1 Thursday, 6 February 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
7 MR. NICE: Paragraph 39.
8 WITNESS: ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC [Resumed]
9 [Witness answered through interpreter]
10 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]
11 Q. General, we were dealing yesterday with arming of the Serbs. In
12 the second half of 1991, did you become aware of individual cases of small
13 amounts of weapons handed over to Serbs by individual members of the JNA?
14 A. Yes. That's right, I did.
15 Q. I want you to give two of the examples set out in your summary.
16 Was there a security officer called Cedo Knezevic? If so, tell us what he
17 did about this.
18 A. As far as I learnt, he was in Bihac, in the counter-intelligence
19 department, which had relocated to that locality from Zagreb, and during
20 that period of time, the evacuation of some warehouses of the Territorial
21 Defence was going on and the JNA from the territories that had already
22 been under threat by the Croatian National Guard Corps, and he took a
23 quantity - I don't know exactly how much - and he transferred it to Zemun
24 through some route up to Batajnica, and it was planned to take it to
25 Slavonia, but the head of security learnt about that and prevented it from
1 taking place.
2 Q. The second example, in February 1992, was there a Colonel Zecar
3 who engaged in some provision of arms?
4 A. Yes, there was. He worked in the security administration, and he
5 also was supposed to transfer a quantity of weapons, as far as I can
6 remember now, towards Srpski Moravici. And he was uncovered in this
7 attempt and so those weapons did not reach their destination either. He
8 came to me and when I asked why he did that, he said that some of his
9 superiors had ordered him to do that without me knowing, that they issued
10 orders without me knowing.
11 Q. Did he indeed identify from where his authority came?
12 A. Well, they weren't any written authorisations or anything like
13 that, it was just an oral agreement, oral acquiescence from a general.
14 Q. Did you criticise the colonel or a colonel -- or, rather, this
15 colonel for what he did? Did he identify --
16 A. Of course, yes, I did.
17 Q. Just help us if you can: Did he say specifically the name of the
18 -- I'll just see -- yes --
19 A. Yes, he did.
20 Q. Go on.
21 A. He said that he had done this, receiving permission from General
22 Zivota Panic.
23 Q. Paragraph 42. Were you aware of the particular nature of arms
24 carried by certain paramilitary formations, and in particular, the type of
25 automatic weapon they had?
1 A. Well, at the time, I didn't have concrete information as to the
2 type of weapons in the paramilitary groups, but I do remember that there
3 was one particular type that was, nonetheless, characteristic, and it was
4 in Slavonia, and they were the Thompson automatic weapons, which were
5 trophy weapons mostly, and they were characterised by the fact that
6 actually the Territorial Defence of Serbia had weapons of that kind. So
7 most probably this type of weapon came from the warehouses of the
8 Territorial Defence of Serbia.
9 Q. You were aware of these being carried in Slavonia, Eastern
10 Slavonia. Was this by the local Serb Territorial Defence or by
11 paramilitary organisations or by both?
12 A. In this particular case, it was paramilitary groups.
13 Q. Do you know what sort of weapons the local Serb Territorial
14 Defence in Eastern Slavonia were carrying?
15 A. I don't really know about that. I don't have that kind of
16 information, and I didn't have an opportunity to see for myself.
17 Q. When the JNA pulled out, were you aware of what happened to some
18 of the weapons in or leaving their warehouses?
19 A. Well, part of the weapons from warehouses which were not evacuated
20 on time were taken control of by the Croatian National Guards Corps in the
21 area, and the warehouses which were evacuated on time, the weapons were
22 pulled out of those and taken to the territory in-depth, and part of the
23 weaponry went to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the warehouses of the JNA units
24 that were found there at the time. And also at that time, we had larger
25 formations being formed and larger units of the Territorial Defence in
1 Krajina, and a part of those weapons were intended for those units, to arm
2 those units according to the material formations that were prescribed.
3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may the witness see tab 4 before I seek to
4 have it admitted. I'd like to ask him a couple of questions about it.
5 Q. Can you just look at this document, General Vasiljevic, please.
6 Remind yourself what it is, and then I'll ask you a couple of questions
7 about it. I think it is a document with which you are personally
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. When did you first receive the document or first see it, I should
12 A. I first saw this document sometime at the end of 1990. To be more
13 specific, at the beginning of December 1990 when work was done to document
14 illegal and unlawful arming, both with the Serbs and the Croats throughout
15 Croatia and further afield as well.
16 Q. Did you see the -- see and/or speak to the person whose statement
17 this is, for it's a statement we're looking at.
18 A. No, I did not speak to the person. The security organ in Knin
19 talked to the person.
20 Q. And was the statement shown to you in the course of your duties as
21 being the statement of someone who had been interviewed about illegal
23 A. Yes. Yes, it was. All this was done at the stage when the
24 disarmament of all paramilitary -- paramilitaries was being prepared in
1 Q. Did you subsequently find out any -- find any reason to disbelieve
2 what this particular witness said about illegal arming in his statement?
3 A. No, I did not. There were a number of statements, in fact, which
4 were taken from a certain number of persons of Serb ethnicity in the
5 Knin-Krajina area, and more or less they were identical, to all intents
6 and purposes.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, let's deal with the admissibility of the
9 MR. NICE: That's exactly why I was asking the questions I was,
10 mindful of the approach that we were taking yesterday. This is a
11 statement which contains declarations against interest by the deponent,
12 and the part in which I am particularly interested is pages 4 and 5, and 5
13 in the English, starting at the words "Concerning illegal arming of
14 citizens..." It's a contemporaneous account, as we know, because the
15 witness saw it within days of its being prepared. He saw it in the course
16 of his duties to investigate these matters. It's part of a body of
17 material coming to him, he tells us, consistent in content. Never been
18 any reason since to discount it.
19 It is similar to the statements being put by the witness yesterday
20 and excluded as being evidence in that it's a witness statement. There's
21 no doubt about that. It's dissimilar in character or quality because it's
22 not a particularly retrospective view by the witness made years after in
23 the course of, for example, inquiries into these proceedings. It is
24 almost as if the witness spoke to the man himself. He wasn't one of the
25 interviewing officers; the document was handed to him afterwards.
1 Had he been an interviewing officer with the acknowledgements or
2 admissions by the deponent being made directly to the witness, then I
3 would have had no difficulty at all in asking the Chamber to say it fell
4 within the acceptable hearsay provisions of this Chamber.
5 In this particular case, the slight difference, a couple of days
6 between the making of the statement and the circumstances described and
7 the witness's receiving it, places it well within the discretion of the
8 Chamber to admit. And the events of which the deponent speaks at
9 paragraphs on pages 4 and 5 are all, as you will see, very recent. They
10 are between October 1990 and December of 2000.
11 JUDGE MAY: And how is it to be distinguished from the statements
12 which we excluded yesterday when the accused sought to put them in,
13 records of interviews about events?
14 MR. NICE: Only on the grounds that I've already set out, namely
15 that these are contemporaneous. They're clearest declarations against
16 interest by the deponent, and they come to the -- or came to the witness
17 in the course of his professional duties inquiring into matters at the
18 time, which of course in certain jurisdictions is itself a factor
19 permitting the adduction of what would otherwise be excluded hearsay.
20 Before we move on, I just noted something in the translation that
21 I must pursue. I'll tell you exactly what it is. You can see it on page
22 4. There's references to 1991 and the statement taken in 1990. I'm
23 pretty sure that's simply an error of translation which we will be able to
24 pick up and be able to --
25 Yes. I'm grateful to Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. The witness of course
1 here in his own statement confirms the accuracy of the statement that he
2 has made. I think the 1991 dates are simply translation errors.
3 JUDGE KWON: So in your opinion, you think it is not sufficient to
4 put the content of the statement to this witness.
5 MR. NICE: It would be my submission that it is proper for this
6 witness to give the content of the statement in the particular
7 circumstances in which he came first to see it.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kay.
9 MR. KAY: Well, of course, the deponent isn't a witness in these
10 proceedings, so just to give him the title of witness doesn't really suit
11 the matter that we're dealing with here. It seems to me that this falls
12 into exactly the kind of category that we've been attempting to exclude
13 from evidence in relation to both parties, that the production of
14 statements made by other people who are not witnesses and then just having
15 them put into the proceedings as exhibits.
16 In our submission, this is not something that should happen here.
17 There is no difference between this position and anything else that, for
18 instance, the accused was trying to do the other day. And then you have
19 the other statements that we've had.
20 JUDGE MAY: We agree.
21 MR. NICE: May that be withdrawn in due course.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll withdraw tab 4.
23 MR. NICE: May tab 5 please be provided. If tab 5 of the English
24 version could be placed on the overhead projector. Thank you very much.
25 Q. General, you're now looking at a document from the 1st Krajina
1 Corps over the signature of Major General Talic, dated the 31st of August,
2 1992. Inventory of weapons issued in response to your confidential order,
3 "We attach the inventory of weapons and equipment issued to units and
4 Territorial Defence staffs, in other words, structures outside the armed
5 forces, since the beginning of the activities aimed at protecting Serbs
6 from genocide in Croatia and the Serbian Republic.
7 "The weapons and equipment listed here were issued against a
8 receipt and still figure on the ledgers of the 1st Krajina Corps units
9 that actually issued the weapons. Please, inform us of your opinion on
10 this matter."
11 And then there's a schedule. If we could look at the other
12 document, which is the schedule in English, which sets out the list of
13 weapons and equipment issued to territorial staffs and units of the 5th
14 Corps. And then we see guns, machine-guns, so on and so forth.
15 Does this document fit with your account of provision of weapons
16 or do you have any other comment?
17 A. This document is from the 1st Krajina Corps. It dates back to
18 August 1992, that is to say, the time when I was not an active-duty
19 officer in the army of Yugoslavia. So I cannot really say whether it is
20 credible and authentic or not looking at the stamp of the military post
21 and signature of the corps commander, because I never saw his signature.
22 However, having said that, from the list and the tables provided
23 and the title itself, which says that it is a list of weapons and
24 equipment issued to the TO staffs and units of the Territorial Defence
25 from the 5th Corps -- of the 5th Corps, so this, then, was what I was
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 speaking about precisely, that a part of the weaponry went from certain
2 units, JNA units, to arm units of the Territorial Defence which at that
3 time were being established and were formed in the different units and
5 Q. Thank you very much. Tab 6, please. Original to the witness,
6 English version on the overhead projector.
7 Dated the 25th of April, from the 2nd Military District Command to
8 the MUP of the Republic of Srpska Krajina in the police station at
9 Korenica. And the paragraph with which we are particularly concerned:
10 "In accordance with a decision of the Federal Secretary for National
11 Defence, top secret ... For the purpose of ammunition replenishment for
12 the MUP of the Republika Srpska Krajina ... We issue the following
13 ammunition to the MUP police station in Korenica from the ammunition
14 warehouse at Golubici without any reimbursement," and then ammunition in
15 the millions, bullets and 6.000 hand grenades and stuff of that sort, a
17 Again, even if you haven't seen the document before, does this,
18 and in particular, does the authority coming from the national -- the
19 Federal Secretary for National Defence, SSNO, fit with your experience?
20 A. Yes, it does fit, because this was a stage when, according to the
21 Vance Plan, what was to be done was to demobilise the active components in
22 the Kninska Krajina area and to establish the units of the Territorial
23 Defence and the police, or milicija, whose weapons had to be kept under
24 key and under the control of the international forces. And when those
25 units were in fact set up and those who were to be placed under reserve
1 composition, part of the JNA weapons were sent into the field for those
2 units to be complete.
3 And I should like to underline once again that we're not dealing
4 with weapons and ammunition for the active components of the army but for
5 reserve components in the area which would be under the control of the
6 international forces.
7 Q. Tab 7, please. And the first page -- the whole document to the
8 witness. First of all, the first page on the overhead projector, please.
9 From the 2nd Military District Command. It's just off the top of
10 the page. Very urgent, 24th of April, 1992. SSNO.
11 "We have received from the Ministry of the Interior of BiH Serb
12 Republic a request, with a strictly confidential number 11 of 23 April ...
13 for ceding of the MTS, materiel and technical equipment, to the special
14 purposes police detachment at the Banja Luka Security Services Centre for
15 their needs." There's then a list of equipment, including half a dozen
16 helicopters and items of that sort.
17 If you go over three pages, please, Usher, to the second to last
18 page in English. "We are sending --" the foot of the page, please.
19 That's fine. No, the foot of that page, I think. Yes.
20 "We are sending this request pursuant to the order of SFRY Armed
21 Forces HQ Chief of Staff ....
22 "We are of the opinion that these supplies have to be provided,
23 especially those which cannot be found at the market and in the quantity
24 that can satisfy the most basic needs."
25 Signed by Commander Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac. And he was
1 -- what was his position? Do you know, General?
2 A. He was the commander of the 2nd Military District in Sarajevo.
3 Q. We see what the document says. Any other comment you want to make
4 apart from what it reveals on what his position is, or does it speak for
6 A. Well, first I recognise the signature of General Kukanjac, and I
7 recognise it on this fax copy of the document. And secondly, this is the
8 period of time after the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina had split into two
9 parts, because the Serb part stepped down from the MUP and formed its own
10 MUP, the MUP of Republika Srpska, in fact.
11 So I would say that this was a megalomaniac request in actual
12 fact, because what is asked for are four helicopters to transport one's
13 heavier ones, and I don't think I need to comment on this, whether it is
14 objective or not, this request and what it asks for.
15 But looking at this last page when this request was sent on
16 upwards towards the General Staff of the armed forces, this actually
17 emerges from a situation in which units of this kind and groups of this
18 kind being established on the ground, in the field, had the practice of
19 referring to their nearest commands for assistance for materiel and
20 technical equipment. And what happened next would be an order from the
21 head of the General Staff, drawing attention to the commands, that they
22 could not immediately and directly respond to the requests made but that
23 they would send it on up to the General Staff in Belgrade with their
24 opinions where the final decision would be taken as to each individual
25 request separately.
1 Q. Be that as it may, what we see here is that this is assisting in
2 the arming of Bosnian Serbs; is that right? Just yes or no. Well, no --
3 yes. This is arming the Bosnian Serbs and indeed ...
4 A. I'm not hearing the translation.
5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think actually the document speaks for
6 itself and I'll move on.
7 The next exhibit is an intercept which has already been produced.
8 It was Exhibit 353, tab 39, between Karadzic and the accused, dated the
9 23rd of September, 1991. There is the declaration that is produced from
10 this witness. Your Honour, I'm not going to take the time dealing again
11 with the content of that intercept. If it may be produced, the
12 declaration. Tab 8.
13 Q. Did you listen to an intercept, General, identified here Exhibit
14 353 tab 39, were you able to identify the voices on it as the voices
15 identified of Karadzic and the accused?
16 A. I listened to several conversations where I was able to identify
17 the voices and to evaluate the content of the conversation. I don't know
18 which specific conversation you are referring to now, but the ones that
19 were shown to me --
20 Q. Look at the ones there. You'll see one of them is Exhibit 353,
21 tab 39, and the voices are registered there. And you signed the
22 declaration accordingly.
23 A. Yes. There is nothing contentious here. All the conversations
24 listed on this document, I looked at the originals and I confirm that I
25 made this statement so that there should be no problem here.
1 Q. Thank you very much. Can we move now, then, to the training of
3 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we will perhaps play a couple of
4 intercepts but no more. As to the balance, we'll either just have the
5 witness confirm his identification of the voices where the material has
6 already been considered or occasionally give a summary of what he knows
7 from those intercepts.
8 Q. General, can we move to the obtaining of volunteers. Did the
9 security administration learn of Frenki Simatovic in the Krajina area, and
10 if so, when and to what effect?
11 A. This was the first information that arrived, and it was sometime
12 in the autumn of 1990. We did not have full identifying data at the time,
13 we just knew about the name Frenki and the presence of this person in the
14 Krajina area and that at that time he was an employee of the MUP of
16 Q. Did you learn of a man called Captain Dragan, and if so, what did
17 you learn of him?
18 A. According to our information, Captain Dragan turned up in Knin
19 sometime in early 1991. He trained volunteers from the Knin Krajina in a
20 camp or a facility in Golubici. Quite a lot of time elapsed before his
21 identity was established, and according to the information that was later
22 fully confirmed, he arrived from Australia with the help and mediation of
23 the people from the State Security Service of Serbia, and he was one of
24 their sources, apparently.
25 This is as far as training in the Krajina is concerned. When I
1 was in Sid on the 28th of October, 1991, in connection with determining
2 the circumstances surrounding the crime committed in that village, I had a
3 short briefing with the security organs of the time from the 1st Military
4 District, which was located in Sid. [redacted].
5 On that occasion, he told me that in the area of Sid and further
6 afield there were several volunteer paramilitary units which were not
7 under the command of the Yugoslav People's Army and that there was some
8 camps where these volunteers were received and trained, and it was not
9 known where they went after their training and who sent them there. One
10 of these camps was the Lipovaca camp which, as far as he knew, had about a
11 hundred volunteers. Some of his senior officers from the security sector
12 where he was tried to reach the camp, but they were not admitted. They
13 were not allowed to enter.
14 Mirko Jovic's unit was there, which bore the name Dusan Silni and
15 which perpetrated the crimes in Lovas directly. Then there was also a
16 detachment which was referred to as Crnogorac or Montenegrin. It was a
17 mobile detachment with several vehicles, and it moved from one area to
18 another. The people behind this detachment were from the MUP. As far as
19 he knew, Radovan Stojicic Badza was in charge of it.
20 He then told me that in Erdut there was a unit commanded by
21 Raznjatovic, Arkan, and the status of that unit shifted continually. The
22 number of men ranged from several dozen to 200 or 300 men. As far as I
23 can recall, it was a special purpose police unit commanded by Vasilije
24 Mijovic. That was another unit. And this unit operated later on in the
25 Baranja area, and it had a camp on a farm near Sombor. That's what I can
1 remember from that period.
2 Q. And the only detail that we'll probably get elsewhere but just
3 take it now; Captain Dragan's training centre was near Knin at what town
4 or village?
5 A. In Golubic near Knin. I mentioned that. I said it was in
7 Q. My error for overlooking it.
8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may we go into closed session very
10 [Private session]
13 Page 15792 – redacted – private session
13 Page 15793 – redacted – private session
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session.
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. Can you tell us, please, what happened when reservists were called
2 up in Serbia for the JNA and what the accused's attitude to the call-up of
3 reservists and the use of volunteers was.
4 A. In Serbia, there were obvious problems about the response of
5 reservists in 1991. A large number of wartime JNA units could not be
6 established, and some who were established, although with a lot of
7 problems, soon disintegrated.
8 At that time, the slogan that was bandied around in Serbia and put
9 forward through the media was that Serbia was not at war, and as far as I
10 can remember, the accused used to say that we would not force anyone to go
11 to war. And from this it followed that only those who wanted to would
12 join the JNA.
13 The practical consequences of this in the field was a large number
14 of deserters whom the MUP did not want to arrest or bring to the units,
15 which they were bound to do under the law, and this opened up room for
16 various volunteer groups which often had the characteristics of a
17 particular political party, and they would be mobilised to enhance the
18 political image of the parties at the time.
19 Q. Before we move on, at the same time as there were these
20 difficulties with call-ups or with what might be determined draft-dodgers,
21 I'm not sure, was the Territorial Defence of Serbia making any offers for
22 the provision of troops to the JNA?
23 A. Yes. I attended a meeting in the Ministry of Defence of Serbia in
24 late October 1991 where there was discussion, among other things, of the
25 poor response to the call-up and the poor replenishment of the JNA units
1 with men. And then the commander of the Territorial Defence said they
2 were not having any problems at all with replenishing the Territorial
3 Defence units and that some Territorial Defence units could be sent and
4 used where this was needed. Whether this was an official proposal, I
5 don't know, but I do know that some territorial units from Serbia were at
6 the Slavonian battlefield.
7 Q. And to -- as you told us really yesterday, the authority to use
8 Territorial Defence units in that way could ultimately only come from
10 A. I think only the president of the republic.
11 Q. And indeed, just to tidy up something that I understated yesterday
12 when we were talking about the Lika authority -- this is paragraph 24,
13 Your Honour; I may have left things unclear -- when we were talking about
14 the Lika authority that would be required to use territorial detachments
15 in Valjevo, in Lovas, or of territorial units from Montenegro in Kordun,
16 in fact is it your evidence that such deployments did take place and
17 therefore would have required the authority of the same president?
18 A. I know that these units were in these areas that you have
19 mentioned, and I said that I assume and that it is my opinion that such a
20 decision would have been under the competence of the president of the
21 republic, because this is a category or, rather, an area in which I am not
22 an expert. I don't know what the powers of the president of the republic
23 are, but I do know in principle that he is the Commander in Chief and
24 that, in principle, he should issue the approval for such a deployment of
1 Q. Returning, then, to what you were saying about volunteers being
2 linked to political parties - paragraph 48 - were there for a short period
3 of time centres, two of them in Serbia, for the training of volunteers,
4 one at Smederavska Palanka and another in Vojvodina?
5 A. Yes. These were centres that the JNA tried to organise so that
6 volunteers would be received and dealt with in accordance with the
7 regulations. These centres, however, have operated for only a short time,
8 and I remember the incident that took place at the centre in Palanka,
9 because I received a report that people were coming there wearing party
10 insignia, that they were unkempt, that they wore beards, that they refused
11 to put on JNA uniforms and carry the insignia that were then prescribed,
12 and that they set themselves apart as compact units, and they also caused
13 mischief; they went out to town and broke shop windows owned by Albanians,
14 for example.
15 Q. And so was it the case that those two centres didn't last for very
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. I want to move now to the Serb Territorial Defence in Croatia at
19 the time which you can help us with. And if we can use the term "Eastern
20 Slavonia" for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, can you tell
21 us, please, did you detect differences between the operation of the
22 Territorial Defence in the Krajina and in Eastern Slavonia?
23 A. Very briefly, in the Krajina, the Territorial Defence was
24 established pursuant to the then-valid principles governing the
25 establishment of staffs and units. This meant that the commanders of the
1 staffs, the Territorial Defence staffs, were mostly active-duty officers.
2 In specific terms, I know that in the Knin Krajina a number of senior
3 officers, through the personnel department, were assigned to duties as
4 commanders of the Territorial Defence units. I will mention one, that was
5 General Djuic, who was appointed commander of a Territorial Defence Staff.
6 These units were subordinated to the JNA units operating there.
7 In contrast to this, in Eastern Slavonia I do not know of any
8 active-duty JNA senior officers being appointed as commanders of any
9 Territorial Defence staffs in Eastern Slavonia. Even those who -- who had
10 been performing these duties up to the beginning of the war in Eastern
11 Slavonia were replaced. I know of one such replacement, both of the
12 commander and the Chief of Staff and the security officer in the
13 Territorial Defence Staff in Sid. So that in Eastern Slavonia, there were
14 legal Territorial Defence units.
15 One of the people who led the Territorial Defence units, as far as
16 I can recall, was General Mandaric, who was at the forward command post of
17 the 1st Military District together with General Zivota Panic, which was
18 quite natural, because in an operation of that kind, it was normal to have
19 coordination of activities between the JNA units and the Territorial
20 Defence units.
21 Q. Couple of details just to flesh that out: You've spoken of
22 General Djuic who was, I think, an active JNA officer appointed commander
23 of the Krajina Territorial Defence, and I think you said probably
24 appointed by the personnel administration, but I'll just check that, if I
1 But the appointment of --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. -- a general to that position required the authority of whom, of
4 what level?
5 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters cannot hear this.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. During -- objection.
8 Mr. Nice is conducting the examination of this witness wrongfully, because
9 during Babic's testimony, it was shown that he appointed this Djuic, who
10 had previously been retired, who was a retiree, on his own. So he was not
11 appointed by the Federal Secretariat for National Defence at all. And now
12 he is asking the witness what is the rule when the JNA appoints generals.
13 It has to be someone --
14 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness give the evidence of what he knows.
15 He will not be led by counsel. He will merely give the evidence from what
16 he knows and understands. Let him do that. Mr. Nice will not lead him.
17 Yes, Mr. Nice.
18 MR. NICE:
19 Q. What level and by whom, as you understood it, would General Djuic
20 have been appointed?
21 A. As far as I know, General Djuic was in the inspectorate of the
22 armed forces of the SFRY. Generals are appointed to any post by the
23 Presidency of Yugoslavia, by their own decree. And as far as I can
24 remember, from the inspectorate of the armed forces, he was transferred to
25 Krajina. Whether his status was changed in the service before that is
1 something that I don't know about.
2 Q. So appointment by the Presidency of the -- of Yugoslavia by their
3 own decree, that would be ultimately - or perhaps consequentially - over
4 whose signature would you expect such an appointment to be authorised?
5 A. So the president of the Presidency or somebody acting on his
7 Q. Do you remember who that was at the time?
8 A. No.
9 Q. A little more detail. So far as Eastern Slavonia is concerned -
10 and you may have mentioned this and I missed it - you've given an account
11 of how you think it was set up. Did you actually see any documentation
12 supporting your understanding?
13 A. Well, in addition to what is written down on the 28th of October
14 in my notebook, my working notebook, these were personnel changes carried
15 out in the staff of the Territorial Defence in Sid. I remember on the
16 25th of February, 1992, there was a meeting held in Vukovar between
17 General Zivota Panic, General Mandaric, Jovica Stanisic, Radovan Stojicic
18 Badza, and Goran Hadzic. New commanders were appointed at that meeting,
19 new commanders of the Territorial Defence Staff in Vukovar.
20 As I was informed by the security organ, the persons appointed to
21 these positions were two officials -- I mean until then, two officials of
22 the MUP of Serbia.
23 Q. Just pausing for one minute there, please, General. You're giving
24 detail, and I realise that you're still at an early stage of the evidence.
25 Is this material you're happy to give in open session or not?
1 A. Oh, I can. That's no problem for me. That part I can present
2 that way.
3 So Branko Curcic was appointed, and another man whose name I
4 cannot recall right this moment. So in this way, people from the MUP,
5 from the MUP of Serbia, were appointed as commanders of the Territorial
6 Defence staff in Vukovar. It would have been natural to appoint military
7 personnel or military experts, because that was the prevalent practice
9 Q. Finally, I think, on this topic, did you observe the presence of
10 groups such as Dusan Silni, and did that mark any difference in the
11 operations in Krajina from the operations in Eastern Slavonia?
12 A. Well, yes, there were such attempts made by certain parties from
13 Serbia to send larger groups of volunteers to Krajina. I know that on the
14 ground that was something that was not received gladly, so that every
15 attempt was made to have them returned.
16 There was a larger group coming from the Serbian Renewal Movement,
17 for example, and it is known that two of the main persons from that
18 detachment got killed in Krajina. However, they were not on a rampage, so
19 to speak, these so-called volunteer units that were not under the command
20 of the Territorial Defence or the army. At least, they could not hold out
21 for long as such.
22 As opposed to that, in Eastern Slavonia the situation was quite
23 the opposite.
24 Q. In fact, there are a couple more details before we perhaps go into
25 closed session, with the Chamber's leave.
1 You've spoken of General Mandaric, who was the commander of the
2 regular Territorial Defence of Vojvodina being present at the forward
3 command post, I think. Was that in the military facility at Karadjordjevo
4 in the town of Mladenovo?
5 A. I don't know whether Mladenovo could be called a town, but anyway,
6 that is the locality, the one that you referred to.
7 Q. Now, are you saying that he was there regularly or irregularly?
8 And if he was there regularly, what significance if any was there in that?
9 A. Well, it was regular because there were Territorial Defence units
10 from Vojvodina and because at that time he was commander of the
11 Territorial Defence of Vojvodina. So he was directly with the commander
12 of the 1st Military District, and in that way operations were coordinated
13 among the Territorial Defence units and the JNA.
14 Q. Had there been a regular and fully effective Territorial Defence
15 in place in Eastern Slavonia, would you have expected this level of
16 attendance by General Mandaric?
17 A. That depends on the specific situation. It is not unusual. As a
18 matter of fact, it is desirable for two commanders to be together.
19 Q. You may have mentioned a unit called Sajkaska Brigade, and if you
20 haven't -- I may have missed it, but if you haven't mentioned it, what did
21 you learn of them?
22 A. No. I mentioned that by way of an illustration, that Territorial
23 Defence units of Vojvodina were in the area of Eastern Slavonia. So when
24 I talked about these legal units, that is the name of a particular
25 Territorial Defence unit.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. NICE: May we go briefly into closed session, Your Honour.
2 [Private session]
13 Page 15806 – redacted – private session
7 [Open session]
8 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. General, was there a meeting on the 25th of February of 1992 in
11 Erdut -- sorry. I'm told you covered that already. It's my mistake for
12 not registering that and moving too fast.
13 Just give me one minute.
14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm sorry I wasn't able to tick off
15 paragraph 58.
16 Q. But I think you may have covered some of it or most of it. There
17 was a meeting on the 25th of February, 1992, in Erdut, attended by whom?
18 A. Well, I said that what was discussed were the appointments in the
19 Territorial Defence Staff of Vukovar, that General Zivota Panic was there,
20 General Mandaric, Jovica Stanisic, Radovan Stojicic Badza, and Goran
22 Q. At that meeting, what decision was made about who was to be the
23 commander of the Territorial Defence in Vukovar?
24 A. Well, I've said already that two men were appointed from the MUP
25 of Serbia.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we've identified at this part of the
3 summary the map Exhibit 327, tab 12, which has already been tendered,
4 which may be a useful map for the Chamber to have to hand for geographical
6 Q. Before we move to another short closed session, General, a very
7 short one, you, I think, regard there is some significance in the
8 treatment that was accorded you different from the treatment accorded
9 Arkan when you visited the Serbian Ministry of Defence. Can you just
10 explain that, please.
11 A. Oh, I can. At the entrance into the Ministry of Defence, although
12 I was wearing my field uniform, I was asked at the entrance, at the office
13 there, to leave my weapons because that was in accordance with
14 regulations. That was strange in view of the time and in view of the fact
15 that I was wearing field uniform. And I knew that Raznjatovic came to
16 that same ministry to attend meetings at somebody's office and that he
17 walked in with a Heckler, with an automatic rifle.
18 I reacted: "Why am I being disarmed as a general and Arkan walks
19 in with an automatic weapon?" And this man answered quite simply, "Well,
20 you're not Arkan."
21 MR. NICE: I gather that the reference to the map was an incorrect
22 reference. I'll tidy that up later.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it's Prosecutor's Exhibit 326, tab
25 MR. NICE: I apologise for the error. A short closed session, if
1 registry could accommodate us.
2 [Private session]
13 Page 15810 – redacted – private session
16 [Open session]
17 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
18 MR. NICE:
19 Q. While you were still head of UB, did you discover any connection
20 between the recruitment of volunteers and political parties? You've
21 touched on this already. Interested with your comment or observation on
22 anything that Seselj said about this.
23 A. First of all, what you're asking now is a well-known fact where I
24 live. Specifically as regards the involvement of the members of the
25 Radical Party in these volunteer units that were sent to the Slavonian
1 theatre of war, I remember a BBC television programme called "The Death of
2 Yugoslavia," in which Mr. Seselj said quite openly that he was engaged by
3 Jovica Stanisic to rally volunteers and that he got weapons from the state
4 security service for arming them. It is quite noticeable that no one from
5 the MUP ever denied that, so his statement is probably a truthful one.
6 Otherwise, on the ground, I did have knowledge that there was a
7 group of radicals that consisted of the members of the Radical Party, and
8 that detachment was called Leva Supoderica.
9 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, this may be a convenient moment. Before I
10 forget, there is one matter on which we are awaiting a response from the
11 Prosecution, and it relates to the large number of documents which the
12 accused says has been disclosed on him during the period before we started
13 sitting again.
14 MR. NICE: It hasn't been overlooked. Inevitably, Ms. Dicklich,
15 who is heavily engaged in court and out of court until all hours, has also
16 to supervise the preparation of this document. We are preparing it at the
17 same time as we are preparing a general Rule 68 report, because another
18 one is due, and I think they'll both be with you, I think, by the end of
19 the day.
20 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
24 MR. NICE: Exhibit 387, tab 10, please.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Nice, please.
1 MR. NICE: Exhibit 387, tab 10, please, for the witness.
2 Q. Look at it very briefly and then followed by tab 11. The English
3 translation is somewhat incomplete because of the quality of the
4 handwritten original, but, General Vasiljevic, is this a letter dated the
5 10th of August, 1991, coming from someone called Branislav Vakic? And the
6 content of the letter is to this effect: Written to the military post at
7 Baosici, and it says: On the 6th of July, in accordance with an order, a
8 T-1, registration number K-5459 was given to the Serbian Radical Party
9 unit currently deployed in Grab. The name of the unit is Serbian
10 Volunteers, something to that effect, and is part of the Hercegovina Corps
11 under the command of a colonel whose name isn't quite legible. Then it
12 says, P-4463 has remained in the unit so as to be fixed and then replaced.
13 On the 10th of August, in accordance with General, whoever it
14 may be, a PG-4463 was given, on the condition that something be returned
15 by the command of Serbian Volunteers of Herzegovina, a Chetnik major.
16 Signed Branislav Vakic.
17 If we can then look at tab 11 very briefly, please.
18 Is this something called a trip ticket, and it deals with an
19 official travel report validity for a Pinzgauer, consumption of fuel, but
20 importantly, we note that the driver is the same; one of them is Branislav
22 These two documents, then, please, General, at tabs 10 and 11,
23 what do they show us in respect of what you were telling us earlier about
24 political parties and volunteers?
25 A. The first document, either it's been wrongly translated or not
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 properly stated, but it was a document dating to August 1992, and I think
2 you said 1991.
3 Q. Yes, I did, and it's obviously just an error of translation.
4 A. From both these documents, we can see that the units which were
5 sent by some parties, political parties from Serbia, to the areas, in this
6 case in Montenegro, relied upon the JNA commands from which they received
7 either vehicles or were able to tank up for fuel purposes at the army
8 petrol stations. And I know that Branislav Vakic, in fact, was a member
9 of the Radical Party.
10 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 62. To what extent had the DB of Serbia
11 infiltrated political parties of the opposition at this time?
12 A. The state security, the DB of Serbia, had very good positions in
13 practically all the opposition parties of the day, and it was
14 well-informed about the overall situation within them.
15 Q. To whom did it -- to whom was it directly subordinate, the state
16 security of Serbia?
17 A. To all intents and purposes, it was subordinated to the President
18 of Serbia at the time, that is to say Slobodan Milosevic.
19 Q. And so the information on opposition parties available to the
20 state security, in your judgement, would it have been available to him?
21 A. Yes. They would have to have been, because no service collecting
22 information collects information for itself, for its own purposes but it
23 is duty-bound and obliged to inform the person who is superior to it.
24 Q. When he became President of the FRY, what was the position then
25 about the DB of Serbia? To whom was it then subordinate?
1 A. In a very short space of time, it was to be subordinated contrary
2 to the provisions in force at the time. Once again, subordinated to
3 President Milosevic as the president of Yugoslavia.
4 MR. NICE: Paragraph 63, Your Honour, is one I'm just going to
5 take a little -- the paragraphs ceased to be numbered for a few
6 paragraphs, but I'm going to take a little context at the foot of page 11
7 and one paragraph on page 12.
8 Q. General, was there an admiral called Mamula who had both political
9 and, as it were, military interests?
10 A. Well, there was General Mamula. As to an answer whether he had
11 military interests and political ones too, you would have to be more
13 Q. Was he known to you to have any particular political interest or
14 interest in any particular political party? If not, I'll move on.
15 A. I -- yes, I know what you mean. You want me to speak to the
16 period, that is to say, when Mamula was the Federal Secretary for National
17 Defence or, rather, when Admiral Mamula was a retired admiral. So I
18 assume what you're interested in is the latter period, when General Mamula
19 was retired.
20 Q. Yes, indeed.
21 A. After he had retired, for a time - and that was in 1991, in the
22 summer - he held high-ranking posts in the League of Communists of
23 Yugoslavia, the movement for Yugoslavia, in fact.
24 Q. Thank you. That's all I need for that. And then we move on page
25 12, top of the page.
1 Was there a meeting he sought with you?
2 A. Yes, that's right. And this was in the summer months. I think it
3 was the end of July or perhaps the beginning of August 1991.
4 Q. Did you decline to meet him yourself but ask your deputy, General
5 Tumanov, to see him?
6 A. I didn't refuse. I would prefer the term I avoided meeting him,
7 because there had already been a slight conflict or clash, if I can put it
8 that way, between General Kadijevic and Admiral Mamula.
9 Q. In any event, did General Tumanov meet him, and did he report back
10 to you on what the admiral had sought?
11 A. Yes, that's right. He had a brief meeting, and he told me that it
12 was the admiral's interest in seeing that some of the security officers or
13 staff of the security administration should be sent into the area of Lika,
14 Banija, and Kordun to provide security to the units over there, the units
15 that had been established, units of the Territorial Defence.
16 Q. Was this something the state security then did or declined to do?
17 A. I think you're thinking of military security, are you?
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. The translation I got was "state security."
20 Q. Military security. Your units, did they provide officers pursuant
21 to this request?
22 A. No, nobody did.
23 MR. NICE: Paragraph 65, Your Honours.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It couldn't have gone forward
25 without permission from me, and I did not grant permission.
1 MR. NICE:
2 Q. Thank you. On the 28th of November of 1991, did you speak to your
3 superior, Kadijevic, about paramilitary groups?
4 A. Yes, I did, and previously the -- General Kadijevic and the
5 leadership had been sent information about the presence of the
6 paramilitary groups on the territory of Slavonia. And to be more
7 specific, the reason for in-depth monitoring and reporting were the
8 problems that had been created after the goings-on in Vukovar. And some
9 volunteer groups insisted, those which were not within the frameworks of
10 the JNA, insisted that they be paid a remuneration that was due them. And
11 as this was not accepted, because they weren't on the lists of JNA
12 members, they resorted to various excessive situations. And we had
13 information that after the operation in Vukovar was over, these groups
14 went about looting, looting from the houses that had been abandoned. And
15 for that reason, General Kadijevic issued orders that orders be issued to
16 disband and disarm all the paramilitary formations from the areas where
17 military units were present.
18 This order came out on the 10th of December, as far as I recall,
19 1991, and it was issued by the Presidency in restricted composition, that
20 is to say, the Yugoslav state Presidency of the day.
21 Q. Tab 12 of Exhibit 387, please. We need look at no more than the
22 top of the first page where the "Order on the engagement of volunteers in
23 the armed forces of the SFRY during immediate danger of war" is headlined.
24 And then if we go over to the second page, paragraph 7, we read:
25 "Volunteer formations currently engaged outside the Armed Forces
1 of the SFRY on the carrying out of certain military assignments and
2 volunteers currently in the units and institutions of the Armed Forces of
3 the SFRY must bring their position [something] the armed forces of the
4 SFRY into accord with the regulations in this order within --" I'm not
5 sure how many days it is. It looks like 30.
6 How many days is it, General?
7 A. I don't really know how many days.
8 Q. Paragraph 7 of the order, and in the original -- it's ten days.
9 Ten days of the order.
10 And this is the order signed by Branko Kostic that you were
11 telling us about.
12 A. Yes. I never saw it before, but I see it now.
13 Q. Did Arkan's group comply with this order?
14 A. Arkan's group did not comply with this order, and I know that from
15 the reports -- a report sent in to me via the 1st Military District, in
16 fact, from Colonel Petkovic. In concrete terms, on the 28th of January,
17 1992, General Zivota Panic ordered Colonel Petkovic to come into contact
18 with Radovan Stojicic, nicknamed Badza, from the MUP of the Republic of
19 Serbia, and to caution him, to warn him that Arkan's units had to leave
20 the areas where the military units were located.
21 Q. What was -- carry on with Badza's response, please.
22 A. Badza's response was the following: He said that there would be
23 no problem with Arkan's Tigers. He would take them over within the
24 composition of the unit being established by the MUP of Serbia.
25 MR. NICE: A short closed session, please -- private session.
1 [Private session]
13 Pages 15820-15825 – redacted – private session
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
8 MR. NICE:
9 Q. Can we talk about something -- or can you talk about something
10 quite briefly called operational groups, OGs, in a couple of sentences.
11 And remembering what you told us yesterday about the concept of unity or
12 singleness of command, how did operational groups come into being and
14 A. Operational groups, according to the rules, are formed when
15 several units of different kinds, which are not from the same organic
16 composition, act on a common task and a common area, in the same area. In
17 order to ensure efficient command and carrying out of the task and to
18 reduce the number of direct links with the commander, operational groups
19 are established and the lower level category are tactical groups.
20 Therefore, an operational group is a term normally employed in
21 military terminology, and I know that in the area of Banija, Lika, and
22 Kordun, three JNA operational groups were set up, the 5th, 6th -- rather,
23 the 7th and the -- 6th, 7th, and 8th Operational Groups, and there was one
24 in the Slavonia area as well.
25 Q. And who would have authority to create an operational group
1 comprising JNA as well as Territorial Defence units?
2 A. It is the commander of the military district who creates an
3 operational group.
4 Q. Tab 13, please.
5 MR. NICE: English on the overhead projector, please.
6 Q. This from Major General Spiro Nikovic. Territorial Defence,
7 Socialist Republic of Croatia, 19th of October, 1991, 1st Operational
8 Group Command, heading: Placing Territorial Defence Units Under JNA
9 Units. The order, and then perhaps the second paragraph: "All TD units
10 --" Territorial Defence units -- "from the territorial zone headquarters
11 of Banija and Kordun ... are placed under 1st Operational group Command
12 starting on 19th October... and continue as such to be engaged and used as
13 an organic part of JNA units in the combat zones where JNA units are."
14 This is simply an example of the creation of an operational group
15 that you've spoken of.
16 A. No. This is an example of resubordination of Territorial Defence
17 units from the area staff of the Banija and Kordun to the command of the
18 operational group, who is Spiro Nikovic. So he had to receive an order on
19 the establishment of an operational group in which he would be told that
20 this area staff of the Territorial Defence would be resubordinated to him.
21 And on the basis of this command, he would have received from the military
22 district command, he would have issued an order to the area command and to
23 these units, telling them that they are now under his command.
24 So this is not an organisational order on the formation of an
25 operational group. Rather, it is an order issued to these units,
1 informing them that, from now on, they are under his command.
2 Q. I follow that. It was my error. This reflects the existence of
3 an operational group in the way that you've described.
4 JUDGE MAY: I think we have it, we can read it.
5 MR. NICE: Thank you. Can we look at tab 14, please.
6 Q. You can see this on the overhead projector. Not all of it has
7 been translated, but this is a letter going to Comrade Martic, and so far
8 as material, it reads: "The Federal Department --" to the Ministry of SAO
9 Krajina and to Milan Martic.
10 "The Federal Department for National Defence ordered me to come,
11 together with a group of superiors on the specific day to Vrhovine and to
12 make preparations for establishing the 2nd Lika's brigade of the 6th
13 Lika's division that will take over the commanding from the Territorial
14 Defence and that will combine activities of all structures on this
16 Now, does this explain the creation of the Lika Brigade and the
17 combination of all activities in that area?
18 A. Yes. I know that sometime in August 1991, at a meeting with the
19 Secretary for National Defence, General Kadijevic, a decision was reached
20 on the establishment of the 6th Lika Division. And from that it follows
21 that these brigades were also formed. And this is within the context of
22 what I said, that these were not paramilitary units but units under the
23 command of the JNA.
24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the witness is very helpfully covering
25 something that had I omitted at paragraph 52. And the commander of this
1 unit --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, please.
3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if this is an objection, we'll hear it,
4 but it shouldn't interrupt too much. Now, what is the point?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In essence, Mr. May, in tab 14, this
6 letter written to Martic by Trbojevic, in the English translation, only
7 one paragraph has been translated. The original is a whole page. And you
8 cannot determine anything. And he's complaining about a paramilitary
9 formation and saying that they were common thieves.
10 JUDGE MAY: We will deal with it in this way: Mr. Nice, can we
11 have the whole letter translated?
12 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues]... on its way, yes.
13 That will be done.
14 JUDGE MAY: That will be done.
15 MR. NICE:
16 Q. But returning to the topic of the creation of this division or
17 brigade out of the 6th Division, you were telling us, General, about the
18 decision of General Kadijevic. The units of the JNA, paragraph 52 for
19 reference. Who was the commander of the division?
20 A. First I have to explain why the 6th Lika Division was established,
21 if you will permit me. After the reorganisation of the JNA in 1987, this
22 area objectively had no large JNA units there. And as war was beginning,
23 there was a need to establish or reactivate those units which had existed
24 previously, before 1987. And this -- it was in this context that the
25 order was issued to establish the 6th Lika Division. I don't know who the
1 commander was, but I know that Mica Cusic, an active duty general, was
2 commanded to go to the area and assist the commands there in establishing
3 the units. I don't know, however, who was appointed commander of this
5 Q. Cusic was, of course, a JNA officer; is that correct?
6 A. He was a general of the JNA. And he was still on active-duty
7 service at the time. He was available.
8 Q. Paragraph 72, please. I want to turn to the support of the JNA,
9 to the armies of Krajina and the Republika Srpska.
10 Can you tell us, please, this: From mid-1992 until the end of the
11 conflict, what number of officers of the VJ, as you discovered, served in
12 the SVK and the VRS?
13 A. [redacted]
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, are we now in open session, to remind you?
15 MR. NICE: Very grateful. At the foot of the page, and -- yes,
16 please, may we go into closed session? I'm grateful to Your Honour.
17 [Private session]
13 Page 15831 – redacted – private session
13 Page 15832 – redacted – private session
1 [Open session]
2 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. We're now in open session, General. Either the end of April or
5 the beginning of May 1992, did the Rump Presidency make a decision about
6 officers of the JNA born in Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina and as to where
7 they should serve?
8 A. Yes, but this decision was made pursuant to a conversation between
9 Branko Kostic and Blagoje Adzic with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina in Skopje on the 26th of April, 1992. An agreement was
11 reached on that occasion that all members of the JNA who were citizens of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina should remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that
13 Muslims and other citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the territory of
14 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina
15 within a fixed period of time and that all the senior officers and
16 soldiers who were not citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina would leave
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina within a certain time period.
18 As far as I remember, the deadline for withdrawal to Yugoslavia
19 was the 19th of May, 1992.
20 Q. Tab 15, please.
21 MR. NICE: English version on the overhead projector, please.
22 Q. This comes, as we'll see, from the chief of the staff of the armed
23 forces at the headquarters of the armed forces operative centre to the
24 command of the 5th, 10th, 13th, and 17th Corps and the 4th Military
25 Region, and for information, the 2nd Military Region, and it reads: "On
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the basis of the entire situation on the territory of the Republic Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina, and in accordance with the decision of the SFRJ on the
3 transfer of members of the JNA - citizens of SRJ from the territory of
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina to the territory of SRJ, and vice versa,
5 "I am issuing the order:
6 "Carry out all the necessary preparations and transfer the
8 And if we go to the second page, paragraphs 2 and 3: "The
9 officers, soldiers and civilians from the aforesaid units born in the
10 territory of the Serbian Republic of Krajina, that is, Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, or according to the plan of the Personnel Department of the
12 Federal Department for National Defence are determined for the
13 reinforcement of the Territorial Defence and the police of the Serbian
14 Republic of Krajina or the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
15 will stay in the territory."
16 And then a further order. Comment on this document, please,
17 General Vasiljevic.
18 A. I think this is in accordance with what I have already said. And
19 the deadline of the 19th of May, units and personnel who are citizens of
20 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are being transferred.
21 There is one thing that is insufficiently clear to me here. Under
22 item 2, when it says: "According to the plan of the personal
23 administration of the SSNO, they are to bring up to manpower levels the
24 Krajina Territorial Defence and police." I assume that this means that
25 the citizens from the Krajina and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were
1 active-duty members of the JNA and who were to be transferred to the
2 Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they were to be appointed according
3 to the plan of the personnel administration, because this document was
4 issued on the 11th of May when I had already retired.
5 Q. Thank you. Tab 16. We look at this. This is a document much
6 later, the 7th of December of 1993. And I needn't trouble the usher to
7 turn to it, but we can find in due course that it comes from Major General
8 Mile Novakovic, and it's a list of military personnel who left the Serbian
9 army of Krajina without permission, and it goes, amongst others, to
10 Lieutenant General Perisic. And the document says: "In our document,
11 confidential number ... submitted to you a list of officers who left the
12 Serbian army of Krajina without permission and returned to the Yugoslav
13 army." And then: "We hereby inform you that the following persons
14 replied to our summons."
15 And then in the middle of the page: "We ask you take necessary
16 measures for return to the SVK of those who did not reply to our summons
17 and whose names we send you again ..." And then there's a long list.
18 What does this help us with, General? Any comment on this
19 document as to the way personnel support was organised?
20 A. Well, this supports everything I have said up to now. There was
21 an intervention in order for members of the army of Yugoslavia who were
22 born in the Krajina, or in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not remain in the
23 units in the field, and so an appeal is made to the Chief of Staff that he
24 should use his authority to return these people to the army of the Serbian
1 Q. And we see that there had already been an earlier list submitted
2 and non-compliance with that list so that this was further pressure or
3 enforcement. Would that be correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. We're still in open session, remember. Later on - you may have
6 covered this but just detail it very briefly if you will - it was also
7 citizens as well as the military who were ordered to serve in the army of
8 the Krajina or Republika Srpska; is that correct?
9 A. You mean in this document here?
10 Q. No. Forget the document. No, we're moving on.
11 A. Yes. Both. Both. There was some sort of mobilisation in the
12 area of the Republic of Yugoslavia where all citizens of Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina or Croatia who had not responded to the call that they should
14 report to the army of their republic or Krajina be rounded up. And they
15 were on the territory of Yugoslavia. And the other case was if they were
16 active members of the army of Yugoslavia, they were put into a situation
17 where they had to report.
18 MR. NICE: Your Honours, we've covered paragraphs 75 and 76 in one
19 setting or another.
20 So far as 77 is concerned, perhaps a sentence from that.
21 Q. General, were promotions of officers in the SVK or VRS sometimes
22 upheld when they returned to the VJ? Just yes or no.
23 A. Probably the interpretation was not right. I assume you mean
24 promotion to higher rank --
25 Q. I do.
1 A. -- in the army of the Krajina or the republic. If that is what
2 you meant, and I think you did, then on their return - I'm referring to
3 senior officers who after a certain period of time returned from the
4 Krajina or the Republika Srpska to the army of Yugoslavia - their ranks
5 had to be verified by the competent organs in the Federal Republic of
7 I know of some cases where some ranks to which they had been
8 promoted were not upheld, although in the army of the Krajina or of
9 Republika Srpska, they had already -- these ranks had already been
10 conferred upon them.
11 Q. In your experience, did officers in the SVK or VRS maintain
12 contact with their VJ units and the commanders of those units?
13 A. Yes, they did. I experienced this myself because I contacted some
14 of them. I was in contact with some of them. It's as if these were
15 people who were temporarily assigned outside the army of Yugoslavia. And
16 since their families lived in Yugoslavia, they came to visit them, and
17 then they had occasion of having informal contact with their previous
18 superior officers. They were probably asking whether their previous posts
19 were taken up and whether there would be any possibility for them to come
20 back there.
21 Q. General Vasiljevic, the support that you've described, the VJ to
22 the SVK and the VRS, how did that, in your judgement, reflect as to
23 whether these were entirely separate armies or whether they were in some
24 ways connected?
25 A. Well, according to the factual situation, these were two states
1 that had two armies, and they were financed from a third state. I don't
2 know whether there is any need for clarifying this in order to make it
4 So there is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There are the two
5 Krajinas or, rather, the Krajina and the Republika Srpska who have their
6 own governments, who have their own armies, but the funding comes from the
7 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
8 Q. We may be dealing with that later in a different session in
10 MR. NICE: Page 16, for the Chamber.
11 Q. But staying with the measure of personnel support and accepting
12 that these armies were based in different countries, did they operate to
13 any extent as if they were based in the same country or did they operate
14 as if they were truly and completely based in different countries?
15 A. As for the specific operations, I cannot speak authoritatively
16 about that, so I cannot give a precise answer to that question. If you
17 mean who commanded which army.
18 Q. No, I don't mean that, and what I'm going to do is come back to it
19 a little later.
20 Let's look, please, now, if we can, at Exhibit 327, tab 23. This
21 is, of course, after your retirement, but I would be grateful for your
22 comment on this and some other documents.
23 This is a letter of the 9th of June, and it comes from Milan
24 Martic, Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, and
25 it says, going as it does to the accused:
1 "Dear Mr. President:
2 "Having assessed the military and political situation in the
3 Republic of Serbian Krajina as very complex, we feel obliged to inform you
4 about it and --" I'm so sorry.
5 "We feel obliged to inform you about it and to ask you to use your
6 authority and position to improve the situation."
7 We go over to the second page and to the bottom of the page,
9 "The SRJ army failed to meet its obligations regarding the
10 required ammunition and spare parts.
11 "We hereby ask you to do the following:
12 "To exert pressure on the General Staff of the Yugoslav army to
13 provide us with the required ammunition, spare parts ...
14 "Serbian television should report on Croatia's intentions in the
15 media, and include news from the RSK in the evening news headlines. It
16 would be advisable to send a Serbian television crew to the front of
17 Northern Dalmatia if possible.
18 "The GS of the Yugoslav army should send the requested officers to
20 And over the page. Next page, please. "It's worth noting that
21 we've sent these requests to the chief of the Yugoslav army, but they are
22 being fulfilled slowly or not at all."
23 As to the integration of working together as different armies on
24 different territories, what, if anything, do you have to say by way of
25 comment about this letter?
1 A. This last section that you read, it would be natural if Mr. Martic
2 would, in relation to the problems he had in his communications with the
3 army of Yugoslavia, address the president of the Federal Republic of
4 Yugoslavia, who is in charge of commanding the army of Yugoslavia. If he
5 addresses the person he did address, at that time he was just one of the
6 members of the Supreme Defence Council of the Federal Republic of
7 Yugoslavia, so it would be natural for this to be sent to the other member
8 of the Supreme Defence Council of Yugoslavia. So he is actually
9 addressing here the person who he believes has factual influence and who
10 can issue orders through the General Staff for granting Martic's requests.
11 Q. Then two topics covered, the nature of the help that was expected
12 or sought and the fact that the letter goes to the accused.
13 Can we look then now, please - perhaps the same topics in mind -
14 to Exhibit 327, tab 5. This one from Goran Hadzic, president of the
15 Republic of Srpska Krajina. Received on the 24th of June, 1993. So
16 again, outside the period of your engagement when you were in retirement.
17 To the president of the Republic.
18 "Dear Mr. Milosevic:
19 "We want to draw your attention to certain problems which we were
20 not able to solve by ourselves ... and which represent the urgent problems
21 of the Serbian army of Krajina."
22 Next paragraph: " ... asking for military personnel procurement
23 and so on."
24 Next paragraph: "Technical maintenance of weapons."
25 Next paragraph: "Minimal ammunition."
1 And then next paragraph but one: "We ask you to try to exercise
2 your authority and influence for realisation of our requests presented to
3 the General Staff of the Yugoslav army."
4 This was addressed to the accused. Do the comments you made in
5 relation to the previous letter apply similarly to this one?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Tab 17, please. The first page, please, on the overhead
9 This is a SitRep, a situation report, on the 25th of November. We
10 can see it goes to the office of the president and the president
11 personally and to the Chief of Staff, General Perisic. And then if we go
12 on to the third page, please, usher, to paragraph 2.3.
13 "Mobilisation and Personnel Issues:
14 "There have been no major changes since the last report.
15 "A new group of active-duty military personnel arrived from the
16 VJ on the 23rd of November ...
17 "Of the 259 called up, 82 responded, i.e., 31 per cent."
18 The problem with the lack of doctors. And then this is signed by
19 Borislav Djukic.
20 Your comment on this document that comes from the Serbian Krajina
21 army Main Staff, please.
22 A. Well, that is in the context of sending officers of the army of
23 Yugoslavia to the army of Republika Srpska Krajina. And again, there is
24 this intervention which is in accordance with the documents you showed
25 beforehand, that those who had not responded to the call-up should
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 respond. And the chief of General Staff is informed about this and also
2 the Supreme Defence Council. This is yet another document in this
3 respect, and it shows where the Main Staff of the army of the Serb
4 Republic of Krajina, where the Main Staff is vis-a-vis the army of
5 Yugoslavia. It would be interesting now to see later whether something
6 was done in connection with these interventions, that is to say, to send
7 those who had not responded earlier on.
8 Q. And finally in this series of exhibits, tab 18, please. 25th of
9 May, document from the Serbian Interior Ministry over an illegible
10 signature but with a stamp on the original. Subject: To approve
11 certificate. "This is to approve the transfer from Skelane of the
12 following commodities seized as war bounty in territories where combat
13 operations are taking place." Some minor items listed.
14 "The certificate is being issued on the basis of the Order of the
15 Tactical Group Commander, General Mile Mrksic ..."
16 Your comment on this document coming from the Republika Srpska
17 covering war booty, signed by Mile Mrksic.
18 A. The first thing that is evident is that the unit for special
19 purposes of the MUP of the Serbia, in May 1993, had its command in Bajna
20 Basta. However, there is another thing that can be seen, that television,
21 typewriter, a stove, a water heater are being transferred from Skelane
22 which is the Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is obvious that this unit operated in
23 that area.
24 As for the existence of Tactical Group 1 commanded by General
25 Mrksic, it is there, and he issued an order as to how war booty should be
1 treated. I'm not aware of this existence of Tactical Group 1. I am not
2 aware of that. This is 1993, but the document is -- makes this quite
4 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm not going to touch 79 or tab 19. May
5 we have a short closed session, please.
6 [Private session]
13 Page 15846 – redacted – private session
13 Page 15847 – redacted – private session
16 [Open session]
17 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there is now a full English translation of
19 tab 14. I hope it's been included in your -- oh, it hasn't. So we now
20 will be in the position of the accused and the witness, able to read the
21 document in full.
22 Q. Can we turn then to logistical support, General --
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Nice. Paragraph 82, if the
24 witness can deal with the name UB. It's written here "UB/KOS," so whether
25 it should be read "KOG" and the distinction between them.
1 MR. NICE: KOS, KOG, and UB, yes. I'll ask the witness about
2 that. It may be that we'll want to look at one of our charts.
3 Q. But in any event, so far as you're concerned, General, what did
4 KOS ever mean? When did it cease to be an appropriate current term?
5 MR. NICE: If Your Honour looks at this chart - I can't remember
6 the number of it - the JNA command structure.
7 JUDGE KWON: Tab 1.
8 MR. NICE: Tab 1. In the legend in the bottom left-hand side.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KOS, in translation, means
10 counter-intelligence service of the JNA. And it ceased to exist in the
11 1950s. The official term, the official title or name was the Security
12 Administration of the JNA or the Organs of Security of the JNA, and KOS
13 does not actually exist as an expression any more, as a term. It is
14 synonymous with the security organs, but we don't use it in ordinary life,
15 even less in official communication.
16 The KOG, KOG, stands for counter-intelligence group, and this is a
17 branch of the security organs which has specific counter-intelligence
18 assignments. So KOG is a component part of the security organs or, as it
19 says KOG, counter-intelligence group. And it has its own branches,
20 counter-intelligence branches, and those are the official names or titles
21 of those organisational entities.
22 MR. NICE: Your Honour --
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 MR. NICE: -- this is covered in the summary. We were probably
25 not going to deal with it simply for the usual problems of time, but
1 you'll see it on page 28, and there's a tab 36 that may help, but it may
2 be we can turn to the need to spend time on that when we reach that part
3 of the summary.
4 You will find a rather detailed chart at tab 36, and we will
5 review the position between now and next Wednesday as to how much of that
6 we should give.
7 Q. Tab 20, please.
8 MR. NICE: If you could place it on the overhead projector. Yes.
9 Q. Now, we're on the topic of logistical support, General, and we've
10 got here a document of the 31st of December, 1991, so back within your
11 period. Equipping Territorial Defence units coming from the SSNO.
12 Equipping Territorial Defence units with weapons and military equipment.
13 And it says:
14 "Since the start of combat operations, territorial operation
15 Territorial Defence units that have been formed have contacted the SSNO
16 directly, either themselves or through their staffs, to request
17 replenishment --" it's at the top of the page, Usher. "... staffs, to
18 request replenishment of NVO weapons and materiel equipment from JNA.
19 "When conditions allowed, these units were equipped by the
20 relevant tactical bodies SNO arms and services through the 608 something
21 or other of the SSNO and the VO command. Due to the large number of
22 requests and the difficulties involved in continuing to meet the level of
23 the SSNO and in order to continue to observe regulations and prevent
24 potential abuse, I order..."
25 And then chief of the General Staff, Adzic orders:
1 "Replenishment of Territorial Defence units in accordance with
2 regulations." Sorry. Have I got the wrong document? I'm so sorry.
3 Apparently I'm reading from the wrong document. Very well. Sorry.
4 As you were, if people wonder what I was reading from, this is the
5 one that's pursuant to an order 2260, Chief of the General Staff orders in
6 respect of regulations and possible abuse during the equipping of
7 Territorial Defence units, orders replenishing the Territorial Defence
8 units in accordance with regulations in force.
9 Item 2: Analysing requests received and assess whether they're
11 After those tactically responsible are given approval, SSNO will
12 prepare decisions.
13 Corps and logistics base commands must inform those from this
14 command who are tactically responsible and then hand over allocated
15 equipment to the commands and staffs of the TO units.
16 That came -- that was tab 20. Thank you very much. I hope that
17 the Judges -- the Court's binders are tabbed in the way that I've now
19 21, then. Let's see if I've got 21. Can we put -- I think the
20 better thing is for you to comment straight away on tab 20, please,
21 General. What does this tell us, 1992 January, about the logistical
22 support of the VJ?
23 A. Well, this document comes from an order of the General Staff head
24 dating back to December 1991, and all this is taking place during a period
25 of time when, according to the Vance Plan, the JNA should be leaving
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 certain areas. And the weapons, military materiel and TO units should be
2 placed under the control of the international forces. And it is during
3 this period of time that replenishment is taking place and additional
4 arming. And some units of the Territorial Defence, according to this,
5 probably did not have all the technical means and materiel they should
6 have been equipped with.
7 As previously, we already said that some Territorial Defence units
8 and the MUP of Republika Srpska itself would make direct requests to the
9 commands in the field, on the ground, where they were located. The head
10 of the General Staff, through its orders, settled the procedure of how
11 this equipment could be handed over and issued to the units, how the units
12 could be issued the materiel they required.
13 But I can recognise the signature of General Kukanjac, or, rather,
14 he initialed this, his initials, as chief of the General Staff, although
15 General Kukanjac himself took over his duties only at the beginning of
16 1992. So the 30th of December should not be misleading as the date here
17 -- the 31st of December, and the fact that his initials were on this
18 document, the fact that he initialed it.
19 Q. Thank you. Tab 21, please. Yes. This one is the document I was
20 reading from earlier. Superficially similar, I suppose, in appearance but
21 with an earlier date of 31st of December, 1991. Sorry. Another one. 7th
22 of April, 1992. 7th of April, 1992:
23 "In accordance with Article 46 of the Temporary Rulebook... time
24 of peace, the Article 9 of the Rulebook on the jurisdiction..."
25 Order, this time coming from Vladan Sljivic, general colonel for
1 SSNO logistics assistant, and he orders: "That the logistics security of
2 all units and institutions on the territory of RS Krajina that is under
3 the control of 'UNPROFOR' should prepare for their relocation to new
4 areas ..."
5 Next paragraph, paragraph 2: "Forming of the Main Staff Logistic
6 Base of RS Krajina and zone logistic bases and reinforcement of their
7 formations ... in accordance with the request of GSTO of RS Krajina ..."
8 And then down to paragraph 4: "In cooperation with SSNO personnel
9 management, the sanitary management will bring appropriate decision about
10 the health insurance of AVL, GL, and PVL ..."
11 What does this tell us, very briefly, about logistic support
12 coming to RS Krajina?
13 A. The formation of the logistics base for the Main Staff of the
14 Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. That's what it
15 tells us about, that this kind of army institution did not exist in that
16 territory previously. The logistics base is a very complex logistic
17 institution with -- which implies numerous material and materiel and
18 repair capacities, and it comes under the Territorial Defence which will
19 remain in the area under the control of the international forces. And it
20 is regulated, in point 4, with the -- it says here sanitary management of
21 persons and health insurance of persons who remain on the territory of the
22 Republika Srpska Krajina.
23 And as far as I know, this health insurance and management was
24 done in medical military institutions, at the Medical Military Academy as
25 well, and the costs of treatment and health care for these persons was
1 paid for.
2 So this is all a preparatory stage, in fact, for placing the whole
3 -- the entire Territorial Defence, according to all the principles
4 defined, in the territory of Krajina when UNPROFOR arrived in the area.
5 Q. And then finally on this exercise, Exhibit 352, tab 157. This is
6 again outside your period, the 23rd of December, 1993, from Milan
7 Celeketic, a colonel, 18th Corps Command of the SVK, I assume, and it
8 says: "Order on the method of securing materials from the FRY army."
9 "In spite of orders and many warnings that the securing of
10 material and supplies from the VJ be done in planned fashion and through
11 the Serbian army of Krajina Main Staff, there are instances of commands or
12 individuals directly contacting the General Staff of the VJ or individual
14 "Direct contacts give the impression of unorganised and haphazard
15 work and incur unnecessary costs ..."
16 And then there's an order that requests for replenishment of units
17 that have been sent directly to the corps command, forbidding subordinate
18 commands to approach the General Staff directly.
19 Any comment on this? It's self-evident that it's revealing of
20 support by the VJ of the 18th Corps Command, but any other comment?
21 A. Well, I think it's self-evident. This is dated the 23rd of
22 December, 1993, and it is evident from this order that there was a method
23 of supplying the Main Staff of the army of the Republic of Krajina, and
24 some individuals established direct links, bypassing these official
25 channels. I assume that they must have served in the JNA and later on
1 they were in this other army, and they used their connections in order to
2 obtain supplies, bypassing the Main Staff. So this is actually telling
3 them not to do that.
4 MR. NICE: Your Honour, could we go perhaps into closed session,
6 [Private session]
13 Page 15857 – redacted – private session
13 [Open session]
14 MR. NICE: Your Honours, we'll just go back to that outstanding
15 question in paragraph 78.
16 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
17 MR. NICE:
18 Q. General, we've now looked at various aspects of what happened with
19 the armies of the SVK and the VRS and their connection with the VJ. Back
20 to a question I asked you a little earlier - my fault entirely in the way
21 I phrased it - but as it appeared from all these various factors, were
22 these two armies and the -- operating as if they were in different
23 countries or in any way operating as if they were the same country? If
24 you -- if you don't find the question helpful, say so and we'll move on.
25 A. I've already answered this. Objectively, there were two armies in
1 two countries. And from a third country, the Federal Republic of
2 Yugoslavia, they were treated as if they were both armies of the Federal
3 Republic of Yugoslavia, because they were supplied with funds, personnel,
4 materiel and equipment. And there is nothing more to add.
5 Q. Thank you. That's fine. Can we now move to the influence, if
6 any, of the accused over federal and Serbian institutions.
7 In your experience, the members of the Presidency were what
8 category or kind of politician?
9 A. The members of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of
10 Yugoslavia - and to begin with there were eight of them - in my estimation
11 and in the general view, were third-class cadres, third-class politicians,
12 many of whom were not known to the general public or who were political
13 upstarts. Real power at that time resided in the republican leaders,
14 while the members of the Presidency were, if I can express myself
15 metaphorically, ambassadors representing their own republics and provinces
16 in the Presidency. In other words, they were bound to advocate the
17 positions set by the republics. That's my impression of the members of
18 the Presidency and its actual power.
19 Q. The position of the accused in this structure as you describe it
20 was what?
21 A. I don't think he -- his position was any different than that of
22 the presidents of the other republics, but there is no doubt that he was a
23 very strong political leader, that he was very authoritative, and that
24 because of this, he was, in reality, able to influence four of the members
25 of the Presidency, and these were the ones from Serbia, from Kosovo, and
1 Metohija, and Vojvodina.
2 Q. Your superior, Kadijevic, was he technically subordinated to the
3 accused or not? We know the answer but please confirm it.
4 A. No, neither in technical terms nor in any other way.
5 Q. Paragraph 88. Did the accused exercise any influence over the
6 appointment of people to the Serbian Ministry of the Interior? He
7 obviously had the power to, but did he actually exercise that power?
8 A. The procedure of appointing ministers in the government is clear.
9 They were nominated by the Prime Minister designate, and I think that
10 there is no doubt that in relation to the key positions, one of which was
11 always the post of Minister of the Interior, were certainly strongly
12 influenced by the accused. The appointees were people he had special
13 confidence in. However, the entire procedure, in formal terms, went
14 through the Assembly or the parliament, and there the Socialist Party of
15 Serbia held the majority, and he was the president of that party, so that
16 it was very easy for votes to be in favour of what had already been
18 Q. Radmilo Bogdanovic was Minister of Internal Affairs for Serbia
19 until March 1991, being replaced by Zoran Sokolovic, who was in office
20 throughout the conflict. Was that replacement a genuine replacement;
21 i.e., did Sokolovic really take over the powers of the Minister of
22 Internal Affairs with Bogdanovic leaving the scene, or did Bogdanovic
23 remain an influential figure?
24 A. I think that both statements are correct. Zoran Sokolovic took
25 over the post of Minister of the Interior of Serbia, but a strong
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 influence on key persons in the ministry was still exerted by the former
2 minister, Radmilo Bogdanovic. Zoran Sokolovic was by nature, by character
3 and temperament, a quiet man, and he seemed to be more of a figurehead in
4 all this. Real power at that time, objectively within the Ministry of the
5 Interior of Serbia, resided in the head of the public -- of the state
6 security service.
7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think the witness would prefer to go
8 into closed session for what follows.
9 [Private session]
13 Pages 15863-15871 – redacted – private session
13 [Open session]
14 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
15 MR. NICE: The Vojna Linija --
16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, we're now coming up to quarter to. We have
17 to be out literally in two minutes. If you're going to go on to a new
18 subject, it may be a convenient moment.
19 MR. NICE: I'm entirely in the Court's hands. It's a short
20 paragraph, but --
21 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We've got literally a minute, so we need
22 to be off.
23 Mr. Vasiljevic, would you be back, please, on Wednesday morning to
24 continue your evidence.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of
2 February, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.