091027ED

Page 46037

1 (redacted)

2 [Open session]

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, do you personally know Mr. Petkovic?

5 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'll repeat my question.

7 Q. Do you personally know General Petkovic?

8 A. Yes, we met 35 years ago in Postojna.

9 Q. Did you actually meet or did you work together?

10 A. We worked together in the same barracks for six years.

11 Q. What is your impression of General Petkovic? What was he like 35

12 years ago, except for more hair on his head, no doubt?

13 A. There wasn't that much more, to be perfectly frank. He was a

14 young lieutenant, young captain, and the commander of an elite unit, a

15 division, anti-armour battery, as a matter of fact. This was one of the

16 best units in the entire division. It was also the strike force that the

17 JNA used for anti-armour combat, the best such unit within that division.

18 I knew him as an exceptionally composed, calm, and responsible officer.

19 I did not work directly with him, but we were in contact a number of

20 times. At the time, I was also deputy barracks commander. In my

21 capacity, I was receiving reports from the officers then on duty, and

22 among their number was also the then Captain Petkovic.

23 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, you also happen to be a Praljak Defence military

24 expert. Let me ask you this question: Did you personally know

25 General Praljak as well?

Page 46038

1 A. No, I only knew him from the media.

2 Q. Fair enough. Mr. Gorjanc, I'll be asking you a number of

3 questions now about the way in which your expert report was drafted.

4 To begin with, who typed it up for our benefit?

5 A. I did.

6 Q. You can write?

7 A. Yes, I can both use a typewriter and a PC.

8 Q. When did you learn to use a PC?

9 A. When I was the chief of the Corps Staff in Uzice.

10 Q. During our meetings, Mr. Gorjanc, you never used a single sheet

11 of paper. You always brought your computer, nevertheless. Can you tell

12 me how you organised the whole thing for yourself on your computer in

13 order to be able to track down all the documents immediately and follow

14 everything that was going on, document-wise, facing these enormous

15 amounts of paperwork?

16 A. I've developed a system of gathering required materials.

17 Everything that's written, I immediately transform into a digital format,

18 be it an image or a PDF document, and then I make excerpts from certain

19 relevant documents or sections of documents that I believe to be

20 relevant.

21 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, you include as part of your report certain maps that

22 are obviously computer generated. Can you tell me who produced those

23 maps?

24 A. I produced them myself.

25 Q. Fine. Briefly, how did the Praljak Defence and the Petkovic

Page 46039

1 Defence get in touch with you? Who was the first to call you?

2 A. Mr. Kovacic was the first to call me. We had a brief encounter

3 not far from my holiday cottage. We had lunch together, and he simply

4 asked me whether I was willing to come on board and work with your team.

5 Q. Who took it on from there?

6 A. You were the only person that I then was still in touch with

7 after that.

8 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, can you roughly give us a year or time when we first

9 got in touch with you and we started working together?

10 A. I think it was around Easter time 2007. We met no more than a

11 month later. I think it was actually during the summer break. And then

12 we would meet at regular intervals over the several months that followed.

13 Q. From our very first meeting, what was the one thing that was

14 entirely certain as to what the substance of your expert report should be

15 or should reflect?

16 A. Primarily, the importance of Central Bosnia and Northern

17 Herzegovina in the war, as well as All-People's Defence as it applied in

18 the previous state or country and as it panned out during the war in

19 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20 Q. During our brief meetings -- or, rather, where did we meet?

21 A. Once, I believe, at the Holiday Hotel in Zagreb. I'm not that

22 familiar with the center of Zagreb, so I asked you to meet me along one

23 of the roads leading into the city. And then I think I came to your

24 office in Zagreb about three times total after that.

25 Q. During our meetings -- or, rather, how long were our meetings,

Page 46040

1 normally?

2 A. The first one took an hour, perhaps, no more than that.

3 Afterwards, we would normally talk for two or three hours.

4 Q. What about your impression of those meetings? Was I seeking your

5 professional opinion on any documents or developments of military

6 relevance to this case, or did we, as a rule, discuss the case generally,

7 in a general way?

8 A. My impression was you were trying to find out how familiar I was

9 with the subject matter as a whole. It wasn't that we discussed any

10 specifics.

11 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, when I explained your brief to you, in terms of

12 drafting your expert report and when you produced the reports, did you

13 work independently and did you present nothing but your own independent

14 opinions, or was there anyone who tried to exert pressure on you to say

15 this or to say that?

16 A. I was entirely independent, and there was no one trying to

17 channel my work or monitor my work.

18 Q. Were there any demands that were made by our Defence for you to

19 alter or change any of your opinions?

20 A. No, none at all.

21 Q. Your expert report has chapters or paragraphs that are numbered.

22 How come?

23 A. I wrote this, for the most part, as one produces a thesis at

24 university. I subdivided this into chapters, and you asked me to do just

25 that for ease of handling here in this courtroom. So I assigned numbers

Page 46041

1 to the different chapters and paragraphs.

2 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, what were the documents that you used for your

3 expert report?

4 A. Initially, I was working based on what I had previously

5 experienced in the Kordic case, and then at a later stage I went back to

6 you for further documents, especially as original documents were

7 concerned, although most of the original documents I was able to track

8 down on the web, specifically Mr. Praljak's web site.

9 Q. What about various memoirs?

10 A. For the most part, those were my books from earlier on.

11 Q. When you wrote about the doctrine of All-People's Defence, you

12 were using various regulations; right? We lawyers always find it very

13 interesting, how someone who is not, by profession, a lawyer should be

14 using regulations and books of regulations. I must ask you several

15 questions in that regard.

16 Were you familiar with the laws and regulations covering the

17 Defence Sector at the time?

18 A. By all means, I was, yes. Being in command of the units that I

19 was and my job in the army required a detailed knowledge of regulations.

20 Q. What about your involvement in Slovenia? Were you actively

21 involved in drafting the defence-related regulations?

22 A. Yes, I was consulted, and I provided certain opinions on the

23 first-draft Defence Law which was adopted in 1995.

24 Q. One final question about these methodological remarks. In your

25 opinion, in order to understand the Defence Law, is it not necessary to

Page 46042

1 actually be familiar with the subject matter, the actual thing, defence?

2 A. Yes, by all means, because laws are always based on practice, in

3 order to change that practice somehow in one way or another.

4 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, let's move on to your report.

5 I would kindly ask the usher to hand over to the witness the

6 expert report and all the documents that have been prepared for him.

7 Let's start with chapter 4, which is "Wartime Army." In that

8 chapter, Mr. Gorjanc, you describe two types of wartime armies, one which

9 is created from a peacetime army and the second one which is an ad hoc

10 wartime army. Could you please tell us, just in a very few brief

11 outlines, what is the notion of an ad hoc wartime army?

12 A. An ad hoc wartime army is created under the conditions and

13 principles of the non-existence of a state and the peacetime organisation

14 of the defence system of such a state. It is mostly created under the

15 conditions of civil liberation, inter-religious, inter-ethnic and

16 inter-racial conflicts. It is a chaotic process, at the beginning the

17 main goal being to resist either the occupying force, the existing

18 government. And first the units are small, engaged in mostly guerrilla

19 and terrorist actions. With time, those units gain support among the

20 population and gradually grow into bigger groups, with the final result

21 being an army with its system of command.

22 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, the military expert for the Prosecution,

23 Andrew Pringle, said before this Trial Chamber that it should take

24 several years for the -- for a proper army to be created, and that was

25 recorded on page 24246. Tell us, please, Mr. Gorjanc, would you be able

Page 46043

1 to agree with Mr. Pringle's assertion?

2 A. Yes, for the most part, but it depends on the level of threat

3 that the country faced, the level of preparations, and the level of unity

4 of the population to support such an army.

5 Q. When it comes to the organisation of an ad hoc army, how would

6 this look from a center -- from a top, in a centralised way?

7 A. It would be easier, it would be much simpler, because in such a

8 case there would be a state, there would be some tangible conditions for

9 its creation, there is an officer staff, and then all you have to do is

10 to form commands. And you also have a large number of reserve officers

11 that had been trained previously from which you can create larger-size

12 units.

13 Q. If a wartime army is created in a decentralised way, could you

14 describe the situation for us then?

15 A. In that case, as I've already told you, the process starts with

16 small units which are not linked up without the unity of command, without

17 any communication among those units. They have just one link, and that's

18 their ideology, and the ideology boils down to a countering the enemy,

19 and it's a much harder way to create a wartime army.

20 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, if you were to compare a decentralised army as

21 opposed to a centralised army, what would you say? Which chain of

22 command is established -- established in a faster and more complete way?

23 A. It would certainly be in an organised and centralised way. The

24 chain of command is actually established even before any units are

25 established, whereas in an ad hoc army which is formed in a decentralised

Page 46044

1 way, it is first units, then commands at lower units, and finally

2 commands at the highest levels.

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me if I interrupt.

4 On line -- on page 21, the first lines, you have said,

5 Mr. Gorjanc, that, I quote:

6 "It depends on the level of threat that the country faced, the

7 level of preparations, and the population to support such an army."

8 Now, I would be grateful if you could explain in which way it

9 depends. The greater the threat, what? What is the relation in these

10 mechanisms that you intimate?

11 I hope I made myself understood.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If the threat is higher, which

13 would mean that the enemy is stronger, then it is more difficult to

14 establish such an army, especially because of the lack of the necessary

15 support on the part of the population due to the repressive measures

16 undertaken by the enemy. However, the enemy repressive measures at a

17 certain point in time can even stimulate the population to put up more

18 resistance and join the units faster.

19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, Judge Trechsel's question was a bit different. I

21 believe that the question referred to the time that was necessary for a

22 wartime army to be organised, because in --

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. I think the witness understood me

24 quite well, and he gave an answer which I consider a correct and valuable

25 answer.

Page 46045

1 If I may sum up, you first said that the greater the threat, the

2 greater the difficulties, but it may also be that the greater threat

3 fosters more willingness with a people to get together and to make

4 efforts which would facilitate an army. So in a way, there is a certain

5 ambivalence, if I understand you correctly.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

8 Please, Mr. Alaburic, and thank you for your efforts, too.

9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Can we now summarise, please --

11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, I'm sorry. This is

12 an occasion, I think, to ask my own question to the witness.

13 Witness, you quote the expert of the Prosecution, Andrew Pringle,

14 about the number of years which were necessary to establish an army.

15 Could you specify what is this number of years, according to you, and if

16 it is the same in all cases? Because I'm thinking for the moment for the

17 different armies of the ex-Yugoslavia, the Slovenian, the Croatian Army,

18 and the others. Those are armies which recuperated officers and soldiers

19 which were trained by the JNA, and this gives you an impression of an

20 army which starts from scratch; it's not the case? I'm talking about the

21 training of the officers and the soldiers, for instance.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The creation of different armies in

23 different states on the ground of the former Yugoslavia is very

24 different. If I may say so, the HVO, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

25 [as interpreted], were liberation armies, and they have some joint

Page 46046

1 characteristics in terms of how they were created. All of those armies

2 that were formed on the ground of the former Yugoslavia have one thing in

3 common; all their members, or most of them, had been trained in the

4 former JNA as conscripts and during manoeuvres as members of the reserve

5 force. Also, some of the officers had been trained by the JNA, both

6 active through regular education, as well as reserve officers who were

7 trained as reserve officers in appropriate schools.

8 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

9 But precisely because these officers were very well trained, and

10 a great number of the soldiers were also, I would like to create a

11 parallel -- make a parallel between the army of a young state, which is

12 just starting from scratch. What is, according to you, the number of

13 years which would be necessary to reach the level of a normal army? With

14 the case, for instance, of the ex-Yugoslavia or the case of an African

15 army or an independent state, would there be no difference in the number

16 of years necessary to do this, to establish this?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In such a case when a new state is

18 created, a state which doesn't have any trained officer staff, that

19 process would take much longer. A recent history shows, especially when

20 it comes to the liberation movements in Africa, that those movements took

21 ten years before they were able to create armies that would be able to

22 secure them independence.

23 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Right. For the moment, I will

24 stop there, but we will see a bit later.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I am listening very

Page 46047

1 carefully to what you tell us, and sometimes when you use a word, I

2 wonder.

3 A while ago, you were speaking about the HVO army and the BiH

4 Army, that they were liberation armies, and when you said that, I

5 wondered, What does the witness mean? Does he mean that the JNA occupied

6 the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic, Croatia, Slovenia, and that when there

7 was the dismantling of Yugoslavia, there was a liberation which took

8 place? Is this what you mean?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The JNA was not an occupying

10 army, although politicians proclaimed it an occupying army. It was a

11 state army for as long as it existed.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Then why do you qualify the HVO

13 as a liberation army, and BiH?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't remember

15 having said the liberation armies. If I did, I misspoke.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was the one who

17 was supposed to intervene to correct the record, because it's the record

18 that creates problems.

19 On page 23, line 21, here it reads that the witness is speaking

20 about the HVO and the BiH Army, which were liberation armies. The

21 witness was speaking about the HVO and about the Liberation Army of

22 Kosovo. The witness never mentioned the BiH Army. I was going to

23 correct that, but I did not think that it would create any confusion.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you see, I'm listening to

25 every word. There was a translation problem. Thank you.

Page 46048

1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. However, I would like to arrive at a simple answer in response to

3 Judge Trechsel's questions. If there are no objections, I would like to

4 lead the witness.

5 Is it possible that due to the circumstances and wartime

6 conditions and special requirements at the time that was necessary for

7 the formation of a war army was actually shorter than a few years that

8 have just been mentioned?

9 A. Yes, but a minimum of -- a minimum would be one year.

10 Q. Very well. Let's now continue comparing two armies, the one that

11 is created in a decentralised way and another one which is created in a

12 centralised way. What would you say about the influence of local

13 authorities on the army in these two different types of wartime armies?

14 A. In an army that is created through centralisation, when there is

15 a state, when there is a supreme command as the primary command, and

16 where there is a body of law, constitution laws, decrees, and so on and

17 so forth, and there is also a system which goes from the lowest level to

18 the highest level of civilian authorities, in such a case an army is

19 exclusively in the function of the performance of such civilian

20 authorities, which is the defence of the country together with the

21 civilian authorities.

22 Q. Could you please focus on the influence of local authorities?

23 A. Local authorities, in principle, when it comes to a centralised

24 army, don't play any role and don't exert any influence on military

25 units, even at the lowest level.

Page 46049

1 Q. And what about in a decentralised army or an army that was

2 created in a decentralised way?

3 A. In such a case, the first units that are created are small units

4 at local levels, and they are usually supported, created, and

5 logistically supported by local communities, and those local communities

6 try to exert influence over those units for as long as possible.

7 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, given your military experience and knowledge, would

8 you tell us, if a municipality is funding its own military unit, would

9 you, as a military commander, be able to estimate that the military --

10 that the municipal authority will exert influence on that unit?

11 A. Of course, because they pay the bill, they foot the bill, and

12 they will not give up on the influence.

13 Q. Given your knowledge and experience, and also the familiarity

14 with the events on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, would you say

15 that the media and public opinion in an environment exert influence on

16 the behaviour of soldiers in that environment?

17 A. Of course.

18 Q. In this part of your expert report, you explain the components of

19 a wartime army as manoeuvre and territorial components. Could you please

20 briefly explain? What is it that you speak about?

21 A. The manoeuvre component has the purpose of carrying out combat

22 operations throughout the territory of a country or even in enemy

23 territory. Territorial Defence, on the other hand, serves the purpose of

24 defence and protection of the immediate environment where it is set up.

25 Another purpose is to monitor the territory throughout, in exceptional

Page 46050

1 cases to carry out combat operations against the enemy along the

2 front-line.

3 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, can you please look at the first document now in the

4 set of documents; not the expert report, but the other binder, which is

5 the first binder with documents. This is P907, 907, which is an exhibit.

6 This is a report from December 1992 by the Chief of the Main Staff.

7 At this point in time, I would like to go to page 3. For the

8 benefit of the Chamber, this is the last paragraph in item 3 of the

9 report. We see some figures there concerning HVO units. It says that at

10 that time, the HVO had a total of 45.000 men. As for the professional

11 units, there were 855 members.

12 Mr. Gorjanc, let us assume that the 855 men were involved in

13 manoeuvre units, and the remainder, up to 45.000, were with territorial

14 units. What would you say? What does that tell you about the character

15 of the HVO as an army?

16 A. If we bear in mind the fact that there were all these brigades

17 bearing the name of their native areas in which they were established,

18 one can conclude with certainty and for the most part these are

19 territorial units.

20 Q. Given the function of territorial units, what would you be led to

21 conclude, based on this document, regarding the character of the HVO as

22 an army? Was it established in order to conquer territory, to defend

23 territory, or was it organisation-neutral?

24 A. Given the fact that it was organised mostly based on a

25 territorial principle, I assumed that its fundamental task was to defend

Page 46051

1 its territory within its own municipality, the municipality in which it

2 was established.

3 Q. If we go to paragraph 24 of your expert report, line 5, you

4 mentioned the concept of immediate front-line, you talk about army

5 activities outside the immediate front-line. Can you define that concept

6 for us? What does it mean?

7 A. The immediate front-line covers an area in which certain units

8 directly involved in combat are operating, units being used for quick

9 interventions along the front-line. In a specific area and given the

10 nature of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the range would be between three

11 and five kilometres from the confrontation line into one's own territory.

12 Q. Can you tell us what the deployment was like, the front-line and

13 then the three- to five-kilometre belt, and then all the way behind the

14 lines? What exactly goes on there?

15 A. In a theatre of war like that, within the three- to five-range

16 kilometre, you have mostly battalion level units and direct firing

17 support for those units, 82-millimetre mortars, 120-millimetre mortars.

18 Further behind, you can have the artillery weapons with a greater range.

19 But for the most part, you have soldiers resting, or operative reserves,

20 as we call them.

21 Q. Paragraph 25, the last bullet, you conclude that it is impossible

22 to carry out large-scale offensive operations with units of the

23 territorial component without previous thorough training from the

24 individual to the unit at the operational level. Can you briefly explain

25 what you mean by that?

Page 46052

1 A. There are several joint tactical units taking part in operation,

2 at least two to three brigades with appropriate artillery support, and

3 these units must be properly trained to operate as a single entity. It

4 would even be good if they were able to operate as a single entity within

5 the operative unit. You cannot defeat an enemy brigade if you're using a

6 single brigade of your own. The general principle is the ratio should be

7 1:3 in favour of the attacking party, attacking side, in some cases even

8 a greater ratio than that.

9 Q. You react here, Mr. Gorjanc, to a decision by

10 Enver Hadzihasanovic, commander of the 3rd Corps Command. The document

11 number is 4D1473, 1473. This is the second document in that binder.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I'd like to come back

13 to a question which was asked to you by Ms. Alaburic, but she didn't

14 elaborate on her question. Still, I do think that it is a question which

15 is fundamental for the case. There are, of course, quite a few

16 fundamental questions, but this one is even more fundamental.

17 Ms. Alaburic highlights the fact that the HVO is a territorial

18 army, and you said that the names -- that the brigades had the names of

19 the municipalities. And we were shown a document to the effect that

20 there are 45.000 soldiers in the HVO and a professional branch of 855

21 soldiers, among which 85 officers. Now, you know as well as I do that in

22 the HVO there were professional units. Now, with an 800-strong unit,

23 is it possible to carry out large-scale military operations in a

24 territory such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, to take control of these

25 territories or to annex them? Do you think it's possible?

Page 46053

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Professional units would certainly

2 not be able to establish control. Nevertheless, when I spoke of the

3 territorial army, I said their main objective was to monitor their

4 territory. All these brigades were established on a territorial basis.

5 That's a fact. Therefore, they monitor the territory of their own

6 municipality or municipalities in which they were established. Along

7 these lines, you could say that the HVO was establishing control over

8 some of the territory, whereas the unit that was used for activities

9 throughout the territory would not have been able to do that.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Replace "800

11 individual units" by "a 800-soldier unit."

12 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, when you say control --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Soldier unit --

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. -- of the territory, what exactly does that mean?

17 A. That means controlling traffic, controlling any population

18 movement, protecting features and facilities of particular importance,

19 and control over any potential incursions by enemy forces into the

20 territory, or possibly repelling any incursions.

21 Q. If my conclusion is right, these are military functions which are

22 important in order to defend the territory of a municipality. Right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So when you say "control," did you have in mind other functions,

25 such as upholding public law and order or anything like that?

Page 46054

1 A. No, "control" in the military sense alone.

2 Q. In this context, meaning no offensive actions could be launched

3 through these territorial component units, we see your reaction to this

4 decision by the 3rd Corps Command. This is 4D1473, 4D1473. Mr. Gorjanc,

5 could you clarify the meaning of this document, please?

6 A. In the memoirs of the commander of the Lasva Operative Group,

7 General Alagic, I noticed something which I didn't mention here. When

8 the 305th Jajce Brigade was involved along the Visoko front for the first

9 time as a whole, as a single entity, this proved to be very successful,

10 and then I went on looking for a document which I then found on the web,

11 on Mr. Praljak's web site, the document being a decision by the commander

12 of the 3rd Corps for the setting-up camp. He took all the units to a

13 certain area in Central Bosnia in order to have a joint training

14 exercise, and in order --

15 JUDGE PRANDLER: Excuse me.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

17 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes. Let me repeat only briefly that please

18 kindly indicate in which binder can we find that article, in particular

19 the 4D1473 document. Thank you.

20 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I forgot to explain

21 how the binders are organised. You have a small binder containing the

22 expert report and then three binders containing documents which we shall

23 be discussing with this witness. The documents are organised based on

24 the chapters of the expert report. There is a blue slip of paper

25 separating them, there is a title every time, and the documents are

Page 46055

1 ordered in a sequence that I shall be following as I examine the witness.

2 If I run out of time, I may have to skip something, but I'll always give

3 you advanced notice of that. Therefore, we are now dealing with binder

4 number 1, and this is the second document in that binder.

5 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, could you please continue explaining the importance

6 of this document?

7 A. The Command of the 3rd Corps decided to use all of their forces,

8 including the territorial units, the municipal staffs, and all of their

9 units, to set up camp in an area in which their units were otherwise

10 partially involved along the front-line, the objective being to raise

11 their stamina, the stamina of soldiers, commanders, members of those

12 units, to strengthen the bonds of trust between them and their general

13 comradeship, as a whole. Previously, it says that there should be a

14 manoeuvre to fool the enemy, in terms of hiding their own intentions of

15 carrying out combat operations. The aim or the objective was to properly

16 train the units for them to be able -- units, the rank of a brigade, in

17 order to perform large-scale combat operations, to train them for that

18 purpose.

19 Q. In relation to this, I have two further questions.

20 You said units of the 3rd Corps, as a single entity or as a

21 whole. What exactly does that mean? Does that have to do with the units

22 taking shifts the way the BH Army had been functioning up to that point?

23 What exactly did you mean by that?

24 A. If you look at this notion, you see that the units that were

25 deployed along the front-line would become a form of decisive defence, in

Page 46056

1 terms of defending that line, whereas the other units that were resting

2 in their own respective areas would now come to this area where they were

3 setting up camp, and then they were all -- they were all about to carry

4 out some training together.

5 Q. Is my understanding correct? Is this the first time that the

6 army was not working in shifts, but rather they were all together there

7 without rotating, all present in this camp for this round of training?

8 Right?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. When you read a part of this decision about concealing their true

11 intentions, can you tell us what that means to you? How do you interpret

12 this?

13 A. It's difficult to say. The commander, in one portion of the

14 document, says that defence activity will be actively used to inflict the

15 greatest possible losses on the Serbs, the Chetniks, in terms of manpower

16 and equipment. Nevertheless, when I looked up the positions of those

17 units on the camp map, as a soldier I simply couldn't understand why the

18 greatest part of those forces were actually positioned away from the

19 front-line facing the Serbs, stretched along a very broad front facing

20 the Serbs; towards Mount Vlasic, towards Tesanj, towards Tuzla and so on

21 and so forth. As for offensive operations, large-scale offensive

22 operations, as the document states, they would need to join forces along

23 a narrower front and then direct this action at a single target.

24 Q. What was your conclusion, according to what you saw on the map?

25 What was the brunt of the 3rd Corps attack?

Page 46057

1 A. Given the deployment, I would say that the target was to cut off

2 communications in the Lasva and Lepenica Valleys, which means between

3 Travnik and Vitez and Vitez and Kiseljak.

4 Q. Very well. Mr. Gorjanc, could you please tell us something

5 about -- about army taking shifts? You've explained that very well.

6 What matters to us here is the following question: According to your

7 knowledge and experience, army taking shifts, does it reduce or increase

8 militarily in discipline?

9 A. In any case, it reduces military discipline.

10 Q. Could you tell us briefly why?

11 A. One-third of the units, in principle, I'm talking in principle

12 and the ratios could be different, in principle one-third is on the

13 front-line, engaging the enemy. The other third is in the vicinity of

14 the front-line, in the facilities or on other premises, and one-third is

15 at home, on furlough, in neighbouring places, and this is especially

16 typical of a territorial army. When it comes to that one-third that is

17 at home, in factual matters the commander cannot exert effective control

18 over their behaviour as soldiers and citizens.

19 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, could you please try, in view of your military

20 experience and knowledge, could you please try and tell us if everybody

21 knows what the effect on military discipline and an army taking shifts

22 has? How come that somebody will decide to organise their army in such a

23 way?

24 A. It happens when the opposing party also applies that type of

25 warfare under adverse weather conditions and other conditions, when the

Page 46058

1 intensity of combat is not that high, when there are no forthcoming

2 offensives on the part of the enemy side, and also it has a positive

3 effect on the morale of the fighters and the population alike. And,

4 thirdly, this reduces the cost of logistics, the accommodation of

5 soldiers, and if they spend time at home they can look after their

6 households, their family members, and the local commune as well.

7 Q. If you have an army that is not organised as an army taking

8 shifts, do you have to have barracks or some other facility where the

9 troops would be billeted, where they would spend nights?

10 A. It would be desirable to have barracks or facilities where the

11 troops could not only be billeted and sleep, but also where they could

12 have some sort of a normal life, where they could have washing

13 facilities, entertainment facilities, and so on and so forth.

14 Q. Given your good knowledge of the facilities of the JNA in the

15 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, could you please tell us where the

16 barracks were located in the territory of North Herzegovina?

17 A. In the territory of North Herzegovina, there were just two such

18 facilities, one in Mostar and the other in Capljina.

19 Q. Very well. In paragraph 37 of your expert report, Mr. Gorjanc,

20 you're trying to explain the difference between warfaring in one's own

21 territory and warfaring in the territory of a different state, of another

22 state. Could you please briefly explain the difference to us?

23 A. The difference arises primarily from --

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we move on to

25 paragraph 37, I would like to ask a follow-up question. I was really

Page 46059

1 interested in what you said on a third facing the front-line, a third as

2 a reserve, or a third at home -- and a third at home.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, and a third at home.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So I have these three figures

5 in mind.

6 Let's assume, and this is a hypothesis, let's assume there is an

7 offensive action, and I underline "offensive," so you have a third facing

8 the Serbs on the front-line. Knowing this, how can the HVO carry out an

9 offensive action if you have a third of the soldiers at home and a third

10 in reserve? How can the HVO solve that problem?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It would be exceptionally

12 difficult, especially to organise an offensive on a large scale. You can

13 organise an attack by recruiting reservists close to the front-line, and

14 those troops who are at home are not easy to gather if they are at home,

15 if it's not coming up to the time when they are supposed to return to the

16 front-line.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Does that mean that with the

18 so-called system of territorial army, is it impossible, from a military

19 point of view, to carry out large-scale military operations?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it's impossible, if you're

21 talking about a large-scale operation which would require the engagement

22 of an entire brigade, if not more people.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. I'm sure we'll have an

24 opportunity to come back to this.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

Page 46060

1 Q. Just one more question, and then we will bring that chapter to an

2 end.

3 In paragraph 37, Mr. Gorjanc, you're trying to point out the

4 difference between waging a war in one's own territory as opposed to

5 waging a war in the territory of a different state. Could you please

6 explain the difference to us?

7 A. The difference arises from the fact how the civilian authorities

8 act. In one's own territory, where there is an already-arranged system

9 of power which is implemented and regulated, military units and military

10 commanders are duty-bound to respect those regulations and show such an

11 attitude towards civilian authorities. The attitude, that means mutual

12 trust, mutual cooperation, and mutual respect. In case when you are in

13 the process of taking another territory or liberating one's own territory

14 after it had been under the jurisdiction or military occupation of

15 another army, then the military commander has all the powers to take over

16 some of the authorities of the civilian authorities, and in that case we

17 call such a commander a military government. However, even in such cases

18 he has to cooperate with the authorities that had previously existed, if

19 such authorities are cooperative, if such authorities are of assistance

20 to that commander. If those authorities are hostile, he has the right to

21 remove and bring in his own people. If we are talking about the

22 liberation of the formerly -- of former territories, he has such powers,

23 but he has to cede power to the previously-elected authorities or bring

24 in his own people that had been appointed by the central authorities of

25 the mother state.

Page 46061

1 Q. Could you please tell us, Mr. Gorjanc, how is this done by the

2 American Army in Iraq, for example, or another state?

3 A. Every American division has a brigade for civilian affairs. That

4 brigade has the task to establish civilian authorities in the territory

5 that the American Army takes. That brigade has, on its strength,

6 different experts, mostly lawyers, administrative experts, experts in the

7 matters of economy, and so on and so forth.

8 Q. What you have just told us, Mr. Gorjanc, is that something that

9 arises from the military doctrine as a rule that is applicable to all

10 situations, or would that be something specific for Bosnia or

11 Herceg-Bosna?

12 A. No, this is what every military in the world does, with the

13 caveat that the American Army is specific in that case, owing to the fact

14 that it has a special unit.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, since I have

16 finished with this part of the expert report, maybe this would be a good

17 time for a break.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Twenty minutes' break.

19 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing starts again.

22 Ms. Alaburic, you have the floor.

23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, we shall now move on to the doctrine of All-People's

25 Defence. But before that, we will also be talking about laws regulating

Page 46062

1 the Yugoslav People's Army. But let's clarify your answer to the as to

2 whether the Yugoslav People's Army at one point became an aggressor in

3 any of the territories of the former Yugoslavia. If I understood you

4 correctly, you said that the Yugoslav People's Army could not have been

5 an aggressor in the territory of Yugoslavia for as long as Yugoslavia

6 existed; is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. That would then mean that after the break-up of Yugoslavia,

9 Yugoslavia could have been an aggressor in some of the parts of the

10 former Yugoslavia; am I right in thinking that?

11 A. That was after the withdrawal from Slovenia, the JNA only by

12 name, but in factual terms it was no longer -- it was no longer the

13 Yugoslav People's Army. It was not even the Army of the Federal Republic

14 of Yugoslavia. That was created subsequently. In that sense, I don't

15 think that the JNA was an occupator [as interpreted] anyway. However,

16 the remainder that withdrew from Slovenia and Croatia behaved as an

17 occupator [as interpreted] -- as an occupying force in Bosnia-Herzegovina

18 is a fact.

19 Q. Tell us, Mr. Gorjanc, when did the so-called Yugoslav People's

20 Army withdraw from Slovenia?

21 A. It started withdrawing from Slovenia on the 18th of July, and it

22 withdrew completely on the 26th of October, 1991.

23 Q. Could you please repeat the year?

24 A. It was in 1991.

25 Q. Can we then consider that after the dates that you've just

Page 46063

1 mentioned, the JNA no longer existed and that the remains of the JNA

2 could have been an occupying force in one of the parts of the former

3 Yugoslavia?

4 A. Yes.

5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for that clarification.

6 Your Honours, we will start this section with a video-clip.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I thought this was a bit fast.

8 If Slovenia is off the former Yugoslavia, does that mean that the

9 rest does not exist as a mutilated SFRY? You seem to say Slovenia off,

10 Yugoslavia broken, doesn't exist anymore, and I wonder whether this is

11 correct.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm not a lawyer,

13 especially not an expert for international law. However, in my view,

14 personally, the JNA stopped existing and Yugoslavia stopped existing

15 because it did not contain Slovenia, and Croatia also declared its

16 independence at the same time. So it was a rump Yugoslavia, as they call

17 it, but it was no longer Yugoslavia with its former six republics.

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That is different. If you say it was rump

19 Yugoslavia, I can accept that. The question, of course, then arises

20 whether this still means that an aggression is possible, an aggression is

21 not possible. But as you state, you are not a lawyer, and this is

22 essentially, I think, a legal question. I will not insist that you

23 answer at all. I think you have done as good as you can be expected to

24 do.

25 Ms. Alaburic.

Page 46064

1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I absolutely agree

2 with you. I wanted the witness to provide us with his own opinion on

3 that. And we know exactly when Yugoslavia broke up and what was

4 happening at the time, so I don't think we should have any problem with

5 that.

6 Your Honours, the section about All-People's Defence is something

7 that we would like to start with a video-clip. If you will allow me, I'm

8 not going to inform you in advance who is depicted in the video-clip. I

9 would like to ask the witness to tell us that, and then we would provide

10 some explanations as to what the whole thing is all about.

11 [Video-clip played]

12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We are doing everything to make any

13 interference with Yugoslavia impossible, even after me, because anybody

14 who would think that after my departure Yugoslavia could be weakened from

15 inside and that it is now in danger to become prey for some invasion from

16 the Soviet part, I don't believe in that. Yugoslavia has a firm unity,

17 regardless of its multi-nationality. Today, Yugoslavia has, it could be

18 said, one of the strongest militaries in Europe. Then we also have

19 All-People's Defence with a huge number of people, and we enacted into

20 law that everybody must be faithful to the defence of the country and

21 thereon.

22 "Yugoslavia can deploy 8 million people in the battle-field, and

23 8 million is not a joke, especially considering that those people are

24 Yugoslav, who are accustomed to being on a war path."

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my associate,

Page 46065

1 Davor Lazic, tells me that the translation or interpretation did not

2 start from the very beginning, but I don't think we should re-run the

3 video-clip. I would like to draw your attention that the film is in

4 electronic courtroom under number 4D1733.

5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters would appreciate if that

6 information was furnished before the video-clip was played.

7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, a question for you. Do you recognise the person on

9 the video-clip?

10 A. I did not have the image on my screen, but I recognised it by

11 voice. This is Josip Broz Tito. He was my commander for a number of

12 years. He was talking about 8 million people that he could arm at any

13 one time. At that time in Yugoslavia, the units of the Yugoslav People's

14 Army and the Territorial Defence of all republics numbered about

15 2.400.000 people, and the figure of 8 million refers to the entire

16 population, able-bodied men, ranging in age from 16 to 60. That would be

17 the approximate explanation.

18 Q. In this statement dated 1978, just before his visit to the US,

19 his statement to an American journalist, he mentioned the doctrine of

20 All-People's Defence. What about these 8 million potential soldiers?

21 Does that have anything to do with the doctrine?

22 A. Yes, in every way. Under the Constitution, the entire

23 population, those who were able-bodied and able to resist in an armed

24 way, the number would have grown significantly even compared to that.

25 Q. You mean the women, too?

Page 46066

1 A. Yes, them, too.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could I have the usher's

3 assistance, please. If Mr. Gorjanc's monitor can be switched to e-court.

4 I now understand that he didn't see the video-clip, so the monitor is

5 probably in the wrong mode.

6 Q. Meanwhile, Mr. Gorjanc, could you please explain when the

7 doctrine of All-People's Defence was first established?

8 A. The doctrine was first discussed in the autumn of 1968, following

9 the incursion carried out by the Warsaw Pact powers into Czechoslovakia.

10 Yugoslavia then felt that it, too, was at risk from the same forces.

11 Facing that kind of power and in that kind of environment, a textbook

12 army, such as the JNA, would not have been able to withstand an

13 aggression. The doctrine was then adopted and became part of the

14 Constitution in 1974, after which it was elaborated in a systematic way.

15 The first documents about the doctrine in writing were first released in

16 1973. The doctrine was complete, you might say, in terms of the theory,

17 by 1976.

18 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, were you, too, involved in the creation of that

19 doctrine and its implementation?

20 A. The implementation, yes, sure thing, but as for the creation of

21 that doctrine, at a lower level, the level of my command, starting with

22 battalion level and company/platoon level corps.

23 Q. Could you tell us, in the briefest possible terms, what the

24 essence of the doctrine of All-People's Defence might be?

25 A. The substance of the doctrine is about pooling together all the

Page 46067

1 resources of a country, in this case Yugoslavia, for the purpose of

2 defending its sovereignty and integrity, meaning the armed forces and all

3 the other players involved in armed as well as non-armed resistance and

4 any other activities supporting that resistance, regardless of the age

5 and sex of those involved.

6 Q. We will speak about that in greater detail when we come to the

7 regulations.

8 Now, paragraph 44, if we could please move on to that, you talk

9 about committees for ONO and DSZ, which is short for "All-People's

10 Defence" and "Social Self-Protection," ONO and DSZ, "Social

11 Self-Protection." Mr. Gorjanc, could you tell us what these committees

12 were, headed by who?

13 A. These committees for ONO and DSZ were a form of political control

14 exercised by the League of Communists, the party, over the entire defence

15 system. The committees comprised representatives or leaders of various

16 socio-political organisations in certain environments, as well as

17 municipal presidents, a municipal executive board president, the head of

18 the Internal Affairs Secretariat, the commander of the Territorial

19 Defence, and by virtue of his position, also the commander of whichever

20 JNA unit happened to be in a certain specific area. These committees had

21 within their remit the organisation of defence in a certain area. In

22 case the defence wasn't functioning, it was their job to take any

23 measures available to them to set up forms of resistance. Whenever that

24 wasn't possible, they would take charge of commanding the defence of that

25 area. The committee would normally be headed by the president or the

Page 46068

1 secretary of the League of Communists in a certain local area.

2 Q. Speaking of these committees for ONO and DSZ, if you tried to

3 compare these to bodies that came into existence in the early 1990s in

4 certain parts of the former Yugoslavia, and I believe that was the case

5 in Slovenia as well, which particular body could you compare these

6 committees to?

7 A. In Slovenia, we had something that we referred to as

8 coordination, ranging from the local communes and then on to

9 municipalities in the republic itself. The coordination body was headed

10 by the prime minister, who was also the president of the party in power.

11 In other areas, such as Bosnia and Croatia, in particular, they had

12 something they called crisis staffs at municipal levels or district

13 levels. And that's about as much as I know.

14 Q. You say that these committees were also organised at the level of

15 local communes and municipalities; right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Based on your knowledge, these crisis staffs that were set up in

18 the early 1990s across Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were organised

19 at municipal levels, too, or not?

20 A. As far as I know, they were organised at the municipal level,

21 headed by a party president or a mayor normally from the party that won

22 the elections.

23 Q. A hypothetical question. Were someone to tell you that these

24 crisis staffs in municipalities across Bosnia-Herzegovina had influence

25 over military units in these same municipal territories, would you

Page 46069

1 believe that this had anything to do with how the All-People's Defence

2 committees had been working previously?

3 A. The way they conducted their business was almost identical.

4 Q. Fair enough, thank you. Mr. Gorjanc, let's look at the first

5 document after the blue paper. I think the documents are separated by a

6 blue sheet of paper. 1D2976, 1D2976. This is the Constitution of the

7 SFRY. At this point in time, we will be looking at Article 240,

8 paragraph 3. Article 240, paragraph 3.

9 Can you please read this article, Mr. Gorjanc?

10 A. "Each citizen participating in resistance against the enemy in an

11 armed way is a member of the armed forces of the SFRY."

12 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, can you now tell us, from the point of view of a

13 citizen, who in the former Yugoslavia would be considered a member of the

14 armed forces of the SFRY?

15 A. Anyone putting up resistance to an attacker, an aggressor in any

16 way, armed or not.

17 Q. Can you repeat your answer? Armed or --

18 A. Armed or not, armed or in another manner. In an armed manner or

19 in another manner.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I have a question, a

21 follow-up question.

22 I'm reading paragraph 3 of Article 204 [as interpreted], and I

23 put myself -- I place myself in the generalised defence -- people's

24 defence. You have been an officer in the JNA, and you have said that

25 during several years you were in the same barracks as Captain Petkovic.

Page 46070

1 I would like to know, according to your memories, at the level of the JNA

2 were there some orders, or circulars, or instructions which were either

3 written or verbal on possible problems in the ex-republics of Yugoslavia,

4 and trouble, let's say, and where the JNA would have intervened? Has

5 such an assumption or hypothesis has been envisaged or not?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there were no

7 particular instructions regarding that. Nevertheless, the JNA during its

8 existence intervened several times in different areas; Kosovo, first and

9 foremost, when there was unrest. The last such intervention was on the

10 9th of March, 1991, in Belgrade, when there were the huge nationalist

11 rallies taking place. However, there were no specific instructions

12 regarding that.

13 Back in 1988, sometime in the spring of 1988 - I can't remember

14 the exact date, I was not personally involved in that - a document was

15 produced covering the entire territory, in the sense of involving JNA

16 units in the eventuality of riots, unrest, rallies. This document was

17 produced specifically for Slovenia, and eventually the person who outed

18 this document, published this document, was tried simply because the

19 document was a classified one, a state secret.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, of course it goes

21 without saying that this document would have been interesting --

22 particularly interesting, since we don't have this document - maybe we'll

23 have it one day, you never know - that in case of incidents, you spoke

24 about the intervention of the JNA in Kosovo. When there are incidents,

25 trouble, can you consider that a civilian may be potentially a combatant

Page 46071

1 if one applies Article 240 which we are -- which we have here, and if he

2 potentially, he is a combatant, will then the JNA -- can it -- can the

3 JNA arrest him then?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The doctrine of All-People's

5 Defence was not meant to be used against one's own citizens, it was meant

6 to be used against an external enemy. In situations involving one's own

7 citizens, it was the civilian police that took action.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. Thank you very much for

9 your answer.

10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. When you say "an external enemy," Mr. Gorjanc, who exactly do you

12 have in mind?

13 A. One of the states that conceivably could have attacked Yugoslavia

14 at the time. We prepared equally in relation to all of the neighbouring

15 states surrounding us.

16 Q. Very well. Let us try to wrap up Article 240, paragraph 3. It

17 follows, based on this article, does it not, that a person putting up

18 armed resistance in defence of his country and another person defending

19 his country in an unarmed way would be equally considered, both of them,

20 as fighters and members of the JNA; is that what the doctrine of

21 All-People's Defence amounted to, in practical terms?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Article 237 of this same document, it talks about how the defence

24 of the country is an inviolable and inalienable right and duty of the

25 nation's nationalities, working people, and citizens. Let's look at

Page 46072

1 citizens for the time being, Mr. Gorjanc. Given your military expertise

2 and your familiarity with these regulations, what does this mean, the

3 inviolable and inalienable right, in terms of defence?

4 A. "Inviolable and inalienable" means that no one can deny anyone

5 else the right to put up resistance, to resist. No later regulation

6 contradicting the Constitution could be applied in this sense, in the

7 sense of preventing someone from putting up resistance.

8 Q. Very well. Let's move on to the next document now, the Law on

9 All-People's Defence. This is 4D1470. You discuss this law in

10 paragraph 54 of your expert report. We'll be looking at some key

11 regulations which I think are material to our understanding of the

12 doctrine of All-People's Defence. To start with, Article 91, Article 91.

13 It reads:

14 "The armed forces make up a single entity and are comprised of

15 the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defence."

16 And then, in paragraph 2, there is the following provision:

17 "Any citizen who, with weapons or in any other fashion,

18 participates in resistance against the enemy is also considered a member

19 of the armed forces."

20 Mr. Gorjanc, is this the same fundamental provision that we

21 analysed a minute ago?

22 A. Yes. This is the operationalisation of a constitutional

23 provision in the form of a law.

24 Q. Let's move on to Article 3, defining the notion or the concept of

25 All-People's Defence. Could you please pay particular attention to the

Page 46073

1 concept of all-people's resistance in line 7. It's right there. There

2 are the various forms of all-people's resistance being enumerated there.

3 What is the place of all-people's resistance in the doctrine of

4 All-People's Defence?

5 A. Resistance, I would say, is the chief component -- the main

6 component of All-People's Defence.

7 Q. Very well. Let's look at Article 17 of the same law. In this

8 article, there are definitions of the basic forms or, rather, the basic

9 rights and duties within the scope of All-People's Defence. Mr. Gorjanc,

10 could you please tell us, what were the basic rights and duties within

11 All-People's Defence?

12 A. I apologise. The basic rights and duties were the military

13 obligation, the obligation to take part in civil protection, the

14 obligation to fulfill work obligation, to be trained for All-People's

15 Defence, and to meet requisition requirements.

16 Q. Let's look at the Article 118 of the same law, which regulates

17 the reinforcement of the armed forces. And here it says that:

18 "Units and institutions of All-People's Defence are reinforced,"

19 and I'm quoting, "with personnel from the regular and reserve armed

20 forces."

21 Could you please tell us, Mr. Gorjanc, who makes up the regular

22 force, on the one hand, and who makes up the reserve force, on the other

23 hand?

24 A. The regular force is composed of active officers of -- or active

25 military personnel, students of military schools, and civilians serving

Page 46074

1 in the armed forces. Soldiers carrying out their military duty are also

2 part of that strength.

3 Q. Very well. And what about the reserve -- the reserve armed

4 forces?

5 A. The reserve armed forces are composed of able-bodied men who had

6 served in the army, those who had regulated their army service in a

7 different way, and female military conscripts.

8 Q. Let's skip the Law on Service in the Armed Forces, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me for interrupting.

10 Mr. Gorjanc, I fail to understand this. The title is

11 "Reinforcement of the Armed Forces," and then:

12 "The armed forces shall be reinforced with personnel from the

13 regular armed forces."

14 To me, this reads tautological because the regular armed forces

15 are the armed forces. How do the armed forces reinforce the armed

16 forces? I would be grateful if you could explain.

17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe that the

18 problem arises from the translation or interpretation and that

19 Mr. Gorjanc does not understand your question.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judging from what His Honour has

21 just said, it is a tautology, but it's not about reinforcing forces, but

22 to make up forces.

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. It's not the first time, probably

24 not the last time that we stumble over such subtleties or difficulties in

25 translation. Perhaps you could give or read the word "reinforcement" in

Page 46075

1 the original language, and the interpreters perhaps find another word

2 than "reinforcement," the title of number 5.

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Maybe Mr. Gorjanc should read the

4 entire Article 118.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The units and institutions of the

6 Yugoslav People's Army and units, institutions, and staffs of --"

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. I'm sure this is a well-meant

8 proposal, but it's a long article, and what he -- the witness just has

9 not read is what I wanted; namely, the title numbered 5, which is above

10 Article 118. Just that title, if you please.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Bringing units up to strength in

12 the armed forces."

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. I think I grasp it now. Thank you.

14 End of the interruption, Ms. Alaburic. Excuse me, please.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. In Article 118, it is confirmed that JNA units are brought up to

17 strength with the men from the active and reserve forces; is that what we

18 have just read?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. All this is very well regulated by the Law on the Service in the

21 Armed Forces. However, that document is not on our list. Let's look at

22 the following document, which is 4D14 --

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Hold on, hold on. Witness, I

24 have a follow-up question on the basis of that document.

25 I was struck by the content of Article 12 on the role of the

Page 46076

1 League of Communists in wartime. Under this Article 12, it plays a

2 fundamental role, it's a driving force. Since you have known the

3 Yugoslav system very well, and then you've also -- or you also know the

4 system of your country, Slovenia, very well, could you tell me if, in

5 your country, Slovenia, for example, or any country, in case of war, as

6 regards the mindset and mentality of the country's inhabitants, is it the

7 political party which is in power, which federates, coordinates,

8 supports, the people's defence?

9 On that basis in Herceg-Bosna, was it the role of HDZ HB to do

10 this and to play that role which was carried out formerly by the League

11 of Communists, but since it disappeared, is it a political -- a political

12 party's role to do that?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's very difficult

14 for me to claim that. The League of Communists, in its programme, said

15 that it was the leading political and ideological power of the Yugoslav

16 society. As far as I know, there is no such provision in the HDZ, i.e.,

17 that it is the leading political power of the Croatian people in

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was some other parties present in the Croatian

19 people and Croatians also belonged to some other parties in

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so it would be very difficult for me to determine or

21 to draw that parallel between the League of Communists and the HDZ.

22 However, I'm not excluding the possibility that at certain levels there

23 may have been such attempts.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

Page 46077

1 Q. Let's look at the Law on Military Service. 4D1471 is the

2 document number, 4D1471. The first article is Article number 47. This

3 is the whole chapter in the law that regulates the obligation to serve in

4 the reserve forces of the armed forces.

5 Mr. Gorjanc, tell us, please, who was subject to that obligation

6 to serve in the reserve forces of the armed forces?

7 A. I apologise. I don't have that document here.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, in which binder

9 can I find that document?

10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm following the

11 sequence of documents. I do have to say there has been some confusion.

12 I am taking the document -- the documents one at a time in the sequence

13 as they have been dispatched to my case manager. We are on the second

14 binder. It is the first document in the second binder. This is what

15 I've just been told.

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ms. Alaburic, in my second binder the number of

17 the first document is 4D01472. You have called 1471, so which one do you

18 want? It's the number or the place, what we should rely on? The first

19 document, to make it easier, is called "Decree on the Declaration of the

20 Law on Service in the Armed Forces," and it is of February 1985, and the

21 second one is dated "Belgrade, 1986," and is called "Law on Compulsory

22 Military Service."

23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, document 4D1472 is

24 the one that I have skipped because you have not allowed us to put it on

25 our 65 ter list, and now I'm on document 4D1471, which is the second

Page 46078

1 document in the sequence of documents in the second binder.

2 Q. I would now kindly ask the witness to -- I apologise for not

3 having been aware of the fact that we have moved on to the second binder.

4 I thought that we were on the first one. My mistake.

5 In Article 47, the law prescribes who are those who are subject

6 to serving in the reserve forces of the armed forces. Mr. Gorjanc, could

7 you please tell us whose duty was that?

8 A. Of all those citizens of Yugoslavia who have completed their

9 military service, also those who had regulated their military service in

10 a different way, and also women conscripts.

11 Q. In Article 48, it is stipulated how long the obligation to serve

12 in the reserve forces lasts. Mr. Gorjanc, could you please tell us that?

13 A. From the day a person stopped his obligatory military service,

14 and then in men up to the age of 60, and for women, from the ages of 19

15 to 50.

16 Q. In Article 69, there are provisions about the military records of

17 military conscripts. Could you please explain to the Trial Chamber as to

18 how the military records were kept?

19 A. It was done on the territorial principle in municipalities, in

20 the departments for All-People's Defence. In municipalities, I would

21 like to say that in the year 1990 a decree came on the establishment of

22 military districts, the military territorial commands, and then the

23 records were taken over from the military departments of municipalities

24 by the military districts and fell under the legal jurisdiction of the

25 JNA.

Page 46079

1 Q. In this part of your report, you talk about mobilisation. Could

2 you please tell us about the forms of mobilisation that existed at the

3 time?

4 A. Mobilisation could have been public or classified, general or

5 individual, in the narrow sense of that term, it could be partial.

6 Q. In the end of that chapter, you refer us to a book by

7 Gavro Perazic entitled "Constitutional, Political, International Legal

8 Status of All-People's Defence and Armed Forces." Could you please tell

9 us, Mr. Gorjanc -- we can find this in paragraph 62 of your report.

10 Could you please explain to us who Gavro Perazic was?

11 A. Professor Gavro Perazic, a colonel in the JNA, was one of the

12 biggest experts on international laws of war in the former Yugoslavia.

13 He authored several works about that subject.

14 Q. If I understand his positions well, given the doctrine of

15 All-People's Defence, he believes that a participant in the resistance is

16 not only a person carrying arms and fighting, but also all those who do

17 not carry arms but are potential fighters, which means that people who

18 are members of the reserve forces, and, therefore, in case they are

19 arrested, they should be treated as prisoners of war. Did I understand

20 the whole point properly?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, according to what you know and according to how you

23 understand the rule -- regulations that prevailed at the time of the

24 former Yugoslavia, is that how you saw the doctrine of All-People's

25 Defence, and did you think that this was how it should have been applied?

Page 46080

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, let us now look at the application of the doctrine --

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In general, paragraph 62 of

4 your report is an interesting one, but I'm trying to figure out what

5 exactly you meant. Let's take the case of a 30-year-old civilian who's

6 not a member of any armed forces, but who's capable of holding a gun at

7 some stage. Can that person or must that person be detained on the

8 grounds that he's a potential enemy, and if arrested, what's his status?

9 Is he a prisoner of war, or a combatant and, hence, has the status of a

10 war prisoner, or is it a potentially -- or is it potentially a civilian

11 who can be a combatant, and could he possibly refer the matter to any

12 authority or to any court? Could you -- it is a complex matter, but I

13 hope you understand my question.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Under the Constitution and the

15 laws, all those who put up resistance, irrespective of the fact whether

16 they carry arms or not, are members of the armed forces. All those who

17 have served in the army are military conscripts, irrespective of the

18 facts whether they have been assigned to units or not. This means that

19 if there is an indicia that such people who are not carrying arms and

20 look like civilians, at first glance, if there are indicia that they

21 might be detrimental, too, then they have to isolate it. Only in case

22 that it is proven that they act in a detrimental way, they can be

23 arrested. In any case, they enjoy the status of prisoners of war.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is an accurate answer, but

25 I would like you to specify something.

Page 46081

1 You said if there are indications, that person can be isolated.

2 This is what you said, if there are indicia. Now, what does that mean,

3 "isolate them," according to you?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "To isolate" means to restrict

5 movement in a certain area or even within a person's place of residence,

6 in their homes, placing them under house arrest or a special room that is

7 monitored, under surveillance. I'm not talking about a POW camp.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And according to you, according

9 to the surveys/studies carried out with an armed forces, or according to

10 what you learned in the Military Academy, do these people have rights,

11 these people who are isolated, or is it so that the only right they have

12 is to remain silent?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They're a POW.

14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Gorjanc, still on paragraph 62, this last

15 sentence is not quite clear for me. First you say if he, that is, a man

16 in serviceable age, is not found in open, armed combat, the enemy should

17 consider these men fit for military service. Are you sure you want to

18 say "should" here? If you say "could," "might," I would understand, but

19 do you state a duty for the enemy here?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in this case I'm

21 quoting Colonel Perazic. Nevertheless, I personally believe that this is

22 offered as a possibility, not an obligation.

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: All right. Then there is -- the language is not

24 quite clear.

25 And furthermore, you say "because in a different situation, they

Page 46082

1 could be found bearing weapons." You establish here a relationship of

2 causality. I must confess that I don't see any logic in this.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All able-bodied men and other

4 citizens are under an obligation to put up resistance. If they can get

5 hold of arms, they are certainly expected to use those arms.

6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I will not insist on this, bearing in mind that

7 you're not a lawyer and you do not formulate along the way lawyers would

8 expect -- be expected to. Thank you.

9 Sorry, for the record, the last sentence, I'm speaking "would be

10 expected to." Thank you.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, in your country, have

12 you been personally faced with that same problem by which you isolated

13 potential enemies or have you never been faced with that particular

14 circumstance?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Personally, Your Honour, over in

16 Slovenia I never encountered a situation like that. The armed clashes

17 went on for a mere ten days over there. Nevertheless, the Slovenian

18 authorities and the army, the Territorial Defence and police, were

19 arresting JNA officers, taking them to prisoner camps, even arresting

20 some in their homes and taking them away from their families in order to

21 take them to these prisoner camps. One of these camps was in a coal mine

22 over in Hrastnik.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. You provide an example,

24 the conflict lasted for ten days. But as far as you know, has the

25 Slovenian Army arrested Serbs who were not JNA officers, but who were

Page 46083

1 Serbs and who could potentially pose a threat?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not as far as I know, but they

3 had under their control most citizens hailing from other republics who

4 were believed not to be loyal to these newly-established Slovenian

5 authorities. That is why those people were erased from the register of

6 citizens of the state of Slovenia, and as a consequence those people had

7 to leave.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine.

9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, let us return to this document, the excerpt from

11 Gavro Perazic's book, 4D1492.

12 In response to Judge Trechsel's question, you said you were, in

13 actual fact, quoting Mr. Perazic specifically in Article 62 of your

14 expert report. Could we please, then, pay close attention to the

15 following sentence which I'm about to read. It's at the very bottom of

16 page 200:

17 "If they were not caught in open armed struggle, the enemy can

18 consider them to be potential fighters or combatants, and that is how

19 they shall be treated, because in another situation they might be caught

20 with weapons in their hands."

21 While quoting Perazic, did you believe these people to also be

22 potential combatants and that they should be treated as such, potential

23 soldiers of an enemy army?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. All right. That wraps up this chapter, and we are now moving on

Page 46084

1 to All-People's Defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the application of

2 All-People's Defence.

3 Let us look at what the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina has to

4 say about this. It's a new chapter. It's in binder 2, 1D1236. You

5 refer to this in paragraph 64 of your report. What we're dealing with is

6 Article 162. Article 162, paragraph 3, reads:

7 "Every citizen who, with arms or otherwise, participates in

8 resistance to the aggressor shall be considered a member of the armed

9 forces of the republic."

10 Mr. Gorjanc, you can focus on the screen in front of you.

11 A. Your Honours, may I just say one thing? I don't have the

12 transcript on my monitor. Therefore, I'm no longer able to follow the

13 pace and when I should start answering.

14 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have --

15 Q. Now you have it on your screen. Could you please look at

16 Article 162, paragraph 3. I've just quoted from it. I'm not going to

17 repeat. Tell us, Mr. Gorjanc, do you see any difference between the

18 definition in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and what we saw

19 as having been prescribed in the former Yugoslavia?

20 A. None whatsoever.

21 Q. In your opinion and in your understanding of this provision, are

22 the armed and unarmed resistance against an aggressor, are they one and

23 the same, in your view?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Let's look at the following document, which is the Decree on

Page 46085

1 Defence. This is 4D408. It is already in evidence, and we will not

2 dwell upon this document for long. I would just like to highlight some

3 parts that might be of some importance for the topic of All-People's

4 Defence.

5 In Article 5, line 3 or bullet point 3, a reference is made about

6 resistance of people during the war. In Yugoslav regulations, reference

7 is made to all-people's resistance. In your view, from a military

8 perspective, is there any difference between the two terms?

9 A. No, there is no difference. It's just about the wording.

10 Q. Let's look at Article 46, where reference is made to the rights

11 and obligations of citizens in terms of defence. Mr. Gorjanc, we looked

12 at the Yugoslav regulations and we saw that the defence of the country

13 was right and the obligation of all citizens. Was the situation the same

14 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

15 A. Absolutely the same.

16 Q. Let's look at Article 48. Could you please tell us whether

17 Article 48 speaks about work obligation? Was work obligation one of the

18 forms of non-armed resistance?

19 A. Yes, that's how it could be understood. Units of work obligation

20 were very often directly engaged on the front-line.

21 Q. How old did you have to be in order to fall under work

22 obligation?

23 A. It started at the age of 15 and lasted until the age of 60.

24 However, in mobilisation call-up papers, I often saw that work obligation

25 extended up to the age of 65.

Page 46086

1 Q. Let's look at Article 66. Mr. Gorjanc, could you please help us

2 to understand this article properly? I'm going to be very brief. This

3 is about the deployment of human and material resources, and the final

4 part of the provision reads so that all human and material resources of

5 the republic are utilised for defence, to the optimum of their

6 professional and other abilities. Could you please take an example of a

7 chemical engineer who is a top expert for explosives. Could you take

8 that example and explain how, based on the provisions of this law, such

9 person could be engaged in the defence of the country?

10 A. In any case, he had to be engaged either in the production of

11 explosives or -- in the production of basic or raw materials for the

12 production of explosives, or in the institutes for the development of new

13 explosives, or in the depots where explosives and explosive materials

14 were safeguarded.

15 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, if you were a commander in wartime, would you engage

16 such an engineer who worked in a factory and supplied the enemy army?

17 Would you consider such a person as a more dangerous enemy than a foot

18 soldier on the front-line?

19 A. Of course.

20 Q. Let's look at Article 70. The entire chapter is entitled "Scope

21 and Structure of Civil Defence." The previous chapter of the same law

22 applies to military defence. I conclude, therefore, Mr. Gorjanc, there

23 are two basic types of defence, military and civil defence. Is that the

24 way I should understand it?

25 A. Yes.

Page 46087

1 Q. In Article 71, there is the description of --

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. I'm still a bit puzzled about this

3 chemist who you have said, Mr. Gorjanc, that he's obliged to work on

4 explosives. Now, let's say he's engaged in working on fertiliser or

5 another very essential product for agriculture. Who is deciding whether

6 he's going to do this or whether he's going to another department of the

7 factory or to another factory to work on explosives? Who is taking that

8 decision?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The decision is taken by the

10 administrative and executive bodies who assess where he would be more

11 needed. Maybe he would be needed in the production of fertilisers,

12 because agricultural production is also very important for resistance and

13 for supplying armed forces, but this is not within the purview of

14 decision-making by military bodies.

15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That's quite logical, yes, and it is not his own

16 task to decide. You have said, No, thank you, or you have gestured, No,

17 thank you.

18 Ms. Alaburic, excuse me.

19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, for --

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, just to come back to a

21 doubt I have: We have this chemist who's working in a factory. Everyone

22 knows that sometimes agricultural products may be used to make bombs.

23 But independently from that, if the belligerent part considers that this

24 chemist, this engineer, is a potential danger because of his knowledge,

25 of his know-how, in such a case may he be isolated, put aside?

Page 46088

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe so, yes.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to ask

4 you something. We know that you decided that only General Petkovic's

5 Defence will be entitled to examine Mr. Gorjanc. However, since

6 Mr. Gorjanc is a joint expert used by both Praljak and Petkovic Defence,

7 we would kindly ask you to take off from our time, if this is deemed to

8 be necessary, by General Praljak's Defence, that you should allow

9 General Praljak's Defence to put some questions, if, with your leave,

10 General Praljak has one question to put to the witness.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a minute. I have to

12 consult my colleagues.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber sees no problem,

15 but on two conditions. First of all, that the time spent will be

16 deducted from your time, and then General Praljak has to tell us what is

17 the purpose of the question.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

19 Just for the sake of clarification, the question concerns

20 prisoners of war. In current war and after the Second World War, whether

21 those were rocket scientists, chemists, physicists, in Germany it was

22 Heisenberg, or, for example, in Russia, where engineers were being taken

23 away, in that sense I wanted to ask Mr. Gorjanc -- and maybe I would have

24 a few more questions by way of clarification, with your leave.

25 So my first question is: Who may be considered a prisoner of

Page 46089

1 war, for example, in the Second World War, in the Vietnam War, and so on

2 and so forth? Thank you very much.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When we're talking about that

4 category of people, a chemist in this particular case, I can provide an

5 example from the Second World War.

6 Engineers, Slovenians, were arrested as civilians by the German

7 occupying forces, and they were taken to camps where they continued

8 working as engineers in chemical plants and institutes. After the war,

9 in 1948 they were sentenced as collaborators and traitors by the

10 Slovenian government.

11 And as for the other militaries in other wars, war prisoners were

12 all those who were found with arms in their hands and also those who

13 didn't carry arms.

14 There were all sorts of types of isolation during different wars.

15 For example, in the Second World War, after the attack by the Japanese

16 Imperial Army against Pearl Harbor, all or nearly all citizens,

17 irrespective of their age and sex, who were American citizens were

18 incarcerated, if that is any sort of clarification that the general is

19 satisfied with.

20 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I propose that I should finish

21 this line of questioning the way I intended to.

22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Witness, I wonder how you know this. Were the

23 Americans -- were the Japanese arrested in the United States after

24 Pearl Harbor, were they prisoners of war, according to your view, and in

25 the sense of the Geneva Conventions?

Page 46090

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wouldn't know that. I apologise.

2 I don't know, because I could only draw that knowledge from movies.

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. And I will not press you on this.

4 I think it's totally irrelevant, and you are not supposed to be an expert

5 on the Law of War. Thank you.

6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

7 I will go back to Article 66 in this law in the follow-up to

8 Judge Trechsel's questions as to who would decide where the hypothetical

9 engineer would be assigned.

10 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, let's look at Article 66. What does Article 66 say?

11 Who will take the decision on deployment of such people? What did you

12 say? Who is it who decides about the assignment of such people?

13 A. It is the civilian authorities, upon the request, for example, of

14 companies that need people.

15 Q. And what is the basic criterion when it comes to the assignment,

16 in view of this article?

17 A. Professionalism and capability to contribute towards resistance

18 in the highest possible level.

19 Q. Very well, then. Let's look at Article 47, paragraph 3. It says

20 that citizens should communicate urgently to the reporting centre or the

21 state authorities any defence-related information they've learned or

22 noticed. Tell us, Mr. Gorjanc, does this refer to the intelligence

23 activities on the part of citizens?

24 A. This is about intelligence activities on the territory.

25 Q. Let's look at document 4D1475. It's not the -- if it's not in

Page 46091

1 the next -- in the sequence, then it is the one after. It is 4D1475.

2 This is an order issued by the commander of the 3rd Corps of the

3 BiH Army, dated March 1993. Let's look at the ending of the second

4 bullet point. It says:

5 "As a special task, maintain connections with our structures and

6 sympathizers in temporarily-occupied territory."

7 Could you please tell us, Mr. Gorjanc, whether that would be in

8 the function of the exercise of the Intelligence Service on the part of

9 the citizens?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And now let's look at document 4D409. This is a Decree Law on

12 the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Article 4,

13 paragraph 3, speaks about the bringing up to strength of war institutions

14 and units. Mr. Gorjanc, how was this done in Bosnia-Herzegovina? How

15 were war units brought up to strength?

16 A. War units were brought up to strength from the ranks of military

17 conscripts who served in the army, military conscripts serving in the

18 army, and other able-bodied men who regulated their army service in any

19 different -- any other way.

20 Q. Does this refer to reservists?

21 A. Yes, we're talking about the reserve composition, save for the

22 conscripts who were serving in the army at that time.

23 Q. People who were reservists, were they also potential combatants?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. When they became actual combatant?

Page 46092

1 A. When they were deployed into units and when they started carrying

2 arms.

3 Q. And now let's look at the following decree, 4D412. This is the

4 Decree on Service in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 Let's look at the decree law just briefly. Article 3, paragraph 1,

6 defines the term of military personnel serving in the army, and

7 Article 4, paragraph 2, speaks about soldiers and persons in the reserve

8 force which -- who enter into service within the army.

9 Mr. Gorjanc, tell us, please, persons in the reserve force, what

10 is the basis for them entering into the army service? Is that their army

11 obligation or some other obligation?

12 A. Based on their army obligation upon a mobilisation call.

13 Q. Let's look at Article 60. This is about health-care, but we

14 would like to see how the legislator differentiates between certain

15 categories. In view of this provision, Mr. Gorjanc, would you say that

16 there is a difference between army members and members of the armed

17 forces during a state of war?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Well, very well. And now I would like us to look at document

20 1D1238. These are the amendments to the Decree Law on Defence. Let's

21 look at Article 4. Actually, I'm going to skip this document altogether

22 because there is no need to look at it. I wanted to draw your attention

23 to other courier tasks and other tasks this decree defines. They're also

24 members of the armed forces, people who act as couriers, what do they do

25 exactly?

Page 46093

1 A. The Defence Department in every municipality had the courier

2 service which carried mobilisation call-up papers and other information

3 to military conscripts. Those were people who were members of the staff

4 of the Department of Defence or, alternatively, military conscripts who

5 were not assigned to any units, but were still present on the territory.

6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] What the witness has just said,

7 Your Honours, is regulated by Article 126(C) of this law.

8 Q. Paragraph 114 of your report, sir, contains a conclusion as to

9 whether, under the BH regulations, the doctrine of All-People's Defence

10 was, in fact, applied. Could you please outline your conclusion?

11 A. Bearing in mind the totality of laws and regulations in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, all citizens had the right and duty to participate in

13 the country's defence and to directly contribute to its success in

14 various ways, regardless of their age group, sex, or social status. In

15 practical terms, the entire population was placed under the banner of

16 All-People's Defence.

17 Q. We've looked at the regulations, and could we now go and look

18 at individual decisions and orders, showing how, if at all, this doctrine

19 was implemented.

20 The first document that I'd like to discuss with you is 4D403

21 which is a decision on the organisation of the armed forces of the

22 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you please explain about item 1?

23 There is a distinction there between staffs and commands. Could you tell

24 us what this is about?

25 A. This was adopted from the organisation of Yugoslavia's

Page 46094

1 Territorial Defence, where they had staffs at various levels and unit

2 commands within the TO.

3 Q. Were you to look at the types of tasks they were performing and

4 to draw, based on that, a distinction between the staffs and commands,

5 what would that difference be, the difference between the two?

6 A. In the erstwhile Territorial Defence, the staffs were in actual

7 fact commands. They were only called staffs. I assume that the

8 distinction here is provided based on the erstwhile doctrine. I'm not

9 sure what time or period it dates back to.

10 Q. 1992.

11 A. That means that they based the whole thing on the erstwhile

12 structure of territorial defence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 Q. Look at item 2, please. The Main Staff of the Armed Forces is

14 classified as a staff and not a command. What would you say about that?

15 A. This a direct transfer from the erstwhile structure. The staffs

16 were, in actual fact, commands over units. The units were the corps, the

17 divisions, the brigades, the regiments. As far as the corps is

18 concerned, I don't think there could have been any talk of that back in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, that far back.

20 Q. You have told us that the staffs, in actual fact, were performing

21 the tasks of commands; right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Then why do we see commands as a special separate structure here?

24 A. I'd be hard put to answer that question. I think this was copied

25 from the erstwhile system of All-People's Defence.

Page 46095

1 Q. Next one up, P274, 274, the decision to declare a state of war.

2 Paragraph 2 defines, as one of the objectives, the following:

3 "A more efficient involvement of all human and material

4 potentials."

5 And paragraph 3 talks about organising all-people's resistance.

6 In your opinion, Mr. Gorjanc, does this have anything to do with the

7 doctrine of All-People's Defence?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Next document, 4D1164, 4D1164. This is an order to declare a

10 general public mobilisation in the territory of the Republic of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on paragraph 1, who was it that was mobilised

12 as a result of this order?

13 A. All men of military age, between 18 and 55 years of age.

14 Further, all citizens, men between 18 and 65 years of age, and women

15 between 18 and 55 years of age, in terms of their respective war

16 assignments, civil protection and other defence-related activities.

17 Q. Talking about the first group you mentioned, men, men liable for

18 military duty, does that refer to men who were in the reserve?

19 A. All those liable, because there wasn't the textbook structure.

20 It was only being set up, and they needed to draw up military records for

21 that purpose. As I said, most of the records had been taken over from

22 the JNA through the military districts, and one needed to establish a

23 whole new set of military records to be used.

24 Q. Paragraph 7 says that any failure to adhere to this order would

25 entail criminal and other responsibility under conditions of a state of

Page 46096

1 war. Based on what you know about the laws that prevailed in the former

2 Yugoslavia and at the time in Bosnia and Herzegovina, what punishments

3 were envisaged for a crime of this nature?

4 A. This was a misdemeanor, and this is described in greater detail

5 in each of the provisions. And then there were certain punishments that

6 were imposed under the Penal Code.

7 Q. The next document is 4D1727. This is a directive on the defence

8 of sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

9 dated April 1992, signed by Hasanefendic, who was then commander, and --

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a question.

11 In document 4D1164, one sees that women may also be considered as

12 taking part in the territory of defence, the territorial defence. Could

13 you tell me what is your point of view on the following situation? A

14 woman who is wearing a camouflage uniform is cooking either in barracks

15 for soldiers or on the ground. According to you, this woman, is she a

16 soldier or civilian personnel?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If she is within the barracks and

18 cooking for soldiers there, then she's performing a task within that

19 military unit and is, therefore, to be considered a soldier.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And if she's in the field with

21 the unit, is she carrying out a military mission or is she a civilian?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] She's on a military mission.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right.

24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, 4D1727, paragraph 2, says that forces of the

Page 46097

1 Territorial Defence and armed civilians should be united under a single

2 command. Getting people together like this and placing them under a

3 single command, is something like this anything that has to do with the

4 doctrine of All-People's Defence?

5 A. Yes, fully. It's entirely consistent.

6 Q. Paragraph 4, where it talks about stage 1, armed resistance by

7 citizens on a massive scale, does this have anything to do with the

8 doctrine of All-People's Defence?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Paragraph 5, set up units of the TO, volunteer units, the

11 Patriotic League, TO units, and other patriotic forces throughout the

12 municipality, does this have anything to do with the doctrine of

13 All-People's Defence?

14 A. Yes.

15 MS. WEST: My apologies.

16 Good afternoon, Your Honours. Kim West for the Office of the

17 Prosecution. Good afternoon to everyone else in and around the

18 courtroom.

19 Ms. Alaburic has been very pristine in her questions and have

20 almost all have been open-ended questions. However, in the last ten

21 minutes, and I understand that she's trying to get through some

22 documents, there have been a number of leading questions, and I would

23 just ask that they remain open-ended.

24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I thank my colleague, and I fully

25 agree with her objection and her remark. It was entirely my fault. I

Page 46098

1 had failed to preface this by saying how I was going to examine the

2 witness on this particular subject. I'll be asking about certain

3 components of this document, and depending on his answers, I'll be asking

4 an open-ended question at the very end.

5 Q. If that is not consistent with the doctrine of All-People's

6 Defence, why, and how, precisely, if it's inconsistent with the doctrine,

7 why not? If it is, yes, and if it's not, why not? Could we just go

8 through the document with these brief questions, simple questions, and

9 clarify the whole thing eventually at the very end?

10 If we could go to paragraph 6.2, Mr. Gorjanc, gathering

11 intelligence involved one's own forces and equipment, MUP forces, loyal

12 citizens, and local inhabitants, are we looking at intelligence that is

13 part of the doctrine of All-People's Defence?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. 6.4 --

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Hold on. Witness, I wanted to

17 ask a question earlier on, and I didn't, but I would like to take

18 advantage of the consideration of 6.2 to ask the following question.

19 In your CV, I saw that you had been an intelligence officer for a

20 short period of time during your career in the JNA. As an intelligence

21 officer, at the time whilst exercising your duty, were you in plain

22 clothes or dressed with a military uniform?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the division staff in Postojna,

24 I was in charge of reconnaissance units within that division, the scouts,

25 their training and their potential involvement in the eventuality of war.

Page 46099

1 I was a military man. I was not a civilian.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. So you always wore a

3 uniform?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From Day 1 to the very end.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. I'm asking the

6 question because sometimes some military people wear civilian clothes for

7 intelligence work.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it's possible, particularly

9 when one crosses over into enemy territory.

10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, I think now you need to clarify this. Were you with

12 the Security Service in the army - Intelligence Service, that's what it

13 would translate into - or in the --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could counsel please

15 repeat this question. The interpreter did not understand the question.

16 Thank you.

17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The interpreters have not understood your

18 question, Ms. Alaburic, even though, of course, the witness has. But it

19 would be nice if you could repeat it, and then the witness would answer.

20 Thank you.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It is hard to do an

22 interpretation when there is too much interference between the two

23 languages. The question should ideally be phrased either in Croatian or

24 B/C/S or in English. Thank you.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

Page 46100

1 Q. The SIS is the [In English] Security -- Intelligence Service,

2 Security Service, Intelligence Service. [Interpretation] And if VOS, the

3 military intelligence -- [In English] Military Informative Service.

4 [Interpretation] Did you work for what resembled the SIS back in

5 Yugoslavia or in the VOS?

6 A. I was with the intelligence. It was called the Security Service

7 or, as we called it, the KOS.

8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last part of

9 the witness's answer.

10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I know that this

11 right now is somewhat unclear to you, but I think it really is necessary

12 to clarify this now.

13 Q. If the KOS was the same thing as the SIS, would that mean that

14 you were working with a service that, in Herceg-Bosna, was called the

15 VOS?

16 A. Yes.

17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as far as the

18 terminology is concerned, let me make this clear to everyone in the

19 courtroom. I discussed this with our interpreters in order to be able to

20 avoid confusion, because they use the word "intelligence," everything

21 that we say about these services, and we concluded that the simplest

22 thing might be to use the abbreviations SIS and VOS so we all know what

23 we're talking about. The SIS and the VOS was the Military Intelligence

24 Service that was within the Main Staff. It was a part of the Main Staff,

25 and I don't think there should be any further problems understanding

Page 46101

1 this.

2 If my understanding is correct, we should take a break now.

3 Right?

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right, but I'll give the floor

5 to the Registrar for an IC number which was urgent.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honour. The Stojic Defence has

7 submitted an objection to 4D list of exhibits with Witness Curcic. The

8 document shall be given Exhibit IC1086.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right, 1086, IC1086.

10 Now a 20-minute break.

11 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

12 --- On resuming at 12.50 p.m.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's resume.

14 Ms. Alaburic.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, the issue of somebody working in the KOS or not was

17 a delicate issue in Slovenia, and after this confusion with terms, could

18 you please tell us whether you ever worked in KOS?

19 A. Never. I was not even an informer, a secret informer.

20 Q. Very well. We've clarified that. Let's go back to our document.

21 In the meantime, I've decided to reduce the number of questions

22 based on this document. Let me point you to Article 64. We're still on

23 the same document, which is 4D1727, 4D1727.

24 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] My apologies, Ms. Alaburic.

25 You wanted to clarify something as regards the witness working or

Page 46102

1 not with KOS, KOS being the intelligence -- the Military Intelligence

2 Service within the Main Staff. Is that right, Witness?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Nevertheless, it had its

4 officers in units starting with battalions upwards. In every unit, there

5 was a KOS officer or a KOS department. In a division, there was a

6 department with several officers.

7 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] All right. But you said that you

8 didn't work for KOS; is that correct?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's true. I never worked for

10 KOS.

11 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Good, very well. So you worked

12 for the counterpart of the SIS, but with a uniform?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was not its counterpart. It was

14 a decolent [as interpreted] of the Military Intelligence Service, also

15 known as VOS.

16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Many thanks.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, this is very

18 complicated for us. As regards the service in which you worked, you said

19 that it was the equivalent of VOS. But KOS, was it an equivalent of VOS?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those were two completely different

21 services, completely separate. KOS was in charge of internal security in

22 the units and in the areas where the units were deployed. VOS or the

23 Intelligence Service was active in collecting intelligence about a

24 possible enemy, a possible opponent. KOS, on the other hand, collected

25 intelligence about one's own forces, one's own officers, one's own

Page 46103

1 territory.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So I understand better now.

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, it stems from what you've just told us that in the

5 Yugoslav People's Army, KOS was tied to the General Staff of the JNA?

6 A. It played a dual role. While it was still KOS, until the year

7 1952, it was tied exclusively to the Ministry -- or, rather, the State

8 Secretariat for National Defence. Later on, for a while it was tied to

9 the General Staff or, rather, its Administration for Security, and for

10 the last ten years or so - I can't tell you exactly for how long - it was

11 again the Administration for Security that was subordinated to the

12 Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the Ministry of Defence.

13 And maybe I can simplify things for you. It was a state within

14 the state of the army.

15 Q. Tell me, please, did KOS also control the moral and political

16 suitability of the officers, their loyalty, their behaviour in private

17 life?

18 A. It was its basic, fundamental duty.

19 Q. You've also told us that you were once or at some point in time

20 the subject of KOS activities and surveillance?

21 A. Yes, it did happen from time to time.

22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I am correcting the

23 interpretation. My question was whether you were an object, [In English]

24 object, [Interpretation] of KOS activities and surveillance.

25 [In English] Okay, maybe it's a good translation. I don't know.

Page 46104

1 I thought that maybe it's not, so I apologise if it's correct.

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would suggest the word "target."

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I believe that this would be

4 the best interpretation. But the most important thing is that we

5 understand each other.

6 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, I would like to draw your attention to Article 6.4

7 of the same directive, where reference is made to all the other subjects

8 in the territory that are duty-bound to work on the securing facilities.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Does this have anything to do with All-People's Defence? Could

11 you please provide the whole of the document from the point of view of

12 All-People's Defence? Does it have anything to do with All-People's

13 Defence?

14 A. This is an example of how the doctrine was operationalised by way

15 of a directive to engage military forces.

16 Q. Let's look at the following document, which is 1D942, 942. This

17 is a platform for the activities of the Presidency of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina in conditions of war. Please, let's first look at

19 paragraph 5 of this document, which speaks about the political basis of

20 the All-People's Defence war. In the second line, a reference is made to

21 the All-People's Defence war of all citizens and all peoples, aimed at

22 liberating Bosnia-Herzegovina. In your understanding of the doctrine of

23 All-People's Defence, does this have anything to do with that doctrine?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Let's look at the paragraph 6 of the same document. An appeal is

Page 46105

1 to launch to all patriots and all citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina to

2 actively join the patriotic front. This appeal to all citizens, does

3 this have anything to do with the doctrine of All-People's Defence?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Very well. Let's look at the following document, which is

6 4D1240, 4D1240. I am repeating the document number, 4D1240. This is a

7 directive issued by the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces of the

8 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, dated September 1992. The document has

9 several significant parts and several important claims. Irrespective of

10 the topic that we are covering. At the moment, I would like us to look

11 at the entire document.

12 On page 1, Mr. Gorjanc, could you please look at the definition

13 of aggressor as the combined forces of the armed forces of Serbia and

14 Montenegro, the rump of the former JNA, and so on and so forth, and it

15 says here that the aggressor is preparing actions by which it wants to

16 separate the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Republic of Croatia.

17 Would your personal knowledge about the plans of the activities

18 of the JNA in that territory point to the fact that there was, indeed,

19 such a goal even during the time when the JNA was functioning?

20 A. Yes, there was such a goal.

21 Q. And that was in case of an attack from the West?

22 A. Yes, for the aggression from the West or, to be more precise, in

23 the case of the NATO forces landing in the territory of Central Dalmatia.

24 Q. Did you -- using one of the maps, did you depict that planned

25 activity?

Page 46106

1 A. I illustrated the plan of a possible engagement of the forces of

2 my corps that had been elaborated in February 1991.

3 Q. This was still a JNA corps?

4 A. Yes, the JNA corps from Uzice, which is in Serbia.

5 Q. Let's look at number 3 on page 3, Mr. Gorjanc. This is how

6 neighbours of the armed forces were defined, and we're talking about

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I quote:

8 "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia engaged in the

9 offensive activities for the liberation of the territory of the Republic

10 of Croatia, some part of the forces engaged in the territory of Dubrovnik

11 will cooperate closely with our forces in an effort to liberate

12 East Herzegovina and particularly the towns of Trebinje and Stolac ..."

13 If this document was signed by Mr. Sefer Halilovic, the commander

14 of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what would you then conclude? Is he

15 talking about the joint, synchronised activities undertaken on the part

16 of the armies of the two states?

17 A. This document shows that this was, indeed, a joint action of two

18 allies, to say the least.

19 Q. When you say in the function of two allies working together,

20 could you please repeat your answer, because the end of the sentence was

21 not interpreted. You said that this shows that their cooperation was in

22 the function of the two of them working as allies, to say the least?

23 A. I can't claim, based on this document, this was a coordinated,

24 joint action, because there should have been a special staff that would

25 be in control and command of such a joint action, if that, indeed, was

Page 46107

1 the case.

2 Q. Thank you very much. Irrespective of the degree of cooperation,

3 it is indisputable that it was cooperation?

4 A. It was a joint activity.

5 Q. Could you please look at bullet point 4, second paragraph. It

6 says:

7 "Main forces to be engaged on lifting the blockade of Sarajevo to

8 liberate -- to defend liberated territories and for defensive

9 activities."

10 My question to you, Mr. Gorjanc, is this: If the Army of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina was planning an action to lift the blockade of the

12 city of Sarajevo, according to your knowledge of the territory of Bosnia

13 and Herzegovina, what territory should have the BiH Army have had

14 complete control of?

15 A. In order to lift the blockade of the city of Sarajevo, the Army

16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina should have had full control of the territory of

17 Mount Igman, the territory of Konjic, and the territory of North

18 Herzegovina.

19 Q. Very well. Let us look under 5; tasks, operational forces, in

20 connection with the 4th Corps. That's on page 4. Certain activities are

21 planned in cooperation with the forces of the Republic of Croatia. Could

22 you please explain the cooperation with the forces of the Republic of

23 Croatia, could you say something about the degree of that cooperation?

24 A. This term, "sadestvo" [phoen] is a higher form of cooperation.

25 This immediate cooperation and joint combat activity in one and the same

Page 46108

1 facility or against one and the same target of the operation.

2 Q. Let's look at number 6, "Content of Armed Combat," where it says

3 "Sabotage and Anti-Sabotage Combat." This is on page 7 of the B/C/S

4 text, and here reference is made to continuous conduct of large-scale

5 sabotage operations in the aggressor's rear. Could you please explain,

6 Mr. Gorjanc, this term "aggressor's rear," what area is that?

7 A. The aggressor's rear depends on the size of the unit that is

8 engaged on the front-line, and the views of that are different in

9 different armies. In the army that existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

10 rear meant the area behind the first line of defence, which was three to

11 five kilometres from the contact line or contact point with the enemy.

12 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, this kind of planning of sabotage warfare as an

13 important element of combat, does it have anything to do with

14 All-People's Defence or not?

15 A. This is completely and fully in the spirit of All-People's

16 Defence.

17 Q. Could you please look at Chapter 7, under "Intelligence Service"

18 or "Intelligence Support." This is on your page 8. It says:

19 "The task of intelligence support will engage intelligence bodies

20 and reconnoitering units, the MUP forces, and the population."

21 Mr. Gorjanc, could you comment upon the engagement of the

22 population within this context?

23 A. The population is deployed across the entire territory, and the

24 population can continuously observe the situation as it evolves on the

25 territory. The only question is: To what degree is the population

Page 46109

1 organised in order to convey the results of their observation of the

2 territory as quickly as possible? In the former state, within the

3 concept of All-People's Defence and the gathering of intelligence about

4 the enemy, there was a special service, the so-called Local

5 Reconnoitering and Intelligence Service. Military intelligence officers

6 would engage or hire reliable members of the population who gathered

7 intelligence, and they, in their turn, spread their network further

8 afield.

9 Q. Let us now look at a chapter called "Logistics as Support."

10 Let's look at the quarter-master's support. This is on your page 9.

11 Could you please tell us, when it comes to food supply, accommodation,

12 the possibilities of maintaining hygiene, does this have anything to do

13 with the doctrine of All-People's Defence?

14 A. Yes, because it relies fully on the population.

15 Q. And were I to ask you now about this document in its entirety,

16 was this document prepared in terms of having anything to do with the

17 doctrine of All-People's Defence, what could you tell us as a general

18 clarification?

19 A. It's a textbook example of how the doctrine of All-People's

20 Defence was operationalised, in terms of a military order.

21 Q. Let's look at the next document, Mr. Gorjanc. This is 4D1603,

22 1603, 1603. That's right. Page 1, paragraph 1.1:

23 "The unity of all components of armed struggle and resistance."

24 Paragraph 2:

25 "The unity of the army and the people must be fostered and

Page 46110

1 boosted through all various forms of preparing both the army and the

2 people to defend the country."

3 There is mention there of all sorts of efforts being made by the

4 people to help the army; manifested in its financial security, care for

5 the sick and wounded, gathering information on the enemy, uncovering and

6 obstructing enemy agents, securing important features, participation in

7 fortification of the terrain, and other activities.

8 Mr. Gorjanc, what about this definition and these tasks; does

9 that have anything to do with the doctrine of All-People's Defence?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Fine. On to the last document, in terms of this whole, 4D766,

12 proposed measures to organise All-People's Defence war. Paragraph 2 and

13 the first line in paragraph 1:

14 "Maximum mobilisation of all segments and potentials of the state

15 to ensure its survival."

16 The bullet that I mentioned:

17 "At this crucial hour, we must organise all political forces,

18 parties, associations, movements, and citizens to form a patriotic

19 front."

20 Can you comment on this document from the perspective of

21 All-People's Defence?

22 A. It is fully in the spirit of All-People's Defence.

23 Q. At 6.3 of your expert report, you talk about actions in the enemy

24 rear by relying on the population. This is one of the elements of the

25 doctrine of All-People's Defence. You told us about what "the rear"

Page 46111

1 meant in this case, and could I please ask you to explain, why is this

2 considered a part of the doctrine of All-People's Defence?

3 A. Simply because this activity in the enemy's rear was particularly

4 important in terms of inflicting the losses and damage on the enemy, and

5 leaving the enemy in disarray, reducing the pressure along the front-line

6 and raising the morale of one's own forces, raising the morale of one's

7 own forces and the population on either side of the front-line.

8 Q. And now 4D1476, the next document. This is an order by the 306th

9 Mountain Brigade belonging to the 3rd BH Army Corps, January 1993,

10 securing rural areas. Paragraph 2 reads:

11 "Involve all able-bodied residents to secure the villages in

12 which they live. All conscripts, regardless of whether they have work

13 obligation or are battalion members, on condition that they are free, are

14 to be involved."

15 Can you comment on this from the perspective of involving

16 population not directly on the front-line?

17 A. Under the doctrine, the entire population was committed to

18 establishing a level of security to ensure that the units involved in

19 military actions got enough rest.

20 Q. Based on this document, it would follow that a commander of the

21 BH Army was determining what tasks military conscripts would have, those

22 who were not in the army. Can you --

23 MS. WEST: Objection, Your Honour, to form.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, be careful, be

25 prudent.

Page 46112

1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was just

2 introducing the question. I didn't actually ask my question yet. I was

3 just stating that this was an order by a military commander of the

4 BH Army which establishes what military conscripts were to do.

5 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, could you please comment on this? How is it

6 possible for a commander of the army to determine and decide how military

7 conscripts should be involved in activities in certain villages and

8 towns?

9 A. I suppose there were no functioning civilian authorities in place

10 in these areas, no police providing security. In order to establish a

11 security system, he had to do this himself. I happen to know that this

12 was in the immediate vicinity of the front-line on the eastern slopes of

13 Mount Vlasic, in the immediate vicinity of the Serb forces that were

14 there. It was only logical for him to do that, and under the doctrine he

15 was definitely allowed to take those steps.

16 Q. When you say the doctrine allowed him to take those steps, what

17 exactly do you have in mind?

18 A. I mean all military conscripts, regardless of whether they were

19 deployed to military units, were duty-bound to respond to any call-up to

20 perform their military duties. In this specific case, this entailed

21 security.

22 Q. The next document that I have prepared for you -- or, rather, a

23 set of three documents should be an example of acts of sabotage that were

24 carried out. Of course, you can't address this from a factual

25 perspective, or at least not in detail, but perhaps you could comment on

Page 46113

1 4D462, 4D462, which is an official transcript or record reflecting an

2 interview. The interviewee was Salko Alihodzic. He describes actions

3 taken by the population and organised by the BH Army in Dubravska Plateau

4 in mid-July 1993. Please look at the document and tell us whether it has

5 anything to do with acts of sabotage carried out under the doctrine of

6 All-People's Defence.

7 A. I happen to be familiar with this area. I know for a fact that

8 the area was HVO controlled at the time. There were no BH Army units

9 around. This is not a textbook act of sabotage, in terms of penetrating

10 behind enemy lines in order to carry out sabotage. It is my conviction

11 that this gentleman was probably keeping a rifle at his home. Someone

12 then simply called him, and he joined this action. But it wasn't the

13 unit, as such, in this case that was organised to perform this.

14 Q. The next document is 4D910, 910. Likewise, an official record.

15 The interviewee here is Musair Klaric, describing the very same event.

16 In paragraph 2, he says that all of this was happening based on a

17 scenario devised by the BH Army in the area of Dubrava. Can you comment

18 on this, Mr. Gorjanc, in the overall context of these documents and what

19 you know about that?

20 A. I could say that this -- this is basically about ad hoc training

21 and establishment of BH Army units at someone's request. He says, There

22 were very few of us at the beginning, but later we grew to become a group

23 of about 120 men, weapons were then distributed, and so on and so forth,

24 which means that weapons had been hidden somewhere previously. You

25 couldn't simply carry weapons across arms, especially not in these

Page 46114

1 quantities, and still pass unobserved.

2 Q. The last document of this set is 4D1730, the last document in

3 this set. Let me draw your attention to a set of proposed measures. I'm

4 talking about item -- paragraph 14, which is page 4 in your copy, sir. I

5 will read, and you can simply listen because it's simple enough. The

6 task is as follows:

7 "Continue to insert, on an even larger scale, sabotage groups in

8 the enemy's rear in order to carry out acts of sabotage or commando

9 raids."

10 Could you comment on this from the perspective of acts of

11 sabotage as part of the doctrine of All-People's Defence?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Does that have anything to do with that?

14 A. Yes, it's fully consistent with the most salient premises of the

15 doctrine.

16 Q. All right. Let's move on to the next document, then. Let me

17 just take a minute to sort the documents out.

18 The next paragraph is in relation to Chapter 7 of your report.

19 The issue is Muslim soldiers as a potential security problem.

20 To begin with, Mr. Gorjanc, we should look at three maps on our

21 screens. The first map is 4D1216, 4D1216, which is a map of Mostar up

22 until the 30th of June, 1993. You see, Mr. Gorjanc -- do you see the

23 East Mostar area here?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. And what about the blue portions? That marks the positions of

Page 46115

1 the HVO? What would you say? Up until the 30th of June, 1993, who is it

2 that is in control of the areas to the north and south of Mostar?

3 A. The HVO.

4 Q. All right. 4D561, the next map. As a matter of fact, I don't

5 have a question about that map.

6 Let's move on to the next one, 4D562, just these two maps for you

7 to see what was going on further north from East Mostar in

8 Central Bosnia. We'll put all of these together at a later date. You've

9 seen these maps before, and there's no need for us to dwell on them any

10 longer now.

11 Let's first try to see if the HVO had any inkling whatsoever that

12 the BH Army was planning to take the whole Neretva River Valley. The

13 first document is 4D948.

14 Sir, this is an order by the Chief of the Main Staff, dated the

15 7th of June, 1993. Looking at this, could we conclude that the HVO knew

16 anything about the BH Army being about to launch offensive operations in

17 the areas of Jablanica, Bijelo Polje, and Mostar?

18 A. This shows that the HVO was taking some preemptive measures in

19 the expectation that the BH Army would be launching offensive operations

20 throughout the area.

21 Q. The next document is 4D702, 702, the letter by the Chief of the

22 Main Staff of the HVO. The date is the 30th of June, 1993, after the

23 BH Army had seized control of the territory to the north of East Mostar.

24 The date is the 30th of June, 1993. The letter was sent to Mr. Wahlgren

25 and Mr. Morillon. Paragraph 6 reads, I quote:

Page 46116

1 "We would like to remind you that during the meeting with

2 General Morillon in Medjugorje on June 26th, 1993, our side warned about

3 the possibility that the Muslim side was organising a frontal assault

4 against the town of Mostar, the HVO positions, and its surroundings."

5 The next paragraph claims that this was very easy to foresee and

6 was logical as a continuation of offensive activities by the Muslim

7 forces that had begun in Central Bosnia and then later continued in

8 Northern Herzegovina:

9 "The Mostar Valley and the whole of Neretva Valley are only a

10 continuation of the same geo-strategic entity across which the Muslim

11 leadership wanted to gain access to the sea."

12 My first question to you, Mr. Gorjanc, you being someone who is

13 knowledgeable about the geographical setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is it

14 true that the Mostar Valley and the entire Neretva Valley are a

15 continuation of the same geo-strategic entity?

16 A. That is entirely true.

17 Q. Looking at this document, could you, too, conclude that the HVO

18 knew about these offensive operations that were being planned?

19 A. Yes, they sure knew about this. We know that because they warned

20 the UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia.

21 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, let's imagine we're facing the following situation,

22 we have the following premises: Firstly, the HVO units in the area

23 contained a large percentage of Muslims. The HVO units in the area

24 contained a large percentage of Muslims. Secondly, up until that point

25 in time, no special steps had been taken against the Muslim soldiers in

Page 46117

1 the HVO, in terms of a precaution, in terms of being disarmed, or

2 isolated. Given your vast knowledge and experience, what would you be

3 led to conclude about the relationship between the HVO military

4 commanders and their Muslim soldiers?

5 A. There are two possibilities. Either they were not careful, which

6 I very much doubt because they had even gone so far as to warn

7 international players about this possibility and have given their units'

8 tasks that were aimed at stopping precisely this. I think the intention

9 and the general will was to maintain these relations at a good level of

10 cooperation and to continue to work as allies.

11 Q. I asked you specifically about the Muslim soldiers in the HVO,

12 who were members of the HVO.

13 A. I believe that the HVO commanders did trust those men, after all,

14 probably knowing most of them on a personal basis, and they had been

15 fighting head to head with the Croat soldiers from the same units for at

16 least six or seven months previously.

17 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, looking at this point in time, late June, if you had

18 been an HVO commander in the area and if you had known about these plans

19 and operations being in the offing by the BH Army, if you had even

20 suspected that there was a possibility for Muslim soldiers not to remain

21 loyal to you, would you have taken any measures, and if so, which?

22 A. The first measure I would have taken would have been to establish

23 surveillance, especially concerning officers in higher levels of command,

24 and units that were predominantly Muslim. I would step up surveillance.

25 Another measure I would have taken was purely operative. I would have

Page 46118

1 moved a unit like that, a unit that we didn't particularly trust, and put

2 it somewhere else, along a different section of the front-line, to work

3 alongside another unit that appeared to us more trustworthy, because had

4 there been any enemy activity, the damage would have been limited.

5 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, imagine the following situation. You, as an HVO

6 commander, lose control over a piece of territory, and then this area is

7 conquered by the BH Army in cooperation with your own soldiers of Muslim

8 ethnicity, and then all your misgivings are confirmed as a real and

9 present danger. What would you, as a commander, do in a situation like

10 that?

11 A. When I talked about surveillance measures, I would have applied

12 those to all soldiers still remaining in my units. Wherever this danger

13 was greater, especially near the front-line, I would have simply had no

14 choice but to isolate those soldiers.

15 Q. Mr. Gorjanc, let's look at what exactly happened, in territorial

16 terms, following the 30th of June. Please look at 4D622.

17 We're moving on to binder 3 right now, Your Honours, and this is

18 the first document in binder 3.

19 Mr. Gorjanc, since you're not a fact witness, everything we're

20 talking about is hypothetical, of course. Assume that on the 30th of

21 June the BH Army established control over a territory covering about 26

22 kilometres to the north of East Mostar, and assume that they established

23 control over the territory stretching south of Mostar towards Buna and

24 Blagaj. What would you say about that, about all these territorial

25 conquests about East Mostar? Would you have considered that to be a

Page 46119

1 militarily relevant development?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. In view of your knowledge and understanding of Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina, if the road northbound is opened towards Jablanica and

5 Central Bosnia, would, in such a situation, it be possible for the units

6 of the 1st and 3rd Corps from Central Bosnia to come to fight in Mostar

7 and further afield south?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I'm going to show you some documents that indicate that the

10 services in charge of security --

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have a few minutes left

12 only, and, Witness, this map for me is fundamental. Therefore, this

13 deserves to spend a little time on it, a few minutes.

14 According to this map, one can see that the HVO controls an area,

15 including Mostar, part of it. In blue, we have the BiH -- sorry, in

16 green, in green. In blue it's the HVO. In green, it is the BiH, and the

17 BiH controls Mostar East, the east of Mostar. And then you have the

18 Serbs, who are on the right of the document. Now, the question which,

19 from my point of view, is very important, according to what you know,

20 according to your knowledge, an inhabitant of Mostar East, can he, with

21 this military map, leave Mostar East either by the north or by the south,

22 inasmuch as one sees that the band is controlled by the BiH. The strip

23 controlled by the BiH has a certain length. We don't have the exact

24 length of the distance, but there are at least a few kilometres.

25 So, I summarise, is it possible for an inhabitant of Mostar East

Page 46120

1 to leave Mostar East, passing by the area controlled by the BiH, either

2 by the north or by the south?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it was possible.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, he can pass. Now,

5 we have on the left the HVO, and the Serbs on the right, according to

6 this map. I suppose that the HVO had artillery, and I suppose that the

7 Serbs also had artillery. Notwithstanding the fact that there was

8 artillery on both sides, could an inhabitant of Mostar East, maybe by

9 taking some precautions, leave by the north or leave by the south?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, they could, especially during

11 the night.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. With the technical

13 knowledge you have, which is certainly 100 times superior to mine, could

14 you -- can you tell me what is minimally the strip which is controlled by

15 the BiH, as one sees it in the length or distance, as we see it?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In what sense? The width of the

17 corridor, Your Honours?

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, the width of the corridor,

19 the width.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The width of the corridor was some

21 seven or eight kilometres. However, on the slopes of Mount Velez, it was

22 impossible to take a route from the north to south, so this was limited

23 to Donje Polje, the city of East Mostar, and the enlargement of

24 Bijelo Polje, and further afield. In factual terms, it was possible to

25 take several roads through the town, and then onwards towards

Page 46121

1 Bijelo Polje there were just two roads, one along the River Neretva and

2 the other one was the main road.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. You are affirmative on

4 this, you are positive?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last question before the

7 end of the hearing, because there's another case coming. The inhabitants

8 of East Mostar, since there could be some artillery shelling, was it

9 easier during the night to take the roads towards the north and the

10 south? Would it have been easier by night?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was easier by night, when it

12 comes to leaving the town and going towards the area of Buna and

13 Bijelo Polje. It was, however, much more difficult across the mountain

14 of Prenj in the direction of Jablanica, the western slopes of Prenj.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It's practically

16 the time to finish our hearing, because I don't want to get in trouble

17 with the Judges who are coming for the next hearing. We are, therefore,

18 going to stop here. We will resume tomorrow.

19 The Registrar will tell us how much time the Defence still has

20 for General Petkovic. We will see this tomorrow. Apparently, we have to

21 finish with one of the binders.

22 Therefore, I wish everybody a pleasant day, end of the day, and

23 tomorrow, sir, Witness, we will have the pleasure of seeing you tomorrow

24 morning at the hearing, which will start at 9.00.

25 Thank you.

Page 46122

1 [The witness stands down]

2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day of

4 October, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.