1 Tuesday, 14 May 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can we just tidy up a few things arising

7 from yesterday's cross-examination and sort out the exhibits. But before

8 I come to those, there is one point that I would have dealt with in

9 re-examination which I think is important to point out straight away.

10 The Court may remember some cross-examination about the

11 discoveries at Racak by an Irish OSCE member called Eamonn Smith, and

12 there was the suggestion being made that ammunition of Chinese manufacture

13 had been found. And when challenged about the nature of his

14 cross-examination, the accused moved us on.

15 Now, the statement of Smith and another man with whom he was

16 working at the time say absolutely nothing about Chinese manufacture. On

17 the contrary, the only identification so far as the ammunition is

18 concerned in both of their statements taken together is that there was

19 Cyrillic writing on some of the ammunition found in the area. The matter

20 having been raised, I'll deal with it evidentially, probably, in due

21 course, as I now must.

22 The exhibits, we've done our best to make things easy for the --

23 for us overnight by draft translations of untranslated documents, but I've

24 barely looked at some of them myself because they've only just become

25 available. Can I suggest we -- to avoid things getting unsatisfactory or

1 being found to be unsatisfactory later, can I suggest that we deal with

2 the exhibits that the accused presented in the order in which he presented

3 them.

4 So if we start with Exhibit D2, which is this document, we do have

5 a translation in English of that, and I'm going to invite the Chamber to

6 say that this is not a document that it should accept at the moment

7 because it's basically an expert report. Now, expert reports can be

8 admitted as part of a party's evidence, and if they are presented, the

9 other party has a right to cross-examine. If this document is simply

10 taken, its status is entirely unclear but it no doubt will be relied upon

11 as an expert's report without the expert being called.

12 So if I can ask you to consider it and with that objection in

13 mind. You will see that it's a publication, scientific journal, headed

14 the Racak case, then there are the authors, Dobricanin, Matejic, Milosevic

15 and Jaksic. There is then -- the subject, it's a discussion of the Racak

16 incident and the result of autopsies on the bodies. There's then a

17 history. And then over the page, an introduction and some reference to

18 factual matters, as we can see, with William Walker's name. Then on the

19 third page, the findings and discussion.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We see this. One suggestion is that we mark it

21 for identification and not admit it.

22 MR. NICE: I can't improve on that. Then can we come to the next

23 one, which is D3. This one was a document I was going to introduce in

24 re-examination myself in any event, and I did ask the witness one question

25 about it. It's the report of the Judge, the investigating local Judge,

1 Danica Marinkovic, and we have a draft translation for you of that.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

3 MR. NICE: I've already referred to the one point that I wanted to

4 refer to, and so there's no objection to that as a document.

5 We then come --

6 JUDGE MAY: Let's hand those round so we've got them.

7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next document is D4, which the accused

8 presented without any translation. We do have this in-house so there's no

9 challenge to its provenance or anything of that sort, and I've now been

10 able to provide a draft report -- draft translation. So although we're

11 using the version submitted by the accused, there being no reason not to,

12 it does exist in the files here with the ERN number should we need it.

13 The draft translation of D4 shows it to be an on-site

14 investigation report, signed again by that same judge, and summarising

15 bodies found and dealing with the report of lists of weapons, trenches,

16 and so on. So that becomes D4.

17 There are then three more documents, and I don't know what numbers

18 have been associated with which and in which order. He handed in three

19 more documents, which we've tried to process overnight and we have now

20 obtained draft translations.

21 JUDGE MAY: Are these the Internet documents?

22 MR. NICE: I'm not sure what he said about them.

23 JUDGE MAY: Well, before we get there, there is the extract from

24 the Human Rights Watch book.

25 MR. NICE: Right. Well, that book we have for you. We don't have

1 quite enough copies to meet our usual copy provision duties, but we have

2 enough for the Chamber and Registry and the accused and so on. And it's

3 much like "As Seen As Told," the book summarising events from all

4 perspectives, and the accused wanted it to go before you and we would be

5 happy for that to happen. So can --

6 JUDGE MAY: Very well. That should have -- that should have the

7 next number. Which is the number of the book, please?

8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, we actually skipped one before we get

9 to --

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Because we've given another Exhibit D5.

12 JUDGE MAY: Let's go back to the book. That would suit you if

13 it's D6, would it?

14 THE REGISTRAR: Correct, Your Honour. D6.

15 JUDGE MAY: So the book will be D6. Now let us go back to D5.

16 MR. NICE: And if the Registry could hold up whichever D5 is so

17 that I know which one it is.

18 JUDGE MAY: If you give it to me, I'll deal with it. Yes.

19 Of course, having said that, it's in B/C/S.

20 MR. NICE: If Your Honour could hold it up, I --

21 JUDGE MAY: It's the number numbered 4 by the accused. Perhaps

22 the simplest thing is to hand it to the Prosecution.

23 MR. NICE: Yes. Right. We can hand in a draft translation of

24 that. I have barely read it myself. It's a document that purports to be

25 from the Republic of Serbia's Autonomous Province of Kosovo, dated the 9th

1 of March 1999. It says that it is official notes made on the 9th of

2 March, following the analysis of material from the pre-criminal

3 proceedings in connection with the Racak incident. And the draft and

4 probably summary translation goes on to say that the deaths were not

5 caused by a criminal act committed by members of the RS MUP.

6 Now, I know nothing of this document. I'm in no position to

7 accept its authenticity. I know nothing of its provenance, and I find it

8 hard to see how it can be admitted for any purposes save if it's admitted

9 for -- at this stage for identification but not for --

10 [Trial Chamber confers]

11 JUDGE MAY: We will mark it for identification and not admit it.

12 MR. NICE: Now, there are two more documents. One appears to be

13 an extract from a book and one is something that the draft translation is

14 apparently part of a speech, although the single sheet -- I don't know

15 which number is going for which at the moment. Can we come to the

16 one-page document next or the, I think it's the three- or four-page

17 document.

18 JUDGE MAY: Is there a further extract from a book?

19 MR. NICE: Yes. If this is the extract from --

20 JUDGE MAY: We've got two now in front of us. One is the excerpt

21 from the book, the other one is a draft speech.

22 Turning first to the excerpt from the book.

23 MR. NICE: If we can be told what number that would have. I'm not

24 going to object to its production. I don't know anything about the book

25 at the moment.

1 The Chamber will see that the points that I think the accused rely

2 on are on the second page of the draft translation where there's a

3 reference to Mrs. Ranta, and the Court's already indicated to the accused

4 that Mrs. Ranta can always be called as a witness if her material is to go

5 in. Whether the book should be identified at this stage as an exhibit or

6 simply produced for identification purposes is a matter about which I'm

7 comparatively neutral.

8 JUDGE MAY: I think this would be 7; is that right? D7?

9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be marked Defence Exhibit D7.

10 MR. NICE: Is that being produced or for identification only?

11 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE MAY: We'll admit that.

14 MR. NICE: Very well. And then the last one, I think, which must

15 become Exhibit 8 is a -- Exhibit 8 is simply a photocopy, as I have it, a

16 part photocopy of part of a sheet of paper which is said in the draft

17 translation to be a draft speech for the second anniversary of the Lodza

18 battle, and it is a speech praising the KLA. Where it comes from, who is

19 it by --

20 JUDGE MAY: We'll mark that for identification. D8; is that

21 right?

22 THE REGISTRAR: Correct, Your Honour.

23 MR. NICE: In which case, Your Honour, I think that tidies up the

24 exhibits from yesterday.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. There are, I'm told, three other documents which

1 the accused wished to have admitted. Perhaps I could have them in front

2 of me. They are marked -- he has marked them 8, 9, and 10. They are,

3 apparently, one from the Wall Street Journal -- in any event, have you got

4 these?

5 MR. NICE: I haven't seen them.

6 JUDGE MAY: Well, perhaps it would be convenient -- we will stop

7 there for the moment on these exhibits. You might like to have a look at

8 those ones, and you can address us on it. And I will also explain to the

9 accused what has happened so far and give him the chance to address us on

10 it.

11 Mr. Milosevic, as you've heard, we've been going through the

12 various documents which you produced yesterday and asked for admission.

13 The last three which have come from the Internet we will deal with later

14 when the Prosecution have had a chance of considering them.

15 The position is this: That we've admitted all the documents so far

16 but for two -- three, I should say. We have not admitted the report from

17 the scientific journal of the faculty of medicine. That appears to be an

18 expert report. At the moment, it's been marked for identification, which

19 means that it's been noted that it's been put in but it hasn't been

20 admitted, and you'll have to call evidence about that if you want it

21 admitted.

22 The next item which we've not admitted is described as an official

23 note of the Republic of Serbia, Province of Kosovo and Metohija, District

24 Public Prosecutor's Office, dated the 9th of March, 1999. And similarly,

25 the letter on the second anniversary of the Lodza battle, again a draft.

1 And the reason that they have not been admitted but simply marked for

2 identification is that they -- the provenance where these items come from

3 isn't clear. And again, if you want them admitted, you'll have to call

4 some evidence about that to explain what the documents are.

5 Now, is there anything you want to say to us about that since you

6 haven't had the opportunity of addressing us?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me start from the last one. As

8 for this exhibit, I tendered it when the witness was questioned about the

9 presence of foreign elements within the terrorist organisation of the KLA.

10 It's no draft. It is a telegram that was published. It was sent by one

11 of the KLA commanders to the participants in the anniversary of the Lodza

12 battle. They consider that to be important. You may remember that this

13 was near Pec. Some witnesses here said the civilians had been attacked.

14 It was a major battle with large scale KLA forces involved.

15 In this telegram, he thanks the fighters of the KLA and the

16 foreign units or, rather, participants from other countries, which is,

17 doubtless, additional proof that one of their so-called commanders pays

18 homage to these foreigners. And this is linked to the other exhibits that

19 you are going to look at subsequently that speak of the presence of Al

20 Qaeda in Kosovo and also other terrorist organisations that are very well

21 known in the world.

22 So this corroborates from their side as well - that is to say from

23 the side of the Albanian terrorists - the presence in their own ranks of

24 foreign fighters, these holy fighters of Al Qaeda, et cetera. So I think

25 that it can certainly be admitted into evidence.

1 Number two that you mentioned that you not including, that you are

2 not admitting, that is the public prosecutor who is in charge, and he

3 looked at this according to the law on criminal proceedings in Yugoslavia.

4 He looked at the Racak case, and he established that in accordance with

5 the law on the interior, the police intervened, or, rather, that no crime

6 was committed there. That is the position of the state authority in

7 charge, that is to say the public prosecutor in charge, whose sole right

8 is to establish whether there are grounds for criminal prosecution or not.

9 So this is an official document, and therefore, I believe that it

10 should also be admitted into evidence.

11 As for this Praxis Medica scientific journal which has not been

12 admitted so far either, I bore in mind that this document was marked by a

13 number given by this other side, K021747 -- 0212747, that is, and the

14 other pages, 8, 9, 10. Many facts were presented there, and this denies

15 any possibility of presenting Racak as a crime. This is not a political

16 text, this is a professional text, and it looks at the thoughts expounded

17 by university professors and other persons who were involved in the entire

18 proceedings. So I believe this should be admitted into evidence too.

19 I also would like to say, and I hope that I'm not making a mistake

20 because I'm not familiar with your procedures, this also means that the

21 tapes I played here and that have to do with everything that you have seen

22 - I don't have to describe all of that now, the presence, et, et cetera

23 - that all this should be exhibits too because --

24 JUDGE MAY: Let me stop you there and see if there's any

25 opposition to that. The tape.

1 MR. NICE: That the tapes be exhibited? They should be. I had

2 overlooked that and they should have been given a number.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we should have dealt with it at the time. What

4 would a number be?

5 THE REGISTRAR: We will give the videotape Defence Exhibit D9.

6 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, since you mentioned your lack of

9 familiarity with the procedures, I'd like to point out that the forensic

10 report that you sought to have tendered is governed by a particular

11 procedure, the testimony of expert witnesses, and what is to be done is

12 that you should file the statement of the forensic analyst as an expert

13 witness, and the other party will have, I think it is 30 days within which

14 to indicate whether it accepts the statement or whether it wishes to

15 cross-examine the expert witness, which is the point that Mr. Nice made.

16 So that the other party does have a right to cross-examine, and that is

17 why we were not able to admit it. If the other party wishes to accept

18 that statement, then the statement can be admitted and would be admitted

19 without cross-examination.

20 So that is the particular procedure relating to the forensic

21 report, and you will no doubt wish to bear that in mind.

22 Well, the other -- the other exhibits that you sought to have

23 tendered, we have marked for identification for different reasons relating

24 to the provenance, as explained by the Presiding Judge.

25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it may assist the accused, now that he's

1 obviously researching the materials we're supplying to him, to understand

2 that where material is supplied under, for example, Rule 68 as being

3 potentially exculpatory, that doesn't mean it can simply go in as an

4 exhibit because it's been produced by us. It's simply handed over by us

5 as material that may assist him, but the rules of production of exhibits

6 are still going to apply.

7 As to the newspaper articles, I'll read them as soon as I can. In

8 any event, the Court will remember that there's an outstanding bundle of

9 newspaper articles that were considered in part by the accused, put in in

10 part by the accused, and being further considered by us. It may be in due

11 course it will be sensible to have a single collection of newspaper

12 articles and simply to add to them with any newspaper articles that the

13 Chamber thinks is useful.

14 JUDGE MAY: We should deal with those three before we forget the

15 point.

16 MR. NICE: Yes. I'll deal with them all collectively, I hope, by

17 tomorrow.

18 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

19 MR. NICE: I think, incidentally, it was more than one video that

20 the accused produced. The booth will know. I think it was three or two

21 rather than one in three parts.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, it was one video and he had different

23 segments on one video.

24 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.

25 Mr. Nice, while you're on your feet, it may be convenient to deal

1 with another matter, which is the next batch of Rule 92 bis witnesses.

2 MR. NICE: Yes.

3 JUDGE MAY: It may be you're not in a position to deal with them,

4 but can I indicate the preliminary view of the Trial Chamber about them?

5 It reflects particularly K5.

6 The witnesses who deal with Racak - that's Bilal, Avdu, Drita

7 Emini, Agron Mehmeti, and Xhemajl Beqiri, Nesret Shabani, those statements

8 are all admissible. However, the Chamber is not at the moment satisfied

9 as to K5.

10 MR. NICE: This is the -- can I come back to K5 at a slightly

11 later stage? You mean he's not permissible under 92 bis.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I'm not sure that's an appropriate procedure,

13 given the nature of the evidence.

14 MR. NICE: In which case, if that's the provisional view, and

15 unless I'm able to persuade you to the contrary, his evidence will have to

16 be given in full.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

18 MR. NICE: The issue of the summarising witness will turn up

19 fairly soon. That's Barney Kelly. I'm going to have prepared, I hope

20 today, a note on the relevant law. It's been before this Chamber

21 similarly but not identically composed in the past and will be familiar

22 territory but it ought to be served on the amici and on the accused and

23 I'll try to have that done today or tomorrow so that a very short oral

24 presentation by me will remind the Chamber of the issues.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

1 MR. NICE: Can I have a couple of minutes in private session to

2 deal with protection of witnesses, but it really is only a couple of

3 minutes and then we'll be ready to press on with the next witness.

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11 [Open session]

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're now in open session.

13 MR. NICE: Just before the witness is called by Mr. Saxon, one

14 other administrative matter. The next report on disclosure under Rule 68

15 will be served on all the parties, I hope, tomorrow, bringing things

16 up-to-date.

17 In our efforts to ensure that we set the parameters for Rule 68

18 appropriate -- in an appropriate way for this case, we are considering the

19 requests by the accused Ojdanic, as he sent a detailed request setting his

20 parameters, and we are considering those. It is rather helpful to have

21 those parameters in mind because of the proximity of the two accused, in

22 association with the two accused.

23 I'll hand it over to Mr. Saxon.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have something to say with respect

25 to procedure. One more technical matter, if I may.

1 I was informed yesterday that for this week, we have a new

2 witness, Merovci, who would be heard immediately after the secret witness

3 that nobody has ever heard of. So once again, I demand that the order of

4 witnesses be ascertained for at least one week and not to have changes and

5 surprises each week which I cannot hear about when I'm in the detention

6 centre during the weekend. I hear about them on a Monday, usually by the

7 end of business on Monday, as to who the next witness will be or the

8 witness after. And usually there's somebody new who appears every time

9 whose statement I do not have or whose statement I received the night

10 before and so on and so forth.

11 So --

12 JUDGE MAY: Let us see what the position is.

13 MR. NICE: Merovci was originally scheduled as the very first

14 witness in the case so that he should have been the subject of preparation

15 at that stage. He was unable to attend at that early stage and eventually

16 became available whenever it was, I think last week, and he was notified

17 as a witness coming this week last Thursday, so the accused should have

18 had a week to remind himself of the preparation he no doubt would already

19 have made at the beginning of the trial.

20 JUDGE MAY: Clearly, though, it is -- just a moment. Clearly it's

21 difficult for him in the circumstances which he's in in the Detention

22 Unit. So we must ask you to keep this to a minimum.

23 How long will this witness be, the next two witnesses?

24 MR. NICE: It will take all of tomorrow, I'm sure. The first

25 witness won't take very long, but once we start K3, that will take all of

1 tomorrow, I'm sure.

2 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes. No. We -- we --

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is quite untrue that I was

4 informed on Thursday. The Registrar informed me of this yesterday, just

5 yesterday, on the first working day of the week, that Merovci has been

6 included for testimony this week. I received no information on Thursday.

7 It was the last working day last week and I did not receive any

8 information to that effect.

9 JUDGE MAY: We will -- we will see in future that you are informed

10 as early as possible. That particular witness will not be giving evidence

11 today or tomorrow but, at the very earliest, on Thursday.

12 Yes.

13 MR. SAXON: Good morning, Your Honours. The Prosecution calls Mr.

14 Mr. Isuf Loku.

15 And, Your Honours, while we're waiting for the witness to come in,

16 the evidence of this witness will pertain to an area that is depicted on

17 page 12 of your Kosovo atlas, at the very bottom of the page.

18 [The witness entered court]

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

21 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

22 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

23 WITNESS: ISUF LOKU

24 [Witness answered through interpreter]

25 Examined by Mr. Saxon:

1 Q. Sir, is your name Isuf Loku?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And Mr. Loku, were you born on the 2nd of August in 1965?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Were you born in the village of Kotlina in the municipality of

6 Kacanik in Kosovo?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Is the village of Kotlina to the south of the town of Kacanik?

9 A. Yes, it is.

10 Q. Mr. Loku, on the 11th of June, 1999, did you provide a statement

11 to representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor concerning events that

12 you witnessed and experienced earlier in 1999 in Kosovo?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And on the 11th of March this year, 2002, in the village of

15 Kotlina, in the municipality of Kacanik, in the presence -- were you

16 provided with a copy of the statement that you had made in 1999 in the

17 presence of representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor and a

18 presiding officer appointed by the Registrar of this Tribunal?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And at that time, were you able to confirm that the copy of the

21 statement provided to you was true and correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, at this time I would offer the statement

24 of Mr. Loku into evidence under Rule 92 bis.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's

1 Exhibit 144.

2 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, Isuf Loku is a 36-year-old Kosovo

3 Albanian man from the village of Kotlina in the municipality of Kacanik.

4 Mr. Loku lives in the hamlet of Dreshec in Kotlina. Mr. Loku's statement

5 describes how his village was attacked by Serb forces on the 8th or 9th of

6 March, 1999. Mr. Loku hid nearby and observed that shelling was coming

7 from the direction of Globocica. Among the Serb forces were 13 tanks and

8 two armoured personnel carriers. Mr. Loku observed VJ soldiers and

9 policemen entering his village. Mr. Loku observed as these Serb forces

10 looted and burned the homes in his village. Seventeen homes were burned

11 in the village that day. Several days after this attack, Mr. Loku found

12 the bodies of two residents from Kotlina.

13 On the morning of 24 March 1999, Serb forces began to shell

14 Mr. Loku's village again. Mr. Loku and some relatives hid on the Sheshi

15 mountain nearby. Mr. Loku observed Serb forces advancing toward Kotlina.

16 Again, he saw tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Shortly thereafter,

17 Mr. Loku saw flames coming from the centre of Kotlina.

18 Mr. Loku returned to his village at about 8.00 in the evening. He

19 found one of his neighbours, Zymer Loku, who was badly wounded by

20 machine-gun fire and subsequently died. At about 10.00 that same evening,

21 Mr. Loku and other residents of his village decided to flee to Macedonia.

22 Mr. Loku arrived in Macedonia early in the morning of 25 March 1999. Two

23 of Mr. Loku's brothers disappeared after the attack on Kotlina on the 24th

24 of March, 1999.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

1 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

2 Q. [Interpretation] According to you, the village of Kotlina, on the

3 8th or 9th of March, 1999, was attacked by artillery fire; is that

4 correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. When did that happen; on the 8th or the 9th?

7 A. On the 9th.

8 Q. All right. Now, again according to you, after that attack, the

9 attack that followed from all sides - that's what you said - but mostly

10 from the direction of Globocica and the village of -- it says here Gurri i

11 Zi, I don't know what we call that in Serbian, and from the local Kashani

12 road, all the inhabitants flew from the village to take to -- fled from

13 the village to take to the mountains, Mount Sheshi; is that right?

14 A. Yes, that's right.

15 Q. Then that means -- or let me put it in the form of a question.

16 Does that mean that, as you say, the Serbs in fact attacked an empty

17 village if, as you say, all the inhabitants had taken to the Sheshi

18 mountains? So the Serbs in fact attacked an empty village, and they

19 shelled it and fought to gain control, you say, from 7.00 until 11.00 on

20 that same day. Is that it?

21 A. They shelled it from the -- from 9.00 to 11.00 from Gllobocica

22 village. Then they arrived in our village, looted it and raided it and

23 burned the houses. That was how it happened.

24 Q. I'm asking you -- and I'm taking this question by question. You

25 said everybody left. They went to hide and then they fought to gain

1 control of the village from 7.00 to 11.00. Now, tell me, please, what

2 stopped the Serb forces for a full four hours from entering the village

3 which, as you say, was empty? So what stopped the Serbs from entering for

4 a period of four hours?

5 A. They shelled the village for three hours, and then after that,

6 they arrived in our village.

7 JUDGE MAY: The question, I think, was this: Was there any reason

8 you could see why they couldn't go into the village earlier? Was there

9 any reason that occurred to you why that couldn't be done?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First they shelled it from

11 Gllobocica. After the shelling stopped, they came to the village, they

12 arrived in our village.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. And how far away is Mount Sheshi from your village?

15 A. It is very close to the village.

16 Q. Well, I guess it is close if you fled to the Sheshi mountains.

17 But I'm just asking you how nearby or how far away it is.

18 A. It is about 50 metres away from my own house, where we had taken

19 shelter in that mountain.

20 Q. Oh. You fled into a mountain that was 50 metres away from the

21 village?

22 A. We left our houses after the shelling, and we stayed there, close

23 by, as I said. Only after the shelling we left the houses and took refuge

24 in the Sheshi mountain, where we stayed.

25 Q. All right. When you sought shelter there, when you fled from your

1 houses, if I understand you correctly, you found shelter 50 metres away

2 from your house. So you fled only 50 metres away from your house. Is

3 that what you're saying?

4 A. My brothers and my neighbours were there. The others went in the

5 direction of the centre of the village.

6 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Loku, it was the distance which we're concerned

7 about. The translation appears to have come out as the mountains being 50

8 metres from your house. Is that right, 50 metres?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Let's be very specific about this. Mount Sheshi is 50 metres away

12 from your house; right?

13 A. Yes. It is about 50 metres. But the mountains is quite high, I

14 would say.

15 Q. After the shelling, you fled 50 metres away from your house and

16 you felt safe there; is that right?

17 A. It was not that we felt safe there, but that was the only place we

18 could go.

19 Q. All right. When the Serb forces entered the village, did they do

20 anything to you, because you stayed there 50 metres away from house,

21 didn't you?

22 A. They didn't see us. They entered the houses, they raided them,

23 they looted them, then burned them, and then left later.

24 Q. So you were 50 metres away from your house, but they did not see

25 you; right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. How did you manage to hide that way? Where is it that you were

3 hiding?

4 A. It is a mountain with forests, and we hid there and stayed there

5 all day.

6 Q. And how many of you were there there?

7 A. Thirteen people.

8 Q. Thirteen of you were 50 metres away from the house and nobody saw

9 you?

10 A. Yes.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Loku, perhaps you can help us with this

12 concept of 50 metres. If you look at this courtroom, from that end to

13 that end, how would you say the distance was that you fled in relation to

14 the distance in this courtroom? Was it twice as long, thrice as long or

15 six times as long, or how would you put it?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was three times as big.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Three times as long.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As long, yes.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Than you.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. All right. Actually, I don't know whether it's worth continuing,

22 but I shall continue my questions.

23 Who did you see? You were watching the soldiers enter the

24 village. They were 50 metres away from you. Who did you see?

25 A. We saw Serb and police -- Serb army and police. They were the

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1 ones that we saw.

2 Q. And how many of them were there?

3 A. There were many. I couldn't count them. They were together, army

4 and police.

5 Q. Yes. Approximately, what does "many" mean? Was there a thousand

6 of them, 2.000, 5.000, 500? How many of them were there, approximately?

7 A. I saw about 25 near my own house. That was the closest possible

8 distance I could see that.

9 Q. Near your house. And you didn't see anybody else but those 25

10 soldiers?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And did you see anybody else apart from these 25 soldiers?

13 A. No. I saw only those soldiers.

14 Q. So according to what you have been claiming, it is 25 soldiers

15 that entered your village. Yes or no.

16 JUDGE MAY: No. To be fair to the witness, he didn't say that.

17 He said he saw 25.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I'm asking

19 him. He is testifying about the number of soldiers that entered the

20 village. He said that he saw 25 of them.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's as far as he can say. He saw 25 himself.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. How many of them were policemen and how many were soldiers?

24 A. I think about ten were policemen and the others were soldiers.

25 I'm talking about those who were near my own house.

1 Q. All right. Tell me, how did they arrive there? Did they come in

2 some kind of vehicles or did they come on foot?

3 A. They came there by tanks, armoured cars, trucks; all sorts of

4 vehicles.

5 Q. How many tanks did you see?

6 A. Thirteen.

7 Q. And how many armoured vehicles did you see?

8 A. I saw two armoured vehicles. There may be more, but I only saw

9 two.

10 Q. All right. And how many trucks did you see?

11 A. Ten trucks.

12 Q. All right. In 13 tanks, ten trucks, and two armoured vehicles,

13 that's a total of 25 combat and non-combat vehicles, that is to say combat

14 and transport vehicles. Those are the ones you saw with your own eyes.

15 Twenty-five soldiers and policemen arrived in these vehicles. Is that

16 right or is that not right?

17 JUDGE MAY: That is not fair. What he said was that he saw 25

18 near his house. He's also said that there were a large number of

19 vehicles, which he's described. Now, that's his evidence.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not that way, Mr. May. If you

21 look at the transcript, you will see what I asked him. I asked him

22 whether the soldiers and the policemen came on foot or in vehicles. His

23 answer was that they came on tanks, in armoured vehicles, and trucks. And

24 I asked him how these 25 soldiers came to his place, and that was his

25 answer.

1 JUDGE MAY: We have a picture of a large force arriving in trucks

2 to the village, and 25 being seen, 25 soldiers and police being seen by

3 the witness.

4 Perhaps we should ask him this question: Do you know if any

5 police or soldiers went to any other houses besides your house?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

7 JUDGE MAY: Just let the witness answer. Let the witness answer.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't understand that you were

9 asking him.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, they did, they went to

11 other houses.

12 JUDGE MAY: Tell us what happened.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I could see them looting, raiding

14 the houses, and burning them afterwards. This is what happened.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I proceed now?

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. A short while ago, you said that you saw these 25 soldiers around

19 your own house. Now you're saying that you saw soldiers around other

20 houses as well. How many soldiers and policemen did you see around other

21 houses?

22 A. I don't know around the other houses. They were further away. I

23 saw them, but I don't know how many there were.

24 Q. All right. A minute ago you said that they were going to other

25 houses, that you saw them going to other houses, and now you say you don't

1 know what happened, that they were further away. Now, which one is the

2 truth; what you said a minute ago or what you're saying now?

3 JUDGE MAY: You know, you must be fair to the witness. There's

4 not necessarily a distinction. He saw soldiers going to other houses, but

5 he doesn't know how many.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, we hear what his answers

7 are. There is no need for you to interpret his answers. All right.

8 JUDGE MAY: No. There's no reason for you to be unfair to the

9 witness and put to him things which he didn't say. But let's move on.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Tell me, now, in your village were there ever any members of the

12 KLA?

13 A. Yes, there were -- there were not.

14 Q. I'm sorry. The interpretation I got was yes, there were, and then

15 there were not. Now, just tell me yes or no. Were there any or were

16 there not any?

17 A. No, there were not. There were no KLA in Kotlina.

18 Q. All right. And then, in your opinion, why were the Serbs shelling

19 an empty village, and why did they manage to enter this empty village only

20 four hours after they had started shelling? Empty village from 7.00 to

21 11.00, they are shelling an empty village, and then they entered at 11.00

22 and there's no one in there. Why?

23 JUDGE MAY: That's a matter for them. You'll have to ask the Serb

24 forces that. It's not for him.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That seems logical to you, Mr. May;

1 is that right?

2 JUDGE MAY: The witness can't answer for somebody else. If you've

3 got a comment about his evidence, you can make it in due course. Now,

4 let's get on to the next question.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right. All right.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. On page 1 of your statement, in the fourth paragraph, you say --

8 you can take a look at it now. The Serbs entered your village with 13

9 tanks, trucks, two combat vehicles, and there were -- there were several

10 thousand Serb soldiers. That's what you say. Is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Well, now, could you please explain this to me? I asked you how

13 many entered, and you explained to me that there were 25, that you saw 25

14 and that you didn't see anybody else, and in the statement you wrote that

15 there were several thousand of them. And I will remind you that I asked

16 you, when you said "many," I said, "How many? 500, 1.000, 2.000, 5.000?"

17 And then in response to that, you said 25. And in the statement, it says

18 several thousand. Now you said 25. Could you please explain this?

19 A. There were those that I saw near my house, but those that I didn't

20 see around the other houses. There were a lot more around other houses

21 but I saw these 25 were around my house. The others I don't know, but

22 there were a lot more of them.

23 Q. Yes. But I asked you, apart from those whom you saw near your

24 house, how many soldiers and policemen were in the village, and you said

25 to me that you don't know, that you only saw 25. In the statement that

1 you signed, you wrote that there were several thousand of them. When were

2 you telling the truth; then or now? Tell me.

3 A. Well, that's how it was.

4 Q. All right. If that is correct, what could have prevented several

5 thousand soldiers from entering that small village of yours? Why did they

6 have to wait for four hours? What do you think? Several thousand people.

7 Several thousand people entering into Kotlina.

8 A. I don't know. You may know.

9 Q. All right. But it is certain that you claim that there were

10 several thousand of them; right?

11 JUDGE MAY: Let's move on. You've made that point.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know how many there were.

13 There were a lot of them.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. All right. Do you know -- please, listen to me carefully and give

16 me an accurate answer to my question.

17 Do you know that it is precisely in your village that one of the

18 well-known prisons was where the KLA held detained Albanians who were

19 loyal to the authorities? Yes or no. Please give me an answer. Yes or

20 no.

21 A. There was no prison there. This isn't true.

22 Q. And do you know that this same kind of prison existed in the

23 village of Ivaja?

24 A. There wasn't. I don't know.

25 Q. Tell me, how far away is the village of Ivaja from your village?

1 A. It's five kilometres away.

2 Q. And I assume that you know this village well.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. All right. Can you tell me how many members of the KLA were in

5 the school, clinic, and mosque in your village on that day?

6 A. I don't know. I'm not from Ivaja.

7 Q. I said your village. In the following buildings: The school, the

8 clinic and the mosque of your village.

9 A. What do you mean?

10 JUDGE MAY: It's being suggested, Mr. Loku, that on the day of the

11 attack, the 8th of March, that there were KLA members in the school,

12 clinic, and the mosque. Now, is that right or not?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that's not right.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. And tell me, Milaim Loku, was he related to you?

16 A. He's a distant cousin.

17 Q. And do you know that he was the commander of this so-called

18 sub-command of the 162nd Brigade of the KLA, the so-called Kacanik

19 Brigade, and it was precisely for the village of Kotlina? Do you know

20 that?

21 A. No, he wasn't a commander. He wasn't a soldier. He was a

22 civilian. There was no KLA in Kotlina.

23 Q. All right. You claim that he and Emerllah Kuci were killed by

24 sniper fire. Is that right or is that not right?

25 A. Yes, on the 9th of March. He was killed after a river [as

1 interpreted].

2 Q. Do you know that your relative Milaim Loku lost his life precisely

3 in that capacity, as commander of this sub-staff of the 162nd Brigade of

4 the KLA in their clash with the army and the police?

5 A. He was killed by Serbian forces. He was a civilian. Milaim Loku,

6 and Emerllah Kuci, both of them were civilians.

7 Q. And tell me, where were they when they were killed?

8 A. They were in the village, near the river.

9 Q. So that means that they were in your village, in the village of

10 Kotlina; is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. How could they be there when, in response to the first question I

13 put to you, you answered that all the inhabitants of the village had left

14 Kotlina?

15 A. I saw them on the 10th of March, after the Serbian forces left.

16 That's when I found them.

17 Q. Yes. But you said that all the inhabitants of the village had

18 left Kotlina. Why did they stay on there?

19 A. They didn't go away. They hid. They were in Kotlina, in the

20 village. Everybody was there.

21 JUDGE MAY: It's time for the adjournment now. We'll adjourn for

22 20 minutes.

23 Mr. Loku, could you remember in this adjournment not to speak to

24 anybody about your evidence until it's over, and not to let anybody speak

25 to you about it, including the members of the Prosecution team. Could you

1 be back, please, in 20 minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

3 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. You explained that there were no KLA members in your village and

7 that the relatives of yours --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- are not members of the KLA. Tell me this now: Where were the

10 closest KLA members in terms of your village? If they weren't in your

11 village actually, where were they? What was the closest point at which

12 they were to your village?

13 A. There was no KLA in Kotlina. I repeat it again.

14 Q. I'm not talking about Kotlina now. What I'm asking you is near

15 Kotlina, how far off were they? Not in Kotlina. You said they were not

16 in Kotlina. All right, then, but how far off were they? Where were they

17 if they weren't in Kotlina?

18 A. The KLA was a long way away, in the village of Ivaja. There was

19 KLA there.

20 Q. You said a moment ago that the village of Ivaja was five

21 kilometres away from your own village; right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, the soldiers whom you say entered your village, the several

24 thousands of soldiers, as you said, first passed through Ivaja or did they

25 first go through your own village?

1 A. On the previous day, they had been Ivaja, but they came -- on the

2 8th they were in Ivaja, on the 9th they came to Kotlina but they didn't

3 come through Ivaja, they came through Gllobocica and Gurri i Zi.

4 Q. All right. And how long did the fighting go on for in Ivaja?

5 A. All day. All day. I don't know; I wasn't there.

6 Q. All day. What does that mean? From morning to night or what? Or

7 did it go on after dark as well?

8 A. From morning to midday probably. I don't know.

9 Q. And how many KLA forces were in Ivaja?

10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. Since the fighting went on from morning to noon, to the afternoon,

12 I assume that there were quite a lot of KLA members in Ivaja. Did they

13 escape? Did they flee from Ivaja in the afternoon?

14 A. I don't know.

15 Q. And how do you know then that the fighting went on from morning to

16 afternoon?

17 A. Because I heard the gunfire from morning to noon.

18 Q. Now, afterwards, after this clash had ended, that is to say

19 between the army and the KLA in Ivaja, did you meet members of the KLA?

20 Did you come across them, you and the inhabitants of your village?

21 A. I didn't meet them.

22 Q. Not even afterwards, over the next few days? You didn't meet them

23 then either?

24 A. I didn't meet them ever.

25 Q. And is Hazbi Loku a relative of yours too?

1 A. He is a distant relative. He is a cousin but a distant one.

2 Q. All right. Now, was he a member of the KLA units?

3 A. No, he wasn't.

4 Q. Since he's a distant relative, is that something that you know for

5 sure or do you only assume that to be true?

6 A. No. I know about this.

7 Q. And do you know that Hazbi Loku is a witness here in The Hague as

8 well?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. When did you see him last?

11 A. Two months ago.

12 Q. Did you talk about your testimony here and his testimony?

13 A. No.

14 Q. So both you and he know that you're going to testify in The Hague,

15 but you didn't discuss it amongst yourselves; is that what you're saying?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And tell me this: From your family, both distant family and close

18 relatives, how many of them were members of the KLA?

19 A. There were no members of the KLA.

20 Q. All right. Now, is it true, in connection with the event that you

21 describe, that already on the next day, that is to say after the alleged

22 attack by the Serb forces on your village in Kotlina, that the OSCE

23 appeared?

24 A. Yes, on the 10th of March. That was when the OSCE came.

25 Q. And how many of them were there?

1 A. Three.

2 Q. Three individuals. So just one OSCE vehicle; is that right? Just

3 one vehicle arrived?

4 A. First came one. Then came others.

5 Q. I don't understand what you mean when you say one and then

6 another. You mean one vehicle and then another vehicle? Is that what

7 you're saying?

8 A. I meant that, later, five others came.

9 Q. Let's clear this up. So three men arrived in one vehicle first

10 and then five others, five other people in the second vehicle. So this

11 makes eight people in two vehicles; is that right?

12 A. In Dreshec neighbourhood came only one. Four others came in the

13 centre of the village.

14 Q. I don't follow you. What do you mean when you say in the village

15 of Dreshec? Your village is named Kotlina. Did they come to Kotlina or

16 did they come to Dreshec?

17 A. Dreshec is a neighbourhood. I said a neighbourhood. I didn't say

18 a village.

19 Q. All right. But I assume that they made a tour of the whole

20 village.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And did anyone, any of the authorities - Serbia, Kosovo,

23 Yugoslavia - was any official together with them or were they alone?

24 A. This I don't know. I have no information about that.

25 Q. All right. But you saw them. You say you saw them and that there

1 were three plus five, which makes a total of eight.

2 Did anybody else come with them?

3 A. There was the interpreter.

4 Q. And how long did they stay in your village?

5 A. They stayed there the whole day.

6 Q. Did they give you any kind of assistance on that occasion?

7 A. They took the inhabitants of Dreshec neighbourhood to Kacanik.

8 Only the inhabitants of Dreshec neighbourhood because the houses were

9 burned. Women, children, and elderly people.

10 Q. And how many houses are there in that part of town, the part of

11 town that is called Dreshec, the Dreshec neighbourhood?

12 A. Seventeen.

13 Q. Does that mean that in the other part of the village, that is to

14 say in the village proper, that the houses were all right?

15 A. That day, they only raided and looted those villages in the centre

16 of the -- the houses in the village, in the centre of the village, on the

17 9th of March. They didn't burn them that day.

18 Q. But you said that the village was shelled for several hours. How

19 come then that the houses weren't destroyed if the village had indeed been

20 shelled for several hours?

21 A. The infantry troops came and set fire to the houses.

22 Q. Where?

23 A. Dreshec neighbourhood.

24 Q. All right. In the Dreshec neighbourhood. You said that it

25 comprised 17 houses, and Kotlina itself was not damaged. Is that what you

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1 said? Did I understand you to say that?

2 A. Yes. Only -- they only raided the houses in the centre of the

3 village on the 9th of March.

4 Q. All right. That's why I'm asking you. How is it possible that

5 Kotlina remained untouched, was not damaged, if it had been shelled for a

6 period of several hours, as you yourself described, before the forces

7 actually entered the village?

8 A. The whole village was burned on the 24th of March, afterwards.

9 JUDGE MAY: Can you help us as to this: The point that's made is

10 if there was shelling, were the houses damaged by the shelling or not?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Some were damaged, some not.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. And did the representatives of the OSCE give you any kind of

15 assistance? Did they help you in any way, apart from taking the

16 inhabitants of that part of the village which is called Dreshec away to

17 Kacanik, as you yourself said?

18 A. They brought some assistance to the sick people.

19 Q. Was there a doctor among them perhaps?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And the people they helped, what were they suffering from? Why

22 did they need help?

23 A. I don't know. They were sick.

24 Q. All right. And Naim Loku and Lulezim Loku, were they also members

25 of the KLA?

1 A. No, they were not.

2 Q. According to you, during the second attack launched on Kotlina,

3 which took place, once again according to your own explanation, on the

4 24th of March, 1999, you say you watched the attack and saw the arrival,

5 as you say, of the Serb forces from a distance of about two kilometres.

6 So you watched all this from a distance of about two kilometres. Is that

7 right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Was that not the same position that you were in when you watched

10 the attack on the 8th and the 9th?

11 A. No. It was elsewhere. I was near the centre.

12 Q. When were you near the centre?

13 A. On the 24th of March.

14 Q. Yes. But you say that you watched the attack take place from a

15 distance of approximately two kilometres.

16 A. I was closer than that.

17 Q. Now, let's clear this up. You say that you were close to the

18 centre, near the centre, and then you also say in your statement that you

19 watched from a distance of two kilometres. So which is correct; that you

20 were near the centre or that you watched from a distance of two

21 kilometres?

22 A. The centre of the village is about two kilometres away from

23 Dreshec neighbourhood, and I was near the centre, I said. And this is

24 from where I saw the attack.

25 Q. So on the 24th of March, you watched the attack on Dreshec; is

1 that right?

2 A. I heard the shells, I saw the shells coming from Gllobocica. Then

3 they arrived in the centre of the village.

4 Q. But you say you were in the centre of the village.

5 A. I was nearby, close to the centre, not in the centre.

6 Q. Please. You've just explained to us that from close to the

7 centre, from near to the centre with respect to Dreshec, you were two

8 kilometres away. Isn't that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And that the attack was launched on Dreshec. Now, as you say, you

11 were watching the attack from a distance of two kilometres. So the attack

12 was on Dreshec. Yes or no.

13 A. Yes. They fired in the direction of Dreshec.

14 Q. All right. That means that you saw them shooting in the direction

15 of Dreshec on the 24th of March from a distance of two kilometres, which

16 is where you were near the centre of the village. Is that it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But a moment ago, you explained that Dreshec had been completely

19 destroyed. That means all 17 houses.

20 JUDGE MAY: We go round and round these points. I don't think

21 we're going to get much further with them. The witness has explained the

22 best he can. Now, unless you've got a new point, let's move on rather

23 than spending a lot of time on these distances and descriptions. We'll

24 have to make up our mind about this evidence in due course.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but you can't make up your

1 minds unless you hear my questions and his answers.

2 JUDGE MAY: Not if there's a vast amount of repetition. Now,

3 you've got about six minutes more of this examination.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very well. Let me hurry

5 up then. But the witness is explaining that he watched the attack on

6 Dreshec, which he claims was destroyed on the 9th of March, and that from

7 the centre of the village.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Now, on the 24th of March, did you happen to see any army or

10 police when this second attack took place?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And where were you watching them from, from that same place near

13 the centre of the village?

14 A. When they came, they came from Gurri i Zi in the direction of

15 Gllobocica, towards the centre. And this is where they stayed. And they

16 killed and looted and burned the houses.

17 Q. All right. Are you talking about the 24th now or are you going

18 back to the 9th of March? Because you said that they came from Globocica

19 then too.

20 A. I'm talking about the 24th. They came again from Gllobocica and

21 from Gurri i Zi, but now I'm talking about the 24th.

22 Q. And is it true that in the village, at that time when you returned

23 after the attack, that you noticed Zymer Loku who was wounded, who had

24 been wounded; is that right?

25 A. Yes. Yes.

1 Q. Where was he wounded?

2 A. He was wounded in the right hand and in the right arm.

3 Q. I'm asking you what place he was at when he was wounded. So your

4 answer -- according to your answer, he was in the village. You found him

5 in the village. Is that right?

6 A. He was in his -- near his house. He was injured near the centre.

7 I saw him myself.

8 Q. And as you saw him, did you talk to him?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you know why he hadn't left the village previously then, like

11 the rest of the people?

12 A. All were there. He was injured. He couldn't go to Kacanik. The

13 others were killed and massacred and taken to Kacanik. He told me.

14 Q. On the 24th of March, in your village, were there any KLA members?

15 A. No, there weren't.

16 Q. Therefore, you're claiming that nobody in your village lost their

17 lives in the fighting between them and the forces of Yugoslavia and

18 Serbia.

19 A. The Serbs captured them.

20 Q. Who did they capture?

21 A. Twenty-two were massacred.

22 Q. You say that they captured them.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What happened next, after they had captured them?

25 A. They massacred, they buried them in a hole and covered the hole.

1 Q. Did you see that?

2 A. I didn't see that when it happened, but after they left, I went to

3 that site.

4 Q. And what did you see at that site?

5 A. They had covered them with earth. I saw some clothes lying

6 around, some boots, some shoes. That was all I saw. It was night also.

7 Q. Well, how did you know they had been massacred if they'd already

8 been buried?

9 A. Zymer Loku told me. He was injured but still alive.

10 Q. Yes, but that means that everything you're saying now is things

11 that in fact you heard from others. You saw none of that yourself; right?

12 A. I saw Zymer Loku myself.

13 Q. All right. You saw Zymer Loku who was wounded. Yes. You saw

14 him. But all the rest of it, everything else you've been talking about is

15 something that you heard from him or from others. You didn't actually see

16 it yourself; right?

17 A. Yes, that's right. I was close by, but I didn't see it with my

18 own eyes.

19 Q. All right. Thank you.

20 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Wladimiroff, have you got any questions for this

21 witness?

22 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Saxon.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before this is continued, since

25 you've provided a lot of these documents, as regards this book and its

1 admission into evidence, I did not ask for the entire book to be admitted.

2 I just asked for one sentence of Robert Gelbard to be admitted, and that

3 has to do with defining the KLA as a terrorist organisation.

4 JUDGE MAY: We will consider that in a moment, but let's finish

5 with this witness first.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that this witness was

7 finished.

8 Re-examined by Mr. Saxon:

9 Q. Mr. Loku, how many hamlets or neighbourhoods make up the village

10 of Kotlina?

11 A. Three neighbourhoods.

12 Q. So besides Dreshec, what are the other two neighbourhoods of

13 Kotlina?

14 A. Reka and Dreshec. Dreshec and Reka and the centre of the village.

15 Q. And are those three hamlets spread around the base of a mountain

16 that you refer to as the Sheshi mountain?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Let's talk for a moment regarding the 9th of March, when your

19 village was attacked. When the shelling began, were you at home?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Were your neighbours also at home?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And when people began to flee into the forest nearby, and you say

24 you hid with a total of 13 people in one spot, had those persons all been

25 at home when the shelling began?

1 A. Yes. They all had been at home.

2 Q. Have you done your military service, Mr. Loku?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So you're familiar with firearms and the sounds of firing?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. From the spot where you were hiding on the morning of the 9th of

7 March, did you see or hear any return fire coming from your neighbourhood,

8 Dreshec, going against the Serb forces who were entering?

9 A. No.

10 Q. From the spot where you were hiding, did you see or hear return

11 fire against the Serb forces coming from anywhere?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. You mentioned that you saw policemen and soldiers close to your

14 house. Can you briefly describe the uniforms worn by the policemen that

15 you saw?

16 A. Yes. It was blue, blue. The police were wearing blue uniform;

17 the army, green uniforms.

18 Q. On the police uniforms, did you notice -- were you close enough to

19 notice any writing on the blue uniforms?

20 A. Yes. On their left arm they, had the insignia "Milicija."

21 Q. Let's move briefly to the 24th of March. Can you explain where

22 you were hiding on the Sheshi mountain that day?

23 A. It was in a high place but near the centre of the village.

24 Q. Could you actually see the centre of the village from where you

25 were hiding on the 24th of March?

1 A. I didn't see it with my own eyes.

2 Q. On the 24th of March, did you see or hear any return fire being

3 directed against the Serb forces?

4 A. No. No.

5 Q. You mentioned, on the 24th of March that "they arrived in the

6 centre of the village." Who do you mean by "they"?

7 A. The Serb police and army troops. Those are what I meant.

8 Q. After the Serb forces arrived in the centre of the village, what,

9 if anything, could you see coming from the centre of the village?

10 A. After they left, I went and saw that the houses of the village

11 were burned. The house -- the school was burned, the out-patient clinic

12 was burned, the mosque was damaged but not burned.

13 Q. Whilst the Serb forces were in the centre of Kotlina on the 24th

14 of March, were you able to see any flames coming from the centre of the

15 village?

16 A. Yes. I saw the flames and the smoke rising up in the sky.

17 Q. Later that evening, you mentioned that you spoke to a wounded man

18 named Zymer Loku, and in the translation it came through on the English

19 transcript that Mr. Zymer Loku had been wounded in the arm and the hand.

20 Did you say the arm and the hand or the leg and the hand?

21 A. In the leg and in the arm. In both places. In the right arm and

22 leg.

23 Q. And did Mr. Loku subsequently die from his wounds?

24 A. Yes, after two hours.

25 Q. What did Mr. Loku tell you about the fate of the 22 men who had

1 been captured in Kotlina that day?

2 A. He said to me that the Serb forces came and captured them. They

3 took women -- some of the women and children to Kacanik, some they

4 massacred. He said, "I was injured, and I could see it."

5 Q. Did Mr. Loku tell you how the men were massacred?

6 A. He had seen them from a distance.

7 Q. What did he say, if anything, about how the men were massacred?

8 A. He said that they took them from that ambulance building and took

9 them to a higher place. They beat them and then they massacred them.

10 Q. You mentioned in your cross-examination that these 22 men who were

11 massacred had been buried in a hole. Did you mean a hole or a well?

12 JUDGE MAY: That's a leading question.

13 MR. SAXON: I'm trying to clarify what might be a translation

14 error.

15 JUDGE MAY: No, but it's a very leading question, Mr. Saxon, and

16 on rather an important issue.

17 MR. SAXON: I can --

18 JUDGE MAY: What sort of a hole was it?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a hole dug by a villager to

20 look for water, but he didn't find water and the hole was still open.

21 That was it. Like a well.

22 MR. SAXON:

23 Q. Before the attack on the 24th of March, had that hole or well been

24 -- was it still open?

25 A. Yes, it was still open.

1 Q. During the attack on the 24th of March, did you hear any

2 explosions that day?

3 A. Yes. I heard two explosions. It was about 5.00 in the afternoon.

4 Q. And when you came back to your village subsequently, what

5 condition was that hole or well in?

6 A. It was covered with earth. It was flattened out.

7 Q. Have those 22 men been seen alive since that day, the 24th of

8 March?

9 A. No.

10 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour. Nothing further.

11 Questioned by the Court:

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Loku, you told about the massacre of 22 young men

13 who were buried in the hole. You told us that you heard that incident

14 from Mr. Zymer Loku. Is that right?

15 A. Yes.

16 JUDGE KWON: How did Mr. Zymer Loku know about the incident? Was

17 he one of the captured men or --

18 A. He was there, and he had seen when they took them, those 22

19 people.

20 JUDGE KWON: How did he -- I'm not clear. Did you say that he was

21 one of the captured men? Yes or no? Let me check it.

22 A. He was injured. He was not captured. He only saw the others

23 being captured and taken up to that place where the hole was.

24 JUDGE KWON: Where did he see the incident?

25 A. He was near his own house.

1 JUDGE KWON: You said you know Mr. Hazbi Loku, who is a distant

2 cousin of yours.

3 A. Yes.

4 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, where does he live? Does he live nearby

5 from you?

6 A. No. He lives in the neighbourhood of Reka, the other

7 neighbourhood that's called Reka.

8 JUDGE KWON: Milaim Loku is a brother of his?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 JUDGE KWON: Did you hear about the massacre of 22 young men from

11 Mr. Hazbi Loku?

12 A. Yes.

13 JUDGE KWON: So you heard about that incident from two men; Mr.

14 Zymer Loku and Hazbi Loku.

15 A. From Zymer Loku.

16 JUDGE KWON: Not from Hazbi Loku?

17 A. Yes.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And you didn't mention about the massacre

19 in your written statement. Why was that?

20 A. Because I didn't see it myself. I wasn't present there.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.

22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Loku, that concludes your evidence. Thank you for

23 coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 [The witness withdrew]

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Wladimiroff.

2 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Your Honour, before hearing the next witness, I

3 want to raise an issue related to that witness. Should that be in

4 private?

5 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry, the accused raised a question about the

6 book, and it may be convenient just to deal with that before we go on to

7 the witness.

8 Mr. Milosevic, the reason that the book was admitted, amongst

9 others, was the fact that you asked for it to be admitted. I've just been

10 passed the part of the transcript where you asked that the book be

11 admitted into evidence, and we said yes.

12 Now, are you asking now for the book to be removed?

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I don't know what's

15 going on with the microphone.

16 I asked for the statement of Robert Gelbard, envoy for the

17 Balkans, to be admitted, in which he defined the KLA as a terrorist

18 organisation. And that statement is contained in that book, and that is

19 undeniable.

20 So it is as if I were asking for a special item to be admitted

21 from an encyclopedia, not the entire encyclopedia. I invoke the book

22 because --

23 JUDGE MAY: Very well. What -- are you now objecting to the book

24 itself? And if so, why?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Because, first and foremost, I

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12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

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1 haven't read the book. Secondly, in the book, I found Gelbard's

2 statement. And I thought, since you use that book, then the authenticity

3 of that statement is undeniable, although it can be corroborated by

4 various media records as well in terms of the time when this statement was

5 given.

6 So my request is to admit his statement in which he defines the

7 KLA as a terrorist organisation, and that is the core of the matter. That

8 is what I insisted upon.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE MAY: Would the Prosecution ask that the book be admitted?

11 MR. NICE: Certainly. And if it will assist, the Chamber should

12 know that there is a witness coming who can give an account of the

13 methodology of this book in the same way as the book "As Seen As Told"

14 will be the subject of methodological explanation by witnesses.

15 JUDGE MAY: The solution may be this: That the passage to which

16 the witness referred and that he put into evidence can be D6. The book

17 can have a Prosecution number so that there's no muddle about that.

18 THE REGISTRAR: The book will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 145. The

19 book will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 145.

20 MR. NICE: The next witness --

21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Wladimiroff had a point.

22 MR. NICE: Sorry.

23 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you, Your Honours. I was informed before

24 the witness should be -- will be heard that his protection will be lifted

25 and that evidence would be given in open Court, so I did not really

1 reflect on the issue of protection and consequences thereof. I now did

2 and I apologise for not being that alert, but really, Your Honours, I

3 believe that I should submit to the Court that I have an objection to

4 hearing the witness with the protection of face distortion. And there are

5 two concerns: The first one I already addressed to your Court, and I

6 think we can easily solve it by asking the witness for a formal identity,

7 passport or such kind of document before he is giving his evidence.

8 The other concern is of a more principled nature, that is, the

9 assertion that he did not perform the functions that he claims he did in

10 his statement. It may well be that cross-examination may not be able to

11 deal with the issue properly, and I feel that the accused is entitled that

12 the witness should make to give evidence in public as the accused is

13 entitled to be given the opportunity for potential witnesses to come

14 forward after having recognised this man as perhaps his name will not be

15 known to the public at all.

16 So if he would be allowed to give evidence with face distortion,

17 that function of a public trial will not work out, and that is my main

18 concern, to ask you to reconsider your ruling on the matter.

19 May I also remind the Court that the witness protection order in

20 relation to this witness was made on March the 22nd when the Chamber

21 considered witness protection orders as a group. There was no individual

22 attention given to this witness. We are told that the witness will be the

23 subject of a relocation programme. We don't know whether the witness

24 insisted on this, but even if he had done so, the issue is whether such

25 evidence as we are asking you to allow the witness to be in open Court

1 without that facial protection would really jeopardise such relocation.

2 Actually, nobody knows where he will be relocated, so it's highly

3 unlikely that a face in court will endanger his new life. And on top of

4 that, we believe that the Court may prohibit journalists or anyone else to

5 make photographs or drawing sketches, because that would be a different

6 position here.

7 So we believe that the facial distortion is not the appropriate

8 way to address the issue raised by the accused because these are serious

9 concerns which may not be solved if we have to deal with it by

10 cross-examination only. Thank you very much.

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll consider that.

12 MR. NICE: I don't know if the Court wants to hear from me

13 further, but really, the provisions exist for protection of witnesses.

14 This is a witness who, amongst other things, has been, on his evidence,

15 tortured along with his wife. That drove him from the country, he's been

16 in fear for his life ever since. He's prepared his evidence on the basis

17 that he's going to be afforded some measure of protection. He's got the

18 courage to come and give this evidence. Of course his identity is going

19 to be well-known to an enormous number of people. As we can see from his

20 statement, he was a close partner in politics with a man who is at present

21 serving minister in the Serbian government. There is absolutely no risk

22 of prejudice if he is afforded the advantage of his face not being beamed

23 around the world just at the moment. And I have nothing further to say.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. One moment. We've really heard enough argument

25 on this.

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE MAY: We're not going to change the order. It was plainly

3 made at the time. It's right that the witness should have this protection

4 in the particular circumstances. The trial will, of course, be public,

5 and any prejudice to the accused seems to be totally minimal.

6 Yes.

7 MR. NICE: May arrangements be made for the witness then to be

8 brought in with the blinds down?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I add something?

10 JUDGE MAY: No, not on this issue, Mr. Milosevic. We have really

11 canvassed it very broadly.

12

13 MR. NICE: Your Honour, while those arrangements are being made, I

14 think that the Court has been provided with a list of individuals named in

15 his statement, which may be of use because there are too many names,

16 frankly, for most people to remember and so they're given with their

17 positions. And there's also a selection of proposed translations that's

18 been distributed I hope helpfully, and not in any sense impertinently, to

19 the interpreters just simply so that the various different bodies referred

20 to here can be consistently interpreted.

21 [The witness entered court]

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, as a matter of technicality, should the

24 session be open before he takes the oath?

25 JUDGE MAY: Probably, yes. If you'll take a seat, we'll go into

1 open session.

2 [Open Session]

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration. You can

4 do so sitting down. You can sit.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

6 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

7 WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Examined by Mr. Nice:

10 Q. Your full name, please.

11 A. Ratomir Tanic.

12 Q. Mr. Tanic, you're giving evidence with the benefit of face

13 distortion because you are, in due course, going to live elsewhere than in

14 your former home, and you are going to have further protections where you

15 ultimately live, but in all other particulars, your evidence will be open.

16 Do you understand that?

17 A. Absolutely.

18 Q. Paragraph 1. How old are you now?

19 A. Forty-six.

20 Q. Were you initially a businessman but then did you become involved

21 in politics in Yugoslavia when multi-party politics was a possibility?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Were you involved in the formation of something called the Civic

24 Alliance?

25 A. Yes. I was one of the founders of the Civic Alliance of Serbia.

1 Later on, its vice-president as well.

2 Q. Were you involved from the beginning with a party called New

3 Democracy?

4 A. No. My involvement in Novo Demokracija started in 1994/1995. The

5 end of 1994, the beginning of 1995, that is.

6 Q. Its president was who, and what was your position in relation to

7 him?

8 A. The president of Novo Demokracija was Dusan Mihajlovic. My status

9 from the very outset was that of special advisor to Mr. Mihajlovic,

10 primarily for international affairs. And after that, for questions

11 related to Kosovo as well as certain matters related to ideology and

12 doctrine. This was a political position, it was not a staff position.

13 Q. Did that party form a coalition with the accused's party, the SPS,

14 and also with the United Left Party, the Yugoslav United Left party, JUL?

15 A. Yes, Novo Demokracija accepted Mr. Milosevic's invitation to form

16 a coalition government or, rather, a national unity government at the time

17 when it was necessary to prepare and reinforce the Dayton peace agreement.

18 Q. So in what year was that and how long did the coalition survive?

19 A. As far as I can remember, this was the period 1994/1995 -- or,

20 rather, 1994. The coalition later ran in the elections together, the

21 federal elections in 1996 under the name of SPS/JUL, Novo

22 Demokracija-Slobodan Milosevic and the coalition effectively lasted until

23 the end of 1997 when Novo Demokracija withdrew its membership in that

24 coalition. Formally, the coalition was not dissolved until the new

25 elections were held but, in essence, it ceased to exist at the end of

1 1997.

2 Q. In a sentence, why did your party leave the coalition?

3 A. The leadership of our party - and this was confirmed by the

4 executive organs of our party - had serious misunderstandings with

5 Slobodan Milosevic in relation to agreements, basic agreements upon which

6 this coalition was established. This has to do with three problems. One

7 of these problems was the conflict policy in Kosovo. Instead of a

8 political settlement that had already existed and that had already been

9 concluded to such an extent that it could have guaranteed the resolving

10 the Kosovo problem. Instead of that, Mr. Milosevic opted for a policy of

11 conflict, and that is one of the reasons why we abandoned the coalition.

12 Q. That's history that we're going to explore in due course. As to

13 your position, what were you doing by way of political activity, I mean

14 work, between 1995 and 1998?

15 A. Well, among these activities related to the international

16 community, these contacts with the international community and ideology

17 and doctrine-based activities, I was engaged in discrete political

18 dialogue with the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians together with a few

19 other people from the parties in the ruling coalition in order to prepare

20 a political settlement which would avoid further --

21 Q. Very well. Who authorised this work of yours in negotiation with

22 Kosovo Albanians?

23 A. The negotiations or political dialogue, depending on what was

24 when. Authorisation came from three sources. First by my president, the

25 president of my party, Dusan Mihajlovic, in his capacity as president of

1 one of the three ruling parties. The second authorisation came from the

2 leadership of the security service, State Security Service; and thirdly,

3 the authorisation came from Mr. Milosevic himself. Of course the

4 authorisations were at different levels, but they were crystal clear in

5 each of the cases.

6 Q. At that stage, who was the head of the security, the State

7 Security Service, the SDB?

8 A. Mr. Jovica Stanisic.

9 Q. Reading your summary of your activity over the relevant period of

10 time, did you perform broadly similar work later on in 1999? Just in a

11 couple of sentences.

12 A. Yes. Yes. That's right. On the basis of the subsequent wish of

13 the security services, and under specific circumstances, this is linked to

14 the war with the NATO pact.

15 Q. So for whom were you acting at this time in 1999?

16 A. Well, first of all, I always worked on behalf of my own party in

17 view of our membership in the ruling coalition and the fact that things

18 hadn't been clarified yet, who was right and who was not right. So I

19 worked in conformity, of course, with the interests that were defined by

20 the State Security Service relating to Serbia's vital interests and the

21 vital interests of Yugoslavia as well.

22 Q. Because by 1999 --

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. By 1999, the coalition was over. So in the negotiations you were

25 conducting then, who authorised your work? Was it just the security

1 service or was there anybody else involved in that?

2 A. It was the SDB, the State Security Service and its leadership.

3 However, this took place in times of war, when the Supreme Commander was

4 Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, in fact. So no such authorisation could have been

5 issued either without his agreement or without him tolerating that kind of

6 activity. It was not possible, faced with a war, for the SDB service to

7 authorise, as it saw fit, anybody to do any work whatsoever.

8 Q. Very well. Well, that passage of your life we'll turn to later.

9 Before we turn to any of the detail, help us with this: Working

10 for the State Security Service, did that bring you into contact with

11 intelligence services of other countries? Yes or no.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you now please list the countries with whose intelligence

14 services you came into contact.

15 A. England, Italy, Russia. I'm talking about working contacts. I

16 wasn't working for anybody, but working contacts linked to intelligence

17 problems and political problems.

18 Q. So far as the first period of your work is concerned, 1995 and

19 onwards, was your making contact with these intelligence services known to

20 those for whom you were working in the RDB, the State Security Service?

21 A. Absolutely so. It was absolutely well-known. It wasn't worked

22 for, it was cooperation in analytical affairs and not in the classical

23 sense of working, that is to say, linked to unilateral services of that

24 type. But yes, absolutely. My contacts were well-known to everyone

25 because they were legal political issues and involved an exchange of

1 information. So it was activity that was legal.

2 Q. So far as --

3 A. By law.

4 Q. So far as you know, was your working in this way and making these

5 contacts known to the accused or not?

6 A. Absolutely so, yes.

7 Q. Dealing now in detail a little bit more with this, so far as the

8 United Kingdom or the English, as you've described it, security service is

9 concerned, when did you first have contact with that service?

10 A. This was the period of the preparation for the Dayton agreements,

11 which means 1993 onwards.

12 Q. And that, therefore, takes you through the first period of work

13 that you're going to tell us about. But how long did it continue, your

14 contact with the United Kingdom security service?

15 A. Well, they were continued without any interruption.

16 Q. Until what year?

17 A. Until 1999. The end of 1999, in fact.

18 Q. In the course of your contact with the United Kingdom security

19 service, did that service provide you with some financial assistance?

20 A. For five or six years, no. And then in 1990, with respect to a

21 study linked to the victims of the Kosovo conflict and linked to my book,

22 the book that I had planned to write about Kosovo, I got a smaller sum to

23 cover my -- the physical costs of research, and I used some of my own

24 money --

25 Q. Can I stop you --

1 A. -- in that regard as well.

2 Q. The translation says in the year 1990. What was the year you were

3 intending to say?

4 A. That's a mistake. 1999.

5 Q. Thank you. You say that they provided you with some assistance in

6 respect of the book. How much, in money terms, did they provide you?

7 Just for completeness.

8 A. Roughly speaking, about 5.000 euros it would be, linked to the

9 expenditure for that kind of research.

10 Q. Did you also get some money for living expenses at any stage from

11 the United Kingdom intelligence service, security service?

12 A. Yes, but after I had to leave Belgrade, after the attack on my

13 wife and myself, under very unusual circumstances. I had to leave under

14 extraordinary circumstances. I had to leave the country, and then I got a

15 one-off assistance.

16 Q. Roughly how much? In whatever currency it was paid, probably

17 easier.

18 A. Well, about 2 or 3.000 euros it would be now, the equivalent to 2

19 or 3.000 euros.

20 Q. And to complete this topic: Did you get any assistance from any

21 other of the countries with whom you had been in contact, whether in the

22 form of money or in the form of other assistance, for example,

23 accommodation?

24 A. Not while we were carrying out - what shall I say? - these

25 political matters or research work. I received assistance from the

1 Hungarian press ministry, for instance, after I had left the country, for

2 a brief period of time. This was to help me with my accommodation. But I

3 was a private individual already at that time.

4 Q. Well, now, what you're going to tell us about is based on, first,

5 your personal experience in liaison and negotiation; is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Secondly, what level and what frequency of contact did you have

8 with the security service, the SDB, of Serbia?

9 A. They were very frequent. Roughly speaking, in intervals of two to

10 three meetings a week. Ranging from two to three meetings a week to one

11 to two meetings a month, depending on whether the situation was critical

12 or not. And as our work was analytical, they were working meetings and,

13 of course, depended on the situation in the country, whether there was a

14 major crisis going on or a small-scale crisis.

15 Q. At what level, with which individual in the SDB did you typically

16 have contact?

17 A. The leadership level of the SDB of Serbia.

18 Q. And then who in particular?

19 A. Well, if the Court agrees, I would prefer to state this in a form

20 of private or closed session, because I don't want to place these

21 individuals in a difficult position, because they might be criticised for

22 doing some things.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues]... can't on a regular basis so

24 I'll come back to that in case we have a later request for private

25 session.

1 Did you have any contacts with the accused?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. One? More than one? And in the most general terms --

4 A. More. More than one.

5 Q. Give us an idea of the frequency and the setting whereby you had

6 direct contact with the accused.

7 A. More than one but not too often because I wasn't a personal friend

8 or a close associate of the accused. So the contacts were more than once.

9 Between five and seven times, to the best of my recollection throughout

10 that time, but always in a working environment or at a reception or things

11 of that nature.

12 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we are now on paragraphs 7 to 13, but I'm

13 going to come back to the earlier passages but I'll complete this:

14 Q. Whereabouts did you have these meetings?

15 A. Well, some of the meetings were, for example, annual meetings

16 between our party and Milosevic as the head of the coalition. That was

17 customary standard practice, and they took place in the Presidency of

18 Serbia, with the presence of the delegation. My party's delegation was

19 always present, and Milosevic was there too. So that took place two or

20 three times.

21 On two or three occasions, this took place at receptions. For

22 example, in July -- in the JUL party. He didn't go to receptions very

23 often, but he did go to receptions of the Yugoslav United Left, the JUL

24 party, and it was customary to use these receptions for an exchange of

25 opinion.

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1 And the third circumstance were state holidays, such as the 29th

2 of November holiday. Once again, they were a form of working and

3 ceremonial reception. But let me specify with respect to receptions.

4 These receptions always had a working character, and I think that is the

5 technique used everywhere in the world.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Is that a convenient moment?

7 MR. NICE: Certainly, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now. Mr. Tanic, in this

9 adjournment and any others there may be in your evidence, don't speak to

10 anyone about your evidence until it's over, and don't let anyone speak to

11 you about it. That does include the members of the Prosecution too.

12 Very well. We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

13 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

16 MR. NICE:

17 Q. Mr. Tanic --

18 MR. NICE: Paragraph 14, Your Honour.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. Mr. Tanic, let's go now to the formation of the coalition and its

22 purpose. Your recollection of the formation is that it happened in what

23 year?

24 A. During 1994. Of course, the coalition wasn't formed overnight but

25 in the process of negotiation and agreement, and the official policy of

1 Serbia at that time, and Yugoslavia, took place in the preparation of the

2 Dayton Peace Accords which would put an end to the war in Bosnia. Mr.

3 Milosevic, on several occasions openly and privately, in his private

4 talks, stated that we would now -- Serbia was now going to take quite a

5 different policy and route and that he wanted to set up a peaceful

6 coalition in Serbia which would support the Dayton peace agreements and

7 that those were the motives for which he offered participation in the

8 coalition Government of Serbia to parties from Depos.

9 Q. Mr. Tanic, you're going to have to be guided to some extent by me

10 so we can keep the evidence suitably compact.

11 At any stage in the establishment of the coalition, did the

12 accused make any connection of Kosovo's future to the work of the

13 coalition or to Dayton?

14 A. In the establishment of the coalition, one of the questions was

15 the Kosovo question, and the reason was that Belgrade wanted to avoid the

16 fact that the Kosovo issue should be on the agenda of Dayton, and Mr.

17 Milosevic said, him and his associates on several occasions, said that we

18 ourselves in Serbia would enter into negotiations with the Albanians to

19 solve the Kosovo question.

20 Q. Did you ever hear him say that yourself or was it only ever

21 reported to you by others?

22 A. I heard him say that once himself. On two occasions, Mr.

23 Mihajlovic, the president of my party, said that to me, and five or six

24 times later, through the leadership of the State Security Service and it

25 is incontestable. He said this once not to me but at a meeting that I

1 attended.

2 Q. And was anything said about his willingness to negotiate directly

3 with Ibrahim Rugova?

4 A. Yes, absolutely so. He did show willingness of this kind. I know

5 that from him personally on one occasion, but from all the other relevant

6 factors, both international and domestic, who came into contact with him

7 and myself as well.

8 Q. We now, then, embark on the period of your negotiations; and your

9 authority to negotiate came directly from whom, please?

10 A. I said negotiations or a political dialogue. Sometimes it took

11 the character of negotiations, sometimes as political dialogue over a

12 period of three years, three or four years. And my authorisation came

13 from the president of my party, Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, from the leadership

14 of the State Security Service, and on one occasion it was authorised by

15 Mr. Milosevic himself, together with the platform --

16 Q. Right, stop there.

17 A. -- platform at which these --

18 Q. Thank you. The authorisation directly from the accused, when and

19 how? Very briefly, please.

20 A. In the summer of 1995, a working meeting of the delegation of the

21 ND, with Mr. Milosevic in the building of the Presidency of Serbia.

22 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 14. Just yes or no: Did you have any

23 involvement in the school agreement of which we've heard?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you. What part did you take in all of that?

1 A. Well, to prepare the meeting. The agreement, I'm sorry. First of

2 all, with Monsignor Vincenzo Paglia but with other associates of

3 Milosevic's as well, who took part in the negotiations, and our party to

4 all intents and purposes or, rather, Mr. Mihajlovic and myself were the

5 moving souls of this agreement and in solving the Kosovo problem and the

6 school agreement being one step in those negotiations and preparations.

7 Q. Thank you. Another idea that was I think referred to at the time

8 was the South Tyrol model. Can you tell us how that came to be

9 considered, by whom, and so on, and indeed what it was.

10 A. The South Tyrol model was elaborated by the Institute for

11 International Politics or, rather, the director of this institute,

12 Predrag Simic was his name. The Institute for International Politics

13 and the Economy is an affiliation of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, so it

14 is a semi-official institution in fact. And Mr. Simic, in the capacity of

15 an expert, advocated the idea of following the model for the autonomy in

16 the South Tyrol area and that that should be applied to the solution of

17 the Kosovo question. And this was one of the desirable solutions that was

18 put out at that time.

19 Q. Did you champion or espouse that? Was the idea picked up by

20 anybody close to the accused?

21 A. As for me personally, I wasn't so much a champion of that idea. I

22 wasn't quite sure that it would be able to function. But I do know,

23 however, that the autonomy in South Tyrol was a component part of official

24 policy, first of all with Mr. Ratko Mladic [as interpreted], who advocated

25 that idea. I know that from Mr. Markovic himself. And our platform was

1 somewhat different but not in direct contrast to the South Tyrolian

2 autonomy model.

3 Q. Thank you. The transcript has the name "Markovic" incorrectly

4 recorded as "Mladic."

5 A. Ratko Markovic was the name.

6 Q. He was the Deputy Prime Minister for Serbia at the time?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So these are a couple of the --

9 A. Yes, he was, one of the participants in the Serbian-Albanian

10 dialogue, like Dojcilo Maslovaric and myself.

11 Q. In the dialogue, who was the principal negotiator, as you

12 understand it, and what was your role, if you weren't the principal

13 negotiator?

14 A. In a formal sense of the word, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic was the

15 chief negotiator, because from time to time, he did take part in this

16 dialogue. Very seldom, but usually when the platform was prepared.

17 However, at working level, Mr. Ratko Markovic was the chief negotiator

18 from a formal and legal point of view. I personally and the president of

19 my party, Dusan Mihajlovic, were the driving forces you would put it -- as

20 you would put it in English. I can't really find the right Serbian

21 translation for that. But the president of my party and I were the

22 driving force behind that dialogue with the Albanians in a political

23 sense. But from a formal, legal point of view, it was Ratko Markovic.

24 Q. Now, right from the beginning, your meeting in 1995, was there a

25 plan for a phased approach to these negotiations?

1 A. Yes. That plan is contained in our platform that was expounded to

2 Mr. Milosevic by us and, in principle, he espoused it.

3 Q. Can you tell us about the phases, please, and then we'll look at a

4 document that records it. First phase?

5 A. Yes, there were three phases. It's a step-by-step plan. The

6 first stage is a set of measures of confidence building in Kosovo in order

7 to ease existing tensions in Kosovo. These are measures related to

8 education, health, media, sports and, last but not least, certain security

9 arrangements that would lessen the level of physical tension in Kosovo.

10 That was the first stage. So these were confidence and security building

11 measures.

12 Q. The second stage was to be what?

13 A. The second stage was a transition political solution for Kosovo in

14 implementing the first phase. This would slowly lead to the reintegration

15 of Kosovo Albanians in the political life of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

16 Q. And the third stage was to be what?

17 A. The third stage was the status of Kosovo after the first two

18 stages, and this phased approach was also the position of the European

19 Union and the Contact Group. Identical, as a matter of fact.

20 Q. And when this phased approach was agreed upon by your party and

21 presented to the accused, did he put any limits on the resolution of the

22 problem with the Kosovo Albanians? Did he have any preconditions?

23 A. Only one. In principle, he agreed with this. Also when talking

24 to foreign representatives, he agreed with this identical approach. And

25 there was a constraint that was quite understandable, and that is that the

1 definite solution of the status of Kosovo should not create conditions for

2 the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and Yugoslavia. I emphasise this word

3 "secession." The other things, as he put it - these are his words -:

4 "We can agree on anything else." I mean with the Albanians, not with us

5 from the Novo Demokracija party.

6 Q. Can we look, please, at an exhibit. Perhaps the -- the original

7 original is here, and we can see it for what it is. Thank you very much.

8 A. May I please add something to the sentence that I said a minute

9 ago, to that sentence because my concentration went down a bit, I'm

10 afraid.

11 Q. If you omitted to say something that completes your answer, please

12 say so.

13 A. Yes, just to complete it. This was no longer a precondition. The

14 wish of Mr. Milosevic was that the NGOs should be present from the

15 international community, not official structures of the international

16 community, so that the impression would not be created that things were

17 being dictated to Belgrade from abroad, but this was not a precondition.

18 Q. Well, if we look at the exhibit, Exhibit Number --

19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this will be marked Prosecutor's

20 Exhibit Number 146.

21 MR. NICE: You can see it and perhaps the witness can have it and

22 we can lay it on the overhead projector.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I object to having this admitted

25 into evidence. It bears no weight whatsoever in terms of evidence. Also,

1 this person, whom I do not know, has been saying untruths only until now.

2 This is no evidence concerning some kind of a platform. These are pieces

3 of research in terms of the future of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in

4 dialogue. This is a project of some kind of --

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, let us -- let us hear the evidence

6 about it, and if it turns out to be worthless, then we will reject it, but

7 let us hear what it is first. We haven't heard anything about it.

8 Yes, Mr. Nice.

9 MR. NICE:

10 Q. Mr. Tanic, can you just look at this document. It's a

11 presentation or a booklet headed Exploring -- or titled "Exploring Futures

12 for Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in Dialogue." That's on the

13 overhead projector. The accused has made some observations about it.

14 Can we just look, please, towards the end of this document. First

15 of all, at the second-to-last collected item, which is on page 66. Page

16 66.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: I would start at 68.

18 MR. NICE: I'm sorry. In which case, can the original just go on

19 the -- if you've only been provided with an extract, Your Honour, I'm

20 sorry about that. Can we just look at this page of the original on the

21 overhead projector, in light of what the accused has just said.

22 This booklet contains a collection of articles, and here we see

23 one on page 66, "Results of a Discussion with Ratomir Tanic, Beograd and

24 Zymberi." Who is the Ratomir Tanic referred to there? Look at the

25 article, please.

1 A. Judging by the article, I think it is me.

2 Q. Now let's look at page 68. This particular booklet is in fact

3 dated August 1997. So insofar as it's going to assist with 1995, it's

4 retrospective. But if we go to page 69, in the article headed "Project

5 for the Settlement of the Serbian-Albanian Issue in Kosovo and Metohija,"

6 on page 69, it is set out that: "Representatives of Serbia and ethnic

7 Albanians from Kosovo, as well as all representatives involved in the

8 settlement of this question opt for a gradual, phased approach in the

9 settlement of the Serbian-Albanian controversy in Kosovo and Metohija;

10 that is, for a political settlement respecting the step-by-step formula."

11 A further sentence, and then to take it briefly, it sets out the

12 three stages; confidence building, basic political agreement, and status

13 of Kosovo that you've already described for us. So does this article,

14 published in 1997, reflect the agreement or the plan that you told us

15 about?

16 A. Absolutely. It reflects the spirit of the talks as well. As for

17 everything that causes any suspicion, I can give two or three independent

18 sources in addition to this to prove that it is so. The article reflects

19 the overall spirit of these negotiations that Mr. Milosevic was aware of.

20 Q. Thank you. Let's move on. On behalf of the Republic of Serbia

21 government and apart from Ratko Markovic, were others involved in these

22 negotiations, and if so, can you give us at least some names of those who

23 were involved?

24 A. In these negotiations or, rather, in this political dialogue, it

25 depended on the nature of the talks involved, there were only members of

1 the ruling coalition taking part; SPS, JUL, Novo Demokracija. In that

2 sense, every representative of Novo Demokracija was duty-bound to

3 represent the agreed views of the coalition not only those of his or her

4 own party.

5 In addition to myself and Ratko Markovic, the president of my

6 party, took part, Dusan Mihajlovic, and also Dojcilo Maslovaric, a member

7 of the leadership of the JUL and the future ambassador of then-Yugoslavia

8 to the Vatican. And Ratomir Ivica took part, a member of the SPS. On two

9 occasions Goran Percevic, the ambassadors of the Contact Group countries,

10 and the Albanian representatives, but now we are only talking about the

11 Serb side, if I understood things correctly.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. They did not participate in all the meetings, not each and every

14 person at every meeting, but in this process that went on.

15 Q. All right. Now I'm going to ask you to try and keep your

16 questions shorter in order to abbreviate the total time that you will

17 spend giving evidence.

18 Who was the principal Kosovo Albanian with whom you liaised, by

19 name?

20 A. The late Fehmi Agani.

21 Q. And you've already mentioned that Monsignor Paglia.

22 A. Yes, but we're talking about Kosovo Albanians, right?

23 Q. Yes, but I'm just moving on now. You already mentioned Monsignor

24 Paglia was involved for the Vatican.

25 How many meetings were there for this dialogue, roughly?

1 A. Mr. Paglia, to put it quite precisely, was a representative of the

2 Holy Father, John Paul II. He was his personal envoy.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. And as for my dialogue, at least on ten occasions I talked to Mr.

5 Paglia at various places; and with Mr. Agani, a minimum of 30 to 50 times,

6 I cannot remember exactly over those four years.

7 Q. Was the state security, the SDB, supportive of what you were doing

8 or not?

9 A. It was supportive of the entire process of political dialogue that

10 would avoid a war in Kosovo, especially this course that was espoused by

11 us. And we knew that, at that time, that was the official course that was

12 also approved of by Mr. Milosevic.

13 Q. Did any other countries involve themselves in these negotiations?

14 Just yes or no, and if yes, name the countries.

15 A. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. There were other countries. The countries

16 of the Contact Group. Should I mention all the countries of the Contact

17 Group? The United States of America, England, France, Germany, Russia,

18 and, later, Italy joined in at the meeting at Florence.

19 Q. Thank you. And did NGOs take part as well?

20 A. In conclusion, the Bertelsmann Foundation took very active part

21 there. Its document is presented here. That's why it's mentioned. It

22 worked very clearly on behalf of the German and French governments, and

23 this was in accordance with Mr. Milosevic's request that official

24 structures not be involved in the dialogue but NGOs, rather. Also Mr.

25 Paglia can be taken as a kind of NGO because he was religious leader of a

1 monastery. So ...

2 Q. Thank you. Were these negotiations occasionally reported in the

3 press?

4 A. Of course. Regularly.

5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I've got a small collection of newspaper

6 articles. What I would like to do now is simply put one on the ELMO, for

7 reasons I'll explain, and then complete the collection tomorrow.

8 The reason I only want to put one on at the moment is because, in

9 copy form and in translation form, they've been redacted by deletion of, I

10 think in all cases, the witness's name; and of course, since he's giving

11 evidence with his name and since it's now being challenged that he's got

12 anything to do with these things by the accused, his name as reported in

13 newspaper articles is of some significance.

14 So if I can just, while we're dealing with this matter in

15 sequence, put one of the exhibits before you, and I'll then get unredacted

16 versions, I hope, for tomorrow.

17 Can we take -- can we produce -- if we can give them a number now,

18 and if I can complete the exhibit tomorrow with other newspaper articles,

19 and they can go in as the same exhibit number. It will become Exhibit

20 Number?

21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's

22 Exhibit Number 147.

23 MR. NICE: I can now hand in for this one, and just for the

24 purposes of the overhead projector, if we could lay that on the overhead

25 projector, please.

1 Q. What you're looking at now, Mr. Tanic, is an unredacted and

2 unedited version of a newspaper, and I think the newspaper, is it

3 Politika?

4 A. Yes, this is Politika, the official newspaper of the government of

5 Serbia.

6 Q. And its's headed, "How to Find a Solution for Kosmet."

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And it may seem a silly thing to ask you but could you just read

9 the subheadline and the interpreters will translate it for us. Could you

10 just read the subheadline, please.

11 A. "Discussion about three possible scenarios: The crisis in Albania

12 will move in the direction of more moderate requests of Albanians from

13 Kosovo is believed by Ratomir Tanic, participant in this gathering." That

14 is the subtitle.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: Could the witness please

16 spoke slower.

17 MR. NICE:

18 Q. Mr. Tanic, you heard the request to speak more slowly, by the

19 interpreters.

20 A. No. No, I didn't hear it. I shall observe it in the future. I

21 do apologise. Thank you.

22 Q. The Ratomir Tanic referred to in this newspaper article and in

23 others we will produce tomorrow, is that you or was there some other

24 Ratomir Tanic?

25 A. Yes, it is I.

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1 Q. Well, I'll complete that exhibit tomorrow.

2 The -- just briefly, let's go to paragraph 34 and then come back

3 to 29. When you started this dialogue, did you believe that the accused

4 was sincere in what he was doing? Just yes or no.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you believe that he genuinely wanted Kosovo's autonomy to be

7 restored?

8 A. His explicit words were that we would do anything to prevent a war

9 from occurring in Kosovo, that the autonomy of Kosovo is not a problem,

10 that possible secession is only a problem, and I have no reason not to

11 believe in what I heard from him and also from his closest associates on

12 several occasions. At that time, of course.

13 Q. Let's just go quite quickly through the achievements, if there

14 were any, of this dialogue process. Was there a meeting on the Greek

15 island of Halki where there was simulated negotiations between the parties

16 to the problem?

17 A. Yes, there was. This was a sequel to the Rhodos meeting and the

18 public was informed immediately after the meeting.

19 MR. NICE: I ask to produce the next exhibit that deals with that.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's

21 Exhibit 148.

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. You participated in this meeting yourself or not, Mr. Tanic?

24 A. Yes. Yes, I did participate in it myself.

25 Q. We have here a document headed the Bertelsmann Science Foundation,

1 one of the NGOs, I think, to which you were referring, headed "Joint

2 Recommendations on the Kosovo Conflict," and dated 1997.

3 Look at that, please. Does this set out -- and I'm not going to

4 go through it in detail, it's available as a work of reference, if

5 necessary, for later. Does it set out the joint dialogue on page 1,

6 paragraph 1; set out in paragraph 2 the need for urgent action; 3,

7 summarise the recommendations or, rather, the premises upon which the

8 recommendations were based; has a letter of intent drafted on the second

9 page, and then sets out, "With confidence building and practical

10 improvements" on the second and third page and so on. Is this the

11 document that emerged from that meeting at Halki? Correct?

12 A. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. As a result of or following that meeting, were there

14 other meetings, particularly in Germany -- or the German embassy, I beg

15 your pardon, in Belgrade?

16 A. On the basis of the recommendations of this NGO, two types of

17 activities and meetings took place. One is international activity in the

18 sense of the German and French diplomacies having adopted these

19 recommendations and jointly defended them before the European Union. And

20 the other activity were meetings that were held in Belgrade. Some -- I

21 took part in some of them and one was held at the German embassy. These

22 are working meetings, they're not receptions or --

23 Q. Yes, yes. At this meeting, was Ratko Markovic present?

24 A. Yes, absolutely.

25 Q. Did he give any view of the government or the SPS party or anyone

1 on this proposal?

2 A. In relation to this proposal, he expressed principled agreement to

3 it in the presence of the German and French ambassadors, principled

4 agreement to the spirit of this, explicitly saying that the spirit of this

5 agreement has been present for three years now. His only objection was in

6 line with the objection that was voiced by Mr. Milosevic at the outset,

7 that it should be reinforced, that it should not be a step towards

8 secession. At that time, the problem of Albanian terrorism was already

9 there. So these were the only two objections that Mr. Markovic had to the

10 spirit of the agreement itself, but he did support it.

11 Later if, I may add to this -- it is relevant to this piece of

12 information. Later, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel

13 and I think that Mr. Vedrine was also present, they came with the

14 representatives of the Bertelsmann Foundation and they had a meeting with

15 Milosevic and this topic was also dealt with. So it absolutely reflects

16 the spirit of these negotiations that were held, and that is why this is

17 presented here as well.

18 Q. Despite this joint recommendation and its apparent adoption, was

19 there a speech in June 1997 that you can recall, and if so, please tell us

20 about it. Speech by the accused. Paragraph 36.

21 A. As far as I can recall, the accused, Mr. Milosevic, after these

22 preparations were completed in terms of the political dialogue, a serious

23 political agreement could be turned to, between him and Mr. Rugova that

24 is. After that, he abruptly backed off. I know that he backed off in

25 internal circles as far as I can remember too. He made a speech in

1 Pristina. However, independent of this speech in Pristina, he said that

2 there would be no Albanian autonomy, not even the least bit of it, that

3 first other matters had to be resolved. This was a new development

4 because the return to autonomy was always something that was a

5 self-explanatory thing.

6 Q. Now, just explain your answer. You say that he said this

7 independent of the speech in Pristina. What did he say in the speech

8 itself? Can you help us on this topic?

9 A. Well, I remember the backing off in the internal circles of

10 Serbian government more than the speech itself, but the essence is the

11 same; that Kosovo remains an integral part of Serbia, there is no

12 autonomy, that it remains an integral part of Serbia, that there will be

13 no more international representatives in the negotiations, and until this

14 backing off international representatives were present, primarily Mr. --

15 Monsignor Paglia, and they took part in the education negotiations.

16 Q. I can't be sure but --

17 A. I do apologise.

18 Q. -- I think from the speed of interpretation that you will be

19 thanked for going more slowly. If you notice the speed at which I'm

20 going, it's intended to guide you in the speed of your reply.

21 A. Is there any need for me to repeat what I've said until now?

22 Q. No. The interpreters succeeded.

23 A. Is there any need for me to repeat my answer?

24 Q. If we move on, then, did you have any contacts with the accused

25 over these years, and did any of these contacts touch on whether there was

1 discrimination against the Kosovo Albanians? Paragraph 38.

2 A. One contact that I had with him, with Mr. Milosevic, pertains to

3 the month of July 1997, the summer, at the reception hosted by the JUL.

4 Before that, no. Between 1995 and the authorisation of the platform and

5 then until then, 1997, there weren't any. There was just one more

6 contact, but Kosovo was not discussed extensively. Since I already had

7 information concerning this backing off, I availed myself of that

8 opportunity to ask Mr. Milosevic why this political agreement is not

9 entered when everything was completed in terms of everything he had been

10 saying, not only to us, to Novo Demokracija, but also the other partners

11 in the ruling Serb coalition and also to the international intermediaries.

12 Q. Now, keeping the speed of your reply at a level that you

13 understand the interpreters would prefer, can you tell us what you recall

14 the accused saying at this July 1997 reception?

15 A. Well, with Mr. Milosevic, it was very difficult to talk about the

16 Kosovo question at that time. His answer was in anger undoubtedly, but it

17 did reflect the position that I had heard a long time ago, and that was --

18 what he said, quite simply, was that he would show that there are fewer

19 Albanians than 1 million or, rather, less than 10 per cent, and that

20 therefore they could not have autonomy to the extent they want to have it

21 as a constituent people. And suddenly this was a problem, the number of

22 Albanians.

23 Q. You say you'd heard that a long time ago. Can you just explain

24 where and tell us whether this was something that was otherwise new to you

25 or whether it was a proposition in general circulation at that time, this

1 proposition of less than a million, less than 10 per cent?

2 A. I have to explain this in a little more detail, but I'll be

3 concise as possible. This assertion as to the number of Albanians was not

4 mentioned at all up until the time, for example, the spring of 1997,

5 through different contacts than the ones that I took part in, until the

6 preparations had come to an end of a sort of political agreement, at least

7 provisional for Kosovo sufficient to avoid a war at any rate. Now, when

8 these preparations were completed and when Mr. Milosevic was confronted

9 with the fact that the international community supported the spirit of

10 that agreement, suddenly comments came in as to the number of Albanians.

11 Not only from him but his associates as well and via the leadership of the

12 SDB, I received this information; also via our parliamentary group in the

13 parliament of Serbia, and suddenly people began to speak about this, that

14 there were far fewer Albanians than 1 million, less than 10 per cent in

15 fact, and that because of that, they couldn't have broad autonomy as a

16 constituent people.

17 So something similar. In the end, I was able to hear from Mr.

18 Milosevic himself. When he was angry. Not in an official meeting or

19 anything like that, but it was compatible with what I had heard earlier

20 on. Let me also remind you that there was a minimum of 1.200.000

21 Albanians in Kosovo, perhaps even a million and a half.

22 Q. Now, you've told us, then, what the accused said about the number

23 of Albanians. Can you recall anything else that was said at that meeting

24 about prospects for Kosovo, its difficulties or otherwise, what was going

25 to happen?

1 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic suddenly, just like his closest associates,

2 began to link the number of Albanians with terrorism and support to

3 terrorist activities, and ultimately there was a definition that was

4 repeated by Milosevic himself, at least as far as I remember with respect

5 to that reception, and that was that the Serbian authorities should first

6 of all quite simply reduce the number of Albanians to realistic numbers to

7 settle accounts with terrorism and then to see what was going to happen

8 with political negotiations.

9 That is what I can tell you at this point in time.

10 Q. How, was it explained, were the numbers to be reduced?

11 A. Well, nothing was said. Nothing specific. But there was only one

12 way in reducing the number of the population of a matrix state from

13 1.200.000 to below a million to below 10 per cent, which means this would

14 make it about 800.000, there's just one way of doing that, and that is

15 through ethnic cleansing. This is no speculation or speculative thesis.

16 There is no other way in which this can be achieved.

17 Q. You've spoken earlier about how there was an agreement sufficient

18 to avoid or reduce, I think, but avoid the prospects of war. Was anything

19 said, by either the accused or any others close to him, either at this

20 meeting or at about this time in relation to the prospects of war or not?

21 A. A minimum correction: It wasn't an agreement, it was a

22 negotiating process which went on for three years, and it ended in the

23 results the spirit of which was expressed in the agreement. So it's not

24 one political agreement, I'm talking about the negotiating process between

25 the Serbs, the Albanians, and the international community, which lasted

1 between three and three and a half years, so that is what I wanted to say.

2 Q. Slow down, Mr. Tanic. Slow down.

3 A. I do apologise.

4 And in concrete terms, one of Mr. Milosevic's associates who

5 explained the need for war in greater detail was Mr. Vladimir Stambuk, to

6 quote an example. Not only him, but to quote an example. He,

7 unfortunately, explained that to me quite specifically at a reception

8 prior to the Milosevic-Holbrooke meeting in October in 1998, for example,

9 where this same spirit of agreement cropped up, the one that I was talking

10 about a moment ago.

11 Q. We'll come to Mr. Stambuk later.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tanic, in answer earlier to the question

13 about the reduction of the Albanian population, you said that there was

14 only one way in which that could be done. That, of course, was your --

15 that's your own conclusion. What I want to find out was whether there was

16 anything in the environment surrounding the negotiations, in the

17 environment in which you operated, that led you to believe that that was

18 the only way in which the population could be reduced. That is, ethnic

19 cleansing.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, unfortunately, first we had

21 direct experience from the past how the number of inhabitants is reduced

22 in certain parts of the territory of the former Yugoslavia through ethnic

23 cleansing which was carried out by the Serb, Croat, and Muslim forces. So

24 this was a direct experience for myself as well, the most immediate

25 experience. A concrete experience.

1 Now linked to the Kosovo problem itself, there was the fact that

2 the associates of the accused Mr. Milosevic on several occasions claimed

3 that the Albanians were abusing figures, the number of inhabitants, the

4 figures they were bandying about. This was partially true because they

5 kept talking about 2 million. Now the realistic figure was about

6 1.200.000 to one and a half million. This was a realistic estimate. And

7 one of the closest associates of the accused on several occasions repeated

8 this, that quite simply these people should be thrown out, that there were

9 many people who had come in from Albania in that period and that Josip

10 Broz Tito's government gave them a passport to do this. Now, the accused

11 never said this, I want that to be understood, but he tolerated similar

12 statements for a long time and I couldn't think of anything else but that

13 because the accused Mr. Milosevic, according to the constitution, is

14 duty-bound to sanction statements and observations of this kind. If he

15 let's them go unsanctioned, then what conclusion can one make but that

16 perhaps a new ethnic cleansing was being prepared, and there is no other

17 way in which it can be solved.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

19 MR. NICE:

20 Q. I'm about to move from the July 1997 meeting that you had where

21 you heard him speak directly. Is there anything else you can recall him

22 saying, apart from what you've told us already; about the Albanians or

23 about the prospects of war or the nature of war or anything else? And if

24 not, we'll move on.

25 A. Well, if I can use the expression without being abusive, he sort

1 of muttered something else and said that the Albanian population were

2 supporting Albanian terrorism and there was a sort of collective form of

3 guilt but, as I said, it was fairly difficult to talk to him along any

4 sensible lines with Mr. Milosevic, at least for people like myself. So

5 that this was a comment which, to be honest, I have to say was verbal

6 abuse, if I can put it that way, or offence, and it was in keeping with

7 what was to happen in Kosovo later on.

8 Q. You may have covered this already, but just for completeness, the

9 significance of 10 per cent, is that something that's to be found in the

10 constitution or in some other formal document, and if not, how had 10 per

11 cent become an apparently significant figure?

12 A. No. It is not mentioned in any constitutional document or legal

13 document but we are a multi-ethnic state - Yugoslavia, that is - and in

14 every multi-ethnic state in the world, including our own, there are

15 different rights and we differentiate between constituent rights or

16 minority rights. A figure of 10 per cent, for example, or rather, over 10

17 per cent clearly indicates that it is a constituent peoples that we're

18 talking about; and this figure, over 10 per cent and over 15 per cent, was

19 bandied about in previous ethnic cleansing, in Bosnia, to the disadvantage

20 of the Serbs but also we're talking about an absolute number, not only a

21 10 per cent -- a percentage of 10 per cent, an absolute figure for

22 Albanians, because it's one thing, you see, if --

23 Q. Probably enough on that. Dealing with the approach of the accused

24 and those close to him generally to settlement of the problem, had there

25 been a proposal to establish a European Union branch office in Kosovo -

1 paragraph 42 - to assist in the negotiations with Kosovo Albanians?

2 A. Yes. That proposal was put forward on several occasions.

3 Q. Was it at one stage apparently adopted as policy?

4 A. I'm afraid I don't follow your question. I don't understand it

5 quite.

6 Q. My mistake entirely. Was there a plan to have a meeting with

7 someone to set up such an office? If so, with whom?

8 A. There were meetings of that kind with diplomatic representatives,

9 the ambassadors of all the Contact Group, they had meetings with

10 Milosevic. But I too had a meeting along those lines with his wife, not

11 as his spouse but as the president of one of the three ruling -- the

12 leaders of one of the three ruling parties, and with an international

13 representative, Mr. Martin Lutz, who was Carl Bildt's representative, the

14 High Commissioner of the United Nations for ethnic relations.

15 Q. After that meeting, did the accused's wife tell you something

16 about what was going to happen to this plan for a European Union branch

17 office?

18 A. It wasn't the accused's wife. It wasn't a private matter. It was

19 a question of the leader of one of the ruling parties. Mrs. Markovic,

20 during the meeting, received this initiative very well. She had, of

21 course, been informed of it earlier on. This wasn't the first time she

22 had heard of it via me. And in principle, she agreed, as far as she was

23 able to, to exert -- to -- in the political sense, spare upon her husband

24 to have this office opened up indeed in order to help in the research of

25 Serb victims. However, after the meeting, I was informed by her the next

1 day that nothing would come of it and that, quite simply, that they would

2 be -- their conduct would be proper towards an international

3 representative and that it was their affair to defend Serb interests in

4 Kosovo, not Albania's.

5 Q. Obviously your views on whether negotiations were being conducted

6 seriously or not are not perhaps material. It's for the Court to decide

7 that. But did you have a meeting later, just before Rambouillet, with the

8 same Ratko Markovic in which he expressed a view on whether the

9 negotiations were serious or not? Can you just answer that question yes

10 or no.

11 A. Yes, yes.

12 Q. Then can you tell us, please, what he told you about the

13 seriousness or otherwise of those negotiations.

14 A. Well, we had rather a lengthy meeting precisely after the meeting

15 with the British and German ambassadors to Belgrade, with the attendance

16 of Mr. Branko Brankovic. After that, Mr. Ratko Markovic and I went to the

17 building of the Presidency or, rather, the Government of Serbia, and we

18 discussed the problem at length. It was studied seriously in Belgrade,

19 not at the level of hearsay and rumour but on the basis of serious

20 analyses, not gossip. And they said that this overall negotiating process

21 in which he took part and I took part and already the other people I

22 mentioned took part, that he was very serious to begin with but that

23 solely things were coming to a head and that Mr. Milosevic, his initial

24 support, began to wane and that Serbia's priorities had begun to change.

25 He did not accuse anybody specifically but expressed serious reservations

1 and there was an about turn. They were my own reservations too, so we

2 discussed them and then he said, contrary to the spirit of negotiation, he

3 had got recommendations for Mr. Milosevic for a completely different type

4 of platform for the negotiations with the Albanians, and we all knew that

5 this was destined to fail because it was essentially different from the

6 previous platform, so there were smoke screens being set up already and

7 the situation which we call, in Serbia, the worse the better. We refer to

8 situations like that in that way. And responsibility was passed on to the

9 other side instead of taking strides forward in settling the matter.

10 Q. Paragraph 48. Did you, in 1997/1998 or thereabouts, learn from

11 your contacts perhaps with the security services of other countries

12 whether there would be support for elimination of the KLA?

13 A. Yes. I wish to stress once again that these were working meetings

14 in the sense of exchanging analytical information and nothing that would

15 resemble spying. The international community was very much concerned with

16 the security aspect of the Kosovo problem and the whole wave of refugees,

17 the drug trafficking trade which was linked to Albanian terrorism, trading

18 in human beings and so on and so forth. And the signals were very clearly

19 given that the new authorities, that Mr. Milosevic would have the green

20 light for the breakdown of the terrorist organisation of the KLA, of

21 course legally, through legal means, the legal use of force, and if Mr.

22 Milosevic were to ensure a political agreement with the Kosovo Albanians

23 for a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo problem. So these two matters

24 were linked. They were interlinked. Not in the sense of a threat of any

25 kind, blackmail of any kind, but with an explanation that I, together with

1 the State Security Service, put forward, that if there were no political

2 agreements, then terrorism would get wings and fly and ordinary people who

3 didn't wish to be terrorists would become terrorists in fact.

4 Q. Therefore, international support available, was that explained to

5 the accused, so far as you knew? And if so, what was his reaction to the

6 available international support for the elimination of the KLA?

7 A. This was explained to Mr. Milosevic not once but, if I can put it

8 figuratively, a hundred times because this was a very important question;

9 and I have absolute proof that this was explained to him at very high

10 level contacts far above the level that I am ready to talk about. At all

11 events, at Foreign Minister level and Prime Minister level, and our

12 security service also worked very actively in that regard, and from all

13 sources of information, including the sources of information that I had at

14 my disposal, this support on the part of the international community to

15 stop Albanian terrorism should there be a political solution was quite

16 clear. It was presented to Mr. Milosevic and he was at first very

17 exhilarated to hear of that support but, as I was subsequently informed,

18 he cooled down very quickly and began to behave as if that support did not

19 exist, as if the international community was supporting Albanian

20 terrorism. So this was a complete inversion of the truth and that is

21 where the State Security Service reacted and we had discussions on this

22 question and that's how I came to know, in fact, that Mr. Milosevic saw

23 that international -- inverted that international support or just kept

24 quiet about it.

25 Q. In February and March of 1998 or thereabouts, were efforts -

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1 paragraph 53 - being made to get better facts about the position in

2 Kosovo?

3 A. Yes. Those efforts were undertaken by General Perisic, in his

4 capacity of Chief of the General Staff, and Jovica Stanisic, in his

5 capacity as the chief of the state security of Serbia, together with Mr.

6 Zoran Lilic. I was informed about that by the State Security Service of

7 those efforts. By the leadership of the SDB, in fact.

8 Q. And the purpose of this fact-finding effort was what?

9 A. As I was informed by the leadership of the State Security Service

10 and later I was able to substantiate that information by the military

11 leaders, the object was to clear up the controversial facts about the true

12 state of affairs in Kosovo. How many terrorists there really were,

13 whether there were few of them, a medium number, or a lot, what their

14 logistics were like, whether the population truly did support KLA

15 terrorism or not, whether there was any responsibility for this by the

16 Serbian police, whether there was army responsibility and accountability,

17 so a serious report to be tabled, and study to be tabled to Mr. Milosevic

18 on the basis of which the leadership of the army and the SDB leadership

19 would demand of Mr. Milosevic to adjust his conduct in Kosovo to the

20 existing state of affairs and to the laws and regulations of the country.

21 Q. As a result, were recommendations made to the accused?

22 A. Well, first of all, that mission, as I was informed once again by

23 the leadership of the SDB and later on by the military leadership, this

24 mission was abortive to begin with because somebody close to Milosevic was

25 included in it and his task was to look at the results in the field and

1 represent them in a different light. I don't know whether the Court will

2 allow me to mention the name here of this person or not because I'm

3 talking about Mr. Nikola Sainovic, in fact. That's who I mean. He

4 included himself partially on his own in this mission and partially

5 following an okay from Mr. Milosevic. Perisic and Lilic wanted to

6 sidestep any of Milosevic's associates who wanted to reverse and turn the

7 truth upside down. They wanted a clean and unbiased approach and insight.

8 However, regardless of the presence of this particular gentleman, Mr.

9 Sainovic, the conclusions from this mission did come forward and they took

10 two or three directions. Do you want me to mention them or not?

11 Q. What were the recommendations?

12 A. Well, the recommendations, and we're talking about the spring of

13 1998 when the first fighting was under way between the Serb security

14 forces and the Albanian terrorists, so the recommendations were, first of

15 all, that the army and the police must begin to be active within the

16 frameworks of the legal and constitutional frameworks and not, as they had

17 been doing so far, through the private chains of command and

18 insufficiently defined goals.

19 The second recommendation was that should -- if Albanian terrorism

20 wanted -- was to be broken down within the frameworks of the constitution,

21 a state of emergency must be proclaimed on part of the territory and that

22 the KLA must be proclaimed a terrorist -- officially a terrorist

23 organisation. The extraordinary situation was to be brought in by the

24 Assembly of Yugoslavia, not the president according to his own whim, and

25 the recommendation was that a political solution should be undertaken as

1 soon as possible, as quickly as possible, one which already existed so

2 that Serbia and Yugoslavia should have a legal and political basis to

3 apply force in breaking up Albanian terrorism because, otherwise, the

4 Albanian terrorists would become freedom fighters, that is quite clear.

5 So those by and large were the recommendations which were to be

6 repeated through the position taken by the leadership of the State

7 Security Service, by the leadership of the army, and by our own party and

8 myself as well.

9 Q. Remembering the speed of your reply, please, you made mention at

10 the beginning of that answer to private chains of command. What did you

11 mean by that?

12 A. Well, it was common knowledge already in the second half of 1997

13 that the leadership of the State Security Service, the leadership of the

14 army and a group of politicians within the ruling coalition which was

15 colloquially referred to as The Reformist Wing, that they were opposed or,

16 rather, shall I say that we were opposed - because I was one of the

17 members of that group - that we were opposed to voluntaristic use of force

18 in Kosovo for the simple reason that there was no need for it, not because

19 somebody liked the Albanians more than the Serbs, but there was just no

20 need for it. So confronted with this fact, Mr. Milosevic applied a

21 private chain of command out of the institutions, sidestepping the General

22 Staff, the leadership of the State Security Service, and the legal

23 institutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia such as the Assembly, the

24 government, and so on and so forth. And this was pinpointed as a problem

25 already at the end of 1997 and it was particularly highlighted in 1998

1 when the first more serious fighting started between the Serbian security

2 forces and the Albanian terrorists where many civilians were casualties

3 without any need to be.

4 JUDGE MAY: The time has now come for us to adjourn.

5 Mr. Nice, we'll continue with the witness's evidence in the

6 morning. Perhaps you could consider the timing of this. If possible, we

7 should finish this witness this week, but there are very full answers. It

8 may be that they could be given more shortly.

9 MR. NICE: We can do our best, as it were.

10 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now.

11 Mr. Tanic, could you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 15th day of May,

15 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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