, there

20 appear to be no rules about questioning in this courtroom. Leading

21 questions, suggesting answers, argumentation, Mr. Karnavas testifying.

22 There's a very simple way to proceed and it's been done in common law

23 systems for the last several hundred years; it's no secret. You ask

24 open, non-leading questions and the lawyers do it every day in common law

25 systems and Mr. Karnavas seems incapable of asking one. I'm sorry but

Page 29402

1 enough is enough.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: It pains me to hear these comments from Mr. Scott,

3 it really does because I'm being facetious because I've laid a

4 foundation. We're building on this. We've already seen that the

5 gentleman has indicated and in any event.

6 Q. Sir, could you look at this document and could you tell us these

7 names, and these are names of the foreign ministry of the -- of which of

8 the three nations do they most predominantly represent?

9 A. If you look at the first document, it's Mustafa Bijedic, who was

10 a Bosnian ambassador to Geneva. I asked him at the time to submit to me

11 a list of all ambassadors in foreign countries.

12 Q. Please so down, please because this is valuable information

13 otherwise I have to lead you.

14 A. So Mustafa Bijedic signed this. He was the BH ambassador to

15 Geneva. During my time in Geneva, I asked him during the negotiations to

16 submit to me a list of BH ambassadors abroad. He submitted this document

17 to me. If you look at this at page 1 specifically, you can see that

18 these are Muslims alone.

19 Q. All right. Let's move on to the next --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

21 MR. KARNAVAS:

22 Q. The Court can look at the rest of the document, we need to move

23 along a bit. Let's look at some concrete examples, here, 1D 01276 binder

24 1 for Your Honours, this is a decision, it's 22 January 1993, we see this

25 is a decision to appoint an ambassador to the Republic of

Page 29403

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Republic of Turkey. Now, of what nation is the

2 gentleman?

3 A. Hajrudin Somun is a Muslim.

4 Q. Move on to the next document, 1D 01297, binder one again and this

5 is January 22nd, 1993. This is an appointment to Pakistan. You see

6 Silajdzic. From what nation?

7 A. Sadzida Silajdzic, she's a Muslim lady. Or as they say today, a

8 Bosniak.

9 Q. We mean no disrespect by using that term.

10 1D 01348. This is a decision to Iran, binder 1. Omer Behmen?

11 A. Muslim.

12 Q. 1D 01347, 11 February, 1993. This is a decision to appoint,

13 binder 1, decision to appoint the director of the agency of the Republic

14 of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the reception and distribution of

15 humanitarian aid. This individual Aziz Sunje?

16 A. Aziz Sunje, a Muslim.

17 Q. Apologies for my pronunciations. 1D 01307, binder number 1, this

18 is appointing an ambassador to Tunisia, this is now 18 July 1993?

19 A. Nerkez Arkihodzic [phoen] a Muslim.

20 Q. Then we go to 1D 01310, binder 1, this is a decision to appoint

21 consul to the consulate of R BiH in Milan.

22 A. Muhamed Kresevljakovic, Muslim.

23 Q. Thank you. That concludes that topic, Your Honours, unless there

24 are any questions, I will move on to the next topic.

25 Okay. Now, sir, we're going to go on to another topic and we're

Page 29404

1 going to be dealing with the Presidency and I'm going -- we're going to

2 be looking at the minutes of the meeting. I'm sorry. I apologise.

3 We're going to the London conference. All right. We're going to be

4 going to 1D 02438, this is in binder 2. The first couple documents I

5 will sort of segue into that topic so just bear with me.

6 This document here is dated 21 May 1992. You see your name at

7 the bottom, Mr. Akmadzic, and along with it in this document, we also see

8 in English a letter dated the 20th of March by Mr. -- right, exactly.

9 Then there is another one by a Mr. Cutileiro.

10 Could you please comment on this? Why was it necessary for you

11 to send a letter to Mr. Susak enclosing letters from Cutileiro and

12 Pinheiro addressed to Izetbegovic and this was -- you were asking for

13 Mr. Brkic to be informed of this. Why was it necessary?

14 A. At the time, and this is the 21st of May, 1992, I was

15 secretary-general of the Presidency. Mr. Brkic was not in Sarajevo. I

16 just asked that the same text that Mr. Izetbegovic had received be sent

17 to Mr. Brkic for the negotiations.

18 Q. All right. Now, if we look at the one document that's dated 20th

19 March, 1992 that's addressed to, it says, "Dear Mr. President" and you

20 can see at that it is addressed to Alija Izetbegovic, the third

21 paragraph, it says, "Let me reiterate to you that the only solution to

22 the problems Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in proceeding at once with the

23 constitutional talks in order to reach a final agreement." Then it goes

24 on.

25 Can you comment on what Mr. Izetbegovic's position was at the

Page 29405

1 time -- yeah, comment on that and then we're going to see what Cutileiro

2 is saying.

3 A. At the time this was -- these so-called one of the plans. The

4 first one was Cutileiro and then Carrington. The Cutileiro plan was

5 about a decentralised Bosnia and Herzegovina. It had a number of

6 components. I'm not going into that now though. The general framework

7 for that plan, however, was accepted by both the Serb and the Croat

8 sides. Mr. Izetbegovic, however, refused it, turned it down.

9 Q. All right. Let's look at the following document and this is from

10 Mr. Cutileiro and this is dated actually the day earlier, 19th May,

11 second paragraph it says, "I'm aware of the difficulties, but I cannot

12 agree that they are reasons for a postponement, and I do ask you to

13 reconsider your position for the following reasons ..."

14 Then the next paragraph, he says:

15 "I did not reconvene the talks lightly. As you know, the council

16 of the ministers of the EC, the United Nations Secretary General and the

17 United Nations Security Council from urged us to get on with our work

18 with the utmost urgency" and then later on they're pleading that he would

19 make it to Lisbon on the 20th.

20 Do you know why Mr. Izetbegovic was being begged, essentially, my

21 word not theirs, but cajoled, whatever you want to call it to attend the

22 meeting?

23 A. Mr. Izetbegovic refused to have talks to the extent that he

24 could, talks about Bosnia and Herzegovina that was not a unitary state.

25 Again, he tried but Cutileiro was warning him about communication

Page 29406

1 difficulties and he said that talks should be arranged and organised.

2 Q. All right. If we go to the next document, 1D 02564, binder 2 for

3 Your Honours. This is dated 17 August 1992 and it appears to be

4 addressed to Mr. Boban and it's from Lord Carrington. Now, given your

5 position at the time, were you aware that Mr. Carrington was having

6 dealings with Mr. Boban and, if so, in what capacity was Mr. Boban

7 dealing with Mr. Carrington? I guess he would be Lord Carrington, I

8 apologise to the gentleman.

9 A. Yes, Lord Carrington. Mr. Boban was the representative of Bosnia

10 and Herzegovina's Croats and of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna as

11 well.

12 Q. It appears that he's being invited, Mr. Boban that is, to the

13 London conference; is that correct? If you look at the second paragraph,

14 "If you are planning to be in London ..."

15 A. Mr. Boban was invited to the London conference, he was there, but

16 not in any official capacity. There was an official delegation of Bosnia

17 and Herzegovina that appeared at the London conference, and I was a

18 member of that delegation.

19 Q. Who else were members of that delegation?

20 A. The delegation was headed by Mr. Izetbegovic. There was myself,

21 and I couldn't tell you who the others were.

22 Q. All right. And at that time, who was the president of HDZ, if

23 you recall?

24 A. At that time, Mr. Mate Boban was the president of the HDZ. [In

25 English] No, excuse me, maybe not yet. Mm-hm.

Page 29407

1 Q. Who preceded him?

2 A. [Interpretation] it was Mr. Brkic. It was Mr. Brkic at that

3 time, but I can't really confirm that with 100 per cent certainty because

4 Mr. Boban was appointed the vice-president and that was in November.

5 Q. Now, if we look at the next document, 1D 02454, this is in binder

6 2, this is the secretariat of the conference on Yugoslavia dated August

7 24, 1992. And this is by Boban. And here, he indicates with this:

8 "I confirm that the Croatian delegation will attend the London

9 Conference. I will be but myself plus translator and we will alive at

10 London August 25th."

11 Did you see Mr. Boban there?

12 A. Mr. Boban did attend the London Conference but not in an official

13 capacity. He was not there in the BH delegation.

14 Q. All right. Now, if we look at the next document, 1D 01312, we've

15 seen some of these documents before but this is just to -- this is in

16 binder 1, Your Honours. And I'm going to be directing your attention,

17 sir, to page number 13. If you look at the English version, it might be

18 easier. Page 13, where it talks about the structure of the state.

19 Mr. Usher if we could get your assistance. At the very top of

20 the page, you will see in English it has page numbers, 13, page 13 and

21 you will see number 2, "Structure of the state." And it has the basic

22 considerations.

23 Now, without going into this document too much, could you please

24 tell us, to your understanding, what was the structure of the state

25 being -- what was under consideration at the time?

Page 29408

1 A. The organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was under

2 consideration. We used various terms, the structure of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina, but words to that effect at any rate.

4 Q. Okay. Let me go on paragraph 34 it says:

5 "It was recognised from the beginning that the views of the three

6 parties diverged widely on the structure of the future Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina. One of the parties initially advocated a centralised,

8 unitary state, arranged into a number of regions possessing merely

9 administrative functions."

10 What party advocated that position, sir?

11 A. The Muslim side advocated purely administrative functions and as

12 for an organisation of a sovereign state with the decentralised system,

13 this was what the Croat side advocated.

14 Q. Let me go step by step. You need to answer my questions. It

15 says:

16 "One of the parties initially advocated a centralised, unitary

17 state arranged into a number of regions possessing merely administrative

18 functions."

19 So my question was: Who advocated this position, which party?

20 A. The Muslim party.

21 Q. Thank you. Now, we go on.

22 "Another party considered that the country should be divided into

23 three independent states respectively for the Muslims, Serbs and Croat

24 peoples with each of the three states having its own international legal

25 personality, which states might form a loose confederation for the

Page 29409

1 purpose of coordinating certain of their activities."

2 Which of the three parties advocated this position?

3 A. The Serb party.

4 Q. Then, it says, "The third party supported a middle position."

5 That would leave the Croats; correct?

6 A. Yes, that is correct.

7 Q. Now, if we go to paragraph number 37 it says:

8 "The co-chairmen also recognised, however, that a centralised

9 state would not be accepted by at least two of the principal

10 ethnic/confessional groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina since it would not

11 protect their interests in the wake of the bloody civil strive that now

12 sunders the country."

13 Going into the next page on paragraph 38:

14 "Consequently, the cochairman believe that the only viable and

15 stable solution that does not acquiesce in already accomplished ethnic

16 cleansing and is further internationally unacceptable practices appears

17 to be the establishment of a decentralised state. This would mean a

18 state in which many of the principal functions, especially those directly

19 affecting persons, would be carried out by a number of autonomous

20 provinces. The central government, in turn, would have only those

21 minimal responsibilities that are necessary for a state to function as

22 such, and to carry out its responsibilities as a member of the

23 international community. The proposed decentralisation also appears to

24 reflect the wish of all the parties as indicated by their responses to

25 the questionnaire on the distribution of governmental responsibilities

Page 29410

1 mentioned in paragraph 32 above."

2 Now, my question to you, Mr. Akmadzic, is this: Paragraph 38 as

3 is stated, which of the three parties advocated this position, that is,

4 of a decentralised state?

5 A. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as I have already said, there were

6 three parties. The Serb and the Muslim parties were at the opposing

7 sides and the Croat side throughout the negotiations was insisting on

8 what we call compromised solution, that is to say, a decentralised state

9 of all peoples where three constituent peoples are recognised as such and

10 are recognised as equal. We considered that such a state would be viable

11 both in the future and at that time.

12 Q. All right. Now, did the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, did

13 they look at any particular model as an example of how potentially Bosnia

14 and Herzegovina as a decentralised state could be established?

15 A. We studied several models. I personally went to Austria and I

16 spoke to Mr. Mok, I was accompanied by Mr. Kljuic, the HDZ president. We

17 talked to Switzerland, we studied their constitution and it was our

18 conclusion that for us, the best model would be a state that would not be

19 divided into three ethnicity-based parts but a state composed of a number

20 of provinces or cantons based on a variety of principles: Historical,

21 geographical, communication, economic principles, educational principles,

22 and so on. It was our view that a federation with a majority ethnic

23 group would lead to its prevalence and on a smaller -- on the part of a

24 smaller nation, it would lead to cessation and it would not be possible.

25 That's why we advocated this policy, a decentralised, regionalized joint

Page 29411

1 state.

2 The Vance-Owen Plan was the best solution for us.

3 Q. All right. Now, if we look at the next document, 1D 02456,

4 binder 2 for Your Honours. 1D 02456, this is dated 21 October 1992 and

5 we see at the top of it, it says, "Sixth draft." Do you see it, sir? It

6 says "Possible constitutional structure for BiH."

7 A. Yes, I can see that.

8 Q. Now, obviously there must have been a first, a second, a third a

9 fourth and a fifth draft preceding this one. Can you please explain to

10 us what was going on?

11 A. This is the result of negotiations, a result indicating what

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina should look like and here, it is envisaged that it

13 would be an internationally-recognised state within its

14 internationally-recognised borders. The borders would be the same as the

15 ones in the Yugoslav times, but it would be a state that would be divided

16 into a number of provinces and a state that would be decentralised.

17 Q. All right. Look at 1D 02883, 2883. That's in binder 3, Your

18 Honours. 1D 02883. This is the next document for you, sir. And if we

19 look at the Croatian version and look at the last page, is that your

20 signature?

21 A. Yes, it is my signature.

22 Q. If we look at the -- there's something else that's written, 1992

23 and it appears to be of a darker colour. We may get a question as to

24 what's it doing there because it would appear that it says, "October

25 1992." And that's handwritten. That's the translation of it. Is that

Page 29412

1 correct?

2 A. Yes, the October 1992, this is something that I added later on.

3 As far as I can recall, I prepared this material for a working group at

4 the Presidency, and it was my position as to how Bosnia and Herzegovina

5 should be organised or set up.

6 Now, I can't recall whether that was the time or perhaps this may

7 have happened earlier but that was my position. It was also the position

8 of the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in this initial period of

9 time.

10 Q. All right. To the best of your knowledge, as I understand it,

11 this would have been drafted in October 1992, on or about.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. In other words, I just want to make sure that we're very clear,

14 it wasn't drafted in preparation for your testimony here today or for

15 another testimony in years past, but this was done at the time; correct?

16 A. It was done at the time but I -- perhaps I didn't sign it on that

17 day. Maybe I did it some other day.

18 Q. All right. And lastly, this document, does it reflect -- does it

19 accurately reflect your position then, that is the position that you held

20 at the time?

21 A. These were my thoughts about a viable Bosnia and Herzegovina and

22 they correspond, for the most part, with what we advocated at the

23 negotiations.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. Your Honours, that would conclude this

25 segment, and I don't have enough time to go into the next. I know we're

Page 29413

1 about four minutes shy of 7.00 and the interpreters have been working

2 very hard today in light of everybody speaking rather quickly. So

3 perhaps we could end a little early.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I think we will adjourn the

5 hearing at 7.00. You used up 2 hours and 30 minutes, approximately,

6 Mr. Karnavas, which means that you still have 3 hours and 30 minutes.

7 Maybe we will finish tomorrow. I certainly hope so. And then we will

8 have another two days for the rest.

9 Witness, like I said earlier, you will have to come back tomorrow

10 afternoon. We will be sitting in the afternoon which means that our

11 hearings start at quarter past 2.00. We will see you then.

12 It's almost 7.00 p.m. I wish everybody a nice evening, and we'll

13 meet again tomorrow afternoon.

14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.

15 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day June,

16 2008, at 2.15 p.m.