1 Tuesday, 14 September 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.
6 MR. KAY: Thank you. Your Honour, before I call the first
7 witness, who is Mr. Roland Keith, there is another matter that I would
8 like to raise at the end of his testimony - the witness is here and
9 available and should be heard first - and that deals with the matter of
10 the accused's appeal on the issue of his right to represent himself.
11 As the Trial Chamber knows, we lodged before the Trial Chamber an
12 application for a certificate for leave to appeal that decision. Leave
13 was given last Friday, and we would be making an application after this
14 witness is finished testimony on the issue of the suspension of the
15 proceedings until the appeal is heard by the Appeals Chamber.
16 I gave notice to the Prosecution of this matter slightly earlier
17 this morning, and I --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. Let us hear the witness
19 first and then we'll deal with that matter afterwards.
20 MR. KAY: I was raising it to put the Trial Chamber on notice as
22 If we could have Mr. Keith, please.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: He's not coming from Canada, is he?
24 MR. KAY: He had arrived. I don't know whether he -- ah, here he
1 [The witness entered court]
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
3 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
4 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
6 WITNESS: ROLAND KEITH
7 Examined by Mr. Kay:
8 Q. Your name is Roland Keith; is that right?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And you're a citizen of Canada?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. If we could just have a brief resume of your background,
13 Mr. Keith. You were an army officer in the Canadian army; is that right?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. For what period of time?
16 A. I was a military officer in the Canadian army for 32 years.
17 Q. And finishing your service when?
18 A. I finished my service -- it was broken service, actually. I
19 finished initially in the year 1982. I then took what I call a
20 sabbatical. I was back at grad school, studying history. I returned to
21 the army for a further four years in the year 1987 to 1991.
22 Q. And your rank at retirement was captain; is that right?
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. And you became a member of the Kosovo monitoring force in 1999?
25 A. Yes, I did.
1 Q. What we call the KVM?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. When were you first recruited to take part in that mission?
4 A. The background to my service with the Kosovo Verification Mission
5 was in the summer of 1998 when the first indication that it would be
6 constituted, and I subsequently applied to participate, and in the late
7 fall of 1998, my government and -- contacted me and said is that they --
8 they furthered -- they forwarded, rather, my resume and my application,
9 and I was notified in -- shortly after New Year's 1999 that I -- that they
10 would like me to serve with the OSCE, Kosovo Verification Mission.
11 Q. And did you arrive in Kosovo in the first week of February, 1999?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. And you undertook a period of training for some four days on about
14 the 9th of February?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. And did you go down to Pristina on the 12th of February for a
17 period of two days?
18 A. I believe that is correct, yes.
19 Q. And the purpose of that was for what?
20 A. The purpose of that was to assign me to a role within the Pristina
21 Regional Centre and the Pristina Coordination Centre of the Kosovo
22 Verification Mission, which was done in that short period of time.
23 Q. Before this period, had you ever spent any period of your service
24 in the Balkans?
25 A. No. This was my initial participation with the Balkans.
1 Q. Had your previous military experience had you undertaken observer
2 duties in other countries?
3 A. Yes, I had. In the mid-1970s I had served a double tour as a
4 United Nations military observer in the Sinai -- the Suez Canal, the
5 Sinai, throughout the United Nations truce supervisory organisation area,
6 including the state of Lebanon.
7 Q. And in your previous military history have you spent a previous
8 period in the Suez area, right at the start of your military career?
9 A. Yes. I was very, very proud as a young man to have served with
10 the Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron as one of the initial units
11 under General Burns in what was then the United Nations Emergency Force 1,
12 and a very interesting and challenging experience.
13 Q. Right. Now let's turn to Kosovo. When you arrived here in The
14 Hague, you brought with you some documents, and the first one I'd like to
15 put before the Court, which will serve as a familiarisation process, is a
16 general map of the Kosovo area centred upon Pristina.
17 MR. KAY: And if copies of that can be handed out and one put
18 before the witness.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between question
20 and answer. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you have seen the notification? Pause
22 between question and answer. And I say the same to the witness, for the
23 benefit of the interpreters.
24 MR. KAY: Yes. Thank you.
25 Q. It's what I discussed with you yesterday. We must be careful
1 about not running our questions and answers together, and the mistake is
2 entirely mine in not doing that which I told you not to do.
3 If we could look at this map, then, and we see Pristina in the
4 middle of the map. We see an area, a town to the left, Kosovo Polje. We
5 see, slightly above that, Obilic. And we see to the left Glogovac. And
6 if you could confirm this: The testimony that you're to give largely
7 concerns that area to the west of Pristina; is that right?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. I'd like you now to take us through your tour of duty, which I
10 believe commenced after you had had your familiarisation process in
11 Pristina, with going to Glogovac; is that correct?
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. And if you could inform the Court what the circumstances were at
14 this time in the middle of February when you arrived in Glogovac. What
15 did you see?
16 A. My initial recollections of arriving in Glogovac in this time
17 frame, in the middle of February of 1999, this was a small Serbian --
18 sorry, a small Yugoslavian town inhabited by, I believe, some 6 to 7.000
19 inhabitants. It was predominantly Albanian, and to the best of my
20 knowledge, it was -- it was, I believe, entirely Albanian at this time.
21 The surrounding area consisted of a number of small villages. To my --
22 best of my knowledge, all of these were entirely Albanian.
23 The town had a -- a small MUP, paramilitary station in an old
24 industrial site or a former industrial site, and routine patrols and the
25 replacement of MUP personnel occurred on a daily basis, and there were
1 frequent patrols after the hours of darkness into and out of Glogovac to
2 visit this MUP site.
3 The general area both to the -- in the surrounding villages, to
4 the north-east, the east, and to the south, and to the south of Komorane.
5 If you see Komorane, it's a small community on the crossroads on the
6 Pristina to Pec road. And the surrounding -- the villages from Lopusnik
7 and all down the valley to the south there were all, as well, additional
8 Albanian inhabited small communities. In all of these communities there
9 was what I refer to as the home guard. They were local UCK members,
10 referred to as terrorists by the authorities, who had a presence in all of
11 these villages, and they maintained static armed checkpoints on the routes
12 in and out of their villages. There was no -- there was no harassment or
13 incursion of Serbian or Yugoslavian authorities or forces into any of
14 these villages at this time. To my knowledge, they stayed, as I've
15 previously stated, to the route in and out of Glogovac and patrolling the
16 main road which I've previously referred to as well, the Pristina-Pec
17 highway, and the road going down to Orahovac and down to the -- down to
18 the Prizren area from the north.
19 So this was my -- my general impression of the Glogovac area.
20 There were some incidents that had occurred as recently as the day before
21 I arrived when an individual was fatally murdered just south of Glogovac.
22 I did not participate in the investigation nor in the follow-up to that
23 particular incident, but to the best of my knowledge, it was a local
24 attack by one side or another or retribution.
25 Q. The period you spent at Glogovac was how long?
1 A. I don't have the precise dates in front of me at the moment,
2 Mr. Kay, but I -- I believe I was there for about one week.
3 Q. In your previous answer which I can see on the LiveNote
4 transcript, you said the MUP was in a paramilitary building. Is that what
5 you meant?
6 A. In Glogovac itself?
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. Yes. I believe I stated that the MUP team in Glogovac occupied a
9 military -- had a military presence in a former industrial building which
10 was fortified, of course.
11 Q. Yes. In terms of what you saw in that week of -- of Glogovac, did
12 you come across any abuses of power by the local MUP or the VJ or any
13 other body to be associated with the Serbian authorities?
14 A. No. During that -- that week that I was in Glogovac, as I've
15 previously stated, the -- the VJ had a very limited presence. There were
16 some armoured infantry fighting vehicle movement into and out of Glogovac,
17 small numbers of vehicles, platoon size. There -- but basically the VJ
18 were staying in their barracks, and other than some movement on the
19 principal roads, the MUP, again as previously stated, had routine patrols
20 on the roads into and out of their -- their patrol sites, and they manned
21 checkpoints along the major highway, again referring to the Pristina-Pec
22 highway, and these -- within the Glogovac area of responsibility, these
23 would number probably one or two a day along the main road or on the road
24 into Glogovac where they would set up temporary checkpoint, and they would
25 examine all personnel transiting that particular checkpoint.
1 I observed a number of these operations in progress. It was not
2 my observation that there was any abuse or -- or harm, physical harm, that
3 is, done to any of the inhabitants transiting those checkpoints. We did,
4 however, in conversing with the predominantly Albanian population of the
5 area, ask them if they were having any difficulty in moving through the
6 area, transiting the area, or being harassed. They stated in some cases
7 they thought they had in that -- in that their -- some of their documents,
8 they claimed, were taken from them. In some cases, they claimed that some
9 individuals were detained for a short period of time, perhaps maybe
10 overnight, but I did not see personally any maltreatment or physical or
11 harmful harassment to the inhabitants trying to participate in their
12 lawful -- lawful business.
13 Again, the -- the -- the local -- what I referred to as the local
14 home guard of the UCK, or the terrorists, did again stay within their
15 villages at this time in this area, to my knowledge.
16 Q. You've described there the UCK/KLA as having a home guard network
17 in the villages in the surrounding area. What level of strength are we
18 looking at in terms of KLA forces that you were able to observe at this
19 time in this area?
20 A. These were local forces, in my estimation. They would be in half
21 a dozen -- strength of half a dozen young men. Sometimes -- sometimes
22 there were more, but they appeared to me to be local inhabitants and not
23 part of any main force UCK offensive group.
24 Q. After that we -- did you then establish a field office in Kosovo
1 A. That is correct. I was -- I had gone to -- I'd been assigned to
2 Glogovac with the understanding that I would take over the direction of
3 that field office. That did -- did not happen. And after the short
4 period of time, approximately one week, I was requested to assume
5 responsibility to form a field office under the direction of the Pristina
6 Coordination Centre and Regional Centre at Kosovo Polje. This was a new
7 team that did not exist until the time that I was appointed.
8 Q. You brought to the Tribunal with you some -- some notes from your
9 records at the time; is that correct?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. And these notes came from what source?
12 A. The notes were -- were put together by myself, and they are weekly
13 summaries, I believe the ones you're referring to, that were based on the
14 daily reports that were put together by myself and my team of verifiers
15 and submitted to the Pristina Coordination Centre on a daily basis. The
16 weekly reports were -- were put together by myself to -- to give a summary
17 of what those daily reports consisted of and to provide me personally with
18 a record of what my participation in the Kosovo Verification Mission was.
19 Q. Now, it would probably help to consider your evidence with those
20 notes before us.
21 MR. KAY: So, Your Honours, if the map we produced could be the
22 next exhibit, which would D246.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's admitted.
24 MR. KAY: And if the notes of the witness can now be produced and
25 put before the parties.
1 Q. Whilst that's going on, Mr. Keith, on your left-hand side is a
2 very detailed map which is your personal property again; is that right?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Which is a map of the general area and was your operations map at
5 the time; is that right?
6 A. That is correct, Mr. Kay.
7 Q. You're familiar with that map, and if you need to direct our
8 attention to anything on the map, please do so as it's on an ELMO and
9 we're able to look at it on the video screens if necessary. We've got the
10 general map and then we've got the more detailed map which may help your
12 Just looking at the first note, then, which is headed 28th of
13 February, 1999, Weekly Summary Number 1, it states you established your
14 field office in Kosovo Polje on the 22nd of February, 1999; is that right?
15 A. That is correct.
16 JUDGE KWON: Before moving on, Mr. Kay, why don't we make sure the
17 ELMO is operating properly or not.
18 MR. KAY: We did a test earlier, Your Honour, and it was. Shall
19 we see?
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're not getting any signal.
21 JUDGE KWON: We can proceed.
22 MR. KAY: Are you getting something on your monitors now, Your
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. But proceed, Mr. Kay.
25 MR. KAY: We just had a flash then and then it went.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: There we are.
2 MR. KAY: We have the picture there. Thank you.
3 Q. Kosovo Polje, if you can tell us there what the situation was that
4 you found at that stage when you arrived on the 22nd of February.
5 Describe the type of place it was.
6 A. Kosovo Polje, of course, is a very historic site. The town -- I
7 can't recall the estimates of the population, but I would estimate 10 to
8 15.000; a major -- a major site.
9 It was -- in asking questions of the various authorities and
10 people who I had the opportunity to associate with, I understood the
11 ethnic distribution within Kosovo Polje, the town itself, to be
12 approximately 70 per cent Serbian and perhaps 20 per cent Albanian and 10
13 per cent of others, including Turks, Roma, and various other ethnic
15 The -- now, would you like me to go on about the --
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. -- area of responsibility?
18 The area of responsibility that I was assigned ran from Pristina,
19 the western -- the western ends of Pristina going south, including the
20 Pristina airport, which was -- which was a military site and was -- we
21 were not allowed to go into the Pristina airport site itself without a VJ
23 The area again going down just to the west of the main south
24 highway down -- proceeding to the -- sorry, to the south and then to the
25 west and then up, including the principal town of Obilic and the very
1 large coal mining site of Belacevac - sorry if I do not pronounce the
2 names that well - and the area then actually exceeded right to the north,
3 up to the Mitrovica highway and a number of small villages. Is that
5 Q. If the map can be brought down the ELMO.
6 A. Thank you. And then as you see from my Chinagraph markings here,
7 going up through the wooded and the high grounds going from south to north
8 to the west of the Belacevac mine site and the Obilic power station and up
9 towards the Mitrovica highway, and actually beyond my Chinagraph markings
10 here to a number of small villages around Hamidija and to the north and to
11 the north of the Grabovac and Obilic road.
12 So this was the general area of my responsibility, then back to
13 the Pristina highway and north.
14 The -- to describe it, the -- the area south of the Pristina-Pec
15 highway, a number of agricultural villages, numerous villages, had been
16 there for many years, I assume. These villages were primarily occupied by
17 Serbs. I believe there were other smaller numbers of ethnic authorities
18 in some of them as well. However, in the -- in the Grabovac - and I'll
19 mention Donji Grabovac a little later - but at Grabovac area, again I
20 believe these villages had -- had been ethnically -- an ethnic mix prior
21 to the troubles of the summer of 1998. However, on my arrival in February
22 1999, I believe that these were, in my opinion, entirely occupied by
23 Serbian peoples. And the village of Donji Grabovac was totally deserted,
25 And the small villages that I've referred to in the north and off
1 the major routes were -- had suffered damage in the troubles and the
2 fighting of the summer of 1998, and the peoples residing in these villages
3 to this -- at this time, to the best of my knowledge, were almost entirely
4 Albanian. And in all of these villages there was what I referred to
5 earlier as a home guard element of the UCK.
6 We were -- we were allowed in and out of all of these villages but
7 only after we showed our credentials. And each and every time the UCK
8 sentries made a point of writing down all our credential information and
9 communicating with some -- with superiors which I could not observe before
10 they would let us proceed. However, they did not obstruct us other than
11 going through this procedure.
12 The MUP, again, similar to the Glogovac area, the MUP patrolled
13 all the routes in and around Kosovo Polje, the main roads. Of course
14 there was a police station in Kosovo Polje, another police station in
15 Obilic. I went to these police stations and introduced myself to the
16 local police chiefs and worked with them throughout my stay in the Kosovo
17 Polje area up till the evacuation of the Kosovo Verification Mission.
18 They -- I was received hospitably, professionally, and at all times they
19 cooperated with me and all of my requests. I was not -- I was not
20 obstructed from carrying out any of my duties or responsibilities by them.
21 Q. If I can just --
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kay. Mr. Kay, I remember the witness mentioned
23 the place which is called Grabovac, which is different from Glogovac.
24 MR. KAY: Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: If you could help me to find --
1 MR. KAY: In between Glogovac and Pristina would be Grabovac and
2 Donji Grabovac --
3 Q. Perhaps you could find it on the more detailed map which we
4 anticipated may be needed. And I wonder if the scale can come up a bit.
5 We've lost it totally.
6 MR. NICE: I don't know if Your Honours will be assisted by having
7 a look at Exhibit 83 if you've got it with you.
8 JUDGE KWON: But in that map Grabovac is near in Pec, which should
9 be different from the location.
10 MR. NICE: I think if you look at -- look --
11 MR. KAY: The witness is pointing to the part on the map where
12 Grabovac is.
13 THE WITNESS: This.
14 MR. KAY:
15 Q. And Donji Grabovac, which is of importance in a part of your
16 testimony, is just to the north-west.
17 A. That is -- that is correct.
18 Q. If you just keep your pointer on Grabovac, and if we can go back
19 now to have a smaller scale, we can see where it is in relation to
20 Pristina perhaps. If the technical booth can do that.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I found it in Exhibit 83.
22 MR. KAY:
23 Q. We can see Obilic on the right-hand side --
24 MR. NICE: I'm glad. If it can be found as Donji Grabovac --
25 JUDGE KWON: It appears --
1 MR. NICE: Grabovac itself is not marked.
2 JUDGE KWON: On page 6, yes.
3 MR. NICE: Yes. The map otherwise is quite helpful.
4 MR. KAY:
5 Q. And would I be right if you drew a line, say, between Glogovac and
6 Obilic it would cross-intersect over Grabovac and Donji Grabovac roughly?
7 A. That is correct. I believe it's off the map here, Glogovac, now,
8 but it would be just to the south of the Grabovac area, directly on an
9 east -- east-west line, that is correct.
10 MR. KAY: Yes. I hope that assists the Trial Chamber.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the distance from Pristina?
12 THE WITNESS: This map is a 1:50.000, so each of these squares is
13 one kilometre. We are looking at a distance of about -- in Donji Grabovac
14 we're looking at a distance of 9 or 10 kilometres from Pristina and of
15 course Glogovac would be something like 17 or 18 kilometres, as I recall.
16 MR. KAY: Yes.
17 Q. In relation to the KLA in that area, you've described the home
18 guard but it's the overall situation within the region that you're dealing
19 with. Are you able to give evidence about that?
20 A. Yes. Yes, I believe so. Am I being -- am I being heard?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. Thank you.
23 MR. KAY: If the other microphone could be switched on so the
24 witness can speak across to me. Thank you. Yes.
25 Q. So if you could tell us about the overall strength. You've
1 mentioned the home guard in the villages, but was there a force behind
2 them elsewhere?
3 A. Yes, there was. In the area just west of Donji Grabovac -- I'm
4 not sure is this ELMO still projected or --
5 Q. We're off at the moment. If we could go on again. Yes.
6 A. In the -- in the area just to the west of Grabovac and Donji
7 Grabovac, we see a wooded rolling series of hills. I believe this is the
8 south-western end of the Drenica valley. When we proceeded into the
9 wooded rolling hills here and directly west of Donji Grabovac, we
10 encountered a local force of the UCK, and I had a number of meetings, as
11 did my deputy, almost on a daily basis, with this force. In my
12 estimation, what I saw when I was visiting and discussing security matters
13 with the UCK local commander would be a force about platoon size. That
14 would be about 35 armed personnel. They would have assault rifles, light
15 machine-guns, rocket propelled grenades. And in all our discussions with
16 the local commander and his deputies, they were not -- they were unable to
17 give us any assurances on -- on what they could or could not do without
18 reference to superior command, and this was seldom forthcoming.
19 They also -- they also were unable or -- or unwilling to answer
20 any queries about individuals from the authorities' side or the government
21 side who had disappeared, been abducted, or killed or injured. So
22 basically they were friendly, hospitable, but generally did not cooperate
23 in a meaningful manner for -- to enable me to carry out my
24 responsibilities as a verifier of the agreement.
25 Q. We'll just summarise those responsibilities now. They were to
1 monitor the cease-fire between the parties and to record incidents that
2 took place. And did you have a role as well in attempting to pacify the
4 A. Yes, I did. The -- again, as you previously mentioned, Mr. Kay,
5 upon my arrival and my introduction in consultation with the MUP police
6 chiefs and local police chiefs, they claimed that -- that the area within
7 both Kosovo Polje and the Obilic police area, that the major concern was
8 this Donji Grabovac area. Again, just for the -- for the -- perhaps the
9 enlightenment of the Court or the assistance of the Court, the Bjelovac
10 mine, which covers almost -- a great deal of the area between Kosovo Polje
11 and Obilic and its power station, this is a vast coal mine that produced
12 the coal that fuelled the Obilic power station which not only provided
13 power to most of Kosovo but also to other parts of Yugoslavia, and with
14 the troubles and with the agreement that we were trying to verify, of
15 course the authorities were trying to facilitate the movement of mine
16 workers into and out of the mine on a regular shift basis. I believe they
17 operated around the clock, 24 hours. And because of the importance of
18 Donji Grabovac to the authorities and hence to myself and my team was that
19 that was an area where there was daily movement in and out of workers.
20 Not only were the MUP trying to maintain security and protect the -- the
21 mine operation and facilitate the comings and goings of the mine workers,
22 but the -- there was also a mine police force. This was a paramilitary
23 police force that was organised and hired, I assume, by the mining company
24 or the power company, and they also had a hierarchy of police,
25 non-commissioned officers, and police chiefs. I also dealt with these
2 It was these -- it was this force that was primarily challenged,
3 in my opinion, with providing security to the mine and hence the mine site
4 which was right near the village of Grabovac. And this was a problem to
5 the authorities because they were suffering -- from all reports and
6 physical evidence that I saw, they were suffering almost daily harassing
7 attacks, sniping attacks. Prior to my arrival, an engineer had been
8 abducted, presumably -- to my knowledge he was never seen again.
9 Presumably he was murdered or disappeared. And mine guards --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Attacks from whom?
11 THE WITNESS: Allegedly from the UCK.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was that the only presence of the UCK in that
14 THE WITNESS: No, I think as I previously described, Your Honour,
15 the UCK were -- occupied all of the small villages outside of the beaten
16 track with their what I referred to as home guard forces, and in the
17 wooded area to the west of Donji Grabovac there appeared to be, to my
18 military estimate, a platoon or elements of a company size UCK force which
19 was perhaps local but perhaps it was more than the home guard element that
20 I described earlier.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm trying to arrive at a number for the size of
22 the UCK force in that area.
23 THE WITNESS: I mentioned -- I mentioned in my previous testimony,
24 Your Honour, that the force that I witnessed when I visited was
25 approximately platoon size. That would be about 35 personnel, armed
1 personnel, and more heavily armed than the -- what I referred to as the
2 local UCK home guard in the various villages that I -- I visited.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: You encountered one force of platoon size, but
4 there are others?
5 THE WITNESS: Yes. I would -- again I'm trying to portray what I
6 actually saw. If you see -- as a former soldier, if you see a platoon,
7 there's obviously a company; and if you see a company, there's obviously a
8 battalion. I say this because military forces do not operate in
9 isolation, they operate with mutual support. And it would be my estimate
10 that this was a small element of a larger element further to the west and
11 to the north.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: So you assume that the UCK had such a
13 sophisticated command structure?
14 THE WITNESS: They certainly had a command structure over and
15 above what I -- whom I met or what I witnessed, yes.
16 MR. KAY:
17 Q. I think you referred as well to decisions being unable to be taken
18 by the local commander and so that matters were referred elsewhere; is
19 that right?
20 A. That is correct, and that's another supporting element of my
21 assessment that this was a smaller element of a larger force. The local
22 commander was never able to answer any of my queries or any of my
23 questions without reference to higher authority.
24 Q. Where you indicated the KLA/UCK were regionally centred from what
25 you could -- you could see, was the VJ or MUP presence outside that area?
1 A. The -- no. As I've tried to state several times, the -- the VJ
2 stayed either within their barracks area or camp areas other than for --
3 for patrolling the major routes or moving to conduct small exercises. And
4 the MUP, as well, occupied various observation posts overlooking some of
5 the highways. And of course they -- as I've previously mentioned, they --
6 on a daily basis they established checkpoints on the major highway
7 primarily but also on some of the rural areas, the rural roads, to provide
8 security to personnel and inhabitants moving along those corridors.
9 Q. You mentioned sniping attacks that were taking place which
10 affected the mine workers. Are you able to give any idea of responses
11 that there were to those sniping attacks, how the local authorities
12 attempted to deal with it?
13 A. The local authorities, again primarily the mine police, complained
14 to me on a daily basis that -- that they were being harassed and -- and
15 sniped at. I was shown evidence of new bullet holes in some of the mine
16 security buildings personally, and these -- I can attest that these were
17 not there the day or so before when I had looked at that same building.
18 So the rounds had been fired from west or north of the site.
19 Again, if you -- refer you to my weekly summaries of my daily
20 reports, and I don't for a minute think that the harassment was coming
21 from -- entirely from one side. The -- in discussions with the UCK
22 commander in this area, he, of course, complained that the mine police
23 were sniping at his forces and he was -- would respond. In discussing
24 with the mine police, of course I received entirely the other story. They
25 said that their -- their movement of personnel workers and security
1 personnel were being harassed and sniped at, and they then would respond
2 to ensure their safety.
3 In some cases, in my -- excuse me. I believe -- I believe there
4 are several quotes in my documents that I wrote at that time where I give
5 greater credibility to one side or the other based on my personal
6 judgement, and I think in the Grabovac area, given the situation that I
7 have tried to describe in the mine police to maintain security to their
8 workers that probably - and this is my assessment - that they probably,
9 during the hours of darkness were -- were somewhat nervous and probably
10 initiated a number of the gunfire accounts which, of course, would
11 probably elicit a response from the UCK side.
12 So I think -- I think there was a two-way stream here given the
13 general insecurity and the importance of this site to maintain the
14 operation of the mine and the power plant.
15 Q. Yes. Also in this region, and we can see that on your first
16 weekly summary of 28th of February, is somewhere known as the chicken
17 farm, which was a site of local economic importance; is that right?
18 A. Excuse me. No. The chicken farm was an unoccupied former
19 agricultural site, and I can point it on the big man here, to the ELMO, I
20 guess, to find it. It is -- it is the area shown on this map around the
21 crossroads of Krivovo --
22 MR. KAY: We're not picking it up. If the map could be moved,
23 please. We're on screen with it but if you can put the part where Mr.
24 Keith has the wand.
25 A. You see the Pristina-Pec highway.
1 Q. Yes?
2 A. Again running west from Pristina through Kosovo Polje, and it goes
3 through a small -- a small -- on my map it's known as Krivovo. And this
4 is again on the road going to the crossroads for Glogovac, and there are a
5 number of agricultural buildings on my map. I am circling the area with
6 the pointer at this time. The highway is just to the north and you see a
7 series of buildings there. This was -- this was not in operation as an
8 agricultural site when I was there. It was occupied by a VJ company team,
9 varied. There would always be a platoon of tanks, perhaps a company of
10 tanks - a company of tanks would be ten tanks, a platoon three tanks - in
11 this area. Certainly a platoon or more of infantry fighting vehicles.
12 And -- but they generally stayed in that area other than, as I've stated
13 earlier, moving out for small exercises or to conduct route patrols along
14 the main routes, primarily from there towards the Pristina air field,
15 which was -- is right within about three to four kilometres from that
17 Q. Right.
18 A. Which was a heavily militarised area.
19 Q. Was that part of the security for the air field?
20 A. Well, it would be -- it would be addition to -- in addition to the
21 security at the air field, but it was a crucially military important area
22 because of its location right on the highway. It could facilitate a rapid
23 response to any major emergency in that area.
24 Q. The chicken farm, as it was called, was that subject to any
1 A. The chicken farm per se I -- I know of no attacks on the chicken
2 farm. However, I was witness to an attack on a police patrol just -- just
3 approximately 1.000 or 1.500 metres to the -- no, less than that, I'm
4 sorry. Probably about 200 metres to the west of the -- of what we refer
5 to as the chicken farm. Again, the Pristina-Pec highway comes out of the
6 open agricultural area and goes into a re-entry to get into the higher
7 ground, and there, as you approach the -- what we referred to as the
8 chicken farm, is what in military terms I would know as a D file.
9 Consequently a dangerous area if your opponents controlled the ground to
10 either side.
11 Q. And what did you witness there?
12 A. I believe it was on the 27th of February, if I recall correctly.
13 It's in my notes, I believe. At that site one of my patrols was -- had
14 proceeded to the west and was returning. It was towards last light, this
15 being February; the days were short. He encountered a major military
16 operation with a large amount of fire, including tanks, although I don't
17 know -- the tanks were not firing their main armament but their
18 machine-guns, and infantry fighting vehicles that had responded to what
19 was clear to me an attack on the police patrol that took place a few
20 minutes before this. And what my patrol was witnessing was the response
21 and retaliation to this attack. And I myself was proceeding on -- on
22 other business, about to leave Kosovo Polje, when I received his call.
23 The sound of heavy gunfire was obvious because it was transmitted when his
24 radio was transmitting. I immediately proceeded to the area and was there
25 within three or four minutes.
1 The -- when I arrived, the firing was beginning to subside but
2 there was still -- it had -- it had been going on for some time, and the
3 MUP estimated platoon, again about 35 armed paramilitary police, had
4 assaulted across the road under the support of a platoon, three T55 tanks.
5 And when I asked the local police commander if he could tell me what had
6 occurred, he said yes. He was cooperative, and although there was a great
7 deal of tension as one of his police NCOs had been fatally injured,
8 another critically injured, and I -- I observed the fatal casualty, and I
9 was witness to the evacuation of the critically injured police
10 non-commissioned officer, and the -- it was clear to me that there had
11 been an attack from the north of the D-file, in my estimation with the use
12 of light machine-gun or similar weapon that had been used to make this
13 attack. It was clear to me that -- that the force that had attacked had
14 been opposed to the government, and I assumed that they were UCK.
15 Q. I think in your report you used the phrase: "It appears to be a
16 clear case the KLA provocation."
17 A. That is correct, Mr. Kay. It -- it was -- this was no accident
18 where the MUP or the VJ had moved out and -- and challenged any of the
19 outlying areas. This was a clear case that the -- the terrorists,
20 insurgents from outside were coming in to harass the authorities,
21 obviously, in my estimation, to provoke a response.
22 Q. Thank you. You referred slightly earlier in your testimony to the
23 cooperation that you received from the local MUP police chiefs, and you've
24 referred to their involvement --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay. Sorry. Can I ask the witness, what
1 indicated to you that it was a KLA provocation? By that, I gather you
2 mean that the KLA initiated the attack.
3 THE WITNESS: It was -- my assigned role as a verifier was to
4 verify the -- the situation in accordance with the agreement of October
5 1998 of which the authorities, meaning the MUP and the VJ, would withdraw
6 from confrontation but maintain security in their -- along their routes
7 and in their -- in their -- the main sites, and they would not -- they
8 would not move into the hinterland, if I may use that term, that was
9 occupied primarily by the Albanian Yugoslavs. And -- and again, as I've
10 tried to describe and I certainly witnessed during my -- my few months in
11 Kosovo, the -- they generally did.
12 Conversely, it also was part of the agreement to my understanding
13 that the KLA or UCK would stay in the hinterland and would not harass,
14 interfere, or conduct military operations where the government authorities
15 held sway. And it appeared to me in this occasion and on several others
16 that I witnessed or observed that the UCK were not abiding by the
17 agreement, and they were conducting military attacks. In my military
18 assessment, given their strengths and the strengths of the authorities,
19 they were trying to -- trying to provoke a response. And being a military
20 man, the responsibility to defend your forces, to defend your assigned
21 responsibilities, if you are attacked, you naturally, given the authority,
22 you respond.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: When you arrived at the scene, the attack was
24 already in -- taking place?
25 THE WITNESS: The -- the -- by the time I arrived there, I would
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 assume it would be ten minutes after the attack had been initiated, and
2 the perpetrators of the attack had withdrawn because they -- there was no
3 -- there was no fire coming from - sorry - the attack position in that
4 ten minutes when I arrived there. The fire was all going from the MUP and
5 the VJ side into the -- the -- the high ground where the attack had been
6 committed from.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Kay.
8 MR. KAY:
9 Q. And the significance of the attack is that it's 200 metres from
10 the military installation at the chicken farm?
11 A. I believe that is significant, but it's also significant that the
12 attack was on a routine police patrol on the main highway from Pristina to
13 Pec, a highway travelled not only by the local inhabitants but also by
14 NGOs. International Committee of the Red Cross and other NGOs used this
15 road frequently as did the Kosovo Verification Mission.
16 Q. It's the Pec to Pristina highway?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Carrying a great deal of traffic?
19 A. It's one of the major routes in Kosovo.
20 Q. And the chicken farm itself was -- was how far from the road?
21 A. The chicken farm, as you can see from the map, was just a matter
22 of metres, 50 metres to a hundred metres south of the road.
23 Q. You turned off the road into the chicken farm military
25 A. Who did? I'm sorry.
1 Q. No. If you were to drive along, you'd turn off the road and drive
2 into it.
3 A. Correct. You -- anybody transiting that road can observe the --
4 what we knew as the chicken farm, yes.
5 Q. You described the higher ground at this particular site. Was that
6 to the north of the road?
7 A. The -- there was high ground primarily to the north but also some
8 high ground to the south, and the attack allegedly had come from the
9 north. And by looking at the fatality and the injured, the damage -- and
10 one armoured jeep was destroyed in this attack, another one was damaged,
11 the -- it was quickly clear to me the attack had come from the north.
12 Q. Back on the other matter I wanted to deal with, which was the
13 cooperation you received from the local police commanders.
14 A. Could --
15 Q. You had dealings with several; is that right? Perhaps if you
16 could name those individuals and where they were based, if you're able to
17 remember this length of time.
18 A. I would be -- I would be really -- I'd be pleased to do that but
19 perhaps if I may just momentarily -- when we're talking about the security
20 of the Pristina to Pec highway, I had observed a previous UCK attack when
21 I had arrived in Glogovac at the Lopusnik observation point, which is on
22 this same highway just further to the west.
23 Q. Towards Komorane?
24 A. Beyond Komorane.
25 Q. Beyond Komorane towards Lopusnik?
1 A. Yes, and I believe five kilometres to the west of Komorane.
2 Q. Still in the Drenica region?
3 A. Yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kay, all those names appear on this map book so
5 if you can check during the adjournment, we will be more assisted by using
7 MR. KAY: Yes.
8 THE WITNESS: I'm pointing to Lopusnik site now. Again, as the
9 highway moves west there is a high ground to the south of the highway,
10 approximately 800 metres south of the highway. The MUP had established a
11 section observation post - a section being approximately ten personnel -
12 and in early -- in early February while I was doing an introductory patrol
13 from Glogovac, the sound of heavy gunfire came from the Lopusnik area. We
14 immediately responded, as did a MUP reinforcement element of platoon size
15 - again two armoured Land Rovers, approximately 25 to 30 armed personnel
16 - when we -- they evacuated a wounded policeman from the observation site
17 maintained by the section with a corporal in charge. When we asked what
18 had happened, they explained that one of their personnel had gone from the
19 fortified observation post to a well to fetch water, which would be
20 approximately 20 to 30 metres distance from their site, and he was fired
21 upon from the east by a sniper and was wounded. Not critically, to my
22 knowledge, but was wounded. And they responded with a fusillade of
23 automatic fire in their defence and their responding reaction force also
24 swept the area looking for the sniper and no sniper was found. But again,
25 it was -- there was a clear police location that was fired on from the --
1 from the west -- sorry, from the east, which is indicative of the type of
2 incidents that took place periodically along this route.
3 Now, to respond to your query, Mr. Kay, on the cooperation with
4 the local police chiefs, again I mentioned they were cooperative to me
5 personally and to my verifiers. The police chief in Kosovo Polje was an
6 individual by the name of Dragan Miric. He and his police commanders and
7 deputy commanders -- developed a working relationship with him and his
8 staff, and they -- they cooperated with all the requests that I gave them,
9 to the best of my knowledge.
10 The other individual who I found cooperative and helpful to enable
11 me to carry out my task was Bozidar Spasic, who was the police chief in
12 Obilic and his area of responsibility, and he and his staff were
13 cooperative. The -- the mine police as well were cooperative, and I
14 mentioned that earlier. When we sought their information on what their
15 problems were and what their troubles were, they -- I'm not -- I'm not for
16 a minute saying that I was told the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
17 but they were cooperative and did reply to my queries, I thought,
18 relatively well.
19 MR. KAY:
20 Q. Thank you. Let's just look at the next page, then, in your weekly
21 summaries. You've given a lot of the general evidence that covers this
22 period now. The next one is the 7th of March, 1999, in which you describe
23 the area remaining generally calm, sniping Grabovac area, regular nightly
24 sniping at Glavotina, and you refer to the chicken farm and movement of
25 tanks and vehicles. You describe there the good contacts with the police
1 chiefs. "Humanitarian issues increased during the week with the
2 increasing incidents of attacks on the MUP and consequent retaliation
3 against KLA positions to our north. These resulted in the movement of an
4 estimated group of 100 plus IDPs" - internally displaced persons - "to our
5 northern area of responsibility from the north." And: One of our patrols
6 escorted 70 former villagers from Donji Grabovac from Pristina station.
7 We'll look at that issue separately, but what I've read out there
8 from the situation of the week ending the 7th of March is a summary of
9 that week. What did you mean by "humanitarian issues increased during the
10 week with the increasing attacks on the MUP?"
11 A. I -- my meaning in this report was that the -- the retaliation by
12 the MUP to the increasing incidents of sniping and other attacks resulted
13 in a -- the normal disruption of the movement of the -- the civil
14 population. As the tensions rose, the contact and the movement became
15 more difficult. And in visiting these series of villages, many of them of
16 which I've listed in this report, Mr. Kay, to the north, north of Obilic
17 but also north along the -- towards the Mitrovica highway, they were
18 individuals who required medical treatment or other treatment, and their
19 ability to attain foodstuffs and the normal paraphernalia of a civil
20 society was disrupted, hence they were in contact with them. During this
21 period, there were always concerns that somebody couldn't get there or
22 somebody couldn't be taken out to receive what they thought were necessary
23 treatments. And the NGOs, who they were reliant on for providing some
24 assistance, were -- were unable, with the growing instability, of
25 attending to these people. So they -- when we encountered them, they
1 always had concerns.
2 Q. You referred to the "consequent retaliation against KLA positions
3 to our north." If you are able then to describe what was going on between
4 the two parties here, being the MUP and the KLA, what was the pattern of
6 A. I believe that the -- we've talked about several incidents, but to
7 the north there was -- as the month of March moved on, there were
8 increasing reports of -- of UCK attacks. Policemen were being abducted,
9 were being murdered. Other people were being abducted and murdered. And
10 the -- then out of Pristina and out of the various other military camps
11 the VJ moved to support the MUP in counter-terrorist operations. They
12 would move north, and this was further north than my area of
13 responsibility, I just saw the forces on the move and of course heard the
14 consequent radio reports of military and MUP activity.
15 These forces then moved in away from the major routes and the
16 highway in an attempt to cleanse the area and re-secure the area where the
17 UCK were conducting what I have referred to as a mid-level insurrection.
18 I -- I would -- I would describe the situation that I've tried to portray
19 here this morning as generally a low-level insurrection, but by the early
20 part of March, the middle of March, this had -- had grown to what I would
21 describe as a mid-level insurrection where there were -- major forces were
22 now attacking the authorities and the authorities were responding. The VJ
23 went into action in conjunction with the MUP in major military operations
24 up to the battle group level. By "battle group," I mean a force of six or
25 so hundred military personnel, including all arms, supported tanks,
1 mechanised infantry, the MUP in wheeled armoured vehicles, all of it
2 supported by artillery. And they were -- in my military assessment, they
3 were conducting counter-guerilla operations to secure their major routes
4 and their control of the area.
5 Q. This report for this week refers to Donji Grabovac. If you could
6 tell us briefly what your interest was in Donji Grabovac. What happened?
7 A. Well, Donji Grabovac, as I've -- as I wrote about after my
8 experience in -- in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo, had been a village that had
9 been evacuated in the summer of 1998 when the troubles of that time. And
10 again, as I've tried to stress in my testimony, the importance of this
11 particular site because of the mine and the operation of the mine
12 supporting the Obilic power plant, the villagers of Donji Grabovac,
13 predominantly Albanian, to my understanding had generally moved into
14 Pristina but they still retained a cohesiveness, and they were anxious to
15 return to their village and resume their normal life.
16 I had the opportunity to meet with them and their village leaders
17 on several occasions in Pristina, meetings that were arranged, and I told
18 them that I would try with the best of my ability to facilitate their
19 return to their village. These meetings had taken place over a number of
20 weeks commencing shortly after my arrival in Kosovo Polje up until, if I
21 recall correctly, a day or so before we were evacuated on the 20th of
22 March, 1999.
23 The cooperation with the authorities was good, in my estimation.
24 The police chiefs said they would -- they would help facilitate security.
25 They even offered to provide small arms to the villagers to enable them to
1 protect their homes if they were to re-inhabit them.
2 I helped facilitate a visit back to their homes by bus, or several
3 buses, of a number of them so they could see their homes and see what
4 damage or what existed of their homes, considering they had not been
5 occupied for some months. This visit was carried out. It generally went,
6 the visit itself, of the -- of a village delegation generally went well.
7 There were some -- there was some verbal harassment by the mine guards
8 allegedly of the personnel when they returned under escort from my
9 verifiers. They had the opportunity to spend some hours in the village,
10 and then, under escort of my verifiers, they returned to the -- the main
11 highway and returned back to Pristina.
12 The -- I was trying to facilitate this re-occupation of Donji
13 Grabovac, because I believed that if we could have achieved a small
14 accomplishment of restoring normality and putting people back in their
15 homes at such a -- in a critical area that had caused so much disruption
16 over the last number of months, we might have some hope of re-established
17 stability throughout the province of Kosovo. And of course the fact that
18 all my negotiations and whatever endeavours others made to help facilitate
19 this particular operation, it appeared to me after that that powers higher
20 than mine had no -- no real interest in rebuilding stability in Kosovo but
21 probably had other political agendas of which this would not play a role
23 Q. And just -- did the resettlement of Donji Grabovac take place?
24 A. The resettlement did not take place. As I said, the meetings were
25 taking place, I believe, up 'til, I believe, the 18th of March. After
1 that, we had facilitated the return of the delegations to Donji Grabovac,
2 and of course with the -- the order to evacuate Kosovo in preparation for
3 the NATO war, there was -- that was the end of that particular programme.
4 Q. Evacuation of KVM 20th of March.
5 A. That is correct.
6 MR. KAY: If we take the morning --
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kay, just before that. The villagers who wished
8 to return to Donji -- Kosovo Polje, were they of Serb ethnicity?
9 A. The majority of them were Albanian ethnics, to my understanding,
10 and I don't know if there were any Serbs amongst them or not.
11 JUDGE KWON: You said that they had been evacuated in the summer
12 of 1998.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, that was my understanding.
14 JUDGE KWON: Do you know why?
15 THE WITNESS: Well, because of the fighting that was taking place
16 at that time, which was the -- the precursor to what I've tried to
17 describe today in that this was such a critical site because of the mine
18 operation and the very close presence of UCK in the -- to the -- a few
19 thousand metres to the west.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MR. KAY: If we take the break now, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Time for the adjournment. Mr. Keith, we're going
23 to adjourn now for 20 minutes.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Kay.
2 MR. KAY: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Q. I'm on the last session with you now, Mr. Keith. If we just turn
4 to the 14th of March, in your bundle of reports, weekly summary number 3.
5 And there again you cite what the activity was at that time; is that
7 A. Which activity are you referring to, Mr. Kay?
8 Q. Just generally the situation report for the week.
9 A. Yes. That relates to the situation as I reported it at that time.
10 Q. You deal at the end of it with the -- with one of your verifiers
11 being sick on leave in Germany. So that we have an idea of your
12 resources, can you tell the Court how many people you had working under
13 you in your region of Kosovo Polje.
14 A. Yes, I can. My team consisted of myself and eight other
15 verifiers. These were from a variety of nations representing the OSCE. I
16 was the only Canadian in my team, and the rest of the team represented
17 verifiers from countries such as France, Norway, Germany, the United
18 States, and several others that don't pop into my mind momentarily.
19 We were supported by 13 interpreters. These interpreters were, to
20 my recollection were eight -- sorry, seven Albanian Yugoslavs. One
21 identified herself as a Turk, and four were Serbian. They provided the
22 translation and were always present when I or my patrols were attempting
23 to conduct our verification role.
24 And in addition to this, I -- the office and the location where I
25 resided in Kosovo Polje was the Herzegovina Motel. This was a building
1 that had been leased by the United States State Department to support the
2 United -- formerly support the United States diplomatic mission. They had
3 been evacuated from Kosovo early in February, during the Rambouillet
4 negotiations, and took up residence in Skopje in Macedonia, and hence the
5 building was available, and it was given to me to use as a site to reside
6 and to operate my responsibilities within the Kosovo Polje area of
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. I should just add to that, Mr. Kay, that because of this I did not
10 have to hire security personnel. Most of the field stations hired local
11 personnel to provide 24-hour security to prevent theft or other
12 disruptions. The security personnel at the Herzegovina Motel were
13 employees of the United States State Department.
14 Q. Just moving on to the next page, 9th of March, which is an
15 incident report; is that right?
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. There had been a murder during the night, and as a result of that
18 murder, an investigating judge appeared at the scene; is that right?
19 A. That is correct, Mr. Kay.
20 Q. If you could just briefly say what you found there, what the
21 situation was as you saw it.
22 A. This was one of a number of instances where fatalities occurred.
23 As I've said in my commentary, in articles, and in comments, in my
24 judgement many, if not the majority, of these murders were criminal in
25 nature and not necessarily political.
1 In this particular incident, as I've reported and have this one
2 document, in early hours of the morning a police commander - not the
3 police chief but one of their subordinate commanders - came to my office
4 in Kosovo Polje and stated, because I had asked them to keep me informed
5 of any -- any troubles or problems that would be of interest to the
6 Verification Mission and my field office, and said that there had been a
7 murder of a male and that the investigating judge would be there and if I
8 would like to go and have a look and observe the scene I would be welcome
9 to do so. I -- I did that.
10 I arrived at the scene about the same time as the investigating
11 judge. There were a number of MUP policemen who were in the area
12 conducting their police work, and I observed, as I have reported here, a
13 vehicle and who had been a male in the back seat who had been fatally
14 injured by a number of bullet wounds from automatic machine pistol, and
15 the casings of a number of rounds, allegedly 33 rounds from the machine
16 pistol were in the area. The individual had sustained gunshot wounds from
17 the groin to the head and was obviously very dead.
18 Q. And the -- from what you were able to see of the activities the
19 investigating judge?
20 A. The investigating judge and the police work at this particular
21 incident seemed to be routine. The victim's name was provided to me, of
22 which is recorded on the document, and I received no further information
23 to this incident other than submitting my report and carrying on with my
24 other activities.
25 Q. But you were brought into this to observe rather than conduct any
1 investigations yourself?
2 A. That is correct. That is correct. This was --
3 Q. And that was in accordance with your mandate.
4 A. In accordance with my mandate and in accordance with the
5 arrangements that I had established with the local police authorities so
6 that I would be aware of what was happening in relation to the stability
7 and the violence that was taking place within the Kosovo Polje area of
9 Q. The remaining pages in your bundle of exhibits concerned activity
10 reports, 10th of March, and 18th of March, 1999, which are just general
11 daily activity reports; is that right?
12 A. That is correct. This, of course, a daily report was submitted
13 for every day.
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. These are the only two I've managed to retain in my possession.
16 When we evacuated Kosovo Polje, we actually left on the evening of the
17 19th of March, and unfortunately we left most of my possessions and all of
18 our records other than what I could carry, and we proceeded to Pristina,
19 to the Coordination Centre in Pristina, and then of course I never had the
20 opportunity to return to Kosovo Polje.
21 Q. And then you went to Macedonia where you remained for a few weeks;
22 is that right?
23 A. Yes. We -- we left Kosovo the morning of the 20th of March and
24 proceeded to Skopje and then carried on to the south-west of Macedonia, to
25 the Lake Ohrid region, where the whole of the Kosovo -- Kosovo
1 Verification Mission was housed in a number of resort hotels around the
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. KAY: I would like to exhibit this now, Your Honour, as D247,
5 the collection of reports.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. That will be admitted.
7 MR. KAY: 247. Thank you.
8 Q. And thank you very much for giving your evidence. Wait there,
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do you wish to ask any questions
12 of this witness?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this
14 examination-in-chief is completely senseless. For example, Mr. Keith was
15 explaining how the superiors in the Verifying Mission did not have --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there is a procedure that the
17 Chamber has established, and you will either follow that procedure or you
18 will not be heard. And the procedure is this: At the end of the
19 examination-in-chief, you may, if you wish, invite the Chamber to consider
20 allowing you to ask questions of the witness, and that's what I just did.
21 You're not to make a speech, whether in criticism or in support of
22 the examination-in-chief. If there is an aspect of the
23 examination-in-chief that in your view needs to be supplemented by further
24 questions, then the Chamber will allow you to ask questions. That's the
1 I don't want to hear a speech from you, and I will not allow you
2 to make a speech. If you have questions, you may put questions to the
3 witness, and that is all you will be allowed to do. And that's consistent
4 with the order that we made. It's entirely a matter for you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. Mr. Robinson, I'm
6 asking that you return me my right to defend myself, because this
7 examination-in-chief is senseless, as I've said --
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've cut you off again. We've made an order
9 assigning counsel, and you indicated that you would appeal that decision.
10 The Chamber has certified the appeal. That's the end of the matter for
11 this stage of the proceedings. If you have no questions to ask of the
12 witness, we'll proceed to the cross-examination.
13 Mr. Nice.
14 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:
15 Q. Just dealing with your very last bit of evidence and before we
16 overlook it, you gave us an account of the strength of your office, which
17 included 13 locals. Can you just help us with the ethnicity of those
18 locals, please.
19 A. I thought I had done that, Mr. Nice. To my recollection, seven of
20 them were of Albanian extraction, one identified herself as a Turk, four
21 identified themselves as Serbian extraction. As far as their gender goes,
22 if I recall correctly, the majority were female but some were male.
23 Q. What was the -- no, no. First of all, this: You had no prior
24 experience of the Balkans at all.
25 A. This was my first visit and work in the Balkans, that is correct.
1 Q. In the course of your long service with the Canadian military, was
2 it your first working visit to this part of Europe at all?
3 A. I had -- I had spent several tours serving in Western Germany,
4 travelled extensively throughout Western Europe. I had spent, as
5 previously stated, three tours in the Middle East, travelled extensively
6 both then in the Middle East and since have visited the Middle East and
7 other places in Europe.
8 Q. What part --
9 A. Western Europe.
10 Q. The Balkans you hadn't visited before?
11 A. During most of my life in Western Germany it was during the era of
12 a bipolar world and the Cold War was the reason that I was present in
13 Germany, and I was not permitted to travel to many of the countries beyond
14 what was then the division of Europe.
15 Q. I see. What was the purpose of the October agreements that gave
16 rise to the KVM mission?
17 A. The agreement, as I understand it, and I've read it myself - not
18 recently but I did at the time - was to allow normality and stability to
19 return to the province of Kosovo and enable -- enable the government to
20 restore authority and also to enable the -- the ethnic Albanian element of
21 the population to -- to have their rights and -- and have an opportunity
22 to have a civil society.
23 Q. Were the Kosovo Albanians in any way a party to this agreement or
24 these agreements?
25 A. It's -- not the October agreement, as I recall. It was negotiated
1 between the governments.
2 Q. You've spoken about the chicken farm. Help us, please. It was on
3 your patch. What particular significance did that have as a location?
4 A. It was important from a security point of view because of its
5 proximity to the Pristina-Pec highway, which I have described as a main
6 arterial within the province of Kosovo. It also was identified as a
7 company location for the VJ to enable them to provide security and carry
8 out their security role within that part of Kosovo, and that is its
10 Q. Identified where?
11 A. Identified where? In what context?
12 Q. Well, you say it was identified as a company location for the VJ.
13 A. I believe -- I believe I was told the -- as part of the October
14 agreement, the location and disposition of the VJ was in the various
15 barracks, and I understood the -- that this was a company site that was
17 Q. Of how many? How many such company sites were there, do you know,
18 in the totality of Kosovo?
19 A. I'm not sure. I -- I remember somebody mentioning four, if I
21 Q. They were very limited exceptions, were they not, to the general
22 rule about deployment of VJ forces?
23 A. That's my understanding.
24 Q. So when we look at the particular area over which you were to have
25 some oversight for -- was it five weeks?
1 A. I believe so.
2 Q. We find this: That on the western side you have an armoured VJ
3 unit, and in Pristina you had which brigade? Do you remember?
4 A. I don't remember the number of the brigade.
5 Q. 15th Armoured Brigade?
6 A. There was an Armoured Brigade in Pristina, yes.
7 Q. So that this small area in which you worked for five weeks was
8 actually unusually well guarded on either side by VJ presence?
9 A. The disposition of the VJ, I think, is understandable in the sense
10 that Pristina was the capital, the administrative capital of the province.
11 The -- when you say 15 Armoured Brigade, in my understanding of military
12 organisations, this was a very small brigade compared to what I was used
13 to in Western Europe.
14 MR. NICE: Can we have a look, please, at the map we routinely
15 used, Exhibit 83, opened at page 6. And it will be bottom right-hand
16 portion of it.
17 My monitor isn't showing me anything at the moment. Oh, yes,
18 there it is.
19 Q. If we look at the bottom right-hand corner of the right-hand page,
20 we see the word "Kosovo." In fact that is Kosovo Polje, the word is --
21 oh, yes, you can see it under the figure 20. So there's Kosovo Polje.
22 And the area to the left within the strongly drawn border, do you
23 recognise that area? It's a sort of --
24 A. Are you referring to the hash marks on the --
25 Q. No, not the hash marks, they're the train. But the general area
1 you see going up -- the area that's got the strongest border surrounding
2 it. South of Obilic. South of Obilic there's a borderline.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. What does that line show? It's sort of not a rectangular shape
5 but it's broadly rectangular, I suppose.
6 A. It was my understanding, I think, that the railway ran along that
8 Q. I'm not explaining myself well. Just look to the -- Kosovo Polje
9 is to the right-hand side of an area that is delineated by a fairly strong
10 line on the map, a borderline. Do you see it? That's the one there, yes.
11 And we can see it stops -- well, it goes up north, crosses the
12 railway line, turns left and then wiggles westward, and then to the west
13 of Donji Grabovac it turns south. I'm so sorry you're having trouble
14 following this, Mr. Keith. No, further down than that, please. Yes.
15 That's it you were there. Yes, that line there. Follow it to the west.
16 And then the line, you can see it, it's a big bold line, then it goes
17 south. That's the line. And if we can look at that whole area on the
18 map. What's that area enclosed by that line?
19 A. Are you referring to this entity?
20 Q. Well, the bottom half of it, yes.
21 A. This area here.
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. I'm not certain. This is a boundary that I'm not familiar with.
24 Q. Does that fit with your understanding of the extension of the
25 Kosovo Polje municipality?
1 A. That's probably correct.
2 Q. And is that roughly the area that was in your area of
4 A. No. That is only a small part of it.
5 Q. Your area went up to Obilic?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. And then how much further? Because the map that was being shown
8 was rather shiny and the -- it was hard to follow it, I'm afraid. So you
9 went up and you incorporated the Obilic municipality?
10 A. Yes, and beyond that.
11 Q. Up to a bit of Vucitrn?
12 A. Yes. I'm having some difficulty relating to you -- to your map
13 here as well.
14 Q. But you didn't go as far west for responsibility purposes as
16 A. No. I was part of the Glogovac field station in my earlier
17 service before Kosovo Polje.
18 Q. Well, in that one week.
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. So at most it appears that you had two and perhaps two and a bit,
21 or oversight of two and a bit smallish or small municipalities; correct?
22 A. No. I would -- I would expand on that. My responsibility went
23 south of the Kosovo municipal boundaries there as well to some -- a few --
24 ten or 12 kilometres and extended north of the Obilic municipal
25 responsibilities by again another estimated ten or 12 kilometres in parts.
1 Q. You've told us about the reporting mechanism in short. How many
2 members were there altogether of the KVM? Do you remember?
3 A. I believe we were authorised for -- to have several thousand. I
4 believe 1.638 is the number that comes to mind, were deployed before the
5 mission was evacuated.
6 Q. And all these people were reporting in -- in what, daily reports
7 or weekly reports?
8 A. The routine -- the basic routine was daily reports and incident
9 reports. My weekly reports were -- were just my own process of trying to
10 provide some context to what we were doing on a larger scale.
11 Q. So that the daily reporting in -- of matters of detail is what was
12 going up the -- up the chain of command.
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. You have no reason, do you, to doubt that your reports were
15 faithfully reflected at the intermediate stages before they reached the
16 central and final clearing house for reporting?
17 A. I saw several general reports coming out from the Regional Centre
18 and perhaps from the mission itself. They generally reported, to the best
19 of my knowledge, what was included from the smaller field sites. However,
20 I -- I don't think, in generalising the situation, that the full essence
21 of what was happening was perhaps being transmitted as clearly as it could
22 have been.
23 Q. But before we go on, and I want you to focus on this, please,
24 Mr. Keith, because you're a man who has written about these events since,
25 are you suggesting that there is in some way bias on the part of those 16
1 or 1.700 people in transmitting reports, or do you accept that what you
2 wanted to be reported was reflected centrally?
3 A. I -- I can't speak for biases of anybody else. I did not try to
4 bring any biases to my service in the Kosovo Verification Mission. I
5 tried to be objective at all times and -- however, as I became more
6 knowledgeable and familiar with the procedures and what was happening
7 there, I realised that not everybody was perhaps as objective as I was
8 and --
9 Q. Where did you find that out from?
10 A. That was my sense of communicating with my fellow verifiers and
11 observing the process of the -- what was happening.
12 Q. We'll come back to that a little later, but are you familiar with
13 the Blue Book?
14 A. I'm not sure which book you're referring to.
15 Q. It's an exhibit in this case, and we'll just have a little look at
16 it, if we may.
17 MR. NICE: It's a very substantial document, as Your Honours well
18 know. I propose just to remind the Court of the way in which it was
19 prepared and then we can look for one or two entries that relate to the
20 witness's testimony.
21 You'll see -- and the usher -- perhaps the usher could put it on
22 the overhead projector. I think it would be helpful. Exhibit 321. The
23 Blue Book's in a big folder, a big file. I don't know if you've brought
24 it with you, but it will help, in any event, to remind ourselves of how
25 it's composed.
1 The pages, unfortunately, are not easily numbered, and so I'm
2 going to deal with things in a slightly different way.
3 Q. What was the first day of your arrival in Kosovo, Mr. Keith?
4 A. I don't have my detailed diary in front of me now, Mr. Nice.
5 Q. Roughly, shall we say.
6 A. In Kosovo Polje?
7 Q. No, in Kosovo.
8 A. In Kosovo. I believe it was in the first week of February, about
9 February the 6th or 7th.
10 MR. NICE: If the usher to whom I've explained the way the
11 document works goes to one of the red tabs at the top for an early week in
12 February, we will see something there perhaps.
13 Which date have we got there? Let's have a look. The 1st -- no,
14 that's the 1st of January. Can we go on to February, please. 1st of
15 February. That's perfect. Thank you.
16 Q. Now, Mr. Keith, if you haven't been acquainted or haven't
17 acquainted yourself with this document, it was prepared on a daily basis,
18 and the first principal sheet of which is recorded like this, you see.
19 "Significant events as reported" on and the code means the 24 hours of 1st
20 of February, 1999. And we then see various pointers, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, to
21 events that have been reported in that 24-hour period. Did you follow?
22 A. I do.
23 Q. And then if we look to the next page, Usher, if you would be so
24 good, we see the first of the itemised blocks in the map. Here's number
25 1, which is an expansion of and giving some detail to the matter shown on
1 the map as number 1. And similarly if you go on you'll get actually
2 number 4, and number 2, and number 3, and number 5. And then the next
3 page, not surprisingly, is the map for the 2nd of February.
4 This is a document that summarises on a daily basis things that
5 are happening all around Kosovo.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. When you started forming and expressing your views on what had
8 happened in Kosovo, bearing in mind you only had this limited number of
9 your own documents to refer to, did you seek to research at all documents
10 that existed to show what was happening?
11 A. I did not have access to these documents at the time, you are
13 Q. Did you seek access to any documents before you started forming
14 your views on what had happened in Kosovo?
15 A. Mr. Nice, I left Kosovo under the circumstances which I think this
16 Court is aware. The media of the international community had -- had
17 decided that -- and were reporting things that were -- were not objective,
18 in my -- my limited experience, as you have pointed out. I thought it was
19 proper and just and right that -- that somebody who had had personal
20 experience over a matter of albeit limited weeks should take the
21 opportunity to try to redress some of the incorrect statements that I was
22 hearing and other people were hearing in the general Western media.
23 Q. Uh-huh. Well, let's just see what --
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, pausing there.
25 MR. NICE: Yes.
1 JUDGE KWON: I have difficulty locating this page which appears on
2 the ELMO.
3 MR. NICE: The one for --
4 JUDGE KWON: If you could identify the registry number.
5 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly. The expanded registry number for the
6 2nd of February is 03524965.
7 JUDGE KWON: No, no, registry number. My registry number is --
8 February begins on page 13118, but it's a different map.
9 MR. NICE: I'm very sorry to be working from different numbers.
10 The -- but if Your Honour -- unless the bundle that Your Honour has has
11 been incorrectly compiled, the indicator at the top starts off with the
12 day number, so it will be 01 and the month of February, to 28, and then
13 the month of February is shown at the end of that expansion.
14 JUDGE KWON: The map in my binder begins with number 030018 and
15 not with this.
16 MR. NICE: 03?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it begins with 03.
18 MR. NICE: In which case it should be the immediately preceding
19 set of pages, if Your Honour would be good enough to go back a few pages.
20 JUDGE KWON: It's January then.
21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I help further? Because I want the
22 Court to be able to follow these documents, obviously. We're going to go
23 on a little further.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Proceed, please.
25 MR. NICE:
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Q. Well, Mr. Keith, you -- your last answer said that you wanted to
2 redress some of the incorrect statements. Let's just see what this
3 document shows so far as your period of reporting is concerned.
4 MR. NICE: Can we perhaps, Usher, go to the red tag at the top
5 that relates to the 21st of February, if you'd be good enough to find
7 Your Honour, while that's happening, Your Honour Judge Kwon's
8 query may be resolved in this way, that I gather we are yet to have agreed
9 on an authoritative version of this document with Registry. It was put, I
10 think, on hold, or the exercise was put on hold by Judge May, with copies
11 being left in the vault for Your Honours, I understand, but I can't help
12 further than that at the moment.
13 JUDGE KWON: That can be sorted out later.
14 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.
15 Q. Now, this, if we've got the right one, yes, is for the 1st -- the
16 21st of February. We can see immediately, Mr. Keith, by looking at
17 Pristina that there's nothing of any great significance reported for
18 Pristina or the area of Pristina, which is your area, but we can see lots
19 of things reported, or several things reported, round and about. And if
20 you look at number 2 on the map, we can see a reference here to the
21 shelling of Studencani resulting in 5.300 internally displaced persons.
22 And, Usher, if you'd be good enough to go over, please, to the
23 next page but one where we see number 2, which will be the detail for that
24 entry. This comes from UNHCR: "The shelling of the village of Studencani
25 on 20 February 1999 has resulted in 5.300 internally displaced persons
1 from Studencani. These villagers fled their villages during the shelling
2 and are now residing ..." And it says where. Now, this is an example of
3 the sort of thing that was happening in Kosovo. Do you accept that?
4 A. You're showing me a document recorded by an NGO, or in this case
5 the UNHCR. I was not present there. I cannot vouch for the validity or
6 the correctness of this report. I do know, however, that many reports
7 were made that when -- when even in my limited area, as you so correctly
8 pointed out, when I was told by people - locals, that is - that we were
9 talking of hundreds of IDPs, upon investigation normally it would be a
10 score or a dozen.
11 Now, I was present in following up things. I have no idea who
12 made this report and what accuracy is involved here. Whether -- I'm not
13 here to say it's wrong, but I have no way of attesting to its validity and
14 correctness either.
15 Q. Well, I asked you earlier on whether you were really suggesting
16 bias against any or a majority or some of the 1.700 or 600 members of KVM,
17 and I don't think you were able to identify any, and I am going to explore
18 more with you how you came to be saying as early as May of 1999 the
19 wide-ranging things you felt you could say. But let's turn on, please,
20 and look at -- if the usher would be good enough now to go to the 27th of
22 And this, I think, is a little nearer to home.
23 You've got the map up for the 27th of February. Thank you very
25 Here we see, although plenty of activity round and about Kosovo,
1 we see number 2, MUP ambushed, one dead and one wounded. And if we go
2 over to look at number 2, the significant event reported, "MUP killed. At
3 approximately 1730 hours a MUP patrol was ambushed west of the Pristina
4 air field." This is the incident you were telling us about, isn't it?
5 A. This is correct.
6 Q. This is the reporting process as it worked. "It is believed that
7 they were engaged by sniper fire. The vehicle, though armoured, had holes
8 in the roof." Then this little line: "Interestingly, a local Judge and
9 TV crew were both in the immediate vicinity of the ambush at the time of
10 the incident." Do you remember that?
11 A. I do remember it. They were travelling the road. They were not
12 at the site when I was there, but when the firing ceased, they -- I
13 believe they were to the west on the road proceeding towards Pristina and
14 then they moved into the area on the cessation of the engagement.
15 Q. Was it you who reported that up the chain of command?
16 A. I reported this incident up the chain of command, yes.
17 Q. Including the bit about the judge?
18 A. I can't recall whether that was in my incident report or not.
19 Q. Let's go on now --
20 A. It -- it may well have been.
21 Q. Let's go to the 3rd of March. Because you're painting a picture
22 of the kind you are, and you know what the October agreements said about
23 whether arms should be brought into Kosovo from Serbia or taken out, do
25 A. I don't have the details in front of me, but I am aware that there
1 was not to be an increase the arms that were present, as I understood it,
3 Q. So if we can now then go to the 3rd of March, looking at the map
4 first and then at item number 9. It's rather a busier map now on the 3rd
5 of March. We can see lots of things there. A little something at
6 Pristina air field with some MiG 21s. Any significance in that?
7 A. In the MiG 21s?
8 Q. Uh-huh.
9 A. I recall -- I recall there being some increased aviation activity
10 during this phase. MiG 21s were observed by myself and my team members,
11 more than normal, yes. I didn't --
12 Q. That wasn't the KLA. The KLA didn't have MiG 21s, did they?
13 A. Not to my knowledge, no. But the -- the activity -- they were not
14 conducting hostile action against any location that I was cognisant of.
15 Q. Shall we go to number 9. You see number 9 at the top: "Tanks
16 arrive by train." And if we go over a few pages, please, Usher, to where
17 article number 9 is detailed: "Tanks arrived by train. Seven M-36/85
18 tanks arrived in Mitrovica by train. Point of origin is unknown at this
19 time. One was off-loaded in Mitrovica while the other six continued by
20 train south towards Pristina. The train normally only carries sand or
21 gravel. It is not known yet where the other six were off-loaded.
22 "Comment: There is currently no indication that the train with
23 its tank cargo has reached Pristina. There are numerous points along the
24 rail line between Mitrovica and Pristina where tanks can be off-loaded.
25 This event clearly indicates the current rail capability in the area.
1 Investigations by RC2 and RC5 continue to determine where the tanks are
2 and what their point of origin was. If the train originated outside of
3 Kosovo, this may indicate a build-up in forces."
4 Did you ever learn where those tanks were off-loaded?
5 A. I can't recall, but I was -- I was cognisant of the movement of
6 some armoured vehicles by rail and by road, and I was asked to report on
7 all armoured vehicles, whether they had come into the province or they
8 were moving from one location to the other. I tried to do that to the
9 best of my ability, and being a former armoured officer, I took particular
10 interest in monitoring the types of armour and the numbers and quantities
11 of armour and what they were and what they were doing.
12 Q. You had been a tank driver at one stage, didn't you?
13 A. Not only -- I've done every role in a tank squadron up to
14 commanding it.
15 Q. When you were a tank driver?
16 A. That was when I was a very young man.
17 Q. Now, you've given evidence about your three days of reporting --
18 not three days, about the days which you kept records of reporting that
19 I've temporarily mislaid but let's have a look at those.
20 The first one in time was the 7th of March, so I think we better
21 check your reporting, make sure that anything you wanted to go through
22 went through. So if you go, please, to the 7th of March.
23 MR. KAY: First one in time was 28th of February.
24 MR. NICE: So sorry. I missed that one.
25 THE WITNESS: I don't --
1 MR. NICE:
2 Q. I'm now past it.
3 A. I don't have that document in front of me any more.
4 Q. Well, you must have it, of course.
5 MR. NICE: Let's go back, Usher, if we can, to the 28th of
6 February at the top.
7 JUDGE KWON: Let the witness have the D247 in front of him.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. Now, we see, of course, in the -- on the general map for the 28th
11 of February, there was a local businessman shot in Pristina, but that
12 would not be within your general area of reporting, would it?
13 A. I was involved in some of these incidents because I, in transiting
14 to Pristina to coordinate my activities at the Coordination Centre, there
15 were two occasions that I responded to incidents that involved murder or
16 fatalities, but because it wasn't in my area of responsibility, any input
17 I had with passed on to other verifiers.
18 Q. So when we look at this part of your own exhibit which is in front
19 of you, Mr. Keith, for the 28th of February, we see familiarisation of
20 administrative controls. Next paragraph: Patrolling continued for the
21 rest of the week. Contacts made, positive and friendly, and so on.
22 We read a line which says: "Regular patrolling of this area will
23 be maintained, and our assessment is that the KLA account may well be more
24 correct in this particular location."
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Then you refer to an incident in which a tank platoon and wheeled
2 APCs were involved, and one MUP was killed and one wounded.
3 A. That is the same incident --
4 Q. That's right.
5 A. -- you previously alluded to in the Blue Book.
6 Q. So that everything in your report that should have been recorded
7 centrally would appear to be there.
8 A. I'm not questioning that it wasn't.
9 Q. Thank you. So if we now move to the next day of your reports,
10 which is, I think, the 7th of March. Would the usher very kindly go to
11 the 7th of March and have in our hands your document.
12 You deal with, in your document, unconfirmed reports of sniping,
13 daily movement of one to three tanks at the chicken farm and the airport,
14 six other tanks observed moving, good contacts made with various police
15 chiefs, humanitarian issues increasing during the week with increasing
16 incidents of attacks on the MUP and retaliation against the KLA positions
17 to our north.
18 Nothing specific here, is there?
19 A. Keep in mind, Mr. Nice, this is a -- a summary of daily reports,
20 and I tried to relate as accurately and as objectively as I can the things
21 that occurred at that time, and this document was written at that time.
22 No, you're correct, the --
23 Q. Because reporting from the north would be the responsibility of
24 other KVM officials?
25 A. Yes, in adjacent areas of responsibility. However --
1 Q. Account of movement, humanitarian movement of 70 former villagers,
2 and what you describe as regular routine patrolling.
3 A. If I may, Mr. Nice, that 70 former villagers is the incident that
4 Mr. Kay had me recount and which I was instrumental in participating in
5 the arrangement of trying to re-establish normalcy and restore the
6 inhabitants from Donji Grabovac.
7 Q. And since you remind us of that, you will remember His Honour
8 Judge Kwon's question, I think, the villagers who had been displaced, to
9 your knowledge, had simply been displaced generally because of fighting in
10 the area; is that right?
11 A. Yes. I think it would be very difficult to maintain a normal
12 civil life when you're within a few hundred metres of fighting, regardless
13 of whether it's initiated from one side or the other.
14 Q. And you have no further knowledge to help the Court with why they
15 actually became displaced persons at an earlier stage?
16 A. No, that is correct, I do not have detailed knowledge.
17 Q. So if we look at the map for the 7th of March, we just see in
18 Pristina "Local members of KVM claims to have had warning shots fired into
19 the air. Two MUP are killed and one wounded after going to a home to
20 arrest three people for theft." But otherwise, events around and about
21 Pristina but nothing on Kosovo Polje.
22 A. No. To keep in mind, though, Mr. Nice, these are very perfunctory
23 reports that are compiled from a number of inputs, as you're well aware,
24 including mine and a number other Kosovo verification individuals. And
25 this is a very, very brief summary, and I don't think it -- it relates to
1 the tensions and the -- the anxieties of the people who were either
2 working there or living there at the time.
3 MR. NICE: Usher, if we could go to the 7th of March, please,
4 which is the next day for which we have -- I beg your pardon. No, not the
5 -- we have one for the 8th, but before we move -- can we go to the 7th,
6 in any event, just for this reason -- thank you very much.
7 If we look at -- sorry, Usher. We can go on to the 8th. My
8 mistake. The 8th will do fine.
9 Q. And would you like to look at your report for the 8th, Mr. Keith.
10 Have a look and see what found its way to head office, as it were.
11 On the map on the 8th we can see that there are interesting things
12 going on. Number 7, large scale MUP convoys heading west in an area well
13 to the west of you. To the north, VJ shelling five villages resulting in,
14 shall we just say a number of internally displaced persons. We see to the
15 east at number 6, VJ troop movements in and out of Gnjilane, and other
16 activity, but nothing relating to your area.
17 And if we look at your report for the 8th of March, little hard to
18 follow it -- I don't mean that critically, but follow it briefly, swiftly,
19 but there wasn't anything here that should have been reported, was there?
20 A. Mr. Nice, this particular report is one of many. This is not a
21 daily report, this is a specific incident report that came out of an
22 incident of which I and several of my other verifiers were participating
23 in and it resulted in damage to a vehicle which had to be withdrawn and
24 repaired. There would have been a daily report, which I no longer have
25 access to, from this day as well. But this is only a small part of that
1 day and refers to a specific incident that I -- in my opinion, could have
2 been quite nasty. As it turned out, it was not and nobody was
3 significantly hurt.
4 Q. So in the great scheme of things, not what you would expect to
5 find your superiors reporting at head office?
6 A. I'm not surprised that this incident didn't get into the blue
7 book, no.
8 Q. So no complaint about the method of reporting so far?
9 A. No.
10 Q. In which case the next report is the 9th of March, which we can
11 find if the usher can carry on with his helpful working through the
13 And here we see on the map various things around the area,
14 sporadic -- number 1, sporadic firing of heavy weapons by the VJ. Number
15 3, the abduction of an Albanian male. Number 4, air activity west of
16 Prizren. And then at number 8, we see an Albanian male in Pristina
17 murdered on the evening of the 8th of March.
18 We come to your document for this day. We see at 0830 "police
19 commander at Kosovo Polje reported a murder had occurred at Donje Dobrevo
20 and the police escorted JB," which is a code sign -- call-sign, "to the
21 site where the victim is found." This would appear to be that report,
22 would it?
23 A. That is based on the same incident, and the "JB" refers to "Juliet
24 Bravo," which was one of my vehicle call signs.
25 Q. Yes, and we can see that again. If the usher would be good enough
1 to turn over to the itemised entry just a few pages on -- you've already
2 done it, haven't you?
3 A. Yes, I have.
4 Q. There it all is. And while we're on this day, the 9th of March,
5 Usher, if you could come back, please, just to number 5 in the detailed
6 analysis so that we can see what was happening elsewhere in Kosovo.
7 "The VJ MUP operation to clear the KLA from General Jankovic area
8 continues. KVM patrols were initially blocked from proceeding to the
9 affected villages. MUP forces then followed their pattern of surrounding
10 the local villages and forcing the inhabitants to flee, through the use of
11 direct and indirect fire. By mid-afternoon, houses were burning. MUP
12 units appeared intent on destroying these villages."
13 Mr. Keith, although I've been focusing, with the assistance of the
14 usher, on entries you've referred to, will you accept from me that we have
15 actually pretty well covered all the references to Kosovo Polje in this
16 Blue Book for the period with which we are concerned?
17 A. I'm not sure what the point you're getting at here, Mr. Nice, but
18 yes, more or less, I can't argue with that.
19 Q. And you've clearly spoken to others in other areas of reporting,
20 and the reality was that the Kosovo Polje was actually, as we can actually
21 see by looking at the maps, one after the other, was actually quite a
22 quiet area. There wasn't much happening.
23 A. Actually, if you refer back to your incident number 5 on the 9th
24 of March, some of those villages are in my area of responsibility that
25 we're talking about being attacked and -- and burning.
1 Q. And in which case, then -- and that was properly reported?
2 A. I tried to report all events as best as I could, yes.
3 Q. Sorry, not to pick that up as your reporting but ahead of your
4 giving evidence we had no idea of the area that you covered and the
5 exhibits didn't reveal it.
6 We look on then from the 9th --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you move on, Mr. Nice. I'm not following
8 that answer at the moment, Mr. Keith. You're saying that some of the
9 villages referred to in 5 were in your area.
10 THE WITNESS: Those villages that are reported in that incident
11 item number 5, yes.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: And are you saying that you had no knowledge of
13 them being attacked?
14 THE WITNESS: On the contrary, Your Honour. I reported them, and
15 I assumed this report is taken from my report.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: So this is your report of events.
17 THE WITNESS: It consists of information that I assume came from
18 my report, yes.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
20 THE WITNESS: If I may, Mr. Nice, in your line of questioning --
21 I'm sorry?
22 MR. NICE:
23 Q. You probably may, yes.
24 A. In your line of questioning and the reporting procedures of the
25 Kosovo Verification Mission, the 1.638 verifiers which came from, I
1 believe, 54 of the nations of the Organisation for Security and
2 Cooperation in Europe involved people and individuals who I respect for
3 participating and respect where they came from and who they were.
4 However, in my humble opinion, of many whom I had the privilege to work
5 with, very few had a sound military background, and many of them did not
6 -- were not able to understand what they were seeing at times. Now, I'm
7 not suggesting they were incompetent, I'm not suggesting they were trying
8 to provide bad information. I'm suggesting to you that in many cases
9 reports may not have been as factual as they could have been or perhaps
10 should have been. And that -- I'm not trying to take away from who
11 reported and what they said, but I know in working with others, not just
12 in my area but adjacent areas and across the mission, many people did not,
13 in my humble opinion, did not have a good grasp of the military situation
14 on the ground and hence had difficulty in reporting competently and
15 accurately in some cases.
16 Now, this doesn't take away what they were saying, but it may not
17 be -- it may not be what was occurring on the ground.
18 Q. I'll come back to that answer immediately after I tidy up
19 something that follows on from His Honour Judge Bonomy's question. And if
20 the usher would be good enough to take us back to the map, the red tag at
21 the top for the 9th of March. And if we look together, Mr. Keith, at
22 number 5. We can see that number 5, "VJ operation, a further flow of
23 IDPs, minimum KLA response," is the entry that is expanded at the number
24 5, if the usher would then turn back to the number 5 we were looking at
25 and that said a number of villages -- houses were burning. Now, this is
1 the entry you say related to you; is that right?
2 A. I haven't had the opportunity to translate those map coordinates
3 onto the map, but the names of some of those villages I do not believe are
4 in the General Jankovic border area. I believe they are north of Kosovo
5 Polje on the Mitrovica highway.
6 Q. Well, that -- I see. That would mean, then, that you saw, had
7 evidence of, and now have a recollection of the MUP and VJ burning houses
8 and forcing people to move; is that right?
9 A. That is not correct, and that is not what I have reported.
10 Q. I mean, the map is -- before you answer, the map is quite clear
11 that point 5 could hardly be further away from your location to the south
12 -- I suppose it could be a bit further away if it was underneath Prizren,
13 but it's a pretty long way to the south. Now, are you sure that you
14 remember these villages as being villages on which you reported, or do you
15 think, on reflection, that this may have nothing to do with you?
16 A. If you refer to my weekly summary number 3 in my document reported
17 on 14th of March, you will see, about halfway down in my weekly summary --
18 perhaps these are not the same ones then but if you look at the names of
19 the villages that I was reporting, just at the end of the second paragraph
20 the movement of IDPs and the humanitarian needs decreased during the week
21 although conflict in the Priluzje, good contact in Mihalic intensified
22 during the week. These were villages to the north of -- in the north of
23 my area of responsibility bordering on the adjacent area of
24 responsibility, and these were areas that during this period of time and
25 in the days to follow where the -- where the counter-terrorist operations
1 took place inhabitants did leave their villages and buildings were -- did
2 sustain damage.
3 Q. It may be, Mr. Keith, but please look at number 5. You've
4 adopted, in answer to His Honour Judge Bonomy, or possibly initially to
5 me, I can't remember, these villages as being in some sense villages on
6 which you were reporting. There's nothing in your report for the 14th of
7 March that relates at all to the names shown here, is there?
8 A. I think that's correct. I was referring to the recollection of
9 the names that I had reported and I thought there was a similarity between
10 some of them.
11 Q. Can we just leave it on this basis: You may have been entirely
12 wrong and number 5 on that particular report has nothing to do with you?
13 A. That report may not include any input from my reports.
14 Q. Thank you. Let's go back now to the question that you raise by
15 effectively criticising the reporting skills of some of your fellow KVM
17 You started in the army at what age?
18 A. I was a reserve soldier at the age of 17.
19 Q. When did you become a full-time soldier?
20 A. At the age of 19.
21 Q. What year was that, please?
22 A. 1955.
23 Q. You then stayed in the army until a sabbatical break in 1980?
24 A. 1982.
25 Q. So between 1955 and 1982, 27 years, continuous service, what ranks
1 did you hold?
2 A. I started out as a soldier. I was a -- went through the -- became
3 a commissioned officer in 1962 and -- and went through the various junior
4 officer ranks.
5 Q. And when you took your sabbatical, were you a captain?
6 A. When I retired I was still wearing the -- the rank of captain,
7 that is correct.
8 Q. That means, without being in any way critical, that your access to
9 senior command, to how senior command is dealt with is necessarily
11 A. No. I would -- you're -- you're right. I did not wear
12 significant rank, if you will, but given the small size of the Canadian
13 army during my military service and the participation that I had in it, I
14 had opportunity to work with a number of senior officers quite intimately
15 and on various staffs, although most of my service was in lower-level
16 leadership and in instructional roles.
17 Q. Did you go to staff college?
18 A. I'm staff trained, yes.
19 Q. You went to staff college?
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. But in the course of your working in the Kosovo mission, for the
22 Kosovo mission, you had absolutely no access to senior military figures on
23 any side, did you?
24 A. Reference to the Kosovo Verification Mission?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. No. My -- my responsibilities were as described, to -- to lead
2 and direct the small team at Kosovo Polje.
3 Q. You didn't, for example, discuss things with your own countryman
4 General Maisonneuve?
5 A. No, I did not.
6 Q. Although I suppose you would agree, would you, with his assessment
7 that to use tank fire against houses is quite a disproportionate use of
8 force, isn't it?
9 A. I'm not sure of the incidents that he was commenting on, but tank
10 fire is -- can be used to provide covering fire. It's direct fire, as
11 you're probably well aware, and to be -- to use against buildings or copse
12 or a farmhouse in the context of a military operation I would think
13 totally appropriate. However, I'm not suggesting that tank fire against a
14 farmhouse -- it depends -- is appropriate. It depends on the
15 circumstances of the military operation.
16 Q. You didn't have any contact with a British man called Ciaglinski,
17 did you? Or Ciaglinski as I think it's pronounced.
18 A. No, not to my knowledge.
19 Q. Have you followed the evidence in this case at all?
20 A. I have tried to follow the media accounts. I haven't followed the
21 detail, no.
22 Q. Because we'll see perhaps in due course, if it's necessary, what
23 you were later to express so firmly as your views -- and indeed your views
24 didn't stop at the military, they extended to the political, didn't they?
25 A. The views that I wrote and expressed subsequent to my service in
1 the --
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So you're a man who held and expressed political and military
5 views. You were unaware, were you, of the fact, if it's in due course
6 accepted by the Court, that the officer Ciaglinski was informed of a plan
7 both to rid the area of the KLA and to force the Kosovo Albanians out?
8 A. I'm not aware of any such plan.
9 Q. And when you were subsequently to express your opinions, you of
10 course had had no discussions with senior military figures on either side,
11 were you?
12 A. No, I was expressing opinions from my sentiment, and in
13 conversation with the various other verifiers, especially after the
14 evacuation in the days and week or so before we left the area, I had the
15 opportunity to talk to a number, now in the scores I guess, a score or so,
16 of the 1.638 verifiers, and it was my recollection, Mr. Nice, that many of
17 the people that I talked to agreed with my sentiment and provided me with
18 some insight into some of their own sentiment and experiences, which may
19 or may not be related in the official reporting that was done during the
20 duration of the mission.
21 Q. Well, let's go back to the accuracy of the reporting. We've got
22 something from you described as a daily activity report of the 10th of
23 March where the situation in Kosovo Polje was calm and quit or quiet. And
24 if the usher would turn to the 10th of March. We can see again a map that
25 shows nothing of significance and that matches what you were reporting;
2 A. I believe so.
3 Q. The next one, I think, and I'll be corrected, I'm sure, by my
4 learned friend Mr. Kay if I'm in error, the last one I have to deal with
5 is simply the 14th of March.
6 And we can turn to the map, please, Usher, for the 14th of March.
7 You can see at number 8 the threat against the KVM. Before we go
8 and look at the expansion of number 8, staying with the map, we can see VJ
9 reported an ambush at number 6.
10 A. Excuse me, I'm not sure which document you're referring to.
11 Q. Just to the map on the screen at the moment. We can see the
12 threat against the KVM at Pristina, and then 2, 3, 4 on the left-hand
13 side, threats against KVM, shots fired at KVM, KLA booby-trap houses,
14 heavy VJ/MUP and KLA fighting, and so on.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. In the Pristina area there is the threat against the KVM, and in
17 your document we see the situation in Kosovo Polje calm, tension
18 increasing, two-night -- two-car night patrol stopped, verbally and
19 physically harassed on the 8th.
20 A. Which of my documents are you referring to now?
21 Q. The ones on the 14th of March. The weekly report. The next
22 paragraph --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- unconfirmed reports of sniping in the Grabovac area. Next
25 sentence: "The KLA credibility is more believable in this location.
1 Meetings with police chiefs designed to commence the return to Donji
2 Grabovac villagers to their deserted village."
3 Next paragraph but one: "VJ activity very limited. MUP activity
4 increased with increasing checkpoints and aggressive static patrols.
5 Contact with KLA."
6 Nothing particular that needed reporting there, was there,
7 Mr. Keith?
8 A. You mean to be reported in the Blue Book reports?
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. No. Not in the overall scheme of things, no.
11 Q. Very well.
12 MR. NICE: Could we just, since we're on the 14th of March and
13 since we're looking at the picture in the round, go to number 5, please,
14 Usher, in detail. Two more entries in the Blue Book and I shall be done
15 with it, I think.
16 Q. But this was the sort of thing that was going on elsewhere. This
17 is: "Heavy fighting in the southern part of Klina area of
18 responsibility. Heavy fighting focused around and south-west of Svrhe and
19 Prcevo developed during the morning. Most fire had ceased by 1500 hours.
20 The exchange of fire included tank, mortar rounds, and heavy machine-guns
21 from the VJ, with small arms and possibly light mortars from the KLA.
22 Neither VJ nor MUP reported casualties but a KVM patrol observed four
23 bodies of KLA fighters in Dus. Villagers fled the villages...
24 "Comment: The VJ explained their activity as being a planned
25 training exercise, the MUP said they had not been involved. However, MUP,
1 including PJP milicija, were observed by RC3 operating in the area. UNHCR
2 reported that 5.300 civilians abandoned the villages. RC3 can confirm 500
3 from two of the villages."
4 Now, Mr. Keith, you've been, if I may say so, willing to criticise
5 the reporting techniques and indeed capabilities of your fellow KVM
6 colleagues. Is there anything here that is other than, if it's accurate,
7 simply factual, the type of fact that a responsible educated person could
9 A. Mr. Nice, I'm not questioning the abilities of my fellow
10 verifiers. As a matter of fact, I tried to compliment them and praise
11 them for what they were doing. What I did suggest was that many of them
12 did not, were not clear in the military importance of small tactical
13 operations as perhaps somebody with rather extensive small tactical
14 experience had. And I see -- I see nothing in that report other than, may
15 I suggest, that when the UNHCR report that 5.300 civilians abandoned the
16 villages - which is a significant number, I'm sure the Court would agree -
17 but RC3 only confirmed 500 from two of the villages. I think that
18 supports some of my general comment about an inflation of numbers.
19 Now, I wasn't there, and I'm not saying that this report is
20 inaccurate, but what I have tried to suggest to you and to this Court is
21 that many of the reports submitted on a daily basis were reported by
22 individuals whose competency in many fields may be very impressive and
23 certainly worthwhile, they did not always --
24 Q. Mr. Keith, who is RC3?
25 A. That's the Regional Coordination Centre 3.
1 Q. So the Regional Coordination Centre of your very body had gone
2 about the process of if not correcting certainly qualifying reports
3 received from others. Tell me, please, does that show on the part of the
4 KVM greater or lesser responsibility?
5 A. I'm not sure what you're -- what the point of that comment was,
6 Mr. Nice. I'm not -- I'm suggesting to you and to this Court that this
7 report is -- is compiled from a number of other reports and input from a
8 number of sources, and I'm not suggesting that this is an incorrect or
9 inaccurate report. I'm suggesting it is reporting information that they
10 have acquired from both their field centres and from other sources. And I
11 wasn't -- I wasn't there, and I don't believe you were there, so I don't
12 think either one of us can say that this is a hundred per cent accurate,
13 but again, please understand me, I'm not trying to criticise my fellow
14 verifiers, I'm only suggesting that their competency in small military
15 actions --
16 Q. Is less than yours.
17 A. Is less than many people and --
18 Q. I see. Well, let's move on to the next date, please.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'd like to find out whether before
20 verifiers were sent out there was a training programme for them.
21 MR. NICE:
22 Q. You heard His Honour's question. You mentioned the days of
23 training that you had on arrival. Can you expand for His Honour, please,
24 the nature of the four days of training that you received.
25 A. Yes, I can, Your Honour, and I would be pleased to. Upon arrival
1 it was mostly administrative and technical training, the competency to
2 handle a Peugot four-wheel drive sport utility vehicle competently on the
3 roads of Kosovo was taken. I must say it was pretty rudimentary but
4 everybody did have to pass a test. The ability to operate a radio was
5 provided. The ability to use a GPS, global positioning sensor, and some
6 of the briefings on what was taking place in the province by various high
7 officials from within the mission were provided to people to try to give
8 some sense of what the situation in the province was; and of course, to a
9 very limited degree, if I may, direction on what we were to do.
10 But in my humble opinion - and Mr. Nice is questioning my
11 credibility due to a limited rise in rank - my humble opinion, it was very
12 rudimentary, and at no time was anybody given, and certainly I wasn't,
13 information of -- of what we were looking at, what we may be looking at.
14 Now, booklets were given to or were accessible to people of what the
15 organisation of the VJ was, and the organisation of the MUP was, but my --
16 Mr. Nice referred to staff college, staff training. This was -- was
17 certainly not a staff document, and --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was there any training in identifying the matters
19 that ought to be reported on?
20 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour, I can honestly say, other than
21 "report what you see." And if I may suggest, in some of these incidents
22 and circumstances, it's hard to be in places. And I would like to make a
23 comment on this, on this line of questioning that Mr. Nice is proceeding
24 on here.
25 The Kosovo Verification Mission was road-bound because we were
1 vehicle borne, and we were located in small towns and the cities of Kosovo
2 with a large headquarters and administrative establishment, and -- in
3 Pristina and in the various Regional Centres as well. So consequently, I
4 don't know what the numbers are off the top of my head, but of the 1.638
5 verifiers, I would hazard a guess that only half of us were sent to the
6 field. The other half were doing headquarters type work, administrative
7 work, and directional work. But our inability - and I stress this very,
8 very strongly - our inability to monitor the KVM at the field level was --
9 was apparent to me from day one. We were monitoring the Yugoslav
10 authorities. We could monitor the VJ, as Mr. Nice has pointed out, with
11 the reports in the Blue Book because we could see a train with M36/85
12 tanks. An M36/85 tank, in my opinion is, by the way, just for your
13 information, Your Honour, is a World War II anti-tank gun modernised with
14 a Yugoslavian or Soviet type 85 millimetre gun and is not a particularly
15 potent weapon, although it is an armoured vehicle and does carry a
16 direct-fire weapon.
17 But we could monitor tanks on trains. We could monitor tanks
18 leaving Pristina to go north. We could monitor the MUP going in and out
19 of Glogovac, but I know of no other verifier who could monitor anything
20 that the KVM or the UCK did -- sorry, the KLA or the UCK did other than
21 when they -- when they committed attacks - sniping attacks, terrorist
22 attacks, call them what you will - against the authorities or the
23 inhabitants of the province.
24 So as a former military man, I can say categorically we were
25 watching one side but we weren't watching the other side.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I think we have come to the time for
2 the adjournment.
3 Before we adjourn, Mr. Milosevic, may I just remind you that at
4 the end of the cross-examination Mr. Kay will re-examine and you may also
5 ask questions. You have seen the line of the cross-examination. You are
6 familiar with the issues. In the break, think about the matter and see
7 whether there are any questions that you might want to put by way of
9 We are adjourned.
10 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your lawyer isn't even making
12 observations with respect to the fact that the cross-examination, and this
13 is the third witness in the so-called Defence case which isn't the Defence
14 case at all, but anyway, during the cross-examination has bypassed the
15 limits for cross-examination and the time restrictions for
16 cross-examination that you gave yourself, and that is the ratio of 1 to 6.
17 And all three witnesses that we have heard so far, we have had a
18 cross-examination going beyond that time limit, and your lawyer isn't
19 raising objections to that. So what are we speaking about then? And you
20 yourself --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, this Court was
22 very flexible with you in relation to your cross-examination, and the same
23 flexibility will be applied in relation to the Prosecution within reason,
24 within limits.
25 Think about what I said to you.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 We are adjourned.
2 --- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, with regard to the point raised by the
5 accused about the time spent in cross-examination, the time that was
6 allocated to the accused was done on the basis that the cross-examination
7 would be two-thirds of the time for re-examination -- for
8 examination-in-chief. We will be flexible, but you ought to bear that in
10 Mr. Milosevic, I commend you for your attention to these
11 procedural details but wish you would become more involved in the
12 substantive matters. Once again I invite you to bring your mind to the
13 substance of the evidence and consider whether you wish to ask questions.
14 The time for playing games is gone. This is not a playing ground. It is
15 a different arena. And your conduct, I have to say, borders on being
16 petulant and puerile. I expect a more mature approach from you with
17 regard to the conduct of the proceedings, Mr. Milosevic.
18 Mr. Nice.
19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I have the time in mind. Can I deal with
20 that generally when we have the procedural discussion at the end?
21 Q. Mr. Keith, you made the observation to His Honour just before the
22 break that you were keeping a watch on one side but not the other. Which
23 side weren't you observing?
24 A. We did not have the presence or the physical ability to observe
25 the UCK/KLA except when it acted against authorities or other members of
1 the community. What I'm --
2 Q. Nor the mandate, come to that.
3 A. I'm sorry?
4 Q. Nor the mandate.
5 A. Well, it was my understanding of the agreement, Mr. Nice, that
6 both sides would cease hostile operations and allow a time of stability to
7 re-establish order and civility within the province. It was clear from my
8 experience in my limited area that -- that the -- the agreement was being
9 generally adhered to by one side but it wasn't being agreed to by the
10 other side. I mean, if we're talking about not only my incidents of
11 sniping attacks or murder or mayhem, but as you have referred to the Blue
12 Book, the report that came from across the province over a matter of
13 months that the incidents where when one side attacked the other and the
14 first side responded.
15 What I'm suggesting to you, if we had been established to do our
16 mission to ensure that the agreement was sustained, then I would suggest,
17 besides having a mission like mine in Kosovo Polje and many other
18 communities across the province, we would have had to have members out
19 living in the hinterland --
20 Q. I'm going to have to cut you short because time is not limitless.
21 You spent, because it was part of your mandate to supervise what the Serb
22 side should be doing or the Serb Montenegrin side should be doing, you
23 spent a lot of your time with chiefs of police and Serb officials of one
24 kind or another; yes?
25 A. I did -- I did that, but I also spent time and --
1 Q. You spent some time with the KLA but they were more difficult to
2 find and indeed they weren't the immediate object of your mandate.
3 A. But the ones that I had to have chance to have contact with I had
4 contact with and I tried to carry out my mandate to the best of my
6 Q. Could we look, please, now, at the two last entries, two more,
7 actually. 16th of March --
8 JUDGE KWON: Before going on, why don't you ask the witness to
9 make a comment on the point 8 of 14th of March from the Blue Book.
10 MR. NICE: Certainly.
11 The 14th of March, if the usher would be so good. We'll see how
12 it's summarised.
13 The stolen KVM vehicle did Your Honour have in mind?
14 JUDGE KWON: Threat against KVM which was not dealt with in his
15 report dated 14th of March. You mentioned this during the
16 cross-examination, a threat against KVM.
17 MR. NICE: Yes. Sorry, I'm not following Your Honour. If the
18 matter wasn't dealt with in the report --
19 JUDGE KWON: Well, it was dealt with by the witness's report.
20 MR. NICE: Yes.
21 Q. I think what His Honour wants to know is this, Mr. Keith: The
22 threat against the KVM that we see mentioned on number 8 for the 14th, do
23 you see that?
24 A. I do.
25 Q. And His Honour's interested to know why that wasn't in your
2 A. The northern suburb of Pristina was not in my area of, so I'm not
3 familiar with the --
4 MR. NICE: Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 THE WITNESS: -- the incident.
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. Then can we go to the 16th of March just to see what's happening
9 in the time leading up to your withdrawal after your five weeks there.
10 And we see number 1, "Large VJ convoy observed."
11 And if we turn over the page, Usher, please, to the expansion of
12 that short entry.
13 We see "Large VJ convoy was observed at 1200 hours. A large VJ
14 armoured group probably arrived from Kursumlija into Mitrovica by train.
15 Once assets were off-loaded in Mitrovica, the convey headed towards
16 Srbica." And then it identifies the composition of the convoy, which was
17 substantial. And the convoy left at 1230 and arrived in the vicinity of
18 Srbica at an ammunition factory.
19 "Comment: RC2 intends to maintain continuous watch on the
20 factory for future moments. The train is believed to have originated in
21 Kursumlija as VJ baseline data shows M-84s garrisoned at this location and
22 are subordinate to the Pristina Corps. Movement of M-84 assets into
23 Kosovo is in clear violation of the baseline agreement."
24 Well, in your later opinions, I'm just going to remind you in
25 summary, you expressed the view that there was no plan afoot and that
1 everything that happened was responsive to KLA bombing -- to NATO bombing,
2 something like that.
3 There's plenty of evidence in this document, isn't there, you've
4 seen it, for active VJ activity contrary to the agreement.
5 A. Mr. Nice, this report you're referring to refers to seven tanks
6 used and a number of other lesser armoured vehicles. The M-84, of course,
7 as you're probably well aware, is the Yugoslavian version of what was then
8 the Soviet T-72. I don't -- while this was taking place, and it may well
9 have been in contravention of the agreement, this is a relatively small
10 element we're referring to here, and -- and if they -- and as I have
11 suggested in my comments and what I've written is that there was a great
12 deal of incitement and provocation, and as a -- as a military man, I would
13 only -- I understand it that you have to respond. You have to defend your
14 soldiers' lives and -- and your possessions. I'm not sure what you're
15 suggesting here, that this is -- if it's a contravention of the agreement,
16 it's a contravention of the agreement, and I and others were trying to
17 monitor the number of armoured vehicles and the number of troops in the VJ
18 that were moving around the province in these days.
19 Q. Mr. Keith, you've been fairly free with your criticism or
20 allowance of criticism of your equal colleagues. I mean, this Court has
21 heard from Generals Naumann, Davinkovic, Maisonneuve. You were there on
22 the ground. These were very senior officers doing important and difficult
23 jobs, weren't they?
24 A. I don't deny that.
25 Q. You have no reason to doubt them, do you?
1 A. I'm not doubting the -- I'm not doubting what they have reported,
2 but I'm trying to put a context to -- to what I'm trying to say here,
3 which is my experiences in -- in my particular area.
4 MR. NICE: And finally, the 17th of March, please, Usher.
5 Your Honours may -- I can't suggest you will remember it because
6 I'm certain I don't, in detail, but the 37th Brigade is shown moving into
7 Kosovo in early March on the evidence of the expert report. We can find
8 the detail, if necessary, but it will take time. Not very long but it
9 will take time.
10 Q. If we look at the 17th of March, and we focus for once on the 17th
11 of March itself, the overall map, please, just so we can remind ourselves,
12 because we can actually see Dubica there and Pristina. We can get an idea
13 of just how small your area of responsibility was in relation to Kosovo as
14 a whole. It's a very small part of overall Kosovo, isn't it?
15 A. It was a small component part of Kosovo; correct.
16 Q. So now if we look just at item number 6 here, it's described as a
17 new VJ/MUP offensive. And if we go to number 6, please, Usher. Thank you
18 very much. "FRY security forces opened a new offensive to clear suspected
19 KLA forces from the area five kilometres north-west of Prizren. The towns
20 of Korisa and Kabas were particularly affected. An estimated 200 VJ/MUP
21 with tanks and Praga support took part in the operation. Approximately
22 1.500 internally displaced persons were driven from the area in
23 anticipation of the operation. The operation ends at approximately 1900
25 "Comment --"
1 A. Well, it's just --
2 Q. No, I'm just reading the Comment from the paper.
3 A. Oh, I'm sorry.
4 Q. "This operation is almost a carbon copy of the Jeskovo operation
5 conducted by the FRY forces on the 11th of March."
6 This sort of reporting, opening an offensive to clear the KLA,
7 estimated 200 VJ or MUP, tanks and Praga, that's the sort of reporting
8 that any intelligent and conscientious person can do. He doesn't need the
9 specialist skills of a commissioned officer, does he?
10 A. No. I would say that to -- to comment on that, if one can -- can
11 ascertain the size of a -- of a tactical unit and the type of equipment
12 they are using, it's -- it's presumably factual information, but may I
13 suggest to you that 200 is a -- is a relatively small military force.
14 It's basically company size or combat team size, as I would know it, and
15 -- and again, I -- I don't know the context of -- of what this particular
16 operation was about. I -- but I was aware that these operations were
17 taking place, because I -- we received these on a daily basis. Not only
18 did our reports go out, the reports from across the mission came in the
19 next day of what was happening across the mission. So some of these types
20 of events were -- were occurring adjacent to the area of responsibility
21 that I had, and then towards the last days into my area of responsibility.
22 Q. I want to move on to just a few other matters, some of them of
24 The police, the Special Police Unit you saw at the Glogova Feros
25 nickel factory, where did they come from?
1 A. What time frame are you speaking of?
2 Q. What time did you see them?
3 A. I didn't make a comment that I saw special police. I commented on
4 -- are you talking about Glogovac?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. I said I visited the MUP police station in a former industrial
7 site in Glogovac in conjunction with the team leader at the time who I was
8 preparing to replace. Now, what was your question again?
9 Q. Did you see police at the Feros nickel factory?
10 A. The police station, to my recollection, was not at the Feros
11 nickel factory.
12 Q. I'll leave that.
13 A. I will add to that. I know that the team in Glogovac was trying
14 to ascertain what was going on at the former Feros nickel factory.
15 Q. You referred interestingly to paramilitaries in the same breath as
16 you referred to where the police were being lodged. What did you mean by
18 A. Well, to me a police -- a policeman is a paramilitary.
19 Q. Policeman is a paramilitary?
20 A. That's -- yes.
21 Q. Why?
22 A. Well, he's not military.
23 Q. You're not -- I mean, you've been a soldier all these years.
24 You're not aware of "paramilitary" having any other meaning apart from
1 A. Yes. It could -- it could -- it could describe any non-military
2 element of the society bearing arms and conducting military-like
4 Q. Do we take it, then, that these police, from all that you could
5 see, were acting in military or, shall we say, paramilitary ways?
6 A. The -- well, I just described, Mr. Nice, any individual or group
7 of individuals, in my definition, who are not professional soldiers but
8 who conduct military operations or military-like operations I would
9 describe as paramilitary. I think the definition would go from police to
10 groups of any size trying to conduct or attempting to conduct military
11 operations, but non-military personnel.
12 Q. We've already established that you had no access to military
13 information, intelligence from senior officers or otherwise. When you
14 left to go to Macedonia?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. How many days or weeks were you there?
17 A. I believe about ten days.
18 Q. While there, apart from talking to other verifiers, did you do any
19 work for the mission?
20 A. Not other than routine looking after my team and preparing for
21 their possible future employment, and in the final analysis assisting the
22 departure from the area of the personnel who I had the privilege to lead.
23 Q. And throughout your time in Kosovo, you had no access, directly or
24 indirectly, to the political leadership?
25 A. Of -- of Kosovo?
1 Q. Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, wherever you like.
2 A. The political leadership, no. I did have contact -- I was
3 starting to have contact with some of the political leaders in Kosovo
4 Polje in the democratisation programme that the mission was starting to
5 undertake. And I was very interested in this because I'm a political
6 person myself and I'm a student of politics and a student of history, and
7 I was looking forward to learning and trying to understand the complexity
8 of the politics within the province.
9 Q. But you didn't -- did you in listening to or following the in
10 evidence this case, did you by chance pick up the evidence of General
11 Naumann where he explained what had been said to him by the accused?
12 A. No, I have not seen that.
13 Q. And obviously anything that was said by the accused to a senior
14 general would be something you would want to take into account in forming
15 a view were the information available to you?
16 A. I would be interested in seeing information of that sort, yes.
17 Q. Very well. You started expressing views about what was happening
18 in Kosovo as early as May of 1999, and you continued doing so right
19 through to the year 2000, is that right?
20 A. I believe the -- the public participation was over that time
21 frame, yes.
22 Q. Your articles, insofar as I've got them, and I may not trouble the
23 Chamber with them, have no footnotes. They're not based on any learning,
24 are they, any further research?
25 A. You've already asked me that question, I thought, Mr. Nice, and I
1 responded as accurately as I can. They were -- the first article was
2 written within a few weeks of my departure from the area. I've tried to
3 explain to the Court that -- that I thought the international and
4 especially the Western media reports of what had occurred during the time
5 I was there were not -- did not represent the events accurately, and
6 within my limited competency I thought that it would be enlightening and
7 perhaps informative if somebody could provide perhaps a little more of an
8 alternative view of somebody who had witnessed certain events within my
9 limited field of experience.
10 Q. But what we know from your account is that whatever your views of
11 the competence of your colleagues, you were quite satisfied, really, as to
12 their integrity.
13 A. I'm not challenging the integrity, and I'm not trying to challenge
14 the competency of my colleagues. I've made a statement that they came
15 from various backgrounds, from various nations. I'm -- I'm an
16 English-speaking born person coming from Canada. Many of the members did
17 not speak English as well as they -- as I've had the privilege to speak
18 it, and -- and even in communicating sometimes it was not always easy --
19 Q. To some degree I'm going to have to cut you short because I want
20 to finish this last exercise and allow time for the Court to deal with
21 other matters.
22 I think you've really adverted to this already. You cannot know
23 what is in somebody's state of mind necessarily at a particular time
24 without knowing what comes after. You don't know what's in my mind as I
25 ask you a question until you see the questions that I ask you. You don't
1 know what's in the intention of an armed force stuck in its barracks until
2 you see subsequently what it does; correct?
3 A. I won't quarrel with that.
4 Q. You have expressed opinions elsewhere and in this court about what
5 was the state of intention of the Serb forces and the MUP forces, the VJ
6 and the MUP, in the five weeks you were in this small part of Kosovo.
7 A. I -- I don't think, Mr. Nice, that I have stated anywhere publicly
8 that I -- that I knew of what the intentions of the Serbian authorities or
9 Yugoslav authorities were in Kosovo. What I have tried to do is to -- is
10 to suggest that, as I titled my initial article that I wrote and
11 published, that it was a failure of diplomacy, that there were sources
12 that to me were quite -- appeared to be quite obvious in the consequences
13 that did not want a diplomatic solution and, therefore, I felt when I left
14 Kosovo that -- that I was somewhat frustrated from something that I
15 thought was important and wasn't given enough time to evolve.
16 Q. Mr. Keith, the same OSCE as that with which you were associated
17 published two books in 1999. Have you read them?
18 A. I'm not sure which books you're referring to.
19 MR. NICE: Can the witness please see -- or can we display on the
20 overhead projector, Exhibit 106, As Seen As Told, and since the witness I
21 don't think is familiar with it, we must look initially at Roman page VII,
22 I think, or perhaps if we look at the executive summary on page VII and
23 then turn over the page so we can just see what we're looking at.
24 Q. We're looking at an executive summary of the report. There it is.
25 It sets out how after more than six months of escalating armed conflict
1 between the Yugoslav and Serbian forces, et cetera, the UN called for
2 immediate cease-fire. Then it sets out, and we can see the initials
3 there, your KVM mission.
4 If we look to the right of this page, this substantial report, the
5 first of two, says: "Analysing the OSCE-KVM's Human Rights Findings." It
6 says what its approach is. At the bottom: "Violations, Their Impact on
7 Kosovo Society, and Human Rights Map of Kosovo."
8 If you could turn over the page, please. This is all, of course,
9 within an executive summary.
10 Perhaps we can look at the right-hand column. That's fine.
11 "The third perspective is a geographical human rights 'map' of
12 Kosovo. Proceeding municipality by municipality, the report presents
13 descriptions of events in hundreds of communities across Kosovo. In some
14 cases the descriptions are of events of a single day or within a short
15 time period, and reveal how the most characteristic human rights
16 violations of the entire reporting period - forced expulsion, inevitably
17 accompanied by deliberate property destruction --"
18 MR. KAY: If I can interrupt. I'm not sure how the witness can
19 deal with this evidence at all. He's made it entirely clear that his
20 testimony comes before the Court on the narrow basis that in fact Mr. Nice
21 predicated his questioning with. As a cross-examination technique, trying
22 to elicit the views that weren't part of his evidence in the first place,
23 to introduce material that's already before the Tribunal, in my submission
24 is not an appropriate way of questioning this witness.
25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I respond to that?
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please.
2 MR. NICE: First of all, I'm going to check on the reliability of
3 a witness who, in dealing with a matter of this importance, when such an
4 obvious source of material is available to him and he hasn't looked at it
5 is a matter right for your consideration; and secondly, I'm going to take
6 him to the passages that deal quite specifically with the area of his
7 responsibility to discover if he's ever borne any of these evidenced
8 conclusions of the report in mind. And that, in my respectful submission,
9 is entirely appropriate for the witness given the fact that he has, both
10 in examination in chief and since, has expressed views, very wide-ranging
11 views, however likely expressed.
12 MR. KAY: My submission is that he's entitled to express his views
13 on his experience rather than being asked to comment upon other matters
14 that are not by any means connected with him and that is what the witness
15 to date has done, express his views based on his experience and his
16 testimony. To attempt to get him to comment on other conclusions or
17 opinions of other people, in my submission, is not producing probative
18 evidence before the Court.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will allow the questioning to this extent:
21 You may put the questions in relation to specific areas, subject areas, to
22 test reliability. And when we hear those questions, Mr. Kay, you may then
23 decide how to address them.
24 MR. NICE:
25 Q. May I just then deal with one aspect of methodology, but first,
1 you're completely unaware of this report?
2 A. I can't say I'm unaware of it. I looked at the publishing date.
3 I see it says 1999. These documents, of course, were not available and
4 nor were they available to anybody, to my knowledge, at the time I wrote
5 the initial article.
6 Q. Not the first article, no, but later articles.
7 A. I consider myself a minor scholar, if you will, Mr. Nice. I've
8 been trained in the discipline of history. I know how to conduct
9 research. I know how to find documents in archives. This -- this subject
10 that I'm being asked to participate as a witness before this Court took a
11 very short period of my life, and although it may be a very important one,
12 it's the reason I have consented to come here today, to try to bring truth
13 and justice to the proceedings here, and -- and what I wrote at the time
14 was a summary of my experience, my opinions based on my competency, my
15 knowledge. I -- and I would like to stress before this Court I am not
16 biased. I don't come here with anything but the -- the objectivity of
17 bringing out the truth. I know you're -- you're asking to me to comment
18 on a series of documents put together as we have here, an executive
19 summary of a period of time of very important incidents that took place.
20 I have --
21 Q. I'm going, if I may, to interrupt you.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, please go to the specific areas that
23 relate to his evidence.
24 MR. NICE:
25 Q. If the -- if the -- first of all, Mr. Keith, I can simply alert
1 you to the fact that the report is based on large part on interviews of
2 people who came out of the territory and who were spoken to by OSCE
3 personnel and others, and we know that you've got no reason to doubt the
4 integrity of OSCE.
5 A. I'm not questioning the -- what's in these documents, but --
6 MR. NICE: Can we now go to page 235, Usher.
7 Q. See, here's a whole passage that deals with matters of background
8 as well as what happened after the withdrawal of the mission. It
9 describes the municipality, the principal municipality in which you were
10 interested and how it contains Pristina airport. It says that: "It was
11 affected by escalating armed conflict in the summer of 1998 when violence
12 erupted in the area around a coal mine and in the nearby village of
13 Grabovac. According to information later obtained, the UCK was positioned
14 in the mountains west of Grabovac. In the second half of 1998, the UCK
15 occupied the coal mine and the village of Obilic."
16 Just pausing there. Did you make inquiries that revealed these
17 details or do you accept that these details are accurate?
18 A. I certainly made inquiries as to what had transpired in the events
19 leading up to my deployment in the area. I was not present when these
20 events took place but I did try to find out what had happened, yes.
21 Q. On the 22nd of June, nine Serb employees of the coal mine were
22 abducted on their way to work. Did you find that out?
23 A. I was told and informed of that, yes.
24 Q. VJ and police attacked the UCK shortly afterwards and it was at
25 that point that nearly all the inhabitants of nearby villages fled, either
1 to Drenica or east to Pristina. You see, that's why I was asking you -- I
2 think His Honour Judge Kwon asked you about why certain villagers had
3 moved. Does this appear to be the reason why they moved?
4 A. I think that is in line with what my testimony and my comments
5 have said. I've said that villagers generally were displaced, from what I
6 saw and had been told, when conflict came to their areas.
7 Q. And looking on: "Villagers also stated that in 1998, around 700
8 Kosovo Albanians had lost their jobs in the coal mine to be replaced by
9 Serb workers." Did you in your inquiries find that out as one of the
10 antecedent problems?
11 A. I have been informed of these facts or opinions, and I have been
12 told different things by different people, but, yes, that -- I was told
13 that that occurred.
14 Q. Then let's read on. You see, we're looking, of course, in this
15 trial into cause and effect in various ways. "Police and VJ maintained
16 intensive controls at checkpoints. At Grabovac there was repeated looting
17 of Kosovo Albanian property continuing through to the end of 1998, and the
18 police reportedly failed to investigate complains of such crimes." Did
19 you hear about that in your formulation of your views?
20 A. As I think I've tried to say, Mr. Nice, we heard -- I heard
21 personally from people who lived in this area, their accounts of what had
22 transpired in the months in the past. I also heard from the Serbian
23 police authorities their interpretation. I'm not here to say that one is
24 a hundred per cent right and one is a hundred per cent wrong. I found
25 there was a lot of political agenda, but obviously, yes, I heard that
1 these events had occurred.
2 MR. KAY: Yes. I've got this observation to make: We're not
3 getting any further with this because he's being asked what transpired
4 before that other people had said and whether he'd heard it then. It
5 doesn't make it any better nor does it make it probative evidence, and in
6 our submission, Mr. Milosevic's objection to time being taken too long in
7 cross-examination is -- is a matter of complete relevance on this issue
8 because we appear just to be using up time on matters that are not
9 advancing the case. And I say --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: On the first matter, Mr. Kay, the Chamber agrees
11 with you. Move to another point, Mr. Nice.
12 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me finish. On the second point, the
14 procedural point, I should say that if the Chamber allows the Prosecution
15 to exceed the time limit, it is because the Chamber considers that it is
16 necessary in the specific case, but I want to give you and Mr. Milosevic
17 the assurance that we will take account of that in computing the time, and
18 the Defence will not have any time that is less than the Prosecution did.
19 MR. KAY: I'm grateful to Your Honour. And just as a matter of
20 record, we were quite happy for the witness giving his answers earlier at
21 the time that Mr. Milosevic objected as it seemed that it was evidence
22 plainly in his interest that went to support his Defence.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: And it does not mean that the Prosecution is at
24 large in cross-examination.
25 Mr. Nice, you must bring your cross-examination to an end.
1 MR. NICE: I intended to do so, and so far as this part of the
2 book is concerned, having established through the witness that matters
3 reported appear to be accurately reported, although we hadn't heard about
4 them, the Court will see that on the right-hand side of this page there
5 are several other matters of detail concerning the period before the
6 withdrawal of OSCE but I don't particularly need to raise them myself.
7 If the Court would be good enough to turn over to page 237 so that
8 I can draw its attention to matters that it may have an interest in before
9 the withdrawal, it will see at the bottom, under "Grabovac," a reference
10 to an event there that happened when a Serb security worker was killed on
11 the 7th of January, and the Chamber will, in light of what the witness has
12 said about his area of responsibility, possibly be interested in knowing
13 that at page 268 there's a similar detailed passage dealing with the
14 municipality of Obilic.
15 And with Your Honours' leave, then, I'll just ask a couple more
17 Q. Were you aware, Mr. Keith, of policy in force at the time that you
18 were on the ground coming from Serbia, from Belgrade, of Serbs being armed
19 and Kosovo Albanians being disarmed by the authorities?
20 A. The -- the possession of arms during my stay in Kosovo was very
21 extensive. Many people besides the MUP and the VJ had arms. Certainly
22 many Serbs. And my encounters with the KLA, they were armed, as I
23 described earlier, with an assortment of weapons. If you're asking me am
24 I aware of one side being armed and another side disarmed, no, other than
25 the -- the authorities I assume were trying to do their role as assigned
1 or directed. This would be a natural programme, I would think, in an
2 insurrection. But to arm -- to arm members of -- of the dominant ethnic
3 minority, which happened to, I guess, represent the interests of Serbia or
4 Yugoslavia, I'm -- I'm not -- I mean, I saw people carrying arms. Who
5 gave them arms --
6 Q. I think your answer is you're not aware of such policy. Your
7 Honour, the matter is dealt with at --
8 A. Mr. Nice, let me just say I'm not aware of any policy of the
9 Yugoslavian government or the Serbian government. I was not in their line
10 of command or control.
11 Q. And while you were in Macedonia, did you observe Kosovo Albanians
13 A. No, I did not. That doesn't mean they weren't. I -- I -- I fully
14 understand that a number of people fled the province of Kosovo during the
15 days and weeks after the -- the withdrawal.
16 Q. Thank you very much.
17 Re-examined by Mr. Kay:
18 Q. In re-examination, I've got two matters. The first was
19 questioning that concerned the number of monitors that there were under
20 the KVM, and I think you mentioned the figure of 1.638.
21 A. That was my understanding and my recollection.
22 Q. And you mentioned that you were road-bound so you couldn't cover
23 the whole territory.
24 A. That is correct. I tried to make that -- the Court understand
25 that our role was restricted to where we could get by road.
1 Q. How many were you supposed to be as monitors? What was the full
3 A. I -- I haven't looked at those figures for some years now,
4 Mr. Kay, but I understood the force, I think, was due to expand to some
5 3.000 verifiers.
6 Q. You mentioned administrators and others probably in headquarters.
7 Are you able to say how many monitors or what the proportion was in terms
8 of administrators, those in office, those in the field?
9 A. I couldn't give you a definitive answer because I don't have
10 access to that information, but it was my sense, and I've already stated
11 this before this Court, that probably close to 50 per cent if not 50 per
12 cent of the alleged 1.600 were probably involved in tasks other than
13 verifying in the field.
14 Q. The issue's been raised about the people you worked with. You've
15 told us you had a military background. In your group, were there similar
16 military backgrounds or other backgrounds that you were -- of your
18 A. There was a variety of backgrounds. There was only one other
19 individual who had a military background. I'm sorry, two if you call my
20 deputy, who had been a former fighter pilot in the Luftwaffe. The other
21 was an American who was a member of my team. The others, there was a
22 lawyer, a journalist -- I'm sorry, and an Italian military, so there were
23 three had military backgrounds, but they were a variety of military
24 backgrounds in those three. The others had other professions.
25 Q. Thank you very much. I have no further questions to ask you.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay and Mr. Nice, I am a little confused. I
2 must say I had the impression throughout the trial that the monitors were
3 all people of military background. Is that not so? You had lawyers and
4 people from other professions?
5 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honour.
6 MR. NICE: Quite a number of former military personnel, I think.
7 The witness will be able to confirm, but by no means --
8 THE WITNESS: If I may, Your Honour, while there were -- there was
9 an element of former military personnel and some serving military
10 personnel who had been seconded to the mission, it is my recollection that
11 of the -- of the 1.638, if that's what there were, then people with a
12 military background would probably be no more than 30 per cent and maybe
14 MR. KAY:
15 Q. It wasn't a military operation, was it? Quite the opposite. It
16 was structured in a way that was supposed to be non-military; is that
18 A. It was a non-military mission, certainly. However, to -- to have
19 some military insight would -- would have helped people who were there
20 observe and report well, I would think.
21 Q. Just while we're on the subject, the age range, would that be
22 something you'd be able to give of your group, the range of ages?
23 A. Yes, I can. I don't have all their ages computed in my mind, but
24 we varied. I was the oldest in my group, but the others varied to fairly
25 young men in their -- in their late 20s. And many of these people came to
1 the mission, and I think they were very good people, but as I've tried to
2 stress a number of times now in answer to Mr. Nice's queries, their
3 experiences were somewhat limited, and their professional competency
4 somewhat limited. This doesn't take away from who they were or what they
5 were, but their ability to do the job we were assigned, I think was
6 somewhat limited because of that.
7 Q. Did you have any issues with them concerning the description of
8 events? You as a military man would have been familiar with explosions,
9 the sound of gunfire. Were those who were non-military blessed with that
10 kind of experience? Was there any training or was there anything that
11 made them have any particular knowledge of those kinds of things?
12 A. No. And as a matter of fact, when I was, I think, asked the
13 question from the Court itself, it relates to that question, Mr. Kay. As
14 a matter of fact, I frequently questioned not only my verifiers but other
15 verifiers who I heard made comments about something, and it was obvious
16 they -- they didn't know what they were saying, because -- and again, they
17 just didn't understand what they were looking at and what was happening.
18 MR. KAY: Thank you.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, any
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish, Mr. Robinson, to say
22 something to you in relation to the observation you made in view of my
23 attitude and position. I think that the right to defending oneself is a
24 right of principle --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, that issue is now in another
1 forum. We're not going to debate that here again. It's now in another
2 forum. You have taken it to a higher forum. Whatever that forum says,
3 the Court -- this Chamber will abide by that.
4 I am not -- I am not going to continue this.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Keith --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But you said --
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Keith, that concludes your testimony. The
9 Chamber is grateful to you for coming to give it. You may now leave.
10 MR. KAY: And if the witness can go with his documents that he
11 kindly provided. He wants to keep his originals as part of his archive.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, the matter that you wanted to raise.
14 MR. KAY: There were several matters that I wanted to raise in the
15 best interests of the accused, which may take some time. We have no more
16 witnesses for this week. This was the only witness that we were able to
17 obtain for the hearing, and I know that we have a court day scheduled for
18 tomorrow. If the Trial Chamber was in agreement, perhaps we could deal
19 with those issues tomorrow in the hearing. I wanted to cover the issue of
20 the accused's health as well, so it would occur to me it would be helpful
21 if the Trial Chamber had the medical reports to hand and the particular
22 reports from the doctors recently, Dr. Tavernier, and Dr. Dijkman, the
23 reports that we've had since the 24th of July, to raise an issue from
24 there concerning the appropriateness of a further medical examination to
25 see if he was fit enough to represent himself at this stage, the reports
1 having been filed then dealing with the period of time at that stage. And
2 it's my understanding of the matter there has been no recent concern about
3 the accused's health, and we have moved on in time, and it's quite clear
4 from his representations to the Court that this is a matter that he would
5 like dealt with on his behalf.
6 So to enable the matters to be raised properly and all parties, so
7 to speak, in possession of the relevant information, it might be helpful
8 if that could be dealt with at 9.00 tomorrow rather than fitting into a
9 period of time --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: We can deal with it tomorrow, but let me see if I
11 understand you. You'd like to raise the issue of a further medical
12 examination for the accused following up on the examination in August.
13 MR. KAY: Yes, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You believe that the subject matter might have --
15 circumstances might have changed in two, three weeks?
16 MR. KAY: No. The last visit to Mr. Milosevic was on the 26th of
17 July. He has daily medical reports provided by the nurse, and there is,
18 of course, the Detention Unit doctor. I think his name is Dr. Falke. The
19 last expert reports were as a result of examination on the 26th of July.
20 That was by Dr. Tavernier. And on the 28th of July, I think, the other
21 doctor, Dr. Dijkman, saw him. But we need to get the reports before us.
22 But certainly the last -- the last report on his condition and fitness was
23 on the 26th of July, and in our submission, just as the Prosecution at
24 various stages during their presentation had matters reviewed and
25 reconsidered by the Trial Chamber in the face of changing circumstances,
1 it would be in the interests of the trial, in the interests of the
2 accused, and appropriate if we raised the matter in -- in a full way
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Very well, Mr. Kay, tomorrow morning at
5 9.00 a.m. We are adjourned.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.30 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 15th day of
8 September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.