Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17180

 1                           Tuesday, 6 March 2012

 2                           [Prosecution Closing Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 5                           [The accused entered court]

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is open.  Please

 7     call the case, Mr. Registrar.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you.  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is

 9     case number IT-03-67-T, the Prosecutor versus Vojislav Seselj.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar.

11             Today is Tuesday, the 6th of March, 2012.  Let me greet everybody

12     in the courtroom.  I'll give the floor to Ms. Biersay without further

13     ado, who's going to continue with her arguments on behalf of the Office

14     of the Prosecutor and will say some more about Exhibit 1200.

15             MS. BIERSAY:  Good morning, Your Honours.

16             Yesterday before I concluded I was describing to the

17     Trial Chamber the series of SRS press conferences that the accused gave

18     during this period of May and June of 1992, and specifically in and

19     around the time that non-Serbs were being tortured and murdered at the

20     Ekonomija farm and Ciglane factory in Zvornik.

21             Now, yesterday I talked about a rally that was given by the

22     accused and other members of the SRS, and that rally was published on the

23     28th of May, 1992, and according to the report it said "yesterday."  So

24     the rally happened exactly before these crimes were being committed.

25     Now, I don't know what Mr. Seselj is talking about.  And if he has

Page 17181

 1     something to say on this issue, it should wait until he has his ten hours

 2     to use.

 3             So not only were non-Serbs being killed around the time of that

 4     May 27th, 1992, rally; they're also being killed by Seseljevci around the

 5     time of other press conferences, like the ones in May -- at the end of

 6     May, 1992, around the same time that a group of Seseljevci murdered

 7     88 non-Serbs at the Drinjaca Dom Kulture in Zvornik.  And again, when he

 8     gave a press conference on June 4th, this is around the same time that a

 9     group led by Seselj's Vojvoda Vidovic murdered 22 non-Serb men and women

10     in Ljesevo, Ilijas.  And when he gave the other one in June -- on

11     June 11th, 1992, that's around the same time that 740 non-Serbs were

12     being massacred in Karakaj and Gero's slaughter-house.

13             Poisoned by the accused's persecution propaganda, the accused's

14     Seseljevci and other forces were unleashed to the epicentre of ethnic

15     conflict and violence.  In the crime bases where his volunteers were in

16     the field of operations, Serb forces committed crimes.

17             Now, to be clear, his Seseljevci need not be physical

18     perpetrators for him to be found guilty of the crimes charged; it is not

19     required.  However, crimes were often committed by volunteers associated

20     with the accused and he honoured these perpetrators again and again.  And

21     to some of them, he gave the very special title that he himself had, that

22     of Vojvoda.  He filled his Vojvodas, he filled his Seseljevci, and he

23     filled Serb forces with his hateful propaganda, which they took with them

24     to the front lines.

25             His ability to offer a fighting force was a significant

Page 17182

 1     contribution to the common purpose of the JCE and it was a substantial

 2     contribution to the commission of the charged crimes.  He had the

 3     influence, he had the authority to promise practical assistance to Serb

 4     forces throughout the former Yugoslavia.  And as Mr. Marcussen explained,

 5     consequently, because of this ability, other JCE members - suffering from

 6     manpower shortages - appealed to him for volunteers.  And that set forth

 7     in Exhibits P226, P652, and P239, for example.

 8             The accused promised and delivered volunteers to

 9     Eastern Slavonia, including Vukovar; to the Krajina; to Western Slavonia;

10     and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.  That he could both make and keep

11     such promises undermines any claim by him that he was a political figure

12     disconnected from military organisation and operations.

13             His persecution propaganda served to facilitate his contribution

14     of manpower.  His inflammatory public statements were used to recruit

15     volunteers.  His visits to the front lines strengthened their

16     indoctrination and were used to reinforce the branding of non-Serbs as

17     threats to be removed.

18             In one -- and the Trial Chamber should take in account, this is a

19     public speech that he gives to his Seseljevci.  And by "public," I mean

20     it's being televised, that he gives to his Seseljevci before sending them

21     to the Vukovar front lines.  And in a minute I'll ask that P17 be played.

22     Now, in this clip the accused called the volunteers going to Vukovar, he

23     called them Serb Chetnik heros and emphasised that they were fighting in

24     an ethnically Serb army and for Serbian land.

25             And at this time I'd ask that P17 be played.

Page 17183

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

 3             "Reporter:  ... is the common struggle together with the

 4     Yugoslav People's Army for the final liberation of Vukovar.  To the

 5     question if the volunteers would be sent to Grubisno Polje, one of the

 6     deputies of the volunteer detachment replied that Vukovar had priority

 7     over other regions.  Here is what Branko Vasiljevic told us.

 8             "Reporter:  How old are you?

 9             "BV:  58.

10             "Reporter:  Where are you from?

11             "BV:  Nis born and bred.

12             "Reporter:  And where are you going?

13             "BV:  I'm going to help the brothers ...

14             "Reporter:  Are you alone?

15             "BV:  ... brothers in arms.  No, I have two sons.

16             "Reporter:  Are they here too?

17             "BV:  They came 10 to 15 days ago.  One is in Borovo and the

18     other one in Knin.  My uncle was a commander, so blood is thicker than

19     water.

20             "Reporter:  Mr. Seselj held a speech in front of a group of

21     volunteers standing in line and said the following on that occasion.

22             "Seselj:  God bless you heros!

23             "Volunteers:  God bless you too!

24             "Seselj:  Brothers Serbs, Serb Chetnik heros, you are going to

25     the war today!

Page 17184

 1             "Today you are going to liberate the Serbian Vukovar and defend

 2     the Serbian Slavonia.  You are going to join hundreds of thousands of our

 3     volunteers.  You are leaving from all parts of today's reduced Serbia to

 4     restore the glory of the Serbian arms.  You will co-operate with the

 5     Yugoslav army units, since this is our army.  Most of all, it is the

 6     Serbian army, considering the ethnicity of its officers and its struggle

 7     for the salvation of the Serbian country and Serbian territories.

 8             "Reporter:  Mr. Seselj finished with the words:  'Good luck,

 9     guys.  See you in Vukovar.'  Do these words mean that he too will join

10     the volunteers of the Serbian Radical Party is yet to be seen."

11             MS. BIERSAY:  Many of the Seseljevci units established,

12     recruited, and organised by the accused participated both during 1991 in

13     combat operations to seize and cleanse parts of Croatia as well as parts

14     of BiH in 1992.  The Seseljevci were deployed to vital and difficult

15     areas.  The scope of the accused's volunteer recruitment and deployment

16     was vast.  It was vast in terms of the significant numbers of volunteers

17     mobilised to the front line, in terms of the geographic area they

18     covered, and in terms of their notoriety for brutality against non-Serbs.

19             Now, Your Honours, I have -- we have prepared a slide

20     illustrating some of the places to which the Seseljevci were deployed.

21     And at this time I'd ask that the slide be displayed.  And it's based on

22     a number of sources and I'd be happy to provide those separately to the

23     Trial Chamber, but the core of it, it's based on the P217, P218, and the

24     statements by and evidence of the former SRS senior members as well as

25     other evidence.

Page 17185

 1             And you can see that -- and as the Trial Chamber is well aware,

 2     the Seseljevci were deployed throughout the crime-base areas and the

 3     pattern municipalities.  So you see them clustered around Vukovar.

 4     They're also in and around Vocin, Zvornik, Greater Sarajevo, and

 5     Herzegovina, where Mostar and Nevesinje are located, Bijeljina,

 6     Bosanski Samac, and other places like the Krajina, which is in the -- on

 7     the western side of that slide, which can be removed at this time.

 8             The accused himself, in Exhibit P342, has put the number of

 9     Seseljevci as high as almost 30.000 and he admitted that he contributed

10     around 10.000 volunteers to the common purpose in BiH alone.  As early as

11     May 1991 - and this date -- that date, that's around the time that the

12     Seseljevci participated in the killing of Croat police officers in

13     Borovo Selo.  Around that time according to -- according to P1275, there

14     were already 15.000 Chetniks in the accused's ranks.  Between January and

15     July of 1992, more than 6.000 Seseljevci were stationed and trained at

16     barracks in Belgrade before being deployed to the front.  Vojvoda

17     Branislav Gavrilovic, aka Brne, and I'll discuss him a little bit more

18     shortly, he established volunteer training centres in Greater Sarajevo

19     through which at least 1500 Seseljevci passed during the course of the

20     war.  And that's just one small area.

21             The evidence, including Exhibits C10, P1275, P54, and P1000, has

22     proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made a significant

23     contribution of thousands of Seseljevci to facilitate the crimes charged

24     in the indictment.  And I'd also refer the Trial Chamber to P1219.

25             Now, this was a massive organisation, and so the accused had

Page 17186

 1     machinery in place to handle that.  And his SRS and SCP Crisis Staff and

 2     war staffs were created to spear-head his deployment of volunteers.

 3     Senior members of the SRS war staff recounted that as leader of both the

 4     SRS and the Serbian Chetnik Movement, the accused made all important

 5     decisions concerning their policies and operations.  The accused

 6     appointed Witness Petkovic as head of the War Staff and Rankic was the

 7     deputy head.  And their admitted statements, for example, P1074, P1076,

 8     and C11, describe how the accused maintained complete power over the

 9     Crisis and War Staffs.  Witness Rankic, for example, noted that:

10             "Seselj had absolute power and made all the decisions himself."

11             One of the functions of the SRS War Staff was to co-ordinate

12     arming and training of the Seseljevci with other JCE members.  And again,

13     high-ranking members of the SRS War Staff, like Rankic and Petkovic,

14     visited training camps to arrange for the arrival and deployment of

15     volunteers.  The accused also visited and inspected volunteers at

16     training centres, and that has been mentioned by Mr. Marcussen.  He

17     highlighted Exhibit P528, in which the accused addressed volunteers at

18     the Erdut training centre, telling them that Serb Chetniks had laid down

19     their lives in the defence of Borovo Selo.  He also told volunteers that

20     wherever there were Ustasha, they should be killed and expelled because

21     it was all Serbian territory.

22             The accused gave similar orders to volunteers in private, and,

23     for example - I'm not going to say the name of the witness.  I will cite

24     the exhibits pertaining to the witness - he directed one volunteer to

25     cleanse everything in a particular area and "to kill Muslim civilians

Page 17187

 1     without mercy ..."

 2             And that's described in Exhibits P1129, pages 218 to 219; P1128,

 3     at page 2; and P1112, at page 11.  And they have to be read together as

 4     the Trial Chamber will understand.

 5             The evidence beyond a reasonable doubt shows that the accused was

 6     more than a recruiter of volunteers for the JNA.  This quasi-military

 7     politician exercised his authority and influence over each and every

 8     aspect related to the volunteers, even though he did not have operational

 9     command over them.

10             He decided where his volunteers were deployed and he deployed

11     them in units, so not on an individual volunteer-by-volunteer basis.

12     Discrete units identified as Seseljevci.  Unit commanders were appointed

13     by the accused or the SRS War Staff that he controlled.  And this is

14     shown, for example, in Exhibit P227, which was sent by a member of the

15     War Staff to a TO and required that the TO "co-ordinate with our unit

16     command" as a condition of sending the volunteers.  So we will send you

17     volunteers, but you must co-ordinate with our unit command in order for

18     that to happen.

19             Witness Petkovic, in Exhibit C18, explained that the War Staff

20     decided to send a unit, for example, under Vojvoda Debeli's command to

21     Bosanski Samac in spring 1992.  And it was the accused himself who chose

22     the commanders of that unit.  And more specifically, I'd refer the

23     Trial Chamber to paragraphs 49, 53, and 56.  The accused personally

24     approved the sending of volunteers for the operations in Zvornik and

25     Mostar.  Petkovic described how the War Staff supervised local

Page 17188

 1     Crisis Staffs, SRS boards, and commanders, but "there was only one

 2     leader, and that was Seselj."

 3             Once in the field, the accused's volunteers were generally

 4     subordinated to the local TO, to the JNA, or VRS, or MUP units, but the

 5     accused received regular reports about field activities, both through the

 6     War Staff and through direct reporting by his commanders at the front

 7     lines.  They telephoned him.  They visited the Belgrade SRS/SCP office to

 8     meet him in person.  And as a result of those close contacts, he could

 9     and he did intervene in field operations as he deemed necessary.  And I

10     would refer the Trial Chamber to, for example, Exhibit P59; P688, at

11     paragraph 50; Exhibit P1074, at page 49; and Exhibit P1058, at

12     paragraph 21.

13             Witness Glamocanin, in Exhibit P688, described the accused as

14     having "command and control" over volunteers in the field.  The

15     SRS War Staff had the authority to issue orders to its units in the field

16     regarding, for example, where the units would be deployed and when they

17     should be withdrawn.  I would refer the Trial Chamber to Exhibit P221.

18     Witness Rankic, again in Exhibit P1074, confirmed that regrouping and

19     redeployment orders were given by the SRS War Staff to an SRS commander

20     in Vocin.  Likewise, Seseljevci of the Kragujevac Chetnik detachment,

21     they were ordered by Rankic to participate in a joint operation to

22     forcibly take over targeted villages in Croatia.  And again, I'd refer

23     the Trial Chamber to Exhibit P253; P225; and C11, page 12.

24             The accused also had the power and influence to intervene

25     personally to assist his volunteers in the field.  For example, as shown

Page 17189

 1     by intercept Exhibits P513 and 514, one of which I'll play in a moment,

 2     when the accused wanted to have a group of his volunteers commanded by

 3     Vojvoda Gavrilovic rescued from an ambush in and around Sarajevo in

 4     April 1992, he threatened Serb political and military leadership in BiH

 5     that if they weren't pulled out, he would withdraw all his men from the

 6     front lines and "never deploy them again."

 7             And so at this time I'd ask that Exhibit P513 be played, and it's

 8     an intercept so it's not a video.

 9                           [Intercept played]

10             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

11             "Seselj:  This is Vojislav Seselj.  Could I speak to

12     Branislav Gavrilovic?

13             "Unknown male person:  Yes, sir.  One moment, please.

14             "Gavrilovic:  God bless you, Vojvoda.

15             "Seselj:  God bless you.  What's going on there?

16             "Gavrilovic:  Well, Vojo, our men are down there in the town, you

17     know.

18             "Seselj:  How many of them?

19             "Gavrilovic:  18.  18 are left.

20             "Seselj:  Are they surrounded?

21             "Gavrilovic:  Sorry?

22             "Seselj:  Are they surrounded?

23             "Gavrilovic:  They've been surrounded since the beginning.  The

24     volunteers have left down there to get them out and we don't know about

25     anything happening down there.

Page 17190

 1             "Seselj:  You're wounded, right?

 2             "Gavrilovic:  Yes, in my leg.

 3             "Seselj:  What's the wound like?

 4             "Gavrilovic:  Well, the bullet went through but I'll be all

 5     right.  There won't be any problems.

 6             "Seselj:  Have you been given any medical attention?

 7             "Gavrilovic:  Yes, yes, everything's fine.

 8             "Seselj:  Look, I've just called Pale.  I can't find Radovan and

 9     nobody can find him.

10             "Gavrilovic:  Yes.

11             "Seselj:  But I've left a message that if they don't get our men

12     out, we'll withdraw all our men from the front lines and we'll never

13     deploy them again.

14             "Gavrilovic:  All right.

15             "Seselj:  You know.  Please don't lose your nerves ...

16             "Gavrilovic:  The people ...

17             "Seselj:  ... don't get into arguments with your men offhand.

18     Only try to find as many men as possible to get these out, you know.

19             "Gavrilovic:  Well, they're constantly being deployed to get them

20     out all the time.

21             "Seselj:  We'll clean these things up when it's more peaceful.

22             "Gavrilovic:  All right, Vojo.  How's your health?

23             "Seselj:  It's not bad.  Please try and have as many people sent

24     over here as possible.

25             "Gavrilovic:  Well, all right.  Everyone's active and sending

Page 17191

 1     people down there.  We'll see, something will come out of this.

 2             "Seselj:  All right.

 3             "Gavrilovic:  Right, cheers ...

 4             "Seselj:  Do you have this number here?

 5             "Gavrilovic:  I do, I do.

 6             "Seselj:  Well, all right.  Please let me know then.  I can

 7     barely get through here.  I have been calling this number for over an

 8     hour.  I can barely get through.

 9             "Gavrilovic:  All right.

10             "Seselj:  It's probably easier for you because not everybody's

11     calling this number.

12             "Gavrilovic:  All right.  All right.

13             "Seselj:  So please let me know what's going on.

14             "Gavrilovic:  I'll let you know.  Cheers.

15             "Seselj:  Hang in there."

16             MS. BIERSAY:  And of course his men were rescued and in intercept

17     P514, which I won't play, Momcilo Mandic recognises and acknowledges that

18     Seselj has just called from Belgrade.  And he gave -- he passed on the

19     information that that group should be pulled out and they were.  And all

20     of this illustrates the accused's power to direct volunteers on the front

21     line and to enforce his will with other JCE members.

22             This was not a recruiting sergeant or agent for the JNA.  He was

23     much more.  He knew where his Seseljevci were deployed.  He received

24     information from the front lines.  He communicated with them.  He

25     communicated with other leaders of the Serb forces.  And he decided when,

Page 17192

 1     where, and how his Seseljevci worked with other Serb forces.  In other

 2     words, the accused was not recruiting and deploying volunteers at arm's

 3     length.  He was intimately involved in every aspect of inspiring them to

 4     his cause and deploying them to commit crimes.

 5             On the 13th of May, 1993, reflected in P1219, the accused held a

 6     press conference to announce his promotion of Vojvodas, a ceremony held

 7     as war raged in BiH.  And the Trial Chamber previously saw that at the

 8     beginning of the presentation as video P255.  The accused continued to

 9     hold large-scale rallies and celebrations of Chetniks to evoke their

10     bloody past and their crimes against non-Serbs, including Muslims.  The

11     evidence shows he publicly promoted men who committed crimes throughout

12     the former Yugoslavia.

13             Now, I'd like to show the Trial Chamber - and if we could please

14     show it now - a slide listing the Seseljevci who were promoted to Vojvoda

15     by the accused because you will hear some of the names again.  And this

16     is just to give you a little context for those names when they pop up.

17             In Vukovar, Milan Lancuzanin, aka Kameni; Miroslav Vukovic, also

18     at Vukovar, aka Cele; Branislav Gavrilovic, aka Brne; Branislav Vakic.

19             In Bijeljina and Brcko, Mirko Blagojevic.

20             In Bosanski Samac, Srecko Radovanovic, aka Debeli.

21             In Zvornik, Miroslav Vukovic, aka Cele.

22             In Greater Sarajevo, Vasilije Vidovic, aka Vaske; Slavko Aleksic;

23     Branislav Gavrilovic, aka Brne; and Nikola Poplasen.

24             Now, as the Trial Chamber has heard, there are repetitions of

25     certain names and he redeployed them from one crime base to the next.

Page 17193

 1             Wherever Seseljevci went, crimes were committed.  Wherever

 2     Vojvodas went, crimes were committed.  Often it was the Seseljevci

 3     committing those crimes, the Vojvodas committing those crimes.

 4             And from the very start of his persecution campaign, the accused

 5     was well aware that his impact through his contributions was, indeed,

 6     significant and substantial.  He describes in Exhibit P1180 how it showed

 7     how successful the Serbian Chetnik Movement was because Croats and

 8     Muslims sometimes weren't sleeping in their houses because they heard

 9     that the Chetniks were coming.

10             But Biljana Plavsic really described the core of the accused's

11     impact.  He motivated Serb fighters and he frightened non-Serbs, and she

12     said in Exhibit P1310:

13             "He came to see us, visited the front; his presence meant a lot

14     to the men.  The troops would talk about his visits long after he would

15     leave.  On the other hand, news that he was at the front would act as a

16     great demoralising factor for our enemies."

17             He knew the impact he had.  He knew it from the thousands of

18     volunteers he successfully raised and deployed to implement the common

19     criminal purpose.  He knew it from the crowd responses at his rallies.

20     He knew, and that is why he never stopped using his hate propaganda as a

21     weapon and why he has not even stopped today.

22             Through his hate propaganda, the accused relentlessly promoted

23     the forcible establishment of ethnically Serb territories encompassing

24     significant parts of Croatia and BiH.  He inspired fear and hatred in

25     Serbs that non-Serbs were their enemies.  He then used this fear and

Page 17194

 1     hatred of non-Serbs to create and to aggravate an atmosphere conducive to

 2     violent acts against targeted non-Serbs.

 3             Through his campaign of recruitment, organisation, and deployment

 4     of volunteers, he assisted the other Serb forces in their fight for the

 5     creation of separate Serb-dominated territories in Croatia and later in

 6     BiH, all the time co-ordinating the activities of Seseljevci with other

 7     JCE members.  He encouraged and instigated groups and individuals within

 8     the Serb forces, including Seseljevci.  And this has been proven beyond a

 9     reasonable doubt and the time has come for him to be held accountable for

10     his crimes.

11             In conclusion, the accused cannot suppress the evidence, and that

12     evidence shows that his Seseljevci and Serb forces worked together to

13     commit the crimes charged in the indictment.  And ethnic cleansing was

14     accomplished by using the same tactics again and again and again.

15     Non-Serb villages were shelled and destroyed.  Areas seen as rightfully

16     Serb were forcibly taken over by Serb forces.  Non-Serb families were

17     ripped apart as children and men -- as children and women were isolated

18     from men, rounded up and either sent to camps where they were abused,

19     raped, and killed, or were forced to flee for their own safety.  And

20     non-Serbs were prevented, by fear or force, from returning to their

21     homes, many of which - along with their religious and cultural sites -

22     had been plundered or destroyed.

23             That is what the evidence shows.

24             At this time, Your Honour, I will turn the lectern over to my

25     colleague Ms. Hochhauser, and she will describe how these tactics were

Page 17195

 1     replicated in Vukovar.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good morning, Ms. Hochhauser.

 3     You have the floor.  You may proceed.

 4             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Thank you, Your Honours, and good morning.

 5             Before the conflict began, the people of Vukovar municipality in

 6     Croatia lived in a prosperous, generally peaceful multi-ethnic community.

 7     By November 21st of 1991, those same citizens of Vukovar were intractably

 8     divided by ethnic hatred.  They had lost loved ones, their homes, and

 9     their city to shelling and violence aimed at driving them out of Vukovar.

10             The crimes committed in Vukovar municipality were committed in

11     furtherance of the common purpose of the joint criminal enterprise and

12     the Serb forces - the JNA, the local TOs, and volunteers, including

13     Seseljevci - were the perpetrators of those crimes.

14             Just as they had throughout other targeted areas of Croatia,

15     beginning in August 1991, and just as they would go on to do in targeted

16     areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb forces wreaked havoc on the

17     lives of the people of Vukovar in pursuit of their common goal of an

18     ethnically homogenous Serb nation.

19             The accused, along with the other political and military leaders

20     that were members of the joint criminal enterprise charged in this case,

21     saw Vukovar as strategically important to the achievement of their common

22     goal.  The accused spoke of Vukovar's exceptional significance to Serbia

23     and the Serbian people, calling it, in P1208 at page 10, "equally

24     Serbian" as Belgrade.

25             The accused characterised the battle for Vukovar in

Page 17196

 1     discriminatory terms, describing the municipality as "the most powerful

 2     Ustasha stronghold" upon which Serb victory would depend.

 3             As shown here in a clip from P298.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

 6             "J:  How significant is the liberation of Vukovar for Serbia and

 7     the Serbian people?

 8             "S:  It is of exceptional significance, exceptional.  This is the

 9     most powerful of Ustasha strongholds.  Once Vukovar is taken, Ustashas

10     have no chance of saving either Osijek or Vinkovci.  There is nothing to

11     stop our forces.  Vukovar is the key line that needs to be broken

12     through, that needs to be captured, and ... that if Vukovar falls here,

13     if Slunj falls in Serbian Krajina, then Tudjman's Ustasha regime in

14     Zagreb will fall too.  And that is why this battle is decisive."

15             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  The JCE's persecutory campaign in Vukovar was

16     clear.  As JNA General Panic said, in Exhibit P261 at page 219, Vukovar

17     would be "a Serb enclave," or in the words of the accused, at P1186,

18     page 6, "that town will be the capital of Serbian Slavonia, Baranja, and

19     Western Srem."  And added:  "The Serb people have to return there."

20             Indeed, as discussed earlier by Mr. Marcussen, the SAO SBWS had

21     already been created in June 1991 and a government led by JCE member

22     Goran Hadzic had been formed in August and September 1991.  So to

23     implement their common purpose in Vukovar, the JCE members sent Serb

24     forces and structures controlled by them in large numbers and those

25     forces and structures supported one another.

Page 17197

 1             The largest part of Vukovar, including the areas of Ovcara and

 2     Grabovo, were situated within the zone of responsibility of the JNA's

 3     Operational Group South.  The importance of Vukovar to the common purpose

 4     of the JCE was further reflected by JCE member Adzic's order, assigning

 5     the JNA elite Guards Motorised Brigade to Vukovar on 30 September 1991.

 6             The Guards Motorised Brigade was a premier unit of the JNA.  Its

 7     personnel were carefully selected, they were highly trained, and they

 8     were well equipped.  And after 7 October 1991, it was under the command

 9     of Mile Mrksic.

10             On 10 October 1991, the Assembly of the SAO SBWS, led again by

11     Goran Hadzic, attached the local Serb TO officially to the JNA.  The

12     Seseljevci didn't arrive in Vukovar of their own accord.  The Vukovar TO

13     sent a request for volunteers to the SRS War Staff, and it was the

14     accused who decided that the unit which would go on to be called the

15     Leva Supoderica Detachment, which I will refer to, Your Honours, as LSD,

16     to Vukovar in response to that request.

17             The LSD arrived in Vukovar in early October, and it was primarily

18     composed of Seseljevci, many of whom were natives of the area, including

19     Milan Lancuzanin, aka Kameni, commander of the LSD and later a Vojvoda.

20     Other fighters in the detachment were recruited elsewhere by the SRS

21     War Staff.  And as expert Theunens and Witness VS-012 both discussed,

22     those Seseljevci - sent from elsewhere - were equipped and trained in

23     association with MUP Serbia, under the authority of JCE members Stanisic

24     and Simatovic, and often in co-operation with JCE member Arkan, as well

25     as by the JNA, under the authority of JCE members Kadijevic and Adzic.

Page 17198

 1             P250, signed in Sid on 18 October 1991, demonstrated

 2     unequivocally that the TO recognised and incorporated the LSD under the

 3     command of Kameni.

 4             P199, the decision on the continuation of the assault operation

 5     on Vukovar, signed by Mile Mrksic on 29 October, specifically identifies

 6     the LSD as being under the command of Mrksic and the JNA.  And the JNA on

 7     the ground in Vukovar took pride in the seamless co-ordination and

 8     integration into the JNA of the TO and volunteers, as can be seen in the

 9     clip of this interview with Major Sljivancanin of the JNA in Vukovar.

10             And I'd ask now that P291 please be played.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

13             "Major, could you please describe briefly today's combat

14     activities here in this area.

15             "VS:  Well, all the units in the territory of Vukovar are

16     fighting under the unified command of the 'South' Operations Group and

17     command of the Yugoslav People's Army, which is very important.

18     Volunteers often say:  'You never mention us,' and then I think we're all

19     of the same kind and we fight under the same command ... everyone,

20     whoever comes ... we equip them right away, prepare them for combat, and

21     include them in the units of the JNA.  They carry out combat activities

22     side by side with other soldiers.  The enemy, that is, the Ustashas, are

23     completely defeated ..."

24             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  The accused was actively and intimately involved

25     in the events in Vukovar and with the actions of his Seseljevci once they

Page 17199

 1     arrived there.  Vojvoda Branislav Vakic and Vojvoda Branislav Gavrilovic,

 2     aka Brne, were also sent to Vukovar with Seseljevci units.  And the

 3     accused appointed Slobodan Katic, an experienced fighter from Belgrade,

 4     as the leader of the Seseljevci who were sent from Belgrade and

 5     subordinated him and his unit to the LSD, which, of course, was in turn

 6     subordinated to the local TO.

 7             Witnesses Petkovic and Rankic both stated that the accused kept

 8     in close contact with Kameni and communicated with him directly, as with

 9     his other commanders in Vukovar.  According to Witness Petkovic, both

10     Katic and Kameni treated Seselj -- treated the accused, excuse me, as

11     their commander.  And they both went to SRS headquarters regularly to

12     speak with him.

13             At the time of the conflict, the accused also took great pride in

14     the lock-step co-ordination between his men in Vukovar and the JNA and

15     TO, and he boasted of the Seseljevci's significant contribution to the

16     achievements of the Serb fighting force there.

17             And I'd ask you now to play, as we can see in P185.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

20             "We painted almost all the helmets over.  Wait a second!  One of

21     those army helmets ... you know what, guys, I am used to everybody being

22     silent while I am talking.  Perhaps you still haven't developed this

23     habit, but I have.  We've painted two-headed Serbian white eagles on the

24     helmets and the army officer, Captain, Major, commands our people.  And

25     by co-ordinated action, Kameni, our chief commander in Vukovar, plans the

Page 17200

 1     action in co-operation with the army major in the evening, and they carry

 2     it out the following day.  Because of soldiers deserting from their

 3     units, the army did not have enough manpower to go from house to house

 4     and take them over, so our people did that.  Army strikes with tanks,

 5     mortars ..."

 6             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours, I believe there was an additional

 7     line that would have ended there and so I'll read it from P185, which was

 8     that:

 9             "Army strikes with tanks, mortars, and howitzers, and our people

10     go from house to house and conquer it."

11             The accused himself said in his "Death of Yugoslavia" interview

12     that during the siege he met with -- the siege of Vukovar, he met with

13     Mrksic and he met with Sljivancanin, and he even claims to have taken

14     part in the combat there, as can be seen in P644, a clip from P644, which

15     we'll play now.

16                           [Video-clip played]

17             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

18             "I had meetings with General Mrksic, who was the commander of the

19     Guards Brigade which participated in the operations to liberate Vukovar

20     and who commanded our volunteers.  Our volunteers were under the direct

21     command of the Chetnik Vojvoda Kameni, Milan Lancuzanin, also known as

22     Kameni, and he was under the command of General Mrksic, commander of the

23     Guards Brigade.  I met with him there, spoke to him, inspected the

24     forward lines with him, and so on.  He even gave me an army helmet there,

25     onto which I stuck the Chetnik symbol of the double-headed white eagle.

Page 17201

 1     This helmet was too small for my head and they later asked me how come

 2     the army didn't have any bigger models."

 3             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours, the TO members and volunteers who

 4     populated the ranks in Vukovar also had the perception that the accused

 5     was linked to them.  And this is demonstrated, for example, by

 6     Exhibit P25, which is Katic's letter to the SRS War Staff dated

 7     9 December of 1991, in which he signs his signature as the -- excuse me,

 8     along with his title as the SRS "Chetnik Commander of Vukovar."  And he

 9     writes in that letter to the SRS War Staff to "propose warriors for

10     promotion."  And as Your Honours would expect, some of the people he

11     proposed were fighters from the LSD, along with -- fighters like Kameni,

12     the commander; Kinez, who it notes was the commander of the LSD's

13     1st Assault Platoon.  But Katic's letter also requests promotion from the

14     SRS Crisis Staff for the members of the TO who the Seseljevci had fought

15     alongside, such as TO members Vujovic, the commander of the local TO;

16     Vujanovic, the chief of the local TO; and Peranovic, commander of the

17     Petrova Gora TO detachment, along with others.

18             Finally, the accused's visits to the front line in Vukovar also

19     ensured that he was well informed and in communication with his men

20     there, his Seseljevci, to whom he was providing constant support and

21     moral -- and encouragement.  As the accused himself said during his

22     testimony in the Milosevic trial, which, as the Chamber well knows, is in

23     evidence as Exhibit P31, and this is said at page 542, the accused said:

24             "I went to Vukovar twice while the struggle for liberation was

25     going on.  I saw everything.  I was at the front lines.  I visited almost

Page 17202

 1     every street.  It is impossible that there was something there that I

 2     didn't see."

 3             The accused's contribution to the joint criminal enterprise's

 4     mission and to the Serb forces in Vukovar was not limited to supplying

 5     the manpower.  The accused also lent the power of his words, and as

 6     Ms. Biersay touched upon in relation to Vukovar, the accused's speeches

 7     in and about Vukovar were hateful, they were violent, and the evidence

 8     has proven that they had a searing and motiving effect on those who heard

 9     them and not just the Seseljevci.  His speeches stoked their ethnic

10     hatred and division and they were not just political speeches.

11             The accused was a self-styled military man, and when he appeared

12     in Vukovar he toured that front line wearing a helmet, as you've heard

13     him say, a bullet-proof jacket, and a special JNA camouflage uniform

14     generally worn by high-ranking officers, which was specially made for

15     him.

16             And, Your Honours, I can point you to Exhibit P1058,

17     paragraphs 45 through 46.

18             According to Witness Rankic, as Sljivancanin briefed the accused

19     in Vukovar during his tour of the front line, he called the accused

20     "President" in fronted of all those gathered.  And the JNA and police

21     organised his transportation and his security.

22             The effect of all of this, of course, was to boost the accused's

23     influence over the Serb forces he addressed, to lend credibility to his

24     words, and to show that the other authorities in Vukovar -- acting in

25     Vukovar, the other authorities under the control of other JCE members in

Page 17203

 1     this case supported the violent and ethnic agenda that the accused

 2     espoused.

 3             Now, there is no doubt, there is no doubt, that the crimes

 4     charged in Vukovar actually occurred.  As will be discussed below -- or

 5     as I will discuss now, even the accused admits that the crimes happened,

 6     and so instead in the brief that he filed he claims that neither he nor

 7     his Seseljevci can be linked to them.

 8             Now, to begin with, even the accused, while not acknowledging his

 9     own responsibility, acknowledged in an interview, which is in evidence as

10     P1225, in fact, re-published by the accused in 1995, that in

11     Vukovar - and these are his words - there was "excessive use of artillery

12     and unrestricted firing of shells without any tactical purpose."

13             That admission is supported by the witness evidence and

14     adjudicated facts which proved that Croatian homes were bombed, that

15     shelling was "indiscriminate" and seemed geared "to wipe out any life

16     from the area."  And that's from Exhibit P268 at paragraphs 8, 9, and 15.

17     Targets included the hospital, kindergarten, graveyards, markets, and

18     school buildings.  And the shelling continued, as VS-002 described at

19     6461, even as the Croats put up little resistance.

20             Witness Covic, in P844, page 7, said:

21             "They shelled the entire city irrespective of where the defenders

22     were located."

23             And on 18 November 1991 when Vukovar fell to the Serb forces, the

24     entire city had been razed to the ground.  That destruction was not

25     justified by any military purpose, but, Your Honours, there was a

Page 17204

 1     two-fold criminal purpose.  Because in addition to the physical

 2     destruction of Vukovar, the JNA shelling was the means by which large

 3     numbers of non-Serbs were forcibly transferred and deported out of the

 4     municipality.  And, Your Honours, I'll leave this still from P289 as I

 5     continue to discuss this topic, but you can see in P289 not only the

 6     physical destruction to the town but the lines of people, of residents of

 7     that town, forced out of it.

 8             Now, the accused is responsible as a JCE member for the effects

 9     of the shelling and the bombing, even though he himself was not making

10     the tactical decisions.  What happened in Vukovar is a classic example of

11     the JNA tactics observed by the European Monitoring Mission in P412 at

12     page 14 and as described earlier by Mr. Marcussen.  The JNA in Vukovar

13     terrorised the population with heavy artillery and then the JNA-backed

14     and armed undisciplined irregulars, Seseljevci amongst them, moved in.

15     So he is responsible because Seseljevci were already active in fields of

16     operation across Croatia as part of the Serb forces, and he is

17     responsible because for at least a significant portion of the time the

18     JNA was bombing Vukovar, Seseljevci were already under the command of

19     Kameni, who was already under the direct command of Mrksic, who was under

20     the control of Kadijevic and Adzic of the JNA.

21             As the accused himself agreed in P644 at pages 12 through 13, the

22     JNA could not have taken Vukovar by "shelling alone."  And so war was

23     waged "street by street" by volunteers and the TO, including the

24     Seseljevci.

25             The Seseljevci, along with the other volunteers and TO,

Page 17205

 1     contributed to the forced flight in another way as well, by creating an

 2     atmosphere of uncertainty, an atmosphere of fear and ethnic hatred which

 3     reinforced the need to leave, reinforced the fact that non-Serbs had no

 4     choice but to leave if they wanted to survive.  For example, according to

 5     Witness Emil Cakalic, at transcript page 4954, the song "Slobo, Slobo,

 6     there will be plenty of meat, we will slaughter the Croats," "resounded

 7     throughout Vukovar" and was sung "especially by volunteers."

 8             And I'd ask that P -- the video P58 which demonstrates what he's

 9     describing be played now.

10                           [Video-clip played]

11             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

12             "There will be plenty of meat.  We will slaughter the Croats.

13             "Against the Croats ..."

14             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  And that was the song that can be heard sung by

15     the volunteers you saw marching through P58.

16             The accused's propaganda, as described by Ms. Biersay, labelling

17     every --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection, I have to intervene now.

19     The Prosecutor quoted the words from one song, she quoted it, and you can

20     see that from the English transcript.  "Slobo, send us salad, there will

21     be meat, we will slaughter the Croats."  The interpreter, however,

22     provides completely different verses, i.e., "Croats, we will slaughter

23     you."  How come that the interpreter can create the closing argument for

24     the Prosecutor?  Please remove that interpreter instantly.  These are

25     completely different verses that entail different implications.

Page 17206

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]

 2             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, I didn't get an

 3     interpretation of what you just said.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you hear me in English?

 5             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes, now I can.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would like you, please, to

 7     ask a replay of --

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1110 to 1120, that is where you

 9     have that.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And I ask the interpreters to

11     interpret what they hear.

12             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

15             "There will be plenty of meat.  We will slaughter the Croats.

16             "And singing a tribal song against the Croats ..."

17             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  May I continue?  The interpretation --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Judges, I believe that this should

19     entail repercussions.  This was not played to the end.  But I remind you

20     the Prosecutor very precisely quoted the verses from the song that was

21     sung.  At the same time the interpreter, the Croat, provided a totally

22     different interpretation from a song that I have never heard before.  To

23     you, this may sound and look similar; however, the implications are very,

24     very different.

25             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours, if I may, it's

Page 17207

 1     Witness Emil Cakalic at transcript page 4954 that gives the quote -- that

 2     the song:

 3             "Slobo, Slobo, there will be plenty of meat, we will slaughter

 4     the Croats" resounded throughout Vukovar and was sung especially by

 5     volunteers.

 6             The interpretation that I get in English of P58 is exactly that,

 7     but in any case, if there are small language differences or language

 8     differences from the interpretation, I present to you P58 as an example

 9     of this type of song.  So may I continue?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please --

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj, you will have

12     ten hours to plead, so you will have an opportunity to take up this topic

13     again, and you can challenge the words of the Prosecutor when time comes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Antonetti, I'm not contesting

15     what the Prosecutor is saying.  The Prosecutor quoted a somewhat shorter

16     and very true version of the song that was sung by the column.  My

17     objection is of an administrative nature.  You are duty-bound to issue an

18     order for somebody from the service to listen to the interpretation into

19     the Serbian language, to convince yourself that the interpreter very

20     deliberately provided a very different interpretation.  One song is:

21             "Slobo, send us salad, there will be meat, we will slaughter the

22     Croats."

23             However, the song that was provided by the interpreter of his own

24     will states:

25             "Hey, Croats, we will slaughter you, we will slaughter half of

Page 17208

 1     you and the rest we will give to the dogs."

 2             Do you understand how very, very different the implications of

 3     these two songs are?  This is not a licencia poética of the interpreter.

 4     This is a deliberate deceit.  This is not an objection against the

 5     Prosecutor's words.  This is an administrative objection as a result of

 6     the false interpretation, and I have the right to urgently object and you

 7     have to undertake measures on my objection.  Or maybe you can tell me

 8     that I am telling nonsense, you can do that.  But this is not something

 9     that I should be dealing with in my closing argument.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right.  Good note has been

11     taken of what you said, and the translation unit will be asked to verify

12     and to write a report about this interpretation issue.

13             Mrs. Prosecutor, you can go on.

14             MS. HOCHHAUSER: [Microphone not activated]

15             I apologise.  In addition to the discriminatory and persecutory

16     songs that rang throughout Vukovar, as we've just heard and seen, the

17     accused's propaganda, labelling every Croat as an Ustasha, infected the

18     mind-set of the Serb forces in Vukovar and to them the evidence has shown

19     every Croat was an Ustasha, and volunteers openly killed unarmed Croats.

20             For example, Witness Stojanovic, in P528, paragraphs 40 to 41,

21     stated that Kameni issued an order to kill any Croats and further that

22     "volunteers engaged in cleansing the area told us that when they found

23     Croats, they killed them on the spot, armed or not, because they did not

24     have time to take them to Velepromet, where there was a collection centre

25     and a prison.  Kameni himself ordered our group, which guarded houses, to

Page 17209

 1     execute any Croats we found on the spot."

 2             Witness Stojanovic went on to describe seeing Seseljevci "from

 3     Kameni's group" beat and then slit the throats of five unarmed Croats in

 4     front of about 30 people.  According to Witness Stojanovic, the JNA

 5     called in Kameni and Kinez, his deputy, as a result but they were not

 6     arrested and they remained in command of the LSD.  And that,

 7     Your Honours, is at P526, paragraphs 26 and 27.

 8             Stojanovic, Witness Stojanovic, confirmed this information in

 9     both P526, which was -- which he gave in August 2004, and again in P528,

10     his statement from June 2006.  And for further discussion of the

11     credibility of those -- and reliability of those written statements, I

12     refer the Chamber back to our discussion in the brief and the

13     argumentative appendix.

14             VS-034 also confirmed the Seseljevci's brutal treatment of

15     detainees and gave evidence that he was ordered by Kameni to murder

16     detainees.  And, Your Honour, for that I refer the Court to

17     Exhibits P1058 at paragraphs 39, 42 to -- 42 and 43, and P1056,

18     paragraph 31.

19             The violence and persecutions in Vukovar committed by the Serb

20     forces, and specifically by the volunteers and Seseljevci, was open, it

21     was accepted, and it was exacted without fear of repercussion from the

22     accused or from any other political and military leader who controlled or

23     contributed to those Serb forces and who are the named JCE members in

24     this case.  And of the few non-Serbs who remained by the end of the siege

25     of Vukovar, many were later forcibly transferred out by the bus-load,

Page 17210

 1     some to Croatian areas of what remained of Croatia; and others across

 2     borders to Serbia and then on from there.  And although the accused later

 3     publicly questioned the JNA shelling tactics, Your Honours, he may not

 4     rely on that now to escape criminal responsibility because the evidence

 5     has proven that he supported the implementation of the JCE's common

 6     purpose, the JCE's common plan by any means possible, including the

 7     occurrence of crimes such as the wanton destruction of the town.  And

 8     thus, in Exhibit P1225 at page 6, in the same interview where he

 9     criticises the JNA tactics of overusing artillery, he added that he would

10     "always celebrate the liberation of Vukovar."

11             I now turn specifically to the murders, torture, and cruel

12     treatment and persecutions at Ovcara, Grabovo, and Velepromet on the

13     19th to 21st of November, 1991.  Again, these crimes are so well

14     established that they are simply undeniable.  As the accused said during

15     the testimony of Vilim Karlovic, and I quote the accused:

16             "I am not challenging the crime.  I have never challenged it.  A

17     terrible crime did take place and there's no doubt about that."

18             So again, unable to challenge the crime, the accused denies any

19     link to the physical perpetrators in his final submission.  But the

20     accused is responsible for those crimes because the Serb forces were

21     still in control and operating during the time-period when the crimes at

22     Velepromet, Ovcara, and Grabovo occurred.  He is responsible because his

23     Seseljevci were amongst the physical perpetrators and are both linked to

24     him and to other JCE members through the TO and the JNA, and he is

25     responsible because the other physical perpetrators themselves, JNA, TO,

Page 17211

 1     and other volunteers, are linked to his fellow JCE members.

 2             The continued co-operation of these Serb forces on the

 3     19th to the 21st November is demonstrated by the evidence in numerous

 4     ways.  For example, members of the JNA knew that the TO and volunteers

 5     were exacting violence upon the non-Serb prisoners of war throughout the

 6     siege of Vukovar.  And there are extreme examples of this throughout the

 7     record.  For example, when JNA Major Lukic was told about Seseljevci

 8     looting and cutting off the ears of a prisoner, and he chose not to

 9     punish them because volunteers were needed on the front lines.  And for

10     that, Your Honours, I can refer you to Exhibit P857, at paragraphs 57 to

11     58.  Or Sljivancanin's 19 November warning about Velepromet that

12     "Chetniks are slaughtering there."

13             Despite the knowledge of what was happening, Sljivancanin

14     deliberately prevented access to the hospital by the Red Cross until the

15     detainees had been taken from the hospital and were on their way to the

16     JNA barracks.  And it was the JNA that re-routed the detainees to the

17     Ovcara hangar from the barracks after a meeting at which including JNA,

18     TO, and members of the SAO SBWS government, including JCE members such as

19     Arkan and Hadzic, were present.  Some members of the JNA were then at the

20     barracks, participating in the beatings itself, while others took no

21     action to stop it.

22             Miodrag Panic, the highest-ranking JNA officer on the scene,

23     left.  The JNA military police who were supposed to be there to protect

24     the detainees withdrew at Mrksic's order.

25             The testimony of Josip Covic also illustrates the co-ordination

Page 17212

 1     and the clear chain of authority that was still in effect at Velepromet

 2     on 20 November 1991.  He told of how the JNA and TO together drove

 3     people, including civilians, the elderly and infirm, and hors de combat

 4     fighters, away from the hospital, the Vukovar hospital.  He told how the

 5     men were then separated by TO members and then it was a JNA officer who

 6     ordered them taken to Velepromet.  Once at Velepromet, a group of

 7     detainees were separated out and civilians allowed to point to some

 8     amongst them, after which the TO called Seseljevci to take those selected

 9     people behind the hangar and to kill them.  One Seseljevac slit a man's

10     throat in front of the rest of the detainees.

11             As Covic himself was beaten by people he described as Chetniks, a

12     JNA officer called the men beating him away, not to stop them from

13     beating him, which he testified nobody there tried to do, but to go

14     fulfil another one of their orders.  A JNA major then ordered Covic and

15     the other detainees onto buses to Sremska Mitrovica.

16             Victims Emil Cakalic, Vilim Karlovic, and Dragutin Berghofer

17     similarly told what occurred at Ovcara and they are corroborated by

18     others, by victims, perpetrators, and observers alike, including

19     Vesna Bosanac, JNA officers Vukasinovic and Vojnovic, and protected

20     witnesses VS-051, 16, 21, 65, 2, and others.

21             The testimony of these witnesses which proved so unassailably

22     that the crimes occurred also prove the accused's guilt for the murders

23     and abuses at Ovcara and Grabovo beyond a reasonable doubt.  The evidence

24     proved that when JNA Witness Vukasinovic arrived at the hospital on the

25     20th of November with the buses that had been ordered by

Page 17213

 1     Major Sljivancanin, the commanders of the TO detachments, including

 2     Miroljub Vujovic, Stanko Vujanovic, and Kameni, were there with their

 3     fighters along with Sljivancanin.  Men of all ages, including the

 4     wounded, the elderly, and minors, were taken and herded onto buses.  They

 5     were brought to the JNA barracks and eventually to the hangar at Ovcara.

 6     Kameni, along with others, escorted the first group of buses.

 7             With the JNA present, detainees were forced to run through a

 8     gauntlet of TO and volunteers, who some described as Chetniks, who beat

 9     them and taunted them, and as VS-016 recounted at transcript 11129,

10     taunted them with ethnic slurs such as:  "Beat the Ustasha cunts."

11             Inside that hangar, members of the JNA, TO, and volunteers

12     including people who were identified as Seseljevci, beat the detainees.

13     VS-065 reported that Stanko Vujanovic, Miroljub Vujovic and Seseljevac

14     Kameni were the TO commanders on the scene.

15             Some of the beaters wore the Chetnik insignia and had the four Cs

16     on their caps or wore fur hats.  Someone blew a whistle to indicate when

17     beatings should stop and start.  And they sang persecutory songs like

18     "Bring out the salad and we'll have meat because we're going to slaughter

19     the Croats."

20             And that was from the testimony of Mr. Karlovic at

21     transcript 4779, the quote.

22             One survivor recalled watching a man beaten to death while he was

23     forced to sing Chetnik songs and to lick the boots of his attacker.

24     Beatings lasted for several hours, and sometime after 2100 hours,

25     TO commander Miroljub Vujovic ordered the first group of detainees out of

Page 17214

 1     the hangar and into a trailer bound for Grabovo and the pit that had

 2     already been dug.  Several trips were made bringing additional prisoners

 3     of war to their deaths.

 4             Witnesses VS-016, VS-065, and Stoparic, at transcript 2357 and

 5     2360, identified people who were members of the LSD as being among the

 6     volunteers -- I'm sorry, as being among the volunteers, TO, and JNA

 7     members who brought the detainees to the pit.  And the same combination

 8     of forces also made up the firing squads who shot and in some cases

 9     stabbed the detainees to death.  According to VS-002, when they ran short

10     on ammunition at the pit, Vujovic, the TO commander, went to the JNA to

11     get more.  And that can be found at transcript 6549.

12             The evidence thus proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Kameni

13     and the LSD, along with the other TO commanders and their fighters, were

14     part of the organised removal of people from the hospital overseen by the

15     JNA, and that they followed the prisoners from there under the protection

16     of the JNA, which was still clearly in a position of authority, they

17     followed them to Ovcara and ultimately all the way to their death at the

18     Grabovo pit.  And those events clearly demonstrate that the accused is

19     linked to the physical perpetrators of those crimes.

20             Your Honour, the lengths that the accused goes to in his brief to

21     distance himself from those physical perpetrators betrays a willingness

22     to assert as facts information that is wholly unsupported in the record

23     and without basis in truth.  His efforts to deny his link to those crimes

24     are remarkable in his submission -- to deny his links to those crimes in

25     his submission are remarkable for their lack of credibility.

Page 17215

 1             First, the accused claims that there were no more SRS volunteers

 2     in Vukovar when the crimes at Ovcara, Grabovo, and Velepromet were

 3     committed.  Now, aside from the extensive witness evidence already

 4     discussed, which places the LSD and its Seseljevci still in Vukovar,

 5     still taking orders from the TO and working with the JNA at the time when

 6     the murders and abuse occurred, there is definitive documentary evidence

 7     that the accused's assertion is not true and that is at Exhibit P41.

 8     Mrksic's order regulating the issue of resubordination and the return of

 9     the home units.  This order clearly shows that on the 20th of November,

10     when the Serb forces, including Seseljevci, were committing those crimes,

11     the LSD was still in Vukovar and still subordinated to the JNA.

12             Next, the accused asserts in his brief that no SRS volunteer has

13     been linked to any crime, and to back up this assertion in his brief, the

14     accused incredibly disavows his connection to his Vojvoda Kameni and the

15     fighters under his command, now drawing a distinction between Seseljevci

16     sent to Vukovar from elsewhere and those from Vukovar and its environs.

17     He even relies in his brief on the assertion that Kameni was just a

18     reserve JNA member from Vukovar and not a member of the SRS.

19             Your Honours, would this be a good time to take the break?

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have been sitting for

21     approximately an hour and a half.  We shall have a break and resume

22     around ten minutes to 11.00.  We shall have a break at 12.25 and have a

23     break because a new Judge is being appointed today.  That should last

24     20 minutes or so.  And after that, we will resume after the swearing-in

25     ceremony.

Page 17216

 1                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

 4             You may proceed.

 5             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 6             Your Honours, when we broke I was turning to the accused's next

 7     argument in his brief in which he disavowed his relationship to Kameni

 8     and the Seseljevci under his command and relied on the assertion that

 9     Kameni was just a reserve JNA member from Vukovar and not a member of the

10     SRS.  And while Kameni was from Vukovar and was a reserve JNA officer, it

11     is indisputable that he was a Seseljevac, whether or not he was a member

12     of the SRS, which in fact anyway he was.  He commanded Seseljevci, he

13     reported to the accused, and there is an unbreakable link between Kameni

14     and the LSD and the accused.  And for that I would draw the Chamber's

15     attention, in addition to the videos that we already saw where the

16     accused mentions Kameni and the other testimony discussed, to

17     Exhibits P255, page 3; P185, page 1; transcript 3429 to 3435;

18     Exhibit P288, page 1; transcript 5075 to 5077; and Exhibit P217, page 3;

19     and in fact to the accused's own testimony in Milosevic about Kameni's

20     SRS membership.  Of course, Exhibit P31 at page 627.

21             Seselj's order, the accused's order, appointing Kameni Vojvoda

22     commends him -- commends Kameni as having been with "the Serbian Chetnik

23     Movement since its establishment."  And describes him as the "commander

24     of Leva Supoderica Volunteers Unit of the Serbian Radical Party and

25     Serbian Chetnik Movement."  And that is at Exhibit P217, page 3.

Page 17217

 1             The accused's connection not just to Kameni but to every fighter

 2     under Kameni's command in the LSD was so well established that, as

 3     Ms. Biersay mentioned earlier, even the JNA referred to the fighters in

 4     that detachment by the name Seseljevci in official communications.  And I

 5     would point to Exhibit P41, page 2.

 6             Now, the accused in his brief next makes a legal argument that

 7     the judgement in the case of Mrksic, Sljivancanin, and Radic, that in

 8     that case there was not sufficient evidence to find a JCE had been proven

 9     beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused argues that that precludes this

10     Chamber from finding him responsible for the crimes in Vukovar under a

11     JCE or, in fact, under any other theory.

12             The Mrksic Trial Chamber found no joint criminal enterprise had

13     been proven between those three accused in relation to the limited common

14     purpose alleged in that indictment which was "the persecution of Croats

15     or other non-Serbs who were present in the Vukovar Hospital after the

16     fall of Vukovar."

17             And that's from the Mrksic indictment, Your Honours, at

18     paragraphs 5 through 7.

19             The JCE, the joint criminal enterprise, charged in this case is

20     defined by a different common purpose, that of the permanent forcible

21     removal, through the commission of the enumerated crimes, of a majority

22     of the non-Serb population from approximately one-third of the territory

23     of Croatia and large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to make it

24     part of a new Serb-dominated state.

25             And, Your Honours, that's of course in this indictment,

Page 17218

 1     paragraph 6.

 2             So the existence of the JCE in this indictment aimed at a

 3     significantly larger geographic area, a more broadly defined population

 4     with a differently defined common purpose is not affected by that

 5     judgement.

 6             Next, the Mrksic appeals judgement does not preclude this Chamber

 7     from finding the accused guilty of persecution as a crime against

 8     humanity for the killings at Ovcara and Grabovo, as the accused argues in

 9     his brief that it does.  His argument -- his argument is that the

10     Appeals Chamber's finding in Mrksic that the killings did not have a

11     nexus with the widespread and systematic attack on the civilian

12     population constitutes an effective estoppel for this Chamber, and that

13     is not correct.

14             First, the subjective knowledge of the physical perpetrators is

15     not crucial to determining the liability of the accused pursuant to the

16     JCE.  The Mrksic Appeals Chamber had to determine there whether the

17     physical perpetrators' subjective knowledge fulfilled the nexus

18     requirements of crimes against humanity because at that point the Chamber

19     was focusing on whether the accused were guilty of aiding and abetting

20     rather than committing those crimes.  However, when the mode under

21     consideration is JCE, it is the JCE members' subjective knowledge which

22     is relevant, irrespective of whether the physical perpetrator has that

23     knowledge.  And for further discussion of this point, I would point the

24     Chamber to the Milutinovic judgement at paragraphs 158 to 162.

25             The accused and his fellow JCE members in this case, including

Page 17219

 1     the JNA commanders Adzic and Kadijevic, and also including Arkan and

 2     Goran Hadzic, both of whom, the latter two, played critical roles in the

 3     hand-over of the prisoners of war to the TO and volunteers directly as

 4     well as the JNA members, they all had knowledge that there was an attack

 5     on the civilian population and that the attacks committed by the physical

 6     perpetrators were part of that attack.  The evidence of the knowledge of

 7     the JCE members in this case is set out at length in the Prosecution's

 8     final trial submission, final trial brief, at, amongst others,

 9     paragraphs 136 to 146, 181 to 182, and 194 to 195.

10             Second, this case is distinguishable from the Mrksic case on its

11     facts.  The widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population

12     in this case has a greater geographic and temporal scope, and therefore

13     purpose, to the attack considered in Mrksic.  The attack in this case was

14     against the non-Serb population, as I've said, in one-third of the

15     territory of Croatia and a significant portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

16     compared with an attack limited to the civilian population of Vukovar in

17     that case.  A much broader range of factors are thus relevant to

18     determining whether the underlying crimes at Ovcara and Grabovo have a

19     nexus to this widespread and systematic attack against the civilian

20     population, as defined in this case.  And the evidence in this case

21     demonstrates that the JCE members aimed to rid a large geographic area of

22     all non-Serbs, whether civilian or otherwise.  The Ovcara and Grabovo

23     victims' status must be considered in the context of acts committed

24     against those non-Serbs as a whole.

25             This Chamber consequently heard significantly different evidence

Page 17220

 1     than the Mrksic Chamber regarding the removal of and crimes committed

 2     against the targeted non-Serb population of Croatia and of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 4             Now, as I previously noted in relation to Vukovar during the

 5     siege and as is discussed in the Prosecution's final trial brief at

 6     paragraphs 108 to 125, in relation to the larger Croatian campaign, other

 7     murders, abuse, and persecutions against both hors de combat non-Serb

 8     fighters and civilians had already been perpetrated as part of the larger

 9     campaign of persecutions throughout the region and they would go on to be

10     perpetrated throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11             The primary consideration for all of these victims was that they

12     were non-Serb.  That the physical perpetrators at Ovcara and Grabovo

13     singled out for harsher treatment those who they perceived as being

14     hors de combat doesn't sever the required connection in this case on this

15     evidence to this attack as it has been defined.

16             Thus, whether the Chamber is looking at these killings through

17     the lens of the JCE or whether the Chamber is considering the other modes

18     of liability, like aiding and abetting or instigation, the Mrksic

19     Chamber's findings are not binding because that Chamber examined whether

20     the acts of the physical perpetrators had a nexus with a completely

21     different attack, one that was of a much smaller scope and a much smaller

22     purpose.

23             If the Chamber should nonetheless find that no crimes against

24     humanity have been proven under Article 5, the accused is still

25     responsible for the murders, torture, and cruel treatment at Ovcara and

Page 17221

 1     Grabovo under Article 3.

 2             The accused is also charged with the direct commission of

 3     persecution for his speeches regarding Vukovar, one made in Vukovar and

 4     one made in Sid, and I will address his claims regarding these charges

 5     briefly now.

 6             First, the accused is charged in regard to the speech he made in

 7     Sid on 7 November 1991, in which he stated that the Serb TO of the

 8     SAO SBWS was at work in the region and that as a result "this entire area

 9     will soon be cleared of Ustasha."  His words were reported in the

10     "Politika" article that's in evidence as P1285, as he intended that they

11     would be reported since he made the statement at a press conference.

12             At the time, Sid had temporary barracks set up to arm volunteers.

13     It was close to the front in Vukovar, and the accused made the statement

14     as part of his press tour en route to Vukovar to encourage the troops

15     there just at the time when Serb forces were gearing up for a final push

16     and tensions were running especially high.

17             Regarding the accused's infamous statement that "no Ustasha shall

18     leave Vukovar alive," the accused now adamantly denies ever making the

19     statement and relies heavily on the Mrksic Chamber's discussion of

20     VS-027.  But in his brief, the accused misrepresents that Chamber's

21     opinion of that witness's evidence.  At paragraph 364, the Mrksic

22     Trial Chamber expressed certain concerns about aspects of the testimony,

23     but noted that they accepted parts of the testimony, where it was

24     corroborated by credible, independent evidence.  And in this case,

25     Your Honours, that testimony, the testimony that the accused said while

Page 17222

 1     in Vukovar before its fall, that "no Ustasha shall leave Vukovar alive,"

 2     is corroborated by credible, independent evidence, evidence which was not

 3     heard in the Mrksic case.  The statements of Zoran Rankic, a close

 4     associate of the accused, who gave evidence, in Exhibit P1074 at

 5     paragraph 69, that he was with the accused throughout his trip to Vukovar

 6     and recalls the accused pronouncing "not one Ustasha is to leave Vukovar

 7     alive."

 8             He recalls him making this statement to at least 50 people,

 9     including volunteers, TO members, and officers of the Guards Brigade,

10     including Sljivancanin and Radic.  And people fired in the air in support

11     of his words.

12             Rankic's statement in P1074 in this regard is unambiguous and it

13     should be relied upon, and he acknowledged the accuracy of that

14     statement -- of P1074 in multiple subsequent statements.  And for further

15     discussion again of Rankic's credibility, I would refer the Trial Chamber

16     to the final trial brief, paragraphs 3 through 7, and the argumentative

17     appendix.

18             There is further corroboration from VS-016, who also heard the

19     accused repeat those words as he stood on Nova Ulica, next to the LSD

20     headquarters.  The accused declared that "not a single Ustasha should

21     leave Vukovar alive" to the gathered group, which included Seseljevci,

22     including Kameni and others, policemen, JNA soldiers, TO members, and

23     other fighters.  And in response to the accused's statement, the fighters

24     all raised their rifles as a sign of approval.

25             And that, Your Honour, is from VS-016's recounting.  At

Page 17223

 1     transcript 11121, 11171 to 72, 11288.

 2             Witnesses' differing recollections of the exact circumstances

 3     under which the statement was made by the accused suggests that the

 4     accused, as he is wont to do, repeated those words in some variation

 5     throughout his visit.  And additionally as discussed in the brief, the

 6     Prosecution's final trial brief at paragraph 155, the crimes at Ovcara,

 7     Grabovo, and throughout Vukovar can be directly attributed to those who

 8     heard his remarks or those under the command and influence of other

 9     people who heard them.

10             The accused's strenuous denials that he ever uttered these words

11     are all the more unreliable since in his 84 bis statement in front of

12     this Chamber - at transcript 1921 to 1922, while denying that he made the

13     infamous statement specifically to troops in Vukovar - the accused was

14     forced to acknowledge that it was possible that "at somewhere, sometime,

15     I said something like that."

16             And it was telling when testifying in the Milosevic trial at --

17     in P31 at page 581, he used the very same phrase:

18             "It was always my standpoint that the Ustasha had to be defeated

19     and that not a single Ustasha could leave alive, but that they should all

20     be caught."

21             Witness Stojanovic, himself a Seseljevac, who was motivated to

22     join the war effort by one of the accused's speeches, as he explained in

23     P528 at paragraph 8, reported that the accused's audience understood his

24     message when he spoke.  As Stojanovic said at -- in P528 at paragraph 12,

25     he understood that:

Page 17224

 1             "One of Seselj's objectives was to cleanse parts of Croatia that

 2     he considered to be Serbian land."

 3             And referring to the other fighters that heard the words -- that

 4     heard Seselj's words with him, Stojanovic said:

 5             "Other people understood it the same way."

 6             The accused understood and intended the persecutory nature of his

 7     statements.  And as he himself conceded in an interview in Exhibit P50,

 8     page 8 [sic], his statements against non-Serbs and calling for the

 9     expulsion of non-Serbs could have caused those who listened to him to

10     hate non-Serbs.

11             And nor were these his only such statements.  Seselj made other

12     similar statements in Vukovar, the accused did, in Vukovar which provoked

13     equally strong reactions.  VS-034 recalled, in P1058 at paragraph 46,

14     watching the accused address the soldiers in Vukovar, and saying that:

15             "Ustasha should be expelled."

16             And recounted how the volunteers responded, and what he said was

17     that the volunteers responded by singing:

18             "Croats, we shall slaughter you, slaughter you a bit but give you

19     to the dogs more often."

20             And, Your Honours, that concludes the portion of the presentation

21     on -- regarding the charged crimes in Vukovar municipality, and I would

22     like to now hand the floor over to Mr. Mussemeyer, who will be addressing

23     the pattern municipalities of Vocin, Bijeljina, Bosanski Samac, and

24     Brcko.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good morning, sir.  You may

Page 17225

 1     proceed.

 2             MR. MUSSEMEYER:  Your Honours, the JCE members and their forces

 3     implemented their common purpose similarly throughout the regions they

 4     targeted, as Mr. Marcussen has explained.  Four key patterns were

 5     repeated throughout the conflict, these were:  First, arming and military

 6     training of Serb local population; second, volunteers and paramilitaries,

 7     including Seseljevci, arrived in the area; third, Serbs took over the

 8     municipalities and created separate Serb authorities; and fourth, Serb

 9     forces, including Seseljevci, committed crimes, including killing of

10     non-Serbs, forcible transfer, detention and mistreatment in facilities

11     controlled by local authorities, and destruction of cultural monuments.

12             The repeated occurrence of the same patterns demonstrates that a

13     common plan developed and executed by the JCE members was behind the

14     take-over of these municipalities.

15             The patterns of implementation of the JCE happened first in

16     Croatia.  Evidence of those patterns, and the accused's involvement in

17     implementing them, goes back to the arming of Serb forces in Borovo Selo

18     and the arrival of Seseljevci there.  My colleague Ms. Hochhauser

19     described the crimes that were later committed nearby, in Vukovar, and

20     similar events were repeated in the Bosnian crime-base locations.  These

21     patterns carried through from the Serb campaign in Croatia to the crimes

22     in Vukovar and then to the first pattern municipality in this case, which

23     is Vocin.  The pattern of events was similar and some of the perpetrators

24     were even redeployed from Vukovar to Western Slavonia.

25             After the crimes in Vocin, as Mr. Marcussen discussed, the JCE

Page 17226

 1     members shifted their focus from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The

 2     same patterns carried through there.  They were seen in the

 3     municipalities of Bijeljina, Bosanski Samac, and Brcko, and then the same

 4     forces and some of the same fighters would implement the common purpose

 5     in the Bosnian crime-base municipalities.

 6             The accused and his Seseljevac were involved in the

 7     implementation of the common purpose in all four municipalities.

 8             I will now summarise the events in Vocin.

 9             Witness Maretic testified that local Serbs in Western Slavonia

10     started arming themselves after the elections in Croatia in 1990.  By

11     August 1991, paramilitary formations and a local Serb TO were present in

12     the area.  That month, Serb forces took over Vocin.  Witness Matovina

13     testified that local TO leader Boro Lukic occupied the police station in

14     Vocin, took down and burned the Croatian flag, and hoisted the Serbian

15     flag in its place.  Shortly afterwards, armed Serb forces occupied Vocin.

16     Shooting from machine-guns and automatic weapons could be heard.  When

17     the shooting stopped, Lukic told Croats to surrender their weapons.  Serb

18     forces searched Croats' houses for weapons.

19             Soon thereafter, Serbs established separate Serb authorities in

20     the SAO Western Slavonia.  On 27 September 1991, the commander of the

21     TO municipal staff of Podravska Slatina ordered that regional departments

22     of Vocin police station be formed.  The new departments were staffed by

23     Serb officers who served in the Croatian police before.  Most Serb police

24     officers did not return their weapons when they left the Croatian police.

25             In October 1991, paramilitaries, including Seseljevci and

Page 17227

 1     White Eagles, arrived in Vocin by civilian buses.  The commander of

 2     Seselj's men was Radovan Novacic.  Other Seseljevci, after taking part in

 3     conquering and destroying Vukovar, were deployed [sic] to

 4     Western Slavonia.  The JNA armed these Seseljevci and paid their

 5     salaries.  The volunteers had a very bad reputation among the local

 6     population.  They walked around with weapons, came into courtyards asking

 7     for alcohol.  They scared the local inhabitants.

 8             The accused visited his volunteers in Vocin in late November

 9     1991.  In Sekulinci Lager he gave a speech to his volunteers, and yet,

10     after his visit, tensions rose and the Seseljevci actually became more

11     violent and started killing civilian Croats.

12             Crimes had occurred throughout the Serb campaign in

13     Western Slavonia.  22 civilians were killed during the Serb forces'

14     attack on Cetekovac, Cojlug, and Balinci.  Volunteers abducted non-Serbs

15     and brought them to Sekulinci Lager where they were maltreated and even

16     killed some detainees.

17             At the beginning of December volunteers torched Croats' houses.

18     Around the 4th December, four young Croat men who had to perform forced

19     labour for Serb forces were killed by Seseljevci.  By 8 December 1991,

20     ethnic Croats had entirely vacated the nearby municipalities of Grubisno

21     Polje and Daruvar due to the conflict.

22             In the night from the 12th to the 13th of December, 1991,

23     45 elderly non-Serbs were murdered.  We viewed Exhibit P435, showing

24     victims whose bodies were mutilated and some were burned.

25     Witness Matovina, the police officer supervising the criminal

Page 17228

 1     investigations after the killing, discovered during his investigations

 2     that Seseljevci were among the perpetrators.  Witness Kulic corroborated

 3     this.

 4             Serb forces blew up the Catholic church in Vocin.  We have seen

 5     Exhibit P437, a video-clip showing the ruins of the church.  Houses at

 6     Vocin were torched and looted.  The day after the explosion

 7     Witness Matovina came to Vocin and he testified that it "looked like

 8     Hiroshima."

 9             After the crimes in Vocin, many Croat inhabitants fled the

10     village.  A list of refugees who fled Vocin is in evidence as

11     Exhibit P434.

12             In his closing brief, the accused denies that there was a pattern

13     and that the JCE existed in relation to Vocin.

14             But he did not contest that the events happened in Vocin, which I

15     just summarised.  His Seseljevci were in Vocin, he visited his volunteers

16     there.  The accused did not contest the killing of 49 non-Serbs in Vocin,

17     but he disputes that his men were involved in the crimes.  However,

18     Matovina, Maretic, Kulic, VS-018, and VS-033 all provide evidence which

19     demonstrate that the Seseljevci perpetrated crimes in Vocin, just as they

20     had in Vukovar and throughout the JCE campaign in Croatia.

21             I will now turn to the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992,

22     which show the same characteristic pattern I described in the beginning,

23     namely, arming and military training of local Serb population; arrival of

24     volunteers and paramilitaries, including Seseljevci; Serbs taking control

25     over the municipalities and creation of separate Serb authorities; the

Page 17229

 1     commission of crimes.

 2             This pattern repeated in the Bosnian municipalities relevant to

 3     this indictment, the first of those municipalities was Bijeljina.

 4             The take-over of Bijeljina was led by the accused's Vojvoda

 5     Mirko Blagojevic.  Here on Exhibit P737, you can see his role during the

 6     take-over.

 7                           [Video-clip played]

 8             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

 9             "Shoot at the ...

10             "Mirko Blagojevic:  I am the president of the Serbian Radical

11     Party Regional Board.  We actually control all the accesses to the city

12     and all exits from it too, and we control approximately 75 per cent of

13     the city."

14             MR. MUSSEMEYER:  The accused and Blagojevic discussed the

15     take-over and ethnic cleansing of Bijeljina before the war.

16     Witness VS-1028 overheard a conversation in the Café Srbija where they

17     discussed how to cleanse Bijeljina of non-Serbs.  They agreed to kill

18     non-Serbs and agreed that anybody who remained and was not loyal would be

19     expelled to Turkey or Croatia.  Vojvoda Blagojevic, together with Arkan's

20     men, then organised arming and training of the local population.

21             Arkan's men were deployed in the surrounding areas of Bijeljina

22     before the conflict began.  The accused admitted that JCE member

23     Biljana Plavsic brought Arkan and his men to Bijeljina.  Along with the

24     deployment of paramilitaries, JCE members began creating separate Serb

25     institutions in Bijeljina.  Republika Srpska Minister of Interior

Page 17230

 1     Momcilo Mandic instructed police commanders, among them the chief of

 2     police from Bijeljina, to prepare for separation, including arming of

 3     Serb police officers and the police station.  And I refer to adjudicated

 4     fact number 179.  Witness VS-1035, a Muslim police officer, had to sign a

 5     declaration to be loyal to the Serbian SUP.

 6             The take-over of Bijeljina started on the night of the

 7     31st of March, 1992.  VS-1028 realised that his Serb neighbours left

 8     their homes before the attack.  Blagojevic commanded the Seseljevci who

 9     participated in the take-over.  He and his men co-operated with Arkan's

10     men and JNA units.  The accused boasted on several occasions that

11     Bijeljina was liberated by Vojvoda Blagojevic and his men, for instance,

12     in Exhibits P682; P685, page 11; and P1242, page 10.

13             During the take-over, many non-Serb civilians were killed.  A

14     member of Blagojevic's unit known as Suma killed a father and two sons.

15     Arkan's men killed members of the Sabanovic family and one of Arkan's men

16     can be seen in this slide abusing their bodies.

17             And when the fighting was over, Witness 1035 was ordered to

18     provide protection to the people who collected the corpses in the streets

19     and cellars in Bijeljina.  He testified that they collected 48 bodies.

20             Many non-Serb inhabitants were arrested and mistreated by the

21     MUP.  In Batkovic camp, close to Bijeljina, prisoners were regularly

22     beaten and subjected to forced labour.  Some were killed.  The horrible

23     conditions in the detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including

24     Bijeljina, were noted by this Chamber in its first adjudicated facts

25     decision number 293 and 297.

Page 17231

 1             And Serb forces destroyed non-Serb religious and cultural

 2     monuments.  Expert Riedlmayer's report shows that monuments throughout

 3     Bosnia and Herzegovina were systematically destroyed.  In Bijeljina, all

 4     15 non-Serb religious and cultural monuments were damaged, and 12 of the

 5     Muslim religious buildings were either completely destroyed or almost

 6     destroyed.  Riedlmayer often found a huge garbage container where the

 7     mosque has one been.

 8             I will now show five characteristic examples of the destruction

 9     of cultural monuments in Bosnia.  The examples are all taken from

10     Exhibit 1045, the annex to Riedlmayer's report.  And I will show

11     pictures -- two pictures from before and after the destruction.

12             First picture.  This first example is the destructed Krpic mosque

13     in Bijeljina.  The picture on the left shows the mosque before the

14     destruction and the picture on the right how the place of the mosque

15     looked after the destruction.  On the second after-destruction photo, you

16     also see a garbage container Riedlmayer talked about during his

17     testimony.

18             The second example is the Azizija mosque in Brcko.  You see --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Judges, this is a show for the

20     public, first and foremost.  Therefore, I would kindly ask Mr. Mussemeyer

21     to say about every mosque when it was actually destroyed.  It is very

22     important for this to be known.  I'm sure that he has the data about

23     that.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's absolutely not normal for

25     you to interrupt the Prosecutor during his presentation, and I would tell

Page 17232

 1     you the same if you had the floor.  The accused is supposed to speak last

 2     and he speaks last in order to be given the opportunity to challenge what

 3     has been said before, and in particular things like the Prosecutor has

 4     shown pictures of this kind and that kind, et cetera.  And this has

 5     already been said when the expert witness testified about these mosques.

 6     You made the same remark then.

 7             So the Chamber knows perfectly well that there may be a problem

 8     in the dates.

 9             Mr. Prosecutor, you can go on.

10             MR. MUSSEMEYER:  The second example is the Azizija mosque in

11     Brcko.  You see how the mosque looked before the conflict and what

12     remained.  You see in the picture on the right an empty place.

13             The third example shows the before and after picture of the

14     Azizija mosque in Bosanski Samac.  Again, you see a huge garbage

15     container on the empty place where once the mosque was standing.

16             The next two examples refer to destroyed Catholic churches, and

17     again you see the situation before and after destruction.  The first

18     picture shows the Roman Catholic Parish Church of the Most Sacred Heart

19     of Jesus in Bosanski Samac.  What is interesting on the after-destruction

20     picture is the undamaged Orthodox church opposite to the empty place

21     where the Catholic church used to stay.

22             The last example is the Roman Catholic Parish Church of

23     St. Anthony the Hermit in Gorice, in Brcko.

24             In his closing brief the accused contested that his men

25     co-operated with Arkan's men during the take-over of Bijeljina.  However,

Page 17233

 1     Witnesses VS-1028 and Gusalic described the Seseljevci's co-operation

 2     with Arkan's men in Bijeljina.

 3             The accused challenges the credibility of VS-1028, asserting that

 4     the witness expected to be provided with means to live abroad if he

 5     testified against the accused, but the accused ignores that the witness

 6     testified that he got his residency permit in the country where he lives

 7     today without the help of this Tribunal and before he testified in this

 8     case.

 9             Further, the accused is correct that local Seseljevci led by

10     Mirko Blagojevic participated in the take-over of Bijeljina where they

11     committed crimes.  It is irrelevant that these Seseljevci were not from

12     Serbia.

13             The accused was directly involved in the take-over.  He met with

14     Blagojevic to discuss ethnically cleansing Bijeljina and bragged that

15     Blagojevic liberated the municipality, as I already mentioned.  And after

16     the take-over and crimes in Bijeljina, Blagojevic still shares the

17     accused's ideas of Greater Serbia and celebrated the JCE members'

18     persecutory campaign.

19             I will now turn to the events in Bosanski Samac.

20             The pattern that Vojvoda Blagojevic helped implement in Bijeljina

21     were soon repeated in Bosanski Samac.  The JNA armed local Serbs in the

22     Bosanski Samac region to advance the common purpose of the JCE.  In

23     addition, the local MUP leadership sent 20 Serbs to a MUP training camp

24     for special training.  On 29th February, 1992, local Serbs created a Serb

25     municipality of Bosanski Samac, which is Exhibit P670.  This led to

Page 17234

 1     conflict because non-Serbs in the area did not accept the Serbian

 2     proclamation that the entire territory was theirs.

 3             Shortly after the first take-over in North-Eastern Bosnia, the

 4     first Seseljevci arrived in Bosanski Samac by JNA helicopter from a

 5     Red Berets training camp in Serbia.  The night before, the head of the

 6     Red Berets, JCE member Frenki Simatovic, had visited the camp to instruct

 7     the Seseljevci on their upcoming task in Bosnia.

 8             Days later, in Bijeljina, ethnic Serbs temporarily evacuated

 9     Bosanski Samac and then Serb forces took over the municipality.  As local

10     Serb leader Blagoje Simic informed the JNA, a Crisis Staff was

11     established and paramilitaries and police took control of the most

12     important facilities in the town.  Their goal was to ethnically cleanse

13     Bosanski Samac.

14             Seseljevci Srecko Radovanovic, aka Debeli, and

15     Slobodan Miljkovic, aka Lugar, were among the paramilitaries who

16     participated in the take-over as the accused admitted in the Milosevic

17     case.  The accused appointed Debeli Vojvoda in May 1993.  He contests

18     that Lugar was an SRS member when he was in Bosanski Samac.  But

19     Exhibit P1041 shows that already in 1991 Lugar had asked the accused to

20     become a Seseljevac and went to Slavonia as a member of the SRS.

21             The consequences of the take-over for non-Serbs from

22     Bosanski Samac was drastic.  A good example which demonstrates the

23     atmosphere and the discriminatory measures taken against non-Serbs after

24     the take-over is an order signed by Stevan Todorovic of the local public

25     police station which is in evidence in P673, and I will quote it.  It

Page 17235

 1     says, first:

 2             "It is forbidden for three or more Muslims or Croats to gather

 3     together in public places."

 4             Second:  "Any such group should be first warned, and if the

 5     offence is repeated, the participants should be apprehended and

 6     arrested."

 7             Third:  "For the fulfilment of this order, the commander of the

 8     military police platoon and the commander of the public safety stations

 9     are personally responsible."

10             Because of this order, Muslims could not even have funeral

11     processions, as Witness Sulejman Tihic testified.  Along with these

12     discriminatory measures, other indictment crimes were commonplace in

13     Bosanski Samac.

14             This Chamber has judicially noticed that Serb forces set up

15     detention facilities in Bosanski Samac which were full of people who had

16     no weapons and nothing to do with arming or armed groups.  More than

17     1.500 non-Serbs were detained at sites including the TO building and the

18     secondary schools in Bosanski Samac and the Omladinski Dom in Crkvina.

19             The detainees were abused and some were murdered.  Witness Tihic

20     and VS-1000 testified that one of the worst perpetrators was Seseljevac

21     Slobodan Miljkovic, aka Lugar.  Lugar participated in a massacre in

22     Crkvina where 16 non-Serb prisoners were murdered and killed the prison

23     inmate nicknamed Dikan.

24             As occurred throughout Bosnia, non-Serb religious sites were also

25     destroyed in Bosanski Samac.  Here I refer, for instance, as we have just

Page 17236

 1     seen, to the Catholic Parish Church of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus

 2     which was completely destroyed.  The Orthodox church across the street,

 3     however, was undamaged, suggesting that the Catholic church was

 4     intentionally targeted.

 5             In his closing brief, the accused alleges that Seseljevci are not

 6     linked to the perpetrators of the crimes in Bosanski Samac.  However,

 7     this link is clearly demonstrated by Witnesses VS-1058, VS-1000, VS-1010,

 8     and Sulejman Tihic.

 9             I will finally turn to the events in Brcko.

10             Seseljevci under Blagojevic arrived from Bijeljina to Brcko.

11     Also, Arkan's men participated in the take-over of Brcko.  Before the

12     paramilitaries arrived, Witness 1033 observed JNA helicopters landing at

13     the barracks and soldiers wearing red berets leaving the helicopter.

14     Later he saw Red Berets training local Serbs in self-defence.  The JNA

15     distributed weapons to local Serbs, street signs appeared indicating

16     Brcko was now part of a separate Serb region, SAO Semberija and Majevica

17     or SAO Serbian Krajina.

18             On 30th April 1992, Serb forces started to take over Brcko by

19     blowing up the two bridges over the Sava River.  The actual fighting

20     began during the night of the 2nd May 1992.  Arkan's men and Seseljevci

21     under Blagojevic participated in the take-over, as they already had in

22     Bijeljina.  A JNA aircraft bombed the town, while the attack on Brcko was

23     carried out by groups of mixed members of Serb forces, military police of

24     the JNA, Serb volunteers, Red Berets, and Seseljevci.  This has all been

25     testified by Witness VS-1033.

Page 17237

 1             The crimes which characterised the JCE campaign also occurred in

 2     Brcko.  The day when the take-over began, policemen and soldiers

 3     massacred a group of civilians outside the local market.  Witness VS-1033

 4     observed similar situations to the photos showing Goran Jelisic killing a

 5     civilian.

 6             Many people died in the area and Witness 1033 personally

 7     witnessed soldiers dumping bodies from a refrigerator truck into a mass

 8     grave.  Non-Serbs were detained at Luka camp in the Brcko harbour area.

 9     Blagojevic and his Seseljevci arrived at the camp.  Blagojevic gave

10     speeches and his men tortured the inmates in his presence.  One

11     Seseljevac carved a cross into the forehead of a Muslim inmate with a

12     knife.  And one member of Serb forces, Goran Jelisic, tortured inmates

13     and bragged that he had already killed 97 non-Serbs.

14             Expert Riedlmayer --

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection, again there is a huge

16     problem with the interpreter.  Here Mr. Mussemeyer said Blagojevic and

17     Seseljevci arrived in the Luka camp, and the interpreter says Blagojevic

18     and Seselj arrived at the camp.  Are you going to tolerate, to keep on

19     tolerating that interpreter?  Please listen to the recording in the

20     Serbian and look at the transcript to check what Mr. Mussemeyer actually

21     said.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj, what you hear in

23     your language -- we don't know what you hear because what we see is the

24     screen with the transcript in English and we hear the French

25     interpretation.  So what you hear is not of our knowledge.  Therefore,

Page 17238

 1     if, as you just said, the Prosecutor has said that Blagojevic and the

 2     Seseljevci arrived, whereas you heard that Blagojevic came together with

 3     you, yes, indeed, there's a difference between these two sentences.  But

 4     what did the Prosecutor say, that the -- that Blagojevic came with the

 5     Seseljevci or that he came with Seselj?

 6             MR. MUSSEMEYER:  I did say with Seseljevci.  He did not come with

 7     Seselj himself, but he come with Seseljevci, Seselj's men.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right.  In that case I will

 9     ask the interpreters to clearly distinguish between the men of Seselj,

10     the Seselj's men, and Seselj in person.

11             You can go on, Mr. Prosecutor.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, you are now mocking

13     my objection.  You're making fun of it.  We are not talking about whether

14     the interpreter is going to make a distinction between myself and

15     Seselj's men.  It's a more important issue as to whether the interpreter

16     is going to interpret properly or not.  You are taking every opportunity

17     to mock me, but you're actually mocking the Hague Tribunal, not me.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj, no one turning

19     you -- is making fun of you.  You made a remark and the Chamber has noted

20     your remark, and I have invited the interpreters to be quite careful.

21             Mr. Prosecutor, you can go on.

22             MR. MUSSEMEYER:  I will now discuss the destruction of cultural

23     monuments in Brcko.  Expert Riedlmayer has listed 21 damaged cultural

24     monuments, 12 Muslim and 9 Catholic religious buildings in Brcko.  Seven

25     mosques were completely and one almost destroyed.  Three were heavily and

Page 17239

 1     only one was lightly damaged.  From the damaged Catholic churches, seven

 2     were heavily and two lightly damaged.

 3             In his brief, the accused alleges that the crimes in Brcko were

 4     not linked to him or to Seseljevci from Serbia.  The evidence actually

 5     shows the participation of Blagojevic and his Seseljevci in the take-over

 6     and the torturing of detainees in Luka camp by Blagojevic's unit.  The

 7     implementation of the common purpose in Bijeljina and Bosanski Samac was

 8     followed by its implementation in Brcko.  Some detainees in camps in

 9     Samac were subjected to the patterns of the JCE in all three

10     municipalities:  Arrested and detained in Samac, then transferred to

11     Brcko, and transferred again to Bijeljina when the conflict reached

12     Brcko.

13             In sum, municipalities throughout Bosnia and Croatia were

14     subjected to discriminatory, illegal arming, the arrival of the

15     Seseljevci units and other paramilitaries, Serb take-overs of power and

16     crimes.  These patterns of implementation of the JCE which began in

17     Croatia continued in the Bosnian crime-base municipalities.  My colleague

18     Ms. Iodice will now discuss the first two of those municipalities and

19     explain the implementation of the JCE members' common purpose in Zvornik

20     and in Greater Sarajevo.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Madam.  You

22     have the floor for the rest of the presentation.

23             MS. IODICE:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Good morning.

24             The crimes committed in Zvornik were in furtherance of the common

25     purpose of the JCE.  The evidence proves that on the 8th of April, 1992,

Page 17240

 1     Serb forces, including Seseljevci, attacked Zvornik.  Over the following

 2     months, Serb forces turned the multi-ethnic society of Zvornik into a

 3     purely Serb municipality starting by expelling non-Serbs, looting and

 4     destroying their property, and culminating in the mistreatment, torture,

 5     sexual assault, and murder of hundreds of non-Serbs.

 6             The attack on Zvornik was prepared well in advance by members of

 7     the Serb municipal authorities, which were established by the SDS in

 8     Zvornik with the support of the DB Serbia, the JNA, and the SDS of BiH.

 9     These authorities were controlled by JCE members, including

10     Veljko Kadijevic and Radovan Karadzic.  The common purpose of the JCE

11     members was to ethnically cleanse Zvornik of its non-Serb population and

12     create a Serb-controlled area.  The attack was carried out by Serb

13     forces, including Seseljevci sent by the accused.

14             The Seseljevci formed part of the hierarchical SRS/SCP structure

15     controlled by the accused and operated in co-operation with or under the

16     command of other Serb forces and municipal authorities, which were under

17     the command and control of other JCE members, including Radovan Karadzic.

18             In his brief, the accused claims that the crimes committed in

19     Zvornik were not part of a common purpose and that no JCE was in

20     existence.  The accused ignored the evidence on the record, which proves

21     beyond a reasonable doubt that crimes were committed in furtherance of

22     the common purpose and that the accused is responsible for them.

23             These claims are even contradicted by the admissions of the

24     accused, as it can be seen in an interview he gave before the indictment

25     against him was issued, where he explained how the JCE members had

Page 17241

 1     planned the take-over of Zvornik long in advance.  This is Exhibit P644,

 2     time code 01:05:13 through 01:07:30.

 3                           [Video-clip played]

 4             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

 5             "Well, in May 1992, Milosevic finally took absolute control over

 6     the Yugoslav People's Army.  This is when a new constitution of the

 7     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was declared and when he formally,

 8     actually and inherently became the main person in the state - the man who

 9     decides everything.  This Zvornik operation too was planned in Belgrade

10     and the Bosnian Serb forces took part in it as they had more manpower.

11     However, the special units and the most militant units came from this

12     side.  These were police units, the so-called Red Berets.  These were

13     special units of the Serbian State Security Service.  They were

14     volunteers from the Serbian Radical Party, Arkan's volunteers and another

15     smaller group of volunteers also under the control of the police.  The

16     army was not very involved in this operation.  For the most part, it

17     provided artillery support where needed.  The operation had been planned

18     long in advance, there had been lengthy preparations for it so there were

19     no anxious calls of 'Hurry-up, we need this or that urgently!'

20     Everything was well organised and carried out until the hostilities

21     ended.  Later, when looting began, no one was able to control it.

22             "LS:  Whose idea was it and how well was it prepared?

23             "VS:  This was thought up by key persons from the State Security

24     Service, including Franko Simatovic, Frenki, and he was one of the

25     persons who carried it out.  There was some other people too, but I

Page 17242

 1     forgot their names.  Our volunteers gathered in Loznica, which was their

 2     focal point from where they headed to Zvornik.  They were led by

 3     Vojvoda Cvetinovic and he received orders directly from the special unit

 4     commanders."

 5             MS. IODICE:  Zvornik is located in Eastern BiH on the banks of

 6     the Drina River, demarcating the border with Serbia.  Zvornik had a

 7     number of bridges, main roads, and a railroad connecting Serbia with

 8     Serb-populated areas further west in BiH.  Because of the strategic

 9     location, the municipality of Zvornik was important for the creation of a

10     Serb-dominated area.

11             The take-over of Zvornik realised three of the strategic goals of

12     the 12th of May, 1992, discussed in Exhibit P966.  Strategic goal

13     number 1, the separation of the Serb people from the two other national

14     communities.  Strategic goal number 2, the establishment of a corridor of

15     Serb-controlled land spanning from Serbia through Bosnia-Herzegovina to

16     Serbian Krajina.  Strategic goal number 3, the elimination of the

17     Drina River border between Serbia and Republika Srpska.

18             The local Serb leadership followed the policies of their leaders

19     in BiH to implement the common purpose in Zvornik.

20             First, at least by October 1991 Crisis Staffs were set up.

21             Second, the local Serb leadership established separate municipal

22     authorities and a Serb police force pursuant to the Variant A and B

23     instructions.  Variant B was implemented in December 1991, when the SDS

24     established the Serb municipality of Zvornik, and Jovo Mijatovic, who

25     openly spoke of the plan to exchange populations to create mono-ethnic

Page 17243

 1     areas, was chosen as its president.

 2             Third, the Bosnian Serb leadership monitored the implementation

 3     of its policy decisions in Zvornik.  As a representative of the

 4     Bosnian Serb Assembly, Mijatovic was in contact with the SDS Crisis Staff

 5     at the level of BiH and with JCE members Radovan Karadzic,

 6     Momcilo Krajisnik, and Biljana Plavsic.  But updates also came from the

 7     SDS in Zvornik, as it kept the SDS leadership informed of its progress in

 8     the implementation of the instructions in the municipality.

 9             At the same time, the Serb authorities started military

10     preparations for the implementation of the common purpose, assisted by

11     the leadership of the DB Serbia, under the control of JCE member

12     Jovica Stanisic, and in co-operation with other institutions under the

13     command and control of other JCE members, including Karadzic's SDS in

14     BiH, Kadijevic's JNA, and the accused's SRS/SCP.

15             For example, in October 1991 the SCP Mali Zvornik, which had

16     frequent contacts with the SRS/SCP in Belgrade, organised a group of

17     volunteers to be sent to Darda in Croatia for military training.  At that

18     time, Rade Kostic from the DB Serbia was the head of the police for the

19     area where the training was held.

20             After the adoption of the Variant A and B instructions DB Serbia,

21     the JNA, the TO, and the SDS intensified the provision of weapons to

22     local Serbs in Zvornik.

23             For example, between December 1991 and March 1992, the DB Serbia

24     provided weapons to Zvornik from Croatia through Rade Kostic and

25     Marko Pavlovic and with the assistance of JCE member Radmilo Bogdanovic.

Page 17244

 1     Bogdanovic, assisted by Kostic, also provided weapons from Belgrade after

 2     meeting with the SDS leaders of Zvornik.

 3             The involvement of DB Serbia in the arming and training of Serbs

 4     in Zvornik is shown by this slide and is based on Exhibits P1039, P1144,

 5     P1029, P1028, P1027, P1077, P1085, and the testimony of VS-037.

 6             As we can see, Pavlovic referred to Kostic as his boss while

 7     Kostic was subordinated to Milan Tepavcevic, who was Jovica Stanisic's

 8     deputy.  Tepavcevic was responsible for the Zvornik military operations

 9     and met regularly with the local police commander who co-operated with

10     Bogdanovic and Kostic to obtain weapons.

11             Also the Zvornik MUP started arming Serbs by handing out weapons

12     licences in an uncontrolled way, while other Serbs received weapons

13     through the police or JNA reserve forces.  Since the Muslims of Zvornik

14     were dismissed from the JNA reserve forces, the distribution of weapons

15     to JNA reservists meant arming only Serbs.

16             Once parallel political and military structures were in place,

17     the local Serb leadership in Zvornik finalised the preparations for the

18     take-over by arranging the deployment of Seseljevci to Zvornik and the

19     move of Arkan and his men from Bijeljina to Zvornik.

20             The Serb municipality of Zvornik requested volunteers from the

21     SRS/SCP a few days before the take-over.  Shortly after, Witness Rankic

22     and another member of the SRS War Staff, together with Vojin Vuckovic,

23     aka Zuca, and his brother Dusan, aka Repic, met with representatives of

24     the Serb municipality in Mali Zvornik to discuss the deployment of the

25     Seseljevci.  They agreed that the Seseljevci were going to be equipped,

Page 17245

 1     armed, and incorporated in the TO, but would remain together as a unit

 2     and were going to be lodged at the Karakaj shoe factory in Karakaj -- at

 3     the Standard shoe factory in Karakaj.

 4             The accused approved the deployment of Seseljevci to Zvornik and

 5     admitted, in Exhibit P1233, that he had a high control -- a high degree

 6     of control over them.

 7             Two days later, a group of Seseljevci under the command of

 8     Vojin Vuckovic, aka Zuca, arrived in Karakaj.  This is confirmed by

 9     victims detained at the Standard shoe factory and is shown in

10     Exhibit P305, which should not be broadcast.

11             This is a sketch of the Standard shoe factory prepared by

12     Witness VS-1013, whose evidence will be discussed later on, showing that

13     Seseljevci, under number 1, were in fact lodged at the Standard shoe

14     factory.

15             Seseljevci and other members of the Serb forces committed crimes

16     in Zvornik.  In his brief, the accused claims that the crimes alleged in

17     the indictment have not been proven and that he is not linked to any of

18     the perpetrators.  The accused also claims that his Seseljevci withdrew

19     from Zvornik after the fall of Kula Grad.  The accused's claims are

20     contrary to the evidence on the record and should be rejected.

21             For the detailed identification of the groups of Seseljevci that

22     took part in the take-over of Zvornik and their link to the accused, I

23     refer back to paragraphs 291 through 298 of the Prosecution's closing

24     brief, and I will now highlight the evidence proving that Seseljevci

25     linked to the accused perpetrated crimes in Zvornik.

Page 17246

 1             The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt - and the accused

 2     does not contest - that Seseljevci participated in the attack on Zvornik.

 3     Together with Arkan's men, the Seseljevci forcibly displaced and murdered

 4     non-Serbs.  The JNA forces under Tacic's command provided artillery

 5     support during the attack.

 6             On the 5th of April, 1992, Radio Zvornik announced to the

 7     inhabitants of Zvornik town to take shelter for their own safety.

 8     VS-1062, her husband and two sons, and their neighbours took shelter in

 9     the basement of the building where she lived.  They were all unarmed

10     non-Serb civilians.  On or about the 9th of April, 1992, a group of

11     Arkan's men stormed into the shelter and forced all the men out.  A group

12     of Seseljevci entered the shelter and took the women and children away,

13     while the men were lined up against the wall.  VS-1062 heard gun-fire

14     from the location where the men were standing.  VS-1062's husband and

15     sons and all the others were never seen again.  They were executed by

16     Arkan's men.

17             VS-1062 --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down for the sake of the

19     interpreters.  Thank you.

20             MS. IODICE:  VS-1062 and the other women and children were put on

21     a bus and deported to Serbia.

22             The testimony of VS-1062 is clear.  Arkan's men and Seseljevci

23     co-operated to murder able-bodied non-Serb men and to expel women and

24     children from Zvornik.  VS-1062 explained to the Court how, first,

25     Arkan's men burst into the shelter and took all the men out; then a

Page 17247

 1     different group, who introduced themselves as Seseljevci and wore

 2     different uniforms, escorted the women and children away while Arkan's

 3     men executed the men.  VS-1062 also explained the pattern followed by

 4     Arkan's men and Seseljevci at transcript 5958.  Quote:

 5             "These men were going from house to house, from door to door,

 6     killing men."

 7             The success of this pattern was recorded by JCE member Mladic in

 8     his diary, Exhibit P1347, when, briefed by Marko Pavlovic, he noted that

 9     volunteer formations "led by Arkan and Seselj" "enjoyed exceptional

10     success."

11             The accused claims that VS-1062 did not mention Seseljevci in a

12     statement given to the BiH authorities in 2003.  This claim is baseless

13     and should be dismissed.  VS-1062 denied that the 2003 statement to the

14     BiH authorities which is not in evidence is hers.  She denied ever having

15     contacts with the authorities of BiH and ever living at the address

16     indicated on that statement.

17             VS-1062 also did not recognise the signature.  These crimes and

18     Seseljevci's participation have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

19             Even though the accused is contesting the participation of

20     Seseljevci in the murder, he admits, for example, at transcript 1933,

21     that Seseljevci participated in the attack together with other Serb

22     forces.  The accused admitted that the SRS municipal committee in Loznica

23     organised a group of Seseljevci for the take-over of Zvornik and one of

24     the Seseljevci guarding VS-1062 and the other non-Serbs before they were

25     forcibly displaced stated that he hailed from Loznica.

Page 17248

 1             The evidence of VS-1062, VS-1013, VS-038, Boskovic, Jovic, and

 2     VS-1087 proves beyond a reasonable doubt that as a result of the attack

 3     by the Serb forces, which included Seseljevci, non-Serbs fled out of fear

 4     or were rounded up and deported to Serbia and many of them were killed.

 5             Your Honours, would this be a good place to stop?

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you continue for another

 7     seven minutes?

 8             MS. IODICE:  Of course.

 9             After the fall of Kula Grad on the 26th of April, 1992, non-Serbs

10     who had remained hiding in Zvornik were arrested as they tried to flee

11     towards Muslim territory and taken to the detention facilities as in the

12     case of Witnesses VS-1013, VS-1015, and Fadil Kopic, or were arrested in

13     their homes as in the case of VS-1063.  These witnesses were taken to the

14     detention sites at the Standard shoe factory and Ekonomija farm and later

15     on were transferred to the Ciglane factory.  During the detention at

16     these sites, they were brutally abused, tortured, and murdered by members

17     of the Serb forces, as specified in paragraphs 316 through 330 of the

18     Prosecution's closing brief.

19             Amongst the perpetrators the victims identified the Seseljevci

20     from Kraljevo, including Vojvoda Cele, Miroslav Vukovic; Major Toro;

21     Pufta; and Sava; the Seseljevci from Loznica; the Yellow Wasps, including

22     Vojin Vuckovic, aka Zuco, and his brother Dusan Vuckovic, aka Repic; and

23     Pivarski's men, including Stojan Pivarski and Zoks.

24             These groups are linked to the accused and operated in

25     co-operation with or under the command of other Serb forces and municipal

Page 17249

 1     authorities which were under the command and control of other JCE

 2     members, including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

 3             After the take-over, the volunteer units were incorporated into

 4     the Serb police and TO, later VRS.  The Loznica's group was incorporated

 5     into the police.  Zuco's Yellow Wasps, Pivarski's men, and others were

 6     incorporated into the TO/VRS.  The volunteers were housed and paid by the

 7     Serb TO and by the Serb municipal authorities.

 8             The victims' identification of their abusers has been established

 9     beyond a reasonable doubt.  The victims spent long periods of time in

10     detention.  They learned personal details of their attackers.  They saw

11     them day after day.  They learned what unit they belonged to directly

12     from them, as VS-1015 also explained at transcript 5406.

13             Witnesses VS-1013, VS-1015, Kopic, and VS-1063 all suffered and

14     witnessed severe abuses by the Seseljevci from Kraljevo and Loznica over

15     an extended period of time.

16             At Ekonomija farm, for example, VS-1063 saw a group of Seseljevci

17     take out a detainee.  They shot the detainee in the legs.  They carved a

18     cross into his flesh and broke his arm before taking him back into the

19     room, where they stabbed him and shot him to death.  At Ciglane, both

20     Kopic and VS-1015 testified that Pufta cut off Cirak's ear and stabbed

21     him.  On that same day, Pufta and Sasa then drove Cirak away and shot him

22     to death.  On that same day, Pufta, together with Sasa, cut a crescent

23     tattoo off Enver Dautovic's arm with a knife.  Sasa then congratulated

24     Dautovic, saying:

25             "You fared well, but if you had been yelling louder you would

Page 17250

 1     have ended up with Cirak ..."

 2             And this can be found at transcript 5435.

 3             The crimes committed at these detention facilities were so grave

 4     and gruesome that the witnesses could never forget what they saw and will

 5     always remember the perpetrators.  VS-1013 observed his abusers for

 6     almost three months, from his arrest and transfer to the detention centre

 7     at the Standard shoe factory to the day of his transfer from the

 8     detention centre at Ciglane factory to the Batkovic camp.

 9             While cleaning the premises at the Standard shoe factory, VS-1013

10     read the names of the groups of Serb forces on the doors of the rooms

11     where they were lodged, including the Seseljevci from Kraljevo, the

12     Loznica group, and military police.

13             Amongst the Seseljevci from Kraljevo, VS-1013 recognised Cele

14     whom the prisoners had to address as Vojvoda and whom the accused held in

15     high esteem.  VS-1013 stated at transcript 5210 how the prisoners were

16     told:

17             "A special man will come by.  He will talk to you.  You mustn't

18     look him in the eyes and you must address him with Vojvoda, sir,

19     honourable Vojvoda sir."

20             Vojvoda Miroslav Vukovic, aka Cele, is not the only Seseljevac

21     identified by VS-1013.  For example, VS-1013 saw Major Toro's SRS

22     identification card and in June 1992 heard that Seselj had promoted Sava,

23     Zoks, and Pufta.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We need to stop now because the

25     Judges need to go into the room downstairs for a swearing-in ceremony.

Page 17251

 1     We shall return towards ten to 1.00 or so.  This is not something in our

 2     control.  This is our last break for today.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 12.23 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 12.55 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

 6             Madam Prosecutor, you may proceed.

 7             MS. IODICE:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 8             Before we broke, I was describing the evidence of VS-1013, who

 9     testified that the detainees were told that the Vojvoda would visit them.

10             The evidence of VS-1013 is credible and reliable, despite the

11     accused's allegations.  VS-1013 explained to the Court that he did not

12     explicitly mention Seseljevci in his 1993 statement to the authorities of

13     BiH, but he mentioned the same people, the same nicknames.

14             Later, when he gave a statement to the ICTY in 1996, which, as he

15     said at transcript 5303, was the only official statement he gave, he did

16     his best to recollect every detail.

17             Other witnesses also recognised the same perpetrators as members

18     of the Seseljevci.  For example, Witness Kopic who spent almost

19     three months in detention in Zvornik recalled that some members of the

20     Kraljevo group, and Zoks, glorified Seselj as their leader.

21             VS-1015 observed and identified members of the Seseljevci

22     throughout the almost three months he spent in detention, from his arrest

23     on the 7th of May, 1992, to his transfer to Bijeljina in mid-July 1992.

24             While detained at Ciglane factory, VS-1015 was regularly forced

25     to loot by the Seseljevci.

Page 17252

 1             VS-1015 recognised Zoks and a man addressed as Vojvoda as those

 2     who beat him and beat Nesib Dautovic to death at Ekonomija farm.  The

 3     evidence demonstrates that the person identified by VS-1015 as Vojvoda is

 4     Miroslav Vukovic, aka Cele.  The accused has claimed that the man

 5     referred to as Vojvoda was instead Dusan Vuckovic, aka Repic.  This claim

 6     should be rejected.  The accused confronted VS-1015 with a 1993 statement

 7     given to the BiH authorities, where VS-1015 referred to the Vojvoda he

 8     identified as the man present at the beating and murder as Vojvoda Repic.

 9     VS-1015 explained to the Court that he never heard anyone refer to the

10     man he identified as Vojvoda with the nickname or surname of Repic and he

11     might have used this nickname by mistake.  And I refer the Trial Chamber

12     to transcript 5458.

13             VS-1015 carefully described the man he addressed as Vojvoda.  He

14     recalled that Vojvoda had a beard.  He recalled that Vojvoda wore some

15     sort of trainers, as he said at transcript 5413, the sort of shoes that

16     elderly women usually wear.  These same details are confirmed by VS-027,

17     who recalled, at page 114 of Exhibit P868 and transcript 14607, that Cele

18     wore some sort of women's trainers.  The accused himself admitted that

19     Cele limped at transcript 5359.  It has been established beyond a

20     reasonable doubt that the man participating in the beatings and murder at

21     Ekonomija farm together with Zoks was Miroslav Vukovic, aka Cele.

22             The accused, in his brief, has also admitted that Cele was in

23     Zvornik until the 17th of May, 1992, confirming his opportunity to take

24     part in the murder of Nesib Dautovic which occurred on or about the

25     12th of May, 1992.

Page 17253

 1             The accused also disputes VS-1015's identification of Seseljevci,

 2     claiming that VS-1015 did not mention their affiliation in his 1993

 3     statement to the BiH authorities.  VS-1015 explained to the Court that he

 4     heard members of the Serb forces refer to the Kraljevo group as

 5     Seseljevci.  And he also explained that his 1993 statement was given in

 6     haste and it is only two pages long, while he gave a much more detailed

 7     statement later on to the ICTY.

 8             For these reasons, the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt

 9     that the crimes charged at the Standard shoe factory, Ekonomija farm, and

10     Ciglane factory were committed by the Serb forces, including Seseljevci.

11             Once Zvornik town was cleansed of its non-Serb population, Serb

12     forces started displacing all non-Serbs from settlements around the town,

13     as detailed in paragraphs 302 through 309 of the Prosecution's closing

14     brief.  Systematically, between the end of May and the end of June, 1992,

15     non-Serbs were forced out of their homes at short notice.  Able-bodied

16     men were separated and forced to detention facilities, where they were

17     severely mistreated, abused, and murdered because of their ethnicity by

18     members of the Serb forces, including Seseljevci.

19             By August 1992, Zvornik and most of the towns along the

20     Drina River had been ethnically cleansed in furtherance of the common

21     purpose.  In May 1993, the accused admitted, in Exhibit P1218, how

22     Zvornik, "where many Muslims used to live, is now flooded with Serbs."

23             As Mr. Marcussen had already described in detail, the non-Serb

24     population of Drinjaca-Kostjerevo was amongst those who were forcibly

25     displaced from Zvornik municipality at the end of May 1992.

Page 17254

 1             Your Honours heard that women and children were displaced while

 2     the men were detained at the Drinjaca Dom Kulture, where they were

 3     brutally beaten and murdered.

 4             Witness VS-1064 identified the perpetrators of the murder from

 5     their uniforms and called them Chetniks, explaining that by "Chetniks" he

 6     meant Seseljevci.  He repeated at transcript 8738 to 8739:

 7             "That's how I view Chetniks, how I see them.  Now, if there's

 8     someone else, another Chetnik Vojvoda, for instance, who had special

 9     insignia ... then I wouldn't say that they were Seselj's men.  I would

10     say that they belonged to this other man.  But we know of no other man

11     who was involved in this or meddled in Vojislav Seselj's business.  Now

12     that there are Chetniks in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and all over the

13     place, we know of only one boss, one head."

14             The identification of these perpetrators as members of the

15     Seseljevci has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

16             The non-Serb population of Setici, Djulici, and other

17     neighbouring villages suffered the same fate.  After being forced out of

18     their homes by Serb forces, including VRS, police, and paramilitaries,

19     women and children were expelled while the non-Serb men were separated

20     and taken to the detention facility in Karakaj technical school.  After

21     being detained for a few days, all non-Serb detainees, approximately 740,

22     were executed.  Some were murdered at the Karakaj technical school, some

23     at Gero's slaughter-house.  Some of the perpetrators of this crime,

24     namely, the Yellow Wasps, Pivarski's men, and the Loznica's group, formed

25     part of the hierarchical SRS/SCP structure controlled by the accused, as

Page 17255

 1     just discussed.

 2             The Yellow Wasps, like other paramilitaries in Zvornik, were

 3     arrested in July 1992 as they had started looting Serb property as well.

 4     They were shortly after released and redeployed.

 5             The accused has on several occasions sought to distance himself

 6     from the Yellow Wasps.  And as the serious crimes committed by them were

 7     soon publicly known, the accused denied any affiliation to them to avoid

 8     political liability, as Witness Rankic stated in Exhibit P1074.  However,

 9     when the head of the TO, Marko Pavlovic, had complaints about the

10     Yellow Wasps' behaviour, he directed them to the SRS/SCP in Belgrade and

11     the accused responded to these complaints by redeploying the Yellow Wasps

12     to Skelani instead of calling them back to Serbia or dismissing them.

13             Pivarski's men were also a group of Seseljevci.  Its commander,

14     Stojan Pivarski, held the rank of major in the SCP, while his deputy

15     Ivan Korac, aka Zoks, held the rank of captain.

16             And if we could now move shortly in private session.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You really have to move to

18     private session?  Can't you do it otherwise?  Because normally in closing

19     arguments I like it to be public.

20             Okay, let's move to private session and we'll see whether we

21     should lift the confidentiality of it later on or not.

22             Please, Mr. Registrar.

23             MS. IODICE:  Thank you, Your Honours.

24             [Private session] [Confidentiality partially lifted by order of Chamber] 

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we are in private session.  Thank

Page 17256

 1     you.

 2             MS. IODICE:  The accused has claimed, based on a list of members

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)  VS-038's

 8     membership to either group is anyway irrelevant.  The evidence proves

 9     that these groups worked together and eventually were arrested together.

10             We can now move back to open session, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Judges, I believe that there's no

12     reason for this to remain in private session.  It should be made

13     available to the public, and I think this should be done urgently because

14     I don't want the Registry to redact the version that is to be broadcast

15     to the general public.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] After deliberations, we are

18     concerned because we want to avoid possible identification of a protected

19     witness, and the Trial Chamber observes that as of line 16 until line 19

20     there may be elements that might identify a witness.  Therefore, we are

21     going to make public lines 14, 15, 16, until "Yellow Wasps," and then

22     from "the Yellow Wasps," from that mention, it's going to be redacted

23     until line 19 up to the word "Zoks."

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection to this.  Who

25     can identify a protected witness on the basis of this?  A code has been

Page 17257

 1     used and only some information from the field have been provided that

 2     pertain to a period 20 years ago.  This is something that only

 3     additionally smears the whole process.  Why shouldn't all this be

 4     broadcast?  There's no rational reason why this shouldn't be broadcast.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber is of the

 6     view - and I could express a personal opinion in this matter - the fact

 7     that it is said that he arrived into the unit commanded by Pivarski in

 8     May 1992 could be something that might identify VS-038.  So this is the

 9     decision by the Trial Chamber, but the remaining lines will be public.

10             Madam Prosecutor -- yes, Mr. Registrar.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an additional demand then.

12     Since my legal advisors cannot follow the transcript -- ever since

13     Marina Raguz left my Defence team, we no longer have the key that would

14     allow us to directly follow the transcript.  My legal advisors help me

15     based on the public broadcast and they send their opinions to me by fax.

16     Already today I have received the entire transcript from the trial

17     yesterday.  Since you eliminated this from the public transcript, I

18     demand that the Registry now finds the way to print for me and make it

19     available to me until tomorrow this part that is not going to be publicly

20     broadcast because I need it, I need to use that.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber invites the

22     Registrar to give to the accused the redacted part, give him a hard copy,

23     whatever he may want to use it for.

24             Let's move back to open session.

25                           [Open session]

Page 17258

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we are in open session.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed,

 3     Madam Prosecutor.

 4             MS. IODICE:  The Loznica group was also linked to the accused

 5     and, as stated above, the accused admits that the SRS municipal committee

 6     in Loznica organised a group of Seseljevci for the take-over of Zvornik.

 7             The link of Yellow Wasps, Pivarski's men, and Loznica's group to

 8     the accused is proven beyond a reasonable doubt by Witnesses Rankic and

 9     Jovic, whose evidence is corroborated by Witnesses Drazilovic, VS-027,

10     Alic, VS-036, VS-038, and Exhibit P971.

11             Crimes of the same nature were also committed at Celopek

12     Dom Kulture, where non-Serb men were transferred after being expelled

13     from their homes in Divic by members of the army and police, following

14     the same well-established pattern.  VS-1065 detailed in his evidence the

15     severe mistreatment, sexual assault, torture, and murder to which the

16     inmates at Celopek were subjected.  He identified the perpetrators as

17     Dusan Vuckovic, aka Repic; Major Toro; Pufta; and Zoks.  For example, on

18     one occasion Repic selected some prisoners and carved crosses on their

19     forehead with a knife.

20             On Bajram day, a Muslim holiday, Repic returned to Celopek

21     Dom Kulture, selected fathers and sons amongst the detainees, ordered

22     them onto a stage, and forced them to engage in oral sex.  He then

23     started shooting at the detainees on the stage and killing them.

24             The accused did not contest VS-1065's evidence.  He stated that

25     VS-1065 testified truthfully.  As shown above and detailed in

Page 17259

 1     paragraph 291 of the Prosecution's closing brief, these perpetrators were

 2     linked to the accused.

 3             After the displacement of non-Serbs from Divic, it was Kozluk's

 4     turn to be cleansed.  Initially, Muslims in Kozluk were allowed to stay

 5     in their homes.  However, non-Serbs were intimidated, abused, and killed

 6     by the Serb forces which occupied the town.  Those forces included men

 7     under the command of Marko Pavlovic, Zoran Subotic, Arkan, Pivarski,

 8     Zuco, Niski, and Captain Dragan.  Despite having complied with the order

 9     of handing over their weapons, on the 26th of June, 1992, the Muslims

10     were forced onto buses and trucks and deported to Serbia.  Those who

11     refused were killed.  The Serb forces that carried out the displacement

12     included members of the army, police, TO, Arkan's men, and Yellow Wasps.

13             With the cleansing of the last non-Serb villages, the

14     implementation of the common purpose in Zvornik had entered its final

15     stage.  Exhibit P1347 proves how a few days after the deportation of the

16     non-Serbs from Kozluk on the 30th of June, 1992, Branko Grujic announced

17     to JCE members Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic that the Zvornik Serb

18     leadership had "successfully implemented the President's," Karadzic,

19     "decision to settle Divic and Kozluk with our children."  "Our children,"

20     namely Serbs.

21             That the crimes committed in Zvornik were part of the JCE common

22     purpose is also evidenced by the large-scale destruction of mosques and

23     religious institutions carried out by the Serb forces after the take-over

24     of Zvornik, as detailed in paragraphs 345 through 348 of the

25     Prosecution's closing brief.

Page 17260

 1             A few examples demonstrate that the intent behind the destruction

 2     of Muslim religious property was to erase the existence of Zvornik's

 3     Muslim population.  In Divic, the historic Dervis lodge was destroyed and

 4     a junked lorry was placed on the top of the graves of two Muslim saints.

 5     An Orthodox church replaced the Divic mosque.  The sites of the destroyed

 6     Rijecanska mosque and Begsuja mosque in Zvornik and the mosque of

 7     Mehmed-Celebi in Kozluk were used as rubbish dumps.  The destruction was

 8     carried out by the Serb TO because they were symbols of the Muslim

 9     culture and not for military purposes, as testified by VS-037 and VS-038.

10             To conclude, the evidence discussed proves beyond a reasonable

11     doubt that the crimes charged in relation to the municipality of Zvornik

12     were committed by members of the Serb forces, including Seseljevci.

13     These crimes were an integral part of the common purpose to ethnically

14     cleanse Serb-targeted territories in BiH of its non-Serb population and

15     create a Serb-controlled area.

16             I will now turn to the Greater Sarajevo area.

17             The crimes committed in Greater Sarajevo were part of the common

18     purpose.  The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a JCE was in

19     place and that its common purpose included the take-overs of Ilijas,

20     Vogosca, Novo Sarajevo, and Ilidza, and the resulting crimes committed by

21     members of the Serb forces, including Seseljevci.

22             The Seseljevci formed part of the hierarchical SRS/SCP structure

23     controlled by the accused and, as in Zvornik, operated in co-operation

24     with or under the command of other Serb forces and municipal authorities,

25     such as the JNA, TO, and later VRS and MUP, which were under the command

Page 17261

 1     and control of JCE members, including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

 2             The accused claims that the crimes committed in Greater Sarajevo

 3     were not part of the common purpose and that no JCE was in existence.

 4     These crimes should be rejected.

 5             I'm sorry, Your Honours, I meant these claims should be rejected.

 6             Sarajevo was a key location in the pursuit of the common purpose.

 7     At the 8th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in February 1992, JCE

 8     member Karadzic explained the importance of Sarajevo, saying, quote:

 9             "Leaving Sarajevo, where there are 215.000 Serbs including

10     Yugoslavs, where there are great riches, if we left Sarajevo, well, we

11     should be hanged," and this is found in Exhibit P949.

12             Karadzic's position was reflected in the strategic objectives of

13     the Serb people in BiH on the 12th of May, 1992, Exhibit P966, when the

14     establishment of Serb control in and around Sarajevo was deemed essential

15     to the achievement of the first and fifth of the strategic objectives,

16     namely, the separation of Serbs from Croats and Muslims and the division

17     of Sarajevo into Serb and Muslim parts.

18             The accused has attempted to distance himself from the SRS in BiH

19     and from the Vojvodas active in the Greater Sarajevo area.  His claims

20     are contrary to the evidence and should be dismissed.

21             The accused has admitted in Exhibit P199 [sic] that at least from

22     May 1992, the SRS had a branch in BiH, and he has stated in Exhibit P1219

23     that the SRS was "the second political party in the territory of the

24     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

25             The accused has also admitted, in Exhibit P1215, having "a

Page 17262

 1     considerable number of volunteers" in Sarajevo.  This is confirmed by

 2     other evidence on the record, for example, Exhibits C10 and P836, proving

 3     that significant numbers of Seseljevci were sent to Ilijas, Vogosca,

 4     Ilidza, and the Jewish cemetery near Grbavica throughout the war.  The

 5     Vojvodas present in Greater Sarajevo came from that area and the accused

 6     has confirmed his link to them before the indictment against him was

 7     issued.  He stated in Exhibit P644, page 14, quote:

 8             "Grbavica was saved by our volunteers, mainly by Vojvoda

 9     Slavko Aleksic.  You've heard of Slavko Aleksic.  He's still at the

10     Jewish cemetery.  He is our member of the central homeland

11     administration, the highest party leadership, and he's been there since

12     the first day of the war.  What he managed to save stayed Serbian and no

13     one else could take it.  There was also Vojvoda Branislav Gavrilovic, aka

14     Brne, and Vojvoda Vasko in Ilijas."

15             In furtherance of the common purpose, Serb leaders in

16     Greater Sarajevo started implementation of the Variant A and B

17     instructions, creating Crisis Staffs and Serb-only Municipal Assemblies.

18     The implementation of the instructions in Novo Sarajevo was confirmed by

19     Vojvoda Slavko Aleksic in Exhibit P1102.  Aleksic at the same time had an

20     important role in both the SRS and the SDS.

21             Similarly, in Ilidza, the proclamation of the Serb Assembly on

22     the 3rd of January, 1992, was in accordance with the SDS Main Board

23     instructions of the 19th of December, 1991.

24             On the 24th of March, 1992, the creation of the Serb

25     municipalities of Vogosca and Rajlovac was announced at the 12th Session

Page 17263

 1     of the Assembly of the Serb people in BiH.  Finally, right before the

 2     outbreak of the conflict, the Ilijas SDS separated the municipality from

 3     the district of Sarajevo and annexed it to the so-called Serb Autonomous

 4     District of Romanija.

 5             Like in other parts of BiH, Serb leaders started military

 6     preparations in Greater Sarajevo, in furtherance of the common purpose.

 7     While in October 1991, the council of the SDS was discussing the need to

 8     start military preparations, JCE member Karadzic, referring to the

 9     impending war in Sarajevo and the prospect of the disappearance of the

10     Muslim people "from the face of the earth," stated that "there are

11     20.000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo," and this can be found in

12     Exhibit P502, page 7.

13             A Serb police force was set up throughout Greater Sarajevo.

14     Shortly after the 3rd of April, 1992, the Novo Sarajevo MUP formed a Serb

15     MUP station at Vraca.  In Ilidza, just prior to the outbreak of the war,

16     the head of the Ilidza special police disbanded the existing ethnically

17     mixed reserve police force and set it up again with only Serb

18     policemen [sic].  In Ilijas, Serb policemen assisted by Serb policemen

19     from other municipalities took control of the police station.

20             The SRS significantly contributed to the military preparations in

21     Greater Sarajevo.  In Exhibit P1319, Vojvoda Slavko Aleksic stated that

22     although the election of Alija Izetbegovic made it difficult for Serbs to

23     arm themselves, he did his best to ensure Serbs in Novo Sarajevo did not

24     fall behind.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please.

Page 17264

 1             Let's move back into closed session.

 2                           [Private session]

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17                           [Open session]

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session, thank

19     you.

20             MS. IODICE:  Going back to the SRS contribution to the military

21     preparation in Greater Sarajevo, Branislav Gavrilovic, aka Brne,

22     explained, in Exhibit P1000, how, upon his return to Greater Sarajevo,

23     his Seseljevci were armed by Major Krstovic, commander of the Sarajevo

24     city defence.  Brne also admitted, in Exhibit P999, capturing the

25     TO warehouse in Ilidza where 50.000 weapons were located, bragged about

Page 17265

 1     disarming Muslims, and explained how these weapons "contributed to the

 2     defence of all Serb people from Sarajevo jihad fighters."

 3             Brne's statement mirrors the accused's efforts to associate

 4     Bosnian Muslims with Islamist fundamentalists.

 5             Nikola Poplasen also played an important role organising and

 6     arming Serbs in BiH.  The accused admitted this in Exhibit P218, when he

 7     promoted Poplasen to Vojvoda in March 1994.

 8             The efforts of the Serb leaders to prepare militarily for the

 9     implementation of the common purpose can be summarised in the words of

10     the Ilijas deputy to the Assembly of the Serb people in BiH, who less

11     than a month before the attack by Serb forces on Ljesevo confirmed Serbs

12     in Ilijas were prepared for war in Exhibit P966.

13             "We are organised and I have asked the TV to come and record how

14     well organised for the war we in Ilijas are, how our defence lines are

15     organised.  It is true, yes, that we have stolen a lot of goods.  We have

16     a lot of provisions down there to live on ... we have cut off and mined

17     the railway line and no one can now get into Sarajevo.  We have mined the

18     motorway too.  We shall do our best to prevent the enemy from ever

19     getting to Sarajevo from the direction of Zenica, and anyone who tries

20     the upper route will also meet his end."

21             Serb forces, including Seseljevci, committed crimes in

22     Greater Sarajevo.

23             As in other areas of BiH, once parallel political and military

24     structures were set up, Serb forces, including Seseljevci, attacked and

25     took control of the municipalities.  The evidence proves beyond a

Page 17266

 1     reasonable doubt that in the course of and following the take-overs in

 2     Greater Sarajevo, non-Serbs were expelled, killed, detained or put under

 3     house arrest, mistreated, and otherwise persecuted.

 4             Detainees were subjected to forced labour in dangerous conditions

 5     at the front lines, where on multiple occasions they were used as human

 6     shields.  Non-Serb property and cultural monuments were systematically

 7     plundered and/or destroyed.  In his brief, the accused claims that the

 8     crimes alleged in the indictment have not been proven and that he is not

 9     linked to any of the perpetrators.  These claims are contrary to the

10     evidence on the record and should be rejected.

11             For the deployment of Seseljevci to the Greater Sarajevo area and

12     for the identification of the Vojvodas fighting with their Seseljevci in

13     the area and the link to the accused, I refer back to paragraphs 255

14     through 263 and 358 through 375 of the Prosecution's closing brief.  I

15     will now highlight the evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

16     Seseljevci perpetrated crimes in Greater Sarajevo and that these

17     perpetrators were linked to the accused.

18             The evidence of Witnesses VS-1111, VS-1055, Mujo Dzafic, and

19     Exhibit P451 proves that the attack on Ljesevo was carried out by the

20     VRS, members of the Ilijas TO, and by a group of Seseljevci led by

21     Vojvoda Vasilije Vidovic, aka Vaske.

22             Contrary to the accused's claims, it has been proven beyond a

23     reasonable doubt that Vasilije Vidovic, aka Vaske, and his Seseljevci

24     took part in the attack on Ljesevo together with members of the Ilijas

25     TO, resulting in the forcible displacement of the non-Serb population and

Page 17267

 1     the murder of 22 non-Serbs.

 2             VS-1055 explained how in the afternoon on the 5th of June, 1992,

 3     he recognised Seseljevac Vaske and TO member Ranko Draskic amongst the

 4     members of the Serb forces that captured him.  He saw Amir Fazlic falling

 5     to the ground, shot in the head, when Vaske approached him with one of

 6     his Seseljevci.  Earlier that day, while the shelling was still ongoing,

 7     Ranko Draskic had taken part with other TO members in the murder of

 8     another 21 non-Serbs.

 9             The accused claims that VS-1055 did not mention Vaske's presence

10     in his 1992 statement to the BiH authorities.  VS-1055 explained that his

11     1992 statement was given immediately after the trauma he had experienced

12     and with time he remembered more details.  In any event, the accused has

13     admitted in Exhibit P644 the presence of his commander Vaske at the

14     Ilijas front.  It has been established beyond a reasonable doubt that

15     Vaske was amongst the Serb forces that took over Ljesevo and murdered

16     non-Serbs.

17             In April 1992, in Svrake, Vogosca, Serb forces including the

18     special unit led by Rajko Jankovic, attacked the village, rounded up its

19     non-Serb population, displaced women, elderly, and children, while

20     detaining able-bodied men.  The implementation of the common purpose was

21     so successful that JCE member Ratko Mladic noted in his diary, on the

22     6th of June, 1992, that there were "no more houses or inhabitants in

23     Svrake," and this can be found in Exhibit P1346.

24             Would this be a good moment to stop, Your Honours?

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed.  So we shall

Page 17268

 1     continue tomorrow starting at 2.15 p.m.

 2             Since then, I wish you all a very good afternoon.

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 7th day of

 5                           March, 2012, at 2.15 p.m.