1 Tuesday, 10 February 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before we begin, let me say at the outset that
7 Judge May being indisposed, Judge Kwon and myself are sitting pursuant to
8 the provisions of Rule 15 bis.
9 Mr. Theunens, you remain subject to the declaration that you made.
10 And Mr. Tapuskovic, last day that we met, ten minutes was set for your
11 cross-examination. You may begin.
12 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours and
14 Mr. President Robinson. In the course of these ten minutes, I'm sure you
15 will recall that we broached this subject, I was asking the expert witness
16 something about a document I showed him, so might we have the document
17 shown to the expert witness once again. I wanted to put certain
18 paragraphs to him which I wasn't able to do because our time was up. So
19 just a few documents of a document exhibited in September 2002, which
20 comprises 300 pages. I would just like to put several paragraphs to the
21 witness and ask him some questions about them.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Go ahead.
23 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic: [Continued]
24 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Theunens, you know that on the 1st of July,
25 1991, Stipe Mesic, under the influence of the European Community, became
1 president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, rather, the
2 President of the Presidency of the SFRY. Are you aware of that?
3 A. Your Honours, as I replied last time to this question, related
4 questions, this is outside the scope of my report. However, I do recall
5 that there were certain problems already on the 15th of May when Stipe
6 Mesic was supposed to become the president of the SFRY but he didn't
7 obtain the required majority, and the EC, or currently the EU, became
8 involved in trying to find a peaceful solution. I also recall the
9 negotiations that took place in Brioni on the 7th and 8th of July.
10 But to answer the question, I didn't analyse that aspect of the
11 conflict in detail for my report as it is outside the scope of the report.
12 Q. Please, Mr. Theunens, your report or, rather, the summary of your
13 report, reads as follows: "The armed forces of the SFRY and the conflict
14 in Croatia." That's the heading, a title. And precisely because of that
15 I'd like to present certain paragraphs from that report or, rather, from
16 the document, and it is the Presidency session of the 12th of July, the
17 first and only Presidency session held within that composition under the
18 Presidency of Stipe Mesic which dealt exclusively with questions of what
19 the armed forces of the SFRY should do, should undertake.
20 The Chief of the General Staff, Kadijevic, and even Ante Markovic
21 was present, the Prime Minister of the federal government. And the only
22 person missing was Drnovsek. And if you look at page 1 of that document,
23 do you agree with that, with what I've just said?
24 A. Yes, Your Honour, I agree with that.
25 Q. Now, please, would you take a look at the English version of page
1 36, the sixth and seventh paragraphs on that page. In paragraph 6 --
2 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreters apologise, they don't have
3 a copy of the document.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. -- Kadijevic is speaking, and would you pay attention to the
6 several sentences before, and you will see that it is Kadijevic speaking
7 about the place and role of the army and the goals of the army, the
8 objectives of the army of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
9 And that is in paragraph 6; right?
10 A. Yes, Your Honour. I don't know how many pages the document
11 counts, but these are apparently minutes and I believe Mr. Tapuskovic when
12 he says it's Kadijevic who is speaking, but --
13 Q. What I've just read out. He says the following, in paragraph 7
14 now, speaking with the tasks of the army, its essence lies in the
15 following: "First and foremost to have all armed conflicts cease
16 throughout the territory of the SFRY within the space of four days, to
17 demobilise all armed formations on the territory of the SFRY except the
18 JNA." So isn't it right that that's what he asked the Presidency to do,
19 that a decision be taken for that objective to be fulfilled? Is that what
20 it says here in that paragraph?
21 A. Based on this paragraph indeed. In this paragraph, Colonel
22 General Kadijevic or army General Kadijevic, sorry, indeed requests, makes
23 that request on the 12th of July. Now, I think it's obvious from other
24 sources, like for example the book of Kadijevic and the orders I discussed
25 in the reports, orders from the SSNO as well as the Chief of General Staff
1 of the JNA that the situation--
2 Q. Please excuse me, but I don't have time to go into all that. I've
3 just presented a document to you, and you spoke about Kadijevic's book
4 yourself. Take a look at page 85 of the English version, please,
5 paragraphs 1 and 2 of that page.
6 The majority were in favour of Kadijevic's proposal, the one that
7 we've just set out. And in the previous paragraph he asks for just four
8 days, a four-day deadline to have the paramilitaries disarmed, the units
9 that were operational throughout Yugoslavia, and the majority agreed. And
10 this is what Bogicevic says - he was the president of the
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina - on page 85, you have it, and it is before you. "When
12 it comes to the first proposal to cease all armed conflicts throughout the
13 territory of the SFRY, I absolutely agree with that, and I think that the
14 establishment of peace is the sole guarantee for us to move towards
15 negotiations. Whether we'll succeed, and I'd like us to succeed within
16 the space of 24 hours not even with us in the space of four days."
17 So that was -- those were the views presented by the majority, and
18 is that what it says, or words to that effect?
19 A. Your Honours, this is what the paragraph says, but again, it's
20 a --
21 Q. Thank you.
22 A. Okay. I would still like to say, I mean, it's a very long
23 document, and I find it dangerous to draw conclusions based on certain
24 paragraphs without having had the opportunity to look at the other
25 paragraphs. Of course I can read too, I know what this paragraph says,
1 but I'm not in a position to say whether this paragraph reflects the
2 contents of the whole document because it is just a paragraph.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: We note what you have said.
4 Continue, Mr. Tapuskovic.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Theunens, you spoke about Kadijevic's book, and I know that
7 you respected what he said in the book, but I don't think you remember
8 that the document that was produced on the first day of the Croatia trial,
9 which is 300 pages long and it exclusively focuses on the work of the army
10 of the SFRY and its efforts to disarm the paramilitaries, that you failed
11 to organise this document. So it is my duty to quote several paragraphs
12 to you and put them to you to ask you why the army wasn't given the green
13 light to go ahead and disarm the paramilitary.
14 So how is it possible that you have not had occasion to see this
15 document and analyse it and you've been working in the OTP for so many
16 years? Why didn't you look at the problems linked to the conflict in
17 Croatia? Could you give me an explanation for that, please.
18 A. Your Honours, the three parts of the document, or the report, I
19 believe there are around 400 documents footnoted. I think it's also clear
20 from the -- what is described in the beginning of the report in the scope
21 as well as executive summary that my task was mainly a military analysis
22 task. My task was not to analyse the sessions of the SFRY Presidency or
23 to act as if I were a legal analyst.
24 My understanding of the various sessions of the SFR Presidency and
25 the various meetings is that indeed there were a lot of discussions about
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 arming, disarming, taking measures and so on, but I didn't judge it
2 necessary or didn't consider it necessary to go into details into that
3 matter as it --
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I should like to
5 ask Mr. Theunens to clarify two more matters with respect to this report,
6 and I'd like to ask for his comments, and my final question would come
7 after presenting two more paragraphs to him from this document.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]...
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour, yes.
10 Q. On page 194 -- or rather, the English version is 171, page 171,
11 paragraph 5, this is -- above that it says Kadijevic addresses everybody
12 there and says the following, as far as point number 1 is concerned, it is
13 so crucial that, as you were able to see, the new variant to withdraw from
14 Slovenia, he didn't sidestep that point because the future of Yugoslavia
15 ultimately is either a civil -- a civil war and it will depend on point 1
16 regardless of what will happen in Slovenia. Ante Markovic's response to
17 that was, "I completely agree." And Kadijevic then says this is the key
18 point, the crucial issue, and whether there will be a war or not depends
19 on that key point. Is that what it says, or words to that effect?
20 A. Your Honours, I will repeat my previous answer to similar
21 questions. This is one paragraph out of a quite long document, 252 pages.
22 I can read the paragraph. I agree with what Mr. Tapuskovic has read as
23 far as this paragraph is concerned. I'm not in a position to compare it
24 with other paragraphs of this document.
25 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Now take a look at page 228, paragraph 2.
1 Stipe Mesic says when everything was over and when everybody was in favour
2 of taking the decisions, Stipe Mesic said, and this is what it says here:
3 "Very well, you can take that decision, make any decision you like, but I
4 cannot sign the -- a capitulation here and that you are seizing Croatian
5 territory." And at one paragraph further on, he says: "I can't go back
6 to Croatia tomorrow as a traitor. That's out of the question. You can
7 arrest me, you can do what you like. Do you want me to tender my
8 resignation? If you do, I will do so." Is that what it says? And Mesic
9 as president of the Yugoslav state Presidency did not want to stand behind
10 the positions taken by all the other Presidency members to give a deadline
11 of four days to the army to disarm the paramilitaries. To disarm the
12 paramilitaries. I said the army but I meant paramilitaries, yes.
13 And in that connection, Mr. Theunens, my final question.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone. Microphone,
16 JUDGE KWON: Microphone, please.
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC [Interpretation]
18 Q. In a situation of that kind, if the Yugoslav People's Army had the
19 monopoly of violence, was the sole person which had the monopoly of
20 violence, and if they were asking, the Presidency was asking to disarm the
21 paramilitaries to prevent any further conflicts all over Yugoslavia, was
22 that something that was of significance for further developments in
23 Croatia, since the very next month all the barracks were blocked in
25 A. Your Honours, I find it very difficult to make comments more or
1 less out of the loop or out of the blue on one paragraph of a quite
2 extensive document which discusses a very complicated matter, a
3 complicated, complex matter which is actually not completely within my
4 field of expertise as I focused on the military aspects of that conflict.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my last question.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is your last question?
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Just one more point, please, with
8 the Court's indulgence. And here's why, and this is why I'm asking this
9 last question of mine.
10 Q. Mr. Theunens says that this does not come within his remit to say
11 anything, and in paragraph 8 it says: "The task of the armed forces of
12 the SFRY was --" and this is from his summary -- "to pretext the
13 independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country and
14 the social order as provided for by the SFRY constitution." Now, how,
15 then, was it possible for the -- how could the army of the SFRY fulfil its
16 duty and obligation if the decision that the army wanted the Presidency to
17 take could not be implemented? How could it fulfil its role if what you
18 say in the summary in paragraph 8 is correct?
19 A. Paragraph 8 of the executive summary is the executive summary, so
20 it's based on, as far as the mission is concerned, that mission is
21 indicated and defined in the 1974 constitution and is of course confirmed
22 in 1992 Law on All People's Defence as well as relevant JNA regulations,
23 so I'm not in a position to discuss whether this is -- this is correct or
24 not correct; I just read these legal documents and I quoted from there.
25 And the second part of paragraph 8, where the evolution of the
1 actual implementation of that mission is discussed, that's based on my
2 review of JNA orders, SSNO orders, statements in the SSNO bulletin signed
3 by Kadijevic and/or General Adzic, and last but not least, Kadijevic's
4 book. If my task had been to analyse --
5 Q. Yes. Thank you. Thank you.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... not to
7 continue. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Thank you, Mr. Tapuskovic.
8 Mr. Nice, last day you had indicated that you would not
9 re-examine. Is that still your stance?
10 MR. NICE: I was prepared to waive re-examination on the last
11 occasion in the interests of brevity, and I'm not going to change my
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
14 MR. NICE: However, can we deal with exhibits.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
16 MR. NICE: I've -- in order to save time, I've filed a short
17 motion making a proposal as to how exhibits might be dealt with.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have -- we have the motion in hand, and I am
19 to say that the Chamber accedes to the motion except for the third
20 paragraph of the relief sought, that is, that the balance of the documents
21 be marked for identification so that the other exhibits can be marked as
22 proposed, and Judge Kwon will oversee the marking with the registrar.
23 MR. NICE: Grateful. And then there's also tab 22 to be added,
24 which is a document. I don't know whether Mr. Theunens knows if it's
25 being added or not but if he's got it there then I ask him just to have a
1 quick look at it.
2 THE WITNESS: I don't have it.
3 MR. NICE: The proposed additional exhibit, tab 22, just explain
4 what that is, please, Mr. Theunens, if you're immediately familiar with
6 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, this is a report prepared by the 2nd
7 Military District where the commander, General Milutin Kukanjac, makes an
8 assessment of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is during the
9 March time period in 1992. I reviewed this document before, and it was
10 also used in the third part of the report, the section -- the part that
11 deals with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I don't know whether you
12 want me to go further into details.
13 MR. NICE: No, that's fine.
14 And, Your Honour, for those following the evidence and with an eye
15 to the detail of how evidence is being dealt with, the proposal made to
16 the Chamber in the short motion that I filed is that the 20 or more
17 binders of material that Mr. Theunens has examined and that are reflected
18 in his and Mr. Borrelli's reports remain available, as it were, through
19 the conclusions in the report but aren't otherwise to be produced and to
20 burden the court record save for the 22 tabs in the exhibit.
21 We propose to the Chamber alternative ways of dealing with it and
22 are entirely intent, of course, with the outcome, the position being that
23 if at a later stage of the trial it is necessary to look at one of those
24 documents in detail, you will have to take the appropriate step at that
25 stage to look at the document.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. As for tab 22, which is just being
2 introduced, the accused should have a chance of looking at it. The
3 Chamber is disposed to --
4 Mr. Milosevic, have you had a chance to look at tab 22 which was
5 just given to you?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, I have not, Mr. Robinson.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. We will give the accused a chance to
9 look at that, and we'll come back to that specific tab later.
10 Mr. Theunens, that concludes your evidence, and you may go.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As there is no witness in the
16 courtroom just now, I should like to take this opportunity to ask you two
17 things, to raise two matters.
18 I have received a schedule for our sessions, the 4th of February,
19 and I'd just like to quote two paragraphs, and I'd like an explanation
20 about that from you, please. You say the following: "Considering that
21 the accused must prepare [In English] for five longer sitting days in
22 circumstances where he is currently unwell and because the longer sitting
23 days will create a requirement for the accused to make preparations
24 outside of the normal sitting schedule, it is appropriate for the
25 Registrar to provide whatever reasonable assistance the accused may
1 require to prepare for court."
2 [Interpretation] The next paragraph says: "Noting that Judge May,
3 due to illness, will not be available to sit in the trial when the trial
4 recommences on the 10th of -- 2004 --"
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. Just a minute, Mr. Milosevic.
6 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: The order speaks for itself. The Chamber was of
18 the view that since you're ill, it would be appropriate for the Registrar
19 to render whatever assistance he could to you, and I expect that he's
20 doing that. The Chamber is of the view that it is important that this --
21 the Prosecution case be completed within the next two weeks. That is as
22 much as we'll discuss in relation to that matter.
23 Mr. Nice, next --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just tell you something,
25 Mr. May -- Mr. Robinson and Mr. Kwon. I don't see what the Registrar
1 could do. That's the first point. And secondly, the Registrar has done
3 And then I have a further question, Mr. Robinson. A moment ago I
4 received the prolongation of the ban on communication, that is to say for
5 the third month running. And as you know full well, once you finish your
6 half time that that false accusation has over there, then it's my turn to
7 function. So how do you assume that I will be able to function even under
8 conditions where I -- there is a ban on my communicating with anybody?
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is a matter which the Chamber will look at
10 in due course, I can assure you.
11 Mr. Nice.
12 MR. NICE: The next witness is --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before the witness is brought in, Mr. Nice, the
15 -- you will, of course, have received the order that the Chamber made in
16 relation to --
17 MR. NICE: I've received the order, and we've made preparations
19 The witness, as you know, made an extensive statement from his own
20 notes, and in order to deal with matters swiftly, I'd ask that he be
21 allowed to have that with him as an aide-memoire and I can take him to
22 paragraphs and I can deal with --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. The statement is very long, and we were
24 concerned that the examination-in-chief and indeed the cross-examination
25 should be focused.
1 MR. NICE: It will be. But if he could have the document as an
2 aide-memoire, then it will make life much easier.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, he can have the document.
4 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I trust the Court and everybody else has
5 the exhibit binders. I'm going to ask that all the exhibits be produced
6 in due course, and I shall use the list of exhibits as another way to move
7 through the evidence very swiftly.
8 While we're waiting for the witness, if a provisional exhibit
9 number could be given for the binder I'd be grateful.
10 THE REGISTRAR: 645, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE MAY: The legal officer.
12 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
13 [The witness entered court]
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
15 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
16 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 WITNESS: DIEGO ENRIQUE ARRIA
20 Examined by Mr. Nice:
21 Q. Your full name, please.
22 A. Diego Enrique Arria.
23 Q. A Venezuelan, holder of various high offices, permanent
24 representative for Venezuela at the United Nations in 1992 and 1993,
25 currently holding unpaid office at the United Nations as Assistant to the
1 Secretary-General, and other posts well documented and available in detail
2 if anybody wants.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please answer.
4 THE WITNESS: Pardon me, sir?
5 MR. NICE:
6 Q. Did you hear the question, I'm sorry? Venezuelan, permanent
7 representative to the UN for Venezuela in 1992 to 1993, former governor of
8 Caracas, holder of various other high offices and academic posts, and
9 currently with an unpaid position at the United Nations.
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. You've publicly and in the course of a very long statement that's
12 available but not produced here, expressed views that are highly critical
13 of various parties and non-parties to the conflict, including the United
14 Nations and the international community generally; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. I want to focus on two aspects of evidence that you can help us
17 with. They are these: First, I want you to summarise through exhibits
18 and through your evidence the way and ways in which to your knowledge the
19 accused and governments in Serbia and Yugoslavia were put on notice as to
20 what was happening in the territory.
21 Second, I want you to help us from your knowledge and experience
22 of what effect that had on any sense of impunity that may have existed in
23 those territories. Do you follow me?
24 A. Your Honours, on the first case, the Yugoslavia -- the former
25 Yugoslavia, was for the people in the part of my world an extremely
1 prestigious country and we were completely in support of preserving the
2 integrity of Yugoslavia until the end of 1991. And when events start
3 turning in the wrong direction, it was beginning of 1992, the end of 1991,
4 is when we put it -- put a notice to the accused of the direction the
5 events were taking.
6 Q. Now, I'm going to have to ask you to be responsive to questions
7 because of the very great limitations of time. You have an index of
8 exhibits and you also have the exhibits to your left-hand side. They can
9 be -- the index can be laid on -- or a copy of the index can be laid on
10 the overhead projector. We don't have time to go through it in detail.
11 But were there several Security Council Resolutions about the former
12 Yugoslavia and about Serbian involvement there of which, in general terms,
13 you're critical on the grounds that they were either too strong or too
14 weak, which was it?
15 A. They were too weak. They were not relevant to really putting a
16 stop to the conflict.
17 Q. And in your judgement, what effect did that have on the people on
18 the ground and on the Serb parties in particular?
19 A. It definitely created the impression that the international
20 community was not about to put a red light. Was not precisely a green
21 light but was not really meaning to do anything forceful to stop the
22 developments on the ground.
23 Q. Tabs 1, 2, and 3 of what will be Exhibit 615 are some of those
24 Resolutions. The Chamber has seen others of them through other witnesses.
25 Can you turn, please, to tab 4, very briefly, which is a letter from
1 Branko Kostic, vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, denying all
2 allegations made, this letter being the 30th of May of 1992 - a little out
3 of order in the bundle, but never mind - and if we turn to the second page
4 of that, we see setting out following denials of all allegations against
5 the former Yugoslavia, firstly respect -- that it respects territorial
6 integrity; secondly, that it will use all means to stop the fighting;
7 third, it will prevent military organisation; fourth conditions be ensured
8 to enable efficient and unhindered distribution of humanitarian aid;
9 fifth, reaffirm strong opposition to forcible expulsion.
10 Just yes or no: In your speech in the United Nations in due
11 course on this topic, did you deal with those five assertions by the
12 former Yugoslavia?
13 A. Yes, definitely.
14 Q. Was any one of them true?
15 A. None.
16 Q. I turn to the next exhibit in the file, tab 5, a letter from
17 Mrs. Ogata, dated the 18th of March of 1993.
18 This is a letter that has on page 1 an account of receiving verbal
19 assurances from this accused and Dr. Karadzic on the 16th of March of that
20 year, but on page 2 of the letter - this can be shown on the overhead
21 projector if there's time but I can't delay so I will be dependent on the
22 usher's good offices - on page 2 it says: "I also wish to draw your
23 attention to the medium term developments in Srebrenica. I consider it
24 absolutely necessary to maintain a permanent international presence in the
25 enclave. This is the only means to ensure that the desperate population
1 is not totally abandoned." And she's ready to maintain her own staff
2 there. "Everything would indicate that a massive humanitarian tragedy is
3 unfolding in the Srebrenica enclave. I believe that key world leaders
4 should be alerted to these developments. I hope that what is happening
5 today in Eastern Bosnia can be brought to the attention of the
6 participants of the international conference."
7 When did you first see that letter, Mr. Arria?
8 A. I saw this letter almost 11 years later, after it was never
9 revealed or shared with the Security Council.
10 Q. You make many comments, we don't have time to expand on them,
11 criticising the Security Council's failure to disseminate or even to have
12 information available; correct?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Go to tab 6, please.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, let me just ask Dr. Arria: Whose
16 underlining is it in the two paragraphs?
17 THE WITNESS: Madam Ogata's, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's her emphasis.
19 THE WITNESS: It's her emphasis, yes.
20 MR. NICE:
21 Q. Tab 6 is a letter from the then Secretary Boutros-Ghali of whom
22 you are extremely critical generally, which has, as we see, general
23 distribution. In short, would "general" have included distribution to the
24 former Yugoslavia?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. The second page of tab 6 is the letter to which he refers. What
2 he says, and we can see his description on the first sheet, is in line 3
3 -- he refers to a letter which is a second letter from Mrs. Ogata. It
4 describes the disturbing situation which has developed in Srebrenica.
5 Does that match the first letter or is that different in tone?
6 A. It complements the previous letter.
7 Q. The next letter we see, however -- no, I meant does
8 Boutros-Ghali's observation reflect the tone of the first letter or --
9 A. Not at all. Madame Ogata actually, Your Honour, urged the
10 Secretary-General to bring key leaders into the matter and with a great
11 sense of urgency, and it took about 12 days for the Security Council to
12 hear again about the situation while the people in Srebrenica were
13 beginning -- were under siege.
14 Q. And we see at the second two -- the second and third sheet of tab
15 6 the letter of the 2nd of April set out in an annex setting out the
16 plight of the people in Srebrenica in paragraph 1, and over the page, as I
17 must deal with this briefly, it can all be read at leisure, second
18 paragraph: "Under these circumstances, I believe we are faced with two
19 options if we are to save lives. The first is to immediately enhance
20 international presence in order to turn the enclave into an area
21 protected," and then she goes on to deal with other assistance that must
22 be given.
23 That letter, therefore, and what it reflected of the position on
24 the ground, was available to Yugoslavia.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. We then see at tab 7 a note by the president with general
2 distribution of the Security Council. First paragraph: Shocked and
3 alarmed at the dire and worsening position. Second paragraph, the
4 Security Council recalls and affirms its relevant Resolutions and
5 condemns the disregard and wilful flouting of the Bosnian Serb party which
6 once again, in pursuit of its unlawful, unacceptable, and abhorrent policy
7 of ethnic cleansing has blocked humanitarian relief efforts. And in the
8 third paragraph, four lines up from the bottom, recalls on strict
9 compliance with Security Council Resolutions.
10 That letter was available?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Tab 8, we see the first of two, I think, letters from Sacirbey.
13 How were Sacirbey's complaints of what was happening treated?
14 A. They were almost totally disregarded. It was a total sense of
15 blase, another complaint by Sacirbey coming to the Council.
16 Q. Was Bosnia, in your judgement, taken as seriously as it ought to
17 have been at that time in any complaints it made?
18 A. It was not. We live in a sort of a climate of denial of what the
19 whole world knew was taking place, but not -- the Council was not very
20 much interested in accepting the collective knowledge.
21 Q. Was this attitude connected, in your judgement, to any particular
22 position taken by Council or, rather, UN members to Bosnia?
23 A. Well, definitely. We always felt, in aligned countries in the
24 Security Council, that there was a great fear -- there was a double
25 standard being applied in the case of Bosnia versus the standards that we
1 applied in the case of Kuwait shortly before, and there was a fear of the
2 emergence of a Muslim country in the middle of Europe and that they were
3 being treated not as Europeans but as Muslims.
4 Q. Tab 9, please. A document we haven't looked at yet but which was
5 available because of its being an order from the 8th of April from the
6 International Court of Justice. This was an order on the complaint of
7 Bosnia. We don't have time to look at the Bosnian complaint in any
8 detail, but it's all set out, what they were complaining. But if we go to
9 three or four pages from the end of the document, and we can see it at the
10 top page 24, bottom of page 25. The court under a heading "Application of
11 the Genocide Convention" ordered unanimously that the government of the
12 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should immediately take measures within its
13 power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide, and then by 13
14 votes to 1, with the Russian I think not voting, that they should in
15 particular ensure that any military, paramilitary, or irregular armed
16 units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any
17 organisations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction,
18 or influence do not commit any acts of genocide or conspiracy to commit
19 genocide or direct and public incitement to commit genocide. So this was
20 a publicly available order following a publicly available complaint.
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. You regard that as an important document, and did you at the time
23 regard it as important?
24 A. Very important, significant document, Your Honours. So much so
25 that we, the non-aligned countries in the Security Council struggled to
1 actually have it recorded in a Resolution and to be acknowledged, coming
2 from the International Court of Justice. There was great resistance to
3 the inclusion of the Council of genocide at the moment.
4 Q. And explain so that we can understand, on such a document, how
5 long would normally or might take before some Resolution could be passed
6 and some action could be taken? Could it be done the same day or the
7 following --
8 A. It could have been within the next 48 hours, and especially coming
9 from the International Court of Justice, which was the second time in my
10 memory that I recall that addressed the Security Council. First it
11 addressed in the case of Libya and second in this case it was done. It
12 should have deserved urgent treatment by the Security Council, coming from
13 the International Court.
14 Q. But in this case, as we see tab 11, you have to wait until the
15 15th of April, until your letter as coordinator transmits the copy of a
16 statement. The statement we see on the following page. All of this is
17 available for general distribution. The statement comes from the
18 non-aligned countries; correct?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. And in the middle of the first sheet, the --
21 JUDGE KWON: The tab number should be ten.
22 MR. NICE: Did I not say 10? I apologise, tab 10.
23 Q. The paragraph headed, "In this context we consider an extremely --
24 as extremely serious the postponement of the adoption of the
25 aforementioned draft Resolution." This was your draft Resolution;
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. "The Bosnian Serb party has given ample proof that it is not
4 willing to heed to any goodwill efforts to peace." Then you deal with
5 Vance-Owen. Next paragraph towards the bottom of the page: "We stand
6 behind the principles contained in the draft Resolution." Last paragraph
7 you deal with the lifting of the arms embargo for which you pressed. And
8 your view on the existence of the arms embargo was what? What effect did
9 that have on Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. We consider that when the arms embargo was imposed on the
11 countries in 1991, at the end of November 1991, we thought that this was a
12 very significant, important measure, but we didn't know that actually we
13 were preordaining the outcome of this conflict because the only side that
14 was not armed, to have a regular armed forces, was actually the government
15 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and no one informed the Security Council or the
16 permanent members of this situation. So it was innocently believing that
17 this would put all the parties in similar condition. That was not the
18 case at all, as time proved to be the case.
19 Q. Now, the draft Resolution itself is at tab 11 where, as drafted by
20 your non-aligned group, you pressed for reaffirmation of position against
21 ethnic cleansing. You reaffirmed the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
22 and pressed for the establishment of this Tribunal. On the second sheet
23 we see at number 3 concern at the refusal to accept the agreement of
24 interim arrangements, demands observations of a cease-fire and full
25 respect for rights of UN.
1 This draft Resolution never got passed; correct?
2 A. No.
3 Q. And your judgement on what would have been the consequences of its
4 being passed at that time had there been the will to do so?
5 A. It was very clear and evident that the Security Council was not
6 going to go, Your Honour, beyond what it had already done, so we thought
7 if they lifted the arms embargo would level the situation, and there was a
8 complete agreement on the majority of the countries of the United Nations
9 but not the Security Council where the Resolution was voted 9 to 6.
10 Q. Returning to the issue of impunity that may or may not have been
11 created, was the atmosphere and the attitude that was apparent to you in
12 the United Nations something that should have been or would have been
13 available to Yugoslavia?
14 A. Yes. So much so I remember that the Yugoslavian ambassador at the
15 time, Jokic, used to send letters, Your Honours, to his colleague in
16 Venezuela, informing exactly what we were doing in the private
17 consultations of the Security Council. I remember one day telling to
18 Jokic that I wasn't going to send more reports to my own government about
19 my performance in the Security Council because his reports were more fully
20 informed than even mine, and presented even faster.
21 Q. So if it was coming to Venezuela from the Security Council, your
22 inference is that it was going at the same speed and the same quality to
24 A. I have to imagine that, sir.
25 Q. We then come to the mission, and the only mission, I think, of the
1 United Nations to Srebrenica at the relevant time; correct?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. You pressed for that mission and led it.
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. By the way, tab 12 is another letter from Sacirbey, you would say
6 characteristically not taken seriously?
7 A. The same situation, even though at the time all these letters were
8 corroborated by the international media.
9 Q. And also tab 14 as well.
10 If we please in your -- you using your statement as an
11 aide-memoire because the Court has allowed you to do so, go to page 40,
12 and it's -- I'm going to start about paragraph 304. The mission involved
13 several countries and we're going to see in due course that your report
14 was a unanimous report; correct?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. Something itself of which you are proud.
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. When you got there, what did you discover about the agreement that
19 had already been forged by UNPROFOR? Paragraph 304.
20 A. Well, Your Honours, we were debating the Resolution of the
21 Security Council until midnight, thinking that we were about to preserve
22 the safety of the people of Srebrenica, and when we got to Srebrenica, to
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, we found out that at the same time that we were
24 debating this issue, the issue had already been settled on the ground;
25 capitulation had been forced upon the Bosnian forces and demilitarisation
1 and disarmament of the Bosnian side had started, implemented and enforced
2 by UNPROFOR, which is much beyond the scope of the Resolution. But it
3 meant that actually our Resolution was irrelevant and it was not pertinent
4 because it had already been replaced by the action on the ground.
5 Q. And again, the conflict between the public debate in the United
6 Nations but the capitulation on the ground which we see reflected at tab
7 14 of the exhibits in the agreement which you've referred to, would that
8 have been available to the former Yugoslavia?
9 A. Oh, yes.
10 Q. If we go to paragraph 307, we're going to find that you prepared a
11 report in due course. We shan't look at it in detail. In the course of
12 that, you refer to the possibility of a massacre of 25.000 people having
13 been stemmed by this agreement. Your view on whether that potential for
14 massacre of 25.000 people was obvious at the time.
15 A. Yes. It was a figure that we reached consulting with the
16 representative UNHCR, the humanitarian office, the Red Cross, Medicins
17 Sans Frontieres, and other NGOs plus the UNPROFOR forces on the ground,
18 that was the estimate.
19 Q. You say in the report that as the UNPROFOR agreement brings that
20 to an end. What do you say as to whether that was the end of the threat
21 or the risk of massacre of this number of people or whether it continued?
22 A. At the moment, yes, because the whole attention of the
23 international community, Your Honours, thanks fundamentally to the
24 international media, we can focus on the case of Srebrenica and we thought
25 at the moment a red light had been put on by the international media and
1 public opinion at the moment.
2 Q. In the mid-term or long-term, however, what was the position?
3 A. We thought, and it is in the report, that we saw crimen and the
4 slow-motion genocide taking place and that a massacre would take place.
5 And the degrading conditions when I visit Srebrenica were really
6 unimaginable of the situation being suffered by the people in the area
7 which had not been described to us and the Security Council at all. We
8 thought that Srebrenica was under siege but never that it had been taken
9 over it was like an open gaol where the -- this slow-motion genocide was
10 taking place and was actually finalised in the second stage of 1995.
11 Q. Did the risk to these people continue?
12 A. The risk continued because the UNPROFOR forces were actually under
13 the control and supervision of the Serb paramilitary around the area.
14 Q. We'll come to the detail in second. The risk continued. Was it
15 obvious to you and to anybody on the ground --
16 A. Yes, it was obvious that we were -- the whole village, enclave was
17 surrounded by heavy weapons around the hills, we were shown that by
18 UNPROFOR forces, and the Serb paramilitary were actually patrolling the
20 Q. The -- the mission, paragraph 311, involved your being held up by
21 a limited number of Serb soldiers for an hour and a half, I think, and
22 having a gun pointed at you in Kiseljak.
23 A. Yes, sir. I mean, it was five Serb soldiers stop about a
24 contingent of about 20 armoured cars and a hundred paratroopers from
25 Denmark that were escorting the Security Council mission.
1 Q. What did that and other events on the ground show you about who
2 was in charge in Srebrenica?
3 A. It was very clear to us that the United Nations was not in charge
4 at all, that the Serbs were in charge, and the attitude of the officers
5 who were leading us were like subordinates to the Serb soldiers, not even
7 Q. Had that ever been revealed to you in New York?
8 A. Never. I mean, to me, to us, to the whole mission came as a shock
9 so much so that even though some of the ambassadors who accompanied us and
10 were part of the mission had a different position than the Security
11 Council. They all signed the report and they noticed that that was the
12 situation, and they were the ones who included this quotation in the
13 report to the mission.
14 Q. Did Brigadier Hayes, who was your contact, facilitate your visit
15 or did he stand in the way of your seeing what you wanted to see?
16 A. Brigadier Hayes was more interested in having sort of a
17 perfunctory visit by the mission, not -- he did not show himself to be
18 cooperative in any way to really get us to be able to discharge our
19 responsibility in evaluating what was going on in Srebrenica. On the
20 contrary; he did everything possible to block that we really get an
21 impression. I would say that I understood finally why the United Nations
22 didn't ever send missions to the ground, because when you send missions to
23 the ground you find out the truth.
24 Q. I think your colleagues were delayed and stalled. Everybody's
25 cameras were taken away except yours, and yours were the only photographs
1 broadcast around the world.
2 A. That's the case. I was even brought into Zvornik without telling
3 me. We landed in a stadium in Zvornik and I was greeted by the Serb
4 colonel, Ratko I think was his name, who told me that I was arriving into
5 the Republika Srpska, which of course we never recognise. And they -- I
6 was held there for another hour. It was clear they were killing time for
7 us not to get to Srebrenica, and my colleagues had been left behind in
8 Kiseljak and actually arrived an hour later, and the journalists who came
9 from New York international media were not allowed to come into
10 Srebrenica. And the only -- the only camera that was allowed, because I
11 didn't surrender, was mine and it was given to Reuters at the time and
12 those were the photographs that came out of Srebrenica.
13 Q. And then you saw Karadzic who'd previously said something about
14 trapping the people in Srebrenica?
15 A. Well, we saw the other indicted in Belgrade, in the airport in
16 Belgrade. He was just coming out of a meeting with Mr. Milosevic, and
17 that was at the airport when we met with him, and he had publicly said
18 that they had them trapped like rats. And I actually quoted him in one of
19 my speeches at the Security Council but we never anticipated what he meant
20 until we got to Srebrenica and we really saw that he was not telling a
22 Q. And you made your complaints to him. Was this something he was
23 expecting or was it, in your judgement, something that came as a surprise
24 to him that complaints could be made in the way you did?
25 A. No, he was smiling all the time to us, you know. He didn't know
1 anything. He didn't know that there was no water coming to the city, no
2 electricity, no doctors --
3 Q. Very well.
4 A. -- there were people starving, et cetera.
5 Q. To deal with the question of notice, you've described the control,
6 the general atmosphere that was there. Page -- paragraph 344 on page 46.
7 You then gave press statements which of course are available around the
8 world, and to pick up some of them to save time, you've already dealt with
9 the fact that this was a slow-motion genocide, that Srebrenica was far
10 from being a safe area. You dealt with the cutting off of all aid,
11 including medical aid, and you also said, is this correct, middle of
12 paragraph 344, that there was open defiance of the international
14 A. Absolutely.
15 Q. And you then made your observations later to some other
16 journalists about, or perhaps Serbs running a concentration camp --
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. -- policed by UNPROFOR. Meanwhile the slow-motion genocide to
19 kill them gains speed.
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. If we, to deal with the exhibits, look at tab 15, there's your
22 unanimous report, and you set out a draft Resolution, which was not passed
23 or was passed?
24 A. It was passed.
25 Q. Sorry, yes. You're dealing with the adopted Resolution first.
1 But if we go on to the report, effectively the report itself, which is
2 four pages in, under the heading "Situation on the Ground," you've set out
3 a number of points. The Muslims viewed by the Serbs -- actions by the
4 Muslims viewed by the Serbs as justifying their offensive.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: What paragraph?
6 MR. NICE: This is paragraph 6.
7 Q. Seven, the 70.000 people there. Down to paragraph 11, an account
8 of how you'd been obstructed. Paragraph 13, your account of what Wahlgren
9 told you that came as a surprise to you about the so-called agreement, or
10 the agreement, rather. And then you set out the potential massacre of
11 25.000 people in paragraph 14.
12 17 you go back to that. 19 you deal with the slow-motion
13 genocide. And then over the page, paragraph 27A, the town practically
14 under siege -- sorry, 24 you set out what you observed, tanks dug in,
15 heavy weapons, and so on; and 27A, under siege; B inhuman conditions.
16 Over the page, G, the general humanitarian convoy position that you
17 observed; K, the need to be kept fully informed.
18 Was that document, your report, which can be perused in detail if
19 necessary, available to the former Yugoslavia and to this accused?
20 A. Absolutely. That report was actually circulated to the whole
21 General Assembly and it was widely quoted by the international media, Your
22 Honours, so that definitely it was a very well known report. It was the
23 first report ever produced by the Security Council on a mission on the
24 ground during a conflict.
25 Q. Then we go through tabs 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22. They are
1 samples of press and radio television output by you at that time?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. Your observations at the time, that this was a slow-motion
4 genocide waiting to happen or in the course of happening, was that ever
5 significantly challenged in the debate?
6 A. It was never challenged because it was so evident, Your Honours,
7 to watch a small town surrounded by heavy weapons, no doctors coming in,
8 no health, no water, no electricity, and it was obvious that it was going
9 to be a matter of time, which unfortunately proved to be the case. And
10 where the United Nations wasn't willing to do anything more forceful to
11 prevent that from happening, not even with withdrawing the heavy weapons
12 around the area or even allow the doctors to come into the area or water
13 to be resumed.
14 Q. You've described a state up and until your visit where information
15 coming to New York was inadequate and indeed incorrect.
16 A. And -- and not only that, usually late, too late. We -- we
17 really, it was a tremendous great shock to all the members of the Security
18 Council mission when we visit the area that the papers we had in our hands
19 did not reflect the gravity and the tragic situation on the ground, and I
20 think that that's why it propelled the members of the mission to put it in
21 black and white and really present it to the Council.
22 Q. Your mission was able to bring -- put the problem of Srebrenica on
23 the map for a time. Following this attempt of yours to bring change, what
24 happened? Did the level of reporting and information coming out of
25 Srebrenica continue at the higher level that you'd raised it to or did it
1 return to the lower level?
2 A. It returned to the lower level, Your Honours. Not only that, at
3 the time, the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali addressed General Wahlgren
4 on the ground to tell him that he didn't believe any military -- his
5 interpretation of our Resolution did not imply any changes in the military
6 attitude or policy. And that was corroborated to me by the Brigadier
7 Hayes who told me in Sarajevo that the Security Council Resolution were
8 woolly-headed Resolutions. If our own forces considered them irrelevant,
9 you can remember what the Serbs in the area considered them.
10 Q. Had you been able to effect any long-term change in any level of
11 impunity existing in the area of Srebrenica?
12 A. The Council never took any more measure -- initiative. The
13 Canadian Battalion at the time was about 200 effective were left intact.
14 They were not increased, augmented. The situation didn't change. What
15 Mr. Karadzic offered to us at the Belgrade airport never took place, and
16 the situation continued there, and other events continued absorbing the
17 attention of the international media and Srebrenica slowly came out of the
18 radar of the international community until it was too late and to -- in
19 July 1995.
20 Q. Tab 23, just to complete the documentary position. Tab 23 is a
21 letter from the permanent representative of Pakistan dated the 14th of
22 May, and this is a letter signed up by various people, the non-aligned
23 group. It -- I think paragraph 2 says that the Council has been
24 fundamentally unable to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter
25 to maintain the collective security system as envisaged, has failed to
1 redress this tragic situation. This is evident from the fact -- and then
2 various facts are set out.
3 Now, this document -- oh, yes. If we go over the page, please, to
4 paragraph -- the top of page -- the next page, at the end of what is
5 paragraph 4. "Since the London International Conference on the Former
6 Yugoslavia and up to the Vance-Owen Plan, the Serbs have repeatedly
7 deceived the international community and reneged on their commitments.
8 The Serbs have used the negotiating process and the Vance-Owen Plan not as
9 a means to a peaceful solution but as a vehicle for procrastination and
10 for gaining internationally legitimacy." Was that the view held by your
11 group at that time?
12 A. Yes, Your Honours. If I may explain something that I believe is
13 very significant: The non-aligned countries in the Security Council were
14 very concerned that all these debates were taking place in a closed room.
15 People always to used to see the public room of the Security Council, but
16 in formal consultation room, which are where the real debates and
17 discussions are held, were not being made public. And the non-aligned
18 felt that the real questions were not being brought up to the light. That
19 was reason that we produced this document, which became then and gave the
20 full information not only what was our position but what our information
21 was regarding this issue.
22 Q. So again available to the former Yugoslavia, and at paragraph 15
23 on the same document: "Bosnia and Herzegovina have become a symbol of the
24 resistance to the resurgence of the crime of genocide," and you set out
25 more than a hundred thousand deaths, and you say, "No one can claim
1 ignorance or lack of knowledge of these facts."
2 A. Even in colours, there was -- the only crime that wasn't committed
3 there was the crime of silence, like Bertrand Russell once said.
4 Q. And then tab 24, Resolution 827, adopted on the 25th of May, does
5 alarm -- continue to express alarm at continuing the talks of genocide.
6 And then finally, the tab is tab 25, a number of countries dealing with --
7 a draft Resolution this. Just tell us about this, please.
8 A. This was a draft Resolution which we presented to lift the arms
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. Described, as I explained before in my previous comments, to
12 really provide to -- to one of the parties the capacity to defend itself,
13 which is enshrined in the United Nations charter, because we were negating
14 them the possibility to defend them so at least we should allow them to
15 defend themselves. And even though that was a unanimous decision by the
16 General Assembly, it did not get the support of the permanent members of
17 the Security Council with exception of the United States who supported our
19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I have just got a couple of more
20 questions, with your leave, and then I'm done.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, Mr. Nice.
22 MR. NICE:
23 Q. In the draft statement, acting as an aide-memoire, at page 60,
24 paragraph 436, you set out how it was that it was on the 29th of June that
25 you spoke in favour of the draft Resolution that you advanced, and at page
1 400 -- page 64, paragraph 463, some of the things you said, which were of
2 course going to be reported back to Belgrade in your judgement, you set
3 out how the UN was not a debating Chamber. You likened the position there
4 to Czechoslovakia in 1938. Is that correct?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. And you said that the historical backdrop, page -- paragraph 465:
7 "... had sowed many dangerous seeds in the degenerating conflict.
8 President Izetbegovic has been called intransigent by Lord Owen, just as
9 Benes was. And Bosnia-Herzegovina is being compelled to cede to its Croat
10 and Serb neighbours 90 per cent of its territory. What will be left will
11 be perfectly homogenous areas within the spirit of apartheid so often
12 condemned by this organisation."
13 You go on to extend your analogy with Czechoslovakia, and at
14 paragraph 467 you set out the danger of preventing people from the right
15 to defend themselves.
16 Mr. Arria, as you know the time is limited and I have indeed
17 exhausted my time: You did everything you could, or did you do everything
18 you could to describe the position on the ground to the world and to the
19 United Nations?
20 A. Yes, sir, even though I believe it was completely unnecessary
21 because the whole world knew what was taking place. It was being
22 recorded, Your Honours, by all the international media and television all
23 over the world, so what we did was to add I would say the gravity of
24 coming from the Security Court members as the non-aligned members of the
25 Security Council agreed. By the way, I don't think add anything new
1 except when, during our visit to Srebrenica, Your Honours, when we found
2 this dire and terrible and tragic situation. Otherwise, the whole world
3 knew exactly what was going on.
4 Q. And the means of communication that you've described identified
5 the risk to the 25.000 people that you set out in your report?
6 A. Absolutely. I remember perfectly well, Your Honours, even The New
7 York Times carrying a long story about what slow-motion genocide meant and
8 actually fatally happened in 1995. It was an accumulation. I always
9 believe that the massacre started in 1993. It did not take place, started
10 in 1995. It was the same crime in an accumulated fashion that just took a
11 longer period to be implemented and executed but it was a massacre that
12 started two years and it took two years to accomplish and went beyond the
13 7.000 people of Srebrenica. It was around 20.000, even according to the
14 report of Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the Srebrenica report.
15 Q. In the absence of a red light, to which you referred at the very
16 beginning, was that clear to those who became involved in this matter?
17 A. I always believed that the sense of the culture, Your Honours, of
18 impunity started when the United Nations, the UNPROFOR forces were taken
19 to the airport in Sarajevo. The Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia,
20 Mr. Turajlic, they opened the door of an armoured car and he was murdered
21 in front of a patrol of United Nations troops and no one did raise a
22 finger, did anything about it, and it was clear that if you can murder,
23 with the protection of the United Nations, the Deputy Prime Minister the
24 newest member of the United Nations, you can get away with murder, which
25 actually they did.
1 MR. NICE: I'm grateful for the indulgence of a few more minutes,
2 but I hope that's a compact form of evidence acceptable to the Chamber.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. The Chamber is grateful for your
4 cooperation. Mr. Milosevic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, how much time am I
6 going to have for the cross-examination of this witness?
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: We had originally indicated one hour, but in view
8 of the examination-in-chief, we'll give you an hour and 20 minutes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I received this
10 witness's statement, which is almost 500 paragraphs long, last night, and
11 I received your decision that his presentation would be shorter,
12 shortened, and that Mr. Nice would have 30 minutes. Mr. Nice took up 60
13 minutes, as you've just seen.
14 JUDGE KWON: No. He has used only 40 minutes, 41 minutes.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, commence. The Chamber has always
16 been sensitive to your right to cross-examine. If you have an application
17 to make at the end, then you can make it and we'll consider it.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.
19 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Arria, in paragraph 7 of your statement you
21 say the following: "This statement is not meant to provide a definitive
22 chronology [In English] of events relating to all matters I dealt with as
23 I was brought in and out of service of the UN Security Council. I have
24 been asked by staff from the Office of the Prosecutor -- I have been asked
25 by staff from the office of Prosecutor to review a number of documents and
1 comment on them."
2 [Interpretation] That's a quotation from your statement. Was that
3 indeed the task you were given by the opposite side?
4 A. Precisely.
5 Q. And did you adhere to the task presented in that way when you made
6 your statement?
7 A. The request to me, Your Honours, was not regimented my
8 contribution to my position. I volunteer most of the information that is
9 provided in the document.
10 Q. So you selected the information; is that right? The information
11 that you provided and the comments you provided.
12 A. Your Honours, I always had full control of my own contribution to
13 this document.
14 Q. Very well, Mr. Arria, but the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a
15 continuous process, and the Security Council followed the continuity of
16 this process. Do you feel that a complete picture of this process and UN
17 Security Council reactions can be given if you limit your analysis to just
18 a part of the documents without giving us a full chronology of the events?
19 A. That was precisely, Your Honours, what I tried to contribute to
20 the case, to fill the gaps that were -- have to be filled and to bring
21 exactly whole context of my experience throughout whole process in the
22 Security Council and not -- that's what I said. I was not regimented or
23 limited in my contribution.
24 Q. Very well. But Mr. Arria, when we're talking about the events
25 that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you weren't present, you weren't
1 there, you have no direct knowledge of them with the exception of your
2 brief stay there in April 1993 within the frameworks of the UN Security
3 Council mission; isn't that right?
4 A. We had the information from many sources, not only from our own,
5 Your Honours, visit. We had, even though some of them were late, we had
6 from the UNPROFOR forces, we had from the missions who had people on the
7 ground, so we had -- we were in a privileged position to really know and
8 to get information, Your Honour.
9 Q. When I say that you have no direct knowledge except that brief
10 stay from the 23rd to the 26th of April, that's what I mean, that's right,
11 isn't it? And during those three days, you visited Zagreb and Belgrade
12 and various other places in Bosnia. So your immediate direct knowledge
13 was only based on what you learnt during the space of those three days.
14 Isn't that right, Mr. Arria?
15 A. No, Your Honours, that's not the case. There have been many
16 reports from commission of experts, human rights, the UN, especially the
17 United Nations Human Rights Commission, special commission, et cetera,
18 there was a lot of information. Of course you cannot have access directly
19 to all of them, but we were receiving a lot of this information.
20 Q. Yes, but in fact, you are testifying only about what you learnt
21 and the information you received from other sources, in fact. Would that
22 be right, Mr. Arria?
23 A. No. I am relying on my own information. I'm relying on
24 information from reliable sources, qualified sources to report to Security
25 Council. After all, the Security Council doesn't have people on the
1 ground. The whole United Nations system is actually politically under the
2 Security Council, so actually, Your Honours, we were working with the
3 whole system that is supposedly working for you.
4 Q. Very well. So that means that you as the representative of
5 Venezuela in the UN Security Council at that time base your knowledge on
6 the events on the ground from reports that were sent out by
7 representatives of UNPROFOR in the field, or UNMO, and it was their task
8 to follow events in the area and to report back to New York; is that
10 A. No, not necessarily the case. We received information, Your
11 Honours, like I said before, from different sources, missions, the
12 commission of experts, the UNPROFOR, our own mission on the ground, our
13 own embassies, embassies from other countries that had access to
14 information. So it was -- we were not lacking, from that point of view,
15 information what was really happening on the ground.
16 Q. Mr. Arria, in paragraph 38 of your statement, you say the
17 following: "I always thought that the UN Security Council, [In English]
18 regardless of its international political prominence was collectively an
19 extremely poorly informed body for two reasons. First because the
20 permanent members generally do not share information available to them;
21 and second, because the secretariat reports were regularly late and often
22 partial and incomplete and not necessarily because of the ignorance of the
24 [Interpretation] So it was this information precisely to which you
25 are referring that you say in paragraph 38 were withheld and that the UN
1 Security Council was an extremely poorly informed body is what you say.
2 A. Your Honours, the Security Council officially, that's what I mean,
3 was poorly informed but not in the reality. The problem with the Security
4 Council was precisely that they don't want to acknowledge and they won't
5 recognise even though they knew what was taking place. So it wasn't
6 because of lacking of information. What I meant was a lack of official
7 information that could be acted upon it.
8 Q. All right, Mr. Arria, but the first of the reasons that you
9 indicate was not that all the persons were not informed but the permanent
10 members generally do not share information with others. And then in
11 paragraph 29, you say that the permanent members had their own sources of
12 information and that it was those -- that they shared those informations
13 with the -- selectively and at their convenience shared the information.
14 It was the non-permanent members that were not informed or, rather, their
16 A. Yes, Your Honours, but again I reinstate it was officially but in
17 reality we knew, there were a lot of people in the United Nations
18 membership countries who were alarmed what was happening on the ground and
19 were willing to provide information to us, even missions from the
20 permanent member countries, from the permanent members of the Security
21 Council. So we had ample information to act. What -- but there was not
22 officially acknowledged by some of the permanent members who really didn't
23 want to act.
24 Q. Very well. The fact that you accuse these UN Security Council
25 members is your affair, but you say that the secretariat, and I'm quoting
1 you, "The secretariat reports were regularly late and often partial and
2 incomplete. [In English] And not necessarily because of the ignorance of
3 the facts."
4 [Interpretation] So Ghali and his services consciously and
5 intentionally covered up the facts. Is that what you're saying,
6 Mr. Arria, in fact?
7 A. Your Honours, I think it's only one accused party here. I'm not
8 accusing anybody else except the accused. And then what I said that, that
9 also -- I consider this operation one of the most -- the greatest cover-up
10 operation of the United Nations officially because so much information was
11 kept away from the -- from the Security Council membership to act upon.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: The -- there's a very narrow area of relevance of
13 the evidence of this witness, and that is why the Chamber issued an order
14 directing the Prosecutor how to conduct the examination-in-chief. The
15 United Nations and the Security Council is, of course, not on trial here,
16 but what happened there is -- is important and relevant as part of the
17 backdrop, the background to the events in Srebrenica.
18 I understand Mr. Milosevic to be asking you about the -- how well
19 the Security Council was informed, because to the extent that it was
20 poorly informed and that you are a member, then he might be saying that
21 you're also poorly informed, and I think that is what you need to answer.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I fully grasp the meaning
23 of the accused's remarks and questions to me, and I would like to try to
24 clarify what I said, that officially the Council was very poorly informed,
25 but that didn't mean that the members of the Council would not get access
1 to the information except for information that we were only able to gather
2 on the ground, like during our visit to Srebrenica. I don't know whether
3 I make myself clear, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, please continue.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I have been trying to
6 establish that this witness presented the facts in a lopsided manner,
7 upside down. He is criticising the Security Council and the
8 Secretary-General, and it seems the Security Council did not know
9 anything, but it seems that the entire UN structure, only he and a few
10 member of his group knew something and that no one else knew a thing.
11 Q. Please, Mr. Arria, in paragraph 29 you even went a step further in
12 your accusations against Boutros-Ghali. You say [In English]: "... in
13 some cases has provided disinformation." [Interpretation] You emphasised
14 that far the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina and specifically Srebrenica. So
15 you claim not only that the secretariat headed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali
16 denied you information but that even they disinformed you that they gave
17 you misinformation. That is a major accusation, isn't it? I'm quoting
18 you, so that is what you allege.
19 A. Your Honour, it is very clear to me that I'm not accusing anybody
20 else except the accused. The -- the relevance of this -- of the
21 secretariat not providing information on time or it is very clear -- I
22 actually mention in Madame Ogata's letter, for example, of October --
23 October -- March 18, I only came to see this letter 11 years later. If
24 that's not misinformation, it's very difficult to understand what
25 misinformation means. Not only that, we were prevented -- actually the
1 Secretary-General at the time, Boutros-Ghali was almost never present
2 during the private consultations when we were debating the position of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I was very critical of this arm-length position
4 from the man who is responsible to the charge and moral responsibility,
5 like the case of the Secretary-General.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: It is time for a break. We are I think five
7 minutes beyond.
8 Mr. Nice.
9 MR. NICE: Can I raise an entirely separate administrative matter
10 that it would be helpful to sort out just now?
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, let me have the witness now leave.
12 We're going to break for half an hour, and during the break you
13 are not to discuss your evidence with anybody. You may leave, Mr. Arria.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 MR. NICE: Small matter. The Court will remember issuing an order
16 about a range of documents, SDC minutes, Council for Harmonisation
17 documents and so on in respect of which it seeks us to provide and we are
18 going to provide analysis and interpretation. The task is a rather large
19 one and despite staff working all weekend, I'd be grateful for a short
20 extension of time. The Chamber may remember that there's a return date
21 for the amici I think one month after our document is in, and if you could
22 give us until the end of the week that would be of great assistance to us.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's granted. Yes. We adjourn for half
24 an hour.
25 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Please continue.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. So, Mr. Arria, let it be quite clear. I am fully challenging your
6 assertion that the general secretary of the UN at the time, that is to say
7 Boutros-Ghali, misinformed you and that when you say the secretary in some
8 cases, that is a completely unfounded accusation levelled against the
9 then-Secretary-General. Are you aware of that or not?
10 A. Your Honour, I believe if that will be the case, I think
11 Mr. Boutros-Ghali would choose another lawyer besides the accused.
12 Q. I don't understand your answer. I'm quoting you, Mr. Arria,
13 because you say: "Has provided disinformation."
14 A. Your Honour, to --
15 Q. You also express a lack of confidence in the Secretary-General and
16 the Security Council and everybody except for what you have been saying
17 all along yourself in terms of what you say happened.
18 A. Your Honour, when the accused referred before to a group, I would
19 like to tell you that our group meant 110 countries in the United Nations,
20 all the non-aligned countries of the United Nations, whom the members of
21 the non-aligned who were represented in the Security Council kept always
22 in consultation. So it was not only the opinion of only five members or
23 non-aligned members of the Security Council.
24 To illustrate to the Court, Your Honour, you allow me, I will tell
25 you only three things which I didn't want to extend more. Mrs. Ogata was
1 the highest official of the United Nations in charge of humanitarian
2 refugees. On March 18th informed the Secretary-General of the emerging
3 tragedy of an imminent danger for the population of Srebrenica. It took
4 two weeks for the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council.
5 The night that we were debating the Security Council Resolution of
6 safe areas, the secretariat knew fully well that Srebrenica had already
7 been capitulated, even though they did not inform the Council that
8 such-and-such was the case.
9 The third case, when the new Resolution for all the safe areas,
10 the secretariat withdrew the terms of reference that had been prepare by
11 Madame Ogata and the secretariat itself which were excellent terms of
12 reference to really create safe areas, they were withdrawn by the
13 secretariat at the instruction of the Secretary-General. That was what I
14 was -- when I address the issue of the lack of cooperation or
15 misinformation or cover-up, this is what I'm referring to, sir.
16 Q. Mr. Arria, since you mentioned Mrs. Ogata now and her letter that
17 you showed here, are you aware of the fact that it was actually the other
18 way round, that it was quite different from what you've been trying to say
19 all along as you show this letter, because she says: "[In English] During
20 the course of three telephone conversations I had with President Milosevic
21 on passage of relief convoys to Eastern and Central Bosnia, and in
22 particular to Srebrenica."
23 [Interpretation] Do you know that there has not been a single case
24 whatsoever that Serbia and I personally, and I was the one whom Mrs. Ogata
25 addressed, turned a deaf ear to requests put forth by the UN High
1 Commissioner for Refugees in order to facilitate the passage of
2 humanitarian convoys? Every humanitarian convoy that went through Serbia
3 was approved and not a single one was prevented from carrying out their
4 mission. You do not have one single case that Serbia presented any kind
5 of obstacle to humanitarian aid. On the contrary. Serbia made every
6 effort to make it possible for humanitarian convoys to come through. Do
7 you know that Serbia itself sent convoys to Serbia, including Sarajevo,
8 including the Muslims in Sarajevo?
9 So what have you been trying to prove through this letter as far
10 as Serbia's concerned and as far as I'm concerned personally? You do not
11 have a single case that we did not --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must allow the witness to
13 answer the question that you have raised.
14 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I sort of understood that was a
15 statement rather than a question. I don't know -- will you please correct
16 me if that's wrong.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think the substance of his question is that
18 Serbia did not present any kind of obstacle to humanitarian convoys coming
20 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, Serbia provided all the tanks,
21 ammunition, armament, uniforms, fuel to precisely to their proxies who
22 were preventing the humanitarian assistance to arrive.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. That is an absurd assertion, Mr. Arria, but let's move on. You
25 say in connection with this lack of information which is impermissible,
1 and you say that it was Boutros-Ghali and his services. In paragraph 30
2 you say: "[In English] The filter became excessive in the case of the
3 former Yugoslavia tragedy when the filter turned into a dam for the
4 containment of information that limited and prevented the arrival of
5 valuable information to Security Council in realtime, even on issues
6 affecting the lives of thousands of peoples."
7 [Interpretation] Are you accusing the secretariat or, rather,
8 Boutros-Ghali of having committed a crime?
9 A. Your Honour, in the documents that I presented, General Wahlgren
10 admits that a month before we ever knew that Srebrenica was about to fall
11 the secretariat knew about it. That's precisely what I'm referring to.
12 The information was not provided in time. I hardly doubt that the
13 Security Council would have done much more had it been provided
14 information but the situation was not as dire a month before as it was in
15 April 1993.
16 Q. In relation to Ghali, you spare no accusations, even in insulting
17 terms. Paragraph 42 when you say that he did not come to informal
18 consultations at the UN. You call Ghali's behaviour "[In English]
19 perverse to define such a practice." "I can only use the term perverse to
20 define such a practice."
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the specific question that you're putting
22 to the witness?
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Does that mean that Ghali was concealing information and providing
25 misinformation about things that had to do with the lives of thousands of
1 people and that he behaved in a perverse way? You describe the behaviour
2 of the General-Secretary at the request of a body which aspires to be a
3 body of the United Nations.
4 A. Your Honour, almost 11 years ago I raised my hand to approve the
5 creation of this Tribunal, and it was precisely to handle the case such as
6 the person who is the accused, not to consider the Secretary-General. So
7 I have said in my deposition, and I repeat it, that at the time I always
8 was critical and I remain very critical of the lack of candidness, to use
9 a term, by the secretariat and some of the member countries to admit and
10 to provide the real information in realtime to the Security Council.
11 Q. All right, Mr. Arria. You are no less harsh in an assessing the
12 behaviour of envoys in negotiations, like Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen.
13 In paragraph 148 of your statement, you say: "[In English] Negotiations
14 were ongoing at the time under the leadership of David Owen and Cyrus
15 Vance. A territorial division of an apartheid character was being
16 proposed by them and by Milosevic ..."
17 So according what you say, the two of them, together with me,
18 created apartheid in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is a crime, isn't it?
19 How did you get that idea?
20 A. The Security Council, the non-members, Your Honour, always said
21 that it was -- it should not be the outcome that Bosnia-Herzegovina should
22 be divided apartheid lines, which precisely the United Nations fought for
23 years before. One of the greatest victories of the United Nations was the
24 victory against apartheid.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic is, however, asking what is the
1 specific basis for your conclusion that he was proposing a division based
2 on apartheid?
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the accused was at -- proceeded --
4 adopted a policy of endless conversations and negotiations with the
5 Security Council with some of the mediators. I was perfectly informed by
6 Mr. Owen and Mr. Vance at the time precisely of what the ambitions of the
7 Serb Party were. At the time, even included from the beginning Srebrenica
8 as part of what they called later on the Republika Srpska. That's what
9 I'm referring to. And it came -- that part came from Mr. Milosevic
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, continue.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Even that is not correct, that it came directly from me. And I
14 asked you a question by quoting you directly, because you say territorial
15 division of an apartheid character was being proposed by them. So it's
16 Owen and Cyrus Vance. And then you add "and by Milosevic." That's why
17 I'm telling you, so the two of them, together with me, created some kind
18 of an apartheid.
19 A. I think I already replied, Your Honour, to that question.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Well, do you know, Mr. Arria, that the Vance-Owen Plan precisely
23 envisaged the cantonisation of Bosnia, which hardly overlapped with the
24 ethnic pattern of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Partly it did
25 coincide, but partly it did not at all. So that was not the basic premise
1 of the Vance-Owen Plan that we all supported, to create any kind of
2 apartheid. After all that, plan still exists and can be seen.
3 A. Your Honour, precisely the part that did not coincide on ethnic
4 grounds was the area of Srebrenica, and I think that the main party in
5 this conflict knows what they did about it, which was precisely to remove
6 the people from Srebrenica which were far away from Sarajevo. That's
7 precisely the region that did not fit exactly into the ethnic partition.
8 Srebrenica was the part that paid for this.
9 Q. Mr. Arria, in paragraphs 150, 51 and 52 of your statement you
10 say: "[In English] The surrender of Srebrenica to the Serbs was of
11 strategic importance - both for the Serbs and for the UN negotiators -
12 because Srebrenica had to be in Serb-held territory in order to be able to
13 secure a peace 'deal.'
14 "It would become part of Greater Serbia.
15 "Such a premeditated course of action can be easily established
16 by just following the reports that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali never
17 shared with the Council non-permanent members - who were the only ones who
18 would have opposed such a course - as well as by reading the directives he
19 provided to UNPROFOR not to assist in the protection of the enclaves."
20 [Interpretation] So this is what you said in terms of the
21 responsibility of the UN negotiators. I assume that you include Owen in
22 addition to Vance and the Secretary-General and the permanent members of
23 the Security Council. So this is a premeditated course of action, as you
24 put it; is that right?
25 A. Your Honours, I think I have even put it in writing what's my
1 position, which I don't want it to be altered in the way that's been
2 presented by Mr. Milosevic.
3 Q. I didn't alter anything, Mr. Arria. I just quoted you.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: In other words, you stand by what is in your
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So in your opinion, Owen, Vance, and the Security Council,
9 together with me, created some kind of a basis for a Greater Serbia. Is
10 that what you're alleging? There's a lack of seriousness in that,
11 Mr. Arria. Doesn't it look that way to you?
12 A. No, it doesn't look that way at all to me. From the first
13 negotiations, at the end, the outcome that came from the peace Resolution
14 at the end of the conflict reflected precisely what was intended from the
15 beginning, which was an ethnic partition of Bosnia which unfortunately
16 took place at the end.
17 Q. Are you saying now that the Dayton Agreement was also
18 misconceived, the one that brought the war in Bosnia to an end, achieved
19 peace? Is that what you're claiming, Mr. Arria?
20 A. Your Honour, I don't know how the accused feels about it. I feel
21 greatly relieved that fortunately peace was brought to people with whom he
22 humiliated and damaged for such a long time but I don't think that is the
23 cause of issue that is at stake, but if you want me to reply to that, Your
24 Honour, I will do that with pleasure.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. But please take a look at paragraph 46 of your statement, the UN
3 mission. You say -- you actually refer to the enclaves, the safe areas,
4 and then you say: "[In English] But in any Resolution to give effect to
5 such designation, it should be clearly and emphatically recorded that the
6 establishment Security Council safe areas in no way -- in no way
7 undermines the proposed settlement details of the --"
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I think we're having difficulty
9 finding that. Did you say paragraph 46?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, in the report of the mission to
11 the Security Council. His mission or, rather, the mission of his group.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. "[In English] ... in no way undermines the proposed settlement
14 details of the Vance-Owen Plan. It is not an attempt to create new and
15 different internal boundaries within Bosnia."
16 [Interpretation] So you, like all members of the mission then,
17 supported the Vance-Owen Plan. Does that mean that by giving your support
18 in writing by way of an official document, you supported apartheid,
19 actually, by way of supporting the creation of a Greater Serbia? Because
20 in this report of yours, you actually support the Vance-Owen Plan.
21 A. Your Honour, I couldn't follow the paragraph that he's quoting.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think he's referring to paragraph --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not paragraph 46 of your statement but paragraph
25 46 of the report to the Security Council.
1 Mr. Nice, is that --
2 JUDGE KWON: It's tab 15.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab 15.
4 JUDGE KWON: And page 11.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, 46. I have it, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Have you read the paragraph, and are you in a
7 position now to answer the question raised?
8 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. Yes, Your Honour, I am. Throughout the
9 whole process, the non-aligned members of the -- we always endorse all
10 peace plans that were proposed, especially the Vance-Owen Plan. It was
11 always -- we could not but hope for peace, but at the same time we were
12 demanding some force of action would be taken by the Security Council and
13 we conceived that to be compatible and especially compatible with the
14 political situation within the Security Council, which nothing else could
15 be achieved. And unfortunately, I believe at the end the Council
16 agreement brought, as actually corroborated, the ending partition of a
17 country, setting a terrible precedent for humanity. I believe so, sir.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Well, I assume that you're not testifying here about your
21 convictions, but it has become obvious that you are testifying about your
22 convictions. So you supported the Vance-Owen Plan, although you said
23 before that the Vance-Owen Plan was -- or, rather, that Vance and Owen,
24 together with me, were creating a division which constituted apartheid.
25 That plan, if you don't know that, Mr. Arria, was made by the three
1 parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yugoslavia supported that as it supported
2 all other peace plans. In that respect, you cannot find any difference
3 between the positions upheld by the Security Council and the positions of
4 Yugoslavia, because Yugoslavia, Serbia, and I personally supported all
5 peace plans. Are you aware of that?
6 A. I am very much aware, Your Honour, that Srebrenica was always an
7 issue in discussion, because the Serb side always wanted to have
8 Srebrenica, which was -- they wanted to have it always on the Serb side,
9 and that was finally what happened. Srebrenica today is on the Serb side.
10 Q. Do you know that these maps are the result of the final
11 negotiations held in Dayton on the basis of the finally adopted position
12 which was based on the proposal of the Contact Group, 51 to 49 between
13 Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that
14 proposal of the Contact Group had been put forth months before that. You
15 remember that, don't you?
16 A. Your Honour, at the moment of Dayton, already the situation
17 created by the atrocities committed by the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina
18 have settled already the issue. There was no option for the
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina government to accept those terms, especially knowing
20 that no one else was going to do anything about it.
21 Q. Mr. Arria, since you were not in Dayton, you probably don't know
22 that all options were on the table, and there weren't any questions that
23 were reserved, so to speak, and that could not be discussed. The Dayton
24 Agreement is the result of consensus among the three parties that
25 participated in it as well as the representatives of the Contact Group and
1 the host country, the United States. I assume that you know that and that
2 you don't need me to explain it to you.
3 A. Your Honour, I don't know whether the Council will -- the Dayton
4 Agreement is part of what you would like me to consider in the time that
5 I've been given. If you want me to, I will go into it.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, answer to the extent that you can, briefly.
7 THE WITNESS: I stand by what I said before. I believe that at
8 the outcome it was -- people had already been ravaged, the country has
9 been destroyed, subject to genocide, all kinds of crimes against humanity,
10 and the situation settled by the Serb forces with the support of Belgrade
11 had made it -- that possible, and there were no other options but the
12 representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina to sign. There are many books
13 written about what happened there, and I'm sure Your Honours know about
14 it, but there is one item, a fact that remains standing, that at the end,
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the newest countries of the United Nations,
16 partitioned on ethnic considerations, and that's -- I -- I stand on that.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. All right, Mr. Arria. You stand by facts that cannot be
19 corroborated in the field, actually, but let us move on, because our time
20 is not unlimited.
21 In paragraph 35, you say: "[In English] The non-permanent members
22 therefore often relied on media sources rather than UN information
23 services. They were usually more reliable than the secretariat ..."
24 [Interpretation] So since you were very poorly informed in the
25 Security Council, you received information from the media; is that right?
1 A. Your Honours, if a courageous British photographer and journalist
2 had not brought to the attention of the world what was happening in
3 Srebrenica even though the United Nations knew, we didn't know, all the
4 attention would have been provided, and it was international media
5 precisely in Great Britain that provided that information. The media was
6 following actually were the greatest allies that the non-permanent members
7 had. They had more people on the ground covering up and being objective
8 and independently providing information. That was not the only source, of
9 course, but it was the one that resounded more in public opinion.
10 Srebrenica to a great extent was not massacre in April 1993 because of the
11 assistance that this British journalist provided to world opinion.
12 Q. Why there was not a massacre in 1993 is something that is clearly
13 testified about. There is a lot of evidence about that, but I'm not going
14 to take up any more time because you obviously don't know about it. If
15 you received your information from the media, can one therefore infer that
16 you did not differ substantially from millions of people who received
17 their information by watching television, listening to the radio, and
18 reading the newspapers? Can we, therefore, conclude that you are no
19 better a witness than any other listener of the radio or any other person
20 who read the newspapers, watched television, and so on?
21 A. Your Honours, had it not been for this information, General
22 Morillon probably would not have appeared in Srebrenica, and he did. And
23 when you compound the news that were circulating in the world and
24 immediately General Morillon going to Srebrenica, that made it impossible
25 for the Security Council not to meet. And I must tell Your Honours that
1 had it not been because the non-aligned countries present their Resolution
2 to create a safe area, no Resolution had been created, probably just a
3 presidential statement would have only been circulated.
4 Q. That's not true, but as we'll have occasion to hear General
5 Morillon here in this courtroom, I don't suppose there's any need for you
6 to testify in place of General Morillon.
7 Now, tell me, please, since you're speaking about the media and
8 the fact that you were informed thereof, do you agree with the observation
9 made by David Owen which he presents in his book, and I'm going to quote
10 from that book, and it is linked to the media. This is what he says: "In
11 this stage of the propaganda war via its relations with the public has
12 become a feature of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The documents
13 registered with the Ministry of Justice of the United States of America
14 have shown that the -- that Croatia paid a Washington company for
15 relations with the public, Rudder-Finn Global Public, $10.000 a month plus
16 expenses, for it to project a favourable image of Croatia, a member of the
17 Congress, the function of administration and media placing news, and for
18 their part the Bosnian government paid for services rendered in placing
19 comments and columns by writers to -- and letters to the editor." And
20 then it goes on it state all the activities undertaken. I haven't got
21 time to quote Lord Owen in full on all these communiques, interviews and
22 all the rest granted to the press through official letters and so on --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: We must now put a specific -- you must now put a
24 specific question.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So Lord Owen concludes that: "In the International Committee for
2 the Former Yugoslavia we did not have the means by which to respond to
3 something of that nature." So he means to this media propaganda that Owen
4 is indicating.
5 So are you bearing that in mind or not, and do you agree with him
6 or don't you?
7 A. Your Honour, I believe that's for Lord Owen to respond to himself.
8 I cannot respond for Lord Owen, but I can make, if you like, a couple of
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you wish to, briefly.
11 THE WITNESS: I will. Had Belgrade not been under sanction most
12 probably would have also hired a public relation firm but they were under
13 sanction. Had the former Yugoslavia kept the prestige it had for many
14 years until this conflict started, they would not have needed any kind of
15 public relations to help them. Yugoslavia was, before the accused came
16 in, a very respected and prestigious country in the international
17 community. Thank you, sir.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Well, why, then, did the Bosnian government need experts for
20 public relations and paid agitators and lobbyists in Congress and in the
21 media in general in the west? Why did they need that if everything you
22 say was true?
23 A. Well, I'm not here to -- first, I'm not privy to what Bosnia had
24 or had not. That's for them to respond, Your Honour.
25 Q. All right. But bearing in mind the propaganda war that Lord Owen
1 mentions, can you say with certainty that the media information upon which
2 you based your knowledge about the events in Bosnia were always true and
3 correct and reliable?
4 A. Your Honours, I cannot comment on the propaganda war. What I can
5 comment is on the ethnic cleansing war, on the massacre war, and the
6 crimes and atrocities being committed. That I can report. I cannot
7 report on the propaganda war.
8 Q. Tell me now, please, since in the report that I quoted from, and
9 it is your own report I was quoting, paragraph 46, whereas we can see you
10 say nice things about the Vance-Owen Plan, whereas in the statement you
11 gave following an assignment from the opposite side you say the worst
12 things about the peace plan. So what knowledge did you gain in the
13 meantime which influenced this change of opinion on your part?
14 A. Your Honour, I really don't understand the question.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Repeat your question.
16 THE WITNESS: -- for example.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Repeat the question and clarify it.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Arria, in your statement, the one that I quoted from, saying
20 nice things about the plan, and you gave that statement at the request of
21 the opposite side, meaning Mr. Nice.
22 Now, in your report you say favourable things about that same
23 Vance Plan. So I'm asking you now, from the time you made favourable
24 statements about the plan, what made you change your opinion? What
25 influences were you working under which led you to change your opinion
1 about the Vance-Owen Plan?
2 A. The behaviour of the accused fundamentally, the systematic
3 boycotting of the process, the creation of the image that the accused was
4 going to -- being the main party was really going to be put into effect,
5 the finalisation of the conflict. That's what created fundamentally our
6 change of opinion and policy.
7 Q. But, Mr. Arria, it is common knowledge that all my efforts, and
8 you say that that is the main side, geared -- was geared towards achieving
9 peace, and nobody can dispute that through all the peace plans that were
10 put on the negotiating table. Are you aware of that or not?
11 A. We were clear that the two-prong approach had been adopted by the
12 Serbian side. One side you had the accused, Mr. Milosevic, entertaining
13 endless negotiation. On the other side you had his proxies on the ground
14 doing the dirty work of the ethnic cleansing and killing, committing
15 atrocities, and that two-prong approach was led the international
16 community to wait for so many years and almost 200.000 people to be killed
17 and dead until they finally reacted and put an end to this conflict.
18 Q. Oh, come on, Mr. Arria. You're talking about our relationship
19 towards ethnic cleansing. I'm going to quote now something from 1992. So
20 the year is 1992, much before you yourself were in Srebrenica?
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: What are you quoting from, Mr. Milosevic?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is my interview given to the ITN
23 TV network where I speak about the London conference, and I say that we
24 are associating our efforts to stop the bloody events in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And then I go on to say the following: "There are
1 some," I say that, "there are some who are advocating some sort of ethnic
2 cleansing, and I say to that we in Serbia consider that that is a criminal
3 act, a crime." And that was in the summer of 1992. Officially we
4 emphasised very clearly that something like that must not happen and that
5 anybody engaging in things of that kind must be prosecuted criminally.
6 And then I go on to speak about Bosnia and say that there is a civil war
7 going on there and in wars like that there are no innocent sides and
8 victors. All there are are casualties and victims.
9 So the London conference held in the summer of 1992, then, is what
10 I mention, and you say that we behaved as if we did not know about this
11 and did not wish to help to bring about peace. So what I read out was my
12 statement to the British ITN news network, and it refers precisely to
13 those who, as it says here, are advocating ethnic cleansing. And my
14 position was that we in Serbia consider that to be a crime, a criminal
15 act, and any perpetrators thereof must be brought to justice.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. And do you know this detail, for example? Are you aware of that
18 detail, Mr. Arria? And that is just one of the examples that I chose to
19 quote, but there are many others.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness answer, now, Mr. Milosevic.
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, my only comment to this would be that
22 I only wish that he had lived up to these words.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you know, for example, Mr. Arria, that the first crimes or
1 criminal acts that people learnt about, the crimes that took place in
2 Bosnia and where it was established that the perpetrators were certain
3 citizens of Serbia or those who were in fact taken to court and tried for
4 war crimes in Serbia in 1993? They were prosecuted. Are you aware of
6 A. Yes, Your Honour, I'm aware of that.
7 Q. So it wasn't just verbally, it was the actual factual conduct of
8 Serbia this should not be allowed. And as you know the former Yugoslavia,
9 Mr. Arria, and are well acquainted with Serbia and Montenegro, I assume
10 you know that throughout the ten years that the crisis lasted it was only
11 Serbia and Montenegro which did not change anything in the ethnic
12 structure and that nobody was persecuted in the Federal Republic of
13 Yugoslavia on an ethnic basis in any way whatsoever. Do you know about
14 that? Are you aware of that?
15 A. Your Honour, I don't believe that that one -- that single case
16 contradicts what I said before. I only wish and hope that Mr. Milosevic
17 would have lived up to what he declare, like he declare many other times
18 and he would do something about it. And it took many years. And it took
19 until the international community regain resolve and will to really force
20 Mr. Milosevic to put an end to this conflict.
21 Q. Mr. Arria, well, I assume that it was a civil war between three
22 warring parties in Bosnia and not Mr. Milosevic's war, as you said. And
23 Lord Owen wrote about it anyway, and he spoke about it too. It was a
24 civil war between the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats,
25 the three sides. And as opposed to you, he was there all the time, and
1 throughout he was at the head of the international conference.
2 A. Your Honours, if this had been a civil war like the accused is
3 stating, his country would have never been under sanctions. His country
4 would have never been mentioned in more than 50 Resolutions. Why would
5 former Yugoslavia be punished by the international community if this was a
6 civil war? This was not a civil war. It was war of aggression of one
7 former member of the United Nations against a smaller undefended member of
8 the United Nations. This was not civil war. This was a war of aggression,
9 conquers of territory, ethnic cleansing. That's what it was.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: As for the nature of the conflict, that is a
11 legal issue which the Chamber will have to decide.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Since you say that the sanctions were introduced because
14 Yugoslavia behaved as it should not have behaved, I'm going to remind you
15 of something now. The statement or, rather, report of the UN
16 Secretary-General linked to a UN Security Council Resolution number 752.
17 This is the 30th of May, 1992. I think I received it within the batch of
18 documents I was given, report of the Secretary-General, pursuant to
19 paragraph 4 of the Security Council Resolution number 752.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just allow us to find it, Mr. Milosevic.
21 Mr. Nice, can you help us? Or maybe Mr. Milosevic himself can
22 tell us. Do you have the tab number, Mr. Milosevic?
23 MR. NICE: Tab 4.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I have a lot of papers here.
25 It was in one of the tabs, and I pulled it out.
1 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues]... he's referring to,
2 the proposal --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're going to try tab 4.
4 MR. NICE: The way he describes it, it makes it a little unclear
5 to me.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, it doesn't appear to be tab 4. If he shows
7 me the document or if he shows Ms. Dicklich the document, we can find it.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I tell you what, Mr. Milosevic, you continue with
9 your cross-examination. Just read very slowly the passage, and I'm quite
10 sure we will be able to gather what you mean.
11 MR. KAY: Page 12 of the witness statement of Dr. Arria contains a
12 reference to it.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Kay. Page 12.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. As I was saying, this is a report of the UN Secretary-General, and
16 I'm just going to read a couple -- or, rather, three basic points that I
17 wish to refer to. This is what he says, and it is the report of
18 Boutros-Ghali to the UN Security Council on the 30th of May, 1992. Point
19 5 says: "[In English] The bulk of the JNA personnel were deployed in
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina were citizens of that republic and were not
21 therefore covered by Belgrade authorities' decision of 4th of May to
22 withdraw JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of them appear to have joined
23 army of so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Others have
24 joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina which is under the
25 political control of the Presidency of that republic. Others may have
1 joined various irregular forces operating there."
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Time to put your question now, Mr. Milosevic.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Point 6 reads: "[In English] [Previous translation continues]...
5 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are said by the Belgrade authorities number
6 barely 20 per cent of the total. Most of these are believed to have
7 withdrawn already into Serbia and Montenegro, some of them having been
8 subjected to attack during their withdrawal. Others, however, remain at
9 the various garrison in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in
10 Serb-controlled areas, et cetera. A further category consists of
11 personnel who have been blocked -- personnel who have been blocked in
12 their barracks by the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina or hostile
13 irregular forces."
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's now time for you to put a
15 question. Otherwise, the sense of the original passages will have been
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Now, Mr. Arria, is it clear to you that in the UN
20 Secretary-General's report, Boutros-Ghali to the Security Council, it
21 clearly states that the decision of the leadership of Yugoslavia was to
22 withdraw its citizens because at the time Bosnia-Herzegovina had already
23 been recognised. And Yugoslavia does that. It withdraws all its citizens
24 who were members of the Yugoslav People's Army from Bosnia-Herzegovina and
25 that the people who were not withdrawn were those who were blocked in some
1 of the garrisons and couldn't be. I assume that's clear to you.
2 A. Your Honours, I have not been able to find this in my documents.
3 What I have found is the other counterpart of the present
4 Secretary-General for United Nations's report to Srebrenica, which is the
5 opposite to what --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you need it to be able to answer the
7 question, you need to see it?
8 THE WITNESS: I want to make sure --
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: You want to make sure.
10 THE WITNESS: -- that's what was said because Mr. Annan said
11 something completely different in his report on Srebrenica.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we're not able to find it.
13 MR. NICE: The last document we thought we'd found as Exhibit 547,
14 tab 2, but that's the Resolution. The latest document, I'm not sure
15 what's being referred to, if the same or --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you have the document there?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is, yes. And I was quoting from
18 that document, Mr. Robinson.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the usher pass it to the witness.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I have it back, please.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think the witness will purloin it,
22 Mr. Milosevic. Will you just pass it to the witness and let the witness
23 read it, the particular passages.
24 I am now told it's Defence Exhibit 91. After the witness has read
25 it, Mr. Milosevic will rephrase his question very shortly, and the witness
1 will answer.
2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, meanwhile I can tell you this is the
3 first time ever I see this document and the title on top is different to
4 the regular documents of the Security Council. So I don't even know who
5 issued this. Doesn't look like an official document of the Security
6 Council at all. Doesn't have a number, doesn't have a reference.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Pass it to me. I do have some familiarity with
8 Security Council Resolutions.
9 It seems to be a report of the Secretary-General pursuant to a
10 Security Council Resolution. That's Exhibit 91.
11 And, Mr. Milosevic, you are quoting from what paragraphs?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Point 5, para 5, I believe,
13 Mr. Robinson. If you turn the page and have a look at paragraph 5, and I
14 think 6 and 7 as well.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Would you pass that to the witness. I have
16 marked it. It's on the second page.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may I be given my own copy back,
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Give Mr. Milosevic his copy. So it's a report of
20 the Secretary-General pursuant to a Resolution.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. The one I was presented was
22 a different text.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
24 THE WITNESS: This one I also recognise. I've never seen it
25 before, I must tell you.
1 On the -- precisely on that point, Your Honour, the
2 Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report on Srebrenica states specifically
3 that the bulk of the army suddenly created by sort of an act of magic in
4 the so-called Republika Srpska was coming from Belgrade. The
5 Secretary-General Annan says himself that also with people linked to Mafia
6 and criminal activities were the ones, are the way he described it in his
7 now well-known report on Srebrenica. And he says here, in a way he's in
8 contradiction because this initial report by Secretary-General Annan says
9 it is a mission on the responsibility of the United Nations failing a
10 member country. And I'm just quoting Mr. Annan's words. And he says the
11 opposite of this. He says precisely that they were transferred,
12 ammunition, tanks, planes, radars, the whole thing was transferred from
13 Belgrade. It was not an act of magic. It was an act of support by
14 Belgrade to create these armed forces to the group that was the same
15 coming from Serbia. Now, whether there were some from Bosnia -- Bosnia
16 was an ecumenical country until this conflict began. There were all kinds
17 of ethnic groups living under the same roof until they were provoked into
18 this conflict.
19 So I see, Your Honour, differences between Secretary-General
20 Boutros-Ghali's remarks, which is the first time I see this document, and
21 the Secretary-General Kofi Annan several years later evaluating the
22 situation, stating perfectly clear that they moved the armed forces from
23 Serbia, from former Yugoslavia, to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, whether they
24 were -- of course there must have been contingents of these officers who
25 were already living on the other side. After all, it used to be one
1 country until the year before. That's all I have to say, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Arria, let's be proper in our conduct and stick to the report
5 from those times, that is to say when Boutros-Ghali, on the 30th of May,
6 1992, reported to the United Nations Security Council. And it is quite
7 clear in that report that those parts of the JNA - and as you know, it was
8 an army throughout the territory of Yugoslavia - that those people that
9 originated from Serbia and Montenegro or, rather, the Federal Republic of
10 Yugoslavia, were being withdrawn to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
11 That is what he observes and takes note of. And the only people remaining
12 were those people who were citizens of that newly recognised country, as
13 you yourself say. So why would they then withdraw to the Federal Republic
14 of Yugoslavia if they were in this newly recognised country? The Federal
15 Republic of Yugoslavia cannot withdraw and pull out citizens of a
16 neighbouring state, can it, withdraw it to its own territory? And Ghali
17 here confirms the fact that Yugoslavia did fulfil its responsibilities and
18 withdraw that portion of the JNA back to base, so to speak.
19 And then he goes on to explain, if you have noted that, and I
20 don't think that can be challenged or disputed.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: After you note that, the witness should answer if
22 he can.
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the only thing that I can contribute
24 with here would be to contrast Secretary-General Annan's review with the
25 statement. I cannot -- I think that it would not be useful for me to
1 comment on Boutros-Ghali's comment, report at that time which I just seen
2 it for the first time today, even though I was a member of the Security
3 Council at the time. But I can quote on Secretary-General Kofi Annan's
4 precisely on that mission, precisely on this point, which it carries a
5 completely different interpretation of what I've been hearing now.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Mr. Arria, you yourself mentioned a moment ago that it was because
8 Yugoslavia did not carry out something it should have done that sanctions
9 were imposed. And this is a report dated the 30th of May, 1992 and it
10 states what I quoted. It also states clearly that the forces which
11 remained in Bosnia beyond the control of the JNA. And then in point 10 it
12 says the following: "As regards the withdrawal of the elements of the
13 Croatian army [In English] [Previous translation continues]... now in
14 Bosnia, information currently available in New York suggested no such
15 withdrawal has occurred. UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of
16 Croatian army personnel in uniform operating within and as part of
17 military formation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian authorities here
18 consistently taken position that the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina have left the Croatian army and are not subject to this
20 authority. International observers do not, however, doubt that portions
21 of Bosnia and Herzegovina are under control of Croatian military units,
22 whether belonging to the local Territorial Defence, to paramilitary group,
23 or to the Croatian army. It is unclear in the circumstances how their
24 withdrawal or disbandment as required by the Council can be achieved."
25 [Interpretation] Therefore -- therefore, three points. Ghali is
1 saying three points here, that the JNA has withdrawn, that the army of
2 Republika Srpska is outside any JNA control whatsoever, or the control of
3 Belgrade in other words, and that the Croatian army has not withdrawn.
4 And now I'm going to ask you, are you aware, Mr. Arria, of the fact that
5 this report precisely was kept by the then-Chairman of the UN Security
6 Council, Mr. Hohenfellner, the Austrian representative, that he did not
7 divide it up among the UN Security Council members. He waited for the UN
8 Security Council session to pass, at which sanctions against Yugoslavia
9 were voted on, and he gave an explanation which is quite different from
10 Ghali's report, and it was only after the sanctions had actually been
11 enforced, introduced that --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic -- Mr. Milosevic, stop.
13 Mr. Milosevic, as a rule of thumb, no more than two or three sentences and
14 then a question. Otherwise, it becomes very difficult for the witness and
15 does not serve your interests also. It doesn't serve the interests of the
17 Let the witness answer now if he can.
18 THE WITNESS: As you can see, Your Honours, I was right. I never
19 seen the report. It was not circulated. That is what has been said. But
20 I can comment, make a general, very brief comment.
21 That it was very convenient for Mr. Tudjman and for Mr. Milosevic
22 to masquerade, to carry on a masquerade that these were local forces.
23 These were forces coming from Croatia one time and coming from Belgrade.
24 I don't think Mr. Mladic went to a military school in Pale. He went to
25 military school, like all these officers, in Belgrade.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Arria, it's very difficult for me to understand
2 that this report of the Secretary-General was not circulated at that time.
3 Are you positive?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I am positive. I have never seen
5 this before. It's not the only time. As I said at the beginning, I have
6 also seen other reports that have come to my attention 11 years later, and
7 I have consulted with some of my colleagues at the time, and I -- if you
8 read, Your Honour, in the French commission that evaluated, there are many
9 gaps into the same thing because some of them didn't even know that these
10 documents were circulated. That's why I alluded to a cover-up operation
11 at the beginning where there were very few people who were not guilty.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Does it have a Security Council number, the
14 THE WITNESS: No. It is a report -- yes, it has a number. It
15 could be a general distribution document. It -- the Security Council
16 number, as you -- I cannot compete now with your knowledge of the Security
17 Council Resolution, always have a number, and it's SC, X number,
18 et cetera, and they put the number and the date. This is not the case
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. But this is a report of the
21 Secretary-General pursuant to.
22 THE WITNESS: Pursuant to. But I -- yes.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: But it would still have a number.
24 THE WITNESS: It looks like a report. There's no doubt in my
25 mind. You are absolutely correct, it looks like a report, but I have
1 never seen it. I'm sorry, Your Honour, not to be able to provide more
2 information now.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the hour and 20 minutes will end
5 in three minutes. What is your position?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, in response to that,
7 Mr. Robinson, I ask you to extend my time for at least one hour, for one
8 hour at least.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think one hour may be too much, but I'll
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. You will have the rest of this session,
13 that is up to 12.30, and then ten minutes after the break.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. I will
15 try, then, to make a selection, but do bear in mind that I received a
16 500-paragraph long statement of this witness, and then it was shortened
17 down only much later.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Arria, do you know that Peter Hohenfellner, who was president
20 of the Security Council in the month of May 1992, that is to say at the
21 time when this report of Ghali's was submitted to the Security Council for
22 it to reach its further decisions on that -- on the basis of that report,
23 that he kept this report, withheld it, waited for the session to end where
24 sanctions were voted on, and this decision was based on facts which were
25 totally not in line with the facts presented in the report? Do you know
1 about that?
2 A. Your Honours, I know very well Ambassador Hohenfellner, and I know
3 very well the Austrian people, and I cannot -- doubt that that would be
4 the behaviour of Austria and of the ambassador, but that was -- it is
5 really could be irrelevant, because the basis -- that would not alter or
6 change at all the decision taken by the Security Council on sanction, not
7 even by the closest people to Belgrade. It would not alter it at all.
8 Q. All right, Mr. Arria. Isn't it obvious from the content of
9 Ghali's report that he is not giving any basis for imposing sanctions on
10 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? Perhaps only against Croatia, because
11 on one page he says that the JNA did withdraw but that the Croatian forces
12 did not withdraw. And as you know full well, Austria was their ally, and
13 now you say that Hohenfellner did not withhold the report although that is
14 a material fact, because the report is dated the 30th of May. Are you
15 aware of that?
16 A. I'm not aware of any deceive by the Austria ambassador acting as
17 president of the Security Council, Your Honour, and I haven't read the
18 whole report, this report. You asked me to read a paragraph and I cannot
19 speak for the whole document which I have not seen. I can speak to the
20 paragraph that you had asked me to address.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Quite so, yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll try to speed things up as much
23 as I can, Mr. Robinson. I hope that that is quite clear, and I assume
24 that this report of the Secretary-General has been admitted into evidence.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In paragraph 444, when speaking about the negotiations in Geneva
2 chaired by Owen and Stoltenberg, you say: "[In English]... when it came
3 the moment to negotiate with the Muslim side, the negotiators agreed to
4 bring seven members of the Presidency of that republic: Three Croatians,
5 three Serbs, and one Muslim. I repeat, only one Muslim."
6 [Interpretation] Quotation. Now, if we have the same Presidency
7 of Bosnia and Herzegovina in mind, I don't know which one you have in
8 mind, it had a totality of seven members. Its ethnic composition could
9 not have been determined by international negotiators. It had been
10 established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is not true at all that there
11 was only one Muslim on the Presidency.
12 Are you aware at least of that material fact, and also is that an
13 indicator of the fact that you are using complete inaccuracies here? I've
14 quoted you just now.
15 A. Your Honours, at the time I said in a public meeting of the
16 Security Council that the negotiator was trying to clinch a deal at any
17 price, and then I said that it was bizarre to say the least that the
18 negotiations in Geneva that could pull three of the other two parties,
19 three members and one Muslim, and I said to the bad luck of the conveners
20 that man was being searched by the police and had to leave the meeting,
21 because he was the only one who were able -- that they were able to get to
22 appear in that meeting.
23 Q. Never heard of any such thing, and I did not hear at all about any
24 representative of the Muslim delegation, starting from Alija Izetbegovic
25 onwards, he always had very numerous delegations, was mistreated by the
1 police in Geneva or discriminated against. You are the first person to be
2 claiming so. This is the first time that this has ever been heard.
3 A. Your Honour, I can only tell you that is in the record of my
4 public statement. Lord Owen was there. It wasn't contested. The British
5 representative was there. It wasn't contested. No one in the Security
6 Council contested this information.
7 Q. And when did this happen? Tell me, please. If you say that you
8 have it in your notes, when was this meeting held when three Croats and
9 three Serbs came from the Bosnian Presidency? Three Serbs were never on
10 the Bosnian Presidency. There were two of them, Nikola Koljevic and
11 Biljana Plavsic. I don't see how three could have come when they were not
12 members of the Presidency at all.
13 A. Your Honour, I'm not saying they were members of the Presidency.
14 I said delegates. The three of the Croats, three of the Serbs, and one of
15 the Muslims. I didn't say they were members of the Presidency.
16 Q. All right. Let's not dwell on this any longer. I believe that
17 this is a completely unfounded allegation.
18 In paragraph 11, which is highly unlikely for a witness, you put
19 many questions. "[In English] Why did the UNSC delegate ex officio the
20 main responsibility for the handling of the crisis to the EU (David Owen)
21 and the United States (Cyrus Vance)?"
22 [Interpretation] Now, tell me, you are putting this question. You
23 are referring to the delegate of the European Union, David Owen, and the
24 US envoy Cyrus Vance, and in the text further on you refer to Thorvald
25 Stoltenberg who replaced Vance as UN envoy. It is obvious that you are
1 aware of that fact because you referred to it. Stoltenberg is a
2 Norwegian. That has nothing to do with the United States. So this
3 question that you put, that they delegated people from the European Union
4 and from the US, that's senseless, isn't it?
5 Vance was elected or, rather, appointed and was there for a while
6 and then he was succeeded by Stoltenberg. That's what you knew.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tell us what motivated the question.
8 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it proved to be a major catastrophe, to
9 say the least, for the poor Bosnians, that it was claimed that it was the
10 hour of Europe and the European Community decided to assume
11 responsibility, which they never discharged properly, and my question was
12 raised more as a point to the international community. They -- I remember
13 the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Mr. Poos, said this is the hour of
14 Europe, it's not for the United Nations or the United Nations, this is our
15 responsibility. And of course that responsibility was not discharged, and
16 that's what I'm referring to. And what I add, Your Honour, was that the
17 Security Council found that convenient, and it had to do it. Imagine this
18 all happened in middle of Europe, that genocide was being committed and
19 rape of women as a policy of a state was being committed in the middle of
20 Europe after they had said 40 years before no more, never again. And this
21 was happening again in the middle of Europe, that the Security Council
22 didn't have any other option but to let the European Community to try to
23 manage the issue. This is what I'm referring to.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Are you aware of the fact that there was a civil war going on over
2 there and that atrocities or, rather, that in such a war and in such
3 conflicts there could have been no parties involved who were innocent?
4 A. Your Honour, I restate my answer before: This was not civil war,
5 this was a war of conquest.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: And, Mr. Milosevic, refrain from engaging in the
7 question of the characterisation of the conflict, as I have told you
8 before. That's a legal issue. So please move on.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. When speaking about the Security Council Resolution dated the 7th
12 of February, 1992, and that is Resolution 740, in paragraph 60 you say:
13 "[In English] When the Resolution was passed, I remember the satisfaction
14 that the non-aligned members of the Council felt for having approved a
15 Resolution to impose an arms embargo. Little did we know then that with
16 that Resolution we were sealing the fate of the Bosnian republic, that we
17 were taking away from this member country the right of self-defence
18 enshrined in the UN Charter."
19 [Interpretation] Tell me now, Mr. Arria, what kind of a member
20 state are you talking about on the 7th of February, 1992? There was only
21 one country then, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At that
22 time, Bosnia and Herzegovina had not even proclaimed its own independence,
23 and it was recognised only on the 6th of April, 1992. And it was admitted
24 into the UN on the 22nd of May in 1992. And you are talking about a
25 Resolution dated the 7th of February. So that is to say three months
1 before this which you call a member state of the UN had even existed as an
2 internationally recognised state. And as you know, this unfortunate war
3 was triggered by this premature recognition. Aren't you aware of that?
4 Isn't that clear to you, Mr. Arria?
5 A. I am aware not only -- not only aware of the first part, but, Your
6 Honours, that I said in my deposition that my country was a supporter
7 preserving the integrity. It took very few weeks to find out under the
8 conflict that Yugoslavia was not the Yugoslavia of Tito and that the
9 accused was not just Josip Broz Tito either, and then that's when the
10 position changed.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, your last question before the
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Tell me, please, in paragraphs 53 through 56, you talk about your
15 support to preserving the territorial integrity of the SFRY, and you refer
16 to it just now. This same kind of support was given by other members of
17 the non-aligned movement to Yugoslavia. Now, tell me, how is it that you
18 can express regret, then, that the arming of secessionists was forbidden
19 in the SFRY? Because according to the constitution of Yugoslavia, it was
20 only the army and the Territorial Defence that had the right to be the
21 armed force of Yugoslavia.
22 For example, the Patriotic League of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other
23 such organisations were illegal because they only pursued secession.
24 Don't you know that? And had they been disarmed, there would have been no
1 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, will you please help me? Which is the
2 question here?
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, just rephrase the question
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Well, do you know that at that time there was support given to the
7 territorial integrity of Yugoslavia? Isn't that right, Mr. Arria?
8 THE WITNESS: In which date, Your Honour, I would like to ask Mr.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: What period are you talking about?
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. The time before the recognition of these republics that had
13 carried out secession. There was The Hague Conference, there were several
14 statements by all sorts of world officials who supported the territorial
15 integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia and so on. My question is, how
16 can you express regret over the fact that the arming of secessionist
17 political groups was being banned? That is to say they were trying to act
18 apart from the constitution of Yugoslavia, and that was the only
19 legitimate state, and they were trying to pursue violent secession.
20 A. Your Honours, the non-aligned movement in the United Nations kept
21 the support of the integrity of the unity of Yugoslavia until Belgrade
22 started shelling Croatia, and then it was clear that we were facing a war
23 in the Balkans again. And what my remarks at that time was
24 -- I'm referring to what happened, our knowledge of the situation in
25 February 1992 that -- I'm commenting that had we known the intentions of
1 Belgrade at the time, and we innocently thought that to put an arms
2 embargo was actually like a great measure and a great help, and I said
3 that this really meant that we left unarmed, and I believe, Your Honours,
4 that's a major responsibility for the countries who knew this issue well,
5 that they should be more accountable for having imposed and then later
6 refusing in the -- even if confronting the realities on the ground,
7 refused to lift the arms embargo which actually almost sealed the fate --
8 the fatal fate of the Bosnian population.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It's time for the adjournment. We break
10 for lunch and resume at 2.00 p.m.
11 I remind you, Mr. Arria, during the adjournment you're not to
12 discuss the case with anyone.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
14 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 2.06 p.m.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, ten minutes, to be applied
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. All right.
19 I will really try to deal with two topics very briefly.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Arria, in paragraph 49 of the mission report to the Security
22 Council established according to Resolution 819, "[In English] General
23 Morillon and UNPROFOR military and civilian staff, et cetera ..."
24 [Interpretation] So in April 1993, after visiting
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, you admired the generals and other members of
1 UNPROFOR. And now you claim that they made the Muslim side surrender on
2 the basis of the demilitarisation agreement. Is this a change in your
3 position yet again?
4 A. Your Honour, I am on the record for being an admirer of the
5 efforts of the countries that put up the forces of UNPROFOR. Actually,
6 that's one of paragraphs in the statement. I have actually even added
7 that the government of Holland, the Netherlands, took an unfairly heavy
8 load of responsibility upon themselves on the massacre at Srebrenica which
9 should have set a precedent for the other countries to be more
10 accountable, like the Dutch government, that even one government failed
11 fell. I have never changed my opinion about UNPROFOR forces. When I said
12 they were forced to capitulate and we understood at the moment it was
13 because they knew on the ground that no other help, no other assistance
14 was coming. Even Lord Owen had said before to President Izetbegovic, no
15 one is coming to your assistance. So there was no other option at the
16 moment for UNPROFOR forces but to do what they did. And I -- we said that
17 in the report. It was not only my belief, it was the belief of all the
18 members of the Security Council delegation.
19 Q. All right, Mr. Arria. Do you know that this zone was not
20 demilitarised, that the 28th Division was operating within it under the
21 command of Naser Oric and that before these events in 1993 and after that
22 the safe area was used as a support for committing terrible atrocities
23 against the Serb villages around Srebrenica and around the area, that
24 hundreds of people were killed and villages destroyed? Do you know
25 anything about any of this?
1 A. What I said at the moment, and I continue saying today, is that we
2 knew that Srebrenica was surrounded, under siege, under siege, that it was
3 being bombarded, shelled to the defenceless population. That is as much
4 as we knew, Your Honour.
5 Q. All right. And did you know how much we from Serbia and I
6 personally made an effort precisely in that year, 1993, in order to
7 prevent larger-scale conflicts and these horrible consequences? At that
8 time, it was supported by the leadership of Republika Srpska too in order
9 to attain an agreement and to have an alleviation of the situation on the
10 ground and that terrible atrocities were committed, horrific crimes. Are
11 you aware of that?
12 A. I am aware, Your Honour, that Mr. Milosevic stated through a long
13 period of time all kinds of promises and statements that were not
14 fulfilled until international community took a firm action and stopped
15 him. That's as much as we all know.
16 Q. I'm not aware of any promises that I gave, promises that I gave
17 and did not fulfil, but we don't have time to go into that now.
18 And now this other issue I wish to deal with. It seems to me that
19 your most telling proof of what you have been saying, that Serbs committed
20 genocide and that Yugoslavia committed genocide against the Muslims, and
21 you keep referring to the 8th of April, 1993, ruling of the International
22 Court on provisional measures. Isn't that right, Mr. Arria?
23 A. Your Honours, it's very important that I clear -- I have never
24 addressed the Yugoslavian people as a whole, for whom I have great
25 admiration. They are not to be blamed for the faults and crimes committed
1 under the name of their country. It's terrible what has been brought also
2 to the Serbian population because of the practices promoted and
3 implemented by the Belgrade regime, never addressed them as Yugoslavian
5 Q. Mr. Arria, I'm not asking you about whether you spoke about that.
6 You say that the International Court of Justice, by their measures taken
7 on the 8th of April, 1993, in connection with the Convention on Genocide,
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina brought charges against the Federal Republic of
10 In paragraphs 178 and 180, you say: "[In English] The following
11 provisional measures to be in effect while the court is seized of this
13 179: "That Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) together with its
14 agents and surrogates in Bosnia and elsewhere must immediately cease and
15 desist from all acts of genocide and genocidal acts against the people and
16 the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina including but not limited to murder,
17 summary executions, torture, rape, mayhem, so-called ethnic cleansing, the
18 wanton devastation of villages, towns, districts and cities, the seige of
19 villages, towns, the starvation of the civilian population, the
20 bombardment of civilian population centres and the detention of civilians
21 in concentration camps."
22 [Interpretation] That is what you said the position of the
23 International Court of Justice was. However, my question to you,
24 Mr. Arria, is the following: Isn't it clear to you from the actual text
25 that you've quoted from that what you say is not an integral part of the
1 decision of the ICJ at all? This sentence is part of the request put
2 forth by the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is not part of the
3 court ruling. So you, Mr. Arria, deceive those who are listening to this,
4 claiming that what I just quoted to you now is part of the court ruling,
5 the court order, and you actually quoted the government of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And of course, their document is worded in the worst
7 possible way against the Serbian side.
8 A. Your Honour, this was the first time ever the International Court
9 of Justice took a case such as this and took it on the monumental evidence
10 provided to it. This is only one part, one quote from the whole court
11 order by the International Court of Justice. If we take a minute to read
12 the other parts of the court order, you will see that that's repeated
13 throughout the whole document. This is the most detailed court order
14 because it was the first time ever that the issue of genocide was being
15 considered --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: What I understand Mr. Milosevic to be saying is
17 that what is in paragraph 179 reflects the request made for provisional
18 measures and does not itself form a part of the actual decision. One
19 would need to look at the judgement itself to be sure.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you know full well,
21 and I hope that Mr. Arria, with his diplomatic experience, would have to
22 know that when provisional measures are taken by the International Court
23 of Justice, they do not go into the merit of the case, and they do not
24 establish the factual basis. They just remind that there is the duty to
25 abide by the provisions of the convention, but they do not rule that there
1 actually had been a violation of them.
2 Please look at this document. I got it in your tab number 9.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. So after all of this, and of course there are quotations of
5 sentences provided by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because
6 after all that is what they are ruling on, after all those quotations, it
7 says very nicely on page 24: "[In English] For these reasons the court
8 indicates, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted on
9 20th of March 1993 by Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Federal
10 Republic of Yugoslavia, the following provisional measures: A, the
11 government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should immediately in
12 pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention of the Prevention and
13 Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 9 December 1948 take all measures
14 within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide."
15 [Interpretation] And paragraph 2: "[In English] Yugoslavia should
16 in particular ensure that military, paramilitary, or irregular armed units
17 which may be," [Interpretation] would like to emphasise may be, "as any
18 organisation and person which may be subject to its control, direction or
19 influence do not commit any act of genocide or conspiracy to commit
20 genocide of direct and public instrument to commit genocide or of
21 complicity in genocide whether directed against the Muslim population of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnic, racial or
23 religious group."
24 [Interpretation] And finally under B: "[In English] The
25 Yugoslavian government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina should not
1 take any action and should ensure that no action is taken which may
2 aggravate or extend the existing dispute over the prevention of punishment
3 of crime of genocide or render it more difficult a solution."
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, stop. We have the
5 ICJ decision, and we can look at it to see what it actually says.
6 It appears, however, that what is in paragraph 180 of the
7 statement, the witness's statement, is reflected in the second paragraph
8 on page 24 of the decision, but what is in paragraph 179 of the statement
9 does not appear to be reflected. But we have the decision, as I said, and
10 we can -- we'll have a look at it, and we'll make up our own minds. So
11 please proceed.
12 In any event, you are beyond the ten minutes now. So I think you
13 have to stop.
14 The amicus.
15 Questioned by Mr. Kay:
16 Q. Dr. Arria, I've got some questions which essentially deal with the
17 report that you made for the United Nations and deal with the comments you
18 made in various press conferences. So if you could turn, first of all, to
19 tab 17 of our exhibit file.
20 A. 17, 5, page 5?
21 Q. Tab 17, and it's headed "Transcriptions from Arria tapes." Have
22 you got that?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And you'll see within this section apparently a number of recorded
25 statements that were made by you and others after you had visited
1 Srebrenica and during your visit to the region and the statements that
2 were made there. And if we could look first of all at that first page, at
3 the foot of it, and there's a paragraph that begins: "No, these
4 conditions have not been known. This is the first time. I am a member of
5 the Security Council. My colleagues never knew this. We have to ask
6 permission for a doctor to enter Srebrenica," and it goes on to say you're
7 really shocked and it's a serious matter, and you were shocked to see the
9 Now, the issue in your evidence concerns notice and knowledge, and
10 what it seems to be saying here, which may be slightly different from your
11 testimony earlier today, that you did not know about the conditions within
12 Srebrenica. Is that right?
13 A. Absolutely correct. The situation and conditions as I describe
14 them in this press statement which were made to BBC of London, which gave
15 me a copy.
16 Q. And you comment on page 2, if we look at the second paragraph,
17 saying what the UN authorities have done there is extraordinary, and you
18 refer to particular troops from countries such as Canada, Bangladesh,
19 Russia, and Denmark. So it seems you were impressed by what the UN
20 authorities had done within Srebrenica; is that right?
21 A. Yes. I stated that previously. I never ceased my admiration for
22 the men and women who served under UNPROFOR.
23 Q. I'd like to turn now to the next page, which is headed in the top
24 right-hand corner "842" as the numbering, and we see paragraphs there. If
25 we turn to the fourth -- or third paragraph, second to last sentence. You
1 refer to the UNHCR doing a wonderful job. Do you see that?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. "We absolutely should help those who are not residents and want to
4 leave." And in the next paragraph you mention: "We met with the Muslim
5 government, and they did not express that they did not wish their people
6 to leave. No one in the streets approaches us to ask if they want to
8 Was there an issue then that in fact people within that safe
9 haven, that the civil authorities wanted to keep a large number of
10 civilian people within Srebrenica?
11 A. That was not our impression at all.
12 Q. Was there an issue that people were not saying that they wanted to
14 A. We would have been surprised people didn't want to leave, living
15 suffering under those conditions. Actually, we were impressed by the
16 opposite, that they didn't want to leave, living under those extreme
17 circumstances, under siege and surrounded by the Serb paramilitary.
18 Q. Yes. Srebrenica was a community of a certain size. The figure
19 escapes me, you might be able to correct me, but I think 10.000 population
20 that had become the home to 40.000 plus people; is that right?
21 A. There were 70.000.
22 Q. Seventy thousand. You correct me. So the whole population in
23 this place had expanded to a degree that the actual community there didn't
24 have the facilities and structure to cope with that number of refugees.
25 A. It didn't even satisfy the conditions for 500 people, even less,
1 of course. By the time we got there, there weren't 70.000. There were
2 around 10.000 to 15.000 when we got to Srebrenica.
3 Q. And the point is that this safe haven was created importing a
4 large number of people beyond the level to which that particular town
5 could deal with those numbers. It was simply not equipped to deal with
6 those numbers.
7 A. This is first time I hear that, sir.
8 Q. Well, isn't that why there was horrific conditions concerning
9 water, concerning the way people were living? There was insufficient
10 housing, there was insufficient food. This place had not been established
11 to cope with that number of people.
12 A. The reality was completely opposite, sir. There were no houses
13 because they had been shelled. There were no houses because they had been
14 destroyed. There were no medicines, there was no water because it had
15 been cut. There was no electricity because it had been cut. Even 500
16 people could not live there.
17 Q. And were you aware at the time that you were there that in fact
18 there was an issue that was being put forward by the Bosnian Serbs that
19 they were facing attacks from Muslim forces who were kept within that
21 A. You know, I had company, sir, the Canadian Battalion commander in
22 Srebrenica, and you will see -- I have never forgotten that Brigadier
23 Hayes introduced me to the Serb officers by name - this is Colonel
24 Such-and-such, Major Such-and-such - and then he looked at the ones on the
25 right who were almost dressed like civilians and said these are also my
1 friends on the Muslim side. They were very lightly armed and you would
2 have to be blind not to see that the town was surrounded by heavy weapons
3 and very heavy artillery and under the absolute control of the Serb
4 paramilitary forces, and the kinds of armament actually UNPROFOR found
5 later on, they were very light weapons.
6 Q. That may have been the case about the armory that was surrounding
7 Srebrenica. I'm not asking about that. I'm asking whether you were aware
8 of the issue that there were forces led by a commander going out from
9 Srebrenica who were fighting the Bosnian Serb forces in the surrounding
10 territory. Were you aware of that as an issue?
11 A. That was an issue that was always raised by Mr. Karadzic. That I
12 absolutely recall, yes.
13 Q. And were you aware of the name of the commander who was said to be
14 of those particular forces, a man called Naser Oric?
15 A. No, sir.
16 Q. If we just turn over to the next page, then, the -- if we turn
17 over to the next page, then, the figures end in 843. And it's in the
18 middle of the large -- there's a large paragraph in the middle of the
19 page. One of your UNHCR representatives had explained that the town is
20 overcrowded, it's impossible to assist all the population, problems for
21 doctors, materials, foods, every day comforts. And in the middle of the
22 page there is this: "But the main question is should we fight for the
23 right of the people to be evacuated from Srebrenica or for the right to
24 stay in dignity and safety? The UNHCR here will do whatever we can, and I
25 hope that the politicians and ambassadors will help us in negotiating
1 expansion of the safe area."
2 So firstly, going back to that issue, people did not -- or people
3 were being subject to a decision made by the civilian authorities within
4 Srebrenica, telling them not to leave the safe haven. Were you aware of
6 A. We created -- we thought that we passed a Resolution, Your
7 Honours, to create a safe area, and of course it was far away from. It
8 was a very unsafe area. So much so that when we returned to New York, we
9 said to the Security Council we cannot repeat this experience in the next
10 safe areas which were recommended, for those cities, and eventually, as
11 Your Honours remember, there was another very unsafe area Resolution which
12 did not prevent the repetition of the experiences that were suffered by
13 the people in Srebrenica. That's how I recall these events.
14 Q. Moving back to your report, then, which is in tab 15, and I'm
15 looking at what has in the top left-hand corner page 4.
16 A. It's not my report, Your Honour. It's the report of the mission.
17 Q. Sorry. You're just the vehicle in court and I appreciate it was
18 others, but it's come to be known -- it's come to be identified with you.
19 So if we look at the report that you were a party to making, page
20 4 sets out the mandate and scope of activities, and you list in paragraph
21 3 the leaders of the three parties to the conflict whom you met. Is that
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. President Izetbegovic, Dr. Karadzic, and Mate Boban. You didn't
25 meet Mr. -- President Milosevic on this -- during this report; is that
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. You conducted interviews. You have said several remarks during
4 the course of your evidence about the various parties, but it's correct
5 that it was reported to you that all sides were committing atrocities at
6 different levels but only the Serbs are taking territory; is that right?
7 A. I was informed of that. I was also informed what the
8 Secretary-General Kofi Annan called at the time the moral equivalence of
9 the parties as completely different in importance and significance.
10 Q. And that is why you were seeing all the parties to the conflict,
11 from the Croat leadership to the Bosnian Serb leadership to the Bosnian
12 Muslim leadership, because you were aware that this conflict involved
13 three parties.
14 A. Not completely like that, sir. We did not see at the time
15 President Milosevic for one reason specifically, because we did not want
16 to interfere in the negotiations that were being under going in the Lord
17 Owen and Secretary Vance. That was exactly the reason why we didn't
18 include him in our agenda. Not because we thought that he was not a
19 party. On the contrary. We thought he was the main party.
20 Q. But it seems, though, that from -- you don't mention that within
21 this report; is that right?
22 A. Yes, I think I mention it in the report, why we didn't meet with
24 Q. Very well.
25 A. And if you want, I'll read it over.
1 Q. If you could point it out to me and let me know where it is.
2 A. I'll have to take a look.
3 Q. In fact, the Judges can probably look at that in their own time
4 and it can be re-examined on if it's there, Dr. Arria. My time is very
5 brief, as you will understand, and that is why I'm dealing with one issue
6 and trying to deal with it as rapidly as possible.
7 If we go to page 7 of the report, at the foot of the page,
8 paragraph 27(C), Dr. Karadzic indicated to the mission at its meeting with
9 him at the Belgrade airport that he would not take the town, that the
10 water supply would be immediately restored and that humanitarian convoys
11 would be allowed.
12 It would be right to say that in terms of forces at that stage, it
13 was obvious that Dr. Karadzic had sufficient troops and weaponry, if he
14 had wanted to, to have gone into Srebrenica there and then.
15 A. Well, actually he was not telling the truth, and we express in the
16 report. He had already taken the town. The town was an open gaol. And
17 actually, when we entered into Srebrenica, I went in the United Nations
18 armoured car, and the car behind me was the head of the Serb paramilitary,
19 Colonel Ratko, parading around town with Brigadier General Hayes. If
20 that's not a sign of control of the town, I wouldn't know what else could
22 Q. But it's a world apart from actually being in the town and having
23 taken over its government, infrastructure, and having troops on the
24 streets, isn't it?
25 A. There was no infrastructure, there were no troops on the street.
1 There was only poor people couldn't have a house, couldn't have water,
2 couldn't have doctors, couldn't have medicines. There were epidemics
3 around. So it was easier to leave the poor people in the village to take
4 care of themselves. It was an open gaol.
5 Q. This was a matter that was known about by you, then, and others,
6 presumably, on your mission for the United Nations, of Dr. Karadzic's
7 ability at this time in 1993, the position that he was in?
8 A. Which position, if you can tell me.
9 Q. Of having surrounded and made Srebrenica an open gaol, as you've
10 described it.
11 A. We actually described it to him, because he acted like he didn't
12 know. And he of course promised that the water would be resumed and the
13 doctors be allowed into town, and the tents be allowed into town, which he
14 never did, of course.
15 Q. Very well. But having seen Srebrenica, if we look at your
16 observations within page 11 and the two paragraphs that have been dealt
17 with so far, paragraphs 46 and 47, in fact, the position that you and your
18 mission had come to was that the safe haven should remain. The mandate
19 may be changed as far as UNPROFOR was concerned, but that the use of a --
20 a place such as Srebrenica should be maintained.
21 A. I'm not following the last part of your question, sir.
22 Q. All right. Isn't that right? That is the position. If we look
23 at 47, the mission recognises, and that is the creation that enclaves are
24 safe areas deserving serious consideration, as you say in paragraph 46,
25 but a larger UNPROFOR presence, a revised mandate to accompany cease-fire
1 and safe area monitoring and different rules of engagement but stopping
2 short of a military strike enforcement.
3 A. I don't understand. Is that a question or are you quoting my
5 Q. I am quoting your statement and I am putting to you --
6 A. I stand behind that.
7 Q. So that is the position you had found yourself in rather than
8 tearing up the rule book as far as Srebrenica --
9 A. Sorry, what?
10 Q. Tearing up the rule book. Rather than changing the whole policy
11 concerning Srebrenica, you had decided with your mission that that policy
12 should be continued.
13 A. No. On the contrary. When we came back to New York, one of the
14 points in the report says that the bad experience of Srebrenica should not
15 be repeated and we recommended the creation of other safe areas based on
16 different terms. It's the opposite of what you're asking me.
17 Q. Perhaps there's a misunderstanding between you and me on that
18 issue, but I'll leave the matter there. Thank you.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, just to return to a question that you
20 asked earlier.
21 MR. KAY: Yes.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were you asking the witness whether the
23 conditions in Srebrenica, the suffering of the Muslims was due primarily
24 or only to overcrowding in contradistinction to anything else, any other
1 MR. KAY: Your Honour, the -- if we turn to that particular
2 section of the press conference. Tab 17. Apologies.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
4 MR. KAY: What was being said at the time was the damage to the
5 particular town, including damage to the school, damage to the buildings,
6 but that the circumstances in which the people were living was also due to
7 the numbers, the sheer numbers of people who were taking refuge within the
8 particular confines of that place. At the top of page 843 is the remark
9 that the town is so overcrowded it's impossible to assist all the
11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, would you like me to comment?
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you may comment on that paragraph, clarify.
13 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. You know, that would be a major
14 recreation of the circumstances. Your Honour, I visit the school, one of
15 the schools in Srebrenica where five days before we arrived, or a week
16 before we arrived, the same Serbian colonel who was accompanying us had
17 shelled the city of Srebrenica and there were still remains of children on
18 the patio. With a city without doctors, without medicines. I admit it
19 must be true that many people came afterwards, because the small villages
20 around Srebrenica had already been run over by the Serb paramilitary, but
21 by no measure of the imagination it's possible to conceive that people
22 could live under those circumstances, no water, no electricity, no
23 surgeon, no houses. People were living on the streets, Your Honour. When
24 we talk about infrastructure, there was no infrastructure to talk about.
25 And on top of that, they were surrounded, intimidated by the pressure of
1 very heavy armed people, and the people knew already that the United
2 Nations didn't have any control. I don't think what happened was so much
3 -- public opinion was concentrated those days on the enclave that nothing
4 more could happen. I think that was our contribution at the time.
5 As time passed by, Srebrenica ceased to be in the centre of
6 attention of the world opinion, and as we all know, we all know how this
7 sad chapter for humanity ends.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Nice.
9 MR. NICE: One or two points to pick up on, please, Mr. Arria.
10 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
11 Q. On tab 15, the report, you've been asked about these paragraphs 46
12 and 47, it being suggested that you were in favour of continuation or
13 enlargement of the safe area policy. Your recommendation, was it for more
14 of the same or was it for something totally different?
15 A. Something totally different. The only thing it had in common was
16 the name.
17 Q. And the differences that you regarded as essential if the
18 interests of the citizens were to be taken care of.
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. What were the differences? What --
21 A. The differences is we had asked for protection. This is one
22 thing, Your Honour, it is interesting to note. I'm sure know about it, in
23 the United Nations, in the drafting the language, semantics plays a very
24 important role. In French version it was "la protection," in Spanish it
25 was "ellos protohijos [phoen]," and in English it was "safe areas," and
1 each one chose his own interpretation. And this is what happened. Not
2 only in that, I cannot really imagine how many other documents of the
3 Security Council the same thing goes and happens but with a mandate for
4 something completely different.
5 Q. You've referred to it, indeed your report or your -- your, as you
6 describe it, affidavit speaks of the moral equivalence spoken of by
7 Mr. Annan. Can you just explain that term and its significance.
8 A. The UN had a tradition, a custom to apply this term both parties,
9 aggressors and victims, like they were on the same. And I think
10 Secretary-General Kofi Annan called it the moral equivalence of the
11 parties to put the perpetrators and the victims in the same consideration
12 was like to appear to be neutral in something which was difficult to be
14 Q. But was neutrality being represented here --
15 A. I think --
16 Q. -- in a moral equivalence or was there some lack of neutrality --
17 A. It could be a combination, but it was also a reaction not to be
18 more involved than they should -- they wanted to be. That's one of the
19 reasons I said this morning the Council of Genocide. There was so much
20 effort to even get that into a Resolution, even though it was coming from
21 the International Court of Justice, because the Convention on Prevention
22 of Genocide should have obligated the parties to do something about it.
23 So to acknowledge this was taking place would have put them in a very
24 difficult situation, and that's why many of the permanent members decided
25 that it wasn't a good idea to be so forceful on that issue.
1 Q. Was the -- were the armies that hadn't been recognised, the
2 Republika Srpska army and so on, treated in the same or a different way
3 for purposes of equivalence to the state itself?
4 A. I'm not understanding you.
5 Q. I haven't asked the question well. I may come back to it but
6 let's move on. By the way, your reference to not meeting Milosevic is in
7 your affidavit at paragraph 301. It may not be in the report. I think
8 that may be what you had in mind.
9 A. Thank you. I know I said it somewhere.
10 Q. You said that Karadzic complained of Muslim forces attacking out
11 of Srebrenica. When you were there, you were in the presence of the Serb
12 soldiers who appeared to be confident and in charge; correct?
13 A. Absolutely.
14 Q. Did they complain to you, the ones actually on the ground, did
15 they complain to you in the way that Mr. Kay's been raising, of any
16 attackings coming from out of the enclave?
17 A. Not at all. They were even walking around the city unarmed or
18 maybe they had a pistol. The colonel marched into Belgrade United Nations
19 force never expressed any concern at all about troops of Bosnians in the
21 Q. And Mr. Kay asked you two other questions for which I have
22 follow-ups. One is you were giving a general account of the lack of
23 water, lack of medicines. Can you just give us one example, I think it's
24 in your report, about the water and Karadzic. Did he deal with that,
25 turning it on or off?
1 A. We had the meeting, Dr. Karadzic at the airport, he was just
2 coming to visit Mr. Milosevic in his office. That was the we met in
3 Belgrade, because that's where he used to dispatch very often. And when
4 we met him at the airport of Belgrade, I told him General Dr. Karadzic the
5 water problem is something that can be solved immediately, and he said I
6 will solve this immediately. He never did.
7 Q. And finally from Mr. Kay's questions, you speak of your admiration
8 for the UNPROFOR forces but you've also spoken of the way in which the
9 forces you saw were subordinate to the Serb forces. That's the Canadian
10 Forces, I think, at the time.
11 A. No. This situation was with the British officers.
12 Q. British officers.
13 A. This was not actually in Srebrenica. I think on the contrary.
14 The Canadian Battalion commander was extremely angry at the lack of
15 support he had. And not only -- and also many British officials privately
16 complained to me of the orders that they had to perform, like do not rock
17 the boat. That was the general policy. Do not create too many problems.
18 Do not get us involved. So that was the reason they had those, I would
19 say subservient -- acting in relationship with the Serbs.
20 Q. So your admiration for the forces takes account of the fact that
21 they were acting in the way they did and for the reasons you've given?
22 A. Yes, and acting under instructions, of course, the military.
23 MR. NICE: As to the ICJ case, Your Honour, and the references to
24 that, I think I dealt in the few questions in examination-in-chief with
25 the distinction between the recital and the conclusions.
1 Yes. I think I've asked that already.
2 Q. It's been really suggested to you by the accused that you were
3 taken in by the public relations of, for example, Bosnia. You were
4 deceived by it because it was a propaganda war. Just remind us in short
5 form how, if at all, you thought you were able to achieve balanced
6 reporting, how you got enough information to have a balanced view.
7 A. The only fact that convinced us, Your Honours, what was happening
8 was the reality on the ground. I don't think any propaganda war, I never
9 met any of the lobbyists, of the Bosnians. The issue here, when I became
10 member of the Security Council I didn't think I was representing only my
11 country. I was representing the region as a whole. And I vowed not to be
12 a bystander, and I would -- and that's the reason why I'm here, because I
13 was not a bystander.
14 Q. You were very concerned to go on this mission to Srebrenica?
15 A. We wanted to see what was happening because we were by that time
16 receiving all kinds of information. The president of the Security Council
17 was a Pakistan ambassador at that time, Marker. It was not easy to get
18 the mission to be approved to be sent to Srebrenica. It was a long
19 discussion for about two hours at night in the Security Council. Then
20 they appointed me to head the mission, to really, you know, gather the
21 facts on the ground, and it was a very important visit.
22 Q. And what you saw, as the accused has suggested was propaganda war,
23 did this fit in with the general reporting that you were getting from the
24 press and the media or did it change your view, or did it confirm your
25 view? Just explain.
1 A. It was worse. Your Honour, I mentioned this morning that a
2 British journalist was the first one who showed the world what was
3 happening, and that prompted General Morillon and prompted the Security
4 Council to act, but when we got there, it was much worse. It was
5 unimaginable. I remember telling the Russian Ambassador who had -- who
6 was in a position to our policy at the Security Council. I said you
7 always talk of Leningrad. There is another Leningrad in a different
8 scale. You have to see it on your own. And even the Russian ambassador
9 who was with us on the mission shared this in our report. He signed the
10 report which was a consensus report.
11 Q. Two last questions. You've been asked by the accused about what
12 he said in a particular report about ethnic cleansing being a criminal
13 act. You told us of what you regarded as the accused's two-prong
14 approach. You remember. Does his being reported as saying that ethnic
15 cleansing was a criminal act fit in with your understanding of the
16 two-pronged approach?
17 A. Yes. You know, I remember explaining to the members of Security
18 Council. I said we finally understood the full meaning of ethnic
19 cleansing. Ethnic cleansing is putting bombs under the roofs of the
20 homes, it's to intimidate, to terrorise and to eliminate the possessions
21 and to move them and to displace them. That's ethnic cleansing. I said
22 now we don't have to read it, now we know what it means. It was the first
23 time that we really could grasp the meaning of this terrible policy.
24 Q. I think you misunderstood my question. It was my mistake. Did
25 the accused's saying publicly that ethnic cleansing was a crime fit with
1 your description of his having a two-pronged approach?
2 A. Absolutely. You know, it was very clear to us that it was, like
3 you said, a two-pronged approach; one from Belgrade entertaining the
4 international community in endless negotiation, paramilitary negotiation.
5 On the other side I said this morning the proxies, Mladic, Karadzic and
6 others in Bosnia-Herzegovina, executing the policy of ethnic cleansing,
7 genocide, crimes against humanity. So it was until the moment came when
8 these two-prong approach was stopped by the international community, but
9 this served to conquer more territory and to change the geography of a
10 sovereign state of the United Nations.
11 Q. And that brings me indeed, by the phrase "change the geography,"
12 to my last question. The phrase "Greater Serbia" suggested as, I think, a
13 fiction by the accused has been used by you in your report, not
14 associating it with necessarily the speech of the accused himself. But
15 your understanding at the time of Greater Serbia or the intention to
16 create a Greater Serbia was what?
17 A. It was understood there was not one media or one report that
18 didn't speak of the Greater Serbia. It would be difficult to understand
19 how a country in the former Republic of Yugoslavia was willing to accept
20 these sanctions imposed upon them if they have anything to gain in this
21 process, and the thing to gain was a larger territory controlled by
22 proxies in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 MR. NICE: No other questions of this witness. Thank you very
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] By your leave, just a minute,
3 please. Since Mr. Nice mentioned only now the meeting with Karadzic at
4 the airport, just one question. Just one question for the witness please.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, one question.
7 Further cross-examination by Mr. Milosevic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Arria, since you met Karadzic on the 26th of
9 April at the airport, as you said here, the Belgrade airport, and he said
10 to you that he had been at a meeting with me, the question is, do you know
11 that only a few days later in Athens, on the 1st of May, a peace
12 conference was held under the auspices of the Greek Premier, Constantin
13 Mitsotakis, where Vance and Owen presented their plan and at that
14 conference Karadzic signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan? So it was a few
15 days after that meeting. Do you remember that or not?
16 A. Your Honours, the meeting in Athens, which I even quote in my
17 official speeches in the Security Council, the negotiators allow something
18 which we thought and I stated officially was uncalled for. This is true
19 Mr. Karadzic signed, but with the proviso that he will have to get the
20 authorisation and confirmation from a so-called congress or parliament in
21 the so-called Republika Srpska, which didn't exist, and the negotiations
22 allowed that to happen.
23 And Your Honour, if I may add, like, I have another question, on
24 the disappearance of this mysterious document that you asked me this
25 morning of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the only way -- you remember
1 Mr. Milosevic asked me do you know, have you seen this document? I said
2 no. He said this document was circulated to the Security Council. After
3 I said, no, it wasn't, then he said, well, this document was retained by
4 the Austrian Ambassador, who was the president of the Security Council,
5 who wanted to impose sanctions and hid it from the Security Council. The
6 only way that this could have happened was Mr. Boutros-Ghali to be in
7 connivance with him in complicity, and that was not the case. I cannot
8 imagine Mr. Boutros-Ghali allowing the Austrian ambassador to hide a
9 report from him addressed to the Security Council. I just wanted to add
10 that as a contribution to the point you made this morning.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much. That concludes your
12 evidence, Mr. Arria.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you're free to go.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
16 [The witness withdrew]
17 MR. NICE: Before the next witness who is --
18 JUDGE MAY: Just a minute, Mr. Nice.
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, before you proceed, I want to deal with
21 two matters raised by Mr. Milosevic this morning. The first one is a
22 follow-up to the order made by the Chamber that the Registrar would give
23 him as much assistance as it could during this phase of the case, and he
24 said he had not received any. I have caused inquiries to be made, and I
25 am to say that Mr. Milosevic, you are to raise this matter with the
1 Registrar, let him know what assistance you need, and he will, to the
2 extent that he can, provide the assistance. In particular, if you need
3 more time for consultations with your associates, that's the kind of
4 assistance that he would be in a position to grant.
5 The second matter raised by Mr. Milosevic had to do with the
6 effect of the decision of the Registrar on communication. Mr. Milosevic
7 maintained that the effect of that decision would be that he would be
8 hampered in the preparation of his case. I've looked at the decision
9 itself, Mr. Milosevic, and it explicitly states that the restrictions do
10 not apply to communications and visits reasonably necessary for the
11 preparation of your case, including interviewing by telephone or in person
12 potential witnesses or otherwise collecting evidence in his defence
13 provided that the facility is not to be used in any manner for any
14 contacts with the media. So your right to prepare your case is not
15 prejudiced in any way by the decision.
16 Mr. Nice.
17 MR. NICE: Before we turn from --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Nice.
19 MR. NICE: Apologies. Before we turn from the last witness, he
20 was, in the course of cross-examination, asked a large number of questions
21 of a detailed nature about his statement. I'm entirely in the Court's
22 hands. It might be more convenient for the statement to be exhibited
23 principally for reference to the passages to which Mr. -- the accused
24 referred but generally where there's extensive cross-examination on
25 grounds of credibility or reliability on a witness's statement, it may be
1 thought appropriate to exhibit it.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do you have any comments on that,
3 exhibiting the statement of the --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- of the last witness?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do, Mr. Robinson. That statement
7 contains 500 paragraphs, and as you know full well, I did not have the
8 opportunity of dealing with more than one fifth of it. I mean, I could
9 not deal with four-fifths because of the time limit that was imposed and
10 because of the evasiveness of this statement. It is no doubt evasive and
11 not relevant.
12 This story looks like a newspaper article to me more than anything
13 else. It is supposed to support this false indictment and it doesn't
14 really prove a thing. It just shows what the witness's line of thinking
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, I see you're getting ready to rise.
17 MR. KAY: If I could just assist the Court. The Court passed an
18 order as to the confines of the statement. That statement well and truly
19 exceeds that. It is also full of opinion and observations and personal
20 opinions of that particular witness. In my submission, the extent of that
21 statement does not require, as a result of the cross-examination, the
22 evidence heard live in court, for it to be made an exhibit as a result of
23 what the Court heard.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: The decision is not to admit it.
1 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases. Before the next witness,
2 there's one administrative matter to be dealt with, and after the next
3 break I suspect I will have to come to the question of the order of
4 witnesses for tomorrow. I'm not in a position finally to come to it at
5 the moment. So may I deal with the first administrative problem now,
6 which can be dealt with in open court, bearing in mind that the next
7 witness is protected to some degree.
8 With the change of the timetable, there is no date within the
9 current schedule on which Mr. Bildt can come. He was originally coming, I
10 think, last week on the 4th, and I've explored with him his diary for this
11 week; today, tomorrow, and Thursday the 12th; next week the 18th and 19th.
12 Without going into it in any great detail, he is between several -- well,
13 two or three continents, I'm not quite sure how many, in that one-week
14 period, returning to Northern Europe, he would be available on the
15 afternoons of either this Friday, next Monday, or next Tuesday, but he is
16 completely unavailable for the other remaining four days. He was a
17 witness who, as the Chamber will recall, we sought to add both because he
18 can provide valuable evidence over a short time period but also because,
19 in our submission, it's evidence that will give a context or deepen the
20 context of other evidence that's very important for the Chamber to assess
21 in relation to the accused's state of knowledge and activities at the time
22 of the Srebrenica massacre, and it was for that evidence that we sought
23 leave to add him to the list.
24 Of course he could give a great deal of other evidence because of
25 his position, but that wasn't critical to our application, and we would
1 still not be seeking to lead any evidence of it, although the Chamber was
2 comparatively generous in the cross-examination allowed so that, overall,
3 his evidence could last three hours, perhaps a little longer.
4 I don't obviously seek an immediate response, but I would ask the
5 Chamber to consider adjusting the timetable so that he might give
6 evidence, perhaps next week, given that his inability to come on the day
7 fixed for him was not as a result of any action of his or ours but through
8 forces outside our control.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: We hear the submission.
10 MR. NICE: Thank you. The next witness is entitled to protection
11 by your order. May I respectfully suggest that we go briefly into closed
12 session for the opening parts of his testimony and for consideration of
13 how to deal with his evidence --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
15 MR. NICE: -- and the exhibits.
16 [Private session]
12 Page 31810 redacted, private session
12 Page 31811 redacted, private session
12 Page 31812 redacted, private session
12 Page 31813 redacted, private session
16 [Open session]
17 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
18 MR. NICE: -- read out literally the topics covered by the witness
19 in his statements, picking up at the exhibits and informing Your Honours
20 where those exhibits have already been tendered so that you can mark your
21 papers accordingly.
22 Q. Witness B-1804, in your first statement -- just a minute.
23 [Prosecution counsel confer]
24 MR. NICE:
25 Q. In your first statement, did you deal with the withdrawal and
1 deployment of your then-unit to Bosnia?
2 A. Yes, I did answer those questions.
3 Q. You went on to deal with the conditions in Zvornik?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And to deal with the takeover of Bijeljina?
6 A. I was asked several questions in that regard.
7 MR. NICE: Your Honours will see that tab 2 in the bundle is a
8 document that relates to paragraph 24. We take the view on review and in
9 order to save burdening the Chamber that it's an exhibit that we needn't
10 bother with so it need not be produced.
11 JUDGE KWON: Let me clarify this. What are included in tab 1, the
12 two statements --
13 MR. NICE: No just the first statement.
14 JUDGE KWON: The first statement, together with the pseudonym
16 MR. NICE: Indeed.
17 JUDGE KWON: Okay.
18 MR. NICE: And if we strike tab 2.
19 Q. You then went on, Witness B-1804, to deal with the arming of Serbs
20 in Zvornik, and at paragraph 33 dealt with a document called the Variant A
21 and B document.
22 MR. NICE: Your Honours will see this is in your papers at tab 3.
23 It has previously been exhibited, and therefore, subject to how the Court
24 orders its papers, need not become a burden.
25 Q. You went on to deal with the attack on Zvornik, with Kula Grad,
1 with the cleansing, as described, of Zvornik; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And at paragraph 52, in that section, you deal with an exhibit
4 again previously tendered, the decision on strategic objectives of the
5 Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 You turned to the creation of the VRS and then dealt with
7 Srebrenica, focusing first on the relationship between the VRS and the
8 JNA, or VJ, including the 30th Personnel Centre, and at paragraph 72 dealt
9 with an intercept.
10 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, intercepts are, save perhaps with one
11 exception or maybe more than one, but the exception being dealt with by
12 being marked for identification only in the conduct of the trial.
13 Q. But this particular intercept you dealt with as a document
14 confirming payment of salaries from Belgrade; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. One detail slightly outside the statement but just for the
17 avoidance of doubt: When you were paid, you yourself were paid money, as
18 you explain, from Belgrade right the way through the period we are
19 concerned with, you were paid at the rank appropriate -- at the rate
20 appropriate to your rank; is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And that relates to the entire period with which your two
23 statements are concerned.
24 A. Yes. Just an interruption of five or six months.
25 Q. Not a question of when paid from Belgrade simply getting a reduced
1 amount of money constituting social security, you were paid the rate
2 appropriate to your rank in the services.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Tab 6 you dealt with in the section of your statement follows,
5 following support from the VJ to the VRS and with examples, and this was
6 an intercept.
7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, at this point may we perhaps go into
8 private session, please.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, private session.
10 [Private session]
12 Page 31818 redacted, private session
4 [Open session]
5 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
6 MR. NICE:
7 Q. With -- in the next section on the planning of the proposed attack
8 on Srebrenica, tab 8, a document you were able to produce or identify,
9 although it's been previously exhibited, and that was a command of the
10 Drina Corps of the 2nd of July of 1995.
11 A. I have had a look at that document, yes.
12 Q. You dealt with the objective of the attack, with the expectations
13 prior to the attack on the Srebrenica area, and at paragraph 111 within
14 this section, you produced or you identified an exhibit already produced,
15 tab 9, a directive for further operations issued by the Supreme Command of
16 the Armed Forces of Republika Srpska.
17 MR. NICE: Already produced, Your Honours, as you will see, 553,
18 tab 2.
19 Q. Correct?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. You dealt with the embargo imposed on Republika Srpska, with the
22 lack of direct VJ involvement in the military attack on Srebrenica safe
23 area, saying that so far as you were aware, no VJ units or personnel took
24 part in any direct combat action in the 1995 military operation to attack
25 and -- the Srebrenica safe area?
1 A. That's right.
2 Q. After the fall of Srebrenica was the next section of your first
3 statement, and then in the section dealing with General Krstic at tab 10,
4 may we look at that, please? At paragraph 125, you see an identification
5 card of Krstic, the rank of major general from Belgrade, and of course a
6 VJ military service and identification card; is that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. At tab 11 in the same section but at your paragraph 131, a further
9 identification card to the same general effect, and you can authenticate
10 it; correct?
11 A. This is the civilian identification card.
12 MR. NICE: At tabs 12 to 17, Your Honours will see have already
13 been produced or tendered, and -- Your Honour, I think we must now return
14 to private session very briefly.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, private session.
16 MR. NICE: To --
17 [Private session]
12 Page 31821 redacted, private session
2 [Open session]
3 MR. NICE: -- being an organigramme of the Main Staff VRS
4 structure, which you were able to confirm as accurate?
5 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, with certain remarks that I
7 made on the occasion.
8 MR. NICE:
9 Q. And in the following tab, tab 19, there's another organigramme of
10 the Main Staff of the VRS. Again you were an able to confirm the data at
11 least in part?
12 A. Yes. There were two organigrammes, one of the Main Staff and the
13 second of the Drina Corps command.
14 Q. The following tab, tab 20, gives VRS code names.
15 MR. NICE: And if Your Honours have this before you, I think the
16 witness can take us down, as he says in paragraph 144, to Domar, that he
17 doesn't know the call-signs after that.
18 Q. Paragraph 146 produces tab 21, an order dated the 8th of April of
19 1994, which lists, at page 6, Gojko Simic as a member of the Zvornik
20 Brigade; correct?
21 A. Yes. I was shown an order by the brigade commander where that
22 name was mentioned.
23 Q. At tab 22, paragraph 107 -- 147 is a document perhaps you could
24 just look at, please. Does this appear to you to be a genuine document?
25 A. This is a copy of the original document.
1 Q. Yes. Signed by Pandurevic. And on page 3 in the English, under
2 the Organ for Combat Arms, we can see Maksimovic and Kajtaz as on the
3 records for the General Staff of the VJ; correct?
4 A. I apologise, but may I just take a minute to find that? Yes. I
5 found it under number 8 and 9, the organ for the services for the
6 brigade. Maksimovic Milos Captain First Class and Kajtaz Milenko Captain
7 First Class. They weren't in the masons staff but in the command of the
8 Zvornik Brigade.
9 MR. NICE: As we turn to page 21 of the witness's statement, the
10 Chamber should know that from the top of the page of the English version,
11 two lines have been inadvertently missed out and we've got a substitute
12 page that I hope is before you that provides those two missing lines.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's page 20 --
14 MR. NICE: Page 21.
15 Q. Tab 23, actually, is dealt with in that paragraph that we're
16 looking at and is a document that the witness is able to identify,
17 although a copy, as he correctly says, as being an identical one --
18 original one properly copied coming from Zivanovic, a major general of the
19 Drina Corps.
20 A. Yes, commander of the Drina Corps.
21 Q. Tabs 24, 5, 6, and 7 deal with vehicle logs, and the Chamber will
22 see, looking at tab 24, the dates in the second half of July 1995 at 24,
23 and then it will see the logs of personnel of the logistics platoon
24 company for tab 25. For tab 26 it will see the log of presence of
25 personnel for the battalion. And for tab 27, the work of vehicle
1 maintenance and generators, again with dates in July.
2 And we then come to tab 28, dealt with at paragraph 154, which is
3 the death certificate of Gojko Simic, which, Witness 1804, you were able
4 to identify as, I think, an authenticate document.
5 A. Yes. I have had a look at that document too, earlier on when you
6 showed it to me.
7 Q. And finally tab 29, dealt with at paragraph 155, is a document
8 that you looked at for the military police dealing with attendance roster
9 for July 1995.
10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can we then please go into private session
11 for tab 30.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
13 [Private session]
12 Page 31825 redacted, private session
13 Page 31826 redacted, private session
20 [Open session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
22 MR. NICE:
23 Q. Sets out matters at paragraph 1 to 3 which are background that I
24 won't cover, sets out general areas of history for material matters in the
25 following paragraphs, gives a chronology of material events in the middle
1 of 1995 and then sets out in some detail some of the events that happened
2 at the fall of Srebrenica; correct?
3 A. Yes, you're right.
4 MR. NICE: Your Honours will see what is, and I don't need to go
5 into private session to deal with this -- perhaps -- no, perhaps I should
6 to assist the Chamber. Can we go, sorry, into private session very
8 [Private session]
12 Page 31829 redacted, private session
8 [Open session]
9 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before the cross-examination commences, I want to
11 say that this witness is a protected witness. That means he's subject to
12 certain protective measures, and protective measures are an important
13 element in the administration of justice in this Tribunal. As such, any
14 person breaching the protective measures will be subject to prosecution,
15 and so I advise and warn the media and others that any reporting of the
16 witness's testimony that tends to identify him would amount to a contempt
17 of court and be punishable under Rule 77 of the Rules of Procedure and
19 Mr. Milosevic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, tell me, how much time
21 are you giving me for this witness?
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we had assigned two and a half
24 hours, and it would be subject to the same thing that I said this morning;
25 if you have an application to make, should you choose to use the entire
1 time, you may make it.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I will be able to assess
3 that tomorrow, thank you, Mr. Robinson.
4 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. 1804 --
6 A. Please go ahead.
7 Q. Before the conflict broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you were an
8 active JNA officer; isn't that right?
9 A. You're right.
10 Q. Tell me, before any conflict broke out in the former Yugoslavia,
11 although you hail from Bosnia-Herzegovina, you did your military service
12 or, rather, no, not your military service but you were in the military
13 outside Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Is it correct that it was the usual practice, in view of the fact
16 that the Yugoslav People's Army was multi-ethnic, that officers, depending
17 on the requirements of the service, be assigned throughout Yugoslavia
18 without any constraints in terms of the republic they originally came
20 A. That's right.
21 Q. In the units that you served in, did you work as an officer
22 together with members of all other ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. Among you, were there any tensions in view of the fact that you
25 belonged to different national or ethnic groups?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Tell me, when did the first crises and tensions appear in the
3 Yugoslav People's Army?
4 A. Well, sometime just before the war in Slovenia broke out, if I
5 remember correctly. So perhaps -- let me say 1991, something like that.
6 Q. All right. You were withdrawn from the area where you had been
7 serving. You were withdrawn to Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Do you know where other units were withdrawn to from your corps or
10 from part of the army district that you had served in?
11 A. Well, I could not give an exact answer to your question in view of
12 my position then, but they were withdrawn to Bosnia, Vojvodina, Serbia.
13 Q. All right. I will try to work as efficiently as possible so that
14 we would make the best possible use of our time. So I'm going to start
15 dealing with some matters that were brought up in your statement.
16 In paragraph 11 of your statement, you say that the practice was
17 in the JNA, when the conflicts started, that is, and that is what
18 paragraph 11 of your statement pertains to, that paramilitary units were
19 involved in combat activities, and you mentioned Seselj's men, Dragan's
20 men, and others by way of an example here. Is that right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Tell me, please, in that case would these units be under the
23 command of the JNA or were they able to move about independently and to
24 operate without any kind of superior command?
25 A. On the basis of what I heard and what I know, these different
1 paramilitary units took part in combat activities voluntarily if they
2 wanted to take part in such activities. And when actual combat would take
3 place, then they were operating on the basis of command. So within the
4 combat operation itself under the command of the JNA officer in charge.
5 Q. Are you aware of any order of a superior officer or any superior
6 related to paramilitary units that were not willing to be under the
7 command of the JNA, that such paramilitary units would have to be
8 disbanded, disarmed, arrested, et cetera?
9 A. I do not recall such an order, but I do remember that in Zvornik
10 there was an intervention when the units of the Protection Regiment
11 expelled a paramilitary unit.
12 Q. They expelled a paramilitary unit which was engaged in unlawful
13 acts; is that right?
14 A. Well, yes.
15 Q. Could the witness repeat? Yes, he said Zuca. And this man Zuca
16 was later arrested in Serbia. I assume you know that.
17 And tell me, please, these combat activities which took place in
18 Croatia in 1991 occurred when Yugoslavia was still in existence; is that
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. I can see from your CV that you graduated from your military
22 schools in regular fashion, the military academy as well, and I assume
23 you're familiar with the provisions that have to do with All People's
24 Defence; is that right, Mr. 1804?
25 A. Yes, I think so.
1 Q. I'll now skip some of the general points but I'm sure you know
2 that in the constitution of SFRY it is stated that each and every citizen
3 who with arms takes part in resistance against the attackers is a member
4 of the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I
5 assume that as an educated officer yourself you're aware of that.
6 A. Yes, I am.
7 Q. Now, does that mean -- I'm asking you now, give me your example
8 and tell me, did you consider that all those who took part in the defence
9 of the SFRY and defence of its territorial integrity pursuant to the
10 constitution were legal members of the armed forces, lawful ones? Would
11 that be true?
12 A. Mr. Milosevic, I personally considered that those people who were
13 in the legal units and lawfully belonged to those units were, by the same
14 token, members of the armed forces, that is to say the police or milicija,
15 the Territorial Defence, the JNA, et cetera.
16 Q. I assume that you include the volunteer units there if they are
17 subordinated to the JNA.
18 A. Yes, if they're subordinated to the JNA.
19 Q. And we've already observed that if they weren't subordinated to
20 the JNA, they were arrested, disarmed, and expelled. Is that right?
21 A. Yes, in certain cases.
22 Q. All right. Now, in view of the profession, your military
23 profession and the rules and regulations in force at the time from your
24 position and post, I assume you had an awareness of the fact that the
25 character of the paramilitary formations were those formations which did
1 not defend Yugoslavia. They were characterised as paramilitaries, and
2 their territorial integrity -- and its territorial integrity, but did the
4 A. Yes, there were paramilitary formations of that kind too.
5 Q. They were formations that jeopardised the territorial integrity of
6 Yugoslavia and acted contrary to the constitution, that is to say contrary
7 to the law and legal provisions, and their very existence was unlawful and
8 contrary to the provision of law; is that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. As you have experience from those days in 1991, can we conclude
11 that, for example, the Croatian National Guard Corps, the ZNG, set up an
12 institution that was contrary to the Yugoslav constitution; or, for
13 example, the Patriotic League, another instance in point in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Were they paramilitary formations, in fact?
15 A. Mr. Milosevic, I think that until those republics were recognised,
16 these were indeed paramilitary formations.
17 Q. And do you know since -- well, let's narrow down our focus of
18 attention and look at Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the Patriotic League, for
19 example, was established already in March 1991.
20 A. Yes, that's right. I don't know the exact month, whether it was
21 March or not, but I do know that it was set up sometime in 1991.
22 Q. Well, the date exists and it is celebrated as Patriotic League Day
23 on that particular day with them, so this is no secret.
24 A. You're probably right although I didn't pay attention to the exact
25 date, but I did say that I know it was sometime in 1991, yes.
1 Q. In paragraph 8 of your statement, say, and I'm quoting you, that:
2 "An order was received from a higher instance that all officers and
3 soldiers who were from the Krajina should remain in Krajina and join up
4 the army of Krajina and that anybody else could join up with the other
6 Is that what you said?
7 A. Yes, that's what I said.
8 Q. Now, tell me, this superior instance that proclaimed this
9 obligation on the -- for the Krajina citizens to join the Krajina army was
10 quite certainly not the JNA or any kind of Yugoslav authority. It didn't
11 have this competence and authorisation when the JNA was withdrawing from
12 Croatia or, rather, the territory of the Krajina.
13 A. We reached that -- that reached us from the superior command,
14 which means from the corps command, in fact.
15 Q. Well, is it true that this kind of order could only have been
16 issued by the authorities in Krajina to its own citizens and that in fact
17 it was a component part of the general mobilisation process?
18 A. Well, I suppose that the authorities of Krajina issued that order,
19 but I don't know about these details as to what was going on in the
20 Krajina. I can't say with any great precision. I'm not sufficiently
21 aware of what was going on.
22 Q. All right. Now, do you know that the withdrawal of the JNA from
23 that territory was a component part of the agreement that was reached and,
24 generally speaking, the plan that was well known under the name of the
25 Vance Plan when the area was placed under protection, the areas in Croatia
1 were placed under protection?
2 A. Well, I do remember that there was some political negotiations,
3 but what I remember more was that General Raseta negotiated on pulling out
4 the JNA units, on having the JNA units pull out and that they deblocked
5 the barracks for us and allowed us to withdraw, and I'm thinking of my
6 particular unit.
7 Q. Right. So up until then, the barracks in Croatia were blocked
8 until that time; is that right?
9 A. The one I was in was blocked, yes, and I assume the others were
10 too, but I'm now speaking about my own one and I say yes.
11 Q. How long was your barracks blocked for? How long did the blockade
12 of your barracks last?
13 A. Well, sometime after the war in Slovenia, that is to say from the
14 summer of 1991 to the withdrawal itself.
15 Q. When did you withdraw from Croatia yourself?
16 A. If I remember correctly, that was sometime on the 10th or 11th of
17 November, 1991, thereabouts.
18 Q. And you had spent several months under a blockade; is that right?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, your particular unit at that time while it was under a
21 blockade, did it launch any attack on its environment at all?
22 A. The unit I was in did not, no.
23 Q. Did -- were you fired at? Did they shoot at you?
24 A. On several occasions. Not like they did in some other places,
25 but --
1 Q. Not like they did in some other place, but yes, they did shoot at
2 you, is that what you mean?
3 A. On several occasions. It was infantry fire on several occasions.
4 Q. And you didn't shoot at them at all, did you?
5 A. No, we did not.
6 Q. The order -- you had an order not to shoot?
7 A. Yes, by our commander.
8 Q. In paragraph 12, you state the following: "When I was redeployed
9 with my unit --" and I'm going to skip the locality you were redeployed to
10 bearing in mind the fact that this could disclose your identity, but
11 that's what it says in paragraph 12 of your statement, the point isn't on
12 location itself, so: "When I was redeployed with my unit to a locality X
13 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were more Serb officers there than any other
14 ethnic group."
15 And I'm continuing with the quotation: "This, however, was mainly
16 because the different ethnic groups had decided to join up with the armies
17 of their own countries. For example, the Croats left to join the Croatian
18 army, and the Slovenes went to join the Slovenian army. A part of the
19 Muslims and the Albanians also fled the unit. Also, some political
20 parties invited the members of their nationalities to leave the JNA or not
21 to respond to the JNA as well as for other reasons." End of quotation.
22 Now, my question to you is the following: Up until the war in
23 Slovenia and Croatia, until the war broke out there and then during the
24 war in Croatia, the JNA was multi-ethnic, as we have already observed. It
25 included different nationalities. And then there was this change, the
1 secession of the republics which forcibly seceded from Yugoslavia. That's
2 right, isn't it?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Then that secession was followed by secession from the JNA by the
5 members of the JNA who adopted for the secession; is that right?
6 A. Some of them left, others fled, so I don't know whether we can
7 call that secession, but yes, they did leave our ranks.
8 Q. All right. So what you observe, that is that it was mostly the
9 Serb officers who remained, was not the result of any kind of act by the
10 JNA to be rid of the members of the other ethnic groups. It was purely
11 the fact that they had left the JNA.
12 A. Well, I didn't say that.
13 Q. Yes. I just wanted to check that out with you, to verify it. I'm
14 not claiming that you did say that. So they left the JNA.
15 When you say that they were mostly Serb officers, that means that
16 it wasn't only the Serb officers that stayed on, there were other
17 ethnicities who stayed on in the JNA when you arrived in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
19 A. Yes, that's right.
20 Q. Then in paragraph 14, paragraph 14 you say that amongst the
21 officers of the JNA in Bosnia there was the fear that the Muslims and
22 Croats in Bosnia might unilaterally try to secede from Yugoslavia and
23 establish their own unitary state as Slovenia and Croatia had previously
24 done. Is that right?
25 A. Yes, that's right.
1 Q. Can I conclude and take it then that the officers in the JNA, who
2 were mostly Serbs at the time, were in favour of preserving the common
3 state of Yugoslavia or, rather, that they wished to preserve it?
4 A. In the majority of cases, yes, they did.
5 Q. All right. Now, since you yourself are a Serb from
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did the Serb inhabitants in Bosnia-Herzegovina come
7 out in favour of preserving Yugoslavia?
8 A. As far as I know, yes.
9 Q. And since Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state whose federal
10 constitutional system guaranteed equal rights to all its citizens, you
11 know full well that the Serbs -- the total Serb population in Yugoslavia
12 was a little less than 40 per cent of the total population. This means
13 that the Serbs strove for multi-ethnicity and equality; is that right?
14 A. Most of the population, the majority of the population strove to
15 preserve Yugoslavia, if we're talking about the Serbs in Bosnia.
16 Q. All right. Fine. Now, what about their position? Was it their
17 position that all nationalities or ethnic groups should be equal?
18 A. At the time we're talking about, yes.
19 Q. Tell me now, please, since the preservation of the countries'
20 territorial integrity was guaranteed by the constitution and since
21 secession was banned by that same constitution, does that mean that Serbs
22 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Krajina and all over Yugoslavia strove to
23 protect the constitutional order by the same token?
24 A. Well, I've already said they did strive to preserve Yugoslavia.
25 Q. Now, this fact that the Serbs strove to preserve Yugoslavia and
1 that the JNA as a Yugoslav institution also was in favour of seeing
2 Yugoslavia preserved, was that precisely the factor which painted an
3 impression as to an alliance between the Serbs and the JNA, gave that
5 A. Well, perhaps it did, yes.
6 Q. All right, Mr. 1804. If they were essentially allies and if their
7 goals were to respect the constitution and preserve the state and thereby
8 stand in opposition to those toppling the state and the constitution, is
9 it obvious that there was nothing in that that was bad, if I can put it
10 that way, but that both acted in the moral and legal sense as dictated by
11 the constitution and the law?
12 A. At the beginning, yes.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you seem to be reinvigorated for
14 the afternoon session, but it's time to adjourn.
15 Mr. Nice.
16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, if we are adjourning -- I see the time,
17 yes, we are adjourning. There are administrative matters that I must deal
18 with and I prefer to deal with in the absence of the witness, they having
19 nothing whatsoever to do with him.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Witness 1804, we will adjourn for the
21 afternoon. You are not to discuss your evidence with anybody during the
22 adjournment, and be back tomorrow morning at 9.00.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
2 MR. NICE: My concern is with the following --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
4 MR. NICE: My concern is with following witnesses:
5 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
6 MR. NICE: Can we be in private session, please.
7 [Private session]
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.50 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 11th day of
19 February, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.