1 Monday, 11 November 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. NICE: Concluding the witness Mr. Candic.

8 WITNESS: MUSTAFA CANDIC [Resumed]

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

11 MR. NICE: We are in the summary before the Court at paragraph 21.

12 Q. Mr. Candic, a couple of -- or a few matters of detail before we

13 conclude. During the battle for Vukovar in the autumn of 1991, did you

14 become aware of a JNA soldier arrested by his commanding officer for

15 executing four Croat civilians who was brought to the Central KOG in Zemun

16 near Belgrade?

17 A. Your Honours, I do know that during the fall of Vukovar or,

18 rather, when Vukovar was won over by the JNA, a soldier from the traffic

19 unit of the Batajnica air force garrison who was transferring detained

20 civilians to Serbia, when an attempt was made for this transport to be

21 effected into Serbia, the soldier -- rather, he wasn't a soldier, he had

22 two stripes on his shoulders, a lower rank -- he shot in the back,

23 executing four civilians. He was a lance corporal, in fact. And the

24 commander of his unit considered that this was contrary to the rules of

25 international warfare, and this lance corporal was taken into custody and

1 taken to the Central Intelligence Group for processing and further

2 treatment.

3 Q. In fact and in the event, what processing was undertaken? How

4 long did he stay in custody?

5 A. In this particular case, that is to say when that soldier was

6 brought in to the Central Counter-Intelligence Group in Zemun, he was

7 taken over by Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Radakovic, and he talked to him, he

8 interrogated him for an hour, no more than that, but the talk was not

9 fruitful. It did not provide documents which would be handed over to the

10 investigating judge or, rather, the prosecutor later on to bring him to

11 accountability and take proceedings against him. This interrogation, I

12 would say, took the form of a leisurely conversation in a relaxed mood,

13 and one hour later, that soldier was released from the Central

14 Counter-Intelligence Group, and of course he himself took the bus, the

15 town bus, to his unit. So actually, nothing was done with respect to the

16 criminal liability of that particular soldier.

17 Q. Very well. And did that colonel, Colonel Ratko Radakovic, express

18 a view on the gravity of the killings of this sort to you?

19 A. On several occasions I just peeped through the door of the room in

20 which the conversation was taking place. And it wasn't Colonel Ratko

21 Radakovic, it was Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Radakovic. And once the

22 soldier was released, I asked him why he had let him go because he had

23 killed four people, shooting them in the back. And all he said to me by

24 way of response was, "Well, it happens. It happens every day and there's

25 nothing we can really do about it for each individual case. We can't file

1 a criminal report for each case." And that to me, as a man, as a

2 legalist, seemed to me to be something quite flagrant. And I couldn't

3 believe that a high-ranking officer could behave in that way faced with a

4 situation of that kind.

5 Q. Next, Mr. Candic, short accounts by you, please, of two named

6 operations, one called Labrador and one called Opera. Let's start with

7 Labrador. Can you give us in literally two, three, four sentences your

8 account of what Labrador was.

9 A. Operation Opera or, rather, the operative undertaking called Opera

10 was the natural continuation of the operation called Labrador. In Zagreb,

11 what happened was a network was set up for a strong one among the members

12 of the state security of the state of Croatia and high-ranking officials

13 within the HDZ party, and it was within this operation Labrador that

14 several concrete operations were undertaken, terrorist acts in actual

15 fact, and when the Croatian authorities learnt of an operation of this

16 kind in Zagreb, they -- the members of Operation Labrador fled to Belgrade

17 with all the documents.

18 Upon their arrival in Belgrade, which means in the second half of

19 August, a department was set up for a propaganda war, propaganda warfare,

20 and that was named Opera for short, and its headquarters were located in

21 the aviation centre near the command of the air force and anti-air defence

22 department.

23 Q. A couple of points of detail. The first point of detail may or

24 may not relate to either of these operations. Was there action at the

25 Jewish graves at a cemetery in Zagreb connected to either of these named

1 operations?

2 A. Your Honours, it is true that within Operation Labrador, or,

3 rather, when this network of collaborators was active in Zagreb, at the

4 Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb, a terrorist attack was launched and Jewish

5 graves were mined at the Mirogoj cemetery, the object being that the

6 Croatian authorities should be represented and shown as being pro-fascist

7 or, rather, to create animosity, that the Jews should have animosity

8 towards the Croatian authorities in Zagreb.

9 Another terrorist act was also being planned on the synagogue in

10 Zagreb. However, that was never carried out because the members of the

11 Labrador operation had to flee to Belgrade because they were in danger of

12 being arrested.

13 Q. Finally on Labrador, who was the officer in charge of Labrador and

14 what, if any, part of the KOG detachments were involved or was involved?

15 A. The officer in charge for Operation Labrador was the head of the

16 security department, Slobodan Rakocevic, in Zemun, while the operative

17 staff of the second detachment of the counter-intelligence group in

18 Zagreb, first and foremost Colonel Ivan Sabolovic and Major Cedo Knezevic,

19 were the people who had links with the collaborators in Zagreb and the

20 persons in the field in the state security that actually launched these

21 operations and sent in reports about everything that was happening in

22 Zagreb and in the top leadership of the Republic of Croatia.

23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, is "Labrador" the name of a place or does

24 it have any special meaning in B/C/S?

25 MR. NICE: I think it may be the name of a place, but let's see

1 from the witness.

2 Q. Can you help us, Mr. Candic? Does the name "Labrador" relate to a

3 place? Why was the name chosen for this particular operation?

4 A. Every undertaking secret code names are ascribed which are then

5 used in all correspondence and links between the superiors and their

6 subordinates in the security services. In this case, the operation was

7 given the secret name of Labrador in -- to associate -- to bring to mind

8 the breed of dog that is called Labrador because the collaborators in

9 Zagreb and in the region further afield set up in several locations

10 explosives, weapons, and everything they needed for performing further

11 terrorist acts in Zagreb and further afield as well.

12 Q. Then let's ask the same question in relation to the next

13 operation, Opera. Was there any particular reason for that word being

14 used for the second operation?

15 A. Well, "Opera" is once again short for the department for

16 propaganda warfare which is a higher level from the Operation Labrador,

17 being a retriever, and it was to serve for psychological and propaganda

18 activity throughout the territory of the Republic of Croatia,

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia as well.

20 Q. Can you now give us a few particular examples of the Opera

21 operation in action? First in relation to propaganda, disinformation, and

22 ethnic unrest, what sort of things were done?

23 A. Well, when speaking of Opera, let me first say that one of the

24 main actors in the Opera operation, Radenko Radojcic, informed me that

25 detailed, specific plans were devised for the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1 within this Operation Opera, first of all for the Republic of Croatia and

2 then for Bosnia-Herzegovina. And he was the one who told me - and I was a

3 witness to this - about several of these actions that were undertaken and

4 effected within Operation Opera. And let me mention by way of an example

5 one particular operation which had as its goal to show the Croatian

6 authorities up as being fascist, because in Serbia and along the borders

7 with Croatia, there were quite a lot of Croats, Croats living in Serbia,

8 that is, on the Serbian side of the border, and they were terrorised daily

9 by the volunteer units belonging to Seselj, Arkan, and the Jovic bothers

10 from Pasova. So what they did was to throw in bombs into their yards, and

11 they were intimidated and frightened in that way, and many of them fled

12 into Croatia. And they would have it appear as if nobody was actually

13 making them flee.

14 And in order to prove this point, an operation was undertaken in

15 the central part of the television news bulletin in Belgrade where a

16 conversation was televised between two leaders of the HDZ. One leader

17 represented himself as being from -- an HDZ leader from Zagreb, and the

18 other man was a leader from Ilok, HDZ leader from Ilok. I saw that news

19 bulletin on television, and I recognised the voices. I knew that these

20 two men, these two HDZ prominent officials were Radenko Radojcic on the

21 one hand and, on the other, Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Sabolovic. I

22 recognised their voices.

23 The leader of the HDZ from Zagreb issued an order to the other

24 man, the man from Ilok, HDZ man from Ilok, to mobilise the entire Croatian

25 population in Serbia, that is to say along the borders with Croatia, and

1 that within the space of two days that they should move towards Zagreb.

2 The HDZ man from Ilok in that conversation says that that is

3 impossible, that it will be very difficult to do that --

4 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt. It's very difficult to follow

5 this. Can we summarise it in a few words, please.

6 MR. NICE: Yes.

7 Q. Was what was being presented on the television accurate or was it

8 disinformation?

9 A. Well, as I've already said, it was disinformation, and the

10 conversation between these two people was devised in advance. Lieutenant

11 Colonel Radojcic and the other man, and they wanted to present it as being

12 reality, portraying these as being the true leaders of the HDZ from

13 Zagreb.

14 Q. And the purpose of it was to create what state of mind in the

15 listeners?

16 A. Well, the object, the whole object of this was that the viewers

17 and the people in Serbia, first and foremost, would gain the impression

18 that the Croatian authorities were fascist and that they wanted to have

19 ethnically pure areas inhabited only by Croats and areas where the Serbs

20 would be.

21 Q. The second category of example of Opera operation may relate to

22 wire taps. Can you give us one or possibly two examples of that, but

23 again explain in summary what happened and the purpose of what was done.

24 A. Opera had a wide range of technical devices for tapping, and

25 everything was available to them. And they were able to rig

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1 conversations, wiretap them in accordance with the plans that were made

2 for Croatia and for Bosnia-Herzegovina and so on. And this was always

3 linked to the propaganda that they wanted to disseminate, something that

4 was read about with something that had taken place in the field within the

5 frameworks of terrorist action.

6 Q. Can you give us one example, perhaps, of a rigged wiretap

7 conversation and tell us what its true purpose was.

8 A. Well, a concrete specific example was wire taps of conversations,

9 yes, and there was an example of a conversation between Mile Dedakovic,

10 known as Jastreb, the defender of Vukovar, and General Anton Tus in

11 Zagreb. That was one example. On the basis of the wire taps - they

12 intercepted conversations on several occasions between these two men - a

13 conversation was compiled using excerpts from all these conversations in

14 which Mile Dedakovic, Jastreb, asks for his assistance in weaponry, and he

15 says to him that he mustn't count on any kind of assistance and that he

16 was left to his own devices, he had to fend for himself and do as best as

17 he could.

18 Q. Very well. Finally on Opera, was it the same unit, that is the

19 unit of the 2nd KOG detachment that was involved, and if so, can you tell

20 us about an incident on the railroad at Vinkovci?

21 A. I don't know what actually happened on that railroad at Vinkovci,

22 but Radenko Radojcic told me, and he was very pleased when he told me

23 this, that within the frameworks of Operation Opera or Plan Opera, that a

24 terrorist action was effected along the railway line near Vinkovci, and a

25 name was used there of the late president of the Croatian republic, Franjo

1 Tudjman.

2 The object of that operation was to show that this had come from

3 Tudjman's orders and that this was to make Tudjman make official denials

4 of that. And this is in fact what President Tudjman did on two occasions.

5 And that is why Radenko Radojcic was so pleased and said that they had

6 managed to achieve their objective.

7 Q. And just yes or no: Was it still the 2nd KOG detachment that was

8 involved in Opera or was it another detachment?

9 A. Operation Opera was the 2nd Detachment of the counter-intelligence

10 group from Zagreb with its men, Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Sabolovic, Radenko

11 Radojcic as a collaborator from the Labrador operation who came to

12 Belgrade, then there was Slavko Malobabic who was also a collaborator of

13 the 2nd Detachment. So they were the main actors in Operation Opera.

14 Q. Staying just very briefly with propaganda, paragraph 24, you told

15 us when you were last giving evidence about the Operation Proboj 2. Did

16 officers involved in that operation engage in propaganda and

17 disinformation activities via photographs of apparent war victims from

18 Croatian villages?

19 A. Yes, that's correct. I did talk about Proboj 2 and Major Ljuban

20 Karan was at the head of it with a team of men, and they were in Eastern

21 Slavonia and Ivica Katancic was with them from the technical department of

22 the central counter-Intelligence group, and he always took with him a

23 camera and an automatic rifle because that's where he fought. On several

24 occasions, Ivica Katancic took the films with mutilated bodies to -- he

25 brought them to the counter-intelligence group to show us the footage he

1 had made and to show us what the Croats were doing to the Serbs in that

2 part of Eastern Slavonia. And they were really terrible, dreadful

3 pictures, dreadful footage. And some of those videotapes I showed --

4 played on Television Belgrade. And I recognised these images and the

5 footage taken by Katancic in the area of Eastern Slavonia.

6 Q. In the event, were you clear what the ethnic origin of the victims

7 shown was?

8 A. Now, what Ivica Katancic said and Karan said, that the victims

9 were Serbs, to me as an officer this didn't seem to be quite logical. It

10 wasn't logical that the Croats should carry out this massacre and

11 slaughter in a particular area and to leave the area that they had won

12 over, for Ivica Katancic to be able to come in and take films of that and

13 take the footage back to Belgrade. I think what happened was quite the

14 reverse; that the victims were Croats, in fact, and they were depicted as

15 being Serb victims.

16 MR. NICE: We've already dealt, I think, last time with paragraph

17 27, the witness having testified about Vasiljevic's report of Milosevic

18 asking the generals to sign a loyalty oath. Just one detail in case this

19 didn't emerge.

20 Q. Mr. Candic, you did give an account on the last occasion of that

21 request by the accused Milosevic that generals should sign a loyalty oath.

22 According to Vasiljevic, did any or many of the generals sign such an

23 oath?

24 A. When I talked about what General Vasiljevic informed us of, the

25 head of the security department, that certain generals were signing

1 loyalty oaths to Slobodan Milosevic, he mentioned a particular name and he

2 said, "Your General Stevanovic, nicknamed Mika Sprajc, is one of them, one

3 of the people who signed this loyalty oath to Slobodan Milosevic." And he

4 was the commander of the 1st Airborne Corps in Belgrade.

5 Q. At the time this request was made by the accused, did the accused

6 have any authority in the form of membership of the Presidency or the

7 Supreme Command to make such a request of the generals?

8 A. When this was going on, the accused had no right to ask the

9 generals or anybody else, any other officers for that matter, to sign a

10 loyalty oath because the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav People's Army and

11 the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, they had the Presidency as

12 the supreme organ and not the President of Serbia, in this case the

13 accused.

14 Q. Finally, Mr. Candic, you left the JNA in February 1992. Did you

15 do so of your own free will?

16 A. Yes, I did. I left of my own free well. Because for a relatively

17 long period of time this dissatisfaction in me had been mounting. And so

18 when it -- I had had enough, I decided to leave on the 19th of February,

19 1992.

20 Q. Thank you very much. Wait there, you will be asked some further

21 questions.

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

23 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

24 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Candic, since you're talking about the state

25 of affairs in the JNA as it was until you left it, tell me, was there any

1 discrimination in the JNA?

2 A. At the time when I was leaving the JNA, I must be honest, there

3 was no discrimination against me, at any rate. I enjoyed authority and

4 the trust of the people I was working with. I can say, however, that

5 there was discrimination against the Croats who were leaving the army at

6 the time. And at the time when the war in Croatia began, they were trying

7 to desert, in a way, on one hand. Some of them who were caught before

8 they actually deserted were brought for interrogation to the Central

9 Counter-Intelligence Group, exhaustive interviews were conducted with

10 them. They were first threatened with prison and charges of desertion,

11 whereas the ultimate aim was to recruit them as collaborators of the

12 Yugoslav People's Army.

13 Q. During all the time that you were in the JNA, and that was several

14 years, was there any discrimination based on ethnicity in the ranks?

15 A. It is true that I spent a long time in the service of the JNA, and

16 I've made an oath here to tell the truth and only the truth, and I can say

17 that with the exception of that year, 1991 and the beginning of 1992,

18 there was no discrimination of any kind except against ethnic Albanians in

19 the JNA. Large-scale operative processing was conducted against them to

20 ascertain that they were not working for the Albanian side, and sometimes

21 these investigations were based on false assumptions.

22 Q. When you say that there was discrimination against officers who

23 were deserting from the JNA, tell me, how can that be discrimination if

24 somebody had decided to leave the army, to desert? Was that a move

25 initiated by the person who had decided to desert or was somebody

1 expelling them from the army?

2 A. That was a moral decision made by every individual. I must tell

3 you one truth here - and that's what I'm supposed to do - the people who

4 were -- who wished to leave the army were called deserters, but nobody

5 ever raised the issue of the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia, where

6 after the brief war that took place there, the government of Slovenia

7 decided that the JNA should be withdrawn from Slovenia within three years,

8 and that caused confusion in the Presidency in Belgrade which held long

9 sessions. These sessions ended with Borisav Jovic, the president,

10 requesting from the Federal Secretary of Defence, Veljko Kadijevic, to

11 make the decision himself and the latter took out a paper and said since

12 the people don't want us in Slovenia any more, I suggest that the army

13 withdraw within three months.

14 Therefore, I don't see why a Croat should be called a deserter if

15 such a decision had been made already at that time by the Presidency and

16 the federal secretary himself.

17 Q. But that decision concerned the withdrawal of army from Slovenia,

18 didn't it?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Whereas desertion of Croatian officers from the JNA was not

21 related to Slovenia. It was related to Croatia. And you, as a

22 counter-intelligence officer, were following events in Croatia in 1990 and

23 1991.

24 A. Yes. I am familiar with it. I know a lot about it. It's not

25 only about Slovenia. It's -- it was also about Macedonia. The Yugoslav

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1 People's Army withdrew from there very easily. They had no longer any

2 interest in that republic. It was no longer the country that we, the

3 officers, made the oath to defend from Djevdjelija to Mount Triglav.

4 Q. I'm asking you about Croatia, Mr. Candic. What was going on in

5 Croatia in 1990 and 1991?

6 A. You know that as well as I do. It was the log revolution and all

7 the things that were going on in relation to the insurgence of Serbs in

8 the Republic of Croatia and the involvement of the JNA, which intensely

9 helped them, primarily with air force units using rockets and other

10 equipment. It was not the job of the JNA to do this within their own

11 country. They were supposed to defend their country from the enemy

12 without.

13 Q. It seems from what you told us that your job in the army did not

14 actually involve many of the things that you were doing.

15 A. We were doing the things that were in our job description, but it

16 was other people, including you, who made many other things happen in all

17 of Yugoslavia and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well.

18 Q. We know that, but I'm asking you about your testimony here.

19 A. Would you please ask a specific question.

20 Q. Well, I'll stick to what you said. You said, among other things,

21 that in 1989, 1990, 1991, you were creating a network of informers in all

22 areas, all spheres of society.

23 A. That's precisely what I said.

24 Q. Your main targets were government agencies, the media, businesses,

25 schools; is that true?

1 A. Yes, I did say that.

2 Q. But although you targeted all spheres of society, your main

3 targets were government agencies and the police force.

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. And in response to a question whether it was linked to ethnicity,

6 you answered that your activities did not take into account ethnicity, and

7 you aimed at the largest possible coverage.

8 A. I said we did that in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

9 regardless of ethnicity.

10 Q. Precisely. And in 1990 and 1991, your main targets were civilians

11 and not the Ministry of the Interior or security services. You said that

12 you had your own informers within security services themselves and within

13 the police force itself.

14 A. That's true. I said we tried to recruit collaborators within the

15 security services of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, not Serbia.

16 Q. I don't know about that, but you were obviously doing something

17 illegal over this entire period.

18 Tell me, please, how many people were employed in this security

19 service you -- where you worked?

20 A. Where I worked. Let me answer first the first part of your

21 question about the illegality of our work. I already said that we were

22 doing this against the law, but that was the instruction we had been

23 given. The place where I worked, the counter-intelligence group, employed

24 37 people. That was the counter-intelligence group of the air force and

25 air defence, plus services in Zagreb and Sarajevo.

1 Q. So all of these units taken into account, how many people were

2 employed?

3 A. I said 37.

4 Q. All right. Thirty-seven plus?

5 A. We can add another 15, so that makes a total of about 50 if we're

6 talking about the counter-intelligence group, in addition to security

7 services within units, namely assistant commanders for security.

8 Q. But however, the security services within units in the form of

9 assistant commanders for security, they did not engage in this penetration

10 of civilian structures. You did that.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. So you were 50 all in all.

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. But how could 50 of you penetrate all civilian structures in half

15 the country practically?

16 A. Let me tell you how. I explained how it was only in the air

17 defence and air force we were 50 of us, 50 members of the

18 counter-intelligence group. However, in the army, in the navy, there were

19 also counter-intelligence groups which numbered approximately the same

20 number of people as in the air force. So if you take into account the

21 fact that there were four armies, 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th, plus the navy,

22 do your own arithmetics.

23 Q. About 200 people.

24 A. More.

25 Q. How many more?

1 A. Two hundred fifty. I would rather say 300.

2 Q. So 300 of you created a network in all spheres of life, as you

3 said; the police force, state administration, security services,

4 education, government agencies, civilian structures, and so on. Is that

5 what you're saying?

6 A. I am. I personally, as I said, or I did the last time, I had

7 eight informers in members of security services that I recruited.

8 Q. Is that so?

9 A. I won't go into how many informers others were running, because I

10 don't know about that.

11 Q. Since you said yourself that your work was illegal but it was on

12 orders --

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. -- when orders are issued to officers, they're accompanied by

15 explanations usually. What was the purpose of those activities? Were you

16 preparing a military putsch if you were penetrating civilian structures

17 like that? What was the objective?

18 A. We had been informed that Yugoslavia was about to fall apart, to

19 disintegrate, that that the leadership of Serbia and the security services

20 were involved. And for the sake of preserving Yugoslavia we got these

21 orders that we got.

22 Q. Does it mean that you were working against the security services

23 of the Republic of Serbia and the state leadership of Serbia with these

24 orders?

25 A. No, we were not. We were not acting against the leadership or the

1 security services of Serbia. You may have got such a report based on what

2 Rakocevic said, that there is an Academy of Arts and Sciences in Belgrade

3 which had prepared a document called the memorandum, that you were pulling

4 the strings in all that. One of our operations officers taped this

5 conversation, handed it over to a security officer, and after that,

6 Colonel Slobodan Rakocevic was arrested and tried because you thought he

7 was preparing a military putsch against you together with Vasiljevic.

8 Q. Explain, then, because it sounds contradictory to me. On one hand

9 there are claims that I was controlling the army. On the other hand, you

10 are telling us here that the army or, rather, the security services of the

11 army were trying to control me. The two don't go together. Which is

12 true?

13 A. I told you which is true. The truth is that the Yugoslav People's

14 Army was trying to assume the role of the last cohesive factor for the

15 preservation of the former Yugoslavia. Another truth is that the State

16 Security Service, which you led, the police force of Serbia, and the

17 reserve police force of Serbia, that was built up to such an extent that

18 it was a match for the army at the time, both in terms of manpower and

19 equipment.

20 Q. You obviously don't know what you're talking about, but I don't

21 want to question you about things you know nothing about. I want to

22 question about you about your testimony.

23 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. You say he doesn't know what's talking

24 about. You've heard that suggestion, Mr. Candic. Would you like to

25 answer it?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All this time I've been trying to

2 tell you about things I know. The accused is trying to say that I don't

3 know what I'm talking about. I really can't say anything about things I'm

4 not familiar with. However, if I know something and if I'm certain of it,

5 I'll say so.

6 The State Security Service of Serbia was geared all the time at

7 implementing the memorandum and creating a Greater Serbia, or the Rump

8 Yugoslavia as it was called then popularly.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. All right, Mr. Candic. Let us be precise. You said during

11 examination-in-chief that it was I who initiated the memorandum of the

12 Serbian Academy of Sciences, that I was pulling the strings, and the

13 concept was about Greater Serbia.

14 A. I didn't say you initiated the memorandum of the Serbian Academy

15 of Arts and Sciences. I said that it was members of the Academy

16 themselves who launched this memorandum, whereas you wanted this project

17 to be implemented.

18 Q. All right. I understood you as saying that I was the prime mover

19 of the memorandum, of the whole project.

20 A. No, I didn't say that. I said that you wanted it implemented.

21 Q. All right. Do you know when the memorandum was adopted?

22 A. Of course I know; in 1986.

23 Q. It was adopted in 1984.

24 A. 1986. Am I right, 1986?

25 Q. Of course you're not right.

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1 A. I am.

2 Q. It is a factual issue. You don't have to argue or repeat.

3 Tell me, Mr. Candic, where did you read in this memorandum about

4 Greater Serbia, disintegration or destruction of Yugoslavia? Where did

5 you find in it any ambition to work against other nations within

6 Yugoslavia? Where did you read that?

7 A. I read the memorandum. It's true that there is nothing in it that

8 explicitly talks about the creation of Greater Serbia, but there are

9 chapters, such as the first chapter, that deals with the crisis in the

10 former Yugoslavia that was evident at the time. The second chapter talks

11 about the position and status of the Serbs as the most numerous nation

12 within Yugoslavia, that accounted for about half of the population.

13 Q. Let us not waste time on this recounting of the contents. I asked

14 you where you found Greater Serbia in the memorandum. Where did you find

15 those ideas that seemed to go against any nation, any ethnic group in

16 Yugoslavia? Can you tell me one single position of that kind?

17 A. 1986 was a long time ago. I cannot quote anything, but I remember

18 what the memorandum said about the Serbian people and how it was in

19 jeopardy and how that had to be dealt with, and you could easily draw your

20 own conclusions about the ultimate aim.

21 Q. Is that the explanation that was commonly accepted in the army

22 about the ultimate aim?

23 A. Yes, it was.

24 Q. Small wonder, then, that you engaged in this broadcasting of

25 videotapes on television created by your services.

1 A. The tapes that I mentioned about crimes and the rest brought by

2 Katancic Ivica had not been given by Opera, the propaganda war within the

3 air force. They had been given to us by the State Security Service, by

4 people from the counter-intelligence group who had been recruited by the

5 State Security Service of Serbia.

6 Q. Mr. Candic, do you at least remember that these tapes dealing with

7 the import of arms, about Spegelj and the rest, were broadcast on

8 television and we were all shocked to see them as material taped by

9 military services and they were broadcast on a decision by military

10 authorities to familiarise the people with what was going on. Do you

11 remember that?

12 A. I remember very well the tapes that were shown on television in

13 end 1990 beginning 1991 concerning Martin Spegelj, arms, imports, the role

14 of Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, and all that, the

15 role of Gojko Susak and other protagonists. It is true that it was

16 broadcast according to a decision of the military leadership but nothing

17 was done by the Presidency to hold anyone criminally responsible. Who

18 could have prevented this? The JNA couldn't. It was only the Supreme

19 Command that could have done something about it.

20 Q. Mr. Candic, do you remember that we all criticized the army at the

21 time for engaging in showing images about violations of the law instead of

22 protecting the border, confiscating, arresting people who were smuggling

23 arms, which it was their duty to do?

24 A. That is how it should have been, but I do know that after this

25 video was aired, fear spread even within the top leadership of Croatia and

1 that President Tudjman himself that night had a fever, but he felt

2 relieved when he received an answer from Belgrade that nothing would be

3 done, and probably somebody had wanted it to be like that.

4 Q. So the army didn't want to do what it should have done by

5 constitution but simply expected the public to respond to quite obvious

6 violations of the law, very extreme violations. Is that what you're

7 telling us? Did you have an explanation, you in the security service, why

8 the army was not reacting in accordance with the constitution?

9 A. The army would have acted if it had received orders from the

10 Supreme Command, and it is quite clear that the Supreme Command or,

11 rather, the Presidency, didn't want to do any such thing. If they had

12 wanted it, the army would have followed those orders.

13 Q. Very well, Mr. Candic. Let's go back to the beginning of your

14 testimony here, because it is highly contradictory. You have been saying

15 that you were in control of what was happening in Serbia, and yet on the

16 other hand you're saying that the leadership of Serbia and I personally

17 were in control of the army. So explain to me, please, whether you had

18 ever, apart from what you've been talking about here, had you ever heard

19 that any officer of the JNA had ever been asked to sign an oath of loyalty

20 to me? Was what you had heard a provocation in your service or do you

21 really believe in such a fabrication?

22 A. I'd ask you, first of all, not to distort my words. Never for a

23 moment, and I am repeating myself, did I say that we controlled what was

24 happening in Serbia. What I said was that we were criticised to the

25 effect that we are not informed only about what was happening in Belgrade.

1 So we did not control the situation there.

2 As for this signing of an oath of loyalty in the federal

3 Secretariat for National Defence, as well as in all units, the security

4 bodies had their collaborators, which was normal. The information that

5 Aleksandar Vasiljevic, the general, obtained that individual generals were

6 signing loyalty to you is certainly information which he received from

7 trusted collaborators. Maybe not from one collaborator but several of

8 them who did not wish to sign such a loyalty oath to you. And that is

9 what I referred to. I personally did not have such an occasion, nor was I

10 of an appropriate rank to be present when somebody was signing or not

11 signing loyalty to you.

12 Q. Mr. Candic, do you remember that since we supported Yugoslavia,

13 that is we Serbia, its political leadership and all the citizens

14 considered the Yugoslav People's Army to be the legitimate armed force of

15 Yugoslavia? Are you familiar with that?

16 A. Of course I am.

17 Q. Then why would we ask the legitimate armed forces of Yugoslavia,

18 which we recognise and trust, select certain individuals to sign an oath

19 of loyalty? Don't you know that that is quite the opposite?

20 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, he can't answer why you should have

21 done something, what your motives may have been. All he can say is what

22 he knows of his own knowledge and observation.

23 Now, frame the question differently.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I wish to draw your

25 attention to a phenomenon, and that is that various witnesses have a piece

1 of a mosaic fitted into their statements which is quite the reverse to

2 what was actually happening. The previous witness was claiming here that

3 in Serbia --

4 JUDGE MAY: That is your case. If you say that this witness has

5 made it up or somebody has told him to say it, then you can put it to the

6 witness and he can answer it, but it's no good asking him what may have

7 been going on in your mind at the time. He doesn't know.

8 Well, let's deal with it.

9 What the accused is putting to you, Mr. Candic, is this: That

10 you've had, it's said, evidence fitted in as part of a mosaic. So what in

11 effect is being said is that you've been told or somebody's suggested that

12 you should say something, apparently this point about the oath of loyalty.

13 Has anybody suggested that to you?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before I uttered a

15 single word as part of my testimony, I read out loud the solemn

16 declaration that I would tell the truth and nothing but the truth. No

17 person can be born in this world who can tell me, "Say such-and-such a

18 thing" if it's something I don't know. So there is no human being on this

19 earth who could do that.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Very well, Mr. Candic. Let me hold you to your word then. So you

22 know, because you said you wouldn't say anything that you don't know, so

23 you do know that some generals signed an oath of loyalty to me. You know

24 that.

25 A. I said that General Aleksandar Vasiljevic informed us that some

1 generals had signed an oath of loyalty to you, had signed it. Among them,

2 he said, was one of your generals, that is he meant an air force general,

3 General Stevanovic, nicknamed Mika Sprajc, the commander of the 1st Corps.

4 Q. Did he then explain to you when he informed you about it what that

5 oath looked like, this oath of the loyalty, what the words were, et

6 cetera? Do you have any kind of knowledge about that?

7 A. No. He didn't go into such details.

8 Q. Well, then, tell me, Mr. Candic, since you're a professional

9 security -- intelligence officer, could you believe such nonsense that the

10 president of a republic that was a component part of Yugoslavia would ask

11 generals to sign oaths of loyalty to him, generals of the JNA, over which

12 he has absolute no authority? Did that seem probable to you or not?

13 A. I had known General Aleksandar Vasiljevic for about ten years, and

14 what he said I accepted without any doubt, and I thought it would be -- it

15 must be 100 per cent true.

16 Q. It was common knowledge that it was in Croatia that generals were

17 required to leave the JNA and to sign loyalty over there and that

18 Izetbegovic had asked his own to abandon the JNA and to sign loyalty to

19 them over there. We didn't ask anyone to leave the JNA. We supported the

20 JNA. Do you -- are you aware of these phenomena in Croatia and

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

22 A. With respect to Croatia, I am familiar with such events, but these

23 were public calls to the officers. When the war had started in the

24 Republic of Croatia, there was a public call to the officers to abandon

25 the JNA and to join the defence forces of the Republic of Croatia. When

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1 it comes to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Izetbegovic, he

2 did not ask an oath of loyalty to be signed to him. President

3 Izetbegovic, even at a point in time before the war in Bosnia had started,

4 had made suggestions that the Yugoslav People's Army should remain as an

5 armed force such as it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a defensive force for

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina without any changes having to be made such as it was at

7 that time. But this was not accepted in Belgrade.

8 Q. That again is not true, but never mind. Tell me, when did

9 Izetbegovic call? The last time you testified here, you said that

10 Izetbegovic had called on the Muslims and the Croats from Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina who had been members of the JNA to abandon the JNA, and when a

12 mobilisation call was made, that they should not respond. Is that what

13 you said? Isn't it?

14 A. I have to intervene for a third time. Do not distort my words.

15 Never did I say that Izetbegovic was calling on members of the JNA to

16 abandon the JNA. What I had said was that the President Izetbegovic had

17 called on the reservists not to respond to the mobilisation call. This

18 was made in public, addressed to Croats and Muslims but not to the

19 officers of the JNA, that is, the active-duty officers.

20 Q. Very well. Mr. Candic, I took note of this. It is not my

21 intention to distort your words. You can find this in the transcript.

22 Izetbegovic called on them not to -- to the Bosniaks and Croats, not to

23 respond. That is the terms you used. And those who had responded, to

24 return home. That's what you said, isn't it?

25 A. I did say a part of what you said.

1 JUDGE MAY: There's no point in arguing about this. We can look

2 at the transcript in due course. Yes, let's move on.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. I wish to ask a question in this connection. Did you say that

5 they shouldn't respond and that those who did respond should return home?

6 Isn't that what you said?

7 A. I said with respect to those who had been called up from the

8 reservists to be given wartime assignments - I was referring to them - and

9 that those who had responded should return home.

10 Q. Did you say that?

11 A. Yes, I did.

12 Q. So we don't have to check the transcript.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I now find it. Has -- what the witness said was

14 they were mobilised as reservists and received weapons since Izetbegovic

15 appealed to Muslims and Croats not to respond.

16 Yes. Let's go on.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. And then he went on to say

18 that those who had responded should return home.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's go on.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Candic, you said, and I assume you can find that in the

22 transcript too, what you said in the seat you're sitting in, that you

23 wrote about everything, about the arming of all three groupings. I'm

24 talking about Bosnia and Herzegovina now. The arming of the SDS, of the

25 SDA, and the HDZ. Is that what you said?

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. And since you mentioned the arming of Serbs very briefly, tell me,

3 what did you write about the arming of the SDA and the HDZ and what you

4 knew about the arming of these two, that is the SDA and the HDZ?

5 A. I shall be brief in answer to that question. With regard to the

6 arming of the SDA, what I wrote about could be reduced to really minimal

7 figures about smuggled weapons by individuals from the Republic of Croatia

8 or Slovenia into Bosnia-Herzegovina in the boots of passenger cars; a few

9 rifles. That's what I reported about, the people who were doing it and

10 when.

11 Q. Very well. Never mind. We'll come to that. You were working in

12 the department for internal enemies, that is, all those who were a threat

13 to the constitutional order of Yugoslavia. Is that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Those threats against the Yugoslav state, were they the -- the

16 product of the imagination of the state security in the JNA or did they

17 really exist?

18 A. With respect to those threats, and once again I must specify the

19 time period, threats against the constitutional order of the former

20 Yugoslavia were real threats, and we took them very seriously. In a later

21 stage, this was not legally regulated because one didn't know whether

22 these were threats or whether it was a grouping or an ethnic group who

23 were preparing not to experience a debacle as, unfortunately, they did.

24 Q. I assume that as a high-ranking intelligence officer, you must

25 have known that between 1981 and 1987, that is prior to all these events,

1 that is up to 1987, 216 illegal groups had been discovered in the JNA, and

2 then from 1987 to 1991, another 140 such groups, the aim of which was

3 first to break up Yugoslavia, the JNA as a cohesive factor. Is that true

4 or not?

5 A. I am familiar with that. I don't know whether the figure was 260,

6 but certainly a large number of them. Up to 1987 and of course after that

7 period, as you said. But really, I couldn't tell you what the exact

8 figure was, but there were really very many.

9 Q. So you're not familiar with any details about this?

10 A. These were mostly groups acting from positions of Albanian

11 nationalism and separatism, and a couple, one or two, that acted from

12 positions of Croatian nationalism. There wasn't a single group that was

13 discovered acting from positions of Greater Serbian nationalism.

14 Q. There wasn't single group acting from positions of Albanian

15 national -- of Muslim nationalism?

16 A. No.

17 Q. The groups that you're talking about, so from those positions

18 then, were they in favour of terrorist actions in the SFRY territory of

19 the JNA?

20 A. Some of the groups which were discovered, as an example in the

21 Zlata operation, Zlata 1 and 2 which was waged at a federal level, this

22 was a group of Albanian nationalist and separatists, and they were tied up

23 with members of the JNA and Albanian civilians, there were intentions

24 within their plans to perform terrorist operations both within the JNA and

25 of course within the civilian structures.

1 Q. As you were responsible for the Kosovo area and for the 90

2 municipalities in the northeast of Bosnia as well, which elements in

3 Kosovo represented a threat to the constitutional order of Yugoslavia?

4 Tell us that, then.

5 A. Well, the main elements that were a threat to the constitutional

6 order of Yugoslavia and -- was the attempts made to separate Kosovo from

7 Yugoslavia and join it up with Albania. That was the main segment of

8 threat, to topple the constitutional order of the Socialist Federal

9 Republic of Yugoslavia.

10 Q. And from that time, do you know about the illegal underground

11 Albanian separatist organisation that was called the Movement for an

12 Albanian Republic in the SFRY? Do you know about that?

13 A. Yes. The abbreviation was the PASRY, and I even read the platform

14 they compiled and how these cases were clarified later on.

15 Q. Do you know that from that time, eight members of this Central

16 Committee of theirs were active from outside the country, from aboard?

17 A. I don't know how many there were abroad. I focused on the members

18 who were active within the Yugoslav People's Army, and I do know that

19 there were quite a number of them from Zagreb, Sarajevo, Ljubljana, so

20 that those are the sections that I can talk about, whereas within the

21 operative action linked to that part, there were the security services of

22 Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia taking part so that the

23 data about the civilians, those working from abroad, from outside the

24 country, is something I really don't know about.

25 Q. Well, do you know at all anything about the Military Committee, to

1 use the PASRY abbreviation that you mentioned, this movement for an

2 Albanian socialist republic, do you know anything about the Military

3 Committee of that organisation?

4 A. Well, it wasn't actually a Military Committee but a military

5 organisation, along those lines, in order to achieve this Albanian

6 socialist republic within Yugoslavia.

7 Q. And were you able to establish within your service who the JNA

8 officers were who were illegally included into that Military Committee?

9 A. Of course we were able to establish that, and we processed them

10 and they were brought to trial. Lawsuits were brought against them.

11 Q. Is it also correct that this group in -- way back in 1984, had

12 planned the liquidation of workers in the Ministry of the Interior in

13 Kosovo and Metohija and planting explosives in Gjakove and the

14 thermoelectric power station of Obiliq? Do you remember information along

15 those lines?

16 A. I don't know about that, but if you have any questions with

17 respect to my testimony, ask me that. Don't go through my general

18 knowledge. I really do know a great deal, but I do not want to talk about

19 things that I have not brought up in my testimony.

20 Q. Mr. Candic, everything has to do with your testimony. Do you know

21 Naim Maljoku and Azdemi Rahim? Do those names ring a bell to you?

22 A. Yes, they do.

23 Q. Who were they?

24 A. Naim Maljoku was a captain, I think, in Lukavice. I don't know

25 who this other man was.

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1 Q. Rahim Azdemi was the other one. Were they members of this

2 terrorist group?

3 A. They were members of this movement PASRY, the abbreviation was.

4 That was what they were in favour of, and they were referred to as the

5 Marxists and Leninists of Kosovo.

6 Q. All right. But regardless of the fact that these Albanian

7 terrorists were united with respect to an ethnically purely Albanian

8 state, were you aware at the time, and do you know today, that amongst

9 themselves they were set up against the fascist traditions on the one

10 hand, stemming from the Second World War, and their links with the German

11 occupiers and the Italians and the representatives of this Marxist

12 Leninist faction which come from the Albanian Enver Hoxha? Were you aware

13 of that? Did you know about that? Did you have at your disposal that

14 kind of analysis for the activities of this separatist organisation of

15 theirs and those characteristics?

16 A. Working on the data available, we of course did take into account

17 all the different segments, and we did not let a single detail slip

18 through which could help us in our investigations in order to arrive at

19 authentic and precise concrete responsibility and the linkage that existed

20 or, rather, where a particular operation stemmed from in order to bring it

21 to account.

22 Q. Did you ever hear of the mass exodus of Serbs from Kosovo and

23 Metohija under pressure from these separatist organisations in Kosovo and

24 Metohija over all those years, during the years that you worked there and

25 when you were in charge of Kosovo?

1 A. While I was working in Kosovo, I did know and did hear about the

2 exodus or, rather, attempt at an exodus, and the directive came from

3 Belgrade that the Serbs from Kosovo should leave so that the impression

4 should -- became that they were terrorised and forced to leave. That is

5 not true. I was down there. I had my associates, both Serbs and

6 Albanians, and I know exactly what was going on. There was an attempt to

7 bring in the Romanians after what had happened in Romania, after the

8 killing of Ceaucescu, to bring in Romanians into Kosovo and for Kosovo to

9 become settled with Romanian inhabitants, to change the demographic

10 composition of the Serbs and Albanians, the populace in Kosovo.

11 Q. Oh, come on, Mr. Candic. Now, how many Romanians came to Kosovo?

12 Come on.

13 A. I didn't say that a single Romanian came to Kosovo, but I did say

14 that an attempt was made and that the offer was made to build houses for

15 them as well.

16 Q. Oh, come on, Mr. Candic. As far as I remember, the Romanians were

17 in Eastern Serbia, across the Danube, along the borders with Romania, and

18 they engaged in trade. Some of them were refugees, but as for Kosovo,

19 there were absolutely no Romanians there. Do you know that? Were you

20 aware of that, Mr. Candic?

21 A. I didn't say that there were. I was just talking about an attempt

22 to bring them in.

23 Q. All right. Who wanted to bring them?

24 A. The leadership of Serbia.

25 Q. That means me. You're trying to say that I wanted to bring in the

1 Romanians into Kosovo.

2 A. That's what you said.

3 Q. Well, I was at the head of Serbia at that time. I have heard all

4 sorts of things told in connection with my name, but never have I heard

5 that I planned to bring in Romanians into Kosovo.

6 Now, tell me, was part of your job to analyse the situation and

7 foresee coming operations by hostile elements and the proposal of measures

8 to thwart those attempts?

9 A. Well, a component part of my daily job and the job of the state

10 security organs in the JNA was to exert constant counter-intelligence

11 assessments. And of course, within those assessments and evaluations we

12 did incorporate all the elements required in intelligence work and

13 assessment. And it was updated on a daily basis. So, yes.

14 Q. Then you must have known and been aware of the pressures exerted

15 on the Serbs to leave the area. For example, a moment ago you claimed

16 that a directive had come from Belgrade that the Serbs should leave the

17 area. When did this direction come in?

18 A. Well, it was around the events of Azem Vllasi when he was arrested

19 and what you said before, Azem Vllasi was taken into custody in the mine,

20 when he was there with the miners.

21 Q. So the directive then, that would be 1989, 1990, wouldn't it, for

22 the Serbs to leave, to displace themselves. Do you know that it was at

23 that time that public opinion and propaganda, et cetera, was precisely the

24 reverse, that Serbs should not leave their homes but that those who had

25 already left should go back, those who had left under pressure should go

1 back to their villages and homes and to their own thresholds as the term

2 was used at the day. Do you remember that, Mr. Candic?

3 A. Do you remember the name of Mitar Balevic?

4 Q. Of course I do, I do remember Mitar Balevic from Kosovo Polje.

5 A. Yes. Well, precisely. It was his sister-in-law, Ljilja Balevic,

6 who told me about things of that kind taking place.

7 Q. Well, I don't know what his sister-in-law told you about, what she

8 spoke about, but when you're talking about 1990 or 1989, do you know how

9 many Serbs under pressure left the area from 1980 to 1989, when you say

10 the directive came?

11 A. Nobody left.

12 Q. Nobody left. Is that what you're saying?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. All right. Fine. And what year were you in charge of Kosovo?

15 A. 1989, 1990, and 1991.

16 Q. And up until 1989, you weren't in charge of Kosovo?

17 A. No.

18 Q. And you knew nothing about the exodus of Serbs from Kosovo?

19 A. I didn't delve into those problems. I had my units that I worked

20 with, and I had to take care of the units I was in charge of.

21 Q. All right. As you were working in your units, did any information

22 ever reach you, any facts and figures, about the fact that the leadership

23 of the JNA in any way whatsoever was in favour of any kind of Serb

24 nationalism?

25 A. I said I was an organ of security within the units of the JNA up

1 until 1988. Up until that year, I can safely say that I could not have

2 felt - neither could anybody else, I think - feel any influence by any one

3 of the republics or anybody from outside, wield influence on members of

4 the JNA.

5 Q. Yes. You said something that was quite right. The republics had

6 no influence, wielded no authority or had any competence or were able to

7 command the JNA; isn't that right?

8 A. Yes, that's right. I don't know whether I said that the republics

9 didn't have it in their competence, but that was true. The republics

10 didn't have the power to command the Yugoslav People's Army because it was

11 a federal institution which was exclusively subordinated to the Supreme

12 Command or, rather, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of

13 Yugoslavia.

14 Q. Which was the collective supreme body; right?

15 A. Right. Supreme Command.

16 Q. And is it the general position of your service, which as I have

17 understood it was declared generally at your regular briefings, meetings,

18 that the JNA was there to preserve Yugoslavia?

19 A. This term was frequently used, that the JNA was the sole cohesive

20 remaining factor - let me repeat it again - the sole cohesive factor for

21 the preservation of Yugoslavia.

22 Q. And did you share that opinion? Did you think that way too?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. All right, then. You have presented one example according to

25 which there was no information from Belgrade at a particular meeting you

1 mentioned. Now I want to ask you this: Generally speaking, your service,

2 did it collect information pertaining to the leadership of the Republic of

3 Serbia?

4 A. I don't know, but let me say that the system -- that the service

5 is a system as was shown on the chart. So my part, the Central

6 Counter-Intelligence Group, did not delve into matters of that kind, and

7 that is why we were criticised, precisely for not doing anything along

8 those lines. That is to say in Belgrade or in Serbia, to see what was

9 going on.

10 Q. All right. Now, as you said that you attended a meeting at which

11 General Vasiljevic explained that some generals, and you even said that I

12 asked many generals, not only some but many generals, to sign an oath of

13 loyalty, and you say that on page 4 of your statement, paragraph 4, tell

14 me the names of the persons who attended that meeting apart from you and

15 Vasiljevic?

16 A. Well, there were members of the Central Counter-Intelligence

17 Group, Lieutenant Colonel Radakovic, Colonel Tomislav -- Lieutenant

18 Colonel Dzigurski, Karan Ljuban, Ivica Katancic, Dragan Grigorjevic

19 [phoen], Branislav Nesic, Darvin Lisica, et cetera.

20 Q. All right. Very well. Now, you say not only that I asked them to

21 sign an oath of loyalty but that many generals did indeed do so.

22 A. I said that a portion of the generals did. I didn't say a large

23 number. I didn't know how many. And we weren't told how many, what the

24 exact figure was. But I was told that one of your generals did do so.

25 Q. One of my generals?

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1 A. I said the -- in the air force.

2 Q. Oh, I see. From --

3 A. From your structures. From among your ranks. From your branch of

4 the Armed Services.

5 Q. So you believe, as you mentioned General Stevanovic; did you not?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What was he at the time, the commander of what?

8 A. He was the commander of the 1st Airborne Corps in Bajnica. The

9 headquarters were at Bajnica, which means Belgrade.

10 Q. So you claim that General Stevanovic signed an oath of loyalty to

11 me.

12 A. Yes. I claim that, and it later proved to be correct.

13 Q. How did this prove to be correct later on?

14 A. Well, it proved to be correct because there were constant demands

15 from Eastern Slavonia for the air force to act in the area of Eastern

16 Slavonia, that is to say, Vukovar and all the other places where the

17 Croatian forces were deployed, and as such demands were thwarted by the

18 commanders in the air force, Zvonko Jurjevic, who was a general at the

19 time, the commander of the 1st Air Force Corps, Stevanovic, together with

20 the commanders of the squadrons, at a meeting of the air force command

21 that was held, they demonstratively got up and said, "My commanders, the

22 commanders who are with me, let them stand up and leave." And all his

23 commanders, the squadron commanders, got up, got to their feet, and left

24 of the meeting that was led by the commander of the air force and air

25 defence system of the air force.

1 Q. And tell me, what does that have to do with me? What is that to

2 do with me or the Republic of Serbia, your relationships with the army and

3 the JNA generally?

4 A. Well, I don't want to discuss that matter, what it has to do with

5 you. That's what you asked me and I gave you an answer.

6 JUDGE MAY: If you want us -- if you want us to take your answer

7 into account, you must tell us how it affects the position. You were

8 asked how it was proved to be correct that General Stevanovic signed the

9 oath, and at the moment it is not clear from your answer how you say it

10 was proved to be correct. Perhaps, Mr. Candic, you can explain and

11 clarify.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try and explain that once

13 again. The commander of the air force corps, the 1st Airborne Corps in

14 Belgrade, General Stevanovic, insisted nonstop that the air force and

15 aviation units bomb the positions of the Croatian forces and towns in

16 Eastern Slavonia or, rather, in the area of responsibility of the 1st

17 Airborne Corps. As he was not allowed to do this by the commander of the

18 air force, a meeting was held after these persistent demands were being

19 made, and General Stevanovic attended the meeting, as did the commanders

20 of the squadrons who were to have acted in Croatia, launched this attack.

21 After hearing the explanation that the JNA could not behave in that way

22 and could not attack a tower on some church, that the JNA was there to do

23 other things, General Stevanovic demonstratively got up, got to his feet

24 although he was the head of the air force, he was the --

25 JUDGE MAY: You've told us all that. What I want to understand is

1 how it shows that he took the oath of loyalty.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, from what I said earlier on.

3 The demands made for the Proboj 2 operation, that the Serbs should be

4 armed. Major Ljuban Karan, parallel to the reports he sent through the

5 regular channels to the security and intelligence department, drew up

6 charts and diagrams that he sent to pilots at the Batajnica airport,

7 saying which targets they should target, and he didn't inform Colonel

8 Slobodan Rakocevic about that, which was the usual, regular channel.

9 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've got to leave it there for the

10 moment because it's time for the adjournment. We will adjourn now for 20

11 minutes. Mr. Candic, would you be back then.

12 Mr. Milosevic, you can have up to an hour after the adjournment to

13 complete your cross-examination, if you require it. We will adjourn.

14 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

15 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. I understand from --

19 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, from your legal

21 officer, a few seconds ago I was informed that after the examination of

22 this witness, we would be discussing matters related to the health of

23 Mr. Milosevic. But as amici curiae, I believe we are duty-bound to draw

24 your attention to the fact that, although I am not a cardiologist, I am

25 not a psychiatrist or a doctor at all, but I --

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic --

2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] -- noticed at the beginning of

3 the examination --

4 JUDGE MAY: We are in the middle of an examination of witnesses.

5 There is a matter which we wish to raise with Mr. Milosevic. We will do

6 it in due course, and you will have a chance to comment on it.

7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is my duty to

8 draw your attention to this. A doctor hasn't been to see him in three

9 days.

10 JUDGE MAY: You can do it in due course. Now, let us finish this

11 examination, please.

12 Mr. Milosevic, would you continue, please.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Candic --

15 JUDGE MAY: We'll rise for three minutes while it's dealt with.

16 --- Break taken at 10.58 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. So, Mr. Candic, based on the fact that the commander of the 1st

21 Corps, as you say, quarreled with the commander of the air force at that

22 meeting and walked out, you conclude that is the proof that he had signed

23 loyalty to me. Is that it? Is that the proof for you?

24 A. I didn't say that. I didn't say it was proof. The proof is that

25 Aleksandar Vasiljevic said that he had signed a loyalty oath. This only

1 proves that he had departed from the line of command that was prescribed

2 for the Yugoslav People's Army.

3 Q. All right. Tell me, since, from what you say, General Vasiljevic

4 allegedly made such serious accusations against me, how is it possible,

5 then, that General Vasiljevic, as you said, ordered arms to be distributed

6 to Serbs?

7 A. I don't know who issued such orders. I only told you what I knew

8 about Operations Proboj 1 and Proboj 2, and I said Aleksandar Vasiljevic

9 was informed thereof. Who ordered that, I really don't know. And I don't

10 know who the reports were copied to in addition to Vasiljevic. He wasn't

11 the last in the line. These reports must have been submitted to some sort

12 of political authority as well. I really wouldn't like to go into things

13 I know nothing about.

14 Q. But does it tell you something as an intelligence officer, as you

15 explained yourself and as I would like to remind you, first you said that

16 weapons were distributed up there in Western Bosnia from the depot of the

17 Territorial Defence; right?

18 A. Yes. I said weapons were distributed from the depot of the

19 Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20 Q. Precisely. And then you described an event wherein an officer,

21 whose rank I didn't note down, but it was an officer named Knezevic --

22 A. Cedo Knezevic.

23 Q. Yes. Officer Cedo Knezevic was talking to Ljuban Karan, the

24 latter complaining about the fact that the JNA was not giving them any

25 weapons, and he said, "I have lots of that up there and I'll send you

1 some."

2 A. That's not how it was.

3 Q. How was it?

4 A. I must quote again my own words. Major Ljuban Karan complained

5 that Serbs in Eastern Slavonia were not armed and had no weapons. He

6 didn't say that the JNA wouldn't give any weapons to Serbs. And it was

7 after that that Cedo Knezevic said, "I have lots of it and I can give you

8 some. Here is a friend of ours. He can confirm that I can arm half of

9 the United States, if you want."

10 Q. Does it speak then to the fact that weapons were distributed at

11 that time according to old friendships, not on anybody's orders?

12 A. That is not so, because this operation had its name. It was

13 Operation Proboj 1, Breakthrough 1. It's not something that somebody did

14 of their own accord. They were following orders and reporting according

15 to procedure.

16 Q. And who was this officer subordinated to, Cedo Knezevic?

17 A. Major Cedo Knezevic was directly subordinated to, first of all,

18 Colonel Tomislav Cuk head of the Central Counter-Intelligence Group, and

19 since Colonel Cuk was directly linked with Slobodan Rakocevic, he was also

20 subordinated to Slobodan Rakocevic, head of the security service of the

21 air force and air defence.

22 Q. You just explained that precisely this Colonel Rakocevic, who,

23 according to this chain of command, was the superior officer of Knezevic,

24 was against this distribution of arms to anyone.

25 A. Exactly. And when those two trucks arrived in Zemun, Colonel

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1 Rakocevic spoke up against it. He said, "This can't be done this way. We

2 have the JNA, and if anything is to be done, we have to receive orders

3 first, and it is the JNA that should intervene rather than some volunteer

4 units or paramilitary formations."

5 Q. Doesn't it confirm that there were no orders to distribute

6 weapons?

7 A. If you remember what I said, I said that Major Cedo Knezevic

8 skipped one level in the chain of command. He went over the head of the

9 head of the security service of the air force and air defence and

10 addressed this precisely to the security administration.

11 Q. Are you saying that he had direct orders from General Vasiljevic

12 to distribute weapons, going over the head of Vasiljevic?

13 A. I really don't know.

14 Q. This General Vasiljevic that you mention made this accusation

15 against me at that meeting, saying that I was requiring officers to sign

16 loyalty oaths.

17 A. That's precisely how it was. He said that certain generals had to

18 sign, and signed, loyalty oaths to you. And you keep using this term

19 "General." You keep saying, "This general," as if you didn't know who he

20 was. You arrested him and tried him.

21 Q. I didn't arrest or try anyone, Mr. Candic, as you know well, nor

22 did I have any authority over the JNA or the army of Yugoslavia until

23 1997. And after that time, I had authority over them because I was

24 president of Yugoslavia. But let's move on.

25 How do you explain, then, that orders came eventually if you say

1 orders did not come from Vasiljevic? Rakocevic, who is in the chain of

2 command, is against this. Knezevic, as you claim, distributes weapons

3 according to somebody's orders. Whose orders?

4 A. When I made my statement, when I testified here, Your Honours, I

5 said that Cedo Knezevic was a deputy in the Proboj 1 operation, whereas

6 the leader of the operation was Lieutenant Colonel Smiljanic from the 5th

7 Army district, which means that the orders could have only been received

8 by Lieutenant Colonel Smiljanic. I don't know from who. And according to

9 those orders and the reporting chain, it must have been for this reason

10 that the security service of the air defence and air force was skipped,

11 bypassed.

12 Q. Doesn't it prove that it was somebody's arbitrary behaviour?

13 A. If this operation was given a name, it means that it must have

14 come from upstairs. So it couldn't have been arbitrary conduct. It was

15 something intentional.

16 Q. Perhaps this operation was given a name completely opposite to its

17 nature. It was something designed to control the distribution of weapons,

18 not to distribute weapons.

19 A. I don't know what kind of orders were given exactly, but I said

20 that weapons were distributed. It was not about controlling or monitoring

21 the distribution of weapons. I even gave you a figure of how many weapons

22 could have already been distributed at the moment when I became aware of

23 it.

24 Q. All right. Let us dwell on one thing that you mentioned. You

25 just mentioned Lieutenant Colonel Smiljanic. Is this the same person

1 whose letter addressed to General Mladic was exhibited here?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All right. I would like to hear your comment now on certain

4 excerpts from this letter. He says towards the bottom of page 1: "Before

5 the beginning of the war, I was head of the security service in the 9th

6 Corps in Zagreb, and I was familiar with the origins of the rising Ustasha

7 power. After my arrival in Plitvice, on the orders of my superiors, I had

8 to stay in the territory of Krajina until the beginning of 1991."

9 That's what it says here, isn't it?

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters don't have a copy and don't

11 know where the accused is reading from.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. And then he says, two pages later: "With the arrival of the

14 notorious telegram which said that officers and soldiers born in the

15 territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should withdraw," that was

16 after the approval of the Vance-Owen Plan to the effect that the army's

17 withdrawing from the territory of the Serbian Krajina, and he says: "With

18 the arrival of the notorious telegram that soldiers and officers born in

19 the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should withdraw, the

20 JNA remains composed of those born in Serbia and Montenegro. A large

21 percentage was made up of active-duty officers and soldiers. They are

22 made to leave from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Republika Srpska, whereas you

23 Palestinians from the RSK can go to Nis or wherever you want. All those

24 who are not from the territory of Yugoslavia or don't want to be involved

25 can go wherever they like. I as a Palestinian --" I continue quoting --

1 "went to Knin, but I didn't desert as some people interpret that now. On

2 leaving, I advised the officers who remained to keep a close watch on

3 Second Lieutenant Kliko, a Muslim, because he would definitely desert to

4 the Muslims, which unfortunately, happened since he deserted actually with

5 a BOV."

6 End of quote. This thing that you presented here as an exhibit,

7 does it mean that the leadership of Yugoslavia abided by the Vance Plan

8 and withdrew the JNA from the territory of the Serbian Krajina? Because

9 that's exactly the event that he's describing.

10 A. First of all, I did not present or provide this letter. This is

11 the first I hear of it. And second, what you quoted from this letter, I

12 can only say that this is exactly how it happened. I was aware of certain

13 things, such as that officers from Bosnia and Herzegovina were told to

14 remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Officers from Croatia were told to

15 remain in Croatia. But all of them were on the payroll in Belgrade until

16 the last day of war and even after the war.

17 Q. How, then, do you explain this part where he says, "Those from

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina should go to Republika Srpska, and you Palestinians

19 from the RSK can go to Nis or wherever you like"?

20 A. I don't know what Smiljanic wanted to say, what he meant when he

21 said he was a Palestinian. He was probably hurt by something that he was

22 told in his communication with Ratko Mladic. I wouldn't like to comment

23 on this.

24 I'm also familiar with the Vance-Owen Plan, but it is not true

25 that it was observed to the letter. All of the equipment and all of the

1 personnel of the JNA remained in those areas where they had been deployed,

2 and only those who were born in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could,

3 if they wanted to, to return. Some returned, but many remained.

4 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the letter ought to be made available to

5 the witness and indeed to the Prosecution and the other parties, not least

6 because now it's been acknowledged as accurate in part by the witness.

7 JUDGE MAY: Where is the letter? I haven't got it, have I? Tab

8 3. Let the witness have it.

9 JUDGE KWON: And the English version, page 4, third paragraph.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is your exhibit. I am not

11 tendering it. You have tendered it.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness have his copy.

13 Have you got it there, Mr. Candic, in a language you can follow?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do have it, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Milosevic.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Will you please look at this letter, the one but last page of it.

18 The ERN numbers are 72. The second paragraph, in which he says: "Attacks

19 against the Serbian army of Krajina have -- are very arrogant and tested

20 methods are being applied. Only some perpetrators have changed and it's

21 at different times. Among others, enemies of the Republic of Serbia

22 Krajina are ranked in the following manner as enemies of the Republic of

23 Srpska Krajina." Then four dashes. "First the remnants of communism and

24 the JNA on the territory of RSK. Secondly, the army of Yugoslavia.

25 Thirdly, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 5th Corps which is in

1 their neighbourhood in Bosnian Krajina. And fourth, the army of the

2 Republic of Croatia."

3 Please explain to me how come that the army of Yugoslavia is being

4 ranked as an enemy of the Republic of Serbian Krajina while at the same

5 time it is alleged that the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina was a

6 component part of the army of Yugoslavia? Can you explain that for me,

7 Mr. Candic? This is your exhibit.

8 A. Let me repeat: I didn't bring this letter, nor did I hand it over

9 to the Prosecution or to the investigators. I saw this letter here. What

10 the author of this letter meant in listing these elements, I really would

11 rather not comment on.

12 Q. You also consider that it wasn't the officers who distributed the

13 weapons as it would emanate from the conversation between Knezevic and

14 Ljuban, but they had an order, and you don't know, however, where that

15 letter came from.

16 A. Well, one knows where it could have come from. It couldn't have

17 come from a lower level than the intelligence administration, so it must

18 have come from them, the federal Secretariat, and the Supreme Command.

19 Q. But you don't know anything about that.

20 A. Of course I don't. I didn't say I did.

21 Q. Very well. I just wanted to take note of that.

22 Tell me, please. You say on page 4 of your statement that, "After

23 the war in Slovenia, the JNA withdraw to the line that Milosevic had set

24 as the borders of a Greater Serbia." That's what you said.

25 A. Yes, that's what I said. I didn't say that a line that Milosevic

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1 had set but a line imagined by the so-called Rump Yugoslavia or the

2 Greater Serbia, as they called it. And a good part of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina.

4 Q. Please look. I'm reading for you. You said that you didn't say

5 it. I didn't make it up. I'm reading from your statement. So let me

6 read it from page 4, the middle of your page 4 of your statement. "Upon

7 the end of the war in Slovenia, the JNA withdrew from there to a line

8 which Milosevic had set as the border of Greater Serbia," et cetera. This

9 is what is stated in your statement. If you didn't say that, tell me.

10 A. I don't believe I said that. I may have made a slip of the

11 tongue. If I did, let me say now that I didn't say that it was Milosevic

12 that had set the borders of Greater Serbia. I don't have that transcript.

13 Q. It's not a transcript. It's your statement that you signed, page

14 4 of that.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think this may be time for the Chamber

16 to have a copy of the statement.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we haven't got a copy. Let us have a copy, and

18 let the witness have a copy too.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Let us not waste time. I quoted correctly what is written in the

21 statement.

22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you question a witness about a

23 statement or any other document, he has the right to have it so he can

24 answer, provided it is available.

25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, copies for the Chamber will be coming

1 down. I'll just read the whole paragraph, because I'm not suggesting that

2 the sentence wasn't accurately quoted by the accused. It may have been

3 appropriate to put it into context. And in English, particularly in light

4 of an earlier answer and an exchange by the witness and the accused.

5 The paragraph reads: "When the war ended in Slovenia, the JNA

6 pulled out of Slovenia and withdrew to the line that Milosevic had

7 determined was the border for Greater Serbia. This idea of a border for

8 partial Yugoslavia had been written in the memorandum of the Serbian

9 Academy of Science. This was Milosevic's goal as it was published, and it

10 was common knowledge that this was Milosevic's plan."

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE MAY: We should have copies for ourselves.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Very well. In the second part, again the same is mentioned as I

15 asked you about. Was it my plan? And you said it wasn't. Now here it

16 says that you're claiming that the memorandum was in fact my plan, Mr.

17 Candic.

18 A. I've already answered that question. I think you have. I think

19 you have, if you agree. If you agree, I have already answered that

20 question.

21 Q. Tell me, please, as a former intelligence officer, inform me too

22 so that I might know. When was it and where did I set or determine the

23 borders of a Greater Serbia?

24 A. I never said that.

25 Q. A moment ago, you were given the statement to check.

1 A. If you want me to say when you determined the borders of a Rump

2 Yugoslavia, I will say on this occasion that that was when you took the

3 leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when you became

4 president. Of course, you were the author of the constitution of the

5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and in one paragraph of that constitution,

6 it says that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consists of Serbia and

7 Montenegro and all others who wish to join it.

8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Candic. You remember that in those days we

9 declared very clearly that we had no territorial pretensions towards any

10 of the former Yugoslav republics. But tell me, please, during the time

11 period you're testifying about, which -- of which ethnicities were Admiral

12 Miro Brovet, Grubicic, Jurinovski, Tus, Agotic, Tumanov, et cetera, all

13 these who were in the top military leadership of the Yugoslav People's

14 Army at the time?

15 A. Let me explain this comment that Serbia or, rather, the Federal

16 Republic of Yugoslavia had no pretensions towards other republics, towards

17 the Republic of Croatia and towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to

18 the rules of what acts of aggression constitute, a classical act of

19 aggression was committed against both republics with special warfare as an

20 introduction to this.

21 Secondly, when you asked me about the names of certain people and

22 whether I knew them, I did; they are generals. And to be specific, with

23 respect to General Simeon Tumanov, the deputy of General Aleksandar

24 Vasiljevic, chief of the Intelligence Administration, at the end of

25 February or maybe beginning of March, 1992, after the beating by volunteer

1 units in Serbia, I was in hospital at the Military Academy, and I met with

2 General Simeon Tumanov because he had an operation of polyps in his nose.

3 And he told me at the time that I had no reason to abandon the Yugoslav

4 People's Army because Bosnia and Herzegovina would join the Rump

5 Yugoslavia. He used the term "Rump Yugoslavia." So I'm talking about the

6 period I spent at the Military Medical Academy on the 13th floor of the

7 building. And I asked him how, and he said, "With Macedonia, the

8 situation has already been changed," and he, as a Macedonian, had to

9 return to Macedonia, whereas I would have no problems. I should stay in

10 the JNA because Bosnia and Herzegovina would also become a part of the

11 Rump Yugoslavia. I just looked at him and thought to myself that --

12 actually, I didn't want to make any comments aloud, but I wanted to let

13 him know that he was wrong.

14 Q. You wanted to say that to him, but you didn't?

15 A. Yes, I didn't tell him that.

16 Q. What do I care what you spoke about with a colleague at the

17 Military Academy, he a Macedonian and you a Bosnian? What has that got to

18 do with this?

19 A. It has plenty to do with the project of creating a Rump

20 Yugoslavia, that is, a Greater Serbia.

21 Q. Very well. What you call a Rump Yugoslavia, that is, the Federal

22 Republic of Yugoslavia, which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro, this was

23 the result of the fact that separatist movements in Slovenia, Croatia,

24 Bosnia and Macedonia had separated from Yugoslavia and not because Serbia

25 and Montenegro had seceded from Yugoslavia. That's clear to you?

1 A. Apparently it's not clear to you that Slovenia was allowed to

2 separate from Yugoslavia because the JNA withdrew in three months instead

3 of within three years, because it had no -- there was no interest in

4 Slovenia for it to remain within Yugoslavia as it was at the time.

5 Q. My position is quite the opposite. I think it was in the interest

6 of everyone to preserve Yugoslavia. There was no better country.

7 Unfortunately, the forces who broke it up had other goals in mind. As far

8 as I understand it, you too were for Yugoslavia.

9 A. Of course I was, but maybe I don't agree with you when you mention

10 forces. I don't know what you mean when you use the word "forces." I

11 probably have one thing in mind and you something else.

12 Q. Very well. I mentioned all these high-ranking officers from

13 Admiral Brovet, Ljubicic, Jurinovski, Tus, Agotic, and others. Were they

14 and you thrown out of the JNA? Did anyone throw you out from the JNA?

15 A. Let me correct you. Colonel Agotic was not a Serb. He was a

16 Croat. I was a Muslim.

17 Q. All the people I have listed were non-Serbs, and I'm asking you

18 whether they were thrown out of the JNA.

19 A. They were.

20 Q. You too?

21 A. I was not. I threw myself out.

22 Q. And who threw these people out of the JNA?

23 A. Imeraj Agotic was thrown out by Colonel Slobodan Rakocevic because

24 he didn't wish to establish any collaborationist position in the

25 leadership of Croatia as an intellectual and a highly educated man, an

1 intelligence officer who headed the security department of the 5th Corps

2 in Zagreb and he was replaced. So he didn't even have an office any more.

3 He went to work and sat with his colleagues in their offices and spent his

4 time there.

5 Q. After so many years, doesn't it seem to you that this so-called

6 idea of a Greater Serbia was simply a screen, a smoke screen, for the

7 achievement of separatist goals in these republics that seceded from

8 Yugoslavia, including Albanian separatism and nationalism?

9 A. I don't know why it's important what I think. What happened,

10 happened. Of course I don't like most of it. As for assessments and

11 judgements, let time and history have their say about it.

12 Q. Very well. Tell me, please, something that you must know. In

13 which one of the former republics of the SFRY were there the largest

14 number of national minorities, then and today for that matter? Is it

15 Serbia?

16 A. Yes. Serbia is the republic that had the largest number of

17 national minorities.

18 Q. Do you know that only in Serbia the national structure from the

19 year 1990 to 2000 did not change? Only in Serbia.

20 A. I do know that a key issue which shook up Serbia was the 1974

21 constitution and the crisis that set in throughout the former Yugoslavia.

22 The roots of that crisis can be traced to the 1974 constitution because

23 Albanians were given -- Albanians in Kosovo were given autonomy and

24 Vojvodina was granted autonomy. So that Serbia was put in a position to

25 be reduced to Serbia proper, because in the parliament of Serbia, there

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1 were people from both provinces, and they could out-vote the others when

2 political decisions were taken.

3 Q. Let us not discuss constitutional matters with you but let us

4 refer to your own experience. During your service with the JNA, was a

5 single Hungarian from Vojvodina, a Bulgarian from Eastern Serbia, an

6 Albanian from Kosovo, a Muslim from Sandzak, a Ruthenian or any other

7 national minority member thrown out?

8 A. I am not aware of that.

9 Q. Are you aware that according to the constitution, Serbia is the

10 state -- a state of all its citizens, that it is defined as such?

11 A. It is true that the constitution not of Serbia but of the Federal

12 Republic of Yugoslavia says that the -- not the Federal Republic. I'm

13 sorry. Yes, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a state of the citizens

14 living in it. That is what it is inscribed in the constitution.

15 Q. Yes. The same is inscribed in the constitution of Serbia, that it

16 is the state of all its citizens?

17 A. I really don't know about the constitution of Serbia.

18 Q. And do you know what happened after the constitutional solutions

19 and the multi-party elections in Croatia in 1990 regarding the status of

20 the Serbs in Croatia?

21 A. I do know that not only Serbs but Muslims, too, in Croatia were

22 reduced to a minority.

23 Q. Since your service collected data about the Croatian Ustasha

24 emigres, did you know anything about their plans and ideas with respect to

25 the Yugoslav state?

1 A. Of course. As an operative officer in the intelligence service, I

2 did have access to information regarding the activities of hostile Ustasha

3 emigres groups abroad, and all that information pointed to a tendency or,

4 rather, a wish of those emigres, Ustasha emigres circles to create a

5 greater Croatia.

6 Q. And do you know that no one then, before that or after that, in

7 Serbia called in question the right of the Croatian people to

8 self-determination but that an ethnically pure Croatia was unacceptable

9 for hundreds of thousands of Serbs who were expelled from there?

10 A. I don't know anything about an ethnically pure Croatia. I really

11 never heard of any such project nor is there any written trace of that, an

12 ethnically pure Croatian.

13 Q. You don't know of the project that one-third should be converted

14 to Catholicism, one-third expelled, and one-third killed. As an

15 intelligence officer, you knew nothing about that project?

16 A. We're switching from one subject to another. When talking about

17 the emigres groups or the extremists within those circles did make such

18 statements about the three thirds, as you said, but that was not something

19 that came from the official authorities of the Republic of Croatia.

20 Q. I won't quote any such things because they're not contained in

21 your statement. Do you know who, among representatives of the extremist

22 Ustasha emigration joined the top level leadership of the Croatian state?

23 A. One of them was Gojko Susak.

24 Q. And who was Gojko Susak?

25 A. Gojko Susak, I think, came from Canada to Croatia just before the

1 beginning or, rather, after the multi-party elections and just before the

2 war in the Republic of Croatia.

3 Q. And what was he in Croatia?

4 A. Defence Minister.

5 Q. From your statement, I see that you were in charge of the Krajina

6 region. Is that right?

7 A. In charge of what?

8 Q. In charge of the Krajina, that particular region.

9 A. No, I wasn't in charge of the Krajina region. I didn't say that.

10 Q. That's what it says at the beginning of the third paragraph from

11 the top on page 4, and I'll read the whole sentence out to it from the

12 capital letter to the full stop: "I was responsible for the areas of

13 Kosovo and north-eastern Bosnia, but I was also in charge of Krajina."

14 That's what it says in your written statement.

15 I'm asking you now, were you in fact in charge of the Krajina

16 region? You say you weren't.

17 A. Well, I don't know who wrote this, but let me repeat: I never

18 said that I was in charge of the Krajina region.

19 Q. All right. Very well. Thank you. I'm not going to ask you any

20 more about that because you say yourself that you don't know who wrote

21 your statement.

22 A. Well, possibly it's the translation. I said that I was

23 exclusively in charge of Kosovo and north-eastern Bosnia, but I also said

24 that, according to my official capacity, I travelled both to Croatia and

25 Slovenia and Macedonia and to Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only north-eastern

1 Bosnia but Central Bosnia as well when necessity required or, rather, when

2 I received orders to that effect.

3 Q. So you weren't an intelligence officer in Banija, Kordun, Lika; is

4 that right?

5 A. No. I wasn't in those areas but I said that I was in Bosanska

6 Krajina or, rather, the Bihac area and the airport region in Bihac.

7 Q. All right. You said that the JNA became an exponent of Serbian

8 policy and this in a strange way, in view of the fact that in 1991 it sent

9 you to Bihac as an officer, and you were a Muslim. So that would appear

10 rather strange. How, then, does that coincide with the statement that you

11 made that it was an exponent of Serb policies?

12 A. The Yugoslav People's Army as an institutional system didn't send

13 me to Bihac by orders, on orders, but I was sent by orders from colonel

14 Slobodan Rakocevic, and in response to a question I was asked, I explained

15 why he chose me to go. I said he probably trusted me. And the fact that

16 he trusted me testifies to the fact that I was an officer, very

17 conscientious, and it was said in a portion here that for my work and due

18 to my conscientiousness I was promoted to the rank of major of the air

19 force before my time within the JNA.

20 Q. Yes. I saw that. That just proves that there was no

21 discrimination but that you were favoured and that you were judged

22 according to the results of your labours.

23 A. Yes, and I said that during my testimony today. I said there was

24 no discrimination towards me personally, that I felt no pressure exerted

25 upon me, and that people right up to 1987 and even 1988 and 1989 and 1990

1 were ranked according to their abilities, the results of their labour, and

2 not according to their national or ethnic affiliation.

3 Q. All right, then. So when they sent you on that assignment, did

4 you fulfil your assignment? Did you find the transmitter you were sent to

5 find?

6 A. I'm not an expert in finding transmitters. I was just sent there

7 to take through a column of three radio reconnaissance vehicles with their

8 crews on board, and that's why I stayed there for three or four days,

9 because I was waiting for these teams, for those crews, to find the

10 transmitter. Whether they actually found it or not, I don't know, because

11 they were supposed to hand in their reports to their superiors. It wasn't

12 within my mandate to look into the affair myself.

13 Q. All right. Fine. Tell me this: After the event that you

14 describe when you say that because of the shooting that took place on some

15 of the reservists that some bombs were thrown in a village but you don't

16 remember the name of the village, whether it was Zegar or Vaganac, which

17 of those two villages, and you go on to say that you saw that the village

18 had been set alight. Now, do you know whether anybody was killed on that

19 occasion during that operation, how many people were killed, what happened

20 at all?

21 A. I wasn't able to speak about that in detail, but when I went to

22 Bihac, I noticed enormous flames and smoke. And when I arrived at the

23 airport in Bihac, I met Colonel Topalovic, Jovo Topalovic, who screamed at

24 me and who was swearing, who cursed all the generals in Belgrade and asked

25 me, "What's that you're doing over there, because the whole village has

1 been torched." The whole airport is on its feet, and so is the air force

2 and with bombs, inflammatory bombs launched on the villages. The villages

3 were set alight, and I don't know how many people were killed. But I did

4 see, judging by the reactions of the colonel, Colonel Jovan Topalovic who

5 replaced Igor Topalovic as head of security of the 5th Air Force Corps,

6 that he was dissatisfied, because he said that this was all rigged and

7 that somebody had purposely fired at the paramilitary units.

8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Candic, we will get on better if you try and

9 concentrate on the question. In the middle of that you said you don't

10 know how many people were killed.

11 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. So you don't know which village that actually was; is that right?

14 A. I didn't hear your question.

15 Q. I was saying you don't know which village it was.

16 A. Vaganac.

17 Q. And you don't know if there are any dead, any people killed, and

18 you don't know who gave the orders for the village to be bombed in the

19 first place.

20 A. According to what Colonel Topalovic told me, the order for the

21 aeroplanes to leave Bihac airport with the incendiary bombs, the orders

22 were issued by the commander of the air force brigade, Mahmut Skadrac

23 [phoen] and Slobodan Jeremic, who was at the Bihac airport very frequently

24 as head of air support.

25 Q. And what was this brigade commander by way of ethnicity?

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1 A. Well, he was from a mixed marriage, the child of a mixed marriage.

2 I don't know whether his father was a Serb or his mother.

3 Q. What was his name?

4 A. His name is Mahmud.

5 Q. I see, Mahmud. Right. Now, as you said that you came -- you saw

6 the officers drinking and celebrating in the mess; that's right, isn't it?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Well, tell me, what mess was this that served alcohol to the

9 officers?

10 A. In the military canteens, there is no alcoholic beverage, but on

11 that particular night in the canteen or restaurant or mess where the

12 pilots take their meals, there was alcoholic beverage, more than in any

13 other restaurant, I would say, which generally served alcoholic beverages.

14 Q. Well, tell me the name of one -- at least one officer who was

15 there at the time.

16 A. Well, there were Cako Ivan, Baraban Mirko; people from my own

17 class and group, year, those two.

18 Q. And you say you met Cedomir Knezevic; right? That's what it says

19 in your statement. What was the reason for this meeting of yours?

20 A. Well, the reason was because I was supposed to wait for three or

21 four days, to stay at the airport, sleep there, in order to escort the

22 column back to Belgrade. And as I saw that Jovan Topalovic was drunk, I

23 knew that I couldn't sit down and talk to him but I was on good terms with

24 Cedo, and I asked him where Cedo Knezevic was, although I knew he was at

25 the Bihac airport, and he said he was at the hunting lodge. And he took

1 me to the hunting lodge, in fact, which is where I set up my

2 accommodation.

3 Q. The weapons that the JNA gave out to the JNA, was it from the JNA

4 depots or from the Territorial Defence depots?

5 A. Well, I'm saying for the umpteenth time that the weapons were from

6 the TO depots of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Q. All right. Fine. Now, why in this action to arm Serbs in

8 Croatia, why would the Croats themselves take part? Could you explain

9 that absurdity? Because you say that Miroslav Jarun, a Croat, was a

10 participant in that operation.

11 A. I didn't say Miroslav Jarun but Miroslav Juran.

12 Q. All right Juran then.

13 A. Miroslav Juran was not in Bihac. Miroslav Juran was stationed in

14 Dvor Na Uni, together with Slavuj Ljubisa, and he did not take part in the

15 handing out of weapons. It was Major Cedo Knezevic who was in the hunting

16 lodge which is where the depots and stockpiles were.

17 Q. But he was engaged in this operation. He was part of it,

18 according to what you say, right?

19 A. Juran was a member of the 2nd Detachment of the

20 counter-intelligence group from Zagreb, and they had moved because they

21 were afraid of being arrested, so they had displaced and moved to Bihac.

22 Part of them were in Bihac and another part in Dvor Na Uni, and the third

23 part of the detachment had moved to Glina or rather, Petrinja. And every

24 one of them had the task of developing a network, which meant that the

25 collaborators in Glina, Dvor Na Uni, Bosanski Novi formed this network of

1 collaborators and informers within the frameworks of Proboj 1 and the

2 dissemination of weapons to Serbs in Krajina Lika and Kordun.

3 Q. All right, but everything that you know about Proboj 1, that

4 particular operation, you learned from Knezevic, as far as I was able to

5 gather, right?

6 A. Yes, of course, and saw it with my own eyes.

7 Q. With your own eyes. You said you saw a report with your own eyes.

8 A. And the weapons and when the weapons were taken away.

9 Q. Did you inform your superiors about everything you had learnt?

10 A. No, I didn't inform anybody. That was not my assignment or

11 mission. I was just there on assignment, that is to say, to wait for

12 those who had gone there to find the radio ham transmitters and take them

13 back to Belgrade.

14 Q. But you said you would see on a daily basis at least three or four

15 trucks loaded full of weapons which where driven by regular JNA soldiers,

16 escorted by the military police, as they left the depots and warehouses.

17 That's what it says on page 6, paragraph 4 of your statement.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the statement is now available.

19 JUDGE MAY: Give it an exhibit number.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Quite possibly --

21 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. We're going to give this an exhibit

22 number.

23 THE REGISTRAR: This will be marked Prosecutor's Exhibit 350, tab

24 4.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I go ahead with my question now,

2 please?

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. What you say on page 6, paragraph 4, is the following: "Every day

6 I saw at least three or four trucks loaded with weapons," et cetera, et

7 cetera, "leave the warehouse." Now, my question for you is why, then, on

8 page 5, in paragraph 5, you claim the following, and I quote: "Those

9 weapons were not being smuggled to Serb civilians but representatives of

10 the Serbs would come with a list of individuals that supported the Serb

11 rebellion and who should be armed. The Serbs were coming to Bihac in

12 their own trucks to pick up weapons for their villages."

13 Now, which of those two statements is correct, Mr. Candic? Which

14 of those two claims?

15 A. I said that every day three to four trucks were parked in the

16 vicinity on the plateau near the hunting lodge. I said that I had

17 occasion to see, one day, how two trucks were driven off when the

18 representatives of the Serbs turned up, those who had come to ask for what

19 they needed. I didn't say that this happened every day. Perhaps there

20 was a slip during the translation. I didn't say that every day I saw at

21 least three to four trucks being driven off. But when it came to

22 smuggling, I did say that Major Cedo Knezevic told me that if he learnt

23 that any one of the Serbs who had been given weapons, that he would have

24 shot them personally. So I don't know who did the translation of this,

25 but that is what I said.

1 Q. As far as the translation is concerned, the translators here are

2 very good. So those arguments that you put forward and people put forward

3 very frequently, I've heard them umpteen times. Let me just remind you

4 what it says in your statement. "Every day," it says, "I saw at least

5 three or four trucks loaded with weapons leave the warehouse." Now you

6 say that one day you happened to see two trucks parked by there somewhere.

7 A. I didn't say I saw them parked. I said I saw them loaded and that

8 they were driven off with the weapons. That's what I said just now.

9 Q. Now, how did you know where those trucks were going and who was

10 taking over the weapons?

11 A. I didn't say I knew where they were going, where their destination

12 was.

13 Q. You said that in Bihac -- when you were in Bihac, did you contact

14 anybody else except Knezevic?

15 A. Yes, Slobodan Jeremic was there all the time. For those three or

16 four days that I was there, he was there too, and I can see that he was

17 involved in this whole situation, that he knew everything about it, and

18 Slobodan Jeremic, Colonel Slobodan Jeremic, head of the air force support

19 from Zemun.

20 Q. All right. Tell me now, please, when you're talking about the two

21 trucks loaded up with weapons who arrived at the headquarters in Zemun,

22 isn't that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And that Rakocevic protested. So he couldn't have been the

25 organiser of the Proboj 1 operation, or perhaps the Proboj 1 operation was

1 an operation contrary to the smuggling of weapons. Which of the two is

2 correct?

3 A. I don't know which is correct. I said that Rakocevic did lodge

4 protests and said why things were going on without his knowing about it.

5 That's what I said.

6 Q. But later on, you say that he issued the order for the weapons to

7 be distributed.

8 A. That's not what I said. He said that the weapons could be

9 distributed only to those people who deserved to be given one artillery

10 piece and a maximum of ten barrels, which is what Major Karan obtained

11 from the entire contingent and handed over to those people in Eastern

12 Slavonia.

13 Q. That means those ten barrels, that was actually the Operation

14 Proboj 2. That was the whole operation, was it?

15 A. I didn't say those ten barrels were the Proboj 2 operation,

16 because later on in my statement I go on to say that Major Ljuban Karan

17 turned towards Goran Hadzic more and more often and that he would go to

18 Novi Sad frequently and approach the security service and Arkan there.

19 Q. All right. But you said that as a result of this operation, you

20 said a moment -- a few days ago, seven or eight pieces handed over to

21 friends. Now you say ten. Let it be ten.

22 A. I said ten at the most.

23 Q. All right. Fine. So that's what the Proboj 2 operation means.

24 That's what you know about it; right?

25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. All right. So these seven or eight artillery pieces were

2 distributed to friends, right, to their associates by way of a gift?

3 A. I said to associates.

4 Q. All right, to associates. Can you then refer to this as arming

5 the Serbs, use the term "arming the Serbs" if that's what it was?

6 A. I didn't say it was arming the Serbs.

7 Q. All right, Mr. Candic. On page 8, paragraph 4, you say that the

8 images and footage of massacred civilians came in who were killed by

9 Croatian paramilitary formations. However, you were of the opinion that

10 those civilians were actually killed by the Serbs. Now, why did you think

11 that?

12 A. Well, I explained that today in the first portion of my testimony.

13 Q. You explained that it wasn't logical to you.

14 A. Ah, right. That's it.

15 Q. But you have no actual knowledge about that. All you said was

16 that it didn't seem logical to you if civilians were massacred and then

17 the people who massacred withdrew and then these other people found them,

18 took footage of them, and that it wasn't logical for those who did that to

19 take the bodies off.

20 A. It's illogical.

21 Q. It's illogical only because they left them lying there; is that

22 right?

23 A. There are more reasons why it seemed illogical but I wouldn't like

24 to lecture anyone here.

25 Q. You claim that something like that could not have happened to

1 Croat paramilitary formations, nothing like the killing and mutilating of

2 civilians.

3 A. It could have happened once or twice but it couldn't have been

4 happening all the time.

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we're drawing to an end. You've got

6 another two minutes.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have quite a few questions left,

8 Mr. May. I really don't know --

9 JUDGE MAY: You were given extensive time. I'll give you another

10 five minutes.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It will be extremely difficult to

12 choose from these, because I've got about 50 questions left.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. All right. Tell me, please, is it true that during your service,

15 your tour of duty in Tuzla, you monitored the arming of paramilitary

16 formations such as the Green Berets and the Patriotic League?

17 A. I said in my statement that I monitored the arming of all three

18 ethnic groups. I didn't say a single word about the Green Berets or the

19 Patriotic League. Of course, if I have the opportunity to say so now, I

20 know for certain that in north-eastern Bosnia, there were no Green Berets

21 or any formations of the Patriotic League.

22 Q. Do you know who Vahid Karavelic is?

23 A. Of course I do.

24 Q. Is it true that he was a captain of the JNA at that time,

25 commander of the Patriotic League for north-eastern Bosnia?

1 A. Mr. Karavelic was arrested in Zivinice in north-eastern Bosnia and

2 taken to Sremska Mitrovica to prison. He was later exchanged. It is true

3 he was a captain of the Yugoslav People's Army. His assignment was to

4 coordinate the Patriotic League, but it was only coordination. No

5 operation involving arming or organisation of paramilitary formations.

6 Q. So you claim there were no paramilitary formations of the

7 Patriotic League in north-eastern Bosnia, and now you say that Captain

8 Karavelic was commander -- was coordinator of the Patriotic League. I

9 call him commander, you call him coordinator. What is true?

10 A. I'm saying he was not the commander of the Patriotic League, but

11 he was involved with people who were members of the Patriotic League, and

12 one of them was Haris Redzic. He was the one who sheltered Captain Vahid

13 Karavelic, and Karavelic even lived at his place for a while.

14 Q. Is it true that he blocked the supply of food to units near a

15 military airport?

16 A. No, it's not true.

17 Q. Is it true that during an operation which you commanded directly,

18 you had a conflict with Karavelic's people and a lieutenant of the JNA, an

19 Albanian, was killed then?

20 A. I know who was killed. Raif -- first of all, I didn't command

21 any operation. But when Lieutenant Raif Miftari was killed, I was in

22 Belgrade. I learnt about it later. I learnt that he was killed near

23 Zivinice, by his own commander, by the way, the commander of the artillery

24 and rockets regiment.

25 Q. Is it true that you arrested Karavelic himself and transported him

1 to the prison in Sremska Mitrovica by helicopter?

2 A. I just told you, didn't I, that I never saw Vahid Karavelic in

3 north-eastern Bosnia. I couldn't have transported him via helicopter. I'm

4 not a pilot. I couldn't have done it myself. I wasn't even there when

5 not only he but two other people were arrested and taken to Sremska

6 Mitrovica.

7 Q. Mitrovica is not in north-eastern Bosnia. Is it true that his --

8 that documents concerning the arming of the 108th Brigade of the ZNG, the

9 Croatian National Guard, were found on him?

10 A. I don't know about that.

11 Q. The information you had thanks to your rank and position, is it

12 true that you gave them to another intelligence service after leaving the

13 JNA?

14 A. Well, the information I had access to thanks to my rank and

15 position was indeed given by me not to intelligence services but to one

16 intelligence service, sorry, the service for the protection of the

17 constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia. Radenko Radojcic was the

18 person I gave them to.

19 Q. When did you join the BH army?

20 A. I was commander of the municipal -- Territorial Defence

21 headquarters for the Brcko municipality.

22 Q. Is it true that after leaving the JNA, you spent some time in

23 Italy and Austria?

24 A. For a while I did live in Austria.

25 Q. Did you contact any foreign intelligence services there?

1 A. No.

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, this must be your last question now.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will have many questions unasked

4 left.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do you know who Fikret Muslimovic is?

7 A. Fikret Muslimovic is an officer from the security service of the

8 former JNA, and during the aggression committed against Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina, he was an officer of the BH army.

10 Q. Is it true that as an intelligence officer, he was in charge of

11 monitoring the nationalism in the religious orders of the Catholics and

12 that -- and Catholic clergies?

13 A. He was never a member of the counter-intelligence group. Within

14 his purview, on his job in the unit, he could have monitored the clergies,

15 emigres groups, but only within the unit. But -- and he could have

16 recruited moles only from the people within the unit.

17 JUDGE MAY: All right. Mr. Milosevic, you've had your time.

18 Yes. Does the amicus have any questions?

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I do

20 have a number of questions.

21 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

22 Q. [Interpretation] In order not to come back to it later, since Mr.

23 Candic said a lot of things today, I would ask him to clarify a couple of

24 points. First of all, the recent questions concerning the tapes of

25 massacred civilians. He already gave us his own explanation.

1 However, in your statement, Mr. Candic, I mean the witness

2 statement, page 9, paragraph 2 in the English version, three last

3 sentences, and in your statement you have in front of you it's page 8,

4 paragraph 4, you say you were never quite certain what these people's

5 ethnicity was. Is that correct?

6 A. I said I wasn't prepared to accept this information for granted,

7 although it was alleged by Katancic and Karan they were Serbs.

8 Q. But you were not sure of their ethnicity is what you said. Is

9 that true?

10 A. Well, there were no inscriptions. There was no writing or sign

11 anywhere on their body parts.

12 Q. I'm just asking if that's what you said. I was pointing out

13 something illogical about it.

14 Q. Why did you say in this statement, since it is already exhibited

15 here, otherwise I wouldn't be using it probably, you mentioned this

16 officer or soldier who executed four persons by shooting them in the back.

17 How come you never mentioned it during any of the previous interviews?

18 Because it is a gruesome incident.

19 A. Nobody asked me earlier. I mentioned it today because I was

20 asked.

21 Q. When you saw that Radojcic Radenko doing nothing to punish this

22 officer or soldier who did this, why didn't you report it to some of your

23 superior officers or the military prosecutor's office?

24 A. I was a junior to Colonel Radojcic Radenko, rather, Lieutenant

25 Colonel Radojcic Radenko who was head of the counter-intelligence group,

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1 but I did have a verbal duel with him on the subject. However, I did not

2 think it was my job or my duty to report it.

3 Q. Thank you. When you were talking about Opera and Labrador, you

4 mentioned wire taps and intercepts. Did this group, including you in that

5 service, engage primarily in operations that were designed to prevent the

6 break-up of the JNA?

7 A. When I was talking about Opera, its main objective was propaganda

8 operations designed to influence the psychology, the mind-set, beliefs of

9 people in those places where this information was presented.

10 Q. Is it true that it was organised that 70 aeroplanes should cross

11 over to the Croatian side?

12 A. I don't know.

13 Q. Is it true that the military prosecutor of the JNA had them all

14 arrested in 1992 for precisely this?

15 A. I don't know what happened then. I left the army in 1992. I am

16 not aware of what you're talking about.

17 Q. You said yourself that they were all arrested.

18 A. Who was arrested?

19 Q. Vasiljevic.

20 A. I said that Vasiljevic, Rakocevic and the Opera group were

21 arrested rather than 70 pilots who were preparing to desert with their

22 aeroplanes to Croatia.

23 Q. I understood you as saying that this group was arrested, as

24 suggested by the military prosecutor of the JNA, and brought to justice.

25 A. There was a trial. I was even a witness. And what I said today,

1 including what I said about those two trucks and weapons and the work of

2 the Opera I said on that occasion in Belgrade as well, and I suppose there

3 must be transcripts of my testimony there. I didn't know I would end up

4 here today, telling the same story. I said what I knew as a witness in

5 Zagreb in the case against Radenko Radojcic.

6 Q. I would kindly ask you only to answer my questions rather than

7 give me elaborate explanations. I'm only asking you were they were

8 arrested or not?

9 A. I said they were.

10 Q. I have three subjects to cover, Your Honours, related to this

11 witness's testimony. First of all, on Day One you spoke about the fact

12 that the army penetrated civilian structures in 1989, 1990, and 1991.

13 A. I didn't say the army penetrated them. I said members of

14 counter-intelligence groups created moles or collaborator positions in

15 civilian structures in these years.

16 Q. All right. Was it possible for someone to work for 30 years in

17 your organisation, named KOG, without knowing that it was called "KOG"

18 rather than "KOS"?

19 A. No one ever in the structure where I worked used the term "KOS."

20 They always said "KOG."

21 Q. Could anyone have been a mole or an informer for KOG without

22 knowing it was called KOG?

23 A. If somebody is a collaborator, he is run by one operative officer.

24 He is not even supposed to know where that officer works.

25 Q. And he is aware only of this one individual. He doesn't know

1 anything about other employees of the KOG.

2 A. That's normal.

3 Q. And then in those civilian structures, you conducted

4 investigations. You monitored people. You conducted surveillance.

5 A. I only received reports.

6 Q. You only collected data, information about those people?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. For the benefit of the Judges, I would like you to give me a few

9 explanations. The army consists mainly of professionals, officers and

10 NCOs; is that correct?

11 A. The army consists of two components: The armed forces, that is

12 the Yugoslav People's Army, which includes the active-duty force,

13 officers, NCOs and soldiers.

14 Q. I'm interested in this second segment, soldiers. How many

15 soldiers were full-time employed in the JNA, or is it true that 70 per

16 cent of the JNA consisted of conscripts who served their military duty?

17 A. Everybody served for 12 months.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 90 to 95 per cent.

19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. So they were conscripts?

21 A. Before coming to serve in the army, they were civilians, and when

22 they finished, they became civilians again.

23 JUDGE MAY: We've come to the time when we must adjourn. Twenty

24 minutes.

25 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

1 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.

3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

4 Q. Mr. Candic, could you please answer my questions with a yes or no

5 or as briefly as possible.

6 We came to the point when civilians, citizens between 18 and 20

7 years of age, would spend up to a year in the army, upon which they would

8 return to civilian life; is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. When doing their military service, was the principle that a Croat

11 should serve in Serbia, a Macedonian in Slovenia, a Serb in Slovenia, a

12 Montenegrin in Bosnia; was that the principle applied?

13 A. There was no special principle or key as to where recruits would

14 be assigned to do their military service, but in any event, efforts were

15 made that he shouldn't serve close to his home but further away, and as a

16 rule, in another republic of the former Yugoslavia.

17 Q. Thank you. So in view of that, I'm asking you as an officer, and

18 especially since you're familiar with life in the army, could any nation

19 living in Yugoslavia feel that it was being occupied by another nation?

20 A. As an officer, I can say that I could never discover any elements

21 of one nation occupying another.

22 Q. Thank you. And was one of the main duties of the officers to

23 develop tolerance, absolute tolerance of different religions and

24 ethnicities?

25 A. Yes, indeed.

1 Q. Did this apply to the officers as well?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. The army, up to 1989, did it interfere at all in civilian affairs

4 except in humanitarian campaigns?

5 A. The army interfered in civilian affairs, as I tried to explain,

6 when it came to operations of a federal level, if we're talking about the

7 security segment, when both JNA security services and the State Security

8 Service would participate.

9 Q. I'm talking about the period of some 50 years or 40 to 50 years.

10 Is it true to say that the army interfered in civilian affairs only in the

11 case of elemental disasters, the building of bridges and roads, and no

12 other civilian affairs?

13 A. That's right, it did not interfere.

14 Q. Thank you. Another point has to do with everything that you said

15 with respect to the memorandum in Serbia. You may be right, I'm not

16 absolutely familiar with this subject matter, but I think that you are

17 right when you said that it was first published in 1986, and I think it

18 was in a newspaper called Vecernje Novosti, an evening paper.

19 A. I don't know in which newspaper it was published, but the

20 memorandum as a document as such existed. It wasn't published in the

21 newspaper.

22 Q. Are you sure that this document ever acquired an official form

23 signed by its -- the people who drafted it?

24 A. I do know that it was by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences.

25 Q. So you're claiming that.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Can you tell us with respect to 1986 what state positions did

3 Milosevic hold, Slobodan Milosevic?

4 A. In 1986, I think he was president of the League of Communists of

5 Serbia.

6 Q. Did he have any position in the state administration?

7 A. No.

8 Q. You said yesterday or, rather, not yesterday but during your

9 examination-in-chief, though you denied it a moment ago, I have in front

10 of me the French version of the transcript from the hearing during your

11 examination-in-chief, and you said, the page 12701 in the French version,

12 I think it coincides with the English version, when you said that the main

13 initiator of this project called the memorandum was Milosevic.

14 A. I tried on a number of occasions to say that he was not the

15 creator of that document, but he was the person who had it carried out,

16 implemented, that he was the key figure.

17 Q. But I'm asking you something else. If you say that he was the

18 initiator, that would mean that he initiated or prompted the Academy of

19 Sciences to compile such a document.

20 A. I didn't say that. I think it was the Serbian Academy of Arts and

21 Sciences.

22 Q. Very well. 12702, line 10, I have to read it out in French so as

23 not to make any mistakes, so could the -- "He saw in the memorandum and

24 what Slobodan Milosevic was about to do, the disintegration of Yugoslavia,

25 of that Yugoslavia, and the establishment of a Greater Serbia project."

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1 Is that what it says in the memorandum?

2 A. It doesn't say in the memorandum. That is what I said.

3 Q. So you're claiming that the memorandum deals with the

4 disintegration of Yugoslavia and that that in fact was the desire of

5 Milosevic in the days when the memorandum was drafted.

6 A. I did say that it was the wish of Milosevic. And the question

7 that you quoted from the memorandum referred to the position of the Serbs

8 as the most numerous nation in Yugoslavia.

9 Q. Did you also say in your statement, page 4, paragraph 9 of the

10 English version, "According to that idea on the borders of a Rump

11 Yugoslavia is referred to in the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of

12 Sciences." Does that memorandum indeed speak about those borders if you

13 claim that you have read the memorandum?

14 A. When the position of the Serbian nation is addressed, one can

15 infer from that which part or which territories inhabited by Serbs should

16 belong to the most numerous nation.

17 Q. And the memorandum speaks about the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

18 Is that what you're claiming?

19 A. In the memorandum, it says that the thesis should be overcome

20 according to which a weak Serbia implies a strong Yugoslavia. So in other

21 words, one needs to break up Yugoslavia to strengthen Serbia.

22 Q. That is your interpretation, but does it say that explicitly in

23 the memorandum?

24 A. No, it doesn't.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 The third topic I would like to address, and I think that will be

2 my last, you said that after Slovenia and Croatia, you realised that the

3 JNA had sided with one ethnic group.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Can you tell me whether Slovenia in those days really was a

6 republic in Yugoslavia with a higher standard of living and where there

7 were no ethnic tensions?

8 A. The standard of living was the highest.

9 Q. Is it also true there were no ethnic tensions in that republic?

10 A. There were no ethnic tensions.

11 Q. Now that you referred to the memorandum as a member of this

12 service you belonged to, do you know anything about the events linked to

13 Mladina?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. If you did, this happened in 1988, wasn't it? Wasn't the idea

16 launched by Mladina that the military service should be done as civilians?

17 In other words, that the country should be demilitarised then disarmed,

18 and the expenses for the JNA, the budget reduced? One of the main

19 advocates of that was Janez Jansa.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did he later become Defence Minister in the days when disarmament

22 was advocated? Was -- were people disarmed?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Were weapons distributed to them at one point in time?

25 A. At one point when border posts needed to be taken control of in

1 1991 in Slovenia, when the conflict broke out in Slovenia, then

2 individuals broke into warehouses and seized weapons from TO.

3 Q. The barracks were surrounded in Slovenia, and attack was launched

4 against the JNA; is that right?

5 A. Well, this is rather a broad topic, and one shouldn't go into it

6 whether they were surrounded. Yes, they were surrounded. As to the

7 scenario and who had arranged what, I had my own opinion about it.

8 Q. Is it true that over a period of ten days - there were no

9 conflicts anywhere yet - in Slovenia between 40 and 50 young men were

10 killed after they had raised their hands in surrender?

11 A. I don't know the figure of the number of killed.

12 Q. As your service, did you see a film, a footage that was shown when

13 about 40 young men between 18 and 20 years of age are standing with their

14 hands up and they're being fired at and killed?

15 A. I, as an individual, call the conflict in Slovenia as a show, as a

16 film type of war.

17 Q. In any event, those boys had surrendered. They didn't want to

18 engage in conflict.

19 A. I don't know that.

20 Q. After all that, the Presidency of Slovenia called this an

21 aggression by the JNA against independent Slovenia and called on the

22 population to resist.

23 JUDGE MAY: Our time is limited, and I'm not sure this witness is

24 in the best position to deal with these matters even if relevant. Yes.

25 Have you finished now?

1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge May, I am --

2 I'll finish in a second.

3 Q. What I'm trying to say is that after this clash in Slovenia, what

4 happened in Slovenia, it was only after that that Proboj 1, 2, and 3 took

5 place. In October. This was in June when these soldiers were killed and

6 Proboj 1, 2, and 3, occurred in October 1991; is that right?

7 A. No, it's not.

8 Q. Well, explain then, please.

9 A. Because Proboj 1, I learnt of Proboj 1 sometime in September, and

10 from the document that was shown here, one could see that Lieutenant

11 Colonel Smiljanic conducted that Operation Proboj 1 even in July, which

12 means before the war broke out in Slovenia.

13 Q. You spoke about Proboj 1, 2, and 3.

14 A. Proboj 2 was a continuation in Eastern Slavonia.

15 Q. In any event, these three operations, Proboj 1, 2, and 3, were

16 they after the events in Slovenia?

17 A. They were before October 1991.

18 Q. Then your statement earlier on is not correct, because in your

19 testimony, you referred to October up to December.

20 A. That is when I learnt about them, but they started earlier on.

21 Q. In any event, the arming didn't occur after the memorandum.

22 A. The memorandum was in 1986.

23 Q. Was there any arming then?

24 A. No, there wasn't.

25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

1 MR. NICE: I think there are three passages in the statement that

2 I will take with you first of all. And the Chamber will have noticed that

3 the page numbering is different in the version that you have and the

4 version that I think the accused has, but I'll deal with the version the

5 Chamber has.

6 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

7 Q. At the foot of page 4, the accused suggested in a question that

8 the witness had acknowledged responsibility for events in the Krajina. In

9 fact what he said is as follows, and perhaps you can just listen to this,

10 Mr. Candic, and confirm that this is correct: "My responsibilities were

11 the areas of Kosovo and north-eastern Bosnia, however, I did have

12 assignments to the Krajina." Does that adequately reflect your position?

13 Yes or no, please.

14 A. No.

15 Q. Just explain what your position was in relation to the Krajina.

16 A. My position in relation to Krajina was not such that I had any

17 kind of participation or any kind of assignments or obligations there. As

18 a member of the Central Counter-Intelligence Group, I wanted to explain to

19 Their Honours that I frequently took part in the final stages of

20 operations in Zagreb, in Sarajevo, Tuzla. So independently of my two

21 zones of responsibilities for -- of which I was in charge. That is what I

22 meant to say.

23 Q. Page 7, at the foot. Mr. Tapuskovic suggested there was no

24 reference in your earlier statements to the execution of four Croat

25 civilians. The last paragraph, the Chamber will see that it is indeed

1 there.

2 Page 9, please. As to Proboj 2, Mr. Candic, and the possibility

3 of the filmed bodies being of uncertain ethnicity, you say in your witness

4 statement the following: "That the civilians filmed -" that's the dead

5 civilians filmed - "were from the villages of Nustar, Borovo Naselje,

6 Vinkovci, and the railway centre at Osijek." Can you, one by one, just

7 tell us what your understanding of the ethnic composition or domination of

8 those locations is, if you know.

9 A. Well, half/half, roughly.

10 Q. A few other questions in reverse order. You were asked by

11 Mr. Tapuskovic about people working for intelligence services, and you

12 explained how such people weren't supposed to know even where the

13 operative works. Two questions, please.

14 You were involved in counter-intelligence. Were you aware - yes

15 or no - of active intelligence agencies or services, the sort of agencies

16 that might have included work abroad?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. Did the body for which you worked have such an active intelligence

19 element to it or not?

20 A. The body that I worked for, the sector for foreign intelligence

21 services and the immigration sector did have collaborators abroad, and

22 sometimes those people went to attend meetings abroad and to receive

23 reports from their agents there.

24 Q. Were you aware - yes or no - of other units or organisations

25 performing active intelligence, and in particular, did you know of

1 anything called the Second Directorate or the Second Administration?

2 A. It's called the Intelligence Administration, and they had

3 authority exclusively for work abroad. So the collection of information

4 of intelligence, political and military, and possible preparations to

5 launch threats against Yugoslavia. So that is the Intelligence

6 Administration or Second Administration. But it did not have any firm

7 links with the Security Administration.

8 Q. Finally -- I said it was only two questions, I think it was four

9 -- was "KOS," the term that formally expired decades ago, was "KOS"

10 nevertheless used in an informal way as an umbrella term for intelligence

11 activities?

12 A. It's a term which officially ceased to exist many decades ago.

13 And the official term was what I referred to, the intelligence service in

14 the Yugoslav People's Army and the counter-intelligence groups within the

15 security service. The term "KOS" stayed on. People referred to that

16 service as KOS, and they were -- the people working in the system were

17 known as the Kosovci or KOS people, and the system was known loosely as

18 KOS.

19 Q. Very well. A few more questions now starting at the beginning of

20 your cross-examination by the accused.

21 Can you give some examples of discrimination in the JNA against

22 Albanians, please, very briefly.

23 A. Well, an example of discrimination against Albanians in the JNA

24 or, rather, a category of soldiers and officers from the Albanian ethnic

25 group, this was always a dominant priority in counter-intelligence

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1 assessments. That was something we did first, to view the danger

2 presented by separatism or irredentism in Kosovo.

3 Q. The JNA's involvement in the log revolution. A couple of examples

4 of what they were actually doing in that revolution, please, so-called

5 revolution.

6 A. Well, any concrete participation of the JNA in the log revolution

7 did not exist, but - how shall I put this? - there was moral support or,

8 rather, contacts in the sense of advisory activity to see that the process

9 was ongoing.

10 Q. You've been asked many questions about the memorandum, and you've

11 given us your perception of how that memorandum took effect. Is the

12 perception you have in your judgement one held by many people or is it

13 particular to you?

14 A. Well, my opinion is shared, I would say, by the majority of

15 people.

16 Q. You were asked about a plan to bring in Romanians. The accused

17 said no such plan ever existed. Where did you hear of that plan and when?

18 A. I heard about that plan in 1989, 1990 in Kosovo from Ljilja

19 Balevic, who was the sister-in-law or, rather, the wife of Mitar Balevic,

20 and that is why I asked the accused whether he knew Mitar Balevic because

21 she was an activist, a Serb from Kosovo Polje.

22 Q. Two more questions only. You were asked about the exodus of --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Daughter-in-law.

24 MR. NICE: Thank you.

25 Q. You were asked about the exodus of Serbs from Kosovo pursuant to a

1 directive. In respect of that directive, did you see it? Who did it come

2 from? How do you know about it?

3 A. I did not see the directive. However, in Kosovo, in addition to

4 the aforementioned Ljilja Balevic, I had other associate Serbs who spoke

5 about the directive, and that the Serbs were to be displaced to show how

6 far they were threatened and in jeopardy in Kosovo, but that they had no

7 intention of leaving Kosovo, moving away.

8 Q. Thank you. Finally, you were asked by the accused about illegal

9 groups, so-called illegal groups in the JNA, and the accused suggested

10 there were 216 such groups. You said you didn't know about that number

11 but you accepted there were some such illegal groups in the JNA. What

12 scale of groups are we talking about when you speak of these illegal

13 groups? How many participants in each group?

14 A. Well, there were lots of illegal groups like that, whether 260 or

15 a little less, but a large number. And those groups were made up for the

16 most part, of at least six, nine, 12, 15 members of these underground

17 organisations or groups in the units.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. You're welcome.

20 MR. NICE: Nothing else of this witness. Thank you.

21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Candic, that concludes your evidence. You are now

22 free to go. Thank you for coming to the International Tribunal to give

23 it.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too, for listening to me.

25 [The witness withdrew]

1 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the next witness is to be taken by

2 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, but I understand that you may be wanting to raise some

3 administrative matters.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, there are some administrative matters to deal

5 with first.

6 Mr. Milosevic, in your absence due to illness on the 1st of

7 November, we raised an issue concerning your health and the future conduct

8 of the trial with the Prosecution and the amicus. Now, we're going to

9 discuss your health. Would you like to go into private session to do so?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's your affair, Mr. May.

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Milosevic, as I said, the Chamber

14 expressed concern about the effect on the proceedings of your apparently

15 poor health. We invited submissions as to the future conduct of the trial

16 from the Prosecution and also the amicus. We have had those submissions,

17 and we don't want to deal with them now, but you should know that we also

18 said that if you wanted to make any submissions about the future conduct

19 of the trial in relation to your health, you could do so. Now, if you

20 want to say something about that today you can, or if you want to consider

21 the matter and to address us later, we will hear from you when we deal

22 with the submissions of the amicus and the Prosecution, both of which we

23 need to consider before we hear any further argument about it.

24 Is there anything you want to say about that today?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, first and foremost, I would

1 like to say that I know very little about these ideas of yours, but as far

2 as I was able to gather, that side over there, the opposite side, is

3 trying to take away my right to speak here and to impose some sort of

4 lawyers, counsel on me, and it has no right to do so. So I should like to

5 remind you that according to the International Pact on Civilian and

6 Political Rights, it is Article 14.3(D), and pursuant to the American

7 Convention, chapter 8.2(D), Article 8.2(D), and the European Convention

8 Article 6.3(C), and according to the Statute of the Court of Rome Article

9 68.1(D), nobody can be refused the right of defending themselves. And you

10 yourselves have provided for that possibility in your Rules and

11 regulations, although I don't consider this Tribunal of yours to be legal.

12 But as you yourselves do, then I assume you adhere to the Rules you laid

13 down yourselves.

14 Therefore, this position on the part of the opposite party I

15 consider to be completely illegal, absurd, and ill-intentioned, and I

16 don't think it deserves any further explanations at all, nor can anything

17 along the lines of what they have proposed be acceptable.

18 And as far as the position goes, a position that I just briefly

19 saw contained in the letter signed by Mr. Kay, the amicus, I said earlier

20 on, gentlemen, at no price whatsoever would I leave the fight I'm fighting

21 here and from this political process -- trial. Therefore, I think that

22 they have rightly stressed that you ought to set me at liberty, set me

23 free, that you ought to give me time, lege artis, to see to my health and

24 to be given sufficient time to take a look at the 200.000 pages that have

25 been amassed and all the tapes alongside the documents, and you yourselves

1 know full well that I would not run away.

2 Therefore, if you want to speak of any kind of fair treatment,

3 fair play, then I think that that is the approach that should be taken,

4 because without a doubt, the existing conditions do not allow me in any

5 respect to take care of all these things in the proper manner. And I

6 shall take a closer look at what I have here, and if I consider that I

7 wish to make some more comments, I shall do so in due course.

8 JUDGE MAY: We will consider what's already been said, but

9 meanwhile, Judge Kwon wishes to add something.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, there may come a time when you have to

11 prepare your Defence case. You have to prepare the examinations, and you

12 have to present your witnesses to the Court. How are you going to manage

13 without the assistance of lawyers in the court? It will be very difficult

14 for you to meet the witnesses in advance and to prepare the examinations.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it is you who are placing me

16 in that position, gentlemen, to make it difficult for me. It's not up to

17 me. It's up to you.

18 If the circumstances were such that I would be able to function

19 normally, to take care of my health normally and to prepare myself for all

20 those piles and piles -- well, look at what they've just brought me for

21 the coming witness. Look at all those binders. There are seven of them,

22 these books, the covers. So if the right conditions existed and the

23 circumstances to give me sufficient time, then this would be no problem

24 for me at all. No health problems or the problems of the documents. This

25 is not something that the lawyers can do, because they know far less about

1 it all than I do. So nobody treated their health with the help of

2 lawyers, nor was anybody able to place what he knows into the heads of

3 lawyers.

4 And there's another matter of principle. In view of the fact that

5 I don't recognise this Tribunal, I do not wish to have an appointed

6 Defence counsel before this Tribunal which I do not recognise, and I have

7 explained that on several occasions previously.

8 JUDGE KWON: What do you think about the idea that your associates

9 sit in the court and assist you in preparing the examinations or sorting

10 out the documents, et cetera?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't need them. I don't need my

12 associates sitting up here with me.

13 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you should reflect on that. You are

14 undertaking the conduct of a very lengthy and very complex case. Your

15 health is not good, as we now know, and you should consider carefully in

16 your own interests and the interests of your health, whether you wouldn't

17 be assisted, as Judge Kwon says, by having somebody to help you in the

18 court.

19 It's not only the difficulty which you have, naturally, in

20 conducting a cross-examination in a case of this sort with the amount of

21 material which you have to deal with, it is the number of witnesses which

22 remain to be cross-examined. And then as the Judge says, there's the

23 question of your own case. You need to be thinking about that. If you

24 wish to call evidence, you've got to consider how that's to be done in a

25 practical way.

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1 And so the suggestion simply is -- we will, of course, consider

2 the proposal of the Prosecution that Defence counsel is ordered but you

3 have said you object to that and we will consider that too, but the

4 suggestion is that you merely have somebody in court to help you with the

5 papers and anything else that you need help with.

6 Now, we don't expect you to deal with that now, but you may like

7 to consider it as a way forward in your own interests. Not in the

8 interests of anybody else, but in your own interests in helping you

9 conduct your case as effectively as you can and also in conserving your

10 health.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I just say that the magnitude of the task

12 that you have undertaken, Mr. Milosevic, can be illustrated by a look at

13 the team that the Prosecutor has -- is using. By my count, and Mr. Nice

14 can correct me, the Prosecutor has so far used, I think, seven or eight

15 counsel in the conduct of its case, and you are by yourself. For that

16 reason, I endorse the comments made by my brothers and hope you will take

17 them to heart.

18 MR. NICE: In light of His Honour Judge Kwon's observation, it may

19 be of assistance if I make available to the Chamber and also to the

20 accused and the amici the fairly well-known case of McKenzie which gave

21 rise to the acceptance of the appropriateness of using something called a

22 McKenzie friend. That's the second judgement of Lord Justice Sachs which

23 is perhaps most helpful on the point. If I can just make that available.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the usher would be kind enough to hand that

25 round, we'll all have a look at it and we can reflect on it.

1 Mr. Milosevic, it's for you to think about it. We don't need a --

2 yes, a copy to the amicus, a copy to the accused, please.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

4 JUDGE MAY: You can have a read of this case -- yes?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As -- despite my referring to all

6 these international pacts and covenants, European, American, Roman, et

7 cetera, the opposing party is now once again referring to court practice

8 and is offering up McKenzie versus McKenzie. I am also going to provide

9 you with something. It is a copy from a court case, and it is Faretta

10 versus California, the United States Court, where quite clearly once again

11 it excludes the possibility of having anybody impose a Defence counsel or

12 lawyer to anybody unless the accused wishes to appoint one himself. So I

13 think it is useless to carry on a discussion of this kind.

14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will have that authority circulated in

15 an appropriate way. We'll ask the registrar to deal with this, and we

16 will have it. We will return to this topic in due course.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: The point really is that the Chamber will

18 ultimately have to decide what is the best course to follow. And there

19 is, as you will discover, a conflict in the practice between the civil law

20 and the common law, and the very same European Convention to which you

21 have referred has been interpreted by the European Court in a particular

22 way and in a manner that is contrary to the way in which the international

23 covenant has been interpreted. So the Chamber will have to consider all

24 of these matters and ultimately make a decision.

25 But my point really is that there is no clear-cut, no clear-cut

1 legal answer to the issue that has been raised.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

3 JUDGE MAY: Let us -- let us go on. There are matters now which

4 we have to consider.

5 Mr. Tapuskovic, very briefly, if you would. As I say, we're not

6 going to consider the issue now. We're not going to make any sort of

7 ruling, and in fact, we're going to return in due course to this point and

8 we will hear further argument upon it before we make any decision. But

9 yes, is there something you want to add?

10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, throughout this

11 time I've tried to be brief and perhaps I'll be as short as possible now.

12 When we discuss -- come to discuss everything in the light of all

13 the proposals that have been put forward thus far, one thing remains

14 outstanding as far as I understand it and one thing that will remain

15 dominant, and that is what it says in the Statute of this very Tribunal.

16 Article 21.4(D), not so much whether Mr. Slobodan Milosevic will defend

17 himself or not and whether that will be a problem, a hurdle to overcome,

18 but in view of his health. There is something much more important to be

19 considered, and that is that he be tried in his presence, whether he is

20 healthy or not. We cannot work here in this courtroom if he is incapable

21 of attending the proceedings however you decide to solve the problem. So

22 that will be the main line of thinking that you will have to deal with.

23 We won't be able to do without him whatever option you choose.

24 So much from me. Thank you.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Now, let us move on to other matters.

1 There is one matter before the witness is called we want to deal with in

2 private session. We will go into private session.

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11 [Open session]

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back into open session.

13 JUDGE MAY: I'm told that the microphone has not been correctly

14 activated for the protective measures in force in relation to this

15 witness, so I'm afraid, speaking to the witness, that we shan't be able to

16 start your evidence today. I'm sorry that should be so, but it would take

17 five to ten minutes, and since we have to adjourn in that time, we will --

18 there's little point in beginning.

19 But we can -- Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you were going to deal with two

20 matters.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I would like to deal with two technical

22 matters. The first one is the question of going into private session

23 during the course of the testimony on several occasions because of the

24 very particular involvement of this witness into the events. I will ask

25 that in due course.

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1 And the other matter relates to the exhibits. As Mr. Milosevic

2 has already pointed out, we have to deal with seven binders, and these

3 seven binders are actually three different sets of documents. First of

4 all, we have two intercept binders. These two binders are identified as

5 intercept binders and include only intercepts, both in the Serbian

6 language and in the -- in the English.

7 Then we have two document binders which are identified as

8 documents Rule 92 bis. These are actually the documents that are

9 mentioned in the intended Rule 92 bis statement. They are -- these two

10 binders are marked this way. It says "Additional exhibits denied under 92

11 bis."

12 And then we have three binders of exhibits. These are the

13 exhibits that in the beginning we had planned right from the outset to

14 bring in, tender in during the testimony of the witness, and each of these

15 sets has to have a separate exhibit number because we have used the usual

16 tapping procedure, but we have three sets of it now.

17 JUDGE MAY: Let us deal with that now. There will be three

18 separate exhibit numbers. I suggest the intercepts have the third. Is

19 there any reason as to -- or any particular priority between the 92 bis

20 and the documents?

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, if we made the 92 bis volumes the next exhibit

23 number.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the two binders for Rule 92 bis will

25 be Prosecutor's Exhibit 351, the three binders of the actual exhibits will

1 be Prosecutor's Exhibit 352, and the two binders that include the

2 intercepts will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 353.

3 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you. Yes.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: These are the matters that I wanted to raise.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, there is much evidence, we

6 understand. We've now got the latest summary, still substantial, but we

7 think that the matter should be dealt with in chief in three days. So you

8 have up to three days; do you think you can deal with it then?

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I will try my best to do it, but I have

10 doubts that it will really be three days. I rather think it's three and a

11 half because of the huge amount of exhibits, although I do not intend to

12 discuss each exhibit with the witness. We can put them in partly into

13 blocks, but there is a lot to speak about. And I also intend to discuss

14 about quite an amount of intercepts with the witness.

15 JUDGE MAY: We should add too, for the purposes of the record,

16 that Mr. Mueller is here, counsel on behalf of the witness. He comes with

17 leave.

18 If you press the green --

19 MR. MUELLER: I'm on the air. I've got it. Thank you, Your

20 Honour.

21 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

22 Yes, Ms. Higgins.

23 MS. HIGGINS: Your Honour, may I just raise one matter briefly in

24 relation to the intercepts that have been raised? Can I inform the Trial

25 Chamber that the amici curiae are in the process of completing their

1 filing in this regard, which should assist the Trial Chamber. I know Your

2 Honour originally asked for filings and a date to be set for oral

3 argument.

4 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will consider the filings.

5 Witness, would you be back, please, tomorrow morning at 9.00, and

6 we will begin your evidence. You will have to wait for a moment before

7 you can leave.

8 We will adjourn. 9.00 tomorrow morning.

9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.,

10 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of

11 November, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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