1 Wednesday, 5 November 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 WITNESS: WITNESS B-1531 [Resumed]
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. 1531, independently of the fact that you say
11 that you know nothing about Cengic's interview, the one that I quoted,
12 tell me, please, what was the first knowledge you had about the arming of
13 Muslim forces in Foca? Since what he says here, that from the 1st of
14 August there were forces which possessed automatic rifles, machine-guns,
15 mortars, and so on, the 1st of August, 1990, in fact he quotes, six months
16 prior to the formation of the Patriotic League itself. So please tell me
17 what you know about arming.
18 A. I answered that question yesterday, and all I can say is that I
19 really knew nothing about arming at that time, nothing at all.
20 Q. And when did you learn about it?
21 A. Yesterday when you told me that you had read the interview.
22 Q. Well, when did you learn of any Muslim arming at all? When was
23 the first time you learnt about that at all?
24 A. I never learnt anything in concrete terms in view of the fact of
25 what I said yesterday in private session when I explained the specific
1 features of my role.
2 Q. All right. Now, do you know that after these events that took
3 place in Foca, the ones you're testifying about, Halid Cengic went to
4 Visoko where he was one of the main initiators of the exodus of the Serb
5 population in that area?
6 A. What you have just said I was not aware of it, but I did learn
7 through the information media, the writings in the press, that he assumed
8 an important position in the Bosnia-Herzegovina army in that small town.
9 Q. Now, do you know precisely what kind of ethnic cleansing was
10 conducted in that small town as you call it?
11 A. No, I don't.
16 MS. PACK: Your Honour, might I remind the accused that we're
17 presently in open session.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Don't worry, Ms. Pack. I won't say
19 anything that would point to this witness's identity.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. In your statements, Witness, you depict the following picture, if
22 I understand it correctly: You say that the Serbs were arming themselves
23 and preparing for war, whereas the Muslims were not arming themselves or,
24 rather, that you knew nothing about any kind of preparation for arming,
25 even after the large rally that took place, rallying over 100.000 people
1 as you yourself said, in Foca, and the SDA activities along those lines.
2 Is that right, Mr. 1531?
3 A. Yes, that is right. I told you what I knew, and I can't tell you
4 what I don't know about and haven't got any arguments to put forward on
5 something that I have not been kept abreast of.
6 Q. Well, of course I'm not going to go into the details of your
7 statement because I really don't know what all the things that could have
8 been going on there, but I would like to focus on certain portions where
9 you say some things which quite simply I'm just not able to understand,
10 and I would even say they sound rather ridiculous and even grotesque.
11 For example, in the last paragraph on page 2 of your statement of
12 the 25th of June, 1996, (redacted)
19 (redacted); then we have Petko Cancar and Miro Stanic. So the
20 president of the Serbian Democratic Party in Foca who, by the by -- who,
21 by the way, were being seen together. They came to Foca together from
22 Sarajevo. And generally speaking, they were public personages,
23 representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party, in fact.
24 Now, they were having a meeting, as you say, in a church in Foca.
25 Tell me now, please, Mr. 1531, isn't this - how shall I put this?
1 - a ridiculous assertion that personages of that rank could meet anywhere
2 they like, and they were seen publicly around town, they all had public
3 offices, now suddenly they have to organise some clandestine meetings in a
4 church in Cerezluk, and just the two of them who would usually be seen
5 around town in public. Isn't that nonsense?
6 JUDGE MAY: If, 1531, you wish to go into private session to
7 answer that question, you may.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I would, please.
9 [Private session]
12 Pages 28608 to 28615 – redacted – private session.
22 [Open session]
23 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
24 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Witness, could you please look at paragraph 5 of
1 your statement. It is marked with the number 5. It is page 3 of the
2 B/C/S version. The first paragraph. Page 3, first paragraph of the
3 B/C/S, paragraph 5. It's at the top of that page. Page 3.
4 MS. PACK: This is, I assume, the --
5 JUDGE MAY: Which statement? Which statement?
6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Tab 3.
7 JUDGE MAY: Which date, please, so we can get it.
8 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] 25th of June, tab 3, received
9 from the OTP. Tab 3.
13 A. In order to give a more detailed answer to this question, I would
14 ask Their Honours to allow for a private session.
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will not ask
16 anything that could reveal his identity.
17 JUDGE MAY: If he's worried about it, though, he can go into
18 private session. Yes.
19 [Private session]
12 Page 28618 – redacted – private session.
1 [Open session]
2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] In that same statement --
3 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. In that same statement, look at paragraph 15, please, in which you
6 talk about the armed attack on Foca. And you say that a Serb woman was
7 wounded. Would you explain to Their Honours, please, who carried out that
8 attack and how that Serb woman was wounded on the 8th of April, 1992.
9 A. I said that fire from Serbian paramilitary forces were opened on
10 the 8th of April, and that is when that woman was wounded close to the KP
11 Dom, the prison. And this place is known as the Ivanovici houses, that
12 is, the houses of the Ivanovic family, and sniper fire was opened from
13 there. The telephone lines were working, and it was reported by people
14 who have houses nearby, as well as companies, that the woman had been hit.
15 They knew the woman, and I was called up by the president. I think -- I
16 think we have to go back into private session if I have to elaborate on
18 JUDGE MAY: No need to do that unless you want particularly,
19 Mr. Tapuskovic, any more detail about this.
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] No. Since I have to economise
21 with the time.
22 Q. Paragraph 29 again, please. You say -- you talk first about Serb
23 paramilitary units that were directing artillery and machine-gun fire. I
24 think this is in the fourth sentence. And then later on you say: "There
25 was some resistance in those parts of town, but it was sporadic and of a
1 limited nature."
2 Could you explain what the resistance was like and who was putting
3 up that resistance.
4 A. I said what I could hear from where I was, that is, sporadic
5 shooting with infantry weapons as opposed to artillery fire towards those
7 Q. Then you went on to say: "The Muslims who lived there had very
8 little weapons, and later on all ethnically mixed parts of town were
9 exposed to sniper fire."
10 How do you explain that that fire lasted simultaneously towards
11 the parts of town in -- with mixed populations, where both Serbs, Croats
12 and Muslims lived? Was this some sort of a conflict that was going on
13 there and then those involved in the conflict didn't pay any attention to
14 where which civilians were living?
15 A. No. There were sniper nests held by Serb paramilitary units, and
16 in mixed environments, the situation was under control.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
25 [Private session]
12 Page 28621 – redacted – private session.
2 [Open session]
3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I must apologise first. I must
4 ask you, did you say that the area in which you lived, did Radivoj -- did
5 Radovan Karadzic come there? Did you say that yesterday? I just want to
7 A. No, I didn't mention Karadzic in that context.
8 Q. So he was never there?
9 A. I don't know.
10 Q. Yes, but here in paragraph 35 you said --
11 A. Could we go into private session, please?
12 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. What is the question?
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in this paragraph,
14 there is a description of the situation in Foca and that the orders came
15 directly from Radovan Karadzic.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Go into private --
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] He told me --
18 JUDGE MAY: Go into private session to answer that.
19 [Private session]
12 Page 28623 – redacted – private session.
11 Page 28624 – redacted – private session.
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
25 JUDGE MAY: Witness B-1531, that concludes your evidence. Thank
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 you for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You are now free to go. If
2 you would just wait for the blinds to be lowered.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too, Your Honours.
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
6 MR. NICE: The next witness is Mr. Harland who is to be recalled.
7 He is, I gather, ready to come in.
8 JUDGE MAY: Very well. While we're waiting for him, I've been
9 asked to clarify the position of about an exhibit. It's the Pale speech
10 which was marked for identification. I think it was Exhibit 569, tab 9.
11 I will be told if I'm wrong. In any event, it's some days ago, and the
12 registry want it clarified. I don't remember myself why it was marked for
14 MR. NICE: I think this is the one that was produced in two parts.
15 Mr. Groome can deal with it, and I think I mentioned it yesterday, it's
16 now in a comprehensive format.
17 JUDGE MAY: All right.
18 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if you recall the testimony of
19 Mr. Donia, the Prosecution marked for identification the entire Assembly
20 minutes but just introduced excerpts. During the course of the
21 cross-examination, the Chamber indicated that it would be helpful to have
22 the entire -- entirety of this session translated and introduced into
23 evidence, and that is what we provided the Chamber on Monday.
24 JUDGE MAY: Very well. So this is -- the exhibit is no longer
25 marked for identification, Exhibit 538 tab 9; it becomes an exhibit.
1 Thank you.
2 MR. NICE: I assume the usher is collecting the witness. When
3 she's brought him in, I'll get her to put the Sarajevo map back in the
4 position it was if it's thought helpful.
5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Harland, if you'd like to take a seat. You, of
6 course, remain under the declaration which you took on the last occasion.
7 WITNESS: DAVID HARLAND [Resumed]
8 THE WITNESS: Will I have a set of the documents that were
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you should have the documents.
11 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You've got just over two and a half hours
13 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
14 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, since your testimony was
15 interrupted, I have to say in advance or, rather, I would like to make a
16 reservation in advance. I'm not quite sure that the notes that I took
17 during the examination-in-chief always referred to what you yourself were
18 saying. Perhaps they refer to another witness. So please, would you tell
19 me if I make some mistakes, because it's very difficult when testimony is
20 heard in two parts for me to find my way in my notes and documents. So
21 please would you bear that in mind, because I won't intentionally be
22 asking you questions which you didn't refer to and didn't testify about.
23 Quite simply, it might just be a mistake on my part because of the
24 interruption that has occurred, the two-part testimony.
25 We started by looking at the map and the comments made with regard
1 to this Sarajevo map, and most of your testimony referred to Sarajevo, in
2 fact. So it would be a good idea, since you spent a long time in Sarajevo
3 yourself, you had many contacts with people, you knew everything about the
4 Serb positions and the Muslim positions, so it would be a good idea if you
5 were to compare that map and what you knew about the deployment of forces
6 in Sarajevo with this map that I have here. It is a map of Sarajevo
7 showing -- and it says, it's in English, "Ethnic map of Sarajevo on the
8 basis of the population census of the Socialist Federal Republic of
9 Yugoslavia of the 31st of March, 1981." That's the title of the map
10 itself. And you can see on it what the ethnic make-up of Sarajevo looked
11 like at that time.
12 And my question is very short one. It is this: Roughly, or to
13 what extent, to the best of your knowledge, does the deployment of Serb
14 and Muslim positions coincide with this map? I assume the question is
15 clear. Please go ahead. And all the explanations are given in English on
16 the map, the text isn't long, so I'm sure you'll be able to find your way
17 around it.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we have the map placed on the
19 overhead projector, please.
20 THE WITNESS: Right. The map of ethnic distribution only very
21 partially reflects the final confrontation lines. In general, certainly
22 the Serbs secured the areas around Sarajevo, the less densely inhabited
23 areas in which they had been a majority. Many of the mixed areas, mixed,
24 predominantly Muslim and Serb but also with some Croat areas, in the urban
25 part of Sarajevo were secured by the -- by the Serbs at the beginning of
1 the war. So, for example, though of course it's ten years ago so you will
2 excuse me if I don't have the exact figures, I recall that Ilidza, in the
3 urban area, the large part in the west, the urban area of Sarajevo --
4 JUDGE KWON: If you would point out on the ELMO.
5 THE WITNESS: The area here. The Serb -- Serb forces secured that
6 area and removed the Muslim population or it fled despite the fact that
7 that area had a similar number of Muslims and Serbs immediately prior to
8 the war, and in fact, I think, even a slight -- slightly larger number of
10 The same, I think, is true of some of the areas immediately north
11 of the city. Vogosca and Ilijas, these areas were --
12 JUDGE KWON: If you could point on the ELMO so we can see on
13 the --
14 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. If you can't see what the regions indicate, you have a number on
17 each municipality, to designate each municipality, and then you have the
18 names of those municipalities. The Serb territories are blue; the lighter
19 blue areas where the -- where the relative majority is, the darker regions
20 the absolute majority, and the Muslim areas are green and yellow.
21 A. Yes. First of all, this map -- and it doesn't mark who controlled
22 which territory, it marks which population was the greater in 1981. It
23 also doesn't have the names, it just has a series of numbers for most of
24 the areas. Just a second.
25 It's actually much easier for me to work off the big map, if
1 nobody objects.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Do that. It will be much easier for everybody.
3 THE WITNESS: So prior to the war, the Muslims were a large
4 majority in the municipality of Stari Grad, and that was held by the
5 Muslims during the war. Almost all of the other downtown municipalities,
6 that is Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, and Ilidza were -- were heavily
7 mixed, roughly equal in terms of their Muslim and Serb populations. And
8 this area, of course, became divided by the confrontation line. The
9 confrontation line came around here, around the municipality of Stari
10 Grad, which was entirely held by the Muslims, and then the Grbavica
11 section of Novo Sarajevo was held by the Serbs more or less down to the
12 Miljacka river, cutting right through some of the buildings here on what I
13 think is Ljubljanska Street.
14 And then up here again the Muslims controlled these settlements.
15 The Serbs controlled a part of Dobrinja. The Serbs controlled the airport
16 at the beginning the war, and then, by agreement, allowed UNPROFOR to use
17 it. And in the surrounding areas, which were mountainous areas, the Serbs
18 in general were much more numerous than Muslims prior to the war, and
19 those areas were held by the Serbs throughout the conflict.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. [No interpretation]
22 JUDGE MAY: No translation.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English?
24 JUDGE MAY: Can you try again.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will repeat.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Harland, looking at this map which shows where the Serbs live
3 and the Muslims live, because this is just a map of Sarajevo, can we say
4 that mostly the forces deployed during the war were distributed in
5 conformity with the territories on which each of the parties lived, more
6 or less? Of course, it is impossible to have this coincide exactly, but
7 predominantly so, that each side held its territory?
8 A. No. No, that would not be true, because particularly in Sarajevo,
9 particularly in the urban area, the populations were entirely mixed. And
10 in a way, the larger ethnic map only gives you a sense of who is in which
11 area, but of course the overwhelming bulk of the people actually lived in
12 the urban area of Sarajevo, and that area was almost randomly mixed. Not
13 entirely randomly; Stari Grad had a much larger Muslim population, some of
14 the Stup settlement had a larger Croat population, but in general the
15 urban population was mixed. And where -- where Serb forces took control
16 of that, parts of that territory during the war, they did remove or kill
17 or force to flee almost the entire non-Muslim population.
18 Q. All right. On this map, could you point out what the Serbs had
19 occupied, what territory they had occupied where they did not live? The
20 one on the overhead projector, what is it that they took control of and
21 where they didn't themselves live, the areas not populated by them?
22 A. Yes. I must say I don't like working from this map, because first
23 of all it doesn't show the city of Sarajevo, it only shows ethnic groups,
24 and it largely only has -- it has only numbers representing the
25 geographical locations. But --
1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Harland, let's deal with it this way: Since
2 you're a witness in a court --
3 THE WITNESS: Yes.
4 JUDGE MAY: -- and of course you must be accurate, if you feel
5 that you cannot do justice on that map, then you should say so. If you
6 can, of course, if you can answer, well, so much the better, but if you
7 feel that it really isn't possible properly to answer, then I think you
8 should revert to your other map. It's up to you how you feel about it.
9 JUDGE KWON: My understanding is that the names of the cities
10 appear on the -- over the page. Rear side.
11 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. That makes it particularly difficult to
12 deal with it when it's on an overhead projector. Why don't I just refer
13 to the large map.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Whatever you feel more comfortable with. If you
15 can mention particular areas by name, then it might be easier,
16 particularly any areas which the Serbs took over where they weren't a
17 majority or something of that sort before, the areas you were referring
19 THE WITNESS: Sure.
20 The built-up areas of Ilidza, of Novo Sarajevo, Grbavica
21 settlement, of Vogosca, and just off the map, Ilijas, would have been
22 areas where the population would have been mixed prior to the war, that is
23 that no one population of the three ethnic groups, main ethnic groups of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, would have had more than a third of the population, or
25 would have had more than half of the population, anyway. And in those
1 areas which were taken over by the Serbs which did not previously have a
2 Serb majority, the -- the Serbs would have removed or caused to flee the
3 non-Serb population.
4 So I would mention Ilidza, Novo Sarajevo, Vogosca, and Ilijas in
5 that category.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Very well. Now, if we were to place this map over Sarajevo and
8 the distribution of force if it were in the right ratio, do you have an
9 idea of what percentage would not coincide with respect to the territory
10 that belonged to them, and would there be a percentage that would be
11 different regardless of movements up and down?
12 A. Yes. In geographical size, I couldn't tell you very exactly, but
13 approximately -- approximately 100.000 non-Serbs, Muslims, Croats. Mainly
14 Muslim but also Croats and people of mixed marriage found -- Sarajevans,
15 found themselves in territories that by May of 1992 were controlled by
16 Serb forces, and those people, some were killed but a larger number either
17 fled to the Muslim-controlled part of Sarajevo or, in some cases, were
18 able to flee the country altogether.
19 So I would say the area of overlap, as you call it, would be an
20 area affecting about 100.000 people of the total Sarajevo population of
21 400.000 or 500.000 people.
22 So there was some overlap, yes. You are correct when you say
23 there was some overlap between the Serb-held areas and the areas
24 previously inhabited by Serbs. And similarly between Muslim-held
25 territory and the territories previously inhabited by Muslims. But
1 territory on which lived about a hundred thousand people would not be in
2 that general statement.
3 Q. And what about the 150 Serbs from Sarajevo? 150.000 Serbs, I'm
4 sorry? What about the 150.000 Serbs from Sarajevo? What happened to
6 A. First, as you point out, many of them -- the great -- a majority
7 of them were in territory which was immediately taken by Serb forces. So
8 they were, as it were, within their -- the territory controlled by armed
9 forces friendly to them.
10 For the -- for the remaining Serb population, by the time I
11 arrived in Sarajevo, which was in late May of 1993, we estimated that
12 approximately 40.000 Serbs remained within the confrontation line, that is
13 within the area controlled by the Muslim forces. Many of those people
14 reported that their relatives had either fled at the beginning of the
15 fighting or -- and many of those who remained did wish to leave the city
16 but were not able to.
17 Q. But they weren't able to. They weren't allowed to leave town; is
18 that right?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. So the Serbs did allow the Muslims to leave part of town which
21 they held under their control, whereas the Muslims did not allow this to
22 take place with respect to these 40.000 Serbs. They didn't allow them to
23 leave the part of town they were in. Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?
24 A. I think the first part of your statement I wouldn't characterise
25 like that, when you say the Serbs did allow the Muslims to leave. In
1 fact, in most cases, they initially forced them to leave. But the second
2 half of your statement I would have to acknowledge is correct, that many
3 of the Serbs who were caught in the fighting and caught on the Muslim side
4 of the confrontation line wished to leave and were not allowed to do so by
5 the Muslim authorities.
6 Q. As you were an international official, I assume you know that it
7 is the -- that the authorities must -- it is their duty to allow the
8 population to leave a territory where a conflict is being conducted, and
9 that that is a serious violation of the law if they keep the population
10 back, the civilian population back in areas where conflicts are going on,
11 this is a serious violation of the law, isn't it?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. From the positions you held, the United Nations in Sarajevo, did
14 you take any steps to enable the population to take refuge and leave the
15 area of conflict, to allow them to leave the area, those of them who
16 wished to leave, and to go to where they wished to go?
17 A. Yes. And I should say that from our perspective, it was not that
18 we wanted freedom of movement for Serbs or for Muslims, but just we wanted
19 -- we believed that freedom of movement for the civilian population at
20 large was something which we should advocate for.
21 And when I say that many of the Serbs, because we were talking
22 about Serbs, in Sarajevo wished to leave, the Serb civilian population
23 living in the Muslim-controlled area, I should also say that many of the
24 Muslims and Croats and people of mixed nationality also wished to leave
25 but were unable to. That doesn't change the general correctness of your
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 statement, but it's worth clarifying.
2 Now, we did take a number of measures. First, we -- we sought to
3 tell all sides about their obligations under international law towards the
4 civilian population, and we also sought to negotiate what we called Blue
5 Routes, that is routes from Sarajevo to the outside world where both
6 parties, both the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
7 Muslims, and the Serbs would agree to allow certain numbers of civilians,
8 usually, unfortunately, on a basis of a sort of ethnic equation they would
9 make up between them, to allow them to leave the -- leave the city. And
10 these so-called Blue Routes were open at various times.
11 We also made provision so that people who were what we called
12 humanitarian cases, people who were either very sick or who had been
13 wounded, could in some cases be evacuated by us from the airport which we
15 Q. Tell me, please, Mr. Harland, do you know why the conflict broke
16 out between Muslims and Croats at the beginning of your term in Bosnia and
18 A. I certainly heard the views at great length of the leaders of both
19 the Muslim and the Croat communities, because that -- that conflict was
20 just beginning on my arrival and was very much on the minds of both our
21 Muslim interlocutors and our Croat interlocutors, yes.
22 Q. You were there virtually throughout the time of the conflict
23 between Muslims and Croats. It started when you arrived, and it went on
24 for quite some time.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Do you know that it was precisely during those conflicts that the
2 Serbs made it possible to save many thousand Croats where they were
3 threatened with destruction by the Muslim forces?
4 A. That -- that was not true in my experience, except in some limited
5 cases. It is true that we saw that the Serbs provided weapons to the
6 Croat enclave of Kiseljak. The Serbs had a small access to the Croat
7 enclave of Kiseljak I think at a village called Kobiljaca. And they
8 provided weapons, including tanks, we were able to observe moving there.
9 Also, after the Muslim forces took, captured the Croat enclave of
10 Vares, it is true that the Serbs provided access through their territory
11 to Croats fleeing by bus from that area.
12 So, yes, I was aware of some assistance provided by the -- by the
13 Serbs to the Croats during that period.
14 Q. For example, you mentioned only Vares. Let me not mention the
15 others, but you could mention them. How many thousand Croats did the
16 Serbs evacuate so that they wouldn't be the victims of the Mujahedin in
17 those days? They made it possible for them to leave across their
18 territories, to go where they wanted, to avoid certain destruction and
19 extermination in those enclaves of theirs.
20 Well, let's look at Vares alone. How many thousand Croats?
21 A. I no longer recall the exact number of Croats evacuated from
22 Vares. I -- to Kiseljak. I would believe it was probably in the region
23 of 5.000.
24 I should -- I should add, though, that the people -- the people
25 who stayed -- and we had a lot of opportunity to observe this. The Croats
1 who stayed in territory controlled by the -- by the Muslims, their
2 treatment varied a lot. There were some, as in Tuzla, for example, who
3 did not seem to experience negative treatment. When you said, you know,
4 were they victims -- you know, that they were victims of the Muslims,
5 that's -- there certainly were areas where Croats were expelled from their
6 homes and their homes were burnt and some Croats were killed, and I myself
7 saw some of that in -- after the fall of Kakanj with the activities of the
8 7th Muslim Brigade, but in most places that I visited where there were
9 Croat communities living on Muslim-held territory, they were -- they were
10 probably the object of discrimination, but they were not, in my
11 experience, in physical danger except in a few cases.
12 So it's actually not good to make a direct comparison between
13 their condition, for example, and the condition of non-Serbs in Serb
14 territory. In most of the places I visited in Serb-held territory, those
15 who remained, the non-Serbs who remained, would have been in serious
16 physical danger except in a few places, perhaps Banja Luka and Bijeljina.
17 Q. Very well, Mr. Harland. So as not to waste any time, you're
18 saying that only in a few places where Serbs were in control, the
19 non-Serbs lived normally. Only in a few places, is that what you're
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And also, you're claiming that during the Muslim-Croat conflicts,
23 the Croats lived normally in places held by the Muslims?
24 A. It was a mixed picture, but in some places they were able to
25 continue with normal life and to some extent, like in Sarajevo and in
1 Tuzla, as normal as the conditions of the war allowed. But in some
2 places, particularly the smaller communities of Central Bosnia, there was
3 ethnic cleansing by the Mujahedin or the 7th Muslim Brigade. I was able
4 to see that.
5 Q. And according to the information available to you, how many Croats
6 were killed in Central Bosnia and how many were ethnically cleansed by the
7 Muslims from areas in which they had lived?
8 A. The numbers killed we believed to be relatively low compared to
9 the casualties of the other communities in the war. Perhaps a couple of
11 The numbers ethnically cleansed or fleeing in front of Muslim
12 advances was -- was much higher, certainly in the tens of thousands.
13 Q. Very well. Let's not waste time about the figures. There are
14 figures available about this, and there will be occasion to ascertain
16 When making your statement, as I can see, you spoke to the
17 investigators, Todd Cleaver and Stephen Upton, and as far as I can see
18 from paragraph 15 of your statement -- let me just find it for a moment.
19 Actually, that is the first paragraph of your chronology, the beginning of
20 your chronology.
21 So tell me, please, within the framework of that chronology, are
22 you providing your comments to documents presented to you by these
23 gentlemen that you were interviewed by?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Very well. So these are your comments on documents presented to
1 you by them.
2 Is it true that this chronology is not exhaustive and that it
3 doesn't cover all events?
4 A. Certainly.
5 Q. And, Mr. Harland, is it true that particularly lacking are reports
6 on incidents provoked by the Muslim side, that is Muslim violations of
7 cease-fires agreed on the Sarajevo battlefront, as well as reports on
8 crimes committed by the Muslim side against the Serb civilians and the
9 army of Republika Srpska? Am I right in saying that?
10 A. No. That is not correct. On the contrary, in fact. We had -- we
11 suffered, as perhaps all onlookers suffer, from only being able to report
12 what you saw, and we were overwhelmingly able to see what happened on
13 Muslim-controlled territory. So in fact, when -- when there was a
14 violation of the cease-fire by the Muslims, we were much more likely to
15 see it than when there was a violation of the cease-fire by the Serbs.
16 And similarly, when there was a human rights abuse by the Muslims,
17 we would often see it very directly. We all lived in Sarajevo, which is a
18 rather small geographical area. There were many thousands of us on
19 Muslim-controlled territory. There were very, very few of us on
20 Serb-controlled territory. So in general, we were only able to record the
21 abuses on Serb-held territory when we encountered people who were
22 ethnically cleansed from Serb-held territory who were arriving in the
23 Muslim-controlled areas where we were stationed.
24 In fact, it was a particular source of grievance with the Muslim
25 authorities, that they felt that we were constantly holding them to a
1 higher standard in terms of abuses of human rights and cease-fire
2 violations than that to which we were holding the Serbs. In fact, I think
3 we were not prejudiced against the Muslims, but it probably is true that
4 we saw more of their wrongdoing, of their misdeeds, both in terms of
5 cease-fires and in terms of human rights than we saw of the Serbs. So our
6 reporting measured against an objective recording of the events somewhat
7 later would probably show more attention focused on Muslim cease-fire
8 violations and other actions than would be statistically merited.
9 And we did undertake a little study of this -- of this nature
10 which broadly confirmed it.
11 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to interrupt now. It's time
12 -- past the time for the break.
13 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.
14 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Harland, could you please continue giving me as concise
18 answers as possible, because I don't have too much time.
19 From what you're saying, it follows that in view of the fact that
20 you were in the centre of town held by the Muslim forces that you were
21 able to note every cease-fire violation by the Muslim side. Does that
22 mean that you did actually report on each of those violations?
23 A. My particular role was political reporting, but yes, UNPROFOR
24 certainly had a deployment of UNMOs, military observers, whose principal
25 job was to count the shells and to note what type they were and where they
1 were coming from and going to, and, yes, that was part of UNPROFOR's daily
3 Q. Very well. In paragraph 16, you mention the weekly political
4 assessment for Bosnia-Herzegovina number 24, dated the 16th of July,
5 referring to a meeting of the newly-appointed commander, General
6 Briquemont, Viktor Andreev, and yourself with Radovan Karadzic; is that
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And in the report you mention that, "Karadzic noted that even
10 though Republika Srpska had supported exchanges of population, the Serbs
11 recognise the right of people of different ethnic origin to remain or
12 return to their homes if they so wish." Was that his position, the one
13 that he advocated?
14 A. That's what he said.
15 Q. You also say that you raised the issue of ethnic cleansing,
16 particularly in Bijeljina, and that Radovan Karadzic would seek
17 justification for ethnic cleansing. Is that your comment? He would seek
18 to justify it.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Since you talk about Bijeljina, are you familiar with Radovan
21 Karadzic's order dated the 1st of January, 1994, relating precisely to
22 Bijeljina? And since I have it here in the Serbian language, signed and
23 with a stamp, the 1st January 1994 number 01-0894, and it says, "To the
24 Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska and President of the Supreme
25 Military Court. According to information about the work of the military
1 prosecutor's office in Bijeljina --" I am mentioning this order because it
2 refers to Bijeljina that you referred to -- "indicates many missions being
3 made, particularly the release of persons who are suspected of serious
4 crimes. Such an attitude has worsened the security and political
5 situation in Brcko and Bijeljina. The situation requires that the
6 military prosecutor office's work be examined and any errors and omissions
7 be established made by the prosecutor. It is your duty to act according
8 to this order and to report me about your findings."
9 This was written by Dr. Radovan Karadzic and signed by him.
10 Are you familiar with this document?
11 A. No.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into
13 evidence, please, Mr. May.
14 JUDGE MAY: Let us see the document.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From what I have read out, and I
16 read it accurately, I hope that is not at issue, it should be beyond doubt
17 that Radovan Karadzic advocated the more efficient work of the military
18 prosecutor's office in Bijeljina.
19 JUDGE MAY: We'll mark this for identification next Defence
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE MAY: The document will get the next number. The map, which
23 I see the registrar still has, can be returned to the accused.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the document is Defence Exhibit 212,
25 marked for identification.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. So he's advocating that persons who have committed criminal
3 offences should not be released from detention, and he says that this
4 worsens the general security situation in Bijeljina. And he's instructing
5 urgent intervention and inspection of the work of the military
6 prosecutor's office specifically in Bijeljina.
7 Do you know what the status of Muslims was in the area of
8 Bijeljina at the time when you were there?
9 A. During the -- during the war, there were some Muslim communities,
10 some Muslims in the town of Bijeljina and some small Muslim communities
11 around Bijeljina which had remained there until -- at least until 1995.
12 Q. Very well. So they remained there under normal living conditions.
13 They were treated in a non-discriminatory fashion. Is that -- does that
14 correspond to your knowledge?
15 A. No. They -- first of all, there were -- there was a constant
16 stream of people from Bijeljina and the Bijeljina area who were being
17 ethnically cleansed. There were some communities -- I remember in
18 particular representatives of one village came to us and said that they
19 were obliged to pay large amounts of money, or at least large by their
20 standards, as a sort of protection racket. If they paid off the local
21 authorities, military and civilian, then they could expect some degree of
22 protection. So there was a residual Muslim minority there, which made it
23 different from other places, you know, such as Visegrad or Rogatica, other
24 places in Eastern Bosnia.
25 But it would be wrong to describe their lives as normal.
1 I should also -- I know you want me to be brief and that's right,
2 but we had a particular problem with Dr. Karadzic's utterances, both in
3 writing and spoken, that there was, in general, a very large variance
4 between what he would say to us and even what he would write and say that
5 he had issued as orders and what actually happened. He would constantly,
6 when we complained about, for example, a cease-fire violation, say, "It's
7 okay. I have given written orders." And he would sometimes even show us
8 the written orders. And then we would see one of the military commanders
9 affected by those orders, and they would say, "Oh, no, we didn't really
10 get them," or, "They certainly weren't carried out and it wasn't
11 Karadzic's real intention that they were carried out." So I would view
12 with some caution his written order, and I wouldn't take it as evidence
13 that whatever he suggested in that letter actually happened.
14 I don't know this particular case and I don't know what the
15 military court was doing, but I would be careful.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Harland, if you could tell us who specifically he
17 was who said that -- who didn't get the order from Karadzic or they didn't
18 carry out what was ordered by Karadzic.
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. First of all, I should say that there are a
20 lot of such cases, but one which stays in my mind is during the siege of
21 Gorazde in the spring of 1994 - I suppose it's April 1994 - when we were
22 with Dr. Karadzic in Pale while Serb forces in the field were operating a
23 few dozen kilometres to the east of us. And Dr. Karadzic assured us that
24 he had ordered a halt to the advance of Serb forces and that he had
25 ordered a cease-fire. And when it was reported to General Rose, I
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 remember, at one of these meetings in Pale by his people on the ground
2 that the Serbs were in fact continuing to fire, Dr. Karadzic went and said
3 he was sending -- he repeated the order, and he was sending also a written
5 Then later, at the next meeting, we saw General Mladic, and we had
6 already seen him on television in Gorazde, and when we asked him about
7 that, even in the presence of Dr. Karadzic, he laughed about it and said
8 that he was -- he had not received orders that he should not continue to
9 prosecute his attack and that he should do so. And then Dr. Karadzic
10 didn't even say that he hadn't lied, he just came up with a different
11 story. He said, "Well, actually, Lord Owen promised us up to the river in
12 Gorazde." Another fact which he just made up. "And so all we're doing is
13 taking that part of Gorazde which is rightfully ours."
14 And it was so appalling all this business with Karadzic making up
15 facts as convenient, that I was with -- at this time with Vitaly Churkin,
16 who was a representative of the Russian Federation, and he came outside
17 and said, "I give up. I can't negotiate with him any more. I've never
18 heard more lies than I have heard here in the last 48 hours."
19 I could give many such examples.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. In paragraph 18, you refer to a meeting held on the 5th of August
23 at Pale with Briquemont, Hayes and Andreev, and that meeting was held at
24 Karadzic's initiative. Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. As this doesn't correspond to your statement that he keeps doing
2 something other than he says, is it true that Karadzic made proposals for
3 the withdrawal of forces of the army of Republika Srpska from Mount Igman
4 and establishing secure routes in and out of Sarajevo and cooperation for
5 the restoration of public utilities? Isn't that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Did that indeed happen? Is it true that the army of Republika
8 Srpska withdrew from Igman, et cetera, in accordance with this agreement?
9 Isn't that right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. He wasn't forced to withdraw, but he did withdraw in agreement
12 with you, that is your commanders, and this area was taken over by the
13 UNPROFOR forces. Isn't that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Is it true that on the 14th of August, 1993, upon Karadzic's
16 initiative that I now mentioned, a safe area was established in the
17 territory of Igman and Bjelasnica?
18 A. It was a demilitarised zone, not a safe area, yes. I don't
19 believe it was the initiative of Karadzic.
20 Q. Yes, yes. Demilitarised. It was his initiative, a demilitarised
21 zone. Was a component part of that agreement that the Serbs withdraw from
22 13 checkpoints which were to have been taken over by UNPROFOR and that the
23 Muslim forces could not take over that area? Wasn't that the agreement?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. However, is it true that the Muslims only a month later, without
1 being prevented by UNPROFOR at all, did capture those points though they
2 had been ceded to UNPROFOR? And on that occasion, that is during this
3 offensive and the takeover of points, they killed 37 and wounded 34
4 soldiers of the army of Republika Srpska? Surely you're aware of that.
5 A. I don't know the exact numbers, but it is true that Muslim forces
6 were consistently and over a long period of time and on a substantial
7 scale in violation of the Mount Igman agreement.
8 Q. And in this chronology which you have produced, is there any
9 reference to this event and the cheating by the Muslim side and the
10 passiveness of the UNPROFOR command which did not react to that at all?
11 A. First of all, yes, there are references, principally in the
12 section on 1994, as you will see.
13 I must also object to the idea that UNPROFOR was passive. In
14 fact, you have -- you've illuminated an important point, which is that in
15 general, the Muslims did not want the status quo. They did not want a
16 cease-fire with the lines that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the
17 time. They opposed a general cease-fire, and when they made a cease-fire,
18 they did often break that cease-fire. And the commander of UNPROFOR
19 forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, General Rose, did argue very
20 vigorously with the Bosnian Muslim leadership, particularly with Dr.
21 Ganic, who he felt was the principal advocate of this policy of violating
22 cease-fire agreements, and he -- he even sought to threaten them with the
23 use of air attacks by NATO forces on occasions if they would not comply.
24 No such airstrikes ever took place and would not have been agreed to by
25 NATO, it was felt, but UNPROFOR was certainly trying to stabilise the
1 situation, and General Rose was very aware of and very concerned by
2 violations from the Muslim side, particularly with respect to this
3 agreement which we're discussing now.
4 Q. And did the UNPROFOR command indirectly enable the Muslims to take
5 control of these points which the Serbs had voluntarily abandoned in the
6 interest of bringing the Muslims back to the negotiating table, that is,
7 in the interest of shifting the events from war to peace negotiations?
8 A. No. UNPROFOR certainly didn't enable them to it -- to do it, and
9 in fact, the Muslim forces made considerable efforts to try and avoid
10 detection by us. I recall sitting with the commander of the French
11 battalion which was responsible for that area and going over with him the
12 night vision photographs taken by intelligence officers, showing some
13 degree of infiltration into the zone by -- by Muslim fighters who were
14 trying to -- trying to avoid detection by us.
15 Q. So you are refuting the statement that you enabled them to do
16 that. But the second part of my question had to do with the reasons for
17 which the Serbs left Igman or ceded Igman. Will you confirm that at
18 least? The aim was to bring the Muslims back to the negotiating table,
19 that they should switch from the tracks of war to the tracks of peace
20 negotiations. Is that part correct at least?
21 A. That is correct, yes.
22 Q. That is the point. In paragraph 22 you referred to the 15th of
23 October and a meeting between Andreev, Briquemont, De Mello, with Karadzic
24 and Krajisnik at Pale. Is it true that at that meeting Karadzic said that
25 he had issued orders to shop the shelling and sniping, but at the same
1 time, he said that artillery and sniper fire from the Muslim side was a
2 major problem? Isn't that right?
3 A. Yes, he said that.
4 Q. Tell me, please, do you have any knowledge that Karadzic did
5 indeed order units of the army of Republika Srpska to stop shelling or
6 sniping or at least to use it only proportionately?
7 A. I see here in paragraph 22 that General Briquemont said that he
8 had seen no evidence of Muslim preparations for an attack on the Serb
9 areas but that the Serb shelling of civilian areas was increasing. And in
10 general, I would say that one of the complications of UNPROFOR's work was
11 that the -- the Muslim authorities did have -- see themselves as having an
12 interest in breaking the cease-fires, if necessary, in order not to allow
13 the confrontation lines to stabilise when they, who were about half of the
14 population of Bosnia, were then only living on 18 per cent of the
16 So they -- that created a problem for us. And a sort of opposite
17 problem for us was that the Serbs had an interest in keeping as much
18 military pressure on the Muslims as possible without actually attracting
19 any negative attention.
20 So in a way, both sides were deceiving us though for rather
21 different reasons.
22 Q. Very well. But if the Serbs favoured a cease-fire, the
23 cease-fire, and I think you'll agree, Mr. Harland, isn't a political
24 solution. A cease-fire enables the sides to seek a settlement through
25 negotiation and not through loss of life. I assume that is what you
1 advocated for, to have the peace fire -- cease-fire observed.
2 A. It is. And the problem we had with the Presidency of Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina was that they felt that if there was a general cease-fire in
4 which the population under their control, about half of the total
5 population of 4 million of the country, if that -- if they were left on 18
6 per cent of the territory of the country and the cease-fire stabilised but
7 there was no successful outcome to the talks, then they would be left in a
8 very difficult position. So we felt that they were publicly saying that
9 they wanted a cease-fire because it's a hard thing to say you don't want,
10 but in fact were often working to undermine those cease-fires.
11 On the other side, the Serbs genuinely did want the situation to
12 stabilise because they had so much territory, but they also wanted to make
13 life as miserable as possible, through shelling and sniping, of the Serb
14 positions -- of Muslim positions, and Dr. Karadzic even told us that
15 directly, that the sniping and the cutting off of the water serves a
17 So UNPROFOR was in a particularly difficult position between those
18 two parties.
19 Q. Well, when I ask you whether you know if Karadzic ordered the
20 units of the army of Republika Srpska to reduce or stop their operations,
21 I have in mind a document to the Main Staff of the army of Republika
22 Srpska, the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the commanders of
23 the brigades. That's who it is addressed to, of the Sarajevo-Romanija
24 Corps, which means from the Main Staff down to the corps command and the
25 brigade commands. The date is the 7th of February, 1994, where it states:
1 "There is proof and evidence that on Muslim artillery provocations, the
2 Serb side is responding inadequately, sometimes even 20 to 30 and even 70
3 times more. The international community does not criticise us for
4 responding, but that too much force is being used, and the Muslims are
5 provoking us to use our ammunition without effect. The Muslim side is
6 very skillful in ascribing its artillery shelling in town to us, which
7 causes great damage to us and threatens us the loss of our state."
8 And then it says: "I order strict control in responding to
9 provocations and to respond only when we are under threat ourselves and
10 when there is full military justification for doing so. Respond by
11 targeting only military facilities and respond exclusively pursuant to the
12 commander's orders, and respond in the ratio of one to one with the
13 strength of the provocation used." And then it says in figures, "1-1."
14 "Second, exclude any shelling out of control. Control conduct
15 and sanction misdemeanors urgently and on the basis of the law. For corps
16 artilleries, the corps commander shall be responsible to me directly, and
17 the brigade commander for the brigades. Please inform me immediately of
18 any incidents. The Supreme Commander, Dr. Radovan Karadzic." And the
19 signature is his, the stamp says Republika Srpska, the header is Republika
20 Srpska, the president of the Republic in Sarajevo, and so on.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]
22 So, Mr. May, I'd like to tender this into evidence.
23 JUDGE MAY: Before you do, the witness can answer or give a
24 comment about it.
25 Have you ever heard of this document, Mr. Harland?
1 THE WITNESS: No, I haven't heard of this document, but -- and I
2 should say Mr. Milosevic has jumped forward a few months in time. We're
3 now at the beginning of 1994, after the Markale shelling. And I should
4 say that the document is almost certainly a true copy, because at that
5 time, the Serbs were very concerned that as a result of the marketplace
6 massacre, NATO might intervene against them, and they did call us to say
7 that they had passed orders of this type. So I think it is almost
8 certainly correct.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if it could be handed in. Marked for
11 THE REGISTRAR: D213, MFI, Your Honour.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Just a comment on this. It is precisely Karadzic which is
14 indicating this response which isn't in kind and to the same ratio, and he
15 draws the attention of the parties that it should be on a one-to-one ratio
16 and that he is seeking strict control in responding to the provocations,
17 strict supervision of that response. Isn't that right?
18 Now, Mr. Harland, does this coincide and compare with what
19 Karadzic said at the 15th of October meeting, 1993? May we hear your
20 comments on that, please.
21 A. The commitments that the Serbs gave us to a cease-fire in October
22 of 1993 were not observed. They continued their military activity. And
23 we kept a daily record, as I said before, of the shooting which largely
24 confirmed this. They may have passed the order, but the order was not
25 significantly obeyed if it was passed at all.
1 The situation which you have just referred to, however, was very
2 different. By February of 1994, the Serbs did seem genuinely to want a
3 stabilisation of the situation around Sarajevo, and they did stop
4 shooting. And in fact, they did so -- they reduced the amount of fire
5 coming from their side of the confrontation line from February of 1994
6 right through till the autumn of 1994 to a very low level.
7 Q. Practically from the beginning of 1994, in fact, until the end of
8 the autumn of 1994; isn't that right?
9 A. Yes, beginning almost immediately after the so-called Markale
11 Q. We'll come to the Markale incident. But in paragraph 26, you say
12 that in your weekly political assessment of the 3rd of November of 1993,
13 mention that in the forward command post, forward headquarters, there were
14 two Muslim snipers who were active and who even shot at UN staff members
15 and the passersby, and that the 1st Corps, the one holding Sarajevo,
16 claimed that it was individuals that had -- belonging to a man called
17 Caco, this gang of individuals under the command of Caco; is that right?
18 A. Yes, that's what they said.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I assist you?
20 It is tab 4.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Just to compare facts, Mr. Harland, this man Caco, was that a
23 nickname for Musan Topalovic who had under his control the left bank of
24 the Miljacka river on the territory of Stari Grad municipality in
25 Sarajevo? Was that who he was?
1 A. Yes, though he was dead by the time of this claim, of course.
2 Q. And do you know that this man Caco, for which the ABiH 1st Command
3 claimed was a renegade, that he was a commander of a Mountain Brigade of
4 the BH army and so at no event could he have been a renegade, in actual
5 fact? Is that correct, Mr. Harland?
6 A. I believe what it -- what it says is that is that the snipers who
7 were acting at this time were -- they reported to us that these were
8 renegade supports of Caco. In other words, the period which is being
9 reported here is the period immediately or some weeks after the death of
10 Caco. Caco was killed by Muslim forces in Sarajevo. And when we were
11 complaining about the activity of Muslim snipers in Sarajevo who appeared
12 to be firing at targets within Sarajevo itself, other Muslims, they -- BH
13 1st Corps, they recognised that these incidents had happened, but they
14 said that this was not part of their policy, this was the act of these
15 so-called renegade supporters of Caco.
16 Q. Yes, supporters of Caco, who was commander of the Mountain Brigade
17 the BH army. So he couldn't have about a renegade at all.
18 And now, do you know that these formations perpetrated mass
19 killings of Serbs in Bisipoto [phoen], Popodija and Kazani on the slopes
20 of Mount Trbevic in Sarajevo? Do you have an awareness of that?
21 A. Yes, and we made some efforts to establish the events surrounding
22 those -- those events.
23 Q. Well, did you establish it?
24 A. Yes. There certainly had been Serbs from Sarajevo killed and
25 their bodies put in the pits of -- of Kazani above Bistrik barracks, and
1 that the people who did it were certainly associated with -- with Caco.
2 Q. And do you know that in a television programme --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English?
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. -- Alija Izetbegovic referred to Caco as his son? He called him
6 "My son."
7 A. I don't recall that.
8 Q. Well, wasn't it Karadzic at a meeting of the 15th of October who
9 indicated the danger from Muslim sniper fire?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And is it true that General Rose, at a meeting with Ganic, for the
12 umpteenth time indicated the mortar fire that was coming from the Muslim
13 side from a mortar installed on trucks, mortars on trucks, and sniper fire
14 opened by the Muslims at their own people? Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?
15 A. Yes, General Rose did make that protest, and it was our concern
16 that certainly some elements and probably including the leadership of the
17 Bosnian Muslims did not wish to stabilise the situation around Sarajevo,
18 and that was very frustrating for General Rose.
19 Can I just add, though, that concerning the killings of the people
20 at Kazani and Caco's actions, Caco was the commander of -- of a brigade
21 and was very ruthless in the way he dealt with Muslims. He was certainly
22 also a murderer in the way he dealt with Serbs. My sense, however -- I
23 met him, and I met the authorities who dealt with him. My sense was that
24 whatever President Izetbegovic may have said, the Muslim leadership
25 generally considered him dangerous, and ultimately they did kill him on, I
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 think, towards the end of October 1993. So I would not make a line of
2 questioning that suggests that there was a general policy to kill Serbs in
3 Sarajevo. And although the numbers, perhaps several dozen, were shocking,
4 it was really in no way comparable to the crimes that were being committed
5 by the Serbs. And I don't know if it was the intention to make an
6 equation, but that would be a wrong conclusion to draw.
7 Q. So it wasn't the general option. How come so many Serbs were
8 killed in Sarajevo then?
9 A. I think that most Serbs who -- most of the Serbs who were killed
10 within the confrontation lines of Sarajevo were killed by Serb fire coming
11 from outside the confrontation line, either by snipers or by shelling.
12 We kept a rough tally of the number of people killed in Sarajevo
13 by visits to the morgue, by taking reports from family and by our own
14 observations, and our impressions were that although the crimes of Caco
15 were very horrible, they were relatively limited in scope and that most of
16 the Serb casualties in Sarajevo were not caused by actions from the --
17 from the Muslim authorities.
18 Q. All right, Mr. Harland. The killing of Serbs in Sarajevo, do you
19 exclusively link that up to this group of men around Caco or do you allow
20 for the possibility that that was done by many more groups, units, members
21 of the army, the so-called army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, et cetera?
22 A. It was not exclusively done by Caco, though I would -- from the
23 figures that came to us, I would guess that perhaps most of the Serbs
24 killed in Sarajevo by Muslim groups were killed by groups associated with
25 Caco. But there were certainly -- you're correct. There were certainly
1 other Serb victims too, though I hope during this whole line of
2 questioning we are again clear that there is no equation in numbers or
3 even in order of magnitude between what was happening in Sarajevo and what
4 was happening in Serb-controlled territory around it.
5 Q. I don't know why it can't be compared. Perhaps there were a
6 thousand of you there in Sarajevo. But we don't have time for that.
7 Anyway, in your weekly political assessment of the 9th of
8 February, in paragraph 26, you speak about the tragedy that took place at
9 the Markale marketplace, the 5th of February, 1994; is that right? That
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Well, through force of circumstance that your testimony was
13 interrupted, in fact, and in my material, the documents that I received,
14 along with Lord Owen's testimony, who completed his testimony here
15 yesterday, in those CD-ROM materials there is part of a BBC programme
16 which was attached to Lord Owen's book, and the title is "Jankovi the 30th
17 of October, 1995, BBC Panorama, Peace Without Honour, The Propaganda War,"
18 and it quoted a UN document. So I'm asking you here and now whether you
19 remember that. It was quoted in the document that I was disclosed: "Most
20 immediate code restricted 8th of February, 1994 [In
21 English] From UN Command Sarajevo to UN New York. Judging from the
22 trajectory, experts thought -- experts thought that range is more likely
23 -- that the range is more likely to be under 2.000 metres than 2 to
24 4.000 metres, putting it in Muslim territory rather than Serb."
25 [Interpretation] Tell me now, please, in view of the position you
1 held and this report which I assume you know about, would it be true that
2 there was a lot of information pointing to the fact that that was fired
3 from the Muslim side, in fact?
4 A. Yes, I am familiar with that document, but I am not familiar with
5 the BBC broadcast you refer to.
6 With respect to the first Markale massacre, and I should say that
7 there is controversy surrounding who fired the shell in both the first
8 Markale massacre and the second Markale massacre, but in respect of the
9 first one, which we are discussing now, the UNPROFOR conclusion was that
10 it could not be determined beyond reasonable doubt who had fired the first
11 -- the shell for the first Markale massacre.
12 The report that you have just quoted was a very preliminary report
13 which is, in the normal course of events, followed up by a full ballistic
15 Now, the more comprehensive report, which followed a couple of
16 days after the one which you have in your hand, concluded in fact that the
17 range from which the mortar was fired, the possible ranges from which the
18 mortar is fired crossed the confrontation line to the north-east of the
19 Markale marketplace. In other words, it was fired from close to the
20 confrontation line, but it was not possible for us to determine whether it
21 was fired from the Muslim side or the Serb side.
22 And in fact, there is -- there is a factual error in the
23 calculations made for the first report which was noted in the fuller
24 report that followed a few days later.
25 Q. So the finale of it was, the conclusion was that nothing can be
1 said with absolute certainty. The first indications showed that it was
2 from the Muslim side, and then the finale of it was that one couldn't make
3 an absolutely correct assertion. Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?
4 A. That is correct, and I should say that that was often the case.
5 For any given shell, it was very difficult for us to say where it came
6 from. Only some shells could it be confirmed with great accuracy where
7 they came from.
8 When we were able to determine, then in almost a hundred per cent
9 of cases we were able to determine that shells landing on the Muslim side
10 of the confrontation line came from the Serb side of the confrontation
11 line. We had mortar detecting radars, which the Serbs tried to destroy.
12 We had military observers who --
13 Q. Mr. Harland, I'm just asking you about this specific instance. So
14 you needn't tell me that there were shells fired from the Serb side. What
15 we're talking about is the Markale marketplace. The first report was that
16 it came from the Muslim side; the final conclusion that nothing definite
17 could be established; and third, that there was a general anti-Serb
18 hysteria that it was the Serbs who actually perpetrated this crime.
19 That's right, isn't it?
20 A. No, that's not right. I must say I have sometimes accused General
21 Rose of things, but I've never accused him of anti-Serb hysteria. On the
22 contrary. I think that --
23 Q. No, that's not what --
24 JUDGE MAY: Let him finish.
25 THE WITNESS: I think that there was -- there was, in a way, in
1 fact, in certain parts of UNPROFOR a certain sympathy with the Serb
2 military, because I think because the Serb military more closely
3 represented a military like that from which they came. So it was
4 certainly not my experience with UNPROFOR that the reporting of UNPROFOR
5 reflected any anti-Serb hysteria. On the contrary; my experience with
6 that reporting was that it went out of the way to give the benefit of the
7 doubt to the Serb side.
8 And in this case, it was determined by engineers who, as far as I
9 remember, had no obvious political views at all, that it could not be
10 determined who fired that shell, and that remains the UNPROFOR position,
11 though I feel it is also fair to put in the context that that was often
12 true, we could not confirm, and in almost a hundred per cent of the cases
13 where we could confirm where a shell came from, landing on the Muslim
14 side, it came from the Serb side.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Harland, you have made an inversion of theses. I never
17 intimated that General Rose launched an anti-Serb hysteria. I wasn't
18 watching, maybe the translation wasn't quite accurate. On the one hand
19 you had reports that it had come from the Muslim side and then the final
20 conclusion that it was not possible to determine where it had come from.
21 Whereas on the other hand there was a worldwide media propaganda along
22 anti-Serb lines that the crime had been committed by the Serbs. I'm not
23 saying that the source was General Rose. On the contrary; I think that he
24 was quite objective.
25 A. I lost translation. First it got very small and then I lost
1 translation. Okay. Let me try.
2 First of all, I -- I don't believe that the reporting from
3 UNPROFOR was anything other than objective. And from your own reporting,
4 from your own comment from the BBC, they are willing to present a
5 preliminary report which is really very favourable to the Serb view of
6 that event, but they do not, at least as you've described the show, appear
7 to discuss the conclusive report. So I don't think that this media
8 hysteria went as far as the BBC.
9 In fact, I remember quite by coincidence several years later
10 listening to a BBC correspondent, Nick Gowing, who is still a
11 correspondent, a presenter, talking about that incident and saying how it
12 was actually the Muslims who had done that. In fact, he was thereby
13 perpetrating as a fact something which really wasn't known by any of the
14 people who had investigated the incident on the ground.
15 We could -- we wished as much as everybody else that there was a
16 clear answer to the question, but the fact was there was no clear answer
17 to the question. It is still not able to be determined on the basis of
18 the ballistic evidence who fired that shell.
19 Q. Mr. Harland, well, that is the whole point. I'm not saying that
20 you were a source of information, and especially not General Rose. But
21 what I am saying are -- I'm referring to certain coincidences. On the one
22 hand, you were not a source of the information that the Serbs had fired
23 the shell, whereas there was an anti-Serb media hysteria that the crime
24 had been committed by the Serbs. And this programme, which is on a CD
25 together with Lord Owen's book, was broadcast on the 30th of October,
1 1995, so it's much later. And I read out to you from that programme a
2 document that you said you were familiar with and which says that the
3 range was within 2.000 metres and not between 2 and 4.000 metres, which
4 seems to point to the Muslim side.
5 But before that telegram of the 8th of February that I quoted
6 from, there's another telegram that is quoted dated the 6th of February,
7 and it is quoted in the same documents that were attached to Lord Owen's
8 testimony. It is also --
9 JUDGE MAY: I don't know if the witness can follow all this
10 detail. I really don't think we're going to get much further with this.
11 The witness has given you what sounds to be an objective account, that
12 nobody is certain, he says, as they understood it, where the shell came
14 Now, going over and over this again with a witness who can't
15 himself say, of course, where the shell came from seems to me -- just a
16 moment -- seems to me to be a waste of time, and we need to move on to
17 some other point.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am moving on to something else,
19 namely the witness said that he was familiar with this dispatch that I
20 quoted from, and now I am asking him about another dispatch that doesn't
21 relate to Markale but was sent on the same time -- at the same time from
22 Zagreb to New York, on the 6th of February, and it refers to a matter of
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And it says: "Care is particularly important -- [In English] Care
1 is particularly important given the fact that UNPROFOR is almost hundred
2 per cent sure that the Bosniaks on at least two occasions during the past
3 18 months have been the origin of shelling that caused casualties in
5 [Interpretation] Are you familiar with that report? You probably
6 remember it too.
7 A. I believe that was sent from Zagreb, but I am familiar with the
8 assertion and the evidence on which it's based, which came from Sarajevo.
9 Q. And are you familiar that the assertion regarding the massacre in
10 the bread line in Vase Miskina Street on the 27th of May, 1992, that that
11 too was provoked by the Muslims, and for propaganda purposes, and it was
12 successful, because three days later the Security Council adopted
13 Resolution 757 enforcing sanctions against Serbia. Are you aware of that,
14 Mr. Harland?
15 JUDGE MAY: Wait a minute. Let the witness answer these
16 questions. If it's 1992, it sounds as though it may have been before your
17 time, Mr. Harland.
18 THE WITNESS: It was before my time. I'm familiar with the place
19 and with the incident and with the claim by both sides that the other side
20 fired it. But Mr. Milosevic has raised the -- the question of who fired
21 which shell, so if I can just add, to clarify, that about a half a million
22 shells were fired at Sarajevo during the course of the war. Sometimes we
23 were able to determine very exactly where they came from and sometimes we
24 weren't. In nearly a hundred per cent of the cases, that is with the
25 exception of two or three, when we could confirm, we confirmed that they
1 came from the Serb side. And I think that all of our discussion is
2 basically going around that point. Are there some particular shells which
3 are in the grey zone? Yes. Is this one of them? Yes.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Harland, Mr. Harland, Mr. Harland, regarding this bread line
6 about which there is evidence that the shot was fired by the Muslims, and
7 relating to Markale for which there is evidence that the Muslim side fired
8 it, this provoked the worst possible consequences for the Serb side. So
9 it is very difficult --
10 JUDGE MAY: We've been over this point. It's pointless going on.
11 Let's move on to something else. The time is limited. Your time is
12 limited, and the Court's time is limited, and to go over the same argument
13 trying to make the same points and trying to argue the witness into some
14 position or other is a waste of time. Let's move on to something else.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Harland, do you know that, for example, the London Independent
18 in August, the 22nd of August, a Saturday, published an article entitled
19 "Muslims Slaughter Their Own People"? Are you familiar with that
21 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter what the London Independent said.
22 It's not a matter for the witness.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But mention is made here of various
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, there may be, and you can give evidence about it
1 and you can try and put it before the Court, if you want, that the Muslims
2 were killing their own people. You can make your case. But it's
3 pointless going on asking the witness about matters which he's dealt with
4 in evidence as best he can. He's given you the best answer which he can.
5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I hesitate to interrupt, but of course on
6 these particular issues, the Court will have evidence before it different
7 from the material before the witness and to the extent necessary and
8 possible will be invited to make its conclusions in due course, and that
9 does make this exercise by the accused really unfortunately wasteful.
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Harland, you were going to say something?
12 THE WITNESS: I was going to say, I mean, I can't talk about the
13 Independent, first because I didn't read that article, and second because
14 it referred to a time when I was not there. But I was in Sarajevo for
15 most of the war and was familiar with a large number of cases, and in
16 every case where the firing point could be confirmed for a shell that
17 landed in Sarajevo, in almost every case, it was confirmed as having come
18 from the Serb side. And --
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Yes, we've heard that.
21 JUDGE MAY: No. Let him finish. Yes.
22 THE WITNESS: In all cases which I could speak about - I mean we
23 could go through them one by one at great length - are either certainly
24 fired from the Serb side or it's unclear.
25 This one which we happen to be discussing now is one which is
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 unclear. When we come to Markale 2, I think the case is less unclear.
2 But I think I have nothing to add on this one. It was -- it was unclear.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Particularly in connection with what you are now saying, what was
5 clear and what was unclear, General Rose, in his book, and I will quote
6 very briefly from the book, you were there at the same time: "The Serbs
7 whom we could clearly see in their trenches on the slopes behind us
8 covered with fir trees completely halted a Muslim attack. That is when
9 they used their artillery and mortars to respond to the Muslim fire, whose
10 mortars were distributed all over town and one of them within the Kosevo
11 Hospital compound. The Muslims opened fire at the Serbs, hoping that they
12 would respond with blows on built-up areas which would be another cause
13 for the international community to condemn the Serbs and take their side.
14 The history will be the best judge of the Muslim leaders for resorting for
15 such inhumane tactics."
16 This was written in his book by General Rose. Do you consider him
17 to be telling the truth or are you constantly repeating that the Serbs
18 were shelling Sarajevo? We know that the Serbs were shelling Sarajevo.
19 We condemned the Serb shelling of Sarajevo.
20 JUDGE MAY: You're not here to argue. You're merely here to ask
21 some questions. The accused -- I'm sorry, the witness of course can
22 answer and comment on that passage.
23 THE WITNESS: I think -- I think that is both an accurate
24 statement of General Rose's position at the time as I recall it, and it is
25 certainly also an accurate statement of what was going on, yes.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Very well. Is it true that on the 9th of February, 1994, at a
3 meeting between General Divjak on behalf of the BH army and General
4 Milovanovic on behalf of the army of Republika Srpska, an agreement was
5 reached, a cease-fire, in the territory of Sarajevo?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Is it true that in your weekly report of the 17th of February,
8 number 54, you stated that the Serbs had agreed to withdraw their weaponry
9 from around Sarajevo, that the process of withdrawal would be supervised
10 by the UN, that UNPROFOR exchanged liaison officers with the Serbs, that
11 they speed up the procedure for granting approval for humanitarian
12 convoys, that UNPROFOR appoint its men on key border crossings, that more
13 Muslims leave Sarajevo than ever before, that they allow humanitarian aid
14 to be brought in in a greater measure than before? Is all that correct,
15 Mr. Harland?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. What did the Muslims agree to, Mr. Harland? I've enumerated all
18 the arrangements agreed to by the Serbs. What did the Muslims agree to?
19 A. First of --
20 Q. Please go ahead, Mr. Harland.
21 A. First of all, we use in this courtroom, for convenience, the terms
22 Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, but of course the actual general who was
23 making the agreement on behalf of the army of Republic of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina was General Divjak who is, of course, not a Muslim, he's a
25 Serb, but I will continue for simplicity's sake to refer, as you do, to
1 Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.
2 The Muslims were bound by the same --
3 Q. Mr. Harland, I was quoting you, to make myself quite clear. I was
4 quoting from your statement.
5 A. It would be a mistake to refer to General Divjak as a Muslim. I
6 hope that my report doesn't do it, and I'm sure it doesn't.
7 Q. No.
8 JUDGE MAY: One at a time. Now, let -- let the witness finish
9 what he was going to say.
10 THE WITNESS: Now, the Muslim side, that is - to avoid confusion
11 because it is General Divjak - the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
12 agreed to the same four points, which was a cease-fire that was meant to
13 start on the 10th of February, the interposition between the two forces of
14 UNPROFOR, the withdrawal of heavy weapons or their -- or for the Muslims
15 their cantonment in certain sites in Sarajevo and the creation of a joint
16 commission to investigate problems. Both sides were bound by the same
17 four points.
18 The difference was that the Serbs were required to withdraw
19 weapons whereas the Muslims had nowhere to withdraw weapons to. So they
20 were required to put them into cantonment facilities in Sarajevo under our
21 control, which they would not have access to.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Harland, are you familiar with the fact that the Muslim side,
24 in the period from the 28th of March until the 1st of July -- I don't know
25 what's happening with your headphones.
1 A. It's fading away.
2 Q. I see the transcript is working. Maybe it's your headset.
3 So I was saying, do you know that the Muslim side in the period
4 from the 28th of March until the 1st of July, that is over a period of
5 only three months in 1993, violated the cease-fire 196 times, and from the
6 10th of February to the 27th of April, 1994, 318 times they violated the
8 A. I don't recall the exact figures, but that sounds about right.
9 Q. Very well. Are these figures of violations of the cease-fire by
10 the Muslims frightening? 196 times in three months and then later on 318
11 times; doesn't that sound frightening?
12 A. It was certainly very frustrating for our commander, General Rose,
13 who was trying to stabilise the situation. And the Muslims certainly
14 understood that when they fired out, whether they -- of the city, that
15 would provoke a large Serb coming -- incoming fire, which would make
16 normal life in the city impossible. So, yes, it was very -- it was very
17 disturbing for us.
18 Q. Did you have the figures how many soldiers of the army of
19 Republika Srpska were killed as a result of that fire or wounded seriously
20 or lightly? Did you have any such figures and did you review them, take
21 them into consideration?
22 A. In general, we had almost no independent source of information on
23 what was happening in Republika Srpska. The Serbs very often complained
24 to us that they were not treated fairly in the media, and we proposed to
25 them that they just allow journalists to move freely on their territories
1 and that they allow us to move freely on their territories so we could see
2 these incidents, these alleged incidents in which bad things happened.
3 However, they did not do that. Presumably they had their own other
4 reasons for not wanting us to see what was going on, and so we were simply
5 left in the position of having to report information which they gave us,
6 which, when we could verify it, often turned out to be false.
7 I don't say that the other sides did not also produce false
8 information, but the advantage of working on the Muslim side is we could
9 basically go wherever we wanted to, right up to the trench lines. So we
10 were able to double-check what the Muslims claimed was happening, and we
11 did so very aggressively, to their frustration. We were not able to do
12 that on the Serb side. So I can't tell you much about how many Serbs,
13 military or civilian, might have been killed by these cease-fire
14 violations, but obviously, yes, there would have been some.
15 Q. You say that you were not able to establish how many Serbs were
16 killed, but you were present at the spot from which the fire was fired.
17 So you know, for instance, how many shells were fired by the Muslims from
18 their positions and artillery at Dobrinja, Lukavica, Rajlovac, Vogosca,
19 Ilidza, Nedzarica, Mrkovici, Ilijas, Hadzici. So all these places and
20 settlements and small towns which were held by the Serbs, you were able to
21 establish that as you were in the location from which the fire was coming.
22 So you must have very clear records of that. Did you have such records?
23 A. Yes. I think we had a record probably of every shell fired.
24 Q. How, then, is it possible that there is nothing about that in your
25 report? I have listed ten parts or areas around Sarajevo - Grbavica,
1 Dobrinja, Lukavica, Vojkovice, Rajlovac, Ilidza, Nedzarici, Mrkovici,
2 Ilijas and Hadzici. How is it possible that there is no reference to any
3 of that in your report and statement? And it wasn't one shell that was
4 fired at each of these places or these parts of the town where the Serbs
5 were. How would you explain that, Mr. Harland?
6 A. Well, as you can see, the documents which you are quoting from are
7 weekly political assessments. There were also what we called Daily
8 SitReps, sort for situation reports, and there was a military observer
9 called "Shoot Reports," that is, they were counts of how many weapons were
10 fired and of what sort and by which side. There was rather full
11 reporting. And our general conclusions were that there were casualties
12 from these violations of the cease-fire that you're talking about. In the
13 global sense, about 90 per cent of -- we estimated about 90 per cent of
14 the civilians killed around the Sarajevo area were killed within the
15 confrontation line, that is, they were killed on the Muslim side of the
16 line. That might have included Muslims and Serbs and Croats, but about 90
17 per cent of the casualties were inside the confrontation line.
18 But I would certainly accept that firing out of the city,
19 including these violations you've mentioned, could have killed up to about
20 10 per cent of the total casualties from the conflict around Sarajevo from
21 the evidence given to us by Serb hospitals, from the Ministry of Health
22 and so on.
23 Q. Very well. You say you were issuing weekly assessments. Are you
24 familiar with Radovan Karadzic's order of the 2nd of July, 1994, that
25 Yasushi Akashi should be daily briefed about the violations of the
1 cease-fire because the disturbing figures of those violations were
2 absolutely unacceptable. And it says here, "I order that Akashi should be
3 briefed directly on a daily basis on all Muslim violations of the
4 cease-fire and occasionally make public statements." So not regularly
5 make it public but inform Akashi on a daily basis. And when Akashi is
6 mentioned, it is because he is at the top of the UN pyramid. So the
7 reference is to your entire structure. So you had daily reports on
8 cease-fire violations, didn't you, Mr. Harland?
9 A. Not every day, but most days, they did. It was part of a Serb
10 effort to -- to get what they felt would be greater balance in the media.
11 But it was all rather undone by the fact that they would not allow us
12 access to what was actually going on or allow access to the journalists.
13 Their press person who did the briefing was very able, Dr. Zametica, a
14 very clever man, but even he recognised that they were not likely to get
15 more positive coverage until the journalists could go and see for
16 themselves, otherwise, people would tend to discount it, because
17 unfortunately, all three sides were rather given to -- to lying.
18 JUDGE MAY: That's a convenient moment. We will adjourn now.
19 Twenty minutes.
20 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.
22 JUDGE MAY: You have 40 minutes left, Mr. Milosevic, which will
23 give about ten minutes each to the amicus and the Prosecution should they
24 want it.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'll try and be as short as
1 possible to enable Mr. Tapuskovic to have some time for his questions.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. But I should like to ask you, Mr. Harland, also to be as concise
4 as possible. Your answers tend to be quite lengthy.
5 Is it true that on the 9th of April a meeting was held between
6 General Rose, Andreev, Victor Jakovich, US ambassador to the BH, and
7 American envoy Charles Redman and then Rasim Delic and Vahid Karavelic on
8 behalf of the BH army and Mladic, Gvero, Tolimir on behalf of the army of
9 Republika Srpska? And you refer to that in paragraph 36 of your
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Is also true that on the occasion Mladic tabled a draft agreement
13 which was very similar to that tabled by the UN?
14 A. It may well have been, yes.
15 Q. And is it true that Delic agreed to sign just a part of the
16 agreement, whereas Mladic came out in support of a cessation to
17 hostilities, a complete cessation to hostilities on all fronts? And that
18 was the only difference, in fact, between the proposals?
19 A. Yes, I believe that's correct.
20 Q. Is it also true that there was a lull during which Redman, the US
21 envoy, left the meeting, that there was a break for him to consult with
23 A. I don't recall.
24 Q. In his book, General Rose says about this that, "Redman went to
25 see Izetbegovic and said Izetbegovic's office, that information trickled
1 that Redman secretly advises Izetbegovic to change his mind because if the
2 war were to be stopped when the Serbs held 70 per cent of the territory,
3 it would be impossible to establish peace." Was that the explanation?
4 A. That was one of the main Muslim objections to the cease-fire, and
5 it was the main motivation, presumably, for violating the cease-fires when
6 they were made, yes.
7 Q. Well, wouldn't a cease-fire enable matters to be resolved without
8 bloodshed, through negotiation, rather than having a loss of lives?
9 A. Yes. That was one view. There was also a view, not just held by
10 the Muslims, that it would be very difficult to secure a Serb withdrawal
11 from large amounts of territory which they held, and that for there to be
12 an agreement, they would have to first be pushed off the land, and that's,
13 of course, what ultimately happened. The Dayton Agreement agreed on a
14 51/49 per cent division of the country, but they didn't begin negotiating
15 until the battlefield had already produced a result that was roughly 51
16 per cent to 49. So there was a view that the cease-fire would not lead to
17 peace if there was a gross imbalance in the territories held by either
19 Q. On the contrary. It was part of the peace plans, and many Serbs
20 accepted that, and it could be seen that the territory was far smaller
21 than that 70 per cent in several of the plans, in fact, accepted by the
22 Serbs before the war, up to the European Union plan which spoke about a
23 completely different demarcation, delineation. Do you remember that?
24 A. Yes, I think that's right. Though I think there was a large
25 question in the minds of many as to whether or not those agreements could
1 be implemented if the Serbs were actually sitting on those large
2 territories with their armed forces. And Dr. Karadzic, in fact, did make
3 statements to that effect, that we would have trouble - and Mr. Krajisnik
4 - we would find it impossible to evacuate territories, as they put it,
5 that had to be ceded to the other side in case of these agreements even if
6 we signed them. That's what they told us.
7 Q. Well, they offered having the territories -- territories for
8 peace. It was the subject of all negotiations conducted in Geneva between
9 the three parties led by Karadzic, Boban, and Izetbegovic. I assume you
10 remember that.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. In paragraph 37, you mention your assessment of the 16th of April,
13 weekly political assessment, and you say that, "At about 1500 hours
14 yesterday, Bosnian lines to the north of Gorazde suddenly collapsed." Is
15 that right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. So Gorazde was not in fact a demilitarised zone and in that sense
18 where armed installations were prohibited within a circumference of three
19 kilometres, radius of three kilometres.
20 A. No.
21 Q. Therefore, they did have the right within that protected area to
22 have all the weapons they wanted to. Isn't that right, Mr. Harland? Is
23 that your explanation of it?
24 A. Under Security Council Resolution 824, I believe that it called
25 upon all parties other than those of the government of the Republic of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina to withdraw to a distance from which they ceased to
2 be a threat to the safe areas. So we considered that the forces held by
3 the army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Gorazde were there
4 legitimately, though we did try to enter into demilitarisation agreements.
5 Q. So you just attempted an agreement on demilitarisation, but it was
6 never actually reached or drawn up; right?
7 A. For Gorazde, not until after the Serb offensive in the spring of
8 1994; that's correct.
9 Q. And is it contested that the refusal to sign the peace agreement
10 of the 9th of April and the attack of Muslim forces on Gorazde at Serb
11 positions represented a synchronised activity which should set the war
12 machinery into operation.
13 A. That was the Serb position. I'm not sure now whether we were in a
14 position to confirm that.
15 Q. Very well. If you cannot confirm that, let's move on. And tell
16 me this, please: Is it true that on the 14th of August, 1994, at Sarajevo
17 airport an anti-sniper agreement was signed?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And when we're talking about sniping, look at paragraph 105 of
20 your statement and tell me is it true that Muslim snipers targeted
21 civilians more than the Serbs did?
22 A. As I said before, the Serbs did not allow us direct access to
23 their side for most of the conflict, so -- or for much of the conflict, so
24 sometimes we were having to take their word for it. But for the conflict
25 as a whole, over 90 per cent of the sniper casualties were on the Muslim
2 If we're talking specifically about this period in the late summer
3 of 1994, sniping was at a low -- generally a low level, and I believe that
4 the agreement here was -- was violated by the Muslim side on a number of
6 Q. You say in paragraph 105: "Both sides targeted civilians, and
7 when we could monitor sniper activity in Grbavica, it would appear that
8 the Muslims were sniping more civilians than the Serbs." That's what you
9 say in your own statement.
10 A. Yes. I think that is referring to this period in the late summer
11 of 1994. Yes.
12 Q. All right. Now, do you know about, or if not did the investigator
13 Todd Cleaver indicate a document that is in his possession or, rather, Mr.
14 Nice's side, and it is an order to the 3rd Motorised Brigade of the BH
15 army with respect to more effective use of snipers, and it is date the 5th
16 of March, 1993, the number is 23/1-82, signed by Esad Paldum, and it says
17 that "The use of snipers should be planned and organised and under the
18 control and supervision of battalion commanders." And it is attachment 5
19 in 2560308. The document number is 166. Are you familiar with that?
20 A. No.
21 Q. In paragraph 41, you say that the anti-sniper agreement functioned
22 quite well for a time but there was some difficulty with command and
23 control that the warring parties had over their snipers; is that right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Now, this document that I've just quoted to you and which I was
1 disclosed here on -- in CD-ROM form, I assume we can see that from the
2 document of the 3rd Motorised Brigade there was suspicions and doubts as
3 to who was being -- who was in control and there was no control and
4 monitoring over the use of snipers, in fact.
5 A. Yes. That would be consistent with what we knew. In general, we
6 felt that command and control was better on the Serb side than on the
7 Muslim side, in general.
8 Q. Well, I'm indicating quite the opposite document that that other
9 side has over there, which speaks about control on the Muslim side with
10 respect to the Motorised Brigade of BH.
11 A. Yes. I haven't seen that document, but I'm -- it sounds a very
12 plausible document.
13 Q. In paragraph 52, you speak of General Rose's meeting with Karadzic
14 on the 1st of December, 1994, at Pale, and that was linked to the
15 deterioration of relations between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs with
16 respect to the captivity of UN members; is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Well, do you know that it was precisely Serbia and I myself who
19 intervened to effect the urgent freeing of those men and to have them
20 returned? Do you know about that, Mr. Harland?
21 A. I don't recall, but there were several occasions on which the
22 UNPROFOR leadership, particularly Mr. Akashi, would try to use the
23 influence that you exercised over the Bosnian Serb party to bring about a
24 result, and on a number of occasions from Gorazde right through to the
25 fall of Zepa, anyway, and the Dayton Agreement, that was something, it
1 seems, that you were able to do.
2 Q. Well, we're not challenging the fact that I used all my influence
3 to stop the war. I don't think that can be disputed at all. However, let
4 me just find this next portion.
5 General Rose, in his book, writes the following to the Assistant
6 State Secretary Richard Holbrooke on the fourth visit of Bosnia to see the
7 progress that was being made by the United Nations. He said to Andrew
8 Ridgway that he didn't like meetings and that he would raise the question
9 with respect to Central Bosnia and the consequence of the sanctions on
10 importing weapons, et cetera, et cetera. Andrew explained to him --
11 "Andrew explained to him that the Muslim army was responsible for the
12 largest number of violations of the cease-fire in Western Bosnia and that
13 lifting the bans on arms import would fan the flames of war and split the
14 federation once again." Do you know about that?
15 A. Yes. That was a view also strongly held by General Rose.
16 Q. I assume that you don't doubt General Rose's objectivity.
17 A. I believe that he -- he was very honestly committed to a -- to an
18 approach to the war, and he was very frustrated when events conspired to
19 make it difficult for him to pursue that result. I think that in general
20 in pursuit of that strategy, he was very objective and very -- very
21 effective commander, but there were -- there were some points, as I guess
22 there always are, of disagreement between him and those around him.
23 Q. But for the most part, based on the fact that he tried to be -- he
24 tried to be objective and stop the war, would that be your impression, the
25 general impression, because you were one of the people around him?
1 A. Yes, certainly. He was very committed to stabilising the military
2 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to allow humanitarian aid to flow, and to
3 allow time for peace negotiations to reach an effective conclusion. That
4 was his approach. I believe that it may have been mistaken, but I think
5 that was his objective pursuit.
6 Q. All right. And is it true that the fragile truce in Sarajevo was
7 upset once again by the Muslim side with a mortar attack on the 18th of
8 September, 1994, at -- targeting positions of Bosnian Serbs in Eastern
9 Sarajevo? And General Rose says, "Already on the 18th of September all
10 our efforts to establish trust and confidence to continue the peace
11 process were toppled. Along with support from mortars, the Muslim army
12 moved ahead in a large-scale artillery attack on Serb positions in Eastern
13 Sarajevo. I returned from Brussels two days earlier, and today with
14 Viktor spent the day in Pale."
15 A. Yes. I don't have the book in front of me, but that sounds right.
16 It accords with what I remember.
17 Q. And then he goes on to speak of other things after that, the fact
18 that they opened fire, the Muslims opened fire targeting the Serbs in the
19 hope that the latter would respond with attacks in built-up areas which
20 would be a cause for the international community to condemn and blame the
21 Serbs. I assume you remember that.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Is it true that NATO, on the 30th of August, 1995, once again
24 launched an air attack on the positions of Bosnian Serbs around Sarajevo?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. I should like now to draw your attention to another document.
2 Mr. Akashi and myself - and I assume you're aware of that - endeavoured to
3 find or arrive at an initiative, rather, to have the conflict stopped, and
4 you say, "Finally Smith showed me a copy of the letter, and he emphasised
5 that this initiative was borne during talks between Akashi and President
6 Milosevic." And that was our joint initiative to do three things; to stop
7 the attack on the Bihac-Gorazde-Sarajevo and Tuzla safe areas, that the
8 Serbs withdraw all heavy weaponry within a radius of 20 kilometres, and
9 that an immediate cessation to hostility be implemented in keeping with
10 the 1994 agreement, September. The ERN number is the one I have received
11 from the opposite side. It's not a clear copy but it says from David
12 Harland, SPAO UNPROFOR, UNPROFOR headquarters Sarajevo, info Asushi
13 Akashi, General Smith, William Eagleton, et cetera. The 30th of August
14 1995 is the date.
15 Is that right, Mr. Harland?
16 A. I don't have it in front of me but it sounds right, yes.
17 Q. So this initiative, then, did it lead to quieting the situation?
18 A. We're now talking about the 30th of August, 1995?
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. I've tried to be brief, so let me now say something a little
21 longer. The approach of General Smith was quite different to that of
22 General Rose. General Smith had great doubts as to whether the UNPROFOR
23 mandate was implementable and as to whether or not it was useful to
24 stabilise the situation. Stabilising the situation would lead the Muslims
25 to try and get more land if the talks were not unsuccessful, and they
1 always were unsuccessful. So he came to the view that the mandate should
2 be much more aggressively implemented on exactly that time.
3 So when the -- after the Markale 2 attack, it was up to him to
4 decide how to -- how to approach the conflict, he changed direction
5 completely from his predecessors.
6 First he made a statement which was very unclear as to who fired
7 the shell. He deliberately wanted to create a degree of confusion so as
8 not to arouse the suspicions of General Mladic. He then used the time
9 following the attack to clear all soldiers, all UNPROFOR soldiers and
10 personnel off Serb territory. He then ordered -- turned the key, as it
11 was called. He ordered the beginning of NATO air attacks and not narrow
12 air attacks but much broader air attacks as part of an effort, he
13 believed, to bring about an end of the war by allowing the Serb positions
14 to be -- to be rolled back to about what they would get in the final peace
15 agreement. And I think the fact that it was then suddenly possible to
16 negotiate a peace agreement to some extent validates his -- his approach
17 to that conflict.
18 Q. On the contrary. It caused unnecessary casualties, and the
19 agreement was in the offing much before that. But I drew your attention
20 to this particular point, that the calming of the situation came at the
21 initiative of Mr. Akashi and myself to stop -- to stop the attacks in
22 these areas. And what it says in your letter, to have all heavy weapons
23 withdrawn to within 20 kilometres and to sign an agreement for a truce
24 straight away. And after that, the situation did calm down. Isn't that
25 right, Mr. Harland?
1 A. I believe that's correct, though we had received the conclusion by
2 that stage that calming the situation did not bring the war closer to a --
3 closer to a conclusion, and that the -- the advances that were made by the
4 Muslims and Croats after the NATO air attacks and after Operation Alulja
5 [phoen] in Croatia by the Croatians actually did create conditions on the
6 ground much more conducive to a final peace agreement than any number of
7 cease-fire, local cease-fires or withdrawal of weapons agreements on the
9 I think that General Rose was the most patient of all generals in
10 giving it a chance, seeing how we could calm the situation and then give
11 room for peace negotiations. But our experience was that those peace
12 negotiations would not be successful until there was a distribution of
13 territory roughly comparable to what each side could expect in the end,
14 and that is, unfortunately, the way in which the war had to -- had to end.
15 And the document that you are quoting from is a part of the
16 build-up of General Smith to his decision to launch major NATO air attacks
17 on Serb positions.
18 Q. Well, don't you think that the explanations you've just given just
19 represent justification for NATO's involvement in the civil war in Bosnia
20 against the Serbs?
21 A. I -- the decision in the end -- NATO had made it clear from an
22 earlier point that they were willing to carry out the air attacks. So the
23 question is not really whether it indicates anything about NATO's
24 position. It didn't change. What did change was the view of the UNPROFOR
25 command, that narrowly pursuing the mandate to monitor the situation, to
1 encourage a calming of the situation and to facilitate humanitarian aid
2 and to give space for negotiations was a project which had been attempted
3 with some success for a couple of years but in fact simply led to a
4 perpetuation of the status quo on the ground, which was very horrible for
5 most people in the country and particularly the people in the besieged
6 Muslim enclaves.
7 So this document you're referring to represents a -- the beginning
8 of a major departure from an earlier approach to the conflict. I wouldn't
9 say it represents a change in NATO position so much as in or the position
10 of the UN or at least of its commander General Smith.
11 Q. But since you are describing that this came about because there
12 was a lack of trust that the agreement would be respected and the
13 proposals which the Serbs were ready to sign regarding the division of
14 territory, wasn't it logical for NATO to use force if the agreement was
15 not complied with rather than using force to force the Serbs to agree to
16 the agreement? They could always have resorted to force if the agreement
17 was not respected, and that agreement was on the horizon. Is that in
18 dispute, Mr. Harland?
19 A. Yes, it's in dispute. Our view was that the most recent peace
20 agreement on the table was the Contact Group plan which had offered the
21 Serbs 49 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina and had been -- and it had been
22 rejected by the Serbs in the summer of 1994, and the Serbs had, after
23 that, become much more aggressive in the pursuit of a settlement to the
24 war outside of the context of the peace agreement such as by the attack on
25 Srebrenica and the massacre there. And that all of these peace
1 initiatives that you talked about were really just cover for a much more
2 aggressive policy on the ground that were leading nowhere, and that these
3 events on the ground had to be confronted militarily if the massacres like
4 happened after the fall of Srebrenica were not going to be repeated in
5 other areas. And General Smith came to the firm conclusion that he would
6 use all military force at his disposal after the fall of Srebrenica to
7 avoid any possible repetition and to accelerate the peace process.
8 Q. I hope that this question of Srebrenica will be finally cleared
9 up, because it was the ugliest thing that happened and which affected
10 certainly both sides very badly.
11 But you were saying in your examination-in-chief that Mladic often
12 went to Belgrade; is that right?
13 A. Yes, he said he did.
14 Q. Of course. Do you know that his family was living there?
15 A. Yes. He mentioned a daughter sometimes, and then a son would
16 sometimes appear with him at -- at meetings.
17 Q. But his family was living in Belgrade, so he went to see his
18 family. When you say he kept going to Belgrade, it is placed in a context
19 as if he went there for official reasons, but he went to visit his family.
20 His family was living there. Surely you know that.
21 A. Yes, I did know that. Sometimes he said, though, he went there
22 for official reasons, and sometimes members of the international community
23 such as Mr. Bildt would see him with you, such as during the Serb attack
24 on Srebrenica, just prior to the capture of Srebrenica and the massacres.
25 Mr. Bildt was visiting Belgrade to see you and came across General Mladic
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 and the same day. On the 7th of July, I believe.
2 Q. The 7th of July is a state holiday in Serbia, so I don't believe
3 it could have been the 7th of July. On the 7th of July, a reception is
4 held if it isn't a weekend. However, I heard about the events in
5 Srebrenica from Mr. Bildt, in fact. And we saw Akashi's telegram here in
6 which he says -- and this was after those events in Srebrenica, and no one
7 knew anything about any massacre. He says that he was with me at a
8 meeting, Mr. Akashi says that, in a telegram that was produced here, and I
9 think he says he went together with Mr. Stoltenberg and Mr. Bildt, and
10 that General Smith was also with him, and that I, at Mr. Bildt's request,
11 allowed General Mladic to attend, who was having separate discussions with
12 Smith in order to smooth relations between General Mladic and General
13 Smith. Surely that is not challenged as this is stated in Mr. Akashi's
14 telegram. Are you aware of that, Mr. Harland?
15 A. I would just challenge one aspect of it, which is that General
16 Mladic certainly must have known that there was a massacre going on at
17 Srebrenica. He's on television in Srebrenica in the hours before the
18 massacre begins, and there are many people who I spoke to, or at least a
19 number of people who I spoke with on the Serb side who confirmed his role
20 in ordering the massacre. And all I point out is that you asked about his
21 visits to Belgrade, and he was in Belgrade during this period, and Mr.
22 Bildt and I believe one other member of the Contact Group did confirm they
23 saw him with you. So he did know about the massacre, and it seems
24 surprising to me that he would fail to mention the deaths of 7.000 people
25 to you, but it's possible. But anyway, I would challenge the fact that
1 nobody there knew about the massacres. It's true Mr. Akashi didn't know
2 but I believe General Mladic did.
3 Q. Everyone learnt about it later.
4 A. No. No.
5 Q. At the time Akashi came to see me with Bildt and Stoltenberg, when
6 they asked that Mladic come too, at the time, no one even mentioned it
7 because no one had any inkling of it, and this was after it had happened.
8 The fact that General Mladic was filmed in Srebrenica, that was during the
9 attack on Srebrenica. Of course, generally speaking, we never agreed with
10 any attack on any safe areas or any such operations, but at that time,
11 such a cardinal matter must have been the subject of discussion if anyone
12 had known anything about it. It was learnt about later, and there is an
13 indisputable fact.
14 JUDGE MAY: You've made this point. The witness has already
15 answered. Now, you've got about five minutes left, Mr. Milosevic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will cede them to Mr. Tapuskovic,
17 but let me just make one observation.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you know, Mr. Harland, the only direct participant in that
20 crime who was put on trial was Erdemovic, who was arrested by the Serb
21 police --
22 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to stop this. This has nothing to do with
23 the witness at all.
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you.
1 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, I would like to ask you only about
3 things that you have already spoken of or are contained in the report to
4 the Secretary-General pursuant to the General Assembly resolution that you
5 drafted. You're familiar with the number. And I wouldn't go back to any
6 of the things that you have already explained, but I would like to ask you
7 first to start with page 24 of the English version of your statement, and
8 the heading of that chapter is "Sniping."
9 I won't comment on the first paragraph. You've already been asked
10 about it by Mr. Milosevic.
11 Look at the third paragraph, which speaks about the strategy
12 linked to sniping. You say: "The Bosnian strategy seemed to be to
13 suppress sniping by the Serbs through anti-sniping teams and then to have
14 their own snipers to wear down the Serbs and make them less eager to
15 continue the fight. Also, for the Bosniaks it was a way for them to
16 strike back, and especially when they couldn't strike back. The Serbs
17 controlled the high ground, most of the heavy weapons, most of the gas,
18 electricity and water, so it was one of the only ways the Bosniaks could
19 strike back."
20 Is that right? Those are your words, your own conclusions
21 regarding the strategy; is that right?
22 A. Yes. Both sides sought to wage the war by terror. Obviously by
23 far the most victims were on the Muslim side because the Serbs had more of
24 the instruments of terror, but it was the tactic of both sides, all three
25 sides, yes.
1 Q. I won't be asking you to repeat anything you said. I heard it,
2 and that is why I'm asking you whether these were your conclusions.
3 The next sentence is that: "In meetings in Grbavica, the Serbs
4 would often complain that they were suffering from sniping from the
5 Serbs," it says in this text, but it is probably an error; it should be
6 "Bosniaks." Is that right?
7 A. That's right.
8 Q. Is the following correct too: You were with Mr. Andreev, as is
9 stated here at paragraph 110, at a meeting with Muratovic, who is a
10 Bosniak; isn't that right?
11 A. Correct. Correct.
12 Q. And then look at what you go on to say: "Muratovic said that
13 sniping was completely organised, that when they kill one we kill one and
14 that a balance is struck in that way. Both Indjic and Muratovic also said
15 that sniping was a science and that numbers were set for every day."
16 Is what is written in your statement here correct?
17 A. Yes, that's what they said.
18 Q. And now look at the last paragraph, please, of that chapter, where
19 you describe something you saw yourself. "I'm also aware of two instances
20 where the Bosniaks were shooting at Bosniaks. One involved an incident
21 near the Residency in late 1993. The other incident was in early 1994
22 when one of General Rose's bodyguards, whose name was Goose, said that he
23 had returned fire on a Bosniak shooting Bosniaks." Is that correct too?
24 A. Yes. In fact, this reference to the first one is the one that
25 Mr. Milosevic also raised in a different context. It's the one which led
1 us to complain to the Bosnian army 1st Corps and for them to claim that
2 they knew this was happening but that it was just the renegade supporters
3 of Caco. So you are correct.
4 Q. Let me go back just to one more point but not to waste any time.
5 There's another question that you addressed to the effect that the French
6 sometimes suspected that it was mostly Bosniaks that were firing at
7 Bosniaks from large distances. You said that also on page 11. Do you
9 A. No. It was not our view that most of the shooting -- in fact, I
10 should be clear about that: That of the shells that landed in Sarajevo in
11 1992 to 1995, about half a million of them, the overwhelming majority,
12 certainly well over 90 per cent and well over 99 per cent came from the
13 Serb side. So the people killed inside the confrontation line, about
14 12.000 or -- sorry.
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the witness has
16 already explained that. I think he's already said that, and there's no
17 need for him to repeat it. You were already told this, Your Honours.
18 Q. I have to hurry to ask you a few more very important matters that
19 Their Honours need to know about.
20 Look at the next chapter. After Sniping comes Shelling, and this
21 is a chapter beginning on page 26, headed "Shelling." And in the first
22 paragraph you say the following: "Both sides used shelling against the
23 civilian population, each according to their own resources, although it
24 was far greater by the Serbs against the civilians of Sarajevo."
25 That is what you stated. Isn't that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Then two paragraphs lower down, I quote: "The Serb strategy of
3 shelling was often in response. By launching an attack, the Bosniaks
4 precipitated responses that were not necessarily against those fighting
5 but also against the civilian population, in order to send a message."
6 Isn't that what you said?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And you even said, in the last sentence: "This seemed to be a
9 policy that they used around the country." Is that right?
10 A. Yes, but it was particularly common in Sarajevo we felt because
11 they were under media scrutiny, and we felt that they wanted the media to
12 see the Serbs attacking, and so they had to sometimes create the
13 conditions for that. In other parts of the country where the media was
14 not present, they had much less incentive to do that.
15 Q. Very well. Thank you. Then you have the next chapter, Control
16 and Command. Last paragraph, in which you say, and I won't read all of
17 it: "I saw how they were working in a systematically destructive manner
18 -" and you're referring to the Bosniaks - "because virtually every Serb
19 house had been burnt." Is that something you yourself saw?
20 A. Yes. That was ethnic cleansing of Western Bosnia by the Bosnian
21 army 5th Corps. I saw that myself, yes.
22 Q. Thank you. And the last chapter headed "Others." When you said
23 at a certain point in Hadzici 180 Muslims went missing; is that right?
24 A. Yes, at the very beginning of the war before I got there, in fact.
25 Q. And then, "Immediately afterwards the Bosniaks rounded up a
1 similar number of civilians in nearby Tarcin, including women, and placed
2 them in silos." You say that in the next sentence. Is that right?
3 A. Tarcin, yes.
4 Q. And as Karadzic said in an interview that those men were dead, and
5 yet one was found by the ICRC, you say, "... so the Bosniaks never wanted
6 to release those people from the silos because they would lose important
7 leverage. In the course of 1995, I learnt from a local official and from
8 some people in the Bosnian army that some of the people from the silos
9 were being used to clear mines and booby-traps and to dig trenches in the
10 area of Stup and Treskovica and that some had been killed. The Bosnian
11 army personnel who told us this were not happy about the use of people in
12 this way."
13 This is something that you learnt about specifically?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. I don't know how much I will manage to cover in the time available
16 to me, but let us go back to something on page 20, somewhere in the
17 middle. One but last paragraph of the English version, where you talk
18 about your meeting with Silajdzic at the airport, and you say the
19 following: "I was at a meeting at the airport on the day of the Markale
20 massacre and Silajdzic was also present. The interpreter told me when we
21 arrived that Silajdzic had told him, 'Today we're going to surprise them.'
22 I do not think he meant the marketplace bombing, rather, it was a
23 statement pumping himself up for the negotiations. However, that comment
24 has stuck in my mind."
25 Tell me, did Silajdzic do something useful in those negotiations
1 or was this after all perhaps linked to what happened at Markale?
2 A. The meeting was interrupted quite soon after it began because of
3 news that there had been this massacre. So we had not got very far before
4 we were all called away and needed to go and visit the massacre site, and
5 I think General Rose took Mr. Silajdzic there directly, directly from the
6 airport where we were having the negotiations, so I'm not able to give you
7 a clear answer to your question, sorry.
8 Q. Thank you. Could you now look at page 16, please, of the English
9 version, when you talk about a weekly assessment of the 24th of June,
10 1995, and the document number is given, and the Prosecution has it, and
11 you said here that you felt, that you believed that Serbs had about 500
12 heavy weapons within a 20-kilometre range of Sarajevo; is that right?
13 A. Yes. I think later we discovered they had somewhat more than
14 that, but yes, that's what we thought at the time.
15 Q. But you also said, in the next sentence, that, "The Bosnians are
16 believed to have had about 100 to 150 such weapons that could be described
17 as heavy weapons at that time"; is that right?
18 A. Yes. There was a qualitative difference, but yes, that's correct.
19 Q. And when you testified here the last time, you said that the
20 Muslims, in time, acquired sufficient weapons. Is that true, that as the
21 years passed, they acquired more and more weapons, including heavy
23 A. They always had a problem with heavy weapons, and I think even at
24 the end, I don't know the exact -- the Serbs had somewhere in the region
25 of 400 tanks, and the Muslims had only a few dozen. So they never
1 completely addressed the imbalance of heavy weapons. But they had a
2 numerical advantage, and by the end of the war, they were reasonably well
3 equipped and organised and trained, yes, that is correct.
4 Q. Could you, for a moment, please, look at the report to the
5 Secretary-General that you drafted, page 49 (E), paragraph 210. To save
6 time, I have a copy of it.
7 A. Page 49 -- paragraph 49?
8 Q. Page 49 of your report, under (E), and the paragraph is 210, where
9 you say that, "During the first half of 1995, the army of the Republic of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina had made significant changes in respect to its
11 structure." And then later on you say, or maybe straight away, that, "The
12 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with about 200.000 men in uniform, for a
13 long time had an advantage over the Bosnian Serb army, especially in terms
14 of light weapons." Does that mean that the BH army had had about 200.000
15 men armed with light weapons for quite some time already at the time you
16 wrote it?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Is it true that already by the spring that the system of work as
19 stated - this was disclosed under Rule 68 - General Vagram [phoen] said
20 that in 1993, the activities of the Muslim army were concentrated in the
21 spring when Serbs could not operate because of their heavy weapons. Was
22 that true also in the year that you were there?
23 A. Yes, more or less.
24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, I must ask you to wind up, if you
25 would, please, so the Prosecution can have some time.
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I have to wind up, though I have
2 some very important and very useful things to address, but let me try and
3 clear this last topic.
4 Q. On page 44 of that same report, under (A), paragraph 177, you say
5 that despite an improvement on the ground, there were areas in which the
6 situation was still unstable. Croatian forces -- now, please. You say
7 here Croatian forces. Do you mean the HVO or predominantly regular forces
8 of the Croatian army which was advancing through those areas towards
9 Krajina or not? Were they not predominantly Croatian army forces; Livno,
10 Kupres, Glamoc?
11 A. Yes, our military reported to us that there were units of the army
12 of the Republic of Croatia present, yes. And in fact, the Serbs also
13 referred to it, and the Serb leaders regretted that Mr. Milosevic was not
14 as directly willing to provide regular units of the army of Yugoslavia as
15 Dr. Tudjman was willing provide to the Bosnian Croats, yes.
16 JUDGE MAY: Just one more, please.
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll finish.
18 Q. I'm asking this for the following reason: A moment ago you spoke
19 about the strategy, the difference in strategy between General Rose and
20 General Smith, and in General Smith's testimony, I didn't have time to go
21 into it, at certain meetings he would even say to Mladic that Croatia was
22 entitled to advance through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
23 protect its rights according to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter
24 and its right to self-defence.
25 Are you aware of that position, that Croatia was entitled to use a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 foreign country to protect its -- one of its natural rights? Are you
2 aware of that?
3 A. No, and it was certainly never a position voiced to me by General
4 Smith. On the contrary.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
7 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
8 Q. It was made clear to you by, I think, Plavsic and Karadzic that
9 they had a clear objective of ethnic cleansing, a phrase you used on the
10 last occasion. Any suggestion that what was made clear to you was hidden
11 from the accused?
12 A. No. They did indicate that they had differences with
13 Mr. Milosevic. They felt that there should be a greater level of support,
14 and in fact it's when they talked about those differences that we became
15 most aware of the bedrock of regular ongoing support that Serbia provided
16 to -- to Karadzic and Mladic through fuel for tanks and payment to
17 soldiers, and so on.
18 Q. Thank you, yes. But as to whether he was being kept in the dark
19 about their objectives ...
20 A. They didn't indicate that.
21 Q. It's been suggested that there was emphatic opposition from the
22 government of Serbia to shelling Sarajevo. Just yes or no: Did you at
23 the time hear, see, or learn of that, or is that just something you're
24 accepting from the accused saying it today?
25 A. No, certainly no.
1 Q. You weren't aware of it at the time?
2 A. No only unaware of it but aware somewhat to the contrary. What
3 was going on in Sarajevo was rather well-known in Belgrade. We would come
4 across Serbian officers in Lukavica and they never expressed any concern
5 about it at all. On the contrary, they usually wanted to prosecute the
6 war more vigorously.
7 Q. It's suggested on that the last occasion that the accused did
8 everything he could to stop the conflict in Sarajevo. What else could he
9 do, he effectively said. What would happen if they'd withdrawn support
10 from the Bosnian Serb army that was shelling Sarajevo?
11 A. I think that the Serbs would have been in a dire position. They
12 were at a numerical disadvantage, and they relied almost entirely on the
13 support they got from Serbia, from the officer corps, from the
14 intelligence, from the pay, from the heavy weapons, from the anti-aircraft
15 arrangements. Had Belgrade chosen even to significantly limit that
16 support, I think that the siege of Sarajevo probably would have ended and
17 a peace would have been arrived at somewhat earlier rather than having to
18 force them militarily into that weaker position.
19 Q. With the consequent saving of lives of those who died in the
21 A. Almost certainly.
22 Q. You were asked questions about various places this morning;
23 Lukavica, Ilidza, Ilijas, Hadzici, as places from which Bosnian attacks
24 were made, Muslim attacks were made. As a matter of fact, what happened
25 to the ethnic composition of those areas?
1 A. All of those areas, which had been mixed prior to the war, were
2 already essentially 100 per cent Serb by the time I had got there. The
3 Muslims had -- and others had been either killed or expelled or had fled.
4 Q. So these areas referred to by the accused were areas of effective
5 ethnic cleansing by the Serbs?
6 A. Certainly.
7 Q. You were asked about the reasons for Mladic going to Belgrade. At
8 the moment I'm not in a position to put certain documents to you for
9 technical reasons. Were you aware of something called the Supreme Defence
10 Council that met in Belgrade at that time as a superior organ of
12 A. Not closely.
13 Q. But you were aware of it?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Do you know one way or another about visits of Mladic and
16 attendance at the SDC in the summer of 1995?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Okay. So we'd have to learn of that from elsewhere.
19 The 7th of July meeting just with Bildt, do you know if that was a
20 long or a short meeting? The accused has suggested it's in error because
21 of its being the date of a holiday, but your efforts are what?
22 A. I don't recall. Mr. Bildt told me that, and I think it may also
23 be in his book.
24 Q. On the topic of what's in a book and just as a matter of flagging
25 up something, you speak about General Rose being at Sarajevo at the time
1 of the Markale massacre. Is that something you've checked against his
2 book recently?
3 A. Yes. Yes, you're right. I was with Silajdzic and Rose was --
4 Rose was absent that day and came back; correct.
5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, give me one minute.
6 [Prosecution counsel confer]
7 MR. NICE: Nothing else, thank you. The only question that may
8 arise is there has been several references to the witness's statement. It
9 wasn't produced and I suspect it may have been available to you as part of
10 a 92 bis package that was not accepted because his evidence was given
11 live. It's entirely a matter for the Court whether the number of
12 references make it appropriate for it to be given an exhibit number.
13 JUDGE MAY: We will consider it.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll give it the next exhibit number, please.
16 THE REGISTRAR: 582, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there may be just one question.
19 [Prosecution counsel confer]
20 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, is there anything else?
21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, no. I see the time and I know the Court
22 has to rise.
23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Harland, that concludes your evidence. Thank you
24 for coming to the Tribunal and indeed thank you for coming back to it to
25 give it. You are now free to go.
1 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
2 [The witness withdrew]
3 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn until Tuesday morning.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 11th day of
6 November, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.