Page 47752

 1                           Monday, 7 December 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The accused Praljak not present]

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6                           --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, kindly call the

 8     case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon,

10     everyone in and around the courtroom.

11             This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et

12     al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar.

14             Today is Monday.  Let me first greet the witness, Mr. Filipovic.

15     Good afternoon to the accused who are present.  Good afternoon to the

16     Defence counsel, to Mr. Scott and his team, and all the people assisting

17     us.

18             We are going to continue with the cross-examination.  Mr. Scott,

19     I believe you have one hour and thirty minutes left.  You may proceed.

20                           WITNESS:  FILIP FILIPOVIC [Resumed]

21                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

22             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23             Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon, Counsel, all those

24     in and around the courtroom.

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Scott:  [Continued]

Page 47753

 1        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Filipovic.

 2             Sir, I'd like to finish with the topic that we were about to

 3     close on Thursday afternoon.  There was a pending question and then a

 4     substantial amount of discussion among the lawyers in the court.  But the

 5     pending question to you at that time in connection with Exhibit P11131,

 6     and I don't think it's necessary to turn there, it is the BBC article of

 7     a Croatian new agency report.  It's the one that we talked about on

 8     Friday -- excuse me, Thursday, where the last statement that was

 9     attributed to you and that was pending at the time was a statement that

10     you had made to this effect:

11             "To me, this is the third aggression [following Serbian and

12     Muslim] against Croats in Central Bosnia.  This one is being conducted by

13     the international community."

14             The question that I put to you and was pending at the time that

15     we finished on Thursday was:

16             "That was your view at the time, that was your view, sir, when

17     you came to testify in the Kordic case, and that's your view today, isn't

18     it?"

19        A.   Your Honours, I have given a great many interviews.  I don't know

20     whether it was properly conveyed.  I'm not quite sure I said "the third

21     aggression against the Croats."  But knowing Ivica Santic, that is to

22     say, the accused, and knowing Pero Skopljak, another accused, as far as I

23     was concerned at that time, and ultimately Aleksovski, too, Blaskic,

24     Kordic, and I don't know who else -- anyway, it was a bit strange that

25     the first indictments to be raised for the territory of

Page 47754

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina [realtime transcript read in error "Republic of

 2     Herceg-Bosna"] were raised for a defence which was the purest defence

 3     that you could imagine; that is to say, for people to defend themselves

 4     from an aggression and so on.  So as I say, I'm not sure I used that

 5     word, and to the present day I would not refrain from terms and

 6     expressions when it comes to a group of accused.

 7             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have an

 8     intervention to the transcript.

 9             In line 25 on the second page, it was recorded that the witness

10     said that this was the first indictment to be raised for the Republic of

11     Herceg-Bosna, but he said "Bosnia and Herzegovina."  And I wanted to put

12     that right, "Bosnia and Herzegovina."

13             MR. SCOTT:

14        Q.   Well, sir, you say that this involved what you called here "the

15     purest defence," but of course the Chamber will have in mind the

16     conclusions of this Tribunal in the Kordic case, the Blaskic case, the

17     Aleksovski case, and the Cerkez case, which may not have painted the same

18     picture that you've attempted to paint.  You understand that, don't you?

19        A.   Your Honours, I am talking about what I experienced, what I lived

20     through for three and a half years.  I'm talking about a period of eight

21     months in a closed area, where not even a bird could fly in, an area that

22     we defended, and we defended exclusively the Croats.  It was an area

23     which could be targeted by the Muslims.  They could target each other,

24     shoot at each other, so that the defence was crystal clear, as pure as

25     the driven snow.

Page 47755

 1        Q.   Now, let's move forward to the role of the HVO in the structure

 2     of what was happening during the events -- during this time, excuse me.

 3     A number of questions were put to you in that regard by Ms. Alaburic.

 4     Let's start with just some very basic facts.

 5             The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised as a

 6     sovereign, independent state by the European Community on 6th April,

 7     1992, and by the United States the following day on 7 April 1992;

 8     correct?

 9             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please.  Just one

10     moment, please.

11             Your Honours, again we have a problem with the record on page 22,

12     23, where it says -- what it says there is quite unclear.  The witness

13     uttered a sentence which it is difficult to translate.  I understood what

14     it was about.  Perhaps the best thing would be to have the witness

15     repeat.

16             The witness said that the Muslim forces or Muslim soldiers

17     could -- and he used the word "prostrijeliti," and in that way "kill

18     each," so perhaps the witness could explain what he means by the word

19     "prostrijeliti," because this as it stands is not clear.  I think that

20     would be a good idea, if the witness were to explain exactly what he

21     meant.  Otherwise, we're not going to understand the translation as it

22     stands.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can repeat.  An enclave, the

24     Lasva Valley that was defending itself, was so small, so narrow, that the

25     Muslims on the one side could shoot at the Muslims on the other side, so

Page 47756

 1     in that sense it was an entrance/exit sort of wound or passage.

 2             MR. SCOTT:

 3        Q.   The question I had put to you, and which I'll now have to take

 4     the time to put again:  You would agree, sir, the Republic of Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina was recognised as a sovereign, independent state by the

 6     European Community on 6th April, 1992, and by the United States the

 7     following day on the 7th April of 1992; you have no reason to disagree

 8     with that, do you?

 9        A.   I was proud that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised as a

10     state and that I am today a general of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11        Q.   And, further, the new independent, sovereign state had an

12     internationally-recognised legal government in the BiH Presidency and the

13     BiH Government, and had sovereign, internationally-recognised territory

14     extending to all its international borders, didn't it?

15        A.   Correct.

16        Q.   And as a professional soldier, it would hardly be surprising to

17     you, would it, sir, that the new government of this new sovereign state

18     took immediate steps to establish its armed forces?

19        A.   When the international community recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina,

20     the territory and the government, that was one thing, and the people that

21     lived there was the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims.  But as far as

22     the question goes, it's correct.

23        Q.   And you're aware, aren't you, at least generally, that on the 8th

24     of April, 1992, the BiH Presidency abolished the old Territorial Defence

25     under the former JNA system and put a new Territorial Defence in place,

Page 47757

 1     which then some weeks later became the ABiH or Army of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

 3        A.   I don't know the exact dates, but I did know the commander.

 4     Efendic was his name.  I knew him personally, and he was --

 5        Q.   That really wasn't my question, sir, and I'll ask you to please

 6     co-operate with me so that we can use our time today as efficiently as

 7     possible.

 8             You knew, sir, that immediately, essentially, on becoming a new

 9     state, the government of that new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina took steps

10     to establish its armed forces, which were originally known as the

11     Territorial Defence, a new Territorial Defence; correct?

12        A.   No, I didn't know about that, and I couldn't know about that.

13     What I did know was that measures were being taken to defend the country

14     because a pressure was exerted against it in the form of an aggression.

15        Q.   Could you turn, please, to Exhibit 155, P00155.  We're going to

16     look at two exhibits fairly quickly, and then I'm going to put some

17     questions to you.  P00155, 155.

18             Can we have the assistance of the usher, please.  155.

19             If you'll look at that just to acquaint yourself with it.  And

20     the Chamber has seen this and the next two documents a number of times.

21     I'm not going to spend a great deal of time on them.  This is an order

22     issued by Mate Boban on the 10th of April, 1992, among other things

23     declaring that the HVO military was the only legal armed force on the

24     territory of Herceg-Bosna.

25             If you will look next, please, at P00195.  It should be very

Page 47758

 1     close following the one you were just looking at, P00195.

 2             This was a very similar order, I put to you, for those who may

 3     have time, if they haven't already done so, to compare the text from

 4     Colonel General Ante Roso on the 8th of May, 1992, again saying at

 5     number 1:

 6             "The only legal military units in the territory of the HZ-HB are

 7     units of the HVO."

 8             Then I'll next ask you to turn, please, to P00200, which I again

 9     think will be very close, P00200.

10             And likewise, sir, I would explain this document to you as an

11     order by General Blaskic, or Colonel Blaskic at the time, dated the 11th

12     of May, 1992, referring by number to Mr. Roso's order and essentially

13     ordering on down the line, so to speak, again number 1:

14             "The only legal military units in the area of Kiseljak

15     municipality are HVO units," et cetera.

16             Now, starting with Mr. Boban's order of the 10th of April, 1992,

17     can you explain to the Chamber any legal basis that Mr. Boban had to

18     issue such an order?

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, objection to this

20     question.

21             This is a legal issue, and I don't think that it's a proper

22     question for an officer to be asked.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Blaskic at this time

24     was under my command.  That is to say, I was in the Lasva Valley and he

25     was in Kiseljak, and he issued this order, and I assume that it reached

Page 47759

 1     him, although I don't know how.  But I didn't receive an order of this

 2     kind, nor did I hand it down to my subordinates, although at the time I

 3     was the commander of the Regional Staff of Central Bosnia.

 4             MR. SCOTT:

 5        Q.   It doesn't really answer my question, sir.  You're a senior

 6     commander.  In fact, you just told us at the moment you were the senior

 7     commander.  You surely must have had some idea on the basis on which you

 8     were exercising command.  On what basis was the HVO military command,

 9     under the leadership of Mate Boban, asserting at this time that the HVO

10     was the only legal military force?

11        A.   In Central Bosnia, full command of the Regional Staff, it wasn't

12     Boban or Roso who appointed me.  It was the situation in which I imposed

13     myself as commander.  Why?  Well, from the Presidency of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina, papers would go around, but what I had, my

15     inalienable right, then and at all times, was to defend people, the

16     population at that point in time, and to organise them as best as

17     possible, and that's what I did.

18             MS. TOMANOVIC:  I'm really sorry.

19             [Interpretation] I'm going to have to ask the witness to slow

20     down, because half of what he said has not been interpreted.  So could he

21     repeat that answer to this question, to speak slower, because I'm sure

22     the interpreters will become very tired before the end of today's

23     session.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's probably my

25     temperament, and maybe it's the pressure on me all the time to ask me to

Page 47760

 1     confirm something.  He says I must confirm something all the time.  I'm

 2     being asked to confirm.

 3             So I had to know, I had to take steps, and throughout the time I

 4     did take steps.  I did what I had to do in order to defend the people,

 5     the population, the area in Central Bosnia.  The papers that arrived or

 6     that were sent off was something I wasn't interested in.  I was

 7     interested in reality, the situation on the ground.

 8             Let me repeat, I wasn't appointed by Boban, or Roso, or anybody,

 9     nor did I see any of these papers.  It was a meeting of the

10     municipalities of Central Bosnia at which there were 12 municipalities

11     represented, because after that time Asko [phoen] was the commander, but

12     it was decided that I should be the commander at that meeting.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Slow down please, Mr. Scott.

14             MR. SCOTT:  My apologies.

15        Q.   That may or may not have been true in the first couple of days,

16     but you know full well that within a matter of days you were part of a

17     structure called the HVO, you had certain positions -- you were given

18     certain positions, Blaskic was appointed to certain positions, and you

19     know full well that was done pursuant to a structure that was then

20     referred to as the HVO; correct?

21        A.   Yes, that was the structure of the HVO.  Blaskic arrived there 20

22     days after me.

23        Q.   Let's look at Mr. Roso's order, in particular, for a moment, item

24     number -- P00195, item number 2:

25             "All other military units in the above territory must join the

Page 47761

 1     single defence system."

 2             Now, why was that?  What would be the purpose of Mr. Roso saying

 3     all military units on the territory of the HZ-HB must join the single

 4     defence system?

 5        A.   Because there were operations towards the HVO, in the sense that

 6     it was illegal and didn't exist.  Now, I personally was contacted by the

 7     commander of the Territorial Defence Staff of Zenica, in which -- well,

 8     on day 10 he said I was illegal, so he was legal and I was illegal.  I

 9     was at the front, establishing the front-line, whereas he was sitting in

10     Zenica.  So this legal/illegal, lawful/unlawful, was a game that was

11     played all the time.

12        Q.   You didn't answer my question, sir.  Please, I would appreciate

13     your co-operation.  Please listen to my question.

14             Roso says:

15             "All other military units in the above territory must join the

16     single defence system."

17             Why?  Why must they all join the single defence system?

18        A.   They accepted me as commander in the Lasva Valley in the first

19     few months of the war, into a united system of defence, because it

20     couldn't have been otherwise.  So the Territorial Defence, that is to

21     say, people there in the field, and at the beginning, when the Mujahedin

22     arrived as well, they tolerated me and accepted me.  It was a united

23     system of defence.

24        Q.   Why did Roso say that all military units on the territory of

25     Herceg-Bosna had to recognise the HVO Main Staff as their "supreme

Page 47762

 1     command"?

 2        A.   You'd have to ask him that, because you're asking me this for the

 3     fourth time already, and I am telling you that there was a united defence

 4     system.  To establish a defence system, why united?  Because in the area

 5     there were units, weapons, people, and the structure of defence -- well,

 6     the armature was the HVO and the Croats.

 7        Q.   Sir, we established last week and you still agree, don't you,

 8     that the supreme commander of the HVO was the president of Herceg-Bosna,

 9     Mate Boban?

10        A.   Correct.

11        Q.   So why would you say, sir -- why did Mr. Roso say, your superior

12     at this time -- and you said very clearly a few moments ago you were

13     accused of being an illegal -- part of an illegal military force.  Why is

14     it that Roso would say that any military units on the territory of

15     Herceg-Bosna had to recognise essentially, in so many words, Mate Boban

16     as their supreme commander?

17        A.   First of all, I don't know what territory of Herceg-Bosna this

18     was.  It was never defined, although at least not to my knowledge.

19     Secondly, why Roso?  I didn't know Roso at all, so as I say, I didn't

20     know him.  And, thirdly, let me repeat, action gives rise to reaction,

21     and the action was that the -- only the Territorial Defence was the sole

22     force, and everything had to be subservient to that, and then this gave

23     rise to a reaction.

24        Q.   So let me put it to you this way, sir:  In Bosnia-Herzegovina at

25     that time, in April/May 1993, who was the supreme commander, Mate Boban

Page 47763

 1     or the BiH Presidency?

 2        A.   Well, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was the Presidency of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In the Lasva Valley, it was me, and nobody in

 4     between, in the sense of arriving, an order arriving, information

 5     arriving, weapons arriving, or anything linked to the defence.

 6        Q.   Roso's order number 3 says:

 7             "Every member of the above military units must wear HVO

 8     insignia ..."

 9             You were familiar with that, weren't you, as the practice, as the

10     required practice?

11        A.   It was only later that we managed to sew on the insignia and put

12     them on the members of the unit.

13        Q.   Sir, on the 8th of May, 1992, Ante Roso ordered every member of

14     the above military units -- all legal units, according to him, on the

15     territory of Herceg-Bosna were required to wear HVO insignia.  Now, did

16     you not testify in the Kordic case that the HVO insignia was "the

17     insignia of the Croatian people"?

18        A.   The insignia of the Croatian Defence Council and the Croatian

19     people.  And not only the people, but the HVO.

20        Q.   Can you tell the Judges, please, what steps, in April, May, June,

21     July 1992, the HVO armed forces took to place themselves under the

22     command of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its presidency?

23        A.   The forces of the Croatian Defence Council were a function of the

24     defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian people in

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 47764

 1        Q.   That's not my question.  You keep saying that, but tell me the

 2     specific steps that the HVO armed forces took in April, May, June, July

 3     1992 to put themselves under the command of the BiH Presidency of the

 4     sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Tell me specific steps that

 5     the HVO took to do that.

 6        A.   What we undertook to do was that in the units and the area, we

 7     took in all the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the people from

 8     Krajina, the refugees that were pouring in.  We've already heard about

 9     that.

10        Q.   What steps did you take, sir, to put yourself under the command

11     of the BiH Presidency, the HVO?  It has nothing to do with taking in the

12     population of the Krajina.  What steps did you take -- did the HVO take

13     to put themselves under the command and control of the BiH Presidency?

14     It's a very simple and clear question.

15        A.   It is very clear that I didn't take a single step to place myself

16     under the command of somebody who cannot command, that doesn't have the

17     infrastructure to do so, somebody that doesn't have a built-up system for

18     that, for everything to function properly.  I didn't take a single step

19     in that direction.

20        Q.   In fact, sir, you knew full well -- you and the other HVO senior

21     commanders around you knew full well that the HVO had no intention, at

22     the time or after that time, to become a genuine part of a single unified

23     system under the command of the Bosnian Presidency?  You had no such

24     intention ever, did you?

25        A.   Today, in 1999 [as interpreted], that's what you say.  We knew

Page 47765

 1     nothing else but to survive.  That's all we knew, how to survive.

 2        Q.   Sir, you're doing yourself a disservice.  You're an educated man,

 3     a professional officer.  You know what I'm asking you, and you're

 4     avoiding the question.  I've asked you very specifically.

 5             You said you were fighting for Bosnia-Herzegovina.  You said

 6     that -- a number of things that you've said, that, We were all part of

 7     the same thing.  And I'm putting to you, sir, you knew full well at the

 8     time you had no intentions of genuinely putting yourself under the

 9     command of the BiH Presidency.  Now, that's true, isn't it?

10        A.   Please, in the command, the regional Staff in Vitez, the

11     president, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Boras,

12     I think he was, at least -- Boras, yes, he arrived, and in talking to him

13     I didn't gain the impression that I was illegal in any way and that I

14     shouldn't be doing what I was doing.  Quite the contrary.

15        Q.   Sir, the demands of the BiH government at the time, the documents

16     that the Judges have seen before, are very similar, really, in fact, to

17     what Mr. Roso was saying.  Mr. Roso says, All military units operating on

18     this territory must joint a single defence system.  So said the

19     Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  If you're operating on our territory,

20     the territory recognised by the international community, you must joint

21     the single defence system.  Likewise, Mr. Roso says in his view of the

22     world, You must recognise the HVO Main Staff as your supreme command.

23     And what the Bosnian government was saying, No, you must recognise the

24     Bosnian government as your supreme command.

25             Now, I put it to you, sir, the logic is the same, but you can't

Page 47766

 1     have it both ways, you cannot serve two masters.  There's one supreme

 2     commander, and the HVO had no intention of submitting itself to the

 3     command of the BiH Government, did it?

 4        A.   Your Honours, this something that the Prosecutor is claiming, Why

 5     does this element, Herceg-Bosna or Bosna-Herzegovina -- why couldn't it

 6     be Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Everything that the Prosecutor is saying now

 7     is the kind of thinking that somebody else had outside the territory in

 8     which we were active.

 9        Q.   Sir, you know exactly what I'm asking you because you were

10     essentially asked the same question by Mr. Nice in the Kordic case.

11     Mr. Nice asked you this question:

12             "Picking up on what you said not so long ago, if you really

13     wanted to organise defence jointly, why not have one army, why have two?"

14             This the answer you gave, under oath, sitting in this same

15     building some years ago:

16             "We had three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Army of Republika

17     Srpska, which separated and took up arms to reach their objectives; then

18     we had the Muslim side, which wore the green fezzes, had their own flags,

19     had their own insignia; then we had the Croatian component or party and

20     represented the interest of that side.  And if you're talking about the

21     joint defence of Croats and Bosniaks, that is, Muslims, that was jointly

22     but not the same.  At that time, we could not have had the same army.

23     That was a purely theoretical concept."

24             You could not have had the same army, according to your sworn

25     testimony in the Kordic case, sir.  Now, do you stand by that today?

Page 47767

 1        A.   Today, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprises the elements

 2     that you have just enumerated.

 3        Q.   Sir, I'm talking about --

 4        A.   Back then --

 5        Q.   Sir, please, 1992 and 1993.  Your position was and what you told

 6     another set of three Judges some years ago, under oath, was that at that

 7     time there could not possibly be one army, that each side had its own

 8     army and they could not possibly be the same.

 9             MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] Just one thing.  If I could give

10     the Prosecutor a hand, to make sure you don't keep disagreeing with the

11     witness unnecessarily.

12             The witness started answering the question, but the interpreters

13     didn't have the time to interpret.  If you have the time to wait up, you

14     will see that he was, indeed, trying to answer the question.

15             MR. SCOTT:  Sorry, Counsel, but his question [sic] started with

16     "today," and I'm not talking about today.  Unfortunately, I wish I had

17     more time, but as you know, we don't.

18        Q.   Sir, you know full well what I'm talking about, and it would

19     behoove you not to play games on this.  You're an educated man.

20             You testified to the Kordic Judges that there could not be a

21     single combined army with the Muslims; perhaps something jointly, but

22     could not possibly have had the same army.  In your words, that was a

23     purely theoretical concept; correct?

24        A.   Your Honours, maybe I didn't go to the same school as the

25     Prosecutor, maybe we weren't schoolmates, maybe I don't have the same

Page 47768

 1     words that he has, but it is me testifying here and I'm telling you

 2     exactly how it was.  I'm not about to change my evidence.  I said the

 3     same thing nine or ten years ago at a different trial, and I'm still

 4     saying all the same things.

 5        Q.   We'll turn next to the next couple of documents that were put in

 6     front of you on this topic of the HVO and its status in relationship to

 7     the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I'm not going to pull these out

 8     because of time, but I'll refer to the 20 April 1993 cease-fire agreement

 9     which was shown to you, which is Exhibit P01988, and to the 25 April 1993

10     joint statement by Boban and Izetbegovic in Zagreb, which was P -- or is

11     P02078.

12             Now, sir, both of those documents were put to you as including or

13     containing statements about the HVO being a legitimate part of the armed

14     forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I want to come back to that in a moment.

15             But to tie a couple of things together, because our time is

16     limited:  You can confirm, can't you, that around the end of April you

17     joined this joint commission that you talked about, around the 28th of

18     April, 1993; is that right?

19        A.   Yes, that's right.

20        Q.   And you served on that commission until approximately the 10th of

21     June, 1993, when you returned to your duties with Colonel Blaskic in

22     Central Bosnia; correct?

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have an objection

24     based on the document that the Prosecutor is referring to.  The joint

25     command was formed, not the joint commission.

Page 47769

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the joint command,

 2     yes, but it also operated as a separation commission.  The first two or

 3     three days until the joint command was appointed --

 4             MR. SCOTT:

 5        Q.   My question is, sir -- my question to you, and I'm not going to

 6     play word games with you now.  My question is:  You were on that

 7     commission, that body, between the 28th of April, 1993, until the 10th of

 8     June, 1993; correct?

 9        A.   I was on that body from the 20 -- the 21st, or the 22nd of April.

10        Q.   And as I understand it, that joint commission did not meet again

11     after the 14th of April, 1993, because of the ongoing conflicts,

12     including what was happening at that time in Mostar; correct?

13        A.   That's true.

14        Q.   And, unfortunately --

15        A.   I don't know that it did meet, at least.

16        Q.   Unfortunately, sir, you would agree with me, wouldn't you, that

17     this commission had a very, very short life span, and unfortunately at

18     the end of the day there was no lasting peace or real improvements coming

19     out of that commission; correct?

20        A.   Yes, that's correct.  It went on for a very short time, had a

21     short life span.

22        Q.   And tying this back in to those two documents and the two

23     exhibits I referred to you, sir, the 20 April cease-fire and the 25 April

24     joint statement, isn't it simply the reality, sir, those were statements

25     made in the course of the negotiations that ultimately didn't go anywhere

Page 47770

 1     and really weren't worth the pieces of paper that they were printed on?

 2        A.   There was a lot of activity about the statements and about the

 3     operation of the joint command throughout that month.  Thousands of

 4     persons were freed from some sort of detention on both sides.

 5        Q.   But ultimately within a few short days, sir, both sides were back

 6     at killing each other, that the HVO was sending Muslims to the Heliodrom

 7     camp.  Basically, in a very short time, in the matter of a few days, the

 8     war continued on; correct?

 9        A.   I know about the prisons and the prisons in which Croats were

10     detained.  In Central Bosnia, Delic, Sefer and I --

11        Q.   Sir, the war continued on, didn't it?

12        A.   The war continued, yes, in the second half of May.

13        Q.   And it's a bit like -- let me put to you, perhaps, the summary of

14     another professional soldier, such as yourself, and see if you can agree

15     with his assessment.  There was a witness in this case who was an

16     international monitor named Bo Pellnas, and Bo Pellnas came to this

17     courtroom, and on the question of cease-fires and how many there were,

18     and there were so many, one cease-fires after another, and he said this

19     in his testimony:

20             "Well, after a while in these conditions, you know, you don't

21     take much notice of paperwork or oral statements.  You wait to see what

22     happens.  So you don't get, I would say, optimistic or pessimistic about

23     the announcements that a cease-fire has been signed.  You wait and see

24     what happens before you make any evaluation of it."

25             And you would agree with that statement by Mr. Pellnas, wouldn't

Page 47771

 1     you?

 2        A.   He is a true professional, and his statement shows it.

 3        Q.   And, in fact, in your testimony last week you really expressed

 4     the same sentiment.  You said last Monday, in reference to questions put

 5     to you by Judge Antonetti on the Constitutional Court, you said:

 6             "All those documents, agreements, did not mean a thing for me,

 7     when I spent hours every day being fired at."

 8             At the end of the day, sir, what was said on paper really didn't

 9     make much difference, did it?

10        A.   There were negotiations throughout and combat as well going on.

11        Q.   And at the end of the April, you agree, don't you, that when the

12     fighting broke out again and the joint commission went away, and the

13     cease-fire agreements went away, there was fault on both sides; Croats

14     were attacking, Muslims were attacking, there was fault on both sides,

15     and the process simply came to an end, didn't it?

16        A.   I would change this the other way around.  The Muslims were

17     attacking, the Croats were defending but also attacking.

18        Q.   Sir, you testified in the Kordic case.  You said:

19             "There was a big meeting in Travnik at the end of April.

20     Thebault was there, the European Union, others were there.  The attacks

21     did not stop, not only from the Muslim side.  I repeat that, in all those

22     incidents, because Croats were also participating in these incidents."

23             And in another statement a few pages later, you said you couldn't

24     lay the blame at the door of the Muslims, "but at Croats as well."  Isn't

25     that what you said in the Kordic case?

Page 47772

 1        A.   At the meeting in Travnik, when Thebault was there, as soon as we

 2     were out of that room Cuskic saved me when I was facing hundreds of

 3     Muslim barrels.  They wanted to kill me.  Cuskic stood right in front of

 4     them, unarmed.

 5        Q.   Sir, there was fault on both sides.  You so testified in the

 6     Kordic case on two separate occasions under oath.  Are you changing your

 7     answer now?

 8        A.   I'm not changing anything.  I'm telling you that both sides were

 9     provoking incidents.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not understand the last

11     part of the sentence.

12             MR. SCOTT:

13        Q.   The last document on the topic that I will ask you about, sir --

14             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm sorry, Mr. Scott.

15             The interpreter asks the witness to repeat the last sentence.  He

16     did not understand you, Mr. Filipovic.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Both sides were provoking incidents

18     and clashes throughout all of this until the Washington Accords were

19     adopted.

20             MR. SCOTT:

21        Q.   Finally, sir, on this topic you were shown a transcript of a

22     meeting of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 29th of June,

23     1993, and you, in the courtroom, may recall it, because right at the very

24     beginning of the document, without any reference or quotation or any

25     other information that contained the statement:

Page 47773

 1             "We recognised the HVO as a constituent part of the armed

 2     forces."

 3             The short answer on that document, sir, is you don't know

 4     anything about it, do you?

 5        A.   Your Honours, from the very first day the HVO was part of the

 6     armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The moment of the recognition

 7     may have a legal significance, but de facto and de jure, on the ground

 8     the same thing continued throughout.

 9        Q.   Well, sir, you said earlier you didn't know, because you said you

10     weren't bothered by such things.  My question to you is:  You don't know

11     anything about that document; you weren't in the meeting, you don't know

12     what was said, none of us in the courtroom, in fact, knows what was said,

13     we don't know who, if anyone, made that statement.  We don't know what

14     it's about, do we?

15             Let me make it very clear.  I'm talking about -- excuse me.

16             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Objection, objection, Your

17     Honours, objection.

18             Can Mr. Scott please give us the page number for the transcript

19     reference.  What exactly did the witness say a while ago, because it's

20     difficult to keep going like this.  It's difficult for us to monitor what

21     is going on.

22             We should also try to show how what the witness said in his

23     former testimony is being misrepresented.  What we have on page 5, line

24     5, where Mr. Scott said that the witness said something earlier, can he

25     please specify what, when, as well as the transcript page number.

Page 47774

 1             MR. SCOTT:

 2        Q.   Sir, you, in the courtroom, know full well that Ms. Alaburic put

 3     before you a document 1D02664, which was a transcript of the meeting of

 4     the Presidency, and everyone knows -- in the courtroom knows that I'm not

 5     making that up.  My point is a very simple one.  That document was put in

 6     front of you, but you don't know anything about either the document or

 7     its content, did you, because you were not at that meeting and you can't

 8     tell these Judges anything about what happened at that meeting, what was

 9     said, or the outcome of that meeting; correct?  It's a very simple

10     question.  You simply don't know?

11        A.   I don't know about the meeting or about the document.  I know

12     nothing about it.  The only thing I do know is what I read in the press,

13     in the printed media.  I was also shown the document while I was being

14     proofed.

15        Q.   Well, did you read in the printed media, sir, about the

16     Constitutional Court decision that said Herceg-Bosna was illegal?  Sir?

17        A.   That was after the war.  It was disclosed to me after the war.

18     But while all of this was going on, I knew neither of these two things.

19        Q.   You voiced an opinion in response to a question by counsel about

20     whether Mr. Delic should be attending a meeting of the Presidency if

21     Mr. Petkovic was not also attending.  Were you aware, sir, that the law

22     of Bosnia-Herzegovina during a time of war provided that the expanded

23     Presidency included the head of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24        A.   I didn't know that.  But Delic had nothing to do at a Presidency

25     meeting unless Petkovic was there too.

Page 47775

 1        Q.   According to you.  And can you tell us, by the way, how many

 2     meetings of the HVO Defence Department, headed by Mr. Stojic, or how many

 3     meetings of the HVO government, headed by Mr. Prlic, did any of the

 4     senior Muslim military officers attend?

 5        A.   I can't say anything about that.

 6        Q.   None that you know of; correct?

 7             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I really do have an

 8     objection.

 9             Of course not, he doesn't know anything about that.  Of course,

10     the Prosecutor should first lay the foundation, Did you ever attend an

11     HVO meeting?  Yes.  Very well.  Who was there?  Were there any Muslim

12     soldiers there?  No.  Okay.  If not, then he can't ask any further

13     questions.  But my learned friend just breezes right through it, the

14     witness says, No, and then he draws whatever conclusion he likes.  This

15     is entirely unfair.  In a Croatian courtroom, I would be severely

16     reprimanded for that sort of practice.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I haven't asked any

18     question for 45 minutes.  I let Mr. Scott freely conduct his

19     cross-examination.  But given the last questions he put to you, I would

20     like to ask you something.

21             I would like first the Registrar to have document 1D2664, the

22     document mentioned by Mr. Scott, could we have this on the screen,

23     please.

24             We have the text in English, and could we please have it also in

25     B/C/S.

Page 47776

 1             Very well, everyone has it on the screen.  We have both

 2     documents.  The text in B/C/S is a transcription from a tape-recording.

 3     Nobody has the tape-recording, unfortunately, but that's not where the

 4     problem lies.

 5             This is June 29, 1993, 1.30 p.m.  The session is chaired by

 6     Mr. Izetbegovic, himself.  Mr. Scott told you that you did not attend

 7     this meeting.  Of course you didn't attend the meeting.  Otherwise, your

 8     name would be listed here.  But we had a great number of witnesses who

 9     came to testify on the presidential transcripts, and they did not attend

10     these meetings either.

11             But this being said, Witness, let's take a look at the first

12     sentence:

13             "We recognise the HVO as a constituent part of the armed forces."

14             To me, I get the impression - maybe I'm wrong - but it seems that

15     Mr. Izetbegovic is chairing the meeting and is stating this, but his name

16     is not mentioned.  Normally, his name should have been placed right

17     before the sentence, but that's not the case here.  But, well, we might

18     assume that he is saying that.  And then Pejanovic takes the floor, and

19     we see what he says, and then the president speaks again.  The president

20     is, of course, Mr. Izetbegovic.  He resumes what Pejanovic said and says,

21     and I quote:

22             "It says here that there is only one commander in chief of the

23     armed forces."

24             So to me it seems that Mr. Izetbegovic recognised that the HVO

25     was an element of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that

Page 47777

 1     according to him, there are several commanders, because Pejanovic

 2     actually took the floor right before him.

 3             General, I'm sure you're well versed in all this.  You told us,

 4     you know, that you're a retired general of the Army of Bosnia and

 5     Herzegovina.  So when looking at this document, could you tell us whether

 6     Mr. Izetbegovic officially told all members of the meeting that according

 7     to him, the HVO was a constituent part of the armed forces of Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina?

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.

10             Excuse me, Your Honour.  I know it's -- I know it's not exactly

11     customary, but that's exactly the point of my question to this witness.

12     He can't possibly speculate to who said that.  It doesn't say on the

13     record.  The witness has said he wasn't there.  He can't possibly say,

14     nor can the courtroom possibly say, who said [indiscernible] or made this

15     statement.  It's pure speculation.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, it is speculation,

17     yes, but when you're telling the witness that he is speculating, I'm not

18     speculating, myself.  I have a document here on the screen.

19             MR. SCOTT:  It doesn't say who made that statement, sir.  It does

20     not say anything about who made that statement.  Anyone drawing that

21     conclusion is purely speculating, anyone.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

23             Witness, I said that regarding the first sentence, we don't know

24     who uttered these words.  It's true, and Mr. Scott has pressed that

25     point.  But when reading the document, it seems that there is a

Page 47778

 1     discussion on the topic, and Mr. Izetbegovic is actually taking part in

 2     that discussion.  So according to you, Witness, did Izetbegovic recognise

 3     the HVO as a constituent part of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina or

 4     did he not recognise that fact?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He recognises the HVO as a

 6     constituent part of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina; no doubt about that.  Nevertheless, he appointed Delic a

 8     member of the BH Presidency, which could only happen in a duality with

 9     Petkovic, and that is the whole point.  The entire transcript -- or,

10     rather, a portion of the transcript is exactly about that.  The HVO is on

11     an equal footing with the BH Army.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

13             Registrar, could we have page 2 of this document on the screen,

14     as well as the corresponding page in B/C/S.

15             Witness, take a look at Boras's intervention with the president,

16     Izetbegovic, taking the floor right after him.  This is what Izetbegovic

17     says, and I quote:

18             "We can put the question of the status of the armed forces on the

19     agenda in the future, how to resolve the issue.  We tried -- if you

20     remember, we wanted to resolve the matter with joint commands."

21             So military-wise, what did Izetbegovic mean, according to you?

22     He is actually taking the floor.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the time, he was trying to say

24     that the joint command did not succeed, although attempts were being

25     made.  At the time, had it not -- at the time, the joint command was not

Page 47779

 1     there, at least not the way he imagined it.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last question, and then I

 3     will hand the floor back to Mr. Scott.  He has 50 minutes left.

 4             Very early on in this hearing, at 2.20, I think, Mr. Scott

 5     started with the first document, the first document he showed you.  We

 6     don't have to look at it again, but it was a document signed by

 7     Mate Boban.  In this document, signed by Mate Boban, P155, on April 10,

 8     1992, April 10, Mr. Boban says that the TO, which is a service of the

 9     Serbo-Chetnik armada, does not exist for Croats in Herceg-Bosna, and he

10     requests for military units of the HVO to be created.

11             When you were in the field, and then after that all questions put

12     to you by Mr. Scott were quite relevant, and I would have put exactly the

13     same ones as he did, but there's one thing I would like to know.  I would

14     like to know whether on April 10, 1992, the Territorial Defence existed

15     in Herceg-Bosna, manned by Muslims, including Muslims, or was there none,

16     and because there was none, Mate Boban took advantage of that void to say

17     where there's nothing exists, the Croats will set up these units?

18     According to your recollection, can you tell us whether there were units

19     of the Territorial Defence with a Muslim component?

20             Let me give you an example.  Kiseljak, for example, we saw a

21     document shown to you by the Prosecutor where Blaskic is organising, so I

22     would like to know whether in Kiseljak there were Muslim units.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at the time that we

24     are talking about there was no Territorial Defence.  As such, it existed

25     back in Yugoslavia.  At the time, the Territorial Defence had no weapons,

Page 47780

 1     was not properly organised.  It had fallen apart.  The Serbs had left.

 2     There are only files in certain municipalities; in other words,

 3     Territorial Defence documents.  The Territorial Defence was now to be

 4     built back up, an army, forces to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The name,

 5     itself, the TO, was no more but a name.  In Kiseljak, there was the HVO

 6     and an incipient TO or, rather, the BH Army.

 7             When I arrived in Central Bosnia, I found a lot of armed

 8     individuals, 90 per cent of them Croats.  The Muslims had no weapons and

 9     were not organised, in the sense of being able to put up resistance.  It

10     wasn't before the second half of May or June that they were able to

11     perform any military activity.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

13             Mr. Scott asked you a question, and I would have asked the same

14     one.  He asked you what you did, yourself, to come into contact with the

15     armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the armed forces of

16     the Presidency.  And you answered by saying you did nothing.  But there

17     was one additional question that he forgot to put to you, and I will put

18     it to you.

19             What did the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina do in order to come

20     into contact with you?  Obviously, nothing was done between you and

21     Sarajevo, in that direction, but did something come from the other

22     direction?  Because at one point in time you said, I met Mr. Boras, the

23     same "Boras" that we see quoted in this document which is on the screen,

24     so could you tell us what Sarajevo actually did in your direction?  And

25     if it's Mr. Boras who actually contacted you, could you tell us what he

Page 47781

 1     told you.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Colonel Suvalic

 3     arrived in Vitez.  He was the head of the Territorial Defence of the

 4     Zenica District already in Yugoslavia, and he said, "We're creating an

 5     army, be the head of staff and we've resolved the whole issue."  So

 6     Colonel Suvalic has various files in the JNA garrison with the tanks and

 7     so on and so forth, he still had all that.  I had already resolved the

 8     question of the garrison in Travnik, in the sense of me being a hostage.

 9     But he went out, he was creating an army, he had some soldiers and some

10     units, and so I said, Well, establish an army and we'll go into battle

11     together.  He couldn't still go into battle because he didn't have the

12     wherewithal, so I said, Set up your units and we can go into battle.  And

13     it would have been easier for me, I said, to be Chief of Staff, but

14     that's not going to get us anywhere.  So that was the relationship we had

15     with the Territorial Defence, but not Sarajevo.  He didn't have any

16     connection with Sarajevo, either, when he was with me, at least not the

17     kind of connection and contacts for battle and so forth.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And Mr. Boras, what did he tell

19     you?  You told Mr. Scott that you saw Boras.  What did he tell you?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think Boras was there during

21     those days.  There were a lot of events going on, but the basic thing is

22     that Boras said that in Sarajevo, things were becoming a little more

23     organised, and that when I informed him about what I was doing, a defence

24     line had to be set up, first and foremost, so that the Army of Republika

25     Srpska could not take control of any area that was not defended, that was

Page 47782

 1     the basic thing, Jajce, Bugojno, Travnik and so on, and he said, Carry on

 2     what you're doing, you're doing good.  So there was nothing about

 3     subordination, re-subordination, or things of that kind.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You are telling us that

 5     Mr. Boras was a member of the Presidency and said, Go on, it's very good

 6     that way?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

 9             MR. SCOTT:

10        Q.   Sir, your own testimony has contradicted you, which is one of the

11     reasons I spent so much time on some of your testimony last week.

12             You said, under oath, just a matter of a couple of days ago, that

13     when you arrived in Central Bosnia things were disorganised, there were

14     few armed individuals, you had to establish the HVO, essentially, from

15     scratch.  You also said that within a very short time, the Territorial

16     Defence was, in fact, larger, more powerful, and had more professional

17     officers than the HVO, by May or June.  And you gave us the example, in

18     fact, by May, of 2.000 Muslim soldiers arriving in Central Bosnia and

19     becoming to you what you considered to be some sort of threat, in May

20     1992.

21             There was a TO, sir --

22             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I object.  This is a

23     completely erroneous presentation of General Filipovic's testimony about

24     the moment he arrived in Central Bosnia, which was the 10th of April,

25     that general period, until June.  This is a completely wrong

Page 47783

 1     interpretation of what he said.  Now, if Mr. Scott considers that he is

 2     conveying the witness's testimony properly, then let him tell us the

 3     pages of the transcript where he said that.

 4             MR. SCOTT:  I have absolutely no doubt that's exactly what the

 5     witness said.  And if he doesn't remember that, then I'll leave it to the

 6     Chamber to review the testimony.  It's exactly what he talked about, and

 7     he said --

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour --

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me.  I'm not going to have counsel dictate my

10     examination.

11             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I really do consider

12     that we should respect the Rules applied in this Tribunal during the

13     cross-examination, and could you please tell Mr. Scott that if he is

14     referring to the testimony of this witness, or is he referring to any

15     portion of the examination-in-chief or cross-examination by the Defence

16     counsel, that he could tell us what the pages of the transcript are,

17     because it is our right to check and see if the Prosecutor is correctly

18     interpreting the testimony of this witness or not.  And the fact that he

19     is completely convinced that his interpretation is the correct one, I

20     have no doubt that even if Mr. Scott is wrong on certain points, that he

21     is wrong in good faith, but it is my task to point this out.  And I'm

22     sure that Mr. Scott has noted down all the relevant pages of the

23     transcript, so can he just inform us what those pages are where the

24     witness said what he's saying he said?

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're both right.  Mr. Scott

Page 47784

 1     does not have the exact transcript pages, so he can't give you the right

 2     page number.  He is right in saying that the Judges are going to check.

 3     Of course they will.  And you're right, too, because it would be better

 4     to make sure there is no mistake, and if Mr. Scott refers to the

 5     witness's testimony, he has to be precise.  But we have the witness here,

 6     we're lucky in that, so he can either say that Mr. Scott is right or tell

 7     Mr. Scott that he's wrong.  The only one who is able to settle the matter

 8     without the transcript pages being shown is the witness.

 9             Did you follow what has just been said, because Mr. Scott says

10     one thing, Ms. Alaburic says that she wants to have the right page

11     number?  From memory, do you remember what you testified earlier, or, I

12     mean, if it goes back nine years, do you still remember what you said

13     then?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, not only nine years

15     ago, but three days ago.  The Prosecutor is saying that I am not telling

16     the truth, that I'm not answering his questions, that I'm not being

17     precise enough, and so on and so forth.  And as for the last question

18     that he put to me, it is one thing to talk about the 10th of April, and

19     it's another thing to talk about the 10th of April and my arrival in the

20     area, because I said exactly what I found.  I said I came across many

21     armed individuals, but that wasn't an army, it wasn't an organisation

22     being put in place.  And already at the end of May and the beginning of

23     June, and I said that as well, the Territorial Defence, with the arrival

24     of cadres from the JNA --

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Rest assured, I didn't fall;

Page 47785

 1     just my binder did.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I even named names, when it came to

 3     June 1992, from Lendo, Alagic, Cuskic, and all the others, not to have to

 4     enumerate them now.  The BH Army -- the Territorial Defence of BH Army

 5     was stronger in terms of numbers than the HVO; in professional cadres, in

 6     the number of troops, armed combatants, and so on, and it was increasing

 7     in strength.  And that's what I said.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Which is exactly what I represented, and accurately

10     so.

11             And for one example, now that we've had the time, I refer the

12     courtroom and Ms. Alaburic to page 47652 of last week's transcript, where

13     the witness testified in April, May, June 1992, and in a very short

14     time -- and by May or June of 1992, the Muslim armed forces were larger

15     and had a larger professional officer corps.  And I'm sure that can be

16     further checked.

17        Q.   Further, in reference to questions put by Mr. President --

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let me just say,

19     then, what the witness said applying to June 1993, he said was happening

20     in May -- I misspoke.  I meant to say "1992," and once again it's being

21     wrongly interpreted by the Prosecutor.

22             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, I'm not going to continue this process

23     of going back and forth and back and forth on what's being said or not

24     said and what I said.  The transcript is very clear.  I just gave one

25     example of the witness's prior testimony, when he was talking about

Page 47786

 1     April, May, June of 1992, and it's exactly as I represented it at the

 2     time.

 3        Q.   Another question put to you, sir, by President Antonetti, in

 4     terms of communications and the existence -- the existence of the TO, the

 5     new TO, and communications from it, would you please turn to 1D00970,

 6     1D00970.

 7             If I can have the usher's assistance, please, so we can move as

 8     quickly as possible.

 9             Perhaps we can have it on the -- we do have it on the screen.  If

10     we can just proceed that way, Your Honours.  Both the English and the

11     Croatian version is on the screen.

12             Sir, if you can look on your screen, please?  If you can look on

13     the screen, please, sir, this is the communication from the Jablanica

14     Municipal Assembly dated the 6th of May, 1992.  The beginning part:

15             "At its meeting held on 6 May 1992, the Jablanica Crisis Staff

16     decided to organise a unified defence system for the Jablanica

17     municipality area and hereby issued the following:

18             "Announcement.  All citizens of the Jablanica municipality are

19     hereby notified that a unified defence system is being organised in our

20     municipality and will consist of the Territorial Defence forces, the

21     Croatian Defence Council, the Green Berets, and all others who wish to

22     place themselves under the unified command of the Territorial Defence

23     headquarters in Jablanica."

24             Now, can you tell us, sir, after the 6th of May, 1992, what steps

25     did the HVO take to place itself under the unified command of the

Page 47787

 1     Territorial Defence?

 2             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Objection.

 3             We're dealing with Jablanica municipality.  Now, from the

 4     testimony, the witness at that time was in Central Bosnia the whole time,

 5     so how can the witness say what the HVO did in Jablanica or did not do?

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Well, how can he say what happened in a meeting that

 7     he wasn't in attendance at?

 8        Q.   Sir, I might -- this is one example -- this is one example, and I

 9     go back to -- the question came up, What communications from the TO?  You

10     said a few moments ago the TO didn't exist in Herzegovina.  You said so

11     under oath.  Now, here's a document from the 6th of May, 1992, talking

12     about the Territorial Defence and trying to organise a unified defence

13     under a unified command structure, which you said the TO didn't exist in

14     Herzegovina.  And I put this to you as one example, but I come back to

15     the question I put to you 45 minutes ago:  What steps did the HVO take to

16     put itself under the unified command of the Presidency of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

18        A.   Your Honours, I never said that the TO did not exist in

19     Jablanica, which the Prosecutor has just said.  I was just saying that in

20     the first days of my arrival in Central Bosnia, the HVO was stronger in

21     the sense of preparedness on the part of the population for defending

22     themselves against an aggression, because they'd already experienced

23     Vukovar, Ravno, et cetera.  And the Muslims, thanks, among other things,

24     to the statement made by Alija Izetbegovic, when he said, It's not our

25     war, they were not prepared.  So April and the first half of May was

Page 47788

 1     the -- during that time, the only real force in the area of Central

 2     Bosnia was the HVO.  The Territorial Defence was being established.  It

 3     was looking for commanders, it found some commanders, and sometime in

 4     June 1962 [as interpreted] was on an equal footing and stronger than the

 5     HVO.

 6        Q.   Sir, I'm going to turn to a different topic because the record on

 7     this will quite clearly speak for itself, a question from last week.  Let

 8     me ask you that --

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please.

10             Witness, just in the wake of the Prosecutor's questions and

11     following this document of the presidential transcript of the Republic of

12     Bosnia and Herzegovina, isn't this the evidence that the municipalities

13     were required to set up a military system, gathering all those on

14     location?  In Jablanica, it was the Green Berets and the Croats from the

15     HVO, but there could have been other types of systems?  And the

16     interesting thing about this document is that the president of the

17     municipality says that this does not preempt on other political solutions

18     that may crop up later on, so does this mean that back in May 1992 -- so

19     from memory I believe that by then the VRS was being set up in the

20     Republika Srpska.  There were in some municipalities some military

21     formations -- joint military formations being created, as shown by this

22     document shown by the Prosecutor?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, paper soldiers and

24     papers, there was a lot of that, and I see here at this Tribunal now that

25     there was a lot of that.  Roso, Blaskic, the president of the

Page 47789

 1     municipality.  Papers were flying hither and thither.  The problem was,

 2     on the ground, to establish a defence.

 3             Now, in the document that's just been quoted, the Jablanica

 4     document, it says that the Green Berets ought to be unified, which means

 5     that they weren't in the Territorial Defence up until that time, and that

 6     the Patriotic League should be united and unified, and the HVO, too.  So

 7     that's what was said here.  It says here what should be done with the aim

 8     of realising an ideal situation, which this president says, whether he

 9     received a piece of paper, a document to that effect, or whether he wrote

10     it himself.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

12             MR. SCOTT:

13        Q.   I'm going to another topic, sir, and this is in connection with

14     the time that you've told us when you and Mr. Pasalic were -- stayed for

15     a time at the Spanish Battalion base near Dracevo.  And I put it to you,

16     sir, that last week you went -- again, went out of your way to create a

17     false impression for these Judges, didn't you?  And I'll tell you why so

18     you don't have to guess.  You knew full well, didn't you, that the reason

19     that Pasalic was held and the reason that you couldn't enter Mostar at

20     the time was because the HVO wouldn't let Pasalic go anywhere else or

21     enter Mostar, and you knew that, didn't you?

22             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, objection to the

23     question.

24             What is has the HVO got to do with Pasalic, when we had several

25     witnesses before this Trial Chamber testifying about the fact that

Page 47790

 1     Pasalic was in an UNPROFOR vehicle, and how could the HVO do anything

 2     with respect to people who were under UNPROFOR's protection?  So I'd like

 3     Mr. Scott to be more precise and say what he means exactly, because he

 4     was thinking about the 8th to the 9th of May, 1993, then he has no

 5     grounds, in fact.

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Well, that's something that's just not true.  And the

 7     witness said last week, and this -- I do have it from the 1st of

 8     December, the daily transcript, pages 43 to 47 -- what this witness

 9     ultimately said was, in answer to this question:

10             "So can you now, General, comment on this assertion made; was

11     that the truth or not about Mr. Pasalic being held by the HVO?"

12             And Mr. Filipovic gave this answer under oath last week:

13             "The route we followed passes mostly through an area controlled

14     by the BH Army, and I don't know how the HVO could prevent Arif Pasalic

15     from leaving the APC."

16             And I put it to you, sir, that you did know exactly how because

17     you knew -- let me conduct my examination.

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I really have an

19     objection now.  I think that I have been very patient in listening to

20     Mr. Scott, to see the way in which he is conducting his

21     cross-examination, and I hope that in redirect I'll try to illustrate

22     facts to the Trial Chamber, but this is a completely wrong interpretation

23     of the whole part of that testimony and examination of the witness.  It

24     was very clear that the question related to the case -- the Prosecution

25     case that Arif Pasalic, on the 9th of May, 1993, was not in Mostar,

Page 47791

 1     because the HVO would have prevented him from entering Mostar.  That was

 2     the Prosecution case.  Now, we proved -- we showed that at the time he

 3     was in an UNPROFOR vehicle.  And if my colleague, Mr. Scott, now wants to

 4     make any statements in that regard, let him present the question and

 5     answer in its entirety, not to go halfway, because otherwise it would be

 6     a completely erroneous depiction of what was happening in the courtroom.

 7             So Arif Pasalic was in an UNPROFOR vehicle.  He was going from

 8     Jablanica to Dracevo.  He was passing through East Mostar.  And had he

 9     wanted to leave the vehicle, he could have done that.  And that's the

10     crux of the matter.  The HVO couldn't control that.

11             MR. SCOTT:

12        Q.   Can you turn, please, to P11138.

13             And I'm going to ask the usher assist us, please, and to please

14     stand by the witness so we can move as quickly as possible.  My time is

15     really very limited.

16             P11138.  This is a Spanish Battalion report.  I refer you to --

17     it's in the next binder.  Sorry, it's in the loose -- no, this one.

18     Sorry, which one?  My apologies.  This is a separate document.  I thought

19     it had been distributed.  My apologies.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, while you're looking

21     for that document and having it distributed, might I be allowed to say

22     something?

23             MR. SCOTT:  I'm not going to have the witness talking on my time

24     without answering my question, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, Witness.  We're

Page 47792

 1     going to receive this document, just as you are.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But it's about the last question to

 3     which Ms. Alaburic objected, and I said nothing.  So I assume I'm in this

 4     courtroom to say something, to be allowed to say something.

 5             MR. SCOTT:  Consider the question withdrawn until we have this

 6     document in front of us.  There is no pending question.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So the question was withdrawn,

 8     but it may return with this document; right?

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, sir.

10        Q.   Sir, if you'll please turn, in P1138, item 6.1 of this report --

11     item 6.1 "Other information":

12             "At 1850, a Spanish convoy escorting Brigadier Pasalic and

13     Colonel Filipovic was detained at control point E5.  At 2008, an officer

14     of the HVO military police presented himself at the above-mentioned

15     control point, reinforcing it, and encouraging him men to adopt an

16     aggressive attitude towards the Spanish convoy.  Authorisation to

17     continue was given at 2100, but at 2140 the convoy was again detained at

18     the Vrapcici check-point, where allegations were made at the existence of

19     uncontrolled groups that are mining the roads."

20             Now, if you can turn to Exhibit P02241 in the same small binder,

21     P02241.

22             I'm going to move very quickly through these documents, usher.

23             This is another Spanish Battalion report.  Item 1.1, under "Areas

24     of Responsibility," "Check-points":

25             "On the 9th of May, 1993, after painstaking consultations with

Page 47793

 1     Mr. Bozic," I put it to the Chamber that is Slobodan Bozic, HVO, "the

 2     Spanish patrol providing escort protection for Brigadier Pasalic and

 3     Colonel Filipovic was allowed through the check-point at Vrapcici with

 4     the proviso that it must not enter Mostar and must make its way directly

 5     to Dracevo."

 6             Going to Exhibit P02235 in the same small binder, P02235 "Other

 7     Activities," page 5 of the English report:

 8             "Transport and escort protection were provided for general

 9     Pasalic and General Filipovic from Jablanica to Mostar.  The HVO refused

10     this escort entry after a wait of more than seven hours.  The persons

11     escorted were taken to Dracevo, where they spent the night and where they

12     still remained."

13             Please turn to Exhibit P1139, P1139, another Spanish Battalion

14     report for the 10th and 11th of May.  5th item under "Mostar":

15             "General Pasalic, commander of the 4th Corps of the Army of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina, continues to be at the Spanish Detachment in Dracevo.

17     The HVO has set up check-points around the Spanish Detachment to prevent

18     him from leaving ."

19             That's why, sir, Mr. Pasalic -- where Mr. Pasalic was and why he

20     couldn't move freely, and why he couldn't be in Mostar on the 8th, 9th,

21     and 10th of May, 1993, and you conveniently forgot to tell that to the

22     Chamber, but, in fact, created the impression with President Antonetti

23     that it was the international forces who had arrested the two, and you

24     knew full well that you were creating a false impression with these

25     Judges when it was the HVO that controlled where Mr. Pasalic was;

Page 47794

 1     correct?

 2        A.   Your Honours, everything that I've said is correct, and I'll

 3     state it again.

 4             At a meeting in Konjic and Jablanica, we were there, Pasalic and

 5     I, but I had a higher function than he did.  I occupied a higher post in

 6     the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  At the time, I was a member of

 7     the Joint Command, the number 2 man of this one side or the fourth man or

 8     third man within the entire overall Joint Command, whereas Pasalic was

 9     commander of a corps.

10             Now, if the HVO prevented Filipovic's entry -- or, rather,

11     Pasalic's entry, and if they prevented Pasalic from entering, they

12     prevented Filipovic, too, that would be nonsense.  That's one point.

13             Secondly, before the convoy set out from Jablanica, the HVO could

14     not influence its departure.  For four or five hours, the convoy was

15     unable to depart because Mr. Pasalic did not want the convoy to set out

16     for some reason of his own, and he kept arguing with Major Carlos.  I

17     assume the man's still alive, so he'll be able to tell you.

18             Now, as to the check-points that we were talking about, I know

19     nothing about them because I was shut up in an APC together with Pasalic.

20     He couldn't see anything; I couldn't see anything.  And I woke up in

21     Dracevo.  It was 3.00 or 4.00 a.m., and Pasalic woke up then, too,

22     because -- well, now you're implying that I knew that it was -- that

23     Pasalic was not allowed to step down from the APC and some other things.

24     We were arrested by the Spanish Battalion, with all four sides of the

25     container being guarded.  There were guards at all four points, so

Page 47795

 1     neither he nor I could leave and go anywhere.  I said that, I'm saying

 2     that again, and I can confirm it 100 more times if need be.

 3        Q.   Sir, you were a senior commander in the HVO, you were in these

 4     vehicles.  You were held at HVO check-points for at least seven hours on

 5     one occasion.  And you're telling us that during that time, as a senior

 6     commander of the HVO, you never communicated to the HVO soldiers at the

 7     check-point, being held seven hours?  You never looked outside, never

 8     asked a question?

 9        A.   Your Honours, we were both shut up in that APC.  We would stop

10     and then go, and then stop and then go again.

11        Q.   Let's go to another topic, sir, unless the Judges have questions

12     on that item.  I'm going to move forward.  Or the break.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just before the break, Witness:

14     There are two versions of what happened, yours, and you're under oath,

15     and the Prosecutor's.  He is contesting or challenging your version,

16     using the Spanish documents, which are very clear and which state that

17     there were these check-points and that Mr. Pasalic could not go where he

18     wanted to go because he was prevented by the HVO, which was blocking

19     traffic.  Now, of course, your version is different.  You maintained your

20     version when you answered Mr. Scott.

21             I was quite surprised, and I put that question to you.  I asked

22     you why it was that you couldn't contact the HVO, and you told me, No, we

23     were prisoner.  Even though we wanted to go to the bathroom, you know, we

24     were escorted.  So listening to Mr. Scott and listening to you, well, we

25     have two different versions.  Either you're not telling the truth or the

Page 47796

 1     Spaniards, to make sure that they could have you at hand.  Both of you

 2     mentioned check-points and also mentioned rogue groups -- they're blaming

 3     this on the HVO, of course, but they are calling them rogue groups,

 4     rather than anything else.

 5             In this document, you know, I always look at the original version

 6     when I have a document, and in the Spanish document, in Spanish, document

 7     P11138, we have the Spanish stamp and on this because the Spaniards have

 8     this habit of putting stamps everywhere.  Well, this document was written

 9     on May 8 at 11.30 p.m., and you know that events occurred on the next

10     day, on May 9th in Mostar.

11             Now, in this Spanish document, it says that someone from the HVO

12     informed them of the possibility of a confrontation during the night

13     between the ABiH and the HVO.  This is what is written in this document.

14             So are you 100 per cent sure Mr. Pasalic and yourself were kept

15     by the Spaniards, detained?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as I said, there was

17     a discussion between Pasalic and Carlos in Jablanica for several hours in

18     order for the convoy to start out.  Throughout that journey, both on the

19     French side and on the American side, whenever we got into an APC we were

20     unable to communicate with anyone.  Therefore, for the duration of that

21     journey, neither Pasalic nor I were in a position to communicate with

22     anyone.  We did not know what was going on outside; neither of us did.

23             When we woke up, when the Spaniards opened the door of the APC,

24     we were there among containers in Dracevo.  All they asked us was whether

25     we would go on being together in that container.  We said, No problem.

Page 47797

 1     And we were placed in a container under the strictest -- closest possible

 2     monitoring.  I don't think even the Spandau prison was anything like

 3     that.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, General Petkovic.

 5             THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your

 6     Honours.

 7             If I may, could you ask the witness a technical question?  Why

 8     does SpaBat not describe, in its reports, that it drove at least seven

 9     kilometres through Mostar, which was under the control of the BH Army,

10     and why did Pasalic not bang on the wall of the APC for the head of the

11     convoy to stop?  Why do the Spaniards never say that they drove for seven

12     kilometres through East Mostar, that was under the control of the BH Army

13     and no one else?  We saw that a hundred times, Your Honours.  Why, then,

14     does Pasalic not bang against the wall of the APC for them to stop,

15     because he could have done whatever he liked?  Dracevo is a mere 15

16     kilometres south of Mostar.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, unfortunately we do

18     not have a map at hand, because with a map we could have followed the

19     convoy to see exactly where it passed.  But General Petkovic is saying

20     that according to him - of course, it's his version and might not be

21     yours - that you went through -- you must have gone through part of a

22     road that was under the control of the Muslims.  Is that possible or not?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Possible territory under the

24     control of the BH Army on that route.  It's too big to be ignored.  No

25     reason to believe that the area through which we travelled was not under

Page 47798

 1     the control of the BH Army.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When you were in that APC,

 3     couldn't you see the outside; yes or no?  Are you like in a tin can?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.  There's an opening

 5     through which a Spanish soldier was looking.  We could look through the

 6     opening, too, but all we saw was the sky, but not in terms of our putting

 7     our eye right against the opening; rather, right beside the opening.

 8     Therefore, the view from that opening, as far as we in the APC were

 9     concerned, was zero.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If this APC was stopped at

11     check-points, since there was an opening, you must have heard voices

12     asking -- you know, people from the UNPROFOR asking -- people asking the

13     UNPROFOR where they were going when you were arrested.  Didn't you hear

14     voices, conversations, did you overhear them at least?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The APC was stationary for hours.

16     When I say "for hours," it was stopped wherever it was stopped.  We were

17     only able to see part of the surrounding terrain and part of the sky.

18     The talks, negotiations, were there any, we weren't able to tell.  It was

19     impossible.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But couldn't you overhear

21     anything?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, we heard nothing.  The engine

23     was always on.  The APC's engine was on constantly.  Besides, I wasn't

24     interested.  In order for me to catch a glimpse of the surrounding

25     terrain and know where I was, that would have been impossible.  I

Page 47799

 1     couldn't have known.  If Arif Pasalic could have looked outside through

 2     the opening and recognised the terrain, I certainly wasn't able to do

 3     that.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

 5             It's five to 4.00.  We'll break for 20 minutes.

 6             MR. STEWART:  Encouraged by Your Honour's comment about me being

 7     a stickler for precision the other day, just in case it misleads, I note

 8     in the English translation of 11138 there's a reference to the CIA.  The

 9     CIA, we know they're everywhere, but they weren't here.  I think it says

10     "HVO sources have informed the CIA serving in the city."  Your Honour,

11     that appears to be -- Your Honour is in a position to confirm this.  This

12     comes from the Spanish, which is -- it's -- CIA is as an abbreviation, I

13     think, there for "Al Compania," so I just wanted to note that in case

14     anybody gets mislead by a rather strange reference to CIA in this English

15     version of the document, it's nothing to do with the CIA as we know and

16     love them at all.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, you're right, Mr. Stewart.

18     I hadn't noted that in the English version there is "CIA ," but in the

19     Spanish version it says "Al Cap."  So I thought it was the captain of the

20     company.

21             MR. STEWART:  Yes, I think the "CIA" is a Spanish abbreviation

22     for "Al Compania."  I think Your Honour would agree with that.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Absolutely.

24             Very well, I think everything is crystal clear now, and we'll

25     break for 20 minutes.

Page 47800

 1                           --- Recess taken at 3.57 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

 4             Mr. Scott.

 5             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6        Q.   Mr. Filipovic, I'd like to turn to the topic of Sovici/Doljani,

 7     about which you were asked a number of questions.  I'd like you to turn,

 8     first of all, please, to Exhibit P01933.  It should be in the main

 9     binder, in numerical order, P01933.

10             Sir, this is a report from Colonel Siljeg on the 17th of April,

11     1993.  Just two quick questions.  And the first item says that:

12             "Due to T-130 actions ..."

13             Can you just tell us, for the record, what's the "T-130" refer

14     to?

15        A.   I don't know exactly.  Perhaps it's a type of cannon.

16        Q.   And several items below that, if you'll see the sentence:

17             "BH Army forces in Sovici village are crushed, some soldiers and

18     civilians are fleeing from Sovici and some are surrendering."

19             Now, you have no reason to disagree with Mr. Siljeg that that was

20     the state of affairs in Sovici on the 17th of April, 1993; correct?

21        A.   I can't say, Yes, and I can't say, No.

22        Q.   You have no reason to disagree with them?  You have no basis to

23     disagree with Mr. Siljeg; correct?

24        A.   No, no basis.

25        Q.   The meeting that we saw the video of on the 4th of May, can you

Page 47801

 1     recall approximately the time of day?  I know it was some time ago, but

 2     as approximately the best you can, when that meeting started and

 3     approximately when the meeting ended?

 4        A.   I can only assume that it started sometime at 9.30 or 10.00, and

 5     that it ended at about 12.00, 12.30.  After that, we were supposed to go

 6     to -- to leave and go three different ways.

 7        Q.   All right.  And just so the record is very clear, when you say

 8     9.30 to 10.00, you're talking about 9.30 to 10.00 in the morning until

 9     approximately 12.00 or 12.30 in the afternoon?

10        A.   That's right.

11        Q.   Now, according to the transcript -- we weren't getting a

12     translation of the meeting when we were actually seeing the video, but

13     there was a transcript that went with it, and during that meeting

14     Mr. Halilovic offers the -- "the hand of friendship" to the HVO, but

15     raises a number of issues: the holding of Muslim men, expelled Muslims

16     from their homes, Mostar becoming a detention centre.  And he wanted

17     questions from Mr. Petkovic on those points; correct?

18        A.   It's true, what Sefer was saying, and it's true, also, what

19     Petkovic was saying.

20        Q.   And wouldn't you agree with me, sir, that based upon the

21     grievances that Mr. Halilovic and Mr. Pasalic were expressing on that

22     day, they had some reason to be upset, didn't they?

23        A.   Your Honours, the meeting at Jablanica occurred 10 days after an

24     intense round of meetings in Central Bosnia, where we also held

25     meetings --

Page 47802

 1        Q.   Sorry, our time is limited.  Mr. Pasalic and Mr. Halilovic had

 2     reasons to be upset, didn't they; yes or no?

 3        A.   I won't testify here by saying yes or no.  I didn't spend all the

 4     time and all the energy to do that.  I'm telling you what was going on.

 5             At that meeting, for me --

 6                           [Overlapping speakers]

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- what Sefer said was actually

 8     shocking, and also what Arif Pasalic said was also shocking.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, you are here to answer

10     the questions put to you by the Prosecutor.  In this procedure, the

11     Prosecutor is allowed to give his point of view, saying that this meeting

12     didn't unfold correctly, yes or no.  It's his point of view.  Just

13     answer, Yes, or No.  And then if he wants to know why you don't agree

14     with him, he will ask you why and press on.  He is conducting his

15     cross-examination the way he wishes.  I'm sure that Ms. Alaburic told you

16     about this.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, he asked me -- he put

18     it to me that Arif Pasalic and Sefer Halilovic had reason to act the way

19     they did.  I don't know if they had reason or not.  I'm just trying to

20     say what I found shocking.  I found shocking what they actually said and

21     how they said it at the meeting, which was very different from anything

22     they previously said at any of the meetings.

23             MR. SCOTT:

24        Q.   You don't know?  You the answer is you don't know?

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

Page 47803

 1             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you.

 2        Q.   Now, one of the things that came up at that meeting was that

 3     Mr. Pasalic complained about the HVO's arrest of 14 of his soldiers, that

 4     is, Mr. Pasalic's soldiers, the night before.  And when the issue was

 5     raised with Mr. Petkovic, Mr. Petkovic says, and this is at page 11 of

 6     the transcript:

 7             "Give me a list of the 14 people arrested, and they will be freed

 8     tonight, after I get back to Mostar."

 9             You were then asked by Ms. Alaburic, after the video was played:

10             "Now, did General Petkovic demonstrate readiness for

11     co-operation?  What was your impression about his real intentions and

12     wishes?

13             "A.  Our side, on the whole, as a whole, wanted, wished, and

14     endeavoured to do that."

15             So on the one hand, sir, you have this representation by

16     Mr. Petkovic that he's about to see to the immediate release of 14 men

17     held captive by the HVO, but I'd like you to look, please, next at

18     Exhibit P02182, P02182.

19             While you're doing that, sir, to use the time, this is an order

20     from Mr. Petkovic to Stipe Polo or Pole on the 4th of May, 1993, at 2200

21     hours, we can see at the top part of the page.

22             Now, sir, this is the same Stipe Polo or Pole who you've told --

23     you've mentioned several times as one of your sources of information as

24     to what happened in Sovici/Doljani; correct?  Correct?

25        A.   Correct.

Page 47804

 1        Q.   And Mr. Petkovic gives this order to Mr. Pole:

 2             "Release all detained civilians in Doljani and Sovici, keep men

 3     fit for military service."

 4             Now, I'm going to take those in reverse order.

 5             When you were collecting information that you told us about last

 6     week, in talking to Mr. Polo, in talking to some of the others that you

 7     said you talked to, did you obtain this information that it was

 8     Mr. Petkovic who had ordered that all the Muslim men be detained?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   And do you know, to your knowledge, whether there was any effort

11     to distinguish or classify the Muslim men, those who had actually been

12     engaged in combat and those who had not been?

13        A.   I don't know of any cases where a distinction was drawn.

14        Q.   And, sir, this is the 4th of May, 1993.  I want to take us back

15     to one of our earlier topics today.  This is after the cease-fire dated

16     the 20th of April, 1993.  This is after the joint statement by Boban and

17     Izetbegovic on the 25th of April, 1993, in which everything was supposed

18     to be at peace and the armies were supposed to join together and fight

19     together.  In that circumstance, why would Mr. Petkovic order the

20     detention of the Muslim men?  Peace had broken out.  You were on the same

21     side, according to you.  Why hold the Muslim men?

22             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me, Mr. Scott.  I might be lost somehow.

23             I have here a paper where Mr. Petkovic orders the release.  I

24     have not seen any order that they be detained.  Maybe I missed that.

25             MR. SCOTT:  Perhaps at the end of the sentence, sir, after

Page 47805

 1     "Sovici," you'll see:

 2             "... keep men fit for military service."

 3             Does that assist?

 4             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I see that.

 5             MR. SCOTT:  That's what I [overlapping speakers].

 6             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Okay, it's not "arrest," it's "continued

 7     detention" that is ordered, so in this way it's slightly equivocal.  But

 8     thank you.

 9             MR. SCOTT:

10        Q.   Why keep holding Muslim men, sir, at this time?

11             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would just like to

12     ask Mr. Scott to be as precise as possible.  Here, we are clearly talking

13     about able-bodied men of military age, and not just generic Muslims.

14     Therefore, I think there's a need to be as specific as possible here.

15             MR. SCOTT:  There's no need for that intervention.  The document

16     says plainly what it says, "keep men fit for military service," and

17     doesn't change my question at all.

18        Q.   There's a cease-fire, there's an agreement, you're saying the HVO

19     is a legitimate part of the BiH armed forces, We're on the same side.

20     Why hold -- continue to hold the Muslim men of any description, as

21     ordered by General Petkovic?

22        A.   I've answered that already.  I said I don't know about them being

23     detained.  I don't know if the document is authentic.  I don't know why

24     men fit for military service were separated off.

25        Q.   And do you know why this -- going to the first part, "Release all

Page 47806

 1     detained civilians in Doljani and Sovici...," do you know why the

 2     civilians had been detained?

 3        A.   Your Honours, as I've said already, I know nothing about Sovici

 4     and Doljani, apart from the talks I had at the base in Jablanica.

 5        Q.   Sir, that's exactly my point, and that was the point of my

 6     objection during your direct examination.  You're giving testimony about

 7     something you knew nothing about.  You simply don't know what happened at

 8     Sovici/Doljani; correct?

 9             You can't have --

10             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, there's no need for an intervention here.

11     The witness can't have it both ways.  He can't say, I'm going to testify

12     about Sovici/Doljani or I don't know anything about it.

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Your Honours, I

14     don't know why Mr. Scott appears to be losing his temper in the course of

15     this examination.  The witness clearly said he knew nothing about the

16     events at Sovici and Doljani, but he said he knew about the agreement --

17     about the evacuation of people from Sovici and Doljani.  He knew about

18     them leaving for Gornji Vakuf and from then on to Jablanica.  But that's

19     a different subject altogether.  That doesn't mean the witness knows what

20     was going on in Sovici and Doljani, who was detained where, and how many

21     people were detained.  The witness clearly said very clearly what he

22     knew.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, let

24     General Filipovic answer.  He's able enough to understand a question and

25     to answer questions.  It's a waste of time if you have irrelevant

Page 47807

 1     objections.  The Prosecutor asked the witness why civilians were

 2     detained, as stated in the document.  Well, the witness can say, I wasn't

 3     there, I don't know anything about it, and then a question can be asked

 4     whether it was normal to detain civilians.  And he might answer then,

 5     Yes, No.

 6             Please continue, Mr. Scott.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 8             MR. SCOTT:

 9        Q.   A reference that was just made to an evacuation.  That's part of

10     the point.  You don't know what the conditions were, you don't what

11     happened in Sovici/Doljani, you don't know in what conditions the Muslim

12     women and children were being held, or what had happened to them, or what

13     had happened to the men, do you?  So when you say "evacuation," that's

14     your characterisation of something that you don't know anything about;

15     correct?

16        A.   All I know about Sovici and Doljani is what I talked about with

17     Biskit [phoen], Ola, Zuka, and Nihad.

18        Q.   Do you know, sir, that this Tribunal has specifically rejected

19     the characterisation of this as an evacuation?

20        A.   No.

21             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let's just try to be

22     specific.  Which Chamber?  In Croatian, the interpretation we got was

23     "this Chamber," this Chamber dismissed something or has rejected a

24     characterisation.

25             MR. SCOTT:  This Tribunal, this Tribunal in the Tuta Stela case.

Page 47808

 1        Q.   Are you aware of that, sir?

 2             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] So that means some other Trial

 3     Chamber?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

 5             MR. SCOTT:

 6        Q.   Do you know how -- you said that you were involved in arranging

 7     the buses that did come.  How did you -- what arrangements did you make

 8     to have the buses arrive in Sovici?  Who did you contact, what

 9     arrangements did you put in place?

10        A.   I checked to see whether the buses had been sent to Sovici and

11     Doljani.

12        Q.   I didn't ask you about you checked to see if they had.  What

13     arrangements did you make?  Who did you contact in order to arrange for

14     the buses to be sent?  Did you talk to -- you talked to Slobodan Bozic,

15     didn't you?

16        A.   I talked to someone in the Main Staff.  I think it was the duty

17     officer or someone.

18        Q.   Where did the buses come from?

19        A.   I don't know that either.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I have been listening

21     very carefully to your answer.  It is a relevant answer, but in another

22     respect regarding Mostar.

23             The Prosecutor asked you how you organised yourself to send

24     buses, and you said that you called somebody at the Main Staff.  In other

25     words, whenever there was this kind of logistical problem when you had to

Page 47809

 1     dispatch buses and drivers, the buses must have fuel, they must have a

 2     destination.  So in your view, it was the Main Staff that organised all

 3     that; is that correct?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because Petkovic told them,

 5     Check to see if the buses had been sent to Sovici and Doljani.  I don't

 6     know where from -- or, rather, at that point in time I couldn't have

 7     known from where the buses had been sent, who had organised it.  But it

 8     turns out that it was organised by the Main Staff.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So did

10     General Petkovic ask you to check whether the buses had been sent?  He

11     didn't ask you to organise the dispatching; he just asked you to check,

12     didn't he?  In other words, somebody else organised the question of the

13     buses.  You just checked, didn't you?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let us imagine that you

16     encountered a problem regarding the transportation of civilians at your

17     level, so some civilians have to be evacuated.  Who do you have to turn

18     to to have them be evacuated?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Probably the civilian authorities,

20     because the Main Staff, I don't know whether it had any buses.  So the

21     civilian authorities were the ones who were supposed to organise that.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But then in this instance of

23     Sovici and Doljani, why is it that it was taken care of by the Main Staff

24     and not by civilian authorities?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because Sefer, the way you saw him

Page 47810

 1     on the video, and Petkovic talked, discussed, agreed, and I don't know

 2     why the Main Staff dealt with that, or, rather, Petkovic.  Probably at

 3     the request of Sefer.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yet, you know, my questions are

 5     extremely important, as you can imagine.  I just don't ask a question for

 6     the sake of it.  I don't waste my time asking useless questions.

 7             Whenever civilians are evacuated, there may arise problems

 8     because of the state of their health, the food, et cetera.  In such an

 9     environment, shouldn't it be the Civilian Protection that should take

10     care of all this?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Possibly it should have, it should

12     have been dealt with by the Civilian Protection.  But for everything to

13     be successful, the HVO had to involve itself to see that everything went

14     without a hitch.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So let me return to

16     Sovici/Doljani.  And imagine that General Petkovic hears that following

17     fighting, there are civilians to be evacuated because there are problems;

18     either to protect them or for any other reason.  Shouldn't he have turned

19     to the Civilian Protection to take over the problem?  Why did he take

20     care of the problem in person?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know whether it was

22     him or not.  He told me to check and see if the buses had left or gone to

23     Sovici and Doljani.  That's what I know.  Now, who organised it, I really

24     don't know.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So the thing to be remembered

Page 47811

 1     is that you just checked, and the rest escapes you.  Fine.

 2             Mr. Scott.

 3             MR. SCOTT:

 4        Q.   Turning to a moment on another topic.  On military discipline,

 5     sir, you said in your Kordic testimony that HVO commanders had authority

 6     to take disciplinary measures against their subordinates at various

 7     levels; correct?

 8        A.   They had authority on paper, according to the rules or whatever

 9     they were, but in actual fact they could do very little, except if there

10     was a large mistake made, then there was the prison in Busovaca where

11     they were sent.

12        Q.   Those in the military chain of command were involved in military

13     disciplinary investigations, weren't they?

14        A.   Correct.

15        Q.   And you said -- one of the things you said in your previous

16     testimony -- excuse me, my apologies.  One of the things that

17     Mr. Petkovic said in his testimony in the Blaskic case, that one of the

18     things a commander can do is to detain a subordinate for up to 15 days of

19     detention.  Correct?  You would agree with that?

20        A.   I can agree with that.  I mean, it's correct, except for the

21     question of where they would be detained.

22        Q.   And Petkovic also testified in the Blaskic case that

23     Colonel Blaskic had the authority to punish any officers or soldiers --

24     HVO soldiers who were involved in the crimes or misconduct at Ahmici.

25     Would you agree with Mr. Petkovic that Blaskic had that authority?

Page 47812

 1        A.   The crime in Ahmici surpassed the incarceration of soldiers, it

 2     went beyond that.  The crime in Ahmici took place after combat, but the

 3     crime -- and nobody is denying it, but the crime surpassed this 15-day

 4     incarceration period or whatever.

 5        Q.   That wasn't my question.  My specific question was -- and this is

 6     in Mr. Petkovic's Blaskic testimony at page 24166:

 7             "Blaskic had the authority to punish any HVO officers or soldiers

 8     who were involved in the crimes or misconduct at Ahmici."

 9             Now, do you agree or disagree with Mr. Petkovic?

10        A.   Blaskic had the authority to detain an officer or a soldier.

11        Q.   You just mentioned, in response to the question that I put to you

12     about Ahmici, that Blaskic had this authority.  In fact, sir, you

13     testified previously at this Tribunal in the Kordic case that you really

14     were fairly dismissive of the crime at Ahmici, weren't you?  You said

15     that the -- what happened at Ahmici and the issues there was not

16     something very important until some years later, when you said this

17     impression that was created was "orchestrated or fabricated."  That's the

18     testimony you gave in the Kordic case, isn't is it?

19        A.   I said that for the first few days after Ahmici -- or Santici,

20     rather, it wasn't -- well, at all the meetings from the 20th onwards, the

21     question of Ahmici wasn't raised, or Santici, in that sense, and not

22     several years later.

23        Q.   Sir, this is the testimony you gave at page 17054 to 55 in the

24     Kordic case about Ahmici:  It was not something special until later,

25     1994-1995, and it looked to you like it had been orchestrated like a

Page 47813

 1     "fabricated picture."  That was the view you expressed of the controversy

 2     concerning Ahmici in your Kordic testimony; correct?

 3        A.   I said then and I'm saying now, in those first days or in the

 4     first month, because I was constantly with the commanders from the

 5     BH Army, I've already said that I spent two nights in Konjic with them

 6     and two nights in Zenica, in the Joint Command, nobody raised this

 7     question of Ahmici or, rather, Santici.  And so in that sense, it was

 8     only when Mazowiecki toured Ahmici that -- and in the world -- when the

 9     mosque was destroyed, that's when the real pressure began or, rather, the

10     events in Ahmici became something a la Srebrenica, akin to Srebrenica.

11        Q.   Sir, you testified in the Kordic case that it was not until 1994

12     or 1995 that the controversy about Ahmici was, in your words,

13     orchestrated like a fabricated picture; correct?

14        A.   After this picture about Ahmici had been raised, all my

15     efforts -- everything positive that I had incorporated into the defence

16     fell through because we were all criminals.  That's how it was

17     orchestrated then and now.

18        Q.   You're not answering my question, but I don't have time to pursue

19     it further.

20             In fact, sir, you didn't investigate any war crimes during the

21     time you were in command, did you?  You didn't direct that any be

22     conducted, you weren't involved in any investigations of war crimes;

23     correct?

24             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Objection.

25             [In English] I have objection.  First, the witness should be

Page 47814

 1     asked whether he was -- whether he had any authority to perform

 2     investigation or criminal investigation, then if he -- depending on his

 3     answer, then he can be asked whether he did perform some of them.

 4             MR. SCOTT:

 5        Q.   Sir, you didn't conduct any investigations of war crimes, didn't

 6     you?  You testified in the Kordic case:

 7             "No, I didn't, I did not investigate war crimes."

 8             That's what you testified in the Kordic case; correct?

 9     Page 17239.

10             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to join

11     my colleague in objecting, and I'd like to ask my colleague, first of

12     all, where it was prescribed that a military commander must instigate

13     investigations to take proceedings.  And if it is established that

14     Mr. Filipovic occupied a post where that was possible, then he could be

15     asked the question.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, for it to be clear for

17     everybody:  Earlier on, the Prosecutor told you that there had been no

18     punishment.  I sensed that there was going to be a problem, and I waited

19     for the right time to ask my questions, and then there were objections by

20     the Defence counsel.  I'm taking not Ahmici, but a theoretical case.

21             You command a unit, and a crime is committed.  You are informed

22     that a soldier, for instance, burned down a house or stole the money in

23     the house and killed its inhabitants, and so you are being made aware of

24     it.  Tell me, if you go by the JNA rules at the time, what did it say and

25     what did the HVO rules say?  What is the military commander supposed to

Page 47815

 1     do?  So this is a very clear question.  What were you supposed to do?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there's no dilemmas.

 3     Behind the JNA, you had the state, the system, and whatever else, but for

 4     the HVO in Central Bosnia, no courts functioned.  You were not able to

 5     organise anything because everybody had an automatic rifle in their hands

 6     and all they had to do was to pull the trigger and 30 bullets would be

 7     shot.  So I was required to say whether I conducted investigations or

 8     whatever, initiated them.  First of all --

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let me stop you, General.  My

10     question was extremely specific.  It couldn't be more specific, but I'll

11     fine-tune it.

12             You were in Travnik, and you learned that one of the soldiers

13     burned down a house, stole the money out of the house, and killed the

14     inhabitants of that house.  What do you do?  This is very clear.  What

15     are you going to do?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I had to take steps to prevent

17     anything like that from happening again.  A soldier was incarcerated in a

18     Travnik garrison for having killed an HVO member, and then the brother

19     the next day of the victim killed this person who was in prison, so I'm

20     trying to paint what the situation was like in reality.  And for a

21     commander to exercise his authority, you have to be backed up by a whole

22     system.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for the example you

24     gave of the brother, because that was a case you experienced yourself.

25     But let's take another example.

Page 47816

 1             I'll go back to mine.  A soldier burned down a house, stole

 2     money, and killed the inhabitants of the house.  What steps do you have

 3     to take?  What specific steps do you take immediately?  What do you have

 4     to do?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I should arrest the soldier and put

 6     him in prison, disarm him, and hand him over for an investigation.  That

 7     would be it.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You see, that was easy and

 9     specific.  You have to arrest him, disarm him, and hand him over to the

10     body in charge of investigations.  Which are the bodies in charge of

11     investigations?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would be the courts, the

13     investigating judge, the whole system.  But there was none of that.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So normally speaking, you

15     should hand him over to the investigating judge and to the courts, but

16     you say that all that did not exist.  Did that not exist in Travnik?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All over the Central Bosnia

18     Operative Zone.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So, you see, it's easy to

20     answer specific questions.  That's all I need, as far as I'm concerned.

21             Please, Mr. Scott.

22             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23        Q.   If I can ask you next, please, to turn to Exhibit P11128, P11128.

24             Can I have the usher's assistance, please.  Can I have the

25     usher's assistance, please.

Page 47817

 1             While the usher's assisting us, sir, and to use the time:  By

 2     April of 1994, you were the commander of the Central Bosnia Operative

 3     Zone, or it might have been called at that point the Vitez Military

 4     District; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes, the Vitez Operative Zone.

 6        Q.   And is it correct, sir, that by April of 1994, Mr. Petkovic had

 7     once again become the head of the HVO military, had the number 1

 8     position?

 9        A.   Probably.

10        Q.   And when you became head of the Central Bosnia Operative Zone,

11     Colonel Blaskic had moved and taken a position in Herzegovina.  Do you

12     know what position Mr. Blaskic took at that time?

13        A.   Blaskic went to replace Petkovic, and I replaced Blaskic.

14        Q.   So as of April 1994, is it correct, sir, that Mr. Petkovic was

15     again the head of -- the number 1 person in the HVO military, Mr. Blaskic

16     was number 2, and then you were head of the Military District in Central

17     Bosnia; is that correct?

18        A.   When Blaskic took on those functions where it was Petkovic, when

19     Blaskic took over them, Blaskic was the commander.

20        Q.   All right, sir.  Our time is too limited, unfortunately, to try

21     to sort that out any further.

22             If I can ask you to look at Exhibit P11128.  This is a report by

23     UNPROFOR.  Let me just -- it's on page 3 of the English version, item 16,

24     under "Sector South-West."  The point is simply this, sir, if you can

25     confirm for us, it says:

Page 47818

 1             "Commander, Vitez pocket, Filip Filipovic has been promoted from

 2     colonel to brigadier."

 3             Do you recall the approximate date on which you were promoted

 4     from colonel to brigadier?

 5        A.   That was in May 1994.

 6        Q.   Could you look, please, at P11129, P11129.

 7             Is it correct, sir, that around -- at the same time that you were

 8     promoted to brigadier, Mr. Ivica Rajic was promoted to the same rank,

 9     Mr. Kordic was promoted to the same rank, and Mr. Franjo Nakic was

10     promoted to the same rank?

11        A.   I know about Nakic for sure, I know as far as Kordic is

12     concerned.  Now, Ivo Lozancic and probably Ivica Rajic on the same day.

13        Q.   Did it surprise you, sir, to see Mr. Kordic given the rank of

14     brigadier, when you've said so many times that Kordic had no military

15     role, no military involvement, was not a military commander?

16        A.   A rank can be used for command, the command of units, but it can

17     also be for other elements of organisation.  For example, in 1992, Lucic

18     in Kiseljak was given the rank of brigadier just because he had to

19     negotiate in Kiseljak, so he had to have a rank, whereas he wasn't in

20     command of anything, didn't command anything.

21             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just a moment.

22             Could you ask what this person's first name was, Lucic?  I think

23     it was important, what this man Lucic was doing in Kiseljak.  Could that

24     question be asked, please?

25             MR. SCOTT:  No, not on my time.

Page 47819

 1        Q.   Were you surprised --

 2             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I apologise to my learned friend,

 3     but I don't have time, so that's why I intervened, although I know who it

 4     refers to.  But I apologise for interfering.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, this Lucic person,

 6     Lucic person, could you give us his first name?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Lucic.  I can't remember his first

 8     name.  I know him very well, and he was from Kiseljak.  Lucic.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  That's all you can

10     say.

11             In this document, we see that you signed after Mr. Ivica Rajic,

12     who becomes brigadier, just like you?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at that point in time

14     it wasn't the rank of general.  I became major general only in February

15     1995.  So this was the rank of brigadier, the highest officer rank, but

16     not the rank of general.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Let me just tell you, Your

18     Honours, that in the Croatian your question was mistranslated as if it

19     was the rank of general that was being allotted.  That's why you have the

20     witness answering as he's just done.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

22             MR. SCOTT:

23        Q.   Brigadier was the second-highest rank in the HVO; there's only

24     the rank of general higher than that?

25        A.   Correct.

Page 47820

 1        Q.   Did it surprise you, sir, to see Ivica Rajic being promoted to

 2     this very high HVO rank, in light of his history?

 3        A.   At that moment, he was the commander of the operative group, the

 4     tactical group, just like Ivo Lozancic in --

 5        Q.   He was under your command, wasn't he, sir, when you became --

 6     well, he was under your command both when you were the deputy commander

 7     of the Central Bosnia Operative Zone throughout most or at least the

 8     second half of 1993, and he was under your command when you became

 9     commander of the Central Bosnia Operative Zone, correct, Mr. Rajic?

10        A.   When I became commander, Rajic was no longer in Kiseljak.

11        Q.   Sir, he was under your command, wasn't he?

12        A.   He was under my command while I was the deputy commander of the

13     Military District, so in that sense.

14        Q.   And, sir, did you know -- throughout this period, did you know

15     this man as Ivica Rajic or did you ever know him as Viktor Andric?

16        A.   After the Washington Agreement and when I was able to go to

17     Kiseljak, I saw that the commander of the brigade was Mijo -- Mijo --

18        Q.   You didn't answer my question.  I don't know why, what the error

19     might have been, but you didn't answer my question.

20             This man that you say was promoted to brigadier on the same day

21     that you were, Ivica Rajic, did you know him throughout that period as

22     Ivica Rajic or did you ever know him as Viktor Andric?

23        A.   I knew him as Ivica Rajic.

24        Q.   You knew, a deputy commander, by the end of October of 1993, that

25     there had been a huge alleged atrocity in Stupni Do and that Ivica Rajic

Page 47821

 1     was the principal suspect concerning that atrocity, didn't you?

 2        A.   No.  I learnt that after the war.

 3        Q.   Well, let's look at Exhibit P06182.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have five minutes left,

 5     Mr. Scott.

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7        Q.   Sir, this is an UNPROFOR press release, dated the 27th of

 8     October, reporting the Stupni Do atrocity.  It also includes the fact

 9     that the UNPROFOR was kept out of Stupni Do by the HVO for three days

10     before they could actually enter the village.  Sir, this Chamber has

11     heard extensive evidence about Stupni Do, the fact that it was reported

12     literally around the world, in New York, at the UN, in the capitals of

13     Europe, within a matter of days of it happening.  This was in your area

14     of command.  You were the deputy commander.  And I put it to you, sir,

15     you could not possibly not have known about this huge controversy in your

16     area of responsibility; isn't that correct?

17        A.   Your Honours, what I'm claiming is that I didn't know and

18     couldn't have known.  Now, whether New York knew, I can't say.  I know

19     that as far as Ahmici is concerned, the whole world knew on the day when

20     it happened.  I did not know.

21        Q.   Let's go to Exhibit P07394, P07394.  This is an order by

22     General -- by Mr. Blaskic on the 30th of December, 1993, which he

23     dismisses Ivica Rajic from his position.  And the grounds given by

24     Colonel Blaskic are:

25             "Colonel Rajic is being dismissed from his duty due to a series

Page 47822

 1     of apparent weaknesses in command and control and an irresponsible

 2     influence on the units while carrying out combat operations."

 3             And I note that Mr. Blaskic's order is copied to the HVO

 4     Main Staff, to the HVO Ministry of Defence, et cetera.

 5             Now, with that document in mind, I ask you to turn next, please,

 6     to P09981, P09981.

 7             This is a document by the same Colonel Blaskic, dated the 5th of

 8     November, 1993, commending Mr. Rajic:

 9             "Your military attitude towards task and your huge contribution

10     to the organisation of defence and salvation of Croats from Vares has

11     been a great moral inspiration to all of us."

12             So on the one hand, sir, we have Colonel Blaskic praising

13     Ivica Rajic for a great organisation of military forces, for a terrific

14     military attitude, for making a huge contribution, and for being a great

15     moral inspiration to us all.  Several weeks later, we have the same

16     Colonel Blaskic dismissing the same man due to a series of apparent

17     weaknesses in command and control and an irresponsible influence on the

18     units.  Now, sir, which one was it?

19        A.   Your Honours, as to the time we're discussing, we had nothing to

20     do with the Kiseljak enclave.  It was 12 kilometres of territory that was

21     controlled by the BH Army.  Now, Blaskic, on two or three times, flew by

22     helicopter from the Lasva Valley to the south, he flew south, and he

23     could have learnt the truth or whatever else; I don't know.  I could not

24     have.

25        Q.   Sir, please turn to -- and I'm closing, Mr. President.  If you

Page 47823

 1     please turn to P07401, P07401.

 2             Sir, this is an order from the same Colonel Blaskic the very same

 3     day as one of the two that I showed you a moment ago, the 30th of

 4     December, 1993, appointing Colonel Viktor Andric to take command of the

 5     forward command post in Kiseljak.  Sir, I put it to you that this -- all

 6     of this takes place right under your nose, as deputy commander of this

 7     operative zone, someone operating in the Vitez Hotel, as you told us the

 8     other day, only several metres from Mr. Blaskic's office, how documents

 9     and orders were prepared, and you could not have been a deputy commander

10     of this operative zone and not known about this entire subterfuge.

11     Viktor Andric and Ivica Rajic were one in the same person, weren't they,

12     and you knew it?

13        A.   Your Honour, from the Command of the Military District,

14     Krizancevo Selo is just a short distance away, 15 minutes away.  Now,

15     during these Christmas days of 1993, it was Christmas, there were many

16     other things, and now I'm being shown a document and said that I must

17     have known about it.  I had nothing to do with all these papers.  I

18     wasn't a paper soldier.  What I knew about were concrete things.  So when

19     I say I don't know, I'm not lying.  I'm telling you what I do know.

20             MR. SCOTT:  If I can be allowed one final exhibit, Mr. President,

21     P07840, P07840.

22        Q.   I only have time to show you --

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The last exhibit, please,

24     because you're running out of time.  You've run out of time, actually.

25             MR. SCOTT:  If I might finish this exhibit, Your Honour, and just

Page 47824

 1     two questions.

 2             P07840.  I would be most appreciative.

 3        Q.   Sir, I only have time to show you one particular -- one of

 4     several illustrations, but this is a Security Council report dated the

 5     10th of February, 1994, well before the awarding of Mr. Rajic to the

 6     brigadier rank that we saw a few moments ago.

 7             In paragraph number 12 of this Security Council report, in the

 8     second half of paragraph 12, Mr. Ivica Rajic is described as the main

 9     suspect.  And I put it to you again, sir, this is was a matter of

10     worldwide notoriety, it was the subject for the Security Council of the

11     United Nations, and I put it to you, sir, that when you, on this same

12     document, P11129, were promoted the very same day as Mr. Ivica Rajic, you

13     knew exactly who Mr. Rajic was, you knew he had been called

14     Viktor Andric, and you knew of his history, didn't you?

15        A.   Your Honours, I didn't know.  I had no way of knowing.  I really

16     don't know what Rajic was indicted for, was he in Stupni Do or not, or

17     anything to do with that.  Please take that into account.  If I say I

18     don't know, that means just that, I don't know.

19             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I have no further

20     questions.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

22             Ms. Alaburic, you have the floor for your redirect.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think the best

24     idea would be to have a break right now.  I would like to organise my

25     examination a little and start my redirect in what I believe will be the

Page 47825

 1     most efficient way.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] How long do you need for your

 3     redirect?  You know that all the time you will use will be deducted from

 4     your overall time.

 5             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my assessment now is

 6     that I can do whatever I think is necessary in about an hour.  I hope

 7     that you, too, will be joining the discussion concerning some documents

 8     and some issues.  That probably means that, in practical terms, we could

 9     keep on talking to this witness until the end of the day.  And we might

10     have a break now.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Had it been less,

12     it would have been best to end the redirect with the witness and then to

13     have the new witness after the break, but you're telling us that you need

14     about an hour.

15             Let me consult with my fellow Judges to see how to proceed.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have a break, a 20-minute

18     break.

19                           --- Recess taken at 5.18 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 5.41 p.m.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stewart.

22             MR. STEWART:  Your Honour, just very quickly to mention that the

23     Petkovic team and the Prosecution have agreed between ourselves, subject

24     to Your Honours' approval, of course, that we might have until Thursday

25     to file the IC lists of proposed exhibits following the end of this

Page 47826

 1     witness's evidence.  So, Your Honours, would appreciate -- it sometimes

 2     is a bit tight for us, one witness coming after another.  So if Your

 3     Honours are happy with that - I hope you are - that's what we've agreed.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If you agree, the matter is

 5     settled.

 6             Ms. Alaburic, the Trial Chamber would like to know which items

 7     you want to deal with.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I thank you.

 9             Good evening to you.  Good evening to my learned friends from the

10     Prosecution, the witness, and everyone else.

11             My subjects are as follows:  Firstly, the arrival of Arif Pasalic

12     in Dracevo, an analysis of documents shown by the OTP today and pointing

13     on the map at all the locations that Arif Pasalic had to go through in

14     order to reach Dracevo.  The next subject is the JNA leaving all the

15     barracks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I will tell you, when the time

16     comes, what that is in relation to.  The third subject is about the

17     video-clip and the speech given by Dario Kordic in Busovaca on the 16th

18     of January, 1993.  The fourth subject is General Filipovic's evidence in

19     the Kordic case and the credence that the Chamber lent to its relevance

20     in relation to Dario Kordic's command.  The fifth subject is about the

21     organigram of the HVO used by General Petkovic in the Blaskic case, who

22     would have decided on the re-subordination of the Convicts Battalion.

23     The sixth subject, on the status of men fit for military service.  The

24     seventh subject -- correction.  The Kordic speech was given in 1992 and

25     not in 1993, as I erroneously stated.  I do apologise.  The seventh

Page 47827

 1     subject is about the Prosecution and duties of a military commander in a

 2     situation when the perpetrator is unknown.  The eighth subject would have

 3     to do with the legality and legitimacy of the HVO, very briefly.  The

 4     ninth subject would be organising the HVO as a considerable military

 5     force in 1992 or later.  And the 10th subject would be why was

 6     General Filipovic surprised by the fact that the indictments from this

 7     Tribunal raised against the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina started with

 8     Central Bosnia and not some other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 9             There will be a number of new documents being introduced.

10     I think I will manage to ask my questions in an exceptionally brief way,

11     and I hope that we'll be shedding new light on a number of matters.

12             If I may, I would now like to move on to my first subject.

13                           Re-examination by Ms. Alaburic:

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Let us analyse Arif Pasalic's departure for

15     Dracevo in an UNPROFOR vehicle.  General Filipovic, you drove in that

16     UNPROFOR APC.  Can you tell us what it looks --

17        A.   Yes, that's right.

18        Q.   If there is someone inside, what about the person inside this

19     vehicle; can this person decide when they'll stick their head out through

20     the hatch, when he or she will leave the vehicle, or does the vehicle

21     have to be opened by someone else?

22        A.   Whenever I drove in an APC, the person who's being driven is

23     entirely unable to affect anything at all, do anything at all, open the

24     door of the hatch or anything like that.

25        Q.   What about the security aspect?  Would it ever be allowed for

Page 47828

 1     someone who is inside an UNPROFOR vehicle, when the vehicle pulls over,

 2     to stick their head out to see where they were?

 3        A.   That would have been impossible.  There is a soldier who is

 4     inside the APC, and then there's a small opening, and through that

 5     opening you may be able to catch a glimpse of something or other.

 6        Q.   General, based on your information, if an UNPROFOR vehicle came

 7     to a check-point, would the UNPROFOR soldiers immediately tell the

 8     soldiers at the check-point who the persons were inside the vehicle, or

 9     was the information confidential?

10        A.   It was impermissible to ever give away such information at all as

11     to who was inside the APC.

12        Q.   General, when the convoy of APCs, carrying you and Arif Pasalic,

13     came to any of the HVO check-points held by HVO soldiers, what about

14     those HVO soldiers at the check-point; were they in a position to know

15     who was inside which UNPROFOR vehicle?

16        A.   We inside the vehicle didn't know who was outside.  Those outside

17     didn't know who was in the vehicle.

18             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Please, let me ask you again to slow down.

19     Thank you.

20             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours.

21     We apologise if we were going too fast.

22        Q.   General, you remember the SpaBat documents that we were looking

23     at.  There are two check-points specified there at which the UNPROFOR

24     vehicles were stopped.  The first is marked as "E-5," and the other was

25     described as being near Vrapcici.  Did you notice that as you were

Page 47829

 1     looking at those documents?

 2        A.   No, but I know where Vrapcici is.

 3        Q.   If we look at the SpaBat documents, it wasn't observed anywhere

 4     that after Vrapcici, the convoy was stopped at any other check-point

 5     before Dracevo, itself.  I'm just stating the fact.  I tried to look at

 6     the documents closely, and after Vrapcici there were no other

 7     check-points.

 8             Can we now please look at the map 4D1216.  This is a map of the

 9     Mostar area.  It's simple and somewhat stylised, but should be sufficient

10     for our present purpose.

11             General, I do have to admit I'm not sure if it's at the beginning

12     or the end of your folder.  It's a map in colour, red, blue and green.

13     There it is.  It's right there at the beginning.

14             General, let's try to look at this map now.  Can we please blow

15     up the section around Mostar, itself.  That's right, thank you.

16             General, you can follow this on the screen in front of you.  At

17     the edge of the green area, around East Mostar, we can see "Vrapcici"; is

18     that right?

19        A.   Yes, to the north.

20        Q.   General, if a vehicle reaches Vrapcici, it must be on M-17, the

21     main road.  If the vehicle is to head south, which route must it take?

22        A.   It has to drive down the left-hand riverbank of the Neretva

23     River, east of Vrapcici, and then on towards Mostar, and then further

24     south, about a kilometre further south, as far as trig point Hum 436, and

25     then further east, about half a kilometre further east, and then south

Page 47830

 1     through Ortijes and then further south.  We don't see Dracevo on the map,

 2     actually.  Dracevo is at least 15 kilometres further south from Ortijes.

 3        Q.   Let's try to sum this up, General.  A vehicle continues to move

 4     from Jablanica on to Vrapcici and then further south.  This vehicle has

 5     to pass through East Mostar; right?

 6        A.   Yes, that's true.

 7        Q.   What about East Mostar; is that the area marked in green here as

 8     being under the control of the Muslim authorities?

 9        A.   Yes, the entire area is like that.

10        Q.   The last SpaBat document that was shown is P11139, states HVO

11     check-points were set up around Dracevo.  To be quite specific, around

12     Dracevo, to keep Arif Pasalic from leaving.

13             General, given the fact that you spent four days in the area,

14     during those four days did any UNPROFOR vehicles enter or, indeed, leave

15     the Dracevo base?

16        A.   We couldn't see that.  But on the second or third day, a colonel

17     of SpaBat was brought in who had been wounded in Sarajevo.  Arif Pasalic

18     and I could see the colonel and agreed immediately that he wouldn't make

19     it.  He had been wounded too badly, frankly, which means that there were

20     vehicles going into the Dracevo base and leaving.

21        Q.   General, under the assumption that the UNPROFOR vehicles were in

22     a position to leave the Dracevo base, and that Arif Pasalic wanted to

23     leave Dracevo in an UNPROFOR vehicle, could anyone have known that he was

24     inside one of the UNPROFOR vehicles leaving Dracevo?

25        A.   He could have got into an APC and nobody would have known about

Page 47831

 1     it, but he couldn't have asked to leave because for the first two days

 2     the Spaniards kept us in such a way that it was impossible to do that.

 3        Q.   If I remember correctly your evidence-in-chief, you and

 4     Arif Pasalic attended the Medjugorje meeting on the 12th of May.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Petkovic and Halilovic were there, too; is that right?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   General, at the time or at any time after, did Arif Pasalic tell

 9     you that he wanted to leave Dracevo but was unable to leave because of

10     some HVO check-points around Dracevo?

11        A.   There were no check -- or, rather, nothing was said about that.

12        Q.   Can you please repeat your answer?

13        A.   Arif Pasalic could not say anything about the check-points,

14     firstly, because he couldn't see any and, secondly, because he had no

15     reason to talk about that.  He never mentioned any check-points.

16        Q.   Given the fact that at the meeting in Medjugorje on the 12th of

17     May there were also UNPROFOR representatives, for example,

18     General Morillon and other representatives of the international

19     community, at that meeting, or, indeed, at any time after, did anyone, to

20     the best of your knowledge, ever say that the HVO had blocked the

21     UNPROFOR base at Dracevo in order to keep Arif Pasalic from leaving?

22        A.   No one ever said that.  Sefer, himself, didn't say that.  Nothing

23     was said about that at all.

24        Q.   The next subject, General, the JNA leaving the Travnik compound.

25     You were asked by Mr. Scott, at 476 --

Page 47832

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters couldn't hear the number.

 2             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   -- 47684, 684, and then the following three pages, this is

 4     roughly what Mr. Scott put to you:  He first asked you when the JNA left

 5     the Travnik compound.  You answered that this occurred on the 6th of May,

 6     1992.  Mr. Scott then went on to mention to you the meeting between

 7     Karadzic and Boban and the agreement they reached in Graz which occurred

 8     on the same day.  He asked you whether the meeting at Graz, G-r-a-z, and

 9     the JNA leaving the Travnik compound were related in any way.  Your

10     answer was:

11             "I don't think they were in any way related, but I can't rule out

12     the possibility."

13             Therefore, General, let me show you a number of documents now.

14             The next document in your binder, the number is 4D2016, 4D2016,

15     4D2016 - that's right - this is an overview of the news published by the

16     Croatian Information Centre.  I'm only looking at two dates here, and

17     that is the only translation into English that was done.  General, please

18     just listen to me.  This is extremely brief.

19             General, please pay attention to what I'm about to tell you.

20             The 4th of May, 1992, the following piece of news:

21             "The Presidency of Yugoslavia decided to withdraw the JNA from

22     Bosnia within 15 days ..."

23             The news in relation to the 15th of May, 1992, reads:

24             "In Tuzla, Muslim extremists attacked the convoy of JNA soldiers

25     withdrawing from Bosnia to Serbia.  According to unofficial data, about

Page 47833

 1     200 soldiers have been killed."

 2             And the next document, General, which is just in English, so

 3     listen to me - I'll read it out and ask you a question afterwards - it is

 4     4D2017, that's the number of the next document, 4D2017 - yes, we have the

 5     right number now.  Two sections relating to the JNA's withdrawal, chosen

 6     at random.  The first has to do with Zejnil Delalic, the judgement,

 7     paragraph 116, and I'll read it out in English:

 8             [In English] "On 4th May 1992, the authorities in Belgrade

 9     announced that all JNA personnel who were not citizens of Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina would be withdrawn from the republic by 19 May.  In

11     consequence, approximately 14.000 JNA troops left Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina."

13             [Interpretation] Now I'm going to speak in B/C/S again for a

14     while.

15             The next topic was the Prosecutor versus Dusko Tadic, and this

16     fact of the withdrawal of the JNA from the barracks in Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina was the key date for deciding whether or not it was an

18     international conflict or not.  And in paragraph 571, opinion and

19     judgement, the fact is presented, and I'm going to read out it in English

20     again:

21             [In English] "... after the withdrawal of the JNA on 19 May

22     1992."

23             [Interpretation] That's the correct quotation.

24             I have been told to put the date right on page 81, line 3, it

25     should read "the 19th of May."

Page 47834

 1             Now, let me ask you this, General:  If you remember, did the JNA

 2     withdraw just from Travnik or did it withdraw from all the areas of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina which were not under the control of the Serb

 4     authorities?

 5        A.   Your Honours, the withdrawal from Travnik was the result of two

 6     or three days of negotiation with the commander.  It had nothing to do

 7     with the 6th.  That was done in the morning, but I had to negotiate with

 8     the commander for several days, and that's when an agreement was reached

 9     saying that every person leaving should just take their side-arms with

10     them, and all the other details were agreed as well, and also that the

11     most responsible people from Travnik, five on the Muslim side and five on

12     the Croatian side, should be hostages for this column to be allowed to

13     withdraw from one area to an area controlled by the Army of Republika

14     Srpska.  I was one of those hostages.

15             Now, the question of whether all the -- whether from all the

16     garrisons -- well, where the JNA was able to organise its withdrawal

17     itself, it probably did so.  It probably organised this in Tuzla.  I

18     don't know about Tuzla, but it wouldn't have left of its own accord from

19     Travnik had there not been an agreement about their departure.

20        Q.   General, we'll analyse all these various elements in due course.

21     What I'm asking you now is whether you're aware of the fact that the JNA

22     left from Sarajevo, Tuzla, and other towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina which

23     were not under the control of the Serbs.  And then we'll come to Travnik

24     and the specific conditions there.  So that's what I'm asking you.

25        A.   I know about it, having learnt about it subsequently.  I didn't

Page 47835

 1     know about it at the time.

 2        Q.   And I'd like us to clarify the conditions which you agreed upon

 3     with representatives of the JNA in Travnik for the withdrawal, and I'm

 4     going to ask you that because the Prosecutor put it to you or suggested

 5     an answer according to which the JNA was allowed to leave Travnik with

 6     their weapons, and you responded to that and said with side-arms,

 7     personal weapons.  So I now feel that it's not quite clear what it was,

 8     in fact, that you agreed upon as being the conditions for the JNA's

 9     withdrawal.

10             What were the soldiers allowed to take with them and what were

11     they not?

12        A.   I didn't want to belittle the armed forces to which I had

13     belonged just a few days earlier, so with their side-arms they left the

14     Travnik Garrison with dignity.  A Praga and a three-barrelled cannon

15     could not be taken.  The mortars that they had could not be taken, and

16     any other larger weapons, larger than side-arms.  And that, for officers,

17     were pistols, and, for soldiers, were rifles.  Now, for every 10

18     soldiers, one Zolja-type weapon, and nothing more than that.

19        Q.   Tell us, please, General, as far as this heavy weaponry is

20     concerned that was left in the JNA barracks, what did you do with that?

21        A.   We divided it up with the Muslims 50:50, and we divided up the

22     barracks, everything else.  The facilities and everything else was

23     divided up on a 50:50 basis.

24        Q.   Tell us, please, did anyone -- any of the soldiers or the Muslims

25     [as interpreted] who were Muslims take part in your negotiations with

Page 47836

 1     representatives of the JNA about the withdrawal from the barracks?

 2        A.   There was Dzemal Merdan and Halid Genjac as the political leaders

 3     at the time that we conducted the negotiations about the withdrawal, and

 4     the president of the municipality.  His name was Tamburic.  So that was

 5     as far as the Muslim side was concerned.

 6        Q.   Very well.  General, I think that that is all clear now.

 7             And now a few clarifications related to the meeting in Busovaca

 8     on the 16th of January, 1993, and the speech delivered by Dario Kordic.

 9             Yes, I meant to say "1992."  I keep saying "3."  So 1992 is the

10     date.

11             Now, let's all look at 4D2018, the next document, please.

12     General, the document is in English, so focus on what I'm saying.  I

13     prepared it to make things clear and for us to be able to explain why

14     there was such a lot of heated argument here in the courtroom last

15     Thursday, and perhaps Mr. Scott wasn't clear where the problem lay.

16             So, General, the Prosecutor asked you about Dario Kordic's

17     speech, and he paraphrased Kordic's words.  And then it was said that the

18     Croatian people would not be part of any other Croatia.  That word,

19     "Croatia," led to a heated reaction because we were -- it was clear to us

20     and we heard that Dario Kordic was speaking about a rump Yugoslavia.

21             And now just to clear this matter up once and for all, all the

22     misunderstandings that occurred:  In the transcript from your testimony,

23     Mr. Scott's question was recorded correctly, so Mr. Scott did not say

24     "another Croatia," but he said "other creations," "any other creation"

25     were the words he used, and so due to misunderstandings in the

Page 47837

 1     translation there was such heated reaction in the courtroom.  So I just

 2     wanted us to clear that up.

 3             But tell us, General, on that day, the 16th of January, 1993 --

 4        A.   1992.

 5        Q.   Yes, 1992, sorry.  Busovaca celebrated the international

 6     recognition of the Republic of Croatia; is that right?

 7        A.   Correct.

 8        Q.   Now, at that moment the Republic of Slovenia was also outside

 9     Yugoslavia; is that also correct?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   So what did we call the remainder of Yugoslavia when Slovenia and

12     Croatia had stepped down?

13        A.   It was referred to as the rump Yugoslavia.  As far as I was

14     concerned, it was no longer Yugoslavia at all, in no shape or form.

15        Q.   Tell us, General, to the best of your knowledge, what was your

16     attitude and the attitude of the Croats that you knew about the -- about

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining in that kind of rump Yugoslavia?

18        A.   Impossible, inconceivable, unimaginable.

19        Q.   Tell us, General, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did they use

20     the first opportunity offered to them, which was a referendum in this

21     case, for Bosnia and Herzegovina to step down from the rump Yugoslavia?

22        A.   To be an independent state?

23        Q.   Yes.  So did the Croatians take up that opportunity.

24        A.   Yes, they did.

25        Q.   Tell us, General, for you, at a time when Bosnia-Herzegovina

Page 47838

 1     gained its independence and international recognition, was it clear to

 2     you that the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as an independent state,

 3     could not be changed by force and could not be changed unless the

 4     international community allowed it?

 5        A.   Without [as interpreted] recognition by the main powers in the

 6     world, the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina became inviolable, as they were

 7     everywhere; that is to say, the borders of the republics of the former

 8     Yugoslavia.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Now, General, let's discuss your testimony in the Kordic

10     trial, when you spoke about Dario Kordic.  The document is once again in

11     English, so please concentrate on what I'm saying.  The number is 4D2019,

12     4D2019.  That's right.

13             General, my colleague Mr. Scott put two paragraphs to you from

14     the judgement in the Kordic case, the first-instance judgement, but it

15     wasn't clear to us what those paragraphs referred to.  If you will

16     remember, they were paragraphs 585 and 586.  Mr. Scott at the time put

17     this to you.  He said that the Trial Chamber in the Kordic trial did not

18     lend you its trust and didn't take on board your position whereby

19     Dario Kordic was not a military commander.

20             Now, I want to show that the paragraphs which the Prosecution

21     showed you related to the conflict in Busovaca in January 1993.  And as

22     to the conflict in Busovaca, you said in the Kordic trial, on page 17217

23     of the transcript, you said the following, and I'll read it out in

24     English:

25             [In English] "Are you really telling us that you had had no

Page 47839

 1     knowledge of any attack in Busovaca in late January 1993?

 2             "A.  The attack on Busovaca, from what I knew, was launched by

 3     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Territorial Defence, with a view

 4     to taking position -- with a view to taking Busovaca.  That was what I

 5     know about Busovaca."

 6             [Interpretation] Tell us, General -- as far as I've been able to

 7     see, that was all you said about the conflicts in Busovaca, when asked by

 8     the Prosecution, and this took place in January 1993; is that correct?

 9        A.   These questions linked to Kordic took me by surprise.  I was

10     surprised that the Trial Chamber had not taken into account my testimony,

11     and that they were convicted, and they made me out to be dishonourable

12     for having testified in the Kordic trial.  What I'm afraid is that here,

13     during this testimony, all my efforts to help the Trial Chamber in

14     bringing about its decision are going to fall through, and I felt as if I

15     was just a piece of paper sitting here.

16        Q.   Yes, I know, General.  We'll clarify that, clear all that up

17     later on, but through the facts I'm going to show that the Prosecution

18     put forward an erroneous thesis and that -- and if you would allow me to

19     continue, I wish to show that it was not correct, and I want to show what

20     you actually said, and I want to show that the Trial Chamber in the

21     Kordic trial, in actual fact, did adopt your position.

22             What I want to put to you next is the following:  In the appeals

23     judgement, Kordic appeals judgement, the Chamber concluded or, in a way,

24     confirmed the opinions of the first-instance judgement that Kordic was a

25     political leader with military influence, and that, as such, he was

Page 47840

 1     involved in the planning and ordering of the crimes that are mentioned.

 2     And the crimes that are mentioned are the ones in Busovaca in January

 3     1993.

 4             Now, linked to Dario Kordic as a politician, wielding a certain

 5     amount of military influence, I'm going to put your testimony forward

 6     about Blaskic.  It is on page 17220 of the transcript from the Kordic

 7     trial.

 8             The Prosecution put a conversation to you between Blaskic and

 9     Kordic which was intercepted, and you commented on that and said that you

10     don't believe that it was true and that it seemed to you to be somebody

11     putting this in as an intercept.  Anyway, I'm going to quote what you

12     said, what your answer was, in English:

13             [In English] "To begin with, I am not sure; that is, I don't know

14     if that is a conversation between Blaskic and Kordic.  If he has the

15     authority, as you say, then it must have to do with the personal

16     relationship between them."

17             [Interpretation] Or, in other words, you, General, said that if

18     Kordic could have suggested to Blaskic what he should do in a military

19     sense, that it was a question governed by their personal relationships.

20     Do you remember that part of your testimony?

21        A.   I testified that the relationship between Kordic and Blaskic,

22     Kiseljak/Busovaca, well, there could have been no contact like that, so

23     that the transcript or whatever it was that I read, after the war in the

24     paper "Slobodna Bosna," that it was construed in some way, fabricated.

25     But what was authentic was the part where they swore, used swear words in

Page 47841

 1     their conversation, but that it wasn't realistic as to what was implied

 2     there.

 3        Q.   General, the transcript reference is 47738.  In this trial, you

 4     told us, and I'm going to provide a summary in Croatian, that Kordic

 5     could not exercise command in the Vitez recruitment area.  He was in a

 6     position to exert influence over some of the commanders.  He did have a

 7     certain charisma as well as power in certain situations, but I can also

 8     tell you as follows:  He was in no position to exercise command in

 9     Travnik, Vitez, or, indeed, Novi Travnik.  He could not issue orders in

10     Zepce or Lozancic.  He couldn't do anything in Kiseljak, in the Kiseljak

11     area.  He could not give orders to anyone.  I think the remaining portion

12     is not so relevant.

13             General, do you allow for the possibility that Dario Kordic had a

14     significant political influence over people in Central Bosnia?

15        A.   He did have political influence over people in Central Bosnia.

16     He got them organised before the election, on the eve of the election and

17     so on and so forth, so he did have a certain amount of influence, but he

18     was not in command, nor indeed could he have been in command, nor indeed

19     did he ever try to be in command.  My impression of him as a soldier was

20     that he was a bit like a fashion model, carrying no weapons at all.

21     People were guarding him, but he was no commander, he wasn't the man who

22     was headed straight into the thick of it, the fighting, or indeed anyone

23     giving orders.

24        Q.   Another question, and then we'll go back to Kordic.

25             General, when you say "commander," when you say "chain of

Page 47842

 1     command," who do you mean; a person who actually holds a rank as a

 2     military commander, and the chain construed as going from the top-ranking

 3     soldier, trickling down to lower-ranked soldiers?

 4        A.   "Command" means that someone can and has the right to exercise

 5     command.  He has some people below him, and those below him are under an

 6     obligation to carry out the other man's orders.  That is what I would

 7     mean by "chain of command."

 8        Q.   General, what would you say about the following situation:  We

 9     know that the HVO had brigades and that the brigades were more or less

10     based on the existing municipalities.  For example, a brigade commander

11     attends a morning meeting or coffee on a daily basis.  He goes to the

12     president of the HVO in that particular municipality for that meeting.

13     Other people are also there who hold certain offices in that

14     municipality.  The brigade commander likes to hear what the opinions are

15     of the local civilian leader.  He's inclined to act in keeping with the

16     civilian leader's wishes.  And now my question.  This local leader, in

17     your opinion, does he have a place in the chain of command?

18        A.   Command is one thing.  Influence over commanders is a different

19     thing.  Grubesic could have got in touch with Kordic, or Blaskic could

20     have got in touch with Kordic.  They could have acted on that.  But he

21     was always the commander, Kordic, or Grubesic in Busovaca.

22        Q.   Let us go back to the hypothetical level as I first presented it.

23     This would mean that the local civilian leader is not part of the chain

24     of command?

25        A.   That's right, he is not a part of that chain.

Page 47843

 1        Q.   This fact, him not being a part of the chain of command, if

 2     that's what the circumstances were, does this change anything about the

 3     fact that the local political leader has effective power and that he may

 4     make suggestions to the commander as to what to do and what course of

 5     action should be taken?

 6        A.   He has power.  He has the power to influence certain

 7     developments.  He proposes that something be done.  He criticises the

 8     fact that a step was not taken or a measure was not taken.  But we're

 9     still at the level of political influence.  This does not constitute

10     command.

11        Q.   All right.  In a bid to sum up the role of this local politician,

12     would it, in your opinion, be fair to say that he is no military

13     commander, he is not a part of the chain of command, but he does have

14     power and he can exert influence on political developments in his

15     municipality?

16        A.   Take the example of Travnik.  Mr. Tamburic blames me because the

17     compound was taken or something.  He has influence.  He wields this

18     influence and exerts pressure.  He tries to get things his own way, to

19     have things his own way, but he's in no position to order me to do

20     anything.

21        Q.   All right.  Let us go back to Dario Kordic and everything that's

22     been said about him so far.

23             If my understanding of your evidence is correct, we could say, in

24     relation to Dario Kordic, that he was no military commander, he was not a

25     part of the chain of command, but he did have certain power, and he was

Page 47844

 1     in a position to influence certain military commanders; would that be

 2     fair?

 3        A.   He had a lot of power and, yes, he was in a position to influence

 4     commanders by using his personal influence.

 5        Q.   Let us now have a look at what the Appeals Chamber of this trial

 6     decided in the Kordic case about Kordic, himself.  The Chamber did not

 7     conclude that he was a military commander or, indeed, a part of the chain

 8     of command; rather, it concluded that he was a political leader with a

 9     degree of military influence.  Because of his de facto influence, he can

10     be held responsible in relation to certain things that happened.  My

11     conclusion is that the Trial Chamber arrived at the exactly the same

12     conclusion as you, general, about the possible role of a civilian

13     official or, indeed, his influence on military commanders.

14        A.   Right, they kept asking me questions about command, and I said he

15     was not in command and he was in no position to be in command.

16        Q.   General, we need to draw a distinction between command, on the

17     one hand, and external effective control over military commanders.

18        A.   I am a commander.  I set the notion of command quite apart from

19     anything else.

20        Q.   My next subject is about the organigram that the OTP showed you.

21             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  Before counsel continues

22     and just if I could have one brief intervention.  I've been, I think,

23     pretty good about not getting on my feet.  Since a rather serious

24     allegation is being made about my alleged mis-characterisation of the

25     record, I just want to make the record clear, and I'm looking at the

Page 47845

 1     document that counsel has marked 4D02019.

 2             We've now, in the last some minutes, heard all sorts of things

 3     about Mr. Filipovic's further testimony in the Kordic case.  However --

 4     and if you look -- if you look at the right side of the page, down below

 5     the appeals judgement, there are references to a number of transcript

 6     references, starting with 17051.  I waited, because I wanted to make sure

 7     I didn't jump the gun, to see what counsel -- if counsel would cover it,

 8     but I have to point out for the record that the one citation she doesn't

 9     deal with and hasn't dealt with this afternoon is the specific citation

10     by the Kordic Trial Chamber.

11             When you look at the left side of the page, what the Trial

12     Chamber said was:

13             "To this end, a great deal of evidence was called to show that

14     Kordic played no military part in the conflict and simply wished to help

15     his people.  The Defence relies on this evidence in respect of Kordic's

16     alleged role in the Busovaca conflict; footnote 1069."

17             If we go to 1069 at the lower part of the page:

18             "Many witnesses gave evidence of this, including military

19     commands and others; Major General Filip Filipovic at transcript

20     page 17045."

21             Not a page that counsel has dealt with on the right side of the

22     page.  And at P -- and at transcript page 17045, the citation given by

23     the Trial Chamber -- the Kordic Trial Chamber and which the Kordic Trial

24     Chamber rejected was his -- this testimony of the witness.

25             I said that Mr. Kordic never had command over any military unit

Page 47846

 1     in the Central Bosnia Operative Zone.  That's exactly what was cited by

 2     the Kordic Trial Chamber, and not these other items on the page.  I

 3     simply want the record to be clear.

 4             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there's no need to

 5     interpret this.  I understand my learned friend Mr. Scott would want

 6     something like this to appear on the record, but it's perfectly clear

 7     that there is not a single statement by General Filipovic here about the

 8     clashes in Busovaca in January 1993 that might back or corroborate what

 9     my learned friend is saying.  I do think this is crystal clear.  Anyway,

10     therefore, I shall not dwell on it any longer.

11        Q.   General, we spoke about this organigram used by General Petkovic

12     in the Blaskic case.  This is P11123.

13             As we're waiting for the document to come up on our screens, I

14     would like to point out that the English translation of this document is

15     insufficient in one particularly important aspect.  The link between the

16     commander-in-chief and the Main Staff is missing, and it is a direct link

17     which bypasses the Defence Department.  There is a link between the

18     commander-in-chief and the Main Staff.  The Croatian document shows that

19     very clearly.  In the English document, the link is missing.  Therefore,

20     I think it should be corrected, because it just might prove very

21     important further down the road in this case.

22             General, you were asked something about re-subordination in

23     relation to this document.  Among other questions, you were asked who you

24     would report to or who you would get in touch, for example, with in your

25     Travnik Brigade if you wanted an element of the Convicts Battalion to

Page 47847

 1     come out and help you.  The Convicts Battalion, if we look at this chart,

 2     is only linked to the commander-in-chief, and no one else?  You said that

 3     in a technical sense, you would send a request by packet communications

 4     or a different type of equipment, you would send it on through to the

 5     Main Staff.

 6             Judge Antonetti then went on to state:

 7             "Therefore, it would be natural for you to go through the

 8     Main Staff to achieve this."

 9             My question for you, General:  If the Convicts Battalion was only

10     subordinated to the commander-in-chief of the HVO and no one else, who,

11     then, would have had the power to make a decision regarding the

12     re-subordination of a component unit of the Convicts Battalion, for

13     example, to the Vitez operations area?

14        A.   First of all, it would never have occurred to me, never have

15     crossed my mind, to ask for the assistance of the Convicts Battalion.

16     But if I'd needed the services of another unit holding the same position

17     as the Convicts Battalion, again, technically, I would have gone through

18     the Main Staff.  Who could the decision have been taken by, as the chart

19     shows; by the command-in-chief.

20        Q.   Very well.  Thank you, General, that's quite sufficient for my

21     purposes.  Now a very brief question about today's evidence.

22             There was a brief mention of men fit for military service.  There

23     was a short document bearing the name of General Petkovic.  It was said

24     that those men should be kept in Sovici and Doljani.  My question,

25     General:  Were these men fit for military service under a military

Page 47848

 1     obligation?

 2        A.   Yes, they were.

 3        Q.   At a time of war, these military conscripts, are they active

 4     forces or reserve forces?  Do they actively contribute to the defence of

 5     their countries or are they considered to be civilians?

 6        A.   In Bosnia-Herzegovina or in the area in which I happened to be,

 7     everyone was a military conscript.  And they could be assigned to a

 8     civilian posts as well, but the military duty was incumbent equally upon

 9     everyone.

10        Q.   If they weren't assigned to some sort of work assignment or

11     something else, such as a post in the Civilian Protection, they were an

12     active service army; right?

13        A.   Yes, they belonged to one of the units in the active service.

14        Q.   You were asked today, General, what you, as a military commander,

15     would have done had one of your soldiers set fire to a house or, indeed,

16     committed any sort of criminal offence.  You said you would have had them

17     detained.  General, your answer assumes that you actually know who the

18     perpetrator was, who set fire to a house or who committed a crime.  I'm

19     asking you now:  In your capacity as a military commander, would you have

20     launched an investigation in a situation in which the perpetrator

21     remained unknown, you don't know who it was who set fire to a house or

22     committed a crime?

23        A.   When we talk about taking measures, we assume that the measures

24     will be effective, that my life is not at risk in any way.  When

25     Dzemal Merdan came to the village of Jelinak with us, the commission and

Page 47849

 1     the command, finding the same sort of situation that probably prevailed

 2     in Santici or Ahmici, we see soldiers there setting fire to houses, we

 3     see dead bodies.  The people involved are attacking Dzemal Merdan, and

 4     had the Cheshire Battalion soldiers not protected him, they would have

 5     killed him.  What could a commanding officer possibly do in a situation

 6     like that?

 7             When Dzemal Merdan, a high-ranking BH Army officer, said, What on

 8     earth are you doing, we have the international community here, they

 9     attacked him with rifles.  And had it not been for him being protected by

10     the British Battalion, they would have killed him.  This gives you an

11     idea of what a high-ranking or low-ranking military officer can do, and

12     this idea is necessarily a relative one because it relates to what is

13     actually going on and what actually went on in my area.

14        Q.   I'm not asking you anything about the actual possibilities, but

15     what somebody's duty-bound to do.

16        A.   They are duty-bound to prevent something which is not --

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, quickly, because I

18     would like your testimony to end today - we have 20 minutes left and

19     still some topics to broach - but, quickly, I'm just hearing about what

20     happened with Mr. Merdan, where soldiers wanted to kill him, and he was

21     fortunately saved by the intervention of the BritBat.  Well, that's fine,

22     but while I was listening to you, I was thinking about the rebellion in

23     1917 where rogue soldiers had decided not to go and fight during World

24     War I, and generals at that time, just like generals like you, had

25     decided to set up martial courts and to try these soldiers, and then

Page 47850

 1     execute them immediately.  Couldn't you set up a martial court and try

 2     these soldiers that were attacking Mr. Merdan, under your very own eyes

 3     and the eyes of the international community?  Weren't you able to do

 4     that?  Didn't you have the competence to do that?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Impossible, impossible, to set up a

 6     court-martial, nor was there any court-martial in Bosnia-Herzegovina as

 7     far as I know.  What you could perhaps do was to engage the Intervention

 8     Platoon which was more under the control of a commander, or the military

 9     police if it was further away from the front, because the military police

10     is not up at the front.  So at a later stage, once the soldier was no

11     longer at the place where the event had occurred.

12             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, tell us, please, whose soldiers tried to

14     kill Mr. Merdan?

15        A.   The members of the Territorial Defence, I think those of the 7th

16     Muslim Brigade -- as I was saying, members of the Territorial Defence

17     cleansed the village of Jelinak, and we came to solve the issue, and that

18     was that particular event.

19        Q.   Now, General, a brief explanation about some documents

20     particularly with respect to Mr. Roso and Blaskic, dating to May 1992,

21     with the subject of the HVO being the only legal entity, now which one of

22     the two was legal, the HVO or the BH Army, or whatever.

23             Now, the Prosecutor showed you a series of documents ending with

24     one dated the 11th of May dealing with that subject.  If you go back to

25     the agreement about friendship and co-operation, think back, which on the

Page 47851

 1     21st of July, 1992, was signed by Alija Izetbegovic and Franjo Tudjman,

 2     which is document P339, my question to you is this:  In that document,

 3     for the first time it says loud and clear that the HVO and the BH Army

 4     are equally components of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Now,

 5     my question to you is this, General:  To the best of your knowledge, any

 6     time afterwards, as presented by the Prosecution, as put to you by the

 7     Prosecution, was there a discussion about whether the HVO was the legal

 8     and legitimate military force of the Croatian people in

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also of the Muslims and everybody else who wished

10     to take part in combat?

11        A.   Yes, but that was in July 1992.  That particular agreement was a

12     correct and proper agreement, as far as the situation on the ground was

13     concerned, although at the same time there were attempts to do things

14     beyond -- that went beyond this agreement.

15        Q.   Very well.  Now a brief question, General, just to avoid any

16     misunderstanding.

17             My colleague Mr. Scott put it to you -- or, rather, suggested an

18     answer to this effect: that the HVO was an organised and significant

19     military force in 1992, at the end of 1992, in actual fact.  And that is

20     on transcript page 47696 -- 46696 [as interpreted].  And you went on to

21     explain that there was a difference in relation to April 1992.  So I want

22     to ask you something now linked to a portion of your testimony in the

23     Kordic trial, recorded on page 17017 of the transcript, where you say

24     that there wasn't enough time to establish full military organisation and

25     that you -- one needed some time in peace and then another year or two in

Page 47852

 1     order to establish an army in the proper sense of the word, a real army.

 2             Now, to the best of your knowledge, General, what would you say?

 3     When did the HVO become an organised army capable of carrying out attack

 4     and defence assignments which could be considered organised in the sense

 5     of a professional modern army?

 6        A.   We had an army, and I've already said that, only as of 1994, and

 7     just a part of an army, in actual fact, because we had guards brigades

 8     that were being established, and there were manoeuvre units, and you

 9     could go on assignment with the proper unit only in 1994.

10        Q.   General Filipovic, one of the ways in which the Prosecution

11     attempted to shake the Trial Chamber's trust and confidence in your

12     testimony was your alleged statement to the HINA agency with respect to

13     the indictment raised against the six Croats from Central Bosnia.  To the

14     best of your recollection, the first indictments that were raised by the

15     Prosecution of this Tribunal against Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina were

16     exclusively from Central Bosnia; right?

17        A.   Not only Croats, but the first 20 indictments -- within the first

18     20 indictments, there were 15 indictments against Croats, and that was

19     quite surprising and astonishing when I realised that.  And when you look

20     at the number of years people were sentenced to, terms of imprisonment,

21     that was quite astounding, too; at least it was to me, because as I said,

22     we put up a pure defence, a crime had been committed.  Unfortunately, in

23     my state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were a lot of crimes committed by

24     Muslim, Serbs, and Croats, crimes to each other and, especially, victims

25     on the part from the international community that had come to help out

Page 47853

 1     the country, help my country out, and they ended up losing their lives,

 2     they were killed or they were belittled or whatever.  And so in that

 3     sense, the Lasva Valley could not have been the centre of these negative

 4     events that took place within this country of mine that was

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 6        Q.   Now, General, you started answering a question of mine, and I

 7     said we'll deal with that in due course.  So to wind up now, Mr. Scott

 8     tried to compromise you as a witness by saying that you were a Defence

 9     witness for Dario Kordic in the trial -- in the Kordic trial held at this

10     Tribunal.  Tell me, General, what do you think about that?  What do you

11     think about it, when a Defence witness -- when they try to discredit a

12     witness merely through the fact of his being a witness for the Defence?

13        A.   That's a terrible message, a message sent out, that a witness

14     testified in a case when the accused stood trial and were found guilty.

15     That's a terrible message.  It's something that I was really shaken to

16     see.

17             MR. SCOTT:  I apologise for the interruption.  I'm sorry, but I'm

18     not going to allow --

19                           [Overlapping speakers]

20             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] May we allow the witness --

21             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, I'm not going to allow my --

22             MS. ALABURIC:  [Overlapping speakers]... finish the answer.  The

23     witness didn't finish the answer.

24             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, he did.  Yes, he did.

25             MS. ALABURIC:  He did not.

Page 47854

 1             MR. SCOTT:  Well, then I'll wait.  Then I will wait.  But, I do

 2     want to address the matter.  That's -- that statement against me cannot

 3     simply be allowed to stand.  That was not our position, that was never my

 4     position, but I'll let the witness answer first.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour --

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Tell us, please, Witness, how did you experience this and what

 8     did you think?

 9        A.   Your Honours, my overall impressions from that is that part of

10     this Tribunal, the Prosecution sees his work --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat his answer?

12     Could the witness be asked to repeat his answer.  Thank you.

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Repeat that, General, please, for the record.  It wasn't

15     recorded.  The interpreters didn't hear you.

16        A.   This Tribunal -- well, the witness is lost in all the cacophony

17     of voices, procedure, and so on.  I said that the Prosecution is Caesar's

18     wife; she cannot be thought to do wrong.

19             MS. ALABURIC:  "Caesar's wife."  "Caesar," C-a-e --

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, what did you have to

21     say?

22             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23             Well, first of all on the last point, I've never known anyone in

24     this institution to be the slightest bit reluctant to criticise the

25     Prosecution for anything, and so I don't know anything about being

Page 47855

 1     Caesar's wife, but that's not been my experience.

 2             Secondly, Your Honour, that mis-characterises -- more

 3     importantly, that mis-characterises the Prosecution's position, in

 4     particular my position.  I --

 5             THE WITNESS:  [No interpretation]

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, excuse me.

 7             I never took the position, I have never taken the position, I

 8     don't expect to ever take the position, that a witness's testimony should

 9     be questioned simply because he or she came to testify for the Defence.

10     That is not my position.  I raise a separate, different issue in terms of

11     the nature of his specific testimony in the Kordic case, the evidence

12     that he was confronted with to the contrary, and the Trial Chamber's

13     assessment of his evidence.  I have never taken the position, I will

14     never take the position, that a witness should be adjudged less credible

15     simply because he was called for one side or the other.  And to

16     characterise my position as that is not correct.  Thank you.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   And my final question:  Witness, if you remember, Mr. Scott said

19     that you had testified for Dario Kordic and that you considered

20     Dario Kordic to be a hero.  You tried to explain to him that as far as

21     you were concerned, for you Dario Kordic was not a hero, and you tried to

22     explain why you agreed to be a witness for Dario Kordic's Defence, but

23     you weren't able to finish your thoughts.  So tell us now, in your

24     opinion, as far as you're concerned, is Dario Kordic a hero, and why did

25     you go to testify for Dario Kordic?

Page 47856

 1        A.   Your Honours, in the Kordic trial, in this particular trial, and

 2     when Alagic was accused, I offered to come forward and testify because I

 3     lived during the time when all that was going on, and I wanted to assist

 4     the Court in uncovering the truth and making their serious decision.

 5             Now, Kordic, a hero?  Well, he cannot be a hero, as far as I'm

 6     concerned.

 7        Q.   And my last question, General, is this:  Tell us, please, in your

 8     opinion, as far as you're concerned, at any time during the conflict with

 9     the BH Army was the dilemma with -- was there a dilemma whether you were

10     defending Bosnia-Herzegovina or not?

11        A.   Your Honours, all my efforts, before and now, were for

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I did not defend Bosnia-Herzegovina in some imagined

13     or recognised form, but as life and civilisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14     I think that was my duty, because I was a professional.  Now, I could

15     have pulled out.  I had a way of not being involved.  But from one day to

16     the next, I was engaged in the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, General Filipovic.  And

18     that concludes my re-examination.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, your testimony is now

20     over.  I would like to thank you, on behalf of my fellow Judges and

21     myself, to have come here to The Hague for the Defence of

22     General Petkovic and to help us elicit the truth.  I wish you the best

23     and a safe return home, and I will ask our usher to please escort you out

24     of the courtroom.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I be allowed to

Page 47857

 1     say something briefly?

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, if you want to tell

 3     us -- to ask us whether we heard you, fine.  But if you want to make

 4     speeches on this trial, this is not the right forum for this.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was always greeted,

 6     both by the Prosecution and the Trial Chamber in the Tribunal.  I would

 7     like to say thank you to the Tribunal for giving me the opportunity of

 8     giving you my visions of the problems that my country faced.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10                           [The witness withdrew]

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, I hope the

12     witness is ready for tomorrow morning.  Is everything okay?

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the witness was

14     already here in court, but we sent him back to his hotel.  But, yes, he

15     is ready and will appear tomorrow morning.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

17             Mr. Kovacic, is Mr. Praljak ill?  Why is he not with us in the

18     courtroom?

19             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak is tired.  I can't say

20     he is sick.  He's just tired and said he'd prefer not to come in.  He

21     says he's not feeling very well, so that's why.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We hope that he

23     will soon get better and we'll have him in the courtroom tomorrow.

24             I thank you all.  Have a pleasant evening, and we'll resume

25     tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.

Page 47858

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.57 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of

 3                           December, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.

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