1 Tuesday, 16 November 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are to call your first
6 witness, but before you do so, let me say something about an
7 administrative matter. We'll sit from 2.15 to 3.45, then we take a
8 20-minute break, and then from 4.05 to 5.30, then another 20-minute break,
9 and then from 5.50 until 7.00 p.m., and then we adjourn for the day.
10 Mr. Milosevic, as far as I am aware, this is the first time you'll
11 be conducting an examination-in-chief. It is, therefore, a brave new
12 world for you, in a sense, and I'd just like to remind you of some ground
13 rules. This is by way of reiterating what I said in the Pre-Defence
14 Conference on the 17th of June, and generally I should say that the
15 approach which I would like to take to the conduct of your
16 examination-in-chief is that I want the evidence to flow with as little
17 intervention or interruption as possible. We have lost a lot of time in
18 the case, and I want the evidence to flow, to move ahead as quickly as
20 Examination-in-chief is not necessarily easier than
21 cross-examination. I would say it's different from cross-examination.
22 That's perhaps the best description. Firstly, you're not allowed to ask
23 leading questions of the witness. The witness must give the evidence.
24 You are not to give the evidence. And of course, as I said before, you
25 are not to make speeches. And then, most importantly, the evidence must
1 be relevant, which is to say it must relate to the indictment, to the
2 charges, to the allegations in the indictment in a material particular,
3 and it must be evidence which tends to prove or disprove an allegation.
4 In your case, generally to be evidence tending to disprove an allegation.
5 So the materiality and the probative value of the evidence is what is
7 And as I said on the 17th of June, documents must be produced in
8 an orderly manner. If you're producing documents not already in evidence,
9 then you must ensure that sufficient copies are available for the Bench,
10 the Prosecution, and the witness.
11 Please also remember that documents not already translated into
12 English will have to be translated, and therefore, sufficient notice must
13 be given.
14 Having said that, your first witness, Mr. Milosevic. Please call
15 your first witness.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I call Witness Professor Mihailo
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
21 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
23 Begin, Mr. Milosevic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 WITNESS: MIHAILO MARKOVIC
1 [Witness answered through interpreter]
2 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Professor Markovic.
4 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Milosevic.
5 Q. You are a professor, a member of the Academy of Sciences. To save
6 time, I will only read some important elements of your CV, and you will
7 tell me whether all of it is true.
8 Professor of the philosophy faculty in Belgrade, member of the
9 Serbian Academy of Sciences. From 1972 to 1990, professor at the
10 University of Pennsylvania, further on member of the International
11 Philosophical Institute in Paris, vice-president of the International
12 Humanitarian and Union in Germany, professor of a federation for the
13 research of the future, professor of Lund University in Sweden, member of
14 the Academy for the Preservation of Peace in Vienna, Helsinki, and London;
15 and professor at many universities in Europe and America. Secretary of
16 the section of humanities of the Serbian Academy of Sciences.
17 In the 1980s, member of the Council for the Defence of Public
18 Freedom of Speech. For participation in the Praksis magazine, you were
19 suspended at the time. You were suspended from the university in 1971.
20 You were a member of the SPS party in Serbia since its foundation in 1990,
21 and you are one of the authors of the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of
22 Sciences. Is all of this true?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Can we note that you are among the most prominent
25 active members of the social and public life; you have been for the past
1 few decades?
2 A. Yes, we can say note that, but can I explain? When you say that
3 somebody is an engaged intellectual, that means that he is engaged in
4 practice and in theory for the sake of some main human values, such as
5 freedom, equality, equal rights, political, socio-economic rights, social
6 rights, and human solidarity.
7 As far as theoretical engagement is concerned, which has been my
8 case all my life, that means that one is a critical scientist, a critical
9 researcher who does not only deal with description, analysis and
10 explanation of social realities but does so with a critical attitude,
11 identifying certain restrictions that need to be overcome. Practical
12 engagement, however, means to a greater or lesser extent, political
13 engagement in public life. In certain periods of my life, although I have
14 always been engaged in theory, I was also politically active in certain
15 periods, but always these ethical values come into confrontation with
16 pragmatic politics, and on such occasions at such points in my life I had
17 to withdraw in my -- into my scientific work, I was suspended from various
18 institutions, and that occurred several times.
19 Without explaining the reasons, unless you ask me, that happened
20 first when I was in high school before the war, the second time in the
21 1950s, after the war -- I apologise if I was too fast. The third time I
22 was suspended for the longest time, for about 20 years, when I was engaged
23 in the publication of this critical magazine Praksis, and was even editor
24 of its international edition called Praksis International. I was removed
25 for political reasons from the university for 20 years. I was even denied
1 a passport, I was barred from talking to the media and appearing on
2 television, and New York Times and Washington Post frequently wrote about
3 this group involved in the Praksis magazine, describing us as dissidents.
4 And I'm concluding.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And the last time was in 1990, when
7 I was relieved of my duties in the Socialist Party.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. The Yugoslav crisis which resulted in secession and the civil war
10 has roots that go far back into our history; is that so?
11 A. Yes, but allow me to explain one more thing here, because it is
12 important for everything else that we will be discussing later.
13 That crisis has its international and internal political reasons.
14 The international reasons derive from the fact that our territory is of
15 great geographic and political importance. Important thoroughfares go
16 through it linking Europe and Asia, and all conquerors throughout history
17 have attempted to capture this territory. In the seventh century those
18 were Avars, in the thirteenth century Mongolians, Turks in the 18th
19 century, later on conquerors came from the west of Europe. But all of
20 them tried to control, first of all, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, such as
21 Germany, and most recently it was the United States.
22 This territory was populated by South Slavs who frequently wished,
23 although they were different peoples, to defend themselves together and
24 live in a common state. Therefrom stemmed the idea about a common
25 Yugoslav state. On the other hand, those peoples had lived under
1 different historical circumstances. Some of them lived under the
2 Austro-Hungarian Empire, whereas others lived under the Turkish Empire.
3 They were of different religions. Some were Orthodox Christians, others
4 were Catholics, and others were Muslims, but all of them invariably wished
5 to create their own national states. Therefrom stemmed their constant
6 desire for separatism and secession which frequently led to internecine
7 conflict, and what had happened in the most recent history is precisely a
8 consequence of that type of conflict.
9 On the one hand, the aspiration to create one's own state; for
10 instance, Slovenes had their own medieval state as far as back as 1.000
11 years ago, the Croatians as well, and they lost their independence in
12 1102. Others had their states in different periods in time. And on the
13 other hand, these peoples wanted to create their new nation-based states.
14 So on the one hand you have this aspiration for one's own state,
15 and on the other hand you have the interference of external powers
16 desiring control over that area spurring on internecine conflicts. So
17 with this separatism on the one hand and foreign interference, you end up
18 with the crisis of the kind that we had.
19 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much, Professor. We shall now attempt
20 to focus ourselves on the most recent history.
21 Its crisis acquires its most prominent manifestation after the
22 death of Josip Broz Tito, which was coupled by the escalation of the
23 Albanian nationalistic movement and Albanian -- ethnic Albanian
24 demonstrations. In March 1982, the time of the escalation of tensions and
25 the organisation of demonstrations vying for republican status for Kosovo
1 and annexation of Kosovo to Albania. Is that one instance?
2 A. Yes. In 1968, there was an insurgency of a similar character when
3 Tito had to bring divisions to calm them down. After the war, after the
4 Second World War, when Albanians refused to participate in the Srem
5 battles on the front line, there was another example of this kind. So
6 this crisis was what led to these events in Kosovo.
7 Q. Especially painful issue at the time was the pressure --
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'd just like him to elaborate on
9 what happened in 1968. He says there was an insurgency of a similar
10 character when Tito had to bring divisions to calm them down. That's what
11 it says.
12 Could you elaborate on that for me. Explain a little more. What
13 did Tito do to quell that crisis?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Albanians --
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... first.
16 What was the crisis in 1968?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was an insurgency, because
18 Albanians demanded to get their own independent republic, and the position
19 was that the minority, which already had its mother state, cannot get
20 another state, which was the reason why Tito refused that, after which
21 they turned out into the streets en masse requiring these changes
22 requiring the status of republic, and Tito simply brought in divisions
23 which immediately calmed the situation down. There was no fighting at
24 all; the people withdrew immediately.
25 Whatever the case, Tito never agreed to the idea of giving
1 Albanians the status of republic. They had their autonomous province,
2 they had all the rights enjoyable by minorities, not only cultural but
3 also political, but he would never agree to give them a separate republic,
4 because a republic is defined as a separate state, whereas he did not
5 agree to them having a state.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... yes.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Professor Markovic, an especially painful issue at that time was
9 the pressure Albanian nationalists exerted in Kosovo and Metohija upon
10 Serbs and Montenegrins in order to expel them from the province. What can
11 you tell us about that? Very briefly, please.
12 A. In the briefest possible terms: The issue was that they were
13 demanding from Serbs and Montenegrins to sell their houses and leave. And
14 when some of them who wouldn't do that, because some did and left but
15 others didn't, became exposed to violence. They were -- their cattle was
16 killed, their houses was -- were damaged. There were cases of rape as
17 well. And as a result, hundreds and thousands of Serbs left Kosovo in
18 that period.
19 That happened at the times of Tito and Aleksandar Rankovic who
20 held Kosovo in an iron fist. When Aleksandar Rankovic was eliminated,
21 however, in 1966, they got joint government in Kosovo. They became
22 represented in the government in Kosovo. And that was the period when
23 these measures were beginning to be taken against Serbs leading to ethnic
24 cleansing, because that was a figure of tens of thousands of people who
1 Q. All right, Professor. Is it the case that the term "ethnically
2 pure" or "ethnic cleansing" that you just mentioned was used for the first
3 time precisely in connection with this expulsion of Serbs, Montenegrins,
4 and other non-Albanians from Kosovo?
5 A. Yes, it is the case that the term began to be used then. There
6 were different expulsions even before that but they were not called that
7 way. They began to be called ethnic cleansing then.
8 Q. Is it true that it became obvious precisely then how great
9 shortcomings there were in the 1974 constitution which gave enormous
10 rights to the autonomous provinces which existed in one of the republics
11 but were practically separate from it?
12 A. Yes, it's true that this constitution actually determined the
13 history of Yugoslavia according to the laws of unity. Kosovo, in name,
14 remained autonomous province, but it did acquire, in effect, all the
15 attributes of a republic because it had its government, its policies into
16 which Serbia had no right to interfere, and now you had an Assembly, a
17 parliament for the whole of Serbia, including Vojvodina as one autonomous
18 province and Kosovo as another, plus Serbia proper, and everybody sat on
19 that Assembly.
20 However, in the Assemblies in the autonomous provinces, Serbs were
21 not represented. Serbia -- the Serbian government was governing only
22 Serbia proper and couldn't interfere in the government of Kosovo. So you
23 had a situation in which Kosovo could interfere in determining Serbian,
24 all Serbian policies, whereas vice versa was not true.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, even without hearing the complaint, I
1 can notice the difficulty the interpreters are having now. Since you are
2 speaking the same language, please put a pause between question and
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before you continue this, I'm
6 interested in this 1968 event.
7 Professor, how long did that event last, the uprising, the
8 insurgency, before it was quelled?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That insurgency lasted for three
10 days, and as soon as the army appeared in the form of two divisions,
11 Albanians withdrew into their homes and peace was restored immediately.
12 There was absolutely no bloodshed during that insurgency. But it was an
13 insurgency insofar as Tito realised he had to use force in order to calm
14 them down. So he allocated two divisions. However, very little is
15 written or known about this.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. You described the position of the provinces, and I'm not going to
19 waste any more time about that. However, the Serbian republic had the
20 constitutional obligation to protect the population on its entire
21 territory and to ensure the protection of everybody's civil rights.
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. However, there were no appropriate mechanisms ensuring that it was
24 able to perform that function.
25 A. No. There was nothing Serbia could do. If a crime was committed
1 against a non-Albanian person in Kosovo, for instance, the Serbian
2 government could not interfere at all.
3 Q. And that became abundantly plain when the issue of protection of
4 non-Albanians in Kosovo was concerned but also the protection of Albanian
5 population, those among Albanians who did not wish to support this
6 nationalist movement of Albania.
7 A. Yes. Of course there were Albanians who wished to go on in their
8 good neighbourly relations with Serbs and other non-Albanians, and they
9 were punished in a very drastic way because they stuck out.
10 Q. Very well. I hope we've cleared that up now. In the mid-1980s,
11 or more exactly in the autumn of 1985, in fact, you yourself were faced
12 with a different separatist tendency, and that was less well known,
13 generally speaking, and that was the Slovene separatist movement. In
14 1985, that's right, isn't it?
15 A. Yes. In 1985, I was called to attend a meeting in Slovenia, and
16 that's where suddenly I was very much surprised to see that my Slovene
17 friends and colleagues, intellectuals, were talking about the fact that
18 Yugoslavia, as far as they were concerned, was dead and that they wanted
19 to leave Yugoslavia.
20 Now, Slovenia, otherwise --
21 Q. That will be sufficient, Professor, thank you for the time being,
22 to save as much time as possible. Let me ask you this: Is it true that
23 the Serbs and Slovenes had a joint rich experience from World War II, an
24 important experience when in Serbia a large number of Slovenes that had
25 been expulsed spent their time there. When the Germans expulsed the
1 Slovenes, the Slovenes came to Serbian and they lived there and the Serbs
2 believed that this had forged close ties.
3 A. Yes, that's quite correct. President Kucan of the day was also a
4 refugee in Serbia when he was a boy, during his childhood. And before
5 World War II the Serbs and Slovenes enjoyed very good relations because
6 the Slovenes were rather wary of Croatian separatism, and they were afraid
7 that if the Croats were to secede, they would be cut off, too, and they
8 were in Yugoslavia after 1.000 years, and they received their state, their
9 Assembly, their government, their cultural institutions, universities,
10 academies of art -- academy of arts and sciences, and a national state of
11 their own, briefly speaking. So at that time, there was Korosec. Korosec
12 was the most prominent politician and leader of the day, and in actual
13 fact, in Yugoslavia there was a coalition that prevailed between Serb
14 politicians, mostly from the Radical Party, and then Slovene politicians
15 led by Korosec and the Muslims led by Spaho, so that this Slovene/Muslim
16 coalition kept up Yugoslavia, and the Croats were isolated from it
17 although in different ways they resisted Yugoslavia. They wanted to find
18 a way out, but we had the Serb politicians who had strong allies in the
19 Slovenes and Muslims.
20 Q. Very well. Now something more about that position enjoyed by the
21 Slovenes and Slovenia within Yugoslavia. Let me ask you this: It is well
22 known that the key creator of the political system of Yugoslavia from 1945
23 onwards, that is to say from the end of World War II until his death, was
24 a Slovene by the name of Edvard Kardelja, a closest Tito associate; is
25 that right?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes. Edvard Kardelja was the number two man in Yugoslavia. Tito
2 was the number one man and Kardelja came second. He was a fairly cautious
3 man and he was the main theoretician and the creator of the entire system,
4 the constitution, the laws, and he was exceptionally influential.
5 Q. So bearing all this in mind, then, the position that Slovenia had
6 and its key participation in the set-up of the system of the constitution
7 and of life generally in Yugoslavia, do you feel that it is natural that
8 in Serbia and other parts of Yugoslavia few people could have assumed that
9 in Slovenia there were strong separatist tendencies because the question
10 arose as to why somebody would leave a community if it had a key role to
11 play within that community and in creating the system of power and
12 authority government and the economy. Isn't that right?
13 A. Well, yes, but they developed more rapidly than any other republic
14 in Yugoslavia. They quintrupled their social product from 1945 to 1985.
15 And if we look at the relationship in the degree of development, level of
16 development between Yugoslavia and Slovenia on average, then Slovenia
17 already in 1947 was 163 per cent of the overall Yugoslav average, and this
18 grew and in 1982 they had 191, and later on they reached 220. When they
19 seceded, they had -- were -- enjoyed a -- twice as much development as the
20 rest of Yugoslavia, and their investments were also greater on an average,
21 though 169 per cent was invested compared to the general Yugoslav average.
22 Q. Thank you. Now, without a doubt they had and enjoyed under
23 circumstances of that kind even a privileged position. Could we say that?
24 A. Yes, we could. They did indeed have a privileged position. In
25 addition to the fact that they had Kardelja and they also held the Foreign
1 Ministry, they had people there in the economic -- in economic and
2 financial matters, they were always given key posts within Yugoslavia.
3 Q. Yes. But can we say that for the entire Yugoslav economy, the
4 economy was interdependent in fact and there was an interdependence on the
5 part of the republics but the Slovenia economy, which was the most highly
6 developed, it had a privileged interest. But Yugoslavia in all its
7 different parts relied upon each other and it was interdependent; isn't
8 that right?
9 A. Yes, that is right. They were without a doubt interdependent and
10 the price policy had a lot to do with that and was to their advantage to a
11 great extent because prices were higher than the average world prices in
12 branches where they were producing, where Slovenia was producing.
13 Slovenia's industry, electronics, and so on and so forth, the machine
14 building and construction industry, whereas the prices of agricultural
15 products which came from the less developed and backward parts of the
16 country, including Serbia, those prices were below an average world level,
17 so this was the price aspect and rift that existed.
18 Q. Very well. Now, when you met these Slovene intellectuals you were
19 surprised by what you heard from them; is that right?
20 A. Yes, I was surprised.
21 Q. When they said they wanted to step down and secede from Yugoslavia
22 despite the position they occupied?
23 A. Yes, they said that and I must say that the meeting took place in
24 Ljubljana in November 1985 and for our part, in addition to myself there
25 was Dobrica Cosic, the well-known writer who was later the president of
1 the Republic of Yugoslavia, and Ljubo Tadic, a well-known philosopher, my
2 colleague, whose son is now president of the Republic of Serbia, in fact.
3 On the Slovene side there were well-known Slovene intellectuals
4 who later on were to play a very important role in Slovenia's policy. For
5 example, there was Bucar, who was later on the president of the Assembly
6 of Slovenia, then there was Hribar and his wife Spomenka Hribar, Niko
7 Grafenavr was another, Janez Urbancic, Andrej Marinc, Mare Rozaj [phoen],
8 and so on and so forth.
9 As soon as they started expanding their views along those lines
10 and saying that as far as they were concerned Yugoslavia was dead, that
11 they felt restricted within Yugoslavia and that at one time they were at
12 the level of Central Europe whereas they had begun to lag behind Central
13 Europe, I presented them with facts and figures and showed them that they
14 did very well in Yugoslavia, that they developed more rapidly than other
15 parts of the country, in fact, and that if they truly wished to step down
16 and leave, all we could do was to wish them bon voyage because they said
17 that they were afraid that Serbia might oppose their seceding from
18 Yugoslavia, be against it. They expressed that anxiety and that they
19 thought that we intellectuals would play what they thought would be a bad
20 role. And I said rest assured, if you really wish to leave Yugoslavia,
21 although you've done very well in Yugoslavia, we wish you every happiness
22 and bon voyage. They no longer talked along those lines and said that
23 they were backward. They then moved to the ideological plane and said
24 that one had to rid one's self of bolshevism, for example, and so on and
25 so forth, so they moved to a different plane and area altogether.
1 Q. Very well. A book has been written about that particular meeting
2 with the contents of the negotiations and talks conducted; is that right?
3 A. Yes, that's right.
4 Q. So can we say that a part of the Slovene intelligentsia and
5 people when the multi-party system was introduced in the 1990s took the
6 leadership of political life, can we say that already at that time, when
7 we're talking about the autumn of 1985, that there was a clear tendency
8 and clear plan for the realisation of Slovenia's secession, that is to say
9 for Slovenia to secede from Yugoslavia; is that right?
10 A. I have no doubt that already at that time they had made the firm
11 resolve to leave and Kardelja on one occasion himself said that Yugoslavia
12 was only a transit station for them.
13 Q. Very well. I'm asking you that because a thesis has been put
14 forward here that according to which separatist tendencies in Slovenia and
15 Croatia were born as a reaction to some kind of policy waged by Serbia,
16 and even my own efforts to keep the other ethnic groups and nationalities
17 under Serb domination. That is the concept and thesis being put forward
18 here and the grounds upon which the indictment is based. And it also
19 exists, views of that kind were expressed in the propaganda of those
20 republics and in Western propaganda as well. What do you have to say to
22 A. Well, that seems ludicrous to me because if anybody knows anything
23 about history they will know that those secessionist tendencies existed in
24 the past in history a long time before. In the case of Slovenia, for
25 example, they emerged in the 1980s, but that was before you came into any
1 position of power. But they were there. When the meeting took place, you
2 were not one of the party leaders.
3 But if we look at Croatia, for example, from Ante Starcevic in the
4 middle of the 19th century, for example, there were very strong
5 aspirations for Croatia to create a state of its own, an independent state
6 without the Serbs. And Starcevic himself promoted the idea that the Serbs
7 should be put paid to in the country; a third would have to accept
8 Catholic -- Catholicism, become converted to Catholicism, a third should
9 be expulsed, and the remaining third should be killed, and he spoke about
10 that quite openly.
11 Q. Very well, now let's just take a practical example and practical
12 approach. Count 55 of the Bosnian indictment states as follows: "The
13 results of the elections held in November 1990 meant that the Serbian
14 Democratic Party, as time went by, would not be able peacefully to retain
15 the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in what existed as Yugoslavia under
16 Serb domination."
17 Now, what kind of Yugoslavia was this under Serb domination in
18 1990, tell me, please.
19 A. Well, there's no question of that, no question of any kind of
20 domination, because in Yugoslavia -- for example, take Macedonia, the
21 Macedonians, the Tupurkovski, and before him Kolisevski said that in
22 Yugoslavia, throughout the time after World War II, there was a
23 non-principled coalition, as he called it, and he had in mind the
24 coalition of the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Muslims, Bosnian Muslims,
25 and so on, and the two provinces, both Vojvodina province and Kosovo
1 province. And I know full well, for example, that Serbia was left in the
2 minority. It was a 5 to 3 vote or 7 to 1 vote when vital issues were
3 decided upon. For example, it was customary after Tito's death to have a
4 rotating Yugoslav state Presidency president, and you would have the
5 representatives of individual republics. When the turn came for Ivan
6 Stambolic to become president of the federal government, the vote was in
7 the ratio of 7 to 1 against Stambolic. So that was the way in which
8 decision-making took place. So there can be absolutely no question of any
9 Serb domination, although the thesis of the Serbian domination dates back
10 to previous times, in actual fact, and the common form played a very
11 interesting role there, because the common form -- communist international
12 in the 1920s, you had the ties between the Serbian king and the Romanov
13 dynasty and as Serbia and Yugoslavia did not wish to recognise the
14 Bolshevik Soviet Union, Bolshevik Russia whereas all the other countries
15 had already recognised it, the common tern decided that as in Yugoslavia
16 we had the domination of Serbia and the Serb people, that Yugoslavia
17 should be disbanded and that the national liberation movements of the
18 different ethnic groups should be supported; the Croats, the Muslims, the
19 Albanians in Kosovo and the Macedonians, for example, and that Yugoslavia
20 should be broken up and a series of Soviet republics be created which
21 would be attached and affiliated to the Soviet Union.
22 So that is one example of this myth of domination. Serbia could
23 not have dominated by the very fact that it was economically weak and
24 developed more slowly.
25 Q. Yes, but when we go back to the 1990s now and within the
1 frameworks of this explanation of this alleged Serbian domination, you
2 spoke about the Federal Executive Council or federal government, who at
3 that time, and I'm talking about 1990, who was at the head of the federal
5 A. Well, Ante Markovic was the head of the federal government, and he
6 was a Croat.
7 Q. Very well. A Croat. And who was the foreign minister?
8 A. The foreign minister was Budo Loncar, a Croat.
9 Q. So the Prime Minister and president were Croats. Who was the
10 minister of defence and head of the army?
11 A. It was Kadijevic who was also half Croat. He always said he was a
12 Yugoslav, in actual fact.
13 Q. Now, is it true that at that time the Presidency was made up of
14 the Yugoslav state Presidency as a collective head of state and that that
15 was made up of the representatives of all the Yugoslav republics and
16 autonomous provinces, which means eight of them?
17 A. Yes, that's correct. The collective head of state was indeed the
18 Yugoslav state Presidency composed of the representatives of six republics
19 and two provinces. That is to say Kosovo province and Vojvodina province.
20 And those eight made decisions. Decision-making rested in their hands,
21 and usually they always voted against Serbia in the ratio of 7 to 1.
22 Q. The term "Serbian bloc" is often used and bandied about, meaning
23 Serbia and the two provinces. Could that bloc, the Serbian Bloc ever gain
24 the advantage in the voting?
25 A. No. And there was never a bloc, and you -- it was always Slovenia
1 and Croatia who voted together. They did not vote with Serbia.
2 Q. Well, that's precisely why I'm asking you why this term "Serb
3 bloc" has been used.
4 A. No Serb bloc ever existed. Sometimes the Montenegrins would side
5 with Serbia on some issue.
6 Q. Now, what about the Assembly of Yugoslavia of the day? The
7 republics were represented on a parity level and there was the
8 corresponding number of deputies, and in one the Chambers acquiescence
9 from -- and agreement from all the republics and provinces was needed,
10 isn't that right, and in actual fact in practical terms anybody could stop
11 a decision.
12 A. There was no elementary democracy because we had no Chamber of
13 citizens which would include representatives of the citizens at large and
14 then the Serbs, as the majority nation, would have a larger number of
15 representatives, for instance. And then if the voting were to be
16 conducted according to the majority number of votes, then of course Serbia
17 would have had a relatively good position. However, there was no Chamber
18 of citizens, there was just a Chamber of Nations and Nationalities, as it
19 was called. So it was the nations who were represented and, as you said,
20 each nation, regardless of whether it was large or small or ethnic group,
21 whichever you like to call it, Montenegro, Serbia, for example, would have
22 an equal number of representatives regardless of the difference in their
23 populations. And then complete dovetailing and agreement would have to be
24 reached because everybody enjoyed the right of veto. For example, Kosovo,
25 could invoke its right of veto to any decision, and that is why in the
1 1980s Yugoslavia was no longer able to function, which led to a very
2 serious and political and economic crisis because no decision was able to
3 be passed.
4 Q. Now, General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, a Prosecution witness here,
5 spoke about the military leadership at that period of time, and according
6 to what he said here, and we're talking about the middle of 1991, for
7 example, when the crisis escalated and of the 16 top men in the army,
8 according to what he said, there was one Yugoslav, two Serbs from Serbia
9 and Bosnia, eight Croats, two Slovenes, two Macedonians, and one Muslim.
10 Now, is it common knowledge that Veljko Kadijevic as a Yugoslav,
11 Blagoje Adzic as a Serb from Bosnia, Josip Greguric a Croat, Stane Brovet
12 a Slovene, Mile Ruzinovski a Macedonia, Konrad Kolsek a Slovene,
13 Aleksandar Spirkovski a Macedonian, Andrija Silic a Croat, Zivota
14 Avramovic a Serb, Bozidar Grubicic a Croat, Anton Tus a Croat, Zvonko
15 Jurjevic a Croat, Ivan Gordanovic a Croat, Ibrahim Alibegovic a Muslim,
16 Tomislav Bjondic a Croat, and Mate Betan [phoen] a Croat - that makes 16
17 of them - you had one Yugoslav, two Serbs, but one Serb from Bosnia, one
18 from Serbia, eight Croats, two Slovenes, two Macedonians, and one Muslim,
19 and that was the top military leadership; is that right?
20 A. Yes, but let me explain how this came about. During the war --
21 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
23 MR. NICE: I've hesitated interrupting for a long time, but there
24 are serious difficulties with this evidence. First, nearly all the
25 questions, and the last one I don't particularly object to it in
1 particular, but are either leading or at the very least tendentious in
2 form. Second, it is just extremely fast and I suspect that it is as fast
3 an exercise as our admirable interpreters have had to cope with in the
4 course of this trial. And third, as the Chamber will appreciate, it's not
5 been heralded in any way by an expert report although it's clearly
6 touching on a large number, a wide range of expert matters. Now, many of
7 them may be quite irrelevant for trial, but overall it's not coming out in
8 a way that's going to be very easy for us to handle swiftly.
9 Historical matters, of course, if subject to a report, could have
10 been considered by us along with our own expert, if necessary. Not having
11 the advantage of a report in advance, that may not be possible. But I
12 would encourage the Chamber, if it thinks it right, both to slow down the
13 speed a little bit because I can see that the interpreters are finding it
14 very difficult, and I'm finding it difficult to make enough notes myself
15 to pursue any lines of cross-examination.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. It may be true that some of
17 the matters are matters in relation to which expert evidence could be
18 given, but of course the accused can't be obliged to submit his evidence
19 in that way.
20 Now, I have been fairly lenient with you on the leading questions,
21 Mr. Milosevic. You do ask leading questions, that's very true. You put
22 the answer to the questions in the mouth of the witness. And I was
23 looking at the transcript to give you an example. You must ask the
24 questions more generally and have the witness provide the answers. It's
25 not cross-examination, and you can't -- you're not testifying. So you
1 have to be very careful about that.
2 And then the speed, that I can hear the -- hear it from the
3 breathing of the interpreters that they are really struggling to keep pace
4 with the overlapping between the evidence of the professor and your
6 So, Professor, you have to observe a pause after Mr. Milosevic
7 finishes his question. And Mr. Milosevic, you also have to observe the
8 pause. And that requires a discipline, and I think you are -- you are
9 very familiar with that -- with that technique.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson. This has
11 to do with facts. I'm just asking the witness to confirm facts, and these
12 facts are verifiable. We are not talking about assessments or value
13 judgements. If I'm asking him about names of the Prime Minister, of
14 ministers, of generals, of the top military leadership, these are mere
15 facts. These are names and surnames. That cannot be leading. It's
16 either that way or it isn't.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: But it can be leading if -- if they are matters
18 which may be in dispute. If they are matters which may be in dispute,
19 then you cannot lead. You cannot lead on it unless the Court allows you
20 or unless the Prosecution agrees.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.
22 Q. So here comes a question: At the time of the secession of
23 Slovenia and Croatia and later of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, could
24 there have been any kind of Serb domination in Yugoslavia in the top
25 echelons of government, that is to say the Federal Presidency, the
1 Assembly, the top military echelons, et cetera? Could there have been any
2 Serb domination?
3 A. What I was saying were generally known facts in our country. All
4 intellectuals know that. I'm sorry if I spoke about a bit too fast, but
5 everybody knows that at the time of secession, the president was a
6 Slovene, Drnovsek, and then a Croat, Mesic, and then the federal Prime
7 Minister was a Croat, Ante Markovic. The foreign minister was Budo Loncar
8 until the very end. Then the chief of General Staff was a man who was a
9 Yugoslav of mixed origin, partly Serb partly Croat.
10 As for the military, I personally participated in the national
11 liberation war, in the Second World War, so I know from my very own
12 experience what it was like then. At that time, most of the people who
13 fought against the occupiers then were Serbs. A vast majority.
14 Regardless of whether they were Serbs from Serbia or Montenegrins who also
15 largely considered themselves to be Serbs - as of recent, some have
16 refused to do so - but there were a lot of Serbs of Croatia, too, from
17 Lika, Kordun, Banija. Those who were cleansed from Croatia and who fled
18 from there fairly recently.
19 However, Tito's policy was, as well as that of the military
20 leadership, to promote Serb officers as slowly as possible and to speed up
21 promotions among Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians, and so on. So 20 or 30
22 years later, in the very top echelons among the generals, there was
23 already parity. More or less the same number of all. So that was the
24 very nature of the last question. When you look at the military
25 leadership, indeed Serb generals were far from dominant. Actually, it was
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the other way round.
2 Q. All right, Professor. In the addition to the Slovene secessionism
3 with which you had a brief and close encounter in the mid-1980s and that
4 came as a surprise to you, Croatian secessionism was something that people
5 were widely aware of from earlier on; isn't that right?
6 A. Yes, of course. It is a well known fact that it started already
7 in the 19th century. In all fairness, at that time there were two types
8 of Croats.
9 Q. We're not talking about the 19th century now.
10 A. All right.
11 Q. We're talking about those who came to power in 1990 in Croatia,
12 politicians who manifested their secessionist tendencies early on; isn't
13 that right?
14 A. All right. Those who claim to power were clearly secessionist.
15 Tudjman and his cronies. But before, when I used to meet with Croat
16 intellectuals, my experience was that, say, in 1971 - we didn't mention it
17 so far - there was this so-called Croat mass movement when what they
18 wanted first and foremost was to turn the federation into a very loose
19 confederacy in which Croatia would be a sovereign state, which would have
20 its own representation in the United Nations, have a separate army and so
21 on. That was the attempt made in 1971.
22 One of their leading intellectuals with whom I cooperated, and we
23 even edited a publication together, Ivan Supek was his name, and it was
24 Encyclopedia Moderna, practically overnight from being a Yugoslav, he
25 became a Croatian separatist, and that's why we stopped cooperating on
1 this periodical as well.
2 Also, there was a group of Croats who were ambivalent. They had
3 secessionist tendencies and also Yugoslav tendencies. There was a group
4 called the individual in the system and that was a group that I cooperated
5 with. Eugen Pusic, a well-known lawyer, headed this group.
6 Unfortunately, we parted ways with them because they were resolutely
7 against returning to the Yugoslav constitution a classical form of
8 democracy, to have a chamber of citizens in the parliament, to have
9 citizens represented according to the principle of one citizen, one vote,
10 and also to have majority decision-making, not to have only the Chamber of
11 Nations and Nationalities where all nations were represented at the same
12 level and where there had to be a consensus and where all nations had the
13 right of veto.
14 Unfortunately, they were opposed to introducing a Chamber of
15 citizens because they thought that in this way the Croats would totally
16 lose the position they had.
17 The third group was the group that had a Yugoslav leftist
18 orientation. It consisted of Croats who worked in -- on the Praksis desk.
19 Their experience was different, but they also insisted they should have
20 a centre of their own in Zagreb, that the entire desk of that newspaper --
21 of that periodical should be in Zagreb, although a lot of us from
22 elsewhere cooperated within Praksis. That is the experience that led to a
23 cessation of contacts before the war broke out, and some members of the
24 academy who were elected to the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts all
25 resigned and left the Serb academy before the war.
1 Q. All right. What can you say about the majority of the Croatian
2 leadership in 1990, or more precisely, to which extent were part of them
3 recruited from the so-called Ustasha emigres, that is to say heirs of the
4 Ustasha movement of Ante Pavelic, the collaborator of Hitler and
5 Mussolini? Do you have any knowledge about this and does your memory
6 serve you well in this respect?
7 A. Of course. In 1990, Tudjman came to power. He founded the HDZ
8 party, which was eminently nationalist. They held a congress of the HDZ,
9 and they invited to it many former Ustashas from abroad. About 100
10 persons who used to belong to the Ustasha movement came to attend this
11 conference and take part in its work.
12 Very soon they changed the constitution. The constitution said
13 that Croatia was a state of the Croatian and Serb people bearing in mind
14 the fact that about 5 or 600.000 Serbs used to live in Croatia, in Kordun,
15 Banija, Lika, and so on. However, they deleted the Serbs and the only
16 thing the constitution then said was that Croatia was a state of the
17 Croatian people. That's the only thing it said.
18 Also, the language was no longer called the Croatian Serbian
19 language. It was only called the Croatian language. These were things
20 that caused a great deal of unrest among the Serbs who lived in Croatia.
21 And then, when Croats started arming themselves and creating paramilitary
22 formations -- actually, in all fairness, they had paramilitary formations
23 before. These were villagers, protection units, and city protection
24 units, but now they created the ZNG. This was the National Guards Corps
25 of some 10.000 soldiers. They received weapons from Germany and Hungary.
1 And this frightened the Serbs who lived in Croatia. They started putting
2 logs on roads as barriers so that they would prevent a repetition of 1949
3 when they were slaughtered en masse. So this is what led directly to war
5 Q. All right, Professor. Let us now go back to something you
6 mentioned. You said a few words about what happened in Kosovo, about
7 Albanian separatism, about Slovenian separatism and nationalism, something
8 about Croatian separatism and nationalism. Was any of this caused by
9 anything that was done in Serbia?
10 A. I don't think it was caused by anything that was done from Serbia.
11 There was no possibility of any kind of Serb domination. But perhaps they
12 felt that in Serbia there was a mobilisation to stop these injustices, as
13 they had been perceived until then, so that they would lose some of the
14 privileges they had.
15 Q. All right. You took part in the preparation of the Memorandum of
16 the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1991; is that right?
17 A. Yes, that's right.
18 Q. This memorandum, was it a kind of reaction to some of these major
19 developments that I referred to, the situation in Kosovo, in Croatia, in
20 Slovenia, and generally speaking in Yugoslavia? You are one of the
21 authors of this memorandum.
22 By the way, Professor, this memorandum is often referred to here
23 as the Serb nationalist programme, but let's be very precise on this: Are
24 you one of the authors of the memorandum?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Was actually a draft, wasn't it?
2 A. Yes, it was a draft. At the Assembly of the academy in May 1985,
3 the situation was analysed, especially the economic situation of the
4 country that caused great concern, and also the fact that Yugoslavia was
5 turned into six or even eight states. And then Ivan Maksimovic, a member
6 of the academy, suggested that a commission be set up which would draft a
7 memorandum which would present the views of the members of the Serb
8 academy with regard to that crisis. Then a commission was established, I
9 think it had 16 members, and it was headed by Dusan Kanazir, a biologist
10 otherwise, at that time the president of the Serb academy, and this
11 commission at its first meeting already in June 1985 established a working
12 group consisting of seven members. I was one of the seven.
13 This group was supposed to make this draft. And we worked on the
14 draft for an entire year. However, at one session of the commission
15 before the text was even completed, it was concluded what else needed to
16 be done, and already the following day the text appeared in the
17 newspapers. This unfinished text appeared in the newspapers, and there
18 were virulent attacks in the media against the Serb Academy because of
19 this so-called memorandum.
20 Perhaps it would be a good thing if I read out some sections of
21 the memorandum. I don't want to take up too much time, but I think it
22 would be very important to see what are the ideas presented there.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's for Mr. Milosevic to decide, if it is
24 relevant to the exercise we are involved in.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it would certainly be
1 relevant, Mr. Robinson.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. However, Professor, before you read anything out, do you know that
4 the memorandum is being treated as some kind of a Serb nationalist
6 A. I am aware of that. There was this big campaign against the
8 Q. All right. Let's cut things short. People keep saying that this
9 is a Serb nationalist programme, and I just want to quote a single
10 sentence to you and I'm going to ask you to quote the sections that you
11 deem necessary. I have a copy here, and I hope that you have a copy as
13 On page 164, it says, in the text of this memorandum, it says the
14 following: "In a modern society, any kind of political exploitation and
15 discrimination on national grounds is unacceptable from a civilisational
16 point of view."
17 That is what the memorandum says.
18 A. Yes, precisely. This is a sentence that I had written myself.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... this
20 memorandum is already in evidence. Are you seeking to put it in evidence?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly. But I'm just going to
22 ask Professor Markovic to quote --
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. But, please, Professor, as briefly as possible, and only a few
25 things --
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have copies for us?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] They have been handed in. You do
3 have them. We did bear that in mind.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... have them
5 before. That's the discipline. And it's not translated. This is the
6 same point which I made. It's coming? The English is coming? Okay.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the professor was kind
8 enough to provide a copy of the memorandum in the English language to the
9 interpreters so that, when he quotes, their job would be easier. There
10 will be just a few quotations.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that they need an indication
12 of the pages that are being read from.
13 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it may be that I can assist on this
14 occasion, because it occurred to us that the memorandum was likely to be
15 an exhibit to which you would be returning from time to time with the
16 accused's witnesses, given some of the names that are on the list.
17 There is a version of the memorandum, I think, already produced.
18 There have been several versions of the memorandum produced over time, but
19 as this witness will well know and indeed as the accused will well know,
20 the academy published its own English version of the memorandum in 1995 in
21 a booklet you can buy on the street, buy at the academy book shop. It
22 comes together with an Answer to Criticisms of the memorandum, which may
23 itself be quite an interesting document with some witnesses, and I've had
24 this booklet reproduced in actually rather larger and more easy to read
25 type in booklet form, if it will assist you.
1 The memorandum, if you'd -- I've given -- I've provided a copy to
2 your legal officer and there are plenty of others available. The
3 memorandum starts -- itself starts at page 95, the first part of it being
4 the answer to criticisms, but thereafter it is, as it were, the authorised
5 version, published by the -- as I understand it, by the academy itself in
6 English in 1995, and you may find this, and the accused might find this a
7 helpful way to save time.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that the very same document that the witness
9 would be using?
10 MR. NICE: As far as we know, yes. Yes. This is just the
11 memorandum, which starts at page 95. The witness will be able to tell us
12 whether there are any textual changes between this version, dated whenever
13 it was, and the version that appears in the 1995 version.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, do you have exhibit numbers for the other
15 occasions on which the memorandum has been produced, either in full or in
17 MR. NICE: I'll dig them out immediately. I'm sorry, I don't have
18 then immediately at hand.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. I do not like the idea
20 of the witness just selecting passages. You should have gone through the
21 evidence with him and direct the evidence to him. You are in control of
22 the witness. It's not the witness who -- who should decide what it is
23 that he is to tell us. You should direct him to a particular passage
24 because you should be familiar with it.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a moment ago you told me,
1 Mr. Robinson, that if Mr. Markovic wanted to read a few passages, that is
2 up to me. And in answer to that, I said that he should certainly read a
3 couple of passages, the most important ones, being very rational in his
4 use of time. I indeed thought it was the most rational approach. But let
5 me ask him a general question.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Professor, is it true that speaking of intra-national relations
8 within Yugoslavia, the authors of the memorandum written by the Serbian
9 Academy of Science advocated exclusively equality among peoples and
10 nothing more?
11 A. That is perfectly true. And it is emphasised time and again in
12 the memorandum that that is the main demand of the memorandum, to ensure
13 complete equality among nations.
14 I would just like to say that in those sections dealing with
15 intra-national relations as opposed to political and economic
16 circumstances, the emphasis is on relations among peoples.
17 Please read: "In order to achieve the necessary changes, it is
18 necessary to do away with the ideology which puts a nationality and
19 territorial integrity in the foreground. Whereas in modern society there
20 is a predominant integrative tendency, a tendency to overcome
21 authoritarian government and decision-making, in our system disintegrating
22 forces are gaining power, regional and national egotism and authoritarian
23 and autocratic power which violates generally recognised human rights at
24 all levels."
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, where are you reading from, what page?
1 THE WITNESS: That's Serbo-Croatian text page 152. And I have
2 here the English text with noted pages. I -- could I give this to you?
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Go ahead, Professor. Professor --
4 Professor --
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Go ahead and just identify the pages in the
7 Bosnian Croatian text.
8 And Mr. Milosevic, you are in control. You must control the
9 witness. So when he has read it, you may have something to ask him.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly, Mr. Robinson.
11 THE WITNESS: So this is fragment one, and at the end of the
12 fragment one, there will be a note where is the next fragment. Okay. So
13 in the middle of this first fragment --
14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters can absolutely not find the
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- inclination towards divisions --
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: The interpreters are complaining that they cannot
18 find the passage. The interpreters have -- Mr. Milosevic, you said that
19 you have given the interpreters a copy of this.
20 JUDGE KWON: It's at the bottom of page 105.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just add that the passages
22 quoted from are exactly marked for their benefit so that they can follow
23 in English what the professor is quoting.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that they do not have that
25 marked copy. We have it in B/C/S.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The inclination towards division
2 and fragmentation of social entities, active struggle against modern
3 democratic integrating federation is hiding behind the smokescreen of a
4 false ideological slogan of battling unitarianism and centralism. But the
5 real alternative to unitarianism and centralism is not national egotism
6 and polycentrism with one's own national (or, rather, republican and
7 provincial) economies, violent restrictions to science, culture, and
8 education into territorial boundaries and the subjugation of all aspects
9 of public life to the unchecked power of republican and provincial
10 oligarchies. The real alternative is rather a democratic, integrating
11 federalism in which the principle of autonomy of the parts is in harmony
12 with the principle of coordinating the parts within the framework of a
13 single whole in which political institutions, at all levels of society are
14 set up in a consistently democratic way, in which decision-making is
15 preceded by free, rational and public debate and not by secret behind the
16 scenes manoeuvring by cabals self-styled and self-appointed champions of
17 special ethnic interests."
18 [In English] It is just a page later.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Please speak English. They are following you.
21 A. "No one needs convincing that separatism and nationalism are both
22 at work on the social scene, but there is not enough awareness that such
23 trends were made ideological possible by the 1974 constitution. The
24 constant strengthening and synergetic effect of separatism and nationalism
25 have cut the national groups off from one another to a critical degree.
1 Machinations with language and the caging of academics in cultural
2 personalities in republican and provincial enclosures are depressing signs
3 of the burgeoning strength of particularism. All the new ethnogenies are
4 not so much the unfortunate fabrications of an academic community shut up
5 within a provincial bell jar and plagued by the incubus of regional
6 ideologies as they are symptoms of growing alienation not only from a
7 common present and future but even from the common past. It is as though
8 people were in a hurry to get out of a house which is tumbling down around
9 their ears and were trying to run away as fast and as far as possible.
10 The intellectual climate provides a warning that the political crisis has
11 come close to the flashpoint of complete destabilisation of Yugoslavia,
12 Kosovo being the most obvious portent."
13 So the impression was that the house was tumbling down. And the
14 next passage begins with the word "democratisation."
15 "Democratisation is a vital prerequisite both for recovery from
16 the deep-seated crisis and for the imperative revitalisation of society.
17 Yugoslavia does not need lip-service to democracy which changes nothing.
18 What it needs is democratisation of people's minds and relationships in
20 Another quotation: "The situation has reached such a pass that
21 within the republics and provinces informal caucuses are formed to bid for
22 the most influential positions. Similarly, at the federal level, instead
23 of a principled and argumented battle of opinions, coalitions are formed
24 to satisfy a republican and provincial interests to assure the autonomous
25 monopolistic status of the ruling political cliques in them."
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: How many more passages do you plan to read?
2 THE WITNESS: Well, I thought I would have 12, but if you reduce
3 it, I --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not a proper way to conduct an
5 examination-in-chief. It becomes meaningless after awhile.
6 What do these passages illustrate, Professor?
7 THE WITNESS: These passages -- [Interpretation] These passages
8 illustrate the view that then prevailed at the Academy of Sciences of
9 Serbia, namely that the disintegration of the Yugoslav society was a great
10 problem, as was the fact that one state divided into either six or eight
11 parts was struggling with burgeoning nationalism at the detriment of
12 democracy and human rights and that the only solution was consistent
13 implementation of the principle of equality among all peoples wherein
14 Yugoslavia would remain one whole which needs to be democratic and within
15 which all these peoples would cooperate in a democratic, equal way.
16 Therefore, the claim made by all those who never read the
17 memorandum in the first place is not true. It isn't true when they said
18 it was a platform for ethnic cleansing.
19 My personal opinion is this: When the indictment against
20 Mr. Milosevic was being written, there was something missing in the theory
21 of genocide and ethnic cleansing; a motive, an idea, a design, a project.
22 And since the authors of the indictment were unable to find it elsewhere,
23 they took advantage of the fact that at this particular time the Serbian
24 Academy of Sciences adopted this memorandum which was the object of
25 attacks first in Serbia then in Yugoslavia, then in Germany which was at
1 that time a place witnessing systematic satanisation of Serbia. And then
2 a link was made between these two components.
3 On the one hand, Slobodan Milosevic was implementing the theory of
4 ethnic cleansing, and on the other hand, motivation, the memorandum of
5 Serbian Academy of Sciences.
6 As for me, I can tell you I see no link with the memorandum. At
7 the time when it was made, Slobodan Milosevic was not particularly a
8 celebrity. He had even formed a committee to establish whose fault it was
9 and who was responsible for the memorandum, although he didn't express a
10 personal opinion on it. But his part, his policy towards the memorandum,
11 was negative throughout.
12 So in view of its contents or, rather, mainly because of its
13 contents, the memorandum could not serve as a platform for the domination
14 of one people over another, and especially not for ethnic cleansing.
15 Anybody who bothers to read the document will find this to be true.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Now, do you know -- you said
18 there could be no link, but do you know that anybody from the leadership
19 of Serbia, anybody who was in power and, first of all, me, conducted a
20 policy of national intolerance and particularly ethnic cleansing?
21 A. I don't know. I'm not aware of it because there was no such
22 thing. Serbia, at the time, was advocating precisely the restoration of
24 First of all, at the time, Serbia had not yet been formed as a
25 state entity, state community, because it still consisted of those three
1 parts; Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Serbia proper. And precedent needed to be
2 made in order to give it the same status, bring it on a par with all the
3 other republics.
4 Q. All right, Professor. I will quote to you from the transcript of
5 the opening statement of the 12th of February, 2002, dealing with this
6 memorandum. Page 17, line 17: "[In English] It's a memorandum, of
7 course, of genuine intellectuals, and they were able, in 1986, to put
8 their names to the following lines, and I quote in translation, of
9 course." [Interpretation] I'm quoting the introductory address by the
10 opposite side, and then also the following provision of the memorandum is
11 being quoted: "The physical, political, legal and cultural genocide [In
12 English] against the Serb population of Kosovo and Metohija is the serious
13 defeat of Serbia."
14 [Interpretation] And then the quotation ends there and goes on to
15 say: "They went on in the memorandum to say: [In English] 'Except in the
16 wartime period, never have the Serbs of Croatia be so threatened as
17 today.'" [Interpretation] Once again end of quotation.
18 All that is from the introductory statement made by the opposite
19 side. Then it continues on page 18 of the transcript: "[In English]
20 That, then, the reaction of intellectuals in 1986 of Serb persuasion to
21 what was beginning to happen in little Kosovo.
22 "How slight was the face -- the threat that Serbs really faced
23 compared with the threats what were to face others later? How could they
24 sensibly use in that context the notion of genocide of culture? But the
25 prevailing culture was one that could produce such thought, and there was
1 much talk at the time of Serbs being vulnerable and under threat, a
2 concern that the massacres of World War II, where they had suffered badly,
3 so badly, would happen again, concerned that they would be drowned by the
4 Albanians in Kosovo or that they would somehow be exploited and oppressed
5 politically and economically.
6 "It was onto this scene that this accused was propelled, was
7 propelled or propelled himself. And the question may arise, when we
8 consider this part of history of the evidence -- on the evidence, how this
9 man, rare among former communist leaders, was able to effect the
10 transition from party leadership under the old regime to party leadership
11 under the new. Was he a brilliant and kindly leader or was he simply a
12 man who had the sharpest appreciation of how to retain control through
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You must put a question now, Mr. Milosevic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I was just going to.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. What can you tell us? What comment do you have to make about this
18 assertion made in the indictment?
19 A. Well, there are a series of assertions, and of course it would
20 take quite some time for me to comment on each one of them. Of course,
21 when the Second World War is mentioned, I can say that, yes, at the time,
22 terrible atrocious things did happen, both in Croatia and in Kosovo
23 itself. In Kosovo, for example, Kosovo was given to Italy to administer,
24 and Italy brought into power people from the Albanian Balli Kombitar
25 organisation who were people who revived the idea of the Prizren League,
1 and I was going to say that earlier on, so I say that now, in 1888. That
2 was in fact, it was established at the initiative and with the support of
3 Austro-Hungary, the organisation of the Prizren League, the object of
4 which was to create --
5 Q. Just a moment, Professor. Not to go further on about the Prizren
7 A. Yes, but it's about World War II. And it was in World War II
8 where the Prizren League was revived in Kosovo. And they were people -- I
9 have to say this -- who thought that a great Albanian state should be
10 created which would include Eastern Montenegro and Southern Serbia and the
11 whole of Western Macedonia, parts of Greece, and the organisation called
12 Balli Kombitari, expulsed 30.000-odd Serbs from Kosovo, and many of them
13 were killed as well. It was retaliation for everything that had happened.
14 So you were the one who quoted that.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor. Professor. Professor. I've stopped
16 you. We are coming to the time for a break.
17 Mr. Milosevic, you must give time -- give consideration during the
18 break as to how you wish to get the evidence from this witness. Sometimes
19 the questions are too long and almost invariably the answers are too long,
20 and we are not getting any benefit from that kind of approach.
21 Professor, you must give your answers as succinctly, as briefly as
22 possible, where that is appropriate.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, I think in relation to the last
24 question, the real problem is that you did not make it clear which
25 assertion you wished the witness to comment on. I consider this to be a
1 very relevant piece of evidence, but it's identifying the particular
2 assertion relating to you, I think, that you want an answer. And perhaps
3 if that were made clear when we come back after the break, we might get a
4 clear answer to the question.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take a break now for 20 minutes.
6 --- Recess taken at 3.52 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, either now or later we can
9 identify the marked pages in the memorandum that you wanted the witness to
10 read but which I said wasn't appropriate for him to read, and then you can
11 tell us if those are the passages that you would want the Court to -- to
12 attend to, to read itself. Or indeed you may read it to him and ask him
13 to comment on it. Mr. Nice did that in relation to some of his witnesses.
14 So there is no difficulty with the memorandum itself, it is just the way
15 that you were seeking to introduce the passages in evidence through the
16 witness. So please continue.
17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, just before the accused does, I suspect
18 you've already had the answer to His Honour Judge Bonomy's question. The
19 memorandum can be found at 446, tab 28, in the evidence of Mr. de la
20 Brosse, and is inevitably, I think, referred to in the evidence of Audrey
21 Budding, although I haven't checked it out myself.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, I was able to dig out exactly tab 28 of
23 Exhibit 446, but the first part is matching but the last part seems to be
24 different a bit. So could you tell us later what kind of version this is
1 MR. NICE: Yes. It may be a different year. I was aware that
2 there was something less than perfectly satisfactory about that exhibit
3 and I'll explain it to you when I've sorted it out.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the accused.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought it was more logical for
7 one of the authors of the memorandum should quote from the document rather
8 than having myself quote it and then ask him whether that is so, because
9 that would be leading. And it is precisely because I considered that this
10 should not be a cross-examination, or I thought that it would be up to him
11 to quote. But Professor Markovic already did quote a very vivid passage
12 of the memorandum, if I can put it that way.
13 But just to complete my question. I myself was quoting the
14 opening statement, passages from Mr. Nice's opening statement, and you
15 said that it was a quotation -- a lengthy quotation. So there might have
16 been some misunderstanding.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. But in the opening statement by Mr. Nice, quoted a statement from
19 the memorandum, amongst others, "the physical, political, legal and
20 cultural genocide against the Serb population of Kosovo and Metohija [In
21 English] is the serious defeat of Serbia." [Interpretation] End of
23 And then after that it is said that I manipulated that entire
24 issue. Now, Professor Markovic, my question to you is as follows: Was it
25 objective reality or was it my manipulation, this persecution of Serbs,
1 legal, cultural, political, physical mistreatment, right up to the killing
2 of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. Was that manipulation by me? Not to say
3 that I manipulated the memorandum, which is ludicrous, or was it the state
4 of affairs, the actual state of affairs?
5 A. Yes, it was the actual state of affairs, and the memorandum quotes
6 the facts and figures. That 60.000, for example, Serbs were expulsed from
7 Kosovo during the Second World War, and then, after 1968, the exodus
8 became far more intensive when 200.000 Serbs left or were expulsed from
9 Kosovo from 1968 up until 1990. So all that was under threat with a lot
10 of violence; the killing of cattle and livestock, for example, seizing
11 crops and things like that as a means of intimidation.
12 Now, what the authors of the memorandum, I'm not sure whether I
13 remembered the word -- whether the word "genocide" was used but cultural
14 genocide, let me tell you, many monasteries and churches were destroyed
15 dating back to the Middle Ages, the 13th and 14th centuries, some of which
16 were World Heritage calibre. And this continued on the 17th of March as
17 well. The Bugoradiska Jeviska [phoen], for example, which is a supreme
18 artistic creation, it is a wondrous building with frescos and mosaics
19 dating back to the 14th century, it was destroyed.
20 So that's it. That's what happened, that's what was going on.
21 That was the actual situation. That is fact.
22 Q. We don't have here from the transcript, because it was quickly
23 stated by the professor, he said Bugoradiska Jeviska, and we haven't got
24 that in the transcript.
25 A. Bugoradiska Jeviska is the name of that extremely important
1 monastery dating back to the 13th century, and the famous Astroper
2 [phoen], the painter, painted wondrous frescoes of the Mother and Child,
3 and unfortunately that was set fire to and destroyed.
4 Q. All right, Professor. Now, can we say that during that period of
5 time, the material period, and we're talking about the late 1980s,
6 beginning of the 1990s and before that, of course, it was generally known
7 just how much the Serbs and Montenegrins and other non-Albanian population
8 were being expulsed from Kosovo and Metohija. Was that general knowledge
9 or was that me saying it?
10 A. No, it was general knowledge, because groups of unfortunate people
11 from Kosovo were coming into Belgrade constantly, and they were trying to
12 find somebody whom they could tell their troubles to and who would help
13 them, and for a time before you, that is to say before 1986 or 1987, there
14 was a time where nobody wanted to receive these unfortunate people. While
15 Ivan Stambolic was the president, for example, they would spend two or
16 three days sleeping in parks and the grounds surrounding the national
17 Assembly, and it was terrible to see these poor people who were there
18 spending the night during winter, during rain, and there was no help for
19 them because at that time people just adhered to the agreement that was
20 made by which Kosovo was independent and outside the jurisdiction of
21 Serbia proper, and that no Serbian government could do anything about the
22 situation. And that was the consequence of the 1974 constitution.
23 Q. Let's understand each other. You wrote the memorandum in 1986; is
24 that right?
25 A. Yes, that's right.
1 Q. I'm going to remind you now of what Ivan Kristan, the Slovene
2 professor, said and he was a witness here. He was a Slovene, a Slovenian
3 professor, and I'm going to tell you what he wrote five years previously,
4 before that. In the journal Socialism, and he wrote it in 1981, five
5 years before the memorandum, in an issue of that magazine. So he wasn't a
6 Serb intellectual, he was a Slovene. And then I'll ask for your comments
7 and I quote Kristan: "The Albanian nationalist idea about an ethnically
8 pure Republic of Kosovo and about the unification of all Albanians into
9 one republic denies one of the basic heritages of the national liberation
10 war and revolution, the brotherhood of nations and nationalities of
11 Yugoslavia which is the foundations for its life in common and joint
12 building up of socialism. The slogan about an ethnically pure Kosovo
13 offers, instead of true equality and communality on the part of the
14 nations and nationalities, chauvinism and the counting of heads."
15 That is something that the Slovene professor wrote five years
16 before the memorandum do you happen to remember that?
17 A. Well, yes, I do remember. All the intellectuals that were
18 engaged, they spoke about that, but at that time, nothing could be done
19 about it, and the memorandum, in addition to other things, was a reaction
20 to a situation of that kind where evil was taking place before your very
21 eyes and nobody could do anything to stop it.
22 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to draw your attention to another
23 passage from Kristan's quotation, once again dating back to 1981, the same
24 Slovene professor. He says: "Against other nations and nationalities
25 there is --"
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're being asked to slow down.
2 THE ACCUSED: Slow down. Okay.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. "Against other nations and nationalities, numerous pressure is
5 being brought to bear and chauvinist incidents which go so far as to make
6 members of individual nations and ethnic groups leave the region." So
7 this has been going on for some time, and he's saying this in 1981 in
8 Kosovo and a large number of Serbs and Montenegrins have left the area of
9 Kosovo, and according to the 1981 population census compared to the 1971
10 census, the members of these two nations are relatively -- their numbers
11 are fewer. So in 1971, there were 18.3 per cent of Serbs and 2.5 per cent
12 of Montenegrins. In 1981, there were just 13.2 per cent or 1.7 of
13 Montenegrins. And the absolute number was smaller too. 1 per cent for
14 Serbs and 4 per cent for -- 4.8 per cent for Montenegrins, whereas the
15 Albanian percentages rose by 34 per cent.
16 Now, my question to you, Professor, is what Professor Kristan
17 says, does it testify to the fact that what is stated in the memorandum
18 five years later was something that was common knowledge? It was
19 generally known and accepted at that time in the Socialist Federal
20 Republic of Yugoslavia? That is to say not in Serbia but throughout
21 Yugoslavia. Would that be true?
22 A. For all those who have eyes to see and reason to think, that was
23 what it was like, undoubtedly.
24 Q. Thank you, Professor. I'm going to quote another passage, one
25 more. I'll skip one passage, but Kristan goes on to say: "The irridenta
1 aspirations of Albanian nationalists in Kosovo are not of recent date.
2 They actually occurred as the prolonged arm of different quisling and
3 fascist organisations which during the war fought against the National
4 Liberation Movement of the Yugoslav Peoples. The organs of state security
5 have uncovered a number of hostile nationalist and irredentist
6 organisations and groups which were active in Kosovo with the final goal
7 of achieving Kosovo's secession and other parts of Yugoslavia inhabited by
8 Albanians." And in brackets it says "Macedonia and Montenegro" and then
9 "their attachment to Albania." And the slogan was "Kosovo Republic."
10 "A similar hostile background for nationalist slogans in Kosovo
11 were heard at the Central Committee meeting of Serbia where the slogans of
12 'Kosovo Republic by hook or by crook' speaks about an ethnically pure
13 Kosovo directed against all the other nations and nationalities or ethnic
14 groups, principally against the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Turks. The
15 slogan about a Kosovo republic is equally dangerous, just like slogans of
16 having that republic attached to Macedonia and Albania inhabited by
17 Albanians. It is the integrity of Serbia that was attacked and this is
18 just one step towards attacking the constitutional order of Yugoslavia."
19 So this is what the Slovene professor says five years before the
20 memorandum, and he adds that it was the irredentist aspirations of
21 Albanian nationalists in Kosovo which were the prolonged arm of the
22 quisling and revanchist organisations. Now, was that ever in question?
23 A. Well, I mentioned a moment ago --
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
25 MR. NICE: Obviously, and it's early days in the accused's
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 conducting of his own case, but it's going to help if exhibits are
2 identified before he starts reading from them. Now, he doesn't have
3 lawyers to help him. We will, of course, do whatever we can to assist the
4 Court, and if, in respect of these exhibits, he notifies us in advance, or
5 even -- I don't know how quickly we can do it, and if they've been made
6 electronically searchable, we might be able to throw them up by Sanction
7 onto the screen, but without identifying the exhibits, it's very hard for
8 us to do anything very much of value apart from listening to material that
9 comes out too fast.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, there is substance in that
11 observation. If you are going to continue conducting
12 examination-in-chief, you will have to develop a technique to do so. It
13 makes no sense to just read out long passages. We do not have the text.
14 We do not have the passages. I told you at the beginning that if you are
15 going to do that, you must produce documents. You must identify the
16 documents. If they're already exhibits, then you say so. And you must
17 produce copies for the Court and for the Prosecution, because the Court
18 may want to ask questions on it. And you are doing the same thing as the
19 witness. There is no point in reading a passage that takes five minutes
20 to read, because halfway through it I have forgotten what you have said at
21 the beginning. You must summarise it and put it to the witness.
22 We are going to have problems if you continue in that way.
23 Evidence will not be useful to the Court, and if it is not useful to the
24 Court, then what is the purpose of it? Because the evidence that you're
25 adducing must be relevant to the case and must be of use to the case. It
1 must be helpful to us in discharging our responsibilities.
2 So I'm going to tell you this is the last time. If you do that
3 again, I'm not going to allow it. I will not allow it, because this is
4 not the way evidence is to be led. If you have a passage from a
5 particular document, you say first what the document is. And if you are
6 going to read from it, then you should have provided copies for the
7 parties here and for the Court. So after today, you must get your act
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I quoted a periodical
10 called Socialism, which could have been bought in all the republics
11 throughout Yugoslavia. I said that it is issue number 10 from 1981.
12 Whether I quoted it properly can be checked easily. But the point of my
13 question was --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... provide it
15 for us. You must provide copies of that for us.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll give you copies
17 too. I'll obtain copies, and I'll give them to you so you can make your
18 comparisons and see that I quoted everything properly --
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: You must provide it before. That is the
20 procedure. You must provide it before. If you want to lead your
21 evidence, to conduct your evidence-in-chief, then you are entitled to do
22 that, but you must follow the procedures, and the procedures serve a
23 particular purpose. It enables us to follow the evidence.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Professor, is it undeniable that as regards to questions
2 pertaining to the persecution of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo and
3 their expulsion from Kosovo is something that was written about various
4 authors from all of Yugoslavia extensively so and a lot before you wrote
5 the memorandum?
6 A. Yes, of course. There is a lot of literature about this. I would
7 just like to point out one thing here. It was mentioned that in Kosovo
8 there were fascist and quisling organisations. There was an organisation,
9 Balli Kombitar. Electronically, you can obtain a great deal of
10 information about it. It was a purely fascist organisation. And the
11 Germans also gave weapons to entire SS division in Kosovo that consisted
12 of Kosovar Albanians. It was the Skendgerbeg SS division. I personally
13 took part in fighting against that SS division. That is one thing.
14 Secondly, I would like to explain how come this slogan "Kosovo
15 Republic" came into existence. This secessionism wanted to lead to a
16 two-step secession. The first was turning Kosovo towards an autonomous
17 province within Serbia into a full-fledged republic, hence the slogan
18 "Kosovo Republic."
19 Now, why? Because, according to the constitution of Yugoslavia,
20 if -- or, rather, republics had the right to self-determination all the
21 way up to the right to secession. So they wanted, as a first step, for
22 Kosovo to become a republic, and as a second step, for Kosovo to secede.
23 These were indeed generally known matters. There is nothing new
24 in all of this. The facts in the memorandum are not new at all. It is
25 only the analysis presented, and the criticism, that is what is new.
1 Q. All right, in view of your membership in the Serbian Academy of
2 Sciences and Arts and your experience, what would your estimate be? How
3 well-founded are the assertions that this document was a basis for some
4 kind of Serb nationalism and domination, especially for ethnic cleansing
5 or persecution on religious or ethnic grounds?
6 A. This document could not constitute a basis for that kind of thing
7 by its own substance. Also, the document was never completed. The Serb
8 Academy never managed to adopt it as such. It was not published at that
9 time. It was published only over the past few years. It could not be a
10 basis for anybody's policy let alone of a political party that condemned
12 Q. Isn't the truth actually the other way around; that the memorandum
13 actually advocates a principle of national equality, that there is a
14 struggle against hegemony there, a hegemony of any people in the former
15 Yugoslavia and in this society that was undergoing a crisis then?
16 A. Yes, I've already said that, and that can be seen from the other
17 parts that I wanted to present here. It is quite clear that what was said
18 there was the complete opposite. It was quite contrary to what the
19 interpretations that came subsequently said. This memorandum actually
20 explained quite properly how indispensable it was to have a true equality
21 of national rights in Yugoslavia.
22 Q. You want to quote anything from the text now?. The text of the
23 memorandum is in front of you.
24 A. Well, yes, I can quote it but I don't know what I should do
25 because the Honourable Trial Chamber said that I shouldn't quote from it.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you may, just identify the particular
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. So this is advocacy of national equality?
5 A. Yes. [In English] Maybe just the end of it, the last paragraph.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: What page?
7 THE WITNESS: That is just three last passages. [Interpretation]
8 "One development stage of the Yugoslav community and of Serbia was
9 obviously being brought to an end with an ideology that was historically
10 worn out and also with considerable regression in the economic, political,
11 and moral and civilisational sphere. Such a situation imperatively calls
12 for well-founded, scientifically based, resolutely carried out reforms of
13 the entire state structure and organisation of the Yugoslav community of
14 nations and in the direction of democratic socialism and a faster and more
15 fruitful inclusion in contemporary civilisation. Social reforms should
16 activate to the greatest possible degree the natural and human resources
17 of the entire country so that we will become a productive, enlightened
18 society, democratic society, able to earn its own living and contribute to
19 the world community. The first precondition for our transformation and
20 renaissance is the democratic mobilisation of all the creative potentials
21 of a people but not only for carrying out the adopted decisions of
22 political fora but also for elaborating --"
23 JUDGE KWON: Page 140, last, bottom.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "This would mean that for the first
1 time in recent history expertise and experience, conscientiousness and
2 boldness, imagination, responsibility would all come together to carry out
3 the task of importance for the entire society on the principles of a
4 long-term programme."
5 Let me see whether there is an even more explicit passage
6 somewhere in terms of this particular requirement. Could you just give me
7 a moment, please.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: And all these passages illustrate promotion of
9 national equality.
10 THE WITNESS: A passage before the title [Interpretation] The
11 position of Serbia [In English] Serbian people, passage -- just one
12 passage before that.
13 JUDGE KWON: Does it start from, "It follows from this
14 analysis ..."?
15 THE WITNESS: From this analysis -- [Interpretation] From this
16 analysis --
17 JUDGE KWON: Page 119.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "It follows from this analysis that
19 political democratisation and infusion of new blood, genuine
20 self-determination and equality for all members of the Yugoslav nations,
21 including Serbs, full exercise of human, civil and economic and social
22 rights and consistent streamlining of the Yugoslav political system and
23 development policy are those indispensable prerequisites without which
24 recovery from the present crisis in the Yugoslav society could not even be
1 So what is insisted upon here is genuine self-determination and
2 equality of all members of all the Yugoslav nations. This is repeated in
3 several passages. Also, it is here under B, three pages earlier: "[In
4 English] Self-determination of a nation. A is a sovereignty of people, B
5 is self-determination of a nation, and then V [as interpreted] is human
7 Now, now B, self-determination of a nation. [Interpretation]
8 "Self-determination of nations. In modern civilised society, any
9 political oppression or discrimination on ethnic grounds is unacceptable
10 from a civilisational point of view. The Yugoslav solution of the
11 national question at first could have been regarded as an exemplary model
12 of a multinational federation in which the principle of a unified state
13 and state policy was happily married to the principle of the political and
14 cultural autonomy of national groups and ethnic minorities.
15 "Over the past two decades, the principle of unity has become
16 weakened and overshadowed by the principle of national autonomy which, in
17 practice, has turned into the sovereignty of the federal units, the
18 republics, which as a rule are not ethnically homogenous. The flaws which
19 from the very beginning were present in this model have become
20 increasingly evident. Not all the national groups were equal. The
21 Serbian nation, for instance, was not given the right to have its own
22 state. Large sections of the Serbian people who live in other republics,
23 unlike the national minorities, do not have the right to use their own
24 language and script. They do not have the right to set up their own
25 political or cultural organisations or to foster common cultural
1 traditions of their nation together with their co-nationals. The
2 unremitting persecution and expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo is a drastic
3 example showing that those principles which protect the autonomy of a
4 minority, the ethnic Albanians, are not applied to a minority within a
5 minority; the Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, and Roma in Kosovo. In view of
6 the existing forms of national discrimination, present day Yugoslavia
7 cannot be regarded as a modern or democratic state."
8 Very well. I think there is no need for me to quote anything
10 Q. No. No, there isn't.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: I wonder if I could ask the professor a question,
12 Mr. Milosevic.
13 Professor, you've mentioned a number of times that this document
14 was a draft and was at the time never published. Do you know the
15 circumstances in which a few years ago it came to be published?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When this document leaked into the
17 public and was carried by the press, the academy called for punishing all
18 of those -- or, rather, the public called for punishing all of those who
19 worked on the document within the academy. So this was in 1986.
20 However, ten years later, people started forgetting about this.
21 The entire situation had changed, and no one paid attention to the academy
22 any longer. Then two members of the group that worked on the memorandum,
23 Kosta Mihailovic, who will come here later, and Vasilije Krestic revised
24 the document and published it. Also they made comments on all the writing
25 about this memorandum that took place as well. So this is about ten years
2 In the meantime, there was no discussion about the memorandum
3 because the Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts said that this was an
4 unfinished document, we're not going to discuss it at all.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Can we proceed now?
6 JUDGE KWON: Can I ask this question to the professor: Professor,
7 are you aware of the fact that a priest or bishop called Mihajlo Mikic
8 tried to publish this memorandum in 1986?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The only thing I know is that
10 in Croatia, there was this unfinished version that had been published, and
11 twice that. Then the Croats sent it further on to Germany and elsewhere,
12 and then everybody started attacking the memorandum. But I was not aware
13 of this, no. No.
14 JUDGE KWON: Prosecution will clarify that at a later stage.
15 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Please proceed.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. All right, Professor. Now when you were giving these answers, you
18 mentioned the need that was clearly manifested at the time, to have
19 reforms carried out. Do you know what we in Serbia did - I'm referring to
20 the political leadership and to myself personally - in these years, 1989,
21 1990, and 1991, in terms of reforms and what we were engaged in?
22 A. In 1989, two commissions were set up, one for the reform of the
23 economic system. As far as I know, you took part in that as well. And
24 the other commission was for the reform of the political system. I was
25 appointed to that commission for the first time. Until then, I was
1 considered to be a dissident and I had no access anywhere. But then all
2 of a sudden I was appointed member of that commission. I did not take
3 part in its work, but I did see the final version and I gave my own
4 comments on it.
5 So these two looked at the reform of the entire social system in
6 Serbia, and these are actually the first reforms that were carried out
7 anywhere in Eastern Europe. Later on, it was said that other Eastern
8 European countries in the 1990s carried out certain reforms. However,
9 this was the first time when the -- when the following conclusions were
11 The commission on the reform of the economic system concluded that
12 in Serbia there had to be a market economy, that every company had to be
13 held responsible for the results of its own work, that this market
14 economy, in all fairness, had to be regulated rather than to have anarchy
15 reign like in the laissez-faire models of the 19th century. The Serb
16 economy finally became a modern, regulated market economy as the economies
17 of the developed countries are today.
18 The other commission for the reform of the political system
19 established for the first time that there cannot be a monopoly of one
20 political party over power, political and any other form of power.
21 Rather, there had to be political pluralism. That is to say a plurality
22 of different political forces which take part in the elections.
23 Then what was firmly established was that all human rights had to
24 be observed, political and socio-economic ones. And as a result of that,
25 perhaps I should mention one practical matter which had a profound effect
1 on the attitude of Serb intellectuals towards the then-government, because
2 Serb intellectuals were always rather critical of the state and of the
3 regime. However, what was of major importance was that the so-called
4 delit d'opinion, that is to say verbal crimes, were abolished and were no
5 longer in the law. That made it impossible for anyone to be persecuted on
6 the basis of views they expressed. So there were no more political
7 prisoners, and this led to a great freedom of thought and speech.
8 So in this way, I would give an answer to the question that you
9 put before the break. You got the status of the indubitable leader of the
10 Serb people but not because you have the characteristics that were
11 mentioned there, the ability to manipulate, et cetera, et cetera, but the
12 fact that people realised and deeply believed that something new was
13 happening, that there would -- that what was taking place was a true
14 reform of the system and that the foundations of a truly democratic
15 socialist system were being laid, that there would be a regulated market
16 economy, that there will be a freedom of thought, a freedom of press, and
17 that all rights would be observed. That conviction actually led to this
18 great massive support that you enjoyed and that became more than obvious
19 in the rallies that were held at the time. That more than anything else.
20 Q. But let us come back to the memorandum. Can we note -- and I'm
21 asking you this very precisely: Can we note, speaking of the national
22 issue, that authors of the memorandum are advocating specifically equality
23 among nations? They're advocating national centrism to be overcome in
24 finding a solution for national equality?
25 A. Well, if we talk about the essence of the memorandum, then it is a
1 demand for national equality and democratisation.
2 Q. Well, don't you think, then, that those who speak of the
3 memorandum as the Serbian political platform without having read it or
4 having read it with extremely dishonest and evil intentions are actually
5 manipulating the text and abusing it?
6 A. Well, I cannot say anything about people who never held it in
7 their hands or never read it, but we cannot rule out the second
8 possibility, because the greatest evil, as we know, is found among
9 intelligent, educated people who do not have ethical principles to match.
10 So I do not rule out the possibility that this misinterpretation was
12 It was a time when Serbia was vilified and satanised for all sorts
13 of reasons, because it was disobedient, because it didn't fit. Control
14 needed to be established over that territory, and there was Serbia in the
15 middle of it who wouldn't go along. So it was painted as the devil,
16 systematically, primarily in the German media. There were various
17 authors, Reissmueller, writers of the Suddeutsche
18 Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, they satanised all the Serb
19 institutions, the government, the army, et cetera, and that served their
21 Q. Let us now move on to another event and try to assess to what
22 extent it was manipulated. Do you remember the celebration of the 600th
23 anniversary of the Kosovo battle on St. Vitus Day in 1989 in a place
24 called Gazimestan?
25 A. I do remember. It was a huge event. Western media evaluated that
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 there were about 100 -- 1 million people there. And the same media later
2 turned it into a target of virulent attacks.
3 Q. So those who celebrated the event, or welcomed it at first, later
4 attacked it.
5 A. We should perhaps look at the speech that you made there, but
6 before that let us give a general description. Those who praised it, and
7 we could hear them the very next day, BBC, or the Independent newspaper
8 who was represented there with two journalists - I have their names here -
9 they expressed their surprise at the fact that it was a very peaceful,
10 tolerant speech which even disappointed some among those present who had
11 perhaps expected you to attack Albanian terrorism and the oppressive
12 measures that occurred at the time. You instead spoke about lack of
13 unity, lack of agreement that led to all these clashes. But -- let me
14 finish. Those were the first reactions.
15 Ten years later, when the systematic attacks on Serbia had already
16 been long under way, those same media wrote that you had made a firebrand
17 instigating, inflammatory speech. Those were the reactions of the London
18 Times and even the Washington Post. I can name here lots of sources and
19 tell you how they wrote about it. But before we do that, we should
20 perhaps look at what you said --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Allow Mr. Milosevic to ask the questions and you
22 answer them briefly. He knows the evidence that he wants to elicit from
24 Mr. Milosevic, yes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Here, Mr. Robinson, right in line
1 with your suggestion which was just made, and you know how broadly this
2 speech was made use of both in the opening statement of Mr. Nice and more
3 widely in the media in the process of satanising my own person, this is
4 Exhibit number 5. It has been provided to you, copies have been provided
5 to you, and I hope that you see the highlighted passages that I wish to
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I commend you for being a model of
8 procedural correctness.
9 JUDGE KWON: I think we have it under Prosecution Exhibit 446, tab
10 30. Prosecution correct me if I'm wrong.
11 MR. NICE: We're checking for identity of versions.
12 JUDGE KWON: I was told that what we have is only part of it.
13 MR. NICE: Tab 30 is a version from a newspaper, I think. From
14 Politika. And I'm not sure where this version comes from.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, continue, Mr. Milosevic.
16 MR. NICE: I have before me the text in Serbian, and I would like
17 to tender it into evidence. And I will now quote several passages which
18 have been highlighted in the English translation provided to you. I hope
19 you have them. I thought I would ask the professor to do this, but if you
20 find it more convenient for myself to quote my own speech, I will be only
21 too pleased to oblige. So --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Rather than to quote it, just tell us what -- why
23 are you quoting it? What is it that you are seeking to illustrate?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to illustrate that this
25 speech has been a subject of so much manipulation, and that's a mild term.
1 It's a pure lie that this was an inflammatory, warmongering speech or that
2 it acted in any other way against other peoples or nations or helped
3 deteriorate or aggravate the political situation when it was made in 1989
4 or at any other time or that it could have been used for any such purpose
5 whenever it was made.
6 So I'm picking up on what the professor has discussed earlier, and
7 I will quote only a couple of passages so that we do not see this out of
8 context but as a coherent theme.
9 I think you have the translation.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, can I check this one first? The
11 Serbian version is -- was downloaded from Yahoo! but the English
12 translation was offered by the Slobodan Milosevic Organisation. So can I
13 take it that they translated the B/C/S version into English?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think they did. I don't
15 think they did. I think they downloaded the English translation from the
16 BBC website and just revised it. But what is authentic is what was
17 carried in the newspapers the next day. I also wish to add that I have
18 provided a videotape of that speech that was broadcast on television. I
19 didn't mean to take up even more of your time, but if you want to see the
20 videotape, it's available. I just wanted to save time by quoting it
21 orally, but I wish to tender the videotape into evidence.
22 JUDGE KWON: No problem since we have the full text of Serbian.
23 Please proceed.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You can even find the whole speech
25 on that videotape from beginning to end. And what I wish to quote is the
1 following. So I say in my speech: "Therefore, no place in Serbia is
2 better suited for saying this than the field of Kosovo, namely that unity
3 in Serbia will bring prosperity both to the Serbian people in Serbia and
4 to each one of its citizens, irrespective of his or her national or
5 religious affiliation."
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is that? What page on the --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is highlighted in yellow. The
8 same copy has been made available to the interpreters, and I was hoping
9 you have it, too, because I provided enough copies.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is nothing highlighted in my version.
11 MR. NICE: Foot of the second page, I think, and the accused may
12 not be aware that yellow, if he highlighted it in yellow, it may be that
13 it didn't come out. Foot of page 2.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So irrespective of his national or religious affiliation.
17 Then next passage. Beginning of quotation: "Serbia has never had
18 only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other
19 peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for
20 Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. The national
21 composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly
22 developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of
23 different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together
24 more and more frequently and more and more successfully.
25 "Socialism, in particular, being a progressive and just
1 democratic society should not allow people to be divided in the national
2 and religious respect. The only differences one can and should allow in
3 socialism are between hard-working people and idlers, between honest
4 people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live
5 honestly from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and other
6 nations are in their own home republic.
7 "After all, our entire country should be set up on the basis of
8 such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can
9 survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that
10 live in it.
11 "The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has brought about national
12 divisions, but also social, cultural, religious and many other less
13 important ones. Among all these divisions, nationalist ones have shown
14 themselves to be the most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to
15 remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences they have created.
16 "For as long as multinational communities have existed, their
17 weak point has always been the relations between different nations. This
18 threat has been hanging like a sword over our heads all the time, namely
19 the threat that the question of one nation could be endangered by another,
20 and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and
21 intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop.
22 Internal and external enemies of multinational communities are aware of
23 this, and therefore they organise their activity against multinational
24 societies mostly by fomenting national conflicts.
25 "At this moment, we in Yugoslavia are behaving as if we have
1 never had such an experience and as if in our recent and distant past we
2 have never experienced the worst tragedy of national conflicts that a
3 society can experience and still survive.
4 "Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a
5 necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its
6 way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition
7 for its economic and social prosperity. In this respect, Yugoslavia does
8 not stand out from the social milieu of the contemporary, particularly the
9 developed world. This world is more and more marked by national
10 tolerance, national cooperation, and even national equality. The modern
11 economic and technological, as well as political and cultural development,
12 has guided various peoples toward each other, has made them interdependent
13 and increasingly has made them equal as well as mutually equal, equal to
14 each other. Equal and united people can above all become a part of the
15 civilisation toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the head
16 of the column leading to that civilisation, there is certainly no need for
17 us to be at its tail."
18 And now I will quote the entire passage out of which Mr. Nice
19 quoted just one sentence in order to qualify it as warmongering.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Remember, you are not giving the evidence. It is
21 the witness who is giving the evidence. You have quoted a long passage.
22 You should now ask him a question about it so that we -- we can know what
23 the evidence is. The evidence is coming from him. Do you want to ask him
24 whether he agrees that there is nothing in it, in that speech that you
25 have just cited, that section, which would incite or which incited him, or
1 perhaps maybe which incited others or which promoted racial conflict?
2 But that's the point I'm making: You're not giving the evidence.
3 So you -- in order for us to get the evidence, you have to ask him
4 something about what you have just read. Otherwise, it is not of any
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Now, Professor, what I've just read out, is that an authentic
9 passage from the speech you saw on tape and which you have had occasion to
10 read and to look at the tape that was -- that has been stored here and the
11 speech at the time?
12 A. Without a doubt, it is authentic. But let me also add that for
13 people who for decades have been living in Serbia, this was the
14 continuation of the well-known policy waged during Tito, the policy called
15 Brotherhood and Unity. And Tito always spoke about that. And
16 Mr. Milosevic in fact carried on from that and said that equality among
17 nations must exist and that they should live under an atmosphere of
18 brotherhood and unity, although he didn't use the term "brotherhood and
19 unity," but they were the basic ideas upon which Yugoslavia itself was
21 Unfortunately, they were -- had not taken sufficient root in the
22 different nations, and it was separatist ideas that prevailed. But they
23 were the basic foundations upon which Yugoslavia was formed and lived
24 during World War II, after World War II, right up to the major crises that
25 rocked the country in the 1970s.
1 Q. Is there any doubt that what I've just read out is authentic?
2 A. No, none at all. That's it.
3 Q. Now, do you remember the speech ending, and the final sentence is,
4 "Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples."
5 A. Somebody who is preparing for war, genocide and ethnic cleansing
6 would never call upon the people to call out this slogan for peace and
7 brotherhood among peoples. And that is something that was always the term
8 always used during Tito's day, brotherhood and unity, and that was the
9 only foundation upon which Yugoslavia could exist.
10 Q. Very well, Professor. Now, how do you explain the fact that ten
11 years after this speech was delivered, that is to say in 1999, the theory
12 was bandied about according to which that speech was utilised to inflame
13 Serb nationalism and incite Serb nationalism?
14 A. Well, the political needs of the day differed. At the time when
15 the speech was made, and we're talking about 1988 --
16 Q. It's 1989, in fact.
17 A. Very well, 1989. At that time, there were no tensions. There
18 were no problems in inter-ethnic relations, the relations of Serbia and
19 other ethnic groups. Later on, when the conclusion was made that Serbia
20 could not be subjugated and reined in, there was another argument -- there
21 was one argument, first of all, that it could not be subjugated and reined
22 in and the second was that it was the last bastion of communism. So that
23 was the reason for this demonisation in the first place. But as I
24 explained a moment ago, the reforms that were conducted in Serbia were
25 reforms given to a society which had no characteristic features of
1 communism as interpreted by the West. If that was indeed communism, what
2 the situation in Serbia, which was a humane democratic socialism, in fact,
3 then this would be propaganda in favour of communism. But the
4 dogmaticians of the day repeated again and again the fact that Serbia was
5 the last bastion. But Serbia took the middle road, the medium ground.
6 Social democratic in aspirations reflecting itself -- taking its image
7 from Sweden, Norway, and those countries. That was the road that they
8 opted for and wanted to proceed along. But that was not sufficient. It
9 wasn't enough for these aggressive minds, militant ideologists. And so
10 they proclaimed Serbia as being, first of all, ideologically on the
11 opposite side, and on the other hand that Serbia wanted to subjugate other
12 ethnic groups.
13 And you haven't read one portion - I have the text here - but when
14 you speak about the battles which must be waged on the political level,
15 cultural level, economic level, and you say, "Our main battle today is to
16 have social prosperity," and so on and so forth, so when you say it is not
17 an armed struggle although such are not excluded either, "although that is
18 not excluded either," how can this be taken as an explanation for your
19 militant policy of war cleansing or domination among other nations --
20 against other nations?
21 I said at the beginning that this was an area and territory that
22 was always the subject of others who wanted to win it over, and it always
23 had to be ready for defence, including armed defence.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, it seems to me you're asking very
25 specific and direct questions at the moment and you're getting very
1 lengthy answers that don't entirely address the questions you're asking.
2 Bearing in mind the limited time, it seems to me that it might be an idea
3 to, if you wish to ask the witness, perhaps, to restrict his answers to
4 the questions you're asking.
5 Can I ask you one particular question also: Are you going to be
6 presenting to us the press cuttings from the period around 1989 and the
7 period around 1999 to show the inconsistency between them?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In 1989, this speech was covered by
9 the Western media, and it was covered in an entirely proper fashion and
10 correctly. In 1999 - and I quoted this in my introductory statement but
11 incompletely - so in 1999, it was completely incorrectly quoted. It was a
12 falsification because there is no mention of warmongering or extreme
13 nationalistic relationship to what we're talking about. Quite the
14 contrary. Quite the contrary.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that point entirely and I understood
16 it from your opening statement, but I have had difficulty finding the
17 press cuttings in 1999 to which you were referring, and what I was asking
18 is whether you are going to lead as part of your evidence these cuttings
19 which at the moment we don't have ready access to.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.
22 THE WITNESS: May I answer your question? I have -- I have
23 fragments that you're interested in.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: The problem, Professor, is that it's really for
25 Mr. Milosevic to deal with that and for him to present the material that
1 he wishes to lead and not for the witness to organise that for him. So
2 he's answered my question satisfactorily. I don't need any more
3 assistance at the moment on that point.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Now, for me to take the right attitude to what was -- we're
7 talking about and what the professor mentioned a moment ago, he mentioned
8 the quotation at the end of the speech, but let me read out the entire
9 passage to fit it into context.
10 "Six centuries ago, we are still facing battles. They are not
11 armed battles, although such are not yet excluded. But regardless of the
12 kind of the battles they are, these battles cannot be won without the
13 resoluteness and sacrifice and without the noble qualities that were
14 present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle
15 today concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general
16 social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a
17 civilisation in which people will live in the 21st century. For this
18 battle, we certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind,
19 but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved
20 remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary."
21 This portion, gentlemen, or this portion of the sentence, when I
22 say that the battles are not armed battles, although such things cannot be
23 excluded yet, and our main battle is the economic, cultural, et cetera, et
24 cetera, political one, this has been taken as the basis for describing
25 this speech as warmongering, which is a blatant lie and a serious attempt
1 at manipulation.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... evidence.
3 You're not giving evidence.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... the witness
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm asking the witness.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. I'm asking the witness whether when this is extracted from the
10 context in this way that it is sheer and blatant manipulation and lies.
11 A. Any country to the extent that the people in it wish to achieve
12 equality must be capable of defending themselves. So if you're living in
13 a territory like this, in a region like this, and the crossroads linking
14 north and south, Europe and Asia, you must always be ready to defend
15 yourself, first of all from a foreign aggressor, and secondly, if you are
16 living in a country where there is burgeoning secessionism and separatism
17 and the danger of a civil war looming, you must once again be ready and
18 able to defend yourself and meet force with force, and that is the essence
19 and substance of a self-defence, which from all humane aspects must be
21 Q. Professor, do you happen to remember, and you were able to see
22 this when you were watching the tape to refresh your memory, that at the
23 time the overall Yugoslav leadership was present, led by Mr. Drnovsek, the
24 president of the Yugoslav state Presidency as well as the presidents of
25 all the Yugoslav republics, they all attended.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. That's right. Everyone was there and so were most the foreign
2 ambassadors at Gazimestan.
3 Q. Now, did anyone in any of the republics after that speech have any
4 comments to make or criticisms to make along the lines that it being
5 something that does not correspond to the most progressive goals and
6 objectives of a life in common, a life together within Yugoslavia?
7 A. No. Not in Yugoslavia, not in the world. No comments of that
8 kind or negative criticisms of that kind were made at all.
9 Q. Very well. Thank you. I don't think I need dwell on the speech
10 any more.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should like to tender this
12 exhibit. It is Exhibit 5. I would like to have it tendered and exhibited
13 in this written version and the television tape, which is an integral
14 tape, and you'll be able to view it in 20 minutes' time. It's not a long
15 tape. The translation --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a second.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- is --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: This will be Exhibit 5.
19 JUDGE KWON: I think we have to exhibit the memorandum first.
20 Would you like to exhibit this memorandum, Mr. Milosevic?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. It already has an
22 exhibit number. I seem to have mislaid my note on that, but I think you
23 must have it. I'm sure you have it in English.
24 JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, I'd like to have it exhibited
25 because it has the marks which is marked by Professor Markovic.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes. Let it be exhibited. What's the
3 THE REGISTRAR: The memorandum will be D250, and then I would
4 like to give number D251 to the speeches, together with the videotape.
5 MR. NICE: Can I just check before the next question is asked.
6 D250 is the bound volume which contains both the commentary and the text.
7 Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, don't proceed immediately.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to clarify a point.
11 May I clarify something? What Mr. Nice has just said is not an exhibit.
12 I gave this to help you because it's the translation, and it's the text
13 from the BBC that was designed for the press. But the original is in
14 Serbian, and you have the television tape of the entire speech, the
15 integral speech that you have, and you can use this translation to help
16 you. But of course you can always issue an order for the tape to be
17 translated again and then you can compare whether there are any
18 deviations. But the television tape is a sufficiently authentic exhibit
19 and piece of evidence which leaves no doubt as to each word that was
20 uttered on the occasion.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: What Mr. Nice referred to as the memorandum, not the
23 -- not your speech.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have the tape there, Madam Registrar? The
1 tapes? Okay.
2 Mr. Milosevic, you'd like these tapes to be played? Just a
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. There's no need. It will take
5 up too much time. But I said that you have the exhibit, the original
6 television tape and recording, so you can ask them to have it translated
7 again from the original tape to be able to compare and see whether there
8 is any word which might be distorted or anything like that.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll -- we'll take an adjournment for 20
11 --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 5.55 p.m.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Professor Markovic, a principled and concrete approach to the
17 question of national equality of rights: Do you know that that was my
18 position all along, incessantly throughout the Yugoslav crisis and all the
19 way to the end?
20 A. I believe that from that point of view, you had that position
21 consistently. That can be explained by your origins and your previously
22 mentioned positions and also that you grew up in a society that was based
23 on these principles, and you consistently abided by that until the end.
24 Q. Also, there is no denying that in 1998, there was an escalation of
25 terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija; is that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. At that time; that is to say in mid-1998, precisely when there was
3 this escalation of Albanian separatism and terrorism in Kosovo, I spoke to
4 the political leadership, didn't I?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. What I said then, in spite of the fact that Albanian nationalism
7 and terrorism were in full sway, doesn't that still confirm my advocacy of
8 national equality?
9 A. I have the stenographic notes --
10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, reluctant to interrupt when the accused is
11 starting his experience of taking his own witnesses, but aware that we --
12 the Chamber may be also concerned not to allow him to misunderstand how he
13 should be asking questions, I think really the first four questions are
14 all leading.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Certainly the last one.
16 MR. NICE: I think also in reality, Your Honour, all of them. The
17 first one that says concrete approach to the question of national equality
18 of rights, do you know that that was my position all along incessantly
19 throughout the Yugoslav crisis? A question of that character, whatever
20 the answer, leads to an answer of diminished or no value because it's led.
21 That's the problem.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
23 THE WITNESS: May I say something?
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, for example, in the last question,
25 "In spite of the fact that Albanian nationalism and terrorism were in
1 full sway, doesn't that still confirm my advocacy of national equality?"
2 That's definitely leading. You'd have to ask the witness -- you'd have to
3 ask the witness more generally what does that indicate to him.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Professor Markovic, why do you believe that my position was
7 advocacy of national equality even in 1998?
8 A. First of all, I'd like to say that Mr. Milosevic cannot lead me
9 anywhere. I am completely independent of him. We parted ways in 1995
10 politically when I criticised him.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I'm stopping you. I am stopping you.
12 That is not a matter for you. That's a matter for the Court. "Leading"
13 is a term of art. It happens when a question is put to you and embedded
14 in the question is the answer, and it is, as Mr. Nice said then, of little
15 evidential value because you have not given the evidence. So "leading" is
16 a term of art, and that is a matter for the Court to determine. I don't
17 want to hear any comments from you on that issue.
18 Go ahead, Mr. Milosevic.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can just say that was not the way
20 it was. I can always say that. He can put a leading question, but that
21 does not mean that that is the answer I'm going to give, yes, that's
22 right. I can say no, that's not right.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Professor, I am putting a completely neutral question to you. Do
25 you have any proof that in 1998 my position was advocacy of national
1 equality of rights?
2 A. I have here the stenographic notes of the 16th session of the Main
3 Board of the Socialist Party of Serbia. This was on the 10th of June,
4 1998. I will deal with this briefly.
5 Again, you said here, "Our policy is to resolve the question of
6 Kosovo by political means." At that time, there was already fighting
7 there, but you say, "We approach this solution proceeding from our
8 convictions and our programme which implies the principle of national
9 equality of rights. We don't want to harm the Albanians in any way. We
10 don't want them to be second-rate citizens, and we have to distinguish
11 clearly, and we've pointed that out several times, between the Albanian
12 people who live there in Kosovo and the terrorists. Some of our own
13 people think that all of them --"
14 JUDGE KWON: If you can help us finding the passage in the
15 documents. I think you are referring to the Defence Exhibit 142.
16 THE WITNESS: I have -- I have this document. I don't know
17 whether you have it. I simply quote in answer to the question what I
18 have. You wanted my answer to this question, and this is my answer.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is Exhibit 142. You have it
20 before you. In the Serbian text it's on page 52. These are stenographic
21 notes from the session where there was a discussion about this.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Please, Professor, go on and just quote what you wanted to quote.
24 A. "No matter what it looked like, we must have precisely that
25 approach, a political solution, non-violent, and the affirmation of the
1 principles of equality of national rights."
2 MR. NICE: We really must be able to find these passages before
3 the witness launches into them. I think the Court is having the same
4 difficulty that we are. The -- unfortunately, the page numbers have got
5 cut off in the English version, but it would help if the accused
6 identifies both page numbers when he produces documents for us to read.
7 I'm afraid I simply haven't been able to find the passage.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you've heard that and it is quite
9 correct. You must identify the page, both in the B/C/S as well as in
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I do not have the
12 English version, so could somebody please give me the English version.
13 I'll find it. I hope I won't take up too much time doing that.
14 The page numbers are missing in the English version.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: There are no pages.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll tell you --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Mr. Milosevic, if you go to the end of the
18 -- I think if you go to the end of the English version and go then into
19 it about three pages, you'll see the heading "Chairman," and I think it
20 may be at the foot of the page where the heading is "Chairman."
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, correct. Correct. It says
22 "Chairman," and then he started quoting a particular section: "Our policy
23 is to solve the [In English] Kosovo issue by using political means. Our
24 attitude towards this solution is based on our belief and our political
25 platform which includes the principle of national equality."
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Please go ahead, Professor, since we've identified the section in
3 the English translation. Please go on.
4 A. "We must bear in mind the following: That some people have been
5 manipulated in this way. These are unfortunate people that have been
6 manipulated like any other destitute people in the world, first by power
7 wielders in their own countries and then by world manipulaters who use
8 them to destabilise the southern part of Europe since they constantly need
9 to have an alibi for keeping some military forces of the great powers
10 there. They are not the ones organising the activity. They are the
11 vehicle that somebody else is using to carry out the activity. There are
12 among them people like Bukoshi who is in Germany and who became a
13 millionaire thanks to the funds he's been raising.
14 "There is a lot of work to be done, so with regard to Kosovo, we
15 should take the political approach and observe the principle of national
16 equality. This should be observed in the political activity not only of
17 our people in Kosovo but also dialogue, dialogue that was not reserved for
18 the -- [In English] state committee which used to sit there in Kosovo from
19 day-to-day waiting for the representatives of Albanians who never came."
20 So here are listed Ratko Markovic. He was the head of this
21 delegation. On the other hand, the Mahmut Bakali [Interpretation] or
22 Bajazit Nusi or Agani. "It was not reserved for them. I mean, the
23 dialogue was not important only from their point of view. By dialogue I
24 do not mean just the Serbian-Albanian dialogue but also the
25 Serbian-Albanian-Turkish and Muslim and Roma and Montenegrin dialogue.
1 There should be dialogue at all levels, in municipalities and local
2 communes, formal and informal dialogue. Dialogue should be conducted both
3 formally and informally because people should be encouraged to live."
4 Q. That will do, Professor.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into
6 evidence, and my question was that on the basis of what he believed, even
7 nine years later, the position remained unchanged, observing the principle
8 of national equality. So this is a quotation from a speech made in
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. You know, Professor, that terrorism was escalating at the time;
12 isn't that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In spite of that fact, our position is to observe the principle of
15 national equality, that Albanians should not be harmed in any way and they
16 should not be treated as second-rate citizens.
17 A. Yes. Fighting was already taking place in Drenica. The KLA had
18 already organised their activity, and our police responded, but in the
19 midst of this fighting this is the position that you took at the session
20 of the Main Board of the Socialist Party of Serbia.
21 Q. Now let us go back to Gazimestan for a moment. We concluded that
22 the entire Yugoslav leadership and the representatives of all the
23 republics were present at Gazimestan; is that right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And that indeed no one ever assessed the speech made at Gazimestan
1 in any negative terms at the time.
2 A. That's right.
3 Q. In paragraph 88 of the indictment against me, there is a
4 description of events that took place three months earlier on. So please,
5 81 is the count. "The Assembly of Kosovo met in Pristina in Kosovo and
6 adopted the constitutional amendments but most of the delegates of the
7 Kosovo Albanians refrained from voting. Although lacking the required
8 two-thirds majority in the Assembly, the president of the Assembly
9 nonetheless declared that the amendments had been passed. On the 28th of
10 March, 1989, the Assembly of Serbia voted to approve the constitutional
11 changes, effectively revoking the autonomy granted in the 1974
13 Now, my question to you is the following: I claim that what is
14 here in the indictment is a lie, because had that been true, would all the
15 representatives of the Yugoslav republics have been there, would the
16 entire Yugoslav leadership have been there in --
17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, this is not a question. This is a way of
18 making a proposition and giving it air time. I'm sure the accused
19 understands the difference between asking a question and making a comment,
20 and I must press the Chamber to ensure that he obeys the rules from the
21 beginning of his conduct of his case.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think it's midway between a comment and a
23 question. I'll allow the witness to answer that part of it which is a
24 question. Briefly.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I did not mean to answer this,
1 whether all these people would have come. I meant to give an answer on
2 the basis of what I know. The facts are as follows: There was a total of
3 190 delegates. At this Assembly there were 180 delegates present. There
4 were ten votes against, four abstentions, and 166 voted in favour of these
5 amendments. So it is not correct, first of all, that the majority of the
6 Albanians abstained. Secondly, it is not correct that there was no
7 two-thirds majority, because two-thirds of 180 would be 127, and 166
8 actually voted in favour of the proposal. And finally, thirdly, it is not
9 correct that in this way autonomy had practically been revoked. Autonomy
10 is not revoked if we mean by autonomy certain rights that are enjoyed by
11 that region, that is to say to have an Assembly of their own that can vote
12 and decide on certain issues.
13 What was revoked were certain characteristics of sovereignty,
14 because in the constitution of 1974, in addition to autonomy, Kosovo was
15 given certain characteristics of sovereignty. For example, it could veto
16 certain decisions of federal institutions although it was a part of Serbia
17 but nevertheless it could make its own decisions at federal level. It was
18 represented at federal level. The representative of Kosovo at a given
19 point in time was the president of the entire state, and these are the
20 characteristics of sovereignty that these amendments have actually
22 So Kosovo retained only what an autonomy really means, and that is
23 what it has today as well. These are the things about which wrong
24 conclusions have been presented here, these three. So it is not correct
25 that there was not a required two-thirds majority, and it is not true that
1 this revoked the autonomy, and also it is not true that Kosovo Albanian
2 delegates abstained.
3 Q. How was Serbia regulated? How was Serbia defined at the time?
4 A. As the state of all its citizens.
5 Q. That will do. Thank you. All its citizens who live in it?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Is that Article 1 of the constitution?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Was that the case with other Yugoslav republics as well or not?
10 A. Well, the Croatian state, the State of Croatia, was defined as the
11 state of the Croatian people. I've already said that. Before it was the
12 state of the Croatian and Serb people, and then the Serb people were left
13 out and it was only the Croatian people. That's the way it was in other
14 situations too.
15 What prevailed here was that it was the state of all of its
16 citizens, all the citizens who live in it.
17 Q. All right. But do you remember the adoption of the amendments to
18 the constitution on the 28th of March, 1989, an august occasion? Do you
19 remember who sat next to me in the first row?
20 A. I can't remember. I can't answer this question. I don't know.
21 Q. Well, who was the president of the Yugoslav Presidency at the
22 time? Was it Sinan Hasani?
23 A. Yes. The representative from Kosovo.
24 Q. Is he an ethnic Albanian?
25 A. Yes, yes, Albanian. He's a representative of Kosovo. That's an
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 example of what I was saying earlier. As a representative from Kosovo, an
2 Albanian, he was the representative of the entire state.
3 Q. All right. We can see that on the video film of that entire
4 session, but this will suffice as an answer.
5 Tell me, Professor, since in 1990 you were vice-president of the
6 Socialist Party and one of the participants, one of the authors in -- of
7 the platform, of the programme of the Socialist Party, tell me, do you
8 remember how many among the membership of the Socialist Party were
10 A. I know around 50.000 members of the Socialist Party were
12 Q. All right. Can you tell me, what is the attitude expressed in the
13 programme of the Socialist Party regarding national equality and the
14 national issue as such?
15 A. Do you want me to give any quotations or to give you an answer in
16 principle? I can do that briefly.
17 Q. Very briefly.
18 A. Just a minute.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, would you -- Professor, just tell us what
20 is it that you're reading from.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm reading from Fundamental
22 Principles, or the basic platform of the Socialist Party of Serbia, which
23 I authored. That was the platform valid for the Socialist Party, although
24 I haven't been a member for a long time.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: You are the author of it, you said.
1 THE WITNESS: I'm the one who wrote the first draft, and then
2 later there was small corrections.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Go ahead. Go ahead.
4 THE WITNESS: There is a section "National Equality."
5 [Interpretation] "Human rights are primarily the rights enjoyed by
6 individual citizens. Members of national minorities, masters, individuals
7 have the same rights as members of a majority population. In addition to
8 that, national minorities also have certain internationally recognised
9 collective rights. Those are cultural rights, right to use one's own
10 language, fostering of traditions, independent publishing, entertainment,
11 and other activities in their own language. Those rights include cultural
12 but not political autonomy. Among national minorities, it is necessary to
13 ensure their representation in government, especially on the local level.
14 Relying on the most democratic existing international norms and proceeding
15 from centuries of experience in peaceful co-existence, the socialists of
16 Serbia commit themselves to full equality of all citizens of Yugoslavia.
17 The Socialist Party is a party of all the citizens of Yugoslavia who
18 accept its programmes -- programme regardless of ethnic affiliation."
19 And the next one is 75. "Under the circumstances of the
20 dissolution of the former Yugoslav state, the Socialist Party of Serbia
21 undertook to abide by the basic principle that all its citizens have to be
22 equal. And the same right to self-determination according to which
23 Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and others decided to secede from
24 Yugoslavia, the Serb people as well in territories where they are a
25 majority, may decide to continue living in one common state."
1 [In English] Just a moment. [Interpretation] "The quintessence of
2 our policy in Kosovo and Metohija is full civic and national equality.
3 The Albanians who live there as well as members of all other minorities
4 enjoy guaranteed internationally recognised rights such as to use their
5 own language and to attend school in their own language, to foster their
6 cultural traditions and have the necessary institutions, publishing
7 houses, press, et cetera."
8 Q. Professor, please. We have to save time. We have to move on.
9 Are you aware that amid that entire crisis, from 1991 until the
10 end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Serbia was the only place where the
11 national composition, the national structure of the population did not
12 change? Or let me rephrase it. Are you aware of any persecution on
13 ethnic grounds for the duration of that crisis and the wars in Bosnia and
15 A. This may sound as a paradox in view of all these charges
16 concerning the expulsions of Croats and others from their territories, but
17 it is a fact that nobody was expulsed from the territory of Serbia.
18 Serbia still has today the same national structure that it had in the
19 1970s. There is no other state that can claim the same. Croatia expulsed
20 the Serbs who lived in it. Kosovo did the same. There may be only 3 or 4
21 per cent Serbs remaining in Kosovo.
22 Serbs were expulsed from practically all the other republics,
23 Serbia did not change.
24 So there were no expulsions. On the contrary, refugees from
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina and other republics frequently arrived in Serbia.
1 Q. Are Serbs the only refugees who chose to go to Serbia or there
2 were Muslims as well?
3 A. Muslims as well. There were areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina where
4 there was fighting between Muslims and Croats, and Muslims fled from such
5 areas to Serbia. They were free to stay as long as they liked. Some of
6 them went on to third countries, to Europe, but some of them stayed.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just ask how much longer you intend to be
8 with this witness.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope I'll be able to finish by the
10 end of the session, but I'll hurry up, Mr. Robinson.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Let me just quote. I am charged here with heading some kind joint
13 criminal enterprise whose objective was to create some sort of Greater
14 Serbia. And I will quote now the Kosovo indictment, paragraph 16: "The
15 purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was, inter alia, the expulsion
16 of a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from the
17 territory of the province of Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued
18 Serbian control over the province."
19 Similarly, in paragraph 6 of the Croatian indictment says: "The
20 purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was coerced removal of a third
21 or more of this -- of the population of this area --" or, rather, "was the
22 forcible removal of the majority of the Croat and other non-Serb
23 population from the approximately one-third of the territory of the
24 Republic of Croatia that he planned to become part of a new Serb-dominated
25 state through the commission of crimes in violation," et cetera, et
1 cetera. "These areas included those regions that were referred to by Serb
2 authorities and are hereinafter referred to as the Serbian autonomous
3 district." What is mentioned here is the Serbian Krajina and then mind
4 this: The Dubrovnik Republic.
5 And then it says in paragraph 6 of the Bosnian indictment:
6 "The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was the forcible and
7 permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs."
8 THE INTERPRETER: The accused needs to read more slowly. The
9 English interpretation here is not the only one.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I think you didn't hear the
11 interpreters. They're asking you to read more slowly. In the future,
12 please observe that.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will try to read more
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So, Professor, you have heard all my quotations. Do you have a
17 position on them?
18 A. All this is factually inaccurate. Why would Serbs be expelling
19 Croatians from Croatia if they're not expelling them from Serbia? Why
20 would Serbs be expelling Albanians from Kosovo if they're not expelling
21 them from Belgrade and other parts of Serbia? You have Belgrade and many
22 other places in Serbia full of Albanians who are experiencing no harm at
23 all. They continue to work and live there.
24 Q. All right, Professor. If you have in mind that Serbia was
25 supposed to be the main --
1 MR. NICE: Two points. The document from which the witness was
2 reading he says was subsequently amended, but it may be 469, tab 3 or tab
3 4, and it may be that we ought to ask him to provide the copy to check
4 whether it is the exhibit we've got in evidence or not.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a document that he authored?
6 MR. NICE: Yes. He said he authored it. He said it was
7 subsequently amended, but I think there are two documents at 469, tabs 3
8 and 4, which may be either that version or derivatives of it, and it may
9 be we can have a look at it.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll ask the witness to provide that
12 Go ahead and answer the question that you were asked.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, what was the question?
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. I read to you parts of the indictment claiming that I was part of
16 a joint criminal enterprise to expel Croatians from Croatia, Muslims from
17 Bosnia, Albanians from Kosovo, in order to create some sort of Greater
19 Now, if you have in mind that the greatest part of that Greater
20 Serbia would be precisely the Republic of Serbia, which did not see any
21 expulsions at all throughout the crisis, do you find it logical that
22 Serbia should initiate expulsions from territories outside of Serbia?
23 A. Well, I already told you it seems illogical to me. Why would they
24 be expelling Albanians from Kosovo if they're not expelling them from
25 Serbia and so on? I think I've already answered that question.
1 Q. Now, about the Socialist Party, Mr. Markovic. Is that a party
2 that was founded and active only in the territory of Serbia?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Were there ideas and aspirations for it to spread all across the
5 territory of Yugoslavia, and what was my position on that?
6 A. There were ideas to that effect and it was my opinion that it
7 should be founded in Montenegro. I even established contact with some
8 people over there who wanted the same thing as well as in Republika Srpska
9 and in the Serbian Krajina. However, you were resolutely against and I
10 could never understand why. It would have been logical, I thought, for
11 the Socialist Party to be established there. It later turned out it would
12 have been a good thing.
13 Q. Now, tell me about the SDA, the Party of Democratic Action of
14 Alija Izetbegovic. Did it have branches in Serbia?
15 A. It certainly did; in Raska, in Sandzak, in Novi Pazar and other
16 areas populated by Bosnian Muslims. That party was organised there.
17 Q. Do you know about the Democratic Party, which was established in
18 Krajina and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Do you know whether it
19 had its own organisation in Serbia?
20 A. It did, and it was headed -- this branch was headed by my friends
21 Milos Miljanic, a writer and professor of the university, and another
23 Q. Did they take part -- run in the elections?
24 A. They did.
25 Q. And did they run as opposition to the Socialist Party of Serbia?
1 A. They were.
2 Q. This so-called Prosecution is trying to push a theory --
3 MR. NICE: Your Honour.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. -- according to which at the time when I was president --
6 MR. NICE: I must invite the Chamber to consider the
7 appropriateness of allowing this accused to question witnesses in that
9 While I'm on my feet - and I hesitated to mention it last time -
10 can I invite the Chamber at some stage to give some thought to the
11 appropriateness of asking -- of allowing the accused to ask witnesses
12 questions on passages of the indictment of the open-ended nature that was
13 asked on the last occasion, but that's another matter. But really, this
14 question is not permissible.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you heard the Prosecutor. The
16 phrasing of your question is objectionable, and in the future I'm going to
17 ask you to find language, and I know you can find language, which is
18 appropriate for these proceedings. Bear that in mind.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it was you who
20 suggested to me that in my Defence case I should rely on the indictment.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. I wasn't referring to that. I was
22 referring to the manner in which you made reference to the Prosecution as
23 this "so-called Prosecution." That language is unacceptable, and I want
24 to make that absolutely clear.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. It is stated here that I headed a dictatorship of some kind, in
3 some way. Tell me, how many times and how often did I test my own
4 legitimacy at the elections, and do you know how many times I agreed to
5 earlier elections before the expiry of my term of office?
6 A. I don't think anything similar happened anywhere else at any time.
7 We had elections, it seemed, all the time. I didn't always follow that,
8 in the League of Communists of Serbia, for instance, but you were elected
9 in 1990, and already in 1992, although you were entitled to wait for
10 another four or five years, we had new elections in which Mr. Panic tried
11 to take the Presidency away from you, but he lost very clearly, and then
12 there were new elections in 1996 when you became the president of the
13 Federal Republic, and then you again ran in early elections in the year
15 Q. Do you know anyone who is charged with exercising autocratic
16 authority who went in for early elections?
17 A. No. I know of no other such example. Tito, for instance, was a
18 mild sort of dictator, less cruel than Stalin, certainly, and many other
19 dictators, but Tito, during his lifetime, wrote in the constitution that
20 he would be a life-long president. There were no elections during his
21 time. And from that sort of republic we entered your kind of republic in
22 which elections were held all the time. Parliamentarian elections and
23 other elections. It is no small wonder that people are already sick of
24 elections and of voting in our country. But time and again, people were
25 asked to confirm their choice as far as you were concerned.
1 Q. Do you know that in 1992, the Socialist Party did not have a
2 majority in the Assembly of Serbia?
3 A. Well, no, it did not. It was the largest party by a long chalk,
4 but it wasn't able to surpass 50 per cent and it had to make up a
5 coalition. So it went into a coalition, for example, with the national
6 Democracy Party of Dusko Mihajlovic. And then a coalition with the
7 Serbian Radical Party, and later on it was in some sort of coalition at
8 federal level with the SPO, which was in government as a coalition, and
9 then with the Montenegrin party. That was according to the constitution
10 which stated that the strongest party from Montenegro had to take part, so
11 there was a coalition with the Serbian popular national party, for
13 Q. Tell me, please, my position, was it this: That other
14 parliamentary parties should be invited, including the opposition, to set
15 up a joint government of national unity?
16 A. Yes. There were difficult situations where such proposals were
17 made and where you negotiated and talked to their representatives and
18 leaders with Draskovic, Djindjic, and others. I do know about that,
19 although it never materialised, it never came about, and I wasn't kept up
20 -- wasn't kept abreast with further developments after that.
21 Q. All right. Could you tell me, please, is it true that at federal
22 level, although the Assembly majority went to the coalition party and the
23 Montenegrin DPS party, that the first government, upon the inception of
24 the FRY, was composed largely of people who were until then the opponents,
25 led by Milan Panic, for example?
1 A. Well, Panic was the president, the Prime Minister of the federal
2 government. In actual fact you invited him to come and try his luck --
3 try his hand at the elections and he was Prime Minister, federal Prime
5 Now, I mentioned Vuk Draskovic a moment ago, the present day
6 foreign minister. For a time he was in the coalition government at the
7 level of the Federal Republic.
8 Q. Very well. Now, I'm sure you know that for a time events in the
9 Socialist Party of Serbia, for example, whose president I myself was and
10 without a doubt the most influential person in the party, did I involve
11 myself and meddle in the decisions made by the Socialist Party of Serbia;
12 and if so, to what extent? What would you say? How was the leadership of
13 the Socialist Party of Serbia elected and how far did I wield my influence
14 or made any decisions along those lines? Did we have democratic relations
15 or was this just a sort of authoritarian behaviour on my part? You know
16 this very well from those times.
17 A. Well, the elections took place for the leadership in 1990 at the
18 first congress, and there was a certain amount of influence from people in
19 the main board. They favourised certain individuals, for example, from
20 the local organisations, the municipalities, et cetera. But at the other
21 elections, the next elections that took place in 1992 - and I was still
22 there - they were far more democratic already because the proposals put
23 forward were from the basic organisations in the local communes, for
24 example. And it is from those proposals that at the congress and the
25 election that the leadership was elected. So those elections were truly
1 democratic at the time. I don't know what the situation was like later
2 on, but at the time, yes, they were.
3 Now, as far as meddling is concerned, and interference, you had
4 full confidence, I think sometimes even too much confidence in some of
5 your associates, and you never interfered in their work at all. And of
6 course I can also say that what happened was that something contrary to
7 your will was decided upon. For example, you wanted to see the mayor of
8 Belgrade to be Debotic [phoen], that he become the mayor of Belgrade,
9 whereas it was Perucic, whereas Slobodanka Gruden was elected. You were
10 dissatisfied with that but the main board opted to elect her. Or
11 similarly you wanted the hymn of Serbia to be Hej Sloveni. Now, the main
12 board didn't feel that the same hymn should be continued on for Serbia as
13 it was for Yugoslavia and they decided to opt for the March on the Drina
14 River tune. So -- as the hymn.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have had a sufficient answer. Ask another
16 question, Mr. Milosevic.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Professor, did you have an opportunity of reading the indictment
19 in its integrity and the integral form? The indictment against me, have
20 you read it, the full text that's on the table before me?
21 A. I have read through all three indictments, and I have to say, and
22 I have to be categoric in doing so, that although everybody has
23 shortcomings, can be criticised, and I myself criticised you in 1995 at
24 the main board, however, I do not think that you are at all to blame for
25 the war that broke out on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. I think
1 that you have no -- absolutely no responsibility or accountability for
3 JUDGE BONOMY: I think your question was quite simply, Have you
4 read the indictment?
5 Professor, that's all you were asked. Could you answer that,
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I've read it. Well, I
8 wouldn't be able to comment on it had I not read it.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: You were not asked to comment on it. You were only
10 asked if you had read it.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I understood it that he was
12 asking me what I thought about it, not merely had I read it.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. As you have told me that you have read the indictment, answer me
15 this question then, please: Is there a single word of truth in the
16 accusations contained in the indictment?
17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, that has to be a completely inadmissible
18 question. Imagine --
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ask another question --
20 MR. NICE: Imagine if I were to have asked such a question of any
21 Prosecution witness. He is trespassing, through this question, by the
22 witness, on the preserve of the Court.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Next question, Mr. Milosevic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... coming to
1 the end of your questioning now. You don't have to fill up the time.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I am nearing the end, yes. And
3 that's why I want to ask the professor this.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Is there anything in the indictment that you can confirm as being
6 the truth?
7 A. I cannot confirm anything, and I consider that you are not
8 responsible and accountable for the war that broke out. And as I spoke
9 about all the secessionist aspirations and so on --
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have cut you off, Professor. Professor, I have
11 cut you off.
12 Mr. Milosevic, are you at the end of your questioning? If you
13 have no more --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I ask --
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... ask, then
16 Mr. Nice will start his cross-exam.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, let me just ask you
18 something. Do you remember how many times we heard in this courtroom the
19 question asked whether -- asked of a witness is there a single word of
20 truth in what the accused is claiming? How many times have we heard that
21 in this courtroom? Do you remember?
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're not to ask me questions. Ask another
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, if you won't allow the
25 question to be answered, then let me ask a different question.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. What do you think, Professor? What was the motive for raising
3 this indictment in the first place?
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Absolutely no. And I'm going to stop now.
5 If you -- if you have non-forensic purposes, they will not be served by
6 examination-in-chief. You will find some other way to serve those
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well. Thank you,
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
11 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I prefer, if I may --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before -- before you proceed, Mr. Nice, I think
13 there are some questions relating to exhibits that need to be ironed out.
14 MR. NICE: Certainly. And I was going to simply draw to the
15 accused's attention, lest he's overlooked it, that there are a number of
16 exhibits he served on us, apparently for use with this witness, that he
17 hasn't touched on, one or two of them exhibits that I know --
18 JUDGE KWON: If you could hold a minute, please.
19 MR. NICE: So sorry.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll deal with the exhibits at the end of the
22 evidence in its entirety. You may be referring to some of them.
23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. But I don't intend for you to begin your
25 cross-examination this evening.
1 I wanted to ask the professor a question. In the early part of
2 the -- in the first part of the examination-in-chief, you were asked about
3 Slovenia and what prompted the Slovenian movement towards secession, and
4 you spoke about the -- the relative rate of development in Slovenia as
5 compared with the other republics, and I understood you to be saying that
6 Slovenia was the most developed of the republics. But what is not clear
7 to me is what -- were you trying to say that this was a factor that
8 explained why they wanted to secede, the fact that they were more
9 developed than the other republics?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were two reasons why they
11 wished to secede. The first was this: Yugoslavia was becoming a more and
12 more chaotic state, thanks to the 1974 constitution, and that nothing
13 could be decided at federal level any more because each of the republics
14 and each autonomous province had the right to use its veto. For example,
15 the Slovene representative was Krajger, when he was president of the
16 federal state, and he had organised a commission, set up a commission
17 which was supposed to find a solution to that burgeoning economic and
18 political crisis, and the crisis of the entire system. And the proposals
19 made by the commission were unilaterally accepted, unanimously accepted.
20 However, when this was put into operation and when a series of laws are
21 passed in the Federal Assembly, all the laws were rejected because either
22 one or other republic had resorted to its right to veto them. So they saw
23 that nothing could be done, no decision could be made. As I say, the
24 house was toppling. And no state would have survived the constitution
25 introduced by Josip Broz Tito in 1974 --
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Give me the second reason now.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The second reason is this:
3 There was a fund for the development of the underdeveloped regions, as it
4 was called, and that meant that the more developed republics such as
5 Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia were supposed to allot resources to be
6 invested into the underdeveloped areas, and that meant Bosnia-Herzegovina,
7 Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo. So the Slovenes each year had to set
8 aside considerable resources and funds into the fund for the
9 underdeveloped regions, and they became more and more dissatisfied with
10 that, having to do that, and decided to step down.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: One reason was political and the other economic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right, yes.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn. Tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.50 p.m.,
15 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day
16 of November, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.