1 Tuesday, 23 November 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, before you begin, I understand that the

7 witness has to catch a plane at a certain time, which requires that he

8 leave here at about 9.30.

9 MR. NICE: I was alert to this yesterday. The loss of time this

10 morning means that I will reorganise my questions by priority. I won't be

11 able to cover everything.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I am to say to you that in future

13 it is your responsibility to bring to the attention of the Chamber any

14 particular logistical problems relating to your witnesses.

15 Proceed, Mr. Nice.

16 WITNESS: NIKOLAI RYZHKOV [Resumed]

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]

19 Q. I am not going to deal with any of the documents you produced

20 yesterday because I do not have them in interpretation and cannot deal

21 with the rest of the context. However, one document you provided was

22 included in the documents provided to Ms. Del Ponte. We have a

23 translation of that.

24 MR. NICE: May the witness see it. It was tab 4 of his original

25 collection of materials, and it was the one item that was not produced.

1 Q. And I desire to read with you, Mr. Ryzhkov, only the second

2 paragraph of this document, which is described to be conclusions of the

3 first session of the commission for assessing the international legal

4 aspects of the situation regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

5 And I trust on this occasion the interpreters have a translation before

6 them. I apologise to them for the fact that the book extracts we read

7 yesterday were not provided to them. Entirely my fault.

8 The second paragraph of this conclusion reads as follows,

9 Mr. Ryzhkov, please follow it in the Russian: "During a long period of

10 time, a radical part of the Albanian population of Kosovo undertook

11 actions aimed at separation from Yugoslavia. With this end in view, the

12 underground groups, parallel power structures, and illegal paramilitary

13 groups have been formed. To oppose efforts to separate Kosovo, the

14 authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not use,

15 unfortunately, all the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. In a

16 number of cases, the reaction of the federal authorities was inadequate

17 and times unjustifiably rigid. Limiting the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989

18 jeopardised the rights of the Albanian population and led to the deepening

19 of conflict. During the active phase of the conflict, cases of violence

20 against different ethnic groups of the Kosovo civilian population took

21 place. The commission announced its readiness to consider objectively and

22 impartially any evidence of such facts."

23 The simple point then, Mr. Ryzhkov, that even the commissions with

24 which you were involved, and there were many commissions, recognised that

25 limiting the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 had jeopardised the rights of the

1 Albanian population and deepened the conflict; correct? I would be

2 grateful for short answers this is morning, please.

3 A. I will try, Mr. Nice, to answer very briefly. I did not take part

4 in the work of this commission. Therefore, to say that this is my

5 opinion, I cannot. It was an independent commission. It worked in

6 St. Petersburg in 1999, and in this document on page 8, you will find the

7 signatures of all those who signed this document. My name is not among

8 them. Thus I cannot be held responsible for the opinion of the people who

9 drafted this document.

10 Q. Very well.

11 MR. NICE: May this be given an exhibit number. It may be Exhibit

12 788 tab 4, suggests Ms. Dicklich.

13 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That document has nothing to do with

16 this witness. How can it be tendered through my witness? It has nothing

17 to do with him.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: He has commented on it.

19 MR. NICE: And it was provided as one of the pieces of material

20 that this witness was expected to deal with.

21 Q. It's right, is it not, Mr. Ryzhkov, that President Yeltsin at the

22 time held a critical or negative view of the Duma and in his book

23 described the Duma as "issuing one resolution after another, the

24 communists" - which would include you - "establishing active communication

25 with Milosevic, planning a military union of the two governments." Do you

1 recall his taking that view about you?

2 A. In the document that we submitted, there is a list of documents,

3 background documents. You took only one of them, one among the documents

4 that were appended to our report. It was the opinion of the commission

5 that met in St. Petersburg, and we thought it was our duty to submit it as

6 a document in an annex. It is a different matter how it should be

7 interpreted. I, for instance, cannot agree with that particular point.

8 But you are not asking me.

9 And second, Mr. Prosecutor, I should like to clarify one point.

10 Maybe I didn't understand your question correctly, but to a certain

11 degree, you seem to be maybe not accusing but hinting that some people

12 cooperated. I, for instance, cooperated with the leadership of

13 Yugoslavia. Maybe I misunderstood you. But I would like to state before

14 this Honourable Court that I have nothing to do today with the Communist

15 Party of Russia, absolutely nothing to do with them. I used to be a

16 member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which ceased to exist in

17 1991. I have my convictions. As a citizen I have my civic position,

18 which I expressed yesterday, but I can say that --

19 Q. Mr. Ryzhkov --

20 A. -- it is absolutely wrong to say that I am a mediator between the

21 Communist Party of Russia and Mr. Milosevic.

22 Q. I've given you an opportunity to deal with Mr. Yeltsin's comment.

23 There is one other fact relating to Mr. Yeltsin. It's right, is it not,

24 that throughout the time that it would have been possible for Mr. Yeltsin

25 to accord the accused Milosevic a formal visit to Russia he declined ever

1 to afford him such a visit and indeed expressed the view of this accused

2 that he was a most cynical politician. Do you remember his doing that,

3 your president?

4 A. I do not know of such an expression of opinion by Mr. Yeltsin or

5 anyone else from the leadership of Russia. I do know that Mr. Yeltsin did

6 meet with Mr. Milosevic in Moscow, and they discussed precisely the issue

7 of a peaceful resolution to that entire problem. There was a statement

8 issued after that meeting, and we all read it. I have never heard words

9 to the effect that you just read.

10 Q. The materials that you provided to Mrs. Del Ponte were recorded as

11 having been considered in the public document that recorded the decision

12 of the Office of the Prosecutor of this Tribunal not to pursue the inquiry

13 into alleged NATO crimes further. Do you accept that?

14 A. I did not quite understand your question, but I will try to answer

15 nevertheless. I spoke yesterday, and I will repeat today: On the 20th of

16 October, 1999, in keeping with the decision of the state Duma, the state

17 parliament, our commission, which I chaired, drafted a document which I

18 signed addressed to the Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte. And on the

19 23rd of December, my deputy in that commission, Professor Tamara Pletneva

20 and the secretary of that commission, Mr. Tetyorkin, arrived in The Hague

21 and handed that document in. The document was quoted from by Mr.

22 Milosevic yesterday. You did not allow me to quote a couple of paragraphs

23 myself, but you heard it from him.

24 I told you yesterday, and I am repeating today that she stated

25 that the demands contained specifically in paragraph 5, if you read the

1 document, which raised the issue of holding to account the head of NATO

2 and head of states' members of the NATO who unleashed this war --

3 Q. I think I'm going to stop you --

4 A. -- was answered by her to the effect that she did not have the

5 competence. She gave us that answer two months later, to the effect that

6 she did not have the purview to prosecute this. And I have submitted the

7 document to you that we received from Mrs. Carla Del Ponte.

8 Q. Have you read the public document that records the decision of the

9 OTP.

10 A. I read the answer that we received from Madam Del Ponte. I have

11 read no other document.

12 MR. NICE: Your Honours, time does not permit me to put the

13 document in nor am I sure that it is a relevant document, but it is a

14 public document, and if the accused wishes it to go in or anybody else

15 wishes to see it, it's available.

16 Q. Mr. Ryzhkov, have you read and considered either Lord Robertson's

17 report in relation to the civilian casualties and other events that

18 happened as a result of the NATO bombing titled "Kosovo One Year On"?

19 It's not an exhibit.

20 A. I heard that such a document exists, but I never read it.

21 Q. Have you read and considered the Human Rights Watch report, which

22 is an exhibit in this case, Exhibit 206, titled "Civilian Deaths in The

23 NATO Air Campaign"?

24 A. Certainly I'm not very familiar with the forensic practices of

25 this Tribunal, but I do believe that such documents should be shown to me

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1 in order that I can give a qualified answer. Just from hearing it read

2 out as a title from you, I can say nothing.

3 Q. I can show you what the document looks like, and we don't have

4 time, because of your departure, to do more than ask and have answered the

5 question, Have you read and considered it?

6 A. It should be translated into Russian. Here. Here are the

7 photographs which are familiar to me. I see here many photographs that I

8 know. You see, Mr. Prosecutor, I would be very grateful indeed if you

9 could ask me questions as you would a person who represented the Russian

10 parliament or, alternatively, as a man who was on site and an eyewitness.

11 I cannot testify on the basis of documents you are showing me so

12 perfunctorily now. I can only give you my opinion --

13 Q. Mr. Ryzhkov, please help us with this, which is why I've asked you

14 the preliminary questions: In this report, reflected also in Lord

15 Robertson's report, civilian casualties in Kosovo numbering between 488

16 and 527 are allowed for. You visited the area, and I want to know if you

17 have any material that is eyewitness, hard material to show that the

18 conclusion of that report is other than correct.

19 A. Mr. Nice, I'm repeating once again: I did not deal with these

20 issues. I never participated in exhumations. I know people who did, I

21 know people who pulled out corpses, made conclusions. I know the Finnish

22 team. But specifically, specifically I repeat once again, I did not deal

23 with these issues myself. This did not fall within the purview of my

24 missions. I went there as a politician and a public figure, not as an

25 expert who has to determine what kind of shots caused death to those

1 people.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ryzhkov, would you just confirm for me that

3 the latest time that you can be here is 9.30 if you are to make your

4 flight.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I appreciate it very

6 much that you are reminding the Court for the second time that I really do

7 have to leave within three minutes in order to make my plane. There is a

8 session of the senate tomorrow to which I am reporting, and I therefore

9 have to be in Moscow by that time in order to make that trip. Therefore,

10 I would be grateful if you could give me the possibility --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.

12 Mr. Nice.

13 MR. NICE: I've got about two more questions in the time,

14 Mr. Ryzhkov. The first is this: Greater Serbia. You only spoke to

15 Karadzic twice and obviously had limited contact with him. You spoke to

16 the accused more often. Do you accept that the overall plan of the Serbs

17 and the Bosnian Serbs would have involved the linking of lands dominated

18 by Serbs to Serbia, making for a larger territory than the present or then

19 existing Serbia? Do you accept that?

20 A. That was not my impression. As I said yesterday and I repeat now,

21 I met twice in my life with Mr. Karadzic, in 1993 and 1994, and after that

22 I never saw him again. In the past ten years, I did not see him. And I

23 repeat once again that at that time I had the impression that Karadzic was

24 unhappy with the position held by Mr. Milosevic, President Milosevic. And

25 answering specifically your questioning whether I had the impression that

1 everything was being done to annex a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to

2 Serbia, I had absolutely no such impression. And to the best of my

3 understanding of all these issues, I believe this is pure fabrication.

4 Q. Very well.

5 A. There was a civil war in one of the former republics, and what you

6 are saying I absolutely cannot confirm. I believe it is untrue.

7 Q. I've got two more questions, actually. Your first meeting with

8 the accused was in March 1993. We have evidence from stenographically

9 recorded notes of his explaining only a couple of months earlier how he

10 intended through the process of negotiation to maintain de jure, in law,

11 what he'd already obtained on the ground in fact. Did he explain his plan

12 to you in those terms, that he wanted to keep by negotiation what he'd

13 already got?

14 A. Mr. Nice, Your Honours, please take into account the following:

15 Yesterday, when I testified before you all about my activities over 11

16 years when I cooperated and had contacts with Yugoslavia, I said at the

17 outset I never was directly involved with issues concerning Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina. I did not deal with it, and I cannot give you a qualified

19 answer as to what whose position was, whether I agree with Vance and Owen

20 or not, because I didn't deal with it. It wasn't my job. You asked me

21 whether I met with Karadzic. Yes, I did. What kind of questions were

22 raised in that discussion I have already told you. I can't you tell you

23 any more and please don't ask me any more questions about Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina because I can't answer them.

25 MR. NICE: In light of that answer, I don't think I need trouble

1 the witness any further.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, any re-examination? I would

3 encourage you not to re-examine in light of the logistical problems with

4 which the witness is faced.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course. Of course I do not have

6 any intention of detaining Mr. Ryzhkov any further. I just wish to thank

7 him for his testimony.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ryzhkov, that concludes your testimony, and

9 you may leave.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours.

11 Thank you very much indeed.

12 [The witness withdrew]

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Your next witness, Mr. Milosevic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hereby call witness Leonid Gregori

15 Ivasov.

16 [The witness entered court]

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

19 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.

21 WITNESS: LEONID GREGORI IVASOV

22 [Witness answered through interpreter]

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

24 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General Ivasov.

1 A. Good morning.

2 Q. Could you please state your full name.

3 A. My name is Leonid Gregori Ivasov.

4 Q. Please give us a few main facts from your biography.

5 A. I was born on the 31st of August, 1943, in Kyrgyz Republic in the

6 Soviet Union. When I was 17, I entered military school. I served in the

7 army, following which I completed the military academy. Once again

8 following that, I continued serving in the army, and from the December of

9 1976, I worked in the central administration of the Ministry of Defence of

10 Soviet Union. I was at the head of the Ministry of Defence, was chief of

11 the international affairs section within the Ministry of Defence, and once

12 the Soviet Union fell apart, I was at the head of the department dealing

13 with the newly independent states. And starting in 1996, I was appointed

14 head of the main directorate of international military cooperation of the

15 Russian Federation. At the same time, I dealt with military analyses and

16 military sciences. I hold a Ph.D. in the field of military sciences. In

17 2002, I left my post within the Ministry of Defence, and since then I have

18 been with the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. I am a vice-chairman

19 there, and at the same time I teach in various military academies.

20 While I was the head of military department within the newly

21 independent states, I dealt with contacts, meetings, organised with the

22 Ministries of Defence of many countries. I took part directly in various

23 negotiations, including negotiations in Yugoslavia, specifically in

24 Kosovo. I had numerous contacts with NATO, with American military

25 representatives, and I also took part in numerous international

1 conferences.

2 Is that sufficient, Mr. President?

3 Q. Yes, General Ivasov, that's right. And let me just clarify that

4 you're first vice-chairman of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues; is that

5 right?

6 A. Yes, that's right. I'm first vice-chairman of the Academy of

7 Geopolitical Issues of Russia.

8 Q. And you're a colonel general?

9 A. Yes. My military rank is colonel general in reserve.

10 Q. Were you intensely involved in issues dealing with Yugoslavia and

11 the Balkan region for a period of time?

12 A. Yes, absolutely. Starting in 1996, I, within my military duties,

13 was involved in the situation in the Balkans. To be more precise, I dealt

14 with the situation developing in Kosovo and around Kosovo. And as such I

15 had multiple contacts with all countries which were interested or perhaps

16 not interested in resolving the problems there.

17 Q. Did you receive detailed information on all events in Kosovo?

18 When I say "detailed," I'm referring both to confidential and secret

19 information.

20 A. Yes. I received various types of information which was based on

21 intelligence sources of intelligence services. It was also based on my

22 continuous meetings with high military and political officials of various

23 countries including NATO Member States. I received that information

24 through the work of analytical centres within Russia and other countries,

25 and in addition to that I received my information from the international

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1 conferences in which I took part or my subordinates did.

2 I also received information directly from my contacts with

3 President Milosevic, from Chief of Staff, and high officials, military

4 officials of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I also received information

5 from the Verification Mission in which my subordinate officers took part.

6 Q. Were you involved in any analysis? Did you take part in drafting

7 any documents and the like?

8 A. Yes. That was my duty; namely, to analyse the situation unfolding

9 in Yugoslavia, to make conclusions, and to report to the minister of

10 defence and the president. In early 1998, in order to analyse the

11 situation around Kosovo, a special analytical centre was established in my

12 directorate, and it dealt specifically with those issues. And the

13 documents generated were sent to the Main Staff and the president of

14 Russia.

15 Q. In order to clarify, General Ivasov, you've already told us that

16 you had regular and numerous contacts with the military leadership of

17 Yugoslavia. As far as I know, you and I met seven times. We had seven

18 various meetings.

19 A. Yes, Mr. President. You and I met seven times with the delegation

20 of the Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and while I was

21 in Yugoslavia as the head of military delegation, we had constant, almost

22 daily contact with the leadership of the Main Staff of the Federal

23 Republic of Yugoslavia. This was both telephone contact and direct

24 personal contact. We exchanged views on the situation, we attentively

25 listened to your military officials and ours, and we conveyed results of

1 our analysis and other information to the Main Staff of the Yugoslav

2 People's Army.

3 Q. Please tell me, did you have frequent contacts with the military

4 officials of NATO countries?

5 A. Yes, these contacts were also regular, and as the situation in

6 Kosovo and in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became more tense, the

7 contacts became more frequent. I took part in the meetings between Russia

8 and NATO. I took part in bilateral meetings between minister of defence

9 of Russia and ministers of defence of NATO countries. I personally met

10 with ministers of defence of those countries and with top military

11 officials of those countries. I also had frequent contact with

12 Mr. Solana, with Mr. Robertson, who were general-secretaries of NATO. In

13 addition to that, with the chairman of military committee of NATO and

14 other officials of the alliance.

15 Q. Now let us be more precise about the time period I want to refer

16 to now. Could it be said that the Russian side very closely followed the

17 events in Kosovo in 1997, 1998, and 1999?

18 A. Yes, that's right, Mr. President. We intensified information

19 activity in that region. We also intensified our staff within the Russian

20 embassy in Belgrade and gathered information from various sources in order

21 to have an objective picture of what was going on, in order to conclude

22 what were the intentions of all sides involved, especially the terrorist

23 organisation KLA, in order to define what were the channels of weapons

24 entering Kosovo, in order to locate camps and training bases where

25 terrorists were trained, and also in order to locate what were the sources

1 that provided military, political, and financial source -- support to the

2 KLA.

3 Q. Before I put a question related to what you've just told us,

4 please describe briefly the then-situation in Kosovo.

5 A. The -- at the end of 1998, we had a full picture of what was going

6 on in Kosovo. General Staff of Russia and my directorate analysed the

7 situation, and based on the information obtained, based on consultations

8 with various military experts from various countries, we concluded that as

9 far as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was concerned, there was a broad

10 plan to destroy the country, to discredit military and political

11 leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aimed at seceding Kosovo

12 from Serbia and Yugoslavia, separating it from those two countries.

13 We also saw the interaction of various forces. First of all, we

14 saw that in the process of establishing KLA and destabilisation of the

15 situation, a Mafia was established, an international Mafia and a Caucasian

16 Mafia, which wanted to establish its strongholds in Pristina and Albania

17 in order to distribute drugs throughout Europe.

18 Analysing the information, we also concluded that the National

19 Security Council of the United States, back in 1997, adopted a decision to

20 carry out a military operation against Yugoslavia. The plan of that

21 operation was aimed at conducting a very powerful psychological war

22 against Yugoslavia aimed at disrupting the negotiations and inform the

23 international community about what was going on in Kosovo as well as to

24 prepare the international public for the impeding military operation.

25 This plan and these conclusions were reported by us to the

1 leadership of our country, and we also warned the leadership of

2 Yugoslavia.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you because the narrative has gone

4 on too long. It's time for more specific questions to be put.

5 I wanted to ask you whether information that you received which

6 led you to these conclusions, was that gathered exclusively from the

7 Russian embassy in Belgrade?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I will be

9 brief. This information originated not only from the Russian embassy. We

10 received it through daily contacts with NATO representatives. We also

11 received that information through our contacts with other states which

12 were not NATO Member States, and also from open sources.

13 After analysing this information, we reached this conclusion that

14 there was a broad plan to carry out this operation against Yugoslavia, the

15 operation that I've just described.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please ask specific questions to

17 elicit answers. The narrative approach is probably more understandable

18 with a witness as to fact. I think for this witness you need to ask

19 specific questions to elicit answers. Yes.

20 Mr. Nice.

21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may I make an observation about the last

22 long answer of this witness, which came out in a very coherent way,

23 probably - no objection to this - prepared. I intentionally didn't object

24 midway, although I think it's obvious that this evidence or evidence of

25 this kind is extremely problematic and probably inadmissible in -- under

1 many approaches, which is one of the reasons I rise now. By letting this

2 answer be given, it shouldn't be assumed that I'm accepting its

3 admissibility.

4 It's problematic for the following reason or reasons: First, it's

5 clear that the witness, in his conclusions, has relied on a whole range of

6 material, including secret material, which hasn't been provided to us,

7 presumably isn't available to us, and upon which I'm quite incapable of

8 cross-examining.

9 Second, connected to the first point, in reality, the witness is

10 giving an expert opinion, because he is saying, without specifically

11 holding himself out as an expert, he's saying, "I and my team have

12 analysed a large amount of material, and this is our conclusion."

13 Now, amongst the conclusions that he has reached is the very

14 strong conclusion, whether it has any relevance to the case being another

15 matter, the very strong conclusion that the plan of the operation was

16 aimed at conducting a powerful psychological war against Yugoslavia, and

17 this is accredited or discredited to the United States.

18 I -- even if I had a report in advance or a statement in advance

19 of detail, I wouldn't necessarily have been able to do any more than I

20 will be able to do later today, because only with the supporting material

21 and the opportunity to analyse it could one make any sensible approach to

22 this type of evidence.

23 I didn't stop it, and I -- intentionally because I wanted to see

24 what it was the witness intended or wished to say, but I must invite Your

25 Honours to say that we are in very difficult territory. Obviously the

1 easiest way to deal with the problem is to say that evidence of this sort

2 simply isn't admissible for a range of reasons, including the two I've

3 identified, but I am in the Chamber's hands. What I can say is that my

4 ability to cross-examine on this sort of conclusion is pretty well nil.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.

6 Mr. Milosevic, you heard two objections made by Mr. Nice. Let me

7 hear from you and then we will consider it.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not agree with these

9 objections. This is a very competent witness whose job it was to be aware

10 of all the information. As you could see, he prepared information and

11 analysis for the president of the state and the General Staff, and all

12 secret, confidential federation passed through his hands, all information

13 available to the Russian Federation. This is a highly credible witness,

14 both in view of his entire career and the post he held and the information

15 he had at his disposal.

16 General Ivasov, precisely because he knew all of the information,

17 was unable to leave Russia for quite a long time, and this is the first

18 time that he was able to leave the country and come here to testify,

19 excluding various official visits. So this is a highly competent witness,

20 a witness that is very well-informed.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: What do you say about the point that he's giving

22 evidence as an expert? The point being that if he's -- I'm not finished.

23 The point is that, as you know, expert evidence has to be notified

24 beforehand.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that he's a fact witness,

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1 and the fact that in addition to that he's also very competent in his job

2 is not his fault, but he is a fact witness.

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we think the evidence is -- is

5 admissible. You make the point that some of it is based on confidential,

6 secret material to which you have no access. That's a matter which you

7 would raise in cross-examination, and it would then be for the Chamber to

8 determine how to deal with that issue. There's a whole regime of law

9 relating to access to confidential material. But the mere fact that

10 evidence may be based on confidential material doesn't make it

11 inadmissible.

12 We do not believe the witness to be an expert witness. He's -- he

13 has not been examined to suggest that he has expertise in any -- in any

14 particular area. So in conclusion, we'll admit it.

15 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: But, Mr. Milosevic, I do not want this long

17 narrative. It becomes meaningless after awhile. You must ask specific

18 questions, the witness will give a short answer, and then you move on to

19 another -- another question.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. General Ivasov, you've mentioned 1997 and the conclusion of the

23 National Security Council of the United States concerning the attack

24 against Yugoslavia. Does that mean that you can confirm here that you had

25 information at your disposal concerning the fact that way back in 1997

1 there was intention to attack Yugoslavia?

2 A. Yes, Mr. President, I confirm this. Firstly, my affirmative

3 answer is based on the analysis of the strategic of national defence of

4 the United States, especially of 1993, in which a bet was placed on the

5 military force in order to establish and not to protect the US interests

6 in the world.

7 I refer to the military charter of the United States army and

8 those documents which were in force at the time when these decisions were

9 passed. And I also base my conclusions on those materials and that data

10 which I have at my disposal.

11 Yes, indeed, at the end of 1997 a wide scale, coordinated plan was

12 being implemented, targeted at the destruction of the Federal Republic of

13 Yugoslavia. There is an analysis of political, economic, and military

14 reasons for that, and that plan was being implemented in a stage-by-stage

15 basis. In the light of the duration of that plan, I will refer only to

16 the plan of the informational and psychological warfare.

17 In the United States, there is such a rule FM33-5, which

18 prescribes the operations of informational and psychological warfare, and

19 everything which was being implemented in Yugoslavia is fully in line with

20 the provisions of that rule.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ivasov, may I ask you whether you have

22 brought any documents that evidence this plan.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have brought with me documents of

24 the General Staff, analytical documents of the General Staff of the

25 Russian Federation which were, in 2000, declassified and which were made

1 available to the public under the title "The Balkans Today and Tomorrow."

2 This was published by the edition of the General Staff of the Russian

3 Federation. It includes all the specific data and conclusions, including

4 the description of the scenario plan of those things which were being

5 applied with regards to the -- to the former Yugoslavia.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: You don't have a plan emanating from the United

7 States?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I drafted this scenario by hand,

9 this scenario plan, but it was included into the publication which I just

10 referred to.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before allowing the witness to go

12 any further with this, explain how this is relevant to the issues with

13 which we have to deal in this case.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it is relevant because

15 this witness, in addition to others, points to the fact that the decision

16 to attack Yugoslavia, to commit an aggression against Yugoslavia, was

17 adopted several years before the pretext for attack was specified. So

18 therefore, this confirms that there was an intention to commit an

19 aggression, and then through various mechanisms, including Verification

20 Mission, Rambouillet negotiations, they came up with a pretext to

21 implement this.

22 This is absolutely clear. Something was decided upon back in

23 1997, and then later it was presented as though Racak and Rambouillet in

24 March of 1999 were used as pretexts. So it is clear that those were just

25 pretexts, false reasons, and that the real reasons date back to the time

1 when the decision was made.

2 In addition to that, General quoted the document FM33-5 is the

3 document specifying those preparations to carry out informational and

4 psychological warfare on the ground. The details are contained in that

5 document.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll consider the question -- Mr. Milosevic, you

7 are not to continue. The Chamber is going to consult on the question of

8 relevance.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll allow you to carry on. Does

11 the witness have this -- the last document to which he referred, which I

12 think is an American document, a document emanating from the United

13 States.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The documents are in the United

15 States, but such documents as the strategy of the national security, the

16 military doctrine of the US army, those documents get published in open

17 press. As far as the field manuals are concerned and the instructions in

18 psychological warfare, I can say that I had them at my disposal, but I

19 believe that it would be feasible to request those documents directly from

20 the United States, because I do not have them with me at the moment. I

21 have some paragraphs or excerpts from those documents but not the full

22 texts.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is only tangentially and

24 marginally relevant. I allow it because part of your defence is that the

25 JNA and others were acting in self-defence against the NATO attack, and

1 this may be related to the NATO attack. It's on that very slim basis that

2 it is allowed. But you will appreciate that the evidence will not be of

3 much value to your case if the witness cannot substantiate what he's

4 saying. If there is no evidence of this plan, it's of very little -- very

5 little value.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, many things are logical here.

7 This witness knows this information, and this information was known in

8 autumn of 1997, and this is what this witness was testifying about. In

9 addition to that, you've already heard some other witnesses, and you will

10 hear new witnesses who will testify about how troops were recruited for

11 war in Kosovo back in 1996. These are facts. Therefore, it will not be

12 difficult to establish a factual basis indicating that already back in

13 1996, conflict in Kosovo was predicted and supported by those who wanted

14 Yugoslavia to fall apart.

15 But let us continue further.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. In addition to this informational and psychological warfare,

18 General Ivasov, is it true that in addition to that, in parallel, a

19 military structure was being created? You knew that airports and military

20 bases were being prepared in Hungary, Macedonia, and neighbouring

21 countries in order to be used for operations against Yugoslavia. This is

22 not informational and --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is -- that is clearly leading. "You knew

24 that airports and military bases were ..." That's putting evidence in the

25 witness's mouth.

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then I will reformulate

2 my question.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. What did you know about physical preparations being carried out

5 for attack against Yugoslavia?

6 A. Yes, I was aware of this. The preparations were done in a complex

7 way. I already mentioned the information on psychological preparations,

8 but in parallel to that, certain military operations were being prepared.

9 Starting from January 1998, there was an escalation of grouping of

10 intelligence satellites of the United States, and military infrastructure

11 was being prepared. In particular, ten airfields of NATO Member States

12 expanded their operational capabilities. They were getting closer to the

13 borders. Infrastructure was being brought closer to the Yugoslav borders.

14 In particular, the military infrastructure was being set up in Macedonia,

15 in Hungary, and partially in Albania. In parallel to that, additional

16 preparations were taking place in the NATO troops.

17 All this can be characterised as the preparation for a major

18 military campaign. All these issues in particular Marshal Sergeyev and

19 myself raised at the meetings of the Russian NATO Council in particular on

20 the issues of the military pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

21 Q. When did you, General Ivasov, together with Mr. Sergeyev, raise

22 the issue of military pressure on Yugoslavia at the session of the

23 Military Council?

24 A. For the first time this issue was raised by Marshal Sergeyev in

25 May 1998, but in December 1997, at the meeting of the ministers of defence

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1 of Russia and NATO countries, General Rodionov - in those days he was

2 minister of defence - also raised this question.

3 Moreover, we transmitted some information to members of the

4 Russian NATO Council. Marshal Sergeyev offered a concrete plan of

5 settlement of the situation in Kosovo within the framework of the

6 Russia-NATO operation. And this plan included the building up of the

7 peaceful initiatives and peaceful ways of conflict settlement. However,

8 there was no unity in NATO. When minister of defence of Italy agreed with

9 the proposal of Marshal Sergeyev at the meeting of the Russian NATO

10 Council that indeed it would be -- it will be possible to concentrate on

11 the ways to seek the settlement of the Kosovo issue in a peaceful way and

12 through the establishment of a collective security model in Europe, he was

13 interrupted by the US representative, Mr. Cohen, and as a sign of protest

14 he abandoned the meeting hall.

15 So we always raised these issues. Moreover, in December 1998,

16 General Kvashnin, general of the army and Chief of the General Staff of

17 Russia, at the meeting of the military staff committee of the Russian

18 Federation, transferred to General Clark our intelligence data regarding

19 the composition of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the training camps for

20 terrorists and the routes of passage and transit and trafficking of

21 weapons through Macedonia and Albania, and suggested to concentrate the

22 joint effort on the cessation of the terrorist training activities and the

23 supply of weapons to Kosovo. He also offered a plan of joint activities

24 between Russia and NATO with the participation of the armed forces and the

25 security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

1 Mr. Clark took this with acknowledgement and gratitude, but

2 sometime later he informed us that the NATO intelligence is extremely weak

3 and is unable to confirm that data.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you go ahead with your next question.

5 Mr. Nice, is the question of the NATO air attacks on Yugoslavia,

6 is that an issue that is being challenged by the Prosecution?

7 MR. NICE: In what -- I'm sorry, I shouldn't be asking a question,

8 but I seek clarification: In what sense challenged?

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm trying to ascertain whether there is an issue

10 between the parties as to the attacks by NATO.

11 MR. NICE: Judging from the evidence of the last witness, although

12 he subsequently acknowledged he knew nothing of any detail, it would seem

13 that there may well be an issue between the parties. Whether it's

14 relevant or not is for you ultimately to decide, but issue would seem to

15 be what was the true motivation, and indeed what was the real targeting.

16 So at the moment, it would appear on the Defence case that there is an

17 issue.

18 As you will appreciate with the last witness, and indeed with an

19 earlier witness who gave some evidence that was found to be confirmed, for

20 example, in the Human Rights Watch report, we've been happy to live with

21 what we would say are neutral, independent assessments and happy to live

22 with that history, but it seems to be being challenged by the accused, so

23 I can't say there is no issue.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Go ahead.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I really have to make

1 a comment. There is a Latin saying, "difficile est saturam non scribere."

2 I can really not believe that somebody on this planet can possibly

3 challenge the fact that there was a NATO aggression against Yugoslavia.

4 Let me ask everybody in this room if they could possibly disagree. I am

5 just presenting you data.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ask your next question.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. So, General Ivasov, you not only knew in 1997 and 1998 about the

9 preparations of attack on Yugoslavia, but you also had talks about it with

10 NATO representatives at the sessions of the joint Russia-NATO Council; is

11 that correct?

12 A. Yes, Mr. President, this is so. And in NATO, we saw different

13 opinions and different approaches to this issue. In particular, the

14 majority of ministers of defence of NATO Member States did not manifest

15 any initiative or even objected against the preparation of a military

16 operation. The most active part was played by the minister of defence of

17 that United States and the minister of defence of the United Kingdom. The

18 rest were just taking a passive role, objection. And only by February

19 1999, General Zavarzin, the representative of Russia to NATO, reported to

20 me that all the ministers of defence of NATO Member States have been

21 broken and support the military aggression.

22 Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. What do you know about foreign

23 participation in the support and financing of KLA? Sorry. Sorry. I made

24 a slight mistake.

25 Before that question, I would like to ask you this: How would you

1 qualify KLA?

2 A. In all Russian official documents which were being developed by

3 the Ministry of Defence and which were reported to the leadership, the

4 Kosovo Liberation Army was referred to as an illegal military formation

5 carrying out terrorist activities; and the president of the Russian

6 Federation, the parliament and all the official ministries, were in

7 agreement with that definition.

8 The same definition was accepted, at least it was not objected

9 against, also in the Russian-NATO Council and also at the bilateral level

10 between the ministers of defence and other military and political leaders

11 of NATO Member States. And I'm not even mentioning the non-aligned or

12 neutral countries such as Finland or Sweden. Hence the definition of the

13 illegal military formation is the official -- is an official and legal

14 term or definition in Russia which we use.

15 And moreover, we believed that the leadership of the Federal

16 Republic of Yugoslavia had not only the right to combat illegal military

17 armed formations --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to stop you, Mr. Ivasov. You've

19 answered the question.

20 Move on to another question now, Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Very well, General Ivasov. You qualified the KLA as a terrorist

24 organisation. Do you know that in the West, too, it was long considered

25 to be a terrorist organisation as well?

1 A. This can be confirmed by the bilateral meetings in our contacts,

2 but this can be also confirmed by the conclusions of international

3 organisations, and I can quote here the examples both of the Contact

4 Group, which in the beginning of 1998 defined the activities of KLA as

5 terrorist activities. And the same definition, in fact, was also present

6 in our discussions with NATO. They did not refer to KLA as a terrorist

7 organisation in their official documents, but terrorist activities were

8 recorded as such. Hence, this was an international understanding or

9 recognition of the fact that KLA is an illegal terrorist organisation.

10 Q. Tell me, General Ivasov, what do you know about foreign

11 participation in the support and financing of the KLA and the activities

12 of outside sources, and the activities of the KLA?

13 A. Yes. I'm aware that support to KLA was being provided from

14 different structures, primarily from the Caucasian-Albanian-Turkish drugs

15 Mafia. This was a broad network, and in accordance with our data at the

16 initial stages of the establishment of KLA, from the funds of drug

17 trafficking, there was up to 45 per cent of the financing for the

18 procurement of armaments and supplies.

19 I also know that such an international organisation as the

20 People's Movement for the Republic of Kosovo, established as early as

21 1982, had a broad network in such countries as Germany, Switzerland and

22 other European countries and in the United States. This organisation was

23 engaged in the collection of funds for the procurement of armaments and

24 the training of terrorists.

25 We were also aware that before the commencement of the military

1 action or by the beginning of 1990 -- by the end of 1998 --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Correction by the speaker.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- the KLA had in its possession the

4 modern type of equipment and armaments that could be supplied only by the

5 Western countries. And the main armaments were procured in 1994-1996 in

6 Northern Albania when the Albanian people and Albanian rebels basically

7 managed to defeat them, and there were some weapons taken in battles and

8 there were cases of sales of weapons in Macedonia.

9 So I can confirm the participation in the -- such support being

10 accorded to the financing and procurement of arms for KLA.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivasov, in connection with the idea of a

13 psychological campaign against Yugoslavia, you mentioned a document which

14 was FM33-5. What is that document and where is it?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a document of the US army.

16 It is called "Manual on the Information and Psychological Warfare." I can

17 quote some passages from that document if Your Honour leaves me to do so.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: No. That's a matter for Mr. Milosevic or Mr. Nice

19 to take up. I just wanted to be clear about the identity of the document.

20 Thank you.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that -- is that a general manual to which

22 you're referring? It's not specifically related, is it, to Yugoslavia?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. This is a general

24 instruction manual or operational manual which is to be used for guidance

25 by political and military people. And when we were considering the

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1 situation and I had this manual available to me, it was quite obvious that

2 all the technological activities were being implemented in accordance with

3 the guidelines outlined in that manual.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll take a break now for 20

5 minutes.

6 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

7 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. Thank you.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General Ivasov, are you aware of the political objectives that

12 this terrorist organisation, KLA, held?

13 A. Yes, Mr. President, I am. First of all, the leaders of the KLA

14 never concealed their separatist ambitions, and always pursued secession

15 from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this ambition, they received

16 international or, rather, foreign support. That was their objective and

17 the tactics of their struggle.

18 Their second objective, and in this they were influenced by

19 foreign powers, was to destabilise the situation in the province, to carry

20 out terrorist activities in the territory of that province.

21 Therefore, I can confirm that their political objectives were

22 separatist and terrorist, and the methods for attaining those goals were

23 illegal activities against the law enforcement agencies.

24 Q. What do you know about the link between the KLA and NATO?

25 A. I know about such links. They existed on the official level when

1 representatives of NATO officially received representatives of this

2 separatist movement and had contacts with KLA leaders. There were also

3 informal secret meetings that took place with the mediation of NATO

4 special services. With the development of the Verification Mission,

5 Mr. Walker, too, immediately met with --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you tell us a little more about the

7 meetings that you said took place between the representatives of NATO and

8 the KLA leaders. When was this and where?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Most of these meetings took place

10 after the establishment of the Verification Mission. Our representatives

11 to the Verification Mission reported about the contacts of Mr. Walker,

12 starting with October until January, as well as the meetings of

13 representatives of NATO member countries to the Verification Mission. And

14 we received information that in that period intelligence operations were

15 carried out in the territory of the province involving jointly the

16 representatives of NATO and representatives of the KLA. They passed on

17 information about the location of police posts, army deployment, and

18 military facilities in the province, and our people also reported to us

19 about the establishment of special radio transmission devices by NATO.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: What date? Do you know the date?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This happened from the summer of

22 1998 up until the beginning of the aggression against the Federal Republic

23 of Yugoslavia. The most frequent meetings took place in the period from

24 January to March. We also know that Mrs. Albright passed on to Hashim

25 Thaci this piece of information; namely, if the KLA agrees to the

1 deployment in Kosovo of NATO troops, then she would guarantee to them the

2 implementation of a referendum.

3 I met with Mr. Walker and also raised this issue. I asked him why

4 he was meeting so often with KLA representatives, naming names, while not

5 meeting with the representatives of Serbian authorities and Serbian law

6 enforcement authorities.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: So the meetings between NATO officials and the

8 KLA were taking place before the airstrikes?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I can confirm that, Your

10 Honour.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Simultaneously, as just mentioned, NATO troops built up on our

14 borders.

15 A. Yes, that is so. I have already said that the military

16 infrastructure was being developed for a major military operation.

17 Intelligence activities were being stepped up against the Federal Republic

18 of Yugoslavia. Specifically, a regiment of special purposes of the United

19 Kingdom was transferred before the aggression to the territory of

20 Macedonia and established 80 intelligence units for radio surveillance and

21 implemented activities to gather intelligence and organise provocations.

22 The representatives of this regiment frequently met with KLA

23 representatives and jointly tried to infiltrate the territory of Kosovo.

24 Q. Is the build-up of these military activities the reason why we

25 increased the presence of our forces in that area?

1 A. In NATO plans, as the General-Secretary of NATO, Mr. Solana, said

2 more than once, it was included to implement a ground operation with broad

3 use of aviation and ground forces. To carry out a ground operation on the

4 territory of Macedonia and Albania, a powerful group of NATO forces was

5 organised, including the deployment of operative and tactical missiles, a

6 deployment of launches, and fighter helicopters as well as other powerful

7 military equipment. That also included the deployment of two groups of

8 special forces.

9 So when the representatives of NATO officially announced the

10 readiness for an airstrike and ground operation, the armed forces of

11 Yugoslavia were simply obligated, as the armed forces of any country

12 would, to prepare for defence against the aggression. And I believe that

13 the deployment of their forces and increase of their presence in the

14 province was, in my opinion, completely in conformity with the

15 constitution and with their own obligations.

16 Q. I just wish to emphasise one thing: Airstrikes, you said, plus a

17 ground operation. That means both.

18 A. Yes, that means both. And indeed, NATO was preparing for both,

19 including the ground operation. However, the ground operation didn't

20 happen for three reasons. First, there was no consensus within the NATO

21 to carry out this ground operation. There was a number of countries which

22 refused to participate. Second, by that time, major losses were inflicted

23 on the KLA by the Serb police and armed forces. And third, this ground

24 operation didn't happen because, as a result of the airstrikes, the ground

25 forces of Yugoslavia preserved their combat readiness.

1 Q. General Ivasov, is it clear, then, that our forces were mounting a

2 defence of the country? They were busy defending the country?

3 A. Yes, yes. I confirm that. Moreover, the Russian military,

4 including the Defence Minister of Russia, Marshal Sergeyev, myself, and

5 the General Staff proposed the adoption of even more extreme measures for

6 the defence of Yugoslavia's territory and the defence of the territorial

7 integrity and inviolability of its borders. That is a prerogative of

8 every country.

9 Q. I'm asking you this because claims are being made here that we

10 were building up forces in order to expel our own citizens of ethnic

11 Albanian ethnicity from the province. So was the reason for this build-up

12 our own defence or, as they allege, the expulsion of Albanians?

13 A. I assert and affirm that the Serb police and the Serb security

14 forces were forced to eliminate KLA terrorist activities in their own

15 territory. And this is something that Russia pressed the Yugoslav

16 leadership to do, because the terrorist activities of the KLA first

17 destabilised the situation in Yugoslavia. Second, it spread to the

18 territory of the neighbouring countries. And third, it caused massive

19 flows of refugees.

20 Furthermore, any terrorist act, any skirmish or shooting involving

21 both parties caused panic among the citizenry who fled for cover. And I

22 can confirm that it was precisely KLA leaders who conducted psychological

23 operations and exerted pressure on the civilian population to either join

24 the KLA or to leave the area.

25 I met in Greece with Albanian Catholics, with a family of Albanian

1 Catholics who told me that one of KLA field commanders, Adem Jashari,

2 forced Albanian Catholics to join the KLA, and anyone who refused was

3 simply physically liquidated. Therefore, failure to act by the Serbian

4 authorities was not the reason for this flow of refugees. It was the

5 terrorist activity of the KLA.

6 JUDGE KWON: General Ivasov, in an answer to the previous

7 question, you said that you and defence minister and the General Staff

8 proposed the adoption of even more extreme measures for the defence of

9 Yugoslavia. Could you give some examples of such more extreme measures.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Way back in December 1997, the

11 defence minister of Russia, General Rodionov, suggested both to President

12 Milosevic and the Chief of General Staff to increase the presence of

13 security forces and police forces in the province in order to isolate

14 terrorist groups, detect their leaders and organisers, and to stop the

15 supply of weapons and recruits across the border. We were aware that it

16 was necessary in order to avoid engaging the army of Yugoslavia in these

17 operations. However, according to our information and the information

18 available to the General Staff of Yugoslavia, it was insufficient to use

19 only the security forces. Because the situation in the country caused

20 deep concern, it was necessary to protect the borders and simultaneously

21 conduct constant operations against terrorist activity.

22 Furthermore, Marshal Sergeyev also pressed for a greater

23 engagement of police forces and even the army. I saw many military

24 reports and overviews where the main order for the army was to prevent the

25 escalation of combat operations. Always those orders included - and we

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1 criticised them for it - but they always included the clause that in case

2 of attack by terrorists, they should be called upon first to stop combat

3 and warn them that in case of failure to do so, the army would use force.

4 We, on the other hand, thought that in case of attack, one should

5 immediately open fire on the terrorists.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Do you know about the links between the KLA and the al Qaeda?

9 A. Yes. We knew that from our intelligence reports but also from the

10 information we got from representatives of Islamic countries. I had

11 regular contacts with the ambassadors of Islamic countries in Moscow,

12 including the ambassador of Iran and other officials from Iran. They

13 confirmed the links between Taliban and al Qaeda on the one hand with the

14 representatives of the KLA on the other hand. They even indicated

15 specific routes along which terrorists and weapons were infiltrated into

16 the territory of the Balkans. However, they denied any official

17 involvement of Iran or other Islamic countries in such actions except for

18 Turkey.

19 Q. As far as I know, Ambassador Seferi of Iran denied the involvement

20 of Iran but confirmed the links of Taliban and al Qaeda in his discussions

21 with you.

22 A. That's correct, Mr. President.

23 Q. Do you have any knowledge about the activities of an organisation

24 called MPRI, an American organisation including war veterans, military

25 professionals?

1 A. Yes, I know about the activities of that organisation, and I know

2 that it recruits mercenaries into different countries of the world. We

3 also located earlier recruited instructors from the USA and other

4 countries. We observed them in the northern areas of Albania, including

5 the populated areas of Tropoja and Kukes. So I can confirm that fact,

6 yes.

7 Q. When you say that you had talks with the ambassadors of Islamic

8 countries, how many ambassadors would that be; two, three, five, ten?

9 A. At least 15 ambassadors from Arabic and other Islamic countries.

10 They all agreed in the opinion that a terrorist war was going on in

11 Kosovo. Some of them did not actively take part in the discussions, just

12 tacitly agreed. However, the general opinion was that it was a terrorist

13 operation in Kosovo, that a major military operation of NATO was being

14 prepared against Yugoslavia, and the majority of the representatives of

15 the Islamic countries I spoke to confirmed this.

16 Q. Does that mean that the representatives of Islamic countries, the

17 ambassadors you spoke to in Moscow, also knew about the preparation of the

18 NATO aggression against Yugoslavia?

19 A. Yes. I hope they were aware of it, but we received this

20 confirmation also when we met with the highest officials of various

21 countries, including the president of Syria, Hafez Assad, receiving

22 Russia's Defence Minister Marshal Sergeyev, and discussing this issue

23 named the example of how they dealt with the separatists who carried out

24 an insurgency in the town of Homs with the use of heavy artillery and army

25 troops that prevented the spread of terrorism and separatism in the

1 territory of Syria.

2 Q. Tell me, what was the NATO plan? What did the top echelon of

3 Russia's military know about the NATO plan?

4 A. I would say that the complete plan of the aggression against the

5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was known by the highest officials of the

6 USA. A lot of information was available to the defence ministry and the

7 political leadership of the United Kingdom and other defence ministers of

8 NATO member countries who had less information, so they gladly received

9 the information that we gave them.

10 The essence of this was the following: The plan was to discredit

11 the political and military leadership of Yugoslavia with the aim of

12 conducting psychological and media warfare. For that purpose, the 193

13 Aviation Squadron of the national army of the US - those were propaganda

14 aircraft - were deployed in Macedonia. So a media war was started.

15 Second, in the Military Committee of NATO, preparations were made,

16 starting with 1998, of a military operation. Every defence minister knew

17 on a need-to-know basis only a certain portion involving their own

18 participation. This plan involved a relationship of alliance with the KLA

19 and the opposition in Kosovo, the build-up of intelligence gathering

20 activities, and the preparation of specific military actions. The plan

21 envisaged that in case Mr. Milosevic and the Yugoslav leadership failed to

22 accept the ultimatum involving the introduction of NATO troops, then this

23 objective would be attained by military means, which is exactly what we

24 saw.

25 Mr. Walker, too, and Mrs. Madeleine Albright and other

1 representatives of the US and NATO tried, through military pressure and

2 expansion of terrorist activities in the province of Kosovo, tried to

3 coerce the leadership into accepting this ultimatum which would violate

4 the integrity, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the

5 republic and an occupation of Yugoslavia by NATO forces.

6 The Yugoslav leadership did not agree to this, and that is why the

7 plan of military strikes was carried out.

8 Q. Tell me, General Ivasov, in very specific terms, what happened in

9 summer 1998 between NATO and Yugoslavia? What do you know about major

10 military manoeuvres organised at that time on our borders?

11 A. I know about that, Mr. President, indeed. Way back, early in May

12 1998, in the Russian NATO Council, the topic of Kosovo was discussed.

13 Russia eyewitnessed the preparation of a major wide-scale military

14 operation, and Russia's military marshal stated this at the Russia-NATO

15 Council meeting and insisted that NATO should implement the provisions of

16 the founding act governing the relations between NATO and Russia which was

17 signed in 1997. They wanted assurances from Mr. Solana, from Mr. Clark,

18 and General Shelton that Russia would participate in the analysis of the

19 situation and that NATO should not take any decisions involving military

20 pressure and even less military operations.

21 However, during the visit of Marshal Sergeyev to Greece in

22 September 1998, we saw wide-scale military drills of NATO air and ground

23 forces, and that was an unpleasant surprise for our marshal. Our

24 government recalled Marshal Sergeyev to Moscow because it was expected

25 that these drills and exercises would grow into an aggression and our

1 marshal indeed went back to Moscow, although the Greek representatives

2 assured him that there would be no aggression. Nevertheless, such conduct

3 by NATO violated not only the UN charter concerning threat of aggression

4 but also ran counter to the founding act governing the relationship

5 between NATO and Russia.

6 Q. Just to clarify, General Ivasov. Pursuant to this founding act

7 and also in accordance with the specific conversation which took place

8 between representatives of Russia and NATO representatives, NATO was

9 duty-bound to consult Russia and to inform it on any military activity so

10 that there would be no surprises such as those that Marshal Sergeyev and

11 others eyewitnessed in Greece?

12 A. Yes, that's right. That was observed in NATO. Regarding these

13 military exercises, Marshal Sergeyev sent a protest letter to ministers of

14 defence of all NATO countries. He proposed to establish a joint working

15 group in order to come up with proposals on peaceful resolution to the

16 crisis in Kosovo. Some ministers replied to that, and some ministers

17 didn't.

18 In addition to that, if Your Honour would like me to, I can give

19 you the names of the ministers of defence of NATO countries who complained

20 to Marshal Sergeyev because military pressure was exerted upon them

21 regarding a military operation.

22 Q. At the time, did you speak to NATO officials? What I have in mind

23 is Mr. Solana, Cohen, Clark, and the others.

24 A. Yes. Every time a minister of defence visited NATO, or I myself,

25 also involved meetings with general-secretary, also General Clark, and

1 other officials in Europe. All of these visits and meetings took place

2 regularly, both in Brussels and in Moscow.

3 Q. Is it true that minister of foreign affairs also put similar

4 questions within the group of eight where Russian side pointed out to the

5 Helsinki principles, UN Charter, and other international treaties?

6 A. Yes, that's right. This was done both within the NATO and Russia

7 contacts, and ministers of -- ministers of foreign affairs discussed the

8 crisis in Kosovo within the Contact Group and other groups.

9 The position of Russia was always the same. Russian

10 representatives always proposed a very complex plan for peaceful

11 resolution of the crisis in Kosovo. Russian representatives, especially

12 Russian foreign ministers, pointed out that not all peaceful and political

13 measures were used in order to resolve the situation, and they were

14 strongly opposed to the military operation.

15 Some people agreed with this position, and some people objected to

16 it, trying to blame Belgrade for everything, Belgrade and the leadership

17 of Yugoslavia. So the opinions varied. However, this was a very firm,

18 uniform position that Russia always advocated, and it was approved by

19 President Yeltsin.

20 Q. General Ivasov, please tell me, since you had at your disposal

21 various information that you've mentioned here on specific points where

22 conflicts broke out, where there was a build-up of the KLA, what routes

23 were used to bring in weapons, what assistance was received from the

24 outside, your then-Chief of Staff, General Kvashnin, in December of 1998,

25 did he convey all of this vast information to General Clark?

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1 A. Yes. Russian General Staff had such information, information on

2 several camps. I think there were a total of 11 camps where terrorists

3 had training in Northern Albania and in Kosovo.

4 He also reported on warehouses where ammunition and weapons were

5 kept. He also quoted five routes used for supply of weapons, narcotics,

6 and also routes used for troops in order to move in from Albania and

7 Macedonia. All of these routes led to Kosovo.

8 This information was conveyed to General Clark. This was specific

9 military information conveyed to him.

10 We decided to convey this information to NATO so that through

11 joint effort we could put an end to terrorist activity of the KLA and

12 disrupt the support routes for the KLA. This was unprecedented measure

13 taken by the Russian General Staff.

14 Unfortunately, General Clark referred to weak information of NATO

15 intelligence which was not true and refused to discuss this issue.

16 Intelligence services of NATO were quite powerful. Intelligence

17 satellites of USA were increased from ten to 30. And in addition to that,

18 they also established various new information -- intelligence groups. So

19 therefore, the fact that -- the claim that NATO intelligence was weak was

20 not true.

21 Q. As far as I know, it took one month from the minute this

22 information was conveyed to General Clark for him to answer that, despite

23 all resources at their disposal, they could not confirm that information.

24 A. Yes, that's right. However, General Zavarzin, Russian

25 representatives in NATO, tried to cooperate with the representatives of

1 the Military Committee of NATO based on this information to have some

2 bilateral context. And it turned out that Klaus Naumann and other

3 generals within that committee knew nothing about this information,

4 whereas General Clark confirmed what I previously told you.

5 Q. Therefore, not -- even those who were within the inner circle knew

6 nothing about that information.

7 A. Yes. We did not receive any information telling us that Russian

8 information was analysed and discussed.

9 Q. Through your representatives within the Verification Mission, were

10 you able to find out whether the information given to General Clark was

11 passed on to Verification Missions so that it could verify what was going

12 on in Kosovo?

13 A. No. We did not receive any such confirmation. Our officers who

14 worked within the mission had this information, and they tried to convey

15 this information to representatives of other countries within the mission.

16 However, they received no support from them.

17 Moreover, representatives of NATO countries in Verification

18 Mission first of all reported to the Verification Mission staff the data

19 that was not objective. In addition to that, they conducted intelligence

20 activities aimed at establishing coordinates of police forces, military

21 facilities, and so on. And we knew that they had the equipment needed to

22 establish such information.

23 There were many honest people in the mission, both from NATO

24 countries and neutral countries, but there were also others who conducted

25 intelligence activities that would assist the future NATO air raids.

1 Q. General Ivasov, these exercises in Greece, if I understand your

2 explanation well, were seen by Russian top military leadership as a clear

3 intention of NATO to enter Yugoslavia, and that was obvious back in the

4 middle of 1998, wasn't it?

5 A. Yes, that's right. Reports of the Ministry of Defence of Russia

6 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were conveyed to President Yeltsin, and he

7 agreed with such reports. That was the information at the disposal of

8 Russian authorities, and based on that they defined their positions. The

9 negotiations taking place and the deployment of Verification Mission was

10 just a smokescreen needed to conceal the preparations for the aggression.

11 In addition to that, I would like to point out that Yugoslav

12 leadership, when conducting negotiations with Holbrooke, with Clark, with

13 Solana and others, made serious concessions detracting from their

14 sovereignty. Instead of increasing political activities, NATO and the

15 international community did nothing about the intensification of KLA

16 terrorist activities which became even more intensive when OSCE mission

17 was deployed to the area. Therefore, we concluded that Verification

18 Mission agreements signed in October by Holbrooke and Milosevic, as well

19 as other agreements, were made just in order to conceal the preparation of

20 aggression.

21 In negotiations, Mr. Solana and Mr. Clark more and more frequently

22 indicated that military operation was unavoidable. Mr. Walker, in late

23 1998, publicly stated that Serbs have no business in Kosovo.

24 Q. The threats were increasing, troops were building up, Yugoslavia

25 was under UN sanctions when it came to weapons procurement. Was that what

1 the situation was?

2 A. Yes. That's exactly what the situation was. General Ojdanic,

3 Pavle Bulatovic, minister of defence of Yugoslavia, they criticised us

4 Russian officials for the fact that the KLA was increasing its forces

5 whereas Yugoslav army could not even receive spare parts for its

6 equipment. We discussed these issues within NATO, and we pointed out that

7 there was no equality of arms there. On one hand, we had illegal

8 terrorist organisation which was becoming stronger by the day, training

9 its forces, whereas on the other hand, Yugoslav People's Army was not

10 allowed to do the same. We considered this to be one element of the

11 aggression preparation aimed at weakening Yugoslav armed forces.

12 Q. Did the leadership of Yugoslavia apply to Russia for military

13 assistance?

14 A. There were no such applications made at the official level.

15 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia complied with the sanctions which, in my

16 view, were not grounded. And these were sanctions imposed by the Security

17 Council of the United Nations.

18 The officers of the Yugoslav People's Army blamed us for

19 facilitating the aggression and the KLA, which was NATO's ally.

20 Q. When the aggression commenced, what was the position of the

21 Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian military leadership?

22 A. First of all, I will tell you that the president of Russia, Boris

23 Yeltsin, on the 25th of March, called NATO strikes an act of aggression.

24 And this was the position to be taken by all other ministries. Ninety per

25 cent of Russian population also saw this as an act of aggression. Whereas

1 the head of Russian Orthodox church, Patriarch Alexei II, on the 25th of

2 March, 1999, called this a sin before God and a crime which was a

3 violation of international law.

4 We carefully studied the legal provisions of the UN Charter and

5 the provisions of the General Assembly from 1974. I even carefully

6 analysed the documents of Nuremberg trials. All of those documents

7 indicated that an aggression was being carried out against an independent

8 state. That was the only position taken by Russia.

9 Q. At the time, did the build-up of NATO forces in Macedonia

10 continue?

11 A. Yes. The build-up of forces in Macedonia and Albania continued

12 from the beginning of the aggression, and they were creating an attack

13 group to commence an attack against Yugoslavia. We were able to observe

14 that.

15 In the second phase of airstrikes starting in May, the build-up

16 slowed down. We received information from the ministers of defence of

17 NATO countries indicating that there would be no ground operation as there

18 was no consensus among NATO states.

19 Armed forces of Yugoslavia, except for air forces, did not suffer

20 major losses. Therefore, plans were made not to go ahead with ground

21 campaign, but up until that time, the build-up was increasing, yes.

22 Q. Could you tell us briefly, what did you discuss with Walker when

23 he came to see you, based on my information, on the 12th of February,

24 1999?

25 A. On the 12th of February, I did see Mr. Walker, and the first

1 question I put to him was why Russian representatives within the mission

2 were not allowed to present objective information. Why is it that in the

3 mission reports only opinions of NATO representatives were including --

4 included, disregarding Russian, Ukrainian, Swedish, and Finnish opinions?

5 Mr. Walker replied that it was difficult to work because the only unarmed

6 people in Kosovo were the mission members, and the rest of those present

7 there were armed. And when I asked him who was it that armed the KLA, Mr.

8 Walker said that there were various, numerous sources, and he wouldn't

9 detail them.

10 The second question we discussed was what were the perspectives of

11 political solution to the problem in Kosovo. Mr. Walker replied that by

12 springtime of 1999, the situation in Kosovo would collapse and that

13 military operation was unavoidable. And this is when he told me what I

14 have described earlier, that Serbs have no business being in Kosovo.

15 Q. So that was his position, that Serbs should leave Kosovo. You

16 understood him quite well, didn't you?

17 A. Yes. That was the position stated publicly somewhat earlier by

18 him, and then after that he confirmed it to me.

19 The third issue I discussed with him had to do with intelligence

20 activities of the representatives of several countries within the mission

21 which was undertaken in the territory of Kosovo. He refused to confirm

22 that, claiming that he was not aware of the situation.

23 Q. You have just mentioned that you asked him how the Albanian

24 terrorists in Kosovo armed themselves and that he didn't know what to

25 reply, he didn't know how that was done.

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1 A. Yes, that's right. He mentioned weapons from the Second World War

2 which allegedly had been left there. He also mentioned some other sources

3 that he knew nothing about, but he firmly denied that NATO countries and

4 the United States supplied the weapons, and those were the countries that

5 he represented.

6 Q. Did you have information indicating that they did supply weapons

7 to them?

8 A. Yes. Yes. This was indirect information. In the territory of

9 Kosovo in Northern Albania, sniper rifles were discovered, mortars, also

10 night vision equipment, and also portable missile launchers manufactured

11 by NATO countries.

12 I don't have direct information, I only have indirect information

13 that at least from the territory of Turkey these weapons were supplied

14 either through official or unofficial channels. Certain weapons could

15 have come from Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as these

16 countries started using new NATO weaponry.

17 Q. The same question on arming terrorists in Kosovo were put by

18 Marshal Sergeyev on the 18th of February to Minister Scharping, the

19 minister of defence of Germany. What was his reply?

20 A. Yes. I can confirm that this question was put to Minister

21 Scharping. Minister Scharping also avoided answering it. He confirmed

22 the fact that the weaponry was reaching terrorists in the area in large

23 numbers, but he did not confirm that the source of those weapons was in

24 NATO countries. He advised that channels originating from Middle East and

25 Caucasus Mountains should be carefully monitored.

1 Q. In view of the fact that Russia was a member of the Verification

2 Mission, that Russian representatives worked within that mission, could

3 you please tell us what you think is most important and has to do with the

4 work of that mission and the position of Russian representatives within

5 that mission.

6 A. Russia agreed to establish that mission, bearing in mind that the

7 activities of that mission should facilitate the peaceful resolution.

8 When over 1.000 members of that mission were deployed to the region, it

9 turned out that they were unarmed, that they had no protection, that their

10 freedom of movement was limited, and that it was very difficult to gather

11 objective information. However, despite that, Russia undertook all

12 measures aimed at ensuring that its representatives would be able to

13 collect objective information, and this is what they did.

14 But let me point out once again that the representatives sent

15 their reports both to the headquarters of the mission and to Moscow. To

16 our surprise, we learned that in interim reports and the final report, the

17 objective mission of Russian, Finnish, Swedish, and Ukrainian

18 representatives was disregarded. Therefore, we sent these documents to

19 the OSCE directly and to various legal organisations, and in December of

20 1998, I discussed this with our representatives in the mission,

21 Mr. Ivanovski. I asked him why our opinion was disregarded. On the 12th

22 of February, the same question was put to Mr. Walker, and on the 18th of

23 February, minister of defence of Russia put that question to Minister

24 Scharping as well. Therefore, we pressured, trying to ensure that the

25 information in Kosovo was presented unbiased.

1 We asked Mr. Walker how come he met mostly with the

2 representatives of the KLA, representatives of Albanian population. We

3 asked him why only refugees in Albania and in Macedonia were interviewed,

4 and the opinion of various other organisations were disregarded, and how

5 come Mr. Walker rarely met with the representatives of Serbs and other

6 ethnicities in Kosovo. He blamed it on the fact that he had very little

7 time.

8 Q. From what you're saying, General Ivasov, can I conclude that it is

9 based -- that based on the results of research and investigation by your

10 services, Walker's reports were not objective?

11 A. Yes, I can confirm this. Moreover, when we suggested to him to

12 strengthen the mission and to ensure security and to activate the

13 activities, Mr. Walker would not agree to that.

14 Q. What can one say, then, about the reports of Human Rights Watch if

15 the reports of the KVM, the Kosovo Verification Mission were not

16 objective?

17 MR. NICE: There is a limit to --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: He hasn't said that, Mr. Milosevic. Your

19 previous question was whether Ambassador Walker's reports were objective,

20 and he confirmed that they were not objective.

21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, what I'm --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you're not asking about the reports of Human

23 Rights Watch on the basis that the reports of the KVM, the Kosovo

24 Verification Mission, were not objective. I think Mr. Nice is objecting

25 that's --

1 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. I haven't take any point with the

2 range of opinion evidence coming in. The immediate -- the preceding

3 question was, of course, leading in form, but the latest question would

4 appear to be a request for an opinion. Whether that's admissible at all,

5 derived by the process of deduction from his previously expressed opinion,

6 and I would invite the Chamber to say maybe the time has come to draw a

7 limit, to draw a line.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I refer not only to my own opinion,

9 but I -- but I can also quote the OSCE report. Kosovo, as it was seen, as

10 it was also described in the October 1998, 1999, I will quote: "Before

11 the operation, many of the Serb authorities and the law enforcement bodies

12 were acting rigidly only in the areas of the location of the KLA military

13 bases. The punitory operations were directed only against terrorist and

14 separatist organisations openly advocating --"

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you, General.

16 Mr. Milosevic, if he is to give evidence about the objectivity of

17 the KVM, and we have heard evidence here from the KVM, it's a matter of

18 some importance. You would have to establish basis for that analysis, for

19 that evaluation by him.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, General Ivasov has

21 told you clearly here that the Russian members of the Verification Mission

22 were subordinated to him. So at the top of the military pyramid in the

23 chain of command there was General Ivasov himself, precisely over the

24 Russian members of the Verification Mission. So he's basing his testimony

25 on the reports of his subordinates who are directly located in Kosovo and

1 who told him that Walker did not take into account their reports and that

2 they could not find their information in the collective reports that went

3 to Vienna.

4 I hope that it is beyond reasonable doubt in anyone's mind that

5 this was a manipulation.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Put to him the question about the KVM. Mr. Nice

7 will be able to cross-examine on it.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. The reports of the Russian members of the Verification Mission,

10 were they taken into account and treated equally as others by William

11 Walker and his associates?

12 A. The main issue with which we could not agree, to which the Russian

13 officials and other members of the verification mission could not agree

14 was who was the initiator of the terrorist activities, the aggressive

15 terrorist activities? We believe that the initiators were the KLA, some

16 political opposition forces in Kosovo, and some external forces. The

17 representatives of NATO states tried to prove the opposite; that they

18 wanted to prove the KLA and to say that they were illegal formations they

19 -- which were trying to oppose the infringements from the side of the

20 Serbian police forces.

21 We were showing to them the fact that the Serb law enforcement

22 bodies and the army were undertaking only activities to rebuff those

23 actions and were only acting in retaliation. And they were trying to

24 prevent the spread of instability and terrorist activities.

25 Unfortunately, Mr. Walker, in his report, blamed everything on the

1 Yugoslav authorities and the Serbian population. This is the main

2 contradiction.

3 I can quote here --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, your next question.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. So the findings of your members of the Verification Mission,

9 Mr. Ivasov, if I understood correctly, was that the forces of our country

10 only reacted to terrorism.

11 A. Yes, I confirm that.

12 Q. Let us move on then.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Before doing so, are you saying there are documents

14 that demonstrate this?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there are documents, and

16 primarily this will be the orders of the General Staff of the Yugoslav

17 People's Army, the orders to the Pristina Corps, and other official

18 documents where the armed forces and the police forces were tasked to

19 prevent the escalation of the conflict, to isolate terrorists, and to

20 protect the peaceful or civilian population. We have such orders.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but what I was thinking of, were

22 reports prepared by your representatives within the KVM which were then

23 not transmitted to the OSCE headquarters?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Such reports were oral, transmitted

25 by telephone or in writing in the form of documents, and some of those

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1 documents and some of that information was also transmitted to the OSCE

2 directly. And in the report which I already mentioned, we also reflected

3 our position.

4 Moreover, the international human rights organisation Human Rights

5 Watch also may draw a conclusion that the conclusions of the OSCE

6 commission were biased, and we agreed to that. Our representatives also

7 participated in the work of that commission.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you bringing any evidence to

9 support what the witness has confirmed in response to your question, which

10 is that your forces only reacted to terrorism or, rather, that the Russian

11 members of the Verification Mission reported that your forces, the

12 Yugoslav forces, only reacted to terrorism? Are you going to bring any

13 evidence to support that?

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Naturally. Naturally. I also have

15 in mind witnesses, officials of our police and our army, as well as

16 witnesses from Kosovo. I cannot enumerate all the others now, but this is

17 a very important witness we have here because he represents the military

18 leadership of Russia, which is the spot where all the information was --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- gathered, especially during these

21 events in Kosovo.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was saying that you might have been able to

23 adduce that evidence through this witness, but it's a matter for you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As regards the evidence of this

25 witness, I hope that it is entirely clear. I don't know if you seek proof

1 indicating whether General Ivasov is speaking the truth. Is that what you

2 want me to prove here?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it's a matter for you how you conduct your

4 case, but he has made an important statement, and the Chamber will have to

5 assess to determine the weight to be attached to it, and naturally the

6 Chamber will give greater weight to it if it is backed up by documentary

7 evidence.

8 We're going to take the break now, Mr. Milosevic. We'll break for

9 20 minutes.

10 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

11 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. General, you want to say something?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to say

14 that I will be brief, because tomorrow I need to fly to Moscow. I have

15 international commitments to be this week in Copenhagen, in Denmark, and

16 therefore I would like to plead with you to bear this in mind.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: What time tomorrow?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My flight is scheduled for 11.00

19 a.m.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.

21 MR. NICE: If it assists the Court, this is a witness who

22 obviously I could apply to have put back for another day for

23 cross-examination and make all the inquires that I'd like to make, and I

24 would forecast that I'd have a fairly strong application if I chose to

25 make that application. Experience of doing that in earlier parts of trial

1 shows how extremely inconvenient it is, how difficult it is to remember

2 the evidence on the second session, and so on, and my intention is to

3 prepare myself this afternoon to the degree I can to bring the

4 cross-examination of this witness to a conclusion tomorrow, because I'm

5 sure that will be satisfactory. I can't guarantee that I shan't make an

6 application to have him brought back on another day, but I'll do my best.

7 There is, of course, absolutely no way he can -- I can finish with

8 his cross-examination today.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I have much sympathy for what you have

10 said.

11 Mr. Milosevic, you cannot run your case like this. You must bring

12 to the attention of the Chamber any difficulties that your witnesses have

13 in terms of transportation and getting back to their homeland. This

14 witness, in my view, is an important witness, and I would expect

15 cross-examination to be fairly lengthy.

16 What was the times that you had scheduled for this witness?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A bit more than three hours, but I

18 obviously need more time than that.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General Ivasov, is there any possibility for you to fly to Moscow

21 tomorrow evening? There must be a flight in the evening so that we can

22 continue working tomorrow.

23 A. Yes, if the staff of the personnel assists me to rebook my tickets

24 for the evening flight, this would be possible.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll ask the Victims and Witnesses Unit to

1 look into that, yes.

2 Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was just raising the question with my

6 colleagues as to whether indeed his testimony will be finished tomorrow.

7 It was pointed out to me that tomorrow is the last day, in any event, so

8 that in that case, he would have to return if his testimony is not

9 concluded.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Robinson, I will

11 bear your suggestion in mind, that as many documents need to be prepared

12 in advance and distributed as possible, although I think that the evidence

13 given by Mr. Ivasov is authoritative enough, but I would like to ask

14 General Ivasov whether he has any documents on him --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Since you are representing yourself, I'm going to

16 make this intervention. His evidence is important evidence. He has

17 touched upon what I consider to be a very important point, that is the

18 objectivity of the reports of the Verification Mission, because a lot of

19 the Prosecution case is based on that. He has come here to say that the

20 reports are not objective, and he says that on the basis of the fact that

21 the Russian soldiers who were part of the Verification Mission reported to

22 him that their reports were not taken into account in the overall report

23 from the mission to the OSCE. Now, I consider that to be very important.

24 The Chamber would be able to attach much more weight to this

25 evidence if you were to bring evidence to support that, either documentary

1 evidence or evidence from any of the -- any of the Russian officers who

2 were a part of that mission to establish that their reports were not taken

3 into account. Because in my view, the objectivity of the KVM is a very

4 important factor in this case.

5 So that -- don't rely entirely on his evidence on this point. If

6 you have other evidence to bring, it will boost your case, if you can, to

7 confirm the point that you are making.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand what you're saying,

9 Mr. Robinson. I have every intention to call several other Russian

10 witnesses, and I just asked General Ivasov whether he has now with him any

11 documents which can be used to support what he has been saying here. If

12 not, we can get those documents subsequently. And I will have other

13 witnesses who will give similar evidence.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A number of my arguments were

15 reflected in the publication of the General Staff of Russia, which I have

16 here with me. I also have copies of two orders of the Pristina Corps

17 which I could tomorrow tender in, or even today after this session.

18 However, those are copies, those are not the original documents.

19 I could do this, bearing in mind that today I'm -- that today I'm

20 not in military service, I need time in order to have the official

21 authorities confirm the reports of our representatives in the mission.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Please tell me very briefly, General Ivasov, why did the

1 Verification Mission leave Kosovo?

2 A. I believe that as far as the imitation [Realtime transcript read

3 in error "invitation"] of the peace-making process, and I would like to

4 outline the imitation [Realtime transcript read in error "invitation"] of

5 the peace-making process, I believe that that mission managed to fulfil

6 its tasks in that area, and it also provided a reason for the

7 implementation of the plan for the military operation against Yugoslavia.

8 That is why it was evacuated in advance prior to the commencement of the

9 aggression. Hence, the mission managed to fulfil its objectives; namely,

10 to create a cover-up and to create the reasons for aggression. It also

11 conducted its intelligence part of the mission; it managed to outline the

12 objects which could serve as targets for the assaults, and hence the

13 mission was disbanded prematurely.

14 JUDGE KWON: For the record, it is invitation of the peace-making

15 process, or imitation of the peace-making process?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Correction by the interpreter: Imitation.

17 JUDGE KWON: It should be "imitation."

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was the creation of the reason

19 for a military operation under the cover-up of peaceful diplomatic

20 conditions. So they were creating a pretext for a military operation.

21 This was part of the overall plan of the military operation with a view to

22 shape the public opinion that the peace process is furthermore not

23 possible, and the Verification Mission fulfilled those tasks.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. What happened in Racak, General Ivasov? What was Racak?

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1 MR. NICE: I think it might be a good idea to establish first the

2 level of hearsay that we're going into and the nature of witness's source

3 of information.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, by this time -- yes.

5 Mr. Milosevic, by this time, you should have gathered that you have to lay

6 a foundation for these things. It is true that we accept hearsay here,

7 but you have to establish some foundation.

8 He wasn't at Racak, presumably, so how did he come by this

9 information about Racak? You have to get that from him.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the basis for acquiring

11 information on Racak was also, among other things, the Verification

12 Mission plus the Observers Mission --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I've stopped you. We've been

14 through this before. It's a technique. You have to elicit through the

15 witness information which shows the basis for the evidence that he's going

16 to give. You're not to tell me, to tell the Court. I'm not asking you to

17 tell me, because you're not a witness. You have to ask him questions

18 which establish the foundation for the evidence that he's giving. So I

19 don't want to hear it from you. I want to hear it from the witness.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I did ask the witness what was

21 Racak according to the knowledge acquired by his Verification Mission in

22 Kosovo and other information he obtained.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let me ask the witness. Let me ask the

24 witness.

25 Do you know anything about what happened in Racak?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes or no.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: How did you come by this information?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I obtained this information from the

6 Russian embassy, from the observers from Russia to the Kosovo Verification

7 Mission, and the substance of that information was that, firstly, the

8 official conclusion of Mr. Walker was --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Stop. Stop. Did you speak with these observers?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I spoke to the observers, and

11 I can name names among the leaders of the Russian observers. I spoke with

12 them two or three, maybe, days after we got the information.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were these observers present at Racak?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We simply had doubts about the

15 conclusions of Mr. Walker.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just answer the question. I want to find out if

17 the observers to whom you spoke were present at Racak during this event.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. They were not allowed into

19 Racak.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Then how would they have gotten the information?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They acquired information by

22 analysing combat activities in the area. And later on, we used

23 information from independent forensic experts from Finland, as well as the

24 local population who did not see police raids aimed at arresting large

25 numbers of people and did not testify that they were rallied, rounded up

1 into one location in order to be executed. We did not have such

2 testimony, and that's why we have doubts about Walker's conclusions.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, continue.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. So, according to the assessments you reached, what did Racak

6 represent?

7 A. We have information to the effect that armed skirmishes and combat

8 took place there between terrorist organisations and police and army units

9 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We have evidence and testimony to

10 that effect. There is, however, no evidence that they conducted arrests

11 specially. That's why we were very surprised, indeed, by the conclusions

12 of Mr. Walker, which were not based on thorough investigation and which

13 did not involve Russian expertise or participation.

14 Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. When the war operations began, from

15 that time on, what do you know about the cooperation between NATO and the

16 KLA?

17 A. We concluded that they were allies. As a result of NATO

18 airstrikes, the KLA activities intensified at the time, and coordinated

19 work was conducted. Terrorist operations were better organised and

20 intensified in the territory of the province.

21 Some representatives of the KLA acted together and in collusion

22 with intelligence units of NATO deployed in Macedonia. So there was

23 coordination and intensification of activities under the cover of

24 airstrikes and a build-up of intelligence-gathering activity. All that

25 confirmed the existence of an alliance between NATO and the KLA. The

1 international contacts between political representatives of the KLA with

2 the high officials of NATO confirmed this.

3 Q. I will now put to you a series of questions about your own

4 knowledge regarding the movements of population. I will read to you from

5 para 104 of this document that indicts me. It says that on the 24th of

6 March, 1999 - that's para 104 - NATO began its airstrikes. And then later

7 on, it says: "After the beginning of airstrikes, the forces of the FRY

8 and Serbia started their wide-scale and systematic campaign and forcibly

9 expelled hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo."

10 Thus a campaign started. You described a moment ago that in

11 collusion with NATO, KLA attacked our army and the police, whereas here it

12 is alleged that our forces stepped up the campaign to expel the civilian

13 population.

14 A. I hereby confirm that no information to the effect that the armed

15 forces or the police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia conducted

16 actions to expel civilian population was available. I can confirm that I

17 had discussions with Albanians who had left Kosovo at the time of the

18 bombing, including some meetings that I had here three days ago with

19 representatives of the Albanian diaspora who confirmed that bombing marked

20 the beginning of panic among the population, including various ethnic

21 groups, and everybody suddenly wished to leave the area where the war was

22 being waged.

23 In Brussels, the representative of Russia confirmed that by May

24 1999, the number of refugees who had fled to Macedonia had doubled. So

25 the main source and the main cause of the exodus of refugees, which

1 increased relative to the previous period by three times, according to our

2 information and the information available to the High Commissioner for

3 Refugees, it reached 600.000. There was also the threat of the ground

4 operation, and people were leaving the area of war operations. That was

5 the main reason for the mass flow of refugees.

6 And I repeat that under the threat of the ground operation and the

7 airstrikes, the armed forces of Yugoslavia was conducting its own defence,

8 and that explains the movement of their armed units and troops.

9 Q. Does that mean that people were naturally anxious to leave the

10 risk zones? I suppose that you have a plausible explanation.

11 A. Yes. That was the main reason. And let me add that people were

12 leaving that place not only to go to foreign countries. They also fled to

13 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Among refugees, there were Serbs,

14 Albanians, Gypsies, both Muslims and Catholics. It was a natural reaction

15 of people who were looking for cover. And they went to Montenegro,

16 Vojvodina, Sandzak and, of course, Serbia.

17 Q. You said a moment ago something about the time line. Does it mean

18 that the exodus of refugees began precisely at the time when NATO began

19 its airstrikes on Yugoslavia and primarily on Kosovo?

20 A. Yes. Yes, I confirm that.

21 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... I'm not taking the

22 point every time, but this is a leading question and shouldn't have been

23 asked.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Rephrase the question, Mr. Milosevic. And before

25 you rephrase it, Mr. Milosevic, here again you're dealing with an

1 important point, and your case will obviously be strengthened considerably

2 if you bring evidence which is more direct than this witness is able to

3 give on this point.

4 If, for example, you're able to bring evidence from any of the

5 persons who lived in the risk areas to say why it was that they fled, I

6 mean that would considerably boost your case.

7 So rephrase the question so it is not leading.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. You heard the term "humanitarian catastrophe," Mr. Ivasov, did

10 you?

11 A. Yes, Mr. President.

12 Q. What caused this phenomenon that was later named "humanitarian

13 catastrophe"? What was the cause?

14 A. Primarily it was the threat to the lives of all the civilians

15 there. Second, it was the threat to the entire system of public utilities

16 and infrastructure. And third, it was the absence of any normal supply of

17 food and basic necessities. We also had information that members of the

18 KLA army, even before the bombing, and especially after the bombing

19 started, took their large families away from the province. And I can

20 quote the High Commissioner of the UN for Refugees who said that in June

21 1998, there was only 10 to 12.000 refugees. In March 1999, there were

22 200.000. And until the end of the bombings, the number reached 600.000.

23 So the previous conflict and clashes in the province did not cause such a

24 mass flow of refugees as the airstrikes did.

25 Speaking of the humanitarian catastrophe, the entire population,

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1 not only of Kosovo and Yugoslavia but of the neighbouring countries as

2 well, feel today that there is a real humanitarian catastrophe. Seventy

3 per cent of Kosovo's population are unemployed, 30 per cent are starving,

4 and so on and so forth. Life support systems are not working.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was asking what is the relevance of the

6 evidence that there is a humanitarian catastrophe today. That's not the

7 issue. Move on to something else. In any event, I think you have

8 answered the question.

9 Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. If I understood you correctly, this affliction and this exodus of

12 refugees was caused by the NATO aggression. Am I right in saying that

13 that was the conclusion you made in Russia?

14 A. Yes, I confirm that. Yes. That is the official stance of the

15 Russian government and my personal conviction.

16 Q. General Ivasov, since you had very frequent contacts indeed with

17 the top echelons of the Yugoslavia military leadership, do you have any

18 information to the effect that any orders were planned or given to

19 endanger the lives of peaceful citizens in Kosovo and Metohija regarding

20 deportation, forcible transfer, or anything like that?

21 A. No, I have no such information. I have seen many orders, indeed,

22 that were issued by the Yugoslav armed forces. Moreover, the Russian side

23 exerted pressure both on the diplomatic and the military levels to prevent

24 the Yugoslav forces from overstepping the measures of necessary security.

25 And the Yugoslav officials continuously showed us their documents,

1 including orders given to the Pristina Corps. Such orders included points

2 saying that prior to attacks against terrorists, civilian population

3 should be warned of impending combat activities. And these orders were in

4 effect even during the airstrikes against Yugoslavia. And particularly

5 important to the mass exodus of refugees were NATO strikes on civilian

6 targets, including the columns of refugees.

7 Q. Did you perhaps have information to the effect that the military

8 leadership and I personally ordered that every crime committed there

9 should be investigated and that every perpetrator should be brought to

10 justice?

11 A. General Ojdanic, Chief of the General Staff, submitted to our

12 military leaders, including myself, orders to investigate the activities

13 of certain servicemen who went beyond the necessary measures of security

14 and overreacted emotionally in their activities against terrorists. We

15 are aware of such measures, and we know that some servicemen were

16 convicted.

17 During meetings with President Milosevic, I heard as Marshal

18 Sergeyev and Prime Minister Primakov heard, terms like impermissibility of

19 rising ethnic tensions. We constantly heard words to the effect that it

20 was necessary to restore peace to Kosovo, and we heard nothing that would

21 discredit Kosovo Albanians as such or any other ethnic group. The

22 approach to all ethnic communities was equal.

23 JUDGE KWON: General, were you aware of the paramilitaries that

24 had been operative during that time? Were they under control of the

25 military leadership or not?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For the most part, I knew the

2 military leadership in the defence ministry and the General Staff. I can

3 name Mr. Ojdanic, Perisic, Galic and others, and I knew corps commanders.

4 Of course, I saw junior officers, but I didn't know them closely.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You haven't answered the question that the --

6 JUDGE KWON: My question is about the paramilitaries.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. We were aware of

8 that, and we monitored the activities of such leaders as Hashim Thaci and

9 others. Maybe there is -- maybe we are at cross-purposes here, I'm not

10 sure.

11 JUDGE KWON: Are you also aware of the paramilitaries on the Serb

12 side?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand you, Your Honour, now.

14 We checked out this information, and it was not confirmed. There were

15 occasional sporadic attempts of the Serb inhabitants in Kosovo to organise

16 self-defence units, but this was not kindly looked upon by the military

17 command, and there was no organised establishment of such paramilitary

18 structures. There were attempts, rather, of the local population to

19 protect themselves from terrorist acts and violence, but there were no

20 major large paramilitary structures, and I don't know anything of their

21 leaders, if any.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.

23 Mr. Milosevic, proceed, please.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General Ivasov, did you have any information about the crimes

1 committed by the KLA against peaceful citizens, not only non-Albanians but

2 Albanians as well?

3 A. Yes, we had such information. And I even have some numbers of

4 casualties on various sides. We received such numbers both from NATO and

5 from the leadership of Yugoslavia. Terrorist acts took a toll on

6 Albanians, both Catholics and Muslims, the Romas, and other ethnic

7 communities, but certainly there were more casualties among the Serbs,

8 including policemen and troops. The number of their casualties exceeded

9 all others.

10 Q. And do you know anything about the organised activity of the KLA

11 aimed at expelling civilians from Kosovo, or more specifically, sending

12 them to Macedonia and Albania?

13 A. Yes, I know about that. It was precisely the KLA that organised

14 two itineraries, two routes for refugees across the border to Macedonia.

15 That was one route, and another was to Albania. In addition to that, they

16 spread information to the effect that in European countries, refugees have

17 a good life, and that only helped the mass exodus.

18 I know that even Albanian Catholics who refused to join the KLA

19 became victims of violence or were forced to flee. We also have evidence

20 that after forced recruitment of certain men into KLA units to prevent

21 their desertion, their families were taken hostage.

22 Q. And do you know anything about civilians being used as live

23 shields in various activities in Kosovo?

24 A. Yes. We received such information from our Serb colleagues, from

25 the military attache at our embassy in Belgrade, and also from our

1 intelligence services. This issue was also discussed by the

2 representatives of the Yugoslav army at our joint meetings. They showed

3 us convincing documents confirming that during combat operations

4 terrorists would go into populated areas and use the local inhabitants as

5 shields. And even in their military bases they held citizens as human

6 shields. I can confirm that, yes.

7 Q. General Ivasov, do you know that there were orders issued both to

8 the army and police not to shoot even at the KLA if there was any danger

9 that civilians would be injured?

10 A. Yes. I was shown such orders at the General Staff of the Yugoslav

11 armed forces. Yes, I was shown such orders. And there was even a

12 provision in those orders that civilian population ought to be warned

13 about potential military activities. There were such orders, and this was

14 reiterated by President Milosevic during various meetings. They wanted to

15 ensure that the number of victims would be reduced to the minimum during

16 action against terrorist organisation.

17 Q. A specific question pertaining to you, General, and your work. On

18 the 22nd of December, 1998, if my information is correct, you gave a

19 statement concerning the policy that was implemented against Yugoslavia.

20 So that was on the 22nd of December, 1998. If I'm wrong, then I will not

21 press this issue. You gave a statement on behalf of the Russian military

22 leadership, top leadership.

23 A. Yes, there was such a statement. I was authorised to give an

24 official statement on behalf of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian

25 Federation. Previously I stated that by December 1998, Russian military

1 leadership had the full plan of the preparation and implementation of the

2 aggression against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the analysis

3 and consultations within the Ministry of Defence of Russia, we came to

4 conclusion that the aggression will take place and also what were the

5 objectives of the aggression.

6 President Yeltsin was briefed on this conclusion, and pursuant to

7 orders from the Minister of Defence Marshal Sergeyev, I issued a

8 statement, a statement to the effect that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

9 would be broken apart, that the current regime in Yugoslavia would be

10 toppled, and that Kosovo would secede from Yugoslavia.

11 I also made a statement to the effect that after the aggression

12 NATO forces would enter the area and establish their military base there.

13 Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. Now a few words about the conference

14 in Rambouillet. You followed the conference in Rambouillet, didn't you?

15 After the first phase of the conference, did the Russian

16 Federation Ministry of Defence believe that there would be an aggression

17 carried out against Yugoslavia?

18 A. Yes. I have this information. On the one hand, we Russian

19 representatives believed that the international community in Europe would

20 prevent the escalation of the crisis and, therefore, proposed various

21 mechanisms in order to ensure that the conference in Rambouillet would

22 lead to a peaceful resolution. We were convinced that not all peaceful

23 mechanisms were used.

24 On the other hand, we also were against military operation,

25 because that threatened not only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but

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1 the entire system of international security. We believed that that would

2 lead to the destruction of the standards of international law and disrupt

3 the system of collective international security in Europe concerning which

4 we negotiated with various structures in Europe.

5 However, we also felt that military preparation for the aggression

6 was quite far gone. It was difficult to put an end to it. And although

7 there were many diplomats who believed that it was still possible to stop

8 it, we, the military, believed it was not possible to stop it any more

9 because all of the preparations were completed and the only remaining

10 thing that was needed was a pretext.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, next question.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. In one of your statements - if I'm wrong, please correct me -

14 mentioned humanitarian reasons as a smokescreen. What were the real

15 reasons for the NATO activity against Yugoslavia?

16 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... statements or

17 reference to them in some detail, it really isn't very satisfactory to

18 have the question posed in the way it's been posed, "You mentioned

19 humanitarian reasons as a smokescreen." Either the witness can remember

20 his speech or there will be a printed copy of it or some other record, or

21 questions shouldn't be asked like that.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. There is merit in that

23 objection. Does the witness have the statement? Do you have the

24 statement at hand?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't have it with me.

1 However, I do remember that. I can confirm the conclusions of the Russian

2 military leadership to the effect that the objectives for the NATO

3 operation against Yugoslavia were complemented by the following: During

4 NATO air raids, we were able to see that the entire territory of the

5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was turned into an exercise field for

6 testing new weapons.

7 In that territory, they tested more than 40 types of ammunition of

8 the US manufacture. The entire American military industry participated in

9 it, and I can give you some of the names of some of the types of

10 ammunitions used there.

11 Therefore, based on that, we concluded, on the 5th of May, 1999,

12 that Kosovo and the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was

13 used as a testing ground. New ammunition was used there, as well as such

14 ammunition as depleted uranium. So this is just another reason --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Please tell me, General Ivasov, whether at the time the organisers

18 of Rambouillet and NATO really wanted to ensure a political resolution and

19 protect innocent population, or were -- they simply wanted to provoke

20 Yugoslavia, to make Yugoslavia accept the deployment of NATO troops in

21 their territory?

22 A. Yes, I believe that that was a provocation. Should Your Honours

23 want me, I can give you the name of the Minister of a NATO country who in

24 February 1999 stated the following: He said that Mrs. Albright was

25 travelling to Rambouillet and, therefore, the likelihood of reaching an

1 agreement was very little. Therefore, even within NATO, there was a

2 belief that Rambouillet would not be likely to lead to a political

3 solution.

4 That same minister of defence stated that even should one side

5 agree to the terms of the US document, the other side would refuse to

6 agree because that was an ultimatum. And therefore, failure to reach an

7 agreement would be a reason for beginning the war.

8 Q. I have an impression that there is a problem with interpretation,

9 but I have a feeling that General Ivasov did not hear my question.

10 My question was whether NATO truly intended to protect innocent

11 Albanian population, as they claimed, or their purpose was to force

12 Yugoslavia to allow the entry and deployment of NATO forces in its

13 territory.

14 A. Yes, I can confirm that there was such objective to deploy NATO

15 troops in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This was

16 contained both in requests given by Mr. Holbrooke, that was also contained

17 in statements of Mr. Solana and General Clark, and that same objective was

18 present in Rambouillet; to disrupt negotiations, to blame the Serbian side

19 for everything, and to find a pretext for commencement of operation which

20 had been prepared in advance. The planes were standing ready at their

21 airports.

22 Q. General Ivasov, do you believe that during NATO aggression against

23 Yugoslavia the armed forces of Yugoslavia overstepped the bounds of

24 necessary defence?

25 A. No.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a legal question for the Chamber. Ask

2 another question.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this witness is

4 Colonel General, who is very familiar with the action of Yugoslav army

5 during the war. Therefore, he is fully competent to evaluate whether the

6 conduct of Yugoslav army overstepped the bounds of necessary defence

7 during aggression. I don't know who would be more competent to answer

8 this question, more competent than General Ivasov.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Necessity is one of the elements which go to

10 self-defence, and that's an issue which the Chamber will have to address.

11 What you could do is ask the witness questions which relate to factual

12 situations. But I won't allow a question like that, which is an issue

13 ultimately for the Chamber.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will reformulate my

15 question.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. What were the actions of the Yugoslav army at the time?

18 A. I believe that the actions of Yugoslav army were the way they had

19 to be. They carried out manoeuvres, changed their structuring in order to

20 respond both to airstrikes and ground aggression. Therefore, there could

21 have been some faults in organisation of the troops. However, the army

22 and the state are duty-bound to act in precisely that manner in order to

23 defend their state.

24 Q. Well, this might be interpreted as a leading question, so I will

25 turn to the following. General Ivasov, what do you know and what have you

1 heard about the concept of Greater Serbia?

2 A. Yes, Mr. President. I only heard about that from the mass media

3 of some Western countries. This issue was never heard by me in my

4 contacts with the top leadership and with the Ministry of Defence of

5 Yugoslavia. I had no evidence of any such topic being ever discussed

6 there.

7 In my contacts with NATO, that question was never raised by NATO.

8 We discussed the issue of Greater Albania. However, in our contacts with

9 NATO, we also were not able to agree on the fact that that was a realistic

10 concept, Greater Albania. Our NATO colleagues always assured us that that

11 was the concept that existed only in the heads of certain radical

12 individuals. My Russian colleagues also never received such information

13 and, therefore, I also cannot confirm that such a project ever existed.

14 Q. General Ivasov, this will be my last question. As you've said

15 yourself, you had seven meetings with me.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Please tell me, on the basis of all those meetings, can you tell

18 us, what was I mostly committed to? What was my policy? What was the

19 policy of Yugoslavia throughout that time when the meetings were held?

20 What was the main issue that you can tell us about now? Both positive

21 issues and negative ones.

22 A. Yes. I can confirm that we had seven meetings, and as I pointed

23 out, these meetings were not brief but, rather, lasted from three to six

24 hours, each of them. Therefore, we had ample opportunity to discuss

25 various aspects.

1 I can confirm that there was no aggressive sentiment in relation

2 to violating the rights of Albanians or oppressing them. There was no

3 discussion of repression or limiting the rights of Albanian population.

4 To the contrary. President Milosevic discussed his plans.

5 Perhaps his plans were somewhat idealistic, but they referred to

6 establishing peace in the region. These plans also entailed the

7 development in that region. He quoted documents which were adopted

8 concerning the education in the area where priority was given to the

9 education of Albanians. He spoke about the rights of Albanians to a

10 certain level of autonomy, and also said that all of these issues need to

11 be discussed in order to avoid any misunderstandings. He also spoke at

12 every meeting that the main objective of the government, at the helm of

13 which he was, was to prevent any violence in the area and to encourage

14 development.

15 He put limits on the military in their fight with terrorist

16 organisations. When NATO aggression against Yugoslavia commenced, a group

17 of Russian military experts who were not in active service at the time --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I stopped you, General. I think you have

19 answered -- you have answered the question.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the general started

21 speaking about a military operation.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just have one sentence. May I?

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We -- the Russian military proposed

25 to expand to repel the aggression in the territory of other states where

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1 NATO forces were deployed. For example, Macedonia. This is the right of

2 every state. President Milosevic refused to take such action which would

3 spread the combat to other states such as Macedonia.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivasov --

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I did say that that

8 was my last question but that was a mistake and I wish to put another

9 factual question just to clarify an event to ensure that we can know

10 enough about this event. I am following the translation. This is why I'm

11 pausing.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General Ivasov, you were a member of the delegation which came to

14 Yugoslavia together with Chernomyrdin when, together with Atasari on

15 behalf of the G8 group, he proposed the term of armistice?

16 A. Yes, that's right. I was a member of the delegation with the

17 special representative of the Russian president, the objective of which

18 was to find a peaceful solution.

19 Q. As you probably remember, that was a proposal of G8 guaranteeing

20 Yugoslavia sovereignty and territorial integrity --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I am going to have to stop. I'm told that we are

22 delaying the start of the next hearing in this courtroom. That's not

23 proper.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just need one more minute to

25 conclude.

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, Mr. Milosevic. You will have it tomorrow

2 morning.

3 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, can I make one point: Although it's

4 obviously likely that cross-examination will consume tomorrow morning, it

5 must be at least possible that we will reach the position of it being

6 preferable to ask the witness to go away and come back on a later date,

7 maybe with documents, and with that in mind, I would invite the accused to

8 keep his other witness ready so that he can make the best use of his time,

9 because, of course, if I land up -- if - I hope not - but if I land up

10 applying to adjourn the cross-examination of this witness, it will be on

11 the grounds that he was brought here without adequate documents to be

12 cross-examined and therefore it would be the accused's responsibility and

13 the whole day would therefore count against his allocation.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you make an application of that kind, we will

15 have to consider it.

16 We should not delay. We are going to adjourn.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have a witness for tomorrow?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, yes, we have a witness

20 for tomorrow, but as I understand, General Ivasov will continue giving

21 evidence tomorrow.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are going to adjourn until 9.00 tomorrow

23 morning.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.56 p.m.,

25 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day of

1 November, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.

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