110216ED

Page 52342

1 you once again that that happened on the 10th of June, 1993, and I will

2 also remind you of a document, P2690, which was a communique signed by

3 Bruno Stojic after the attack in Travnik. As we read this statement

4 provided by a Prosecution witness, we can see that indeed there had been

5 an attack in Travnik prior to the 9th of June, 1993. We have already

6 spoken about that in paragraph 528. However, Your Honours, what matters

7 and what needs to be emphasised here is the fact that the HVO did not

8 respond to those attacks because already on the 12th of June, 1993, an

9 agreement was signed about the end of hostilities between the BiH Army.

10 The document number is P2726. Yet the BiH Army continued its offensive

11 in Central Bosnia, which is also confirmed by an UNPROFOR report under

12 P2750.

13 Your Honours, we have presented a large number of documents which

14 confirm this fact. However, on this occasion, I wanted to present an

15 objective report, as it were, the report by UNPROFOR, which is very

16 important because it is a day-to-day account of what was going on in

17 Central Bosnia.

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry to interrupt. I think we should avoid

19 reference to reports by a society, an institution which is so touchy

20 about secrecy. They are not -- the public is not supposed to know that

21 we have as evidence reports of this organisation. I think we should

22 redact that too.

23 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, UNPROFOR reports do not

24 fall under that category. I may have been misunderstood, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I may also be wrong.

Page 52343

1 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in this part of our

2 final argument, we were dealing with some of the reports provided by

3 international organisations which contained opinions and conclusions

4 which were not founded on the events on the ground. Thank you,

5 Your Honour Judge Trechsel. You know, we said nobody's perfect.

6 Everybody makes mistakes.

7 Your Honours, we have demonstrated that some assessments and

8 perceptions of people and the entire HZ-HB were subjective and biased.

9 My learned friend Mr. Karnavas also spoke about that. The

10 Honourable Honours could also hear that when those witnesses were --

11 provided their testimonies. I am convinced that that was also sometimes

12 your own perception. We all remember Witness BH who provided his

13 assessments about the situation in Mostar. When my learned friend

14 Mrs. Alaburic asked him where the Vranica building was he didn't know.

15 He could not answer. He also didn't know what had happened on the

16 9th of May, 1993.

17 His Honour Judge Antonetti expressed his surprise when he

18 realised that this witness was not that familiar with the situation in

19 Mostar, and you will find that on transcript pages 17714 and 17715. That

20 person was a high-ranking international official.

21 Nevertheless, they still drafted reports and sent it to their

22 superiors irrespective of the fact that they did not have reliable and

23 complete information.

24 Your Honours, all Resolutions by the Security Council relied on

25 the reports of the international monitors who were on the ground, who

Page 52344

1 were in the area. We have seen in this courtroom, at least partly, at

2 least to a certain extent, how those reports were drafted, and based on

3 those reports, the indictment was issued against these six accused,

4 including my client, for a joint criminal enterprise. These reports

5 represented just tiny pieces from which a big mosaic was created that

6 finally led to the signing of peace agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7 The Dayton Constitution -- or, rather, the Dayton Accords were signed

8 under the auspices of the international community, and the international

9 community relied on reports from the area and rewarded the campaign of

10 ethnical cleansing in Republika Srpska and recognised that area as a

11 separate entity. Before this Trial Chamber and before this Court, which

12 was established by one and the same Security Council, many convictions

13 were brought for genocide and other gravest and most heinous crimes

14 against the political and military representatives of Republika Srpska.

15 At the same time, this Prosecutor's office, as a part of the

16 international court, proclaimed the HZ-HB a para-state, and the

17 Prosecutor repeated that in his final argument.

18 So it was based on the Dayton Accord that a state was created,

19 which even today, 15 years after that Accord, cannot seem to function,

20 but that is hardly surprising. There are two entities, of which one has

21 the attributes of a state, even a flag, a hymn, or a national anthem,

22 actually, and the other is divided into ten cantons. There are 13

23 governments, and the state is headed by three presidents.

24 The majority of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even today, think

25 that the organisational structure imposed by the Dayton Accord has

Page 52345

1 prevented them from realising their rights as one of the constituent

2 people. Even in countries with developed democracies, it is always the

3 least numerous people that is faced with the greatest problems, and that

4 is especially true in a state structured such as this.

5 These unresolved relations between the peoples in

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina have brought Bosnia-Herzegovina to a deadlock,

7 especially these days when the representatives of the Croats and BiH

8 again advocate the restructuring of Bosnia-Herzegovina to realise their

9 rights as a constituent people. The official authorities in Zagreb also

10 voice their concern for the position of the Croats in BiH, although

11 President Tudjman died long ago. This is also advocated by the president

12 of Croatia, who is a social democrat, and also by the prime minister who

13 belongs to the HDZ, and other leading politicians who, at

14 Franjo Tudjman's times, were in the opposition.

15 A third entity in the Herceg-Bosna are no longer a taboo as was

16 the case after the war and all the way until the October elections in

17 2010.

18 We have heard witnesses here who were replaced from their

19 positions by the High Representative in BiH, who was actually the highest

20 authority there, and they were replaced when -- because they spoke about

21 a third entity, or call it Herceg-Bosna. Nowadays, these are no longer

22 taboos, and nowadays the High Representative no longer takes the measures

23 that he used to.

24 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I know we've been giving broad latitude,

25 this is far afield and I don't believe it's in evidence in record. The

Page 52346

1 evidence has to be -- what is submitted to the Court has to be in

2 evidence in record. Now talking about what happened in the last couple

3 of weeks is not in evidence, should not be referred to, and it is also

4 inaccurate. It was just several days ago that the United States

5 ambassador to Bosnia condemned a continuing effort to create a third

6 entity in Bosnia. The United States ambassador came out and said, We

7 reject the creation of a third entity, a Croat entity, et cetera,

8 et cetera. So number one, it's not in evidence. It should not be

9 included; number two, it's wrong. So ...

10 MR. KHAN: Mr. President, I do, with regret, deprecate this

11 intervention. I do deprecate it. It is a matter of very well-known

12 professional courtesy that closing speeches are not interrupted. We gave

13 the Prosecution that courtesy. And we didn't agree with a lot of what

14 they said, whether it was grandchildren or thugs or invective. We kept

15 quiet. Your Honours, if inaccuracies are said, Mr. Scott, on behalf of

16 the Prosecutor, can make an application at the end to rise and address

17 them, but I would ask that he be restrained and remain seated -- and

18 remain seated and allow this final speech and the voice of Mr. Stojic to

19 be heard and not drowned out by interruptions.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Let me consult with

21 my fellow Judges.

22 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honours. Excuse me, Your Honours.

23 Let me respond --

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All I can say is that I come

25 from a system where the voice of the Prosecution and the voice of the

Page 52347

1 Defence is never interrupted by the other party. I was a Prosecutor and

2 it never occurred that anyone interrupted my closing arguments, and I

3 never saw the opposite either.

4 I will now consult with my colleagues to see what should be done.

5 I believe that what has happened is quite extraordinary, Mr. Scott --

6 MR. SCOTT: [Overlapping speakers]

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What do you want to add,

8 Mr. Scott?

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

10 MR. SCOTT: I rose to my feet with great reservation and the

11 Chamber fully knows that I have sat here for the last two-plus days and

12 not gotten up to my feet. I'm happy to sit here and take insults to

13 myself, insults to Prosecutor counsel, and that we've been sleazy and

14 unethical. They can attack me all they want. But what is put before the

15 Chamber and argued does have to be in evidence. It has to be in

16 evidence. And that's the difference in terms of factual assertions.

17 Now, this is not argument. These are factual assertions being made. It

18 is only become an extreme basis that I rose to my feet. I apologise to

19 that, but I think this is completely different than broad latitude in

20 arguing inferences. This is an -- inferences. These are factual

21 assertions about things that are not in evidence. Excuse me, and I

22 apologise if I offended the Chamber. I did so with great reluctance.

23 Thank you.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber has

Page 52348

1 deliberated, as you see, and would like to remind you that there was a

2 written decision from the Chamber in which it said that there should be

3 no objection from any party, from any party, I repeat, Prosecution or

4 Defence, when the other party was making its closing arguments. So we

5 anticipated the problem, and therefore we dismiss Mr. Scott's objection

6 regarding the words spoken by Mr. Stojic's Defence.

7 Mrs. Nozica, you have the floor.

8 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let me add one thing. The

10 Trial Chamber also reminds everyone that the Prosecutor, after closing

11 arguments, can -- can request to have the floor as rebuttal, and the

12 Trial Chamber will allow this or not, but this -- what you said,

13 Mr. Scott, could have been said after the closing arguments.

14 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I'm very

15 glad that Mr. Scott intervened, because I said nothing else but that this

16 is something that's discussed publicly today in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

17 that a third entity or another solution today is a topic dealt with by

18 many political factors in the world who have understood that both

19 Herzegovina, as it was created by the Dayton Accord, cannot function.

20 I am familiar with the position of the American ambassador who

21 opposes the creation of a third entity. That's true. But it's also true

22 that it's a topic of discussion which we -- which I have said. For a

23 long time, that wasn't the case, and the very fact that this is being

24 discussed, whether anybody agrees or disagrees with it, now after

25 15 years is significant in itself.

Page 52349

1 We would like to point out that these six accused were in no

2 position to exert influence on such demands put forward by the

3 BiH Croats, because they have been in detention for five years. I have

4 put this matter forward, because the Trial Chamber will take its decision

5 about the joint criminal enterprise based on the facts in the case file

6 and based on the generally known facts of the present time, because two

7 things are going done in parallel, this trial and repeated criticism on

8 the part of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina due to their inability to

9 realise their constitutional rights. That is relevant for a number of

10 allegations put forward by the Prosecution with regard to the JCE in

11 their final arguments.

12 Now I'd like to discuss the allegation that Bruno Stojic

13 consciously and significantly contributed to the JCE of Herceg-Bosna. In

14 paragraph 532, the Prosecution strived to show the participation of

15 Bruno Stojic in the JCE since 1991 when he was assistant minister of the

16 interior of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by virtue of this

17 function, he was also a member of the Crisis Staff of the HDZ.

18 This allegation of the Prosecution, namely that Bruno Stojic as

19 member of the HDZ Crisis Staff, actually began his activity as part of

20 the JCE cannot stand its ground. Bruno Stojic, acting as assistant

21 minister of the interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by virtue of his position

22 was a member of the HDZ Crisis Staff. This was confirmed by Prosecution

23 witness Stjepan Kljuic. The transcript page is 7962 through 7966. That

24 body was neither illegal nor criminal. It was headed by Stjepan Kljuic,

25 a moderate Croat, as he has been called several times by the Prosecution.

Page 52350

1 It was a task of the HDZ Crisis Staff to protect citizens,

2 because it was obvious that the defence system in Bosnia-Herzegovina had

3 collapsed. It was based, first and foremost, on the JNA. Bruno Stojic

4 was assistant minister of the interior of the Republic of BiH, in charge

5 of finance. At that time, after the first multi-party elections, the

6 minister was a Muslim. The ministry adopted decisions at the collegium

7 of ministers, and Bruno Stojic went about his tasks professionally and in

8 accordance with the laws and regulations of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

9 advocating an integral whole Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is especially

10 corroborated by document 2D841. This is the content of testimony of

11 Witness Davor Korac, who at the time worked at that ministry. The

12 transcript reference is 38825 through 38832.

13 Bruno Stojic didn't leave Sarajevo to join the HZ-HB.

14 Bruno Stojic at that time lived in Neum with his family, and he went

15 there every weekend to see his family. In early April 1992, while he was

16 in Neum, all points of entry to Sarajevo were blocked, and Bruno Stojic

17 was unable to return to his job. Witness Davor Korac says as much on

18 transcript pages 38825 through 38826.

19 Furthermore, it is correct, as put forward by the Prosecution,

20 that Bruno Stojic participated in the procurement of weapons in that

21 period because that was part of his job as assistant minister of the

22 interior, but these weapons were distributed to both Croats and Muslims.

23 Witness Zoran Buntic -- Witness Zoran Buntic confirms that on

24 transcript pages 30587 through 30592, and Witness Slobodan Bozic on

25 transcript pages 36192 through 36196.

Page 52351

1 There's also another document to corroborate this, and that's an

2 excerpt from Dr. Ismet Hadziosmanovic's book, who, as I said, at the time

3 was the president of the SDA for the city of Mostar, and his book is

4 Exhibit 2D976.

5 Apart from that, there is also the testimony of Hamid Bahto on

6 transcript pages 37900 and the following, and there's also a document --

7 or, rather, Exhibit 2D1253.

8 The Prosecution alleges that this Crisis Staff was -- later

9 became the HVO army, and he cites Exhibit P56. But from the persons on

10 the list of 13 members of the Crisis Staff of the HDZ, only one later was

11 a member of the military component of the HVO, and that is Ivo Lozancic.

12 In paragraph 533 and the following, Bruno Stojic's work in the

13 Department of Defence is mentioned. We have dealt with these matters in

14 paragraph 32 of our final brief.

15 I would like to stress the following, though: Bruno Stojic was

16 head of the Department of Defence from the 3rd of July, 1992, through

17 10 November 1993. There are -- there is evidence about the end of

18 service of Bruno Stojic in the Department of Defence, and that is

19 Slobodan Bozic's testimony on pages 36163 and the following, and 36204

20 and the following, and there's also Exhibit P6583 and Exhibit 2D416.

21 I insist on this, Your Honours, because in the Prosecution final

22 brief, in spite of this evidence, the Prosecution claims that

23 Bruno Stojic remained in a leading position in the Department of Defence

24 until late November, as if no evidence had been led before this Trial

25 Chamber as to when exactly Bruno Stojic stood off -- stood down. We

Page 52352

1 think this is very important. The Department of Defence was one of the

2 departments of the HVO HZ-HB with the same capacity as any other

3 department. We also refer to paragraphs 223 through 231 of the Prlic

4 final Defence brief and the final arguments of that same Defence of

5 14 February 2011.

6 Then I would like to mention that the Decree on the Armed Forces,

7 P289 and P588, lay down the -- all relations between the bodies of the

8 HZ-HB with the president of the HZ-HB, and that also applies to the

9 relationship between the HVO HZ-HB and the Department of Defence.

10 Bruno Stojic reported to the HVO HZ-HB for his work there, as all

11 other heads of departments, and, in his work he had no direct link with

12 the president HZ-HB, either de jure or de facto. The relationship

13 between the Department of Defence and the president of the HZ-HB was

14 purely of administrative nature and had to do with appointing officers at

15 lower positions in the military component of the HVO. But let us return

16 to the position of the Department of Defence of the HVO HZ-HB.

17 The Department of Defence compiled a programme of work based on

18 requests issued by the HVO HZ-HB, as all other departments, which is

19 corroborated by Exhibit 1D110, Exhibit P4890, and P646.

20 The Department of Defence submitted reports on its work to the

21 HVO HZ-HB as all other departments did. The HVO HZ-HB forwarded this

22 report to the president of the HZ-HB. The Main Staff, separately from

23 the Department of Defence, also submitted its own report to the

24 HVO HZ-HB, and that was forwarded to the president. This is confirmed by

25 Exhibits P128 and P4699. I deliberately ignore documents created after

Page 52353

1 10 November 1992 when Bruno Stojic was no longer head of the

2 Department of Defence. These reports were accepted by the -- or approved

3 by the HVO HZ-HB, which is corroborated by Exhibit 1D1607 and P4008.

4 The Department of Defence made proposals for the appointment of

5 officials to be appointed by the HVO HZ-HB as any other department did,

6 and the Department of Defence received funds for its work and the

7 military component of the HVO, because the HVO HZ-HB in 1992 and 1993, as

8 all other departments, didn't -- didn't have its own budget. I will

9 mention the relevant documents: P578, P950, P1137, P1197, P1324, P1388,

10 P -- excuse me 1D1183, P5799, and, finally, P6689. This is a letter of

11 the government of the HR HB dated 16 December 1993, which was sent to all

12 municipalities. From it we can see that the government, based on the

13 decisions of the Assembly, requests the establishment of a single

14 financial system to fund the defence, the police, and the judiciary,

15 which shows that even as -- in late 1993, this financial system at the

16 level of the HZ-HB had not been established, which -- which confirms the

17 allegations of Defence in their final briefs that the municipalities

18 actually played the main role in the funding of the army.

19 The head of the Department of Defence informed the HVO HZ-HB

20 generally about the security situation, but the HVO HZ-HB also invited

21 the leading persons from the Main Staff to meetings when it wanted

22 precise information. The relevant documents have already been mentioned.

23 Matters from the remit of the Department of Defence have been

24 discussed at almost 80 per cent of the meetings of the HVO HZ-HB. We

25 have no time to list them all but believe that these, as all other

Page 52354

1 documents, too, will certainly be carefully scrutinised by the

2 Trial Chamber. Although most meetings dealt with Defence matters, at no

3 one meeting was a discussion about operative commanding -- commanding the

4 HVO, because that wasn't part of the remit of the Department of Defence

5 or that of the HVO HZ-HB. So if we look at the minutes from all meetings

6 of the HVO HZ-HB, we see that the Department of Defence, as all other

7 departments, depended on the decisions taken by the HVO HZ-HB and had no

8 specific positions, nor did it have any special links with Boban that

9 would affect its work.

10 Jadranko Prlic's Defence tried to suggest to the Trial Chamber

11 that the Department of Defence had special links with the president of

12 the HZ-HB, which simply -- which is simply wrong. Bruno Stojic didn't

13 issue declarations with Mate Boban, but Jadranko Prlic did, which is

14 logical with regard to his position. Document P2346 corroborates that,

15 and we see what the military situation was like there. Although the

16 Prlic Defence tries to push out the Department of Defence from the HVO

17 HZ-HB, they cannot achieve that, because the evidence points to the

18 contrary, and so does common sense.

19 It's the Decree on the Armed Forces, P289 and P58, is the basic

20 legislative document that determines the remit of the Department of

21 Defence and its head. The -- there's also the decision on the basic

22 structure of the Department of Defence, which is P586, and there's the

23 decision on the organisation and the responsibility of the departments

24 and commissions of the HVO HZ-HB, which is P440.

25 It follows from all these that the Department of Defence, with

Page 52355

1 regard to the H -- the military component of the HVO, is in charge of

2 administrative and professional matters as well as budget and material

3 supply. The head of the Department of Defence did not command the army.

4 That remit was -- that was the Main Staff's remit. We have spoke about

5 that in detail in paragraph 331 of our final brief. We will briefly

6 dwell only on document P586 to explain the remit of the head of

7 Bruno Stojic with regard to the brigade commanders. This is a reply to

8 paragraphs 6510 -- 65 through 106 and 376 through 364 and 614 of the

9 Petkovic Defence brief, final brief.

10 Now, with regard to the paragraph I mentioned in the Petkovic

11 final brief, we would like to stress that the brigade commanders were not

12 subordinate to the head of defence except in matters outlined in

13 Article 9. There's no one -- there's no evidence that brigade commanders

14 turned to Bruno Stojic with regard to matters that were not mentioned in

15 Article 9.

16 With regard to the aforementioned paragraphs in the

17 Petkovic Defence final brief, I would like to say that brigade commanders

18 were not subordinated to the head of the Defence Department, with the

19 only exception being financial matters and budgetary issues.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We no longer have any

21 interpretation into French. It's back. Thank you.

22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I will repeat. There is no single

23 piece of evidence corroborating the fact that brigade commanders were

24 subordinated to Bruno Stojic with regard to any activities or tasks, with

25 the only exception being financial matters, administrative matters,

Page 52356

1 budgetary matters, and organisational issues. There's no single piece of

2 evidence that brigade commanders addressed Bruno Stojic and brought

3 before him any other issues but the aforementioned ones. There's no

4 single piece of evidence that Bruno Stojic issued a single order to

5 brigade commanders, with the only exception being those that dealt with

6 administrative issues. And finally, it arises from the Petkovic final

7 brief that the head of Defence Department was superior to the brigade

8 commanders with regard to the operation of prison because -- of prisons

9 because this was a non-combat activity. This is not corroborated by a

10 single piece of evidence. In footnote 646 of Petkovic's final brief,

11 allegedly there is evidence which corroborate this thesis and those are

12 reports of the SIS of the brigades and not brigade commanders.

13 In paragraph 332 of our final brief, we provided relevant

14 evidence as to how the SIS functioned in the area -- area of HZ-HB and

15 proof which demonstrated without any doubt that assistance for SIS in the

16 brigades were subordinated to the brigade commanders. This was confirmed

17 by Zrinko Tokic, who testified on behalf of both Praljak and Petkovic,

18 and his testimony was recorded on pages T45458, lines 10 to 5.

19 Tokic then alleges that Bruno Stojic remained active in the area

20 of arms and logistics as the head of department for production and sale

21 of weapons and military equipment of the HR HB upon assuming those duties

22 and tasks on the 16th of December, 1993. The Prosecutor did not provide

23 any evidence to this Trial Chamber about the role of Bruno Stojic in the

24 JCE after his departure from the position as the head of the

25 Defence Department on the 10th of November, 1993.

Page 52357

1 Bruno Stojic's Defence claims, with regard to paragraph 339 which

2 deals with the ultimatum story, that there was no ultimatum on the

3 15th of January, 1993. There was none in mid-April 1993. A lot of

4 detail to that effect have been provided in paragraphs 243 of our final

5 brief.

6 With regard to the authorities of Bruno Stojic to issue the order

7 which was admitted into evidence under P1140, this is the order dated

8 15 January 1993, which is portrayed as an ultimatum. We would like to

9 point out that he only implemented a decision of the HVO HZ-HB in keeping

10 with his authorities pursuant to Article 9 on the decision of the

11 organisation of the Defence Department. And here we would like to point

12 out that the order issued by Bruno Stojic shows that this could not be an

13 ultimatum. And the same applies to the order issued by General Petkovic.

14 I would kindly ask the Trial Chamber to pay particular attention

15 to Article 1 in Bruno Stojic's order where it says that the Main Staff of

16 the armed forces of the HVO must establish contact with all operation

17 zone and staffs of the BH Army in the territories of provinces 3, 8, 10,

18 1, 5 and 9, with a view to finalising details of the implementation of

19 this decision of the HVO HZ-HB. That decision was admitted into evidence

20 and clearly shows that that could not have been an ultimatum, given the

21 fact that contact had to be established with commanders and staffs in the

22 territories of various provinces as mentioned in that order.

23 I would kindly ask the Trial Chamber to reconsider and carefully

24 analyse all of those documents that deal with the alleged ultimatum. For

25 the long five years, those documents have been referred to as an

Page 52358

1 ultimatum, so it should be very careful in evaluating whether they,

2 indeed, were an ultimatum, because where I come from, there is a

3 notorious truth which says if you repeat a lie ample times, it becomes

4 true, true, and that applies to this alleged ultimatum. It was not an

5 ultimatum, and I'm sure that the Honourable Chamber will be able to

6 realise very quickly what this was all about.

7 In document 1139, bullet point 7, it says:

8 "Commanders of operative zones are hereby tasked with

9 establishing contacts with the commands of the BiH and find the best

10 solutions for establishing joint commands."

11 This is General Petkovic's orders. How can these decisions be

12 ultimatum but they can only be realised in co-operation with the ABiH?

13 These documents were drafted based on the agreed positions of the

14 negotiators -- negotiators in Geneva and the talks between Izetbegovic

15 and Boban in Zagreb, as General Praljak testified before this Trial

16 Chamber on pages 40568 through 40573 and confirmed by Witness Bozo Rajic.

17 When these documents were issued and when we heard the testimony

18 of Mr. Praljak, this was corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Bozo Rajic,

19 who, at the time, was Defence minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who

20 testified before this Court and his testimony -- his statement was

21 admitted at 2D1409.

22 In the order issued by the minister of defence of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, who also included into his order the units of the

24 Army of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Article 6, states that the

25 implementation of the order will be the duty of Brigadier

Page 52359

1 Milivoj Petkovic, the commander of the Main Staff of the HVO;

2 Colonel Sefer Halilovic; and Colonel Ratko Mladic.

3 The order was issued on the 21st January 1993. The document

4 number is 2D441, and the deadline for the implementation of the order or

5 for its execution is the end of negotiations in Geneva. Why were there

6 objections to the order being carried out and why Mr. Izetbegovic changed

7 his position? It suffices to look at document 2D48 which the

8 Trial Chamber members have in their binders and this is an interview

9 given by Sefer Halilovic to El Pais on the 27th of January, 1993. In

10 that interview, he said that nobody could destroy the idea of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single integral and sovereign state through no

12 negotiations. He said negotiations are all well and good, but if a

13 different result is achieved, we will prevail in a battlefield.

14 And then there is a journalist -- the journalist's comment, and

15 he says Halilovic's opinion probably has more weight than the opinion of

16 President Izetbegovic, although Halilovic does not have his chair at

17 roundtable in Geneva. He is still the one who represents those who fight

18 on the front lines.

19 And finally let me say that there was no ultimatum. This was

20 just an attempt to organise Bosnia-Herzegovina in the way that was

21 agreed -- agreed by the representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Geneva.

22 However, the government in Sarajevo withdrew their consent after

23 decisions and orders had been issued by the HVO HZ-HB.

24 Since the Prosecutor shows this ultimatum as one of the most

25 important pieces of evidence corroborated -- corroborating the existence

Page 52360

1 of the JCE, we have to ask ourselves what would have happened if those

2 decisions had been implemented jointly and in co-operation?

3 One of the very significant options is this: There would have

4 never been a war between Bosniaks and Croats, because everything would

5 have been resolved in January 1991. The problem between Bosniaks, who

6 were then known as Muslims and Croats, from the very outset was different

7 ideas of the internal organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this is

8 precisely what General Halilovic talks about in his interview. On the

9 one hand, there was a desire of the government in Sarajevo for Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina to be organised as an integral state; and, on the other hand,

11 there was a desire of a majority of the Croatian people to decentralise

12 the state and break it down into -- into either cantons or provinces or

13 an association of republics. The concept was accepted by the

14 international community. So the concept of the internal reorganisation

15 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they offered different solutions which

16 were all to the last accepted by the representatives of the HZ-HB.

17 However, none of those solutions were adopted or approved by the

18 government in Sarajevo.

19 Under the pressure of the international community, the war was

20 ended, and the Washington Agreement was signed. The Washington agreement

21 follows the demands of the representatives of the HZ-HB, because the

22 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been split into cantons. It has

23 been divided into cantons.

24 In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we could see in

25 Exhibits 2D1183, Article 1, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the

Page 52361

1 HVO have been recognised as the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

2 nothing has changed to this day. Deadlines were given to establish a

3 Joint Command, and that was done, but that was done only two years after

4 the war and after the collapse of the concept of a unitarian or a single

5 state that was advocated by Alija Izetbegovic from the beginning of the

6 attempts to organise Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Just like my learned friend Mr. Ken Scott did it, I'm going to

8 ask the Trial Chamber to carefully read the transcript from the meeting

9 between Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman, dated 12 July 1992. The

10 document number is P336. This transcript shows that there was a conflict

11 between those two concepts of the internal organisation of

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina. The concept of a unitarian state, on the one

13 hand, and the concept of a state divided into cantons on the other.

14 All of this certainly has to be put into the perspective of

15 solutions as proffered by the Washington Agreement. This transcript

16 clearly shows, and Mr. Alija Izetbegovic confirmed that, that the HVO was

17 the first to organise themselves for the defence of

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time when the government forces did not

19 exist and were not organised. This transcript shows that Mr. Izetbegovic

20 is grateful to -- to Croatia for everything that they had done for the

21 refugees up to then. The transcript also shows that Alija Izetbegovic

22 wanted Croatia to continue assisting Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also it

23 shows his reluctance to accept Croatian demands for the cantonisation of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 I'm now moving on to paragraph 540, and I'm following my own

Page 52362

1 thesis about the way the decision was made on the 15th of January, 1993,

2 the same decision that the Prosecutor calls an ultimatum. He wants to

3 transfer that same picture and image on to the events which took place

4 after the 30th of June, 1993, and again, he's referring to

5 Exhibits P3038, and that's the proclamation which signed jointly by

6 Mr. Prlic and Mr. Stojic on the 30th of June, 1993, and he brings them

7 into connection with an order issued by Mr. Petkovic about raising combat

8 readiness to a higher level, which is P3082 and orders under P3128 and

9 P3012. Contrary to the assertion by the Prosecution that that was a case

10 of some sort of subordination, the Defence points out that the only

11 common reference for this -- for -- for the issuing of those documents

12 was the BiH Army attack against the HVO on the 30th of June, 1993.

13 If we follow the chronology, the first thing that happened was

14 the issuing of the order P3019, then P3082, and finally the order

15 co-signed by Mr. Stojic and Mr. Prlic, P3128.

16 The Petkovic Defence, in paragraphs 253 through 254, states that

17 Mr. Petkovic, on the 30th of June, 1993, after the order P3019 was

18 issued, informed Mr. Bruno Stojic that in all the units measures have

19 been taken to remove Muslims from the HVO units, and that the same was

20 repeated on the 22nd of July, 1993, in his report two days before he left

21 his position as the Chief of Staff.

22 These reports clearly states that measures had been taken in

23 order to disarm Muslim members of the HVO and that additional

24 mobilisation campaign had been carried out. Documents were offered to

25 corroborate this claim. They were 4D480 and P3642. We have to emphasise

Page 52363

1 that it is correct that these documents do not mention that Muslim

2 members of the HVO should be isolated. Those two documents were not

3 presented to Mr. Stojic, because he was in Mr. Petkovic's chain of

4 command, which is proven and corroborated by document P3029, which was

5 delivered to Mr. Blaskic, and the document is identical to 4D48Z.

6 Document P3640 is a six-month report.

7 Mr. Bruno Stojic's Defence points out that the Prosecutor,

8 himself, in his closing argument admitted that on the 30th of June, 1993,

9 the situation changed in the HZ-HB and that that was the date when the

10 war started between the ABiH and the HVO. This is what the Defence

11 claims. And we also claim that the war started with the ABiH attack on

12 the HVO. And now we are moving to the Prosecutor's final brief, to its

13 part entitled as follows: "Stojic had full authority and responsibility

14 for the Defence Department in the HVO."

15 This is not true. Bruno Stojic did not have full authority and

16 responsibility for all the activities of the Defence Department, which we

17 corroborated in paragraph 3 of our final brief. Bruno Stojic did not

18 issue orders to the assistants in the Defence Department, and he also did

19 not issue orders to the commanders of the Main Staff.

20 In paragraph 542, the Prosecutor develops his case and says that

21 Bruno Stojic had wide authorities in managing and controlling the

22 Defence Department, which included issuing order to the assistants of the

23 HVO Main Staff and other bodies. To corroborate his words, the

24 Prosecutor does not proffer a single piece of evidence that would confirm

25 this. Among the documents proffered by the Prosecutor, there's also

Page 52364

1 document P5259. We emphasise that these are the instructions for the

2 work of the SIS in Travnik. This document was not drafted or issued by

3 Bruno Stojic. The document is not signed. The author is not mentioned.

4 However, the heading shows that the document was issued by the security

5 sector and not Bruno Stojic.

6 In paragraph 543, the Prosecutor claims that the collegium of the

7 Defence Department advised Stojic about various defence and military

8 issues and that Stojic put a lot of weight to these meetings and that he

9 told General Praljak that he should personally attend the meeting on the

10 2nd of September, 1993. General Praljak, however, sent his deputy to

11 that meeting.

12 In footnote 1272, the Prosecutor refers to the testimony provided

13 by Slobodan Bozic, who -- when they claim that the collegium advised

14 Stojic on different defence and military issues. The witness never said

15 that. I'm going to quote the witness:

16 "The collegium was an informal body which was not envisaged by

17 any document. The purpose of the meetings of that body was to discuss

18 all relevant issues, issues of some interest for the Defence Department

19 and the preparation of various documents that were supposed to be adopted

20 at the HZ-HB level or at the level of the president of the HZ-HB. So all

21 those should be discussed, and all members of the collegium could

22 participate, all with a view to finding the best possible proposals and

23 solutions that would be later on referred for further processing."

24 Collegium meetings were not intended to -- to provide advice to

25 Bruno Stojic on Defence and military issues. Many administrative and

Page 52365

1 technical issues of some relevance for the functioning of the

2 Defence Department were discussed at the collegium meetings, and this can

3 be seen in all the transcripts. The transcripts clearly show that every

4 sector was independent in the discharge of their duties and that the head

5 of the Defence Department did not have a say in that.

6 Your Honours, I would like to move on to the topic of the

7 collegium. I would like to show some transcripts. I would not like to

8 be interrupted after showing the first in the series of documents that I

9 intend to show, so I would kindly ask you to call the first break at this

10 moment.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It was just about time to have

12 the break. We shall have a 20-minute break.

13 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

16 Ms. Nozica, please proceed. I was told by the Court Deputy that

17 you had so far used 2 hours and 57 minutes. In other words, there is

18 still -- you have nearly two hours left.

19 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you for this information,

20 Your Honour. I will try to finish by the end of this session, and then

21 the final arguments will be presented by my learned friend.

22 Before I continue, I would like to correct the transcript and

23 thank Ms. Alaburic, who -- who pointed this out. On page 19, line 3, I

24 said "lower-ranking commanders," whereas it should be "higher-ranking

25 commanders."

Page 52366

1 I also apologise to the Trial Chamber and everybody else in the

2 courtroom for any possible errors regarding numbers, but in the afternoon

3 we will review the transcript, and, in case of need, tomorrow morning

4 correct the transcript before we proceed, or possibly file a motion.

5 Let me now return to the matter of the collegium of the

6 Department of Defence. I will mention everything relevant.

7 I've already pointed out that the collegium discussed

8 administrative matters. The relevant documents in chronological order

9 are 2D1362. That's an invitation to a meeting.

10 Then 2D1363. And I would like to point out that in these

11 minutes, under item 6, it is clear what administrative role Bruno Stojic

12 had in appointing persons, appointing either personnel in individual

13 sectors or in units. Mr. Stojic asked all his assistants to submit

14 proposals for personnel appointments by Monday, 30 November 1992. He

15 also requested proposals for personnel to be appointed to establish

16 certain brigades.

17 The following collegium meeting is 2D1443, and then 2D1444,

18 followed by P880, P1075, and P4646.

19 P4756 is that meeting to which Bruno Stojic invited

20 General Slobodan Praljak, but he didn't come. In his stead,

21 General Matic was there. He was de facto the fourth most important man

22 in the Main Staff.

23 We can see from a discussion in item 1, and the Trial Chamber has

24 the document, that the restructuring of the Main Staff was on the agenda,

25 and this is a matter normally dealt with by the head of the Department of

Page 52367

1 Defence.

2 On 18 September 1992, the head of the Department of Defence did

3 adopt an interim structure of the Main Staff, that is P502, in which the

4 highest ranking positions of the Main Staff were the Chief of Main Staff,

5 the deputy chief, and the assistant chief. As we see from the discussion

6 by General Matic in these minutes, there were dilemmas due to the

7 introduction of new positions, namely the deputy chief and the assistant

8 Chief of the Main Staff, which were absent from the interim structure.

9 So it wasn't clear what the authority of the Chief of Main Staff or his

10 deputy, respectively, were.

11 The highest-ranking person in the Main Staff should have attended

12 the meeting, but he didn't come, and General Matic didn't have the power

13 to take such decisions. Nothing was done, but a new deadline was given

14 to the services of the Main Staff to draft an instruction about the work

15 of the Main Staff. However, this job was never done before Bruno Stojic

16 left the position of the head of the Department of Defence on

17 10 November 1993.

18 All this is not so important were it not for the insistence of

19 the Prosecution on the fact that Bruno Stojic invited General Praljak.

20 But General Praljak was the highest-ranking man in the Main Staff, and it

21 was normal for him to give his opinion about these matters.

22 Let me now pass to paragraph 545 of the Prosecution final brief

23 where the Prosecution asserts that Bruno Stojic had powers over the armed

24 forces, including the right to issue orders to the Chief of the

25 Main Staff, but he don't corroborate this assertion by any evidence. And

Page 52368

1 that is not surprising, because there is no evidence to corroborate it,

2 and this is a false assertion. The only orders Bruno Stojic ever issued

3 to the Main Staff refer to administrative matters regarding the structure

4 of units which were part of his remit according to Article 9 of the

5 decision on the elements of the structure of the Department of Defence.

6 Furthermore, it is asserted that Bruno Stojic was in a position

7 to order the establishment of HVO units or their merging or splitting.

8 The Prosecution offer Exhibit P3149 to corroborate that, because that

9 document is an order to re-establish the Knez Domagoj Brigade, but this

10 order was not passed by Bruno Stojic. This order was co-signed by the

11 Chief of Main Staff. If this was expressly within his remit, he would

12 have issued the order himself.

13 In item 2 of this order, which is actually within his remit and

14 that's why he co-signs, he gives out a task to the Department of Defence

15 from the remit of the civil sector of the Department of Defence. So this

16 wasn't an order of the head of the Department of Defence, which is

17 confirmed by Exhibit P3151, which is an order issued by Mr. Obradovic,

18 who passes -- passed it on to subordinate units, and in the preamble to

19 that order, he refers to the order issued by the Main Staff rather than

20 the order of the chief of the Department of Defence.

21 Let me move on to the heading in the Prosecution brief that

22 Stojic played an active role in the command and control of the armed

23 forces of the HVO. But Bruno Stojic did not have the authority to

24 command the HVO, nor did he ever do that. This is explained in detail in

25 paragraph 331 of our final brief.

Page 52369

1 Two commanders of the Main Staff have been heard in this

2 courtroom, Milivoj Petkovic and Slobodan Praljak. Both confirmed that

3 they never received an order from Bruno Stojic about the operative

4 commanding of the HVO. The transcript pages where this can be found are

5 43446 and the following. Also page 50349.

6 The Prosecutor actually confirms that, too, in the first sentence

7 of paragraph 547. No one document used by the Prosecutor to corroborate

8 this claim actually confirms it. The claim of the Prosecution is that

9 Stojic actually commanded indirectly, but that doesn't make sense,

10 because the only way you can command is directly, and the Prosecution's

11 duty was to offer evidence to that effect.

12 In Annex N, the Prosecution lists several documents which

13 allegedly show that Bruno Stojic commanded HVO units. Not one of these

14 documents actually confirms that.

15 I would like to point out the testimonies of the commander of the

16 Main Staff again, which clearly show that Bruno Stojic did not command

17 HVO units in an operative manner.

18 The Stojic Defence does not deny that the Main Staff was under

19 the Department of Defence. The Department of Defence did have authority

20 with regard to the Main Staff as outlined in Article 9. We have said

21 that several times. But the -- but a close reading of that paragraph

22 clearly shows that Bruno Stojic didn't have the authority to either plan

23 or command.

24 Your Honours, I would like to draw your attention to the

25 possibility that in Annex N of the Prosecution final brief, you may be

Page 52370

1 able to find Mr. Siljeg's reports, who submitted -- which he submitted to

2 Bruno Stojic and other persons. But for the Trial Chamber to decide

3 whether Bruno Stojic received these reports only for his information or

4 to act upon, it is necessary to see that Bruno Stojic did not report --

5 receive sitreps from commanders of other operative zones. For him to be

6 able to take part in planning or issue orders, even indirectly, as

7 asserted by the Prosecution, then he would have had to have reports from

8 all operative zones, but that is not the case. Therefore, the only

9 conclusion to be drawn is that Colonel Siljeg, in accordance with some

10 procedures that he obviously learned, sent reports both to the

11 Department of Defence and other bodies of the HZ-HB, but there is no

12 evidence that Bruno Stojic ever replied to him with regard to inquiries

13 in these documents or that he gave him instructions or orders.

14 Paragraph 549: Here the Prosecution claims that Bruno Stojic had

15 close and direct connection with Gojko Susak, the Croatian minister of

16 defence, about military matters, and as evidence they offer the

17 transcript from the meeting of the People's Defence Council of Croatia of

18 3 November 1992, where Susak put forward the information that on

19 19 August 1992, he had a meeting with 17 officials from

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, among whom there was Bruno Stojic. This clearly does

21 not corroborate the Prosecution's claim about the existence of direct and

22 close links between Bruno Stojic and Gojko Susak.

23 The Prosecution go on to assert that it is obvious from the

24 transcript of 27 January 1993, that Stojic thoroughly informed

25 Gojko Susak about military operations in Central Bosnia, including

Page 52371

1 Gornji Vakuf, and for that they offer Exhibit P1325 as corroborating

2 evidence.

3 Your Honours, I kindly ask you to review this transcript, because

4 we submit that it does not contain what the Prosecution asserts.

5 The Prosecution further claim that Stojic controlled HVO labour,

6 logistics, and finance. In paragraph 556, the Prosecutor asserts that

7 Witness Miroslav Rupcic confirmed in his testimony that Stojic requested

8 the minister of defence of Croatia to pay for the armed forces and that

9 Susak approved that, but the witness didn't say that. The Prosecutor

10 showed the witness two documents P10290 and 10291. The witness said

11 these documents did not bear Bruno Stojic's signature. This unambiguous

12 statement of the witness is mentioned on page 23375 of the transcript,

13 lines 9 and 10. It suffices to look at these documents to find out that

14 they do not have the letterhead of the Department of Defence. They have

15 no registration number of the Department of Defence or its seal, and they

16 are not signed by Bruno Stojic.

17 During his cross-examination, the witness was shown the settling

18 of accounts of the Department of Defence for 1993. That's P8118, pages 7

19 and 8. It's a lengthy document. The Trial Chamber has -- has it in its

20 possession. And the overall revenue of the Department of Defence is

21 stated in Croatian dinars. Here the amount is shown which the

22 Department of Defence received from the Ministry of Defence of the

23 Republic of Croatia and the Department of Finance of the HR HB. The

24 amount received from the Department of Defence of the Republic of Croatia

25 is 16.764.924.236 Croatian dinars.

Page 52372

1 During the witness's testimony of Witness Miroslav Rupcic, a

2 conversion of Croatian dinars into German marks was made which can be

3 found in paragraph 214 of our final brief. The witness testified that

4 toward the end of 1993, that amount equalled 4.488.445 German marks. The

5 reference can be found in transcript pages 23573 and the following.

6 When we presented this document to the witness, Judge Antonetti,

7 based on the information from that document, said that this amount was

8 received from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia is

9 lesser than 10 per cent, which is completely correct. And the

10 transcript -- the relevant transcript page is 23576 through 23571. I

11 apologise. I misspoke. It's transcript pages 23576, line 17 -- lines 17

12 and 28.

13 Bruno Stojic's Defence points out, and that can also be seen in

14 the documents P1020 and 1291, that the monies were borrowed from the

15 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. And the Defence also

16 points out that the monies loaned to the Defence Ministry were raised by

17 the citizens who originated from Bosnia and Herzegovina and who lived in

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere, all over the world, and that was

19 confirmed by the Prosecutor's witness Mr. Rupcic on pages 23579 through

20 23581 and 23585. We would like to draw your attention, Your Honours,

21 that on that occasion the witness was also shown document 2D532, which

22 was admitted into evidence as 1D1755.

23 The witness explained why those monies were paid into accounts in

24 Croatia rather than in accounts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It should be

25 pointed out because of the Prosecutor's allegation about the -- about the

Page 52373

1 JCE in this part that concerns financial support to -- provided by the

2 Republic of Croatia that the Defence has presented to the Trial Chamber

3 Exhibit 2D545, which is the guarantee of the Ministry of Finance of the

4 Republic of Croatia, dated 13 May 1992. And this guarantee showed --

5 shows that it was guaranteed to the Crisis Staff of the Muslims of

6 Croatia an amount of $30 million US worth of goods will be delivered as

7 assistance to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Your Honours, it

8 really is not necessary to provide any comments about these two amounts,

9 because they clearly show that the Republic of Croatia has given ample

10 money, both to the HZ-HB and also provided guarantees to the republic of

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina that there would be at least a nine times higher

12 amount forthcoming in order to assist the Republic of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina.

14 Paragraph 558: The Prosecution further claims that Bruno Stojic

15 organised special centres, intelligence centres, in Mostar and Zagreb,

16 and he proffers Exhibit P2044. The claim does not arise from that

17 document. The intelligence centre in Mostar had existed even before the

18 war and continued existing during the war. This is corroborated by

19 P7344, pages 41 through 45, where we can see what the role of that centre

20 was -- or, rather, of these centres. These centres were primarily

21 intended for alerting and informing citizens about possible attacks,

22 informing citizens about the passability of different roads, the supply

23 of water, and also they were intended to make a note of all those events.

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina borders on Croatia, and it was only normal for the two

25 centres to co-operate as they do in peacetime. Intelligence centres of

Page 52374

1 that type co-operate during peacetime and during wartime, and they share

2 information of some relevance for each other.

3 In this paragraph, the Prosecutor claims that Bruno Stojic

4 co-operated with the Serbs when it comes to the procurement of weapons

5 from the Serb side. When it comes to the parts of Mladic's diaries and

6 co-operation with the Serbs, we provided a detailed explanation in our

7 final brief, in paragraph 259 -- 252.

8 Bruno Stojic's Defence claims that the purchase of weapons from

9 Bosnian Serbs was the product of the environment in the area of the UHZHB

10 which were under constant attack on the part of the ABiH. They were not

11 in a position to procure weapons in any other way. They were not able to

12 get medical treatment in those enclaves because they didn't have any

13 hospitals. This is confirmed by the Prosecutor's witness EA.

14 The fact that those areas were encircled was used by the

15 Bosnian Serbs as testified by EA to sell their weapons and materiel and

16 technical equipment at prices up to ten times higher than was their real

17 market value.

18 During the examination of that witness, I used the word

19 "blackmail," and indeed it was a blackmail, and Witness EA confirmed that

20 on pages 24904 to 24903 through 24917. The page numbers are 24904, 24913

21 to 24917. This is also confirmed by document P9967.

22 The document shows the prices which were paid for materiel and

23 technical equipment. Would I like to draw the Trial Chamber's attention

24 to the fact that the witness was examined and shown this document during

25 his examination, and we also showed him 2D577. In this document, we see

Page 52375

1 the prices that the ABiH paid for the materiel and technical equipment

2 purchased from the HVO and from the arms factory in Travnik. We compared

3 those prices with the witness, and we established that the prices they

4 paid to the Serbs were up to nine times higher. This was recorded on

5 transcript pages 24913 through 24917.

6 We would like to briefly draw the Trial Chamber's attention to

7 document P9965, specifically to the last sentence in that document which

8 shows that the HVO Kiseljak paid 1 million Deutschmarks to the Serbs from

9 their own funds. This is yet another piece of evidence that the local

10 authorities financed the troops in their own areas.

11 I'm now moving on to the part where it says that Bruno Stojic

12 exerted control over the HVO military police. In paragraph 561, there is

13 a description of the administrative activities which were within the

14 remit of Bruno Stojic, as well as of the chief of the military police,

15 Valentin Coric.

16 In paragraph 564, the Prosecutor alleges that one day before the

17 HVO ultimatum, on the 15th of April, 1993, according to the Prosecutor,

18 the ultimatum was on the 15th of April, 1993, so one day before that, the

19 military police commander Lovric issued a plan for the intensive control

20 of the city of Mostar pursuant to an order issued by the

21 Defence Department head, and he mentions document number P1868. However,

22 the Prosecutor's allegation is not correct. This is indeed a plan of the

23 increased control of the city of Mostar. However, the document says that

24 it was being issued because of the complicated security situation as a

25 result of the conflict between the ABiH and the HVO in Konjic. This plan

Page 52376

1 has nothing whatsoever to do with any ultimatum.

2 Witness Dragan Juric testified about this attack by the ABiH, and

3 would I kindly ask you to look at two documents, P1874 and P1879, which

4 illustrate this claim. The same paragraph says that after the BH Army

5 took the North Camp in Mostar, Bruno Stojic subordinated the civilian

6 police, which had manned the front lines, to the commander of the

7 military police. In the footnote, there is a reference to document

8 P3124. However, Your Honours, this is not correct, and you've -- you

9 will see that confirmed in documents P3027 and P3123. These -- these are

10 orders issued by the head of the department of the interior who had the

11 right to command the civilian police.

12 As far as moving the military police from Livno and their arrival

13 in Mostar, the commander of that unit testified, and that testimony was

14 recorded on transcript page 50973, and in his testimony he said whose

15 orders he followed when he did that.

16 In paragraph 567, the Prosecutor claims that -- that after

17 tensions in Prozor in October, Stojic's Defence Department stepped up the

18 HVO control in Mostar by way of issuing an order to the military police

19 through Valentin Coric. The Prosecutor claims that the order was for the

20 military police to get hold of the most important facilities in town. In

21 order to corroborate that claim, they proffered document P619. In this

22 report, it is stated that pursuant to the order of the head of the

23 department, pursuant to a decision of the president of the HVO, certain

24 facilities in Mostar had indeed been taken.

25 A Prosecutor -- Prosecutor's witness, Witness CV, testified and

Page 52377

1 said that this was done in a joint operation of the ABiH and the HVO, and

2 you will see that at -- in the transcript on page 12590, lines 13 through

3 20. And this was additionally confirmed by Witness Vidovic, and that was

4 recorded on transcript pages 5149 through 51554.

5 In paragraph 568, the Prosecutor offers document P670 to

6 illustrate his claim that that document demonstrates an active role of

7 Bruno Stojic in the military operations in Prozor. The document itself

8 shows that there was a joint attempt by Bruno Stojic and Slobodan Praljak

9 to resolve problems that had arisen with regard to the departure of a

10 group of soldiers from Jajce, Jajce that had came -- come under a Serb

11 attack only one day after the alleged agreement with the H -- with the

12 Serbs, and that took place in Jajce, on the 26th of October, 1992, and

13 this is corroborated by P11380.

14 The document shows that for 40 -- 58 hours there had been

15 attempts to allow an HVO formation to head for Jajce, but there have been

16 attempts to prevent that by the Muslims:

17 "You should try to settle this situation with Muslims in Travnik

18 and Jajce, and you should exert your influence over the Muslims and

19 ensure an unhindered passage towards Jajce on their part."

20 And I end this quote.

21 Why was this quote important, Your Honours? It is important

22 because this unit that headed towards Jajce did that on account of a

23 fierce attack by the Serbs. Jajce was being defended by both Muslims and

24 Croats, and that particular unit was also composed of both Croats and

25 Muslims which is corroborated by document number 3D484.

Page 52378

1 Certainly this document cannot be interpreted as an order, but,

2 rather, as an appeal to do anything possible to save Jajce, which was

3 being defended by both the HVO and the ABiH.

4 The following document that the Prosecution used in order to

5 corroborate his claim that Bruno Stojic had been involved in the events

6 and developments in Prozor in 1992 is P799. The Prosecutor claims that

7 Bruno Stojic called the HVO brigade commander and the commander --

8 I apologise, Your Honours. I was just checking the time, and I

9 apologise for that.

10 The Prosecutor claims that Bruno Stojic, on the 25th of October,

11 1992, called the HVO brigade commanders and the commander of the military

12 police in Mostar and invited them to report to him about the situation in

13 Prozor and proffers document P7992 to corroborate that.

14 When we look at the document, we see that this is an invitation

15 to a meeting. However, the conclusion drawn by the Prosecutor certainly

16 cannot be drawn on the basis of this document. The reason why

17 Bruno Stojic sent this invitation is obvious if we look at document P835.

18 Bruno Stojic, only five days after that meeting, issued an order about

19 appointments in the Rama Brigade of other officers and deputy commanders

20 pursuant to the authorities within his remit, pursuant to Article 34 of

21 the Decree on Armed Forces.

22 When we look at these two documents, we can conclude that that

23 was the main topic on the agenda of that meeting. It would not be

24 logical for a Defence Department head to call all the leading officers to

25 travel across the territory to inform him about certain developments

Page 52379

1 seven days post facto.

2 On several occasions, the Prosecutor used documents issued by the

3 assistant for the SIS to the respective units in order to prove some of

4 his allegations, although those documents were never submitted to

5 Bruno Stojic. Bruno Stojic was not in a position to know about the

6 contents of those documents even if they had been sent to the SIS

7 administration.

8 The Prosecutor never proved that Bruno Stojic had full and

9 complete control over a single sector in the Defence Department.

10 Paragraph 571: With regard to the claims in this paragraph of

11 the Prosecution, the Defence points out that there is no evidence showing

12 that Bruno Stojic was aware of the alleged attacks of the HVO after

13 15 April 1993 in Central Bosnia. And no one document the Prosecution

14 uses to substantiate their claim actually shows that.

15 In paragraphs 572 and 573, the Prosecution claims that the HVO

16 operation against Sovici and Doljani was a large-scale operation that

17 included two operative zones and that it could only be co-ordinated by

18 high authorities, including Bruno Stojic. They likewise claim that the

19 operation was carried out in accordance with the plan, so even if Stojic

20 was not involved, he was at least familiar with the plan.

21 The Prosecution failed to prove any of these claims beyond

22 reasonable doubt. As evidence they offered two orders issued by

23 Miljenko Lasic, but they were not forwarded to Bruno Stojic; as well as

24 document P1915, which shows that it refers to the BH Army attacks on the

25 Herceg Stjepan HVO Brigade in Konjic on 14 April 1993 but which

Page 52380

1 Witness Dragan Juric testified on transcript pages 39318 through 39321.

2 Furthermore, document P2085 wasn't received by either Stojic or

3 the Department of Defence, which can be seen from the log-book of coded

4 messages of the Main Staff, which is P463.

5 The Prosecution also did not prove who this man Dragan is.

6 In paragraphs 574 and 575, the Prosecution claims that

7 Bruno Stojic played a leading role in the military operations of the HVO

8 on 9 May 1993, and substantiates that with BBC footage of 10 May, which

9 the Prosecutor presented in his final arguments. Your Honours will

10 remember that this is Exhibit P4238.

11 I would especially like to point out for the Trial Chamber the

12 words the Prosecution uses -- or, the Prosecution mentions in

13 paragraph 577 are not the words of Bruno Stojic but the words of the

14 journalist. The journalist provides an alleged answer in part of that

15 footage, the alleged answer of Bruno Stojic. But after that, we heard

16 Bruno Stojic's voice. We submit that the words cited were not uttered by

17 Bruno Stojic, because if he had, the journalist would have noted that as

18 he has noted or recorded the -- that part of his statement which is not

19 contentious.

20 There were also valuable observations and questions by

21 Judge Antonetti about this footage and about the way of the office of

22 Bruno Stojic looked as well as the maps in front of him. The transcript

23 pages are 35985 through 35961.

24 About paragraph 579, about shelling Mostar after 9 May 1993 and

25 the alleged reasons for that, the Prosecution claims that Bruno Stojic

Page 52381

1 knows about that based on the testimony of Witness CB. The Prosecution

2 haven't proffered any evidence to support the claim that Bruno Stojic was

3 aware of this statement even if -- if the -- and the Defence asserts that

4 this is wrong and that the witness made it up.

5 This statement was not recorded in any report of the SpaBat.

6 Slobodan Bozic -- we cannot trust a witness who says that he didn't know

7 who Slobodan Bozic was, who regularly contacted the SpaBat as a member of

8 the HVO HZ-HB commission for liaison with international organisations.

9 Now, about paragraph 580 that Bruno Stojic knew about sniping and

10 about the death of Lieutenant Fernandez by a bullet fired by the HVO.

11 The evidence of the death of Lieutenant Fernandez has been

12 analysed. Document 2D117 is a report about the findings of the

13 commission whose task it was to investigate the circumstances of the

14 killing of this lieutenant. This report is dated 14 June 1993, and the

15 allegations from this report were used in the letter that Bruno Stojic

16 sent to the Spanish minister of defence.

17 We would like to remind you that Spanish officers, namely

18 Colonel Castro and Colonel De Salas, also took part in the work of the

19 commission, which means that Bruno Stojic did not put himself in the

20 position to be responsible for the death of HVO soldiers. And we see

21 from report 2D117 that a story was compiled which originates from high

22 officials in Spain, probably by mediation of information from the SpaBat

23 that HVO is to blame and that sanctions are to be taken against the HVO

24 in Croatia. This is the reason why Bruno Stojic wrote this letter to the

25 Spanish minister. So Bruno Stojic didn't put himself in the position to

Page 52382

1 be responsibility for the killing of the HVO soldier as the Prosecution

2 claims. Furthermore, we see that the HVO was not responsible for the

3 death of Lieutenant Fernandez nor has anybody ever established anything

4 else about this event.

5 After the report of this commission, UNCIVPOL got the mandate to

6 investigate the circumstances of the killing of this lieutenant, but they

7 never did that. The document is 2D118.

8 So the Prosecution's claim that the HVO was pronounced guilty of

9 this murder is wrong.

10 I'll get back to the last sentence from report 2D117, because it

11 shows the manipulation of information about the death of

12 Lieutenant Fernandez to the detriment of HVO. This can also be seen from

13 the report by General Petkovic, which is P2808. This manipulation was

14 continued by Witness van der Grinten in his statement given to this

15 Tribunal when he said that Bruno Stojic, when talking to this witness on

16 16 June 1993, said that he had HVO snipers under his control.

17 In the report from this meeting, which is P286 -- I'm not sure

18 whether this is actually the right document number. I will check it and

19 correct it subsequently, if necessary. Anyway, this document states that

20 the HVO had snipers under their control.

21 This is obviously false testimony, because it is not at all

22 logical that this wouldn't have been mentioned in the report I mentioned

23 if Bruno Stojic had ever said that. But we can see that not even the

24 Prosecutor believe him fully because if we read the last sentence in

25 paragraph 589 of the Prosecution final brief.

Page 52383

1 In paragraph 588, the Prosecution claims that the HVO attacked

2 the BH Army on 24 August 1993, at the North Camp, the hydro power plant

3 dam and the Rastane village. But the Defence states that the footnotes

4 of 1369, 1370 and 1371 of the documents cited by the Prosecution show

5 that it was actually the BH Army who started the attack. And the

6 documents mentioned here were not received by Bruno Stojic. They show

7 who was in a position to decide which HVO unit would be involved in these

8 military operations, but Bruno Stojic took no part in that.

9 Documents P4401 and P4435 about the professional units and their

10 training allegedly contain Bruno Stojic's statements, but these reports

11 do not state when he allegedly said that, and since the BH Army attacked

12 the HVO on the 24th of August, 1993, Bruno Stojic, even if this were

13 correct, couldn't know that this military operation would be launched or

14 who would take part in it.

15 We would like to add that even in the log-book of activities of

16 the SpaBat, which is P1717, and the following period, no conversation

17 with Bruno Stojic is recorded.

18 Paragraph 589: Here the Prosecution asserts that after the

19 BH Army had taken Rastane on 20 September 1993, Stojic and Praljak

20 reacted fast by mobilising all human resources to destroy MOS terrorist

21 groups which had infiltrated the area. They refer to documents P5235 and

22 P5232. These two orders have nothing to do with the HVO operation at

23 Rastane, which is north of Mostar.

24 The evidence we offer is document P9276, which is map 18, which

25 the Trial Chamber can use to see where Rastane is.

Page 52384

1 The BH Army took Rastane on 21 September 1993, which follows from

2 the report of the Main Staff, which is document 2D338. The HVO

3 operations were commanded by the commander of the zone of operations

4 South-East Herzegovina, Miljenko Lasic, which is -- which can be seen in

5 document P5303.

6 The commands of Bruno Stojic -- or, rather, the orders of

7 Bruno Stojic and Slobodan Praljak refer to terrorist groups in the area

8 of Capljina, Capljina, which is south of Mostar, and not Rastane, which

9 is north of Mostar.

10 Slobodan Praljak in his testimony explained that he received an

11 order from Bruno Stojic and that he crossed out "Mostar" from this order

12 and entered "Ljubuski" and added his initial to confirm the changes. The

13 transcript page is T42078, lines 36 -- line 36 through 42082, line 25.

14 These orders show that the task was to mobilise men which was

15 within Stojic's remit but also that the forces gathered should be put at

16 the disposal of Colonel Obradovic. The mobilisation was to be carried

17 out by the military police and the civilian police. That's why the head

18 of the Department of the Interior was -- or, rather, the head of the

19 Department of the Interior issued an identical order, this is 2D3002.

20 This is obviously an urgent intervention, and that's why all

21 three orders are almost identical, except for this essential detail in

22 which the order of Slobodan Praljak differs. He at the end of his order

23 adds that the commander of the first sector, Colonel Obradovic, shall

24 inform him about its implementation in a regular fashion.

25 So everybody acted within their remit. The order of

Page 52385

1 Bruno Stojic, which is P5232, cannot be considered commanding HVO units

2 as claimed by the Prosecution in Annex N. If there had been terrorist

3 groups in the general area of Capljina -- or that there were terrorist

4 groups can be seen from two SpaBat reports of 12 September and

5 27 September 1993. The documents are P4971 and P5416. In the former

6 document, it is said on page 5:

7 "The logistical patrol that was returning from supplying food to

8 the front line was ambushed at Stanojevici when six HVO soldiers were

9 killed."

10 Your Honours, I can offer a map. It is IC1108. It is not in

11 your binder, but it shows where Stanojevici is. It is in the Capljina

12 municipality.

13 In the second report, on page 5, it is stated that the

14 reconnaissance group, upon the request of the HVO, found five dead bodies

15 at Oplicici, two of which were in uniforms with their hands tied behind

16 their backs, and all five dead bodies had a large hole in the back of

17 their heads.

18 Where Oplicici is, namely at the Dubravska plateau and very near

19 the areas where mobilisation was to be carried out, can be seen in

20 IC0018.

21 These documents clearly show that terrorist groups infiltrated

22 the area and that they executed some people, because that is the proper

23 name for the event due to the state in which the corpses were. The

24 corpses were found by SpaBat and described by them.

25 Furthermore, the Prosecutor asserts that Bruno Stojic commended

Page 52386

1 Tuta and the Convicts Battalion after these operations in September 1993

2 at Rastane instead of launching an investigation and punishing the

3 perpetrators of crimes. The Defence submits that no crimes were

4 committed in September 1993 at Rastane nor can -- may be found in the

5 indictment.

6 Paragraph 591: In this paragraph, the Prosecutor refers to two

7 documents about the alleged information that Bruno Stojic had about the

8 eviction of people from their apartments and transfer of women and

9 children to the left bank. These are documents P5554 and P5518.

10 None of the documents -- or neither of the two were ever

11 submitted to the HVO HZ-HB or Bruno Stojic. My learned friend

12 Mr. Karnavas commented upon one of those documents.

13 The Prosecutor failed to prove beyond every reasonable doubt that

14 Bruno Stojic had any knowledge about those events.

15 Paragraph 593: In this paragraph the Prosecutor alleges that

16 after the crime in Stupni Do, Bruno Stojic proposed that

17 Bruno [as interpreted] Rajic be promoted into the rank of active colonel;

18 that's according to the Prosecutor.

19 As for the assignment of rank to Ivica Rajic, this was not a

20 promotion as the Prosecutor alleges. This was just a proposal. And this

21 can be seen in document P6328, and this was also explained by Witness EA

22 on pages 24904, lines 1 through 17.

23 The Prosecutor did not prove beyond any reasonable doubt that

24 Bruno Stojic knew or was in a position to know about the responsibility

25 of Ivica Rajic about the crimes in Stupni Do.

Page 52387

1 As we look at all of the documents that have been admitted into

2 evidence in this case, we can see that before the 10th of November, 1993,

3 when Bruno Stojic left the position as the head of the

4 Defence Department, there was no suspicion that Ivica Rajic might be

5 responsible for those crimes. In other words, up to that moment, no

6 single element was proffered or established to prove that Ivica Rajic had

7 ever participated in some illegal actions. Furthermore, the Prosecutor

8 alleges that Ivica Rajic continued to report to Stojic, Praljak, and

9 Petkovic about the Serbian Croatian co-operation even after the crime in

10 Stupni Do. He submitted requests and received replies from Stojic on the

11 following day.

12 This is not true. We have to look at documents P6219, which is

13 Ivica Rajic's request, dated 29 October 1993, and the request is for

14 assisting the population in Vares. And also Bruno Stojic's letter,

15 P6267, which refers to a convoy which was supposed to move from Berkovici

16 via Nevesinje to Konjic. That convoy carried aid to the civilian

17 population and the HVO soldiers which were in the territory of Turije,

18 Zabrdje and the Konjic pocket that we often mentioned in this case and

19 that Witness Dragan Juric testified about. So these two documents are

20 not in a causal relationship.

21 In paragraph 594, there is a reference to the fact that

22 Bruno Stojic was directly responsible for the camps and that he

23 participated actively in the establishment of a system which served to

24 expel a number of Muslim detainees and their families and -- and deported

25 them out of Herceg-Bosna. Bruno Stojic was not responsible for the

Page 52388

1 camps, either directly or in any other way, and we provided ample proof

2 of that in our final brief.

3 The Prosecutor offers a document which refers both to the camps

4 as well as to the deportation of Muslims. The Prosecutor offers document

5 P3573.

6 The document itself refutes the Prosecutor's conclusion about

7 Stojic's direct involvement and responsibility for the camps. This is a

8 record of the HVO HZ-HB meeting which took place on the 28th of July,

9 1993. This is just one of the sessions that discuss the issue of the

10 camps.

11 Your Honours, I suggest that you look at the document P3560, and

12 this document describes one of those sessions that preceded the session

13 described in P3573, the latter discussed at the request of the

14 municipality of Capljina about the transfer of the detainees and the

15 conditions of their detention. The goal was to improve the conditions of

16 their accommodation. A discussion ensued, and a conclusion followed, and

17 this conclusion sayings this:

18 "Prisoners of war have to be provided with good accommodation,

19 conditions in keeping with the Geneva Conventions."

20 And it is also said that if the current accommodation facilities

21 are not adequate, the president of the administration of general

22 co-ordination will assign new locations and transfer prisoners of war to

23 the new locations.

24 And now most importantly:

25 "The accommodation in new locations will be within the purview of

Page 52389

1 the Defence Department."

2 A work group or a task force of three people was appointed at

3 that session, and these three people were tasked with visiting the

4 municipality of Capljina, establish the status of the camps and make

5 proposals to remedy the situation if, indeed, a remedy was needed.

6 At this session it was stated that only when the locations are

7 found, the Defence Department will be in charge of them, but only those

8 locations met the conditions of the [indiscernible] 929 [as interpreted].

9 We would like to point out that Capljina and Dretelj centres

10 where prisoners of war were accommodated, as well as people serving

11 prison services, were not established in keeping with this decree.

12 Now let's go back to the session which was held on the 20th of

13 July and that the Prosecutor referred to. The document number is P3573.

14 The task force submitted its report to the participants in the

15 session, and you can see -- you can see that the task force had

16 established that some media reports were incorrect. They visited the

17 area. They provided their opinion. And as for the transit centres and

18 the finding of new locations for the transfer of people from Capljina,

19 this is very important, that's why I will move to that, the international

20 Red Cross and other international organisations will be allowed access to

21 those facilities in order to control the conditions of stay of

22 incarcerated persons.

23 Secondly, an initiative is upheld for the opening of a transit

24 centre in Ljubuski for those people who wanted to leave war stricken

25 areas and leave for the third countries. The UNHCR has been informed

Page 52390

1 about that.

2 Another task force of three people has been assigned in order to

3 see what the possibilities were to accommodate a certain number of

4 incarcerated persons.

5 This is the information that Bruno Stojic received at the

6 session, and the special emphasis was put on the transit centres. It was

7 said at this session that the initiative also involved the participation

8 of the UNHCR. In other words, Bruno Stojic was not involved in any other

9 shape or form in any of the activities that were aimed at expulsion and

10 deportation. We would like to emphasise that both commissions that were

11 supposed to establish what the conditions were and possibly find new

12 locations were composed without the involvement of any member of the

13 HVO HZ-HB. The commission that was established by Bruno Stojic in 1993,

14 pursuant document number P3995, never took off the ground. The document

15 number is P3995. We said that in our final brief, and we repeat it

16 today.

17 As far as the role of SIS in the procedure to exchange prisoners,

18 we would like to point out that document of 6D168 shows that the SIS

19 centre provided their opinion stating that there were no hindrances for

20 people to be released from the central military prison but did not make

21 any decisions about that. Document P4686 shows that this particular

22 person was released pursuant to an approval that was issued by the office

23 for exchanges.

24 Your Honours, although SIS centres were integral parts of the SIS

25 administration and the security sector, the Prosecution did not prove

Page 52391

1 that Bruno Stojic knew or was in a position to know about the activities

2 of the aforementioned centre.

3 In paragraph 597, the Prosecutor claims that on the

4 27th October 1993, Josip Praljak sent a report to Bruno Stojic about the

5 situation at Heliodrom. And he referred to document P6170. The Defence

6 claims that this letter was never sent to Bruno Stojic. Not only did he

7 not receive it, it was not sent to him. The contents of the document

8 show that the information contained in the document is the information

9 sent by the witness to Mr. Naletilic. And for reasons known only to him,

10 he considered him Mr. Bruno Stojic's advisor and a person higher ranking

11 than Bruno Stojic. The link between him and Naletilic is seen in

12 document P6844, which is a report from the crime police department dated

13 24 November 1993.

14 Mr. Praljak was interview in respect of an unauthorised delivery

15 of documents from the central military prison at Heliodrom to Naletilic.

16 The witness was examined about that before this Trial Chamber,

17 and we can see it in the transcript on pages 1486 through 14873.

18 Here we can see that His Honour -- His Honour Judge Antonetti was

19 surprised to see how the witness could put a lower-ranking person above a

20 higher-ranking person. Namely, he put Mr. Naletilic above Mr. Stojic,

21 and the witness replied to that that this must have been a typo.

22 It was not a typo. We claim that that letter was not even

23 intended for Bruno Stojic's perusal, and whether it was delivered to

24 Mr. Naletilic or not, we don't know that. Besides, if Bruno Stojic, as

25 the head of the Defence Department, was in charge of the central military

Page 52392

1 prison at Heliodrom as the Prosecutor insists, and if the witness

2 Josip Praljak, who was an employee of that prison addressed him as his

3 superior, how is it then possible to explain that the witness, on the

4 24th of November, 1993, sent a letter to Bruno Stojic under

5 Exhibit P6848? And that was 14 days after the new composition of the

6 government was made publicly known. And it was known to everybody that

7 Bruno Stojic was not part of that government, as can be seen in P6583,

8 and that was also 14 days after Bruno Stojic stopped working in the

9 Defence Department.

10 We move to chapter 7 where it says that Stojic consciously and

11 significantly contributed to the operation of the HVO camps by illegally

12 arresting people and sending them for forced labour.

13 In paragraph 600, the Prosecutor claims that the

14 Defence Department was completely responsible for the HVO, according to

15 Mr. Petkovic. This is not what Mr. Petkovic said so explicitly, and you

16 can see this on page 50670.

17 Your Honour, Witness Petkovic said, and I paraphrase, that in

18 HZ-HB they had prisons for prisoners of war and incarcerated people.

19 There was a decree issued by Mate Boban, which is P9292. Whether

20 Mr. Petkovic knew which of the centres had been established pursuant to

21 that decree's moot at this point, but what we would like to draw the

22 Trial Chamber's attention is the testimony of Mr. Petkovic about prison

23 camps and put that testimony in the context of all the other evidence,

24 and we believe that based on all that, the Trial Chamber will be able to

25 draw a correct conclusion.

Page 52393

1 Furthermore, the Prosecutor in this paragraph of his final brief

2 proffers certain documents that should corroborate his claim that

3 Mr. Stojic was responsible for the camps. We will tackle only some of

4 those documents.

5 Your Honours, sometimes -- or, rather, very often when reading

6 Mr. Scott's final brief and all of the other learned friends from the

7 Prosecution, my feeling was that we did not present our Defence case

8 here, that none of the Defence teams called any of their witnesses. The

9 Prosecutor insists on all the charges in the indictment, and it seems

10 that we were here in vain, that we challenged the Prosecutor's case in

11 vain, that we called our witnesses in vain.

12 My learned friend Mr. Karnavas says that it is understandable the

13 Prosecutor doesn't find Defence witnesses credible. But there are some

14 notorious facts. One of them is when Mr. Stojic left the

15 Defence Department, but the Prosecutor does not believe even that. The

16 Prosecutor witnesses themselves corroborated some of our case, but the

17 Prosecutor chooses to ignore those.

18 One of the documents is P193 about the Dretelj Barracks. I

19 really feel bad for having to repeat certain things five or six times,

20 but I'm forced to do that because the Prosecutor chose to include them in

21 his final brief, and I have to react, and I have to point to certain

22 things.

23 So this document P893 is a decision to give the Dretelj Barracks

24 to the military police for their use. This decision has nothing

25 whatsoever to do with the apprehension of persons after the

Page 52394

1 30 March 1993.

2 Your Honours went there, visited the barracks. It is one

3 building, and behind it there was the centre in which the detainees were

4 held.

5 This decision was adopted at a collegium meeting, which is P880.

6 This building houses the 3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion of the military

7 police. It was badly damaged and renovated, which is confirmed by

8 document 2D518. The construction works finished in early March, and this

9 (redacted) on pages

10 22431 to 22434.

11 I apologise. I must correct what I said. I haven't noticed

12 that. It is Witness C.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: I will check. Very well.

14 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, Mr. President. Sorry for the

15 interruption. We need a redaction to be made, I believe.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely.

17 Madam Registrar, could you prepare an order for redaction.

18 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. May I

19 continue? I really apologise. This really was my mistake. I failed to

20 notice.

21 This was confirmed by Witness C on pages 22431, line 11, through

22 page 22434, line 9.

23 The first persons to be taken into Dretelj prison, rather than to

24 the barracks I mentioned, were brought after 30 June 1993. I would not

25 go back to the story what happened on 30 June 1993, but it is beyond any

Page 52395

1 reasonable doubt that this building was being renovated to become a

2 prison and that it was before the BH Army attack, the consequence of

3 which was the arrest of Muslims who were HVO members.

4 The following document the Prosecution mentioned in this

5 paragraph is P2806. In this report of 16 June 1993, Mr. Stojic mentions

6 504 prisoners under investigation. It is important to stress that this

7 number -- that Bruno Stojic is not the source of this number, but that

8 the EC monitors got it from the prison warden on 11/6/1993 when they

9 visit the prison. This is mentioned in document P2721.

10 Secondly, Bruno Stojic, at the collegium on 2 September 1993,

11 which is document P4756, said:

12 "We have two military prisons; namely the central military

13 prison, Heliodrom, and Ljubuski."

14 Because he had information that the central military prison, and

15 in Ljubuski, people are held against whom investigations are being

16 conducted or against whom criminal proceedings have been launched, and

17 the investigative judge or the president of the court had full powers

18 over them.

19 Bruno Stojic had no knowledge about possible detainment of

20 prisoners of war after the report dated 31 October 1992, which is P677.

21 Bruno Stojic was not familiar with the systematic use of Muslim

22 detainees for forced labour. The Prosecution claims the contrary, but

23 they do not corroborate it with evidence.

24 The SIS administration reports of 20 September 1993, which is

25 5222, from the Dretelj prison, and the report dated with the same date

Page 52396

1 from the Gabela prison, which is P5223, are -- were sent to the president

2 of the HZ-HB which can be seen from document 2D926. These two reports

3 came about as the implementation of the conclusions reached at the

4 collegium on 2 September 1993. We have already mentioned that this is

5 Exhibit P4756.

6 These reports were never forwarded to Bruno Stojic, because on

7 15 September 1993, the president of the HZ-HB issued order P5104 to the

8 effect that in detention centres for prisoners of war in which not all

9 conditions prevail as set out by international law of war and

10 Geneva Conventions, these conditions shall be created immediately.

11 The president of the HZ-HB obliged the Main Staff, in item 8, to

12 familiarise all commands and units with that and provide technical

13 assistance in the implementation. This order was also forwarded to the

14 Department of Defence for information and to Bruno Stojic to act upon.

15 This order has also been -- was also sent to all units, which can be seen

16 in documents P5199, 1D1704 and 2D1319.

17 The Prlic Defence stated twice yesterday that this decision

18 was -- or, rather, that this order was adopted by Mr. Boban pursuant to

19 Article 30, which is very correct. This is Article 30 of the Decree on

20 the Armed Forces, which is P588.

21 We don't understand what the problem is here. And this provision

22 in paragraph 1 provides for Boban's right to issue orders, and the

23 Defence created a whole story out of this Article 30, but what does it

24 actually say? Under paragraph (1), it says:

25 "In carrying out the activities from the remit, the commander of

Page 52397

1 the armed forces passes directives, orders, and other acts.

2 "(2) The supreme commander of the armed forces can delegate the

3 implementation of some of the activities, the command and control of the

4 armed forces to the head of the Department of Defence."

5 So that when the supreme commander in issuing orders refers to

6 Article 30, he actually refers to his powers to issue orders. If he had

7 transferred these powers to anybody else, he would have had to refer to

8 Article 30, paragraph (2), which is not the case here. And not only

9 here. I must say once more for the umpteenth time that there's no such

10 document showing that Mr. Boban ever transferred his powers to command

11 the armed forces to Bruno Stojic.

12 It is important to stress, and I'm returning to the sequence of

13 events in connection with the prison, I must stress that at the meeting

14 of 6 September 1993, which is P4841, there was more discussion about the

15 prisons and the finding of new locations. Some tasks were given to the

16 Department of Defence, and a deadline was set of 15 days.

17 If we look at these minutes, it certainly isn't logical to assume

18 that the Department of Defence should be able to do anything within 15

19 days, because the entire HVO HZ-HB was unable to do so in the past three

20 months. But regardless of that, this conclusion of the meeting held on

21 6 September 1993 ceased to be relevant when President Boban passed

22 decision P5104, where he precisely names those charged with implementing

23 his decision.

24 In paragraph 611, the Prosecution claims that Stojic and Coric

25 know -- knew that prisoners were taken out for labour and substantiate

Page 52398

1 that with document P8424.

2 The document was drafted on 12 May 1994; in other words, six

3 months after Bruno Stojic had left the Department of Defence and

4 Valentin Coric was no longer chief of military police.

5 In paragraph 613, we -- we read the Prosecution's allegation that

6 Bruno Stojic received reports about extensive destruction of Muslim

7 property in Prozor. The documents mentioned here are P1315 and P3375.

8 These are reports drafted by Zeljko Siljeg which were forwarded to the

9 Presidency of the HZ-HB and the government of the HVO and the

10 Department of Defence, the Main Staff and the operative zone. These

11 reports were drafted based on the obligation that flows from the joint

12 declaration signed by Boban and Izetbegovic on 27 January 1993 in Geneva,

13 by which they obliged the Main Staffs of the BH Army and the HVO to

14 establish the responsibility for the conflict between the BH Army and the

15 HVO.

16 Based on this declaration, the Chief of the Main Staff, on the

17 same day, issued order P1322, whose item 4 obliges the commanders of the

18 operative zone to immediately establish the causes and investigate the

19 consequences and establish responsibility of the members of HVO units and

20 BH Army units for the conflict. These documents clearly show that the --

21 the commanders of the operative zones were obliged to establish the

22 responsibility.

23 Bruno Stojic was not obliged, either de jure or de facto, to do

24 that.

25 The Prosecution, at paragraph 619, asserts that the HVO HZ-HB

Page 52399

1 held two meetings about the prevention of crime. These are P2606 and

2 P4276.

3 I stress, Your Honours, that the HVO HZ-HB continuously

4 implemented measures to prevent crime and did everything in their power.

5 I have no more time, because I would like to finish before the

6 break, to mention all these government sessions, but the activities of

7 the HVO HZ-HB certainly be a focus of the attention of the Trial Chamber.

8 I'm sure you will find out, and you will notice. But it is important to

9 stress that the activities of the HVO HZ-HB cannot abolish the -- the

10 duty of the commanders of the HVO units whose subordinates committed

11 crimes, which is provided for by Article 27 of the Decree on District

12 Military Courts, which is P587.

13 In paragraph 625, the Prosecution's claim that Bruno Stojic knew

14 and was informed about deliberate killings and rapes committed by the

15 HVO, but the documents to substantiate that were never received by

16 Bruno Stojic.

17 There is -- among these, there is document P2770. That's an

18 intercepted conversation. It has been mentioned many times here. I

19 needn't explain to the Trial Chamber how things go in the army and the

20 war. One service listens in on the other. There's a lot of propaganda

21 on that, and to what extent all that is accurate is questionable. But

22 the Prosecution never showed that this report was submitted to

23 Bruno Stojic nor that the handwritten name "Bruno" refers to him at all.

24 During the -- the final, the Prosecution has read this

25 [indiscernible] name Keza, and said, "I believe it is Keza." We don't

Page 52400

1 know based on what they believe that. We would like to point out that

2 document P2769 shows what was happening on 4 June 1993 in the Dum

3 neighbourhood. This is a report of the military police which recorded

4 the events, but they do not match of the descriptions from the

5 intercepts.

6 Paragraph 626: I would like to -- I have good news for both the

7 Trial Chamber and myself, I'm drawing to an end.

8 With regard to the events at Rastane of 24 August 1993, the

9 Prosecution asserts that -- that this health care sector got involved

10 after these events, and they referred to document P4653. Based on that,

11 it isn't likely that Bruno Stojic knew about these deaths. The cited

12 document shows that this is the reply of the assistant head of

13 Department of Defence for health care to the oral order of the Chief of

14 the Main Staff, Zarko Tole. Bruno Stojic didn't have to know about this

15 activity of the Department of Health. Such a decision or such -- the --

16 the Prosecutor didn't show that he had de facto full control over the

17 work of all sectors and the Department of Defence. Especially in war,

18 such full control is impossible.

19 With regard to paragraph 629 through 632, the Stojic Defence

20 points out that Bruno Stojic was not de jure or de facto obliged to

21 investigate crimes committed by individual members of the HVO. According

22 to Article 27 of the Decree on District Military Courts which is P587,

23 this was the duty of unit commanders.

24 Your Honours, thank you very much. I will no longer take the

25 floor. My learned friend Mr. Khan will continue after the break, and I

Page 52401

1 would like to thank you accordingly for the good co-operation we had all

2 these years, and once again I apologise deeply to the interpreters,

3 because I am not happy to learn that in this courtroom, and I see

4 Judge Trechsel nodding in confirmation, that was -- that I was one of the

5 fastest and most difficult speakers, and this is why I apologise to the

6 interpreters and to everybody else.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. We're going to have

8 our 20-minute break now, and I believe that Mr. Khan is going to take the

9 floor. Well, I have very elaborate calculations by the Court Deputy

10 shows us that he has under 30 minutes, maybe 28 or 29 minutes.

11 Since we're going to resume around 10 to 1.00, you'll be working

12 until 20 past 1.00, and in theory, the Praljak Defence should be

13 starting. It might be for a very short time, but they might be able to

14 start and give us some preliminary remarks. I don't know, because I

15 don't know beforehand what they're going to say. So we're going to break

16 for 20 minutes.

17 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

20 The Court Deputy is telling me that you have 24 minutes, Mr. Khan.

21 MR. KHAN: I'm grateful, Mr. President. If you could just give

22 me a moment while I try to get my LiveNote to work.

23 I'll make do.

24 Mr. President, Your Honours, this, of course, is the final few

25 minutes that we have to ask you to consider the case against

Page 52402

1 Mr. Bruno Stojic and to view it in the light that is most favourable to

2 him, because of course the principle of in dubio pro reo means that in

3 relation to each and every issue where there is doubt, that doubt must

4 fall to the benefit of Mr. Stojic.

5 Now, Your Honours, we did not in our brief address the issue of

6 sentence. It is, of course, extremely difficult for counsel on the one

7 hand to strongly and passionately and with full vigour ask for a client

8 to be acquitted on all counts and in the alternative to say, well,

9 Your Honours, in the event you're not with us, in the event that you feel

10 compelled to enter conviction, a sentence of X amount of years must be

11 imposed. But, Your Honours, that's what the Rules require to be

12 addressed, at least in some general terms on sentence.

13 The overarching requirement of general application to any case,

14 in my respectful submission, by any Judge when tailoring the sentence is

15 to do that. It is to tailor the sentence, to individualise the penalty.

16 But some factors appear to be quite clearly pertinent to the overall

17 assessment of the case of Mr. Stojic.

18 Your Honours, in your first decision on provisional release,

19 noted the fact that despite having indications that he was wanted by the

20 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Stojic did

21 not go underground. He did not try to an evade justice, but, rather, he

22 surrendered to the jurisdiction of this Court voluntarily. And,

23 Your Honour, it's very clear from the jurisprudence of this court, for

24 example the Simic case, that voluntary surrender may be a factor to be

25 taken into consideration.

Page 52403

1 Your Honour, Mr. Stojic during his time in court has never

2 boycotted the trial. He has never walked out, never been difficult,

3 always co-operated, in my respectful submission, in an exemplary manner

4 with the authority of Your Honours as Judges appointed by the

5 international community to decide his fate and the merits of the

6 Prosecution's case. And, Your Honour, it's my respectful submission that

7 his conduct in trial is also a relevant factor.

8 Mr. Stojic has also asked that the Bench be thanked very properly

9 discharging your own duties for the humanity that each and every one of

10 you have shown him. The record discloses that in relation to provisional

11 release applications, and in relation to application for release on

12 humanitarian grounds, on many occasions the Prosecution were vigorously

13 opposed, opposed the applications put in and they sought even to appeal

14 decisions of the Trial Chamber. But Your Honours, in discharging your

15 function, showed faith in Mr. Stojic, and it's relevant that on each and

16 every occasion, on each and every occasion that provisional release was

17 granted, the terms of that conditional release were complied with.

18 There's been no breach, no suggestion of witness intimidation, and on

19 every occasion he has surrendered in a way that this court proceedings

20 have not been disrupted in any manner. And, Your Honour, the content of

21 those provisional release applications disclose, in part, what that has

22 meant to Mr. Stojic, his wife and his parents. And in my respectful

23 submission, of course, it was the proper course, because the presumption

24 of liberty is, of course, the corollary, the natural consequence of the

25 presumption of innocence, but he thanks you for that.

Page 52404

1 Your Honour, the Blaskic Appeal Judgement, at paragraph 728, and

2 the Kordic and Cerkez judgement, at paragraph 1053, makes it clear that

3 complying with conditions of release and behaviour at trial may be

4 mitigating factors, as does the Simic case of October 2003, that a lack

5 of previous conviction, previous good character, are factors that may be

6 taken into account.

7 Now, Your Honours, I preferred yesterday very briefly to the

8 evidence of Davor Korac, who was Bruno Stojic's superior in the

9 Ministry of Interior, and the fact that he had good relations with

10 members of all communities, and that was echoed by his friend

11 Tomislav Kresic - I hope I pronounced it correctly this time - in

12 relation to his personal life. This is important in looking at the man,

13 not the rhetoric, not the caricature that's being painted, but the man

14 that has been sitting in your presence for these many years.

15 Your Honour, I also referred to a General Hamid Bahto's evidence

16 and that is evidence must be given in a significant weight. It really

17 must be looked at before almost looking at the Prosecution evidence in

18 neutralising some of the invective, to neutralise some of the

19 preconceptions that the Prosecution, that are in good faith, have

20 constantly sought to push forward as the truth. Matters are never as

21 simple as may first appear, and the search for truth requires often a

22 difficult navigation through competing narratives. And, Your Honours,

23 that's the task that you all have to get to grips with in the months

24 ahead.

25 Now, Your Honour, General Makar can hardly be called a partisan

Page 52405

1 witness. As Judge Antonetti noted very pertinently, he's a Croat, but he

2 is a Croat who is married to a Serb, who fought in the Army of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hardly a more balanced mix one could hope for. And

4 that witness had the courage to come to this court in open session and

5 speak on behalf of Mr. Stojic.

6 Now, Your Honours, it's often difficult for all sides in

7 different conflicts and different cases to get hold of witnesses, but

8 to -- there are peculiar difficulties in Defence cases to get witnesses,

9 to be the voice of an individual that is castigated and that faces

10 terrible accusations, terrible crimes, and to speak up for such a person

11 whilst you are living amongst people who get to hear a one-sided

12 narrative largely, who have strong feelings, is a matter of exceptional

13 courage. And witnesses on all sides, Prosecution and Defence, that have

14 come before the Court in those circumstances are to be applauded, but the

15 evidence of these -- and I mention they're Muslims because that's

16 something the Prosecution pointed out, these two Muslim witnesses of

17 Hamid Bahto, and then I'll come to him, the second Muslim, Nedzad Cengic,

18 are important, and the fact that all three witnesses, including

19 General Makar, were members of the Bosnian Army, the Army of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, is extremely important.

21 Now, Your Honour, General Nedzad Cengic's evidence is relevant

22 not just to the assessment of the man that Bruno Stojic is, which may be

23 relevant for other purposes that I started with, but, Your Honour, he

24 describes a chaotic situation, and he also describes his account that

25 when he met Bruno Stojic, Mr. Stojic wanted to help. He was willing. He

Page 52406

1 was not hostile, but he had difficulties, and so he asked General Cengic

2 to come back the next day. And when he did it seems that help had been

3 provided, because in that location were General Praljak and

4 General Petkovic -- and the request was given. The MTS that was asked

5 for was provided.

6 Now, Your Honour, this evidence is not to be sidelined. It's not

7 of no consequence. It's not irrelevant as the Prosecution would have you

8 to believe. It may be difficult, it may be awkward, it may be

9 inconvenient because it does not fit in with the theory that they are

10 pushing, but, Your Honours, it is certainly not irrelevant. And it was

11 revealing, again in response to a question by the learned

12 President Judge Antonetti, that when that witness under oath was asked,

13 Who was Bruno Stojic's superior, who did you believe to be the person

14 above him? He says, "In my opinion --" and I quote:

15 "In my opinion, while we were waiting, it was Mr. Praljak -- as

16 we were waiting for authorisation, Mr. Praljak and Mr. Petkovic, because

17 they had to wait for some sort of agreement to be reached; and then

18 thirdly, as we would then bide our time to see what happened."

19 And in relation to the assistance given, he says later on that he

20 does not -- he did not view those gentlemen as his enemies, and he gave

21 reasons for that. But, Your Honours, the fact that he viewed

22 General Praljak as a superior is not unimportant, in my respectful

23 submission. In reviewing the totality of this mass of documents, Your

24 Honours should not lose sight of reality that the HVO existed before the

25 Defence Department was established. What happened overnight? Did the

Page 52407

1 previous modus operandi suddenly get erased by some act of amazing

2 subordination to an administrative structure? Does that happen anywhere

3 in the world, or did the way the HVO acted before the creation of the

4 Defence Department continue in very important and material respects? We

5 say it did.

6 And Your Honours will be guided by the evidence, but you, no

7 doubt, would have formed your own impression of the various personalities

8 in this courtroom over the last few years, and any suggestion -- and,

9 Your Honours, with all your experience in all candour have on occasion

10 had to use all of that experience to keep this trial on track in relation

11 to some of the personalities in this courtroom, and the suggestion on a

12 human level that somehow Bruno Stojic, in fact, is the commander,

13 effective commander of people like General Praljak, General Petkovic, and

14 equal to the highly educated Dr. Prlic is really a nonsense. It is a

15 nonsense. If fits the case, it's convenient, but it is not the truth.

16 Your Honours, when I discussed yesterday in brief the MTS

17 provided by Croatia, again it is important, and I will simply ask

18 Your Honours to note paragraph 215 of our final brief. What I didn't

19 mention, and again it's important, is the training provided by the

20 Republic of Croatia, and that's detailed at paragraph 216 and also by the

21 document 3D00299 of the 4th of January, 1993.

22 Now -- and again paragraph 278 of our final brief that the

23 wounded members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina described as the army,

24 taken out of context, different snippets different people said at

25 different times, the army being treated in the same hospitals as other

Page 52408

1 Croats, taken to Split, is not consistent on any fair appraisal of the

2 evidence with the Prosecution's narrative. One simply does not give

3 weapons to one's enemies, train one's enemies, treat one's enemies. The

4 only solution, the only fair conclusion is those people are not the enemy

5 in the manner that the Prosecution allege.

6 Your Honours, my learned leader discussed in brief the points in

7 detail, the ultimatums and the importance of that, and we refer to

8 paragraph 172 of our final brief and the fact also that Witness DE, at

9 transcript 15671 to 2, noted that 11 HVO brigades, 1 HVO battalion were

10 under the command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in areas not

11 controlled by the HVO. Well, why? Why? Why give men valuable

12 commodities, arms, to help one's enemies in other areas? Well, the

13 Prosecution can't have it both ways. They say, Well, that's because of

14 the fight against the Serbs. Well, what about this joint agreement in

15 Karadjordjevo and Graz? Why have this fight against the Serbs? What

16 necessitated the fight against the Serbs if there's the joint agreement

17 in the simplistic and fallacious manner put forward by the Prosecution?

18 Why help?

19 Your Honour, the help is given because there was no criminal

20 intent to carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina by Bruno Stojic.

21 In the relation to the Greater Croatia case, it is important just

22 to look closely at the footnotes relied upon by the Prosecution. In

23 paragraph 169 of their final brief, they rely upon two documents to

24 support the contention that Croatia was behind it all, the Republic of

25 Croatia.

Page 52409

1 Now, P09839, it's under seal and I won't go into the document,

2 but, Your Honours, look at that. But they also quote Prlic, and Prlic

3 says that the reason they did not take Jablanica and Konjic was because,

4 was because, of pressure from the Croatian government not to take it.

5 And in the following paragraph, 170 of the Prosecution's final brief,

6 P09258, again they rely upon -- yes, P09258, they note that

7 President Tudjman would not allow General Praljak to take East Mostar

8 because of political loss.

9 Now, Your Honours, international diplomacy requires mediators.

10 It requires intervention. It requires assistance. And whatever dreams

11 and scenarios were looked at by President Tudjman as to how the final map

12 would look, and it may well have included every conceivable option, the

13 question is whether or not a criminal intent can be discerned or whether

14 or not there is doubt in relation that massive, broad-brush, simplistic

15 view that we say that it is. There is doubt.

16 Now, Your Honours, the Prosecution can't have their cake and eat

17 it. They can't. I use that phrase, because sauce for a goose, sauce for

18 a gander has been overdone. It's too well cooked that source. But,

19 Your Honours, the Prosecution constantly refer to this co-operation

20 between the Serbs and the Croatians. In furtherance of this subtext,

21 this underlying idea that there's a deal, an unsavory, underhand deal

22 between those parties, and they refer in paragraph 277, 281, 285 and 289

23 of their final brief of various co-operation, including ICRC and others.

24 But, Your Honours, they refer in 871 and 888 to the willingness of the

25 Croats to fight with the Serbs in Zepce. Well, Your Honours, Zepce is

Page 52410

1 not part of the area the Prosecution, themselves, contend to be part of

2 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. And when this comes to assisting

3 Muslims in that area, they say it's not relevant, because actually that's

4 part of, you know, the big JCE theory. And when it comes to helping the

5 Armija of Bosnia-Herzegovina outside, they say it's not relevant. It's

6 outside their geographic area. Well, what they are alluding to in Zepce

7 is the identical argument; they can't have it both ways. The same

8 applies to arms. Your Honours, is this really a true-track policy that

9 the Prosecution would have you believe, or is such an understanding --

10 would such an understanding amount to a one-sided appraisal of the

11 evidence? They can't have it both ways. They're trying to have it both

12 ways and it should be rejected.

13 Your Honours, Bruno Stojic never met President Tudjman. Never

14 met him. It can't be glossed over. It can't be ignored. It has

15 significance. Your Honours must decide what is that significance. We

16 say the fact that General Petkovic and Praljak and Dr. Prlic met him

17 reveals who are the most important individuals. Your Honours, the fact

18 that prior to April 1992 Bruno Stojic was the commandant for logistics

19 and in December 1993 he was in production of weapons is important. Are

20 the Prosecution saying that suddenly he was catapulted to high office and

21 high command, operational control or administrative control, standing

22 astride Bosnia -- the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna as a colossus or

23 is the reality actually that his role was administrative and he did not

24 have effective command and control. Your Honours will see annexed to our

25 final brief a list, a selection of formalising documents, or documents