1 Monday, 29 October 2001
2 [Motion Hearing]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the registrar call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Case number
8 IT-99-37-PT and case number IT-01-50-I, the Prosecutor of the Tribunal
9 against Slobodan Milosevic.
10 JUDGE MAY: I'll hear the appearances, please.
11 MR. RYNEVELD: If it please the Court. Dirk Ryneveld, Senior
12 Trial Attorney for the Kosovo indictment, along with Madam Prosecutor
13 Carla Del Ponte and my colleague Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff for the Croatia
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kay.
16 MR. KAY: Stephen Kay, Queen's Counsel of the bar of England and
18 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Michail Wladimiroff, member of the bar of the
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Branislav Tapuskovic, member of
21 the bar from Belgrade and an attorney from Belgrade, a member of the bar
22 of Serbia.
23 JUDGE MAY: The purpose of this hearing is to deal with four
24 matters which we will deal with in this order: First of all, the hearing
25 of argument on a number of motions; secondly, the reading of the Kosovo
1 indictment and the accused to enter a plea on one count if necessary; the
2 Initial Appearance on the Croatia indictment; and finally a Status
4 As to time, we have available today and, if necessary, tomorrow
5 morning. However, the reading of the indictments is going to take some
6 time, but nonetheless I hope it may be possible to finish today.
7 We begin with the motions hearing, and the matters to be
8 considered are these: First of all, a Prosecution motion for leave to
9 file a second amended indictment, and then various preliminary motions and
10 documents from the accused together with a brief on jurisdiction from the
11 amicus curiae.
12 We'll deal with these motions in this way: that first we will hear
13 the arguments of the Prosecution and the amicus on the motion to amend the
14 indictment; we will next hear the arguments of the amicus and then the
15 Prosecution on the preliminary motions; and finally we will hear the
16 accused on all motions.
17 We begin then with the Prosecution motion for leave to file a
18 second amended indictment, this is under Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure
19 and Evidence, which provides that the Prosecutor may amend an indictment
20 after the assignment of a case to a Trial Chamber with the leave of the
21 Chamber, after having heard the parties.
22 It may be of assistance if I summarise the issues which are raised
23 under this motion. The motion states that the reasons for the amendment
24 are as follows: First, to reflect the link between killings in Kosovo and
25 the bodies found in mass graves near Belgrade; second, to add an
1 additional count of forcible transfer - this relates to the Kosovo
2 Albanians who were internally displaced within Kosovo rather than actually
3 deported; thirdly, to break down the allegation of persecution in Count
4 4 - this amendment seeks to particularise the various persecutions and to
5 replace the earlier very general allegation.
6 Fourth, to add a new section on individual criminal responsibility
7 under Article 7(1) of the Statute. This is said to be an order to specify
8 what the motion calls "common purpose liability." As the Chamber
9 understands it, the amendment seeks to clarify the Prosecution case in
10 this respect and spell out that the Prosecution rely on a joint criminal
11 enterprise in which each of the accused participated. Fifthly, to add
12 three new sites from which the deportations took place and to expand on
13 others, adding more background, and this includes a number of allegations
14 of sexual assault and destruction which were carried out during the
15 deportation operations.
16 There are also various stylistic changes and the rearrangement of
17 some parts of the material.
18 Now, that's intended to be a brief summary of the scope of the
19 amendments, which on the whole, speak for themselves.
20 Now, I'm going to turn to the amicus first.
21 Mr. Wladimiroff, we got your letter of last Friday stating that
22 you wouldn't file a brief on this motion, but there might be some
23 procedural issues to be raised. Is there anything you want to raise on
25 MR. WLADIMIROFF: We have no further observations at this stage,
1 Your Honour, but maybe later on we may come back to the procedural aspects
2 of any amendment if given leave by the Court.
3 JUDGE MAY: We could hear you better if you were on your feet.
4 MR. WLADIMIROFF: I apologise.
5 JUDGE MAY: No. We heard that. So you don't want to make any
6 points about the amendment.
7 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Not at this stage, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE MAY: But there may be some subsequent issues which arise
9 out of it.
10 MR. WLADIMIROFF: That's right. That's right.
11 JUDGE MAY: Well, we can deal with them in the Status
12 Conference --
13 MR. WLADIMIROFF: That's right.
14 JUDGE MAY: -- when we will be timetabling the indictment.
15 MR. WLADIMIROFF: That's what we had in mind, Your Honour. Thank
16 you very much.
17 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Very well. We will hear any submissions
18 from the accused on this issue in due course.
19 We go on to deal next with the preliminary motions, and in this
20 connection, we have the following motions and other documents, all of
21 which we've read: A motion from the accused of the 9th of August of which
22 he's asked us to consider paragraph 8 only, which we've done; a response
23 from the Prosecution filed on the 16th of August; a presentation, as it
24 was termed, filed by the accused on the 30th of August, relating mainly to
25 the alleged illegality of the Tribunal. This we will treat also as a
1 motion. The brief of the amicus curiae on jurisdiction filed on the 19th
2 of October. This adopts and expands the arguments of the accused. And
3 finally, the response from the Prosecution of the 26th of October.
4 As to the argument, we'll hear the amicus first, then the
5 Prosecutor, and finally, the accused.
6 Who wants to start for the amicus?
7 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you, Your Honour. Each of us will deal
8 with matters raised in the brief. We have not much to say in addition to
9 what we already wrote in our brief. We have some observations to make,
10 and I will start to do so.
11 First of --
12 JUDGE MAY: I should say, just to make it clear, that we've had
13 those submissions, for which we are grateful. We have had the chance to
14 read them, so there is no reason to repeat either what you've said or
15 indeed what the Prosecutor has said.
16 MR. WLADIMIROFF: That's exactly what we had in mind, Your
17 Honour. We are not here to repeat things that have already been written
18 or said.
19 The first observation I want to make deals with the position of
20 the amicus curiae and the position of the accused. We pointed out in our
21 brief that the accused should have full opportunity to express himself and
22 to make any statement that is relevant to argue his case. Here, perhaps
23 it would make sense -- perhaps I'll stop here, because while I'm talking,
24 all things happen here, and I have no clue what's going on. Perhaps I
25 should move a little bit to the right. There's little room here too, Your
1 Honour, but we'll try to do it.
2 First of all, I want to say that the amicus curiae, during the
3 pre-trial position, each of us, we feel that we should not raise issues
4 that have not been raised by the accused. So at this stage, we feel
5 appropriate to react to issues that have been raised by the accused.
6 That's for the very reason that we do not want to replace him in terms of
7 raising issues. It's for the accused to raise the issue and we are there
8 to comment on that by assisting the Court in supplying legal reasoning for
9 the argument raised by the accused.
10 So in this approach we feel that the Court should allow the
11 accused the broadest possible room to manoeuvre to argue his case, and as
12 we have said in our brief, that also may include reasons which, on the
13 face of it, might not directly be legal reasons but, more or less,
14 political reasons, because the establishment of the Tribunal, his main
15 challenge, also includes, as we have set out, possible political reasons.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Wladimiroff, I have heard your explanation as
17 to the understanding of your role. I understand what you have said, but
18 in my view, it is perfectly open to the amici to raise any arguments that
19 they wish so long as it will assist the Chamber, and that is perfectly
20 clear from the motion, from the ruling that the Chamber gave. So I
21 understand what you have done, but for the purposes of the rest of the
22 trial, I think it is important that you understand that your role is a bit
23 wider than that. It is not simply to react to arguments raised by the
24 accused. You are there to assist the Chamber in the consideration of this
1 MR. WLADIMIROFF: We understand that, Your Honour. What I tried
2 to explain is at this stage, during pre-trial, having the first motion, we
3 feel that we should approach the matter in a very delicate and diplomatic
4 way, find our way through this method of not being overreactive to
5 anything that's going on or taking initiative where we have no idea what
6 the consequences are. So we start in a very moderate way and develop from
7 there. And that's the reason why we do not feel it appropriate to raise
8 issues at this stage, at the very beginning, that have not been raised by
9 the accused. We may do so later, but not at this stage, because we feel
10 it's for the accused to guide all of us, what he is looking for, what kind
11 of arguments he's looking for, to tell the Court what he is thinking, what
12 he wants. It's not for us to narrow that possibility. So we are very,
13 very, let's say, moderate at the very beginning, and we will develop from
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. I understand the conservative
16 approach that you have taken, but please understand that your role is a
17 bit wider than that. Please proceed.
18 MR. WLADIMIROFF: We may come to that, Your Honour. I am
19 confident that at the end of the day, and that's more than today, I hope
20 that the amici curiae will be able to do what we have to do in the
21 interest of the accused and to assist the Court in finding the right
22 answers to issues that have been raised in this Court. But please allow
23 us to start as delicately as we can.
24 Perhaps I should move on to the next issue I want to touch on.
25 It's a very brief observation as well, because actually we feel everything
1 has been said in our brief. That's the issue of whether previous
2 decisions of the Court or the Appeals Chambers are binding or not.
3 The amici curiae are perfectly aware of the decision in the
4 Aleksovski case, and we are also perfectly aware of what the Appeals
5 Chamber has said there. However, we also believe that whereas in the
6 Statute there is no guidance on the matter that we are now discussing, it
7 is not expressed by the Statute, nor by the Rules, how to deal with the
8 matter. It is, by itself, a matter of case law, how to understand the
10 The Appeals Chamber in the Aleksovski case found that generally,
11 in common law jurisdiction, there is more binding with previous decisions
12 than in civil law jurisdictions because there is no doctrine there. I
13 think there is some logic in that observation, because if law or a system
14 derives from a statutory system where most issues have been described in
15 the Statute, there's less reason to rely on previous decisions of courts
16 interpreting those statutes; while in common law, people take more
17 precedents from previous decisions and therefore the system of previous
18 decisions, the case law, is more important for the functioning of the
19 system itself.
20 Different from the Appeals Chamber, we feel that in the system of
21 the Tribunal, there is a Statute, there are Rules. One may argue that
22 those Rules may not be complete in terms of dealing with all possible
23 issues, but as a matter of fact, they are dealing with all possible issues
24 on a basis that may be different from what one would see in the Statute,
25 for example, on the European continent. But still there are Rules. The
1 answers are in the Rules and in the Statute.
2 From that point of view, we argue that there is no need to rely on
3 previous decisions in the meaning that they are absolute -- they are
4 absolutely binding. We feel that previous decisions have the importance
5 of being authoritative and they should be of guidance for the Judges, and
6 they should follow them unless they may depart from them, so to say,
7 unless there are cogent reasons in the interests of justice not to do so.
8 So it is not an absolute thing, it is a relative thing.
9 Now, as we have said in our brief, we believe that, on the merits
10 of the case at hand, the Trial Chamber is free to depart from previous
11 decisions and to see whether there are any specific circumstances or
12 arguments raised by the accused or enlightened by the amicus curiae, and
13 therefore the Tadic appeals decision is of very authoritative importance
14 to this Trial Chamber but on the basis of guidance.
15 Now, if you carefully study what we have said, and you have done
16 so, you will realise that we are not actually challenging the Tadic
17 decision. We are following it, and we argue that on the basis of that
18 decision - we'll come to that later - we advise the Trial Chamber to ask
19 for an advisory opinion of the ICJ. We are not saying that the Trial
20 Chamber should rule differently to the Tadic appeals decision. And
21 actually, in the Tadic appeals decision, the issue has not been raised, so
22 it's a novelty.
23 Let me see if there is any other reason to make more observations
24 about this one.
25 The next issue will be discussed by Mr. Kay, and that is the issue
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 of independence of the OTP or perhaps the Tribunal. So I will give him
2 the floor, if you agree with that.
3 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Could the registrar come, please.
4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kay.
6 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm dealing with two matters in
7 relation to the brief of the amici curiae filed on the 19th of October.
8 The first of those matters is set out at paragraph 10 of our brief and
9 takes in paragraph 11, and then I'll go on to deal with paragraphs 12 and
10 13, which is the right of this Tribunal to try a head of state and so is,
11 therefore, an argument raised by the accused concerning the right of state
13 Dealing with the first matter, it's quite clear from the points
14 raised by the accused in his correspondence and various documents that he
15 has asserted that this Tribunal is incapable of giving a fair trial
16 because of its failure in relation to impartiality. One of the key
17 fundamental principles for any valid court of law is the principle of
18 impartiality. Without there -- that, there can be no rule of law and no
19 right to a fair trial.
20 I appreciate this point has been taken several times before in the
21 history of the Tribunal, but that doesn't preclude him in being able to
22 raise the matter. In many respects, this argument of impartiality can be
23 linked up with the issue at the end of the brief filed which the amici
24 curiae, which really concerns the right of these judges, so to speak, to
25 judge themselves in relation to their validity.
1 Mr. Wladimiroff will be addressing you at the end of our
2 submissions on that last feature of the brief of the amici, which starts
3 at paragraph 19 and relates to the test of independence and the
4 proposition that for this court to be validated, it should be validated by
5 a principle organ of the UN, being the International Court of Justice. I
6 won't deal with that argument now as he will, but the point I make is that
7 this issue of impartiality is very much bound up within the validation of
8 the Tribunal.
9 The accused has stated, within the various documents, that the
10 pressure on this Tribunal from external sources to try him and others
11 makes the whole culture of the Tribunal unfair and biased against him, and
12 that's notwithstanding any issue that there may be concerning the right to
13 try him in the first place. The indictment that was issued against him in
14 1999, at the time of conflict, was as the result of the Security Council
15 urging the Prosecutor to take action in relation to events in Kosovo.
16 Before that time, it appears from the court records there was no public or
17 secret indictment against him. It wasn't until those political events in
18 1999 that the first indictment was issued as against him.
19 JUDGE MAY: The document on which you rely, I think was from the
20 Security Council in March 1998, according to my note.
21 MR. KAY: The 31st of March, 1998.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. The indictment didn't come until a year later.
23 MR. KAY: Yes.
24 JUDGE MAY: -- a year later.
25 MR. KAY: Obviously there's preparation of these matters. And
1 when that indictment came out, the accused, at that time, was in the
2 middle of a situation of international conflict.
3 JUDGE MAY: It was merely urging the Prosecutor to investigate
4 violations of international humanitarian law. Are you saying that the
5 Security Council shouldn't have done that?
6 MR. KAY: It's a pressure upon the Prosecutor, whose job is
7 derived from the Security Council in the first place, that it would be
8 difficult to say that that party could, thereafter, act independently, and
9 that's the point that's being made here in the submissions of the
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, in order to substantiate that, wouldn't
12 you have to go a little further and show that that pressure was applied to
13 the Prosecutor in her decision to indict Mr. Milosevic? Is there any
14 evidence of that?
15 MR. KAY: With respect, I think it's for the Prosecutor to prove
16 there wasn't. It's impossible for an accused or a party in any other
17 position to prove a negative. We're simply not in possession of any of
18 the facts or any information.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: But you are making the allegation of a breach of
20 independence. In my view, the onus is on you. You are alleging the lack
21 of impartiality on the part of the Prosecutor. The onus is on you to show
22 that lack of impartiality.
23 MR. KAY: What's being asserted here is that there is a suspicion,
24 a reasonable supposition that that could have been the position. As far
25 as the accused is saying within his documents, it would be the definite
1 nature of the allegation.
2 If an assertion such as that is being made in relation to
3 jurisdiction, surely it's for the party who is seeking to establish the
4 jurisdiction to prove to the contrary. For an accused or any other person
5 to take such an argument on the basis of evidence that is not in his
6 possession and would probably never be in his possession in terms of
7 documents or material evidence, it really amounts to an impossibility.
8 JUDGE MAY: You've got to make some sort of showing that there is
9 an absence of impartiality or independence as a result of an urging by the
10 Security Council, not to prosecute this case but to investigate, as I say,
11 violations of international humanitarian law. It may be you can't take
12 the matter any further.
13 MR. KAY: No. Perhaps this is the sort of issue that when an
14 indictment is confirmed, in view of the general circumstances in which the
15 indictment arose, that the Prosecution should seek to justify the position
16 of the issuance of the indictment in the first place, and it may well be
17 that in the early procedural stages that that is when such a course should
18 have been taken on enquiry by the Court itself, the Confirming Judge,
19 Judge Hunt, in relation to the reasons for the issue of the indictment.
20 We have cited an example within our brief that arose in relation
21 to the manner of detention of the accused, which can be looked at as being
22 an example, if you like, of the kind of impartiality that he asserts. He
23 has been forbidden from speaking to the media or the press, whereas other
24 organs of the Tribunal are in a position to be able to do so. From his
25 perspective, that can be seen as an impartial regulation of the respective
1 positions of the parties. But this issue of impartiality is fundamental
2 to his right to a fair trial, and in many respects, that's why we say the
3 proposition at the end of our brief is the proposition that is the true
4 test of validity.
5 Shall I turn now to the second argument that I'm dealing with?
6 Unless Your Honours have any further issues, outside of that which we've
7 written in our text concerning the issue of impartiality.
8 JUDGE MAY: No. If you'd like to go on.
9 MR. KAY: Thank you. This relates to the jurisdiction of the
10 Tribunal against him as an individual, as the former President of the
11 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Court knows and the Prosecution has
12 cited, as indeed we cited the Article 7, subarticle (2) of the Statute
13 that states those acting in their official capacity as head of state may
14 be subject to the jurisdiction or be held criminally responsible for acts
15 before this Tribunal. However, this is an issue here that is probably the
16 oldest and most fundamental rule of the governance between states, and
17 that is the principle of state sovereignty.
18 History is full of examples of attempts to prosecute former heads
19 of state, as we have cited in our brief, none of which were put into
20 effect, and the position of President Milosevic here, one can say
21 properly, is now unique if not historic. The Prosecution, in their
22 response, have cited the case of Prime Minister Kambanda in relation to
23 the Rwanda Tribunal, but that was a plea of guilty and that was not an
24 issue that had to be decided by the Court itself upon this issue of state
1 As I said, the oldest and most fundamental principle that has, by
2 international customary law, governed the relationships between states,
3 which has in fact been inviolable, has been the issue that a state retains
4 its sovereignty and its leader cannot be put on trial for acts committed
5 in that official capacity of acting on behalf of the state.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you must be aware of the vast number of
7 instruments which contain a provision similar to Article 7(2), and I
8 believe you should be aware that by this time, the provision in Article
9 7(2) reflects a rule of customary international law.
10 With the development of the Doctrine of Individual Criminal
11 Responsibility, which commenced after the Second World War, a number of
12 instruments incorporated and reflected that principle; Article 7 of the
13 Nuremberg Charter, Article 6 of the Tokyo Tribunal Charter; Article 4 of
14 the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
15 and most recently Article 27 of the Rome Statute for the International
16 Criminal Court.
17 At this time, I'm at a loss as to how you could argue that the
18 principle in Article 7(2) is anything but a rule of customary
19 international law in relation to the kind of crimes with which the accused
20 is charged.
21 MR. KAY: Article 7(2), of course, arises from a Statute that
22 arose from the Security Council, and as one looks at the materials and
23 documents filed by the accused, his principal argument is that this was
24 not a tribunal that was set up by the General Assembly of the United
25 Nations but by the Security Council --
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: That has nothing to do with the question of
2 whether what is in Article 7(2) reflects the rule of international
3 customary law. The fact that it came from the Security Council doesn't go
4 to that question.
5 What determines whether it is a rule of customary law is primarily
6 two things: state practice, how wide-spread the state practice is, and
7 principally the feeling among states that there is a legal obligation to
8 abide by that rule, the apino juris. And all of the instruments I have
9 cited, including most recently the Rome Statute, clearly reflect this.
10 So I can't understand the argument coming at this stage. Perhaps
11 immediately after the Second World War, but not some 50 years after that.
12 MR. KAY: Of course, no previous heads of state have been subject
13 to a trial, and that is a point in itself probably worth making on this
14 issue. The international customary law in relation to state sovereignty
15 still retains itself as a principle. I take Your Honour's point that in
16 relation to these particular violations, that there have been a number of
17 moves within the international community for the trial of violations of
18 humanitarian law, and that has to be recognised.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, let us take the recent case from your
20 own jurisdiction, the Pinochet case, where the House of Lords held that
21 Senator Pinochet was not entitled to immunity in respect to acts of
22 torture and conspiracy to commit torture alleged to have been committed in
23 his capacity as a head of state.
24 I would draw your attention particularly to what Lord Millett said
1 "In future, those who commit atrocities against civilian
2 populations must expect to be called to account if
3 fundamental human rights are to be properly protected.
4 In this context, the exalted rank of the accused can
5 afford no defence."
6 Another example of the state practise contributing to the
7 customary character of the Rule reflected in Article 7 of the Tribunal's
9 MR. KAY: Yes. And the interesting thing was, of course, Senator
10 Pinochet was returned to his own country and wasn't, in fact, extradited
11 to Spain in the event, and we in our brief cite the examples of Pinochet
12 and Noriega.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: He was extradited or returned on grounds which
14 have nothing to do with the validity of the principle that we are
15 examining now.
16 MR. KAY: Yes. And a national decision doesn't bind an
17 international court.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: It doesn't bind it, but it goes to the question
19 of the development of custom, of a customary rule of law. It is quite
20 clear that decisions of national courts can be considered in determining
21 whether a rule of customary law has developed. That's very evident, and
22 no citation is needed for that.
23 MR. KAY: And far be it for me in any way to diminish the standing
24 of my own House of Lords. But as far as that decision was concerned,
25 which also involved at one stage an issue of impartiality, which I have
1 held myself back from, mentions earlier on, that decision by that national
2 jurisdiction which they said reflected international customary law, we
3 say, at the end of this brief, is an issue that another organ should
4 decide for this Court, an organ of long-standing international stature,
5 which is a United Nations organ with great experience in dealing with
6 international affairs and the affairs of the United Nations, which is the
7 International Court of Justice. The self-validation process that has been
8 evident within this Tribunal has led to the apparent feeling of
9 impartiality by those over whose affairs it seeks to regulate. I just say
10 that because of the time-honored maxim: Justice must not only be seen to
11 be done, it must be done as well. And the --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Your colleague is going to argue that point.
13 MR. KAY: Yes.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't preempt him.
15 MR. KAY: Far be it for me either. But the point here that this
16 issue of state sovereignty that the accused has raised on his own behalf
17 is a valid and historic argument that, if one looks at the history rather
18 than the political intent, has shown to be a rule that has been applied in
19 many circumstances. And that is what he is pleading on his behalf as a
20 valid reflection of international law.
21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kay, I think you've covered the points, unless
22 there's anything else you want to raise.
23 MR. KAY: I'm grateful, Your Honour.
24 MR. WLADIMIROFF: If I may, Your Honour, add to what Mr. Kay
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13 English transcripts.
1 Let's accept that Article 7(2) reflects international law if one
2 accepts that national developments altogether is an expression of a
3 growing understanding between nations and peoples, that such a custom is
4 the right expression of the law. But the real issue then is if Article
5 7(2) is supposed to reflect international -- to reflect a customary
6 international law, does the wording of Article 7(2) reflect international
7 law? Now, there we have a problem.
8 According to Article 7(2), if we deal with functional
9 responsibility, the test is, to say it very simply, knowledge or
10 awareness, power, and negligence or failure to correct. That may be right
11 for commanders, because there is enough evidence to argue that that test
12 is valid under international -- under customary international law, to see
13 whether a commander is assuming responsibility for what he did in that
14 capacity; but we wonder if such evidence is available if it comes to a
15 head of state.
16 When we argue here, is the test as provided in Article 7(2) the
17 right test to apply to a head of state? So if the Court will agree with
18 that, there is more to the test than what is in Article 7(2). In that
19 respect, Article 7(2) does not reflect customary international law.
20 Now, before moving on, let me reflect for a moment again on the
21 position of the amicus curiae. The Court has put it to Mr. Kay that if
22 you raise an issue, there should be a good showing. In general, we would
23 accept that, but we are not the Defence lawyers of Mr. Milosevic; we are
24 amicus curiae. And as I tried to explain at the very beginning, at this
25 stage, at this very stage, at the very beginning where we have been
1 recently appointed, we react to objections, observations made by the
2 accused. Now, we tried to explain to the Court what the accused is
3 saying. So if there is a showing, the showing should be by the accused
4 and not on the amicus curiae.
5 What I'm saying here is the onus of a showing of the amicus curiae
6 may not necessarily be the same as the onus on the accused. We are not
7 one unit. It's not one thing, the defence, Mr. Milosevic, and the
9 So if we argue -- actually, perhaps it's not argue. If we
10 translate what the accused says and we argue on the basis of that
11 translation what the meaning is, what perhaps the consequences might be
12 for your court and we advise the Court how to see it, to take into account
13 other arguments related to what the accused has said, it is a little bit
14 difficult to find out at this stage what exactly is the onus on us.
15 Perhaps we will find the right answers later on. At this stage, we
16 believe it's not quite clear if there is a full onus on us. That's a
17 matter to be studied.
18 JUDGE MAY: I think it was a figure of speech --
19 MR. WLADIMIROFF: I understand that.
20 JUDGE MAY: -- not a precise onus. We are all finding our way
21 with the position of amicus --
22 MR. WLADIMIROFF: I appreciate that.
23 JUDGE MAY: -- and the role.
24 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you, Your Honour. Now, let me move on to
25 the issue I was going to cover. That is the advisory opinion.
1 We have written in our brief that if one studies the literature on
2 the Appeals Chamber's decision in the Tadic case, one of the comments that
3 has been made is the issue of should a court consider its own
4 jurisdiction, its own competence?
5 I'm fully aware that the issue is a common issue in most
6 jurisdictions. At the end of a column, one judge at the end of it, for
7 example, Supreme Court, should judge its own competition -- competence.
8 Here we have a different situation. We are discussing not the
9 competence on the usual issues, but we are discussing the competence in
10 terms of the establishment, the legality of the establishment. That is
11 not a thing that usually is debated in the national setting at the end of
12 the column by, for example, a Supreme Court.
13 So I think some authors are right if they say it could perhaps
14 have been done better if someone else was to refute that.
15 So departing from that point, we believe that it is possible for
16 your Trial Chamber not to refer the case, as the Prosecution asserts, but
17 to consider the possibility of asking an advisory opinion and ruling
18 yourselves on the basis of that advisory opinion. It's your possibility
19 to rule on the matter, but we advise to split up in refining yourself to
20 the formal function of taking the decision but for the substance asking an
21 advisory opinion.
22 Now, under the Charter and under the Statute of the ICG -- the ICJ
23 as well, it is not impossible to do, either by asking it yourself if you
24 believe you've got an inherent authority to do so, or by asking the
25 General Assembly or the Security Council to allow you to do so. And the
1 amicus curiae have found no precedent, no argument why you should not be
2 allowed to ask of such leave.
3 And actually, talking about showing, the Prosecution has not shown
4 there is any valid legal argument that would bar such a request. And we
5 have not seen or heard any argument which explains why the General
6 Assembly or why the Security Council would deny such a question.
7 So we believe it is a possibility which should be pursued, and we
8 believe the Trial Chamber seriously consider that avenue to see whether
9 the answers or the opinion of the ICJ would confirm or attribute or
10 perhaps not confirm the Tadic decision of the Appeals Chamber but is
11 heading for a totally different direction. And then at the end of the
12 day, I think there won't be any criticism any more, because then indeed, a
13 set of judges who are not in force have advised this Court how to proceed.
14 So we believe there's not reason to simply deny it. I think it's
15 a serious consideration to avoid any further criticism on the issue of
16 being independent or being impartial.
17 That's our submission on this issue. Thank you very much.
18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Wladimiroff, we'll consider that. Yes, are there
19 any more submissions? Yes.
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would not dwell
21 on matters which my learned colleagues Mr. Kay and Mr. Wladimiroff have
22 already addressed and explained very well how all three of us understand
23 our role as amici curiae. Our position is, in fact, that if the need
24 should arise, we might even separate our opinions and somebody may adopt a
25 separate opinion.
1 What I would like to ask is just for a few minutes of attention,
2 as I come from a country of which the president, for a time, was Slobodan
3 Milosevic. And I have to submit here a few important points linked to my
4 position as a member of the amici curiae in such a case.
5 I am not saying that in my own country I am in jeopardy in any
6 physical sense, but from the moment I took over this duty as a member of
7 the amici curiae, there were all kinds of criticisms as to why I had
8 agreed to do this. Among other things, this was discussed in the Serbian
9 parliament. Of course I will not discuss that. There was also some
10 discussion at the Faculty of Law by all the law professors who had many
11 objections as to why I had decided to accept this highly responsible job,
12 the objection being that I am taking upon myself a enormous, an enormous
13 moral, professional, and historical role. I don't like big words,
14 highfalutin words. And this "historic" was used by others, not by me. I
15 was also criticised for accepting to be an amicus curiae in this case,
16 whereas those same law professors in Belgrade have offered their services
17 to this Tribunal to act as amici curiae.
18 I was particularly criticised from the moral standpoint, that I
19 had dishonoured the Serb morality because, as you may know or not, from
20 the middle of 1996 to the middle of 1997, I worked in a case, and I
21 considered that to have been a great honour. I was Defence counsel in the
22 Celebici case for Mr. Mucic. That case is in its final stages, and I
23 submitted the opening arguments. But the main criticism then was as a
24 Serb, I was defending a Croat in a case linked to a Muslim camp where the
25 victims were Serbs alone.
1 I said then and I have to repeat that now, that all of us, Serbs,
2 Croats, and Muslims, should be pleased to have had such a person, because
3 he helped people not to have suffered more, and this should have been
4 appreciated by both Serbs, Muslims and Croats, that there was such a
5 person around. And at the time, I made a comparison with Schindler,
6 saying that he was a Schindler among the Croats.
7 However, here I am again in a position to be a part of this case,
8 when both I and the accused come from the same state and belong to the
9 same nation. Again the same criticisms and the same reproaches and risks
10 for myself.
11 I am profoundly convinced that I can perform the duty of amicus
12 curiae as required by my duties as a professional lawyer according to the
13 rules that apply throughout the world, and I am ready to bear full moral,
14 professional, and even, if you will, historical responsibility to
15 participate in these proceedings as an amicus curiae.
16 Believe me, I have had to make that statement because of the
17 situation I am in, and I hope you will not take it against me.
18 To complement what has already been said before coming to my
19 particular point, I think the principle of fairness is a universal
20 principle, and we have a court which in time, space, and personnel has
21 limited its jurisdiction to a small area on the globe. I'm quite
22 confident that this Chamber can absolutely be fair, within the framework
23 of the Rules, but that level of fairness would be absolute if the validity
24 of those rules were to be universal. Until that is so -- and you know the
25 problems there are in the establishment of a permanent international
1 court, and until this Statute becomes universal, we will not be able to
2 speak about absolute justice or fairness, which does not mean to say that
3 I am not confident that this Chamber may be able to achieve absolute
4 fairness, which perhaps will one day be achieved worldwide.
5 To come now to the problem raised by Slobodan Milosevic in his
6 correspondence and submissions, and that is he underlined in particular
7 that his surrender to this Tribunal was not legal, was unlawful. And
8 that brings me to the following issue: We cannot deny that at that point
9 in time, he had been lawfully in detention according to the laws of
10 Yugoslavia at the time. On the 28th of June, he was surrendered to this
11 Tribunal and arrested according to the laws of the country earlier on. We
12 also do not deny that he could have been surrendered by instruction of the
13 Judge of this Tribunal, because detention had been ruled.
14 However, who did the Tribunal or, rather, the Prosecution address
15 via the Tribunal because the Tribunal issued an arrest warrant for the
16 accused? Those requests mainly, or rather, entirely - they couldn't have
17 gone otherwise - through the federal bodies, on the 24th of May, 1999, and
18 on the 22nd of June, 2001, when Yugoslavia was again admitted to the
19 United Nations. And this request was addressed to the federal organs,
20 that is, the Federal Ministry of Justice, and giving primacy to the
21 Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure, was entirely in the hands of the
22 federal bodies of Yugoslavia. There is no dispute over that. There was
23 communication between the two, and the federal minister responded.
24 And what is most important of all, very soon the Federal Ministry
25 of Justice undertook to draft a law which was later transferred into a
1 decree on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. There is no law in
2 Yugoslavia on the extradition of a national to any foreign body. We have
3 a law of extradition of foreign nationals.
4 In view of that, the federal authorities undertook to pass a
5 regulation in the form of a decree or a law that would enable cooperation
6 with the Hague Tribunal. Therefore, what the Prosecution is alleging is
7 not true, and that is that the primacy of the Tribunal is such that
8 domestic legislation is totally unimportant. It cannot be unimportant.
9 The fact that that state, as a member of the United Nations, undertook to
10 pass regulations which would enable cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
11 precisely as stipulated by the Rules and Statute of this Tribunal.
12 And what happened then? Without waiting for that law to be
13 passed, or rather, on the very day when the decree on establishing
14 cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was in the final stages, whether it
15 was before the Federal Constitutional Court, on that same day, the
16 Republican Government decided to extradite Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague
17 Tribunal, and as doing so, it acted arbitrarily. You know very well the
18 provisions of international conventions. No one may arbitrarily
19 jeopardise anyone, that everything has to be done in accordance with a
20 certain procedure and according to a law. And Yugoslavia was investing
21 special efforts to overcome the problem.
22 You're aware of the Tadic case. Tadic was arrested in Germany.
23 Germany worked for four months on the adoption of a law on the basis of
24 which Tadic was extradited. So there was no reason not to wait, and this
25 is something that the current President of Yugoslavia insisted upon in
1 particular, that legitimacy be given to everything. There was no need to
2 turn somebody into an ordinary object to be extradited. This was a
3 decision taken by the government of the republic, which was not a member
4 of the United Nations. It was only a member of the Federation, the
5 Republic of Serbia, and it had no obligation to implement anything linked
6 to international covenants to which Yugoslavia is a signatory. This is
7 something that only the federal government had the right to decide about,
8 federal organs through appropriate procedures, because they were doing
9 everything to have the law adopted as soon as possible, and on the basis
10 of that decree, to do what was necessary to establish cooperation with
11 this Tribunal and thus enable everything else after that.
12 By doing so, the state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
13 prevented from examining the instructions of the Judge of this Tribunal,
14 and this is something that it should have been allowed to do, to examine
15 the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and take the appropriate decision and
16 act accordingly. Because everywhere in the world, including in this case,
17 this procedure should have been respected, the right of the accused whose
18 extradition was requested should have been respected. Only from Republika
19 Srpska and now from Yugoslavia, people were extradited like objects, I
20 have to say that. All I'm saying is that laws have to be respected.
21 Now I come to my most important point. Slobodan Milosevic would
22 not have been delivered in this way, because I assume if everything had
23 been carried out according to procedure, the decree adopted, cooperation
24 established, had there not been very great international pressure - and
25 I'm sure that the Prosecution took part in this, and the Serbian
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 government, when the law on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was
2 adopted, the Serbian government arbitrarily made the decision it made - as
3 a result of such pressure on the national legislation, we now have
4 Slobodan Milosevic here in this courtroom, and on the basis of such
5 circumstances, it is not possible to base this case, and I mean the
7 I must also say that I truly believe that you will devote special
8 attention to this, and I think this is perhaps the most pressing problem
9 to be addressed at this stage. Thank you.
10 JUDGE MAY: Thank you, Mr. Tapuskovic.
11 Now for the Prosecution. Who is going to address us? Madam
12 Prosecutor, we've seen your brief which covers the matter, if I may say,
13 very fully so we would be grateful if you could be fairly brief.
14 MS. DEL PONTE: Yes, Mr. President, Your Honours. I will be
15 speaking in French which the accused does not speak, but I will speak
16 slowly so that he can follow the English on the screen if he decides not
17 to make use of the headphones.
18 JUDGE MAY: He's got an interpretation which is being played to
19 him in Serbian.
20 MS. DEL PONTE: Thank you.
21 [Interpretation] I have to say that I had spoken in English in
22 order to accommodate the accused during the other hearings, especially
23 further to his refusal to put on a headset. But now, Mr. President and
24 Your Honours, for me it is essential to be able to communicate with this
25 Court in the other language of the Tribunal which comes more naturally to
1 me and which allows me to express myself better in respect of the details,
2 without any ambiguities creeping in.
3 Mr. President and Your Honours, the accused Milosevic has said to
4 us and has written to us and has repeated at the hearings, and I quote,
5 "We are a nonexistent institution." This morning, the amici curiae have
6 illustrated and have gone into depth in respect of all the themes of this
7 preliminary motion, and I would like to say that since having heard them
8 this morning, I must say that they acted the way assigned counsel would
10 But, Mr. President, I'm not going to ask that counsel be
11 assigned - things are as they are and I'm not going to insist - but I
12 would simply like to take this opportunity to tell you that we have tried
13 to get into contact with the amici curiae before this hearing. They
14 refused to do so; they did not wish to meet with us, which I lament, in
15 fact. This is to let you know what the problems are that we confront,
16 these procedural difficulties, difficulties in respect to being able to
17 prepare the trial.
18 JUDGE MAY: Let me deal with that. I don't know anything about
19 this. It's a matter for the amici the way that they choose to conduct
20 this case, it is not a matter for the Court. If they choose to meet with
21 the Prosecution, then that's a matter for them; but if they choose not to,
22 equally it's a matter of them, and certainly there will be no criticism of
23 them because of that.
24 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this was not a
25 criticism, it was simply a factual observation.
1 I would also ask that you allow me to say that I have had a study
2 carried out on the right to self-representation. I have a study here, and
3 I should say that the problem is opened for me, and it is true that
4 customary international law does not contain the right to defend oneself
5 without counsel.
6 But I go back to the main point. The charges as -- the exchange
7 of briefs and responses in writing in respect of the preliminary motion on
8 jurisdiction, with all the things that follow upon that, is sufficiently
9 well known. But even if sometimes one should not always repeat things, I
10 would still like to repeat several of the most important points, the
11 principal points in respect, first of all, of the legitimacy of this
12 nonexistent institution.
13 We have already three appeals judgements: the Tadic appeals
14 judgement which, in fact, is an important judgement which deals with the
15 substance of all the arguments raised here; we have the Aleksovski
16 judgement which goes back and follows up on the Tadic judgement. And I
17 believe that the three principles which have been recalled by the Appeals
18 Chamber are untouchable here. By this I mean the establishment of a
19 hierarchy of the administration of justice by ruling on questions of fact
20 and law, the guarantee of the need for security and the foreseeability,
21 and the rule of international customary law, that is, the right to appeal,
22 which means, therefore, the accused's right to have all of these matters
23 dealt with in the same way.
24 For this reason, the Trial Chamber complies with the judgements of
25 the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber itself is following its own
1 decisions, and we heard this morning through the amici curiae that the
2 exchange of these cases -- of these matters has been decided.
3 The judgement in Celebici really simply confirms what has already
4 been set forth as a principle. And I would like to say to you, Your
5 Honours, that we have no interest and no demands in respect of asking for
6 outside opinions. This advisory opinion which has been the subject of
7 great pressure is not necessary insofar as these decisions were already
8 taken in previous cases.
9 We are requesting, Mr. President, that the accused Milosevic
10 recognise our jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The
11 international community has created this Tribunal with limited territorial
12 jurisdiction, that's true, but we do not have temporal restriction as was
13 said this morning. We are asking, Mr. President, Your Honours, we are
14 asking for the power to begin a trial against Mr. Milosevic.
15 The three other principal reasons that I'm going to mention here
16 are the Prosecutor's independence, because that is what is at stake here.
17 In respect of the independence of the Court, there can be no challenge,
18 because that's in law; and in respect that the Security Council urged the
19 Prosecutor to do what she is doing must be an element which falls within
20 the category of lack of independence.
21 I point out to the Tribunal Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998,
22 whereas the Prosecutor announced on the 10th of March, 1998, in public,
23 that the investigation into what happened in Kosovo was going to begin.
24 Therefore, I believe that that small press release of the 10th of March,
25 1998 should be given the importance that it deserves.
1 Likewise, if the Security Council requested or urged the
2 Prosecutor, what does that really mean? It simply means that the
3 Prosecutor should be reminded of her original mandate in respect of the
4 resolution which established this Tribunal; and in the second place, being
5 involved in opening an investigation does not mean that one is going to
6 immediately issue an indictment.
7 In respect of the Prosecutor's discretionary powers,
8 Mr. President, I cannot agree that this be put into question, and I have
9 no justification to provide for saying that. I heard this morning what
10 was said. I don't have to provide any proof. This is a discretionary
11 power subject to the mandate from the Security Council, and that is it.
12 We are asking to be able to bring a trial against Mr. Milosevic, a
13 former head of state, and this is the second argument, former head of
14 state. Here people do not want to understand. People don't want to
15 understand that this Tribunal was established by the international
16 community explicitly in order to put an end to the impunity of the
17 powerful people, the heads of states, and, therefore, a review of their
18 individual criminal responsibility in the exercise of their function is
19 the task of this Tribunal.
20 Permit me to say, Mr. President, that outside the Tribunal there
21 are thousands of victims who are demanding justice. For this reason, no
22 immunity for anybody, when what is involved are war crimes, crimes against
23 humanity, and genocide. The Secretary-General's report to the Security
24 Council in respect of the establishment of this Tribunal leaves absolutely
25 no doubt on that issue, because we know that the heads of state entail
1 more significant responsibility for serious violations of international
2 humanitarian law.
3 Today, Mr. President, this is the turn of the accused Milosevic,
4 who is complaining - my last point - about an illegal transfer. I
5 followed very carefully the transfer of the accused Milosevic, and I must
6 tell you that he was arrested pursuant to a national warrant of arrest in
7 his own country, and was transferred further to a decision of the
8 government of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Yugoslavia, on the basis of a
9 decree which was accepted and then suspended.
10 I am not going to go through the legislative CV of what happened
11 in Yugoslavia, but this has absolutely nothing to do with the
12 international obligation that we are familiar with, Article 29 of the
13 Statute. The only thing I say is that at the time Yugoslavia became a
14 member state of the United Nations, that obligation for Yugoslavia existed
15 further to the obligations that every state would have. So the decision
16 to transfer the accused was taken with full respect for the international
18 One final point, Mr. President - you'll see that I was very
19 brief - is the fact that the amici curiae, the counsel, are asking to
20 allow him to speak. I must say that we have some problems in respect of
21 the review of the exculpatory documents because we do not have a person to
22 speak with. I believe that I should find -- I must find a solution, and I
23 call upon precedents in order to find that solution. Is it the accused
24 himself that's going to look through all the documents? I'm now speaking
25 about the application of Rule 68 which is just as important to me as any
1 other application of the procedural Rules. All this is to say to you,
2 Mr. President, that I feel we must allow him to speak, that is, the
3 accused Milosevic, of course within the limits that we set forth.
4 I thank you, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Madam Prosecutor, if I understand the argument of
6 the amici on the question of transfer, it is that the obligation under
7 Article 29 of the Statute is an obligation of the state. In this respect,
8 they are saying that the arrest warrants were issued to the Federal
9 Republic of Yugoslavia when, in fact, the arrest and transfer were
10 effected by the government of Serbia.
11 In that circumstance, they would see, as I understand it, that
12 Rule 58 would not apply. Rule 58, as you know, is a Rule which says that
13 the obligations in Article 29 prevail over any legal impediment to the
14 surrender of an accused to the Tribunal.
15 Now, their contention is that the obligation is the obligation of
16 the Federal Republic. What was implemented was a transfer by the
17 Government of Serbia, and they contend that for that reason, the transfer
18 is illegal.
19 I raise this because you refer to Article 29, but what they're
20 saying is that Article 29 was not complied with and that Rule 58 would be
22 What do you say to that?
23 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. As you know, in
24 the Yugoslav Federation, the central government of the Federation has no
25 executing power; that is, all transfers, all decisions by the police or
1 any bindings measures taken are carried out by the Republic of Serbia, the
2 Republic of Serbia which executes and caries out the arrests and
3 transfers, which is the case of the other accused who came from Belgrade.
4 It is true that the decision is the one taken by the Federation.
5 Now, the decision itself -- itself of the transfer is the Federation and
6 Prime Minister Djindjic clearly mentioned the fact that the decision to
7 carry out the transfer was taken and accepted by the Federation, but the
8 very execution not only of the accused Milosevic of all things done by the
9 police and the arrests that is were carried out and transfers that were
10 made and searches, all of those fall within the province of the Republic
11 of Serbia, and that is why the transport itself was carried out by the
12 republic of Serbia.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You are saying that this was properly the
14 responsibility of the Government of Serbia, the transfer?
15 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely. It is the
16 Republic of Serbia which must execute the transfer.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: In any event, I believe you would also say that
18 the matter of the internal constitutional organisation of a state is
19 irrelevant in a situation like this. There is a Rule, Article 27 of the
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which prevents a party from
21 invoking the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its
22 failure to perform a treaty obligation. There is a treaty obligation
23 here, and it must be performed.
24 In your brief, you -- I believe you mentioned that.
25 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] It is mentioned, that is, Rule 58
1 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it says that the obligations --
2 [As read] in Article 29 of the Statute shall prevail [In English]
3 [Previous translation continues] ... "any legal impediment to the
4 surrender of transfer of the accused to the Tribunal which must exist
5 under the national law or extradition treaties of the state concerned."
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much. The new point for me is
7 what you say, that it was in fact the responsibility of the Government of
8 Serbia to affect this transfer.
9 Perhaps we'll hear a response from that from the --
10 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Yes.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
12 JUDGE MAY: Madam Prosecutor, there is really two points that I
13 want to cover before the adjournment. The first is this: You refer to
14 customary international law not containing a right to defend oneself. I
15 find that most surprising if it really does say that. It seems a
16 fundamental right for anybody in a court to defend yourself. Maybe we can
17 go into that at some other time.
18 The other point is the point about exculpatory evidence which of
19 course is an important one, and it would seem to be sensible to discuss
20 that during the Status Conference and decide what way of proceeding in
21 relation to obligations in relation to it.
22 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. As regards
23 defending oneself, I can give you the study that I had carried out by my
24 specialist. It's a few pages long. It's interesting to read. And as
25 regards the rest, Mr. President, we have to discuss that at the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 appropriate time, because indeed it is important. Thank you very much,
2 Mr. President.
3 JUDGE MAY: Well, you can pass that document through. There is no
4 reason to say that we will be bound by it.
5 We will adjourn now until half past, when we'll hear the accused.
6 --- Recess taken at 11.05 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 11.30 a.m.
8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's now your opportunity to address us
9 on the motions before us today. There's no need to repeat what's in the
10 written submissions because we've read all those. It's also your
11 opportunity to address us on the Prosecution motion to amend the
12 indictment, if there's anything you want to say about that, it's now your
13 chance to do so.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the first place, I am not
15 submitting any motions to this Court because I do not recognise this
16 Court. If what I am saying into this microphone is considered by you to
17 be a submission on my part, that's up to you.
18 Secondly, with respect to amicus curiae, it is my understanding
19 that your explanation, when appointing the amicus curiae, was that thereby
20 a contribution would be made to a fair trial, if in such an illegal
21 proceedings one can talk of a fair trial. I think in doing so, you have
22 added a new concept to a set of new concepts, because now we are in a
23 situation when two teams are working for the cause of the same party. So
24 this could now be termed as the "Hague fair play."
25 As for this flood of new amendments and indictments, this deluge
1 cannot flood and cover up the truth, because the truth is known to
2 millions of people.
3 I have heard here, as I heard on the previous occasion, some
4 concern because I am not reading the documents from this false indictment,
5 because allegedly I should know what I am charged with. Let me tell you,
6 I know very well what I am being accused of. I have been accused because
7 in a legal way and with legitimate means on the basis of the right to
8 self-determination that belongs to every nation, I defended my nation. I
9 had the honour to defend my nation from the criminal aggression carried
10 out against it, and to defend my people from terrorism whereby the Clinton
11 Administration cooperated closely with. And this is also something that
12 no one will be able to deny.
13 The truth cannot be sunk by any kind of flood of false
14 accusations. And I have no intention still to familiarise myself with the
15 contents of something that has been totally fabricated and that is far
16 from the truth.
17 As for the polemics I have been listening to as to who was
18 competent and who was not and whether a particular government should have
19 done something prior to another government, I wonder and am astonished
20 that not even the attorney from Belgrade, a member of the amicus curiae,
21 that he should be speaking about competencies while forgetting that no
22 government had the competence to enter into arrangements whereby the
23 Constitution of Serbia and the Constitution of Yugoslavia was being
25 I'm glad that the gentlemen from the amicus curiae are aware that
1 they cannot speak on my behalf and that I have nothing in common with
3 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE MAY: We will consider the motions, preliminary motions, on
6 which we've been addressed this morning. We've had the opportunity of
7 considering the application to amend the indictment, and I'll give our
8 ruling on that.
9 Rule 50 does not spell out any test to be applied in deciding
10 whether leave to amend an indictment should be given. However, the cases
11 in the Tribunal show that the fundamental question is whether the
12 amendment would cause injustice or prejudice to the accused if it were
14 In determining whether prejudice or injustice does arise, the
15 issues a Trial Chamber must have in mind include the right of the accused
16 to a fair and expeditious trial, including adequate time for preparation.
17 On the other hand, the Prosecution are entitled to amend an indictment
18 provided that the amendment is necessary and can be done without
19 prejudicing the accused's right to a fair and expeditious trial.
20 A Trial Chamber must balance these factors in coming to a
22 In the present case, the amendments substantially amount to the
23 addition of one count, the particularising of another count, the
24 particularising of a theory of responsibility together with a modest
25 increase in the factual allegations, to add a number of deportation sites
1 to those already in the indictment, and to add some other factual
3 We have in mind that this is the second amendment to an indictment
4 which is already two years old, but any trial on this indictment is more
5 than three months away at least, and the accused, therefore, has adequate
6 time for preparation.
7 These amendments amount to a relatively insubstantial change in
8 the indictment and occasion no prejudice or unfairness to the accused. In
9 fact, they amount to an improvement by clarifying the Prosecution case, in
10 particular, on joint enterprise and persecution.
11 Accordingly, leave to amend the indictment will be granted.
12 [Further Initial Appearance]
13 JUDGE MAY: We now turn to the next stage, which is the reading of
14 the Kosovo indictment. The second amended indictment will now be read, as
15 Rule 62 provides, in a language which the accused speaks and understands.
16 Let the indictment be read.
17 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor of the
18 International Tribunal against Slobodan Milosevic and others. Second
19 Amended Indictment.
20 The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
21 former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the
22 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
23 charges Slobodan Milosevic and others with crimes against humanity and
24 violations of the laws or customs of war as set forth below.
25 Accused. Slobodan Milosevic was born on the 20th of August, 1941,
1 in the town of Pozarevac in present-day Republic of Serbia. In 1964, he
2 received a law degree from the University of Belgrade and began a career
3 in management and banking. Slobodan Milosevic held the posts of deputy
4 director and later general director at Tehnogas, a major gas company until
5 1978. Thereafter, he became president of Beogradska banka, one of the
6 largest banks in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
7 SFRY, and held that post until 1983.
8 In 1983, Slobodan Milosevic began his political career. He became
9 Chairman of the City Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade in
10 1984. In 1986, he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central
11 Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, and was re-elected in
12 1988. On the 16th of July, 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and
13 the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia were united. A new
14 party was named the Socialist Party of Serbia, or the SPS, and Slobodan
15 Milosevic was elected its president. He continued to hold the post of the
16 President of the SPS as of the date of this indictment.
17 Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of the Presidency of
18 Serbia on the 8th of May, 1989, and re-elected on the 5th of December that
19 same year. After the adoption of the new constitution of Serbia on the
20 28th of September, 1990, Slobodan Milosevic was elected to the newly
21 established office of President of Serbia in multiparty elections held on
22 the 9th and 26th of December, 1990. He was re-elected on the 20th of
23 December, 1992.
24 After serving two terms as President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic
25 was elected President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or the FRY,
1 on the 15th of July, 1997, and he began his official duties on the 23rd of
2 July, 1997. Following defeat in the September 2000 FRY presidential
3 elections, Slobodan Milosevic stepped down from this position on the 6th
4 of October, 2000. At all times relevant to this indictment, Slobodan
5 Milosevic held the post of President of the FRY.
6 Paragraphs 5 to 15 deal with other individuals; therefore, we
7 continue with the reading of the indictment as of paragraph 16.
8 Individual Criminal Responsibility.
9 Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
10 Each of the accused is individually responsible for the crimes
11 alleged against him in this indictment under Articles 3, 5, and 7(1) of
12 the Statute of the Tribunal. The accused planned, instigated, ordered,
13 committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or
14 execution of these crimes. By using the word "committed" in this
15 indictment, the Prosecutor does not intend to suggest that any of the
16 accused physically perpetrated any of the crimes charged personally.
17 "Committing" in this indictment refers to participation in a joint
18 criminal enterprise as a co-perpetrator. The purpose of this joint
19 criminal enterprise was inter alia the expulsion of a substantial portion
20 of the Kosovo Albanian population from the territory of the province of
21 Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the
22 province. To fulfil this criminal purpose, each of the accused, acting
23 individually or in concert with each other, and with others known and
24 unknown, significantly contributed to the joint criminal enterprise using
25 the de jure and de facto powers available to him.
1 This joint criminal enterprise came into existence no later than
2 October 1998, and continued throughout the time period when the crimes
3 alleged in Counts 1 to 5 of this indictment occurred, beginning on or
4 about the 1st of January, 1999 and continuing until the 20th of June,
5 1999. A number of individuals participated in this joint criminal
6 enterprise during the entire duration of its existence, or alternatively
7 at different times during the duration of its existence, including the
8 accused Slobodan Milosevic and others known and unknown.
9 The crimes enumerated in Counts 1 to 5 in this indictment were
10 within the object of the joint criminal enterprise. Alternatively, the
11 crimes enumerated in Counts 3 to 5 were natural and foreseeable
12 consequences of the joint criminal enterprise, and the accused were aware
13 that such crimes were the likely outcome of the joint criminal
14 enterprise. Despite their awareness of the foreseeable consequences,
15 Slobodan Milosevic and others known and unknown knowingly and wilfully
16 participated in the joint criminal enterprise. Each of the accused and
17 other participants in the joint criminal enterprise shared the intent and
18 state of mind required for the commission of each of the crimes charged in
19 Counts 1 to 5. On this basis, under Article 7(1) of the Statute, each of
20 the accused and other participants in the joint criminal enterprise bear
21 individual criminal responsibility for the crimes alleged in Counts 1 to
23 Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
24 Slobodan Milosevic and other accused, while holding positions of
25 superior authority, are also individually criminally responsible for the
1 acts or omissions of their subordinates pursuant to Article 7(3) of the
2 Statute of the Tribunal. A superior is responsible for the criminal acts
3 of his subordinates if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinates
4 were about to commit such acts, or had done so, and the superior failed to
5 take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
6 punish the perpetrators.
7 Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of the FRY on the 15th of
8 July, 1997, and assumed office on the 23rd of July, 1997. At all times
9 relevant to this indictment he held the post of President of the FRY.
10 As President of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic was President of the
11 Supreme Defence Council of the FRY. The Supreme Defence Council consists
12 of the President of the FRY and the Presidents of the member republics
13 Serbia and Montenegro. The Supreme Defence Council decides on the
14 National Defence Plan and issues decisions concerning the VJ or Yugoslav
15 army. As President of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic had the power to order
16 implementation of the National Defence Plan and command the VJ in war and
17 peace, pursuant to decisions made by the Supreme Defence Council.
18 Slobodan Milosevic, as Supreme Commander of the VJ, performed these duties
19 through commands, orders, and decisions.
20 Under the FRY Law on Defence, as Supreme Commander of the VJ,
21 Slobodan Milosevic also exercised command authority over republican police
22 units subordinated to the VJ during a state of imminent threat of war or a
23 state of war. A declaration of imminent threat of war was proclaimed on
24 the 23rd of March, 1999, and a state of war, on the 24th of March, 1999.
25 In addition to his de jure powers, at all times relevant to this
1 indictment, Slobodan Milosevic exercised extensive de facto control over
2 numerous institutions essential to or involved in the conduct of the
3 offences alleged herein. Slobodan Milosevic exercised extensive de facto
4 control over federal institutions nominally under the competence of the
5 assembly or the government of the FRY. Slobodan Milosevic also exercised
6 de facto control over functions and institutions nominally under the
7 competence of Serbia and its autonomous provinces including the Serbian
8 police force. Slobodan Milosevic further exercised de facto control over
9 numerous aspects of the FRY's political and economic life, particularly
10 the media. Between 1986 and the early 1990s, Slobodan Milosevic
11 progressively required de facto control over these federal, republican,
12 provincial, and other institutions.
13 Slobodan Milosevic's de facto control over Serbian, SFRY, FRY, and
14 other state organs stemmed in part from his leadership of the two
15 principal political parties that ruled in Serbia from 1986 to 2000, and in
16 the FRY from 1992 to the year 2000. From 1986 until 1990, he was Chairman
17 of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists in
18 Serbia, then the ruling party in Serbia. In 1990, he was elected
19 President of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the successor party to the
20 League of Communists of Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working
21 People of Serbia. Throughout the period of his Presidency of Serbia from
22 1990 to 1997 and as the President of the FRY from 1997 to the year 2000
23 Slobodan Milosevic was also the leader of the SPS.
24 Beginning no later than October 1988 and at all times relevant to
25 this indictment, Slobodan Milosevic exercised de facto control over the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 ruling and governing institutions of Serbia, including the MUP. Beginning
2 no later than October 1988, he exercised de facto control over Serbia's
3 two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, and their representation
4 in the SFRY and the FRY. From no later than October 1988 until mid-1998,
5 Slobodan Milosevic also exercised de facto control over the ruling and
6 governing institutions of the Republic of Montenegro, including its
7 representation in all federal organs of the SFRY and the FRY.
8 In significant international negotiations, meetings, and
9 conferences since 1989 and at all times relevant to this indictment,
10 Slobodan Milosevic was the primary interlocutor with whom the
11 international community negotiated. He negotiated international
12 agreements that were subsequently implemented within Serbia, the SFRY, the
13 FRY, and elsewhere on the territory of the SFRY. Among the conferences
14 and international negotiations at which Slobodan Milosevic was the primary
15 representative of the SFRY and FRY are the following: the Hague primary
16 representative of the FRY, the Paris -- the Hague Conference in 1991; the
17 Paris negotiations of March 1993; the International Conference on the
18 former Yugoslavia in January 1993; the Vance-Owen Peace Plan negotiations
19 between January and May 1993; the Geneva peace talks in the summer of
20 1993; the Contact Group meeting in June 1994; the negotiations for a
21 ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the 9th and 14th of September,
22 1995; the negotiations to end the bombing by the North Atlantic Treaty
23 Organisation, NATO, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the 14th to the 20th of
24 September, 1995; and the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995.
25 As the President of the FRY, the Supreme Commander of the VJ and
1 the President of the Supreme Defence Council and pursuant to his de facto
2 authority, Slobodan Milosevic is personally responsible for the actions of
3 his subordinates within the forces of the FRY and Serbia which included
4 the VJ, the Republic of Serbia Ministry of Interior or MUP, military
5 Territorial Units, Civil Defence Units and other armed groups operating
6 under the authority or with the knowledge of the eight accused and their
7 subordinates who committed the crimes alleged in Counts 1 to 5 of this
9 Slobodan Milosevic, as President of the FRY, Supreme Commander of
10 the VJ, and President of the Supreme Defence Council is also or
11 alternatively criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates
12 pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal's Statute, including but not
13 limited to members of the VJ and the aforementioned personnel of other
14 forces of the FRY and Serbia for the crimes alleged in Counts 1 to 5 of
15 this indictment. In addition, Slobodan Milosevic, pursuant to his de
16 facto authority, is also or alternatively criminally responsible for the
17 acts of his subordinates pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal's
18 Statute, including members of the VJ and employees of the MUP, for the
19 crimes alleged in Counts 1 to 5 of this indictment.
20 Paragraphs 29 to 52 relate to other accused and, therefore, we
21 continue with the reading of this indictment with paragraph 53.
22 Charges. Following the commencement of the joint criminal
23 enterprise beginning on or about the 1st of January, 1999, and continuing
24 until 20th of June, 1999, Slobodan Milosevic and others known and unknown
25 planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted a
1 deliberate and widespread or systematic campaign of terror and violence
2 directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians living in Kosovo in the FRY.
3 The deliberate and widespread or systematic campaign of terror and
4 violence directed at the Kosovo Albanian population was executed by the
5 forces of the FRY and Serbia acting at the direction, with the
6 encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan Milosevic and others known
7 and unknown. Forces of the FRY and Serbia undertook the operations
8 targeting the Kosovo Albanians with the objective of expelling a
9 substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from Kosovo in an
10 effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the province. To achieve
11 this objective, the forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting in concert,
12 engaged in well-planned and coordinated operations as described in
13 paragraphs 55 to 61.
14 The forces of the FRY and Serbia, in a deliberate and widespread
15 or systematic manner forcibly expelled hundreds of thousands of Kosovo
16 Albanians from their homes and internally displaced them within Kosovo.
17 To facilitate these expulsions and displacements, forces of the FRY and
18 Serbia intentionally created an atmosphere of fear and oppression through
19 the use of force, threats of force, and acts of violence.
20 Throughout Kosovo, the forces of FRY and Serbia engaged in a
21 deliberate and widespread or systematic campaign of destruction of
22 property owned by Kosovo Albanian citizens. This was accomplished by the
23 widespread shelling of towns and villages, the burning and destruction of
24 property, including homes, farms, businesses, cultural monuments, and
25 religious sites, and the destruction of personal property. As a result of
1 these orchestrated actions, villages, towns, and entire regions were made
2 uninhabitable for Kosovo Albanians.
3 In addition to the deliberate destruction of property owned by
4 Kosovo Albanian civilians, forces of the FRY and Serbia committed
5 widespread or systematic acts of brutality and violence against Kosovo
6 Albanian civilians in order to perpetuate the climate of fear, create
7 chaos and a pervading fear for life. Forces of the FRY and Serbia went
8 from village to village and in the towns and cities, from area to area,
9 threatening and expelling the Kosovo Albanian population. Kosovo
10 Albanians were frequently intimidated, assaulted, or killed in public view
11 to enforce the departure of their families and neighbours. Many Kosovo
12 Albanians, who were not directly forcibly expelled from their communities,
13 fled as a result of the climate of terror created by the widespread or
14 systematic beatings, harassment, sexual assaults, unlawful arrests,
15 killings, shelling, and looting carried out across the province. Forces
16 of the FRY and Serbia persistently subjected Kosovo Albanians to insults,
17 racial slurs, degrading acts and other forms of physical and psychological
18 mistreatment based on their racial, religious, and political
19 identification. All sectors of Kosovo Albanian society were displaced
20 including women, children, the elderly, and the infirm.
21 Thousands of Kosovo Albanians who fled their homes as a result of
22 the conduct of the forces of the FRY and Serbia and the deliberate climate
23 of terror that pervaded the territory the Kosovo, joined convoys of
24 persons that moved towards Kosovo's borders with the Republic of Albania
25 and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Across the routes from the
1 border crossings forces of the FRY and Serbia manned checkpoints where the
2 displaced Kosovo Albanians were subjected to further beatings, extortion,
3 robbery, harassment, assaults, illegal arrests, and killings. At other
4 times, forces of the FRY and Serbia escorted groups of expelled Kosovo
5 Albanians to the borders. By these methods, the forces of the FRY and
6 Serbia maintained control over the movement of displaced Kosovo Albanians
7 to the borders. Displaced Kosovo Albanians often arrived at the borders
8 of Kosovo on foot in convoys of several thousand persons, or carried by
9 tractors, trailers, and trucks, as well as on trains, buses, or trucks
10 which were organised and provided by forces of the FRY and Serbia.
11 In addition, thousands of Kosovo Albanians who fled their homes
12 and were thereby forcibly transferred as a result of the conduct of the
13 forces of the FRY and Serbia and the deliberate climate of terror that
14 persuaded the territory of Kosovo were forced to seek shelter for days,
15 weeks, or months in other towns and villages and/or in forests and
16 mountains throughout the province. Some of these internally displaced
17 persons remained inside the province of Kosovo throughout the time period
18 relevant to this indictment, and many persons died as a consequence of the
19 harsh weather conditions, insufficient food, inadequate medical attention,
20 and exhaustion. Others eventually crossed over one of the Kosovo borders
21 into Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, or crossed the provincial boundary
22 between Kosovo and Serbia. Forces of the FRY and Serbia controlled and
23 coordinated the movements of many internally displaced Kosovo Albanians
24 until they were finally expelled from Kosovo. .
25 Throughout Kosovo, in a deliberate and widespread or systematic
1 effort to deter expelled Kosovo Albanians from returning to their homes,
2 forces of the FRY and Serbia looted and pillaged the personal and
3 commercial property belonging to Kosovo Albanians. Forces of the FRY and
4 Serbia used wholesale searches, threats of force and acts of violence to
5 rob Kosovo Albanians of money and valuables. And in a widespread or
6 systematic manner, authorities at FRY border posts stole personal vehicles
7 and other property from Kosovo Albanians being deported from the
9 In addition, throughout Kosovo, forces of the FRY and Serbia
10 systematically seized and destroyed the personal identity documents and
11 licenses of vehicles belonging to Kosovo Albanian civilians. As Kosovo
12 Albanians were forced from their homes and directed towards Kosovo's
13 borders, they were subjected to demands to surrender identity documents at
14 selected points en route to border crossings and at border crossings with
15 Albanian and Macedonia. These actions were undertaken in order to erase
16 any record of the deported Kosovo Albanians presence in Kosovo and to deny
17 them the right to return to their homes.
18 Count 1. Deportation.
19 The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs
20 55 to 61.
21 Beginning on or about the 1st of January, 1991, and continuing
22 until the 20th of June, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the
23 direction, with encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan Milosevic,
24 and others known and unknown, perpetrated the actions set forth in
25 paragraphs 55 through 61, which resulted in the forced deportation of
1 approximately 800,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians. To facilitate these
2 expulsions and displacements, forces of the FRY and Serbia deliberately
3 created an atmosphere of fear and oppression through the use of force,
4 threats of force, and acts of violence as described above in paragraphs 55
5 to 61. Throughout Kosovo, forces of the FRY and Serbia systematically
6 shelled towns and villages, burned homes and farms, damaged and destroyed
7 Kosovo Albanian cultural and religious institutions, murdered Kosovo
8 Albanian civilians, and sexually assaulted Kosovo Albanian women. These
9 actions were undertaken in all areas of Kosovo, and these deliberate means
10 and methods were used throughout the province, including the following
12 Orahovac. On the morning of the 25th of March, 1999, forces of
13 the FRY and Serbia surrounded the village of Celina with tanks and
14 armoured vehicles. After shelling the village, forces of the FRY and
15 Serbia entered the village and systematically looted and pillaged
16 everything of value from the houses, set houses and shops on fire, and
17 destroyed the old mosque. Most of the Kosovo Albanian villagers had fled
18 to a nearby forest before the army and police arrived. On the 28th of
19 March, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia forced the thousands of people
20 hiding in the forest to come out. After marching the civilians to a
21 nearby village, the men were separated from the women and were beaten,
22 robbed, and all of their identity documents were taken from them. The men
23 were then marched to Prizren and eventually forced to go to Albania.
24 On the 25th of March, 1999, a large group of Kosovo Albanians went
25 to a mountain near the village of Nogavac, also in Orahovac municipality,
1 seeking safety from attacks on nearby villages. Forces of the FRY and
2 Serbia surrounded them, and on the following day, ordered the 8,000 people
3 who had sought shelter on the mountain to leave. The Kosovo Albanians
4 were forced to go to a nearby school, and then they were forcibly
5 dispersed into nearby villages. After three or four days, forces of the
6 FRY and Serbia entered the villages, went from house to house and ordered
7 people out. Eventually, they were forced back into houses and told not to
8 leave. Those who could not fit inside the houses were forced to stay in
9 cars and tractors parked nearby. On the 2nd of April, 1999, forces of the
10 FRY and Serbia started shelling the villagers, killing a number of people
11 who had been sleeping in tractors and cars. Those who survived headed for
12 the Albanian border. As they passed through other Kosovo Albanian
13 villages which had been destroyed, they were taunted by forces of the FRY
14 and Serbia. When the villagers arrived at the border, all their
15 identification papers were taken from them. In the course of the
16 expulsions throughout the entire municipality of Orahovac, forces of the
17 FRY and Serbia systematically burned houses, shops, cultural monuments,
18 and religious sites belonging to Kosovo Albanians. Several mosques were
19 destroyed, including the mosques of Bela Crkva, Brestovac, Velika Krusa
20 and others.
21 Prizren. On the 25th of March, 1999, the village of Pirane was
22 surrounded by forces of the FRY and Serbia with tanks and various military
23 vehicles. The village was shelled and a number of the residents were
24 killed. Thereafter, forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the village and
25 burned the houses of Kosovo Albanians. After the attack, the remaining
1 villagers left Pirane and went to surrounding villages. In the town of
2 Landovica, an old mosque was burned and heavily damaged by forces of the
3 FRY and Serbia. Some of the Kosovo Albanians fleeing towards Srbica were
4 killed or wounded by snipers. Forces of the FRY and Serbia then launched
5 an offensive in the area of Srbica and shelled the villages of Donji
6 Retimlje, Retimlje, and Randubrava. Kosovo Albanian villagers were forced
7 from their homes and sent to the Albanian border. From the 28th of March,
8 1999, in the city of Prizren itself, forces of the FRY and Serbia went
9 from house to house ordering Kosovo Albanian residents to leave. They
10 were forced to join convoys of vehicles and persons travelling on foot to
11 the Albanian border. En route, members of the forces of the FRY and
12 Serbia beat and killed Kosovo Albanian men, separated Kosovo Albanian
13 women from the convoy, and sexually assaulted the women in view of
14 others. At the border all personal documents were taken away by forces of
15 the FRY and Serbia.
16 Srbica. Beginning on or about the 25th of March, 1999, forces of
17 the FRY and Serbia attacked and destroyed the villages of Vojnike,
18 Leocina, Kladernica, Turicevac, and Izbica by shelling and burning. Many
19 of the houses, shops, and mosques were destroyed, including the mosque in
20 the center of the village of Cirez. Some women and children were taken
21 away by members of the forces of the FRY and Serbia and held in a barn in
22 Cirez. The women were subjected to sexual assault, and their money and
23 property were stolen. At least eight of the women were killed after being
24 sexually assaulted, and their bodies were thrown into three wells in the
25 village of Cirez. On or about the 28th of March, 1999, a group of at
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 least 4,500 Kosovo Albanians from these villages gathered in the village
2 of Izbica where members of the forces of the FRY and Serbia demanded money
3 from these Kosovo Albanians and separated the men from the women and
4 children. A large number of the men were then killed. The surviving
5 women and children were forcibly moved as a group towards Klina,
6 Djakovica, and eventually to the Albanian border.
7 Suva Reka. On the morning of the 25th of March, 1999, forces of
8 the FRY and Serbia surrounded the town of Suva Reka. During the following
9 days, police officers went from house to house, threatening, assaulting,
10 and killing Kosovo Albanian residents, and removing many of the people
11 from their homes at gunpoint. Many houses and shops belonging to Kosovo
12 Albanians were set on fire, and a mosque in Suva Reka was damaged. The
13 women, children, and elderly were sent away by the police, and then a
14 number of the men were killed by the forces of the FRY and Serbia. The
15 Kosovo Albanians were forced to flee, making their way in trucks,
16 tractors, and trailers towards the border with Albania. While crossing
17 the border, their documents and money were taken away.
18 On the 31st of March, 1999, approximately 80,000 Kosovo Albanians
19 displaced from villages in the Suva Reka municipality gathered near
20 Belanica. The following day, forces of the FRY and Serbia shelled the
21 village of Belanica, forcing the displaced persons to flee towards the
22 Albanian border. Prior to crossing the border, their identification
23 documents were taken away from them.
24 Pec. On or about the 27th and 28th of March, 1999, in the city of
25 Pec, forces of the FRY and Serbia went from house to house, forcing Kosovo
1 Albanians to leave. Some houses were set on fire, and a number of people
2 were shot. Soldiers and police were stationed along every street,
3 directing the Kosovo Albanians towards the town center. Once the people
4 reached the center of town, those without cars or vehicles were forced to
5 get on buses or trucks and were driven to the town of Prizren. Outside
6 Prizren, the Kosovo Albanians were forced to get off the buses and trucks
7 and walk approximately 15 kilometres to the Albanian border where, prior
8 to crossing the border, they were ordered to turn their identification
9 papers over to Serb policemen.
10 Kosovska Mitrovica. Beginning on or about the 25th of March,
11 1999, and continuing through the middle of April 1999, forces of the FRY
12 and Serbia began moving systematically through the town of Kosovska
13 Mitrovica. They entered the homes of Kosovo Albanians and ordered the
14 residents to leave their houses at once and to go to the bus station.
15 Some houses were set on fire, forcing the residents to flee to other parts
16 of the town. At least one of the mosques of the town was burned and
17 damaged. Over a three-week period, the forces of the FRY and Serbia
18 continued to expel the Kosovo Albanian residents of the town. During this
19 period, properties belonging to Kosovo Albanians were destroyed, Kosovo
20 Albanians were robbed of money, vehicles, and other valuables, and Kosovo
21 Albanian women were sexually assaulted. A similar pattern was repeated in
22 other villages in the Kosovska Mitrovica municipality, where forces of the
23 FRY and Serbia forced Kosovo Albanians from their homes and destroyed the
24 villages. The Kosovo Albanian residents of the municipality were forced
25 to join convoys going to the Albanian border via the towns of Srbica, Pec,
1 Djakovica and Prizren. En route to the border, forces of the FRY and
2 Serbia robbed them of valuables and seized their identity documents.
3 Pristina. Beginning on or about the 24th of March, 1999, and
4 continuing through the end of May 1999, Serbian police went to the homes
5 of Kosovo Albanians in the city of Pristina and forced the residents to
6 leave. During the course of these forced expulsions, a number of people
7 were killed. Many of those forced from their homes went directly to the
8 train station, while others sought shelter in nearby neighbourhoods.
9 Hundreds of ethnic Albanians, guided by Serb police at all the
10 intersections, gathered at the train station and then were loaded onto
11 overcrowded trains or buses after a long wait, during which time no food
12 or water was provided. Those on the trains went as far as Dzeneral
13 Jankovic village near the Macedonian border. During the train ride, many
14 people had their identification papers taken from them. After getting off
15 the trains, forces of the FRY and Serbia told the Kosovo Albanians to walk
16 along the tracks into Macedonia since the surrounding land had been
17 mined. Those who tried to hide in Pristina were eventually expelled in a
18 similar fashion. During the course of these forced expulsions, a number
19 of people were killed and several women were sexually assaulted.
20 During the same period, forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the
21 villages of Pristina municipality, where they beat and killed many Kosovo
22 Albanians, robbed them of their money, looted their property, and burnt
23 their homes. Many of the villagers were taken by truck to the town of
24 Glogovac, in the municipality of Glogovac. From there they were
25 transported to Dzeneral Jankovic and walked to the Macedonian border.
1 Others, after making their way to the town of Urosevac, were ordered by
2 the forces of the FRY and Serbia to take a train to Dzeneral Jankovic,
3 from where they walked across the border into Macedonia.
4 Djakovica. By March 1999, the population of the town of Djakovica
5 had increased significantly due to the large number of internally
6 displaced persons who fled their villages to escape deliberate shelling by
7 forces of the FRY and Serbia during 1998, and to escape the armed conflict
8 between these forces and members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The
9 continual movement of these internally displaced persons increased after
10 the 24th of March, 1999, when, following violent expulsions in the town of
11 Djakovica, many internally displaced persons returned from the town of
12 Djakovica to the outlying villages only to be expelled from these villages
13 again by forces of the FRY and Serbia. Serb forces controlled and
14 coordinated the movement of these internally displaced persons as they
15 travelled from these villages and -- these villages to and from the town
16 of Djakovica and finally to the border between Kosovo and the Republic of
17 Albania. Persons travelling on foot were sent from the town of Djakovica
18 directly toward one of several border crossings. Persons travelling in
19 motor vehicles were routed first towards the town of Prizren before
20 approaching the border and crossing into the Republic of Albania.
21 From on or about the 24th of March 1999, through the 11th of May,
22 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia began forcing residents of the town of
23 Djakovica to leave. Forces of the FRY and Serbia spread out throughout
24 the town and went from house to house ordering Kosovo Albanians from their
25 homes. In some instances, people were killed and many persons were
1 threatened with death. Many of the houses and shops belonging to Kosovo
2 Albanians were set on fire while those belonging to Serbs were protected.
3 On the 24th of March, 1999, the old mosque in Rogovo and the old historic
4 quarter of Djakovica, which included the bazaar, the Hadum mosque, and the
5 adjoining Islamic library were among the several cultural sites
6 substantially and/or totally destroyed. During the period from the 2nd to
7 the 4th of April, 1999, thousands of Kosovo Albanians living in the town
8 of Djakovica and neighbouring villages joined a large convoy either on
9 foot or driving in cars, trucks, and tractors and moved to the border with
10 Albania. Forces of the FRY and Serbia directed those fleeing along
11 pre-arranged routes and at checkpoints along the way most Kosovo Albanians
12 had their identification papers and licence plates seized. In some
13 instances, Yugoslav army trucks were used to transport persons to the
14 border with Albania.
15 In addition, during late March and April 1999, forces of the FRY
16 and Serbia forcibly expelled the Kosovo Albanian residents of many
17 villages of the Djakovica municipality, including the villages of Drobros,
18 Korenica, and Meja. Many of these residents were subsequently ordered or
19 permitted to return to their communities only to be expelled again by
20 forces of the FRY and Serbia. On or about the early morning hours of the
21 27th of April, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a massive
22 attack against the Carragojs, Erenik, and Trava Valleys of the Djakovica
23 municipality, including the remaining residents of the aforementioned
24 villages, in order to drive the population out of the area. A large
25 number of soldiers and policemen were deployed and several checkpoints
1 were established. In Meja, Korenica, and Meja Orize, a large and as yet
2 undetermined number of Kosovo Albanian civilian males were separated from
3 the mass of fleeing villagers, abducted and executed. Throughout the
4 entire day, villages under direct threat of the forces of the FRY and
5 Serbia left their homes and joined several convoys of refugees using
6 tractors, horse carts, and cars and eventually crossed into Albania.
7 Forces of the FRY and Serbia confiscated the identity documents of many of
8 the Kosovo Albanians before they crossed the border.
9 Gnjilane. The forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the town of
10 Prilepnica on the 6th of April, 1999 or thereabouts, and ordered residents
11 to leave, saying that the town would be mined the next day. The
12 townspeople left and tried to go to another village, but forces of the FRY
13 and Serbia turned them back. On the 13th of April, 1999, residents of
14 Prilepnica were again informed that the town had been evacuated by the
15 following day. The next morning, the Kosovo Albanian residents left in a
16 convoy of approximately 500 vehicles. Shortly after the residents left,
17 the houses in Prilepnica were set on fire. Throughout the entire
18 municipality of Gnjilane, forces of the FRY and Serbia systematically
19 burned and destroyed houses, shops, cultural monuments, and religious
20 sites belonging to Kosovo Albanians, including a mosque in Vlastica.
21 Kosovo Albanians and in other villages in Gnjilane municipality were also
22 forced from their homes. Thousands of displaced persons from villages
23 such as Zegra, Nosalje, and Vladovo sought shelter in the village of Donja
24 Stubla located in the Vitina municipality. Many of these displaced
25 persons from Gnjilane crossed Kosovo's boundary with the province of
1 Serbia where they suffered similar harassment and mistreatment to that
2 which they experienced in Kosovo before entering Macedonia. Others
3 travelled directly to Macedonia. When the Kosovo Albanians reached the
4 border with Macedonia, forces of the FRY and Serbia confiscated their
5 identification papers.
6 Urosevac. During the period between 24th of March, and the 14th
7 of April, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia shelled and attacked the
8 villages in the Urosevac municipality, including Biba, Muhadzer Prelez,
9 and Star Selo, killing a number of residents. After the shelling, forces
10 of the FRY and Serbia entered some of the villages including Papaz and
11 Sojevo, and ordered the residents to leave. Other Kosovo Albanians from
12 Varos Selo and Mirosavlje fled their villages as the Serb forces entered.
13 After the residents left their homes, the soldiers and policemen burnt the
14 houses. The displaced persons went to the town of Urosevac where most
15 boarded trains which carried them to the Macedonian border, crossing at
16 Dzeneral Jankovic. Serb forces directed the train passengers to walk on
17 the railroad tracks to the border. Others travelled in convoys from
18 Urosevac to the same border crossing. At the border, Serb forces
19 confiscated all of their documents.
20 Kacanik. Between March and May 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
21 attacked villages in the Kacanik municipality and the town of Kacanik
22 itself. This had -- as a result, the destruction of houses and the mosque
23 in the Ivaja valley [sic].
24 On or about the 8th of March, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
25 attacked and partially burned the village of Kotlina. On the 24th of
1 March, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia attacked Kotlina again with
2 heavy weapon systems and soldiers. Many of the male residents of the
3 Kotlina fled into nearby forests during this attack while forces of the
4 FRY and Serbia ordered the women, children, and elderly to board trucks
5 which took them towards the Kacanik. Those who could not fit into the
6 trucks were compelled to walk behind them towards Kocanik. A number of
7 male residents of Kotlina were killed during this attack, including at
8 least 17 men whose bodies were thrown into wells. Before departing
9 Kotlina forces of the FRY and Serbia burnt the remainder of the village.
10 Many of the survivors fled to Macedonia.
11 On or about the 27th and 28th of March, 1999, forces of the FRY
12 and Serbia attacked the town of Kacanik. Forces of the FRY and Serbia
13 harassed, detained, beat, and shot many Kosovo Albanian residents of the
14 Kacanik. Thousands of persons fled to nearby forests and eventually
15 walked across the border into Macedonia. Other displaced persons from the
16 town of Kacanik and nearby villages walked to the village of Stagovo where
17 they boarded trains that took them to the Macedonian border.
18 On or about the 13th of April, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
19 surrounded the village of Slatina and the hamlet of Vata. After shelling
20 the village, infantry troops and police entered the village and looted and
21 burnt the houses. During this action, 13 civilians were shot and killed.
22 Following this attack, much of the population of Slatina fled to
24 On or about the 25th of May, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
25 attacked the village of Dubrava in the municipality of Kacanik. During
1 the attack, forces of the FRY and Serbia killed several Kosovo Albanian
2 residents of the Dubrava. Many residents of Dubrava formed a convoy of
3 tractors and trailers and fled to Macedonia. Other residents fled to
4 other villages or into forests before eventually crossing the border into
6 Decani. On or about the 29th of March, 1999, forces of the FRY
7 and Serbia surrounded and attacked the village of Beleg and other
8 surrounding villages in the Decani municipality. Forces of the FRY and
9 Serbia went from house to house and told villagers to leave their houses
10 immediately. About 300 men, women, and children were moved out of their
11 homes and gathered in a nearby field in the village of Beleg. Forces of
12 the FRY and Serbia ordered all men and women to undress and all their
13 personal property was taken away. Men were separated from women and
14 children and taken to the basement of an unfinished house near the field.
15 Women and children were ordered to go to another house. During the night,
16 at least three women were sexually assaulted. The next day, forces of the
17 FRY and Serbia told the villagers to leave the village in trucks and
18 tractors and go to Albania.
19 Vucitrn. On or about the 27th of March, 1999, forces of the FRY
20 and Serbia began to burn houses in the town of Vucitrn and burnt the main
21 mosque in that town. On or about the 2nd of May, 1999, forces of the FRY
22 and Serbia attacked a number of villages north-east of the town of
23 Vucitrn, including the villages of Skrovna, Slakovce, Cecelija, and Gornja
24 Sudimlja. The villagers were forced out of their homes and many of their
25 houses, shops and religious sites were completely burnt, the villagers, as
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 well as persons previously displaced from other communities in the Vucitrn
2 municipality were forced to form a convoy of approximately 20.000 people
3 travelling on the Studime Gorge road in the direction of the town of
4 Vucitrn. In the course of these actions, forces of the FRY and Serbia
5 harassed, beat, and robbed the Kosovo Albanians travelling in the convey
6 and killed approximately 104 Kosovo Albanians. Thousands of Kosovo
7 Albanians in this convoy were detained by forces of the FRY and Serbia in
8 the agriculture cooperative near the town of Vucitrn. On or about the 3rd
9 of May, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia, at the agriculture cooperative
10 separated Kosovo Albanian men of military age from women, children, and
11 the elderly. The Kosovo Albanian women, children, and elderly were
12 directed to travel to Albania, and a number of Kosovo Albanian men were
13 forced to drive vehicles that carried the women, children, and elderly to
14 the Albanian border. The forces of the FRY and Serbia transported
15 hundreds of Kosovo Albanian men of military age from the agriculture
16 cooperative to a prison in the village of Smrekovrica. After several
17 weeks of detention in inhumane conditions where they were subjected to
18 beatings, torture, and murder, many of these Kosovo Albanian men were
19 transported to the village of Zur near the Albanian border and forced to
20 cross the border into Albania.
21 By these acts and omissions, Slobodan Milosevic and others known
22 and unknown planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided
23 and abetted the planning, preparation, or execution of:
24 Count 1: Deportation, a crime against humanity, punishable under
25 Article 5(d) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
1 Count 2: Other inhumane acts, forcible transfer.
2 With respect to those Kosovo Albanians who were internally
3 displaced within the territory of Kosovo, the Prosecutor re-alleges and
4 incorporates by references paragraphs 55 to 61 and, in particular,
5 paragraph 59.
6 By these acts and omissions Slobodan Milosevic and others known
7 and unknown planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided
8 and abetted the planning, preparation, or execution of:
9 Count 2: Other inhumane acts, forcible transfer, a crime against
10 humanity, punishable under Article 5(i) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
11 Counts 3 and 4: Murder.
12 The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs
13 55 to 63.
14 Beginning on or about January the 1st, 1999 and continuing until
15 the 20th of June, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the
16 direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan
17 Milosevic and others known and unknown murdered hundreds of Kosovo
18 Albanian citizens. These killings occurred in a widespread or systematic
19 manner throughout the province of Kosovo and resulted in the deaths of
20 numerous men, women, and children. Included among the incidents of mass
21 killings are the following:
22 On or about the 15th of January, 1999, in the early morning hours,
23 the village of Racak was attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia in
24 Stimlje municipality. After shelling, forces of the FRY and Serbia
25 entered the village later in the morning and began conducting
1 house-to-house searches. Villagers who attempted to flee from the forces
2 of the FRY and Serbia were shot throughout the village. A group of
3 approximately 25 men attempted to hide in a building but were discovered
4 by the forces of the FRY and the police. They were beaten and then were
5 removed to a nearby hill where they were shot and killed. Altogether, the
6 forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 45 Kosovo Albanians in
7 and around Racak. Those persons killed who are known by name are set
8 forth in Schedule A which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.
9 On or about the 25th of March, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
10 surrounded and attacked the village of Bela Crkva in Orahovac
11 municipality. Many of the residents of Bela Crkva fled along the Belaja
12 River outside the village and were forced to seek shelter at a railroad
13 bridge. As the forces of the FRY and Serbia approached the bridge, they
14 opened fire on a number of villagers, killing 12 persons including 10
15 women and children. A two-year-old child survived this incident of the
16 forces of the FRY and Serbia then ordered the remaining villagers out of
17 the streambed, at which time the men and older boys were separated from
18 the elderly men, women, and children. The forces of the FRY and Serbia
19 ordered the men and older boys to strip and then systematically robbed
20 them of all valuables. The women and children were then ordered to leave
21 towards an adjacent village called Zrze. The doctor from Bela Crkva
22 attempted to speak with the commander of the attacking forces, but he was
23 shot and killed, as was his nephew. The remaining men and older boys were
24 then ordered back into the streambed. After they complied, the forces of
25 the FRY and Serbia opened fire on these men and older boys, killing
1 approximately 65 Kosovo Albanians. A number of men and older boys
2 survived this incident, and other persons hiding in the vicinity also
3 witnessed this incident. In addition, forces of the FRY and Serbia also
4 killed six men found hiding in an irrigation ditch in the vicinity. Those
5 persons killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule B, which is
6 attached as an appendix to this indictment.
7 On or about the 25th of March, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
8 attacked the villages of Mala Krusa and Velika Krusa in Orahovac
9 municipality. The villagers of Mala Krusa took refuge in a forest outside
10 Mala Krusa, where they were able to observe the forces of the FRY and
11 Serbia systematically looting and burning their houses. The villagers
12 subsequently took refuge in the house of Sedje Batusha, which is located
13 on the outskirts of Mala Krusa. During the morning of the 26th of March,
14 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia located the villagers. The police
15 forces of the FRY and Serbia ordered the women and small children to leave
16 the area and go to Albania. The forces of the FRY and Serbia detained and
17 searched the men and boys and confiscated their identity documents and
18 valuables. Subsequently, the forces of the FRY and Serbia ordered the men
19 and boys, under threat of death, to walk to an unoccupied house in Mala
20 Krusa. The forces of the FRY and Serbia forced the men and boys to enter
21 the house. When the men and boys were assembled inside, the forces of the
22 FRY and Serbia opened fire with machine-guns on the group. After several
23 minutes of gunfire, forces of the FRY and Serbia set fire to the house in
24 order to burn the bodies. As a result of the shootings and fire,
25 approximately had 105 Kosovo Albanian men and boys died. Those persons
1 killed who are known by name are set forth in Schedule C, which is
2 attached as an appendix to this indictment.
3 On or about the 26th of March, 1999, in the morning hours, forces
4 of the FRY and Serbia surrounded the vicinity of the Berisha family
5 compound in the town of Suva Reka. Tanks were positioned close to and
6 pointing in the direction of the houses. The forces of the FRY and Serbia
7 order the occupants out of one of the houses. Men were separated from
8 women and children and six members of the family were killed. The
9 remaining family members were herded towards a coffee shop by forces of
10 the FRY and Serbia. Those family members were herded along with three
11 extended Berisha family groups into the coffee shop. Forces of the FRY
12 and Serbia then walked into the coffee shop and opened fire on the persons
13 inside. Explosives were also thrown into the shop. At least 44 civilians
14 were killed and others seriously wounded during this action. The bodies
15 of the victims were dragged out of the shop and placed in the rear of a
16 truck which was then driven in the direction of Prizren. Three injured
17 persons thrown in among the other bodies jumped out of the truck en route
18 to Prizren. Property pertaining to at least six of the persons killed in
19 the coffee shop were found in a clandestine mass grave site at a VJ firing
20 range near Korusa. In addition, identification documents pertaining to at
21 least five of the persons killed in the coffee shop were founded on bodies
22 exhumed near a clandestine mass grave located in Batajnica near Belgrade
23 in Serbia. Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in
24 Schedule K, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.
25 On or about the evening of the 26th of March 1999, in the town of
1 Djakovica, forces of the FRY and Serbia came to a house at 134a Ymer
2 Grezda Street. The women and children inside the house were separated
3 from the men and were ordered to go upstairs. The forces of the FRY and
4 Serbia then shot and killed the six Kosovo Albanian men who were in the
5 house. The names of those killed are set forth in Schedule D, which is
6 attached as an appendix to this indictment.
7 On or about the 26th of March, 1999, in the morning hours, forces
8 of the FRY and Serbia attacked the village of Padaliste, Istok
9 municipality. As the forces of the FRY and Serbia entered the village,
10 they fired on houses and on villagers who attempted to flee. Eight
11 persons of the Beke Imeraj family were forced from their home and were
12 killed in front of their house. Other residents of Padaliste village were
13 killed at their homes and in a streambed near the village. Altogether,
14 forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 20 Kosovo Albanians from
15 Padaliste. Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in
16 Schedule E, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.
17 On or about the 27th of March, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
18 attacked the village of Izbica with heavy weapons. At least 4,500
19 villagers from Izbica and surrounding villages took refuge in a meadow in
20 Izbica. On the 28th of March, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
21 surrounded the villagers and approached them, demanding money. After the
22 forces of the FRY and Serbia stole the villagers' valuables, the men were
23 separated from the women and small children. The men were then further
24 divided into two groups, one of which was sent to a nearby hill and the
25 other was sent to a nearby streambed. The forces of the FRY and Serbia
1 then fired upon both groups of men, and at least 116 Kosovo Albanian men
2 were killed on that occasion. Also on the 28th of March, 1999, the women
3 and children gathered at Izbica were forced to leave the area and to walk
4 towards Albania. Two elderly disabled women were sitting on a
5 tractor-trailer, unable to walk. Forces of the FRY and Serbia set the
6 tractor-trailer on fire, and the two women were burned alive. Those
7 persons killed in Izbica who are known by name are set forth in Schedule
8 F, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.
9 On or about the late evening of the 1st of April, 1999, and in the
10 early morning hours of the 2nd of April, 1999, forces of the FRY and
11 Serbia launched an operation against the Qerim district of Djakovica.
12 Over a period of several hours, the FRY and Serbia forcibly entered houses
13 of Kosovo Albanians in the Qerim district, killing the occupants and then
14 setting fire to the buildings. Dozens of homes were destroyed and over 50
15 persons were killed. For example, in a house located at 157 Milos Gilic
16 Street, forces of the FRY and Serbia shot the 20 occupants and then set
17 fire to the house. As a result of the shootings and the fire set by the
18 forces of the FRY and Serbia at this single location, 20 Kosovo Albanians
19 were killed, of whom 19 were women and children. The names of those
20 killed at this location are set forth in Schedule G, which is attached as
21 an appendix to this indictment.
22 On or about the early morning hours of the 27th of April, 1999,
23 forces of the FRY and Serbia launched a massive attack against the Kosovo
24 Albanian population of the Carragojs, Erenik and Trava Valleys of the
25 Djakovica municipality in order to drive the population out of the area.
1 A large number of forces were deployed and several checkpoints were
2 established. Throughout the entire day, villagers, under direct threat
3 from the forces of the FRY and Serbia, left their homes and joined several
4 convoys of refugees using tractors, horse carts and cars. In Meja,
5 Korenica, and Meja Orize, a large, and as yet undetermined, number of
6 Kosovo Albanian civilian males were separated from the mass of fleeing
7 villagers and abducted. Many of these men were summarily executed, and
8 approximately 300 persons are still missing. Identity documents
9 pertaining to at least seven persons who were last seen at Meja on the
10 27th of April, 1999 were found on bodies exhumed from a clandestine mass
11 grave located in Batajnica, near Belgrade, Serbia. Those persons killed
12 who are known by name are set forth in Schedule 1, which is attached as an
13 appendix to this indictment.
14 On or about the 2nd of May, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
15 attacked several villages north-east of the town of Vucitrn, including
16 Skrovna, Slakovce, Ceceli, and Gornja Sudimlja. The villagers were forced
17 out from their homes, and many of their houses, shops, and religious sites
18 were completely burnt. They were subsequently forced into a convoy of
19 approximately 20,000 people, travelling on the Studime Gorge road, in the
20 direction of the town of Vucitrn. In the course of these actions, forces
21 of the FRY and Serbia harassed, beat, and killed approximately 104 Kosovo
22 Albanians. Those persons killed who are known by name are set forth in
23 Schedule H, which is attached as an appendix to this indictment.
24 On or about the 22nd of May, 1999, in the early morning hours, a
25 uniformed person in the Dubrava Prison complex of the Istok municipality
1 announced from a watchtower that all prisoners were to gather their
2 personal belongings and line up on the sports field at the prison complex
3 for transfer to the prison in Nis, Serbia. Within a very short time,
4 hundreds of prisoners had gathered at the sports field with bags of
5 personal belongings and lined up in rows to await transport. Without
6 warning, uniformed persons opened fire on the prisoners from the
7 watchtower, from holes in the perimeter wall and from gun emplacements
8 beyond the wall. Many prisoners were killed outright and others wounded.
9 On or about the 23rd of May, 1999, in the afternoon, forces of the
10 FRY and Serbia threw grenades and shot into the drains, sewers, buildings
11 and basements, killing and wounding many additional prisoners who had
12 sought refuge in those locations after the events of the previous day.
13 Altogether, approximately 50 prisoners were killed. Many of the murdered
14 persons remain unidentified; however, the names of those persons who are
15 known to have been killed are set forth in Schedule J, which is attached
16 as an appendix to this indictment.
17 During the period between March 1999 and May 1999, forces of the
18 FRY and Serbia launched a series of massive offensives against several
19 villages in the municipality of Kacanik, which resulted in the murder of
20 over 100 civilians.
21 On or about the 24th of March, 1999, the village of Kotlina was
22 attacked by the forces of the FRY and Serbia. In the course of the
23 attack, most of the houses were burnt down and at least 17 persons were
24 killed. Some of those killed were captured in the woods, executed, and
25 then thrown into wells. Explosives were thrown on top of the wells.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 On or about the 13th of April, 1999, forces of the FRY and Serbia
2 surrounded the village of Slatina and the hamlet of Vata. After shelling
3 the village, infantry troops and police entered the village and looted and
4 burnt the houses. During this action, 13 civilians were shot and killed.
5 On or about the 21st of May, 1999, the village of Stagovo was
6 surrounded by forces of the FRY and Serbia. The population tried to
7 escape toward the mountains east of the village. During this action, at
8 least 12 persons were killed. Most of the village was looted and burnt
10 On or about the 25th of May, 1999, forces of FRY and Serbia
11 surrounded the village of Dubrava. As the forces entered the village, the
12 population was ordered to gather at the school and leave the village on
13 tractors. Men were then separated from women and children. During this
14 action, four men were killed. In addition, four members of the Qorri
15 family were killed while trying to escape towards the woods. Those
16 persons killed in the municipality of Kacanik who are known by name are
17 set forth in Schedule L, which is attached as an appendix to this
19 By these acts and omissions, Slobodan Milosevic, and others known
20 and unknown, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
21 and abetted the planning, preparation, and execution of the following
23 Count 3: Murder, a crime against humanity, punishable under
24 Article 5(a) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
25 Count 4: Murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war,
1 punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal, and recognised
2 by Article 3(1)(a) (murder) of the Geneva Conventions.
3 Count 5. Persecutions.
4 The Prosecutor re-alleges from paragraphs 55 to 66 and
5 incorporates them into this count.
6 Beginning on or about the 1st of January, 1999, and continuing
7 until the 20th of June, 1999, the forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at
8 the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan
9 Milosevic, and others known and unknown, utilised the means and methods
10 set forth in paragraphs 55 to 66 to execute a campaign of persecution
11 against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population based on political,
12 racial, or religious grounds. These persecutions included, but were not
13 limited to, the following means:
14 The forcible transfer and deportation by forces of the FRY and
15 Serbia of approximately 800,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians as described in
16 paragraphs 55 to 64.
17 The murder of hundreds of Kosovo Albanian civilians by forces of
18 the FRY and Serbia as described in paragraphs 65 to 66.
19 The sexual assault by forces of the FRY and Serbia of Kosovo
20 Albanians, in particular women, including the sexual assaults described in
21 paragraphs 57 and 63.
22 The wanton destruction or damage of Kosovo Albanian religious
23 sites. During and after the attacks on the towns and villages, forces of
24 FRY and Serbia systematically damaged and destroyed cultural monuments and
25 Muslim sacred sites. Mosques were shelled, burned and dynamited
1 throughout the province. Included among the incidents are the following:
2 the damage and/or destruction of mosques in Vucitrn, Suva Reka, Celina,
3 Rogovo, Bela Crkva, Cirez, Kotlina, Ivaja, Brestovac, Velika Krusa,
4 Kosovska Mitrovica, Vlastica, Landovice and Djakovica, as described in
5 paragraph 63.
6 By these acts and omissions, Slobodan Milosevic, and others known
7 and unknown, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
8 and abetted the planning, preparation, and execution of the following
10 Count 5: Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds,
11 a crime against humanity, punishable under Article 5(h) of the Statute of
12 the Tribunal.
13 General Allegations.
14 At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of armed
15 conflict existed in Kosovo in the FRY. All acts and omissions charged as
16 crimes against humanity were part of a widespread or systematic attack
17 directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population of Kosovo in the
19 Additional Facts --
20 JUDGE MAY: It's now 1.00, and that would be a convenient time to
21 adjourn. We will adjourn now for an hour and a half. Half past two.
22 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 2.32 a.m.
2 JUDGE MAY: Let the reading resume.
3 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Additional Facts.
4 The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is located in the
5 southern part of the Republic of Serbia, a constituent republic of the
6 FRY. The territory now comprising the FRY was part of the SFRY. The
7 Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is bordered on the north and
8 northwest by Montenegro, another constituent republic of the FRY. On the
9 southwest, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is bordered by
10 the Republic of Albania, and to the south, by Macedonia. The capital of
11 the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija is Pristina.
12 In 1990, the Socialist Republic of Serbia promulgated a new
13 Constitution which, among other things, changed the names of the republic
14 and the autonomous provinces. The name of the Socialist Republic of
15 Serbia was changed to the Republic of Serbia, the name of the Socialist
16 Autonomous Province of Kosovo was changed to the Autonomous Province of
17 Kosovo and Metohija, and the name of the Socialist Autonomous Province of
18 Vojvodina was changed to the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. During
19 this same period, the Socialist Republic of Montenegro changed its name to
20 the Republic of Montenegro.
21 In 1974, a new SFRY Constitution had provided for a devolution of
22 power from the central government to the six constituent republics of the
23 country. Within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina were given considerable
24 autonomy including control of their educational systems, judiciary, and
25 police. They were also given their own provincial assemblies, and were
1 represented in the Assembly, the Constitutional Court, and the Presidency
2 of the SFRY.
3 In the 1981 census, the last census with near universal
4 participation, the total population of Kosovo was approximately 1,585,000
5 of which 1,227,000, or rather 77 per cent, were Albanians, and 210,000, or
6 13 per cent, were Serbs. Only estimates for the population of Kosovo in
7 1991 are available because Kosovo Albanians boycotted the census
8 administered that year. General estimates are that the population of
9 Kosovo during the time period relevant to this indictment was between
10 1,800,000 and 2,100,000, of which approximately 85 to 90 per cent were
11 Kosovo Albanians and 5 to 10 per cent were Serbs.
12 During the 1980s, Serbs voiced concern about discrimination
13 against them by the Kosovo Albanian-led provincial government while Kosovo
14 Albanians voiced concern about economic underdevelopment and called for
15 greater political liberalisation and republican status for Kosovo. From
16 1981 onwards, Kosovo Albanians staged demonstrations, which were
17 suppressed by the SFRY military and police forces of Serbia.
18 In April 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, who had been elected Chairman
19 of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of
20 Serbia in 1986, travelled to Kosovo. In meetings with local Serb leaders
21 and in a speech before a crowd of Serbs, Slobodan Milosevic endorsed a
22 Serbian nationalist agenda. In so doing, he broke with the party and
23 government policy which had restricted nationalist expression in the SFRY
24 since the time of its founding by Josip Broz Tito after the Second World
25 War. Thereafter, Slobodan Milosevic exploited a growing wave of Serbian
1 nationalism in order to strengthen centralised rule in the SFRY.
2 In September 1987, Slobodan Milosevic and his supporters gained
3 control of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia.
4 In 1988, Slobodan Milosevic was re-elected as Chairman of the Presidium of
5 the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. From that
6 influential position, Slobodan Milosevic was able to further develop his
7 political power.
8 From July 1988 to March, 1989, a series of demonstrations and
9 rallies supportive of Slobodan Milosevic's policies - the so-called
10 "Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution" - took place in Vojvodina and Montenegro.
11 These protests led to the ouster of the respective provincial and
12 republican governments; the new governments were then supportive of and
13 indebted to Slobodan Milosevic.
14 Simultaneously, within Serbia, calls for bringing Kosovo under
15 stronger Serbian rule intensified and numerous demonstrations addressing
16 this issue were held. On the 17th of November, 1988, high-ranking Kosovo
17 Albanian political figures were dismissed from their positions within the
18 provincial leadership and were replaced by appointees loyal to Slobodan
19 Milosevic. In early 1989, the Serbian Assembly proposed amendments to the
20 Constitution of Serbia which would strip Kosovo of most of its autonomous
21 powers, including control of the police, education and economic policy,
22 and choice of official language, as well as its veto powers over further
23 changes to the Constitution of Serbia. Kosovo Albanians demonstrated in
24 large numbers against the proposed changes. Beginning in February 1989, a
25 strike by Kosovo Albanian miners further increased tensions.
1 Due to the political unrest, on March the 3rd, 1989, the SFRY
2 Presidency declared that the situation in the province had deteriorated
3 and had become a threat to the constitution, integrity, and sovereignty of
4 the country. The government then imposed "special measures" which
5 assigned responsibility for public security to the federal government
6 instead of the Government of Serbia.
7 On 23rd of March, 1989, the Assembly the Kosovo met in Pristina,
8 voted to accept the proposed amendments to the Constitution, and with the
9 majority of Kosovo Albanian delegates abstaining. Although lacking the
10 required two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the President of the
11 Assembly nonetheless declared that the amendments had passed. On the 28th
12 of March, 1989, the Assembly of Serbia voted to approve the constitutional
13 changes, effectively revoking the autonomy granted in the 1974
15 At the same time these changes were occurring in Kosovo, Slobodan
16 Milosevic further increased his political power when he became the
17 President of Serbia. Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of the
18 Presidency of Serbia on the 8th of May, 1989, and his post was formally
19 confirmed on the 6th of December, 1989.
20 In early 1990, Kosovo Albanians held mass demonstrations calling
21 for an end to the "special measures." In April 1990, the SFRY Presidency
22 lifted the "special measures" and removed most of the federal police
23 forces as Serbia took over responsibility for police enforcement in
25 In July 1990, the Assembly of Serbia passed a decision to suspend
1 the Assembly of Kosovo shortly 114 of the 123 Kosovo Albanian delegates
2 from that Assembly had passed an unofficial resolution declaring Kosovo an
3 equal and independent entity within the SFRY. In September 1990, many of
4 these same Kosovo Albanian delegates proclaimed a constitution for a
5 republic of Kosovo. One year later, in September 1991, Kosovo Albanians
6 held an unofficial referendum in which they voted overwhelmingly for
7 independence. On the 24th of May, 1992, Kosovo Albanians held unofficial
8 elections for an assembly and President for the republic of Kosovo.
9 On the 16th of July, 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and
10 the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia joined to form the
11 Socialist Party of Serbia, the SPS, and Slobodan Milosevic was elected its
12 President. As the successor to the League of Communists, the SPS became
13 the dominant political party in Serbia, and Slobodan Milosevic, as
14 President of the SPS, was able to wield considerable power and influence
15 over many branches of the government as well as the private sector. Milan
16 Milutinovic and Nikola Sainovic have both held prominent positions within
17 the SPS. Nikola Sainovic was a member of the Main Committee and Executive
18 Council as well as vice-chairman; and Milan Milutinovic successfully ran
19 for President of Serbia in 1997 as the SPS candidate.
20 After the adoption of the new constitution of Serbia on the 28th
21 of September 1990, Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of Serbia in
22 multi-party elections held on the 9th and 26th of December, 1990. He was
23 re-elected on the 20th of December, 1992. In December 1991, Nikola
24 Sainovic was appointed a Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia.
25 After Kosovo's autonomy was effectively revoked in 1989, the
1 political situation in Kosovo became more and more divisive. Throughout
2 late 1990 and 1991, thousands of Kosovo Albanian doctors, teachers,
3 professors, workers, police, and civil servants were dismissed from their
4 positions. The local court in Kosovo was abolished and many judges
5 removed. Police violence against Kosovo Albanians increased.
6 During this period, the unofficial Kosovo Albanian leadership
7 pursued a policy of non-violent civil resistance and began establishing a
8 system of unofficial, parallel institutions in the health care and
9 education sectors.
10 In late June 1991, the SFRY began to disintegrate in a succession
11 of wars fought in the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, and
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the 25th of June, 1991, Slovenia declared its
13 independence from the SFRY, which led to the outbreak of war. A peace
14 agreement was reached on the 8th of July, 1991. Croatia declared its
15 independence on the 25th of June, 1991, leading to fighting between
16 Croatian military forces on the one side, and the JNA, paramilitary units,
17 and the Army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina on the other.
18 On the 6th of March, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its
19 independence, resulting in wide-scale war after the 6th of April, 1992.
20 On the 27th of April, 1992, the SFRY was reconstituted as the FRY. At
21 this time, the JNA was reorganised as the VJ. In the war in Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina, the JNA, and later the VJ, fought along with the Army of
23 Republika Srpska against military forces of the Government of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina and the Croats Defence Council. Active hostilities ceased
25 with the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Although Slobodan Milosevic was the President of Serbia during the
2 wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was nonetheless
3 the dominant Serbian political figure exercising de facto control of the
4 federal government as well as the republican government and was the person
5 with whom the International Community negotiated a variety of peace plans
6 and agreements related to these wars.
7 While the wars were being conducted in Slovenia, Croatia, and
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in Kosovo, while tense, did not
9 erupt into the violence and intense fighting seen in the other countries.
10 In the mid-1990s, however, a faction of the Kosovo Albanians organised a
11 group known as Ushtria Clirimatre e Kosoves, the UCK, or known in English
12 as the Kosovo Liberation Army. This group advocated a campaign of armed
13 insurgency and violent resistance to the Serbian authorities. In
14 mid-1996, the KLA began launching attacks primarily targeting police --
15 Serbian police forces. Thereafter and throughout 1997, Serbian police
16 forces responded with forceful operations against suspected KLA bases and
17 supporters in Kosovo.
18 After concluding his term as President of Serbia, Slobodan
19 Milosevic was elected President of the FRY on the 15th of July, 1997, and
20 assumed office on the 23rd of July, 1997. Thereafter, elections for the
21 office of the President of Serbia were held; Milan Milutinovic ran as the
22 SPS candidate and was elected President of Serbia on the 21st of December,
23 1997. In 1996, 1997, and 1998, Nikola Sainovic was re-appointed Deputy
24 Prime Minister of the FRY. In part through his close alliance with Milan
25 Milutinovic, Slobodan Milosevic was able to retain his influence over the
1 Government of Serbia.
2 Beginning in late February 1998, the conflict intensified between
3 the KLA, on the one hand, and the forces of the FRY and Serbia, on the
4 other. A number of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs were killed and
5 wounded during this time. Forces of the FRY and Serbia engaged in a
6 campaign of shelling predominantly Kosovo Albanian towns and villages,
7 widespread destruction of property, and expulsions of the civilian
8 population from areas in which the KLA was active. Many residents fled
9 the territory as a result of the fighting and destruction or were forced
10 to move to other areas within Kosovo. The United Nations estimates that
11 by mid-October 1998, over 298.000 persons, roughly 15 per cent of the
12 population, had been internally displaced within Kosovo or had left the
14 In response to the intensifying conflict, the United Nations
15 Security Council, or the UNSC, passed Resolution 1160 in March
16 1998 "condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces
17 against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo," and imposed an
18 arms embargo on the import of weapons into the FRY. Six months later the
19 UNSC passed Resolution 1199, dating to 1998, which stated that "the
20 deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
21 constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region." The Security
22 Council demanded that all parties cease hostilities and that the security
23 forces used for civilian repression be withdrawn.
24 In an attempt to diffuse tensions in Kosovo, negotiations between
25 Slobodan Milosevic and representatives of NATO and the OSCE were conducted
1 in October 1998. An agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was
2 signed on the 16th of October, 1998. This agreement and
3 the "Clark-Naumann agreement," which was signed by Nikola Sainovic,
4 provided for the partial withdrawal of forces of the FRY and Serbia from
5 Kosovo, a limitation on the introduction of additional forces and
6 equipment into the area, and the deployment of unarmed OSCE verifiers.
7 Although scores of OSCE verifiers were deployed throughout Kosovo,
8 hostilities continued. During this period, international verifiers and
9 human rights organisations documented a number of killings of Kosovo
10 Albanians. In one such incident, on 15 January 1999, 45 unarmed Kosovo
11 Albanians were murdered in the village of Racak in the municipality of
13 In a further response to the continuing conflict in Kosovo, an
14 international peace conference was organised in Rambouillet, France
15 beginning on the 7th of February, 1999. Nikola Sainovic, the Deputy Prime
16 Minister of the FRY, was a member of the Serbian delegation at the peace
17 talks and Milan Milutinovic, President of Serbia, was also present during
18 the negotiations. The Kosovo Albanians were represented by the KLA and a
19 delegation of Kosovo Albanian political and civic leaders. Despite
20 intensive negotiations over several weeks, the peace talks collapsed in
21 mid-March 1999.
22 During the peace negotiations in France, the violence in Kosovo
23 continued. In late February and early March, forces of the FRY and Serbia
24 launched a series of offensives against dozens of predominantly Kosovo
25 Albanian villages and towns. The FRY military forces were comprised of
1 elements of the VJ's 3rd Army, specifically the 52nd Corps, also known as
2 the Pristina Corps, and several brigades and regiments under the command
3 of the Pristina Corps. At all times relevant to this indictment, the
4 Chief of the General Staff of the VJ, with command responsibilities over
5 the 3rd Army and ultimately over the 52nd Corps, was Colonel General
6 Dragoljub Ojdanic. At all times relevant to this indictment, the Supreme
7 Commander of the VJ was Slobodan Milosevic.
8 The police forces taking part in the actions in Kosovo were
9 members of the MUP. At all times relevant to this indictment, all police
10 forces employed by or working under the authority of the MUP were
11 commanded by Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia.
12 Under the FRY Law on Defence, those police forces engaged in military
13 operations during a state of war or imminent threat of war are
14 subordinated to the command of the VJ, whose commanders, at all times
15 relevant to this indictment, were Colonel General Dragoljub Ojdanic and
16 Slobodan Milosevic.
17 During their offensives, forces of the FRY and Serbia acting in
18 concert engaged in a well-planned and coordinated campaign of destruction
19 of property owned by Kosovo Albanian civilians. Towns and villages were
20 shelled, homes, farms, and businesses were burned, and personal property
21 destroyed. As a result of these orchestrated actions, towns, villages,
22 and entire regions were made uninhabitable for Kosovo Albanians.
23 Additionally, forces of the FRY and Serbia harassed, humiliated, and
24 degraded Kosovo Albanian civilians through physical and verbal abuse. The
25 Kosovo Albanians were also persistently subjected to insults, racial
1 slurs, degrading acts based on ethnicity and religion, beatings, and other
2 forms of physical mistreatment.
3 The unlawful deportation and forcible transfer of thousands of
4 Kosovo Albanians from their homes in Kosovo involved well-planned and
5 coordinated efforts by the leaders of the FRY and Serbia, and forces of
6 the FRY and Serbia, all acting in concert. Actions similar in nature took
7 place during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1991
8 and 1995. During those wars, Serbian military, paramilitary, and police
9 forces forcibly expelled and deported non-Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina from areas under Serbian control, utilising the same method of
11 operations as were used in Kosovo in 1999: heavy shelling and armed
12 attacks on villages; widespread killings; destruction of non-Serbian
13 residential areas and cultural and religious sites; and forced transfer
14 and deportation of non-Serbian populations.
15 On the 24th of March, 1999, NATO began launching air strikes
16 against targets in the FRY. The FRY issued decrees of an imminent threat
17 of war on the 23rd of March, 1999 and a state of war on the 24th of March,
18 1999. After the air strikes commenced, forces of the FRY and Serbia
19 intensified their widespread or systematic campaign and forcibly expelled
20 hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo.
21 In addition to the forced expulsions of Kosovo Albanians, forces
22 of the FRY and Serbia also engaged in a number of killings of Kosovo
23 Albanians since the 24th of March, 1999. Such killings occurred at
24 numerous locations, including, but not limited to, Bela Crkva, Mala Krusa,
25 Velika Krusa, Djakovica, Padaliste, Izbica, Vucitrn, Meja, the Dubrava
1 prison, Suva Reka, and Kacanik.
2 By June 1999, more than 800,000 Kosovo Albanians, about one-third
3 of the entire Kosovo Albanian population, had been expelled from Kosovo.
4 Thousands more were believed to be internally displaced. An unknown
5 number of Kosovo Albanians were killed in the operations conducted by
6 forces of the FRY and Serbia.
7 On the 3rd of June, 1999, the FRY and Serbia accepted a document
8 of principles towards a resolution of the crisis in Kosovo, which was
9 presented to their representatives by Martti Ahtisaari, representing the
10 European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Special Representative of the
11 President of the Russian Federation. That document, which was followed by
12 Security Council Resolution 1244 from 1999, provided for a political
13 solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to the violence
14 and a rapid withdrawal of FRY and Serbian military, police, and
15 paramilitary forces, and the deployment of international civil and
16 security presence in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices.
17 On the 9th of June, 1999, the Military Technical Agreement was
18 signed between NATO, represented by General Sir Michael Jackson, and
19 representatives of the VJ and the MUP, providing for the withdrawal of all
20 forces of the FRY and Serbia from Kosovo. Under the terms of the Military
21 Technical Agreement, the NATO bombing campaign against targets in the FRY
22 would terminate upon the complete withdrawal of forces of the FRY and
23 Serbia. On the 20th of June, 1999, KFOR, the Kosovo Force, announced that
24 the withdrawal of forces of the FRY and Serbia from the territory of
25 Kosovo was complete.
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, that completes the reading. Thank you.
2 It remains on this indictment for the new Count 2 to be put to the
3 accused for him to enter a plea.
4 Slobodan Milosevic, the new Count 2 charges, in relation to the
5 Kosovo Albanians who were internally displaced, you with other inhumane
6 acts, forcible transfer, punishable under Article 5(i) of the Statute of
7 the Tribunal. To that count, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to say to you that the very
9 text that we have just heard in itself shows that the indictment is false,
10 and also that the evidence looked for by Mr. Robinson in connection with
11 the impartiality of that indictment and the Prosecution for two reasons.
12 First of all --
13 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- the parties to the conflict are
15 being changed --
16 JUDGE MAY: -- we are not here to hear argument at the moment.
17 The only matter is for you to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty. In
18 the event -- in the event -- don't interrupt. In the event of your not
19 entering a plea, the Trial Chamber has a power to enter a plea of not
20 guilty. That we will do. You will have an opportunity, as you know quite
21 well, Mr. Milosevic, to address us at other times. Enter a plea of not
22 guilty to that count.
23 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
24 JUDGE MAY: We shall move on to the next part of the hearing.
25 Mr. Milosevic, you've had your -- you will have your opportunity, as I've
1 said, to address us. Now is not the time. The only matter for you to do
2 is to enter a plea. Now that has been dealt with. We will move on to the
3 next part of the hearing which concerns the reading of the Croatian
5 Mr. Milosevic, will you be quiet, please.
6 We will go on to the next matter which is the hearing of the
7 Croatian indictment and the Initial Appearance on that.
8 Yes, Mr. Wladimiroff.
9 MR. WLADIMIROFF: May it please the Court. May I assume that the
10 Court takes the absence of a plea as a plea of not guilty?
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If I didn't say so, I make it plain that it's a
12 plea of not guilty.
13 --- Whereupon the Motion Hearing adjourned
14 at 3.03 p.m. to be followed by the Initial