Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 47152

 1                           Tuesday, 24 November 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, could you please

 7     call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning

 9     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-74-T,

10     the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar.  This is

12     Tuesday, and I greet our witness, the accused, the Defence counsel, the

13     representative of the OTP, and everyone helping us.

14             I believe that our Registrar has an IC number for us.  He has the

15     floor.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you, Your Honour.  The Prosecution has

17     submitted their objections to documents tendered by 3D for admission

18     through Witness Bozo Pavlovic.  This list shall be given Exhibit IC01126.

19     Thank you, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Mrs. Alaburic, you

21     have the floor to continue with your examination-in-chief.

22             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  Good

23     morning to you to, my colleagues from the OTP and the other Defence

24     counsel.  Good morning to the accused, to the witness and everybody who

25     is with us at the moment.

Page 47153

 1                           WITNESS:  WITNESS 4D-AB [Resumed]

 2                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 3                           Examination by Ms. Alaburic:  [Continued]

 4        Q.   We analysed yesterday the order by Enes Kovacevic, which was

 5     document 2D246.  It's dated 14 April 1993.

 6             Witness, let us now try to see what subsequently happened in the

 7     Konjic area.  Please look at document P1874.

 8             This is a summary report for the 13th of April, and let us see

 9     what it says about Konjic.  The first report says that the village of

10     Buscak was attacked and that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina tried to

11     cross the lake from Ostrozac and take Mount Falanovo, but they were

12     stopped there.  And it goes on to say that Butorovic Polje was shelled

13     and that Kostajnica was being shelled, and that combat activity is

14     starting at Konjic, which is blocked just as Jablanica is.

15             Is this description accurate in accordance with your information,

16     Witness?

17        A.   Yes, it is.

18        Q.   Let us look at the second report from Konjic on that day.  The

19     village of Buscak -- or, rather, the fall of the village of Buscak is

20     imminent.  It is requested that our earlier request is -- is granted.

21     What kind of request was that?

22        A.   It is about the shelling of the Muslim positions from which the

23     Croatian villages were being attacked.

24        Q.   Let us look at the following paragraph.  It says stronger

25     enforcements arrived from Jablanica, then moving toward Mrakovo and

Page 47154

 1     Zuglici, and want to take Boksevica.

 2             Tell us, Witness, if we remember the documents that we saw

 3     earlier about the plans of the ABiH, does this direction correspond to

 4     the documents that we saw about the plans of the ABiH?

 5        A.   Yes.  It's in line with those plans.  One unit from the

 6     1st Battalion which was tasked to take this area toward Zuglici and

 7     Mrakovo.

 8     Q.   Let us look at report number 3 from the same document with the same

 9     date.  It says: “There are strong attacks from mortars against Ljesovina,

10     Buturovic Polje and Kostajnica, and I skip one part.  An ultimatum was

11     issued to Radesine.  Forces from Bosnia threatening Konjic, movements

12     of the ABiH from Tarcin have been noticed and then comes a statement:

13             "This is an all-out attack on the entire zone of Konjic and

14     Jablanica."

15             Is this an accurate report, Witness?

16        A.   Yes.  It is very accurate.

17        Q.   Let us look at the following document, P1879.  It's an exhibit

18     already, so we won't dwell on it long.  Just to get the entire picture

19     let us look at item 4.  It reads:

20              "Fighting has started in Konjic as well.  The Croatian villages

21     of Obri and Vrci have been attacked.  We have no reports from Buscak, and

22     there are attacks against Bucurovici [phoen] and Falanovo Brdo."

23             Was it really that way, Witness, as far as you know?

24        A.   Yes, it was really that way.

25        Q.   Let us look at the part of the report that refers to Prozor.

Page 47155

 1     It's the fifth paragraph in this part of the report.  It says that the

 2     Herceg Stjepan Brigade asked for support from the Rama Brigade.  It's the

 3     artillery support that we mentioned, isn't it, Witness?

 4        A.   Yes, it is.

 5        Q.   It goes on to say:  We have forbidden the opening of artillery

 6     fire before an order is received.

 7             Tell me, Witness, did you immediately get artillery support or

 8     not?

 9        A.   No, we didn't get it immediately.

10        Q.   Please take a look at the final part.  It says:  The intelligence

11     situation is unclear in the area of Konjic and Jablanica.  Reports are

12     not coming in from the commanders in charge.  There's arbitrariness in

13     the opening of fire.  We don't [as interpreted] the strength of units and

14     individual zones, et cetera.

15             Can you comment this -- these statements from the report for us?

16        A.   This report clearly depicts the situation in the brigade.  We

17     were taken aback with the attack and the scale of the attack.  Some of

18     our units had lost contact with the staff and with the commander so that

19     individual commanders, even platoon commanders, asked various units

20     around us for help.  So it wasn't -- it was actually people panicking and

21     asking for help.

22        Q.   Toward the end of the report from Prozor, and a report from

23     Konjic was added to the summary report about the situation on the

24     15th of April at 3.00 a.m.  It says:  During the night massive movements

25     of Muslim units were noticed.  Their sabotage groups moving from Rodici

Page 47156

 1     and the municipality of Jablanica toward the strategically important

 2     mount of Boksevica.

 3             And now listen:  Whoever holds that mountain, that is Boksevica,

 4     controls almost the entire Neretvica Valley.

 5             Tell me, Witness, is that really so, that whoever holds Boksevica

 6     controls the area in the Neretvica Valley?

 7        A.   Yes, that is correct.  Not only the Neretvica Valley but also

 8     part of the Neretva Valley and the Jablanica lake from the entry into

 9     Jablanica toward Celebici in the direction of Konjic.

10        Q.   Now let's go a few lines further down.  The report says that what

11     it boils down to is that the ABiH is trying to take Boksevica.  In

12     accordance with your information, was that really the case?

13        A.   Yes, that was the case.

14        Q.   Let's skip one paragraph and look at the statement saying that

15     the artillery of the ABiH is firing from the Risovac Plateau.  Tell us,

16     was that really the case, as far as you know?

17        A.   Yes, it was.

18        Q.   Tell us, this Risovac Plateau, is it anywhere near Sovicka Vrata

19     and the villages of Sovici and Doljani?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And in the last paragraph about Konjic says that:  We are asking

22     from Prozor that they support us with artillery, and it says, if this is

23     not done, that is, if there is no support, then we stand slim chances to

24     get out of it.

25             Was that really the case, that unless help arrives from outside

Page 47157

 1     that this position could not be defended?

 2        A.   Yes.  If the ABiH had taken Boksevica, our 1st Battalion would

 3     have been in the same position as the 2nd Battalion, that is, completely

 4     surrounded.

 5        Q.   Witness, look at the following documents now, please -- following

 6     document now, please, P1887?

 7             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic.

 8             Witness, on the top of the last page of this document I read:

 9             "That is why we are kindly asking you that the artillery, et

10     cetera, fire."

11             Now, this is signed by the chief of HVO General Staff who

12     actually is the highest commanding officer, in fact.  I am very puzzled

13     about this wording.  It is not -- a military commander normally does not

14     kindly ask for fire but orders.  Do you have an explanation for this?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't see the translation at all.

16     I'm not receiving translation.  From the very start.

17             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Does it work now?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm receiving translation now.

19             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Good.  The paragraph is on page 5 in the

20     original, and it is the two, three, four -- fourth paragraph, I think,

21     which starts with the words "Zato vas molimo," and the translation is:

22              "We -- that is why we are kindly asking you that the artillery

23     fire."  I abbreviate here.  And I am struck by this wording, because the

24     document is signed by the highest commander, Brigadier Petkovic, and it

25     is not the tone that one normally finds in -- in military language.  The

Page 47158

 1     commander would order fire but not kindly ask, and I was wondering

 2     whether you could give an explanation for that.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't completely understood the

 4     question.  Could you please repeat.

 5             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I am wondering about the language used by the

 6     Commander-in-Chief, who kindly asks, that's the translation, for

 7     artillery fire; whereas in my own military experience, which I think I

 8     share with -- with everyone who knows about this matter, is that a

 9     commander orders fire.  And the question is:  Can you explain this

10     surprising formulation?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Which paragraph is that?  I haven't

12     found it.  When I read it, I hope to be able to answer.

13             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I am still --

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the Judge.

15             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I have -- my microphone is burning.  I'm still

16     on the document P1879, and I go to the last page.  I'm looking at the

17     B/C/S version now, and there the third or fourth paragraph starts with

18     the words "Zato vas molimo i trazimo" and so on.  Have you found that.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I have.  Your Honour, this is

20     a summary report signed by Mr. Milivoj Petkovic, and these are the words

21     of the people who requested help.  In this case our 1st Battalion.

22             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  So although it -- yes.  Mr. Petkovic is not

23     speaking himself but quoting what he heard from Konjic?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  That's helpful to know.

Page 47159

 1             Excuse me for the interruption, Ms. Alaburic.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, did you know that at

 3     the Main Staff every day there was a compilation made of all the

 4     situation reports come being from the field.  For example, the

 5     Tomislavgrad report, the Vitez report, report from Bosanska Posavina, and

 6     report from Konjic, and the compilation of all these reports was then

 7     signed by the chief of the Main Staff, General Petkovic.  Was that the

 8     way things worked?  Every day all situation reports coming from the

 9     ground were compiled, which is why we have this report where there's a

10     request for artillery.  It's not General Petkovic that is asking an

11     authorisation from himself.  Of course not.  Did you know that this was

12     the mode of operation, or are you discovering it today?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I haven't discovered it today.

14     This is how things worked.  There were daily reports from the smaller

15     units to the Main Staff, and it was usual to send one report a day, and

16     in case of need there would be several.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   We're now about to show how these reports are made.  Please take

19     a look at the following document:  P1887.  P1887.  It's a report from

20     your brigade, Witness, signed by the commander Zdravko Sagolj, and it's

21     the final report from Konjic.  This report says:  We are requesting that

22     the artillery fire from the Risovac Plateau and so on.

23             Witness, is this report part of the summary report we saw a

24     minute ago?

25        A.   Yes, it is.

Page 47160

 1        Q.   If we have now clarified, we can move on to the following

 2     document, 4D83.  A report from of the Lisin Battalion commander who was

 3     in the village of Bradina.  It is dated the 15th of April, 1993.  This is

 4     in the Konjic region, Witness, is it?

 5        A.   Yes, it is in the direction of Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   Let's look at the contents.  On the 14th of April, the BiH Army

 7     took control of the facilities Buscak and HVO barracks.  It goes on to

 8     say that they're proceeding to liberate Klis, and at the end of the

 9     document it is said, and I quote:

10             "I believe that tomorrow is the decisive day and in the morning

11     the action will start to liberate the town which is under heavy artillery

12     fire from the aforementioned elevations.  This time there will be no

13     stopping.  We will proceed until final victory, because we are now

14     convinced that the HVO is the enemy of the Republic of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina."

16             Witness, with regard to the features that the BiH Army was

17     attacking, is this part of the report correct?

18        A.   Yes, it is.

19        Q.   Tell me, the way the developments evolved, would you say that the

20     attacks intensified?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   At the end of the document it says:  We propose that you should

23     order that there will be attacks on Boksevica and Pisvir with a view to

24     their liberation.  As far as you know, was that the goal of the BH Army

25     attacks at the moment?

Page 47161

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Let's look at the following document which is 4D874.  This is an

 3     order issued by the chief of the Main Staff, sent to the OZ Central

 4     Bosnia to the commander Tihomir Blaskic.  It says that with regard to the

 5     newly arisen situation in the territory of Konjic, the HVO from

 6     Central Bosnia should undertake certain activities, certain combat

 7     activities, in order to link up the BiH Army forces or engage the BH Army

 8     forces and thus facilitate the situation of the HVO in Konjic.

 9             Witness, did you request for assistance from Central Bosnia?

10        A.   Yes, we did.  We did request assistance from Central Bosnia,

11     because we thought that in case the HVO forces started moving towards

12     Bradina, we would be able to stop the attack that was launched in the

13     direction of Konjic and further afield.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I have a few questions

15     on distances.  This document 4D874 is a document that I must assess, and

16     when assessing this document I must make sure not to make any mistakes.

17     The Appeals Chamber on paragraph 332 of its Blaskic judgement noted that

18     the Blaskic Trial Chamber had made a mistake when it had assessed

19     Exhibit D269.  And I don't want to make mistakes, so I'm going to ask a

20     few questions to you.

21             Could you tell me what the distance was between Central Bosnia

22     and yourself where you were placed?  How many kilometres were there?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The distance from Bradina to the

24     part where we requested help in Kresevo Kiseljak and the OZ where

25     Tihomir Blaskic was, the distance was about 20 kilometres.

Page 47162

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Twenty kilometres.  Very well.

 2     And could you tell me, if you know, what is the distance between Bradina

 3     and Ahmici?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Between Bradina and Ahmici?  I

 5     can't answer that because I don't know.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, give us an order of

 7     magnitude.  Is it more than a hundred kilometres, less than a hundred

 8     kilometres, 50 kilometres?  A ballpark figure, please.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.  I was never in

10     Ahmici.  I wouldn't be able to tell you.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You cannot help us.  Fine.  In

12     this document -- this is a document where people are asking help from

13     Tihomir Blaskic.  Twenty kilometres away you can have logistical support.

14     You might even have fire artillery support.  Could you tell us whether

15     that's possible?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We requested full military support

17     in infantry and all the other accompanying things that go with infantry.

18     We wanted a unit from the part of Kiseljak and Kresevo start marching

19     towards Bradina and Repovci in order to stop the Lisin Brigade which was

20     marching and advancing in the direction of Duboki Potok.  And thus from

21     Bradina, Zulfikar's men were advancing toward Podorasac, Ganjin [phoen],

22     Galjevo, and towards Konjic as well.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  This document is

24     dated April 15, 1993.  This is an important date for the OTP, because in

25     its pre-trial brief it says that the HVO made an ultimatum which was to

Page 47163

 1     expire on April 15th, and in his submissions the Prosecutor explains that

 2     Ahmici was attacked on April 16.

 3             Now, you were a soldier.  You were on the field.  Had you heard

 4     about this ultimatum sent to the BH Army and expiring on April 15, 1993?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I never heard of such a

 6     document.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're saying no, but remember

 8     that you are under oath.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.

11             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Witness, did you personally speak to somebody from the

13     Central Bosnia OZ?

14        A.   Yes, I did.

15        Q.   Who?

16        A.   We were connected with a commander who did not introduce himself

17     to me, and I spoke to the commander who said that he was the commander of

18     the special MUP unit, and we asked them if they could take the axis that

19     I've already mentioned in order to drew the attention of the forces that

20     were advancing towards Konjic.  However, the answer that we received from

21     them was negative.  They told us that they already had problems in their

22     own territory where they were deployed.

23        Q.   Did any assistance from Central Bosnia ever reach you or not?

24        A.   No, never.

25        Q.   Let's look at the following document, 4D453.  It's already in

Page 47164

 1     evidence.  Let's just look at it briefly.  It is stated in here that

 2     forces that arrived from Bradina and Igman have attacked Konjic, that

 3     there's pressure from Jablanica in the territory of Klis, and then that

 4     Zlatar and Boksevica are encircled.  It says:  Hurry, inform Prozor.

 5     They say they cannot help us.  They say they do not have orders.  Further

 6     on it says:  Boksevica, Konjic, Celebici and Radesine are burning.

 7     Please help.

 8             Further on it says:  Include Kiseljak in the Mount Ivan sector.

 9     In Prozor tie up the forces with artillery until something more concrete

10     is done.  And the final sentence reads:  Move while we're still alive.

11             Can you please comment, Witness?  Was this situation as drastic

12     as is portrayed in the last sentence, by the cry that you can read here?

13        A.   Yes.  The situation was exactly as it is portrayed and described,

14     but the words cannot describe how bad the situation was.  Zeljko --

15     Zdravko Sagolj's cry does not begin to describe it when he says, Move

16     while we're still alive.  The situation was really that bad.

17        Q.   Look at the following document which is P1882.  This is a report

18     from your brigade.  It says:  Frequent armed provocations against our

19     positions are taking place in Sovici.  Muslim forces are carrying out

20     movements and manoeuvres in order to encircle our forces in Sovici and

21     Doljani.  It is then stated:  Muslim forces are moving from their

22     position towards Boksevica across the lake.  And then it says BiH Army

23     are attacking Boksevica and the Neretvica Valley.  This is what is

24     happening according to the commander.

25             Witness, what I just quoted, according to what you know, was that

Page 47165

 1     a true reflection of the situation on the ground or not?

 2        A.   Yes, this is a true reflection of the situation on the ground.

 3             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise.  My client

 4     is telling me that there are problems with the headphones and the

 5     interpretation.  I can't talk to him.  Could somebody from the technical

 6     service do that?  I don't know whether that is the same case with the

 7     other accused.  Maybe somebody could check whether all the ear --

 8     headphones are plugged in properly and switched on to the right channel.

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   We can then continue.  Witness, let's look at the following

11     document which is 3D557.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, let me return to this

13     document about Sovici and Doljani, which is at the very heart of this

14     topic.  I understood that you confirmed how the situation was.  As far as

15     you know, the Sovici and Doljani, were they encircled by the ABiH?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those places were not encircled at

17     the time.  If you remember the document that we showed and that was an

18     order from the commander from Jablanica, he did send some of the forces

19     towards Sovici and Doljani and they were waiting for further attack

20     orders.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as you know, were there

22     troop movements, ABiH troop movements in Doljani and Sovici?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, around that time, on the

24     14th, 15th and 16th, all the units were mobile, which means that there

25     was an all-out action that had been ordered.

Page 47166

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You say all the units, but you

 2     mean ABiH units and HVO units?  Which were the mobile units?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] BiH Army units.  They were carrying

 4     out the plan that we saw yesterday.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What you're saying is

 6     important.  The OTP may not be on the same wavelength, but you are under

 7     oath and you say that on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of April, the ABiH

 8     units were moving, among other places, in Sovici and Doljani.  To your

 9     knowledge, in those locations were they HVO units?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, there were HVO

11     units in Doljani and Sovici.  And for the unit that was tasked with

12     preventing assistance to the HVO from Posusje, that unit had to block the

13     unit that was supposed to receive the other units, which is only logical.

14     And according to our information, those units from Jablanica were

15     supposed to disable the units that were waiting to be received.

16             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I apologise, Vesna.

17             I'm sorry, Your Honours.  Mr. Stojic still cannot follow the

18     proceedings.  He still has go on switching between one channel to the

19     next, and Mr. Pusic has the same problem.  Maybe we could have somebody

20     into the courtroom from the technical service because the usher himself

21     was not able to deal with the problem.

22             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Witness, your last sentence is not clear.  You said the units

24     that were coming from Jablanica were supposed to disable the units that

25     were waiting to be received.  We don't understand from this sentence who

Page 47167

 1     was arriving, who was receiving whom, who was encircling whom.  If you

 2     are talking about units, could you please be more specific and tell us

 3     whether you're talking about the BiH Army or the HVO?

 4        A.   The BiH Army units were tasked with disabling the units of the

 5     HVO which were deployed in Sovici and Doljani villages.

 6        Q.   And the HVO units in Sovici and Doljani, if I can decipher your

 7     sentence properly, were supposed to receive assistance that was supposed

 8     to come from the direction of Posusje.

 9        A.   I may have misspoken.  In case those units of the HVO in Sovici

10     and Doljani, on the occasion of the arrival of assistance to cross from

11     Posusje, it would have been easier for the units to be linked up with the

12     local units instead of acting on their own in a headless way.

13        Q.   And can you tell us whether the BiH Army was active in any area

14     to prevent the arrival of the assistance of the HVO from Posusje and

15     linking up with the units of the HVO in Sovici and Doljani?

16        A.   Yes, we saw that from the order issued by the Neza [phoen]

17     Brigade, the commander from Jablanica.  He issued concrete tasks for

18     carrying out task, and there was even a sabotage unit that was tasked

19     with infiltrating Risovac Plateau in order to destroy all the artillery

20     weapons that belonged to the HVO.  That was their task and you could see

21     that from the document that we saw earlier.

22        Q.   Tell us, Witness, about Risovac and Sovicka Vrata.  Are these two

23     localities near each other?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Let us look at the following document, 3D557.  Let us now see the

Page 47168

 1     assessment of Arif Pasalic.  On the 16th of April, 1993, he says that the

 2     HVO forces in the area of Neretvica -- that is west from Boksevica,

 3     around Klis; is that correct?

 4        A.   Yes, it is.

 5        Q.   So Arif Pasalic says that the HVO forces are in a difficult

 6     position due to lack of manpower.  Was it really that way, that they

 7     didn't have enough men?

 8        A.   Yes, that's exactly how it was.

 9        Q.   He goes on to say that the HVO forces demand that their artillery

10     on Risovac fire at our positions north of Neretvica.  Tell us, were there

11     really such demands from your brigade?

12        A.   Our brigade demanded that the forces at Risovac fire not at HVO

13     forces but at ABiH forces that were in that area.

14        Q.   I apologise if I phrased it that way.  Of course I didn't mean

15     that the HVO should have fired at its own units.

16             Let's go on to see what it says under item 3.  The HVO units

17     expect help and manpower from Prozor from the northern side and that the

18     HVO troops at Kiseljak were ordered to help those units at Bradina.

19             Was that really so?

20        A.   Help was requested.  Arif Pasalic obviously had information about

21     it, it must be from intelligence sources, that we asked for help from the

22     directions of Prozor, Bradina, and Kiseljak, and he informs his people on

23     the ground about the condition we are -- we were in.

24        Q.   Now Arif Pasalic, he orders his units to continue combat

25     activities and not allow the arrival of new forces from the direction of

Page 47169

 1     Prozor via the villages of Kacuni and Grevici, as well as from the

 2     direction of Bradina.

 3             Tell us were they successful in blocking the arrival of help?

 4        A.   Yes, they were successful and we didn't receive any help.

 5        Q.   Arif Pasalic continues to order his units to synchronise and

 6     integrate the joint combat activities for successful combat performances

 7     and crushing the HVO forces.

 8             You were on the grounds -- on the ground at the time.  In

 9     accordance with your information, did the forces of the ABiH act in this

10     way, in a synchronised and integrated fashion?

11        A.   Yes, they did.  They had agreed to -- to that effect, and they

12     signed a document with eight stamps that they would really act in the way

13     that Arif Pasalic had ordered them to act.

14        Q.   Let us look at document 4D85.  It's a combat report by

15     Esad Ramic.  Did you know Esad Ramic?

16        A.   Yes, I knew him.

17        Q.   It's a report from the command of the Igman operations group of

18     the ABiH, dated 16 April 1993.  Among others, it is stated that the

19     Zlatar facility is encircled and operations continue.

20             Tell us, Witness, is that an accurate statement?

21        A.   Yes, the statement is correct.

22        Q.   It goes on to say the HVO forces are requesting assistance and

23     regard to this feature their strength is ebbing.

24             Tell us, Witness, is this a correct statement?

25        A.   Yes, it's correct.

Page 47170

 1        Q.   Toward the end of the report we can read the Babin Nos facility

 2     is blocked, and the operation to capture it will be launched only after

 3     Zlatar and Repovica.

 4             Tell us, Witness, where you were on the 16th of April, 1993?

 5        A.   On the 16th of April, 1993, I was right above Babin Nos.  It's

 6     the village of Zabrdje.

 7        Q.   Tell us, Witness, is the statement that the area of Babin Nos was

 8     blocked on that day correct?

 9        A.   Yes, it is correct.

10        Q.   The final paragraph reads:  It is interesting that the Konjic HVO

11     is pleading for help which has been promised from Kresevo and Kiseljak.

12     Ambushes have been laid on these routes.

13             Let us repeat, Witness, and tell us once again, did you receive

14     help and were their efforts successful?

15        A.   We never received any help from this direction.

16        Q.   Let us look at the following document on which we will dwell

17     somewhat longer.  It's document 4D599.  It's again a report by

18     Esad Ramic.  This one is dated 17 April 1993, at 2000 hours.  Let us go

19     through the parts of that report.

20             It says that the Stari Grad facility's encircled.  Is that

21     correct?

22        A.   Yes, it's correct.

23        Q.   It goes on to say that the Zlatar facility is completely

24     encircled by 60 soldiers of the Black Swans Unit.  The Black Swans.  Then

25     what probably means 40 members of the special units of MUP Hadzici and

Page 47171

 1     80 soldiers of the 7th Konjic Brigade.

 2             While tightening the encirclement of the facility, 20 HVO

 3     soldiers were captured.

 4             Tell us, Witness, are these statements correct, as far as you

 5     know?

 6        A.   Yes, they are correct.

 7        Q.   With regard to the Babin Nos facility, tell us -- I believe that

 8     the facility is on the list.  Were you there on that day too?

 9        A.   Yes, I was.

10        Q.   It says that the facility is encircled and that all important

11     facilities in town are under the control of the ABiH.  Is that correct?

12        A.   Yes, that's all correct.

13        Q.   It goes on to -- to provide information about the village of

14     Radesine.  I will quote what Esad Ramic, from the 4th Corps of the ABiH,

15     is saying.  I quote:

16              "We will try to finish our work at Konjic as soon as possible

17     and then launch a counter-attack with all our brigades in two directions.

18     First, the direction Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar, and secondly,

19     Konjic-Prozor-Rama."

20             Please comment this part of the report for us, Witness.

21        A.   This part of the report submitted by Esad Ramic means that after

22     the completion of the operations from Bradina toward Konjic and further

23     on to Boksevica, where they wanted to link up with units from Jablanica,

24     they would continue to carry out the action in the Neretva Valley, in the

25     direction of valley, and further on to Capljina, Stolac, and as far as

Page 47172

 1     Neum.  And the other direction, the one from Jablanica to the right, that

 2     is, in the direction of Prozor by taking the villages of Doljani and

 3     Sovici and reaching the Risovac Plateau, and on to Prozor, that is, Rama.

 4        Q.   Take a look at the final part of this report where Esad Ramic

 5     says:  We will finalise the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina toward the

 6     east and west.  Please do not stop us and do not send us any negotiators.

 7             Tell us, Witness, can you comment this position of the 4th Corps

 8     of the ABiH for us?

 9        A.   Yes, I can.  If we remember the 23rd of March of the same year,

10     when there was an attempt to carry out this action, that is, on the

11     23rd of March, and it was stopped by negotiations and by bad weather,

12     that is, heavy snowfall, now Esad Ramic saw his opportunity.  If there

13     are no negotiations which could stop the action, he thinks that they have

14     the ability to complete it.

15        Q.   Let us skip the following document and look at 2D89.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When reading this document one

17     is under the impression that there is indeed an ABiH offensive because

18     everything is detailed.  Stari Grad, Zlatar, Spiljani, Polje Bijela, et

19     cetera, but at the last but one paragraph there is the following

20     mentioned.  The author of this document assumes that there is

21     co-operation between the HVO and the Serbs.  He even says that there is

22     an artillery operation on Muslim villages from Borak.  I suppose that

23     Borak is under Serb control.  If it isn't, please tell me if I'm wrong.

24     And he also says that there is an open aggression of the Serbs and the

25     Croats against the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 47173

 1             So the person writing this report emphasises a joint Serb and

 2     Croat operation.  What do you say to this?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was probably some shelling on

 4     the part of the Serbs those days, but if we look at where the fighting

 5     took place, if we go back, where the positions of Spiljani and Bijela are

 6     mentioned, these were on the confrontation line with the Serbs, and that

 7     is where the ABiH disarmed HVO members so that the Serbs also weren't

 8     sure what was going to happen, whether they would advance against them.

 9     So they probably shelled the villages mentioned here.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So as I understand it, as far

11     as you know, there was no joint operation of the Serbs and the Croats

12     against the Muslim.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no such military

14     operation.  We received some services from the Serbs, but we had to

15     provide some services in return.  There have been such instances.  But

16     these were merely commercial transactions in a manner of speaking, but we

17     did -- we never engaged in any joint military operations.

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Tell us, Witness, this commerce or trade with the Serbs, when did

20     it take place?

21        A.   At the time, we were already in the enclave.  It was after the

22     18th of April.  The ABiH had already taken all surrounding villages in

23     the Konjic municipality, and when only our enclave was left, then

24     together with the soldiers and the civilians there were also about

25     150 Serbs, and in the day -- following days their number rose about 450.

Page 47174

 1     The Serbs were grateful for the service we provided to the -- to them

 2     then, and they returned -- returned a favour to us with some services

 3     that we needed later.

 4        Q.   Let us clarify.  It doesn't seem clear enough.  At the moment

 5     when the HVO units retreated to the enclave there were also some

 6     civilians coming with them; right?

 7        A.   Yes, correct.

 8        Q.   Were there some Serbs among those civilians?

 9        A.   Yes, there were.

10        Q.   The figure you mentioned, 150 Serbs, is that the number of Serbs

11     who arrived at the enclave with you?

12        A.   No.  It -- that's the number of people who arrived on the first

13     day, and their total number amounted to about 450.

14        Q.   What would have happened to you in that enclave if it -- that

15     territory didn't lean on the Serb-controlled territory?  Would you have

16     been able to survive there?

17        A.   No, we wouldn't.  We wouldn't have had a supply corridor to

18     supply food or ammunition, or a corridor for saving the wounded, so that

19     at that moment the Serbs were some sort of necessary evil, and with their

20     help we took our wounded and our civilians to Stolac, to Herzegovina.

21        Q.   All right, Witness.  Let us go on to look at other documents.

22     2D89.  It's a joint statement by Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban, dated

23     April 18th, 1993.  These two presidents agree to stop the conflict, to

24     release prisoners.  And tell us, on that day, the 18th of April, 1993,

25     were there any conflicts in the area that you were?

Page 47175

 1        A.   Yes, there were still conflicts, because on the 18th of April

 2     they took the prominent elevations around Konjic, that is, Zlatar and

 3     Grad.

 4        Q.   Let's look at P1959.  That's the next document.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, document 2D89 is an

 6     essential document because it is signed both by Izetbegovic and

 7     Mate Boban.  Any reasonable Judge reading this document could infer two

 8     conclusions from it.  Firstly, these two heads -- these two heads,

 9     Izetbegovic and Boban, are clearly telling their troops that

10     confrontation needs to end immediately.  The word "immediately" is

11     actually stated.  And that it is important to determine responsibilities

12     at all unit level in order to find out what really happened.

13             This is the first interpretation you could make of the document.

14     Izetbegovic and Mate Boban seemed to have been bypassed by their troops

15     on the field, who actually did pretty much anything.  But the second

16     interpretation is the following.  These two personalities, in a very

17     hypocritical fashion, agree on a so-called press release stating that

18     there is a cease-fire.  And as you just said earlier, it still went on

19     after April 18th.

20             Now, you were on the field, so could you tell us what is your own

21     interpretation of this document signed by both Izetbegovic and

22     Mate Boban?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can only say that this was a

24     formality, that this was not implemented on the ground at all.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So you just said

Page 47176

 1     that this was very informally signed.  This was not implemented on the

 2     ground.  But do you have an explanation that would say why this was not

 3     actually implemented?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because of the entire operation

 5     that had been long in the making and in the preparation.  Most probably

 6     one of the founders and advocates of that operation was

 7     Alija Izetbegovic.  Therefore, the operation followed its course, the

 8     course that it should have followed, and of course that it was only

 9     logical that it would have been absurd for him to stop an operation, to

10     stop that operation.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand you correctly,

12     there were two signatories, but the hypocrite was Izetbegovic, who had

13     planned an all-out operation and who had no intention of stopping

14     anything.  That's your testimony, or did I understand you wrongly?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you understood me quite well.

16             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Witness, let's move on and let's see how many orders should have

18     been issued for the BiH Army to stop the attacks much later.  Let's look

19     at P1959 [Realtime transcript read in error "P19959"].  This is an order

20     issued by the chief of the HVO Main Staff based on the conclusions

21     reached by Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic.  The order was issued on the

22     18th of April, 1993, about the cease-fire.

23             And, Witness, did you know about the existence of this order, and

24     did you, on the ground, feel any changes with regard to combat operations

25     on the part of the BiH Army?

Page 47177

 1        A.   We did not see or feel any changes in the BiH Army comportment.

 2        Q.   And did you for any moment until then engage in any attacks or

 3     engage in any kind of military actions that could be construed as

 4     attacks?

 5        A.   No.  We did not launch any attacks.  We did not even have an

 6     occasion to launch an attack.

 7             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I repeat the document number

 8     because it was mis-recorded on line 13.  The document number is P1959.

 9        Q.   Let's look at the following document, Witness.  This is 4D445.

10     This is a combat report by the BiH Army for the same day, and let's see

11     what the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was doing on that day.

12             It says the BiH Army took Zlatar, the facility Zlatar, which was

13     a very important communication hub in Konjic.

14             Tell us, Witness, according to what you know, would this be

15     correct?

16        A.   Yes, this is a correct claim.

17        Q.   It also says here that the town was also concerned

18     [indiscernible] under siege and two hours ago it was taken.  Is that

19     correct?

20        A.   Yes, the claim is correct.

21        Q.   And it says the BiH Army completely took the axis between

22     Galjevo, Homolje, and Repovci, and that the village of Repovci was taken

23     as well.  Is that correct?

24        A.   Yes, that's a correct claim.

25        Q.   It says as well that the villages of Ovcari and Vrbici [phoen]

Page 47178

 1     were also taken and that the corridor was broken between Bradina and

 2     Konjic.  Are these claims correct?

 3        A.   Yes, these statements are correct.

 4        Q.   It says that at this moment, the Neretvica Brigade is liberating

 5     the strongholds of the Croatian Defence Council Pokojiste and Cerici, and

 6     after they are taken, the entire right bank the Neretva will be free.

 7             Is that what really happened.

 8        A.   Yes, but the name of the village is Pokojiste and Cerici, yes.

 9     And the 7th Brigade thus linked up with the Neretva Brigade from Klis as

10     a result of that.

11        Q.   It says here the remaining strongholds on the left bank of the

12     Neretva still need to be liberated, and their names are Turija, Zabrdje,

13     Pomol, and Ljubina.  The action has been prepared and will be carried out

14     tomorrow.

15             My question to you, sir, is this:  One could conclude that the

16     agreement on cease-fire has -- had come to nothing and that the BH Army

17     was still planning actions for the following days.  Tell me, were there

18     offensives launched by the BH Army army on the following days?

19        A.   Yes, there were.

20        Q.   It says further on:  All operations of both of our brigades have

21     vigorously started and are moving forward.  Our goal is to liberate

22     Jablanica as soon as possible and help it further.

23             Witness, could you conclude from what was happening on the ground

24     that this assessment is correct?

25        A.   Yes.  This is a correct assessment.  They were so much stronger

Page 47179

 1     than us that they could have easily carried out their plan.

 2        Q.   Let's look at the following document which is 4D1156.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Alaburic, to make sure

 4     that you can organise yourself, because you still have a few documents to

 5     go through, let me tell you that you only have 20 minutes left.  So try

 6     and use your documents wisely.

 7             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.

 8        Q.   Let's look at the following document which is 4D1156.  This is a

 9     report from the Rama Brigade, and let's look at the last paragraph,

10     Witness.  It says:  In Konjic Muslim extremists are trying to take

11     certain facilities.  In their units there are also women who are "working

12     on prisoners" in inverted commas.  They're treating them and hiding them.

13     It is noticeable that units which are active in the sectors of Konjic and

14     Jablanica are mostly composed of people from outside, who are not locals,

15     and they particularly hail from Eastern Bosnia.  Those are mostly those

16     who were fleeing before Chetniks and decided to stay in these Croatian

17     regions and found shelter in them.  According to our information, they

18     were being organised and incited against Croats by extremist Muslims who

19     had first created chaos in Prozor and then fled to Jablanica."

20             Witness, remind us, when we were talking about the secret

21     mobilisation in the month of February 1993, a document that was signed by

22     Alija Izetbegovic, that document and that mobilisation applied to

23     refugees.  Do you remember where those refugees were from?

24        A.   Those refugees were from Eastern Bosnia.

25        Q.   You told us, Witness, if I understood you properly, that the

Page 47180

 1     units that comprised refugees as well were a bit more radical and extreme

 2     in comparison with units composed of local Muslims.  Did I understand you

 3     properly?

 4        A.   Yes, you did.

 5        Q.   When I compare that statement that you provided yesterday with

 6     the assessment of the Rama Brigade, would you say that this conclusion

 7     reached by the Rama Brigade is correct or incorrect?

 8        A.   It is a correct conclusion and it's a proper conclusion.

 9        Q.   Let's now look at the following document which is 4D90.  Again a

10     report from -- a report from the 4th Corps for the 22nd April 1993.  The

11     BiH Army in its report says:  In the course of the day, in Konjic, we

12     carried out intense combat activities.  We gave up on the liberation of

13     the villages of Turija, Zabrdje, and Zaslivlje, until we liberate the

14     village of Radesine.

15             Witness, tell us, please, was that the situation on the ground

16     that day?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Let's look at the following document which is 4D139.  4D139.

19     This is a report or information on Konjic, a list up and down villages.

20     The signatory of this document is Zarko Keza.  Actually his name is

21     printed, but, Witness, do you recognise the signature?

22        A.   Yes, I recognise Dinko Zebic's signature.  He was Zarko Keza's

23     deputy at the time.

24     (redacted)

25     (redacted)

Page 47181

 1     (redacted)

 2        Q.   Is this document based on information provided by you or

 3     information provided by the 1st Battalion of your brigade?

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, let's redact

 5     lines 14 and 15 because that might help identify the witness.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour.  I was

 7     careless in this particular instance.

 8        Q.   Witness, please tell us, is this report from the 1st or the

 9     2nd Battalion of your brigade?

10        A.   The first part is from our 1st Battalion, dealing with the

11     villages, and the second part of the report hails from the 2nd Battalion.

12        Q.   According to what you know, the information contained in this

13     document, is it correct or not?

14        A.   All the information contained in this report is correct.

15        Q.   Let's look at the following document which is 4D137.  4D137.

16     This is a document issued by the Office for Refugees and Displaced

17     Persons of the HZ HB, which lists information about killed civilians and

18     members of the HVO in the village of Trusina.

19             Witness, tell us, please, do you know anybody from the list?

20        A.   Yes, I do.  I used to know Ivo Drlja [phoen] very well.  I also

21     knew Stipo Ljubic and Zeljko Blazevic.

22        Q.   They were HVO soldiers judging by the list; is that correct?

23        A.   Yes, correct.  Stipo Ljubic was a member of the police

24     administration prior to that, as well as Zeljko Blazevic who was a

25     reserve policeman.

Page 47182

 1        Q.   Witness, tell us, please, in Bosnia-Herzegovina over the past few

 2     weeks, were proceedings launched with regard to the crimes committed

 3     against Croats in Trusina?

 4        A.   Yes.  Some people were arrested.

 5        Q.   Let's look at the following document which is 4D91.  Again issued

 6     by the BH Army on the 24th of April, 1993.  The document says:  Our

 7     forces, with the forces of the Hadzici, Konjic and Jablanica MUP, put up

 8     fierce resistance to the Chetniks and inflicted heavy losses on them.

 9     What I'm interested at the moment is the issue of -- the issue of

10     Hadzici, Konjic and Jablanica municipalities.  Are these the

11     municipalities whose representatives of the army and the police met on

12     the 20th of March, 1993, and reached the conclusions that we analysed at

13     some length which are contained in document 4D454?

14             I would like to correct the date.  No, I'm not correcting the

15     date.  The date is okay.

16        A.   Yes.  Those are the very municipalities.

17        Q.   And it says here at the end:  The plan is to continue along the

18     entire front and to link up Vrci and Ravni, and to link up all the forces

19     in Jablanica.  Witness, at that moment what was happening with Konjic?

20     Had Konjic been taken or not?

21        A.   At that moment, Konjic was already taken.  The only things

22     remaining were the small enclaves of Drecelj, Zabrdje, Zaslivlje, and

23     Turija.  And at that moment, Vrce, which is a small village in the area

24     of responsibility of our battalion, that was still free.

25        Q.    I'm going to read to you several orders issued by the BH Army

Page 47183

 1     about cease-fire and then after that there will be a question.  The first

 2     document is 4D96.  Sefer Halilovic's order about the end of all

 3     offensives, issued on the 25th of April, 1993.

 4             I skip two documents, and I would like to show you 4D435.

 5     Arif Pasalic's order dated 26th April 1993, which orders immediately to

 6     cease all offensive actions again the HVO units.  And the word

 7     "immediately" is in block print.  I skip two documents.

 8             Let's look at 4D549 now.  This is Sefer Halilovic's order dated

 9     28 April, where it says:

10             "I'm most sharply warning you to immediately conduct

11     unconditional and absolute cease-fire against the HVO units."

12             The following document is 4D548.  It's an order issued by the

13     deputy Chief of Staff --

14             MR. BOS:  Your Honours --

15             MS. ALABURIC:  I said -- I said what I will do.

16             MR. BOS:  Okay.  Well, yeah, because I'm expecting a question to

17     the witness, but I hope that will come.

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I said that I would

19     list all cease-fire orders and then ask a question, because I think that

20     it would be wasting the Court's time to ask the same question about each

21     order.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Continue.  Go on.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24        Q.   The next document is 4D548.  It's an order issued by

25     Jovan Divjak, the deputy chief of the Supreme Command headquarters, dated

Page 47184

 1     April 28, in which also he orders the immediate cessation of all combat

 2     activities.

 3             The next document is 4D551.  Arif Pasalic's command:  Cease all

 4     operational activities and fortify the achieved lines, the lines reached.

 5             The next order is 4D436.  Arif Pasalic's order dated April 29:

 6             "I warn you most severely to implement immediately an

 7     unconditional complete cease-fire against the formations of the HVO."

 8             My question to you, Witness, is:  Were these orders implemented

 9     on the ground at all?

10        A.   No, they were not followed.  The ABiH continued its activities.

11        Q.   And now my final question, Witness.  There are two maps at the

12     end of this binder.  The first one is 4D1216.  1216.  It shows the

13     situation in the area of Mostar, but we are interested in Konjic now, in

14     June 1993.

15             From this simplified representation of the situation on the

16     ground, we can see that in the area of Konjic at that moment there were

17     two Croatian enclaves.  In the one below, you were.  You were in the one

18     below, Witness, weren't you?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And the other enclave was held by the 1st Battalion of your

21     brigade around Kostajnica.  Is that a correct representation?

22        A.   Yes, it is.

23        Q.   Let us look at the following map now, 4D129 --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Sorry, correction, 4D1219.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

Page 47185

 1        Q.   It shows the situation from September 1993.

 2             Now there is only one enclave, namely the one where you were.  Is

 3     that correct, Witness?

 4        A.   Yes, it is.

 5        Q.   Tell us the date and the month as of which only one small

 6     Croatian enclave was left in the Konjic-Jablanica area.

 7        A.   The date is roughly in mid-July 1993.

 8        Q.   Tell us the share of the Muslim population at Konjic at that

 9     moment.

10        A.   At that moment the share was over 90 per cent of the overall

11     population.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm looking at the second map.

13     I believe General Petkovic drew this map himself.  In green, we see zone

14     controlled by the BH Army; in pink, the zone controlled by the Serbs; and

15     in blue, HVO-controlled areas.  And this is reflecting the situation as

16     of September 15, 1993.

17             When looking at the Mostar area on this map, I note that from

18     Mostar there's possibility of going south, but the direction is blocked

19     off by the HVO, but it's -- there is a possibility to go north, however,

20     without running into any problems.

21             You were in the small blue enclave at the top of the map, and

22     could you tell us whether this map correctly reflects the military

23     situation in September 1993?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it does, except for this one

25     part behind Turija should have been in contact with the VRS-held area.

Page 47186

 1     If I may show you.  Here in this part the map should be corrected.

 2             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Maybe the witness can correct it

 3     and then we can assign an IC number.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you please make the

 5     correction.  You will be given a marker.  Just a minute.

 6             Nothing's happening.

 7             Could you please repeat what you just did.

 8             It would be maybe best to work with the ELMO.

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] It can be initialed, then, 4D-AP

10     [as interpreted], and could I please ask for an IC number?

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could we please

12     have a number.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  The document just marked by

14     the witness which is a replica of 4D01219 shall be given Exhibit IC01127.

15     Thank you, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Mrs. Alaburic

17     you've run out of time.  If you have one last question, please put the

18     question to the witness and then we'll have our break.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  I merely

20     have a correction.

21        Q.   Witness, when we spoke about the share of the Muslim population

22     in Konjic there was a mistake in the transcript.  Namely, some language

23     from which we -- it could be concluded that we were referring to the then

24     share of the Muslim population at Konjic, and I meant the present share,

25     nowadays.

Page 47187

 1        A.   Well, what I said was the current percentage of Muslims at

 2     Konjic.  It is certainly over 90 per cent.

 3        Q.   And my last question:  As far as you know, does -- do the

 4     Sarajevo authorities nowadays encourage the return of Serbs and Croats to

 5     Konjic?

 6        A.   No.

 7             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you.  I have

 8     finished.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We'll break for

10     20 minutes.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Cross-examination is to start

14     with the other parties.

15             Mr. Karnavas.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  Good morning, Mr. President.  Good morning,

17     Your Honours.  Good morning to everyone in and around the courtroom.

18             We will not be cross-examining the gentleman, but we do wish to

19     thank him for coming here to give his evidence.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] 2D.  I have a document from

21     Mr. Stojic.

22             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.  The

23     Stojic Defence will want to cross-examine the witness, but according to

24     our internal agreement, Mr. Coric's Defence is first today, so we should

25     actually proceed in that order.

Page 47188

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine.

 2             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Good morning,

 3     Your Honours.  Mr. Coric's Defence has no questions to -- of this

 4     witness.  We thank him for coming and giving evidence.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So 4D has no questions.

 6     Then -- 5D had no questions.  6D?

 7             MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 8     Mr. Pusic's Defence has no questions.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] 3D, for Mr. Praljak?

10             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.  Thank

11     you.  General Praljak's Defence will have one brief question for this

12     witness.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So as I understand it,

14     Mr. Stojic's Defence will start.

15             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  I will

16     start the examination now.

17                           Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, sir.

19        A.   Good morning.

20        Q.   Witness - this is what I will call you - I hope that you are

21     about to receive the documents based on which I will examine you.  I will

22     follow the examination-in-chief.  And let us go back to the very

23     beginning, 1992.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Would all unnecessary microphones please be

25     switched off, the microphones of the Judges notably.

Page 47189

 1             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Please take a look at document 2D765, the very first document in

 3     my binder.  Witness -- I will repeat.  It is 2D765.  That is correct.

 4             Witness, yesterday you said, and it is noted on page 23, lines 2

 5     through 5, that the HVO had good co-operation with the ABiH and almost a

 6     Joint Command up until May or June 1992.  Is that correct?

 7        A.   Yes, it is.

 8        Q.   This is a document signed by Mr. Rusmir Hadzihusejnovic,

 9     president of the Presidency, that is the War Presidency of the Konjic

10     municipality.  And in this order he says that the defence forces of

11     Konjic municipality are tasked to make sure that there is joint

12     consumption of crude oil for all members of the defence forces, and in

13     brackets he mentions the TO and the HVO.

14             Was it that way at the time?  Were operations conducted jointly

15     as we see that oil is also used jointly?

16        A.   Yes.  That is exactly the way it was.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I will now deal with the events of the 23rd of March,

18     1993, which you described in detail, and therefore please look at

19     document 2D639.

20             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] For the sake of the transcript, I

21     would like to point out that Witness Dragan Juric, who gave evidence

22     before this Trial Chamber on the 27th of April, 2009, in transcript

23     number 39038, lines 3 through 8, described these events in an identical

24     fashion, I mean the events of the 23rd of March of 1993, which you

25     described also.

Page 47190

 1        Q.   This is a report by Marko Stanic, commander of the 1st Battalion

 2     called Klis.  He says that on March 23rd, there were major conflicts in

 3     the area around Klis.  He also said that a mixed delegation arrived from

 4     Mostar and truce was agreed upon.  There was also an exchange of

 5     prisoners.  There are efforts to calm down the situation.

 6             Witness, was the situation really as described in this document?

 7        A.   Yes.  This is just the way it was on the ground.

 8        Q.   I will ask you to repeat what you have already said in the

 9     examination-in-chief.  Did the conflict stop on that day, and if so, why?

10        A.   On this day, when the joint commission arrived, the conflict

11     stopped in our 1st Battalion, whereas in the 2nd Battalion there had been

12     no casualties and no conflicts.  There was only disarm -- there was only

13     disarmament of Croats in a part of the town of Konjic.

14             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] For the sake of the transcript, I

15     would like to repeat something that we have already seen, that there was

16     an order by Mr. Milivoj Petkovic and Mr. Arif Pasalic about the cessation

17     of conflict.  I'm referring to document 4D125.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I'd like to ask you

19     this:  When the joint commission came, were you there?  Did you see them

20     arrive?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I wasn't present when they

22     arrived.  I wasn't there at the time.  I have already said that I was at

23     the Zlatar facility.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But did you know that there was

25     a joint commission that was about to come?

Page 47191

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We knew about it when the

 2     commission arrived.  We were informed.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm trying to see the logics in

 4     this document.  If there are incidents between the HVO and the ABiH at a

 5     local level, it would be logical if the higher echelon were to go on the

 6     ground in order to appease everybody.  This could be one explanation

 7     provided by this document.  But this would also mean, and this is where I

 8     seek your advice, this would mean that the higher echelon did not control

 9     the lower echelons, and therefore that there could be at any time an

10     incident.  What do you think of this?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Incidents could happen, because

12     units were on the ground, and units tasked to produce incidents tried to

13     bring about such situations in various ways.  And in this instance, there

14     was the -- an order from a higher level to try and calm the situation.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So there were units that were

16     tasked to produce incidents?  In saying this, you blame the ABiH.  You

17     put the responsibility onto them.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, yes.  At the very beginning

19     we said that there were units that came from somewhere else, and there

20     was also a unit under strength of -- or, rather, under the command of a

21     certain Muderiz.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So if we understand correctly,

23     if there had been no unit coming from outside, such as this Muderiz unit,

24     there would have been no incidents.  But since there were people that

25     came from the outside, they caused incidents and hence the intervention

Page 47192

 1     of the joint commission.  Is this your explanation for these incidents?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If only the locals had remained and

 3     if no units had come from elsewhere, there would have been very slight

 4     possibilities for any incidents to break out.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Among the HVO troops were there

 6     Croats coming from elsewhere or were there only locals?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my municipality, Konjic, there

 8     were only local -- locals.  Nobody came from anywhere else.

 9             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Witness, let's go back and follow up on His Honour Antonetti's

11     questions about the incident or the attack, if we look at the documents

12     of the BH Army.  Was this BiH Army attack which happened on the 23rd of

13     March, was that the implementation of the agreement between the units of

14     the BiH Army?  Under 4D454, you analysed the minutes under that number in

15     great detail yesterday with Mrs. Alaburic and you confirmed that the

16     attack on the 23rd of March was the product of the agreement within the

17     framework of the BiH Army to launch that operation.  Am I right in

18     thinking that?

19        A.   Yes, you are absolutely.

20        Q.   And you also said that that attack was stopped very early on

21     because there was a lot of snow on that day.

22        A.   Yes.  I said that the snow did fall.  Maybe not on the 23rd, but

23     in the next few days.

24        Q.   Just to be able to see what you said, I'm just going to say what

25     the BiH Army did on that day in Konjic.  And there's a document speaking

Page 47193

 1     to that.  The number is 4D438.  You don't have to look for it.  I'm just

 2     doing this for the transcript.  You won't need the document.  I'll just

 3     remind you that this is report issued by Commander Cerovac on the

 4     23rd of March, reporting on what had happened on the 23rd of March.

 5     There is another report by Mr. Kolakusic and --

 6             MR. BOS:  Your Honour --

 7             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Just a moment.  Let me finish the

 8     sentence.

 9        Q.   Under number P172 [as interpreted] that was shown to you and

10     which speaks about the same incident.

11             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Go ahead and I apologise.

12             MR. BOS:  Your Honours, I have an objection to one of the

13     questions that was raised by Ms. Nozica.  She says to the witness,

14     referring to his evidence from yesterday:

15             "And you also said that the attack was stopped very early on

16     because there was a lot of snow on that day."

17             Now, I think what the witness said was that on the 24th, it

18     started to snow, but I don't think that he said the attacks stopped

19     because of the snow.  I think that's an inference that's been made by

20     Ms. Nozica.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Nozica, please clarify the

22     question.

23             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes.  If there has been a

24     misunderstanding, let's ask the witness to clarify.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that the operation was

Page 47194

 1     stopped because of the large quantity of snow which fell two days after

 2     the beginning of the conflict.  So it wasn't on the 23rd but, rather,

 3     between the 24th and the 25th, and that's exactly what I said.

 4             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I have a technical problem.  I have

 5     to keep on switching off my microphone.  On page 41, line 14, I would

 6     like to correct the number.  I mentioned document number P1712.

 7        Q.   Now, I'm now going to ask you to move on and see what happened on

 8     the 24th of March, 1993.  Look at the document 2D641.  This is a report

 9     issued by Mr. Zdravko Sagolj, the brigade Herceg Stjepan commander, dated

10     24 of March, and he says here that the situation in the territory of

11     Konjic was getting increasingly complicated.  He said that the BiH Army

12     had killed three HVO members who were first taken prisoners.  They're

13     using civilians as human shield.  They do not allow us to get to our

14     wounded soldiers.  All the Croatian villages are encircled owing to the

15     supremacy in manpower.  And he says:  The cease-fire that was agreed

16     yesterday evening was used by the BiH Army only to exchange their members

17     from our prisons, and then they carried out a regrouping -- regrouping

18     and launched fierce attacks on everything Croatian.

19             Can you confirm, Witness, that that was indeed the following day,

20     the situation in Konjic?

21        A.   Yes, I can.

22        Q.   Witness, I would now like to discuss some documents that are

23     connected with your testimony in the --

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please.

25             Looking at this document, I see that there were three HVO members

Page 47195

 1     that had been captured, and they were killed by the ABiH.  If this

 2     document is accurate, so three soldiers were killed by the ABiH.  We can

 3     also read that civilians were used as human shields.

 4             I'd like to know the following:  In Konjic and in the wider area,

 5     were there UN troops?  Was UNPROFOR present?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Spanish Bat was in charge of

 7     that part of Konjic at the time.  And they were UNPROFOR, yes.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In this kind of situation, when

 9     the commander of the Herceg Stjepan Brigade, Mr. Sagolj, noted that

10     soldiers had been killed, to your knowledge, did he go to see the

11     commander of SpaBat to tell him to do something, to intervene with the

12     ABiH, or were -- was there notice of them?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether there was any

14     meeting of the kind, but as far as I know, there were none.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As for you, did you have

16     contacts with SpaBat?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I personally did not have any

18     contacts with them.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please.

20             Can we move into private session, Registrar.

21                           [Private session]

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 47196

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22                           [Open session]

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.  Thank

24     you.

25             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

Page 47197

 1        Q.   Witness, I would like to talk about the month of April.  Earlier

 2     today we saw a series of documents speaking about the events in the month

 3     of April or, rather, the attacks of the BH Army against the HVO in the

 4     month of April.  Could we now look at the document number 2D403, which

 5     supports everything that you said about the dates when things happened.

 6             We have a report here issued by Mr. Sagolj, the commander, in

 7     which Mr. Sagolj says that the BiH Army had stormed the brigade

 8     headquarters in Konjic, disarmed all those who were found there at that

 9     moment.  He speaks about barricades in several places within the very

10     centre of the town.  He also says that the apartments of Croatian

11     citizens being looted.  He also says that people were being arrested, and

12     he says that in Klis the fightings were -- was intensifying and going on

13     during the night.

14             Could you please confirm that the situation on the 15th of April

15     in Konjic is reflected by this report?

16        A.   Yes.  I can confirm that because our brigade was disarmed on that

17     day, and some of the command staff that was found in the brigade on the

18     day were brought in.

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the counsel.

20             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Witness, when it comes to members of the HVO and citizens, were

22     they being arrested around that time, and if they were, where were they

23     taken, if you know?

24        A.   Around that time members of the Croatian people and the HVO were

25     being arrested and taken to the sports hall in Konjic.  Certain

Page 47198

 1     individuals were also taken to the premises of the social and political

 2     organisations that existed in Konjic.  Those were usually or exclusively

 3     political officials who were members of the HVO.

 4        Q.   And now I would kindly ask you to look at the following document,

 5     which is 2D78 --

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please.  This

 7     morning, Witness, I asked you a question, and I didn't know then that the

 8     Petkovic Defence would present this document to you.

 9             This morning I mentioned an ultimatum by the HVO, on the

10     15th of April, and I asked you whether you were aware of the ultimatum.

11     You said no, you'd never heard of it.

12             I was not aware of this document when I asked you the question,

13     but here I see that on the 15th of April it is the ABiH that disarmed

14     HVO soldiers.  Based on this, I ask myself this:  If there was an overall

15     plan by the HVO with an ultimatum and action, how is it that in Konjic

16     the HVO did not take any steps, and that, on the contrary, they were

17     victims of the disarmament action whilst they were the ones that should

18     have disarmed the others?  How do you account for this?  Is it so that in

19     Konjic you were taken by -- or surprised to see that, on the

20     15th of April, the ABiH disarmed the soldiers?  Was that total surprise

21     for you or was that something that you could actually foresee?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I told you that there

23     was no ultimatum on the part of the HVO as far as Konjic municipality's

24     concerned at least.  Starting with the first conflict, on the

25     23rd of March until the 14th of April, there were a lot of tensions.  The

Page 47199

 1     situation was tense all the time.

 2             At that moment we didn't really expect anything to happen,

 3     because we thought that the period was rather calm.  However, things were

 4     reactivated on the 14th of April.  And on the 15th of April, members of

 5     the BiH Army stormed our brigade premises and found some officers there

 6     whom they arrested.  And they also arrested the civilian leadership, the

 7     president of the HDZ and others who were around there somewhere.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] At the time would you listen to

 9     the radio?  Was there Radio Mostar?  Did you receive information, or did

10     you not have a radio set or a TV set or newspapers?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, we did not hear any information

12     to that effect, as far as I know.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There was a Croat

14     representative in the Konjic municipality.  What was his name?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Drago -- Dragutin Peric, who was

16     the HDZ president.  And people who were arrested in the headquarters were

17     Boro Blazevic, Ivica Azinovic, Dobroslav Zovko [phoen].

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Did Dragutin Peric never tell

19     anybody, well, in Grude or somewhere else, It was decided that as of the

20     15th of April, we would take control of specific areas, and the ABiH

21     would be asked to come under our control, whilst in other areas the HVO

22     would go under ABiH control?  Did he never say anything to the effect?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

25             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 47200

 1        Q.   Witness, in view of the questions put to you by Judge Antonetti,

 2     and in view of the fact that he also put some questions to you during

 3     your examination-in-chief about the alleged ultimatum by the HVO,

 4     allegedly issued on the 15th of April, 1993, I will kindly ask you to

 5     look at the document.  If you don't have it on you, it's one of

 6     Mrs. Alaburic's documents.  I did not prepare for that, but I was

 7     prompted by His Honour's questions.

 8             Let's look at P1879.  You already saw it earlier today.  It's a

 9     report about the events.  It's a summary report signed by Mr. Petkovic.

10             Under item 3 it says in this report -- please listen to me.  I

11     believe that you will have it on e-court, on your screen.  Yes, okay.

12     Now, let's move on to second page in Croatian.  This is the bullet

13     point 4 speaking about the OZ South-East Herzegovina.  Did you find it?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   The second page in the Croatian version.  Did you find it?

16        A.   Yes, I did.

17        Q.   Sir, it says here a report from Konjic on the 13th of April at

18     1600 hours, and it says:

19             "The fighting has just started in Konjic but we don't have any

20     detailed information.  Our villages came under attack.  There's shelling

21     and there's infantry fighting."

22             Sir, according to what you remember and judging by this report,

23     does it appear that the ABiH army in Konjic attacked the HVO units on the

24     13th of April at 1600 hours, which means that this report precedes the

25     alleged ultimatum of the 15th of April.  Is that correct?

Page 47201

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct.  The 13th of April.  It says here the

 2     villages of Obri and Vrci, which are in the part near our 1st Battalion,

 3     or under our 1st Battalion, and this belongs to the area of

 4     responsibility of the 1st Battalion Klis.

 5             In those areas on the 13th of April there was fighting.

 6        Q.   Moreover, Witness, the fighting that was taking place in April,

 7     was that the attack that started with the attack of the BiH Army on the

 8     23rd of March, pursuant to the joint document issued by the

 9     representatives of the army on the 28th of March?

10        A.   Yes, that's correct.  Pursuant to the minutes dated 20th March,

11     the operation was launched on the 23rd of March, but it was halted

12     because of the signing of the peace accord and because of the weather

13     conditions.  An auspicious moment was being waited for.  There were

14     certain frequent skirmishes.  In the meantime, however, the weather

15     conditions improved.  The troops had regrouped, and in the month of

16     April, in mid-April, they launched the final offensive.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone.

18             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] On page 49, in line 12, instead of

19     the 28th of March there should be the 20th of March, because I said the

20     20th of March.

21        Q.   Let us now look at document 2D780, please, about the events on

22     the 18th of April.  This is the following day.  We saw a document about

23     the 17th.  It is 2D780.  It should be the following document in my pink

24     binder.  Pink, sir.  There are too many binders, but I'm sure you'll

25     manage.

Page 47202

 1             So I repeat for your sake, 780.  Have you found it?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   All right.  This is another report by Mr. Zdravko Sagolj.  I'll

 4     start from the centre part about the events on that day.  For the sake of

 5     the Bench I would like to say that I spoke to you during the proofing and

 6     showed you all these documents, actually many more, and I'm showing these

 7     to you in the courtroom based on what you say was your recollection of

 8     the events.  Is that correct?

 9        A.   [No interpretation].

10        Q.   There is no -- no reply recorded anyway, but you said yes.

11             I would like to focus on the part starting with:

12             "At 1715 hours we noticed entrenching at Gradac.  We are

13     receiving reports that strong ABiH forces are massing in the region of

14     the Ribica village and are exerting pressure on Radesine which is --

15     which controls the entrance to Konjic.  And there was no report from

16     Konjic and -- that there were unconfirmed reports that the Zlatar

17     facility is under the control of the ABiH."

18             Can you confirm that that was the situation on that day?

19        A.   Yes.  That's how it was on that day.  That's why there could have

20     been no report from our 2nd Battalion, because our communications centre

21     was already under the control of the ABiH.

22        Q.   Witness, for the sake of the transcript, now something that you

23     don't have to look for, this is corroborated by an ABiH document which is

24     4D445.

25             Witness, let us now together look at something in e-court.  Don't

Page 47203

 1     look for it in the binder because it isn't there.  These were questions I

 2     was prompted to ask during the previous session.  It is 2D49 [as

 3     interpreted].  It is the agreement between Mr. Boban and Mr. Izetbegovic,

 4     and it bears the same date.  I would like to go into what actually was

 5     happening on that day, and that may be an explanation of proceeding at

 6     later events.

 7             I said 2D89 rather than 49.

 8             While waiting for the document to appear in e-court, on that day

 9     an agreement was reached between Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban.

10     Judge Antonetti asked you why this agreement wasn't honoured, because you

11     said it was not, and you explained that the ABiH actually continued its

12     military activity because Mr. -- Mr. Izetbegovic, among other things,

13     following the mobilisation carried out in your area and having received

14     the report in Geneva, as Judge Antonetti has noticed, the report from the

15     meeting held on the 20th of March when the operations were planned, and

16     you said that the ABiH had no interest in stopping these operations.  Is

17     that correct?

18        A.   Yes.  It's correct.

19        Q.   Just to remind ourselves, and you don't need that, a document was

20     shown to you earlier, it can be shown in e-court, namely, 4D599.  I'm

21     merely reminding you that the document is dated April 17 and signed by

22     Esad Ramic, who in that document says:

23             "We'll try to get our work done at Konjic as soon as possible and

24     then launch a counter-attack with all brigades in two directions,

25     Jablanica-Konjic-Mostar, Konjic-Prozor-Rama?"

Page 47204

 1             You confirmed that this was part of the plan which started with

 2     that joint meeting on the 20th of March, 1993; is that correct?

 3        A.   Yes, it is correct, and I've explained the reasons for it.

 4        Q.   Since you spoke about that, namely, that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic,

 5     although he signed the agreement, never had the intention of abiding by

 6     it --

 7             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I apologise to the Bench to proceed

 8     this way, but it was impossible to do it otherwise for reasons of time.

 9             I would now like for document 4D1052 to be called up in e-court.

10        Q.   While we wait for the first page to appear, I would like to say

11     that it's a tape recording made on the occasion of a session of the

12     Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 29th of December, 1993,

13     attended by Mr. Izetbegovic, as we see.  We can see it in e-court now.

14             Let us now go to page 4D23-0699 in the Croatian version, and

15     page 25 in the English translation.

16             You can see the Croatian text already.  Let us wait for page 25

17     of the English translation.  I'm referring to the third paragraph of the

18     English version on that page, and in your text, Witness, it's the only

19     paragraph, and basically the first sentence.  This is discussion -- or,

20     rather, the words of Mr. Komsic who says:  You said once, speaking to

21     Mr. Izetbegovic, we are -- we -- we must do something on our part to

22     avoid it and get through negotiation what we believe we should get for

23     this, and otherwise we will use military means.

24             Witness, why did not -- did Mr. Izetbegovic not abide by the

25     agreement reached in April?  You see Mr. Komsic quoting Mr. Izetbegovic's

Page 47205

 1     words that he would use military means where negotiations prove

 2     unsuccessful.  Is that an accurate reflection of his position?

 3        A.   Yes, it is.

 4        Q.   All right.  Now let's go to May.  I will show you two documents

 5     from May.  Both refer to the level of supply where the materiel and

 6     technical equipment as well as other equipment.  I'll ask you whether

 7     you're familiar with this situation.

 8             The first document is 2D786.  It's dated May 8th.  It's a request

 9     made by Mr. Sagolj who says:  At the beginning of the conflict, between

10     the forces of the HVO and the ABiH in the Klis region, we had normal

11     supplies of food necessary for the nutrition of the 1st Battalion.

12     However, now the situation is such that he's now making a list of

13     whatever is necessary.  He also says:  Alert the humanitarian

14     organisations to get humanitarian aid delivered to the Croatian villages

15     in the Klis region.

16             Earlier you showed us the situation around Konjic.  Was Klis one

17     of these enclaves, and what was the situation on the 8th of May?

18        A.   Yes.  This is one of the enclaves around Kostajnica, and now,

19     after one month, in a situation where in one enclave there were both

20     civilians and soldiers, it is logical for such requests for food to be

21     made to the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations if it wasn't

22     possible to provide supplies in the usual fashion.

23        Q.   Was it possible for supplies to apply in the usual fashion?

24        A.   No.  I said it wasn't possible, and that's why they were making

25     these requests through Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations.

Page 47206

 1        Q.   Please look at the following document, 2D784, of March 7th.  This

 2     is a request for materiel and technical equipment.  Enemy attacks are

 3     mentioned.  It says that there were infantry attacks on the villages of

 4     Vrce, Zitac, Seonica and others, from the early morning hours, and

 5     there's a shortage of materiel and technical equipment and a list

 6     follows.

 7             Witness, do you know whether the unit at Klis was in such a

 8     situation that it was under attack at the time, and can you finally say

 9     how long was it able to keep its position in this enclave as you

10     explained?

11        A.   Yes, this depicts the situation in which the brigade was.  It

12     held out throughout May up until mid-July, but after that it was unable

13     to stay there because there was no supply with any provisions including

14     food, materiel, or technical provisions.

15        Q.   Witness, to my question earlier today you replied that you knew

16     that civilians of Croatian ethnicity and members of the ABiH were

17     arrested following the events on the 23rd of March.  Can you tell us,

18     according to what you know, how many civilians and HVO members were

19     arrested by the ABiH, roughly?

20        A.   In the Celebici camp there were about 310 HVO members who were

21     detained there, and a total of over 1.000 persons passed through those

22     camps.  That is Celebici, the Konjic sports hall, and the other prisons

23     such as Buturovic Polje and other places.

24        Q.   Was anybody from your family in one of those prisons?  Do you

25     know anybody who was detained, maybe some friends or neighbours of yours?

Page 47207

 1        A.   Yes, several friends of mine and even relatives.  We're in open

 2     session but I may be allowed to say that my brother was also detained.

 3        Q.   Yes.  We'll be wary not to disclose your identity.

 4             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] And that's why, namely because I

 5     want to show a document that could reveal the identity of the witness, I

 6     ask for private session.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's move into private

 8     session.

 9                           [Private session]

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 47208











11 Pages 47208-47215 redacted. Private session.















Page 47216

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10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

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20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25                           [Open session]

Page 47217

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.  Thank

 2     you.

 3             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Witness, you were telling us about the Muderiz unit, on page 26,

 5     from line 9 through line 16 on page 27.  Let's look at document 2D769.

 6             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Just for the transcript, I would

 7     like to say that this document is already exhibit under 2D16.

 8        Q.   Let's look together whether this is the same unit and the

 9     commander that we see in this SIS information.  Reference is made to

10     Efendi Halilovic, also known as Muderiz, who arrived in Konjic at the

11     beginning of the 1990s, that he was an active member of the SDA and its

12     founding member.  He educated and trained a number of people whose number

13     rose to 300 in the year 1994, that he was a member of the religious

14     group, that some of the members of that unit had been trained in Libya

15     and Iran, that those were the so-called jihad warriors as they were

16     known.  This document talks about the establishment organisation of the

17     unit and also about the activities or, rather, misdeeds of the unit

18     committed against the Croats.

19             You said that that was the unit that you would refer to as

20     extremists.  You have read this information.  Can you confirm that this

21     information reflects the situation as it was with regard to this unit?

22        A.   Yes, it does reflect that situation.  This Nezir Halilovic, also

23     known as Muderiz, he was the chief imam in the Konjic municipality.  He

24     sent people to training, and later on they joined his units.  They were

25     mostly young men, aged 20 or so.  They wore black uniforms, and on one

Page 47218

 1     sleeve they had a patch that read "Muderiz," and "Allah's fighters" or

 2     something like that.

 3        Q.   Thank you, sir.

 4             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]  This -- I complete my

 5     cross-examination here.  I believe that Mr. Praljak's Defence will

 6     continue.  Thank you, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a follow-up question on

 8     this document.  The person writing this document seems to say this:  In

 9     every town in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by the

10     ABiH, there is a jihad unit commanded by religious officials who are

11     under Izetbegovic's direct control.

12             Was it your impression that you were faced with an army, the

13     ABiH, that was predicated on religious and not on lay principles, which

14     was to defend the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?  What is your

15     evaluation with regard to this document?  Does it confirm what you

16     thought of the opponent or is the author of this document wrong?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right at the beginning I said that

18     such units and the displaced persons who came to the Konjic area

19     contributed to heightening the tensions there, and they were not in

20     favour of any co-operation with the other ethnicity, and they provoked

21     and caused incidents and confrontation in our part of the Konjic

22     municipality.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The same document states that

24     soldiers were in black uniforms like uniforms of desert soldiers.  What

25     did that mean to you?

Page 47219

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it means what I've said

 2     already, that they were people who had come from foreign countries,

 3     mostly Arab countries, who fought in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they called

 4     that war "jihad," that is, "sacred war."  And one such unit was in the

 5     area of Konjic, and it was led by this Muderiz, that is, a clergyman.

 6     And these young fighters were very -- they were very young and getting

 7     killed meant nothing to them.  And for any special assignment, they would

 8     deploy these very units.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that -- yes,

10     Ms. Nozica.

11             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just have one

12     correction.  There must have been a slight technical mistake, because the

13     witness received an interpretation saying that in any major village in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas the document reads any major town.  This is a

15     correction that I wanted to make for you to be able to assess the

16     witness's words correctly.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Quite.  We're going to have a

18     break, but before that we are going to finish with the Praljak Defence.

19             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

20                           Cross-examination by Ms. Pinter:

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Witness.  Most of the questions

22     that I wanted to ask to introduce document 3D332 have already been put.

23             Tell me, have you ever seen Muderiz?

24        A.   Yes, I have.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 47220

 1             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Could we now please see the video

 2     3D00332.

 3        Q.   While we wait for it to start --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone.

 5             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Do you Muderiz in this picture?

 7        A.   The picture's blurred.

 8             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Let's play it, please.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm sorry to interrupt you, Ms. Pinter, but I

12     again would like to raise the question which was previously discussed

13     also upon the points made by Judge Trechsel, and here I would like to

14     quote the decision of the Appeals Chamber, and I quote it in French:

15              "[Interpretation] The Appeals Chamber is of the view that it may

16     be legitimate to present evidence regarding attacks of the opposite side

17     on civilian facilities if they tend to show or refute the allegation of a

18     generalised and wide-scale attack against a civilian population or the

19     allegation of a plan, an organised plan, to attack various villages or to

20     explain the accused's behaviour."

21             And it goes on to say:

22             "However, in such circumstances, the evidence in question must

23     relate to specific and defined aspects.  In other words, the party

24     wishing to submit such evidence must justify for each and every piece of

25     evidence the exact link, for instance, the connection in time and place

Page 47221

 1     with the alleged crimes in the municipalities mentioned in the indictment

 2     and/or with the alleged liability of the accused for such offences,

 3     whether the crimes are alleged to have been committed as part of a joint

 4     criminal enterprise."

 5             [In English] I quoted this part of the decision of the Appeals

 6     Chamber because I really feel that that showing of the element of

 7     "defiler jihad," in my view, has no relevance to our case here.

 8             Thank you.

 9             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you for this

10     question.  First and foremost, General Praljak's Defence, as any other

11     Defence counsel, sticks to the indictment, as to the holy script, and the

12     OTP claims that there was a joint criminal enterprise involving both the

13     accused and other persons to the end of the implementation of a plan

14     contrived by the accused and the HZ HB, part of which was the expulsion

15     of Muslim population and attacks on them.

16             In paragraphs 33 and 34, mention is made of a comprehensive and

17     general attack by the HVO after the 15th of April against numerous Muslim

18     villages and towns.  You cannot decide in this case unless you get all

19     the information and all the facts allowing you to get a complete picture

20     of the situation in which the six accused were and in which they had to

21     act and implement decisions or take decisions as individuals.

22             Apart from that, Your Honours, showing this unit is -- didn't

23     have as purpose showing jihad as such.  There are documents about

24     Muderiz's unit and which go to show what that unit was like.  And if you

25     deploy such a unit to a place like Konjic, where the Croats are encircled

Page 47222

 1     anyway and where they are a minority, and when such a unit is going down

 2     Allah's path, can Croats in such a situation believe that this is an army

 3     that is willing to engage in a defence against the Serbs with them and

 4     defend Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole consisting of three entities.

 5             So the situation in the HZ HB [as interpreted] wasn't as simple

 6     as that.  Decisions about the acts of individuals and political

 7     structures cannot be founded on documents submitted by one side only.

 8     You need to have a complete picture.

 9             This is the Muderiz unit at a military rally at Jablanica in

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I have a question to that witness about this unit.

11             MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I would like to

12     correct the transcript.  On page 69, line 23, my colleague spoke about

13     the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was not as simple, and it was

14     recorded in the transcript that she was speaking about the HZ HB.

15             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Ms. Tomanovic.  And I

16     thank Mr. Karnavas for a suggestion, but I had wanted to ask the question

17     the same anyway.

18             The video showing this unit of the 4th Muslim Brigade refers to

19     that part of the indictment in which it is stated that the policy of the

20     HZ HB, as well as the military of the HZ HB, with that foundation and

21     with using the means of propaganda created fear in the Croatian Muslim --

22     Croatian population and create negative emotions towards the Muslims, and

23     in such territories as under the indictment were meant to belong to the

24     HZ HB or HR HB, respectively.

25             As I said, this video was made at Jablanica, which can be seen in

Page 47223

 1     the video itself.  It's impossible to separate Konjic from Jablanica and

 2     Prozor and other places mentioned in the indictment because they're

 3     geographically connected, and it is impossible to get a complete picture

 4     in this case about the reasons why certain events happened unless we are

 5     allowed to present the other side of the coin.  It has nothing to do with

 6     tu quoque or with the efforts to show, You see, they did this and so did

 7     we.  No.  Our intention is to give you as many -- as much information as

 8     possible, and by analysing this information and assessing the evidence

 9     you will reach your decision.

10             MR. BOS:  Your Honour, if I may say something on behalf of the

11     Prosecution.  The Prosecution is in complete agreement with what

12     Judge Prandler just said and that this video is completely irrelevant for

13     the case.  And what I also wanted to say was that, like one of the other

14     documents that we saw today, is that this video has been shown before in

15     this case, to Christopher Beese, and at that time this video was denied

16     as well.  And then there was a second attempt through a Rule 89(C) motion

17     from Mr. Praljak to admit as evidence.  And it was again denied twice for

18     the reasons of relevance, and I think it's clear that this document --

19     this video is not relevant.

20             And then a last comment that I would like to make is that, you

21     know, we can see it reads "Jablanica," but we have really no date on this

22     video, and I think in this case a date is also very important.  And

23     neither a source of the video, if I may add.

24             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] If I may reply.  I apologise,

25     Ms. Alaburic.  I'll start from the beginning.

Page 47224

 1             It is true that it was attempted to introduce this video through

 2     Christopher Beese and some other witnesses, but we have before us now a

 3     person from Konjic, a witness who knew the person in question personally

 4     and who had personal experience with the behaviour and the acts of this

 5     unit, that is, Muderiz.  So if we want to elicit information that is both

 6     reliable and authentic, we must try to do so from a person with immediate

 7     knowledge, and this is this witness.

 8             Regarding the objection that the place and time when this video

 9     was made are unknown, but we can see here that it was made by the

10     information service of the 44th Mountain Brigade, Jablanica.  So it's a

11     video made by the information service of the ABiH, of its 44th Brigade.

12     That is why I think that the authenticity of this video can't be doubted,

13     and I don't see why the witness can't be asked questions about Muderiz

14     and the Muderiz Brigade.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] To be clear, Judge Prandler

16     read out part of the Appeals Chamber decision.  Not by the -- it was a

17     Trial Chamber decision, not an Appeals Chamber, and I had a dissenting

18     opinion of which I'm going to read out two paragraphs.

19              "It is, furthermore, not justified to dismiss documents on the

20     sole basis that this is tu quoque.  A document relating to a crime

21     committed by another warring party may serve to justify that the crime

22     may have brought about another crime being committed by another warring

23     party without, however, exonerating anyone of criminal liability.  It is

24     not justified either to dismiss a document relating to action carried out

25     by the ABiH, because the Defence case is to say that the actions were not

Page 47225

 1     carried out by the HVO but the ABiH.  The very fact that the attacks took

 2     place in other places not mentioned in the indictment should not mean

 3     that the exhibits are dismissed, because when it comes to military

 4     actions, you need to have an overall view of the theatre of war unless

 5     you make error in assessing the situation."

 6             So this is what I wanted to mention for the transcript.

 7             You're showing a video.  You may have a question also.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your leave,

 9     just two sentences, because we're talking about very important issue.

10             My learned friend Mr. Bos mentioned the relevance of the document

11     for this case.  I would like to present General Petkovic's Defence

12     position.  Of course, Your Honours, you will be deciding as to the

13     relevance of any of the documents of this case, but we believe that at

14     this moment you can still not decide on what is relevant for this case

15     and what is not, and the reason being the following.  The Defence teams

16     are still presenting their evidence, and you are not aware of the theory

17     of the Defence of each and every accused, nor are you aware of all the

18     documents that the Defence teams are going to present, and you don't --

19     also don't know how the Defence teams are going to create their cases

20     based on the documents.  Only after you have heard our closing arguments

21     and seen our final briefs will you be able to gain a proper picture of

22     what actually happened and what is relevant for this case and what is

23     not.

24             Three years ago you will remember your opinion about the

25     relevance of the documents for this case is different from what you're

Page 47226

 1     thinking today.  It's only normal.  It's only understandable that this

 2     should be the case.  That's why I believe that you will be able to judge

 3     the relevance of certain documents for a Defence team that has presented

 4     a case and presented a very extensive pre-trial brief, and you can't do

 5     that for the Defence teams that have not presented their cases.

 6             I don't know if anything is relevant for Valentin Coric's defence

 7     until he reveals it to us.  That's why I believe that a flexible approach

 8     when it comes to the admission of certain documents into evidence would

 9     be very useful for further work, and I believe that we would all waste

10     less time on futile discussions about that.  At the end of the trial

11     you're going to evaluate all the documents.  You're going to estimate

12     what indeed is important and what the truth about this case actually is.

13             Thank you very much for hearing me out.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  We're still waiting for

15     the question to the witness.

16             Yes.  Why did you want to speak, General Praljak?  Your lawyer

17     was about to ask the question.

18             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the Counsel

19     is going to put a question, but we have had this tu quoque problem from

20     the very outset.  Let me just say two words.  The tu quoque should not be

21     incorporated into the method of any sides, being the American side in

22     Afghanistan or in Iraq, the HVO, anywhere.  I'm talking about the method.

23     However, without showing what the other side does or did, you cannot

24     explain the right to an action.  An action is one thing, and its

25     implementation is a different thing.  Tu quoque is the implementation of

Page 47227

 1     an action.  Every state has the right to defend itself.  France or any

 2     other state has the right to defend itself and so on and so forth.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You are entitled to ask

 4     questions, but we're not now in closing arguments.

 5             Do ask your question, Ms. Pinter.  You showed a video that was

 6     not admitted into evidence.  You may seek to tender it and we will rule

 7     on that, but first we need an answer from the witness.  So do ask your

 8     question, please.

 9             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  It's not up

10     to me.  I was not the one who was avoiding putting my question to the

11     witness.

12        Q.   Sir, you have described the appearance of Muderiz unit.  The

13     clothes that you can see in this video-clip, would that correspond to the

14     way his unit looked like?

15        A.   Yes, indeed.

16        Q.   Could this be the Muderiz unit?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   You knew that Muderiz unit at one point became the 4th Muslim

19     Light Brigade, did you?

20        A.   Yes, I did.

21        Q.   Thank you very much.  I have completed my set of questions about

22     the Muderiz.  I have just one more question about page 54 of the record

23     and the answer you give to a question put to you by Ms. Nozica about

24     Klis.

25             You said that between May until mid-July 1993, that they were

Page 47228

 1     encircled and that they had to leave.  Are you talking only about the

 2     troops or were also civilians encircled?

 3        A.   The encirclement of this entire part of the 1st Battalion Klis

 4     included also the civilians who were there in the neighbouring villages.

 5     And finally they reached the small enclave in Kostajnica and the only way

 6     out towards the Croats was in the direction of Prozor, across Boksevica.

 7     And that's why Boksevica was so important in all of that, the taking of

 8     Boksevica was crucial.

 9        Q.   My learned friend Tomanovic is alerting me to the fact that you

10     will have to repeat the entire answer because what you answered has not

11     been recorded.  So would you please be so kind and repeat your answer

12     with regard to Klis, Kostajnica and the civilians.  But could you do it

13     slowly and could you please wait for me to finish my question, for the

14     question to be interpreted and then you can start?

15        A.   May I?  It is true that the 1st HVO Bojna comprised both

16     civilians and members of the HVO.  The small enclave around Kostajnica

17     and Kostajnica itself was where all the civilians from the neighbouring

18     villages finally arrived.  And there was no way to supply them with

19     materiel and technical equipment, food or anything of the sort.  The only

20     way for them to leave was to go towards Prozor or Rama across via

21     Boksevica, as a matter of fact.  And this is what they did in mid-July.

22        Q.   What about the civilians?  Did the civilians leave at the same

23     time?  Do you know if General Praljak participated in all that?

24        A.   Yes, I know that General Praljak participated in that exercise

25     and that civilians also left at the time, those who had found themselves

Page 47229

 1     in that enclave near Kostajnica.

 2        Q.   After the month of July, do you know who was taken by Boksevica?

 3     Was it still the HVO?  Was it abandoned?

 4        A.   After the month of July Boksevica was not in the hands of the

 5     HVO.

 6             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours.

 7     This completes my examination.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Let's break for 20

 9     minutes and after that the Prosecutor can start his cross-examination.

10                           --- Recess taken at 12.41 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

13             Mr. Karnavas?

14             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I wanted to say a

15     couple of words before the break, and I say this with all due respect,

16     but we are extremely concerned, at least the Prlic Defence.

17             Members of the Bench seem to have made up their mind on certain

18     issues, which obviously leads us to believe that no matter what the

19     evidence we present is a futile process at this point, that convictions

20     will result even -- despite our better efforts to present a balanced

21     defence and documents that would show or testimony that shows a plausible

22     alternative explanations to what is being presented by the Prosecution in

23     their -- in their indictment.  This whole issue of Croatisation, this is

24     a term that has been used throughout the trial, Croatisation fits well

25     into this, into what we've been doing here today and showing.

Page 47230

 1             At this point in time I think it -- we would welcome the members

 2     of the Trial Bench who believe that this evidence is tu quoque or

 3     irrelevant to clearly and concretely spell out for us in writing so we

 4     have a record, and then we can make a decision whether we should file

 5     appropriate motions that may require, you know, action to be taken, or to

 6     readjust our defences, or to seek to open our defences, because it would

 7     appear to us at this early stage that when the trial -- members of the

 8     Trial Chamber are making and deciding on -- on relevant issues, and also

 9     precluding the Defence from introducing documents in order that they can

10     then argue in front of you and also to have a record for the Appeals

11     Chamber, it certainly puts us in a position where we're not going to have

12     a full and complete record.

13             I would like to have very much that those members of the

14     Trial Chamber put down concretely what do they mean by tu quoque, what

15     exactly that is going on here today is so outrageously irrelevant that we

16     cannot sit here and listen to it.  How is it that we can possibly argue

17     that this wasn't Croatisation, that there was no reverse ethnic cleansing

18     if we cannot demonstrate through concrete evidence that the people that

19     were there were encircled at one point, and prior to the encirclement,

20     were in utter and total fear of some foreigners who came in trying to

21     wage a holy jihad.  It seems to me it's all relevant, and we should at

22     the very least be able to put it forward.

23             Now, you can reject it at the end, but it seems that decisions

24     have already been made, and I don't see how we can possibly have a fair

25     process if prior to having all the evidence, you're screening it in such

Page 47231

 1     a way because decisions have been made.

 2             Now -- so if there is tu quoque, let's see it.  I would like to

 3     know, at least that part of the judgement, what is it going to look like,

 4     because that's what it seems to me, that this portion of our defence is

 5     uttering being rejected.  And we have two members of the Bench, so that

 6     means that two over one will control that part.  And I don't say this in

 7     any way to disrespect anyone, but simply because I'm concerned and I

 8     would like a clear record.

 9             Now, if I'm -- if I'm wrong, please correct me, but that's the

10     way it appears when you're sitting here, from the Defence, and you're

11     being told constantly, This information we will not consider because the

12     events that happened later on, even though it is in the same area, one

13     has nothing to do with the other.  And we think it's all interconnected,

14     because it does go to the mens rea of the people there at the time and ti

15     the circumstances which were ongoing.  And we're only talking about a

16     relatively short period of time.  It's not years later.  These are

17     months, weeks later, so it's all connected.

18             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Yes.  I thank Maitre Karnavas for his statement,

19     and I would like to say a few words about it.  Let me start saying that I

20     cannot agree with him when he in his introductory part of his statement

21     he said that seemed that the Bench have made up -- or some Judges of the

22     Bench made up their mind on certain issues.

23             First of all, I believe that -- that Maitre Karnavas could not

24     prove his allegation that any of us had made up his mind on any important

25     issues or not, and when he alleges this, I can only say that he's not

Page 47232

 1     right and I cannot agree with him.  It is number one.

 2             Number two, he also alleged that, and I quote him, "decisions are

 3     already made," in his view which threatens a kind of, as he continued,

 4     the fair process.  Again I do not agree with him on that matter, and I do

 5     not see his arguments, his reasoning why he alleged that one, that, in a

 6     way, position, according to which the Bench or the Judges have already

 7     made certain decisions.  I cannot agree with this, and I believe that my

 8     fellow Judges would, of course, make up their own mind, but as far as I

 9     know, nobody among us have made any kind of "final decisions."

10             What this Chamber and what the -- what the position which was

11     already expressed by the Chamber and by the Appeals Chamber as well was

12     that on the issue of the tu quoque, and I underline and I stress, as I

13     did in the past as well, that according to the customary international

14     humanitarian law, the tu quoque has not been and is not being accepted

15     neither by the jurisprudence of this Tribunal and not -- and also nor

16     by -- by the -- in a way by the jurisdiction of other tribunals, as well

17     as by the scientific and juridical writings on that matter.

18             I would like to draw your attention, Mr. Karnavas, and to other

19     colleagues who are interested in it, that a few years ago, three or four

20     years ago, a -- two, three volumes were published by the International

21     Committee of Red Cross about the customary rules of international

22     humanitarian law.  I do not have it now.  I have it in my room.  I didn't

23     bring it, but I can only stress that in that -- in that book, which was a

24     product of a great number of -- of jurists, including judges, et cetera,

25     it has been very definitely established that tu quoque cannot be accepted

Page 47233

 1     as relevant feature in international humanitarian law.  And we have,

 2     among other matters -- as a matter of fact, they referred to the

 3     jurisprudence of the ICTY as well.  So that is why I would only say that

 4     while I appreciate Mr. Karnavas's problems and his goodwill to talk about

 5     those issues, I do not accept his major tenor of his saying, number one,

 6     that we have, or at least some of the Judges of the Bench have made up

 7     our mind.  I cannot agree with this, and I reject this.

 8             Number two, I would like to refer him and to those who -- among

 9     also in the Defence teams or anywhere else to -- to have a look at the

10     relevant sources of international jurisprudence and, of course, those of

11     the writings on international humanitarian law.

12             Thank you.

13             MR. KARNAVAS:  Just to make sure that we're clear, in my opinion,

14     no one here on the Defence has ever argued tu quoque.  Number two, I'm

15     well familiar with its two volumes.  I've read both volumes, and I agree

16     totally with you that tu quoque is not a defence.  I think we're in

17     agreement on that.

18             Where I'm concerned is that it would appear that you're saying

19     this evidence goes to tu quoque, and we don't see how that is.  How is it

20     that when we're -- we're trying to put things into context.  We're not

21     saying one side is entitled to commit crimes with the other one because

22     the other side committed crimes.  What we are saying are the events are

23     interconnected and where there's action there tends to be reaction, and

24     that there was -- there are certain events that are connected and certain

25     actions that are taken by one side, if put into context, are not

Page 47234

 1     necessarily done because they want to Croatise or want to commit ethnic

 2     cleansing.  And what I would like from the Bench is some clear guidance.

 3     What parts of our defence thus far have been tu quoque?  Because I

 4     understand what the concept is.  Now it's a matter of can we agree on how

 5     it is that you believe that we're arguing tu quoque through this.  We're

 6     not.  But I certainly agree with you 1.000 per cent that tu quoque based

 7     on customary international law is an unacceptable defence.

 8             MR. STEWART:  Your Honour, may we just add from the Petkovic

 9     Defence point of view.  Its -- Mr. Karnavas and the Trial Chamber know by

10     now that it's pretty rare that we associate ourselves with everything

11     single thing that Mr. Karnavas says and every single way in which he says

12     it.  That's not normally what we do, but very, very often we do say, as

13     we do now, that on the essential point Mr. Karnavas is absolutely right

14     and we do endorse and support him.  We also wish to make it clear that we

15     have never contended that tu quoque is any sort of defence.  What

16     happens -- what seems to be happening here is some source of confusion.

17             When evidence is put forward which would support tu quoque if

18     anybody were arguing it, what tends to get overlooked is that very same

19     evidence is legitimately relevant to exactly the sort of contextual

20     questions and issues which we are seeking to put forward.  And in an

21     absolute nutshell, what we would invite Your Honours to do is to take the

22     view that unless you can, and I put it this way, unless you can say

23     beyond reasonable doubt that some material is irrelevant and we simply

24     cannot and will not be able to make anything of it in the course of this

25     trial and in our final briefs, then, with respect, it ought to be allowed

Page 47235

 1     in, because it simply, then, can't be dismissed as clearly irrelevant.

 2             Your Honours obviously have the responsibility of rejecting

 3     evidence which simply cannot be relevant, and every trial has some of

 4     that, but it's not what we're talking about here.  There is a solid,

 5     legitimate argument, not tu quoque which we consistently and we accept

 6     persistently because that's our job putting forward, and please if there

 7     is any prospect that we may be able to make something of this evidence,

 8     which there usually is, it ought to be admitted.

 9             MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  With the Court's

10     permission, I would like to make a brief submission on behalf of the

11     Prosecution in response to what's been said, although it will be short

12     because we -- we're very keen to begin the cross-examination of this

13     witness.

14             Mr. President, it appears that really the crux of the issue is

15     the manner in which the Trial Chamber is applying the law of tu quoque to

16     the evidence that's being tendered by the Defence.  I think everyone can

17     go to the books and read about what tu quoque means.  The issue here is

18     how the issue tu quoque is applied by the Trial Chamber in making

19     evidentiary rulings on testimony and also exhibits that are tendered into

20     evidence.  And as I understand it, the Defence is asking for some sort of

21     guidance or advice from the Trial Chamber as to how it might react to the

22     Trial Chamber's views or application of tu quoque to the Defence exhibits

23     and evidence that its tendering.

24             The Prosecution submits that's improper, and it would be nice for

25     all the parties to have some advice from the Trial Chamber along the way

Page 47236

 1     as to how it can do things differently in order to strengthen its case or

 2     to respond or to satisfy the Trial Chamber.  You know, the Prosecution

 3     can't come to the Trial Chamber and ask you to identify for us those

 4     parts of the case that we might be a little bit weak on so that we can

 5     work to support those.  That's not how it works.

 6             Tu quoque is just like any other issue that the parties deal

 7     with.  The Trial Chamber applies the law.  It applies the rules of

 8     evidence in determining what documents and what evidence to admit.  The

 9     Trial Chamber's already made a number of rulings admitting or excluding

10     documents that it perceives to be not closely enough linked to the

11     indictment.  We know from a series of rulings that came out during the

12     Stojic Defence document submissions, and admittedly this is by majority,

13     but the Trial Chamber has issued decisions in which it has informed the

14     parties of the circumstances in which it will admit documents like these

15     from other municipalities they're not -- that are not found in the

16     indictment.  I don't have those decisions and the dates of them in front

17     of me.  I think everyone knows what I'm talking about.

18             So we have rules of evidence.  Trial Chambers apply rules of

19     evidence all the time in admitting or excluding evidence.  There's

20     nothing particularly unusual about that.  We also have specific decisions

21     from this Trial Chamber in which it's described the conditions that it

22     will admit or exclude documents coming out of different municipalities,

23     and everybody knows what those conditions are.  So we think it's

24     improper.

25             Again, I can empathise with the Defence that it would be nice to

Page 47237

 1     have some guidance, but the Prosecution's submission is that it's

 2     improper, it's unfair and it's not the role of the Trial Chamber to be

 3     guiding parties as to how its -- its view of things might enable one of

 4     the parties to modify its case and its submissions.  The decisions are

 5     there.  The Trial Chamber has said what are the rules on admission of

 6     these sorts of materials, and so, in our view, the Defence has what they

 7     need.  They just need to modify their approach and to apply and to follow

 8     the guidance that the Trial Chamber has issued on this already.

 9             Thank you.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, all the submissions by

11     the parties are on the record now and the Judges will see.

12             Witness, I'm not going to rely on the tu quoque, but I had a

13     follow-up question for you following the video we saw.  We saw this

14     footage.  It may be that the Praljak Defence may seek to admit it again,

15     but that's not the problem.

16             In this footage I saw ABiH soldiers dressed in black.  I remember

17     at the beginning of the trial proceedings we also saw video footage, I

18     think it was admitted into evidence, in which ABiH soldiers were dressed

19     in white.

20             Now, if you compare the two videos, you hear the same shouts by

21     these soldiers in Zenica dressed in white and in Jablanica in black.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  The same mottos, interpreter's correction.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'd like to know this.  Now,

24     the Croats in Jablanica saw this.  Well, we don't have any date for the

25     video footage so we don't know exactly when it was taken, but it was

Page 47238

 1     obviously filmed after the ABiH took Jablanica.  I guess so, but I'm not

 2     sure about it.  And I put myself in a Croat's shoes, who is there in a

 3     square and sees all this.

 4             In your view, was he afraid?  Was there reason for him to be

 5     afraid.  Could he be prompted to leave the place because of that?  What

 6     impact, if any, does this shouting in Arabic have on the local

 7     population?  The local population spoke B/C/S, not Arabic.  So in a

 8     nutshell, as you see it, the fact that the ABiH displayed their own

 9     soldiers in this type of clothing, could it have a psychological impact

10     on the Croats, which in turn may prompt them to leave municipalities

11     controlled by the ABiH there by increasing the flux of Croat refugees

12     that are going to move towards municipalities, which in turn may create

13     other problems?  So what can you say to this?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, clearly the marching

15     of these units and this show of force was part of a campaign of

16     intimidating the local Croat population, and these people were actually

17     trained to do so.  Some were even wearing green scarves with some Arab

18     inscriptions on them.  And in the early days of the confrontation, the

19     soldiers we spoke about were the ones who for the most part intimidated

20     the -- massacred the Croatian population.

21             I can give you an account of such an instance.  In the village of

22     Pokojiste, one Petar Josic was skinned alive to intimidate the others and

23     have them escape, have them flee.

24             In a village near Konjic, when soldiers were captured in the

25     course of the retreat from Galjevo, soldier Gajevic [phoen] was killed.

Page 47239

 1     I believe his first name was Dragan.  And on his back we saw a -- the

 2     crescent and star carved in his back when we conducted an exchange.  And

 3     there was similar frightening scenes, so it was logical for the local

 4     population to flee.

 5             MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  One sentence did

 6     not enter the transcript.  On page 86, line 13, the witness said:  "When

 7     his body was exchanged, then we saw that crescent carved in his back."

 8             I believe the witness can confirm that he actually he said that

 9     but it doesn't record it in the transcript.

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Well, I think it is recorded, actually.

11     Nevertheless, we have it twice perhaps now.

12             Witness, you have not -- or there is something that should be

13     filled in.  You have now given examples of atrocities, but the question

14     actually related or the issue was marches, marches in towns and villages.

15             What we have seen on the video appears to have been an occasion

16     of a ceremony, and my question to you is are you aware of situations

17     where these -- these Muslim soldiers that we have seen marched through

18     towns and villages not committing atrocities but marking presence in

19     order to intimidate the population?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there were such instances,

21     because they marched, and while marching they shouted "Allahu Akbar."

22             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Can you say how many such instances you know of

23     and where they were held and at what times?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were many.  I can't give you

25     an exact figure.  In the period we spoke about earlier, especially before

Page 47240

 1     the confrontation began and especially in the early days of the

 2     confrontation, on the 23rd of March when the conflict began, and it

 3     became most prominent when the second conflict began when they

 4     demonstrated as much.

 5             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let us begin with the

 7     cross-examination.  Mr. Bos, you may proceed, and we can continue

 8     tomorrow then.

 9             MR. BOS:  Thank you, Your Honours, and good afternoon everyone in

10     the courtroom.

11                           Cross-examination by Mr. Bos:

12        Q.   Good afternoon, Witness.  We will have 15 minutes left -- left

13     for this afternoon, so I think I will ask you a few questions and then

14     we'll break and then we'll continue tomorrow morning.

15             I will go through the evidence in the same way that Ms. Alaburic

16     has done, which means that I will go through it in a chronological order.

17     So we'll start in 1992, and then we'll move forward to 1993.

18             Now, let me ask you first, in April 1992 till June 1992, is it

19     correct that the Croats and the Muslims in Konjic were jointly fighting

20     in the Territorial Defence against the Serbs?

21        A.   Yes, that is correct.

22        Q.   And is it correct that as of June 1992, the HVO was established

23     in Konjic and that from that period on, the HVO together with the TO,

24     which later became the ABiH, were jointly fighting the Serbs in Konjic as

25     of June 1992?

Page 47241

 1        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 2        Q.   And would you agree with me that in the early period, June 1992,

 3     and maybe you can indicate when it -- it started to deteriorate the

 4     relationship, but in the early period the co-operation between the ABiH

 5     and the HVO was good?  Would you agree with me on this -- on that?

 6        A.   At first everything functioned well.  However, in June there was

 7     some discords with regard to the vision between the HVO and the TO.

 8     Something happened in the meantime.  And I said it yesterday.  I spoke

 9     about that yesterday.  The discord was about the conduct of combat

10     operations, and that was one of the reasons why the road was being opened

11     to Sarajevo, rather why the road was not opened in the other direction,

12     which was the main goal.

13             I also said that during that period, the Ljuta barracks were

14     taken and the distribution of the weapons from the barracks lead to a

15     degree of mistrust which ultimately led to the division.

16             And something else that I forgot to mention is the fact that as

17     the road opened towards Sarajevo, people came who were a bit more

18     extremist, a bit more radical, and they had different tasks in Konjic.

19             Having said all that, I would like to also say that the combat

20     readiness against the Serbs was not jeopardised by all of these events,

21     and the line of defence were manned together facing the Serbs.

22        Q.   Yes.  On what you just said at the end, so that the line of

23     defence was -- was still manned.  Until what date in 1993 did the

24     co-operation between the Muslims and the Croats existed against --

25     against the Serbs?  When did the co-operation stop and the joint defence?

Page 47242

 1        A.   The co-operation between the Croats and the Serbs with regard to

 2     the manning of the line facing the Serbs lasted until the 14th of April,

 3     1993.  A document that we saw can confirm that.  I don't know the title

 4     of the document.  However, it indicates that the Spiljani position was

 5     where 15 members of the Croatian Defence Council were captured at the

 6     separation line facing the Serbs, and that the BiH Army took over the

 7     entire defence line.  Also the same document says that in the Bijela

 8     region, 15 other members of the HVO were captured and they were among

 9     those who had held the lines facing the Serbs.  The same report says that

10     they took over the entire defence line facing the Serbs.

11             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  May I just make an observation to the

12     transcript.

13             Witness, on line 13 you are recorded as saying the co-operation

14     between the Croats and the Serbs with regard -- there's -- of the manning

15     of the line lasted until the 14th April.  Did you really say or want to

16     speak about co-operation between the Croats and the Serbs?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  I have misspoken.  I meant the

18     co-operation between the Croats and the Muslims when it came to manning

19     the lines facing the Serbs.

20             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  Thank you.  I'm not too surprised to

21     hear this.

22             Please, Mr. Bos.

23             MR. BOS:

24        Q.   So can we conclude from your answer that as of 14 April 1993, the

25     line against the Serbs was manned by the ABiH only as of 14 April 1993?

Page 47243

 1        A.   Yes.  As of the 14th of March.

 2        Q.   Now, when the HVO army was established in Konjic, what was the

 3     balance on the number of soldiers between the ABiH and the HVO?  You've

 4     said yesterday that -- that in Konjic you claim that there were three

 5     ABiH brigades and that they had about 10.000 soldiers, and that the HVO

 6     had about 1500 soldiers.  Would that also have been the ratio in the

 7     joint defence against the Serbs, that it would be a 6.5:1 ratio?

 8        A.   Yesterday I said that at the beginning of the war in

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the aggressions of the Yugoslav People's Army and

10     the HVO were… I would say that the numbers were roughly equal.  There

11     was the same number of Croats as Muslims, or maybe there were a little

12     bit more Muslims.  However, as the refugees and displaced persons started

13     arriving from the eastern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the numbers

14     grew in the BiH, whereas the numbers in the HVO remained the same.

15        Q.   Well, you're saying that the numbers --

16             THE ACCUSED PRLIC:  [Overlapping speakers] ... I think there is

17     again mistake in transcript.  This is page 90, line 20, 21.  I didn't

18     hear that witness say the aggression Yugoslav People's Army and HVO.

19     They didn't say that.  They said just aggression of JNA.

20             MR. BOS:

21        Q.   Witness, I find it a bit hard to believe when you say that --

22     that the number of Croat soldiers and Muslim soldiers were about equal in

23     the defence against the Serbs in 1992.  If you look at the census in

24     Konjic, there's 54 per cent of Muslims in Konjic and about 26 per cent

25     Croats.  So already there's a ratio of 2:1.  Are you now saying that when

Page 47244

 1     it came to the defence on the number of soldiers there was an equal

 2     number of soldiers -- HVO soldiers and ABiH soldiers?  Is that what

 3     you're saying?

 4        A.   I can enumerate all the positions from north to south, and I can

 5     tell you how the Croatian Defence Council troops were deployed, including

 6     both Croats and Muslims.

 7             For example, in Glavetica [phoen], which is the northernmost part

 8     of the municipality that's where --

 9        Q.   Witness -- Witness, I'm going to interrupt you.  That's not my

10     question.  I'm asking you, is it your position that there were an equal

11     number of HVO soldiers versus the ABiH soldiers in the defence against

12     the Serbs?  That my question, and you can simply say, yes, no, or -- but

13     don't elaborate on the positions, please.

14        A.   I said that there was no big difference as was construed later.

15     There were maybe a few more Muslims than Croats.  There were maybe

16     2500 [as interpreted] Muslims and about 1500 [as interpreted] Croats.

17             MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  Another mistake in

18     the transcript.  The witness said on page 91, line 25, that there were

19     2.000 Muslims and that there were about 1200 to 1500 Croats.

20             MR. BOS:

21        Q.   Well, let's clear this up because I'm not really sure.  Can you

22     again repeat the numbers of the number of HVO soldiers you think were in

23     Konjic and the number of ABiH soldiers in the defence against the Serbs.

24        A.   I said that against the Serbs there was almost an equal number of

25     us Croats and Muslims facing the Serbs, and whereas refugees and

Page 47245

 1     displaced persons started arriving from Eastern Bosnia that balance was

 2     tipped in favour of the Muslim people.  The Muslim people had

 3     mobilisation, and the Croats did not have that.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's going to be a quarter to

 5     2.00.

 6             MR. BOS:  If I can just finish this particular topic.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But be quick, because I don't

 8     want the Gotovina Chamber to be late because of us.  I want to finish

 9     right on the dot at quarter to 2.00.

10             MR. BOS:  I will do so, Your Honour.

11        Q.   Is it correct that you said that there were about 1200 HVO

12     soldiers and about 2.000 Muslim soldiers?  Just --

13        A.   Twelve hundred to 1500.  That's what I said, and I don't know the

14     exact number.

15        Q.   And just to fine -- my final question for today:  What was it

16     what the ABiH and the HVO were jointly defending Konjic from in the war

17     against the Serbs?

18        A.   What from?  From the aggression of the Yugoslav People's Army and

19     the Serbian people.

20        Q.   And would you agree with me that they were jointly trying to

21     defend the international recognised BiH territory from a Serb takeover

22     with the possible result that Konjic would become part of a greater -- a

23     Greater Serbia?

24        A.   Yes.  They tried to defend themselves together against that

25     aggression.

Page 47246

 1             MR. BOS:  Your Honours, that's -- I can conclude.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Bos.

 3     Everybody's going to be happy.  The hearing will reconvene at 9.00.

 4     Please be here.  Until then, please remember -- [B/C/S on English

 5     channel].

 6                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 25th day of

 8                           November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.