Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 20977

 1                           Wednesday, 29 May 2013

 2                           [Judgement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 10.00 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar, please call

 7     the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Case number

 9     IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic, Slobodan

10     Praljak, Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Coric, and Berislav Pusic.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you hear me?  Very well.

12             And may the parties -- can we have the appearances, please.

13             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, Your Honour.  Ken Scott for the Prosecution.

14     I'm glad to be back in court before Your Honours and thank you for seeing

15     us.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

17             Let's turn to the Defence.

18             MR. KARNAVAS:  Good morning.  Michael Karnavas for Dr. Jadranko

19     Prlic along with Suzana Tomanovic and Ida Jurkovic.

20             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.  Senka

21     Nozica, together with Karim Khan and our legal assistant Anna Katulu.

22             MS. FAUVEAU IVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning,

23     Your Honours.  Natacha Fauveau Ivanovic and Nika Pinter representing

24     General Praljak.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.


Page 20978

 1     Guenael Mettreaux and Vesna Alaburic, counsel for Milivoj Petkovic, and

 2     our associates, Natalija Labavic and Slavko Mateskovic.  Thank you.

 3             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Good morning,

 4     Your Honours.  Representing Valentin Coric, Dijana Tomasegovic Tomic;

 5     co-counsel, Drazen Plavec; and legal assistant, Ester Kirs.  Thank you.

 6             MR. IBRISIMOVIC:  [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

 7     Mr. Fahrudin Ibrisimovic from Sarajevo and Mr. Sahota, on behalf of

 8     Berislav Pusic.

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honours, I apologise.  I didn't know if the

10     Court would take individual appearances, but I was -- I improperly forgot

11     to introduce my good colleague Mr.  Stringer, for the Prosecution,

12     Mr. Roeland Bos, and our case manager Mr. Thomas Laugel.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             The Trial Chamber is sitting today to deliver its judgement in

15     the case the Prosecution versus Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic, Slobodan

16     Praljak, Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Coric, and Berislav Pusic.  I shall

17     now read out a summary of the Chamber's findings.  The only authoritative

18     account of these findings is contained in the written judgements, copies

19     of which will be made available to the parties and the public at the end

20     of this hearing.

21             The Chamber would first of all like to thank all those people who

22     have contributed to the smooth conduct of the trial since it commenced on

23     26 of April, 2006, including the Legal Officers of the Chambers.  During

24     the proceedings, which ended on 2nd of March, 2011, the Chamber admitted

25     approximately 10.000 exhibits into evidence and heard 145 Prosecution


Page 20979

 1     witnesses, seven of whom were expert witnesses, as well as 61 Defence

 2     witnesses, seven of whom were expert witnesses.  The judgement is a

 3     2.629-pages-long document divided into six volumes, including four

 4     annexes and partially dissenting or separate opinions by Judge Trechsel

 5     and myself that reflect the complexity of this case.

 6             The case is based in particular on the allegations contained in

 7     the indictment.  The Prosecution charges the six accused with having

 8     participated in a joint criminal enterprise between the 18th of November,

 9     1991, and April 1994 that was designed to subjugate the Muslims and other

10     non-Croats living in areas of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina, which the Croatian Community, and later Republic, of

12     Herceg-Bosna claimed as its own in order to permanently remove them and

13     to create a Croatian territory along the borders of the Croatian

14     Banovina.  The six accused are accused of having committed crimes in

15     eight municipalities and a whole network of detention centres over a

16     period that lasted for almost two and a half years, crimes that coincide

17     with 26 counts of the indictment.

18             It is alleged more specifically that as part of the joint

19     criminal enterprise the accused committed the crimes of persecution,

20     Count 1; murder, Count 2; rape, Count 4; deportation, Count 6; forcible

21     transfer, Count 8; imprisonment, Count 10; and inhumane acts, Counts 12

22     and 15 as crimes against humanity.  They are also accused of having

23     committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in the form of

24     wilful killing, Count 3; sexual assault, Count 5; unlawful deportation,

25     transfer, and confinement of civilians, Counts 7, 9, and 11; inhumane


Page 20980

 1     treatment, Counts 13 and 16; and extensive destruction and appropriation

 2     of property not justified by military necessity and carried out

 3     unlawfully and wantonly, Counts 19 and 22.  Finally, they are also

 4     accused of cruel treatment, Counts 14 and 17; unlawful labour, Count 18;

 5     wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, Count 20; destruction

 6     or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to religion or education,

 7     Count 21; and plunder of public or private property, Count 23, as

 8     violations of the laws or customs of war.  With regard to the

 9     municipality of Mostar, the Prosecution alleges that the six accused

10     carried out unlawful attacks on civilians, Count 24; that they unlawfully

11     inflicted terror on civilians, Count 25; and that they inflicted cruel

12     treatment by besieging East Mostar, Count 26, which constitute violations

13     of the laws or customs of war.

14             I will initially deal with the findings of the Chamber concerning

15     the crimes committed by members of the HVO.

16             In the municipality of Mostar as early as 1992, the municipal HVO

17     assisted by the HVO of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna embarked

18     upon a policy aimed at placing Muslims living in the municipality at a

19     disadvantage.  Tensions between Croats and Muslims increased throughout

20     1992, in particular in the municipality of Prozor.  On 23rd of October,

21     1992, the HVO attacked the town of Prozor and its surroundings.  When it

22     took over the town of Prozor and the village of Paljike on 24th of

23     October, 1992, the HVO destroyed many Muslim homes and vehicles in the

24     town and burnt down one house and killed two people in Paljike.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Your Honour, would you kindly slow down a


Page 20981

 1     little, please.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The first clashes between the

 3     HVO and the ABiH took place on 11 and 12th of January, 1993, in the

 4     municipality of Gornji Vakuf.  On 16th of January, 1993, pursuant to an

 5     order issued the day before, the Main Staff of the HVO demanded that the

 6     ABiH in Gornji Vakuf subordinate its troops to the HVO.  The ABiH

 7     rejected this demand.

 8             On 18th of January, 1993, the HVO attacked the town of Gornji

 9     Vakuf and several neighbouring villages.  Fighting between the HVO and

10     the ABiH continued for several days.  During these attacks, the HVO

11     destroyed Muslim homes in Gornji Vakuf.  The HVO fired several shells on

12     the village of Dusa, which led to the destruction of Muslim homes and the

13     deaths of seven persons.  During this same attack on the 18th of January,

14     1993, several houses were destroyed in the villages of Hrasnica, Uzricje,

15     and Zdrimci.  HVO soldiers set fire to Muslim houses when they took these

16     villages and Dusa.  In Hrasnica, Uzricje, and Zdrimci, members of the HVO

17     stole property belonging to Muslims.  HVO forces arrested the women,

18     children, and elderly persons in the four villages, held them, and

19     expelled them from their villages to territory under the control of the

20     ABiH.  Some of the inhabitants of Uzricje were beaten or threatened by

21     HVO soldiers while in detention, and the inhabitants of Zdrimci were

22     harassed and forced to recite Christian prayers in front of the Mekteb.

23     From the 18th of January, 1993, onwards, the HVO held 40 to 60 Muslim men

24     at the furniture factory in Trnovaca, which is located in the

25     municipality of Gornji Vakuf.  Some of them were beaten up and/or


Page 20982

 1     suffered abuse from HVO soldiers.  For example, two HVO soldiers cut off

 2     Hasan Behlo's ear and trampled on the wound.  These Muslim men were

 3     exchanged or deported after two weeks of detention.

 4             In the spring of 1993, tensions between the ABiH and the HVO grew

 5     in the municipalities of Mostar, Prozor, Stolac, and Jablanica.  In April

 6     1993, the HVO issued a new order, expiring on 15th of April, 1993, for

 7     the ABiH to be subordinated to the HVO in the municipality of Jablanica.

 8             When the ABiH refused to obey, on the 17th of April, 1993, the

 9     HVO launched attacks on the municipalities of Prozor and Jablanica.

10     Between the 17th and the 19th of April, 1993, the HVO attacked the

11     villages of Parcani, Lizoperci, and Toscanica in the municipality of

12     Prozor where they burnt down Muslim homes and killed two people.  On the

13     17th of April, the HVO shelled the villages of Sovici and Doljani in the

14     municipality of Jablanica.  After the fighting and continuing up to the

15     23rd of April, 1993, the HVO arrested ABiH soldiers, Muslim men of

16     military age, women, children, and elderly persons in these villages and

17     took them to Sovici school where many of them were held until the 5th of

18     May, 1993, in very difficult conditions.  The HVO soldiers beat and

19     abused the detainees including the women, and killed four ABiH soldiers.

20     Some of the detainees were made to perform labour at HVO positions.

21     While some of the male detainees were being taken to the Ljubuski prison

22     on the 18th of April, 1993, they were severely beaten and humiliated by

23     HVO soldiers, including members of the Convicts Battalion.

24             From the 19th of April, 1993, HVO soldiers assembled

25     approximately 400 women, children, and elderly persons from the villages


Page 20983

 1     of Sovici and Doljani in the houses in Junuzovici in the municipality of

 2     Jablanica where they held them until the 4th or 5th of May, 1993, and

 3     treated some of them very cruelly.  On the 5th of May, 1993, following a

 4     visit from a joint HVO and ABiH delegation, including Milivoj Petkovic

 5     and Berislav Pusic, as well as several representatives of international

 6     organisations, the HVO moved the detainees held at the Sovici school and

 7     in the houses of Junuzovici to Gornji Vakuf.

 8             On the 20th of April, 1993, members of the HVO, including Mladen

 9     Naletilic, held several ABiH soldiers at a fish farm near Doljani in the

10     municipality of Jablanica, where the latter were severely beaten,

11     insulted, humiliated, and threatened with death.  The same day the HVO

12     arrested Muslim civilians in the municipality of Capljina including some

13     prominent figures and held them at the barracks in Grabovina and at the

14     Dretelj prison.

15             On the 9th of May, 1993, the HVO launched a major attack on the

16     ABiH in Mostar, during which it took the residential neighbourhood of

17     Vranica in which the headquarters of the ABiH were located.  During this

18     operation that lasted several days, HVO soldiers blew up the Baba Besir

19     mosque.  HVO soldiers conducted mass arrests of Muslims in West Mostar

20     and separated the men from the women, children, and elderly persons.  The

21     men belonging to the ABiH were held in the MUP building and at the

22     tobacco institute, where they were savagely beaten.  Other men, some

23     belonging to the ABiH and others not, were held and beaten up at the

24     faculty of mechanical engineering.  Ten ABiH soldiers died as a result of

25     the violence exerted upon them.  The women, children, and elderly persons


Page 20984

 1     of West Mostar were sent to the Heliodrom where they were held for

 2     several days before being able to return home.

 3             Also in Mostar, HVO soldiers systematically expelled the Muslims

 4     from West Mostar between May 1993 and February 1994, in particular by

 5     means of major operations to evict them in mid-May, mid-June, early July,

 6     and September 1993.  The men were detained at the Heliodrom and their

 7     families were expelled to East Mostar.  No distinction was made between

 8     civilians and combatants in detention.  In July 1993, the HVO briefly

 9     detained some of these men at the faculty of mechanical engineering,

10     where they were savagely beaten.  Two of them died after being beaten a

11     whole night long.

12             The HVO besieged East Mostar between June 1993 and April 1994.

13     During this period, the eastern part of the town and the neighbourhood of

14     Donja Mahala in the west were subjected to a prolonged military assault

15     by the HVO, including intense and uninterrupted gun-fire and shelling.

16     This firing and shelling caused many casualties, including the deaths of

17     many civilians and representatives of international organisations.  Ten

18     mosques were also badly damaged or destroyed.  The HVO impeded and at

19     times even completely cut off the passage of international aid.  The

20     Muslim population was thus forced to live in extremely difficult

21     conditions, deprived as it was of food, water, electricity, and enough

22     assistance.

23             On the 8th of November, 1993, as part of the offensive, an HVO

24     tank fired all day long at the Old Bridge until it was unusable and on

25     the verge of collapse.  The bridge then collapsed on the morning of the


Page 20985

 1     9th of November, 1993.  The majority concluded, with me dissenting, that

 2     although the bridge was utilised by the ABiH and thus constituted a

 3     legitimate military target for the HVO, its destruction did

 4     disproportionately damage the Muslim civilian population of Mostar.

 5             HVO soldiers used extreme violence in their operations to evict

 6     the population of Mostar.  The Muslims were awakened in the middle of the

 7     night or early in the morning, beaten and forced out of their homes,

 8     often in their pyjamas.  Many women, including a 16-year-old girl, were

 9     raped by HVO soldiers before being forced across the front line to East

10     Mostar.  The HVO soldiers also confiscated the keys to Muslim apartments

11     and stole the valuables in them.  Some soldiers even made use of

12     Heliodrom detainees to pillage the apartments of Muslims who had been

13     driven out of them.

14             The HVO conducted similar operations in other municipalities of

15     Herceg-Bosna in the summer of 1993.  To begin with, the HVO arrested the

16     Muslim men, whether they were Muslim HVO soldiers, ABiH soldiers, or men

17     of military ages, and placed them in detention in the prisons of Dretelj,

18     Gabela, Ljubljanska, and at the Heliodrom, or in other detention centres

19     where they were often victims of grave abuse.  Then the HVO carried out

20     mass campaigns to arrest the women, children, and elderly persons in

21     these municipalities, and then sent them to territory under the control

22     of the ABiH, often after having held them under appalling conditions for

23     various periods of time.

24             This was the case in the municipality of Capljina where the HVO

25     carried out a mass campaign to arrest Muslim men from the 30th of June to


Page 20986

 1     mid-July 1993.  On or around mid-July 1993, members of the HVO set fire

 2     to houses belonging to Muslims in Bivolje Brdo, stole their property, and

 3     destroyed the mosques of Lokve and Visici.  Between July and September

 4     1993, members of the HVO moved the women, children, and elderly people

 5     from the villages of Domanovici, Bivolje Brdo, and Pocitelj, and from the

 6     town of Capljina to the Capljina silos or to the territory under the

 7     control of the ABiH.  The Chamber concluded, or the majority concluded

 8     with me dissenting, that on the 13th of July, 1993, two young Muslim

 9     women were killed by HVO gun-fire in Domanovici.  In Bivolje Brdo, the

10     HVO killed a crippled 83-year-old man.  Several days later, on the 16th

11     of July, 1993, members of the HVO took part in the arrest of 12 Muslim

12     men from the village of Bivolje Brdo, killed them, burned them, and

13     buried their bodies near a former bauxite mine at the village.  The men,

14     women, children, and elderly persons held by the HVO at the Capljina

15     silos between July and October 1993 were can kept under very difficult

16     conditions, sleeping on the floor without blankets although it was very

17     cold, with very little food and with no sanitary facilities.  The HVO

18     then transferred these persons to territory under the control of the

19     ABiH.

20             In early July 1993 in the municipality of Stolac, the HVO also

21     conducted a mass and systematic campaign to disarm and arrest Muslim

22     members of the HVO, ABiH soldiers and Muslim men of military age, and

23     held them in the Dretelj, Gabela, Ljubuski prisons and at the Heliodrom.

24     Then in July and August 1993, the HVO conducted a campaign to arrest and

25     imprison the women, children, and elderly persons and transfer them from


Page 20987

 1     the municipality of Stolac.  During these arrests, a 17-year-old girl was

 2     killed by an HVO soldier in a burst of gun-fire.  Several hundred persons

 3     thus arrested were held at various sites, in particular at the Aladinici

 4     school, where the conditions of confinement were extremely precarious.

 5     Having been held for several days to several months, some detainees were

 6     held until November 1993, the Muslims were transferred to Blagaj.  In

 7     July 1993, the HVO burned down the Sultan Selim mosque in Stolac,

 8     plundered and set fire to numerous Muslim homes in the village of

 9     Borojevici, and stole property belonging to Muslims in the village of

10     Pjesivac Greda.

11             Moreover, as early as May 1993, the HVO requisitioned the Kostana

12     hospital in order to detain there until October 1993 Muslim men arrested

13     in the municipality of Stolac.  Five of them died following severe

14     beatings and brutal mistreatment inflicted on them by members of the HVO.

15     Other detainees were subjected to extremely violent abuse and still

16     suffer the consequences of it to this day.

17             On the 14th of July, 1993, in Buna, HVO military police took away

18     a young Muslim, aged 16, and his grandfather to the military police

19     building.  They beat the young man violently, kicking and punching him

20     and striking him with an electrical cable.  They then took the two men to

21     the edge of a cliff along the Neretva and shot them in the back, severely

22     wounding the young man and killing his grandfather.

23             Between June and mid-August 1993, the HVO attacked around a dozen

24     villages in the municipality of Prozor.  The HVO members destroyed

25     property belonging to Muslims and a mosque in Skrobucani.  They set fire


Page 20988

 1     to several houses in Lug and damaged property belonging to Muslims in the

 2     village of Podanis.  On the 19th of July, 1993, HVO soldiers killed three

 3     men after severely beating them in the village of Prajine as well as two

 4     men and a woman on Mount Tolavac.

 5             Between June and August 1993, the HVO arrested Muslim men,

 6     including minors, elderly and sick persons in the municipality of Prozor

 7     and detained them for several weeks in various locations.  The HVO thus

 8     detained for several weeks these people.  The HVO thus detained between

 9     400 and 500 Muslim men in the Prozor secondary school in the summer of

10     1993 where they were violently abused and forced to work on the front

11     line during which time some of them were wounded or killed.  The HVO also

12     detained Muslim men at the technical school and at the fire station, in

13     the Unis building where some of them were beaten.  In July 1993, Muslim

14     men detained by the HVO in the MUP building were forced to work on the

15     front line during which time some of them were mistreated.

16             Some detainees also suffered cruelty, including sexual assault.

17     Moreover, 11 detainees were shot dead by HVO soldiers in Crni Vrh on the

18     31st of July, 1993, while they were tied to each other with telephone

19     cables around their necks and forced to march in the direction of the

20     ABiH serving as human shields.

21             The HVO also arrested Muslim women, children, and elderly people

22     in the municipality of Prozor and detained them in houses in Podgradje,

23     Lapsunj and Duge where they lived in a climate of terror and in very poor

24     conditions, suffering mistreatments, threats, rapes, and some of the

25     women were the victims of sexual abuse by members of the HVO and at times


Page 20989

 1     on a daily basis.  On the 28th of August, 1993, the HVO transferred these

 2     persons to territory under the control of the ABiH and at the time fired

 3     at some of them, wounding them.

 4             Some of these women, children, and elderly people returned to the

 5     municipality of Prozor some time later.  The HVO once more arrested and

 6     detained them at Duge, where they were subjected to psychological and

 7     physical violence, but also sexual assault until December 1993.

 8             When Rastani was captured on the 24th of August, 1993, HVO

 9     soldiers killed four men even though they had surrendered.  They then

10     threatened the women and children who were there and stole all of their

11     valuables.  After this, the women and children had no other choice but to

12     return to the territory under the control of the ABiH.

13             Finally, in the municipality of Ljubuski, in July and August

14     1993, the HVO listed, disarmed, and regulated the movement of men of

15     military age and then carried out mass arrests of hundreds of them and

16     imprisoned them in the Ljubuski prison and at the Heliodrom.  Numerous

17     Muslim homes became vacant in the municipality of Ljubuski and were then

18     occupied by Croats from Central Bosnia.

19             At the same time as the mass arrests, the HVO created and managed

20     a whole network of detention centres for Muslims.  Thus, the HVO military

21     police in June 1992 created a detention centre in the grounds of a former

22     police station in the town of Ljubuski.  Three months later, the HVO

23     opened the Heliodrom, a former military facility of the JNA, to the south

24     of the town of Mostar and turned it into a detention centre.  The prisons

25     of Dretelj and Gabela housed in former JNA barracks started functioning


Page 20990

 1     as of April 1993.  The Vojno detention centre operated at least between

 2     August 1993 and January 1994.  The setting up of these detention centres

 3     allowed the HVO to detain thousands of Muslim civilians and soldiers

 4     without any distinction.

 5             The Chamber was able to find, especially from the testimony of

 6     former detainees, that the detention conditions in these centres were

 7     especially harsh.  The premises were not adequate to detain so many

 8     persons and overcrowding became particularly noticeable in the summer of

 9     1993, following large waves of arrests in May and July 1993.  Detainees

10     at the Ljubuski prison had barely any room to sit down on the ground.

11     Those in Dretelj prison were crammed into hangars and underground

12     tunnels.  Detainees in all the detention centres were undernourished and

13     the sanitary conditions were appalling.  Some didn't even have access to

14     toilets and had to relieve themselves in makeshift containers.  Most of

15     the time they had no access to medical care adequate enough to treat the

16     illnesses resulting from the insanitary conditions and the injuries

17     caused by mistreatment that they suffered at the hands of the HVO.  Some

18     of them are marked for life.  The Trial Chamber noted that the detention

19     conditions in some isolation cells at the Heliodrom and at the Dretelj

20     prison were extremely harsh, lacking water, food, sanitary facilities,

21     and even lighting.

22             The Muslims in these detention centres were also mistreated.  HVO

23     members regularly beat them and subjected them to very grave

24     mistreatment.  Members of the HVO used cigarettes to burn detainees at

25     the Vojno detention centre.  Ivica Kraljevic, a member of the military


Page 20991

 1     police and commander of the Ljubuski prison, and two other men subjected

 2     a detainee to electric shocks until he blacked out.  People who came from

 3     the outside, such as military policemen, were authorised, in particular

 4     by the commander of the 1st Brigade of the HVO, to enter the prisons of

 5     Dretelj and Gabela in order to beat the detainees.  Bosko Previsic,

 6     warden of the Gabela prison, personally shot dead a BH army soldier.  At

 7     least two detainees at the Dretelj prison died after having been

 8     mistreated.  Military policemen also shot dead three detainees by firing

 9     at the hangars in which the detainees were locked up.  Mario Mihalj, in

10     charge of the Vojno detention centre beat severely and then shot dead a

11     Muslim detained at the centre.  Members of the HVO also regularly

12     insulted and humiliated detainees.  At Dretelj prison, detainees had to

13     eat using utensils that were never washed and only had a few seconds to

14     finish their meager rations under threat of punishment.  The detainees

15     who did not eat fast enough had to lie down on the blazing hot Tarmac and

16     to roll on the ground without their shirts on.  A detainee at the

17     Heliodrom was forced to lick his own blood so that "the blood of a balija

18     does not remain on Croatian soil," according to his jailers who were

19     members of the military police.

20             Detainees at the Heliodrom, at the Vojno detention centre, and

21     the Ljubuski prison were forced to carry out dangerous work at the front

22     line, during which some of them were wounded or killed in the exchange of

23     fire between the ABiH and the HVO.  Detainees at the Heliodrom were

24     wounded or killed when they were used as human shields on the front line.

25             When the Dretelj prison closed in early October 1993, the


Page 20992

 1     detainees were transferred to other detention centres, including the

 2     Gabela prison and the Heliodrom.  The Vojno detention centre continued to

 3     operate until January 1994.  The Heliodrom and the prisons of Ljubuski

 4     and Gabela closed in April 1994.

 5             From December 1993, following a decision by Mate Boban, the

 6     then-president of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, to close all the

 7     detention centres, the HVO emptied its detention centres.  It ensured

 8     that the detainees promised to leave Herceg-Bosna with their families by

 9     providing letters of guarantee from third countries willing to accept

10     them.  Detainees were then transferred to Croatia while awaiting

11     departure to third countries.  Other detainees and their families had to

12     move to territories under ABiH control.  Finally, the HVO used some

13     detainees as part of the exchange policy with the ABiH.

14             In the municipality of Vares in Central Bosnia, the HVO

15     endeavoured to encourage and even put pressure on the Croatian population

16     to leave the municipality and go to Herceg-Bosna.  The HVO also committed

17     numerous crimes against Muslims in that municipality.

18             On the 23rd of October, 1993, members of the HVO proceeded to

19     arrest and detain Muslim men in the town of Vares.  Most of them were

20     detained at the Vares high school and the Vares elementary school where

21     the detention conditions were very harsh and where members of the HVO

22     beat them.  Between the 23rd of October and the 4th of November, 1993,

23     Muslim men were also detained at the prison in Vares-Majdan.  HVO

24     soldiers subjected them to violence and humiliation.  For instance, one

25     of the detainees was forced to cut his own beard and eat it.


Page 20993

 1             On or around the 3rd of November, HVO troops withdrew from the

 2     town of Vares in the direction of Kiseljak.  The HVO thus left its

 3     detention centres around that date, abandoning the detainees who were

 4     able to identify themselves, at least some of them, to UNPROFOR.  Before

 5     leaving the town of Vares, members of the HVO raped two Muslim women from

 6     Vares.  HVO soldiers also engaged in looting shops and houses belonging

 7     to Muslims.

 8             Moreover, HVO armed forces launched an offensive on the village

 9     of Stupni Do inhabited by Muslims on the morning of the 23rd of October,

10     1993.  Soldiers from the Maturice and Apostoli special units raped and

11     sexually abused three women from the village.  During the attack they

12     also killed 36 people, including three children aged 13, 8, and 3 years

13     old respectively.  The entire village was destroyed and the villagers

14     were stripped of their belongings.

15             The Chamber found that the highest HVO authorities tried to

16     convince the international community that investigations of the crimes

17     were under way, when in fact they were never carried out.  Moreover,

18     Ivica Rajic, commander of the HVO troops at Vares, continued in his

19     position under the pseudonym of Viktor Andric and he was never

20     investigated.

21             The Chamber found by a majority, with me dissenting, that the

22     conflict between the HVO and the ABiH during this period of time was of

23     an international character.  Indeed, evidence has shown that troops of

24     the Croatian army fought alongside the HVO against the ABiH and that the

25     Republic of Croatia had overall control over the armed forces and the


Page 20994

 1     civilian authorities of the Croatian Community and then the Republic of

 2     Herceg-Bosna.

 3             Applying the legal elements of the crimes alleged in the

 4     indictment to the facts found proved in relation to each of the

 5     municipalities and each of the detention centres, the Trial Chamber finds

 6     that the following crimes were committed:

 7             Crimes against humanity:  persecution on political, racial, or

 8     religious grounds, murder, rape, deportation, forcible transfer as

 9     inhumane acts, imprisonment, inhumane acts;

10             Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949:  wilful

11     killing, sexual assault as inhumane treatment, unlawful deportation of a

12     civilian, unlawful transfer of a civilian, unlawful confinement of a

13     civilian, inhumane treatment, extensive destruction of property not

14     justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,

15     appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried

16     out unlawfully and wantonly; and

17             Violation of the laws or customs of war:  cruel treatment,

18     unlawful labour, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or

19     devastation not justified by military necessity, destruction or wilful

20     damage done to institutions dedicated to religion or education, plunder

21     of public or private property, and specifically with respect to Mostar:

22     Unlawful attack on civilians and unlawful infliction of terror on

23     civilians.

24             The Chamber decided not to address Count 26, cruel treatment,

25     Mostar siege, for reasons set out in Volume 3 of the judgement, and


Page 20995

 1     analysed the events that occurred between June 1993 and April 1994 in

 2     Mostar, in East Mostar, as cruel treatment under Count 17.

 3             Having described the findings of the Chamber with regard to the

 4     crimes committed in the municipalities in the detention centres listed in

 5     the indictment, I will now summarise the findings of the Chamber with

 6     respect to the responsibility of the accused as set out in the

 7     indictment.

 8             The accused are charged under every form of liability set out in

 9     Article 7(1) of the Statute, including commission through participation

10     in a joint criminal enterprise, and command responsibility under Article

11     7(3) of the Statute.  Considering the extent of the crimes charged

12     against the six accused and found proved by the Chamber, the Chamber

13     finds by a majority, with me dissenting, that analysing their

14     responsibility by virtue of their participation in a joint criminal

15     enterprise is the obvious legal approach.  Consequently, the other modes

16     of participation alleged in the indictment have only been considered for

17     those crimes that do not come under the joint criminal enterprise.

18             Therefore, the Trial Chamber finds by a majority that a joint

19     criminal enterprise existed and had as its ultimate goal the

20     establishment of a Croatian territorial entity with part of the borders

21     of the Croatian Banovina from 1939 to enable a reunification of the

22     Croatian people.  This Croatian territorial entity in Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina was to either unite with Croatia following the prospective

24     dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina or become an Independent State

25     within Bosnia and Herzegovina with direct ties to Croatia.


Page 20996

 1             The Chamber finds, again by a majority, that as early as December

 2     1991, the leadership of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, which

 3     included Mate Boban, President of the Croatian Community, later Republic,

 4     of Herceg-Bosna, and Croatian leaders, including Franjo Tudjman, the

 5     President of Croatia, deemed that in order to achieve the ultimate goal,

 6     namely, the establishment of a Croatian territorial entity as I have just

 7     described, it was necessary to modify the ethnic composition of the

 8     territories claimed to be part of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.

 9     From at least the end of October 1992, Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic,

10     Milivoj Petkovic, and Slobodan Praljak were aware that achieving this

11     goal went against the peace talks conducted in Geneva and would entail

12     moving Muslim populations out of the territory of Herceg-Bosna.

13             Evidence establishes that as of mid-January 1993, the HVO

14     leadership and certain Croatian leaders had the intention of

15     consolidating HVO control over the provinces claimed to be Croatian and

16     to proceed with the ethnic cleansing of these provinces to ensure that

17     they had either a majority or an exclusively Croatian population.

18     Therefore, the joint criminal enterprise was established as of

19     mid-January 1993.  The HVO conducted the military campaigns I described

20     previously in the provinces it considered to be Croatian for the purpose

21     of consolidating its presence.  These military campaigns were accompanied

22     by the displacement of the Muslim population.  The HVO also organised the

23     displacement of Croatian population from Central Bosnia towards

24     Herzegovina.  The aim of this displacement was to protect a part of the

25     Croatian population in Central Bosnia from combat taking place in the


Page 20997

 1     area, but also to strengthen the presence of Croats in Herceg-Bosna.  The

 2     goal of this was to shift the balance of power in favour of the Croats.

 3     Consequently, one part of the Croatian population in Central Bosnia

 4     voluntarily left whilst others were forcibly displaced by the HVO.

 5             The Chamber finds that the many crimes committed by HVO forces

 6     against the Muslims between January 1993 and April 1994 followed, for the

 7     most part, a clear pattern of conduct.  In the majority of cases, the

 8     crimes committed were not the random acts of a few unruly soldiers.  On

 9     the contrary, these crimes were the result of a plan drawn up by members

10     of the JCE whose goal it was to permanently remove the Muslim population

11     from Herceg-Bosna.

12             The Chamber is satisfied that the members of the joint criminal

13     enterprise were directing and co-ordinating events on the ground in order

14     to commit the crimes described above.  They implemented a system to expel

15     the Muslim population living in the territory of Herceg-Bosna, which

16     consisted of the following:  Displacement and/or detention of civilians,

17     murder and destruction of property during attacks, ill-treatment and

18     destruction during eviction operations, ill-treatment and poor conditions

19     in detention, the widespread and almost systematic use of detainees to

20     carry out work on the front line and even to serve as human shields at

21     times, as well as the murders and maltreatment associated with this work

22     and the use of human shields, and finally, the displacement of detainees

23     and their families from the territory of Herceg-Bosna following their

24     release.

25             Consequently, as part of the joint criminal enterprise we have


Page 20998

 1     the crimes charged in Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,

 2     16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, and 25.

 3             The Chamber finds furthermore that during the eviction campaigns

 4     against the Muslims by the HVO or their detention, HVO members committed

 5     other crimes which were not within the objective of the joint criminal

 6     enterprise but were the natural and foreseeable consequence of its

 7     implementation.  These were crimes of theft, rape, and sexual violence as

 8     well as a number of murders during the eviction campaigns and murders

 9     resulting from harsh detention conditions or ill-treatment in detention

10     centres and the destruction of mosques in Sovici and Doljani in April

11     1993.

12             It should be noted that the Chamber has not included the crimes

13     committed in the Prozor municipality in October 1992 in the joint

14     criminal enterprise.  As I will describe subsequently, the Trial Chamber

15     considered the possible responsibility of the accused for these crimes

16     under the other forms of responsibility set out in the Statute.

17             In order to design and implement this joint criminal purpose, a

18     group of key Croatian figures including Franjo Tudjman, Gojko Susak,

19     Janko Bobetko, Mate Boban, Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic, Slobodan

20     Praljak, Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Coric, and Berislav Pusic

21     co-ordinated with each other.  It also emerges from the Chamber's factual

22     and legal findings that the HVO's operational mechanisms, structures, and

23     forces were used to implement the different aspects of the common

24     criminal purpose.

25             After having identified the ultimate goal and criminal purpose of


Page 20999

 1     the JCE, the Chamber considered whether each of the accused had knowingly

 2     participated in the joint criminal enterprise, significantly contributed

 3     to it, and shared the intention of committing crimes in order to

 4     implement the common criminal purpose of the JCE.

 5             Let me start with Jadranko Prlic.

 6             From the 14th of August, 1992, until late April 1994, Jadranko

 7     Prlic, as the President of the HVO and later the President of the

 8     Government of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, exercised

 9     significant de jure and de facto power to co-ordinate and direct the

10     activities of the HVO and the government.  He also had authority of HVO

11     detention centres and had notably the power to open and close them.

12     Lastly, he played a key role in relations between the HVO and the

13     Croatian Community, later Republic, of Herceg-Bosna and the Government of

14     Croatia.

15             It was through his position that Jadranko Prlic drafted the

16     ultimatums of January 1993 and April 1993 directing the ABiH to

17     subordinate itself to the HVO in the territory of Herceg-Bosna.  These

18     ultimatums materialised through military campaigns, as I described

19     earlier, in the municipalities of Gornji Vakuf, Prozor, and Jablanica,

20     which entailed the commission of numerous crimes against the Muslim

21     population.  The Chamber is satisfied that Jadranko Prlic significantly

22     contributed to the implementation of this plan in these municipalities by

23     planning, aiding and abetting the crimes committed by members of the HVO.

24             Jadranko Prlic also endorsed the arrests and detentions carried

25     out by the HVO in Mostar as of the 9th of May, 1993, and knowingly turned


Page 21000

 1     a blind eye to the increasingly violent ethnic cleansing operations in

 2     Mostar during the summer of 1993.  On the 30th of June, 1993, Jadranko

 3     Prlic issued a further call to arms to the Croats against the Muslims and

 4     accepted the simultaneous and systematic mass detentions of Muslims by

 5     the HVO in several municipalities considered to be Croatian by the

 6     leadership of the Croatian Community, later Republic, of Herceg-Bosna.

 7     Jadranko Prlic endorsed the siege of Mostar by the HVO.  Although the

 8     besieged Muslim population lived under horrible deprivation and constant

 9     firing and shelling by the HVO, Jadranko Prlic personally contributed to

10     blocking the arrival of humanitarian aid to this area of the town for

11     months.

12             Furthermore, Jadranko Prlic had knowledge of numerous crimes

13     committed by members of the armed forces of the Croatian Community, and

14     later Republic, of Herceg-Bosna.  He was also aware of the difficult

15     conditions under which Muslims arrested by the HVO were detained in the

16     Dretelj, Gabela, and Heliodrom prisons.  Nevertheless, he justified the

17     detention of Muslim civilians and refused to consider the reality of

18     their situation.  By doing so, Jadranko Prlic accepted and abetted the

19     extremely precarious conditions and ill-treatment of the detainees in

20     several HVO detention centres.

21             He was also informed that detainees from the Heliodrom and Vojno

22     were being used on the front line and knew of the abuse suffered by these

23     detainees while they worked on the front line or while they were used as

24     human shields.  By failing to intervene when he had the ability to do so

25     and by remaining in power whilst aware that crimes were being committed,


Page 21001

 1     the Trial Chamber finds that the only reasonable inference it can draw is

 2     that Jadranko Prlic aided and accepted the commission of crimes against

 3     Muslims resulting from their systematic detention by the HVO.

 4             Jadranko Prlic also endorsed the policy of deportation of the

 5     detained Muslims and their families to third countries via Croatia and

 6     participated in the virtually simultaneous displacement of Croats in

 7     Central Bosnia to populate those territories claimed by Herceg-Bosna.

 8     The Trial Chamber finds that the only reasonable inference it can draw is

 9     that Jadranko Prlic had the intention to displace the Muslim population

10     from the territory claimed by Herceg-Bosna and replace it with Croats

11     from Central Bosnia.

12             The Trial Chamber, by a majority, with me dissenting on this form

13     of responsibility, is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that Jadranko

14     Prlic made a significant contribution to the joint criminal enterprise

15     and was one of its principal members.  It is clear from his contribution

16     that he had the intention to carry out the common criminal purpose of

17     driving out the Muslim population and to commit the above-mentioned

18     crimes to achieve this purpose.  The Trial Chamber finds, furthermore,

19     that by virtue of his involvement in achieving the common criminal

20     purpose and his knowledge of the facts could have reasonably anticipated

21     the crimes of murder and sexual abuse committed during the operations to

22     evict Muslims from West Mostar, the looting committed during the

23     evacuation operations in Gornji Vakuf, Jablanica, and West Mostar, the

24     murders related to the detentions in Sovici and the destruction of the

25     two mosques in Sovici and Doljani.  He accepted and assumed the risk that


Page 21002

 1     these crimes could be committed.

 2             I shall now look into the responsibility of Bruno Stojic.

 3             From the 3rd of July, 1993, to the 15th of November, 1993, Bruno

 4     Stojic, as the head of the Department of Defence, exercised significant

 5     de jure and de facto authority over the majority of the armed forces and

 6     military police of the Croatian Community, and later Republic, of

 7     Herceg-Bosna.  Therefore, he commanded and exercised effective control

 8     over the HVO armed forces and the military police, notably by making

 9     decisions on military operations which he implemented through the chain

10     of command and by issuing orders to the chief of the Military Police

11     Administration, including orders directly linked to operations on the

12     ground.  Bruno Stojic also took part in the setting up of the defence

13     policy of the Croatian Community, and later Republic, of Herceg-Bosna by

14     taking part in decisive meetings of the HVO.  Furthermore, he represented

15     the HVO at high-level peace talks.

16             As part of his duties, Bruno Stojic facilitated the military

17     operations of the HVO in Gornji Vakuf in January 1993.  He participated

18     in the planning of HVO military operations in Mostar on the 9th of May,

19     1993, and in the days that followed.  He participated in the organisation

20     and implementation of campaigns to evict Muslims in West Mostar in the

21     summer of 1993.  Lastly, he participated in the planning of the military

22     operations in Vares in October 1993 and as a consequence took part in the

23     numerous crimes that were likely to be committed in the course of these

24     operations.

25             Bruno Stojic was informed of the crimes committed by the HVO


Page 21003

 1     during the military operations in Gornji Vakuf in January 1993 and in

 2     Jablanica in April 1993, the evictions of the Muslim population in

 3     Capljina in July 1993, the shelling and attacks against members of

 4     international organisations and the poor living conditions that the

 5     Muslim population in East Mostar was subjected to.

 6             He was also informed of the fact that the detention of Muslims by

 7     the HVO did not meet the standards of international law in the Ljubuski,

 8     Dretelj, and Gabela prisons and at the Heliodrom.

 9             Nevertheless, Bruno Stojic continued to exercise effective

10     control over the armed forces and the military police for the duration of

11     his mandate as the head of the Department of Defence.  Furthermore, Bruno

12     Stojic did not make any serious efforts to put an end to the crimes that

13     were being committed, although he had the authority and the duty to do

14     so.  He also attempted to renege on his responsibility before

15     representatives of international organisations.  The Trial Chamber finds

16     that the only inference it can draw is that Bruno Stojic accepted the

17     commission of these crimes.

18             The majority, with me dissenting on the form of responsibility,

19     is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that Bruno Stojic made a

20     significant contribution to the joint criminal enterprise by controlling

21     the armed forces and serving as a link between them and the government.

22     It is clear from his contribution that he had the intention to carry out

23     the common criminal purpose of driving out the Muslim population and to

24     commit the above-mentioned crimes to achieve this purpose.  The Chamber

25     finds, furthermore, that by virtue of his involvement in the common


Page 21004

 1     criminal purpose and his knowledge of the fact could have reasonably

 2     foreseen the sexual abuse or assaults committed during the operations to

 3     evict Muslims from West Mostar as well as the looting committed during

 4     the evacuation operations in Gornji Vakuf in January 1993 and in the

 5     municipality of Mostar as of May 1993.  He accepted and assumed the risks

 6     that these crimes might be committed.

 7             I shall now look into the responsibility of Slobodan Praljak.

 8             Between autumn 1992 and the 9th of November, 1993, Slobodan

 9     Praljak had significant de facto then later de jure and de facto

10     authority over the armed forces and the military police of the HVO.

11     Between autumn 1992 and the 24th of July, 1993, Slobodan Praljak, who at

12     the time held positions in the Ministry of Defence of Croatia, commanded

13     the armed forces of the HVO, specifically by assuming command of certain

14     operations, giving orders to the units, and receiving reports from the

15     commanders in the field, by representing the HVO in its efforts to

16     implement a Joint Command with the ABiH and by commanding some of the

17     units of the HVO military police.  He likewise acted as a mediator to

18     ease the tensions between the various elements of the HVO armed forces.

19     Then between the 24th of July, 1993, and the 9th of November, 1993,

20     Slobodan Praljak in his capacity as commander of the HVO Main Staff had

21     effective command authority and control over all the elements of the

22     armed forces.  He therefore took decisions with regard to military

23     operations which he had carried out through the chain of command.

24             Slobodan Praljak thus planned, facilitated, and was kept informed

25     of the HVO's military operations in Gornji Vakuf on or around the 18th of


Page 21005

 1     January, 1993.  He planned and commanded HVO military operations in the

 2     municipality of Prozor starting on the 24th of July, 1993.  He

 3     participated in the command and planning of HVO operations in Mostar in

 4     the municipality of Mostar between July and early November 1993,

 5     including on the 8th of November, 1993, which resulted in the destruction

 6     of the Mostar bridge.  Lastly, he participated in the planning and

 7     command of HVO operations in Vares in October 1993.  He thus participated

 8     in crimes that were likely to be committed in the course of these

 9     operations.

10             Slobodan Praljak was, moreover, informed of the fact that members

11     of the armed forces were removing, detaining the Muslim population of

12     Prozor from July to August 1993.  He knew that crimes would be committed

13     in the municipality of Mostar, including the destruction of buildings in

14     East Mostar, including the mosque and the Old Bridge and the murders, and

15     the wounding and the attacks against members of international

16     organisations.  He facilitated the murders of Muslims who did not belong

17     to any armed force and the destruction of property in Stupni Do in

18     October 1993.

19             Slobodan Praljak, however, continued to serve in his positions

20     until the 9th of November, 1993.  He did not make any serious efforts

21     either to put an end to the commission of crimes or to the crimes

22     committed by the armed forces of the HVO.  On the contrary, he denied

23     that crimes were being committed against the Muslims and helped the

24     perpetrators of these crimes evade prosecution.  Slobodan Praljak

25     contributed, inter alia, to the efforts made by the HVO to conceal the


Page 21006

 1     HVO's responsibility for the crimes committed at Stupni Do.

 2             Slobodan Praljak served, moreover, as a conduit between Croatia

 3     and the HVO in order to carry out the criminal purpose of this

 4     enterprise.  By virtue of the positions he held in the Croatian

 5     government and within the HVO, he was made aware of the policies of the

 6     most senior Croatian leaders with regard to Herceg-Bosna and demonstrated

 7     his willingness to implement these.  It is in this context that Slobodan

 8     Praljak forwarded orders, communications, and instructions from the

 9     leaders of Croatia to those of Herceg-Bosna and participated in obtaining

10     the military support of Croatia on behalf of the armed forces of the HVO.

11             The majority, with me dissenting on the form of responsibility,

12     is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that Slobodan Praljak made a

13     significant contribution to the joint criminal enterprise.  Furthermore,

14     it is clear from his contribution that he had the intention to carry out

15     the common criminal purpose of driving out the Muslim population and to

16     commit the above-mentioned crimes in order to achieve this purpose.  The

17     Chamber finds, moreover, that Slobodan Praljak, because of his

18     contribution to the implementation of the common criminal purpose and his

19     knowledge of the facts, could reasonably foresee that looting would be

20     committed during the eviction operations in Gornji Vakuf in January 1993

21     and during the HVO operation at Rastani in August 1993 and accepted and

22     assumed the risk that these crimes might be committed.

23             I shall now look into the summary concerning the responsibility

24     of Milivoj Petkovic.

25             Between the 14th of April, 1992, and the 26th of April, 1994,


Page 21007

 1     Milivoj Petkovic wielded significant command and control authority over

 2     every element of the HVO armed forces, first as chief of the Main Staff

 3     of the HVO until the 24th of July, 1993, then as deputy commander of the

 4     said Main Staff until the 26th of April, 1994.  Milivoj Petkovic

 5     represented and engaged the HVO during peace negotiations and issued

 6     cease-fire orders.  Lastly, he forwarded orders and decisions taken by

 7     the political and governmental authorities of the Croatian Community,

 8     later Republic, of Herceg-Bosna which were being forwarded to him through

 9     the head of the Department of Defence, Bruno Stojic, and kept the

10     political organs abreast of the military situation on the ground.

11             Milivoj Petkovic planned and facilitated military operations in

12     in the municipality of Gornji Vakuf in January 1993.  He planned and

13     commanded the military operations in the municipality of Jablanica in

14     April 1993; blocked access to international observers in the villages of

15     Sovici and Doljani and then orchestrated the removal of civilians to

16     Gornji Vakuf.  He commanded military operations in the municipality of

17     Prozor in April and June 1993 and planned the operations in July and

18     August 1993.  He participated in the planning of the shelling of East

19     Mostar.  He prevented the Muslim population in East Mostar from gaining

20     access to the humanitarian convoys, planned the military offensive

21     against the old town of Mostar, including the assault on the 8th of

22     November, 1993, which led to the destruction of the Mostar bridge.  On

23     the 30th of June, 1993, he ordered the arrest of men who did not belong

24     to any armed force in the municipalities of Mostar, Stolac, and Capljina.

25     He planned the military operations on the town of Vares in October 1993


Page 21008

 1     and participated in the implementation of a fake investigation into the

 2     incidents at Stupni Do and fictitious sanctions against Ivica Rajic.  He

 3     thereby took part in the commission of the crimes that were likely to be

 4     committed during the course of these operations.

 5             Milivoj Petkovic knew that numerous Muslims were detained in the

 6     HVO detention facilities and he ordered and authorised detainees from the

 7     Heliodrom and the Vitina-Otok camp to work on the front lines.

 8             Milivoj Petkovic, however, continued to exercise effective

 9     control over the armed forces until April 1994, although he was aware

10     that their members had committed and were committing crimes.  Milivoj

11     Petkovic continued to command and control the HVO's units, including the

12     KB, Convicts Battalion, the ATG, and the Bruno Busic Regiment, even

13     though he knew that they had committed numerous crimes.  By continuing to

14     deploy them in the theatre of operations or at least by failing to take

15     any measures to prevent the commission of new crimes, he encouraged or he

16     abetted subsequent crimes to be committed.

17             The majority, with me dissenting on the form of responsibility,

18     is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that Milivoj Petkovic made a

19     significant contribution to the joint criminal enterprise.  Furthermore,

20     it is clear from his contribution that he possessed the intention to

21     carry out the common criminal purpose of driving out the Muslim

22     population and to commit the above-mentioned crimes in order to realise

23     this purpose.  The Chamber holds, moreover, that Milivoj Petkovic, due to

24     his contribution to the implementation of the common criminal purpose and

25     his knowledge of the facts, could reasonably have foreseen that sexual


Page 21009

 1     assaults would be committed during the operations to evict the Muslim

 2     population from West Mostar between June 1993 and February 1994 and

 3     during the military operations in the town of Vares in late October 1993,

 4     that looting would be committed during the eviction operations in the

 5     municipality of Gornji Vakuf in January 1993 and in the municipality of

 6     Jablanica in April 1993, in the municipality of Mostar between June 1993

 7     and February 1994, and during the military operations in the town of

 8     Vares in late October 1993, and lastly, that the mosques in Sovici and

 9     Doljani would be destroyed during the operations conducted in the

10     municipality of Jablanica in April 1993.  He accepted and assumed the

11     risk that these crimes might be committed.

12             Moving on to the responsibility of Valentin Coric.

13             Between June 1992 and the 10th of November, 1993, Valentin Coric

14     in his capacity as head of the Military Police Administration had

15     significant de jure and de facto authority -- there seems to be a

16     problem.  I can't hear the translation into B/C/S/.  Oh, no, I've got it

17     now.  Thank you.  So let me start again.

18             Between June 1992 and the 10th of November, 1993, Valentin Coric

19     in his capacity as head of the Military Police Administration had

20     significant de jure and de facto authority over all of the units of the

21     HVO military police.  More specifically, Valentin Coric wielded effective

22     command and control authority over the units of the military police,

23     specifically the authority to resubordinate the said units for combat

24     actions.  He had the ability to take part in efforts to fight criminal

25     conduct within the HVO.  He was able to control the movement of persons


Page 21010

 1     and of goods on the territory of Herceg-Bosna and the movement of

 2     humanitarian convoys in particular.  Lastly, he wielded significant

 3     authority over the way the network of HVO detention facilities operated.

 4     When he became minister of the interior on 10th of November, 1993, he

 5     still retained the ability to take part in fighting criminal conduct

 6     within the HVO and he still retained the authority to control the free

 7     movement of persons and of goods in the territory of Herceg-Bosna,

 8     particularly the movement of humanitarian convoys.

 9             In connection with his office, Valentin Coric knowingly committed

10     certain units of the military police to the eviction operations in the

11     municipalities of Gornji Vakuf in January 1993, Stolac and Capljina

12     during the summer of 1993, and at Mostar between May and October 1993.

13     He thereby facilitated the arrest and later the confinement of Muslims

14     from these municipalities, contributing whilst operations were underway

15     to the commission of the crimes I have described above.

16             Valentin Coric played a key part in operating the network of HVO

17     detention facilities until the 10th of November, 1993.  He helped keep

18     thousands of Muslims in confinement in harsh conditions, and during that

19     confinement they were beaten, abused, humiliated.  He regularly

20     instructed or allowed them to be used to work at the front line.

21     Moreover, despite the alarming information he was receiving, Valentin

22     Coric did nothing to prevent detainees from the Heliodrom from being sent

23     to work at the front line, where many of them were killed or injured.  In

24     August 1993 he ordered the forced departure of Muslims from Ljubuski

25     municipality on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina by ordering their


Page 21011

 1     release conditioned upon their departure abroad with their families via

 2     Croatia.

 3             The majority, with me dissenting as to the mode of

 4     responsibility, is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Valentin Coric

 5     made a substantial contribution to the joint criminal enterprise.

 6     Moreover, his contribution makes clear that he had the intent to carry

 7     out the common criminal purpose of driving out the Muslim population and

 8     causing the crimes mentioned above to be committed in order to carry out

 9     this purpose.  Lastly, the Chamber finds that because he contributed to

10     the implementation of the common criminal purpose and was aware of the

11     facts, Valentin Coric could reasonably foresee that such thefts would be

12     committed during the eviction operations in the municipalities of Gornji

13     Vakuf in January 1993, that acts of sexual brutality and theft would be

14     committed during the eviction operation in West Mostar commencing in May

15     1993, and that finally certain detainees would die in August 1993 at

16     Dretelj prison as a result of mistreatment.  He accepted and assumed the

17     risk that these crimes might be committed.

18             We shall now move to Berislav Pusic.

19             Between April 1993 and April 1994, Berislav Pusic held several

20     posts and received an ever-growing share of responsibility from the

21     senior leaders of the HVO.  In April 1993, Berislav Pusic was thus the

22     overseeing official at the Department of Criminal Investigations of the

23     Military Police Administration.  Starting in May 1993, he was seated on a

24     commission for the exchange of prisoners and other persons, then became

25     the president of its executive body, the exchange service, on 5th of


Page 21012

 1     July, 1993.  Bruno Stojic, likewise, appointed Berislav Pusic to head the

 2     Commission for Prisons and HVO detention facilities on the 6th of August,

 3     1993.  Finally, Berislav Pusic wielded significant authority representing

 4     the HVO to the international community and before the senior officials of

 5     Croatia and of Bosnia-Herzegovina which made him a major player in

 6     negotiations regarding exchanges and the movement of persons.

 7             Berislav Pusic had knowledge of the mass arrests of Muslims from

 8     Herceg-Bosna as early as April 1993 with the mass arrests that took place

 9     in the Jablanica municipality.

10             He had knowledge of the very harsh conditions in which Muslims

11     were confined at Sovici school and in the prisons at Dretelj, Gabela,

12     Ljubuski, as well as at the Heliodrom, and about the mistreatment

13     inflicted upon the detainees at the Heliodrom and at the Vojno detention

14     facility.  The Trial Chamber finds that he never took the necessary

15     measures to improve these conditions or to cause the mistreatment to

16     stop.  As he continued to remain in office with the HVO, the Chamber has

17     found that the only permissible inference is that Berislav Pusic accepted

18     these crimes.

19             Berislav Pusic played an important role in the use of Heliodrom

20     detainees for work assignments at the front line, as he was one of the

21     persons who had the authority to allow this.  He continued to send

22     detainees to work at the front line when he knew that certain detainees

23     had been there and died or had been injured.  Berislav Pusic therefore

24     contributed to the commission of these crimes.

25             When Mate Boban decided to close the HVO detention centres,


Page 21013

 1     Berislav Pusic played a major part in organising the closing of the said

 2     facilities and did everything to ensure that Muslims would leave the

 3     territory of Herceg-Bosna.

 4             Berislav Pusic was aware of the destruction in the villages of

 5     Sovici and Doljani in April 1993 and of the removal of the population

 6     from these villages to ABiH-controlled territories in late May 1993.  He

 7     also knew that the Muslim populations from Capljina and West Mostar

 8     municipalities had been moved to territories controlled by the ABiH.  He

 9     had knowledge of the disastrous living conditions in East Mostar brought

10     on by the HVO siege, and took part in blocking humanitarian evacuations.

11             Despite the role he had among various officials from the HVO

12     detention centres but also with senior HVO representatives,

13     Berislav Pusic Made no serious effort either to put an end to the crimes

14     that were being committed in the detention facilities or those committed

15     during the arrests of the Muslims or to report them.  On the contrary,

16     Berislav Pusic always sought to avoid embarrassing questions from the

17     representatives of international organisations or from his Muslim

18     counterparts and he gave vague or even false information to these

19     representatives and to the press, thereby attempting to deny or minimise

20     the crimes committed by the members of the HVO against Muslims.

21             The majority, with me dissenting as to the form of

22     responsibility, is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Berislav Pusic

23     made a substantial contribution to the joint criminal enterprise.

24     Moreover, one discerns from his contribution that his intent was to carry

25     out the common criminal purpose of driving out the Muslim population and


Page 21014

 1     of causing the crimes previously mentioned to be committed in order to

 2     carry out this purpose.

 3             Lastly, as the Chamber decided not to accept the crimes committed

 4     in Prozor municipality in October 1992 as constituting part of the joint

 5     criminal enterprise, the Chamber analysed the responsibility of each of

 6     the accused in virtue of the other modes of participation alleged in the

 7     indictment.  The evidence admitted to the record enabled the Chamber to

 8     make findings in respect of Valentin Coric only pursuant to Article 7(3)

 9     of the Statute.  Indeed, as of the 25th of October, 1992, he was informed

10     that members of the military police had stolen certain vehicles belonging

11     to Muslims.  Even though he knew this, Valentin Coric did nothing to

12     punish the perpetrators of these crimes despite having the capacity and

13     the duty to do so.  Moreover, Valentin Coric was advised at the same time

14     that numerous houses had been damaged during the fighting in Prozor town.

15     The information available to Valentin Coric was sufficiently alarming to

16     justify further investigation into this destruction which was not done.

17     As he did not discharge his duties as a superior, the Chamber found by a

18     majority, with me dissenting, that Valentin Coric is responsible pursuant

19     to Article 7(3) of the Statute for the thefts and destruction committed

20     in Prozor municipality in October 1992.

21             I shall now read out the disposition.

22             Will Mr. Prlic please rise.

23                           [The accused Prlic stands up]

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For the reasons I have

25     summarised, the Trial Chamber unanimously finds you, Jadranko Prlic, to


Page 21015

 1     be guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of Counts 1, 6 to 13,

 2     15, 16, 18, 19, and 21 to 25 of the indictment.  The majority, the

 3     Presiding Judge dissenting, finds you to be guilty pursuant to Article

 4     7(1) of the Statute of Counts 2 to 5 of the indictment.  On the basis of

 5     the principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber will

 6     not enter a finding of guilt for Counts 14, 17, and 20 of the indictment.

 7             The Trial Chamber, ruling unanimously, hereby sentences you to a

 8     single sentence of 25 years of imprisonment to run as of this day, with

 9     credit for the time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to

10     Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal

11     pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state

12     where you shall serve your sentence.

13             You may be seated.

14                           [The accused Prlic sits down]

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Will Mr. Stojic please rise.

16                           [The accused Stojic stands up]

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For the reasons I have

18     summarised, the Trial Chamber, ruling unanimously, finds you, Bruno

19     Stojic, to be guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of Counts 1,

20     6 to 13, 15, 16, 18, 24, and 25 of the indictment.  The majority, the

21     Presiding Judge dissenting, finds you to be guilty pursuant to Article

22     7(1) of the Statute of Counts 2 to 5, 19 and 21 to 23 of the indictment.

23     On the basis of the principles relating to cumulative convictions, the

24     Trial Chamber will not enter a finding of guilt for Counts 14, 17, and 20

25     of the indictment.


Page 21016

 1             The Trial Chamber, ruling unanimously, hereby sentences you to a

 2     single sentence of 20 years of imprisonment to run as of this day with

 3     credit for the time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to

 4     Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal

 5     pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state

 6     where you shall serve your sentence.

 7             You may be seated.

 8                           [The accused Stojic sits down]

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Will Mr. Praljak please rise.

10                           [The accused Praljak stands up]

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For the reasons I have

12     summarised, the Trial Chamber unanimously finds you, Slobodan Praljak, to

13     be guilty of Counts 1, 6 to 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24 and 25 of the

14     indictment pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute.  The majority, the

15     Presiding Judge dissenting, finds you to be guilty pursuant to Article

16     7(1) of the Statute of Counts 2, 3, 22 and 23 of the indictment and

17     enters a judgement of acquittal by a majority, the Presiding Judge

18     dissenting, on Counts 4 and 5 of the indictment.  On the basis of the

19     principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber shall

20     not enter a finding of guilt for Counts 14, 17, and 20 of the indictment.

21             The Trial Chamber, ruling unanimously, hereby sentences you to a

22     single sentence of 20 years of imprisonment to run as of this day, with

23     credit for the time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to

24     Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal

25     pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state


Page 21017

 1     where you shall serve your sentence.

 2             You may be seated.

 3                           [The accused Praljak sits down]

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Will Mr. Petkovic please rise.

 5                           [The accused Petkovic stands up]

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For the reasons I have

 7     summarised, the Trial Chamber unanimously finds you, Milivoj Petkovic, to

 8     be guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of Counts 1, 6 to 13,

 9     15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24 and 25 of the indictment.  The majority, the

10     Presiding Judge dissenting, finds you to be guilty pursuant to Article

11     7(1) of the Statute of Counts 2 to 5, 22 and 23 of the indictment.  On

12     the basis of the principles relating to cumulative convictions, the

13     Trial Chamber shall not enter a finding of guilty for Counts 14, 17, and

14     20 of the indictment.

15             The Trial Chamber, ruling unanimously, hereby sentences you to a

16     single sentence of 20 years of imprisonment to run as of this day, with

17     credit for the time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to

18     Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal

19     pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state

20     where you shall serve your sentence.

21             You may be seated.

22                           [The accused Petkovic sits down]

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Will Mr. Coric please rise.

24                           [The accused Coric stands up]

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For the reasons I have


Page 21018

 1     summarised, the Trial Chamber unanimously finds you, Valentin Coric, to

 2     be guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of Counts 1, 6 to 13,

 3     15, 16, 18, 24 and 25 of the indictment.  The majority, the Presiding

 4     Judge dissenting, finds you to be guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the

 5     Statute, of Counts 2 to 5, 19, 21, 22 and 23 of the indictment.  The

 6     majority, the Presiding Judge dissenting, finds you to be guilty pursuant

 7     to Article 7(3) of the Statute of Counts 15, 16, 19 and 23 of the

 8     indictment for the criminal events that took place in Prozor municipality

 9     in October 1992.  On the basis of the principles relating to cumulative

10     convictions, the Trial Chamber shall not enter a finding of guilt for

11     Counts 14, 17, and 20 of the indictment.

12             The Trial Chamber, ruling unanimously, hereby sentences you to a

13     single sentence of 16 years of imprisonment to run as of this day with

14     credit for the time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to

15     Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal

16     pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state

17     where you shall serve your sentence.

18             You may be seated.

19                           [The accused Coric sits down]

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Will Mr. Pusic please rise.

21                           [The accused Pusic stands up]

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] For the reasons I have

23     summarised, the Trial Chamber unanimously finds you, Berislav Pusic, to

24     be guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of Counts 6 to 13, 15,

25     16 and 18 of the indictment.  The majority, the Presiding Judge


Page 21019

 1     dissenting, finds you to be guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the

 2     Statute of Counts 1 to 3, 19, 21, 24, and 25 of the indictment.  The

 3     Trial Chamber, ruling unanimously, enters a judgement of acquittal on

 4     Counts 4, 5, 22, and 23 of the indictment.  On the basis of the

 5     principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber shall

 6     not enter a finding of guilt for Counts 14, 17, and 20 of the indictment.

 7             The Trial Chamber, ruling unanimously, hereby sentences you to a

 8     single sentence of 10 years of imprisonment to run as of this day with

 9     credit for the time you have already served in detention.  Pursuant to

10     Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal

11     pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state

12     where you shall serve your sentence.

13                           [The accused Pusic sits down]

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Judge Trechsel appends a

15     separate opinion and a partial dissenting opinion to this judgement.

16             I, as the Presiding Judge, appends a separate opinion and a

17     partial dissenting opinion to this judgement.

18             Thank you.  The hearing is now adjourned.

19                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.44 a.m.

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