Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 31045

 1                           Monday, 21 July 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the

 6     case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-74-T,

 9     the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11             Today is the 21st of July, 2008.  Good afternoon to the accused,

12     to the Defence counsel, to Mr. Scott and his associates, and to all the

13     people helping us.

14             First of all, I shall give the floor to the registrar for a few

15     IC numbers.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Some parties have

17     submitted lists of documents to be tendered through Witness

18     Buntic, Zoran.  The list submitted by 1D shall be given Exhibit number

19     IC 00827.  The list submitted by 2D shall be given Exhibit number

20     IC 00828.  The list submitted by 3D shall be given Exhibit number

21     IC 00829.  The list submitted by 4D shall be given Exhibit number

22     IC 00830.  The list submitted by 5D shall be given Exhibit number

23     IC 00831.  And finally, the list submitted by the OTP shall be given

24     Exhibit number 00832.  Thank you.  Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.  You

Page 31046

 1     wanted the floor, Mr. Scott.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, Your Honour, ever so briefly.  Can we go into

 3     private session for just a moment, please.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar.

 5                           [Private session]

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24                           [Open session]

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we are back in open session.

Page 31048

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] 4D is about to cross-examine.

 2     You have 2 hours and 60 seconds.  As you see, it's very exact indeed.

 3                           [The witness entered court]

 4                           WITNESS: MIOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]

 5                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, sir.  You know that

 9     the cross-examination is going to resume.  Ms. Alaburic is the one among

10     the Defence counsel who is going to cross-examine you first.  She is to

11     be followed by the Prosecutor for his own cross-examination.

12             You may proceed.

13             Oh, yes.  Ms. Alaburic, my fellow Judge reminds me of this.  If

14     you are to tackle new topics, you have to say so, and if you ask

15     questions that arise from the examination-in-chief, then it will be

16     credited as part of your cross-examination.  If you tackle a new topic,

17     you have to say that ahead of time.

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, good afternoon.

19     Good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul.  Good afternoon to everyone in the courtroom.

20             Your Honour, I believe that all of my questions will in a certain

21     way be related to documents and topics that have been raised or shown

22     during direct examination, but if you still feel that I'm going beyond

23     the scope of direct examination, I will not be opposed to you treating

24     that time as the time allocated to the Defence of General Petkovic.

25                           Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:  [Continued]

Page 31049

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Zuzul, I believe you remember where we left

 2     off, and I will continue according to the plan that I had made already in

 3     May.  Let me remind you of one question asked by His Honour

 4     Judge Antonetti relating to documents of the United Nations.  You were

 5     asked if you could point out Resolution, a report of the

 6     Secretary-General containing major errors.  The question and answer are

 7     on 27713 page of the transcript, and the next page, 27714.

 8             You answered, Mr. Zuzul, that you had not observed any major

 9     errors, but what you could hold against perhaps the international

10     community was their attempt to balance out the responsibilities.  Do you

11     remember that?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   What kind of balancing out of responsibilities were you thinking

14     of?

15        A.   In more than one meeting that I personally had with

16     representatives of the international community I heard the response that

17     neither in Croatia, in UNPROFOR protected areas, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina

18     were they there to establish responsibility or to apportion blame.  They

19     were there just to observe what was happening on the ground without

20     taking into account the broader picture, and that created the impression

21     that there was an attempt to artificially balance out the

22     responsibilities, because if you take into account that that part of the

23     territory of Croatia had been occupied before the UNPROFOR came, and when

24     you are trying to report only as of a certain moment without taking into

25     account what had happened before, the resulting picture is objectively

Page 31050

 1     inaccurate.

 2        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, tell me, were you relatively well informed about the

 3     developments in Croatia in those years, in the '90s, in order to be able

 4     to assess whether a certain UN report does or does not contain errors?

 5        A.   I believe I was relatively well informed.

 6        Q.   Were you equally well informed of developments and events in

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 8        A.   If we are talking about events on the ground in Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina, of course I was not as well informed as of happenings in

10     Croatia, but I knew the overall situation and especially the course of

11     negotiations on the former Yugoslavia.  I was relatively well informed.

12        Q.   I'd like to move on to another topic that concerns the transcript

13     that you discussed on the 7th of May with the Defence of Prlic, P 00131.

14     It's in the binder of Prlic Defence.  I have to admit I don't know which

15     number of the binder because there were several.

16             I believe that you don't even need to see the document.  I'll try

17     to remind you of certain portions of that transcript and then we could go

18     through them together.

19             It's a transcript from a meeting between President Tudjman and

20     the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, the staff of the

21     Croatian army, and the military commanders held on the 4th of March,

22     1992, and in direct examination you spoke about it in the context of the

23     defence of southern Croatia.  In that meeting you were represented

24     [as interpreted], Mr. Zuzul, as a psychologist in the IPD administration

25     of the Republic of Croatia.  Was that really the case in March 1992?

Page 31051

 1        A.   Yes.  In the beginning of March 1992 that was my position.

 2             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry, Ms. Alaburic.  This reads in the

 3     transcript you were represented as a psychologist.  Did you mean you were

 4     presented as a psychologist?  The sentence does not really make sense,

 5     I'm afraid.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I meant to say that he was

 7     introduced as a psychologist.  So everybody when starting to speak gave

 8     their background first, and that's how Mr. Zuzul had introduced himself,

 9     as a psychologist at the Ministry of Defence.

10        Q.   This document is already exhibited in the case, and I believe it

11     contains some important positions that I would like you to explain,

12     Mr. Zuzul, as a participant in that discussion.  At that meeting, it's on

13     page 46 of the English transcript, you pointed out the existence of two

14     categories of people.  One category, former members of the Yugoslav

15     People's Army; and the second category, those who had never been in that

16     army.  And then you tried to point out that in certain segments of the

17     Republic of Croatia there was a certain tension between those two

18     categories of people.

19             Do you remember giving that caution?

20        A.   Yes, I do recall that.

21        Q.   What I would like to know at this moment is the view of

22     President Tudjman.  Tell us, did President Tudjman believe that anyone

23     who wanted to commit themselves to defence of the country, regardless of

24     whether they had previously been officers of the JNA, should be able to

25     find their place either in the army or in some other part of the war

Page 31052

 1     effort?

 2        A.   Correct.  I can testify from direct knowledge and direct

 3     communication with President Tudjman that he indeed believed that,

 4     because only two days after this contribution to the discussion I made

 5     President Tudjman invited me for a talk.  We discussed precisely this

 6     subject and even -- and he even offered me a position in the Ministry of

 7     Defence.

 8        Q.   Could you help us understand another statement made by late

 9     President Tudjman.  On page 92 of the English transcript he said and I

10     will quote:  "As I believe Professor Zuzul mentioned do not make any

11     political statements.  And generally speaking, the army has no place in

12     the political arena."

13             Tell us, Mr. Zuzul, did President Tudjman really believe that the

14     army should concern themselves with the defence of the country rather

15     than being a political factor?

16        A.   My opinion at the time was that President Tudjman held the view

17     that for the defence of the country and for the purposes of creating an

18     army it would be best if the army stayed out of politics as much as

19     possible.

20        Q.   Another very important statement, in fact a three-page speech in

21     the English transcript, that's 103 through 105, I'll try to remind you.

22     On this occasion late President Tudjman said that the US has still not

23     recognised Croatia, and there were some politicians in the US who still

24     viewed Croatia in a way as a continuation of the Independent State of

25     Croatia from the time of World War II, and he reminded us that certain

Page 31053

 1     factors, certain players like the HOS were still taking pictures with the

 2     symbol "U" and the iconography of the independent State of Croatia, and

 3     Tudjman said, I quote, "They are fascists.  They are a continuation of

 4     the independent State of Croatia."  And he called upon all the commanders

 5     of the Croatian army to firmly oppose that and to prevent any attempt of

 6     any soldier to identify himself with any ideology that is similar or

 7     identical to Fascist ideologies of World War II.

 8             Do you think that Tudjman really supported a Fascist policy of

 9     that previous state, the Independent State of Croatia?

10        A.   In all my discussions with late President Tudjman, I only heard

11     anti-Fascist views from him.  Generally speaking, it is well known that

12     late President Tudjman was an active fighter against Fascism, and to add

13     a personal note, it was indeed a subject that I discussed with him quite

14     often because my father had also been actively involved in the struggle

15     against Fascism.  Not in Croatia or in Yugoslavia but in Belgium.  So we

16     discussed it quite often.  I was a young man then, and I was quite

17     interested in hearing his views and his thinking about it.

18        Q.   Tell us, President Tudjman was Tito's general, as the phrase

19     went.

20        A.   Correct.

21        Q.   Now, Mr. Zuzul, I'd appreciate it if you could try to comment on

22     certain statements and events related to Vance-Owen's Peace Plan and the

23     events in January 1993.  You were familiar with the negotiations, and you

24     knew about the plans of the international community.

25        A.   Around the 1st of February, 1993, that's true.  I became the

Page 31054

 1     ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to Geneva, and among other things

 2     my job was to monitor the peace talks.

 3        Q.   In the course of those talks did you come to know

 4     Mr. Herbert Okun?

 5        A.   Yes, I did.

 6        Q.   I will put to you some of his statements, and you will tell me

 7     whether they are correct, accurate, or not.

 8             So one statement goes like this:  "Croats were full of

 9     enthusiasm, not only about maps but the whole Vance-Owen Plan."  It's on

10     transcript page 16752.

11             Tell us, Dr. Zuzul, this evaluation about the enthusiasm of

12     Croats, is that accurate in your view or not?

13        A.   I believe he noted it accurately.  I don't know if I, myself,

14     would use the term "enthusiasm," but I would say that the Croats,

15     generally speaking, readily accepted the Vance-Owen Plan.

16        Q.   On the next page of the transcript Mr. Herbert Okun said:  "The

17     Bosnian Croats signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in January 1993 knowing

18     that Serbs, and to a lesser extent Muslims, would not accept the

19     package."

20             To the best your knowledge did Croats really accept the

21     Vance-Owen Plan sincerely and completely, or they were reckoning that the

22     other side would not go through with it and it will be dead in the water

23     anyway, that it was just pure calculation on the Croat side?

24        A.   It's much easier for me to talk about the positions, the official

25     positions, of Croatia.  I can say that official Croatia truly and with

Page 31055

 1     all seriousness accepted the Vance-Owen Plan, because we believed it was

 2     conducive to a solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to a solution

 3     to the problems in Croatia, because part of Croatia had been occupied

 4     still, and to a general diffusion of tensions.

 5             As for my colleagues from Bosnia and Herzegovina, I had occasion

 6     to talk with many of them at that time, although I did not represent them

 7     officially, and it was my impression that they, too, were embracing the

 8     plan sincerely.

 9        Q.   Could you now give us your comments on certain observations made

10     by Mr. Okun regarding maps?  Mr. Okun told us the discussions on maps

11     were continuous and marked by dispute, constant dispute.  Would that be

12     accurate?

13        A.   Rather.

14        Q.   In my set of documents, I prepared P 9276.  Those are maps.

15     Among others, maps of Banovina Croatia and certain provinces in

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the Vance-Owen Plan from January 1993.

17     The document has been exhibited.

18             Could you please open the documents marked "Banovina '39," and

19     another document, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 2nd January 1993.  We will

20     not go into detail.  Instead, I'd like to look at conclusions that can be

21     made at first blush.

22             If we look at these maps, Mr. Zuzul, can we agree that the

23     territory designated as part of the Banovina of 1939 in the territory of

24     Bosnia and Herzegovina is very similar to what the Croatian provinces

25     used to be in the Vance-Owen Plan of 1993?

Page 31056

 1        A.   I believe that's right.  It's rather similar.

 2        Q.   Tell me, in addition to these two maps, did you see any other

 3     maps during the negotiations which had marked as Croatian territory areas

 4     smaller or larger than these?

 5        A.   During the negotiations numerous maps were shown.  The territory

 6     varied.  It was on occasion larger, on occasion smaller than the one we

 7     have here.

 8        Q.   If we tried to identify a common denominator of all these maps,

 9     would we assert that all these maps had marked as Croatian territory

10     Western Herzegovina, that is the area around Tomislavgrad, Posusje,

11     Grude, Ljubuski, and so on.  Around Tomislavgrad, Posusje, Ljubuski,

12     Grude, and so on.  Let me not go into all the municipalities involved.

13     Then an area of Central Bosnia and a part of the Bosnian Posavina.  In

14     other words, these three groups of territories or areas.  Can we agree on

15     that, Mr. Zuzul?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   If we were to try to look at the ethnicity criterion and the

18     economic units and so on and so forth and try and identify the areas

19     where the Croats were in an absolute or relative majority, and if we came

20     up with a territory which made a more or less sensible area, would that

21     territory again include Western Herzegovina, parts of Central Bosnia, and

22     Bosnian Posavina?

23             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  Sorry to interrupt counsel,

24     but I am just concerned for the accuracy of the record and so that we all

25     know what we're talking about here.  I can appreciate that counsel

Page 31057

 1     doesn't want to necessarily go through all of the municipalities claimed

 2     to comprise Herceg-Bosna, but there might in fact, and the Prosecution in

 3     fact would take the position that there's another category of territory

 4     that is neither Western Herzegovina nor Central Bosnia.

 5             In looking at the map, if the Chamber has that available, the

 6     Prosecution might agree in fact that when one uses the terminology

 7     "Western Herzegovina," that might indeed be the so-called border

 8     municipalities of Livno, Tomislavgrad, Posusje, Grude, Ljubuski.  We

 9     would not agree that Western Herzegovina, for example, includes

10     Jablanica, nor do we think Jablanica is part of Central Bosnia.  So

11     therefore when certain questions are put to Mr. Zuzul which do not -- do

12     not fully set out the territory described, there is substantial area for

13     confusion or lack of clarity.  So counsel might -- if she insists or

14     wants to know this material accurately, she may have to get a bit more

15     detail, I'm afraid.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I thank my learned

18     friend Mr. Scott on the comment.  I must say that I'm not quite clear

19     with the gist of his objection.  Let me just draw your attention that my

20     question to Mr. Zuzul did not relate to the area of Central Bosnia.  I

21     spoke of the territories marked as Banovina in 1939 and the territories

22     marked as the Croatian provinces under the Vance-Owen Plan of

23     January 1993.  In other words, I did not mention Herceg-Bosna in any way,

24     so that his remarks relating to Jablanica and other areas is -- are quite

25     unfounded, and it's not my intention to discuss the area of Herceg-Bosna

Page 31058

 1     with Mr. Zuzul.  I clearly expressed what I wanted to discuss about in my

 2     question.  I'm sure the witness answered the question -- or, rather, by

 3     looking at the transcript, I can see that the witness did not in fact

 4     answer my question, and I would like to ask the Trial Chamber to request

 5     the witness to answer the question.

 6             Let us forget for a moment that Herceg-Bosna ever existed.  If

 7     anyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted to set up a third entity, the

 8     so-called Croat entity based on economic criteria or the criteria of it

 9     being an economic and regional entity and ethnic entity, would that

10     individual come up with a territory that includes Western Herzegovina,

11     parts of Central Bosnia, and parts of Bosnian Posavina?

12        A.   What I can testify to is that based on my knowledge of the work

13     of the work group and the negotiating party is that they drew their maps

14     precisely based on the criteria you mentioned, namely, ethnic, economic,

15     and spatial or territorial criteria.  At any rate, it was experts from

16     the international community who drew these maps rather than the local

17     players from the area, although I believe that the latter would have come

18     up with more or less the same maps.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Zuzul, can you now comment upon the possibility

20     of defining the States which arose from the former Yugoslavia.  In your

21     binder you have document 4D 540.  This document has been exhibited, and

22     this is the opinion of the Badinter Commission defining the conditions

23     based on which the republics of the former Yugoslavia could be recognised

24     as states.  There is no need to read that.  You'll remember that.

25             One of the criteria set out the following:  That the republics of

Page 31059

 1     the former Yugoslavia would be recognised in what were then their

 2     republican borders.

 3             First of all, Mr. Zuzul, were you aware of this view held by the

 4     Badinter Commission?

 5        A.   Although the Badinter Commission advanced their conclusions

 6     before I became actively involved in diplomatic work, I was fully aware

 7     as a private citizen, and later on as a diplomat, of what they were

 8     about.  And if I can say, the vast majority of the citizens of the

 9     Republic of Croatia gladly accepted such a decision.

10             After all these years, I can only repeat that this was the only

11     proper decision, that is that the borders of the new states could only be

12     defined as the borders of the then republics.

13        Q.   Let us look at the next document, 4D 00542.  This is a document

14     of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, guidelines for the

15     recognition of the new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

16     The document dates from December 1991.

17             The last bullet on page 1 says:  "Acknowledging the inviolability

18     of all borders that can be changed only through peaceful means and joint

19     agreement."

20             Mr. Zuzul are you aware of this document issued by the Council of

21     Ministers of the European Community?

22        A.   I am aware of this document.  It was on the basis of this

23     document that Slovenia and Croatia were recognised roughly a month later.

24        Q.   Tell us, was it a fact that the professional expert public at

25     large supported the idea that the new states arising from the former

Page 31060

 1     Yugoslavia should have as borders the so-called AVNOJ borders?

 2        A.   By all means.  Let me just say something that goes beyond the

 3     scope of your question, but I was reminded of that by these documents.

 4             On several occasions in the course of that process, in the course

 5     of this trial, and I saw this in the indictment as well, that there was a

 6     wish for Croatia to be defined within the borders of Banovina Hrvatska,

 7     of the Croatian Banovina.

 8             The document we have now on our screens proves the absurdity of

 9     such a premise or such an aspiration.  The Croatian Banovina did not

10     include important parts of the Republic of Croatia; namely, Istria, one

11     of the most significant and most beautiful parts of Croatia; the town of

12     Rijeka with over 200.000 inhabitants; the town of Zadar with almost

13     100.000 inhabitants.  In other words, if someone offered the citizens of

14     Croatia the borders of the Croatian Banovina whereby they would lose the

15     territory where, roughly speaking, half a million of inhabitants live at

16     present, territory which is at any case an integral part of the

17     Republic of Croatia, in exchange for something that cannot in any way,

18     either historically or territorially, be compared, I don't believe that

19     such an individual offering something like that would be taken in

20     earnest.

21             Truth to tell, I am not aware of or I don't know a single serious

22     individual who, if offered the map of the Croatian Banovina and the map

23     of the current Republic of Croatia, who would in all common sense vote

24     for the former.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you for your extensive answer, but you left out

Page 31061

 1     Baranja which was also not part of the Croatian Banovina.

 2        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 3        Q.   Let's also look at another document which also has to do with the

 4     same topic.  This is 34428 [as interpreted].  It's also been exhibited.

 5     This is an Official Note from the meeting with the -- with the French

 6     delegation.  This was compiled by General Anton Tus.  Please turn to page

 7     2.  Let me repeat the number of the document.  3D, so it's the document

 8     of the Defence for General Praljak, 3D 00482.  Now we have the correct

 9     number.

10             At page 2 -- the document dates from January 1993, and the

11     meeting took place on the 13th of January.

12             At page 2 of the document, the words uttered by General Praljak

13     are conveyed.  Let me quote that.  "The Croats are committed to an

14     integral Bosnia-Herzegovina and to the rights of Croats.  The problems

15     between Muslims and Croats in the BH are the result of different

16     objectives of the political struggles.  Croats are fighting for state of

17     the BH with an autonomy for Croats whereas the Muslims are struggling for

18     a civic state.  So it follows clearly from this that the Croats are also

19     struggling for state of the BH."  Let's look at page 3, the end of the

20     penultimate paragraph where General Tus spoke.  The Geneva conference

21     offers a solution for the BH on equal footing.  The creation of a Serb

22     state in the BH would be an error that would not contribute to the

23     resolution of the Serbian issue in the Republic of Croatia.

24             In connection with this document and in particular in relation to

25     the view or the premise expressed by General Tus, let me put the

Page 31062

 1     following questions to you, Dr. Zuzul, as an individual who was on quite

 2     close terms with President Tudjman, and you can base your testimony on

 3     first-hand knowledge.

 4             Did the Republic of Croatia in the AVNOJ borders represent a

 5     certain value which President Tudjman would not jeopardise under any

 6     circumstances, to your knowledge?

 7        A.   Most certainly, yes.  That is so.

 8        Q.   To your knowledge, was President Tudjman aware of the possibility

 9     that by separating parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and forming and

10     independent state would call into question the very survival of the AVNOJ

11     republican borders as well as the issue of the survival of the

12     Republic of Croatia in the AVNOJ borders?  In other words, would such a

13     development in Bosnia-Herzegovina also legitimise the right of the Serb

14     people in the Republic of Croatia to ask for the -- for the one-third of

15     the territory that was under their occupation to be separated, to secede?

16        A.   I believe that he was aware of that, and such a danger most

17     definitely existed.  I will not go into a discussion about how far such a

18     view, if held by the Croatian Serbs, would have been legitimate.

19     However, the fact of the matter is that back in 1993 or 1994, the Serbs

20     in the so-called Krajina in Croatia and the Serbs from the so-called

21     Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina had made formal decisions on the

22     issue, that is, to get united.  This would most definitely place the

23     borders and even the very existence of the republic of Croatia in

24     jeopardy.

25        Q.   Dr. Zuzul, in your opinion did late President Tudjman consider

Page 31063

 1     the position of the international community serious, its position that it

 2     would not allow for the borders of the republics of the former Yugoslavia

 3     to be changed by force?

 4        A.   I do believe that he regarded it as serious and that he was

 5     convinced that forcible change of borders would not be allowed.  However,

 6     oftentimes during international negotiations there was mention of the

 7     possibility to change borders through peaceful means.

 8        Q.   Can you now clarify what you've just said, the fact that the

 9     negotiations mentioned the change of borders through peaceful means?

10     Which particular borders of the Republic of Croatia are you referring to?

11        A.   The only example I'm aware of where President Tudjman accepted to

12     engage in such talks was the possibility of swapping the territories in

13     the area of Neum in Bosnia-Herzegovina for certain parts of territories

14     in Croatia.  This is something I spoke of earlier on.

15             Proposals for territories to be swapped was something that we

16     were -- we received on several occasions.  For instance, I heard

17     repeatedly that Croatia would not be in a position to reintegrate

18     Eastern Slavonia and that we should best negotiate with the Republic of

19     Serbia in order to have this territory exchanged for -- or swapped either

20     for the territory of the Bosnian Posavina, and I heard indirectly on two

21     occasions the Serb side proposing that that particular territory be

22     swapped for the occupied territory around Knin.  In other words, we were

23     supposed to swap a piece of Croatian territory for another piece of

24     Croatian territory.

25             In a nutshell, not once did I observe President Tudjman agreeing

Page 31064

 1     to such talks to begin with.

 2        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, can you now clarify the statement that you made about

 3     the -- the part of the territory around Neum?  Were these negotiations

 4     which were supposed to result in the possibility for Bosnia-Herzegovina

 5     to have a proper harbour for its economic purposes on the Croatian coast?

 6        A.   Correct.  Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is Muslim representatives,

 7     always emphasised the issue of access to the sea as one of the key issues

 8     in all negotiations, and then the issue of Neum and the status of Neum

 9     arose.

10        Q.   Now, Dr. Zuzul, as opposed to these statements about realpolitik

11     and the standpoints of the international community, I would like to

12     confront you with some statements of President Tudjman about the borders

13     of Republic of Croatia that he sometimes called absurd.  Sometimes he

14     called them unnatural.  Sometimes he said that Croatia is the only state

15     in the world that looks like a croissant, that it's simply not natural to

16     begin with.

17             Let me ask you, this statement of late President Tudjman about

18     the unnaturalness and absurdity of Croatian borders, were they reflected

19     in the press?  Could people read about it in newspapers, hear it on

20     television?

21        A.   I believe so.

22        Q.   Can we, on the contrary, then infer that nobody learned of these

23     views of Mr. Tudjman by wiretapping or any other spy means of gathering

24     intelligence?

25        A.   Correct.  As far as I remember, President Tudjman made such a

Page 31065

 1     statement in one public debate after the first free and democratic

 2     elections in Croatia.

 3        Q.   You mean the one about the croissant.

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Tell us, late President Tudjman was an historian?

 6        A.   Correct.

 7        Q.   As a high official in Croatian politics and a collaborator of

 8     President Tudjman, have you ever noticed that those statements were part

 9     of the official views of President Tudjman and official positions of the

10     Croatian policy and that they affected the foreign policy of Croatia and

11     the state policy in general?

12        A.   Well, if you allow me some time, I will tell you about my

13     impressions.

14             It always seemed to me that President Tudjman approached certain

15     problems in two ways.  First of all as an historian who had spent decades

16     of his life studying the situation in the territory of the former

17     Yugoslavia, inter-ethnic relations in that region.  And as an historian

18     and as a philosopher, I would say that he liked to think in terms of

19     theories of major international solutions.

20             When he spoke from that point of view wearing his historian hat,

21     Dr. Tudjman would expound on all the problems that attended the creation

22     of Bosnia and the problems related to Bosnia and Herzegovina in both the

23     first and the second Yugoslavia, and he did express doubts about the

24     viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the future.

25             At any rate, he's not the only historian or philosopher or

Page 31066

 1     politician who held or expressed those views.  We can still hear them

 2     nowadays.  However, as a statesman who in his own words had an historic

 3     opportunity to create a sovereign State of Croatia, I believe that he

 4     acted rationally and pragmatically, and he accepted the fact that Bosnia

 5     and Herzegovina has been internationally recognised and accepted as a

 6     state.  And from the entirety of his conduct as a head of state, I would

 7     say that his activities, if you want me to say directly, and I know that

 8     from instructions he gave to us diplomats and others, I believe, too, his

 9     activities were directed at preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina, but while

10     protecting Croats inside Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11        Q.   Thank you for this additional explanation, Dr. Zuzul.  When you

12     attended these international talks, did you observe certain participants

13     in the talks, not only as one of the participants yourself, as a

14     politician, but also a psychologist?

15        A.   Well, I am a psychologist by training.  I've spent a good part of

16     my life working as a professor of psychology, and I believe that I could

17     use the same analogy as most of you esteemed lawyers are unable to look

18     at a document without assessing its legal aspects.  Similarly, for most

19     of us psychologists, it's hard to abstract our training.  But at the same

20     time I'm not saying that my conclusions as a psychologist are more

21     accurate than any conclusions a layman could make.

22        Q.   I'm now going to show you some documents, and I'll ask you to

23     comment looking at these documents.  The approach of the delegation led

24     by President Alija Izetbegovic, as representatives of one of the three

25     warring sides of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I believe the documents will

Page 31067

 1     help us understand better.

 2             The first document is 4D 01118.  It's a transcript from the

 3     session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of

 4     the 26th November 1993.  I'll ask you, Mr. Zuzul, about something on

 5     page 4 in B/C/S.  In English it's page marked DD003364.

 6             One of the topics here is demilitarisation.  To the best of your

 7     recollection was demilitarisation one of the topics discussed at

 8     international talks?

 9        A.   Yes, here and there the issue would crop up.

10        Q.   Let us look at what Alija Izetbegovic said about the position of

11     his delegation.  I quote:  "I would say a couple of words about

12     demilitarisation.  Another position has to be defended.  When we accepted

13     this demilitarisation, we reckoned this way.  Light infantry weapons

14     won't be surrendered by anyone certainly, so who will be demilitarised?

15     Those who have heavy weapons will be demilitarised.  Therefore, it won't

16     affect us.  That was our reasoning.  Certain forms of demilitarisation do

17     not affect us, because they will have to surrender tanks and turn over

18     heavy artillery over to be supervised.  They would surrender 100 tanks,

19     whereas we would surrender 4 to 10.  I don't know what the ratio is

20     currently.  In artillery the ratio is 1 to 10, whereas everyone will hide

21     light weaponry, of course, or they will hand it over to the police.  So

22     we thought there could be a way of removing those tanks from Bosnia.

23     However, after touring Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems to us that we

24     need the army too.  We need an army too.  And we need to ensure," I am

25     sorry about the way these sentences sound, but I'm just reading.

Page 31068

 1              "This army has to exist as an army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 2     Demilitarisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not really suit us

 3     because no one would be protecting us then."

 4             Dr. Zuzul, to the best of your knowledge did the Muslim

 5     delegation really support demilitarisation for a while and then after a

 6     certain point they stopped supporting that principle because they decided

 7     it would be contrary to their interests?  Do you know anything about it?

 8        A.   Well, I personally think that demilitarisation had never been

 9     taken seriously by anyone.  No one ever considered it a serious option,

10     because I believe the Serbian side or the Yugoslav army was not prepared

11     to hand over their weapons.  And it was equally clear that the

12     international community had no resolve, did not have the required resolve

13     to take the weaponry away from them.

14             It is quite certain that for Croatia, and especially for the

15     Muslim side in the beginning of the war this demilitarisation would have

16     been useful and good.  But as I said, nobody ever believed it possible.

17             However, if you allow me to say this as a psychologist, to

18     venture a comment, I knew and held in high esteem Mr. Alija Izetbegovic

19     as a man who was visibly deeply concerned for the fate of his people, but

20     I believe this passage that you've just read was quite typical of his

21     approach to negotiations.  In this very brief passage, he advocates two

22     completely opposite stands.  In the first few sentences he supports

23     demilitarisation, and in the next couple of sentences he's against it.

24     And that's when he was addressing his own parliament, if I'm not

25     mistaken.

Page 31069

 1             That frequently happened at the negotiations, even in direct

 2     negotiations and talks.  And if I may say one more thing, it appeared to

 3     me that it sometimes led to problems in communication between him and

 4     President Tudjman.  As a rule, President Tudjman was the kind of person

 5     who, when he made a decision, and he was relatively firm when he made

 6     decisions, he was keen on seeing it through.  President Izetbegovic, on

 7     the other hand, and I have to emphasise I'm speaking from my own personal

 8     experience, had difficulty in making decisions.  And even when he made a

 9     decision, it was not yet certain that he would really carry it out.

10             By this I don't mean to say anything bad about him, but I believe

11     that I'm not alone in thinking like this.  There are many other people

12     who had occasion to observe him and who think the same.

13        Q.   I thought we would come to that when we see some more passages

14     from this transcript, but I believe what you just said is going to be

15     confirmed by what follows.

16             Let us look at the next passage.  In Croatian it's on page 13

17     onwards, and in English it's DD003374 onwards.  I'll quote it here.

18              "Alija Izetbegovic says that only US supports integral Bosnia,"

19     and he says, I'm saying this for the benefit of Judge Antonetti, "all

20     this is for nothing when Mitterrand is leading the policy in France."

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel please start reading again and

22     tell us where she's reading from, please?

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] So let me repeat part of my

24     question.

25        Q.   After a brief comment, "What's the use from France when it's led

Page 31070

 1     by Mitterrand?"  Then Tudjman says:  "The objective of the policy is to

 2     fight for an integral Bosnia," and then I quote:  "I don't see at this

 3     moment any forces that could carry this idea through.  I don't see any.

 4     Just point your finger.  What are those forces that could carry the idea

 5     of an integrated Bosnia through?  If you mean the army, the army can

 6     defend these people here and these areas here, and by exerting its

 7     pressure, with some additional pressure from us through politics, we

 8     could broaden that area perhaps a little bit, but the army is not strong

 9     enough to go all the way to Banja Luka.  It's futile even to talk about

10     it.  Only idealists with no sense of reality can talk about that."

11             I'll end the quotation here.  Tell me, Dr. Zuzul, Banja Luka was

12     the capital of Republika Srpska, wasn't it?

13        A.   One of the two capitals in the view of the Bosnian Serbs.  One

14     was Banja Luka and the other Pale.

15        Q.   Tell us, as a person who relatively -- knew the situation there

16     relatively well, did Izetbegovic want to say that the BH army did not

17     have the strength to reach Banja Luka or to liberate the territory of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina from the army of Republika Srpska?

19        A.   I believe that your interpretation is correct.

20        Q.   Tell us, Mr. Zuzul, based on your participation in international

21     conferences, was it clear that the -- the Muslim delegation led by

22     Alija Izetbegovic --

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic.  I refer to your

24     question before, which I understood to be a question of whether one or

25     the other, and the answer is, "I believe your interpretation is correct."

Page 31071

 1     So the answer is it's either or the other, but probably you were asking

 2     for an answer as to which it was, one or the other, and that cannot be

 3     answered by "yes" very well.  This is an exception to the rule that you

 4     must answer "yes," "no," "I can't say."  It may again be a linguistic

 5     problem.  I'm referring to page 26, lines 6 to 9.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, let me clarify

 7     these -- the word "or," which referred to the following:  To arrive -- to

 8     reach Banja Luka or to liberate the territory depending on how you

 9     interpret it.  This would be an aggression in view of the Serbs, and now

10     for Croats and Muslims this would mean liberation.  So my question was

11     not placed this as opposed to the other but meaning -- liberation meaning

12     the BH army reaching Banja Luka.  I believe that Dr. Zuzul understood my

13     question properly.

14             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  Well, he said -- he did not have a

15     translation either, so it's easier for him, but I thank you for your

16     explanation.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

18        Q.   Dr. Zuzul, I had a feeling you were about to add something.  If

19     not, we can move on to the next question.

20             To your knowledge, based on your participation in international

21     conferences, was it clear that the Bosniak Muslim delegation was in

22     favour of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina as opposed to the state model of a

23     federation, confederation, or anything else of the sort?

24        A.   To qualify the conduct of the Bosnian Muslim delegation

25     unequivocally, I believe that they espoused the idea of a united

Page 31072

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitarian state and more so in the political than

 2     in the territorial sense.

 3        Q.   Thank you for the answer.  Let us look at the page 19 of the

 4     Croatian text and page 3380 of the English version.  We have a very short

 5     conclusion by Alija Izetbegovic which I will read fully.  I quote:  "We

 6     can make one conclusion so far.  The delegation should go up there.  More

 7     or less we know what the platform is, plus those efforts regarding the

 8     extension of functions and territories, plus the failure to sign and so

 9     on and so forth.  Can we go there with such instructions?  Let's see and

10     come back."

11             Dr. Zuzul, based on this it is quite clear that the Bosnia

12     delegation received an instruction here not to sign documents whatsoever,

13     to attend the event but to come back without having signed anything.

14     Based on your experience, were there situations where the Bosnian

15     delegation indeed comported this way?

16        A.   I had never had occasion to see an address by Mr. Izetbegovic to

17     his delegation in such clear terms.  However, my impression on many

18     occasions had been that they did not have the intention to arrive at a

19     solution but that they negotiated for the sake of negotiating or for the

20     sake of buying time.

21        Q.   Thank you.  We will see how the positions of the Bosniak

22     delegations evolved.  Now let us look at 4D 01052.  01052.  This is the

23     transcript from the Presidency session of the Republic of

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 29th of December, 1993.

25             I selected the portions I felt were the most important.  One of

Page 31073

 1     them, maybe not so important but equally interesting, can be found at

 2     page -- we're following the enumeration in the lower right-hand corner.

 3             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Ms. Alaburic, I may again have misunderstood

 4     something, but we have a title with the number, and that speaks of a

 5     meeting of the 29th of December, but then we have the transcript itself

 6     which speaks of 26th of December, and I'd be grateful if you told me what

 7     I misunderstood.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, can you just tell me

 9     where it is that the 26th of December is written since I don't have that

10     date in my document?

11             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  It's the opening page.  It's the very first

12     page.  In the English translation, anyway.

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely.  It's a

14     translation error.  So this is an error in the English translation.  It

15     is indeed the 233rd session, but as you can see in the original version,

16     the date is the 29th.  I apologise for not checking whether the two

17     tally.  I did not look at all the details.

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20        Q.   Dr. Zuzul, this is what I wanted you to comment upon.  Let us

21     look at the enumeration in our language.  It's in the lower right-hand

22     corner.  Look at the enumeration, 0700.  In English that's at pages 26

23     and 27.  I will tell you briefly what the BH Presidency discussed here.

24             They said that it was inappropriate for Boban's army to be called

25     Ustasha, because according to an investigation conducted by the Globus,

Page 31074

 1     Globus weekly, because they had the -- Boban's troops had 221 years'

 2     membership in the party, and they are not Fascists.  They should not be

 3     called Highwaymen, Vampires and such like.  So they should not be called

 4     Vampires, Boban's Men, so on and so forth.

 5             In your opinion, Dr. Zuzul, how did the Bosnian leadership -- the

 6     Bosnian Muslim leadership refer to the leadership of Herceg-Bosnia?  How

 7     did they style them or call them?  Do you have any knowledge to that

 8     effect?

 9        A.   I would not really want to go into what they called them

10     officially, but it is true that the media did use that particular term

11     dating from World War II, the terms harking back to the Ustasha and

12     Chetniks.  This particular term could not have been used by Croats and

13     Muslims given the events of World War II since both -- there were both

14     Croats and Muslims who were members of either the Partisans, on the one

15     hand, or the Ustasha on the other.

16             This is street slang, not to say the slang of the underworld

17     which found its way to the public at large through the media.  I was not

18     aware of such terminology ever having been used at official meetings such

19     as this one, but I was always aware of the fact that this made

20     communication more difficult.  And I mean communication in general

21     between peoples and politicians.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Let us look at what Alija Izetbegovic said at page

23     703 onwards.  That's at page 29 of the English version, 29 onwards.

24     That's the very end of December 1993.  The BH army launched an offensive

25     in Central Bosnia.  We will be coming to that part of the transcript

Page 31075

 1     later on.  What we are interested in at the moment is the following, and

 2     I quote:  "When it comes to the specific conduct of the army in

 3     Central Bosnia, what they say on the issue of negotiations, it literally

 4     says:  Nothing has been agreed upon until everything has been agreed

 5     upon.  Therefore, Central Bosnia -- a deal was not reached on

 6     Central Bosnia.  Armija still has a free-hand in -- in terms of

 7     conducting actions since no deal has yet been made."

 8             Dr. Zuzul, to your knowledge was it the policy of the Bosnia

 9     delegation always such that one issue would be left open, would not be

10     agreed upon, so that pursuant to this particular policy, according to

11     which nothing has been agreed upon until everything has been agreed upon,

12     new -- or, rather, all issues would be raised for discussion again,

13     issues that were considered settled by other parties to the negotiations?

14        A.   I cannot claim with any certainty whether the Muslim Bosniak side

15     acted deliberately in that respect.  However, on several occasions and at

16     several negotiations I observed not only Mr. Izetbegovic but other

17     representatives of the Muslims expressing the view that nothing had been

18     agreed upon until everything was agreed upon.

19             I specifically remember one occasion where during an interval in

20     the negotiations, as an individual who had by that time been studying the

21     theory of negotiations and where more -- speaking more as -- as an

22     intellectual then than a politician, I -- I tried to reason with them

23     that complex political relations could not be addressed or resolved

24     through -- through such a position.  I tried to reason with them on

25     several occasions, but they insisted on taking that course and thus

Page 31076

 1     continued in their resolve to leave these negotiations open without any

 2     specific solutions.

 3             On the other hand, international negotiators were rather inclined

 4     to accept such negotiating position because it made it easier for them to

 5     hold these negotiations.

 6             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  With your permission.  Mr. Zuzul, in your view

 7     is this a wrong attitude?  Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,

 8     or is it a possible attitude in negotiations?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was a position that was

10     possible and oftentimes expressed.  However, in most negotiations that

11     are of a complex nature, and these particular negotiations were of a very

12     complex nature, such a position, and I believe I -- many experts would

13     agree with me on this, such a position leads to an impasse.

14             For instance, in order for them to be able to agree upon

15     political solutions a truce has to be introduced first.  If you say that

16     a truce cannot be introduced because political settlements have not been

17     made, you -- you obstruct negotiations.

18             I have now remembered that this was what they specifically did.

19     Whenever we said that he would should find a framework solution for

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would say, "Well, yes, but we did not really

21     agree upon how individual municipality would be -- municipalities would

22     be divided amongst us."

23             So the global solution could not be reached because not

24     everything has been agreed upon.  However, if you look at the principles

25     of negotiations, you cannot even go into resolving details unless you

Page 31077

 1     have found a framework solution.  That was my opinion at the time, and

 2     that is still my opinion.

 3             I cannot claim that the Muslim side did this to deliberately

 4     obstruct negotiations, or as I described it on several occasions, to buy

 5     time.  It was my impression that the Muslim side, particularly

 6     Mr. Izetbegovic, were convinced that their negotiating position would

 7     strengthen over time.  However, I repeat that was only an impression on

 8     my part.

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  It's time for the

11     break now.  We're going to break for 20 minutes.  I inform the Petkovic

12     Defence that it still has 45 minutes left.

13                           --- Recess taken at 3.52 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 4.12 p.m.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.  I

16     believe that Judge Prandler has a question to ask.

17             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Thank you.  I'm sorry, Ms. Alaburic, to take

18     your time, but just one minute.  It is, of course, not your time, but

19     ours.  So I would simply would like to confirm, as far as my position is

20     concerned, that I would have asked the same question from Mr. Zuzul like

21     what has been asked by Judge Trechsel, and also in view of the -- my

22     experience in the given field, that is the international negotiations, I

23     believe that that very principle which was mentioned has been -- in

24     general has been adopted as a positive one.  So that is why without

25     losing too much time I would only like to -- to ask Mr. Zuzul, Dr. Zuzul,

Page 31078

 1     if you really feel that the given principle has prevented you, I mean the

 2     Croatian side, to proceed with the negotiations and to reach some

 3     positive results.  It is my question.  Thank you.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, by no means did it prevent the

 5     Croatian side.  The Croatian side never even thought or said that it

 6     could thwart us.  I was speaking of the position of the Muslim side by

 7     saying that when you have long-lasting negotiations, you have been

 8     negotiating for days and then you reach a point of agreement, if any of

 9     the sides holds on to the principle that nothing is agreed until

10     everything is agreed, and if they interpret that principle as meaning

11     that everything that had been agreed previously is null and void, then

12     that could practically thwart, disable the negotiations.  That's how I

13     interpreted that principle.  It wasn't always the case, but sometimes I

14     had the impression that that's the way the Muslim side interpreted this

15     principle itself.

16             Let me illustrate again.  We had been negotiating for two days or

17     five days or ten days, but if one side adheres to the principle that none

18     of these agreements are worth anything unless we agree on the minutest

19     detail on the 14th day, and if they proceed from that principle, then on

20     day 13 we will reach a point when they say none of our agreements hold

21     true.  We have to start again.

22             And as I've said already, if you accept this principle in theory

23     and in practice, then it makes it impossible to reach an agreement.  And

24     my impression was that sometimes, not always but sometimes, that's the

25     way negotiations were led.

Page 31079

 1             I hope, Your Honour, I manage to clarify what I really meant.

 2             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Thank you very much, Dr. Zuzul.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, you may proceed.

 4     I was a little too generous earlier on.  I told you 45 minutes, but it's

 5     actually 43 minutes according to our calculations.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you very much

 7     for this generosity.  I hope I will return it with even greater

 8     generosity by not using up all of the 43 minutes.

 9             I thank the Judges for these questions.

10        Q.   Dr. Zuzul, can we try to boil this down to two main standpoints?

11     Can we agree that unless all elements of one agreement are agreed then

12     this agreement has not been reached?

13        A.   Of course.

14        Q.   And if one delegation in these negotiations deliberately and

15     consciously conducts the negotiations in such a way as to always leave

16     one element not agreed on the principle that nothing is agreed until

17     everything is agreed, that can make the negotiations endless.  And can we

18     then say that it is a way of obstructing the negotiations by making

19     agreement impossible?

20             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Ms. Alaburic, I wonder whether it's quite

21     correct to again speak of deliberate, whereafter the witness has said

22     that he could not affirm that there was a deliberate policy behind that.

23     I think this is not entirely correct.  Perhaps you want to reformulate.

24             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my question now is

25     phrased very generally, and it doesn't concern the specific policy of the

Page 31080

 1     Muslim delegation now.  It's a general question.  It can apply in other

 2     situations to Croats.  I am not trying to examine this principle on the

 3     factual level.  We're going to do that with other witnesses, and we have

 4     numerous documents about it even now.

 5        Q.   So in principle, Mr. Zuzul, regardless of who it concerns, if one

 6     delegation behaves in the way I described, if they always leave one issue

 7     open, can that be considered as an obstruction of negotiations?

 8        A.   I am certain that it can, and in my answer to His Honour

 9     Judge Prandler, I tried to illustrate why I believe it can indeed be

10     obstruction.  If one legitimate principle is taken as absolute, namely,

11     the principle nothing is agreed until everything is, then this principle

12     is used to destroy the entire process.  Negotiations are only

13     negotiations if all the sides are talking bona fide in the desire to

14     reach an agreement; otherwise, it's obstruction.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Zuzul.  Let us look at the transcript again.  We

16     were talking about attacks on Vitez.  On page in Croatian 704 and English

17     page 29, Stjepan Kljuic is trying to raise the issue wouldn't it be a

18     good idea if the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina moved to liberate Foca

19     rather than moving at Vitez, and he goes on to say that from the

20     standpoint of Bosnia and Herzegovina and from the viewpoint of the Muslim

21     people, "Foca would be more important to us."

22             Dr. Zuzul, tell us, which side held the territory of Foca under

23     its control?

24        A.   I don't know who held Foca at that moment, but judging by what is

25     said here -- in fact, I'd rather not interpret what Mr. Kljuic meant.

Page 31081

 1        Q.   Several pages later, Croatian 709, English 33 and 34, Mr. Siber,

 2     who was deputy commander of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he says

 3     this analysis is interesting -- I'm quoting from 710, the end of his

 4     contribution.  I quote:  "I'm telling you that the BH army has the

 5     strength with regard to Busovaca, Vitez, and the part of Novi Travnik

 6     currently held by HVO under the absolute control of Boban's men and the

 7     Herzegovina men, save for Kiseljak where the UNPROFOR is located and

 8     when -- where nothing may be done, the BH army has the strength and the

 9     resources to move into those places within 48 hours.  But what will

10     happen to the left bank of Mostar?  The industry in Vitez, especially the

11     segments of the industry in Vitez that are important to this nascent

12     state."

13             Dr. Zuzul, did you know that towards the end of 1993, at the same

14     time as negotiations were going on the BH army was moving to liberate, as

15     they thought of it, Busovaca, Vitez, parts of Novi Travnik from the HVO?

16        A.   Well, I knew about sporadic clashes and skirmishes in those

17     areas, but I'm very surprised to see this transcript and to realise that

18     those were planned operations.  I had no inkling of that, and I believe

19     no one on our side, none of those who participated in the negotiations,

20     were aware of it.

21        Q.   Let's see how the leadership in Sarajevo planned this offensive

22     without having it become known.  Pages 35, 36 in English.  I will quote

23     Stjepan Kljuic.  "Can we do something for our own sake?  Since you --

24     since we were accused at the United Nations.  The finger was pointed at

25     us.  We have to respond.  Why don't you appear on TV and say that the BH

Page 31082

 1     army is not mounting an offensive against Vitez, but between us, look,

 2     and I mean we're not children here.  As Ivo says, someone has more life

 3     experience and more wisdom.  Some speak more, some speak less and do

 4     more, et cetera.  It is clear to all of us that strategically speaking,

 5     the most important for the BH army are Vitez and Novi Travnik because the

 6     industries are there, as my namesake said, that could carry us through

 7     another 20 years.  And I said once, I said that to the president, for the

 8     sake of the international community you should say that we are not

 9     mounting any offensives, and second, strictly between us, by the 18th we

10     should stop the offensive."

11             Tell us, Dr. Zuzul, did you have any knowledge that

12     Alija Izetbegovic or any of the representatives of the leadership in

13     Sarajevo are making public statements that there was no offensive while a

14     very fierce offensive was taking place on the ground and even the date of

15     its termination was defined?

16        A.   I had no idea, and I believe no one on our side in the

17     negotiations had any idea.  I'm happy that it eventually turned out that

18     a solution can be found through negotiations, but I am sincerely

19     astounded by this double play in politics, although I knew it existed.

20        Q.   Can we now look at 4D 009300.  It's a president's assertion --

21             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  May I just ask a question which the answer seems

22     implicitly to have been given by you, but still I think it's of some

23     relevance.  Do you know whether these discussions, and we're reading the

24     text, the transcript of discussions, whether they led to any decision

25     being taken?

Page 31083

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Are you referring to decisions in

 2     negotiations or decisions relative to the situation on the ground?

 3             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm talking about decisions implemented some of

 4     the suggestion that are made in the discussion and that surprise you.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot make any assertions

 6     because I do not know whether on the basis of this some actions followed,

 7     whether the decisions were indeed implemented by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 8     I don't know that.  However, by you leave, Your Honour, let me tell you

 9     why I said that I was astounded.  If you remember, I personally --

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  You have answered my question,

11     actually, and I would not like this to lead to further time being

12     consumed.

13             Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic.

14             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we're aware that once

15     a foundation is laid facts have to be proven about such policies, and

16     this is something that the Defence will be doing in the following -- next

17     months.

18             The next document is 4D 00930.  In other words, the document

19     dated the 14th of January, 1993.  Let's look at the page ending in

20     numbers 232.  In the English version this is page 9, and then 11 and the

21     beginning of page 12.

22        Q.   One participant at the meeting, Mr. Ljubjankic read a German

23     report on the negotiations led in that period.  Among other things, the

24     BH army offensive against Vitez is mentioned.  Let us focus on the

25     statement by Alija Izetbegovic.  I quote:  "Because they said who would

Page 31084

 1     engage in the war effort now.  I say we need Vitez for the sake of the

 2     future and not because we particularly wish to wage a war right now.  We

 3     will be accused of wanting to capture Vitez in order to prolong the war.

 4     That's not why we're doing it.  We need Vitez for the sake of our

 5     future."

 6             Tell us, Dr. Zuzul, did you have any knowledge that in early 1994

 7     there had been fighting between the BH army and the HVO over Vitez?

 8        A.   I didn't have any specific knowledge.  I did, however, receive

 9     sporadic information about fighting in certain areas of Central Bosnia.

10        Q.   Let me draw your attention to one part of the German report

11     Mr. Ljubjankic referred to.  I quote:  "In the last efforts to achieve

12     peace it has become quite apparent that the Muslim army still treats the

13     war option as option number one to say the least.  Evidently they want to

14     obtain from the Croats what it was impossible for them to obtain from the

15     Serbs."  Although there were other interesting remarks made here.

16             Dr. Zuzul, tell us, in the course of international negotiations,

17     was it your impression or did you have first-hand knowledge of the Muslim

18     leadership in Sarajevo having realised that they did not stand a chance

19     in the clashes against the army of Republika Srpska which was their

20     superior and that they decided to try and gain what they could from the

21     fighting against the HVO?

22        A.   I cannot say that I had any specific information to that effect.

23     I can only say that this was the impression I had on occasion.

24        Q.   At page 240 onwards of the minutes, in English that's pages 19

25     and 20, Alija Izetbegovic again refers to that principle whereby unless

Page 31085

 1     everything is agreed nothing is agreed.

 2             Let us look at two of his sentences.  I quote:  "Of course we

 3     have to be in favour of an integral -- an integrated Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 4     but do not forget that the presence of that army is -- that that's the

 5     reason why we're contemplating a different solution other than that of an

 6     integrated state."

 7             Dr. Zuzul, did you have any knowledge about the Muslim leadership

 8     in Sarajevo realising that because of the Republika Srpska and the

 9     Republika Srpska army could not achieve such an integrated state simply

10     because the BH army did not have the strength to win that fight?

11        A.   On several occasions so far I have said, and this is something

12     the transcripts confirm now, that the objective of the Muslim leadership

13     was to establish a unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That is impression that

14     has been confirmed by actual events.  The Muslim side was prepared to

15     give up territory rather than to give up on the idea of a unitarian

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17             Another impression of mine which is proved true by this

18     transcript was that the Muslim side sometimes negotiated not in order to

19     reach or find a solution but to play for time, which would allow them to

20     create conditions conducive to a unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21             Let me describe a situation I experienced.  The talks were held,

22     I believe, in Zagreb when President Tudjman told President Izetbegovic

23     the following:  "Alija, you say you have several hundred thousand dead.

24     How many dead -- or how many more people should die before you should be

25     prepared to negotiate a solution of sorts?"  President Izetbegovic's

Page 31086

 1     response to that was, "Even if million -- a million of them died, a

 2     million would still be left to live their lives the way they should be

 3     lived."  I'm quoting from memory here.

 4             This conversation remained deeply etched in my memory, in a way

 5     it does fit into the general picture.

 6        Q.   Dr. Zuzul, thank you very much.  My cross-examination is

 7     finished.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I generously place

 9     the remainder of my time at the disposal of the Prosecution.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

11     Ms. Alaburic.  You have been very generous indeed.  Mr. Scott, you have

12     the floor.

13             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Perhaps -- perhaps it is important for the Bench

14     to clarify what I think you do not misunderstand.  Ms. Alaburic, of

15     course, cannot dispose of her time in your favour, and you've got plenty

16     anyway, I'm sure.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this was said in

18     jest.  We know that we do have the same amount of time as the Prosecution

19     but that that time cannot be given away in this way.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  The jest was carried on, Ms. Alaburic.

21             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.  Again, good

22     afternoon and to counsel and to all of those in the courtroom.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Scott:

24        Q.   And good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul.  Let me just say that much of your

25     testimony so far has -- has gone a long way toward confirming much of the

Page 31087

 1     Prosecution case, so there will be many things that we won't, I think,

 2     need to talk about.  I would like to ask you a number of questions

 3     about -- or some questions at least about your preparations.

 4             Before you came and appeared before the Chamber and gave your

 5     testimony in May, can you tell us a bit about what preparations you made

 6     in giving your testimony?  Did you meet with anyone?  Did you review

 7     documents?  What steps did you take in that regard?

 8             MR. KHAN:  Well, Your Honour, before that is answered, I don't

 9     want to be pedantic or difficult, but my learned friends for the

10     Prosecution have on numerous occasions decried a proclivity of some

11     members allegedly to insert comments in their questions, and in my

12     respectful submission that is precisely what my learned friend Mr. Scott

13     has done in his opening remarks about much of the Prosecution case being

14     proved.  That is a matter, of course, for Your Honours to decide in due

15     course and I simply rise.  I don't want silence in any way, shape, or

16     form to be viewed as some kind of consent or acceptance or acquiescence

17     of the statement put forward by my learned friend.

18             MR. SCOTT:

19        Q.   Sir, if you can go ahead and tell us, please, about what

20     preparations you made for giving you testimony starting in May, please.

21        A.   Mr. Scott, in order to prepare as best I could to help ascertain

22     the truth and nothing but the truth - this is the way I see my evidence

23     here - I met with the Defence for Mr. Prlic, reviewed the documents they

24     placed at my disposal and went through these documents in my discussion

25     with them.  I had one telephone conversation with Madam Alaburic and that

Page 31088

 1     was all.

 2        Q.   And in the course of meeting with the Defence for Mr. Prlic was

 3     any sort of a statement prepared or a summary or an outline of your

 4     testimony, anything that was prepared and put in front of you by way of

 5     review or something that would encapsulate or summarise, if you will, the

 6     testimony that you were expected to give?

 7        A.   I don't recall any such thing.

 8        Q.   And since you -- you'll recall that when you left the courtroom

 9     room in May the President admonished you not to speak to anyone about

10     your testimony between that time and today, and let me just inquire, have

11     you talked with anyone about your testimony, either the testimony you've

12     already gave or the testimony you anticipated starting or commencing

13     again today?  And by anyone, sir, I mean anyone.  Have you spoken to

14     anyone about your testimony?

15        A.   Well, my wife was present at the time and is present here during

16     my testimony.  I wouldn't place her in any of the categories.  Of course

17     I discussed my evidence with her, and in very general terms I spoke with

18     certain individuals who are part of my private life.  But as I understood

19     what the -- Their Honours said, I did not talk to anyone who would have

20     been involved in this case in any way.  I did not discuss the case with

21     anyone.

22        Q.   Well, who were the certain individuals that you consider part of

23     your private life that you spoke to about your testimony?

24        A.   It would be very difficult to recall these individuals to begin

25     with.

Page 31089

 1        Q.   Excuse me.

 2        A.   I'm --

 3        Q.   If it's that difficult to recall, just how many people did you

 4     talk to about your testimony?

 5        A.   About the substance of my testimony.  Well, I don't know.  I

 6     don't think I talked about that to anyone.  The fact remains that a good

 7     part of Croatia and a good part of Bosnia-Herzegovina know who I am and

 8     that I testified.  This was published in the media.  Everyone was able to

 9     follow --

10        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

11        A.   -- my testimony.

12        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... I will have to sometimes,

13     with my apology in advance, cut you off because I'm not interested about

14     what was reported in the media.  You said a few moments ago, you said,

15     quote, and I'm looking at the transcript:  "... certain individuals who

16     were part of my private life."  Now, please name some of those

17     individuals, please.

18        A.   My apologies, Mr. Prosecutor.  I fail to understand your

19     question.  I think you need to be more specific when you asked me what it

20     is I talked about.  Well, for instance, I spoke to my family about how I

21     felt in the courtroom.  Now, whether this comes into the category of

22     discussing the testimony or not, I don't know.

23        Q.   We'll put your family to one side, sir.  Who else did you speak

24     to about your testimony?

25        A.   I can't particularly recall who it was I spoke to.  In my view, I

Page 31090

 1     did not speak with anyone about the substance of my testimony or the

 2     case.

 3        Q.   And since you appeared here in May anticipating at some point

 4     that you would be scheduled to come and complete your testimony, since

 5     you testified in May have you engaged in any other preparations, made any

 6     other reviews, reviewed any additional documents since beginning your

 7     testimony?

 8        A.   No specific documents.  I apologise.  Yes.  I went through some

 9     documents published on the internet from some other cases.  I read some

10     books about that time period and territory, in particular this one book

11     that is known to the Prosecution publish by the CIA analysts entitled

12     "The Balkan Battlegrounds."  This book helped refresh my memory of

13     certain events.  Other than that, I wouldn't say that I had any such

14     activities, or I undertook any such activities with regard to this case.

15        Q.   When you say that you went through some documents published,

16     excuse me, on the internet from some other cases, what other cases were

17     they about?

18        A.   I saw part of the testimony of Mr. Mile Akmadzic on the internet.

19     It was just a portion of it, not the entire testimony.  And a part of

20     Mr. Rebic's testimony.

21        Q.   Now, what made you think that before coming back to give your

22     testimony here under oath that you wanted to review Mr. Akmadzic's

23     testimony and Mr. Rebic's testimony?

24             MR. KARNAVAS:  Excuse me, sir, before answering the question I'm

25     going to object to the line of questioning.  There was no prohibition on

Page 31091

 1     any of that.  Secondly, as I understand it and from my sources, the

 2     Prosecution has been very, very active in trying to dig up dirt onto this

 3     witness's private or past political affairs.  So I don't think that there

 4     were any prohibitions.  I don't think there's anything wrong with it.

 5     And in fact when the gentleman did ask for his -- a copy of his

 6     transcript, he was told that he could get it from the internet.  So if

 7     we're going to put any limitations, then we should do that before the

 8     person leaves the courtroom, not at this point.  And I object to this

 9     line of questioning.  I would like to know what the relevance is, and I

10     would like an answer and a ruling on my objection.

11             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, the Prosecution hasn't at this point

12     suggested whether anything was improper or not but is simply inquiring so

13     that the Chamber can fully assess the probative value and credibility of

14     this witness, what he has done to prepare to testify, and if Mr. Karnavas

15     doesn't have any objection to the content of it, that anyone can do this,

16     then let's proceed with the questions.

17             My question -- my pending question is:  What made the witness

18     think that he would want to review the testimony of Mr. Akmadzic and

19     Mr. Rebic before resuming his testimony?

20        Q.   Can you tell us that, sir?

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please answer, Witness.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  First of

23     all, I did not use the term, and I believe I'm quite precise in my use of

24     Croatian, and I speak English.  I never said that I reviewed the

25     testimonies of Mr. Akmadzic and Mr. Rebic.  I simply said that since I

Page 31092

 1     was told that I could find transcripts of my own testimony on the

 2     internet and that -- that they could only be found on the internet, which

 3     is not the easiest way of looking through something, then I came across

 4     the transcripts of other testimonies, and it seemed only logical to go

 5     and see what the course of these testimonies was.  Since the transcripts

 6     were quite long and I was away on holiday with my family, I only looked

 7     at them cursorily.  As I've just said, nobody ever told me that this

 8     would be contrary to the rules binding me as a witness.

 9             MR. SCOTT:

10        Q.   Let's move forward to a few other basic points as we begin, sir.

11             MR. SCOTT:  I'd like for the witness to be shown in the

12     Prosecution's book of maps, which is Exhibit P 09276, and whichever is

13     easier, whether to put it on e-court or whether to give it to the witness

14     in hard copy, but map number 1, the very first map in P 09276, or I'm

15     told that there is a copy in binder 2, I'm told, if that also assists the

16     courtroom.  Are P 092 -- I'll make sure I get it right.  P 09276.  All

17     right.  Apparently we're having -- could we please have it on the --

18     thank you.

19        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, if you can look on the screen in front of you, please,

20     and I think this will be fully adequate for the present purposes.

21             If you look at the map -- again for the record this is map

22     number 1 in the Prosecution's book of maps, which is P 09276.  And would

23     you agree with me, sir, that in December 1990, following the elections,

24     the first open elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were held in about

25     November or December of 1990, every bit of the territory within these --

Page 31093

 1     the bright red line surrounding what has been labelled as "Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina," every bit of that territory belonged to the Republic of

 3     Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at that time was completely within the

 4     Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; correct?

 5        A.   It seems to be a precise map.  In other words, that's correct.

 6        Q.   And in December, if we go forward a year in time, if we go to

 7     December 1991, that remained exactly the same; correct?  All the

 8     territory within that bright red line continued to be the territory of

 9     Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?

10        A.   I believe so.  Obviously, yes.

11        Q.   And moving forward to the end of May 1992, after Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina had become an independent state and a Member State of the

13     United Nations, these were -- this red line, this bright red line, these

14     were the internationally recognised borders of that Member State of the

15     United Nations and all the territory within that bright red line, without

16     exception, was the sovereign territory of the UN Member State of Bosnia

17     and Herzegovina; correct?

18        A.   Yes, correct.

19        Q.   And at least until mid-1994, at least, and every day in between,

20     from May 1992 to the middle of 1994, every bit of that area remained the

21     sovereign territory of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

22        A.   In my opinion that remained throughout a sovereign part of Bosnia

23     and Herzegovina to date.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in a similar fashion, as of the time that

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state and a Member State of the

Page 31094

 1     United Nations, again in May 1992, from that time until at least

 2     mid-1994, the internationally recognised government of that

 3     UN Member State was the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was

 4     based, at least primarily, in Sarajevo; correct?

 5        A.   It's correct in principle.  I would not dare venture any

 6     assertions on where it was always stationed, where they was based.

 7        Q.   I'm not sure I understand the last part of your answer.  It

 8     trailed off a bit, sir, I'm sorry?

 9        A.   Well, let me try to explain.  I believe that there had been

10     moments where the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Presidency

11     were unable to enter Sarajevo themselves, and to ask me to confirm that

12     is too much, but in principle I believe what you said is correct.

13        Q.   Thank you very much.  Now, I wasn't asking you any questions

14     about freedom of movement or travel but simply can you confirm for us,

15     this is a basic principle for the Judges, that nonetheless, whether you

16     thought it was a good idea or a bad idea, whichever, the internationally

17     recognised government of the UN Member State throughout this time period

18     was the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you allow me, just

20     one objection.  I don't think it is in dispute that states are recognised

21     by international law, not governments.  Governments can change, but

22     states always remain a subject to international law.

23             MR. SCOTT:  Be that as it may, Your Honour, that has no impact on

24     my question whatsoever.  My question to the witness, I believe he's

25     answered it but given the additional qualification that he made, I just

Page 31095

 1     want the record to be very clear, the question is whether the

 2     internationally recognised government of that state was the government of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina that at least primarily through this period was based

 4     in Sarajevo.

 5        Q.   Correct?

 6        A.   Throughout that time Sarajevo was the capital of the

 7     internationally recognised state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That is not

 8     in dispute and that's correct.

 9        Q.   Sir.  Was there any other government purported to represent the

10     UN Member State of Bosnia and Herzegovina during that period of time that

11     was recognised by the international community?  Is there some other

12     government out there somewhere that was representing this state?

13             MR. KARNAVAS:  Excuse me, sir.  Which period are we talking

14     about?

15             MR. SCOTT:  Between as we said in my initial question, between

16     May 1992, include up to mid-1994.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Then I would object since we have had testimony

18     that at various negotiations Izetbegovic was seen to be a representative

19     of the Muslim nation, and so on and so forth.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let the Prosecutor do his work.

21     We understand perfectly what the question is.  We're waiting for the

22     answer.  Your objection is pointless.

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  I object to the form of the question, because

24     which -- because we have had testimony, we have had testimony where

25     Mr. Akmadzic was there as the prime minister in the United States.

Page 31096

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Karnavas.  Mr. Karnavas, I do not quite

 2     understand the objections.  Do you part from an assumption that every

 3     witness will say the same?  If some witness has said something, do you

 4     think the same question cannot be put to the other witness?

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  But I'm looking at the question, Judge Trechsel,

 6     and we have had testimony that when there were international negotiations

 7     you had three different parties.

 8             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  And that's it?  That's the end of the matter?

 9     No other witness can be asked the same question, perhaps?

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour --

11             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry.  We have to assess the witness

12     testimony that is given here, and we do not expect and cannot and should

13     not expect every witness to say the same thing.  If one witness had said

14     something, another witness may say the same or may say something

15     different, and I do not understand the justification of your objection, I

16     must say.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, if I could just get a ruling on my

18     objection.  My objection is I object to the form of the question as

19     stated.  It allows -- it has facts that are not -- that are not

20     accurately portrayed in the evidence.  My objection can be sustained or

21     overruled and we'll move on, but I'm entitled to a ruling.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Your objection is overruled.

23             Please proceed, Mr. Scott.

24             MR. SCOTT:

25        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, I'm not trying to -- I'm not trying to be difficult

Page 31097

 1     about this.  I'm just trying to get a very clear answer.  I'm not talking

 2     about who individual officials were or the fact that some of them may

 3     have worn different hats, and indeed the Chamber has heard about that.

 4     I'm talking about the government as an entity.

 5             The international community had to be dealing with someone.  The

 6     United Nations sitting in New York had to deal with someone.  It was a

 7     UN Member State.  And that someone throughout this period time from May

 8     1992 to the middle of 1994 was the government of that state, the

 9     government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'm simply saying most people would

10     refer to it sometimes as the Sarajevo government.  Correct?

11        A.   If you want real clarity, what you said is correct, but it's

12     equally correct that the representatives who simultaneously represented

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared in negotiations about Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina as representatives of one of the sides.  To me that posed no

15     problem.  In my correspondent -- correspondence with Mr. Izetbegovic, I

16     addressed him as president, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although at

17     one point it was quite unclear whether according to the constitution he

18     indeed had that position.  But to me it was indeed the government of

19     Bosnia and Herzegovina except when they were acting as representatives of

20     one of the sides in negotiations.

21        Q.   You answered my question yes, sir.  And in terms of other people

22     that acted or wore different hats, you would agree in fact there were a

23     number of people on the Croat side which also from time to time wore

24     different hats, including one already mentioned, Mr. Akmadzic; correct?

25     Sometimes he was acting on behalf of the HDZ.  Sometimes he was acting on

Page 31098

 1     behalf of Herceg-Bosna.  Sometimes he was the personal representative of

 2     Franjo Tudjman, and sometimes he was the prime minister of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

 4        A.   I could not confirm that because you have enumerated many hats,

 5     but, as I said earlier, it's not only true of Mr. Akmadzic.

 6     Mr. Izetbegovic himself sometimes acted as the president of SDA, a

 7     political party, sometimes as a representative of Muslims in

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at other times as a president of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10        Q.   And just in the same way that President Bush of the United States

11     acts as the senior head of the Republican Party, and sometimes he acts as

12     president of the United States.  So I think we can establish that.

13             Now, let's go forward to Greater Serbia.  You used that concept

14     at least seven or eight times in your direct testimony.  You talked about

15     Greater Serbia.  Can you tell the Chamber what that means to you when you

16     say Greater Serbia?

17        A.   It's true I used that term.  I was not alone in that.  I believe

18     there was nearly a consensus among everyone whoever dealt with the

19     history of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia that there existed in

20     Serbia a group of intellectuals that promoted the concept of

21     Greater Serbia, a Serbian state that would include all Serbs regardless

22     of where they lived.  And they even wrote that in so many words in the

23     so-called memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science, which is a public

24     document.  At one point in the early 1990s that policy began to be

25     implemented with the occupation of certain territories in Croatia and

Page 31099

 1     later in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That is how the plan of creating a

 2     Greater Serbia, so-called Greater Serbia, was being implemented.

 3        Q.   And this follows from that, in fact, what you were just saying,

 4     but as part of that practice, and again in your testimony you used

 5     several times the phrase "ethnic cleansing," and I'd like for you to

 6     please tell the Judges what you mean when you use that term, what you

 7     understand that term to mean.

 8        A.   To me and to most people that term means forcible expulsion of a

 9     certain part of a population from territories where they had lived for

10     centuries only because they belonged to one ethnic community.  And if I'm

11     not mistaken that term was first used accurately in the case of the

12     occupation of Vukovar when all the Croatian population, but not only, all

13     non-Serb population was driven out from that area.  And that repeated

14     itself in other territories that were being occupied by Serbs and later

15     in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16        Q.   And can you tell us, please, sir, when you use that term, and you

17     talked about Vukovar and you can give me your next answer in reference to

18     Vukovar if you wish or not, but you've mentioned forcible expulsion, and

19     can you tell us what some other types of conduct or behaviour or

20     practices do you understand to be part of ethnic cleansing or that took

21     place as part of ethnic cleansing?  And again, if you want to refer to

22     Vukovar, please do.

23        A.   I have spoken in very general terms, and although nothing good

24     can be said of such ugly conduct, in addition to expulsions there were

25     mass murders and mass deportations.  I meant everything that led to a

Page 31100

 1     population to disappear from certain areas, and all of that did happen in

 2     Vukovar.  Vukovar was the first.

 3        Q.   Excuse me.  Could you tell us what role does the destruction of

 4     religious or cultural or educational property, based on what you

 5     experienced and observed during these Balkan wars, what role does the

 6     destruction of cultural or religious or educational property play in

 7     ethnic cleansing?

 8        A.   From the very beginning of the aggression, religious property was

 9     a particular target of destruction and that played a role.

10        Q.   And why?  What is it about destroying the others, and I use the

11     term "the other," what is it about destroying the religious property

12     associated with the other that is significant or a part of ethnic

13     cleansing?

14        A.   It's difficult to answer that question, because I wonder myself

15     sometimes why, but if I try to think about it, not an acceptable but a

16     rational reason would be to demonstrate to that population that they

17     would never be able to come back to that area, because it's no secret

18     that in those areas religious property is very important to preserving

19     identity.  It's also indisputable that some destruction occurred

20     motivated purely by hatred.

21        Q.   Thank you, sir.  We'll come back to some of those topics again.

22     I would like to turn now to just some of your positions that you've told

23     us about.

24             When you were an Assistant Foreign Minister, and I believe that

25     was the first appointment that you received in the Croatian government,

Page 31101

 1     if I recall, when you were Assistant Foreign Minister, can you tell us

 2     who was your immediate superior; that is, who did you receive your tasks

 3     from, if you will?  Who gave you directions?  Who directed your work?

 4        A.   In that brief period of about two months, Mr. Zvonimir Separovic

 5     was the minister.

 6        Q.   And I take it that the answer then flows from that that he was

 7     the one who gave you your direction and tasks; is that correct?

 8        A.   Well, he did, and to some extent President Tudjman.

 9        Q.   And then when you were appointed Deputy Foreign Minister, the

10     same question, sir, who was your superior at that point in the same sense

11     that I just explained to you?

12        A.   Professor Skrabalo was the minister, and with him I worked really

13     as one team.  We both reported to President Tudjman.

14        Q.   And then when you took on your position as UN representative --

15     excuse me, Croatia's representative to the UN in Geneva, who did you

16     consider at that time to be your superior?

17        A.   My immediate superior was the Foreign Minister, Dr. Granic.

18        Q.   Was that in formal terms only or was it actually Dr. Granic who

19     actually supervised your work, gave you directions, what positions should

20     be taken in Geneva, or was it somebody else?

21        A.   It wasn't just in formal terms.  Mr. Granic was my superior, and

22     we cooperated very well, but I received many instructions directly from

23     President Tudjman, instructions as to how to act in negotiations.  If you

24     want to know more, in my normal daily work of a diplomat I communicated

25     with the Foreign Ministry, with Mr. Granic as the minister and

Page 31102

 1     Mr. Sanader as Deputy Minister.  In negotiations I communicated directly

 2     with President Tudjman even then, and especially when I became a special

 3     envoy of President Tudjman for these negotiations, and it was logical to

 4     talk directly with him.

 5        Q.   Just assist the Judges in having a bit more sense of your

 6     communications during that time period.  Now we're talking about when you

 7     were a UN -- excuse me, the representative to the UN in Geneva.  How

 8     often would you talk to, say, Mr. Granic or to President Tudjman?  Is

 9     that something that would happen on a daily basis or once a week, or was

10     there a regular morning telephone call?  How would you -- how did you

11     deal with these people?

12        A.   Well, I think I could say that I talked to Mr. Granic almost

13     every day, a little less often with President Tudjman but still

14     relatively often.  During negotiations I would hear from him every day,

15     but it was not a rule to report to him every day.  It's just that I

16     needed to keep him abreast of what was going on at the conference.

17        Q.   Now, let me change to another individual, Mr. Susak.  Had you

18     known Mr. Susak before coming -- taking up your position first as

19     assistant and then Deputy Foreign Minister?

20        A.   Correct.  I met him when I was in the Croatian army -- or,

21     rather, the Ministry of Defence.

22        Q.   And how did you come to meet Mr. Susak at that time?

23        A.   Well, I was with a group of my colleagues, university professors,

24     and we had this idea of creating a section for information and psychology

25     work within the ministry, and that's when we met closer up with

Page 31103

 1     Minister Susak.  I think we first spoke to General Tus and then with

 2     Minister Susak.

 3        Q.   Did you develop a relationship, though, with Mr. Susak after this

 4     initial acquaintance that you -- like with President Tudjman, Mr. Susak

 5     was someone that you had direct access to and would deal with directly?

 6        A.   My relations with Minister Susak developed.  We became friends

 7     almost.  We communicated rather often, but it was not as often as I

 8     communicated with Minister Granic or President Tudjman.  I don't remember

 9     a single case when Minister Susak had given me specific instructions on

10     any score whatever.

11        Q.   And --

12             THE WITNESS:  Just a small intervention in the translation.  I

13     said that I don't remember a single case when Minister Susak had given

14     me, me as the ambassador, specific --

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, you were an ambassador

16     of Croatia to the UN in Geneva.  The Prosecutor asked you how were the

17     communications between Tudjman and Mr. Granic and yourself.  You

18     mentioned phone calls.  You said how often those phone calls would take

19     place, but I would like to know the following:  As is the case in

20     diplomatic matters often, do you send diplomatic telegrams, and would you

21     receive specific instructions from Zagreb, or would everything take place

22     over the telephone?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In normal diplomatic work, in the

24     operation of the mission at the United Nations in Geneva, I believe, our

25     communication was similar to those of any other mission, through

Page 31104

 1     diplomatic channels:  Telegrams, notes, et cetera.  We sent them

 2     regularly, and we received them regularly, including instructions.

 3     Because in a way, ever since I had left for Geneva, I had a dual role.

 4     One was to do the regular diplomatic work at the mission with the

 5     United Nations, and we performed this in the same way as every other

 6     mission did.

 7             As far as monitoring the conference on the former Yugoslavia was

 8     concerned and participating in negotiations, most of the communication

 9     went again through standard diplomatic channels.  However, oftentimes

10     communication was direct, by telephone, because quite simply things were

11     happening too fast, and I had both the instructions and the right to make

12     the judgement myself when something was urgent enough to contact directly

13     the minister or the head of state without going through the usual

14     diplomatic channels.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

16             MR. SCOTT:

17        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, I'd like to turn next please to Mate Boban, who you

18     mentioned in your testimony before.  You said you had known Mr. Boban

19     before, that in fact you grew up in the town, Imotski, where Mr. Boban

20     worked, and as part of your testimony you said that just before the

21     developments that you had just been discussing and that you had just been

22     discussing December of 1991 you said:  "I had been directly in touch with

23     Mr. Boban."  Do you have any recollection of what business you had with

24     Mr. Boban in approximately December 1991?

25        A.   If I remember correctly what I said, I said I was indirectly in

Page 31105

 1     contact with Mr. Boban, and that's because my friend and his cousin, I

 2     suppose, Mr. Marinko Boban, contacted Mr. Mato Boban regarding possible

 3     organising of volunteers to assist with the liberation of Dubrovnik, and

 4     I don't recall any direct talk with him, with Mr. Boban, in December

 5     1991.  No, I don't recall that.

 6        Q.   All right.  Well, I don't intend to spend much time on that given

 7     everything we need to talk about.  You did -- it was transcribed at page

 8     26789 to 90 that you had "I had been directly in touch with Mr. Boban

 9     during that time," but I take it now that's been corrected.

10             What kind of relationship following that time did you develop

11     with Mr. Boban in these -- in the years 1992, 1993, 1994, since he was

12     the president of Herceg-Bosna, which I think we can all agree was

13     something that impacted your life at that time a fair amount.  What was

14     the nature of your dealings with Mr. Boban?

15        A.   I haven't quite understood your statement, Mr. Prosecutor, but as

16     I understand it, I cannot agree at all that my acquaintance with Mr. Mate

17     Boban had significant bearing on my life.  It had no significant bearing

18     on my life whatsoever.

19        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... what I said was in reference

20     to Herceg-Bosna, which I think that we can agree did have, at least as a

21     topic, as something that was going on at the time, did have a substantial

22     bearing on your life or probably you wouldn't be here.  So in that

23     regard, in regard to your dealings with Herceg-Bosna or touching on

24     Herceg-Bosna, can you tell the Judges, please, what relationship did you

25     develop with Mate Boban during that time period?

Page 31106

 1        A.   Once again, Mr. Prosecutor, I will start by telling you that not

 2     even Herceg-Bosnia had a significant bearing on my life.  The Republic of

 3     Croatia did and my work for the Republic of Croatia, but not

 4     Herceg-Bosnia.

 5        Q.   All right.  Well, be that as it may, sir, and we'll have a lot of

 6     time to talk about these specific topics, but tell us about your

 7     relationship with Mr. Boban during that time.

 8        A.   As I said, we knew each other in private life.  We would be in

 9     touch whenever he came to Geneva.  He would come to visit our mission as

10     well.  Sometimes, not always, I accompanied him to various meetings.  On

11     occasion we discussed political issues.  Sometimes I expressed my

12     disagreement with some of his thoughts or actions.  At any rate, I

13     received instructions from Zagreb and behaved the way I was told to

14     behave by my superiors.

15        Q.   Let me ask you about some of the things you've disagreed with.

16     You said, "Sometimes I expressed my disagreement with some of his

17     thoughts or actions."  Can you identify some of those thoughts or actions

18     that you disagreed with?

19        A.   My style is markedly different from that of Boban.  His tough

20     approach did not always help resolve matters, and my remarks were along

21     those lines.  I regularly told President Tudjman and the minister what

22     the situation was like with regard to negotiations, and I left the

23     decision up to them, whether they felt that they need to intervene either

24     toward Mr. Boban or toward anyone else.

25        Q.   So you disagreed with his style.  Did you disagree with any of

Page 31107

 1     his policies or behaviour?

 2        A.   You see, Mr. Prosecutor, I was an ambassador, and I tried to

 3     professionally perform my role.  I was not a politician in Geneva.  I did

 4     not deal with politician.

 5        Q.   Excuse me, sir.  Let me just ask you as a human being at the

 6     moment.  Let's put aside being an ambassador.  Did you ever disagree with

 7     any -- the substance or policies espoused by Mr. Boban during this time

 8     in any capacity, private, personal, official, whatever?  You said you

 9     disagreed with him in style.  Did you disagree with any of his behaviour,

10     actions, or policies?

11        A.   It is very difficult to answer that question in general terms.

12     If you ask me about a specific situation I can give you my opinion, but

13     where can you find a situation where everyone agrees with everyone

14     especially whens such complex issues are at stake.  Of course I did not

15     agree with many politicians and many individuals.

16        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... something important.  I'm

17     sure you won't use the Judges's time to talk about something trivial.  So

18     please talk about something important.  Please talk about some important

19     disagreement you had with Mr. Boban.

20        A.   I apologise.  I believe that you should put that question to me

21     in reference to a specific situation.  I'm giving you a general answer to

22     a general question.

23        Q.   Can you go please -- can I please direct your attention to

24     exhibit -- excuse me.  Can I ask you please to look at Exhibit P 10402.

25     It should be in one of your binders.

Page 31108

 1             MR. SCOTT:  It should be, Your Honours, in binder number 2.  No,

 2     excuse me.  My apology.  Binder number 3.  P 10402.  And if I can have

 3     that on --

 4        Q.   If I can ask you, sir, to turn particularly to -- and you can

 5     look at either one that assist you the most, the English or Croatian

 6     language.  These are excerpts from the book by Mate Granic, and in

 7     particular on page 70 of his book, or in the excerpts you'll just see on

 8     page 5 of the English version you'll see a reference to page 70.

 9             Mr. Granic says in his book:  "Mate Boban had a special role in

10     this conflict.  I had heard of him for the first time in 1992 when he

11     became the leader of the HDZ in BH.  We were formally introduced soon

12     afterwards but our first serious dealings only after I became -- had,"

13     excuse me, "but had our first serious dealings only after I had become

14     head of Croatian diplomacy.  We attended several meetings between the

15     Croatian authorities and Croats in BH.  We were never close, and we

16     supported completely different positions.  Boban was a very narrow-minded

17     man, full of hatred for the Bosniaks.  He supported Bosnian Serbs,

18     believing that he could enter into an agreement with them regardless of

19     the criminal policies of Karadzic, Mladic, and their assistants.  It was

20     clear to me that he was the biggest obstacle to peace in BH.  At meetings

21     he never spoke about the Bosniaks or Muslims but only used words like

22     Turks or Balija."

23             Now, how does Mr. Granic's description of Mr. Boban fit with your

24     experience?  Would you agree with that assessment?

25        A.   This is Mr. Granic's opinion which he wrote a number of years

Page 31109

 1     later.  He did not express his opinion in these terms in the period of

 2     time we're discussing.  Still, I can agree with some aspects of what he

 3     said here.

 4             I was under the impression that Mr. Boban felt that he could find

 5     a common language with the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina more easily than

 6     with the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Regardless of that, I would not

 7     say that Mr. Boban was the biggest obstacle to peace in

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 9        Q.   And how about --

10        A.   I think that's taking it a bit too far.

11        Q.   And how about the statements that he was full of hatred for the

12     Bosniaks and he always spoke about them using terms like Turks or Balija.

13     Was that your experience dealing with him?

14        A.   I did hear him use these terms, but I would definitely not say

15     that he used these terms all the time.  He sometimes referred to them as

16     Muslims and sometimes as Turks or Balija.

17        Q.   If I can just hopefully finish with this because I think we may

18     be coming up on the time for the break, but in the middle of that

19     paragraph Dr. Granic says:  "We supported completely different

20     positions."

21             Now, you worked closely on these issues for some period of years.

22     You worked closely, as you've told us already, with Dr. Granic.  Can you

23     tell us how Dr. Granic's positions differed from Mr. Boban's positions,

24     because Dr. Granic says they were completely different.

25        A.   He makes a general statement here which refers to a large period

Page 31110

 1     of time.  In my view, at some point there was a great difference in

 2     principled views between Mr. Granic and me on the one hand and Mr. Boban

 3     and others on the other, and this preceded the Washington -- that was

 4     about the Washington agreements -- or, rather, about the possibility of

 5     establishing a federation of Croats and Muslims.  Both Dr. Granic and I

 6     thought that this was a possible and implementable option.  And as can be

 7     gleaned from the transcripts, this opinion was shared by

 8     President Tudjman too.

 9             In my view, Mr. Boban did not believe this viable.  That was the

10     biggest difference in opinion at the time, and I think that this is what

11     Dr. Granic referred to here.

12        Q.   Well, excuse me for a moment.

13             MR. SCOTT:  If the Chamber will bear with me for one moment just

14     so we can finish this.

15        Q.   When you say Mr. Boban did not believe this viable, I want you to

16     be very clear.  When you refer to "this," what was it that Mr. Boban did

17     not believe viable?

18        A.   I believe that I spoke quite extensively of the fact that at some

19     point in time during the negotiations, in particular with American

20     representatives but also with representatives of the Muslims, we started

21     working on the agreement about setting up the federation.

22        Q.   What did Mr. Boban not find viable?  Not about what the Americans

23     said or what the Muslims said.  What did Mr. Boban not find viable?

24        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, this was precisely what I was about to tell you.

25     Mr. Boban thought that such a federation could not be made.

Page 31111

 1             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, I don't want to try the Chamber's

 2     patience.  We can come back to it after the break.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  A mistake in the

 4     transcript.  Page 56, line 18, in the English transcript we can read

 5     Judge Antonetti, whereas it was the witness speaking at this point.

 6             We're going to break for 20 minutes now.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 6.06 p.m.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing's resumed.  Please

10     proceed, Mr. Scott.

11             MR. SCOTT:

12        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, in the interest of time I'm going to try and move

13     forward to some other topics.

14             It's fair to say, is it not, that from 1990 and until such time

15     as their status as independent states was internationally recognised,

16     both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were part of the state of Yugoslavia,

17     the territory of which extended to the external borders, if you will, of

18     the various republics of the former Yugoslavia; is that correct?

19        A.   It is correct that they were part of the Socialist Federative

20     Republic of Yugoslavia until their independence was declared.

21        Q.   And up until the time that their independence was declared and

22     recognised, the armed forces of that internationally recognised state,

23     that is, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the armed forces

24     of that state could be garrisoned and moved about within the borders of

25     that state; correct?

Page 31112

 1        A.   For as long as they constituted the armed forces of that state

 2     and for as long as that state existed, yes, I believe that's correct.

 3        Q.   So would it be fair to say that in general in those respects both

 4     President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic, in 1990 and 1991, faced a

 5     very similar situation in reference to the state that they were part of

 6     and to the military forces of that state; correct?

 7        A.   I believe they did.

 8        Q.   At least during 1990 and well into 1991, neither Mr. -- neither

 9     country, I shouldn't just refer to them as individuals, Mr. Tudjman or

10     Mr. Izetbegovic, but neither Croatia nor the Republic of Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina had any substantial military force separate from or not

12     controlled by, ultimately, the Yugoslavia federal government; correct?

13        A.   Up until one point both the Republic of Croatia and the Republic

14     of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including all the other republics of the former

15     Yugoslavia had the Territorial Defence, which was under the control of

16     the republican, not federal institutions.

17        Q.   And in approximately 1990, is it correct that both in Croatia and

18     in Bosnia-Herzegovina the JNA, by one means or another, seized the

19     weapons belonging to the Territorial Defence in both of those republics?

20     Correct?

21        A.   Correct.

22        Q.   And you testified, in fact, that then when the armed conflict

23     with the JNA or the forces of the former Yugoslavia or the Republic of

24     Serbia, perhaps, when that conflict broke out, Croatians -- Croatia's

25     military abilities were actually quite limited.  You actually said at one

Page 31113

 1     point they were "pitifully weak," and they were not able to defend

 2     Croatia against the JNA forces in substantial parts of the territory of

 3     Croatia; correct?

 4        A.   Correct.  That was my impression.

 5        Q.   And is it fair to say, and if you remember from being a citizen

 6     and living in that country at the time, that there was a fair amount of

 7     criticism directed at President Tudjman that he had not -- he and his

 8     government had not done more to prepare for military conflict with

 9     Yugoslavia?

10        A.   There was such criticism, yes, that's true.

11        Q.   And is it fair to say, and just -- and you did touch upon this in

12     your testimony before that by approximately the second half of 1991, Serb

13     forces of the JNA occupied as much as -- or at least one-third of

14     Croatia's territory?

15        A.   I think that that's, roughly speaking, correct.

16        Q.   Now, you've indicated during your direct examination that during

17     this time that the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not do

18     anything to protest the JNA actions or to support Croatia in connection

19     with these various events in 1990 and 1991, and I want to direct your

20     attention particularly there came a time, I believe, sir, on the 9th of

21     January, 1991, where the Yugoslav -- federal Yugoslav Presidency or

22     government ordered illegal paramilitary forces in the republics to

23     disarm.  Do you recall that?

24        A.   Yes.  Yes, I do recall stating in my testimony that the general

25     impression was that the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina was doing

Page 31114

 1     nothing to support Croatia.

 2        Q.   Well, do you recall that on the 21st of January, 1991, the

 3     leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina backed and supported both Slovenia and

 4     Croatia in their conflict with the Yugoslav Presidency and urged the

 5     Yugoslav Presidency to reconsider its actions in threatening to disarm

 6     alleged paramilitary forces in Slovenia and Croatia?

 7        A.   I don't recall that, but I do not exclude that it's true.

 8        Q.   Do you recall that in August 1991, both Bosnia and Herzegovina

 9     and Macedonia announced that they would not allow their conscripts to

10     perform national service outside their republics?

11        A.   Well, I do recall that vaguely.  I don't recall exactly when and

12     how it was formulated.

13        Q.   Okay.  Well, that brings us up to this so-called statement by

14     Mr. Izetbegovic, "It's not our war," and you talked about that in your

15     testimony at page 27618.

16             Now, the Chamber has heard quite a bit of evidence about that.

17     Mr. Izetbegovic made that statement on the 6th of October, 1991, and I

18     wonder, did you hear Mr. Izetbegovic make that statement?

19        A.   I was not personally present when the statement was made, but

20     there were so many reports of it that I believed at the time, and I still

21     do believe that he stated that.

22        Q.   And in fact, that particular four words, if you will, "It's not

23     our war," was part of a much more extensive statement that he made at the

24     time.  I'm wondering if you ever actually read the entire statement.

25        A.   I don't remember.

Page 31115

 1        Q.   Well, do you remember the context in which Mr. Izetbegovic said

 2     that, "It's not our war"?  In the statement itself.

 3        A.   I don't remember the statement, but I do remember the context of

 4     the events in Croatia and the territory in general.  This statement

 5     received quite a great deal of coverage in the media in Croatia.

 6        Q.   But you've told us, sir, that you didn't hear him make that

 7     statement, and you don't recall ever reading the full statement; is that

 8     correct?

 9        A.   I think that that's correct.

10        Q.   Sir, isn't it fair to say that that is something that you've

11     repeated, like so many others, taking Mr. Izetbegovic's words out of

12     context, having no knowledge of the statement in which -- the context of

13     the statement in which they were made?

14        A.   No, it isn't.  I believe that I'm pretty well familiar with the

15     context of political events and what the impact of such a statement amid

16     such events was at the time when Yugoslavia was breaking up.

17        Q.   You can't tell us, sir, what the rest of the statement was.  Do

18     you recall around that same time on the 20th of September, 1991,

19     Stipe Mesic, who at that time was serving as the Yugoslav president,

20     called on JNA soldiers to desert and go over to the side of the elected

21     leadership in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

22        A.   I remember that vaguely.  I do not recall the exact date.

23        Q.   And, sir, wasn't President Izetbegovic's statement a few days

24     later an expression of solidarity with Stipe Mesic and Croatia when

25     Izetbegovic says, "It's not our war," calling for Bosnia's young men, its

Page 31116

 1     conscripts, it's young men, not to go and fight in the JNA war against

 2     Croatia?  That's what his statement said if you've ever cared to read the

 3     entire statement, sir.

 4             MR. KARNAVAS:  I object.  This is testimony now from counsel, and

 5     I'm rather surprised that the Bench is not reacting a little bit.

 6             MR. SCOTT:  All of which is based on the evidence in the record,

 7     sir.

 8             MR. KARNAVAS:  If I may -- if I may be heard for my objection and

 9     then the gentleman can say whatever he wishes.  If we trace the previous

10     questions and answers, the witness has indicated that he hasn't seen it.

11     He vaguely recalls, and so on.  Now a question is put, and then

12     afterwards there is a declarative statement made by the Prosecution, no

13     inflection.  In fact, it is testimony.  I object to that.  In believe

14     Mr. Khan quite eloquently informed us about the evils of such statements.

15             I would respect the rules, and I would ask that the Prosecutor be

16     cautioned, just as I'm cautioned on occasion when I get carried away.  I

17     would ask the same thing --

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Karnavas.  I think

19     you're quite right.

20             Mr. Scott, why don't you put the documents to the witness?  You

21     have other ways of bringing him to where you want to bring him, and I

22     think counsel's objection is upheld.

23             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, sir.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the counsel, please.

25             MR. SCOTT:  The testimony of the witness is he has not seen or

Page 31117

 1     read the statement, so I'll leave it at that rather than showing him a

 2     statement that he's never seen before, but the Chamber has.

 3        Q.   Now, sir, around this same time period in 27 of January, 1991,

 4     you recall President Tudjman endorsing the JNA's right to arrest

 5     individuals who at the time were mainly activists of Croatia's ruling

 6     party concerning the illegal possession of arms.  Do you recall

 7     Mr. Tudjman endorsing the JNA's right to do that?

 8        A.   First of all, I didn't say that I never saw Mr. Izetbegovic's

 9     statement.  I saw the statement on several occasions.  I just said that I

10     didn't hear it.  Those are two different things.

11             Secondly, what you've just said is something I sincerely don't

12     recall.

13        Q.   Well, sir, since you come back to it, I'll just ask you again.

14     Tell us what the rest of the statement -- what the rest of

15     Mr. Izetbegovic's statement says.  You say you've seen it several times.

16     Tell us, please, apart from those four words that you remember, what was

17     the context?  What was said above those four words?  What was said after

18     those four words, and tell us what the context and import of that

19     statement was.

20             MR. KARNAVAS:  I think we need to be fair to the witness, after

21     all of these years to ask the witness to recall something that was said

22     years and years ago.  I believe Judge Trechsel indicated the method by

23     which this sort of technique should be used.

24             I did -- I did not give any hints to the Prosecution because I'm

25     not here to tell him how to do his job, but I think that's the proper

Page 31118

 1     way.  He can show him, and then if wants to further cross-examine him on

 2     that and confront him then that's fine, but I think it's rather unfair to

 3     ask a witness to recall something that he heard 15 years ago.  Let's be

 4     realistic here.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  I don't know what you

 6     want to highlight so I'll let you ask your questions, but as was pointed

 7     out by Mr. Karnavas it would be saving time if you had the exact

 8     statement in the context of Mr. Izetbegovic.  You may as well show it to

 9     the witness.

10             MR. SCOTT:  I don't have time, Your Honour, to do that.  And the

11     point's already been made.  The point has already been made.  I don't

12     know want to argue with him about what I show him in the document.  The

13     point is he doesn't remember anything about it except "It's not our war,"

14     and that's the point.

15        Q.   Sir, do you recall that in May 1991 President Tudjman supported a

16     unanimous decision by the collective federal Yugoslav Presidency to grant

17     the JNA more authority to deal with ethnic conflicts?

18        A.   Truly I don't remember.  I was in the United States of America at

19     the time.  The information you're asking me about is too specific.  I

20     don't remember.

21        Q.   Do you recall this situation where in May of 1991

22     President Tudjman urged a group of ethnic Croats in Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina, in the Mostar area, who had been protesting, carrying on a

24     two-day blockade of a JNA convoy, that they should stop their protest and

25     let the JNA proceed on its way?  Do you recall that?

Page 31119

 1             MR. KARNAVAS:  Again, Your Honour, I'm going to object to this

 2     technique.  Either show the documents and confront the witness, but to

 3     ask the witness to remember things or to recall is virtually impossible

 4     at this stage.

 5             Now, I don't object to this form of questioning.  However, if

 6     this is going to be the basis upon which later there's going to be a

 7     motion to introduce documents, I will high object because now we're not

 8     giving the witness an opportunity to look at the documents.  What is the

 9     basis for Mr. Scott's pronouncements?  I don't know.  I think we're

10     entitled to that.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Scott.  You're asking

12     him whether he recalls, and he said he couldn't remember because at the

13     time he was in the United States of America.  Very well.  Then to refresh

14     his memory you should show him in the document.  You should say here is

15     the document showing this and he can say whether he's seen it or not,

16     whether he was in the USA and he had other things to do other than watch

17     documents -- or read documents and watch the media.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone.

19             MR. SCOTT:

20        Q.   Sir, my question to you was do you recall Mr. Tudjman urging

21     ethnic Croats near Mostar to stop blockading the JNA blockade in about

22     May 1991?  You either remember or you don't.  If you don't remember, just

23     say so.

24        A.   No.  I've already said that I didn't remember specific events.

25        Q.   Do you remember in October 1991 and following the Tudjman

Page 31120

 1     government allowing JNA forces to leave their barracks in Croatia and

 2     take with them their weapons, their tanks, and their ammunitions when

 3     they left?

 4        A.   I do remember that, roughly.

 5        Q.   Did that happen?

 6        A.   I think that it did in part.  Of course the motivation of

 7     President Tudjman was that the Yugoslav People's Army should leave

 8     Croatia.

 9        Q.   And they were allowed to leave with their weapons, tanks, and

10     ammunition in hand; correct?

11        A.   I don't recall the details.  I think it's quite difficult to give

12     a general answer, because if I'm -- unless I'm mistaken, the situation

13     was different in different parts of Croatia.  In some areas commanders of

14     the Yugoslav army units simply laid down their weapons, in others they

15     tried to resist.  So it's very difficult to give a general answer.

16        Q.   Sir, the point of this is that isn't it not correct that in 1990

17     and 1991 the ability of either Mr. Izetbegovic or Mr. Tudjman to do much

18     of anything to stop the JNA was very, very limited?  Correct?

19        A.   It was limited, but time showed that it was not impossible.

20        Q.   Time showed.  You said at one point that Mr. Izetbegovic believed

21     at the time, and I believe this was when you were referring to this you

22     were talking about June 1991, that the JNA, the federal Yugoslav forces

23     would not attack Bosnia and Herzegovina.  You gave that testimony at page

24     27687 of the transcript.  And my question to you again, sir, during much

25     of 1990 and 1991, hadn't that exactly also been President Tudjman's

Page 31121

 1     position or belief, that he could avoid an armed conflict or war with

 2     Yugoslavia and the JNA?

 3        A.   For a certain period of time in 1990 I do believe that this was a

 4     position of President Tudjman.  In other words, that through negotiations

 5     and an intervention from the international community a solution could be

 6     found.

 7        Q.   And indeed wasn't that, however, the exact point of the meetings

 8     between Tudjman and Milosevic in Karadjordjevo, to negotiate a deal by

 9     which Croatia would not be attacked and the two of them would turn their

10     attention instead on Bosnia and Herzegovina?

11        A.   I don't know exactly what was discussed at Karadjordjevo, because

12     nobody was there except Tudjman and Milosevic.  So nobody knows directly

13     what they talked about.

14             Having met Mr. Tudjman later, I know for a fact that his motive

15     for going to meet Milosevic was to try to stop the war and to try to find

16     a peaceful solution.

17        Q.   If we -- we won't stop to pull the map out.  If anyone questions

18     it I'm sure I'll be corrected, but if you look at a map of the former

19     Yugoslavia, sir, you will see that Serbia has no contiguous border with

20     Slovenia, and yet it's correct, was it not, that the JNA was also

21     attacking and resisting the independence declared by Slovenia at that

22     time?  Correct?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   And do you know anything that President Tudjman or the Tudjman

25     government did to prevent the JNA from crossing Croatia territory to

Page 31122

 1     carry out these actions in Slovenia?

 2        A.   Although I can see what logic you are guided by, I have to say

 3     that everybody who knew the situation realised quite clearly that Croatia

 4     was not able to stop the Yugoslav People's Army.  And in any case, this

 5     intervention by the JNA lasted only ten days.  Slovenia did not start any

 6     serious war, nor was Croatia in any position to help Slovenia, nor had

 7     the JNA, as we can see from numerous documents, any serious intentions.

 8     Slovenia and Croatia, nevertheless, had identical political positions and

 9     assisted each other in many ways.

10             There is an imprecision in interpretation.  I said "fully," not

11     "in many ways."

12        Q.   Do you know whether President Tudjman ever told Kadijevic that

13     Croatia would not meddle in Serbia's dispute with Slovenia?

14        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.

15        Q.   Now, you've also talked about, in this -- in fact, in these same

16     set of facts, essentially, that the people in both Croatia and Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina took steps to essentially arm themselves; is that correct?

18        A.   It is a fact that people armed themselves both in Croatia and in

19     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20        Q.   And would you agree, sir, that the Muslim side had every much

21     right to prepare for a conflict and arm themselves as the Croat side?

22        A.   Certainly.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, there might be

24     something unclear in your answer.  Maybe it was due to the question.

25             The arming of the population, was it spontaneous, or did someone

Page 31123

 1     tell them to arm themselves, because that would not be the same

 2     situation.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're right, Mr. President.  I

 4     would have answered precisely, but I had not understood the question very

 5     precisely.  I'm not -- I think there were two parallel things going on in

 6     Croatia.  People organised themselves spontaneously.  I witnessed that

 7     myself.  A large majority of my colleagues tried to get hold of a weapon

 8     without any specific purpose in mind, but on the other hand, the

 9     government was also trying in various ways to get hold of armaments and

10     to assure its defence.  So there were two processes going on in parallel,

11     and there was a third process as well.  A large number of Croats who had

12     emigrated tried to assist by sending weapons, I believe both to Croatia

13     and to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Let me correct myself, not only Croats

14     but others as well.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you for this

16     additional answer.

17             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I appreciate the

18     clarification.  I should have been clearer.

19        Q.   Just to stay on that for one moment longer, sir.  Is it fair to

20     say that in that situation that we've been discussing, both the Croatian

21     government and the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina as governments

22     were taking steps to organise themselves, to arm themselves, and various

23     individuals and groups were also engaged in such efforts?  Is that

24     correct?

25        A.   I think that's correct.

Page 31124

 1        Q.   I'd like to turn to the topic of some of the peace negotiations

 2     that you were involved in, and we've talked a fair amount today in

 3     connection with the questions by Ms. Alaburic about the process of

 4     negotiations, and you had indicated in your direct examination, sir, that

 5     negotiations normally result in some sort of compromise; correct?

 6        A.   In principle, yes.

 7        Q.   And each side or party to a negotiation, broadly speaking, is

 8     entitled to their positions, and they can drive a hard bargain; correct?

 9        A.   Correct.

10        Q.   And I'm sure in your experience there's a number of different

11     negotiating tactics and methods, and people use different methods and

12     different approaches to try to get what they want; is that correct?

13        A.   Correct.

14        Q.   And as frustrating as that process may be, it may be very

15     aggravating, in fact, but that's the negotiating process; correct?

16        A.   Correct.

17        Q.   You talked about situations where representatives of the Muslim

18     party might come and receive information but not be in a position to make

19     a decision.  Now, I put to you, sir, I suspect that's not uncommon in

20     your experience.  A party may come to a meeting and say, "We're here to

21     listen.  We'd like to hear what you have to say.  We're not in a position

22     to make any decision today, but please lay out your position to us."

23     There's nothing particularly uncommon about that, is there?

24        A.   There isn't, but if you use that strategy to obstruct

25     negotiations, then we cannot talk of it as something positive.  I've

Page 31125

 1     never claimed that that's the way they used this strategy.  I just shared

 2     my impression that occasionally that is the way they were trying to

 3     negotiate without actually agreeing to anything.  That was my impression.

 4        Q.   Would you -- could you agree that the opposite, if you've said

 5     that -- if I can paraphrase and I'll try to get it correctly, that, one,

 6     this idea that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, but would

 7     you agree that the opposite can be equally destructive or misleading or

 8     non-productive and that is, the position that as soon as one thing is

 9     agreed, acting as if everything has been agreed?

10        A.   Quite certainly.  Every method, every approach used to obstruct

11     negotiations is equally negative.

12        Q.   Let me just be very transparent with you, sir.  The position of

13     many, and the Chamber has heard some of the witnesses in this courtroom,

14     is that the problem encountered on the Croat side, as it were, I'm not

15     talking about you personally, sir, generally speaking, was that when

16     something -- when one part of something would be agreed, the Croat side

17     would then immediately act as if everything had been agreed and that they

18     were ready to move forward on everything whether there was, in fact,

19     agreement or not.  Have you ever heard that commentary made?

20        A.   I can't remember any specific example, but it is true that the

21     Croat side was keen to go forward with the implementation as soon as

22     something was agreed, guided simply by the idea that the sooner something

23     is implemented, if it had been agreed already, the sooner the objectives

24     will be reached, namely, to stop the war.

25        Q.   Isn't it fair to say, sir, that on a number of occasions, both

Page 31126

 1     the international negotiators and/or the Serbs and/or the Muslim party on

 2     a number of occasions would say, "Hold on.  We're not there yet.  Yes,

 3     we've agreed to something, some parts but not everything, and we're not

 4     ready to go forward further"?  Didn't that happen on a number of

 5     occasions?  January 1993, March 1993?

 6        A.   Naturally.  Certainly such things happened in all sorts of

 7     negotiations, especially the very complex ones like this.

 8        Q.   In one of your -- in some of your earlier testimony you were

 9     talking about one of the meetings -- one of the presidential meetings in

10     June 1991, and there were negotiations involving -- well, the positions

11     of Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Gligorov at one point, and Tudjman was quoted

12     as saying, and again this is in the transcript of the 8 June 1991

13     meeting, P 00037, and Tudjman is quoted as saying, "Basically, that is,

14     Serbia accepted it but giving it its own interpretation."

15             Now, what does that mean to you?  You say a party has accepted

16     the position, but giving it its own interpretation.

17        A.   I could not interpret this sentence because I don't know in which

18     context it belongs, when it was said and what it applies to, but

19     generally speaking we all know of examples when one side says they had

20     accepted something and then interprets it as something entirely

21     different.

22             I doubt that I have ever quoted Tudjman off-the-cuff like this.

23     Now, this sentence, when I see it like this in English, I can't place it

24     in what I might have said then.

25        Q.   I'm sorry, sir, I don't want you to feel misled.  This was a

Page 31127

 1     statement attributed to President Tudjman in the presidential transcript.

 2     I was just putting it to you for your comment as an experienced

 3     negotiator.  When someone says one party has accepted a position but

 4     given it its own interpretation, and I think you addressed that, but I

 5     wasn't attributing the statement to you, sir.

 6             Now, you've talked about the Washington Agreement, and you told

 7     us that you became involved in that process very early on and that you

 8     were involved, in fact, in some of the preliminary steps, if you will, to

 9     initiate that process; correct?

10        A.   Correct.

11        Q.   And can you recall approximately when the Washington process

12     started as opposed to any of the previous efforts?  We are not talking

13     about Owen-Stoltenberg.  We're not talking about anything -- but when

14     something began to be called Washington, when did that process start?

15        A.   I can't give you the exact dates.  I'm sure they're easy to find.

16     But speaking of the situation at the negotiations, I believe two

17     important factors determined the beginning of the Washington process.

18     First was the direct involvement of the US, that is, sending Mr. Redman

19     as a special envoy of President Clinton, and second was the feeling that

20     prevailed in everyone.  I believe that the peace conference, the way it

21     ran in Geneva, had reached a dead end.  I believe those were two

22     important elements.

23        Q.   I think, sir, that both in your prior testimony and in some of

24     the presidential meetings where you were a participant you confirmed that

25     and which hopefully we need not spend more time on that.  It's fair to

Page 31128

 1     say that by the latter part of 1993, all of the previous peace processes

 2     were basically dead, so to speak; correct?

 3        A.   Well, that was the prevailing impression.

 4        Q.   I think at one point in one of your statements you said that the

 5     conference, the ICFY, was -- essentially had run its course and was no

 6     longer productive.  Is that fair to say?

 7        A.   That was my impression at the time.

 8        Q.   Now, you talked about some of the things leading up to Washington

 9     or the fact that the -- this -- one of the important aspects, the direct

10     and increasing involvement of the United States government, but let me

11     also ask you this:  Is it fair to say that by late 1993, early 1994, the

12     Bosnian Croats in particular were under tremendous military pressure in

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina - the war had essentially turned against them at

14     that point - and Croatia was under tremendous international pressure

15     because of certain concerns about its involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16     Aren't those two things true?

17        A.   I could not comment on the situation in the conflict on the

18     ground.  There are certainly other people who know that better.  But it's

19     true that Croatia was under a certain pressure from the international

20     community at that time.

21        Q.   Now, as things headed in the direction of Washington but even

22     before it was formally known as Washington, you had expressed a view, had

23     you not, that a -- some sort of a unification between the Croats and

24     Muslims alone in the same entity, that that was not -- to use Mr. Boban's

25     word, that was not viable.  That had been your position; correct?

Page 31129

 1        A.   That was my impression then, yes.

 2        Q.   I'd like to turn, please, in your binder to -- I'll tell you

 3     which binder in a moment, Exhibit P 10532 should be in the third binder.

 4     P 10532.

 5             Sir, this is a press account by the BBC on the 9th of August,

 6     1993, in connection with ongoing negotiations at the time.  You were

 7     interviewed, described here as the head of Croatian mission to the UN in

 8     Geneva, and in the last part of that -- in the last paragraph that of

 9     that article you say:  "Asked why the Muslim idea of unification of

10     Muslim and Croat republics into a Bosnia-Herzegovina union is not

11     acceptable, Zuzul said, 'It could hardly work.'"

12             Why did you think a unification of Muslims and Croats in a

13     unified Bosnia-Herzegovina "could hardly work"?

14        A.   I don't really recall that statement, although I have no reason

15     to claim it's not true.  But if I had said that, then I must have

16     believed at that moment that it couldn't work.  Still, I continued or

17     started to work actively for that solution in which it could work.  So if

18     I had said that, it applied only to that moment.

19        Q.   And you said earlier today, I believe, that -- you talked -- made

20     reference to the fact that maps had been prepared by the international

21     representatives involved, but just to be clear here, because in the

22     previous paragraph you're commenting on the allocation of territory.  The

23     Bosnian Muslims would get 30 per cent, et cetera.  I mean, isn't it fair

24     to say, sir, that all the parties were constantly preparing and

25     submitting maps throughout this process?

Page 31130

 1        A.   That's completely correct, but I was talking about the map that

 2     was part of the Vance-Owen Plan, because I think that was the question.

 3     The map was shown to me, and I believe I said it had been prepared by

 4     international experts.

 5        Q.   Is it fair to say, sir, moving on Washington, that -- further

 6     into it, if you will, that as it ultimately came about and as ultimately

 7     signed by the Croat and Muslim parties, that the Washington Agreement was

 8     a fairly radical shift from the previous peace plans and represented a

 9     substantial turn in Croatia's position or policy?

10        A.   Well, it's difficult to say whether it represented a turn,

11     because even before there had been talk about a federation and a

12     confederation between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13     However, I believe it represented a concrete and realistic possibility of

14     reaching an agreement which at that moment was being supported by the

15     majority of important international factors -- players.

16        Q.   Let me ask you, please, to go to -- we won't be able to finish

17     this tonight, but I suppose we should use the time.

18             If you can go to Exhibit P 07856, which should be in binder

19     number 2.  7856.

20             Sir, this is -- as you're looking there for the record, let me

21     say this is a record of a meeting with President Tudjman and others in

22     Zagreb on the 13th of February, 1994.  You can refer to -- there should

23     be both in English and a Croatian language transcript there, and you can

24     refer to whichever is most convenient for you.

25             Looking at page number 1, and the page numbers should be the same

Page 31131

 1     in both versions, President Tudjman, if you will, calls this meeting to

 2     order, and he says:  "Gentlemen, I told Minister Susak to invite Mate and

 3     the rest of you - a summit of the leading people of Herceg-Bosna - for us

 4     to come to an agreement as to how and what to take forward after all that

 5     has happened recently:  Our general meeting in Livno, the Sarajevo

 6     meeting, the current talks in Geneva, but above all regarding the new

 7     situation arising from the initiative taken by the United States with a

 8     group of European countries for an ongoing solution to the

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis."

10             Now, the new situation, sir, that's referred to by

11     President Tudjman here, that's Washington; correct?

12        A.   That's the beginning, which leads towards the

13     Washington Agreement.

14        Q.   If you can continue over to page number 2, skipping to the last

15     paragraph on that page.  President Tudjman continues talking and says:

16     "At the same time, pressure on us publicising," apparently some omission,

17     something that's been left out.  "So far they have let it be known that

18     they are not happy with our policy in Herceg-Bosna, that we are to blame

19     for worsening relations with the Muslims, and they have let us know that

20     we must change this and quite openly make Mate Boban a symbol of this

21     supposed responsibility of ours for the clash with the Muslims.  It was

22     said then in friendly talks that we must change this symbol, which is why

23     I decided that Mate would take no more part in the talks ..."

24             Do you recall -- do you recall the decision being made by

25     President Tudjman that Boban would no longer participate in the

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 1     negotiations in early 1994?

 2        A.   I remember that Mate Boban stopped participating in the

 3     negotiations at that time and that President Tudjman wanted him to stop,

 4     but whether anyone made a formal decision about that and who made it, I

 5     don't know.

 6        Q.   If I can ask you to go to page 4 of the record.

 7     President Tudjman refers to the ongoing discussions, and about a third of

 8     the way down that page it says:  "We are for a union of three republics

 9     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the question could be raised and

10     Ambassador Zuzul, who spoke to the American envoy Redman, who was in

11     charge of it, will tell you we could find ourselves in a delicate

12     position if that American and Western policy were to go as far as

13     allowing the departure of the Serbs ..."

14             Now, on the Croat side, and I don't mean the Bosnian Croats but

15     in terms of the Croats from the Republic of Croatia, were you leading the

16     negotiations around that time?

17        A.   I was not leading the negotiations, but I participated in them.

18     Now, in this specific case I believe I reported to the president about

19     talks with Ambassador Redman.

20        Q.   At the top of page 5, Tudjman continues and he says and about

21     this process:  "At the same time as we find ways and means to come to an

22     agreement with the Muslims, but an agreement which will not bring in

23     question our interest in Herceg-Bosna or our state interest as a whole."

24             Now, this record will show, sir, and we probably won't get to it

25     tonight, but that you were present in this meeting.  What did you

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 1     understand President Tudjman to mean when he says, "We will not allow the

 2     agreement to put in question our interest in Herceg-Bosna"?

 3        A.   Then and now my interpretation was that he meant protection of

 4     the constitutive status of the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 5             MR. SCOTT:  Mr. President, I think that's as far as we can go

 6     this evening.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  Witness, some

 8     recommendations on my part since you are to return tomorrow.  The hearing

 9     will start at 9.00 in the morning.  You're not supposed to have any

10     contact whatsoever, but for the members of your family, of course, you

11     are free to convey your impressions about the hearing to them as long as

12     it doesn't go beyond the family circle.  You're also free to read any

13     book that is available to you.  We are not here to exert censorship and

14     we are not to prohibit any reading which might seem useful to you.

15             This is what I wanted to tell you.  We shall reconvene tomorrow

16     at 9.00 in the morning.  Thank you.

17                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,

18                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 22nd day

19                           of July, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.